Analysis of Severe

Railway Accidents Involving

Long Duration Fires

Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards 

NUREG/CR-7034
Analysis of Severe

Railway Accidents Involving

Long Duration Fires

Prepared by:

G. Adams, T. Mintz, M. Necsoiu, J. Mancillas

Center for Nuclear Waste Regulatory Analyses 

6220 Culebra Road

San Antonio, TX 78228

Manuscript Completed: November 2010 

Date Published: February 2011 

C. Bajwa, NRC Project Manager

NRC Job Code J5639

Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards

NUREG/CR-7034 
iii 

ABSTRACT 

As a regulatory authority for transportation of radioactive materials, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission (NRC) ensures that packages designed to transport spent nuclear fuel (SNF) 

meet current regulations. 10 CFR Part 71 provides the regulatory requirements for the 

certification of transportation packages for SNF and high-level radioactive waste. SNF 

transportation packages are expected to be designed to endure a fully engulfing fire, as 

prescribed in 10 CFR Part 71, Section 73. The purpose of the study described in this report 

was to support NRC in determining the different types and frequency of railway accidents 

involving severe, long duration fires that could impact rail transport of SNF. Train accident data 

were examined from both the Federal Railroad Administration and Department of 

Transportation—Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration databases. This study 

focused on accidents where hazardous material was released from multiple train cars. From 

this study, the frequency of occurrence of a severe fire was estimated at 6.2 × 10−4

 accidents 

per million freight train-km [1 × 10−3

 accidents per million freight train-mi]. None of the 

accidents examined involved a reported release of radioactive material exceeding the limits set 

in 10 CFR Part 71. In addition to calculating the frequency, the trends associated with severe 

fire accidents were determined. In general, severe fires are characterized by derailments in 

which thousands of gallons of flammable liquid or gas are released. By limiting the SNF 

package transport to trains that are not also carrying flammable liquid or gas (i.e., to dedicated 

trains), the likelihood of an SNF transportation package being exposed to a long duration fire 

would likely be further reduced. 
v 

CONTENTS 

Section Page

ABSTRACT................................................................................................................................ iii 

FIGURES................................................................................................................................... vi 

TABLES.................................................................................................................................... vii 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ...........................................................................................................ix

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS............................................................................................................. xi 

ACRONYMS/ABBREVIATIONS............................................................................................... xiii

1 INTRODUCTION................................................................................................................1-1 

1.1 Historical Review of Railway Accident Data...............................................................1-1 

1.2 Objective ...................................................................................................................1-4

1.3 Scope and Organization of the Report.......................................................................1-4

2 DATA ANALYSIS...............................................................................................................2-1 

2.1 Data Sources.............................................................................................................2-1 

 2.1.1 Federal Railroad Administration Database.....................................................2-2 

 2.1.2 Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration Database ...............2-2 

2.2 Data Screening..........................................................................................................2-2 

2.3 Overall Frequency of Railway Accidents....................................................................2-3 

2.4 Data Classification for Multiple-Car Hazardous Material Release Accidents ..............2-7 

 2.4.1 Number of Cars Releasing HAZMAT ........................................................... 2-10

 2.4.2 HAZMAT Class ............................................................................................ 2-11

 2.4.3 Type of Accident .......................................................................................... 2-12

 2.4.4 Yard, Industry, and Siding Accidents............................................................ 2-12

 2.4.5 Track Class.................................................................................................. 2-13

 2.4.6 Train Speed ................................................................................................. 2-16

3 IDENTIFICATION OF SEVERE FIRE EVENTS .................................................................3-1 

3.1 Railway Accidents Involved in Potential Severe Fires................................................3-2 

3.2 Brief Description of Railway Accidents.......................................................................3-4

 3.2.1 Accidents With No Severe Fire ......................................................................3-4

 3.2.2 Accidents With Widespread Railcar Severe Fires ..........................................3-6 

 3.2.3 Accidents Involving Local Severe Fires..........................................................3-9 

 3.2.4 Other Noteworthy Events ............................................................................. 3-18

3.3 Frequency of Severe Railway Accidents.................................................................. 3-20

3.4 Severe Fire Accident Parameter Trends.................................................................. 3-20

 3.4.1 Widespread Severe Fire Accidents .............................................................. 3-21

 3.4.2 Local Severe Fire Accidents......................................................................... 3-22

 3.4.3 Summary of Severe Fire Accident Parameter Trends .................................. 3-23

4 CONCLUSIONS.................................................................................................................4-1 

5 REFERENCES...................................................................................................................5-1 

APPENDIX A—ACCIDENTS OCCURRING ON THE MAIN LINE........................................... A-1 

APPENDIX B—ACCIDENTS OCCURRING OFF THE MAIN LINE......................................... B-1 
vi

FIGURES 

Figure Page

2-1 Data Analysis for Single-Car and Multiple-Car HAZMAT Release Accidents .............. 2-4

2-2 Frequency of Railway Accidents From 1975 to 2008 .................................................. 2-6 

2-3 Multiple-Car HAZMAT Release Accidents From 1997 to 2008.................................... 2-7 

2-4 Number of Multiple-Car HAZMAT Release Accidents and Multiple-Car HAZMAT

Release Accidents Resulting in a Fire by Year ........................................................... 2-8 

2-5 Number of Cars Releasing HAZMAT in Multiple-Car HAZMAT Release Accidents

on the Main Line From 1997 to 2008 ........................................................................ 2-10

2-6 Number of HAZMAT Release Accidents From 1997 to 2008 That Occurred on

 the Main Line Showing Four of the HAZMAT Classes Involved ................................ 2-11

2-7 Summary of HAZMAT Release Accidents From 1997 to 2008 That Occurred Off 

 the Main Line............................................................................................................ 2-12 

2-8 Number of Multiple-Car HAZMAT Release Accidents From 1997 to 2008 That 

Occurred on the Main Line Separated by Track Class .............................................. 2-13 

2-9 Average Number of Cars Derailed in Multiple-Car HAZMAT Release Accidents

 From 1997 to 2008 That Occurred on the Main Line Separated by Track Class ....... 2-14

2-10 Average Number of HAZMAT Cars Releasing in Multiple-Car HAZMAT Release

Accidents From 1997 to 2008 That Occurred on the Main Line Separated

 by Track Class.......................................................................................................... 2-15

2-11 Number of Multiple-Car HAZMAT Release Accidents From 1997 to 2008 That

Occurred on the Main Line Separated by Speed ...................................................... 2-16 

2-12 Average Number of Cars Derailed in Multiple-Car HAZMAT Release Accidents

 From 1997 to 2008 That Occurred on the Main Line Separated by Speed................ 2-17 

2-13 Car Having Multiple Platforms Carrying Containers Stacked Two High..................... 2-17 

2-14 Average Number of HAZMAT Cars Releasing in Multiple-Car HAZMAT

Release Accidents From 1997 to 2008 That Occurred on the Main Line 

Separated by Speed................................................................................................. 2-18 

3-1 Diagram of Railway Accident Near New Florence, Pennsylvania................................ 3-5

3-2 Photograph of Derailment, New Brighton, Pennsylvania, on

October 20, 2006........................................................................................................ 3-7 

3-3 Train Derailment Near Eunice, Louisiana, on May 27, 2000 ....................................... 3-8 

3-4 Diagram of the Derailment Near Eunice, Louisiana, on May 27, 2000 ........................ 3-9 

3-5 Photograph of Derailment Near Painesville, Ohio, on October 10, 2007................... 3-10

3-6 Photograph of Derailment Near Oneida, New York, March 12, 2007 ........................ 3-11

3-7 Photograph of Brooks, Kentucky, on January 16, 2007. ........................................... 3-12 

3-8 Photograph of a Train Derailment in Brooks, Kentucky, on January 16, 2007........... 3-13

3-9 Photograph of the Anding, Mississippi, Train Collision and Derailment..................... 3-14

3-10 Photograph of the Derailment of a Canadian National Freight Train in

Tamaroa, Illinois, on February 9, 2003...................................................................... 3-15

3-11 Photos from the Baltimore Tunnel Fire July 18, 2001................................................ 3-16

3-12 Diagram of Accident in East St. Louis, Illinois, Gateway Hump Yard ........................ 3-17

3-13 Aerial Photograph of the Train Derailment and Fire in Texarkana, Arkansas,

on October 15, 2005 ................................................................................................ 3-18
vii

TABLES 

Table Page

1-1 Comparison of Railway Accident Frequencies ............................................................ 1-3 

2-1 Summary of Railway Accidents From 1975 to 2008.................................................... 2-3 

2-2 Summary of Railway Accidents From 1997 to 2008.................................................... 2-4

2-3 Multiple-Car Release Accidents Resulting in a Fire..................................................... 2-9 

2-4 Maximum Speed for Freight Trains by Track Class .................................................. 2-14

3-1 Summary of Severe Railway Accidents From 1997 to 2008...................................... 3-20

3-2 Parameters for Accidents Involving Widespread Railcar Severe Fires...................... 3-21

3-3 Parameters for Accidents Involving Severe Fires (Derailments)................................ 3-22 
ix

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

As a regulatory authority for transportation of radioactive materials, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission (NRC) ensures that packages designed to transport radioactive material, including 

spent nuclear fuel (SNF), meet the regulations prescribed in 10 CFR Part 71. In 2003, the 

National Academy of Sciences (NAS) formed a committee to evaluate risks associated with 

transportation of SNF and high-level radioactive waste in the United States. The principal 

findings from this evaluation indicated that there are no technical barriers to safe transport. 

However, NAS recommended that NRC conduct additional analyses of very long duration fires 

that could exceed the duration of the hypothetical accident condition fire described in the current 

regulations. The purpose of the study described in this report was to support NRC in 

determining the different types and frequency of railway accidents involving severe, long 

duration fires that could potentially impact SNF rail transport. 

To perform this study, railway accidents from the past 34 years (i.e., 1997 to 2008) were 

analyzed to estimate the frequency of accidents involving hazardous material (HAZMAT) 

releases. The railway data were obtained from both the Federal Railroad Administration and 

the Department of Transportation—Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration 

databases. Based on this information, approximately 1,800 accidents involving the release of 

HAZMAT occurred in the past 34 years, resulting in a frequency of approximately 6.2 × 10−2

accidents per million freight train-km [1 × 10−1 accidents per million freight train-mi]; however, 

the number of accidents per year has been decreasing, so including all 34 years worth of data 

may lead to a higher accident frequency than is currently typical. Examining the data during the 

past 12 years, the frequency is about 60 percent of the 34 years of data at 3.7 × 10−2 accidents 

per million freight train-km [6 × 10−2 accidents per million freight train-mi].

Most of the report focuses on the review of multiple-car HAZMAT releases because these types 

of accidents would most likely result in an SNF package being exposed to a fire. The frequency 

of multiple-car HAZMAT releases resulting in a fire is 1.9 × 10−3 accidents per million freight 

train-km [3 × 10−3 accidents per million freight train-mi]. In addition, railway accidents for the 

past 12 years were analyzed in more detail to identify those accidents involving a severe fire 

and to estimate the accident frequency for a severe fire. 

During the last 12 years, 20 railway accidents were identified as having a fire. Out of these 

20 fire accidents, only 9 were determined to be severe. The identification of a severe fire was 

based on (i) the fire being able to fully engulf a railcar for an extended period of time and (ii) the 

source of fuel for the engulfing fire being derived from another railcar. Using these two criteria, 

the frequency of a severe fire was calculated as 6.2 × 10−4 accidents per million freight train-km 

[1 × 10−3 accidents per million freight train-mi]. In addition to calculating the frequency of severe 

fires, the parameters associated with severe fires were examined. National Transportation 

Safety Board reports detailed the accidents involving severe fires. Based on this information, 

severe fires were generally characterized by derailments in which HAZMAT was released from 

five or more cars. In addition, these HAZMAT releases typically involved the release of 

thousands of gallons of either flammable liquid or gas.

Based on the analysis of railway accident data, the frequency of severe fire accidents is very 

small, and therefore, the likelihood of an SNF package being transported on rail that could be 

affected in a severe fire is also very small. However, limiting the transport of SNF waste 

packages to dedicated trains that do not carry flammable liquids or gases would likely reduce 

this likelihood even more.
xi

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 

This report was prepared to document work performed by the Center for Nuclear Waste 

Regulatory Analyses (CNWRA®) for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) under 

Contract No. NRC–02–07–006. The activities reported here were performed on behalf of the 

NRC Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, Division of Spent Fuel Storage and 

Transportation. The report is an independent product of CNWRA and does not necessarily 

reflect the views or regulatory position of NRC.

The authors would like to thank C. Bajwa and E. Easton for guidance during this study. 

In addition, the authors would like to thank A. Ghosh for technical review, S. Mohanty for 

programmatic review, and L. Mulverhill for editorial review. The authors also appreciate 

A. Ramos and L. Neill for providing word processing support in preparation of this document.

QUALITY OF DATA, ANALYSES, AND CODE DEVELOPMENT 

DATA: All CNWRA-generated data contained in this report meet quality assurance 

requirements described in the Geosciences and Engineering Division Quality Assurance 

Manual. Data used in this report are derived from publicly available sources. Each data source 

is cited in this report and should be consulted for determining the level of quality of those 

cited data. Images used in this report that are from the National Transportation Safety Board 

website are in accordance with National Transportation Safety Board policies provided at 

www.ntsb.gov/abt_NTSB/policies.htm. In addition, copyright permissions were obtained for the 

images included in Figures 3-6, 3-7, and 3-11, and attribution was added to the captions of 

these figures. 

ANALYSES AND CODES: Microsoft® Office Excel® 2003 was used to organize the data 

and macros were written within this software to analyze the data.

REFERENCE 

Microsoft. “Microsoft Office Excel 2003.” Redmond, Washington: Microsoft Corporation. 2003. 
xiii

ACRONYMS/ABBREVIATIONS 

ANL Argonne National Laboratory

AAR Association of American Railroads

CNWRA Center for Nuclear Waste Regulatory Analyses

DOT Department of Transportation

EPRI Electric Power Research Institute

FRA Federal Railroad Administration

HAZMAT Hazardous Material

HLW High-Level Waste

LPG Liquefied Petroleum Gas

NAS National Academy of Sciences

NTSB National Transportation Safety Board

PHMSA Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration

RAB Railroad Accident Brief

SFST Spent Fuel Storage and Transportation

SNF Spent Nuclear Fuel

DOE U.S. Department of Energy

NRC U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
1-1 

1 INTRODUCTION 

1.1 Historical Review of Railway Accident Data

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) currently regulates the packaging and 

transportation of high-level radioactive materials under 10 CFR Part 71. Under these 

regulations, a spent nuclear fuel (SNF) transportation package must be designed to withstand a 

sequence of hypothetical accident conditions, including drop, crush (in limited cases), and 

puncture, followed by an engulfing fire and immersion in water. The current NRC regulations in

10 CFR Part 71 state that an SNF transportation package must be designed to survive a fully 

engulfing fire with an average flame temperature of at least 800 °C [1,475 °F] for a period of 

30 minutes. If subjected to a severe fire, the transportation package must maintain 

containment, shielding, and criticality functions throughout and after the fire exposure.

In 2003, the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) formed a committee to review the safety of

transportation of SNF and HLW. The original purpose of this committee was to evaluate the 

risks and identify key current and future technical and societal concerns with the transportation 

of SNF and high-level radioactive waste in the United States. After the study began, the scope 

of the committee expanded to include the examination of procedures the U.S. Department of 

Energy (DOE) used for selecting routes for the transportation of DOE research reactor SNF. 

The review (National Academies Press, 2006) included but was not limited to examination of 

previous technical studies on package performance, transportation procedures, transportation 

risk, transportation corridors, and presentations during public meetings.

The principal finding from the NAS committee was that there were no fundamental technical 

barriers for the safe transport of SNF or high-level radioactive waste. However, the NAS 

committee indicated that there are social and institutional challenges that require resolution to

successfully implement a large quantity shipping program. In addition to this principal finding, 

the NAS committee indicated that the current international standards and U.S. regulations, at 

the time of writing the report, are adequate to ensure that the transportation package would 

provide adequate protection over various transportation conditions. However, the NAS 

committee did note that various technical reports indicated a very small number of severe 

accident conditions involving long duration fires could potentially compromise the containment 

integrity of the SNF package. The committee further recommended that NRC conduct 

additional analyses of very long duration fire scenarios that bound accident conditions expected 

to occur under realistic accidents. 

Based upon the NAS committee recommendation, the NRC has continued to evaluate accidents 

that involve severe, long duration fires. This includes the evaluation of the MacArthur Maze fire 

in April 2007 near the San Francisco-Oakland Bay Bridge in California and the Newhall Pass 

Tunnel fire that occurred in October 2007 north of Los Angeles, California. In addition to these 

two accident events, NRC had evaluated long duration fire events before the NAS committee’s 

report was published. These include the Baltimore (rail) tunnel fire that occurred in July 2001 

and the Caldecott Tunnel fire that happened in April 1982 near Oakland, California. Out of the 

four accidents, three were road accidents and one was a railway accident. The results of these 

accident analyses indicated that the peak temperatures in these fires could have exceeded the 

800 °C [1,475 °F] stipulated in 10 CFR Part 71; however, the regulatory temperature is an 

average temperature (not a peak) and the temperature of the fire is not the only important 

feature in understanding the implication of these events for SNF transportation. The likelihood 

that one of these severe accidents could occur in such a way that it might impact the 

transportation of SNF must also be taken into consideration.
1-2 

Various studies have reviewed the frequency of accidents involving SNF. NUREG–0170, “Final 

Environmental Statement on the Transportation of Radioactive Material by Air and Other 

Modes” (NRC, 1977), considered two factors in evaluating the impact of accidents involving 

vehicles carrying radioactive shipments: the frequency of an accident occurring and the 

consequence of this accident. This report examined the accident rates for aircraft, truck, rail, 

helicopter, and ship. For rail, fire severity was based upon impact velocity and fire duration at 

a temperature of 1,027 °C [1,880 °F]. The impact velocities ranged from 0 to 160 km/hr 

[0 to 100 mph] and were broken into 8 divisions of severity. The fire duration was separated 

into 1⁄2-hour divisions for a total of 2 hours (4 divisions), at an exposure temperature of 1,027 °C 

[1,880 °F]. At the time NRC (1977) was written, rail shipments of SNF were not expected to be 

shipped on the same car with other cargo, so the physical process of crushing an SNF package 

was not considered. Based upon the data Sandia National Laboratories developed, the overall 

frequency used was 0.93 × 10−6 accidents per railcar-km [1.5 × 10−6 accidents per railcar-mi] or 

4.05 × 10−5 accidents per train-km [6.51 × 10−5 accidents per train-mi]. This frequency was 

based on the assumption that the average train length was 70 cars and that on average, 10 cars 

would be involved in the accident. Sandia National Laboratories calculated the frequency of 

different impact speeds based upon examining 700 accidents and calculating the actual impact 

speeds in SLA–74–001, “Severities of Transportation Accidents, Volume IV–Train” (Larson, et 

al., 1975). Most of the speeds from this set of 700 accidents occurred at the lower speed range 

so that the frequencies were extrapolated to the higher speeds where no or little data existed. 

As such, the accident rates for high speed accidents contained a larger uncertainty and may 

have affected the overall accident frequency calculations. 

Additionally, NUREG/CR–4829, “Shipping Container Response to Severe Highway and Railway 

Accident Conditions” (Fischer, et al., 1988), evaluated the level of safety provided if a severe 

accident occurred during the shipment of SNF. The railway accident frequency that was 

calculated for SNF railway shipments was 7.5 × 10−6 accidents per train-km [1.21 × 10−5

accidents per train-mi]. This frequency was based on using the Federal Railroad Administration 

(FRA) database information spanning the time mainly between 1979 and 1982. However, for 

rail-highway crossing accidents, the dates examined included 1975 through 1982. In addition, 

the frequency of fire occurring from an accident was estimated as 1 percent of the accident 

frequency. Note that these frequency calculations are based on total FRA freight train data and 

not just data involving the transport of hazardous waste. Therefore, the additional safety 

precautions associated with the transport of hazardous waste were not taken into account in 

these calculations. This report assumed that more than 90 percent of the train mileage is 

attributed to freight trains so there should be no significant difference in applying these data to 

estimated accident rates, accident velocities, and fire frequencies.

NRC decided to reexamine the risks associated with the shipment of SNF in NUREG/CR–6672, 

“Reexamination of Spent Fuel Shipment Risk Estimates” (Sprung, et al., 2000). This report 

used the same information from NRC (1988) calculating the same frequency, 7.5 × 10−6

accidents per train-km [1.21 × 10−5 accidents per train-mi]. The frequency was again based 

upon the FRA reported information between 1975 and 1982.

In addition to the work NRC conducted to evaluate frequency of transport accidents involving an 

SNF package, many other industry studies have analyzed this concern. The Electric Power 

Research Institute (EPRI) evaluated the frequency of accidents involving railroad material. In 

“Criticality Risks During Transportation of Spent Nuclear Fuel” (Dykes, 2008), accident 

frequencies were evaluated using railway accident data from FRA. The EPRI report examined 

the railway data between January 2000 and May 2006 because (i) railway safety has improved 

since the 1970s, (ii) FRA reporting structures have changed and improved in the last few years, 

and (iii) this data range provides separate freight train and passenger train information. From 
1-3 

this information, the EPRI report calculated a frequency of 2.7 × 10−6 accidents per train-km 

[4.33 × 10−6 accidents per train-mi] using total railway data. However, the EPRI report then 

assumed that total railway data are not as appropriate as using freight train data alone and the 

accident frequency calculated dropped to 1.7 × 10−6 accidents per train-km [2.67 × 10−6

accidents per train-mi]. EPRI assumed that in accidents where a rail cask could be submerged 

in water, the train had to have been derailed. This reduced the accident frequency further to

1.4 × 10−6 derailment accidents per train-km [2.25 × 10−6 derailment accidents per train-mi]. 

In addition, DOE examined the risk associated with transport of SNF in DOE/EIS–0250, “Final 

Environmental Impact Statement for a Geologic Repository for the Disposal of Spent Nuclear 

Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste at Yucca Mountain, Nye County, Nevada” (DOE, 2002). 

DOE evaluated its railway freight accidents based upon ANL/ASD/TM–150, “State-Level 

Accident Rates of Surface Freight Transportation: A Reexamination” (Saricks and Tompkins, 

1999). The railroad accident rates were based on Association of American Railroads (AAR) 

state data from 1994, 1995, and 1996. From the data, the frequency was calculated as 

5.39 × 10−8 accidents per car-km [8.67 × 10−8 accidents per car-mi]. Assuming the average 

number of cars per train is 68, as in NRC (1977), this accident frequency would be 3.7 × 10−6

accidents per train-km [5.9 × 10−6 accidents per train-mi]. 

A comparison of these previous reports is shown in Table 1-1, which indicates that the earlier

studies had a much higher accident frequency per train mile than the later studies. This is likely 

a result of the changes in railway regulation that have increased the safety of train travel over 

the past 30 years. This information is further discussed in Chapter 2. Except for NRC (1977) 

and DOE (2002), the main source of information is FRA. As shown in Table 1-1, the accident 

frequency changes depending upon the timeframe examined with lower frequency in more 

recent years. 

Table 1-1. Comparison of Railway Accident Frequencies

Source Document Source of Data Reported Accident Frequency 

(Accidents/Train-Mi)*

NUREG–0170 (NRC, 1977)

Severity of Transportation 

Accidents, SLA-74-001 

1975

6.51 × 10−5

NUREG–4829 (Fischer, et al.,

1988) and

NUREG–6672 (Sprung, et al., 

2000)

FRA Rail Data

1975–1982 1.21 × 10−5

DOE/EIS–0250 (DOE, 2002) AAR State Data 

1994–1996 5.90 × 10−6

(Dykes, 2008) FRA Rail Data 2000–2006 4.33 × 10−6

*To convert to accidents/train-km, divide by 1.609.

NRC has conducted a preliminary investigation to examine historical railway accidents that 

would have potentially affected an SNF package in order to understand potential accident 

trends. This information was presented in NUREG/CR–6886, “Spent Fuel Transportation 

Package Response to Baltimore Tunnel Fire Scenario” (Adkins, et al., 2006). This document 

examined the fire characteristics and initiated a review of railway transportation accidents. 

Adkins, et al. (2006) reviewed the FRA data between 1975 and 2005 and noted that there were 

1,700 accidents involving HAZMAT release during these railway accidents. Of those accidents, 

the document highlights eight accidents because of the quantity of flammable material released 

and the relatively long fire duration. Even though the highlighted eight accidents were deemed 
1-4

significant, the conclusion was that seven of these could not have provided a fully engulfing fire 

environment for the SNF package because of three factors: (i) the transportation package 

would not have been located close enough to the fire, based on the Department of 

Transportation (DOT) regulations at the time related to spacing of railcars; (ii) the majority of the 

fires resulting from accidents involved gasses that would not result in pooling; and (iii) the 

emergency response time was rapid enough to minimize fire intensity. Only the Baltimore 

tunnel fire provided unique factors, such as location (in a tunnel) and the duration of the fire, that 

might have exposed an SNF transportation package to a pooling fire (had one been involved in 

that particular accident). Adkins, et al. (2006) indicated, however, that the probability of such an 

accident occurring and involving an SNF transportation package would be extremely low.

1.2 Objective 

The objective of the study documented in this report is to support the NRC Division of Spent 

Fuel Storage and Transportation (SFST) in conducting an assessment of severe railway

transportation accidents involving long duration fires. SFST is responsible for developing and 

implementing NRC programs governing storage and transportation of SNF. To support the 

SFST mission, the Center for Nuclear Waste Regulatory Analyses (CNWRA®) was tasked to 

review available data on derailments of trains carrying flammable HAZMAT that resulted in a 

long duration fire, update the railway accident statistics, and assess possible trends associated 

with railway accidents involving long duration fires.

1.3 Scope and Organization of the Report 

As will be described in Chapter 2 of this report, roughly 1,800 reported accidents occurred 

between 1975 and 2008 that involved the release of HAZMAT. Many of these were minor 

releases, and only one involved radioactive material. Analyzing the railway accident statistics 

and determining whether there are any trends in the data can support NRC evaluations of 

current and future regulations associated with SNF transportation.

This report focuses on the statistics and trends of historical railway accident data. The 

document is organized into four chapters, including this chapter (Chapter 1, Introduction). 

The review of historical railway accident data is discussed in Chapter 2. Chapter 2 evaluates 

accident frequency from FRA and Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration

(PHMSA) accident data and examines the trends associated with these data. Chapter 3 

narrows down this accident list to focus on the evaluation and trends of accidents involving 

severe fire. Chapter 4 presents conclusions from this study.
2-1 

2 DATA ANALYSIS

The Federal Railroad Administration (2003) defines an accident/incident in terms of a list of 

reportable events. The list includes fatalities, injuries, illnesses, collisions, derailments, and 

impacts. In addition, the FRA specifies reportable damage above a threshold amount.1

Accidents/incidents are further categorized as (Federal Railroad Administration, 2003)

• Train Accident

•

: “Any collision, derailment, fire, explosion, act of God, or other event 

involving the operation of on-track equipment (standing or moving) that results in total 

damages to all railroads involved in the event that is greater than the current reporting 

threshold to railroad on-track equipment, signals, track, track structures, and roadbed.” 

Train Incident

•

: “An event involving the movement of on-track equipment that results in a 

reportable casualty but does not cause reportable damage above the threshold 

established for train accidents.”

Nontrain Incident

In this report, the term “accident” is used regardless of the reportable damage being above or 

below the threshold established for train accidents. Accidents were identified regardless of the 

cause in which a HAZMAT release occurred during transfer of HAZMAT on a railway. For 

example, accidents were identified in which a single train derailed and accidents in which a train 

collided with an object (e.g., a backhoe left on the track by vandals) or another train.

: “An event that results in a reportable casualty, but does not involve 

the movement of on-track equipment nor cause reportable damage above the threshold 

established for train accidents.”

The review focused on HAZMAT release accidents involving multiple cars to identify those 

involving a fire. This review identifies the HAZMAT class involved and the amount of HAZMAT 

released; Appendix A lists accidents on the main line, and Appendix B lists accidents off the 

main line. These appendices show the types and amounts of flammable materials and oxidizers 

released for the accidents identified. The following sections include the analysis for HAZMAT 

release accidents and identify the data sources, the method for screening the data, overall 

accident frequency, and the means for grouping the data or classifying accidents in terms of 

where the accidents occurred (e.g., main line or yard), what characteristics were associated 

with the accidents (e.g., speed of the train or class of track), what HAZMAT was involved 

(e.g., HAZMAT Class 3 flammable liquid), and what type of accidents occurred (e.g., collision 

or derailment).

2.1 Data Sources

The main sources of data used in this study were FRA data and HAZMAT accident data 

developed by the U.S. Department of Transportation—Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety 

Administration, Office of Hazardous Materials Safety. Microsoft® Office Excel® 2003 was used 

to compile the FRA and HAZMAT information into spreadsheets that could be queried via 

standard filtering and sorting tools and macros. 

 

1

As described in Chapter 2 of Federal Railroad Administration (2003), the reporting threshold has changed over the 

timeframe of this study. For example, the reporting threshold increased from $6,300 in calendar years 1991–1996 to 

$6,700 in calendar years 2002–2003.
2-2 

2.1.1 Federal Railroad Administration Database

Each year FRA collects data from more than 600 railroads as part of its regulatory and 

enforcement responsibilities (Federal Railroad Administration, 2003). The database of railroad 

accidents from 1975 to 2008 was obtained in an uncompressed Excel (XLS) format from the 

Federal Railroad Administration Office of Safety Analysis (2010). Specifically, data for all the 

accidents are found under Section 3.03, Download Accident Data. Each data file includes any 

reported collision, derailment, fire, explosion, act of God, or other event involving the operation 

of railroad on-track equipment and involving damages exceeding the reporting threshold for the 

year reported (Federal Railroad Administration, 2003). 

2.1.2 Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration Database

The number of accidents involving HAZMAT and the number of accidents resulting in a fire were 

calculated using data acquired from PHMSA. Ten years of data were downloaded in Excel 

format from Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (2010; only the “in transit” 

accidents were selected). Railway accidents for 1997 were requested directly from PHMSA 

because they could not be downloaded directly from the website.

2.2 Data Screening 

This study using FRA data initially focused on identifying (i) the number of railroad accidents 

that led to a release and (ii) the number of railcars that were involved in that release. More cars 

involved in a release can potentially lead to more significant events that should be evaluated 

given that, in many of the cases involving multiple-car HAZMAT releases, thousands of gallons 

of flammable liquid or gas were released. Specifically, the process for evaluating this data is 

described next: 

• FRA data were obtained per year, and the database records were sorted by the number 

of cars releasing HAZMAT.

• Once sorted, the records with no release of HAZMAT were removed.

• Duplicate records were identified using incident number, date, railroad division, and 

location of the incident. This identification was done so that accurate values could be 

developed for number of HAZMAT cars releasing.

• Two distinct data sets were developed: one for single-car HAZMAT releases and the 

other for multiple-car HAZMAT releases.

• An indication of whether a fire had occurred was determined by examining the FRA 

description of the accident.

• For some accidents, the FRA information did not describe a fire. In those cases, the 

FRA accident data, where a HAZMAT release occurred, were also compared to the 

PHMSA database using dates and locations. If FRA and PHMSA data matched, the 

PHMSA data were also used to identify whether a fire had occurred during a 

railway accident. 
2-3 

2.3 Overall Frequency of Railway Accidents 

Table 2-1 summarizes the railway accidents for the past 34 years (i.e., 1975 to 2008) to include 

those involving a HAZMAT release. The frequencies in this table are the number of accidents

divided by the total freight train distance traveled. For example, the frequency for freight train 

accidents in 1975 is 6.4 accidents per million freight train-km [10.35 accidents per million freight 

train-mi] obtained by dividing 5,906 freight train accidents by 917 million freight train-km 

[570 million freight train-mi]. The accidents involving a HAZMAT release are shown in the right 

in the table separated by single-car and multiple-car HAZMAT releases. The cumulative values 

for all 34 years are shown in the last row of the table.

Table 2-1. Summary of Railway Accidents From 1975 to 2008

Year

Million 

Freight 

Train 

Miles*

Total Freight Train 

Accidents

Accidents with Release of HAZMAT

Total Single Car Multiple Car

Number Frequency† Number Frequency† Number Frequency† Number Frequency†

1975 570 5,906 10.35 83 0.15 62 0.11 21 0.04

1976 585 7,187 12.28 113 0.19 88 0.15 25 0.04

1977 566 7,192 12.70 114 0.20 86 0.15 28 0.05

1978 568 7,512 13.23 138 0.24 102 0.18 36 0.06

1979 577 6,475 11.23 105 0.18 81 0.14 24 0.04

1980 542 5,339 9.85 119 0.22 94 0.17 25 0.05

1981 511 3,617 7.08 77 0.15 60 0.12 17 0.03

1982 433 2,903 6.70 59 0.14 39 0.09 20 0.05

1983 422 2,598 6.16 52 0.12 45 0.11 7 0.02

1984 448 2,642 5.90 54 0.12 40 0.09 14 0.03

1985 431 2,230 5.17 54 0.13 41 0.10 13 0.03

1986 428 1,894 4.42 51 0.12 39 0.09 12 0.03

1987 439 1,842 4.20 50 0.11 34 0.08 16 0.04

1988 460 1,936 4.21 44 0.10 29 0.06 15 0.03

1989 469 1,996 4.26 56 0.12 38 0.08 18 0.04

1990 460 1,941 4.22 35 0.08 19 0.04 16 0.03

1991 436 1,774 4.07 47 0.11 31 0.07 16 0.04

1992 448 1,539 3.43 27 0.06 22 0.05 5 0.01

1993 464 1,634 3.52 29 0.06 21 0.05 8 0.02

1994 495 1,578 3.19 36 0.07 30 0.06 6 0.01

1995 506 1,578 3.12 27 0.05 19 0.04 8 0.02

1996 507 1,559 3.08 34 0.07 24 0.05 10 0.02

1997 512 1,529 2.98 31 0.06 25 0.05 6 0.01

1998 520 1,612 3.10 42 0.08 28 0.05 14 0.03

1999 542 1,609 2.97 41 0.08 32 0.06 9 0.02

2000 549 1,763 3.21 35 0.06 23 0.04 12 0.02

2001 538 1,773 3.30 32 0.06 17 0.03 15 0.03

2002 547 1,562 2.86 31 0.06 22 0.04 9 0.02

2003 561 1,618 2.88 30 0.05 25 0.04 5 0.01

2004 584 1,810 3.10 31 0.05 21 0.04 10 0.02

2005 597 1,712 2.87 39 0.07 29 0.05 10 0.02

2006 624 1,622 2.60 30 0.05 19 0.03 11 0.02

2007 586 1,465 2.50 46 0.08 34 0.06 12 0.02

2008 565 1,290 2.28 22 0.04 16 0.03 6 0.01

Cumulative 17,489 92,237 5.27 1,814 0.10 1,335 0.08 479 0.03

*To convert to kilometers, multiply by 1.609.

†Frequency in accidents per million freight train-mi. To convert to accidents per million freight train-km, divide by 1.609.
2-4

To identify severe fire accidents, the review focused on multiple-car HAZMAT releases instead 

of single-car HAZMAT releases because larger amounts of flammable materials are more likely 

to be released in multiple-car accidents than in single-car accidents. The last 12 years 

(i.e., 1997 to 2008) were analyzed in terms of multiple-car HAZMAT releases in Section 2.4 and 

are included in Table 2-2. Those multiple-car HAZMAT release accidents involving a fire were 

identified for the last 12 years and are shown in the rightmost columns in the table. As 

described in the flowcharts shown in Figure 2-1, the percentage of releases resulting in a fire 

was significantly higher for multiple-car HAZMAT releases, and therefore, multiple-car HAZMAT 

releases were reviewed in detail to identify accidents resulting in a severe fire.

Table 2-2. Summary of Railway Accidents From 1997 to 2008

Year

Million 

Freight 

Train 

Miles*

Total Freight Train 

Accidents

Accidents with Release of HAZMAT

Total Single Car

Multiple Cars

Involving Fire

Number Frequency† Number Frequency† Number Frequency† Number Frequency† Number Frequency†

1997 512 1,529 2.98 31 0.06 25 0.05 6 0.01 0 0.000

1998 520 1,612 3.10 42 0.08 28 0.05 14 0.03 2 0.004

1999 542 1,609 2.97 41 0.08 32 0.06 9 0.02 0 0.000

2000 549 1,763 3.21 35 0.06 23 0.04 12 0.02 2 0.004

2001 538 1,773 3.30 32 0.06 17 0.03 15 0.03 2 0.004

2002 547 1,562 2.86 31 0.06 22 0.04 9 0.02 0 0.000

2003 561 1,618 2.88 30 0.05 25 0.04 5 0.01 2 0.004

2004 584 1,810 3.10 31 0.05 21 0.04 10 0.02 1 0.002

2005 597 1,712 2.87 39 0.07 29 0.05 10 0.02 2 0.003

2006 624 1,622 2.60 30 0.05 19 0.03 11 0.02 1 0.002

2007 586 1,465 2.50 46 0.08 34 0.06 12 0.02 5 0.009

2008 565 1,290 2.28 22 0.04 16 0.03 6 0.01 3 0.005

Cumulative 6,725 19,365 2.88 410 0.06 291 0.04 119 0.02 20 0.003

*To convert to kilometers, multiply by 1.609.

†Frequency in accidents per million freight train-mi. To convert to accidents per million freight train-km, divide by 1.609.

Figure 2-1. Data Analysis for Single-Car and Multiple-Car HAZMAT Release Accidents

291 Single-Car HAZMAT Release 

Accidents Over 12 Years

•11 accidents resulted in a fire

•252 accidents did not result in a fire

•Not able to determine if 28 accidents 

resulted in a fire

Assuming 

none of the 

undetermined 

accidents 

resulted in a 

fire

Four Percent 

(11 out of 291) 

Single-Car HAZMAT 

Release Accidents 

Resulted in a Fire 

119 Multiple-Car HAZMAT Release 

Accidents Over 12 Years

•20 accidents resulted in a fire

•85 accidents did not result in a fire

•Not able to determine if 14 accidents 

resulted in a fire

Assuming 

none of the 

undetermined 

accidents 

resulted in a 

fire

Seventeen Percent

(20 out of 119)

Multiple-Car 

HAZMAT Release 

Accidents Resulted 

in a Fire 

Single-Car HAZMAT Release Accidents

Multiple-Car HAZMAT Release Accidents
2-5

As shown in Tables 2-1 and 2-2, accident frequencies, in general, have decreased over time. 

For accidents with release of HAZMAT, the total frequency for the past 12 years {i.e., 3.7 × 10−2

accidents per million freight train-km [6 × 10−2 accidents per million freight train-mi]} is 

approximately 60 percent of the total accident frequency for the entire 34 years {i.e., 6.2 × 10−2

accidents per million freight train-km [1 × 10−1 accidents per million freight train-mi]}. The 

single-car and multiple-car HAZMAT release accidents are shown separately in the tables. The 

frequencies for these accidents show similar decreases in the last 12 years when compared to 

their accident frequencies over the entire 34 years. As described in Section 2.4, the 119 

multiple-car HAZMAT release accidents for the past 12 years are divided between 89 accidents 

that occurred on the main line and 30 accidents that occurred off the main line in an industrial 

area, rail yard, or siding. As shown in Table 2-2, the accident frequency for multiple-car 

HAZMAT release accidents involving a fire is approximately 1.9 × 10−3 accidents per million 

freight train-km [3 × 10−3 accidents per million freight train-mi], which is about 15 percent of the 

accident frequency for multiple-car HAZMAT release accidents over the same 12-year period. 

Multiple-car HAZMAT release accidents are further analyzed in Section 2.4.

Considering the summary values in Table 2-1, the HAZMAT release accident frequency is 

approximately 2 percent of the total accident frequency. The multiple-car HAZMAT release 

accident frequency is approximately 0.6 percent of the total accident frequency. Based on the 

information in Table 2-2, the accident frequency for those multiple-car HAZMAT releases 

resulting in a fire {i.e., 1.9 × 10−3 accidents per million freight train-km [3 × 10−3 accidents per 

million freight train-mi]} is estimated to be approximately 0.1 percent of the total accident

frequency {i.e., 1.8 accidents per million freight train-km [2.88 accidents per million freight 

train-mi]}; however, as described in Section 2.4 and shown in Table 2-2, the accident frequency 

for multiple-car HAZMAT releases resulting in a fire has increased in the last 2 years (i.e., 2007 

and 2008). Specific causes for this increase were not identified in this study.
2-6 

Figure 2-2 shows the accident frequency trends for the past 34 years. This figure shows that 

the total accident frequency, HAZMAT release accident frequency, and multiple-car HAZMAT 

release accident frequency has a decreasing trend for the past 34 years.

 

Figure 2-2. Frequency of Railway Accidents From 1975 to 2008

0.00

0.01

0.10

1.00

10.00

100.00

1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005

Year

Frequency

(accidents / million train-mi)

Freight Train Accidents

HAZMAT Release Accidents

Multiple-Car HAZMAT Release Accidents
2-7 

2.4 Data Classification for Multiple-Car Hazardous Material 

Release Accidents 

The FRA and PHMSA data were reviewed for railway accidents that occurred from 1997 to 

2008 to determine the parameters associated with the accidents (e.g., speed and number of 

cars derailed) and to identify the HAZMAT involved. These data sources are described in 

Section 2.1. As shown in Figure 2-3, out of 119 multiple-car HAZMAT releases accidents 

(Table 2-2), 89 were identified on the main line and 30 were identified off the main line. 

Figure 2-3. Multiple-Car HAZMAT Release Accidents From 1997 to 2008

For the 89 accidents occurring on the main line, 17 resulted in a fire. For the 30 accidents 

occurring off the main line, 3 resulted in a fire. It was not clear from the data whether a fire 

resulted in 8 out of the 89 accidents on the main line, nor was it clear from the data whether a 

fire resulted in 6 out of the 30 accidents off the main line. Accident parameters and HAZMAT 

involved are described in this section and listed for the 89 accidents on the main line and 

30 accidents off the main line in Tables A–1 and B–1, respectively, of Appendices A and B. 

Section 3.4 further describes those parameters associated with severe accidents.

As shown in Figure 2-4 involving main line accidents, less than 25 percent (i.e., 21 out of 89) of 

the multiple-car HAZMAT release accidents occurred in the last 3 years (i.e., 2006 through 

2008); however, almost half (i.e., 8 out of 17) of the HAZMAT release accidents involving a fire

occurred in the last 3 years.

89

30

17

3

8 6

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

Main Line Yard, Industry, or Siding

Number of Accidents

All Accidents

Accidents with Fire

Undetermined
2-8 

On average, for the 12 years from 1997 to 2008, between 7 and 8 multiple-car HAZMAT release 

accidents occurred per year, and the number of accidents for 2007 and 2008 fell just above or 

just below the average (i.e., 9 for 2007 and 5 for 2008). Assuming none of the 8 undetermined 

accidents resulted in a fire, then for the 12 years from 1997 to 2008, on average, 1 to 2 

multiple-car HAZMAT release accidents resulted in a fire per year. For the years 2007 and 

2008, the number of these fire accidents was more than twice the average (i.e., four for 2007 

and three for 2008).

Figure 2-4. Number of Multiple-Car HAZMAT Release Accidents and Multiple-Car 

HAZMAT Release Accidents Resulting in a Fire by Year

5

9

7

5

7

4

9

12

11

7

8

5

3

4

1 1

0

2

0

2 2

0

2

0 0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

Year

Number of Accidents

All Accidents

Accidents With Fire
2-9 

Table 2-3 lists the multiple-car HAZMAT release accidents that resulted in a fire. The 

17 accidents that occurred on the main line are listed in the upper portion of the table, and the 

3 accidents that occurred off the main line are listed in the lower portion of the table. Table 2-3 

shows the type of accident (i.e., derailment or collision), the HAZMAT class, the number of 

HAZMAT cars on the train and the number of HAZMAT cars releasing. The accidents listed in 

this table are referred to in the following subsections.

Table 2-3. Multiple-Car Release Accidents Resulting in a Fire

Date Location Type of 

Accident

HAZMAT Cars Track* HAZMAT 

Class† Total Releasing

On the Main Line

12/7/2008 Nolan, ND Derailment 24 6 m 2.1, 3

10/23/2008 Caney, OK Derailment 29 3 m 2.2, 3

8/22/2008 Luther, OK Derailment 13 5 m 3

12/28/2007 New Florence, PA Derailment 17 2 m 3

10/10/2007 Painesville, OH Derailment 40 5 m 3, 9

03/12/2007 Oneida, NY Derailment 42 6 m 2.1, 3, 8

1/16/2007 Brooks, KY Derailment 15 7 m 2.1, 3, 8, 9

10/20/2006 New Brighton, PA Derailment 80 20 m 3

7/10/2005 Anding, MS Head-on Collision 13 2 m 2.1, 3

10/25/2003 Shorters, AL Derailment 43 3 m 3, 5.1

2/9/2003 Tamaroa, IL Derailment 50 7 m 2.1, 3, 8

8/30/2001 Mulvane, KS Obstruction 10 3 m 3, 9

7/18/2001 Baltimore, MD Derailment 9 4 m 3, 8

12/18/2000 Plymouth, MN Derailment 102 6 m 4.1

5/27/2000 Eunice, LA Derailment 56 18 m 2.1, 2.3, 3, 6.1, 8

9/2/1998 Crisfield, KS Derailment 5 3 m 3, 6.1, 8

6/26/1998 Niota, IL Side Collision 6 4 m 3, 8

Off the Main Line

10/22/2007 Middlebury, VT Derailment 15 4 y 3

1/8/2005 Seabrook, TX Derailment 13 2 i 3, 5.1

9/21/2004 East St. Louis, IL Other Impacts 3 2 y 3

*Track: m = main, i = industry, y = yards, s = siding

†HAZMAT Class: 2.1 = Flammable Gas, 2.3 = Poisonous Gas, 3 = Flammable Liquid, 4.1 = Flammable Solid, 

5.1 = Oxidizer, 6.1 = Poison, 8 = Corrosive Material, 9 = Miscellaneous
2-10

2.4.1 Number of Cars Releasing HAZMAT

As shown in Figure 2-5 for accidents on the main line, generally seven or fewer cars released 

HAZMAT in an accident. 

Figure 2-5. Number of Cars Releasing HAZMAT in Multiple-Car HAZMAT Release Accidents 

on the Main Line From 1997 to 2008

There were three exceptions. Eleven cars released HAZMAT in one accident that did not 

involve a fire. In this accident, HAZMAT Class 2.2 anhydrous ammonia (i.e., nonflammable 

gas) was released from the 11 cars. In 2 other accidents, fires occurred with the release from 

18 cars and 20 cars. Assuming none of the 8 undetermined accidents resulted in a fire, 

Figure 2-5 shows that a fire occurred less than 12 percent of the time (i.e., 8 out of 69 

accidents) when 4 or fewer cars released HAZMAT, but occurred 45 percent of the time 

(i.e., 9 out of 20 accidents) when HAZMAT was released from 5 or more cars.

69

17

0 1 0 1 1

8 7

0 0 0 1 1

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

2-4 5-7 8-10 11-13 14-16 17-19 20-22

Number of Cars Releasing

Number of Accidents

All Accidents

Accidents with Fire
2-11

2.4.2 HAZMAT Class

Figure 2-6 displays the multiple-car HAZMAT release accidents for HAZMAT classes involving 

flammable materials and oxidizers. The amount of flammable materials and oxidizers released 

in these accidents is listed in Appendix A, Table A–1. As shown in Figure 2-6, Class 3 HAZMAT 

(i.e., flammable liquid) was released in more than half of the 89 accidents (i.e., 47 out of 89) and 

in all but one of the accidents that resulted in a fire (i.e., 16 out of 17). This one accident for 

which Class 3 HAZMAT was not identified instead involved Class 4.1 HAZMAT (i.e., flammable 

solid) and occurred on December 18, 2000, in Plymouth, Minnesota. In this accident, 

approximately 72,000 L [19,000 gal] of molten sulfur were released from 6 cars. 

In some accidents, such as the one occurring on October 20, 2006, in New Brighton, 

Pennsylvania, multiple cars released flammable liquid. For this accident, approximately 20 cars 

released an estimated 1,837,000 L [485,278 gal] of ethanol (National Transportation Safety 

Board, 2008). For the accident occurring on July 10, 2005, in Anding, Mississippi, there was a 

much smaller amount of flammable liquid released. In this accident, the locomotives released 

approximately 57,000 L [15,000 gal] of diesel fuel (National Transportation Safety Board, 2005) 

as a result of a head-on collision. 

Figure 2-6. Number of HAZMAT Release Accidents From 1997 to 2008 That Occurred on 

the Main Line Showing Four of the HAZMAT Classes Involved. In Some Accidents, the 

Release Involved Material From More Than One HAZMAT Class.

As shown in Figure 2-6, Class 2.1 HAZMAT was released in seven accidents, and a fire 

resulted in six out of the seven accidents from 1997 to 2008 on the main line. As shown in 

Table 2-3, in all six accidents that resulted in a fire, flammable gas was released with flammable 

liquid. The one accident that did not result in a fire occurred on May 27, 2002, in 

Potterville, Michigan. In this accident, two cars released a combined total of about 26,000 L 

[7,000 gal] of liquefied petroleum gas (LPG). Other HAZMAT released in addition to the 

Class 2.1 HAZMAT was not identified from the database.

89

7

47

1

7

17

6

16

1 1

0

20

40

60

80

100

All Classes Class 2.1 

(Flammable 

Gas)

Class 3 

(Flammable 

Liquid)

Class 4.1 

(Flammable 

Solid)

Class 5.1 

(Oxidizer)

Number of Accidents

HAZMAT Class

All Accidents

Accidents with Fire
2-12

Figure 2-6 shows seven accidents in which Class 5.1 HAZMAT (i.e., oxidizer) was released 

from 1997 to 2008 on the main line. The one accident that resulted in a fire occurred on

October 25, 2003, in Shorters, Alabama. For this accident, a combined total of approximately 

216,000 L [57,171 gal] of flammable liquid was released in addition to approximately 1,134 kg 

[2,500 lb] of ammonium nitrate, an oxidizer. For the remaining six accidents, a release of 

flammable liquid, gas, or solid in addition to the release of oxidizer was not identified from 

the database.

2.4.3 Type of Accident

The majority (i.e., 85 out of 89) of the multiple-car HAZMAT release accidents occurring on the 

main line involved a derailment (Appendix A, Table A–1). However, four accidents involved an 

impact or collision. Three of these accidents resulted in a fire. 

For the three impacts or collisions resulting in a fire, one of them was a head-on collision 

between two trains (i.e., July 10, 2005, in Anding, Mississippi), one involved the collision of a 

train with a backhoe that was left on the track by vandals (i.e., August 30, 2001, in Mulvane, 

Kansas), and one involved a side collision where a train struck the lead engine of another one 

that was standing (i.e., June 26, 1998, in Niota, Illinois). All three accidents involved the release 

of Class 3 HAZMAT. Approximately 57,000 L [15,000 gal] of diesel fuel were released in the 

head-on collision, and approximately 27,000 L [7,176 gal] of alcohol were released from 

perfume products in the collision with the backhoe. 

In the side collision, some of the flammable liquid released was identified from the database but 

not all of it. In this accident, fewer than 380 L [100 gal] of flammable liquid was identified. 

2.4.4 Yard, Industry, and Siding Accidents

In Figure 2-7, 30 accidents occurred off the main line and 3 of them resulted in a fire. Seventy 

percent of these accidents (21 out of 30) occurred in a rail yard with the remaining occurrences 

divided about equally among industry locations and rail sidings. 

Figure 2-7. Summary of HAZMAT Release Accidents From 1997 to 2008 That Occurred 

Off the Main Line

As shown in Table 2-3, for the three accidents resulting in a fire, all three of them occurred in 

the last 5 years (i.e., 2004 to 2008). Two of them occurred in a rail yard, and one of them 

30

21

5 4 3 2 1 0

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

All Locations Yard Industry Siding

Location

Number of Accidents

All Accidents

Accidents with Fire
2-13

occurred at an industrial location. In addition, two accidents involved a derailment, while the 

remaining one involved an impact. 

All three accidents resulting in a fire involved the release of Class 3 HAZMAT. Appendix B, 

Table B–1 shows the amount of HAZMAT released, as determined from the FRA and PHMSA 

databases. For the accident occurring on September 21, 2004, in East Saint Louis, Illinois, 

two cars released a combined total of more than 151,000 L [40,000 gal] of vinyl acetate at a rail 

yard from the impact of a 20-car train with a stopped car containing vinyl acetate (National 

Transportation Safety Board, 2005). Considerably less flammable liquid was released in the 

remaining two accidents. For the accident occurring on January 8, 2005, in Seabrook, Texas, 

4,500 L [1,200 gal] of diesel fuel were released along with 380 L [100 gal] of hydrogen peroxide, 

an oxidizer. For the accident occurring on October 22, 2007, in Middlebury, Vermont, 1,900 L 

[500 gal] of gasoline were released.

2.4.5 Track Class

Figure 2-8 shows the multiple-car HAZMAT release accidents that occurred from 1997 to 2008 

on the main line separated by track class. As shown in this figure, of the 89 accidents occurring 

on the main line, approximately 43 percent of them (i.e., 38 out of 89) occurred on Class 4 track. 

Assuming none of the 8 undetermined accidents resulted in a fire, then almost half of the 

accidents (i.e., 8 out of 17) involving a fire occurred on Class 4 track. The remaining accidents 

involving a fire were divided evenly among Class 2, Class 3, and Class 5 track. Three accidents 

occurred on each of these three classes of track. 

Figure 2-8. Number of Multiple-Car HAZMAT Release Accidents From 1997 to 2008 That 

Occurred on the Main Line Separated by Track Class

89

6

14

20

38

10

1

17

0 3 3

8

3 0

0

20

40

60

80

100

All Classes

Class 1Class 2Class 3Class 4Class 5

Excepted

Track Class

Number of Accidents

All Accidents

Accidents with

Fire
2-14

The maximum freight train speed increases with increasing track class, as shown in Table 2-4

(Federal Railroad Administration, 2003). Additionally required inspection frequencies vary by 

class of track; Classes 4 and 5 track have twice-weekly inspections, and excepted track and 

Classes 1, 2, and 3 track generally have a lower required inspection frequency as described in 

49 CFR 213.233. Figure 2-8 shows the number of multiple-car HAZMAT release accidents 

increased from Class 1 to Class 4 track but then decreased for Class 5 track.

Table 2-4. Maximum Speed for Freight Trains by Track Class*

Track Class Maximum Speed (mph)†

1 10

2 25

3 40

4 60

5 80

X (Excepted) 10

*Federal Railroad Administration. “FRA Guide for Preparing Accident/Incident Reports.” DOT/FRA/RRS-22. 

Washington, DC: Federal Railroad Administration, Office of Safety. 2003.

†To convert to km/h multiply by 1.609.

Figure 2-9 shows the average number of cars that derailed and separates this average by track 

class. As shown in this figure, for the 89 accidents occurring on the main line from 1997 to 

2008, on average, 19 cars derailed per accident for all classes of track. For the 17 accidents 

involving a fire, on average, 20 cars derailed per accident for all classes of track. The average 

was higher for Class 4 track: on average, 23 cars derailed in 38 accidents on this track (i.e., 21 

percent increase), and 26 cars derailed in 8 accidents involving a fire on this track (i.e., 30 

percent increase).

Figure 2-9. Average Number of Cars Derailed in Multiple-Car HAZMAT Release Accidents 

From 1997 to 2008 That Occurred on the Main Line Separated by Track Class

19

6

13

19

23

21

3

20

0

18

16

26

7

0

0

20

40

All Classes

Class 1Class 2Class 3Class 4Class 5

Excepted

Track Class

Average Number of Cars Derailed

All Accidents

Accidents with Fire
2-15

Figure 2-10 shows the average number of cars that released HAZMAT and separates this 

average by track class. As shown in this figure, for the 89 multiple-car HAZMAT release 

accidents, on average, 4 HAZMAT cars released HAZMAT per accident for all classes of track. 

This average is higher for the 17 accidents involving a fire. For these accidents, on average, six

cars released HAZMAT for all classes of track, and for Class 3 or 4 track on average, seven

cars released HAZMAT. For Class 3 or 4 track, the average number of HAZMAT cars releasing 

was 75 percent higher for accidents involving a fire compared to all of the multiple-car HAZMAT 

release accidents on Class 3 or 4 track. These values are influenced by the accident that 

occurred in New Brighton, Pennsylvania, where the train was on Class 4 track and 20 cars 

released HAZMAT, and the accident in Eunice, Louisiana, where the train was on Class 3 track 

and 18 cars released HAZMAT. 

Figure 2-10. Average Number of HAZMAT Cars Releasing in Multiple-Car HAZMAT 

Release Accidents From 1997 to 2008 That Occurred on the Main Line Separated by 

Track Class

4 4

3

4 4

3

2

6

0

5

7 7

3

0

0

5

10

All Classes

Class 1Class 2Class 3Class 4Class 5

Excepted

Track Class

Average Number of HAZMAT Cars 

Releasing

All Accidents

Accidents with Fire
2-16

2.4.6 Train Speed

Figure 2-11 shows the multiple-car HAZMAT release accidents that occurred from 1997 to 2008 

on the main line separated by train speed. In this figure, speed was arbitrarily separated into 

32 km/h [20 mph] bins with the highest speed for the last bin corresponding to the maximum 

freight train speed for Class 5 track (Table 2-4). As shown in Figure 2-10, for the 89 accidents 

occurring on the main line, approximately 40 percent of them (i.e., 36 out of 89) occurred 

between 34 and 64 km/h [21 and 40 mph], with approximately 31 percent of them (i.e., 28 out of 

89) occurring at higher speeds between 66 and 97 km/h [41 and 60 mph]. For accidents 

involving a fire, however, a greater percentage of the accidents occurred in the higher speed 

range {i.e., 66 to 97 km/h [41 to 60 mph]}. Almost half of them (i.e., 8 out of 17) occurred from 

66 to 97 km/h [41 to 60 mph], whereas only 35 percent of them (i.e., 6 out of 17) occurred in the 

lower speed range of 34 to 64 km/h [21 to 40 mph]. 

Figure 2-11. Number of Multiple-Car HAZMAT Release Accidents From 1997 to 2008 That 

Occurred on the Main Line Separated by Speed. To Convert Speed to km/h Multiply 

by 1.609.

89

19

36

28

6

17

2 6 8

1

0

20

40

60

80

100

All Speeds 1 - 20 21 - 40 41 - 60 61 - 80

Speed (mph)

Number of Accidents

All Accidents

Accidents with Fire
2-17

Figure 2-12 shows the average number of cars that derailed and separates this average by 

train speed. As shown in this figure, for the 89 accidents that occurred on the main line from 

1997 to 2008, on average, 19 cars derailed per accident over all speeds. For accidents 

involving a fire, on average, 20 cars derailed per accident over all speeds. Also, as shown in 

this figure, for the lower three speed ranges {i.e., speeds of 97 km/h or less [60 mph or less]}, 

the average number of cars that derailed per accident increases as train speed increases. 

However, in the range from 98 to 129 km/h [61 to 80 mph], the result is different. In this range, 

one accident occurred where only four cars derailed and it involved a fire. This accident 

occurred on September 2, 1998, in Crisfield, Kansas, and involved a train having 20 articulated 

cars with 3 to 5 platforms per car (National Transportation Safety Board, 2000). The accident 

may be underrepresented in Figure 2-11 because the four cars identified in the database did not 

capture the number of platforms that were also part of the derailment. In this case, each car 

contained multiple platforms and each platform may contain more than one cargo container

as shown in Figure 2-13. In this accident, 12 cargo containers contained HAZMAT, 8 were

involved in the derailment, and 4 were destroyed by fire (National Transportation 

Safety Board, 2000).

Figure 2-12. Average Number of Cars Derailed in Multiple-Car HAZMAT Release 

Accidents From 1997 to 2008 That Occurred on the Main Line Separated by Speed. To 

Convert Speed to km/h, Multiply by 1.609.

Figure 2-13. Car Having Multiple Platforms Carrying Containers Stacked Two High.

This Image is From National Transportation Safety Board RAR-00/01.

19

9

18

26

23

20

13

19

24

4

0

10

20

30

40

All

Speeds

1 - 20 21 - 40 41 - 60 61 - 80

Speed (mph)

Average Number of Cars Derailed

All Accidents

Accidents with Fire
2-18

Figure 2-14 shows the average number of cars that released HAZMAT and separates this 

average by train speed. As shown in this figure, for the 89 accidents that occurred on the 

main line, on average, 4 cars released HAZMAT over all speeds, and for the 17 accidents 

involving a fire, on average, 6 cars released HAZMAT over all speeds. When considering the 

individual speed ranges for all of the accidents (i.e., the 89 accidents occurring on the main 

line), 3 to 4 cars, on average, released HAZMAT per accident. However, for accidents involving 

a fire, the average was higher for the lower three speed ranges. In the range of 34 to 64 km/h 

[21 to 40 mph], on average, nine cars released HAZMAT. As shown in Figure 2-11, in this 

range, the average is based on six accidents. It includes the accident in New Brighton, 

Pennsylvania, where 20 cars released HAZMAT and the accident in Eunice, Louisiana, where 

18 cars released HAZMAT. To either side of this range {i.e., 2 to 32 km/h and 66 to 97 km/h [1 

to 20 mph and 41 to 60 mph]}, on average, five cars released HAZMAT. 

Figure 2-14. Average Number of HAZMAT Cars Releasing in Multiple-Car HAZMAT 

Release Accidents From 1997 to 2008 That Occurred on the Main Line Separated 

by Speed. To Convert Speed to km/h, Multiply by 1.609.

4

3

4 4

3

6

5

9

5

3

0

5

10

All

Speeds

1 - 20 21 - 40 41 - 60 61 - 80

Speed (mph)

Average Number of HAZMAT Cars 

Releasing

All Accidents

Accidents with Fire
3-1 

3 IDENTIFICATION OF SEVERE FIRE EVENTS 

Following the review and categorization of the data described in the previous section, the next 

step is to identify the railway fires that had the greatest potential to create a fire environment for 

an SNF transportation package similar to the one established in NRC regulations. The 

regulations in 10 CFR 71.73(4) require an SNF transportation cask to survive a fully engulfing 

fire for a period of 30 minutes. When evaluating real-world historic railway accidents, a 

quantitative identification of a fully engulfing fire, as described in 10 CFR 71.73(4), can present 

some difficulties. Accident data are often in summary form, and records of exact fire durations, 

temperatures, and magnitudes for individual railcars were not generally found (as discussed 

next), making the absolute characterization of a fire as fully engulfing challenging. 

In lieu of a quantitative identification of fully engulfing fires (which is not reasonably possible), 

this report identifies historic railway fires that had a reasonable potential to approach a fully 

engulfing fire similar to what is described in 10 CFR 71.73(4). These fires are herein referred to 

as “severe fires.” In this analysis, two criteria were used to define severe fires. The first 

criterion was that a railcar must have been substantially engulfed in a fire that persists for an 

extended period of time. The second criterion was that the principal source of fuel for the 

substantially engulfing fire must have been derived from another railcar. The purpose of this 

second criterion was to restrict the term “severe fires” to those fires that could have affected 

SNF transport packages (implicitly assuming SNF packages and their conveyances do not 

provide fuel to a fire) and exclude railcar fires that were self-fueled. Thus, under the constraints 

of this definition, a railcar affected by a severe fire is a railcar that was substantially engulfed in 

a sustained fire but did not provide the principal source of fuel to the fire. 

These criteria defining severe fires contain some subjective elements—criterion one: 

“substantially engulfed” and “extended period of time” and criterion two: “principal source of 

fuel.” These subjective elements are a result of the often ambiguous information or descriptions 

provided in many accident reports. Often, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) and 

the FRA accident reports are focused on identifying causes and deriving preventative measures 

rather than describing accident consequences. As a result, reports often provide very little

specific information about ensuing fires. Damages are assessed in terms of lost equipment (fire 

damage and mechanical damage), length of damaged rail, and loss of lading (monetary impact 

of the event). Additionally, emergency response times are often presented in terms of times 

required to evacuate affected areas (secure public safety) and then declare areas safe for 

reentry. Without detailed descriptions, these assessments often relied on the interpretation of 

sparse information and details contained in accident photographs. These photographs provided 

information about a fire, either by recording the fire while active or by recording the extent of 

railcar damage after the fire had been extinguished. These photographs in conjunction with 

detailed descriptions (when available) also provided information about railcar configurations, 

which was a key element of the severe fire assessments. Because these accident images 

provide only snapshots of the events, there is the potential that evaluation of an event could be 

skewed by the timing or angle of a particular photograph. Care was taken to assess all of the 

information available for a given accident before making a determination on the severity of the 

fire involved with that accident.

As a consequence, using railway accident reports as a basis to classify railway fires often 

required the use of inferences rather than strict descriptions, and these inferences could have 

the potential for being interpreted subjectively. A general guideline for this analysis follows: 

• “Substantially engulfed” was interpreted as (i) a fire that optically engulfs (or could have 

optically engulfed) at least 30 percent or one-third of the surface area of a railcar or 
3-2 

(ii) damage from fire appeared to have affected at least 30 percent or one-third of the 

surface area of a railcar. 

• “Extended period of time” was interpreted as a duration that appeared to have lasted at 

least 30 minutes or that was documented as lasting longer than 30 minutes. 

• “Non-self-fueled” was interpreted as a fire that was likely, at some point in time, fueled 

by materials from another railcar. This point arose from an occasional ambiguity in 

determining whether the contents of a railcar spawned a secondary fire as a result of a 

large initiating fire or whether the contents were the initial source of a fire. 

Note that this analysis of severe fires does not address the railway configuration (separation) 

requirements in the DOT regulations (49 CFR 174.85) for HAZMAT rail shipments. 

3.1 Railway Accidents Involved in Potential Severe Fires 

On average, during the last 12 years (i.e., 1997 to 2008) more than 1,600 reportable freight train 

accidents occurred each year (Table 2-2), and of the total number of accidents, only a few were

identified as having potentially severe fires. The process of identifying those accidents with 

severe fires began by identifying and focusing attention on accidents that involved the release 

of HAZMAT from multiple railcars and thus were potentially capable of supporting a severe 

fire. As described in Section 2.4, this reduced the number of candidate accidents to just 

119 accidents that potentially had a sufficient amount of fuel to support a severe fire. Of these 

119 accidents, just 20 involved a fire. 

The purpose of this section is to (i) identify those events that involved severe fires and 

(ii) identify trends that could help identify severe fire accidents. The results of this section can 

then be used to (i) focus attention on those historic events that could have potentially 

approached (or exceeded) the regulatory hypothetical accident condition fire for shipping SNF 

packages and (ii) to identify any trends in these accidents that could be used to better 

understand the risks involved in transport of SNF by rail.

The 20 railway accidents identified as having the potential for a severe fire were initially 

identified through a search of the FRA database of railway accidents reported for the 12-year 

span from 1997 to 2008. These were accidents that involved a fire and the release of HAZMAT

from multiple railcars. After these accidents were identified, details about these accidents were 

then derived from available NTSB reports and Rail Accident Briefs (RAB). However, of the 

20 accidents initially identified, reports were not found for several accidents. These missing 

reports were either pending for recent accidents or simply not available through the NTSB 

electronic publications portal for railroad accidents. Consequently, these events were not 

evaluated to determine fire severity, nor were they included in the severe accident parameter 

trend analysis in Section 3.3. These excluded railway accidents were

• Luther, Oklahoma, August 22, 2008: FRA/PHMSA database reports five cars releasing 

Class 3 materials (FRA report pending HQ–2008–70) 

http://www.koco.com/video/17271337/index.html

• Caney, Oklahoma, October 23, 2008: FRA/PHMSA database reports three cars 

releasing Classes 2 and 3 materials (FRA report pending HQ–2008–81)

• Nolan, North Dakota, December 7, 2008: FRA/PHMSA database reports six cars 

releasing Classes 2 and 3 materials (FRA report pending HQ–2008–92) 

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1S9txPvUTF8
3-3 

• Middlebury, Vermont, October 22, 2007: FRA/PHMSA database reports four cars 

releasing Class 3 materials; no report found

• Shorters, Alabama, October 25, 2003: FRA/PHMSA database reports three cars 

releasing Classes 3 and 5.1 materials; no report found

• Mulvane, Kansas, August 30, 2001: FRA/PHMSA database reports three cars releasing 

Classes 3 and 9 materials, no report found. 

http://lubbockonline.com/stories/083001/upd_075-6252.shtml

• Plymouth, Minnesota, December 18, 2000: FRA database reports six cars releasing 

Class 4 materials; no report found

• Niota, Illinois, June 26, 1998: collision, FRA reports four cars releasing Class 3 and 

corrosive materials; no report found

Of the 20 initially identified accidents, accident reports were found for 12. A preliminary 

examination of these accidents was used to separate accidents according to the type of rail line 

on which they occurred, either main line or yard line. 

The main line accidents initially identified were

• New Florence, Pennsylvania, December 28, 2009, derailment: FRA reports two cars 

releasing Class 3 materials; FRA Office of Safety Headquarters Assigned Accident 

Investigation Report HQ–2007–85

• Painesville, Ohio, October 10, 2007, derailment: FRA reports five cars releasing Class 3 

and miscellaneous materials; NTSB/RAB–09/02

• Oneida, New York, March 12, 2007, derailment: FRA reports six cars releasing 

Classes 2 and 3 and corrosive materials; NTSB/RAB–08/05

• Brooks, Kentucky, January 16, 2007, derailment: FRA reports seven cars releasing 

Classes 2 and 3 and corrosive and miscellaneous materials; FRA Office of Safety 

Headquarters Assigned Accident Investigation Report HQ–2007–03

• New Brighton, Pennsylvania, October 20, 2006, derailment: FRA reports 20 cars 

releasing Class 3 materials; NTSB/RAR–08/02

• Anding, Mississippi, July 10, 2005; collision: FRA reports two cars releasing Classes 2 

and Class 3 materials; NTSB/RAR–07/01

• Tamaroa, Illinois, February 9, 2003; derailment: FRA reports seven cars releasing 

Classes 2 and 3 and miscellaneous materials; NTSB/RAR–05/01

• Baltimore, Maryland, July 18, 2001; derailment: FRA reports four cars releasing Class 3 

and miscellaneous materials; RAB–04/08

• Eunice, Louisiana, May 27, 2000; derailment: FRA reports 18 cars releasing Classes 2, 

3, and 6 and corrosive materials; RAR–02/03 

• Crisfield, Kansas, September 2, 1998, derailment: FRA reports three cars releasing 

Class 3; materials; RAR–00/01 

The yard line accidents were

• Seabrook, Texas, January 8, 2005, derailment: FRA reports two cars releasing Class 5 

materials (and Class 3 from the locomotive); FRA Office of Safety Headquarters 

Assigned Accident Investigation Report HQ–2005–05
3-4

• East St. Louis, Illinois, September 21, 2004, derailment: FRA reports two cars releasing 

Class 3 materials; RAB–05/04

In addition to those accidents that involved fires and the release of HAZMAT from at least two

railcars, three accidents were further examined.

• Texarkana, Arkansas, October 15, 2005, RAB–06/04 

• Momence, Illinois, March 23, 1999, RAB–02/02

• Delia, Kansas, July 2, 1997, RAR–99/04

These three accidents were examined because of several noteworthy issues. The Texarkana 

accident demonstrated how flammable material released from a railcar may potentially affect 

railcars on adjacent tracks, when railcars are in rail yards. The Momence accident 

demonstrated how fires involving only fuel released from locomotives could potentially affect 

railcars. And the Delia accident was noteworthy because the fire in this accident resulted in the 

release of a small amount of radioactive materials (not from an SNF package). 

3.2 Brief Description of Railway Accidents 

A brief description of the evaluated accidents is provided in the next section. These accidents 

have been grouped according to the occurrence of severe fires. The first set contains those 

accidents for which no severe fires were identified. The second set are those for which 

widespread severe fires were identified, and the last set are those for which localized severe 

fires were identified. 

3.2.1 Accidents With No Severe Fire

After examining the accidents previously listed in Section 3.1, several of the accidents were 

determined not to have had severe fires. These accidents are described next.
3-5

New Florence, Pennsylvania, December 28, 2007

On December 28, 2007, near New Florence, Pennsylvania, a fire occurred as a consequence of 

a derailment; 9 railcars derailed from a three-locomotive, 41-car train traveling at 37 km/h 

[23 mph]. Of the nine derailed railcars, seven were transporting hazardous flammable liquids 

and one was transporting LPG. Two of the railcars transporting hazardous flammable liquid 

leaked and caught fire. Liquid loss from one railcar was estimated as minimal, while the second 

railcar was estimated to have lost approximately 57,000 L [15,000 gal]. Figure 3-1 shows the 

positions of the derailed railcars and annotates those railcars that were affected by fire. Evident 

in this figure is the nearly linear arrangement of the derailed railcars, which makes it difficult for 

railcars to be affected by fuel or fire from adjacent railcars. This nearly linear arrangement of

the derailed railcars and a relatively limited supply of fuel prevented this accident from 

producing a severe fire. The sparse arrangement of railcars maximized the distance between 

the fire and any potentially affected railcars, and the limited amount of fuel produced a fire with a 

minimal radius of effect.

1

Figure 3-1. Diagram of Railway Accident Near New Florence, Pennsylvania. This Figure 

Depicts Nine Derailed Cars, Two of Which Were Damaged by Fire. This Accident 

Illustrates the Concept of Nearly Linear Railway Accidents. Figure From FRA Office of 

Safety Headquarters Assigned Accident Investigation Report HQ–2007–85.

 

1

Because of a limited amount of fuel, it was unlikely that the fuel could flow to an adjacent railcar in sufficient quantity 

to fully engulf it.
3-6 

Seabrook, Texas, January 8, 2005

On January 8, 2005, in a rail yard near Seabrook, Texas, a Union Pacific train derailed 

1 locomotive and 3 of its 50 railcars while traveling at 8 km/h [5 mph]. Diesel fuel from the 

damaged locomotive and HAZMAT from the three derailed cars were released as a 

consequence of the derailment. The HAZMAT released from these cars was nonflammable, but 

it was an oxidizer. The fire fueled by spilled diesel from the damaged locomotive was 

extinguished immediately upon arrival of emergency response services. 

The derailed cars in this accident were arranged in a sequential linear fashion along the side of 

the rail line. The sparse arrangement of railcars maximized the distance between a fire and any 

potentially affected railcars, and the limited amount of fuel produced a fire with a minimal radius 

of effect. In addition, the fire that resulted from this accident was quickly suppressed by first 

responders. This quick fire suppression is presented as further evidence that this was not a 

significant or potentially severe fire. Based on a review of the accidents evaluated in this 

analysis, it appears that significant fires are rarely quickly suppressed.

Note that significant fires appear to present a variety of challenges for emergency responders 

that prevents the fires’ immediate suppression. These challenges include addressing the 

magnitude and scope of the fire, the large uncertainty in the composition and possible 

progression of a large fire, the potential release of additional fuel or HAZMAT, and the 

associated hazards to the firefighters and the public, as well as the logistics of suppressing a 

large fire. For these reasons, it is assumed that if a fire was quickly suppressed, it was likely a 

relatively small and inconsequential fire.

Crisfield, Kansas, September 2, 1998 

On September 2, 1998, the 17th through the 19th cars and the first two platforms of the 

five-platform 20th car of a Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Railway Company intermodal 

freight train derailed near Crisfield, Kansas, while traveling at 109 km/h [68 mph]. From the 

description in National Transportation Safety Board (2000), this accident appeared to result in a 

sparse distribution, with insufficient fuel to produce a severe fire. 

3.2.2 Accidents With Widespread Railcar Severe Fires

Among the accidents identified as having a potential for severe fire, several accidents were 

categorized as accidents in which severe fires could have affected numerous railcars. 

Descriptions of these accidents follow. 
3-7 

New Brighton, Pennsylvania, October 20, 2006 

On October 20, 2006, in New Brighton, Pennsylvania, a derailment occurred on the Beaver 

River railroad bridge. The train was transporting 86 railcars, 83 loaded with denatured 

ethanol and 3 empty (likely a unit train, but not specified). The train was traveling at 60 km/h 

[37 mph], and as it crossed a bridge, a rail failure occurred, resulting in 23 railcars derailing 

(railcars 23 through 45). Of the 23 derailed cars, 20 released flammable liquids, which ignited 

and subsequently burned for about 48 hours. An aerial photograph from the accident is shown 

in Figure 3-2. 

Figure 3-2. Photograph of Derailment, New Brighton, Pennsylvania, October 20, 2006. 

This Image is From National Transportation Safety Board RAR–08/02.

Interpretations of the accident report and photographs were used in this analysis. Of the 23 

cars derailed, the configuration of the derailed cars can be separated into essentially two 

groups: those that remained on grade with the rail line (of which 6 maintained a sparse linear 

arrangement and 4 collapsed in an accordion arrangement) and 13 cars that landed below 

grade on the bank of the river bed (of which 3 were isolated and partially submerged and 

10 were entangled in a disorganized heap on the bridge embankment). Based on the 

arrangement of the railcars, the fuel available, and the total duration of the fire and the 

appearance of fire damage to the railcars, it is estimated that 14 railcars (i.e., 10 cars in the 

embankment heap and 4 cars in the accordion arrangement) could have met criterion one of a 

severe fire (extended duration, significantly engulfing fire). However, because almost every 

derailed car carried flammable liquids, it is unclear how the fire proceeded and which cars were 

damaged as a consequence of self-fueled fires or from fire fueled from adjacent cars. Thus, as 

a conservative estimate, as many as 14 railcars could be evaluated as having been affected by 

fires from adjacent railcars. And, as a consequence of this conservative estimate, 14 railcars 

can be conservatively estimated as exposed to a severe fire. However, based on observations 

made during the review of all the railway accidents in this assessment (see Section 3.1), it is 

reasonable to assume that a large fraction of the railcars was damaged during the impact of this 

substantial derailment and that these damaged railcars released flammable liquids, resulting in 

several self-fueled railcar fires. Thus, based on these observations, a more likely estimate for 

the number of railcars affected by severe fire is three to five. 
3-8 

Eunice, Louisiana, May 27, 2000 

On May 27, 2000, near Eunice Louisiana, a Union Pacific Railroad train derailed 33 of 

113 railcars as a result of a rail misalignment over a small bridge. Of the derailed railcars, 

15 contained HAZMAT including flammable liquids and gases. The release of flammable 

materials resulted in fires and explosions, which significantly affected a large fraction of the 

derailed cars. First responders were onsite within 7 minutes, and a containment zone was 

established within 3 hours. However, it required several days to safely contain this accident. 

An aerial photograph from the accident is provided in Figure 3-3.

Figure 3-3. Train Derailment Near Eunice, Louisiana, on May 27, 2000.

This Image is From National Transportation Safety Board RAR–02/03.
3-9 

A configuration of the accident was derived from descriptions, diagrams, and photos provided in 

the accident report and a diagram from the report is shown in Figure 3-4. Based on the 

configuration of the derailed cars, the cars can be separated into two groups: (i) those linearly 

arranged and on grade with the rail line and (ii) those below grade and strewn about in a loose 

heap. From the figures and details in the report, it was determined that the nine cars linearly 

aligned on grade (two not shown in diagram) were not damaged by fire and therefore were not 

affected by severe fires. Those railcars that were significantly damaged by fire but appeared to 

have been self-fueled include (i) two railcars lying nearly perpendicular to the rail track on the 

leftmost portion of Figure 3-4, (ii) two cars in the creek bed, and (iii) three isolated railcars.

Figure 3-4. Diagram of the Derailment Near Eunice, Louisiana, on May 27, 2000.

This Image is From National Transportation Safety Board RAR–02/03.

The remaining 17 cars meet criterion one of a severe fire, and because of the uncertainty in the 

progress of the fire and in whether the fire damage was the result of self-fueled fires, 17 railcars 

could be conservatively assumed to have been affected by severe fires. However, knowing that 

nearly half of the derailed cars contained flammable liquids and asserting that some of those 

released flammable liquids as a result of damage incurred during the derailment, it is likely that 

several self-fueled fires occurred. By accounting for these self-fueled fires, it is estimated that 

around 9 railcars were affected by severe fire.

Thus, based on this evaluation, it is conservatively estimated that as many as 17 railcars were 

affected by severe fires, but that a more likely number of railcars affected by severe fire is 9. 

3.2.3 Accidents Involving Local Severe Fires

After examining railway accidents that had some potential for severe fires, the majority were 

determined to have had some railcars that were affected by severe fires. These local severe 

fire accidents follow. 
3-10

Painesville, Ohio, October 10, 2007 

On October 10, 2007, a CSX Transportation freight train derailed 31 of 106 railcars while 

traveling on a main line at 77 km/h [48 mph]. NTSB and FRA investigators determined the 

cause of this accident to be a rail failure. Of the derailed cars, seven were carrying ethanol, one 

was carrying LPG, and one was carrying phthalic anhydride, with the other cars transporting 

corn, wheat, feed, plastic, and lumber. As a consequence of the derailment, several of the cars 

carrying ethanol leaked and ignited, resulting in a fire that burned for 36 hours. A photograph of 

the aftermath of this accident is shown in Figure 3-5.

Figure 3-5. Photograph of Derailment Near Painesville, Ohio, on October 10, 2007.

This Image is From National Transportation Safety Board RAB–09/02.

Based on information provided from the accident report and details from the photograph, the 

following was determined. About 9 of the 31 cars were arranged in a dense heap, in which 

several railcars were exposed to fire. The other 22 cars were arranged linearly along the track 

and were not involved in any fires. Of the nine cars in the heap, four cars appear to meet 

criterion one of a severe fire. Of these four cars, it was estimated using accident report data 

that two cars were affected by self-fueled fires. Therefore, it is estimated that only two railcars 

met both criteria for a severe fire. Thus, it was estimated that two railcars were affected by 

severe fires.

Oneida, New York, March 12, 2007 

On March 12, 2007, near Oneida, New York, a CSX Transportation freight train derailed 29 of 

78 railcars (cars 25 through 52) while traveling on a main line at 76 km/h [47 mph]. NTSB and 

FRA investigators determined the cause of this accident to be rail failure. Of the 29 cars 

derailed, 22 were tank cars loaded with HAZMAT. Of these, six tank cars were breached, 

including four transporting LPG, one transporting toluene, and one transporting ferric chloride 

acid (hazardous but not flammable). The release of materials resulted in fires and explosions.
3-11

The accident report does not provide any images or sketches; however, Figure 3-6 provides a 

photograph taken by a local paper.

Figure 3-6. Photograph of Derailment Near Oneida, New York, March 12, 2007

(Mike Greenlar, Post-Standard Staff Photographer, Used With Permission of the 

Post-Standard, ©Copyright 2007)

From the report it can be determined that the accident occurred on a straight rail with no grade, 

along a level terrain. The majority of the derailed cars were contained in a single heap of 

27 cars, with 2 additional cars isolated by several hundred feet from any other car. Of the four

LPG tanks ruptured, three were initially sequential cars (30, 31, and 32, as numbered from the 

front of the train) and the fourth LPG car was car 42; each of these ignited and burned until the 

LPG was completely consumed by the fire. The railcar carrying toluene was car 34, had about 

1,900 L [500 gal] consumed by the fire. Note that this car was releasing material as a 

consequence of tank venting (i.e., a tank car had been exposed to elevated temperatures for a 

prolonged period).

The fire affecting railcar 42 (LPG) was entirely self-fueled, and no other railcars in the vicinity of 

that car were significantly affected by fire. This conclusion is based on the assumption that the 

railcars in the immediate vicinity of car 42 were tank cars, which if they had been exposed to 

prolonged elevated temperatures would have vented HAZMAT because of a pressure buildup 

caused by heat from a fire. Considering that 22 of the 27 derailed cars were tank cars, there is 

a high possibility that neighboring railcars would have been tank cars. And if HAZMAT had 

been released, the release would have been annotated in the accident report.

The fires affecting cars 30, 31, 32, and 34 are likely related based on their sequential 

arrangement. The occurrences of explosions and the venting of toluene from car 34 provide 
3-12

evidence that at least one of the three cars (30, 31, or 32) was initially damaged during the 

derailment, resulting in a self-fueled fire and subsequent fires. Conservatively, it is assumed 

that only one of the LPG cars in this group (30, 31, or 32) was initially damaged during the 

derailment and this fire caused subsequent fires. This assumption maximizes the estimated 

number of cars in this group (30, 31, 32, and 34) potentially affected by severe fires to three 

railcars. While the subsequent fires likely resulted in additional self-fueled fires, they are 

included as cars that were affected by severe fires. 

The railcar releasing ferric chloride is not addressed by any specific information in the accident 

report. As a consequence, it is conservatively assumed to have released materials as a 

consequence of a severe fire. 

Thus, based on this evaluation, it is conservatively estimated that as many as four railcars were 

affected by severe fires. No estimate is provided for a “likely” number of affected railcars 

because no obvious basis can be made to reasonably constrict the conservative estimate. 

Brooks, Kentucky, January 16, 2007 

On January 16, 2007, 26 railcars derailed from an 80-car CSX Transportation freight train 

(cars 15 through 40) while traveling on a main line at 76 km/h [47 mph]. NTSB and FRA 

investigators determined the cause of the derailment to be a failure of a railcar truck. 

Photographs of the derailment are shown in Figures 3-7 and 3-8. 

Figure 3-7. Photograph of Brooks, Kentucky Derailment, January 16, 2007 

(Michael Clevenger, The Courier-Journal Staff Photographer, Used With 

Permission of The Courier-Journal, ©The Courier-Journal, 2007)
3-13 

Of the 26 derailed cars, 12 were tank cars carrying HAZMAT and 5 were empty. Seven of the 

tank cars were punctured or breached, releasing hazardous liquids as a result of damage from 

the derailment. Four of these damaged tank cars released flammable materials (three liquid, 

one gas) that ignited and burned. 

Figure 3-8. Photograph of a Train Derailment in Brooks, Kentucky, on 

January 16, 2007. This Image Depicts a Loosely Organized, Accordion-Type Heap of 

Railcars, With Railcars Linearly Arranged on the Periphery of the Heap. 

This Image Is From Regional Response Team Region IV 

http://www.nrt.org/Production/NRT/RRTHome.nsf/resources/RRTIVJanMeetings/$File/RR

T%20Brooks.pdf.
3-14

The accident report provided sufficient information to identify the location of the railcars 

releasing flammable materials. Three of the four tank cars that released flammable materials 

were breached by the derailment, with the fourth car damaged and leaking. The breaches 

resulted in a complete release of the tank car contents and subsequent large engulfing fires. 

Two of these cars were located in the dense derailment heap. The third breached car and the 

fourth car releasing flammable materials were located aside the rail track, slightly isolated from 

the railcar heap. 

Based on the configuration of the derailed cars and the locations of the fires, the following 

was determined: (i) the two fires associated with railcars not in the heap were sufficiently 

isolated to not have affected any adjacent railcars and (ii) the two fires associated with railcars 

in the heap were large engulfing fires, which had capacity to affect railcars in the immediate 

vicinity of the breached railcars. Because of the disordered arrangement of the railcars in the 

heap and because of the dense accordion arrangement of the heap, it is postulated that for 

each fire, two adjacent railcars could have met the criteria of a severe fire. 

It is conservatively estimated that eight railcars met criterion one of a severe fire (four of which 

were self-fueled). It is also conservatively estimated that four railcars met both criteria and thus 

are categorized as severe fires.

Anding, Mississippi, July 10, 2005

On July 10, 2005, a train collision between Canadian National freight trains occurred near 

Anding, Mississippi. This collision occurred between northbound and southbound trains 

traveling on a main line rail. The northbound train was traveling at 72 km/h [45 mph], 

transporting 137 cars: 118 were empty, 11 were loaded (5 containing HAZMAT), and 

8 contained chemical residues. The southbound train was traveling at 37 km/h [23 mph], 

transporting 107 cars: 52 were empty, 53 were loaded (15 containing HAZMAT), and 2 

contained chemical residues. A photograph of a limited portion of the accident is shown in 

Figure 3-9. 

Figure 3-9. Photograph of the Anding, Mississippi, Train Collision and Derailment.

This Image is From National Transportation Safety Board RAR–07/01.
3-15

In this accident, 6 locomotives and 17 cars were derailed (8 on the northbound and 9 on the 

southbound trains). Damaged locomotives released 57,000 L [15,000 gal] of diesel fuel, 

which ignited and burned for about 12 hours. The resulting fire caused one or more residue 

cars to begin venting because of pressure buildup caused by the heat of the fire

(National Transportation Safety Board, 2007). These residue cars, which were tank cars that 

contained trace or small amounts of material, were among the nine leading cars on the 

southbound train. They had been placed there as buffer cars by the train engineer and 

conductor to separate the locomotives from several tank cars carrying hydrogen cyanide (cars 

10 through 13, which did not derail). No other information is provided about the configuration of 

railcars involved in this accident. 

Based on the observation of venting from one or more of the residue cars (National 

Transportation Safety Board, 2007), it is assumed that one or two railcars had been 

substantially engulfed in prolonged duration fires, which were not self-fueled. Thus, it is 

estimated that two railcars were affected by severe fires in this accident. 

Tamaroa, Illinois, February 9, 2003

On February 9, 2003, a northbound Canadian National freight train, designated as a “key train,” 

derailed 22 of 108 cars in Tamaroa, Illinois, while traveling at 64 km/h [40 mph] on a main line 

rail. This accident was caused by a rail failure. Of the 108 railcars being transported, 76 were 

loaded and 32 were empty. Of the derailed cars, four released methanol and the methanol from 

two of these four cars fueled a fire that burned for about 24 hours. Other HAZMAT, both 

flammable and nonflammable, was also released from damaged railcars, but these materials did 

not result in fires. A photograph of this accident is shown in Figure 3-10. This image depicts a 

tightly packed accordion arrangement of railcars in the derailment heap. No other information 

about railcar configuration or distribution was provided. The prolonged duration of the burning 

fires suggests that these fires were large and potentially engulfing. Because of the tight 

accordion arrangement of railcars, it is reasonable to assume that up to two railcars rested 

immediately adjacent to each of the railcars engulfed in large fires. Thus, based on these 

assessments, it is conservatively estimated that four railcars were affected by severe fires.

Figure 3-10. Photograph of the Derailment of a Canadian National Freight Train in 

Tamaroa, Illinois, on February 9, 2003. This Photograph Shows a Portion of the 

Railcar Heap Resulting From This Accident. The Arrangement of Railcars 

Illustrates the Concept of an Accordion Arrangement of Derailed Railcars.

This Image Is From National Transportation Safety Board RAR–05/01.
3-16

Baltimore, Maryland, July 18, 2001

On July 18, 2001, a CSX freight train derailed 16 of 60 cars as it was passing through the 

Howard Street tunnel in Baltimore, Maryland. The derailment occurred at a speed of 29 km/h 

[18 mph] and was caused by a rail line misalignment. During the derailment, one railcar 

carrying a flammable liquid (tripropylene) was punctured. This material ignited, and a fire 

spread to the contents of several adjacent railcars carrying wood and paper products. In 

addition, two tank cars carrying hydrochloric acid were breached because of exposure to high 

temperatures, resulting in thermal degradation of the tank liners and corrosive penetration of 

one of the cars. Because the accident occurred within a tunnel, smoke and heat precluded 

access to the tunnel while the fire burned (see Figure 3-11).

(A)

(B)

Figure 3-11. Photos from the Baltimore Tunnel Fire July 18, 2001 [(A) Kim Hairston and 

(B) John Makely, The Baltimore Sun Media Group Staff Photographers, Reprinted With 

Permission of The Baltimore Sun Media Group, All Rights Reserved ©Copyright 2001]
3-17

The following assumptions were made when estimating the number of railcars affected by 

severe fires in this accident:

• The relatively slow speed of the accident and the confines of the tunnel likely resulted in 

a low density, nearly linear arrangement of derailed cars.

• The nearly linear arrangement of railcars limited the number of cars affected by the 

release of flammable liquids to those cars immediately preceding and following the 

leaking tank car.

• Damage to the tank cars carrying hydrochloric acid and wood and paper products is 

evidence that the fire was sufficient to affect neighboring railcars.

This railway accident was previously studied in detail in NUREG/CR–6886, “Spent Fuel 

Transportation Package Response to the Baltimore Tunnel Fire Scenario” (Adkins, et al., 2006). 

Based on report descriptions, it was determined that the railcars adjacent to the tank car, which 

released flammable material, were damaged as a result of exposure to thermal loading. 

Information in the accident report was used to determine that the damage adjacent railcars 

incurred was from a thermal load much smaller than that of a severe fire. However, because a 

clear distinction cannot be drawn based on the descriptions provided, it is conservatively 

estimated that both of the railcars adjacent to the tank car leaking flammable liquid met both the 

criteria of a severe fire. Thus, it is estimated that two railcars were potentially affected by 

severe fires.

East St. Louis, Illinois, September 21, 2004 

On September 21, 2004, in the Gateway Hump Yard in East St. Louis, Illinois, an Alton and 

Southern Railway Company remote control train derailed. The train collided with a tank car 

containing vinyl acetate (flammable liquid); in the subsequent derailment, vinyl acetate, which 

leaked from two tank cars, caught fire. An additional three tank cars carrying ethylene glycol 

also derailed but did not leak or contribute to the fire. A diagram of the accident is shown in 

Figure 3-12. No further details were provided about the duration of the ensuing fire. Based on 

the annotation of a damaged railcar on an adjacent rail (Figure 3-12), it is conservatively

assumed that this affected railcar was involved in a significantly engulfing fire. As a 

consequence, it is estimated that three railcars meet criteria one of a severe fire, while only the 

affected railcar on the adjacent track meets both criterion one and two. Thus, it is estimated 

that one railcar was affected by a severe fire in this accident. 

Figure 3-12. Diagram of Accident in East St. Louis, Illinois, Gateway Hump Yard.

This Image Is From National Transportation Safety Board RAB–05/04.
3-18

3.2.4 Other Noteworthy Events

In addition to accidents that involve a fire and releases from multiple railcars, descriptions of 

three additional noteworthy incidents follow.

Texarkana, Arkansas, October 15, 2005

On October 15, 2005, in a rail yard in Texarkana, Arkansas, two Union Pacific trains collided 

(head to tail) at a speed of 27 km/h [17 mph]. Three cars derailed on the end of the tail-struck 

train, one of which was a tank car. On the other train, the 18th car derailed, causing the 17th and 

19th cars to collide. The collision of the 17th and 19th cars resulted in a puncture in the end of the 

19th car, which released a flammable pressurized gas, propylene. Flowing propylene gas 

reached a house and ignited, resulting in an explosion that destroyed the house and a second 

home. The fire rapidly burned back to the punctured car. Then, under the supervision of 

emergency responders, the fire was allowed to burn for an additional 12 hours. The fire 

destroyed the leaking tank car, damaged four cars on an adjacent track, and completely burned 

a railroad trestle. A photograph of this accident is provided in Figure 3-13. 

Figure 3-13. Aerial Photograph of the Train Derailment and Fire in Texarkana, Arkansas, 

on October 15, 2005. The Widespread Fire Was the Result of Flowing Flammable Gas, 

Which Filled a Large Area Before Igniting in an Occupied House Along the Rail Line.

This Image Is From National Transportation Safety Board RAB-06/04.

Based on this description, it is conservatively estimated that as many as four railcars were 

affected by severe fires (the four damaged railcars on the adjacent track). However, because 

the fuel was a gas, it is likely that the fire burned back to the vicinity of the leaking tank car, and 

that only one railcar on the adjacent track would have likely met the criteria of significantly 
3-19

engulfing fire, while the remaining three railcars were affected by minor secondary fires. It was 

likely that only one railcar was affected by a severe fire.

Momence, Illinois, March 23, 1999

On March, 23, 1999, an eastbound Consolidated Rail Corporation train struck the side of the 

lead locomotive on a southbound Union Pacific train at a rail crossing. This collision resulted in 

the derailment of the locomotives and the first 16 railcars on the southbound train and the lead 

locomotive of the eastbound train. Diesel fuel from the damaged southbound train ignited and 

damaged railcars in the immediate area. No further details were provided that could be used to 

refine an estimate for the number of railcars affected by severe fire. 

In estimating the number of railcars affected by fire, it is assumed that the highest number of 

railcars affected by fire would occur when derailed cars were in a dense accordion arrangement 

in the vicinity of the derailed locomotives (source of fuel). Using this assumption, it is 

reasonable to assume that two or three railcars could have been significantly engulfed in 

prolonged fires. On this basis, it is estimated that three railcars were affected by severe fires. 

This accident is noteworthy because the fuel from the fire was not associated with the release of 

HAZMAT from transported freight.

Delia, Kansas, July 2, 1997 

On July 2, 1997, in Delia, Kansas, a train traveling on a side rail collided with the sixth railcar of 

the train on the main line. The collision resulted in the derailment of 15 railcars from the train on 

the main line and 3 railcars and 2 locomotives from the train on the side rail. A fire then 

immediately erupted, “engulfing the derailed cars and locomotives of both trains” (National 

Transportation Safety Board, 1999). The accident speed was 113 and 24 km/h [70 and 15 mph] 

for the main line and side line trains, respectively. The fire was fueled by the release of diesel 

from the damaged locomotive. 

Similar to the Momence, Illinois, accident, details about the fire are limited. In estimating the 

number of railcars affected by fire, it is assumed that the highest number of railcars affected by 

fire would occur when derailed cars were in a dense accordion arrangement in the vicinity of the 

derailed locomotives (source of fuel). Using this assumption, it is reasonable to assume that 

two or three railcars could have been significantly engulfed in prolonged fires. On this basis, it 

is estimated that three railcars were affected by severe fires. 

This accident is noteworthy because one of the cars affected by fire contained 18 medical 

isotope generators (molybdenum 99 → technetium 99), all of which were spent. 

Eight packages were shipped as Radioactive YELLOW-II and 10 were shipped as Radioactive 

WHITE-I material.

1

 

1

From 49 CFR 172.403 for the maximum radiation level at any point on the external surface of greater than 

0.005 mSv/h [0.5 mrem/h] but less than or equal to 0.5 mSv/h [50 mrem/h], the package of radioactive material is 

labeled YELLOW-II; less than or equal to 0.005 mSv/h [0.5 mrem/h], the package is labeled WHITE-I.
3-20

3.3 Frequency of Severe Railway Accidents 

Table 3-1 includes the multiple-car HAZMAT release accidents that occurred in the last 12 years 

involving a severe fire that were described in Section 3.2. 

Table 3-1. Summary of Severe Railway Accidents From 1997 to 2008

Year Million Freight Train 

Miles*

Severe Fire Incidents Frequency† Widespread Local

1997 512 0 0 0

1998 520 0 0 0

1999 542 0 0 0

2000 549 1 0 0.002

2001 538 0 1 0.002

2002 547 0 0 0

2003 561 0 1 0.002

2004 584 0 1 0.002

2005 597 0 1 0.002

2006 624 1 0 0.002

2007 586 0 3 0.005

2008 565 0 0 0

Total 6,725 9 0.001‡

*To convert to kilometers, multiply by 1.609.

†Accidents per million freight train-mi. To convert to accidents per million freight train-km, divide by 1.609.

‡Assuming a Poisson distribution based on severe fires being independent rare events and assuming the accident 

rate is approximately constant over the 12 years, for a 95 percent confidence interval, the lower limit is 6.1 × 10−4

accidents per million freight train-mi and the upper limit is 2.5 × 10−3 accidents per million freight train-mi.

For the 20 multiple-car HAZMAT release accidents resulting in a fire over the last 12 years, the 

fire was severe in about half of them. Eight of the nine accidents occurred on the main line. 

One accident occurred off the main line in 2004. As shown in Table 3-1, on average for the last 

12 years, fewer than one severe fire accident (i.e., 0.75) occurred per year with an overall 

frequency of roughly 6.2 × 10−4 accidents per million freight train-km [1 × 10−3 accidents per 

million freight train-mi]. In 2007, however, the number of severe fire accidents was significantly 

greater, with one-third of the severe fire accidents occurring in that year alone.

3.4 Severe Fire Accident Parameter Trends

During the investigation of railway accidents that involved potentially severe fires, the accidents 

naturally distributed themselves into three categories: (i) widespread severe fires, (ii) local 

severe fires, and (iii) no severe fires. The following sections describe the parametric trends 

associated with each of these categories. 
3-21

3.4.1 Widespread Severe Fire Accidents

Railway fire accidents for which ten or more railcars were conservatively estimated to have 

been affected by severe fires were placed in a category called widespread severe fires. Of 

the accidents examined in this analysis, only two fall into this category. The first occurred 

in New Brighton, Pennsylvania, on October 20, 2006, and the second occurred in 

Eunice, Louisiana, on May 27, 2000. Accident parameters and values are summarized in 

Table 3-2. Some values in this table differ slightly from the information in the NTSB reports and 

described in Section 3.2.2; however, the data was taken from the FRA database to be 

consistent with Chapter 2. As shown in Table 3-2, the accidents occurred on Class 3 or Class 4 

track where nearly 65 percent of the accidents (i.e., 11 out of 17) involving a fire occurred 

(Figure 2-7). In addition, they occurred at speeds less than 64 km/h [40 mph] where almost half 

of the accidents (i.e., 8 of the 17) involving a fire occurred (Figure 2-10).

For the accident in Eunice, Louisiana, the rail was misaligned due to broken joint bars (National 

Transportation Safety Board, 2002). For the accident in New Brighton, Pennsylvania, the rail 

fractured under the load of the train from an undetected defect (National Transportation Safety 

Board, 2008). In addition to the parameters listed in Table 3-2, both derailments involved track 

failure in the vicinity of a bridge. The close proximity of bridges contributed to the severity of 

both of these accidents by providing conditions that were favorable for the formation of dense 

railcar heaps. In both of these accidents, railcars were piled on top of other railcars. Thus, 

when fires fueled by flammable liquids occurred, railcars were in closer proximity to the fires and 

the severity of the fires tended to be more intense. The resulting intense fires and less 

manageable railcar configurations also contributed to longer duration fires and extended 

accident containment times.

Table 3-2. Parameters for Accidents Involving Widespread Railcar Severe Fires

Parameters New Brighton, 

Pennsylvania

Eunice, Louisiana

Speed (mph)* 37 39

Total Number of Cars 83 113

Number of Cars Derailed 23 32

Number of HAZMAT Cars 80 56

Number of HAZMAT Cars Releasing 20 18

Track Class 4 3

*To convert to km/h, multiply by 1.609

Another key factor contributing to the severity of these accidents was the amount of flammable 

HAZMAT these trains transported. Table 3-2 provides the total number of railcars and the 

number of railcars carrying HAZMAT for the trains involved in these accidents. From this 

information, it is clear that both trains were largely composed of cars containing HAZMAT. In 

addition, as discussed in Section 3.2.2, several cars were carrying flammable materials, and as 

shown in Appendix A, Table A–1, both trains released thousands of gallons of flammable liquid 

(i.e., Class 3 HAZMAT). Note that the trains involved in these accidents were likely either “unit” 

trains, specifically for the New Brighton accident, or “key” trains, and that SNF transportation on 

these types of trains would be unlikely or would occur under more stringent regulations.
3-22

3.4.2 Local Severe Fire Accidents

For accidents involving severe fires that affected some of the railcars (i.e., local severe fires), 

six occurred on the main line and one occurred off the main line in a rail yard. Five of the six

accidents involved a derailment with the remaining one, a head-on-collision. The accident in the 

rail yard involved an impact. Table 3-3 lists parameters associated with the five severe fire 

accidents involving a derailment. Similar to Table 3-2, some values in Table 3-3 differ slightly 

from the information in the NTSB reports and describe in Section 3.2.3; however, the data was 

taken from the FRA database to be consistent with Chapter 2.

As shown in Table 3-3, many of the parameters in the left four accidents (i.e., those occurring in 

2003 and 2007) are similar. These accidents occurred at speeds above 64 km/h [40 mph] 

where more than half of the accidents (i.e., 9 out of 17) involving a fire occurred (Figure 2-10). 

They occurred on Class 4 track where almost half of the accidents (i.e., 8 out of 17) involving a 

fire occurred (Figure 2-7). They involved a HAZMAT release from 5 to 7 cars, and as shown in 

Figure 2-4, a fire resulted approximately 41 percent of the time (i.e., 7 accidents out of 17) when 

HAZMAT was released from 5 to 7 cars. As shown in Table 2-3, the four accidents all involved 

the release of Class 3 HAZMAT (i.e., flammable liquid) and three out of the four also involved 

the release of Class 2.1 HAZMAT (i.e., flammable gas). In Appendix A, Table A–1 shows that

all four accidents resulted in the release of thousands of gallons of flammable liquid or 

flammable gas.

Table 3-3. Parameters for Accidents Involving Severe Fires (Derailments)

Parameters Painesville, 

Ohio

Oneida,

New York

Brooks,

Kentucky

Tamaroa,

Illinois

Baltimore, 

Maryland

Date 10/10/2007 3/12/2007 1/16/2007 2/9/2003 7/18/2001

Speed (mph) 48 47 47 42 18

Total Number of Cars 112 78 80 102 60

Number of Cars Derailed 31 29 26 22 11

Number of HAZMAT Cars 40 42 15 50 9

Number of HAZMAT Cars 

Releasing 5 6 7 7 4

Track Class 4 4 4 4 2

*To convert to km/h, multiply by 1.609

The Baltimore, Maryland, accident in Table 3-3 occurred at a lower speed, on Class 2 track, and 

involved a release from a fewer number of cars. Unlike the other accidents in Table 3-3, the 

accident in Baltimore, Maryland, occurred in a tunnel. The constrained environment contributed 

to making this accident a severe fire because smoke and heat in the tunnel limited access to 

the fire. 

The four severe fire accidents involving a derailment that did not occur in a tunnel are 

characterized by train speeds greater than 64 km/h [40 mph] and a HAZMAT release from five

or more cars in which a significant amount of flammable liquid or gas was released. The 

accident occurring in Brooks, Kentucky, was caused by the failure of a railcar truck. The other 

three accidents were caused by rail failure.
3-23

3.4.3 Summary of Severe Fire Accident Parameter Trends

Severe fire accidents (both widespread and local accidents) are generally characterized by 

derailments in which HAZMAT was released from several cars (i.e., five or more cars). The 

release involved thousands of gallons of flammable liquid or gas. In general, these accidents 

were caused by rail failure. As summarized in Tables 3-2 and 3-3, they generally occurred at 

speeds from just below 64 km/h [40 mph] to just below 80 km/h [50 mph] and typically occurred 

on Class 3 or Class 4 track.
4-1 

4 CONCLUSIONS 

Based on NAS recommendations, NRC is in the process of determining the types of accident 

parameters that could potentially impact the rail transport of SNF. This study has been 

performed to update the frequency analyses of railway accidents. Results suggest that in the 

previous 12 years, the freight train accident frequency is roughly 1.8 accidents per million freight 

train-km [2.88 accidents per million freight train-mi]. This result is comparable to the previous 

study by EPRI, which calculated 1.7 accidents per million freight train-km [2.67 accidents per 

million freight train-mi]. In addition, the accident frequency has declined significantly over the 

last 34 years, from a frequency of 6.4 accidents per million freight train-km [10.35 accidents per 

million freight train-mi] in 1975 to 1.4 accidents per million freight train-km [2.28 accidents per 

million freight train-mi] in 2008. 

This study further examined the accident frequency associated with fires. The report focused 

on accidents where multiple-car HAZMAT releases occurred, because these types of accidents 

would most likely result in a severe, long duration fire. The results indicated that the frequency 

for multiple-car HAZMAT releases resulting in a fire is 1.9 × 10−3 accidents per million freight 

train-km [3 × 10−3 accidents per million freight train-mi]. However, the accident frequency 

increased significantly in the last 2 years (i.e., 2007 and 2008) in which eight of the 20 fire 

accidents occurred.

The evaluation of fire-related accidents further identified those that were severe. The 

identification of severe fires was based on (i) the fire being able to fully engulf a railcar for an 

extended period of time and (ii) the source of fuel for the engulfing fire being derived from 

another railcar. With these two criteria in place, the frequency for a severe fire was 

calculated to be 6.2 × 10−4 accidents per million freight train-km [1 × 10−3 accidents per million 

freight train-mi]. 

To understand some of the parameters that may lead to a severe fire, accident trends were 

evaluated. With only nine severe fire accidents in the last 12 years, data are lacking; however, 

some common factors were identified. The railway severe fire accidents were generally 

characterized by derailments in which HAZMAT was released from several cars (i.e., five or 

more cars). The release involved thousands of gallons of flammable liquid or gas and 

occurred at speeds typically in the range from just below 64 km/h [40 mph] to just below 

80 km/h [50 mph]. 

Based on the analysis of accident data, there is a very small frequency of severe fire accidents 

and therefore a very small likelihood that an SNF transportation package being transported on 

rail would be involved in a severe fire. Limiting SNF package transport to trains that are not 

also carrying flammable liquid or gas (i.e., on dedicated trains) would likely make the likelihood

even lower.
5-1 

5 REFERENCES 

Adkins, H.E., Jr., J.M. Cuta, B.J. Koeppel, A.D. Guzman, and C.S. Bajwa. NUREG/CR–6886, 

“Spent Fuel Transportation Package Response to Baltimore Tunnel Fire Scenario.” 

Washington, DC: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 2006.

Dykes, A. “Criticality Risks During Transportation of Spent Nuclear Fuel, Revision 1.” 

Report No. 1016635. Palo Alto, California: Electric Power Research Institute. 2008.

Federal Railroad Administration. <http://safetydata.fra.dot.gov/officeofsafety/> (15 June 2010).

_____. “FRA Guide for Preparing Accident/Incident Reports.” DOT/FRA/RRS-22. 

Washington, DC: Federal Railroad Administration, Office of Safety. 2003.

Fisher, L.E., C.K. Chou, M.A. Gerhard, C.Y. Kimura, R.W. Martin, R.W. Mensing, M.E. Mount, 

and M.C. Witte. NUREG/CR–4829, “Shipping Container Response to Severe Highway and 

Railway Accident Conditions.” Washington, DC: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 1988.

Larson, D.W., R.K. Clarke, J.T. Foley, and V F. Hartman. “Severities of Transportation 

Accidents, Volume IV—Train.” SLA–74–001. Albuquerque, New Mexico: Sandia National 

Laboratories. 1975.

National Academies Press. “Going the Distance? The Safe Transport of Spent Nuclear Fuel 

and High-Level Radioactive Waste in the United States.” Washington, DC: National Academies 

Press. February 2006.

National Transportation Safety Board. “Derailment of Norfolk Southern Railway Company Train 

68QB119 with Release of Hazardous Materials and Fire, New Brighton, Pennsylvania, October 

20, 2006.” NTSB/RAR-08/02, PB2008-916302. Washington, DC: National Transportation 

Safety Board. 2008.

_____. “Collision of Two CN Freight Trains, Anding, Mississippi, July 10, 2005.” 

NTSB/RAR-07/01, PB2007-916301. Washington, DC: National Transportation Safety Board. 

2007.

_____. “Railroad Accident Brief.” NTSB/RAB-05/04. Washington, DC: National Transportation 

Safety Board. 2005.

_____. “Derailment of Union Pacific Railroad Train QFPLI-26 at Eunice, Louisiana, 

May 27, 2000.” NTSB/RAR-02/03, PB2002-916303. Washington, DC: National Transportation 

Safety Board. 2002.

_____. “Derailment of Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Railway Company Intermodal Freight 

Train: S-CHILAC1-31. Crisfield, Kansas: September 2, 1998.” NTSB/RAR-00/01, 

PB2000-916301. Washington, DC: National Transportation Safety Board. 2000.

_____. “Collision Between Union Pacific Freight Trains MKSNP-01 and ZSEME-29 

Near Delia, Kansas July 2, 1997.” NTSB/RAR-99/04, PB99-916304. Washington, DC: 

National Transportation Safety Board. 1999.

NRC. NUREG–0170, “Final Environmental Statement on the Transportation of Radioactive 

Material by Air and Other Modes.” Washington, DC: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 

December 1977.

Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration. “Incident Reports Database Search.” 

<https://hazmatonline.phmsa.dot.gov/IncidentReportsSearch/> (15 June 2010).
5-2 

Regional Response Team Region IV. “CXS Train Derailment Brooks, Kentucky January 2007.” 

<http://www.nrt.org/Production/NRT/RRTHome.nsf/resources/RRTIVJanMeetings/$File/RRT%2

0Brooks.pdf> (9 June 2010). 

Saricks, C.L. and M.M. Tompkins. “State-Level Accident Rates of Surface Freight 

Transportation: A Reexamination.” ANL/ASD/TM-150. Argonne, Illinois: Argonne National 

Laboratory Transportation Technology R&D Center. 1999. 

Sprung, J.L., D.J. Ammerman, J.A. Koski, and R.F. Weiner. NUREG/CR–6672, “Reexamination 

of Spent Fuel Shipment Risk Estimates.” Washington, DC: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission. 2000.

U.S. Department of Energy. DOE/EIS-0250, “Final Environmental Impact Statement for a 

Geologic Repository for the Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste 

at Yucca Mountain, Nye County, Nevada.” February 2002. 
APPENDIX A 

ACCIDENTS OCCURRING ON THE MAIN LINE
A–1 

Table A–1. Multiple-Car Hazardous Material Release Accidents That Occurred on the Main Line From 1997 to 2008

Track Speed Total Cars HAZMAT Cars Fire† Class 2.1 Class 3

Class 

4.1 Class 5.1

Date Location Type* Class (mph) Derail

Damage/

Derail Release (gal)‡ (cf)§ (gal) (lb)║ (gal) (gal) (lb)

12/7/2008 Nolan, ND D 4 55 67 37 24 11 6 Y 450 6,260

10/23/2008 Caney, OK D 4 24 110 16 29 7 3 Y 12,000

8/22/2008 Luther, OK D 2 19 110 14 13 8 5 Y 80,746

5/24/2008 Mingo, OH D 2 24 45 5 6 3 2 U 2

3/3/2008 Mecca, CA D 5 46 65 28 7 6 4 N

12/28/2007 New 

Florence, PA

D 3 23 41 9 17 8 2 Y 15,000

10/24/2007 Arkansas 

City, KS

D 3 19 110 10 32 7 2 N 21

10/10/2007 Painesville, 

OH

D 4 48 112 31 40 8 5 Y 55,200

10/8/2007 Safford, AZ D 1 10 47 5 20 5 3 U

7/22/2007 Sullivan, IN D 2 22 21 8 14 7 2 U 20,000

5/29/2007 Castleberry, 

AL

D 4 49 66 26 17 8 3 N 15

3/12/2007 Oneida, NY D 4 47 78 29 42 22 6 Y 124,313 3,181

3/8/2007 Hattiesburg, 

MS

D 2 11 58 11 28 5 2 N

1/16/2007 Brooks, KY D 4 47 80 26 15 12 7 Y 33,635 41,685

12/7/2006 East 

Bloomburg, 

PA

D 3 40 60 21 6 4 2 U

11/22/2006 New Ulm, 

MN

D 2 24 66 7 65 7 7 N 24,877

10/20/2006 New 

Brighton, PA

D 4 37 83 23 80 23 20 Y 485,278

7/18/2006 Neosho 

Rapids, KS

D 4 53 86 12 12 5 3 N 219

6/30/2006 Emporium, 

PA

D 3 76 46 31 5 5 3 N 

6/27/2006 Saint Jacob, 

IL

D 4 54 131 21 19 7 3 N 198,100

2/9/2006 Pima, AZ D 1 10 26 8 19 8 6 U

12/8/2005 Lordsburg, 

NM

D 1 5 50 5 50 5 3 N 

9/20/2005 Eagle Pass, 

TX

D 2 10 81 8 6 5 2 N 500

7/10/2005 Anding, MS HOC 3 51 137 8 13 5 2 Y 20 15,000

6/24/2005 Hoxie, AR D 4 54 84 22 18 4 4 N

4/21/2005 Tyrone, OK D 5 70 87 36 12 4 2 N 4,000

10/25/2004 Detroit, MI D 4 2 81 9 9 4 2 N 4

8/8/2004 Newton 

Hamilton, PA

D 4 47 105 37 5 5 2 N 

7/27/2004 Balaton, MN D 3 30 75 14 8 8 2 U 15,000

4/28/2004 Dallas, TX D 2 17 87 12 7 7 2 N 85

2/7/2004 Leslie, MD D 4 44 50 34 13 12 3 N

1/24/2004 Bylas, AZ D 1 8 60 6 39 6 5 N
A–2 

Table A–1. Multiple-Car Hazardous Material Release Accidents That Occurred on the Main Line 

From 1997 to 2008 (continued).

Track Speed

Total 

Cars

HAZMAT 

Cars Fire† Class 2.1 Class 3

Class 

4.1

Class 

5.1

Date Location Type* Class (mph) Derail

Damage/

Derail Release (gal)‡ (cf)§ (gal) (lb)║ (gal) (gal) (lb)

1/11/2004 Hoyte, TX D 4 45 87 36 17 11 6 N 94,445

10/25/2003 Shorters, AL D 4 49 99 27 43 7 3 Y 57,171 2,500

8/14/2003 Vacherie, LA D 4 39 131 45 78 23 2 N

5/8/2003 Matfield 

Green, KS

D 5 51 118 38 15 5 2 N

2/9/2003 Tamaroa, IL D 4 42 102 22 50 19 7 Y 7,000 57,840

10/22/2002 Coahoma, 

TX

D 4 41 56 17 28 11 2 N

10/12/2002 Amite, LA D 4 28 116 21 64 8 2 N 14,000

9/15/2002 Boyd, TN D 4 38 141 25 6 6 2 N

8/26/2002 Brownsville, 

TX

D 1 5 124 9 26 9 3 N 5

8/15/2002 Bozeman, 

MN

D 3 30 74 28 12 11 3 N 

5/27/2002 Potterville, 

MI

D 4 55 58 35 14 11 2 N 7,000

5/7/2002 Bentonia, 

MS

D 4 36 131 42 19 12 2 N 320

2/7/2002 Argonia, KS D 5 66 33 19 17 17 7 N 11

1/18/2002 Minot, ND D 3 41 112 31 39 15 11 N 

12/23/2001 Rochester, 

NY

D 2 30 43 29 3 3 2 N 14,150

11/30/2001 Florence, AZ D 2 25 59 8 25 2 2 N

8/30/2001 Mulvane, KS OBS 5 55 32 10 10 4 3 Y 7,176

8/10/2001 Emhouse, 

TX

D 3 23 92 8 23 4 3 N 275

8/5/2001 Pinehurst, 

TX

D 3 40 84 21 11 7 2 N 26,500

7/20/2001 Ruddock, LA D 4 24 139 26 65 24 4 N 22,881

7/18/2001 Baltimore, 

MD

D 2 18 60 11 9 4 4 Y 30,000

6/17/2001 Wilmington, 

OH

D 3 30 68 16 7 4 2 N 

4/18/2001 Bussey, IA D 4 10 86 9 13 9 4 N 26,133

2/18/2001 Central 

Junction, AL

D 4 25 58 13 15 3 3 N 350,000

1/17/2001 Loder, OK D 5 68 73 11 6 3 2 N 150

1/2/2001 Tucson, AZ D 3 41 107 19 27 9 3 N

12/21/2000 Philadelphia, 

PA

D 2 18 39 12 37 12 2 N

12/18/2000 Plymouth, 

MN

D 2 25 102 28 102 28 6 Y 19,000

11/9/2000 Pima, AZ D X 10 28 3 15 3 2 U

11/4/2000 Scotts Bluff, 

NB

D 4 50 79 18 21 10 5 N 150,020

9/3/2000 Dacula, GA D 3 37 38 15 31 13 6 N 28,500

7/10/2000 Ibis, CA D 4 30 48 3 14 3 2 N 21

5/27/2000 Eunice, LA D 3 39 113 32 56 18 18 Y 6,885 125,130
A–3 

Table A–1. Multiple-Car Hazardous Material Release Accidents That Occurred on the Main Line 

From 1997 to 2008 (continued).

Track Speed

Total 

Cars

HAZMAT 

Cars Fire† Class 2.1 Class 3

Class 

4.1

Class 

5.1

Date Location Type* Class (mph) Derail

Damage/

Derail Release (gal‡) (cf)§ (gal) (lb)║ (gal) (gal) (lb)

5/6/2000 Mt. Hebron, 

AL

D 3 38 107 25 4 4 3 N 48,263 50,525

4/22/2000 Yampai, AZ D 4 19 94 10 29 4 2 N 10,200

3/21/2000 North Power, 

OR

D 5 69 80 38 3 2 2 N 73

2/1/2000 Parmele, NC D 3 32 39 14 12 6 2 N

10/31/1999 Canyon, AK D 2 18 49 10 46 10 6 N 3,140

9/30/1999 Drummond, 

MT

D 4 60 115 46 20 7 2 N 26,033

7/13/1999 Lawler, IA D 3 29 76 24 3 3 2 N 45,200

7/11/1999 Paradise, MT D 4 43 74 29 6 6 5 N

7/2/1999 Hamlet, NC D 2 10 158 12 44 8 2 N 1,000

3/24/1999 Wartrace, TN D 4 44 74 8 25 8 4 N

1/9/1999 Milford, NE D 5 38 124 15 9 9 5 N 109,000

12/2/1998 Crenshaw, 

MS

D 4 26 151 8 72 6 3 N 

9/25/1998 De Quincy, 

LA

D 4 53 24 20 4 2 2 U

9/2/1998 Crisfield, KS D 5 69 59 4 5 3 3 Y 1 2,965

6/29/1998 South Bend, 

NE

D 4 30 94 26 4 4 2 N

6/29/1998 Page, WA D 3 37 57 19 12 6 3 N 1,200

6/26/1998 Niota, IL SC 5 28 64 6 6 6 4 Y 82

6/20/1998 Cox Landing, 

WV

D 3 27 149 20 48 11 2 N

3/18/1998 Cheraw, SC D 4 45 32 17 11 9 3 N

7/18/1997 Flora, MS D 4 27 125 12 25 2 2 N 1,500

6/12/1997 Nampa, ID D 4 22 67 7 9 3 3 N

5/25/1997 Bauxite, AR OI 1 7 12 0 2 2 2 N

3/30/1997 Ridgecrest, 

NC

D 4 54 54 42 4 3 2 N 

1/22/1997 Appleby, TX D 3 38 31 13 8 8 2 N

*Type: D = derailment, OBS = obstruction, HOC = head-on collision, SC = side collision, OI = other impacts

†Fire: Y = yes, N = no, U = undetermined

‡To convert to liters, multiply by 3.785

§ To convert to cubic meters, multiply by 2.83 × 10−2

║To convert to kilograms, multiply by 0.4536
APPENDIX B

ACCIDENTS OCCURRING OFF THE MAIN LINE
B–1 

Table B–1. Multiple-Car Hazardous Material Release Accidents That Occurred Off the Main Line From 1997 to 2008

Track* Total Cars HAZMAT Cars Fire† Class 2.1 Class 3

Class 

4.1 Class 5.1

Date Location Type‡ Derail

Damage/

Derail Release (gal) § (cf) ║ (gal) (lb)¶ (gal) (gal) (lb)

12/1/2008 Birmingham, AL SC y 114 1 3 2 2 N 6

10/22/2007 Middlebury, VT D y 25 24 15 15 4 Y 500

8/25/2007 Knoxville, TN D y 91 5 58 3 2 N 1

5/31/2007 Walbridge, OH D y 75 8 10 8 4 N 203

12/25/2006 Amarillo, TX D y 140 5 24 2 2 N 5

12/5/2006 Memphis, TN D y 92 8 11 3 2 N

10/25/2006 Livonia, LA D y 59 6 14 2 2 N

3/28/2006 Sahuarita, AZ D i 18 2 18 2 2 U

8/26/2005 Willow Springs, 

MO

D s 103 16 9 3 2 N 280

8/6/2005 Portland, OR D y 77 5 9 5 2 N 30

6/24/2005 Worland, WY D s 38 4 27 4 2 N 3

4/15/2005 Delpro, AR D i 15 7 4 4 2 N 1

1/8/2005 Seabrook, TX D i 50 3 13 3 2 Y 1,200 100

12/12/2004 Big Stone City, 

SD

U i 2 2 2 2 2 N 955

9/21/2004 East St. Louis, 

IL

OI y 3 2 3 2 2 Y 48,167

6/7/2004 Vancouver, WA D y 65 5 9 5 2 N 1

4/11/2003 Slaton, TX D y 149 6 5 4 2 N 10,234

8/31/2001 Slaton, TX D y 70 4 2 1 2 N 3,001

6/17/2001 Carson, CA D y 25 4 12 4 2 U 2

3/25/2001 Wamsutter, WY D s 112 14 4 4 2 N

7/11/2000 Columbus, OH D y 125 5 37 5 2 N 10

12/22/1999 Talkeetna, AK D y 49 15 41 15 14 N 120,000

3/23/1999 Bedford Park, IL D y 30 5 6 2 2 U

12/12/1998 Riverdale, IL RC y 33 5 7 2 2 U

10/20/1998 Austin, TX D y 17 4 3 3 3 U

10/6/1998 Camden, AR D y 63 4 4 4 2 N 3,000

8/16/1998 Panhandle, TX OI s 20 6 6 6 2 N 18,000

5/21/1998 Englewood, TX D y 77 5 20 5 2 N

4/19/1998 Henderson, NV D i 7 3 7 5 5 N

6/22/1997 Bowie, AZ D y 74 3 38 3 2 U

*Track: m = main, i = industry, y = yard, s = siding

†Fire: Y = yes, N = no, U = undetermined

‡Type: D = derailment, OBS = obstruction, HOC = head-on collision, SC = side collision, OI = other impacts, RC = raking collision

§To convert to liters, multiply by 3.785

║To convert to cubic meters, multiply by 2.83 × 10−2

¶To convert to kilograms, multiply by 0.4536