United States Court of Appeals 

For the First Circuit 

No. 15-1800 

JOSÉ APONTE-DÁVILA, 

Plaintiff, Appellant, 

v. 

MUNICIPALITY OF CAGUAS, 

Defendant, Appellee, 

CONSOLIDATED WASTE SERVICE CORPORATION; MAPFRE-PRAICO, 

Defendants/Third Party Plaintiffs, Appellees, 

EDDIE JIMÉNEZ; EDDIE JIMÉNEZ-COSMO, Cafetería la Terraza de 

Eddie; INSURANCE CARRIERS, 

Third Party Defendants. 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO 

[Hon. Pedro A. Delgado-Hernández, U.S. District Judge] 

Before 

Torruella, Lynch, and Barron, 

Circuit Judges. 

David W. Román, with whom José Luis Ubarri and Ubarri & Román 

Law Office were on brief, for appellant. 

Michael Craig McCall and Pablo H. Montaner-Cordero, with whom 

The Law Offices of Michael Craig McCall, Luis E. Pabón Roca, 

Clarisa Solá Gómez, and Faccio & Pabón Roca were on brief, for 

appellees. 
July 8, 2016 
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LYNCH, Circuit Judge. José Aponte-Dávila appeals from 

the district court's dismissal of his negligence suit for lack of 

subject-matter jurisdiction. Aponte-Dávila invokes the federal 

courts' diversity jurisdiction, arguing that because he was 

domiciled in Texas and the defendants were domiciled in Puerto 

Rico at the time the suit was filed, there was complete diversity. 

The district court found, instead, that both Aponte-Dávila and the 

defendants were domiciled in Puerto Rico and dismissed the case. 

We conclude otherwise, that Aponte-Dávila had not abandoned his 

Texas domicile while receiving medical care in Puerto Rico, and, 

that in any event, he had reinstated his Texas domicile before 

suit was filed. We reverse and remand. 

I. 

On May 9, 2013, Aponte-Dávila filed a complaint in the 

Puerto Rico federal district court against the Municipality of 

Caguas ("Municipality"), Consolidated Waste Service Corporation 

("ConWaste"), and MAPFRE/PRAICO, ConWaste's insurance provider. 

The issue in this case is where Aponte-Dávila was domiciled as of 

May 9, 2013. 

The complaint alleged that on July 13, 2009, AponteDávila was walking on a sidewalk in Caguas, Puerto Rico, when he 

slipped and fell while trying to pass a dumpster partially 

obstructing the sidewalk. As a result of the fall, Aponte-Dávila 

suffered a series of injuries and was permanently rendered 
- 4 - 

partially disabled. Aponte-Dávila alleged that the Municipality 

and ConWaste, the owner of the dumpster, were negligent under 

Puerto Rico law for failing to move the dumpster from the sidewalk, 

and he sought damages for physical harm, mental and moral anguish, 

loss of earnings, and medical expenses. He asserted that 

MAPFRE/PRAICO, as ConWaste's insurer, was jointly and severally 

liable under Puerto Rico law. 

In the complaint, Aponte-Dávila stated that because he 

was domiciled in Texas and each of the defendants was domiciled in 

Puerto Rico, the district court had diversity jurisdiction over 

his state-law tort claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). 

Each of the defendants filed an answer denying subjectmatter jurisdiction. ConWaste and MAPFRE/PRAICO filed a thirdparty complaint against "Eddie Jiménez Cosmo d/b/a Cafeteria La 

Terraza de Eddie and/or Cafeteria La Terraza de Eddie" claiming 

that it was responsible for the waste deposited in the dumpster 

and for maintaining the area around the dumpster. Cross-claims 

between the defendants were also filed that are not relevant to 

this appeal. The district court held a status conference on 

November 25, 2014, at which the court's subject-matter 

jurisdiction was challenged. The parties suggested that "the issue 

may be ruled on without an evidentiary hearing," and so "the Court 

ordered the parties to file simultaneous briefs and supporting 

documents on the issue." 
- 5 - 

On January 26, 2015, the defendants filed a motion to 

dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 12(b)(1). On the same day, Aponte-Dávila made a filing in 

support of diversity jurisdiction.1 On March 6, 2015, the 

defendants filed a motion to strike sixteen of the documents 

appended to Aponte-Dávila's filing. The motion to strike was 

denied on June 5, 2015. 

The dispute between the parties boils down to whether on 

May 9, 2013, the date the complaint was filed, Aponte-Dávila was 

domiciled in Texas, creating complete diversity and affording the 

federal district court jurisdiction, or Puerto Rico, defeating 

complete diversity and depriving the federal district court of 

jurisdiction. 

II. 

The facts relevant to Aponte-Dávila's domicile, which 

are largely undisputed, are as follows. Aponte-Dávila was born in 

Río Piedras, Puerto Rico, in 1963. In the late 1980s, after 

service with the U.S. Army Reserve in Puerto Rico and the Puerto 

Rico National Guard, he moved to Florida to work as a professional 

 1 The district court "ordered the parties to file 

simultaneous briefs and supporting documents on the issue not later 

than 5:00pm on January 26, 2014." Aponte-Dávila has represented 

that the district court did not permit the parties to reply to 

each other's filings regarding jurisdiction. We caution against 

such a practice of precluding parties from responding to each 

other's arguments on issues such as this. 
- 6 - 

truck driver. After a few years as a commercial dump truck driver 

in Florida, he moved back to Puerto Rico, bringing his dump truck 

with him. 

In 1998, he moved to Arkansas and obtained an Arkansas 

commercial driver's license. From 1999 to 2004, he worked as an 

interstate truck driver based in Arkansas. In 1999, he purchased 

his first semi-trailer truck, a 1995 Freightliner Condo. 

In 2004, Aponte-Dávila left his job in Arkansas, moved 

to Laredo, Texas, and began working for a trucking company called 

Landstar. While working for Landstar, he traded in his semitrailer truck for a 1999 Freightliner Condo. 

Later that year, Aponte-Dávila left Landstar, returned 

his second semi-trailer truck, and relocated to Puerto Rico to 

help his father, who had fallen ill, with his asphalt business. 

In 2007, after his father's health improved, he returned to Texas 

to continue his truck driving career and purchased, with the help 

of a loan from First National Bank in Laredo, a third semi-trailer 

truck, a 2001 Freightliner Condo. From 2007 to 2010, AponteDávila, based out of Laredo, worked for a trucking company called 

Land Carrier. He stated that because he was a truck driver, he 

would frequently stay in Laredo at a hotel, at the trucking 

company's terminal, or in a small utility apartment, and while on 

the road he often lived out of his truck. In 2008, he obtained a 

Texas Class "A" commercial driver's license. 
- 7 - 

On July 13, 2009, while in Puerto Rico to marry his 

second wife, María Teresa Báez, Aponte-Dávila suffered the injury 

giving rise to the instant lawsuit. He remained bedridden in 

Puerto Rico until he was able to return to Texas. After the 

accident, he obtained medical coverage through Puerto Rico's 

government health plan, then known as "Reforma." When applying 

for benefits, Aponte-Dávila provided Báez's address in Caguas, 

Puerto Rico. He explained that he gave Báez's address because 

that was where he was staying while recovering. He and Báez 

divorced two years later in September of 2011. 

Aponte-Dávila returned to Texas in late 2009 after 

recuperating from his accident. The back pain caused by his 

accident prevented him from completing his truck routes with Land 

Carrier on schedule, so he eventually left Land Carrier and began 

working for another trucking company called Hotfoot Logistics, 

which had a terminal in Laredo. His time at Hotfoot Logistics was 

short lived; after three months, he found that his persistent back 

pain prevented him from continuing driving. 

In September 2010, about a month after he left Hotfoot 

Logistics, and still based out of Laredo, he started working for 

Warren Transport. On a personnel form that Aponte-Dávila filled 

out for Warren Transport titled "Warren Transport wants to get to 

know you!!!" he wrote "Caguas, Puerto Rico" in the blank space 

following "I make my home in." He later explained that he had 
- 8 - 

been directed by Warren Transport to do so. The form also asked 

him to provide the names of his family members as well as a list 

of interests and hobbies. During his deposition, Aponte-Dávila 

stated that a dispatcher had told him that the purpose of the form 

was to list the names of individuals who would be authorized to 

ride along with him in his truck and so he listed Caguas because 

that is where Báez, to whom he was still married at that point, 

lived. According to Aponte-Dávila, Warren Transport management 

already knew that he lived in Laredo. On other Warren Transport 

forms, he listed his address as a P.O. Box in Laredo. 

For the tax years 2007 to 2012, Aponte-Dávila filed all 

of his federal tax returns using his Texas address. From 2000 to 

2014, he never filed state personal income tax returns in Puerto 

Rico. 

Starting in 2010, Aponte-Dávila began traveling back to 

Puerto Rico for longer visits to receive physical therapy, staying 

at Báez's residence in Caguas. In September 2011, he applied for 

and received a disability parking permit in Puerto Rico. In the 

application for the permit, he stated that his address was in 

Puerto Rico. In January 2012, he obtained a Puerto Rico driver's 

license, which also listed his address as being in Caguas. He 

explained that the address he provided was Báez's, even though by 

that point they had been divorced for several months. 
- 9 - 

On May 27, 2012, Aponte-Dávila suffered a bout of 

paralyzing back pain that left him immobile on the ground of a 

parking lot in Laredo. A week later, he resigned from Warren 

Transport, sold his truck, threw away everything he had in the 

truck including clothes and documents, and returned to Puerto Rico 

to recover at his parents' house in Canóvanas. In early 2013, he 

filed a Merchant's Registry Certificate with the Puerto Rico 

Department of Treasury, listing his address as being in Caguas. 

He also submitted an application to the Medicaid Program of the 

Puerto Rico Department of Health. In February 2013, his Texas 

commercial driver's license expired. 

Aponte-Dávila returned to Laredo at the end of April 

2013. He stayed with a friend and began looking for work as an 

interstate trucker. He also arranged to attend, in Texas, medical 

examinations for a Social Security Disability benefits application 

that he had submitted before leaving for Puerto Rico. An official 

record from the Texas Department of Public Safety indicates that 

a medical certificate was issued to Aponte-Dávila on May 6, 2013, 

as part of his application to renew his Texas commercial driver's 

license. Aponte-Dávila says that a renewed Texas commercial 

driver's license was issued to him on the same day. This was three 

days before the complaint was filed. 

On May 9, 2013, the day the instant lawsuit was filed in 

federal district court in Puerto Rico, Aponte-Dávila says that he 
- 10 - 

"was physically present in Laredo, Texas organizing his personal 

and professional affairs to continue residing and working there as 

he had done the previous nine (9) years since approximately 2004." 

In July 2013, Aponte-Dávila leased an apartment in 

Laredo. Around the same time, he set up electric and cable 

services with local Texas providers. According to Aponte-Dávila, 

once he moved into his apartment, he notified the Texas Department 

of Public Safety of his new address, and on September 30, 2013, a 

new Texas commercial driver's license was issued to him listing 

the new address. He says that the Texas Department of Public 

Safety took and kept the license that had been issued to him on 

May 6, 2013. 

Aponte-Dávila found a job as a contract driver for a 

company operating out of Laredo in July 2013, but because of his 

back pain he was only able to complete a handful of trips by early 

2014. In September 2013, he filled out a Texas voter registration 

application, and in November 2013 he voted in Texas. He also 

purchased a Chrysler PT Cruiser in Laredo and obtained a Texas 

license plate and disability parking placard. 

On March 11, 2014, Aponte-Dávila received a Notice of 

Decision from the Social Security Administration at his postal 

address in Laredo informing him that he had been found completely 

disabled as a result of the paralyzing incident in May 2012, and 

soon after he began receiving monthly disability payments. In 
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July 2014, unable to work and declared disabled by the Social 

Security Administration, he returned to Puerto Rico. He rented an 

apartment in Puerto Rico in December 2014 and as of January 2015 

had not returned to Texas. 

III. 

On June 23, 2015, the district court granted the 

defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of diversity jurisdiction, 

finding that Aponte-Dávila was domiciled in Puerto Rico on the 

date that his case was filed. Dávila v. Municipality of Caguas, 

No. 13-cv-1367, 2015 WL 3889963, at *1 (D.P.R. June 23, 2015). 

The court found that while Aponte-Dávila "was not a resident of 

Puerto Rico from the early 1980s until around 2007," after his 

2009 injury he reestablished domicile in Puerto Rico because "he 

refocused his life to obtain medical treatment in Puerto Rico." 

Id. at *4. The district court noted that by 2012 Aponte-Dávila 

had "sold his Freightliner Condo truck, thr[own] away everything 

he owned, . . . traveled to Puerto Rico," "let his Texas Commercial 

Driver's License expire," and "severed relevant links to Texas, 

making Puerto Rico his home." Id. The court also placed 

particular emphasis on forms that Aponte-Dávila submitted to 

several entities between 2009 and 2013 in which he listed his 

residence as Puerto Rico. Id. at *5. According to the district 

court, though he "may have sought to reestablish links with Texas 

in July 2013 (lease agreement); September 2013 (car purchase, and 
- 12 - 

Consumer Account Application with Wells Fargo Bank); and October 

2013 (voting registration certificate)," these events all occurred 

after May 2013 and therefore could not support a finding that he 

had abandoned his domicile in Puerto Rico and established a new 

domicile in Texas before the filing of the instant lawsuit. Id. 

This appeal followed. 

IV. 

Though the issue of domicile is a mixed question of law 

and fact, we nevertheless review the district court's 

determination of the plaintiff's domicile for clear error. See 

Meléndez-García v. Sánchez, 629 F.3d 25, 40–41 (1st Cir. 2010); 

Padilla-Mangual v. Pavía Hosp., 516 F.3d 29, 32 (1st Cir. 2008); 

Valentin v. Hosp. Bella Vista, 254 F.3d 358, 365 (1st Cir. 2001). 

This standard applies where, as here, the district court did not 

hold an evidentiary hearing but instead relied on a paper record. 

See Hawes v. Club Ecuestre El Comandante, 598 F.2d 698, 702 (1st 

Cir. 1979). However, where the district court's result is based 

entirely on documentary evidence, "the presumption that the court 

reached a correct result is somewhat lessened relative to findings 

based on oral testimony." Padilla-Mangual, 516 F.3d at 33–34 

(citing Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 

500 (1984) (noting that "the presumption of correctness that 

attaches to factual findings" of the district court "has lesser 
- 13 - 

force" where those "findings [are] based on documentary evidence" 

as opposed to "oral testimony")). 

V. 

Federal courts have subject-matter jurisdiction over 

cases in which the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000 and where 

the parties are "citizens of different States."2 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1332(a)(1). Diversity must be complete -- "the presence of but 

one nondiverse party divests the district court of original 

jurisdiction over the entire action." In re Olympic Mills Corp., 

477 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2007) (citing Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 

U.S. (3 Cranch) 267, 267 (1806)). "For purposes of diversity, a 

person is a citizen of the state in which he is domiciled." 

Padilla-Mangual, 516 F.3d at 31. "A person's domicile 'is the 

place where he has his true, fixed home and principal 

establishment, and to which, whenever he is absent, he has the 

intention of returning.'" Rodriguez-Diaz v. Sierra-Martinez, 853 

F.2d 1027, 1029 (1st Cir. 1988) (quoting 13B C. Wright, A. Miller 

& E. Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure § 3612, at 526 (2d ed. 

1984)). Proving domicile requires two showings: (1) "physical 

presence in a place," and (2) "the intent to make that place one's 

home." Valentin, 254 F.3d at 366. Necessarily then, domicile and 

 2 For the purpose of § 1332, Puerto Rico is a "State[]." 

28 U.S.C. § 1332(e); see also Rodríguez v. Señor Frog's de la Isla, 

Inc., 642 F.3d 28, 32 (1st Cir. 2011). 
- 14 - 

residence are not the same thing. After it is established, a 

domicile "persists until a new one is acquired." Id. 

"Once challenged, the party invoking diversity 

jurisdiction must prove domicile by a preponderance of the 

evidence." García Pérez v. Santaella, 364 F.3d 348, 350 (1st Cir. 

2004). There are a variety of factors that are relevant to 

determining a party's domicile: "current residence; voting 

registration and voting practices; location of personal and real 

property; location of brokerage and bank accounts; membership in 

unions, fraternal organizations, churches, clubs and other 

associations; place of employment or business; driver's license 

and other automobile registration; [and] payment of taxes." Id. 

at 351 (alteration in original) (quoting Wright, supra, § 3612). 

"No single factor is dispositive, and the analysis focuses not 

simply on the number of contacts with the purported domicile, but 

also on their substantive nature." Id. 

VI. 

We believe that the district court committed clear 

error. In a nutshell, the evidence establishes that Aponte-Dávila 

was domiciled in Texas before his 2009 accident, that his stays in 

Puerto Rico while obtaining medical care needed in the aftermath 

of the accident were insufficient to effect a change of domicile 

from Texas to Puerto Rico, and that accordingly he was domiciled 

in Texas on the date his case was filed. 
- 15 - 

No one seriously disputes that Aponte-Dávila was 

domiciled in Texas before his accident. He first moved to Laredo, 

Texas, in 2004 and began working for Landstar. Though he left 

Texas in late 2004 to go to Puerto Rico, it is undisputed that the 

purpose of this relocation was to help his sick father with his 

business. There is nothing to suggest that this move was intended 

to be permanent. In fact, once his father's health improved in 

2007, Aponte-Dávila returned to Laredo. He then obtained a loan 

from the First National Bank in Laredo to purchase a 2001 

Freightliner Condo truck, and he spent the next two and a half 

years working out of Laredo for a trucking company called Land 

Carrier. In 2008, he obtained a Texas Class "A" commercial 

driver's license. Laredo was his base of operations during his 

tenure at Land Carrier. Moreover, for tax years 2007 to 2012, he 

filed all of his federal tax returns using his Texas address. As 

of the date of his accident, July 13, 2009, Aponte-Dávila was 

clearly domiciled in Texas. 

Where the district court erred was in concluding that 

Aponte-Dávila had changed his domicile from Texas to Puerto Rico 

after his accident, as of the time he filed suit in Puerto Rico. 

The bulk of the district court's justification for 

finding that Aponte-Dávila was domiciled in Puerto Rico is based 

on representations that Aponte-Dávila made about his residence in 

various forms including an application to participate in Puerto 
- 16 - 

Rico's "Reforma" health plan,3 an application for Medicaid 

benefits, an application for a disability parking permit, a form 

submitted to the Puerto Rico Department of Treasury, and a form 

submitted to Warren Transport. He also obtained a Puerto Rico 

driver's license that listed an address in Caguas. The district 

court reasoned that "[s]trong evidence of domicile is found in 

representations a party has made on reports and documents submitted 

to third parties," and, citing a treatise, that "[a]lthough 

residence alone is not the equivalent of domicile, the place of 

residence is prima facie evidence of a party's domicile."4 Dávila, 

2015 WL 3889963, at *5. 

 3 The district court and the defendants add that the 

"Reforma" health plan is limited to residents of Puerto Rico. 

Dávila, 2015 WL 3889963, at *2, *5 n.3. Aponte-Dávila disagrees. 

The relevant statute provides: "All residents of Puerto Rico may 

be beneficiaries of the Health Plan established upon the 

implementation of this chapter, provided that they meet the 

following requirements . . . ." P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 24, § 7029. 

As Aponte-Dávila sees it, the statute does not expressly exclude 

non-residents. We need not resolve this dispute, though we 

question whether Aponte-Dávila is correct. For the purposes of 

our inquiry, it does not matter whether the plan is actually 

limited to residents or not -- residence is not the same as 

domicile. See Bank One, Tex., N.A. v. Montle, 964 F.2d 48, 53 

(1st Cir. 1992). Rather, his participation in the plan is relevant 

to the extent that it demonstrates his intent, by claiming Puerto 

Rican residence, to make Puerto Rico his domicile. 

 

4 While this court has never expressly recognized such a 

principle, we note that other courts have. See, e.g., Krasnov v. 

Dinan, 465 F.2d 1298, 1300 (3d Cir. 1972); Walden v. Broce Constr. 

Co., 357 F.2d 242, 245 (10th Cir. 1966) (citing Stine v. Moore, 

213 F.2d 446, 448 (5th Cir. 1954)). But see Mondragon v. Capital 

One Auto Fin., 736 F.3d 880, 886 (9th Cir. 2013) ("It does not 

appear that this circuit has yet adopted this presumption."). The 
- 17 - 

While the district court was certainly correct that 

residence is relevant to the question of domicile and that 

representations of one's residence in certain instances "are 

entitled to significant weight," Lundquist v. Precision Valley 

Aviation, Inc., 946 F.2d 8, 12–13 (1st Cir. 1991) (per curiam), 

the court erred by placing altogether too much emphasis on this 

factor in light of the circumstances. When considered in the 

context of Aponte-Dávila's reason for being in Puerto Rico in the 

first place -- medical treatment -- these representations about 

his residence, many tied to getting such treatment, do not 

themselves result in a change in domicile. See García Pérez, 364 

F.3d at 351 (emphasizing that the court must consider the 

"substantive nature" of the party's contacts with the state). 

Aponte-Dávila shuttled back and forth between Texas and 

Puerto Rico between 2009 and 2013 so that he could obtain medical 

care and assistance from his family as he attempted to recover 

from the injuries from his fall. The district court concluded 

 

Supreme Court long ago stated that "[t]he place where a person 

lives is taken to be his domicil until facts adduced establish the 

contrary." Anderson v. Watt, 138 U.S. 694, 706 (1891) (emphasis 

added); see also District of Columbia v. Murphy, 314 U.S. 441, 455 

(1941); Ennis v. Smith, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 400, 423 (1852) ("Where 

a person lives, is taken primâ facie to be his domicil, until other 

facts establish the contrary."). This principle, however, does 

not provide an end run around the longstanding test for domicile. 

Looking at residency alone is an insufficient analysis if there 

are other facts, and this court has consistently required a careful 

analysis of a variety of factors to determine a party's domicile. 

See Padilla-Mangual, 516 F.3d at 32; Bank One, 964 F.2d at 50. 
- 18 - 

that Aponte-Dávila "severed relevant links to Texas." Dávila, 

2015 WL 3889963, at *4. But the record shows that he never stopped 

returning to Texas to work and that he continued to file his 

federal taxes from Texas. He never filed tax returns in Puerto 

Rico. When he was in Puerto Rico, he stayed with his parents or 

with his ex-wife, Báez. After his last stay in Puerto Rico from 

May 2012 to April 2013, he returned to Texas where he renewed his 

Texas commercial driver's license, leased an apartment in Laredo, 

reactivated his bank accounts at Wells Fargo, and registered to 

vote in Texas. While several of these actions occurred after the 

filing of the lawsuit, "subsequent events may bear on the sincerity 

of a professed intention to remain." García Pérez, 364 F.3d at 

351. In this case, the actions that Aponte-Dávila took in Texas 

after filing his lawsuit are strong evidence that he never harbored 

an intention to change his domicile to Puerto Rico. 

To be sure, Aponte-Dávila's connections to Texas were 

weakest in the period between the paralyzing incident in May 2012 

and his return to Texas in April 2013. At the same time, though, 

his connections to Puerto Rico during this period were not 

meaningfully stronger than they were before the May 2012 incident. 

The district court placed substantial weight on Aponte-Dávila's 

representations about his residency in Puerto Rico between 2009 

and 2013. Many of these representations were made before the May 

2012 incident, when he maintained stronger ties to Texas. After 
- 19 - 

the May 2012 incident, however, he continued to make the same types 

of representations. So even if his ties to Texas were weaker after 

the May 2012 incident, his later, equivalent representations about 

his residency in Puerto Rico are insufficient to show that he 

thereafter intended to change his domicile. 

"Jurisdictionally speaking, residency and citizenship 

are not interchangeable." Valentin, 254 F.3d at 361 n.1. 

"[C]itizenship or domicile, not residence, is the basis of subject 

matter jurisdiction." Bank One, Tex., N.A. v. Montle, 964 F.2d 

48, 53 (1st Cir. 1992); see also Lundquist, 946 F.2d at 10 ("[T]he 

relevant standard is 'citizenship,' i.e., 'domicile,' not mere 

residence."). Indeed, "[w]hile a person may have more than one 

residence, he can only have one domicile." Bank One, 964 F.2d at 

53. This is why residence is not dispositive of the domicile 

inquiry but rather one of many factors that the federal courts 

consider when determining a party's domicile. See García Pérez, 

364 F.3d at 351. Given the circumstances of Aponte-Dávila's 

ongoing medical treatment in Puerto Rico, the unremarkable fact 

that he claimed a residence in Puerto Rico and listed it on a 

variety of forms, several of which pertain directly to his medical 

condition and treatment, is weak evidence of an intent to remain 

in Puerto Rico indefinitely and give up his Texas domicile, 

particularly in light of his continued ties to Texas while he was 

recovering in Puerto Rico. 
- 20 - 

Our conclusion here is guided by our prior decision in 

Valentin. There, the plaintiff was a resident of Puerto Rico when 

she began experiencing severe abdominal pain. 254 F.3d at 361. 

Complications ensued as a result of surgery she received in Puerto 

Rico, and so she moved to Florida to "seek[] more sophisticated 

medical care." Id. While there, she stayed with her sister and 

brother-in-law. Id. She did not terminate her employment in 

Puerto Rico and instead used sick time donated to her by her coworkers and, when that ran out, unpaid leave. Id. at 361–62. She 

also left most of her belongings in Puerto Rico, kept her car 

registered there, and maintained a Puerto Rico bank account. Id. 

at 366. On the other hand, she obtained a Florida driver's license 

and a charge card from a Florida bank, and she even took a Florida 

nurse licensing exam and applied for nursing jobs. Id. at 366–

67. On appeal, we affirmed the district court's determination 

that despite her contacts with Florida, the plaintiff remained a 

domiciliary of Puerto Rico. Id. at 367. We held that "bearing in 

mind that the plaintiffs [sic] primary purpose in going to Florida 

in April of 1998 -- to secure advanced medical treatment for the 

complications arising out of her surgery -- was fully consistent 

with transient status as opposed to outright relocation, we cannot 

say that the district court clearly erred in concluding that the 

plaintiff had not become a Florida citizen." Id. 
- 21 - 

Other cases from this circuit reinforce the importance 

of context in cases involving individuals who relocate for periods 

of time to a new jurisdiction for the purpose of obtaining medical 

treatment. In García Pérez, two parents brought a medical 

malpractice suit against a doctor and a hospital in Puerto Rico 

after three of their four quadruplets died around the time of their 

birth and the fourth suffered from a series of complications. 364 

F.3d at 349. The family relocated to Florida to obtain medical 

care for the surviving daughter. Id. We reversed the district 

court's finding that the plaintiffs remained domiciled in Puerto 

Rico, concluding instead that they had established a new domicile 

in Florida. Id. at 355. This finding, however, was based on much 

more than mere residence in Florida. The parents maintained much 

stronger ties to Florida than Aponte-Dávila did to Puerto Rico. 

We noted that the parents had registered to vote in Florida, had 

acquired Florida driver's licenses, had sold their car in Puerto 

Rico and purchased two new cars in Florida, had rented out, but 

not sold, their house in Puerto Rico, and had opened a Miami bank 

account. Moreover, the father had studied for and passed the 

Florida bar exam and expressed a clear intention of practicing law 

in Florida. Id. at 352–53. 

In Hawes, a husband and wife filed a tort claim against 

various defendants after the husband was rendered a quadriplegic 

when a horse jumped over a fence at a horse show the couple was 
- 22 - 

attending and struck the husband's back with its front legs. 598 

F.2d at 699–700. At the time of the show, the pair lived in Puerto 

Rico, but they soon decided to move to New York so that the husband 

could seek treatment at a rehabilitation center there. Id. at 

700. The couple took their personal belongings to New York, 

leaving their furniture in Puerto Rico with a friend. Id. The 

wife closed her Puerto Rico bank accounts and opened a new one in 

New York. Id. She also obtained a residence in New York. Id. 

The couple's younger daughter moved with them to New York and 

enrolled in school there, but the older one, an eighteen year old, 

stayed in Puerto Rico. Id. While the wife did not quit her job, 

she remained on leave without pay so that she could keep her 

accumulated retirement benefits. Id. Eventually, though, she 

obtained part-time employment in the suburbs of New York and then 

full-time employment in Manhattan. Id. at 702–03. She also filed 

federal income taxes from New York after the commencement of the 

tort action. Id. at 700. On these facts, which again implicated 

much more than just residence, the court concluded that "the 

plaintiffs clearly intended to move to New York City for as long 

as [the husband's] physical condition required," and that "they 

made a deliberate decision to go to New York City for an indefinite 

period of time." Id. at 702. 

Because Valentin, García Pérez, and Hawes, like the case 

at hand, were before this court on clear error review, we cannot 
- 23 - 

-- and do not -- suggest that their outcomes are strictly 

determinative of this case. But they do illustrate the need to 

look beyond the facts regarding residence when faced with a party 

who relocates to a new jurisdiction for the purpose of seeking 

medical care. In the end, this case is most akin to the facts of 

Valentin, where the plaintiff had minimal contacts with the 

jurisdiction in which she sought medical care. Like Aponte-Dávila, 

the plaintiff in Valentin stayed with family while receiving 

medical care and obtained a local driver's license; she went even 

further than Aponte-Dávila and applied for jobs. Both she and 

Aponte-Dávila also maintained connections to their professions in 

their home jurisdictions. Aponte-Dávila's ties to Puerto Rico are 

quite superficial when compared to the parents in García Pérez. 

And while Hawes presents a closer case -- somewhere between 

Valentin and García Pérez -- the facts there strongly suggested an 

indefinite intention to stay in New York that simply is not present 

in this case in light of Aponte-Dávila's continued efforts to 

return to his work as an interstate truck driver in Texas. 

The district court also erred when it concluded that a 

particular document submitted by Aponte-Dávila was "utterly 

incompatible" with the conclusion that he renewed his Texas 

commercial driver's license on May 6, 2013. Dávila, 2015 WL 

3889963, at *3 n.2. The document at issue is a "Certified Abstract 

Record" from the Texas Department of Public Safety, dated October 
- 24 - 

14, 2013, which reflects relevant information pertaining to 

Aponte-Dávila's Texas commercial driver's license. The form 

states that a medical certificate was issued to Aponte-Dávila on 

May 6, 2013, by a Texas doctor. It also states that the "Date 

Last Issued" for Aponte-Dávila's commercial driver's license was 

September 30, 2013. 

Aponte-Dávila argues that the Texas Department of Public 

Safety document shows that he renewed his Texas commercial driver's 

license -- or at least began the process of renewing it -- on May 

6, 2013, which required him to receive a medical examination and 

certificate.5 

 5 The defendants pressed at oral argument that AponteDávila has waived any reliance on the Texas Department of Public 

Safety document to prove that he was in Texas on May 6 to obtain 

a medical certificate because the argument was not presented to 

the district court. Not so. The document was attached as Exhibit 

11 to Aponte-Dávila's Motion in Support of Diversity Jurisdiction. 

In the motion itself, citing to Exhibit 11, he stated: "A week 

after arriving in Laredo, on May 6, 2013, Aponte renewed and was 

issued on that same date his Texas Commercial Driver's License 

. . . that had expired in February 2013 during his extended 

recuperation in Puerto Rico." While no express mention was made 

of the medical certificate, the relevance of the document was 

plainly apparent. Indeed, the district court was aware of the 

document's relevance to his presence in Texas, and addressed that 

point. See Dávila, 2015 WL 3889963, at *3 n.2.

 The defendants also raise a series of evidentiary 

challenges to the Texas Department of Public Safety document. But 

these arguments were not presented to the district court. Unless 

a case involves "exceptional circumstances," we will not allow a 

party to raise a new issue on appeal that it did not raise to the 

district court. T I Fed. Credit Union v. DelBonis, 72 F.3d 921, 

929–30 (1st Cir. 1995) (citing Nat'l Ass'n of Soc. Workers v. 

Harwood, 69 F.3d 622, 628 (1st Cir. 1995)). Such circumstances 
- 25 - 

We think the district court's contrary conclusion is 

based on a misreading of the Texas Department of Public Safety 

document. It clearly states that the medical certificate was 

issued on May 6, 2013 by a Texas "Medical Examiner." Absent any 

evidence to the contrary, this document, along with AponteDávila's deposition testimony and statements in his affidavit, 

could reasonably support the finding that Aponte-Dávila was in 

Texas and either renewed his license on May 6, or, at a minimum, 

began the process of renewal by obtaining the medical examination 

and certificate on that date. That the document says the "Date 

Last Issued" was September 30, 2013, does not, as the district 

court assumed, foreclose such a finding. Aponte-Dávila explained 

in his affidavit that he was issued a license on May 6, 2013, but 

that he was also reissued a new license on September 30, 2013, 

after he obtained a new address in Laredo. See Hawes, 598 F.2d at 

704 (noting that where "the case was decided without a hearing," 

and the "facts set forth in the affidavit . . . are both reasonable 

and logical and do not contradict any statements made by [the 

plaintiff] . . . there could be no credibility determination made 

adverse to [the plaintiff]"). The Texas Department of Public 

Safety document is itself dated October 14, 2013, which would 

explain why the "Date Last Issued" was September 30, 2013. 

 

are not present here, and so these evidentiary challenges are 

waived. 
- 26 - 

In the end, that Aponte-Dávila, within days of returning 

to Texas, renewed his commercial driver's license in order to 

return to his truck-driving career in Texas is evidence that he 

never intended to forego his Texas domicile in favor of Puerto 

Rico.6 

We find that on the evidence presented, Aponte-Dávila 

has shown that he did not abandon his Texas domicile in favor of 

a Puerto Rico domicile after his accident in 2009, and that Texas 

necessarily remained his domicile until at least the date that his 

lawsuit was filed. See Valentin, 254 F.3d at 366 ("[A] party's 

former domicile persists until a new one is acquired."). We add, 

however, that even if we were to agree that Aponte-Dávila had 

shifted his domicile to Puerto Rico for the period during which he 

was seeking medical treatment, we believe that the district court 

erred in concluding that Aponte-Dávila had not reestablished Texas 

as his domicile before filing his complaint. Aponte-Dávila 

 6 We also believe the district court erroneously 

disregarded the significance of Aponte-Dávila's license renewal. 

The district court appeared to equate Aponte-Dávila's commercial 

license with a noncommercial one, stating that "[o]btaining or 

renewing a driver's license is not necessarily a complicated 

procedure for one who (like plaintiff) already has the skill, and 

without more objective evidence of a domicile change is 

insufficient to tilt the balance to plaintiff's side." Dávila, 

2015 WL 3889963, at *5 n.6. Aponte-Dávila's renewal of his 

commercial license, a more onerous task than renewing a 

noncommercial driver's license, is indicative of his intent to 

return to his longstanding career in Texas despite obtaining 

medical care in Puerto Rico. 
- 27 - 

returned to Texas, his prior domicile, and immediately took the 

significant step of renewing his commercial driver's license in 

order to resume his truck-driving career. Shortly thereafter, he 

rented an apartment, reactivated his bank accounts, registered to 

vote, and voted in Texas. Though events that happen after the 

filing of the complaint are "not part of the primary calculus," 

they still "bear on the sincerity of a professed intention to 

remain." García Pérez, 364 F.3d at 351. 

VII. 

The judgment of the district court is reversed and the 

case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this 

opinion.