alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
II

103D CONGRESS

1ST SESSION S. J. RES. 81

Designating the oak as the national arboreal emblem.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

APRIL 19, 1993

Mr. LAUTENBERG (for himself and Mr. BRADLEY) introduced the following

joint resolution; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on

the Judiciary

JOINT RESOLUTION

Designating the oak as the national arboreal emblem.

Whereas the oak has more than three hundred species native

to North America;

Whereas the oak is grown today in every State;

Whereas the oak represents durability and longevity;

Whereas the fruit of the oak, the acorn, was used as food by

early native Americans;

Whereas in a pool conducted by the International Society of

Aboriculture, the oak was selected by a majority of people

as the tree that symbolizes the United States;

Whereas the oak has been renowned in art, music, and literature; and

Whereas it is fitting and proper that the United States have

a national arboreal emblem: Now, therefore, be it
2

SJ 81 IS

1 Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives

2 of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 That the tree commonly known as the oak is designated

4 and adopted as the national arboreal emblem of the Unit5 ed States, and the President is authorized and requested

6 to declare such fact by proclamation.

Æ
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.  No. 00-4579

JOSEPH TITO GRIN, a/k/a Jo Jo,

Defendant-Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Durham.

James A. Beaty, Jr., District Judge.

(CR-98-257)

Submitted: July 10, 2001

Decided: July 31, 2001

Before TRAXLER, KING, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.

Remanded with instructions by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

COUNSEL

Joseph M. Wilson, Jr., BROWNE, FLEBOTTE, WILSON & HORN,

P.L.L.C., Durham, North Carolina, for Appellant. Benjamin H. White,

Jr., United States Attorney, Steven H. Levin, Assistant United States

Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c). 
OPINION

PER CURIAM: 

Joseph Tito Grin appeals from the sentence imposed for his conviction for conspiracy to distribute cocaine and crack cocaine. The judgment and commitment order was entered on July 18, 2000. On August

11, 2000, Grin filed a notice of appeal. No extension of time to appeal

was granted by the district court, and Grin did not request an extension of time. 

In criminal cases, a defendant must file his notice of appeal within

ten days of the entry of judgment. Fed. R. App. P. 4(b). With or without a motion, the district court may grant an extension of this time up

to thirty days upon a showing of good cause or excusable neglect.

Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(4); United States v. Reyes, 759 F.2d 351, 353

(4th Cir. 1985). If the defendant files his notice of appeal outside the

ten-day appeal period, but within the thirty-day extension period, the

district court must make factual findings concerning whether there

was excusable neglect that warrants an extension of the appeal period.

See Reyes, 759 F.2d at 353-54. 

Grin filed his notice of appeal twenty-four days after the district

court entered its judgment. While this filing was after the ten-day

limit, it was within the thirty-day extension period applicable upon a

showing of excusable neglect or good cause. Because the district

court made no factual findings on this issue, we remand the case to

the district court with instructions to make factual findings concerning

whether there was excusable neglect or good cause warranting an

extension of the ten-day appeal period. We dispense with oral argument, because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented

in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process. 

REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS

2 UNITED STATES v. GRIN
I 

118TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 8053 

To amend the Communications Act of 1934 to prohibit Federal funding 

for the Corporation for Public Broadcasting, and for other purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

APRIL 17, 2024 

Mr. PERRY (for himself, Mrs. MILLER of Illinois, Mr. MASSIE, and Mr. 

OGLES) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Energy and Commerce, and in addition to the Committee on 

Appropriations, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned 

A BILL 

To amend the Communications Act of 1934 to prohibit Federal funding for the Corporation for Public Broadcasting, 

and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘No Propaganda Act’’. 


ssavage on LAPJG3WLY3PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 8053 IH

1 SEC. 2. PROHIBITION ON FEDERAL FUNDS FOR CORPORA2 TION FOR PUBLIC BROADCASTING. 

3 (a) IN GENERAL.—Section 396 of the Communica4 tions Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 396) is amended by adding 

5 at the end the following new subsection: 

6 ‘‘(m) PROHIBITION ON FEDERAL FUNDS.—No Fed7 eral funds may be made available to the Corporation after 

8 the date of the enactment of the No Propaganda Act.’’. 

9 (b) CORPORATION PROHIBITED FROM ACCEPTING

10 FEDERAL FUNDS.—Section 396(g) of the Communica11 tions Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 396(g)) is amended— 

12 (1) in paragraph (2)(A), by inserting ‘‘subject 

13 to paragraph (3)(C),’’ before ‘‘obtain’’; and 

14 (2) in paragraph (3)— 

15 (A) in subparagraph (A), by striking ‘‘; 

16 and’’ and inserting a semicolon; 

17 (B) in subparagraph (B), by striking the 

18 period at the end and inserting ‘‘; and’’; and 

19 (C) by adding at the end the following new 

20 subparagraph: 

21 ‘‘(C) accepting funds from the Federal Govern22 ment after the date of the enactment of the No 

23 Propaganda Act.’’. 

24 (c) RESCISSION.—Any unobligated balances of 

25 amounts made available under the heading ‘‘Corporation 

26 for Public Broadcasting’’ in the Consolidated AppropriaVerDate Sep 11 2014 20:44 Apr 30, 2024 Jkt 049200 PO 00000 Frm 00002 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H8053.IH H8053

ssavage on LAPJG3WLY3PROD with BILLS
3 

•HR 8053 IH

1 tions Act, 2022 (Public Law 117–103; 136 Stat. 489), 

2 the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023 (Public Law 

3 117–328; 136 Stat. 4901), or the Further Consolidated 

4 Appropriations Act, 2024 (Public Law 118–47) are hereby 

5 rescinded. 

6 (d) CONFORMING AMENDMENT.—Section 

7 396(k)(3)(A)(iv)(II) of the Communications Act of 1934 

8 (47 U.S.C. 396(k)(3)(A)(iv)(II)) is amended by inserting 

9 ‘‘before the date of the enactment of the No Propaganda 

10 Act’’ after ‘‘amounts received’’. 

Æ 


ssavage on LAPJG3WLY3PROD with BILLS
427 A.2d 1223

#### Commonwealth v. Birdsong, Appellant.

Submitted September 13, 1979. John

W. Packel, Chief, Appeals, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant;

Eric B. Henson, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.

Before PRICE, WIEAND and VAN der VOORT, JJ.*

*

 Judge Donald E. Wieand is sitting by special designation.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

WIEAND, J., dissented.
United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 19-3467

___________________________

United States of America,

lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee,

v.

Taquan Laquise Johnson, (originally named Taquan Laguise Johnson), also known

as MooMoo,

lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant.

 ____________

Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Arkansas - Little Rock

 ____________

 Submitted: October 1, 2020

Filed: October 6, 2020

[Unpublished]

____________

Before COLLOTON, BENTON, and KOBES, Circuit Judges. 

____________

PER CURIAM.
Taquan Johnson appeals after the district court1

 revoked his supervised release

and imposed sentence. The court sentenced Johnson to twelve months in prison and

one year of supervised release, with a special condition that the first 180 days of his

supervised release be spent in a residential reentry center. His counsel has moved for

leave to withdraw, and has filed a brief challenging the treatment of the period in the

reentry center as part of Johnson’s term of supervised release rather than his term of

imprisonment.

After careful review of the record, we conclude that the district court did not

abuse its discretion by requiring Johnson to spend the first 180 days of his supervised

release in a reentry center. The district court has broad discretion to impose special

conditions that are reasonably related to 18 U.S.C. § 3553 factors, involve no greater

deprivation of liberty than reasonably necessary, and are consistent with any pertinent

Sentencing Commission policy statements. See 18 U.S.C. § 3563(b)(11) (court may

require probationer to reside at a community corrections facility for all or part of the

term of probation); U.S.S.G. § 5B1.3(e)(1) (residence in a community treatment

center, halfway house or similar facility may be imposed as a condition of probation); 

United States v. Melton, 666 F.3d 513, 517-18 (8th Cir. 2012).

Accordingly, we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw, and affirm.

______________________________

1The Honorable James M. Moody, Jr., United States District Judge for the

Eastern District of Arkansas.

-2-
COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Benton, Humphreys and Senior Judge Overton

JAMES CLAYPOOLE MEMORANDUM OPINION * v. Record No. 0867-05-2 PER CURIAM OCTOBER 25, 2005 PETERSBURG DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF PETERSBURG Pamela S. Baskervill, Judge (Richard G. White, Jr., on brief), for appellant. (Joan M. O’Donnell, on brief), for appellee. (James Wicker Traylor, on brief), Guardian ad litem for the infant child.
James Claypoole appeals the trial court’s decisi on terminating his resi dual parental rights to his daughter, born February 3, 2004. Claypool e contends the evidence was insufficient to support the trial court’s decision b ecause the Petersburg Department of Social Services failed to make reasonable and appropriate efforts to remedy substantially the conditions which led to or required continuation of his daughter’s foster care placement. He argues the trial court erred in finding the Department met its duty to investigate placement with paternal relatives. Because the record before us reveals no objectio ns to the trial court’s ruling, we decline to address this issue for the first time on appeal. Accordingly, we summa rily affirm the decision of the trial court. Rule 5A:27. The record includes the trial court’s Ma rch 10, 2005 order and a Statement of Facts drafted by Claypoole. Neither the order nor th e Statement of Facts indicate any objection by

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opin ion is not designated for publication.- 2 - Claypoole to the trial court’s deci sion. In addition, Claypoole has fa iled to indicate in his brief “the page(s) of the . . . written statement, r ecord, or appendix where each question was preserved in the trial court.” Rule 5A:20. “No ruling of the trial court . . . will be considered as a basis for reversal unless the objection was stated together with the grounds th erefor at the time of the ruling, except for good cause shown or to enable the Court of Appeals to attain the ends of justice.” Rule 5A:18. Claypoole has offered no argument that this appeal concerns the “good cause” exception. Accordingly, we summarily affirm th e decision of the trial court. See Rule 5A:27. Affirmed.
##### 



EXHIBIT 32.2
CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Great Western Land and Recreation,
Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-QSB for the period ending June 30, 2003 as
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
Report), I, Ron OConnor, Principal Financial Officer of the Company,
certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



| | (1) |  | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section
13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and                              
| | --- |  | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
| | (2) |  | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in
all material respects, the financial condition and result of
operations of the Company.

| |  |                                                                                                            
| |  | -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| |  | /s/ Ron OConnor                                                                                           
| |  |                                                                                                            
| |  | Ron OConnor
Senior Vice President and
Chief Financial Officer
(Principal Financial Officer)
August 4, 2003

This certification is made solely for purpose of 18 U.S.C. Section 1350,
subject to the knowledge standard contained therein, and not for any other
purpose. This certification is not being filed as part of this Report or as a
separate disclosure document.
103D CONGRESS

1ST SESSION S. J. RES. 95

JOINT RESOLUTION

To designate October 1993 as ‘‘National Breast

Cancer Awareness Month’’.
103D CONGRESS

1ST SESSION S. J. RES. 95

JOINT RESOLUTION

To designate October 1993 as ‘‘National Breast Cancer

Awareness Month’’.

Whereas breast cancer will strike an estimated 182,000

women and 1,000 men in the United States in 1993;

Whereas the risk of developing breast cancer increases as a

woman grows older;

Whereas breast cancer is the second leading cause of cancer

death in women, and will kill an estimated 46,000 women

and 300 men in 1993;

Whereas the 5-year survival rate for localized breast cancer

has risen from 78 percent in the 1940’s to over 90 percent today;

Whereas most breast cancers are detected by the woman herself;

Whereas educating both the public and health care providers

about the importance of early detection will result in reducing breast cancer mortality;

Whereas appropriate use of screening mammography, in conjunction with clinical examination and breast self-examination, can result in the detection of many breast cancers early in their development and increase the survival

rate to nearly 100 percent;
2

•SJ 95 ES

Whereas data from controlled trials clearly demonstrate that

deaths from breast cancer are significantly reduced in

women who have been screened by mammography;

Whereas many women are reluctant to have screening mammograms for a variety of reasons, such as the cost of

testing, lack of information, or fear;

Whereas access to screening mammography is directly related

to socioeconomic status;

Whereas increased awareness about the importance of screening mammography will result in the procedure being regularly requested by the patient and recommended by the

health care provider; and

Whereas it is projected that more women will use this lifesaving test as it becomes increasingly available and affordable: Now, therefore, be it

1 Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives

2 of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 That October 1993 is designated as ‘‘National Breast

4 Cancer Awareness Month’’ and the President is authorized

5 and requested to issue a proclamation calling upon the

6 people of the United States to observe the month with ap7 propriate programs and activities.

Passed the Senate July 23 (legislative day, June

30), 1993.

Attest:

Secretary.
§ 1.501(c)(9)-8 Voluntary employees' beneficiary associations; effective date. ( a ) *General rule.* Except as otherwise provided in this section, the provisions of §§ 1.501(c)(9)-1 through 1.501(c)(9)-7 shall apply with respect to taxable years beginning after December 31, 1954.
( b ) *Pre-1970 taxable years.* For taxable years beginning before January 1, 1970, section 501(c)(9)(B) (relating to the requirement that 85 percent or more of the association's income consist of amounts collected from members and contributed by employers), as in effect for such years, shall apply.
( c ) *Existing associations.* Except as otherwise provided in paragraph (d), the provisions of § 1.501(c)(9)-2(a)(1) and (c)(3) shall apply with respect to taxable years beginning after December 31, 1980.
( d ) *Collectively-bargained plans.* In the case of a voluntary employees' beneficiary association which receives contributions from one or more employers pursuant to one or more collective bargaining agreements in effect on December 31, 1980, the provisions of §§ 1.501(c)(9)-1 through 1.501(c)(9)-5 shall apply with respect to taxable years beginning after the date on which the agreement terminates (determined without regard to any extension thereof agreed to after December 31, 1980).
( e ) *Election.* Notwithstanding paragraphs (c) and (d) of this section, an organization may choose to be subject to all or a portion of one or more of the provisions of these regulations for any taxable year beginning after December 31, 1954.
[T.D. 7750, 46 FR 1725, Jan. 7, 1981; 46 FR 11971, Feb. 12, 1981]
### JUDGMENT 

## Court of Appeals First District of Texas

NO. 01

- 14

- 00724

- CV

RONNY PUGA AND RICKE Y PUGA , Appellant s

V.

BARBARA SALESI , Appellee
Appeal from the 133rd District Court of Harris County. (Tr. Ct. No. 2011

- 28575 ).

This case is an appeal from the final judgment signed by the trial court on July 29, 2014. After submitting the case on the appellate record and the arguments properly raised by the parties, the Court holds that the trial court’s judgment contains no reve rsible error. Accordingly, the Court affirms the trial court’s judgment.

The Court orders that the appellants, Ronny Puga and Rickey Puga, jointly and severally, pay all appellate costs.

The Court orders that this decision be certified below for observa nce.

Judgment rendered June 23 , 2015

.
Panel consists of Justices Jennings, Bland, and Brown. Opinion delivered by Justice Brown.
From: Eric Ginsburg/RTP/USEPA/US

To: SStotts@stinson.com

Cc: Jan Tierney/DC/USEPA/US@EPA, Nathan Topham/RTP/USEPA/US@EPA, Ravi Srivastava/RTP/USEPA/US@EPA,

DLane@stinson.com

Date: 04/13/2011 03:54 PM Subject

: CAA Section 112(h)(3) alternative standards

I wanted to get back to you fairly quickly in response to your request for information about any alternative standards that might have been established under the authority of section 112(h)(3) of the Clean Air Act. At this stage none of our folks have identified any such standards,

but I will continue to work with our groups to confirm that no alternative standards exist. I will follow up with you either way to let you know the outcome of our search.

Eric

************************************** Eric O. Ginsburg Senior Program Advisor Sector Policies and Programs Division (D205-01) Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Research Triangle Park, NC 27711

Ph: (919) 541-0877 Fax: (919) 541-4991 Cell: (919) 724-8995

Page 1
# C_2016314EN.01000301.xml

| 29.8.2016 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 314/3 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

29.8.2016

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 314/3

---

Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 22 June 2016 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Nejvyšší správní soud — Czech Republic) — Odvolací finanční ředitelství v Český rozhlas

(Case C-11/15) (1)

1

((Reference for a preliminary ruling - Sixth Directive 77/388/EC - Value added tax - Article 2(1) - Supply of services effected for consideration - Definition - Public broadcasting - Financing from a compulsory statutory fee))

(2016/C 314/04)

Language of the case: Czech

Referring court

Referring court

Nejvyšší správní soud

Parties to the main proceedings

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Odvolací finanční ředitelství

Applicant:

Defendant: Český rozhlas

Defendant:

Operative part of the judgment

Operative part of the judgment

Article 2(1) of Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC of 17 May 1977 on the harmonisation of the laws of the Member States relating to turnover taxes — Common system of value added tax: uniform basis of assessment must be interpreted as meaning that public broadcasting activities, such as those at issue in the main proceedings, funded by a compulsory statutory charge paid by owners or possessors of a radio receiver and carried out by a radio broadcasting company created by law, do not constitute a supply of services ‘effected for consideration’ within the meaning of that provision and therefore fall outside the scope of that directive.

---

(1)  OJ C 138, 27.4.2015.

1

---
§ 1.6011-3 Requirement of statement from payees of certain gambling winnings. ( a ) *General rule.* Except as provided in paragraph (c) of this section, any person receiving a payment with respect to a wager in a sweepstakes, wagering pool, lottery, or other wagering transaction (including a parimutuel pool with respect to horse races, dog races, or jai alai) shall make a statement to the payer of such winnings upon the payer's demand. Such statements shall accompany the payer's return made with respect to the payment as required pursuant to section 3402(q) or 6041, as the case may be.
( b ) *Contents of statement.* The statement referred to in paragraph (a) shall contain information (in addition to that required under section 6041(c)) as to the amount, if any, of winnings from identical wagers to which the recipient is entitled. If any person other than the recipient is entitled to all or a portion of the payment, the statement shall also include information as to the amount, if any, of winnings from identical wagers to which each such person is entitled. The statement shall be provided on Form W-2G or, if persons other than the recipient are entitled to all or a portion of such payment, on Form 5754.
( c ) *Exception.* The requirement of paragraph (a) of this section does not apply with respect to any payment of winnings— ( 1 ) From a slot machine play, or a bingo or keno game,
( 2 ) Which is subject to withholding under section 3402(q) without regard to the existence of winnings from identical wagers, or
( 3 ) For which no return of information under section 6041 is required of the payer.
( d ) *Meaning of terms,* For purposes of this section, the terms “sweepstakes”, “wagering pool”, “lottery”, “other wagering transaction” and “identical wagers” shall have the same meanings as ascribed to them under § 31.3402(q)-1.
[T.D. 7919, 48 FR 46297, Oct. 12, 1983]