1 

2023 IL App (5th) 200072-U 

NO. 5-20-0072 

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIFTH DISTRICT 

________________________________________________________________________ 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the

 ) Circuit Court of

 Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Jackson County. 

 ) 

v. ) No. 19-CF-137 

 ) 

KING MICHAEL OLIVER, ) Honorable 

 ) Ralph R. Bloodworth III, 

 Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding. 

________________________________________________________________________ 

 PRESIDING JUSTICE BOIE delivered the judgment of the court.

Justices Moore and Barberis concurred in the judgment.

 

ORDER 

¶ 1 Held: The defendant’s convictions for threatening a public official and criminal 

trespass to real property are affirmed where the evidence was sufficient for a 

rational trier of fact to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Additionally, the defendant’s failure to provide an adequate offer of proof as 

to the contents of the Facebook Live videos he was barred from using at trial 

amounts to forfeiture of his claim, and the defendant’s claim of a speedy trial 

violation must be rejected where the provisions for a speedy trial within 120 

days do not apply to the defendant in this case. We further find that all 

remaining issues raised on appeal were forfeited by the defendant for failing 

 to make an objection at the time of the alleged errors and for further failing 

 to raise the issues in a written posttrial motion. 

 

¶ 2 On December 17, 2019, following a jury trial, the defendant, King Michael Oliver, 

was convicted of one count each of threatening a public official in violation of section 12-

9(a)(i) of the Criminal Code of 2012 (Code) (720 ILCS 5/12-9(a)(1)(i) (West 2018)), a 

NOTICE

This order was filed under 

Supreme Court Rule 23 and is 

not precedent except in the 

limited circumstances allowed 

under Rule 23(e)(1).

NOTICE

Decision filed 06/26/23. The 

text of this decision may be 

changed or corrected prior to 

the filing of a Petition for 

Rehearing or the disposition of 

the same.
2 

Class 3 felony, and criminal trespass to real property in violation of section 21-3(a)(3) of 

the Code (id. § 21-3(a)(3)), a Class B misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced the defendant 

to 71⁄2 years in the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC) on the charge of threatening 

a public official, to be followed by one year of mandatory supervised release, and time 

served on the criminal trespass to real property charge. 

¶ 3 The defendant raises several issues on appeal. He argues that: (1) he was improperly 

arrested for criminal trespass to real property; (2) the State violated the discovery rules; 

(3) the trial court erred in precluding him from introducing Facebook Live videos that he 

wanted to have played at trial; (4) his statutory right to a speedy trial was violated; (5) the 

evidence was insufficient to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; (6) his “second 

seizure” was illegal; (7) he was a victim of a malicious prosecution; (8) the jury was 

improperly instructed; and (9) the trial court erred in sustaining the State’s objections 

during his opening and closing arguments, which violated his right to address the jury. As 

such, the defendant argues that his conviction should be reversed, and the information be 

dismissed. For the following reasons, we affirm.

¶ 4 I. BACKGROUND 

¶ 5 On April 10, 2019, the defendant was charged, by information, with one count of 

threatening a public official (720 ILCS 5/12-9(a)(1)(i) (West 2018)), in that he knowingly 

conveyed to Officer Andrew Sabens of the Carbondale Police Department, a public 

official, a communication containing a threat that placed Officer Sabens in reasonable 

apprehension of immediate or future bodily harm. The defendant told Officer Sabens that 

upon the defendant’s release from jail, the defendant was going to find Officer Sabens and 
3 

inflict physical harm upon Officer Sabens. The defendant conveyed the aforesaid threat 

because of Officer Sabens’ performance of a public duty, being Officer Sabens’ 

participation in the arrest and transportation of the defendant to jail. 

¶ 6 The defendant was also charged with one count of criminal trespass to real property

(id. § 21-3(a)(3)), in that he knowingly remained in a building other than a residence of 

another, namely the Schnucks store located in Carbondale, Jackson County, Illinois, after 

receiving notice from Bradley T. Young, an occupant and authorized representative of the 

owner of said building, to depart said building. As the State points out in its brief, the 

information identified the statutory violation as section 21-3(a)(1), but the language of the 

charge follows the language set out in section 21-3(a)(3), so it is likely that the State miscited the statute in its charging document. This is further substantiated by the language of 

the jury instructions. Accordingly, we will consider the mis-citation in the charging 

document as a scrivener’s error, and accept the State’s contention that the proper citation 

was to section 21-3(a)(3). 

¶ 7 On April 11, 2019, the defendant posted $750 cash bond. However, on April 25, 

2019, the defendant was arrested in a different matter and was returned to prison for a 

parole violation until October 28, 2019. In this matter, the defendant elected to proceed 

pro se, and filed several pleadings, including motions for discovery. On July 9, 2019, the 

State indicated that it had some discovery available for the defendant to view in open court, 

and further stated: 

“I would propose the Defendant be allowed to review copies of these 

materials in court today but he not receive copies to take with him because under 
4 

the Supreme Court Rules, I can only provide those to an attorney. If he had an 

attorney, I could give copies to the attorney. 

But since he’s pro se, I would propose that he view these in court today. *** 

He has not provided me with any discovery. I heard him say something about a 

video. There may be some witnesses. I would ask on the record that he identify those 

items as I’ve just identified my discovery for this Court this morning.” 

Thereafter, the trial court told the defendant that it could not explain to him how to try his 

case, but indicated that there are discovery rules that the defendant must abide by, and that 

if he had any witnesses or a video that he wished to present at trial, he must provide such 

information to the State. The trial court then asked the defendant if he wanted to review 

the State’s discovery, and the defendant indicated that he did. The trial court then gave the 

defendant time to review the State’s discovery materials. 

¶ 8 The State answered the defendant’s motions for discovery on July 31, 2019, and 

August 7, 2019. On July 31, 2019, the State filed a pleading titled, “People’s Discovery to 

Defendant,” which memorialized what it produced to the defendant on July 9, 2019, in 

open court. At the hearing on August 5, 2019, the State referenced its July 31, 2019, 

pleading, and stated that it included some items that the defendant had not yet seen. One 

of the items was a disk containing audio and video of the incident that occurred when the 

defendant was transported to the jail. The State suggested that the defendant be allowed to 

review the video in the courtroom that day, which was allowed. 

¶ 9 The State further indicated to the trial court that it had not received any discovery 

from the defendant. Thereafter, the State stated: 
5 

“While we were having our discussions, [the defendant] told me about a number of 

items of what he calls discovery that he has been requesting. I believe he’s been 

requesting those items by making filings with the Court without serving any notice 

of those filings on the People. So I didn’t have copies of any of these documents 

he’s been sending to the Court. 

In the documents he sent to the Court he requests things like copies of 911 

call recordings. Well, that could be material evidence in this case that I could 

recover, and I think I have an obligation to search for if it could be material to his 

guilt or innocence. There’s also some Facebook videos that he says he created that 

depict the events in this case or at least related to this case. I think that’s potentially 

material evidence. He told me in the jury room just now that some of those videos 

were on the scene at Schnucks, and he says those are available on Facebook. I could 

not access them, but I think the officer may be able to access them. 

There’s other things that are listed in his court pleadings that I reviewed 

briefly and I think could be material to this case. So what I would propose is we 

vacate the jury trial setting and we set this case for jury trial in 30 to 60 days so that 

I can have time to gather this material evidence and make it available to [the 

defendant], and we can talk about the case at that point.”

The defendant objected, stating that he had previously filed a motion for a speedy trial. The 

trial court indicated, however, that the record was devoid of any such speedy trial motion. 

The trial court further granted the State’s request to vacate the trial date for the following 
6 

week and set the matter over for a hearing on the defendant’s motions—attributing the 

delay to the defendant. 

¶ 10 On September 11, 2019, and November 14, 2019, the defendant filed documents 

titled, “Defendant’s Discovery to State,” both of which consisted of one paragraph stating:

“(1) Facebook live videos and/or rather the proper route to access and/or to view the 

videos via ‘King Youdontknowme’ which are posted publicly for the world to see

on Facebook for anyone and everyone who has a Facebook page (or account) to see.

Defendant hereby notifies the People of Illinois that these videos will be used 

at trial.” 

¶ 11 Also on September 11, 2019, the defendant filed a document titled, “Petition for 

Writ of Habeas Corpus,” which stated, in relevant part, that “[i]n the course of litigation, 

this court has also deprived [the defendant] of *** 120 day speedy trial.” At the trial court’s 

September 11, 2019, hearing on all pending motions, the trial court stated that the 

defendant’s speedy trial right had been tolled by the filing of his motions. The State 

indicated, however, that the defendant was not being held in the IDOC on this case, and as 

such, the State argued that the defendant would have been required to make a motion for 

speedy trial to trigger the running of any speedy trial term. The trial court concurred with 

the State and informed the defendant that he could file a speedy trial motion, but the 

defendant indicated that he believed that the first motion he filed in this matter was a speedy 

trial demand. The defendant then, however, stated that he wished to withdraw all pending 

motions and proceed to trial. Accordingly, the trial court indicated that it would set the 

matter for trial. Additionally, the State provided more discovery to the defendant in open 
7 

court, consisting of a certified copy of a conviction out of Pulaski County, and suggested 

that once a trial date is set, the trial court allow the defendant to come back to court and 

review all of the State’s discovery again in preparation for trial, to which the trial court 

agreed. On September 23, 2019, the trial court informed the defendant in open court that it 

would be remanding the defendant to the Jackson County jail from the IDOC that day so 

that the defendant could adequately prepare for trial by going through discovery.

¶ 12 On October 1, 2019, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss charges, alleging, in 

relevant part, that he had been incarcerated since his arrest on April 24, 2019, and therefore, 

had been in “custody during the entire 120-day term for violation of parole resulting from 

the commencement of this case.” The defendant further declared that he had not agreed to 

any delay and had made many objections on the record in open court. Within his motion, 

the defendant also included his “Final Submissions,” which consisted of things the 

defendant intended to do and use at trial, including questions he wished to ask during voir 

dire, and a “Brief Impartial Statement of the Case.” The defendant’s final submissions also 

included an exhibit list, stating that the only evidence he intended to introduce at trial was

Facebook Live videos he recorded on two different cellphones leading up to his arrest. 

¶ 13 On December 13, 2019, the State filed a response to the defendant’s motion to 

dismiss, arguing that the provisions for a speedy trial within 120 days do not apply to the 

defendant, who was in custody from April 25, 2019, until October 28, 2019, for a violation 

of his parole in a different case. The State further pointed out that the defendant was 

informed that he was not being held in custody on this case and the 120 days did not apply 

to his present incarceration by the trial court in open court on September 11, 2019, 
8 

September 23, 2019, September 30, 2019, October 8, 2019, and October 18, 2019.

Additionally, the State noted that the defendant was not served with the warrant in this case 

until October 17, 2019, and was released on a recognizance bond on November 14, 2019.

Accordingly, the trial court found that 120-day speedy trial provision did not apply to the 

defendant and denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss.

¶ 14 The State also objected to the defendant’s attempt to introduce at trial any Facebook 

Live videos, arguing that the defendant failed to produce any videos in discovery. The 

defendant stated that the videos depicted the events leading up to his arrest, and that the 

videos were publicly accessible. The defendant further stated that he “could try to actually 

provide the State with exact footage that I plan on using at trial.” The trial court indicated 

that if this issue came up at trial, it could not tell the defendant how to get things admitted 

into evidence. 

¶ 15 The defendant’s jury trial began on December 16, 2019. Before the trial began, the 

State made an oral motion in limine seeking the trial court to preclude the defendant from 

introducing any evidence that was not provided to it in discovery, including the defendant’s 

Facebook Live videos. The trial court granted the State’s motion in limine over the 

defendant’s objection.

¶ 16 Bradley Young, a manager at the Schnucks grocery store in Carbondale, testified 

that on April 9, 2019, at approximately 11:30 a.m., he was alerted to a shirtless gentleman 

in the front foyer area of the store who was acting “really strange.” Young testified that he 

and another manager walked out to the foyer area to see what was going on, and saw the 

gentleman, identified as the defendant, holding a cellphone and using a plug-in to charge 
9 

his cellphone “while he was Facebooking.” Young stated that he asked the defendant what 

was going on, and the defendant started talking about an incident that he had with some 

police officers that were not really police officers. Young asked the defendant if he was 

wanting to do some business at Schnucks, and the defendant indicated that he did. As such, 

Young told the defendant that he needed to put a shirt on, and the defendant asked Young 

if he would go in and buy him a shirt. Young told the defendant no, so then, the defendant

began asking customers entering the store to buy a shirt for him. Young stopped the

defendant from asking customers to buy him a shirt, and told the defendant that if he could 

not put a shirt on, then he needed to leave.

¶ 17 Young testified that thereafter, the defendant still had his cellphone and told Young 

that he was going to FaceTime him. Young told the defendant that he needed to put his 

cellphone up because he was not okay with the defendant “FaceTiming” him along with 

another manager. Young again asked the defendant to leave, but after the defendant 

repeatedly refused, Young said he was going to call the police. Young stated that the 

defendant kept talking about issues he had with police officers that morning that were not 

really police officers, and that the defendant said that if Young was going to call the police, 

he wanted to make sure that they were real police officers. Young testified that once the 

police officers arrived, they asked the defendant nicely to leave the premises, but the 

defendant again refused. 

¶ 18 Carbondale police officer Ashley Noto testified that at approximately 11:42 a.m., 

he was dispatched to Schnucks, where he found the defendant in the foyer area of the store.

Officer Noto testified that after speaking with the manager about what was going on, he 
10 

then asked the defendant numerous times to leave the store or he would be subject to arrest 

for trespassing, but the defendant still refused. Officer Noto stated that the defendant was 

recording him on his cellphone to Facebook Live and making odd comments like, “You’re 

not the real police,” and “I need to speak with the real police.” Officer Noto told the 

defendant to walk with him outside, which the defendant began to, but then he stopped in 

the foyer area again to plug in his cellphone. Officer Noto told the defendant again that he 

needed to leave, and once the defendant finally exited the store, he stopped again to plug 

in his cellphone in an outlet on the outside of the store, still on Schnucks’ property, and 

refused to leave. Officer Noto testified that at that time, the defendant was placed under 

arrest for criminal trespass to real property. On redirect, Officer Noto testified that he asked 

Schnucks for any video surveillance that they had depicting the events that led to the 

defendant’s arrest that day, but none were provided. 

¶ 19 Officer Noto testified that Carbondale police officer Andrew Sabens arrived at 

Schnucks after Officer Noto and observed Officer Noto’s efforts to get the defendant to 

leave the foyer area. Officer Sabens testified that he recognized the defendant as an 

individual he had encountered earlier that morning before the incident at Schnucks. Officer 

Sabens described the defendant’s behavior that day at Schnucks as “noncompliant,” and 

stated that the defendant was led outside the foyer area, but when he refused to leave, he 

was thereafter arrested for criminal trespass to real property. Officer Sabens testified that 

once the defendant was placed in handcuffs, he started cussing at the police officers, so the 

decision was made to transport the defendant directly to the Jackson County jail. Officer 

Sabens stated that while the defendant was being transported, the defendant got aggressive 
11 

and threatened Officer Sabens, telling Officer Sabens that he was going to beat him up, 

calling him a “pussy ass bitch,” and saying things like, “take the cuffs off and let’s fight 

man to man.” Officer Sabens testified that the defendant continued behaving in this manner 

the entire drive to the jail. Officer Sabens further stated that the defendant threatened 

Officer Sabens by telling him that when he was released from jail, he was going to 

personally find him. Officer Sabens testified that he felt personally threatened by the 

defendant’s words, as he had no reason not to believe the defendant. Accordingly, the 

defendant was also arrested for threatening a public official. Thereafter, People’s Exhibits 

No. 1 and 2, the video recording and accompanying audio recording made from the in-car 

camera from Officer Sabens’ police vehicle and Officer Sabens’ pager depicting the 

defendant’s behavior and statements made during his transport to the jail, were admitted 

into evidence and played for the jury. 

¶ 20 At the conclusion of the State’s case, the defendant indicated that he was not going 

to testify, but again requested to play the Facebook Live videos of the incident for the jury.

The trial court once again denied the defendant’s request because the defendant had failed 

to disclose any such videos to the State in discovery. The jury returned guilty verdicts on 

both counts, and the trial court subsequently sentenced the defendant to 71⁄2 years in the 

IDOC on the charge of threatening a public official, to be followed by one year of 

mandatory supervised release, and time served on the criminal trespass to real property 

charge. No posttrial motions were filed by the parties.
12 

¶ 21 II. ANALYSIS 

¶ 22 The first issue we must address is that the defendant’s pro se brief fails to comply 

with many of the requirements of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341 (eff. May 25, 2018). 

Rule 341 governs the content of appellate briefs, and is made applicable to criminal cases 

by Illinois Supreme Court Rule 612(b)(9) (eff. July 1, 2017). Although the defendant is 

a pro se litigant, his status does not lessen his burden on appeal. “In Illinois, parties 

choosing to represent themselves without a lawyer must comply with the same rules and 

are held to the same standards as licensed attorneys.” Holzrichter v. Yorath, 2013 IL App 

(1st) 110287, ¶ 78. Rule 341(h) states that an appellant’s brief should contain a statement 

of “the facts necessary to an understanding of the case, stated accurately and fairly without 

argument or comment, and with appropriate reference to the pages of the record on appeal,” 

and an argument “which shall contain the contentions of the appellant and the reasons 

therefor, with citation of the authorities and the pages of the record relied on.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 

341(h)(6), (7) (eff. May 25, 2018). Accordingly, this court is entitled to have the issue(s) 

clearly defined with cohesive arguments presented and pertinent citations to legal 

authority. Obert v. Saville, 253 Ill. App. 3d 677, 682 (1993).

¶ 23 Here, the defendant’s statement of facts does not set forth “the facts necessary to an 

understanding of the case.” See Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(6) (eff. May 25, 2018). Rather, the 

defendant’s statement of facts starts out by stating: 

“There are facts concerning this case that are beyond the scope of this Appeal 

‘however,’ ALL FACTS are relevant to the understanding of any situation in its 

entirety so I have included, in the Appendix (A1-A20), MY PERSONAL 
13 

ACCOUNT OF OFFENSE(S) to insure that full understanding to all and it should 

be read first.”

An appendix should be limited to documents that are in the record on appeal, and placing 

documents in an appendix does not make them a part of the appellate record. See People 

v. Carter, 2019 IL App (1st) 170803, ¶ 44 (“ ‘[t]he inclusion of evidence in an appendix is 

an improper supplementation of the record with information dehors the record’ ” (quoting 

People v. Wright, 2013 IL App (1st) 103232, ¶ 38)); Ill. S. Ct. R. 342 (eff. Oct. 1, 2019) 

(an appendix may include “materials from the record that are the basis of the appeal or 

pertinent to it”). “[I]f the materials are not taken from the record, they may not generally 

be placed before the appellate court in an appendix and will be disregarded.” Oruta v.

B.E.W., 2016 IL App (1st) 152735, ¶ 32. The defendant’s statement of facts and his 

appendix further include several paragraphs of information not contained in the record on 

appeal. 

¶ 24 Moreover, much of the defendant’s argument section is a narrative of the case from 

his perspective, containing conclusory, vague allegations with little or no citations to the 

record on appeal and sporadic citations to legal authority presumably supporting his claims.

The supreme court rules are not mere suggestions, and we may strike a brief for failure to 

comply with the rules. See People v. Williams, 2020 IL App (3d) 180024, ¶ 25. Further, 

the defendant’s failure to support his contentions with citation to legal authority or coherent 

argument forfeits review of his claims. Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. May 25, 2018); People 

v. Sprind, 403 Ill. App. 3d 772, 778-79 (2010). Nevertheless, we have the benefit of the 

State’s cogent brief. As such, as the issues are evident and the merits of the appeal can be 
14 

readily ascertained from the record on appeal, we will proceed to the merits of the appeal. 

See Twardowski v. Holiday Hospitality Franchising, Inc., 321 Ill. App. 3d 509, 511 (2001). 

¶ 25 The next issue we must address is the defendant’s failure to file a posttrial motion. 

It is well settled that an issue is forfeited on appeal unless a party makes an objection at the 

time of a purported error and specifically raises the issue in a written posttrial motion. 

People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 186 (1988). The purpose of this rule is to encourage 

parties to raise their concerns in the trial courts so that courts have an opportunity to correct 

their errors. 1010 Lake Shore Ass’n v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co., 2015 IL 118372, 

¶ 14. Here, the defendant failed to file a posttrial motion raising any of the issues he now 

brings on appeal. Moreover, the defendant raises two new issues for the first time in his 

reply brief. “Points not argued are forfeited and shall not be raised in the reply brief, in oral 

argument, or on petition for rehearing.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. May 25, 2018). 

Consequently, we find that the defendant has forfeited his claims that he was improperly 

arrested for criminal trespass to real property; the State violated the discovery rules; his 

“second seizure” was illegal; he was a victim of a malicious prosecution; the jury was 

improperly instructed; and, the trial court erred in sustaining the State’s objections during 

his opening and closing arguments which violated his right to address the jury, for failing 

to make an objection at the time of the alleged errors and for further failing to raise the 

issues in a written posttrial motion. In Enoch, however, the Illinois Supreme Court held 

that challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence are not subject to forfeiture for failing to 

file a posttrial motion. See Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d at 190. Accordingly, we will address the 

defendant’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence.
15 

¶ 26 Additionally, with respect to the defendant’s issue that the trial court erred in 

precluding him from introducing Facebook Live videos that he wanted to have played at 

trial, it is well settled that in order to properly preserve for review an error in the exclusion 

of evidence, the defendant must make an adequate offer of proof in the trial court, and a 

defendant’s failure to make such an offer of proof results in the forfeiture of the issue. 

People v. Staake, 2017 IL 121755, ¶ 51. An adequate offer of proof requires that the 

proponent of the evidence informs the trial court, with particularity, of the substance of the 

anticipated evidence, and an offer of proof that merely summarizes the evidence in a 

conclusory manner is inadequate. Snelson v. Kamm, 204 Ill. 2d 1, 23 (2003). The purpose 

of providing an offer of proof is to advise the trial court, opposing counsel, and reviewing 

court, of the nature and substance of the evidence sought to be introduced (People v. Leak, 

398 Ill. App. 3d 798, 822 (2010)), and for the reviewing court to be able to determine 

whether the exclusion of evidence was proper (People v. Tabb, 374 Ill. App. 3d 680, 689 

(2007)). 

¶ 27 As the State points out, the defendant did not make an adequate offer of proof 

explaining the content of the Facebook Live videos that were excluded at trial. In response 

to the State’s oral motion in limine asking the trial court to preclude the defendant from 

introducing any evidence that was not provided to it in discovery, including the defendant’s 

Facebook Live videos, the defendant stated, “There are actual recordings of the factual 

truth and I intend to use them in my defense. That’s the only evidence that I have[.]” The 

defendant did not allege that the videos contradicted any of the testimony provided by the 

witnesses at trial, nor that the videos would show anything other than corroboration of the 
16 

events as otherwise stated at trial. Consequently, the defendant’s failure to provide an 

adequate offer of proof as to the contents of the Facebook Live videos amounts to the 

forfeiture of his claim, notwithstanding the defendant’s failure to disclose such videos to 

the State in discovery. 

¶ 28 The defendant also argues that his statutory right to a speedy trial, pursuant to

section 103-5(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963, known as the Speedy Trial 

Act (725 ILCS 5/103-5(a) (West 2018)), was violated because he was held in custody for 

this offense for more than 120 days, and that none of the delays were attributable to him. 

The provisions for a speedy trial within 120 days, however, does not apply to the defendant

in this case since he was in custody from April 25, 2019, until October 28, 2019, for a 

violation of his parole in a different case, subsequent to his arrest in this case on April 9, 

2019, and posting $750 cash bond on April 11, 2019. The State below further pointed out 

that the defendant was informed that he was not being held in custody on this case and the 

120 days did not apply to his present incarceration by the trial court in open court on 

September 11, 2019, September 23, 2019, September 30, 2019, October 8, 2019, and 

October 18, 2019. Additionally, the defendant was not served with the warrant in this case 

until October 17, 2019, and was released on a recognizance bond on November 14, 2019. 

Accordingly, the defendant’s claim of a speedy trial violation must be rejected.

¶ 29 We will now address the defendant’s remaining issue of the sufficiency of the 

evidence. The defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to convict him of 

threatening a public official and criminal trespass to real property. Our standard of review 
17 

for a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence in a criminal case has been stated by our 

supreme court as follows:

“When considering a challenge to a criminal conviction based upon the 

sufficiency of the evidence, this court will not retry the defendant. [Citation.] 

Rather, in such cases the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in 

the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have 

found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.] 

Thus, it is our duty in the case at bar to carefully examine the evidence while giving 

due consideration to the fact that the court and jury saw and heard the witnesses. 

[Citations.] If, however, after such consideration we are of the opinion that the 

evidence is insufficient to establish the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, 

we must reverse the conviction. [Citations.] The testimony of a single witness, if it 

is positive and the witness is credible, is sufficient to convict. [Citations.] While 

credibility of a witness is within the province of the trier of fact, and the finding of 

the jury on such matters is entitled to great weight, the jury’s determination is not 

conclusive. Rather, we will reverse a conviction where the evidence is so 

unreasonable, improbable, or unsatisfactory as to justify a reasonable doubt of 

defendant’s guilt. [Citations.]” People v. Smith, 185 Ill. 2d 532, 541-42 (1999).

¶ 30 At trial, Officer Noto testified that Officer Sabens arrived at Schnucks after Officer 

Noto and observed Officer Noto’s efforts to get the defendant to leave the foyer area. 

Officer Sabens testified that he recognized the defendant as an individual he had 

encountered earlier on the morning of the incident. Officer Sabens described the 
18 

defendant’s behavior at Schnucks as “noncompliant,” and that the defendant was led 

outside the foyer area, but when he repeatedly refused to leave, he was thereafter arrested 

for criminal trespass to real property. Officer Sabens testified that once the defendant was 

placed in handcuffs, he began using obscenities and making threats toward the police 

officers. Officer Sabens testified that he felt personally threatened by the defendant’s 

words, as he had no reason not to believe the defendant. Accordingly, the defendant was 

also arrested for threatening a public official. People’s Exhibits No. 1 and 2, the video 

recording and accompanying audio recording made from the in-car camera from Officer 

Sabens’ squad car and Officer Sabens’ pager depicting the defendant’s behavior and 

statements made during his transport to the jail, were admitted into evidence and played 

for the jury.

¶ 31 In order to convict the defendant of threatening a public official, the State was 

required to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) that the defendant knowingly and 

willfully communicated, directly or indirectly, a threat to a public official; (2) that the 

threat placed the public official in reasonable apprehension of immediate or future bodily 

harm; and (3) that the threat was related to the official’s public status. See People v. 

Kirkpatrick, 365 Ill. App. 3d 927, 930 (2006); 720 ILCS 5/12-9(a)(1)(i) (West 2018). The 

trier of fact may consider the context in which a threat arose when determining whether the 

threat was credible. People v. Peterson, 306 Ill. App. 3d 1091, 1100 (1999). 

¶ 32 Here, based on the evidence presented at trial, the defendant knowingly and 

willfully communicated direct threats to Officer Sabens, a public official. Officer Sabens 

testified that he felt personally threatened by the defendant’s words, as he had no reason 
19 

not to believe the defendant, thereby placing him in reasonable apprehension of future 

bodily harm. Finally, the defendant’s threats were related to Officer Saben’s status as a 

police officer. As such, we do not find that the evidence was so unreasonable, improbable, 

or unsatisfactory as to justify a reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt. 

¶ 33 In order to convict the defendant of criminal trespass to real property, the State was 

required to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant knowingly remained in a 

building other than a residence of another after receiving notice from the occupant to 

depart. See 720 ILCS 5/21-3(a)(3) (West 2018). At trial, Bradley Young, a manager at 

Schnucks, testified that he and another manager repeatedly asked the defendant to leave, 

but after the defendant refused, Young said he was going to call the police. Young testified 

that once the police officers arrived, they asked the defendant nicely to leave the premises, 

but the defendant still refused. As such, based on the evidence presented at trial, the 

defendant knowingly remained in Schnucks after receiving notice from the store’s 

managers to depart. Accordingly, we do not find that the evidence was so unreasonable, 

improbable, or unsatisfactory as to justify a reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt.

¶ 34 III. CONCLUSION 

¶ 35 For the foregoing reasons, the defendant’s convictions for threatening a public 

official and criminal trespass to real property are affirmed where the evidence was 

sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Additionally, the defendant’s failure to provide an adequate offer of proof as to the contents 

of the Facebook Live videos he was barred from using at trial amounts to forfeiture of his 

claim, and the defendant’s claim of a speedy trial violation must be rejected where the 
20 

provisions for a speedy trial within 120 days do not apply to the defendant in this case. We 

further find that all remaining issues raised on appeal were forfeited by the defendant for 

failing to make an objection at the time of the alleged errors and for further failing to raise 

the issues in a written posttrial motion. Accordingly, we affirm the defendant’s convictions 

and sentence.

¶ 36 Affirmed.