UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD 

MARY J. JORDAN,

Appellant,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,

Agency.

DOCKET NUMBER

DC-0432-16-0370-I-1

DATE: February 3, 2023

THIS ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL1

Kristen Farr, Esquire, and Rosemary Dettling, Esquire, Washington, D.C., 

for the appellant.

Crista Kraics, Quantico, Virginia, for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman

Raymond A. Limon, Member

Tristan L. Leavitt, Member

REMAND ORDER

¶1 The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which 

affirmed her removal under 5 U.S.C. chapter 43. For the reasons discussed 

below, we GRANT the appellant’s petition for review, VACATE the initial 

decision, and REMAND the case to the Washington Regional office for further 

 

1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add 

significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, 

but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not 

required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a 

precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board 

as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
2

adjudication consistent with Santos v. National Aeronautics & Space 

Administration, 990 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2021). 

BACKGROUND

¶2 The following facts are not in dispute. The appellant was previously 

employed as a Financial Management Analyst, NH-0501-03, in Quantico,

Virginia. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 1 at 2. Her position was covered under a 

Contribution-based Compensation Appraisal System (CCAS), which is similar to 

a traditional performance-based appraisal system. IAF, Tab 7 at 124-205; see

generally 5 U.S.C. § 4703 (authorizing OPM to conduct demonstration projects); 

Civilian Acquisition Workforce Personnel Demonstration Project, Department of 

Defense, 64 Fed. Reg. 1426-01 (Jan. 8, 1999). Under the CCAS, an employee’s 

performance is assessed based on her overall contribution to the agency’s mission 

in six contribution factors, which is expressed as a numerical “contribution 

score.” Id. at 108, 184; IAF, Tab 23 at 2. If an employee’s contribution score 

during an appraisal period is less than her expected contribution level, she may be 

placed on a Contribution Improvement Plan (CIP) to provide her with a 

reasonable opportunity to improve her performance in the identified factors. IAF, 

Tab 7 at 189-90; Tab 23 at 2. If the employee’s performance does not sufficiently 

improve during the CIP period, the agency may take an action, including a 

reduction in pay or grade (a change to a lower “broadband level”), a 

reassignment, or removal. IAF, Tab 7 at 190; id. at 164-65, 182-83.

¶3 On August 25, 2015, the appellant was informed that her contribution was 

unacceptable in all six contribution factors and was placed on a 60-day CIP. Id.

at 69-79. By letter dated December 11, 2015, the agency informed the appellant 

that she met the expectations for improvement in contribution factor 3, but her 

performance continued to remain unacceptable in contribution factors 1, 2, 4, 5, 

and 6 at the end of the CIP, and proposed her removal. Id. at 52-58. After 

reviewing the written response and accompanying exhibits provided by the 
3

appellant’s attorney, the deciding official sustained the appellant’s removal by a 

letter dated February 10, 2016. Id. at 22-50.

¶4 The appellant timely appealed her removal to the Board. IAF, Tab 1. After

holding the appellant’s requested hearing, the administrative judge issued an 

initial decision affirming the agency’s removal action. IAF, Tab 25, Initial

Decision (ID) at 1, 37. In the decision, the administrative judge determined the 

following: the agency’s performance appraisal system was approved by the 

Office of Personnel Management (OPM); the appellant’s performance standards 

were valid; the agency communicated the appellant’s performance expectations to 

her at the beginning of the appraisal period; the agency warned the appellant of 

the inadequacies of her performance and provided her with an adequate 

opportunity to improve her performance; and the appellant’s performance 

remained unacceptable in three of the six contribution factors during the CIP 

period.2 ID at 23-29. The administrative judge also denied the appellant’s 

affirmative defenses of discrimination on the bases of age and race, and reprisal 

for engaging in equal employment opportunity (EEO) activity. ID at 30-36. The 

appellant has filed a petition for review, and the agency has not filed a response. 

Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1.

 

2

In the initial decision, the administrative judge noted that even though the proposal 

letter indicated that the appellant’s performance in contribution factor 6 was 

unacceptable, it also concluded that the appellant “minimally met [contribution] 

Factor 6” during the CIP period. ID at 4 n.2; IAF, Tab 7 at 56. Consequently, she 

determined that the agency failed to demonstrate that the appellant’s performance was 

unacceptable in this contribution factor. ID at 4 n.2. We see no reason to disturb this 

finding on review. Additionally, although a heading in the initial decision states that 

the appellant’s performance failed to meet the established performance standards in 

four critical elements, the discussion and findings that follow make clear that the 

administrative judge addressed the four remaining contribution factors and ultimately 

found that the appellant failed to meet the requirements for three of them (contribution 

factors 1, 2, and 4). ID at 24-29. Any error in this misstatement was inadvertent and

harmless, and did not affect the outcome of the decision. See Panter v. Department of 

the Air Force, 22 M.S.P.R. 281, 282 (1984) (finding that an adjudicatory error that was 

not prejudicial to a party’s substantive rights provided no basis for reversal of an initial 

decision).
4

DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW

¶5 As an initial matter, we note that although the administrative judge 

correctly identified the performance system at issue in this appeal as a CCAS, she 

applied the elements of a typical chapter 43 appeal. ID at 21-23; see Thompson v. 

Department of the Army, 122 M.S.P.R. 372, ¶¶ 3, 7 (2015). The Board has 

recognized that the elements an agency must prove to prevail in an appeal of a 

CCAS contribution-based action are somewhat different than those in a traditional 

performance-based action under chapter 43, but that contribution-based actions 

are still appealable to the Board under 5 U.S.C. chapter 43. Thompson,

122 M.S.P.R. 372, ¶ 3; Lin v. Department of the Air Force, 2023 MSPB 2, 

¶¶ 12-18. Under the CCAS at issue in this appeal, the agency was required to 

show the following by substantial evidence:3 (1) it notified the appellant that she 

would be placed on a CIP; (2) it informed her of what she must do during the CIP 

to demonstrate acceptable contribution and warned her that failure to do so could 

result in an adverse action; (3) it gave her a reasonable opportunity to 

demonstrate acceptable contribution during the CIP; and (4) the appellant’s 

contribution was unacceptable during the CIP. Thompson, 122 M.S.P.R. 372, ¶ 7.

The appellant does not assert that she was unaware of the applicable elements or 

burdens in her performance-based adverse action appeal.4 Nonetheless, after 

 

3 Contrary to the appellant’s assertion on review, PFR File, Tab 1 at 6, the applicable 

standard in performance-based actions such as the one at issue in this appeal is a 

substantial evidence standard. See Thompson, 122 M.S.P.R. 372, ¶ 7. Substantial 

evidence is the “degree of relevant evidence that a reasonable person, considering the 

record as a whole, might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even though other 

reasonable persons might disagree.” 5 C.F.R. § 1201.4(p).

4

The appellant asserts that the administrative judge should have considered the 

applicable factors from Douglas v. Veterans Administration, 5 M.S.P.R. 280 (1981), in 

assessing the reasonableness of the agency’s removal decision. PFR File, Tab 1 at 6-7. 

However, it is well settled that the Douglas factors do not apply in performance-based 

adverse action appeals under chapter 43. Lisiecki v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 

769 F.2d 1558, 1566-67 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Lee v. Department of Labor, 110 M.S.P.R. 

355, ¶ 12 (2008).
5

considering the facts of this case, we find that the application of the above 

standards would not change the result and therefore we modify the initial decision 

accordingly.

The administrative judge correctly determined that, under the law in effect at the 

time, the agency satisfied its burden of proving that the appellant was provided 

with a reasonable opportunity to demonstrate acceptable contribution during the 

CIP period but her contribution level continued to remain unacceptable.

¶6 Regarding the first two elements detailed above, the appellant does not 

challenge the administrative judge’s findings that the agency notified her in 

advance that she would be placed on the CIP, informed her of what she needed to 

do during the CIP period to demonstrate acceptable contribution, and notified her 

of the potential consequences if she failed to improve her contribution level 

during the CIP period. ID at 4, 29; IAF, Tab 7 at 57, 72; Thompson,

122 M.S.P.R. 372, ¶ 7. On review, the appellant generally challenges the 

administrative judge’s findings that she was provided with a reasonable 

opportunity to improve her contribution level during the CIP period and that her 

performance nonetheless remained unacceptable. PFR File, Tab 1 at 8-13.

¶7 Regarding her claim that the CIP did not provide her with a reasonable 

opportunity to improve her performance, the appellant first argues that the CIP 

requirements were unreasonably onerous and held her to an impermissible 

absolute standard. Id. at 8-10. An “absolute standard” is a standard under which 

a single incident of poor performance will result in an unsatisfactory rating on a 

critical element. Jackson v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 97 M.S.P.R. 13, ¶ 9 

(2004). As an initial matter, the proposition that absolute performance standards 

are per se invalid has been rejected by the Federal Circuit and the Board. 

Guillebeau v. Department of the Navy, 362 F.3d 1329, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2004); 

Jackson, 97 M.S.P.R. 13, ¶¶ 11-12. Regardless, there is no evidence in the record 

suggesting that the requirements of any of the factors held the appellant to an 

absolute standard. Rather, the notice of proposed removal and the accompanying 

spreadsheet maintained by the appellant’s manager during the CIP period identify 
6

that the appellant failed three of the six assigned tasks under contribution 

factor 1, three of the six tasks under contribution factor 2, and one of the four 

tasks under contribution factor 4.5 IAF, Tab 7 at 61-64.

¶8 In determining whether an agency has afforded an appellant a reasonable 

opportunity to demonstrate acceptable performance, relevant factors include the 

nature of the duties and responsibilities of her position, the performance 

deficiencies involved, and the amount of time that is sufficient to enable the 

employee to demonstrate acceptable performance. Lee v. Environmental 

Protection Agency, 115 M.S.P.R. 533, ¶ 32 (2010); see Towne v. Department of 

the Air Force, 120 M.S.P.R. 239, ¶ 8 (2013). The administrative judge provided a 

detailed analysis of these relevant factors, noting that the appellant’s performance 

standards clearly described the performance expected of her and that the detailed 

task descriptions in the CIP memorandum provided her with clear guidance and 

objective benchmarks for success. ID at 23-24; see Towne, 120 M.S.P.R. 239, ¶ 

23. The administrative judge also found that the agency informed the appellant of 

her performance deficiencies prior to the CIP, documented her deficiencies during 

the CIP in emails and on a spreadsheet, and provided her with ongoing feedback 

on her performance. IAF, Tab 7 at 35-50, 61-64, 69-79; ID at 29. The 

appellant’s supervisor also met with the appellant several times during the CIP 

period and created a memorandum documenting what was discussed during at 

least one of those meetings. ID at 6; IAF, Tab 7 at 56-57, 66-67; Towne, 120 

M.S.P.R. 239, ¶ 20 (finding that an agency showed that it afforded a reasonable 

 

5

The appellant’s claim that she was permitted “zero to four errors” for some tasks is 

also not supported by the record. PFR File, Tab 1 at 8. Contribution factors 1 and 2 

required that the appellant submit a number of different spreadsheets, slides, and 

reports with, depending on the task, no more than two to four errors on the first draft, 

and zero errors on the second draft. IAF, Tab 7 at 73-75. The appellant also argues 

that the 2-day limit for her to reply to emails from her manager was unreasonable. PFR

File, Tab 1 at 15; IAF, Tab 7 at 63, 77. However, this requirement was related to 

contribution factor 5, which the administrative judge did not sustain, and thus is not at 

issue on review. ID at 29. 
7

opportunity to improve when it met with the appellant in person and provided 

written and oral feedback). Finally, the CIP ran for the 60 days required by the 

agency’s performance management system. IAF, Tab 7 at 23, 72, 190. 

¶9 The appellant also reasserts that the CIP was unreasonable because it 

required her to complete tasks that were not typical job responsibilities for 

Financial Management Analysts, such as providing written summaries of 

meetings she attended and scheduling meetings with her supervisor to 

demonstrate her competency with agency systems and programs. PFR File, Tab 1 

at 9-11. The administrative judge considered and rejected this argument below, 

crediting the testimony of the appellant’s supervisor stating that the appellant was 

properly apprised of these tasks in advance, and that these tasks were necessary to 

measure the appellant’s proficiency and competency in her job duties. ID

at 26-27. We see no reason to disturb this finding on review. See Haebe v. 

Department of Justice, 288 F.3d 1288, 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (holding that the 

Board must defer to an administrative judge’s credibility determinations when 

they are based on observing the demeanor of witnesses testifying at a hearing and 

the Board may only overturn such determinations when it has “sufficiently sound” 

reasons for doing so). 

¶10 Accordingly, we discern no basis for disturbing the administrative judge ’s 

well-reasoned conclusion that the agency provided the appellant with a reasonable 

opportunity to demonstrate an acceptable contribution level during the CIP 

period. See Crosby v. U.S. Postal Service, 74 M.S.P.R. 98, 106 (1997) (finding 

no reason to disturb the administrative judge’s findings when she considered the 

evidence as a whole, drew appropriate inferences, and made reasoned 

conclusions); Broughton v. Department of Health & Human Services, 33 M.S.P.R. 

357, 359 (1987) (same).

¶11 Next, the appellant challenges the administrative judge’s conclusion that her 

contribution at the end of the CIP period remained inadequate. PFR File, Tab 1 

at 10-13. Specifically, she argues that the administrative judge failed to consider 
8

her improvements during the CIP period, noting that she managed to complete a 

number of the assigned tasks for each of the factors for which her performance

was ultimately deemed inadequate. Id.; IAF, Tab 7 at 61-64. As a result, she 

argues that the administrative judge erred in concluding that her performance 

warranted an unacceptable rating in any of the factors “as a whole,” and 

consequently, in concluding that her contribution remained unacceptable during 

the CIP period. PFR File, Tab 1 at 10-13.

¶12 An agency need not show that an employee’s performance was unacceptable 

on a majority of components of a critical element to prove unacceptable 

performance on the critical element as a whole. See, e.g., Rogers v. Department 

of Defense Dependents Schools, 814 F.2d 1549, 1554 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (finding 

that an unsatisfactory performance on one of six components of one critical 

element and two of four components of another warranted an unacceptable rating 

on both critical elements); Lee, 115 M.S.P.R. 533, ¶ 37 (finding that 

unsatisfactory performance in two of six components of one critical element 

warranted an unacceptable rating in that element). Indeed, unacceptabl e 

performance in only a single component of a critical job element can be sufficient 

to justify removal for unacceptable performance. Wallace v. Department of the 

Air Force, 879 F.2d 829, 834 (Fed. Cir. 1989); see Shuman v. Department of the 

Treasury, 23 M.S.P.R. 620, 627 (1984).

¶13 Here, the administrative judge provided detailed findings regarding the 

appellant’s numerous performance deficiencies during the CIP period. ID

at 24-28. Regarding the first contribution factor, the administrative judge 

determined that the appellant failed to timely provide required summaries of 

meetings, failed to satisfactorily complete exhibits as directed, and never 

scheduled a meeting with her supervisor to demonstrate that she knew how to 

navigate necessary systems for completing budget submission documents even 

though the CIP notice specifically instructed her to do so. ID at 24-25; IAF,

Tab 7 at 52-53, 61-62, 74. Regarding contribution factor 2, the administrative 
9

judge noted that the appellant failed to provide summaries of spend plan meetings 

for five of the six projects to which she was assigned. ID at 26. The appellant 

also failed to timely complete revisions to work, and in one instance submitted a 

report that still contained multiple errors after three rounds of revision, ultimately 

requiring her supervisor to complete the corrections herself due to time 

constraints. IAF, Tab 7 at 54, 62; ID at 26-27. Regarding factor 4, the 

administrative judge noted that the appellant failed to schedule a meeting to 

demonstrate her competency with agency systems and programs for which she 

was not seeking training, despite specific instructions to do so by her supervisor. 

ID at 27-28; IAF, Tab 7 at 55, 63. Consequently, the appellant’s supervisor was 

unable to assess her competency in those systems to determine whether the 

appellant needed additional training. ID at 28. 

¶14 In making these findings, the administrative judge made specific credibility 

determinations based on her observations of the testimony and her review of the 

documentary evidence in the record before her. ID at 24-29. Accordingly, we 

find no error in the administrative judge’s conclusion that the agency met its 

burden in proving that the appellant’s contribution level remained unacceptable in 

contribution factors 1, 2, and 4 at the end of the CIP period, and we see no reason 

to disturb these findings on review.

The appellant failed to prove her affirmative defense of reprisal for EEO activity.

¶15 The appellant also reasserts that she was removed in reprisal for engaging in 

the EEO complaint process. PFR File, Tab 1 at 13-17. The record reflects that 

the appellant filed an EEO complaint alleging discrimination on the bases of race, 

age, and general allegations of reprisal in July 2014 and February 2015, and 

amended the latter complaint on August 31, 2015, to include her placement on the 

CIP. IAF, Tab 20 at 6; Tab 22 at 11-13, 119-24; Tab 24, Hearing Compact Disc 

(testimony of the appellant). As the administrative judge correctly identified, to 

establish an affirmative defense of reprisal for protected EEO activity the 

appellant must first demonstrate that her EEO activity was a motivating factor in 
10

the agency’s action. Gardner v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 123 M.S.P.R. 

647, ¶ 30 (2016), clarified by Pridgen v. Office of Management and Budget, 2022 

MSPB 31, ¶¶ 23-24; Savage v. Department of the Army, 122 M.S.P.R. 612, ¶ 51 

(2015), overruled in part by Pridgen, 2022 MSPB 31, ¶¶ 23-25; ID at 30-32.

6

 If 

the appellant meets her burden, the agency then must show by preponderant 

evidence that the action was not based on the prohibited personnel practice, i.e., 

that it still would have taken the contested action absent the discriminatory or 

retaliatory motive. Savage, 122 M.S.P.R. 612, ¶ 51.

¶16 The administrative judge determined that the appellant had engaged in 

protected activity by filing EEO complaints. ID at 32-33. The administrative 

judge also determined that the proposing official was aware of the appellant’s 

EEO complaint and knew that she was named in it, and that the appellant 

amended her EEO complaint approximately 3 months prior to her proposed 

removal. Id. However, in finding that the appellant failed to demonstrate that her 

protected activity was a motivating factor in the agency’s decision to remove her, 

the administrative judge noted that aside from the close proximity in time 

between the amending of her EEO complaint and her proposed and effectuated 

removal, the appellant presented no evidence that any of the agency’s actions 

were motivated by a desire to retaliate against her for the filing of the EEO 

complaint. ID at 33-35. Instead, as the administrative judge observed, the close 

proximity in time between the appellant’s 2014 and 2015 EEO complaints and 

amendments, and her placement on the CIP and eventual removal can be 

explained by the fact that the appellant filed or amended an EEO complaint each 

time after she received a performance appraisal that identified concerns with her 

performance. ID at 32-33.

 

6 Because we agree with the administrative judge’s finding that the appellant failed to 

prove that her EEO activity was a motivating factor in her removal, we do not reach the 

question of whether the appellant proved that retaliation was a “but-for” cause of the 

removal action. See Pridgen, 2022 MSPB 31, ¶¶ 20-22, 29-33. 
11

¶17 Furthermore, the administrative judge determined that the agency presented 

ample evidence that the appellant’s significant performance deficiencies prior to 

and during the CIP were the actual reasons she was removed. ID at 33-35; see

Gardner, 123 M.S.P.R. 647, ¶ 34 (finding that the appellant failed to establish 

EEO retaliation when, although she asserted that her supervisor knew about her 

EEO complaint, the proposal notice was specific as to her misconduct). 

Accordingly, we agree with the administrative judge’s findings in this regard and 

decline to reweigh this evidence on review. See Broughton, 33 M.S.P.R. at 359 

(observing that mere reargument of factual issues already raised and properly 

resolved by the administrative judge below do not establish a basis for review). 7

Nevertheless, remand is necessary to afford the parties an opportunity to provide 

evidence and argument concerning whether the appellant’s placement on the CIP 

was proper.

¶18 During the pendency of the petition for review in this case, the U.S. Court 

of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit) held in Santos, 990 F.3d 

at 1360-61, that part of the agency’s burden under 5 U.S.C. chapter 43 is to 

justify the institution of a performance improvement plan (PIP) by proving by 

substantial evidence that the employee’s performance was unacceptable prior to 

that time. Following the issuance of Santos, the Board issued an Opinion and 

Order in Lee v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 2022 MSPB 11, ¶ 15, which 

incorporated the changes made by Santos and set forth the agency’s burden of 

proof, concluding that in order to defend an action under chapter 43 the agency 

must prove the following by substantial evidence: (1) OPM approved its 

performance appraisal system and any significant changes thereto; (2) the agency 

communicated to the appellant the performance standards and critical elements of 

her position; (3) the appellant’s performance standards are valid under 5 U.S.C. 

 

7

The appellant does not appear to contest the administrative judge’s finding that the 

appellant failed to prove her affirmative defenses of discrimination on the bases of age 

and race, and so we have not addressed them here.
12

§ 4302(c)(1); (4) the appellant’s performance during the appraisal period was 

unacceptable in one or more critical elements; (5) the agency warned the 

appellant of the inadequacies in her performance during the appraisal period and 

gave her an adequate opportunity to demonstrate acceptable performance; and 

(6) after an adequate improvement period, the appellant’s performance remained 

unacceptable in at least one critical element.

¶19 Although the appeal in Santos involved a performance-based adverse action 

under a traditional performance-based appraisal system, we conclude that the 

court’s reasoning applies equally to contribution-based adverse actions under 

CCAS. See Lin, 2023 MSPB 2, ¶ 19 (applying Santos to a performance-based 

action arising out of a similar contribution-based system). The agency’s authority 

to initiate a CIP under CCAS is predicated on “[i]nadequate contribution 

assessment in any one contribution factor at any time during the appraisal period . 

. . .” 64 Fed. Reg. at 1481. Additionally, a CIP notice must explain how the 

employee’s contribution scores are inadequate and what improvements are 

required and inform her that she may face adverse action “unless the contribution 

increases to, and is sustained at, a higher level. . . .” Id.; cf. Santos, 990 F.3d at 

1360-61 (examining similar statutory language to conclude that that an agency 

must justify institution of a PIP when an employee challenges a performancebased removal under chapter 43). 

¶20 The Federal Circuit’s decision in Santos applies to all pending cases, 

including the instant case, regardless of when the events took place. Lee,

2022 MSPB 11, ¶ 16. Although the record in this appeal contains some evidence 

indicating that the appellant’s contribution level leading up to the CIP was 

unacceptable, see IAF, Tab 7 at 69-70, 81-98, we remand the appeal to give the 

parties the opportunity to present argument and additional evidence on the issue, 

see Lee, 2022 MSPB 11, ¶¶ 15-17. On remand, the administrative judge shall 

accept argument and evidence on this issue and shall hold a supplemental hearing 

if appropriate. Id., ¶ 17. 
13

¶21 The administrative judge shall then issue a new initial decision consistent 

with Santos. See id. If the agency makes the additional showing required under 

Santos on remand, the administrative judge may incorporate her prior findings on 

the other elements of the agency’s case and the appellant’s affirmative defenses 

in the remand initial decision. See id. However, regardless of whether the 

agency meets its burden, if the argument or evidence on remand regarding the 

appellant’s pre-CIP performance affects the administrative judge’s analysis of the 

appellant’s affirmative defenses, she should address such argument or evidence in 

the remand initial decision. See Spithaler v. Office of Personnel Management, 

1 M.S.P.R. 587, 589 (1980) (explaining that an initial decision must identify all 

material issues of fact and law, summarize the evidence, resolve issues of 

credibility, and include the administrative judge’s conclusions of law and her

legal reasoning, as well as the authorities on which that reasoning rests).

ORDER

¶22 For the reasons discussed above, we remand this case to the regional office 

for further adjudication in accordance with this Remand Order.

FOR THE BOARD:

Washington, D.C.

 /s/ for 

Jennifer Everling

Acting Clerk of the Board