UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-4252

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

LEE RONDELL RICHARDSON, a/k/a Lee Rondell Jones, a/k/a 

Porky,

Defendant - Appellant.

No. 14-4267

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

LEE RONDELL JONES,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Virginia, at Newport News. Henry Coke Morgan, Jr.,

Senior District Judge. (4:13-cr-00071-HCM-LRL-1; 4:01-cr-00074-

HCM-1)

Submitted: October 21, 2014 Decided: October 23, 2014

Before SHEDD, DUNCAN, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.
2

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Michael S. Nachmanoff, Federal Public Defender, Patrick L. 

Bryant, Appellate Attorney, Larry M. Dash, Assistant Federal 

Public Defender, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant. Robert 

Edward Bradenham, II, Assistant United States Attorney, Newport 

News, Virginia, Kelly Kathleen Pearson, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT 

OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
3

PER CURIAM:

In these consolidated appeals, Lee Rondell Richardson, 

a/k/a/ Lee Rondell Jones,1 appeals his jury conviction and 

ninety-six-month sentence for one count of being a felon in 

possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 

924(a)(2) (2012), as well as the revocation of his supervised 

release and twenty-four-month term of imprisonment. Appellate 

counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 

U.S. 738 (1967), in each appeal. In the felon-in-possession 

case, counsel questions whether there was sufficient evidence to 

prove Richardson constructively possessed the firearm. In the 

supervised release revocation case, counsel questions whether 

the district court abused its discretion in running the 

supervised release revocation sentence consecutive to the felonin-possession sentence. Counsel concludes, however, that there 

are no meritorious issues in either appeal. Richardson filed a 

pro se supplemental brief raising several challenges, including 

questioning the sufficiency of the evidence for his felon-inpossession conviction. Finding no error, we affirm.

We review the denial of a Fed. R. Crim. P. 29 motion 

de novo. See United States v. Cloud, 680 F.3d 396, 403 (4th 

 1 Although the Appellant’s names in these appeals are 

different, both refer to the same individual, to whom we refer 

as “Richardson.”
4

Cir. 2012). When a Rule 29 motion was based on a claim of 

insufficient evidence, the jury’s verdict must be sustained “if 

there is substantial evidence, taking the view most favorable to 

the Government, to support it.” United States v. Abu Ali, 528 

F.3d 210, 244 (4th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). Substantial evidence is “evidence that a reasonable 

finder of fact could accept as adequate and sufficient to 

support a conclusion of a defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable 

doubt.” United States v. King, 628 F.3d 693, 700 (4th Cir. 

2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

In resolving issues of substantial evidence, this

court does not reweigh the evidence or reassess the factfinder’s 

determination of witness credibility, and it must assume that 

the jury resolved all contradictions in testimony in favor of 

the Government. See United States v. Roe, 606 F.3d 180, 186 

(4th Cir. 2010). Thus, a defendant challenging the sufficiency 

of the evidence faces a heavy burden. See United States v. 

Beidler, 110 F.3d 1064, 1067 (4th Cir. 1997). To establish a 

§ 922(g)(1) violation, the Government was required to prove 

that: (i) Richardson was a convicted felon at the time of the 

offense; (ii) he voluntarily and intentionally possessed a 

firearm; and (iii) the firearm traveled in interstate commerce 

at some point. United States v. Gallimore, 247 F.3d 134, 136 

(4th Cir. 2001). We have reviewed the record and have 
5

considered Richardson’s arguments and conclude that the 

Government produced sufficient evidence to support the jury’s 

conviction. Accordingly, we affirm Richardson’s conviction. 

We also find no error in the district court decision 

to reject Richardson’s request that his revocation sentence run 

at least partially concurrent to his felon-in-possession 

sentence. Sentences for breaches of supervised release are 

meant to sanction the abuse of the court’s trust inherent in 

those violations, and not to punish the underlying offense 

conduct. Therefore, these sentences are intended to run 

consecutively to other sentences. Thus, “[a]ny term of 

imprisonment imposed upon the revocation of probation or 

supervised release shall be ordered to be served consecutively 

to any sentence of imprisonment that the defendant is serving, 

whether or not the sentence of imprisonment being served 

resulted from the conduct that is the basis of the revocation of 

probation or supervised release.” U.S. Sentencing Guidelines 

Manual § 7B1.3(f) (2013). Accordingly, it was not error for the 

district court to run Richardson’s supervised release revocation 

sentence consecutive to his felon-in-possession sentence. 
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In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record 

in these cases and have found no meritorious issues for appeal.2

We therefore affirm the judgment of the district court as to the 

felon-in-possession conviction and sentence in Appeal No. 14-

4252, and affirm the judgment revoking supervised release and 

imposing a twenty-four-month consecutive sentence in Appeal No. 

14-4267. This court requires that counsel inform Richardson, in 

writing, of the right to petition the Supreme Court of the 

United States for further review. If Richardson requests that a 

petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition 

would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for 

leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must 

state that a copy thereof was served on Richardson. We dispense 

with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are 

adequately presented in the materials before this court and 

argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

 2 We have considered the arguments raised by Richardson in 

his pro se supplemental brief and find them to be without merit.