NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

NATALIE LUCINDA WILMOT, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

MARTIN J. O’MALLEY, Commissioner of 

Social Security, 

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 23-15603 

D.C. No. 2:21-cv-01393-SPL 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Arizona

Steven Paul Logan, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted April 3, 2024**

Phoenix, Arizona

Before: HAWKINS, BYBEE, and BADE, Circuit Judges.

Natalie Lucinda Wilmot appeals from a district court decision affirming the 

Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of her application for disability 

insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act. We have jurisdiction 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

APR 5 2024

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
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under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo the district court’s decision affirming 

the agency’s denial of Social Security disability benefits. Miskey v. Kijakazi, 33 

F.4th 565, 570 (9th Cir. 2022). We must “affirm the ALJ’s findings of fact if they 

are supported by substantial evidence and if the ALJ’s decision was free of legal 

error.” Shaibi v. Berryhill, 883 F.3d 1102, 1108 (9th Cir. 2017).

1. The ALJ considered Wilmot’s subjective allegations and gave clear 

and convincing reasons supported by substantial evidence for discounting her 

symptom testimony. See Smartt v. Kijakazi, 53 F.4th 489, 499 (9th Cir. 2022) 

(explaining that “the ‘clear and convincing’ standard requires an ALJ to show [her]

work,” and that the standard is not “whether our court is convinced, but instead 

whether the ALJ’s rationale is clear enough that it has the power to convince”). 

The ALJ explained how the evidence conflicted with Wilmot’s testimony on the 

intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of her symptoms. This evidence 

included the objective medical evidence that showed unremarkable and normal 

findings and the effectiveness of her treatment. See id. at 498 (“When objective 

medical evidence in the record is inconsistent with the claimant’s subjective 

testimony, the ALJ may indeed weigh it as undercutting such testimony.”); see 

also Rounds v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 807 F.3d 996, 1006 (9th Cir. 2015) (“To 

assess a claimant’s credibility, . . . [t]he ALJ must also consider factors including 

the ‘observations of treating and examining physicians . . . [about] the claimant’s 
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symptom[s and] functional restrictions caused by the symptoms . . . .’” (citation 

omitted)). Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s determination. While the 

evidence could be interpreted more favorably to Wilmot, we must uphold the 

ALJ’s interpretation when “the evidence of record is susceptible to more than one 

rational interpretation.”

1 See Terry v. Saul, 998 F.3d 1010, 1013 (9th Cir. 2021)

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

2. Because Wilmot applied for benefits after March 27, 2017, the ALJ’s 

evaluation of the medical opinion evidence and the prior administrative medical 

findings was governed by 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(a) (providing that “[t]he most 

important factors” are “supportability” and “consistency”). See Woods v. Kijakazi, 

32 F.4th 785, 791 (9th Cir. 2022). The ALJ applied this standard and explained 

her consideration of the “supportability and consistency factors.” 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404.1520c(b)(2). The ALJ found persuasive the opinions of state agency 

consultants. The ALJ explained that she found these opinions consistent with the 

medical record and supported by their review of the medical evidence, references 

1 Wilmot observes that the ALJ incorrectly stated that a treatment note from 

October 2015 was dated September 2017. She asserts that the 2015 treatment note 

predated the disability onset date and thus, could not be evidence of improvement. 

Any error was harmless considering that the ALJ mentioned this treatment note “in 

passing” and there is other evidence of improvement. Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 

F.3d 1035, 1038 (9th Cir. 2008) (explaining that an error is harmless “when it is 

clear from the record that [it] was inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability 

determination” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
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to specific findings in the record, and their explanations for their opinions. 

Because substantial evidence supports this determination, we must uphold it. See 

Woods, 32 F.4th at 787.

AFFIRMED.