J-A01018-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

ZAYD BABB-ALIBEY

v.

JIM LIPPMAN, 

CEO/CHAIRMAN/FOUNDER A/K/A JRK 

PROPERTY HOLDINGS, INC. D/B/A 

APEX MANAYUNK D/B/A VENICE 

LOFTS 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1484 EDA 2022

Appeal from the Order Entered May 4, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Civil Division at 

No(s): 220301003

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., NICHOLS, J., and McCAFFERY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.: FILED MARCH 7, 2023

Appellant Jim Lippman1 appeals from the order of the Philadelphia 

County Court of Common Pleas denying his petition to open and/or strike a 

default judgment entered by the Philadelphia Municipal Court. We reverse the 

Common Pleas Court’s order denying Appellant’s petition, vacate the default 

____________________________________________

1

In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the Court of Common Pleas refers to two 

appellants in this matter: Jim Lippman and Venice Lofts. See Rule 1925(a) 

Op., 8/16/22, at 2-9. Further, the notice of appeal refers to “Defendants, Jim 

Lippman, CEO/Chairman/Founder aka/dba JRK Property Holdings, Inc. dba 

Apex Manayunk dba Venice Lofts.” See Notice of Appeal, 6/2/22. However, 

Appellant’s brief refers only to a single appellant, and does not specify whether 

that appellant is Mr. Lippman or Venice Lofts. See Appellant’s Brief at 13-14. 

For consistency, we refer to Appellant in the singular. We refer to Lippman 

and Venice Lofts separately as necessary. 
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judgment order and remand for further proceedings before the Common Pleas 

Court. 

The Court of Common Pleas summarized the factual and procedural 

history of this matter as follows:

In this action originally commenced in the Municipal Court, 

[Appellee] Zayd Babb-Alibey alleged that the apartment he 

rented, along with his wife and newborn child, at the Venice Lofts 

apartment complex in Philadelphia, was contaminated with 

mold.

[FN1]

 [Appellee] named as Defendant Jim Lippman 

CEO/Chairman/Founder aka/dba JRK Property Holdings, Inc. dba 

Apex Manayunk dba Venice Lofts. . . .

[FN1] [Appellee’s] wife, Chloe Davis, filed her own, identical 

action. That case is docketed as March Term 2022 No. 

1004. The 1925(a) opinions in both cases are being filed 

contemporaneously and are identical, save for the identity 

of the [respective] plaintiff.

* * *

[Appellee] initiated this matter on September 14, 2021, in the 

Philadelphia Municipal Court. [Appellee] alleged that Mr. Lippman 

and/or his agents negligently maintained the apartment, which led 

to the growth of mold that caused [Appellee] and his family to 

experience physical and mental injuries. The filed copies of the 

case initiating documents in the Municipal Court bear the date, 

time and location of the trial, which was scheduled for December 

28, 2021.

[Appellee], through counsel, served Mr. Lippman with the case 

initiating documents. The affidavit of service presented in 

Municipal Court indicates that on December 16, 2021, [Appellee’s] 

counsel mailed the complaint via USPS “Priority Mail Express 1-

Day” to Jim [Lippman] and JRK Propert[y] at 11766 Wilshire 

Boulevard in Los Angeles, California. The affidavit included 

tracking information showing that the complaint was received on 

December 17, 2021, by Jessica Rice.

At the call of the trial on December 28, 2021, Mr. Lippman failed 

to appear. As a result, Municipal Court Judge Matthew Wolf 

entered default judgment in favor of [Appellee] and against Mr. 
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Lippman. Municipal Court Rule 120(b) provides that where a 

claimant appears, and a defendant fails to appear, and service 

was made at least 7 days prior to the trial, then the Municipal 

Court Judge shall enter default judgment in favor of the claimant 

(in this case, [Appellee]).

On January 31, 2022, Venice Lofts filed a petition to intervene and 

open the default judgment. Mr. Lippman, as the previously named 

defendant, joined in the petition to open.

At the conclusion of a hearing on February 28, 2022, Municipal 

Court Judge Greg O. Yorgey-Girdy issued an order denying the 

petition to open the default judgment. 

Rule 1925(a) Op., 8/16/22, at 1-3 (some formatting altered).

We add that during the hearing before the Municipal Court, Appellant 

argued that Appellee had served the wrong party and that the proper 

defendant was the owner of the property: Venice Lofts d/b/a/ Apex Manayunk, 

which was located at 4601 Flat Rock Road in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. N.T. 

Hr’g, 2/28/22, at 13, 17, 19. Appellant’s counsel explained that “JRK 

Propert[y] is the parent company to multiple properties over the nation. . . . 

Venice Lofts is the subsidiary of JRK but there is no other connection, it is still 

a separate entity but JRK has no holding in the property [i.e., the apartment 

complex] . . . .” Id. at 18-19. Appellee responded that Appellant was arguing 

that “the left hand doesn’t know what the right hand is doing, . . . ” Id. at 

20. The Municipal Court then denied Appellant’s petition to open the 

judgment. Id.; see also Phila. Mun. Ct. Order, 2/28/22. 

Subsequently, Appellant filed a timely appeal to the Court of Common 

Pleas. Appellant also filed a petition to open and/or strike the default 
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judgment with that court. Appellee filed an answer to Appellant’s petition and 

a supporting memorandum of law. 

The Court of Common Pleas denied Appellant’s appeal from the 

Municipal Court seeking to open and/or strike the default judgment on May 4, 

2022.2 Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal to this Court and a courtordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement. The Court of Common Pleas filed a Rule 

1925(a) opinion concluding that Appellant waived all of his issues. See Rule 

1925(a) Op. at 5-6, 8-9. In the alternative, the Court of Common Pleas 

concluded that that the Municipal Court did not abuse its discretion in denying 

Appellant’s petition to open the default judgment. See id. at 6-8. 

Appellant raises the following issues:

1. Did the Court [of Common Pleas] err as a matter of law and 

abuse its discretion when it failed to properly apply Pa.R.C.P. 

403 as [Appellee] did not serve complaint within 90 days after 

the action was commenced?

2. Did the Court [of Common Pleas] err as a matter of law and 

abuse its discretion in failing to find that the default judgment 

against Jim Lippman who is not alleged to be the owner of the 

property and not a party to the lease agreement is defective?

Appellant’s Brief at 4 (formatting altered). 

____________________________________________

2 The Court of Common Pleas’ order is dated May 3, 2022, but notice of that 

order was sent to the parties on May 4, 2022. See Pa.R.A.P. 108(b); Pa.R.C.P. 

236(b). We have amended the caption accordingly.
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Waiver

Initially, we address the Court of Common Pleas’ conclusion that 

Appellant waived all of his claims on appeal. See Rule 1925(a) Op. at 5-6, 8-

9. “The issue of waiver presents a question of law, and, as such, our standard 

of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary.” Trigg v. Children’s

Hosp. of Pittsburgh of UPMC, 229 A.3d 260, 269 (Pa. 2020) (citation 

omitted). 

Rule of Appellate Procedure 302 states, in relevant part, that “[i]ssues 

not raised in the lower court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time 

on appeal.” Pa.R.A.P. 302(a); see also Steiner v. Markel, 968 A.2d 1253, 

1256 (Pa. 2009) (stating “an appellate court cannot reverse a trial court 

judgment on a basis that was not properly raised and preserved by the 

parties” (citations omitted)); Irwin Union Nat. Bank & Tr. Co. v. Famous, 

4 A.3d 1099, 1104 (Pa. Super. 2010) (stating that “[i]t is well settled that 

issues not raised below cannot be advanced for the first time in a 1925(b) 

statement or on appeal” (citations omitted)). 

However, there are exceptions to this general rule, such as whether a 

default judgment was void, which can be raised at any time. See Mother’s 

Restaurant Inc. v. Krystkiewicz, 861 A.2d 327, 337 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en 

banc) (explaining that generally pursuant to Rule 302(a), this Court “may not 

address any issues which an appellant has failed to raise in the trial court[,]” 

but with respect to a default judgment, “[t]he courts of this Commonwealth 

have long held that an individual may seek to strike a void judgment at any 
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time” (citations omitted)); Green Acres Rehab. and Nursing Ctr. v. 

Sullivan, 113 A.3d 1261, 1268 (Pa. Super. 2015) (Green Acres) (stating 

that “it is never too late to attack a judgment or decree for want of jurisdiction, 

as any such judgment or decree rendered by a court which lacks jurisdiction 

of the subject matter or the person is null and void, and can be attacked by 

the parties at any time” (citations omitted)).3 

Additionally, we note that “[a] petition to strike a judgment and a 

petition to open a judgment are separate and distinct remedies and not 

interchangeable.” U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n for Pa. Hous. Fin. Agency v. 

Watters, 163 A.3d 1019, 1027 (Pa. Super. 2017) (Watters) (citations 

omitted). “A petition to open a judgment seeks to re-open a case following a 

default judgment in order to assert a meritorious defense; a motion to strike 

a judgment is the remedy sought by one who complains of fatal irregularities 

appearing on the face of the record.” Id. at 1027-28 (citations omitted and 

formatting altered). This Court has explained that although a defendant only 

____________________________________________

3 We note that generally, challenges to personal jurisdiction must be raised at 

the earliest opportunity, otherwise they are waived. See, e.g., Manack v. 

Sandlin, 812 A.2d 676, 683 (Pa. Super. 2002). Further, “[a] defendant 

manifests an intent to submit to the court’s jurisdiction when the defendant 

takes some action (beyond merely entering a written appearance) going to 

the merits of the case, which evidences an intent to forego objection to the 

defective service.” Fleehr v. Mummert, 857 A.2d 683, 685 (Pa. Super. 

2004) (citation and quotation marks omitted). However, as discussed above, 

a defect in the service process deprives a court of jurisdiction to enter a default 

judgment, and this defect may be challenged at any time. See, e.g.,

Mother’s Restaurant, 861 A.2d at 337; Green Acres, 113 A.3d at 1267-

68. 
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requested that a trial court open a default judgment, the defendant may argue 

for the first time on appeal that the default judgment should be stricken 

because of a fatal defect that appears on the face of the record. See Grady 

v. Nelson, 286 A.3d 259, 268 (Pa. Super. 2022). 

Here, the Court of Common Pleas concluded:

The arguments set forth by [Appellant] have evolved over the 

course of this case, rendering an appropriate review nearly 

impossible. The sole issue [Appellant] raised in the written filing 

and in oral argument before [the Municipal Court] was that the 

default judgment should be opened because (i) Venice Loft 

Apartments was the only proper defendant as the landlord named 

on the lease, and (ii) Venice Loft Apartments should have been 

served at the physical apartment address in Philadelphia.

When [Appellant] from the Municipal Court to this court, this 

court’s determination was therefore limited to whether . . . the 

Municipal Court judge, committed an error of law or abused his 

discretion in denying the petition to open.

The petition filed in this court, however, did not cite to the 

Municipal Court record or identify any error or law or abuse of 

discretion. Instead, [Appellant’s] petition (i) simply reiterated the 

same arguments they made before [the Municipal Court]; and (ii) 

added new arguments, seeking to open or, for the first time, strike 

the default judgment, contending that (a) service by mail outside 

the Commonwealth was improper; and (b) service had to be made 

within 30 days after the action was commenced, or original 

process had to be reinstated. 

On appeal to the Superior Court, [Appellant’s] arguments have 

changed yet again. In [his] 1925(b) statement of matters 

complained of on appeal, [Appellant] now argue[s] that (i) the 

default judgment is void ab initio because original process was not 

served within 90 days as is required by Rule 404, (ii) that the 

default judgment was defective because [Appellee] did not prove 

that the person who signed for the complaint had the authority to 

accept service on behalf of Mr. Lippman; (iii) that the Municipal 

Court lacked the personal jurisdiction required to enter a default 

judgment against a California resident; and (iv) the default 
J-A01018-23

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judgment was defective because Mr. Lippman was not a party to 

the lease agreement between [Appellee] and Venice Lofts.

The court is frustrated by [Appellant’s] ever evolving arguments. 

The legal process is not a series of “trial and error” steps, where 

a party can tweak previously unsuccessful arguments in the hope 

of convincing the next reviewing court. This court will endeavor 

to address all of the arguments that [Appellant] properly raised 

and preserved.

* * *

Any issues [Appellant] did not present to the Municipal Court are 

waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal to the 

Court of Common Pleas. See ABG Promotions v. Parkway 

Pub., Inc., 834 A.2d 613, 619 (Pa. Super. 2003) [(en banc)]

(citing Pa.R.A.P. 302). Similarly, [Appellant has] raised new 

versions of their arguments in [his] which this court did not have 

an opportunity to address. Any new argument is likewise waived 

on appeal to the Superior Court.

Rule 1925(a) Op. at 5-6, 8-9 (some citations omitted and formatting altered). 

Based on our review of the record, we are constrained to disagree with 

the Court of Common Pleas. We understand the Court of Common Pleas’ 

frustration with Appellant’s evolving arguments over the course of these 

proceedings. However, as the Court of Common Pleas acknowledged in its 

Rule 1925(a) opinion, Appellant argues the default judgment is void ab initio

because defective service deprived the Municipal Court of personal jurisdiction 

over Appellant. See id. at 6; see also Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) Statement, 

6/22/22, at 1-2 (unpaginated). Therefore, Appellant’s claim implicates the 

Municipal Court’s jurisdiction over this matter. See Penn Nat’l Mut. Cas. 

Ins. Co. v. Phillips, 276 A.3d 268, 274 (Pa. Super. 2022) (Phillips). 

Accordingly, this claim cannot be waived and can be raised for the first time 
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on appeal. See Mother’s Restaurant, 861 A.2d at 337; Grady, 286 A.3d at 

268; Green Acres, 113 A.3d at 1268. 

Service of Process

Appellant’s arguments are related, therefore we will discuss them 

together. Appellant argues that the Court of Common Pleas erred in failing to 

strike4the default judgment because service of the complaint was defective 

for several reasons. Appellant’s Brief at 8-13. First, Appellant contends that 

Appellee failed to serve the complaint in a timely manner in accordance with 

Pa.R.C.P. 403 and 404. Id. at 8-9. Appellant asserts that the Court of 

Common Pleas’ conclusion that Lippman conceded that he or his agent 

received the complaint is contradicted by the record. Id. at 9 (citing N.T. 

Hr’g, 2/28/22, at 19). Next, Appellant claims that Lippman was not properly 

served because the affidavit of service indicates it was made on JRK Property 

____________________________________________

4 Appellant refers to “opening” the judgment several times in his brief. See

Appellant’s Brief at 12-13. Appellant also notes that he filed a petition to open 

and/or strike the default judgment with the Court of Common Pleas. See id.

at 2, 6. As noted above, “[a] petition to strike a judgment and a petition to 

open a judgment are separate and distinct remedies and not interchangeable.” 

Watters, 163 A.3d at 1027. Nevertheless, Appellant’s arguments regarding 

defective service relates to fatal defects that appears on the face of the record, 

therefore, we discuss Appellant’s issues in the context of a petition to strike. 

See id. at 1028; see also Green Acres, 113 A.3d at 1267. 

Further, the Philadelphia County Local Rules of Civil Procedure and 

Philadelphia Municipal Court Rules of Civil Procedure do not provide for the 

filing of a petition to strike a default judgment in the Philadelphia Municipal 

Court and only mention the petitions to open default judgments. See, e.g., 

Phila. Civ. R. *1001(a)(3) (referring to appeals to the Court of Common Pleas

from Municipal Court orders denying a petition to open a default judgment). 
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Holdings, not Lippman as an individual. Id. at 10. Lastly, Appellant argues 

that Appellee failed to serve Venice Lofts, the owner of the apartment building 

where Appellee alleges his damages occurred. Id. at 10-12. Appellant notes 

the complaint was served at an address in Los Angeles, California, but Venice 

Lofts’ business address is in Philadelphia. Id. at 10-11. Appellant concludes 

that because neither Lippman nor Venice Lofts were served with a copy of the 

complaint, service is defective, and proper service is a prerequisite for a court 

to acquire personal jurisdiction over a defendant. Id. at 11-12. Therefore, 

Appellant requests that we strike the default judgment, set aside Appellee’s 

defective service, and remand this matter for Appellee to properly serve his

complaint on Venice Lofts. Id. at 12-13. 

Our standard of review regarding the denial of a petition to strike a 

default judgment is as follows:

An appeal regarding a petition to strike a default judgment 

implicates the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure. Issues 

regarding the operation of procedural rules of court present us 

with questions of law. Therefore, our standard of review is de 

novo and our scope of review is plenary.

A petition to strike a judgment is a common law proceeding which 

operates as a demurrer to the record. A petition to strike a 

judgment may be granted only for a fatal defect or irregularity 

appearing on the face of the record. 

Green Acres, 113 A.3d at 1267 (citations omitted and formatting altered); 

see also Phila. Civ. R. *1001(a)(3) (stating that Philadelphia Municipal Court 

“[o]rders granting or denying a petition to open a default judgment . . . are 
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appealable to the Court of Common Pleas, but the appeal is limited to a review 

of the record”). 

It is well established that:

Service of process is a mechanism by which a court obtains 

jurisdiction of a defendant, and therefore, the rules concerning 

service of process must be strictly followed. Without valid service, 

a court lacks personal jurisdiction of a defendant and is powerless 

to enter judgment against [the defendant].

Thus, improper service is not merely a procedural defect that can 

be ignored when a defendant subsequently learns of the action. 

However, the absence of or a defect in a return of service does 

not necessarily divest a court of jurisdiction of a defendant who 

was properly served. The fact of service is the important thing in 

determining jurisdiction and proof of service may be defective or 

even lacking, but if the fact of service is established jurisdiction 

cannot be questioned.

Phillips, 276 A.3d at 274 (citations omitted and formatting altered); see also

Vogt v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 900 A.2d 912, 916 (Pa. Super. 2006) 

(holding that defective service constitutes a fatal defect in the record). 

A petition to strike is not a chance to review the merits of the 

allegations of a complaint. Rather, a petition to strike is aimed at 

defects that affect the validity of the judgment and that entitle the 

petitioner, as a matter of law, to relief. A fatal defect on the face 

of the record denies the prothonotary the authority to enter 

judgment. When a prothonotary enters judgment without 

authority, that judgment is void ab initio. When deciding if there 

are fatal defects on the face of the record for the purposes of a 

petition to strike a default judgment, a court may only look at 

what was in the record when the judgment was entered.

A judgment is void on its face if one or more of three jurisdictional 

elements is found absent: jurisdiction of the parties; subject 

matter jurisdiction; or the power or authority to render the 

particular judgment. The term “jurisdiction” relates to the 

competency of the individual court, administrative body, or other 

tribunal to determine controversies of the general class to which 
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a particular case belongs. Moreover, it is never too late to attack 

a judgment or decree for want of jurisdiction, as any such 

judgment or decree rendered by a court which lacks jurisdiction 

of the subject matter or the person is null and void, and can be 

attacked by the parties at any time. A petition to strike a 

judgment founded on a jurisdictional deficiency is therefore not 

subject to the same “timeliness” considerations as a petition to 

open the judgment.

Green Acres, 113 A.3d at 1267-68 (citations omitted and formatting 

altered); see also Phillips, 276 A.3d at 274; accord Cintas Corp. v. Lee’s 

Cleaning Serv., Inc., 700 A.2d 915, 919 (Pa. 1997) (stating that “where the 

party seeking to open a judgment asserts that service was improper, a court 

must address this issue first before considering any other factors. If valid 

service has not been made, then the judgment should be opened because the 

court has no jurisdiction over the defendant and is without power to enter a 

judgment against him or her” (citations omitted)). 

Philadelphia Municipal Court Rule of Civil Procedure 113 states:

Upon commencement of the action, the Municipal Court 

Administrator shall set the time and place for the trial and shall 

note the same upon the complaint. Said trial shall be scheduled 

not more than ninety (90) days from the date the action is 

commenced, . . .

Phila. M.C.R. Civ.P. No. 113. 

Philadelphia Municipal Court Rule of Civil Procedure 111 provides, in 

relevant part:

A. Except as provided in below, complaints . . . shall be served in 

the same manner as original process filed in the Court of Common 

Pleas and may be served in Philadelphia by writ servers appointed 

by the President Judge of the Municipal Court . . . .
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* * *

C. (1) A complaint may be served by certified mail if 

defendant’s last known address is a post office box, or outside 

the County of Philadelphia, or if a writ server has returned the 

complaint without being able to serve the same. The return 

receipt card for certified mail shall be marked to show to whom 

and when delivered and shall show the signature of the 

defendant or an agent of the defendant authorized to receive 

the certified mail of defendant. If the signature on the return 

receipt is that of a person other than the defendant, it shall be 

presumed, unless the contrary is shown, that the signer was 

an agent of the defendant authorized to receive the certified 

mail of defendant.

* * *

(3) A return of service by mail shall be by affidavit in 

accordance with Pa.R.C.P. 405.

Phila. M.C.R. Civ.P. No. 111(A), (C)(1), (C)(3). 

Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 424 states:

Service of original process upon a corporation or similar entity 

shall be made by handing a copy to any of the following persons 

provided the person served is not a plaintiff in the action:

(1) an executive officer, partner or trustee of the corporation 

or similar entity, or

(2) the manager, clerk or other person for the time being in 

charge of any regular place of business or activity of the 

corporation or similar entity, or

(3) an agent authorized by the corporation or similar entity in 

writing to receive service of process for it.

Pa.R.C.P. 424. However, Rule 424 does not require service by hand delivery 

on out-of-state corporations. See, e.g., Trzcinski v. Prudential Prop. & 

Cas. Ins. Co., 597 A.2d 687, 689 (Pa. Super. 1991). 
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Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 405 requires, in relevant part:

(c) Proof of service by mail under Rule 403 shall include a return 

receipt signed by the defendant or, if the defendant has refused 

to accept mail service and the plaintiff thereafter has served the 

defendant by ordinary mail,

(1) the returned letter with the notation that the defendant 

refused to accept delivery, and

(2) an affidavit that the letter was mailed by ordinary mail and 

was not returned within fifteen days after mailing.

Pa.R.C.P. 405(c). 

Philadelphia Municipal Court Rule of Civil Procedure 120, which governs 

trials and the entry of default judgments states, in relevant part: “If the 

claimant appears [for trial] and defendant does not, and damages are proven 

in accordance with Rule 121, judgment by default shall be entered for 

claimant, provided service was made at least seven (7) days prior to trial, 

otherwise, the claim shall be continued to a date certain.” Phila. M.C.R. Civ.P. 

No. 120(b). 

In Delaware Valley Surgical Supply Co., Inc. v. Geriatric & 

Medical Ctrs., Inc., 299 A.2d 237 (Pa. 1973), our Supreme Court concluded 

that service of process on a parent corporation was not adequate to constitute 

service on its subsidiary corporations where there was no evidence in the 

record to indicate that the subsidiaries conducted business at the address 

where the plaintiff served the parent corporation. Delaware Valley Surgical 

Supply, 299 A.2d at 239. This is because “a corporate parent will retain its 

distinct identity and not be subject to the jurisdictions of its subsidiaries, even 
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when it shares common directors, officers and shareholders.” Fulano v. 

Fanjul Corp., 236 A.3d 1, 20 (Pa. Super. 2020) (citation omitted). 

However,

[t]here is a well recognized exception to these general rules if the 

record demonstrates that the subsidiary is the “alter ego” of the 

parent to the extent that domination and control by the parent 

corporation renders the subsidiary a mere instrumentality of the 

parent; under such extreme circumstances the parent corporation 

may be held to be doing business within the state under the facade 

of the subsidiary.

. . . Under the alter-ego theory of personal jurisdiction, if a 

subsidiary is “merely the agent” of its parent corporation or the 

parent corporation “controls” the subsidiary, then personal 

jurisdiction exists over the parent whenever personal jurisdiction 

(whether general or specific) exists over the subsidiary. 

The theory applies only if the degree of control exercised by the 

parent is greater than normally associated with common 

ownership and directorship and the parent controls the day-today operations of the subsidiary such that the subsidiary can be 

said to be a mere department of the parent. 

Id. (citations omitted and formatting altered). 

Factors that a court may consider in determining whether a subsidiary 

is the alter ego of its parent corporation include: 

(1) ownership of all or most of the stock of the related corporation; 

(2) common officers and directors; (3) common marketing image; 

(4) common use of a trademark or logo; (5) common use of 

employees; (6) integrated sales system; (7) interchange of 

managerial and supervisory personnel; (8) performance by the 

related corporation of business functions which the principal 

corporation would normally conduct through its own agent or 

departments; (9) acting of the related corporation as marketing 

arm of the principal corporation, or as an exclusive distributor; 

and (10) receipt by the officers of the related corporation of 

instruction from the principal corporation.
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Id. (citation omitted). This list is non-exhaustive, and a court may consider 

any evidence bearing on the interrelationship of the two corporations. Id. at 

20-21. The Fulano Court affirmed the trial court’s determination that the 

subsidiary corporation which operated in Pennsylvania was not the alter ego 

its parent corporation based in India. Id. at 21-22; see also Delaware 

Valley Surgical Supply, 299 A.2d at 239 (noting that service of process on 

the parent corporation was not adequate to serve the subsidiary corporations 

where it had not been established that “the subsidiary corporations were 

merely the alter ego of the parent corporation and that the separate 

corporation entities were only paper work”). 

Here, the Court of Common Pleas explained:

At the hearing before [the Municipal Court], Mr. Lippman did not 

challenge the affidavit of service showing that the complaint was 

received at the address in Los Angeles by Jessica Rice. Mr. 

Lippman conceded that JRK Propert[y] is the parent company of 

Venice Lofts. [N.T. Hr’g, 2/28/22, at 19]. Mr. Lippman conceded 

that the apartment complex has undergone a series of name 

changes: originally it was named the Venice Loft Apartments, then 

it was named the Venice Lofts doing business as Apex Manayunk. 

[Id.] [Appellee], through counsel, perhaps not in the most artful 

form, included all of those entities and iterations in the caption. 

Mr. Lippman, through counsel, conceded that he had received 

notice of the lawsuit. [Id.]

Based on Mr. Lippman’s concessions and the statements of 

[Appellee’s] counsel, [the Municipal Court] denied the petition. 

While [the Municipal Court] did not specifically state a reason on 

the record, it can be reasonably understood from the transcript 

that [the Municipal Court] concluded that [Appellee’s] service of 

the complaint (and other Municipal Court case-initiating 

documents) was proper because Mr. Lippman’s counsel admitted 

that Mr. Lippman (or his agent) had received the documents.
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In their appeal to this Court, the [Appellant] did not set forth how 

[the Municipal Court] committed an error of law or abused [its] 

discretion. [Appellant] reiterated the same arguments regarding 

service and made brand new arguments that were never 

presented to the Municipal Court. In so doing, [Appellant] also 

relied upon the wrong rules. [Appellant] contended that service 

outside the Commonwealth was improper and/or service had to 

completed within 30 days. This is simply incorrect.

If a defendant is located within Philadelphia County, service of 

original process is required within 30 days. Pa.R.Civ.P. 401(a). If 

a defendant is located outside the Commonwealth, however, a 

plaintiff must serve within 90 days by mail in the manner provided 

by Rule 403. Pa.R.Civ.P. 404(2). Rule 403 requires that service 

shall be mailed to the defendant by any form of mail requiring a 

receipt signed by the defendant or his authorized agent. 

Pa.R.Civ.P. 403. Service is complete upon delivery of the mail.

If, as [Appellant] argue[s], the address used by [Appellee] was 

incorrect, or the defendant named in the original complaint was 

improper, those issues could have been promptly resolved 

through preliminary objections

[5] or an appearance at the 

Municipal Court trial to dispute service. Instead, Mr. Lippman 

chose to do nothing when he or his agent received the complaint 

in the mail. The entry of the default judgment was the result of 

this negligence. In sum, [the Municipal Court] did not abuse [its] 

discretion or commit an error of law.

Rule 1925(a) Op. at 6-8 (footnote omitted and some formatting altered). 

Based on our review of the record, we are constrained to conclude that 

the Court of Common Pleas erred in its conclusion that service was proper. 

See Green Acres, 113 A.3d at 1267. During the hearing before the 

Philadelphia Municipal Court, Appellant represented that Appellee’s lease 

____________________________________________

5 We note that the Philadelphia Municipal Court Rules of Civil Procedure do not 

provide for the filing of preliminary objections. See Phila. M.C.R. Civ.P. No. 

106(b) (limiting pleadings that can be filed in the Philadelphia Municipal Court

to complaints, counterclaims, additional claims, and cross claims). 
J-A01018-23

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specifies that the owner of the apartment building is Venice Lofts, a limited

liability company based in Philadelphia. See N.T. Hr’g, 2/28/22, at 13, 17. 

Appellant conceded that JRK Property was the parent company of Venice Lofts 

d/b/a Apex Manayunk. See id. at 18-19. Appellee argued that service on 

Venice Lofts was proper because he had served JRK Property with the 

complaint. See id. at 20. Upon reviewing the record of the Municipal Court 

proceedings, the Court of Common Pleas concluded that service was proper 

because JRK Property is the parent company of Venice Lofts. See Rule 

1925(a) Op. at 6-7. 

Given the record before us, we cannot conclude that Appellee properly 

served Lippman and Venice Lofts with his complaint. Assuming that Appellee 

properly served the complaint on JRK Property, that service would only 

establish personal jurisdiction over Venice Lofts and Lippman if each of them 

is an alter ego of JRK Property. See Delaware Valley Surgical Supply, 299 

A.2d at 239. However, there is no evidence in the record to support a 

conclusion that either Venice Lofts or Lippman is an alter ego of JRK Property. 

See Fulano, 236 A.3d at 20. To the contrary, Appellant represented that 

Venice Lofts owned apartment complex where Appellee resided and denied 

that JRK Property has any ownership interest in that property. See N.T. Hr’g, 

2/28/22, at 17, 19. Further, Appellee did not present any evidence that 

Lippman is an owner, officer, employee, or agent of either Venice Lofts or JRK 

Property. Lastly, Appellee did not present any evidence regarding the 

connections, if any, between the personnel and/or operations of JRK Property 
J-A01018-23

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and those of Venice Lofts. See Fulano, 236 A.3d at 20-21. For these reasons, 

we conclude that the Court of Common Pleas erred in concluding that Appellee 

properly served Lippman and Venice Lofts with his complaint. See Delaware 

Valley Surgical Supply, 299 A.2d at 239; see also Fulano, 236 A.3d at 20-

22. 

Because Appellee failed to properly serve Lippman and Venice Lofts with 

the complaint, the Municipal Court lacked jurisdiction over them. See

Phillips, 276 A.3d at 274. Therefore, the default judgment is void ab initio

and must be stricken.6 See id.; Green Acres, 113 A.3d at 1267-68. 

For these reasons, we reverse the order of the Court of Common Pleas 

order denying Appellant’s petition to open and/or strike a default judgment 

entered by the Philadelphia Municipal Court and remand for further 

proceedings before the Common Pleas Court. 

Order reversed. Case remanded to the Court of Common Pleas with 

instructions to remand the case to the Municipal Court with instructions to 

grant the petition to open the default judgment, and for further proceedings. 

Jurisdiction relinquished. 

____________________________________________

6 Based on our disposition, we decline to address Appellant’s other claim 

regarding whether the service of the complaint on JRK Property by mail was 

proper. 
J-A01018-23

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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 3/7/2023