AFRICA SECURITY BRIEF

A Public ation of the Afric a C enter for Str ategic Studie s

no. 22 / August 2012

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Building Africa’s Airlift Capacity: 

A Strategy for Enhancing Military 

Effectiveness

By Birame Diop, David M. Peyton, and Gene McConville

u African states’ ability to respond to violent conflict, transnational threats, natural disasters, and other security 

challenges is severely constrained by limited airlift capacity.

u Like multilateral institutions elsewhere, the African Union and Africa’s Regional Economic Communities 

should look to partnerships and resource-pooling arrangements to leverage airlift capabilities.

u In the near term, large-scale African peacekeeping and humanitarian operations will rely on a combination 

of airlift support from “anchor states” and external partners, the mobilization of which can be streamlined 

by creating strategic airlift framework agreements.

HIGHLIGHTS

In April 2012, the Economic Community of West 

African States (ECOWAS) declared its readiness to deploy 

3,000 troops to northern Mali in response to seizures of 

territory by Tuareg separatists and Islamist militias. Left 

unanswered was the question of how ECOWAS would 

transport these troops and their equipment to Mali. Only 

airlift resources would be able to deliver personnel and 

heavy equipment into the area of operations (AO) in a 

timely manner, provide operational mobility within the 

AO against dispersed and heavily armed irregular forces, 

monitor a geographic area larger than France, and sustain 

operations for months or years. The inability to respond 

to these challenges to territorial control, in turn, further 

emboldens such separatists and other spoilers.

Similar challenges are faced in other inaccessible 

contexts of instability in Africa, including Somalia, the 

Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and Darfur, 

Sudan, where poor roads and rugged terrain make convoys 

slow, ineffective, and vulnerable to landmines or ambush. 

In certain cases, the government or rebel fighters may 

deny peacekeepers and aid workers access to land-based 

infrastructure, making air transport the only viable method 

of moving personnel and supplies.

For each African Union (AU) peacekeeping mission 

over the past decade, the AU has been required to engage 

in complex and lengthy negotiations with international 

partners to secure the airlift assets needed to transport 

African troops and material into and out of the AO. These 

delays often occur at the height of a crisis, precluding 

decisive action and putting civilian lives at increased risk. 

The African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in 

Darfur (UNAMID), for example, took nearly 2 years to 

reach just 68 percent of its mandated deployment levels 

due to stalled political negotiations and a lack of helicopter 
Colonel Birame Diop is the Regional Director of the 

African Institute for Security Sector Transformation in 

Dakar as well as a member of the Senegalese Air Force with 

more than 7,000 flying hours. David M. Peyton is a WriterEditor at the Africa Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS). 

Colonel Gene McConville is a career U.S. Army Foreign 

Area Officer and a Senior Military Advisor at ACSS. Special 

thanks to the Program on Irregular Warfare and Special 

Operations Studies at the Institute for National Strategic 

Studies for its support of this research.

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difficult to halt without aircraft capable of detecting vessels 

on illicit transit routes. Estimates are that approximately 

80 percent of cocaine traveling from Latin America to 

Africa moves by sea and the remaining 20 percent by air.5

Without air assets to monitor these routes, transnational 

criminals will continue to make the apt calculation that 

African states are enabling environments for illicit activities.

Airlift is particularly important to Africa’s security 

context given the geography of the continent. Africa represents one-fifth of the world’s total land mass and is home 

to 30,490 kilometers (18,945 miles) of coastline, dense 

tropical areas, and expansive deserts, rendering land-based 

transportation an expensive and inefficient alternative 

to air travel. In short, airlift capacity is a strategic force 

multiplier for resource-constrained African security sectors. 

THE AU’S AIRLIFT VISION 

Airlift capacity entails both strategic airlift to deliver 

troops and material to an AO, usually by large jet-powered 

aircraft, and tactical airlift to support operations thereafter, 

typically by turboprop aircraft and helicopters. Recognizing 

this and the scope of complex emergencies that it faces, 

the AU set the goal of establishing a Rapid Deployment 

Capability of the African Standby Force (ASF) in 2007 

that would rely on airlift to deploy 2,500 personnel, including peacekeepers, police, and civilians, to a crisis within 30 

days of an AU mandate.6 Depending on the operational 

demands of a given crisis, this could be achieved with a 

mixture of airlift assets. 

At the continental level, airlift platforms such as the 

Antonov An-124, Boeing C-17, and Ilyushin Il-76 (see 

table 1), which are capable of transporting equipment 

into and out of an AO for 1 brigade (approximately 3,000 

troops), would be most efficient. Military airlifters are 

configured to transport equipment and palletized cargo 

more efficiently than passengers, so commercial aircraft 

are needed to transport personnel. This requires aircraft 

capable of carrying at least 1 company (130 troops) that 

can make multiple roundtrips in rapid succession.

At the subregional level, airlift capacity is needed to 

respond to crises and other transnational security challenges that exceed individual states’ capacity, such as 

narcotics trafficking, stabilization operations, and major 

transport to support peacekeepers in remote regions of 

Darfur.1

Once deployed, the ability of African peacekeepers to 

carry out civilian protection mandates is severely limited 

by a lack of strategic and tactical airlift. UNAMID mission commanders have consistently reported an inability 

to defend civilians without helicopters to transport troops 

and equipment over Darfur’s vast and difficult terrain.2

During the rainy season, many roads in Darfur become 

impassible, severely curtailing peacekeepers’ maneuverability and effectiveness.

Airlift resources are also needed to protect the lives of 

African peacekeepers. In July 2008, a UNAMID convoy 

was ambushed by armed militants for almost 3 hours, resulting in 7 deaths and 19 casualties. Without helicopters 

to stage a rescue or reinforcement mission, the convoy 

was left defenseless. Tactical airlift is needed to ensure that 

peacekeepers are, at a minimum, capable of providing security for themselves, a prerequisite for defending civilians. 

United Nations (UN) Secretary-General Ban Kimoon has similarly called for more helicopters in the 

DRC’s Kivu region,3 where a UN stabilization mission 

has struggled to prevent armed groups from targeting civilians in remote areas. 

Insufficient airlift assets have also impeded African 

governments’ ability to interrupt transnational crime, 

including piracy, illegal fishing, oil bunkering, toxic waste 

dumping, and illicit trafficking. Reports of piracy off the 

coast of Nigeria have more than doubled since 2011.4

Moreover, piracy incidents off of Africa’s west and east 

coasts often occur more than 70 nautical miles from shore, 

making them difficult to monitor using land- and sea-based 

surveillance equipment. 

Africa’s growing narcotics trafficking threat will be 
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natural disasters. This requires medium-sized aircraft such 

as the Airbus A400M and C-130 Hercules to transport 1 to 

2 battalions (at least 1,500 personnel) and their equipment 

over medium distances on short notice, ideally 14 days.

Once in an AO, security forces require airlift support 

from helicopter systems, ideally large rotary-wing airlifters 

such as the CH-47 Chinook. Helicopters enable troops 

and equipment to be inserted into and extracted from 

rugged areas as well as provide ground units mobile aerial 

surveillance. Most fixed-wing aircraft, in contrast, require 

well-maintained runways and provide more transient, 

intermittent reconnaissance.

At the national level, African states must be prepared to airlift troops and material for disasters, respond 

to localized crises before they escalate, patrol borders, 

monitor maritime areas as part of antipiracy and exclusive economic zone surveillance, and conduct evacuations. The ideal size of a national airlift fleet varies 

greatly according to a country’s geography, population, 

and overall security environment. Smaller African states 

should at a minimum maintain the ability to transport a 

company-sized force anywhere within their territory in 

a single day. Larger African states or those that regularly 

face national security emergencies should be capable 

of transporting a battalion-sized force in the same time 

period, making successive roundtrip flights as needed. 

Platforms that meet these criteria include the C-130 

Hercules, EMB 110 Bandeirante, CASA C-295, and 

small- or medium-sized helicopters such as the Mi-17, 

SA 330 Puma, and UH-60 Black Hawk (see tables 1 

and 2). 

“Low and slow” airlifters are well suited to the continent’s unconventional security threats and should be 

prioritized over costly attack aircraft that risk draining 

defense budgets of limited resources. Contemporary 

warfare in Africa rarely involves airspace challenged 

by an adversaries’ fighter aircraft, making attack and air 

defense systems virtually irrelevant. Instead, African 

countries must have the capacity to face threats posed 

by irregular forces. 

At present, the majority of Africa’s air forces are not 

equipped with the needed spectrum of air systems and 

trained personnel to support national or regional misAircraft Approximate cost per aircraft Specifications

Antonov An-124 $30-32 Million

Max payload: 300,000 lbs

Seating: 350

Notes: Large cargo aircraft capable of transporting heavy, oversized loads.

Heavy Airlift

Boeing C-17 

Globemaster III $202–270 million

Max payload: 164,900 lbs

Seating: 134

Notes: Capable of rapid strategic delivery of troops and cargo to main operating bases or 

to forward bases.

Ilyushin Il-76 $30–50 million

Max payload: 114,640 lbs

Seating: 140

Notes: Designed to deliver heavy vehicles and machinery to remote, poorly-serviced 

airfields.

Airbus A400M $120–130 million

Max payload: 81,600 lbs

Seating: 116

Notes: Capable of performing tactical airlift, long-range transport, and air-to-air refueling.

Medium-Sized Airlift

Lockheed C-130H $12–48 million

Max Payload: 42,000 lbs

Seating: 92

Notes: Capable of operating from rough, dirt strips and airdropping troops and equipment.

EADS CASA C-295 $24–35 million

Max payload: 20,400 lbs

Seating: 71

Notes: Capable of rapid-response missions with cargo, equipment and soldiers, as well as 

medevac duties and airdrop delivery.

Embraer EMB 110 

Bandeirante $1 million

Max takeoff weight: 12,500 lbs 

Seating: 18 

Notes: General purpose light transport aircraft.

Light Airlift

Hawker Beechcraft 

Super King Air 350 $7 million

Max takeoff weight: 15,000 lbs

Seating: 15

Notes: Modular craft commonly used for surveillance and reconnaissance.

Table 1. Fixed-Wing Airlift Platforms

Source: Cost and specifications vary by model, age, capabilities, and other customizations. Ranges listed are approximations gathered 

from Jane’s All the World’s Aircraft, military procurement records, and other databases.

“contemporary warfare in Africa 

rarely involves airspace challenged by 

an adversaries’ fighter aircraft”
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sions. These emerging capacity air forces are comprised 

of aircraft that may be aging, out of service, or operated 

even when they do not meet the International Civil 

Aviation Organization’s widely accepted safety standards. Such air forces face serious resource constraints, 

have limited access to specialized training, and have 

less developed air infrastructure, especially maintenance 

facilities. 

Moderate capacity air forces in countries like Angola, Nigeria, and Tunisia have the ability to transport several companies of troops and heavy equipment around 

the entirety of their national territory and within their 

respective subregions. However, transporting troops and 

heavy payloads on a continent-wide scale would be slow 

and impractical. Their fleets are comprised of a variety 

of aircraft that are generally reliable, though some may 

be aging or out of service. 

High capacity air forces in Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, 

and South Africa have the ability to transport large troop 

contingents and heavy equipment over long distances 

in short periods of time. Aircraft in these countries are 

regularly maintained and operated by highly trained 

personnel. Their air transport infrastructure, including 

runways, radar systems, and maintenance facilities, is 

modern and conducive to long-range airlift sorties.

To maximize its airlift capabilities, the AU is developing a Strategic Mobility Package (SMP) to coordinate 

transportation services (including and especially airlift) 

for the ASF. Although the AU would administer airlift 

operations, it would rely entirely on the assets of member 

states. The AU’s objective is not to create its own standing air force but to assemble airlift resources from contributing member states and deploy them appropriately.

This requires the AU to secure airlift agreements 

from member states in advance, especially from high 

capacity airlift “anchor states.” These agreements would 

specify the scope of a country’s airlift support and would 

be activated via the AU mandating process. To ensure 

mission readiness, the SMP will need an airlift asset 

verification program to confirm the airworthiness and 

availability of assets pledged to AU missions. This program would function 

similarly to the certification of troops and 

equipment that support 

UN missions. 

Like other Regional Economic Community (REC) and AU 

mechanisms, the success of the SMP will depend on member states’ 

commitment to collective security and decisionmaking. The SMP’s 

airlift activities would 

also require a functioning cost-sharing facility 

that enables airlift contributing countries to 

receive compensation 

for the use of their assets. Africa’s airlift “anchor states” are natural choices 

for the provisions of airlift to AU missions. However, 

they cannot be expected to render airlift support without 

member states sharing the deployment cost.

Rwanda’s Earthquake 

Response

In 2008, 2 powerful earthquakes 

with magnitudes of 6.1 and 

5.0 struck Rwanda’s southwest 

border, resulting in 37 deaths and 

over 600 injuries. The Rwanda 

Defence Force (RDF) immediately 

dispatched helicopters and 

airlifted earthquake victims to 

hospitals in the capital, Kigali. 

Helicopters were also employed 

to transport medical personnel 

to affected areas. RDF airlift 

operations were coordinated 

by the Rwandan Disaster 

Management Task Force, which 

also oversaw the distribution 

of food aid, water supplies, and 

medicine. Rwanda’s response 

demonstrated how even modest 

levels of airlift capacity can yield 

significant results when paired 

with a well-coordinated strategy.

Table 2. Rotary-Wing Airlift Platforms

Source: Cost and specifications vary by model, age, capabilities, and other customizations. Ranges listed are approximations gathered 

from Jane’s All the World’s Aircraft, military procurement records, and other databases.

Aircraft Approximate cost per aircraft Specifications

Boeing CH-47SD/D Chinook $30–32 million

Max takeoff weight: 54,000 lbs

Seating: 44

Notes: Capable of carrying cargo internally or sling loaded.

Mil Design Bureau Mi-17 $17–20 million

Max takeoff weight: 25,000 lbs

Seating: 35

Notes: Twin-turbine transport helicopter that can also act as a gunship.

Sikorsky UH-60 Black Hawk $10–21 million

Max takeoff weight: 21,884 lbs

Seating: 12

Notes: Capable of transporting troops, equipment, and supplies.

Eurocopter AS332 Super Puma $16 million

Max takeoff weight: 18,959 lbs

Seating: 24

Notes: Twin-engine, medium transport or utility helicopter.
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CONSTRAINTS TO AIRLIFT DEVELOPMENT

Most African security structures remain overwhelmingly land-centric—legacies of their colonial and independence-movement origins. Altering these precedents 

requires deepening military planners’ understanding of 

how airlift capacity amplifies the efficacy of ground forces 

by enabling troops to access remote territories quickly, 

extract troops from hostile environments, and receive supplies and heavy equipment in an AO. Conversely, ground 

forces with insufficient airlift support are slow to deploy 

and operationally constrained. Thus, while commonly 

viewed as too expensive, airlift capacity enables African 

militaries with limited resources to cover more territory 

for longer periods of time. Gabon and Cape Verde, for 

example, have employed light turboprop aircraft such as 

the Embraer EMB 110 Bandeirante to transport troops 

and conduct aerial surveillance over regions experiencing 

high levels of maritime and transborder trafficking. At a 

cost of about $1 million per aircraft, such airlift platforms 

are an efficient means of expanding military effectiveness. 

African air forces are also leveraging light and medium 

airlift systems that have been discontinued such as the 

Russian-made Antonov An-24 and Dutch-made Fokker F27, both of which are inexpensive and reliable if 

adequately maintained.

Despite its strategic advantages, building political 

will for airlift systems is a serious challenge when the cost 

of larger, more sophisticated airlift platforms is taken into 

consideration. The AU’s operating budget in 2011 was 

$260 million, the approximate cost of just one Boeing 

C-17 transport jet. Procuring advanced airlift systems is 

a complex process that involves financing multimillion 

or even multibillion dollar agreements with manufacturers. In 2009, the South African Parliament cancelled its 

order of eight Airbus A400M aircraft as opposition grew 

in response to the system’s rising costs, which exceeded the 

initially negotiated price of almost $2.5 billion. 

In addition to high costs, airlift platforms need support 

over the long term. The lifecycle cost of airlift systems, 

including maintenance, fuel, and crew expenses, often 

exceeds the initial purchase price of individual aircraft. 

Overlooking these costs has resulted in aircraft that are 

frequently out of service or operated while failing to meet 

safety standards.

The long-term cost of maintaining airlift systems is 

further compounded by the diversity of African air force 

fleets. African air forces include assets manufactured in 

former colonial powers, Eastern Europe, Brazil, and the 

United States, all of which have discrete maintenance 

requirements. This has led African air forces to outsource 

maintenance work to African countries with high capacity 

air forces or to overseas partners.

The steep cost of quality flight training is a further 

impediment to building African airlift capacity. African 

pilots, crews, and technicians are trained mainly by Africa’s 

high capacity air forces, while others receive training in 

Europe and the United States. These overseas training opportunities are limited, however, and may not correspond 

to the diverse equipment of African air forces, necessitating 

a second round of training when African pilots and crew 

members return to their home countries.

Airlift capacity development has also been hindered 

by a shortage of air transport infrastructure such as air 

traffic control facilities and navigational aids, among other 

components. Air-to-ground communication is one of the 

continent’s most pressing needs. Aircraft can fly for more 

than an hour in parts of Africa without being able to communicate with ground control.7

 These factors have combined to make Africa the continent with the poorest air 

safety record in the world, with an average of 4.31 aircraft 

losses per million departures, compared to 0.65 worldwide.8

PRIORITIES FOR AIRLIFT DEVELOPMENT

Addressing Africa’s immediate security concerns 

while simultaneously building long-term airlift capacity 

requires African states, RECs, and the AU to advance a 

combination of measures.

Build African airlift partnerships. African states 

possessing advanced airlift capabilities, namely Algeria, 

Egypt, Morocco, and South Africa, are capable of serving 

as pillars for bilateral partnerships thanks to their advanced 

“while commonly viewed as too 

expensive, airlift capacity enables 

African militaries with limited 

resources to cover more territory for 

longer periods of time”
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air fleets. Providing leadership for airlift partnerships offers 

these countries an opportunity to promote stability in their 

respective subregions and to shape the development of 

airlift on the continent more broadly. They also stand to 

develop more specialized airlift systems, air maintenance 

facilities, and flight schools as neighboring countries draw 

on them for support. 

Airlift partnerships should involve pooling assets, 

conducting joint exercises, sharing maintenance facilities, 

and providing support to a partner country. Among other 

advantages, shared maintenance facilities enable African 

states to keep their air assets flying safely for longer, effectively extending their capacity at a fraction of the cost 

of purchasing new planes. Several African air forces are 

already seizing the opportunities that bilateral partnerships offer, such as the Senegalese and Royal Moroccan 

Air Forces, which have successfully collaborated on training exchanges and maintenance activities. Algeria and 

Burkina Faso have a similar air partnership.

Nevertheless, such partnerships occur too infrequently. This fact stems in part from the reluctance of neighboring countries to exchange information about their air force 

capabilities. Building African airlift capacity is as much a 

matter of building trust as it is securing financial resources 

for airlift investments. One way to address this challenge 

is to start with modest airlift partnerships that are then 

expanded to support regional efforts over time.

Pool airlift resources within the AU and RECs. 

To overcome air domain constraints, the AU and RECs 

should emulate air partnership models such as NATO’s 

Strategic Airlift Capability initiative, in which a consortium of 10 NATO countries plus 2 partner countries have 

purchased and share 3 Boeing C-17 strategic transport aircraft. NATO members have also pooled resources to form 

the Strategic Airlift Interim Solution (SALIS), a cooperative agreement that maintains two Antonov An-124-100 

aircraft on fulltime charter. The SALIS agreement is also 

capable of dispatching two additional An-124-100 aircraft on 6 days’ notice and another two on 9 days’ notice. 

NATO’s pooling initiatives have enabled member states 

to share the high costs of needed airlift systems and deploy 

airlift assets to a variety of missions and locations. 

Build capacity by collaborating with external partners. External partners, mainly in the United States and 

Europe, have demonstrated a willingness to partner bilaterally with African air forces and offer a variety of capacitybuilding and procurement programs. The U.S. Department of Defense provides partner countries with access to 

its Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military Financing, and 

Excess Defense Articles programs, which can be leveraged 

to finance and procure needed airlift systems. The Botswana Defence Force, for example, successfully purchased 

C-130B transport aircraft using the Foreign Military Sales 

program. These programs have also been used to procure 

smaller turboprop aircraft such as the Beechcraft Super 

King Air 350, used for light airlift and surveillance. Many 

African air forces also operate European aircraft procured 

via security assistance programs and receive specialized 

training and maintenance services from European partners. 

A recurring weakness of external bilateral support, 

however, is its tendency to be episodic, creating planning 

and coordination challenges for African air chiefs. Crafting more formal security cooperation agreements that 

center on shared interests can help to promote consistency. 

These agreements should emphasize Africa’s airlift capacity 

development over other assets such as expensive and less 

useful attack aircraft. 

Streamline airlift agreements with international organizations. To strengthen air support to future peacekeeping missions, the AU should strengthen its relationship to 

the UN. The UN’s Department of Peacekeeping Operations has been a key partner in securing airlift resources for 

joint missions in Africa, such as in Darfur with UNAMID. 

Despite this partnership, AU-UN collaboration has been 

suboptimal due to communication gaps and disagreements 

over mission mandates. To improve this partnership—a 

task that both organizations recognize is needed—the UN 

and AU should consider adopting a strategic framework 

for airlift operations.

The AU should also strengthen its relationship with 

NATO to secure needed airlift in the near term. NATO 

has the capacity to transport multiple brigade-sized forces 

to hostile environments and provide sustained airlift over 

the life of a peacekeeping mission. During the AU Mission 

in Sudan, NATO coordinated the airlift of 31,500 troops 

and personnel into and out of Darfur. Airlift support from 

NATO has also been vital to the deployment of Burundian 

and Ugandan troops to Somalia in support of AMISOM 

and its 17,000 personnel. The AU’s Peace and Security 

Council and its Peace Support Operations Division have 
7

expressed eagerness to expand cooperation with NATO 

on future peacekeeping deployments. This is a step in the 

right direction, and should be reinforced by additional 

efforts to streamline AU-NATO collaboration. 

Engage the private sector. The private sector has a 

critical role to play in providing strategic airlift to African 

security operations. Even the world’s leading air forces rely 

on commercial airlines to provide airlift for large-scale 

operations. NATO countries regularly transport personnel and equipment using privately chartered flights and 

the U.S. maintains the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF), 

a consortium of U.S. commercial air carriers that can be 

called upon to provide airlift services to the U.S. military 

in an emergency. European, Asian, and South American 

air forces also use private sector air carriers to transport 

troops and equipment to crisis situations.

At present, there is untapped potential for publicprivate partnerships to fill Africa’s airlift gap. Africa’s commercial air industry is led by efficient air carriers such as 

EgyptAir, Ethiopian Airlines, Kenya Airways, Royal Air 

Maroc, and South African Airways. The AU, RECs, and 

individual African states should establish relationships 

with these carriers to secure vital airlift capacities for security operations as well as reinforce the profitability of 

Africa’s commercial air industry. African policymakers may 

also consider contracting with non-African commercial 

airlines, which have proven their ability to operate safely 

and at low cost on the continent. 

A prevailing challenge when recruiting support from 

commercial air carriers is the high cost of insurance premiums for aircraft landing in an AO. The AU can help 

minimize this cost by negotiating better collective rates 

with insurance providers and by creating a fund to cover all 

or a portion of war-risk insurance premiums. An example 

that the AU might consider is the Aviation War Risk 

Insurance Program managed by the U.S. Federal Aviation 

Administration, which provides reasonably priced insurance coverage for losses due to war, capture, vandalism, 

and other conflict-related damages.

Air traffic in Africa has surged over the past decade 

and is projected to grow at a rate of 5.7 percent per year, 

significantly faster than the international average of 4.9 

percent.9 Platforms such as CASA C-295s, C-130s, and 

larger airlifters frequently depend on the same air infrastructure that commercial air traffic utilizes, such as runways, fueling stations, maintenance facilities, radar, and 

other secondary air systems, so growth in the commercial 

sector augurs well for Africa’s airlift capacity deficit. 

Nevertheless, subregional disparities have emerged, 

with booming air hubs in Southern and Eastern Africa 

and significantly less commercial air traffic in Central and 

Western Africa (see figure 1). To build airlift capacity in 

countries and regions with less developed air transport 

industries, therefore, African security officials should support civilian counterparts’ efforts to implement cooperative 

agreements created to sustain commercial air industry 

growth. One such measure is the Yamoussoukro Decision, 

an agreement signed in 2000 and ratified by 48 African 

states by 2004. Implementation of this expansive technical framework, which stipulates the liberalization of air 

services, broadening of air traffic rights, and reductions in 

tariffs, has underpinned Africa’s booming air transport industry but remains uneven and incomplete.11 The African 

Civil Aviation Commission’s ongoing efforts to realize full 

application of the Yamoussoukro Decision and develop an 

integrated air transport system on the continent are vital 

to building African airlift capacity.

Inventory existing African airlift assets. Information 

gaps are obstructing African policymakers from optimizing 

air partnerships and making judicious procurement deciSource: Bofinger 2009.10 The thickness of the lines is on a 

continuous scale, with the thickest line (South Africa-Zambia) 

representing nearly 1 million seats for 2007 and the thinnest 

(Ethiopia-Ghana) representing 62,000 seats. The size of the end 

points results from the thickness of the lines.

Figure 1. Top 60 Air Routes Within Sub-Saharan Africa
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sions. Sharing information about African airlift fleets, their 

airworthiness, and the availability of spare parts would 

create opportunities for African air forces with similar 

air assets to collaborate. This would also allow African 

countries to avoid procuring redundant systems or aircraft 

that pose interoperability challenges when conducting 

joint operations.

The AU has stated the need to develop a database of 

the continent’s airlift platforms for the purpose of standing 

up its SMP.12 Like other security cooperation activities, 

however, this priority is challenging due to member states’ 

concerns that information about their strategic capabilities 

will be used against them. More subtly, some AU member states are reticent to divulge the true extent of their 

limited airlift capabilities. Overcoming these concerns 

is a long-term project that the AU should undertake by 

demonstrating the advantages of information sharing and 

airlift cooperation. Conversely, the AU need not oblige 

member states to share information about all air systems, 

such as fighter aircraft, missile systems, or other sensitive 

capacities. The AU should rather compile a limited and 

targeted database of workhorse airlift platforms and spare 

parts.

The AU can also build momentum for its information-sharing efforts by emphasizing existing bilateral and 

subregional security cooperation agreements. Airlift information sharing between countries that are already cooperating will be easier to establish than information-sharing 

agreements between states that interact infrequently or 

not at all. Their willingness to share information about 

their airlift systems will set a powerful example for the rest 

of the continent.

NOTES

1 Report of the Secretary-General on the deployment of the 

African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UN 

Security Council: S/2009/352, July 13, 2009).

2 Mashood Issaka and Elijah Dickens Mushemeza, 

“Operationalizing the African Standby Force,” International 

Peace Institute, January 2010.

3 “DR Congo: UN Peacekeeping Mission Receives Tactical 

Helicopters From Ukraine,” UN News Centre, March 7, 2012.

4 “Six Month Drop in World Piracy, IMB Report Shows,” 

International Chamber of Commerce Commercial Crime 

Service, April 23, 2012. 

5 Liana Sun Wyler, Nicolas Cook, Illegal Drug Trade in 

Africa: Trends and U.S. Policy (Washington, DC: Congressional 

Research Service, February 26, 2010)

6 African Union, Specialized Technical Committee on 

Defense, Safety and Security, 4th Meeting, Progress Report on the 

Status of the Operationalization of the African Standby Force (Addis 

Ababa: AU, December 3-7, 2010). Jakkie Cilliers, The African 

Standby Force: An Update on Progress, ISS Paper 160 (Pretoria: 

Institute for Security Studies, March 2008).

7 “Airport Runways and Terminal Capacity Are Generally 

Adequate, but Air Traffic Control and Surveillance Facilities 

Need Substantial Improvement,” African Development Bank, 

available at <www.infrastructureafrica.org/key-msg/sector/airport-runways-and-terminal-capacity-are-generally-adequate-airtraffic-control-and->.

8 “A Poor Safety Record—Largely Attributable to Low 

Standards and Lax Supervision—Is the Greatest Challenge 

Facing the Air Transport Industry in Africa Today,” African 

Development Bank available at <www.infrastructureafrica.org/

key-msg/sector/poor-safety-record%E2%80%94largely-attributable-poor-safety-standards-and-lax-supervision%E2%80%94-la>. 

9 Charles Schlumberger, Open Skies for Africa: Implementing 

the Yamoussoukro Decision (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 

2010). 

10 Heinrich C. Bofinger, “An Unsteady Course: Challenges 

to Growth in Africa’s Air Transport Industry,” in Africa 

Infrastructure Country Diagnostic, ed. Vivien Foster and Cecilia 

Briceño-Garmendia (Washington, DC: The World Bank, July 

2009), 261.

11 Schlumberger.

12 African Union, 2010.