J-S77038-18

*Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

 Appellee

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JASON V. SIDERIO,

 Appellant

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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

 

 No. 2626 EDA 2017

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence July 11, 2017

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0004420-2015

BEFORE: OTT, J., DUBOW, J. and STRASSBURGER, J.* 

MEMORANDUM BY STRASSBURGER, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 13, 2019

Jason V. Siderio (Appellant) appeals from the judgment of sentence

imposed following his negotiated guilty plea. Upon review, we affirm.

Michael Joseph Walsh was fatally shot in South Philadelphia on January 

22, 2015. In March 2015, the Commonwealth charged Appellant with the 

murder of Walsh, two felony and one misdemeanor counts relating to 

violations of the Uniform Firearms Act, and one misdemeanor count of 

possessing an instrument of crime. 

On July 11, 2017, Appellant entered a negotiated guilty plea to one 

count of third-degree murder, one second-degree felony count of person not 

to possess a firearm, and one misdemeanor count of possessing an 

instrument of crime. The trial court sentenced Appellant on the same date 
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to an aggregate term of 25 to 50 years in prison in accordance with the plea 

agreement.1 

Appellant timely filed a post-sentence motion to withdraw his guilty 

plea. Within the motion, Appellant made a bare assertion of his innocence

and averred that he did not enter into the plea voluntarily and knowingly. 

Motion to Withdraw Plea, 8/20/2017, at ¶¶ 4-5. Specifically, he contended 

that his decision to plead guilty was “clouded by the pressure of the 

consequences of a verdict of guilty” and that he did not understand the 

guilty plea colloquy. Id. Following argument, the trial court denied 

Appellant’s motion on August 2, 2017. 

This timely-filed appeal followed.2 Appellant presents one issue for our 

consideration: whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying his 

post-sentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea. See Appellant’s Brief at 6.

This Court reviews the denial of a post-sentence motion to withdraw a 

guilty plea by the following standard.

It is well-settled that the decision whether to permit a defendant 

to withdraw a guilty plea is within the sound discretion of the 

trial court. Although no absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea 

exists in Pennsylvania, the standard applied differs depending on 

whether the defendant seeks to withdraw the plea before or 

after sentencing. When a defendant seeks to withdraw a plea 

after sentencing, he must demonstrate prejudice on the order of 

 

1 Appellant also pleaded guilty and was sentenced during the same hearing 

in an unrelated case.

2 Both Appellant and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. 
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manifest injustice. [A] defendant may withdraw his guilty plea 

after sentencing only where necessary to correct manifest 

injustice. 

***

Manifest injustice occurs when the plea is not tendered 

knowingly, intelligently, voluntarily, and understandingly. In 

determining whether a plea is valid, the court must examine the 

totality of circumstances surrounding the plea. Pennsylvania law 

presumes a defendant who entered a guilty plea was aware of 

what he was doing, and the defendant bears the burden of 

proving otherwise.

Commonwealth v. Hart, 174 A.3d 660, 664–65 (Pa. Super. 2017) 

(internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Inter alia, the law imposes 

a stricter standard for post-sentence withdrawal motions in order to balance 

“the tension ... between the individual’s fundamental right to a trial and the 

need for finality in the proceedings.” Commonwealth v. Hvizda, 116 A.3d 

1103, 1106 (Pa. 2015).

On appeal, Appellant concedes that his answers during the colloquy at 

the plea hearing “appear[] to show that [his] plea of [g]uilty was knowing, 

intelligent, and voluntary,” and that he is bound by the answers he provided 

under oath at the plea colloquy. Appellant’s Brief at 10. Nevertheless, 

Appellant argues the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion 

based upon his averment in the motion that he did not understand the 

colloquy and his counsel’s statement during the colloquy that Appellant 
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“seemed to understand his rights.”3 Id. at 11 (emphasis in original) (citing 

N.T., 7/11/2017, at 16). 

Our review of the transcript of the plea hearing reveals that following 

Appellant’s oral colloquy, a brief exchange took place between the trial court 

and Appellant’s counsel.

THE COURT: Beginning with [Appellant’s counsel] first. 

[Counsel], have you discussed with your client his right to plead 

not guilty in the homicide case and go to trial?

[APPELLANT’S COUNSEL]: I have, your Honor.

THE COURT: Did he seem to understand his rights?

[APPELLANT’S COUNSEL]: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Are you satisfied that he’s competent and qualified 

to enter into this negotiated plea of guilty?

[APPELLANT’S COUNSEL]: I am.

N.T., 7/11/2017, at 16-17 (emphasis added).

Appellant’s argument that his counsel’s response somehow 

demonstrated the unknowing nature of his plea is utterly unconvincing. 

 

3 To support his claim of manifest injustice, Appellant briefly mentions his 

alleged innocence in passing in the summary of his argument. Appellant has 

waived this claim; a mere reference in a summary of the argument is not a 

substitute for a developed argument with citations to the record and 

authority. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a). Even if Appellant had preserved the 

issue in his brief, “this Court has held that post-sentence claims of innocence 

do not demonstrate manifest injustice.” Commonwealth v. Kpou, 153 

A.3d 1020, 1024 (Pa. Super. 2016); Commonwealth v. Myers, 642 A.2d 

1103, 1108 (Pa. Super. 1994) (“A defendant’s post-sentence recantation of 

guilt does not rise to the level of prejudice on the order of manifest injustice 

sufficient to require that he be permitted to withdraw his plea of guilty.”).
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Appellant’s counsel could not read Appellant’s mind to be certain whether 

Appellant truly understood his rights. Counsel has no choice but to 

communicate his assessment of whether Appellant seemed to understand his 

rights based upon Appellant’s expressions, statements, questions, and other 

clues. 

Moreover, Appellant fails to elaborate upon what specifically he did not 

understand about the colloquy. The Commonwealth provided a description 

of the elements of all three crimes to which Appellant was pleading guilty as 

well as a detailed recitation of the facts it believed it could establish at trial. 

N.T., 7/11/2017, at 23-25, 34-42. The record reveals that the trial court 

conducted an extensive colloquy in plain wording, which covered the 

following: the potential sentence; the sentence recommended by the 

Commonwealth; the terms of the plea agreement; the elements of the 

crimes to which Appellant was pleading guilty; Appellant’s age of 34; 

Appellant’s ability to read, write, and understand the English language based 

upon his completion of the eleventh grade; Appellant’s state of mind free 

from the influence of drugs, alcohol, prescribed medications, or mental 

illness; the rights he was giving up by pleading guilty; and the effect upon 

any probation or deportation. Id. at 4-45. 

Appellant affirmatively testified under oath that he was not threatened 

or forced to plead guilty, and there was no other understanding between him 

and the Commonwealth other than what was set forth in the plea 
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agreement. Id. Further, he discussed his decision to plead guilty with his 

attorneys; he was satisfied with the advice and representation of counsel;

the facts set forth by the Commonwealth during the plea hearing were 

essentially true; he signed the written colloquy after he had read it and had 

it explained to him so that he understood it; and he understood the rights 

described by the trial court that he was giving up by pleading guilty. Id. 

Appellant’s concession in his brief4is correct: his statements under oath 

foreclose him from asserting that he did not understand the colloquy. See 

Commonwealth v. Pollard, 832 A.2d 517, 523 (Pa. Super. 2003) (“A 

person who elects to plead guilty is bound by the statements he makes in 

open court while under oath and he may not later assert grounds for 

withdrawing the plea which contradict the statements he made at his plea 

colloquy.”). 

Furthermore, Appellant spoke up when he had a question relating to 

his sentence in his other case, and did not speak again when offered the 

opportunity. Id. at 4-5, 47. He also signed a detailed written colloquy, 

where he indicated in writing that he understood what he was signing. See 

Written Guilty Plea Colloquy, 7/11/2017, at 3. 

Based on the foregoing, we agree with the trial court that Appellant 

has not demonstrated the manifest injustice necessary to permit him to 

 

4 See Appellant’s Brief at 10.
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withdraw the plea after sentence was imposed. The guilty plea colloquy in 

this case establishes that he willingly and voluntarily agreed to plead guilty, 

after negotiating a favorable plea bargain, with full understanding of the 

consequences of his decision and of the rights he would be giving up by 

pleading guilty. 

Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 2/13/19