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In The

Court of Appeals

Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

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NO. 09-15-00093-CV

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CITY OF BEAUMONT, Appellant

V.

CODY GARRETT AND CHERRY JONES GATES, Appellees

_______________________________________________________ ______________

On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 1

Jefferson County, Texas

Trial Cause No. 124,331 

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OPINION 

This is an interlocutory accelerated appeal from a trial court’s order denying 

the City of Beaumont’s plea to the jurisdiction. We affirm.

Background 

The ruling on appeal relates to a suit that Cody Garrett filed against the City 

arising from an intersectional collision that occurred in February 2012. Cars driven 

by Garrett and Cherry Jones Gates collided in an intersection that is normally 

controlled by a light; however, on the morning their cars were in the accident, the 
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light controlling the intersection was out.1 Gates, who was driving her car in a 

northerly direction on Pennsylvania Street, struck the car being driven by Garrett, 

who was westbound on Emmett Avenue. Gates testified2 that she did not stop 

before entering the intersection even though she knew the stoplight at the 

intersection was not working. Garrett testified3 that when he approached the 

intersection, he noticed that the traffic light was not working and that he stopped 

before entering the intersection. However, in her testimony, Gates suggested that 

Garrett did not stop before attempting to cross the intersection. 

In 2013, Garrett sued Gates and the City claiming they were negligent. With 

respect to his claim against the City, Garrett asserted that the City failed to repair 

the stoplight at the intersection even though it had been notified that the stoplight 

was out. When the City answered, it asserted it was immune from Garrett’s claims

under the doctrine of governmental immunity. 

 1 The evidence in the record does not indicate why the light was out. 

However, before the hearing on the City’s motion, the City admitted that, 

approximately thirty to ninety minutes before the accident, it had received notice 

that the light at the intersection of Emmett and Pennsylvania was not working. 

2 The City included Gates’ deposition as an exhibit to support its request to 

dismiss Garrett’s claims.

3 Garrett’s deposition was also included as an exhibit to the City’s motion.
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In 2015, the City filed a plea to the jurisdiction, challenging the trial court’s 

exercise of jurisdiction over Garrett’s claims. In its plea, the City asserted that 

Garrett could not establish that the malfunction in the signal created an 

unreasonable risk of harm, could not establish that he did not have actual 

knowledge that the light had malfunctioned, could not establish that the City had 

breached a duty of ordinary care, and could not establish that the City’s acts or 

omissions proximately caused the collision. Garrett’s response to the City’s plea

includes his affidavit, in which he stated that he knew the light facing him was not 

working as he approached the intersection; however, Garrett denied knowing that

the light facing Gates was out. 

In March 2015, without stating a basis for its ruling, the trial court denied 

the City’s plea. Subsequently, the City timely perfected an interlocutory appeal to 

challenge whether the trial court properly denied its plea. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. 

Code Ann. § 51.014(8) (West Supp. 2015).4

Waiver of Immunity

The City challenged the trial court’s jurisdiction through a plea to the 

jurisdiction. A plea to the jurisdiction is a dilatory plea that challenges a court’s 

power to decide a dispute. See Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 554 

 4 We cite to the current version of the statute, as the 2015 amendments do 

not affect the City’s right to an interlocutory appeal.
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(Tex. 2000). Generally, in the absence of the State’s permission allowing a 

governmental unit to be sued, a trial court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over the 

governmental unit that has been sued. See Fed. Sign v. Tex. S. Univ., 951 S.W.2d 

401, 403 (Tex. 1997); Duhart v. State, 610 S.W.2d 740, 741 (Tex. 1980). 

For cases involving torts, the Tort Claims Act controls whether a court has 

been given permission by the Legislature to adjudicate a dispute against a 

governmental unit. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §§ 101.021-.029 (West 

2011 & Supp. 2015). Under section 101.025 of the Tort Claims Act, a 

governmental unit can be sued for damages only to the extent that the Tort Claims 

Act creates liability for the governmental entity’s acts or omissions. See Tex. Civ. 

Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 101.025 (West 2011). With respect to the liability of 

municipalities for operating and maintaining traffic signals, the Tort Claims Act 

creates liability only if the malfunction in the signal “is not corrected by the 

responsible governmental unit within a reasonable time after notice[.]” Tex. Civ. 

Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 101.060(a)(2) (West 2011); see also Tex. Civ. Prac. & 

Rem. Code Ann. § 101.0215(31) (West Supp. 2015), § 101.025. 

In this case, the evidence before the trial court indicates that the City had 

notice of the malfunction of the signal before the collision between the cars driven 

by Gates and Garrett occurred. However, there was no evidence before the trial 
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court showing the exact nature of the problem with the light, and no evidence 

explaining how long it should have taken a reasonably prudent governmental entity

to correct such a problem. Given that the City acknowledged that it received notice 

of the malfunction before the collision occurred, and given the complete lack of 

evidence about whether the City acted unreasonably by failing to correct the 

malfunction within a thirty to ninety minute period before the collision occurred, 

the trial court had the authority to allow the parties more time to develop whether 

the City acted unreasonably given the notice it had about the problem with the light

before the collision occurred. See Blue, 34 S.W.3d at 554; Capshaw v. Tex. Dep’t 

of Transp., 988 S.W.2d 943, 946 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1999, pet. denied). 

The City maintains that its plea should have been granted for several 

additional reasons. According to the City, the hazard posed at the intersection by 

the malfunction in the light was not unreasonable, Garrett knew the light facing 

him was out, and its acts and omissions did not proximately cause the accident.

With respect to these arguments, the City asserts that the duty it owed to Garrett 

was “only the duty that a private person owes to a licensee on private property.” 

Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 101.022(c) (West 2011). 

We disagree with the City’s argument that its duties to Garrett are equivalent 

to the duties owed to licensees. When a traffic signal malfunctions, and the 
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municipality that is responsible for the signal has notice of the malfunction, the 

duty the municipality owes to the travelling public is to use ordinary care to reduce 

or eliminate the unreasonable risk of harm posed by the malfunction within a

reasonable time after being notified of the absence, condition, or malfunction of a 

traffic signal. Id. § 101.022(b) (West 2011), id. § 101.060 (West 2011). In cases 

involving malfunctioning signals, a city’s duty is not limited to the duties owed to 

licensees. Compare id. § 101.022(c) (limiting a governmental unit’s duties for 

claims arising from conditions categorized as premises defects to the duty owed to 

a licensee), with id. § 101.022(b) (explaining that the limitations in section 101.022 

do not apply in cases where the governmental unit has knowledge of the absence, 

condition, or malfunction of a traffic signal).

We are also not persuaded that the trial court abused its discretion by failing 

to accept the City’s arguments on the degree of the hazard posed by the light and 

causation. The proper function of a plea to the jurisdiction “does not authorize an 

inquiry so far into the substance of the claims presented that plaintiffs are required 

to put on their case simply to establish jurisdiction.” See Blue, 34 S.W.3d at 554. 

Based on the pleadings and the jurisdictional evidence before it, and given the lack 

of evidence as to whether a thirty to ninety minute delay in correcting the hazard 

posed by the malfunction in the light would be unreasonable, the trial court did not 
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abuse its discretion by allowing the parties additional time to fully develop whether 

the City’s failure to respond and repair the stoplight or otherwise reduce the hazard 

posed by the malfunction in the stoplight was negligent. Id. We overrule the City’s 

sole issue, and we affirm the trial court’s ruling denying the City’s plea. 

AFFIRMED.

 ________________________________

 HOLLIS HORTON

 Justice

Submitted on June 5, 2015

Opinion Delivered December 10, 2015

Before Kreger, Horton, and Johnson, JJ.