T he H o no rable Jud i t h M

. B arzi l ay, Jud ge, U ni t ed Stat es Co urt of Int ernat i o nal T rade , s i t t i ng by desi gnat i o n. * NO T REC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 08a0628n.06 F iled: October 17, 2008 Case No. 07- 1455 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT JOH N M . OK

RO S, P laintif f-App ellee,

v. AN G ELO I AF RA TE C ON STRUC TIO N COMP ANY, Defendan t-Appellant.

_______________________________________ ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON AP P EA L F RO M THE EA STER

N D ISTRIC T OF MICHIGAN

BEFORE: BATCHELDER and SUTTO N, Circ uit Jud ges; and BARZILAY, Judge. * ALICE M . BA TC HE LD ER, C ir c ui t J ud g e. JohnOk

ro s su e d h is f

or me r e mpl oye r, An g e lo I afr at e C o nstruction Company (“I afr ate” ), in fede ral district cour t, claiming a

violation of the Americ ans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 12101 et seq ., and asse rtingdirec t evidenc e of that violation. This direct evidenc e — as r elayed by Okros and thr ee w itnesses who listened on a spe aker ph on e to O kr os ’s e nd

of a te le ph on e c onve rs atio n — wa s th at I a fr ate ’s Vi c e Pr e sid e nt o f O pe ratio ns , Dave Michae l, admitted to firing Okros beca use of his Tour ette’s sy

ndrome a nd even c alled Okr os a “stutteringprick.” But, Da ve Micha el insisted that this phone call neve r happe ned. At tr ia l, t he jur y be lie ve d O kr os and

awa rd e d h im $ 1 mi lli on

in dam ages. Af

te r t ri a l, howeve r, I afr ate discove red c onclusive evide nce that the ca l l h ad never actua lly occur red — i.e .,A l t ho ugh al l of t he wi t ness es at t ri al gave sus p i ci o usl y d i f f erent acco unt s o f b o t h t he co nt ent of t he cal l and 1 t he sur round i ng ci rcum st ances, one co nsi st ent po i nt was t hat t he cal l w a s p laced f rom t he l and

- l i ne i n O kros’ s spare bedroom

. O kr os’ s at t orn ey , K enn et h H ar di n, ev en expl ai ned, on t he r ecor d, wh y O kr os had u s ed t hi s par t i cul ar phone.

Iafrate ha s ra i sed o t he r issues an d p resse d ad d i t i o na l arg um en t s i n thi s ap p ea l

. W e fi nd no m erit t o an y of t he se 2 ot her i s s ues or ar gu ment s an d, i n l i gh t of our di s po s i t i on of t he “ f r aud on t he cour t ” i s s ue, we r ej ect t hos e ot her i s s ues an d a r g u men t s , bu t f

or g o s pec i f

i c di s cu s s i on of

t h em i n t h i s opi n i on , e x ce pt w h er e ot h er wi s e n ot ed. 2 telephone c ompany

rec ords for O kros’s phone line reve aled that no c all had bee n made f rom that 1 phone to I afr ate or

Dave Michae l on the night in question. I afr ate moved the district c ourt for a new trial, but the court — de spite acknow ledg ing a likely “fr aud on the c ourt” — denied the motion based on its finding that I afr ate c ould have, with due dilig ence , discovere d this evidence ear lier. I afr ate now a

ppeals the denial of its motion for new trial, arguing, a mong othe r thing s, that 2 the district court a

bused i t s d i s cr et ion when it acknow ledg ed but then ig nored the perpe tration of “fr aud on the c ourt” by

Okros’s attorney , Ke n n et h Ha rdi n. Be cause we a g ree with I afr ate, we REVERSE the judgment a nd REMAND for

further proce eding s consistent with this opi nion. I. F ro m 19 98 until 20 01 , d e fe nd ant- a pp e lla nt I a fr ate e mpl oye d p la int if f- a pp e llee Okr os a s a h ea v y -e qu i p m en to p er at o r. Okro s h as T o ure t t e’ s s y n dro m e an d h as h adi ts i n ce h e w as fi v e, th o u gh he is not disabled. Dave Michae l was I afr ate’ s Vice Pre sident of Oper ations, who orig inally hired Okros in 1998 and a

pproved O kros for a

manag ement-tra ining pr og ram in April 2001. Acc ordingto I afr ate, Okr os resig ned without notice on August 31, 2001, le avinga short (a nd rude) telephone me ssag e for Dave Michael i n wh i ch h e boaste d that he wa s takinga better job at F o r d

. B u t , o nO c t o b e r

1 , 2 0 0 1 , O kr o s r e tur

n e d t o Ia f r at e , at t e mp t i n gt o r e c l a i mh i s f o r m e r h e av yequipment-ope rator job, a nd a fore man named Bob Crane rehire d Okros, even though Crane ha d no

a uth or ity to d o s o. B e c a

us e Ok ro s h a d n ot g on e thr ou g h p ro pe r c ha nn e ls, I a fr ate ter mi nate d h im“ T h e AD A’ s r eg ar ded- as - di s abl ed

. . . pr ov i s i on pr ot ec t s empl oy ee s wh o a r e per f ec t l y a bl e t o pe r f

or m a j ob, 3 but ar e r ej ect ed becau s e of t he my t hs , f

ear s an d s t er eot y pes as s oci at ed wi t h di s abi l i t i es . [ I ] t appl i es wh en an emp l oy er m i st ak en l y be l i ev es that an e m p l o yee ha s a p hysi ca l im p airm en t tha t su b st an t i all y li m i t s o ne o r m o re m aj o r li f e a cti vit i es, o r . . . t ha t an ac t ua l , no n-l i m i t i ng i m p airm en t sub st an t i all y l i m i t s o ne o r m o re o f an em p l o yee ’ s m aj o r l i f e a cti vitie s. E i t her ap pl i cat i on requi r es t hat t he empl oy er ent er t ai n m i s perc ept i ons ab out t he emp l oy ee. ” G ru en er v . O h i o C a s. In s. Co. , 51 0 F.3d 66 1 , 66 4 (6t h C i r. 20 0 8 ) ( ci t at i o ns, quo t at i o n m arks , and ed i t o ri al m arks om i t t ed ). 3 immediately

(Oc tober 4, 2001). I afr ate ex plained that hea vy -equipment ope ration is a union job and job op e nin g s are fi lle d f

ro m a li st at th e un ion ha ll. Al so , th e po sit ion s in I a fr ate ’s mana g e me nttr a ini ngpr ogra

m, in whi ch Okr os ha d w or ke d a ll o f t

hat summe r, are mana g e me nt p os iti on s, so Ok ro s ’s p ay

and bene fits would have be en entire ly differ ent from those of

a hea vy -equipment op e rator . F ina lly , D ave Mic ha e l, wh o wa s ult imate ly re sp on sib le fo r a ll h ir ingand fi ri ng , w a s st ill

angry wi th O kr os fo r t

he wa y in whic h h e ha d r e signe d w ith out no tic e in Augus t. Acc ordingto Okros, howeve r, he ha d not resig ned in August, but inst ead ha d contac ted Dave Michae l to inform him that he wa s disenchante d with the trainingprog ram a nd wanted to g o back to beinga hea

vy -equipment ope rator. D ave Mic hael a lleg edly agree d and eve n encour ag ed Okr os to do so. T hu s , a c c o r d in gto O kr o s , h e w a s p r o p e r ly r e h ir e d o nO c to b e r

1 , 2 0 0 1 , b u t t

h e nf ir ed without ex planation on Octobe r 4, 2001. That e vening , Okros — usinga spea ker- phone in the spar e bedroom of his a

partment, a

nd with witnesses standingrea dy — made a

telephone c all, which he said was to Da

ve Michae l at the I afr ate office s, seeking an explanation f or why he had be en fire d, wher eupon “Mic hael” reve aled that he had fire d Okros beca use Okros’s Tour ette’s sy ndrome made him a liability

to the company , and eve n called O kros a “ stuttering pr ick.” Okros filed a

char g e with the EEOC a nd, upon obtai n i n g a right-to-sue letter , hired Mr. Ha rd in and su e d I a fr ate in fe de ra l c ourt c la imi ng a vio latio n o f t he Am e ri c ans wi th D isa

bil iti e s A c t, 42 U.S.C.A. § 12101 et seq ., on a reg arde d-as theory

. Duringdiscovery , Mr. Har din describe d the 3 nature of the claim as: “ [o] n or about Oc tober 4, 2001, Da vid Michaels [sic] , [I afr ate]’s offic er a nd4

a g e nt, and

[Ok ro s] e ng a g e d in

a te le ph on e c onve rs atio n whe re in M r. Mic ha e ls [s ic ] spe c if ic a lly state d th at [Ok

ro s] w a s b e ingte rm inate d b e c a us e [I a fr ate ] re g ard e d h im a s a l iabi lity du e to h is Tourette’ s Sy

ndrome.” At this point , I afr ate’ s defe nse did not addre ss the (outrag eous) tele phone

conver sation at all, but instead, I afr ate insisted that Okros ha d not even been fired, let alone f ired due to his disabili ty , as no one at I afr ate e ven suspec ted that Okros ha d a disability . I afr ate e x plained: [ I afrat e] did

no t te rm inate [Ok

ro s]. [O kr os ] re signe d v olu nta ri ly fr om h is employ ment with [I afr ate]. [Okros] later resumed the operation duties, but not the field eng ineer

duties, he had pr eviously perf ormed for [I afr ate] without being r ehire d by [I afr ate] by

circ umventing [I afr ate]’s hiring/reh i ri ngproce ss. When this was discovere d by

[I afr ate], [Okros] was take n off t h e p ay ro ll for circ umventing the re hir ingpr oc e ss. [I a fr ate ] wa s c omp le te ly un awa re of [Ok ro s]’ s a lle g e d im

pa ir me nt. And, eve n though I afr ate wa s not y et foc used on this aspec t of the ca se, Dave Michae l had — as he has throug hout — consistent l y and emphatically

denied that the c all had eve r occ urre d (and

corr esponding ly , denied e ver making the offe nsive rema rks that Okros attributes to him). Th e od dit

y of thi s p art icul ar den ial — a nd Mic ha e l’ s st

ub bo rn ins ist e nc e on

it — is

n o te w o rthy . I t is o d d b e c a u s e O kr o s c o u ld d is p r o v e th e d e n ia l s o e a s il y if it w e r e un true. At the op e nin gof

thi s c a se , M ic ha e l ( and I a fr ate ) ha d no re a so n to susp e c t that Okr os did no t hav e , o r c ou ld

n o tg e t , h i s p h o n e r e c o r d s an d e v e r y r e a s o nt o a s s um e th ath e h a d th e mo r c o u l d g e tth e me a s i l y. Wit hin day s — if not ear lier — of his termination and the purporte d t el ep h one ca ll (October 4, 2001), Okros ha d hired a

n attorney and pursued the matter with the EEOC. Even if O kros did not him se lf thi nk to k e e p h is p ho ne bil l w he n it arr ive d at th e e nd

of the month, it i s c e rt a inl y

re a so na ble to assume that either

his attorney

or the EEO C would hav e co u n s el ed him to do so. I f Okros ha d actua lly made the c all (or anyc a ll t o I a fr ate ’s of fi c e s on th e night i n q

ue sti on ), he c ou ld s imp ly produce his phone bill to prove it a nd, with one swift par

ry , destroy

both Michael’s c redibility andFor ex amp l e, wi t nes s es t es t i f i ed t hat O kr os was not f i r ed, but ha d re s i gn ed an d nev er been r ehi r ed. W i t nes s es 4 al s o t es t i f

i ed t hat , pri or t o t he l aws ui t , I af r at e wa s comp l et el y un awar e of O kr os’ s T our et t e’ s s y ndr om e. 5 I afr ate’ s defe nse. So, at least fr om this perspective, Micha el’s asse rtion that th e p h o n e ca l l never

occur red w as not a ve ry

attrac tive defe nse. B ut, from our prese nt pe rspec tive, it is noteworthy that th i s p art i cu l ar

d en i al , i f u n tru e, h ad s u c h a n en o rm o u s d o wn s i d e an d s u ch a c o rr es p o n d i n gl y

h i gh probability

of dete ction. That Michae l would put so much at ri s k when other options (i.e., other de nia ls) we re ava ila

ble , g ive s th is d e nia l a dd e d c re dib ili ty in l ig ht o f O kr os ’s fa ilure to r e fute it. 4 But I afr ate did not immediately pursue this theory

of defense. Instead, I afr ate made only an informa l

re qu e st f or the ph on e re c or ds , a

nd op te d to purs ue and

e mph a size its oth e r d e fe ns e s. At trial, Dave Michae l denied that the call had ever occur red a nd, when I afr ate e mphasized Okros’s f ailure or inability to produce his phone bill, the absence of the phone rec ords bec ame a key issue. Mr. Har din repre sented to the jury — first as an obje ction duringOkros’s c ross-examination tes ti mo ny andth en d

uri ng hi s o wn r edi rectex ami nat io n of Okr os — t hathe h ad s ub po enaedAT&T fo r t he re c or ds in q

ue sti on , th at A T& T had res po nde d th at th e re c or ds we re un ava ila ble be c a us e AT& T d o e s n o t r e ta in th o s e r e c o r d s , an d th at th e r e w a s n o p o s s ib le w ay to g e t them. The implication of these represe ntations was that, but for AT& T’s obviously defic ient rec ords-re tention policie s , M r . H ar d in w o u ld h av e p r o d u c e d th e r e c o r d s an d p r o v e d c o n c lu s iv e ly th at th e call had indeed oc curr ed. The associate d im p l i cation wa s that I afr ate wa s unfairly attempting to por

tray Okros a s a

li ar w h e nit kn e wth at M r . H ar d in

h a d att e mp te d

to g e t t h e r e c o r d s , w h ic hw ere unavailable for r easons be y ond his control. Ultimately , the jury believed Mr . Har din — that Michael had re g arde d Okros as di s ab l ed and ha d expressed his discriminatory animus in an ig nominious

re mark duri ngthe te le ph on e c onve rs atio n — and awa rd e d O kr os $1 mil lio n in

dama g e s.M r. H ardin m o ved i m m ed i at el y t o qua sh the s u b p o e n a . T he d i st ri ct co urt i ni t i al l y grant ed t he m o t i o n and 5 q ua she d t he sub p o en a, b ut l ater rec an t ed , ad m i t t ed the re co rd s o b t aine d a s a re sult o f t he sub p o en a, an d co nsid ere d t ho se r ec or ds i n r u l i n g on t h e pos t
- t r i al mot i on s . T h e cou r t a l s o a l l owe d a ddi t i on al s u bpoen as , t o pr es er v e t h e r ec or d.

T her e we r e n o ph on e bi l l s f or t h e mon t h of O ct ober 2001 f or an y of t h e ot h er s i x n u mber s l i st ed on t he 6 subp o ena t o A T & T (i

. e. , l i st ed i n O kros’ s p ers o nnel f i l e). A T & T ’ s res p o nse i ncl ud ed a hand wri t t en no t e t o exp l ai n t he a b se n c e o f p h o n e re c o rd s fo r th e o the r six nu m b e rs , w h ic h sta te d “T h e re w e re no c a lls f o r th a t t im e fra m e .” Si nce I af r at e’ s post
- t r i al ac qui s i t i on of t he phone r ecor d ( wi t h al l of i t s var i ous i mp l i cat i ons ) , much has been 7 m a d e o f t h e f a c t t h a t t h i s n u m b e r w a s i n d e e d c o n t a i n e d i n t h e p r e t r i a l r e c o r d ( o n Ok r o s ’ s Oc t o b e r 3 1 , 2 0 0 1 , E EO C ch ar g e) , a l bei t w i t h a di f f er en t a r ea c ode ( i

. e. , i t was l i s t ed a s (810) 792- 4979 wh er ea s t h e c or r ec t n u mber w as ( 586) 792- 4 9 7 9 ). A cco rding t o A T & T ’ s web si t e, am o ng o t her p ub l i c sources, f o rme r area co d e 8 1 0 was s p l i t and cert ai n po rt i o ns re n u m b e re d 5 8 6 , b e g inn ing S e p te m b e r 2 2 , 2 0 0 1 , an d b e c o m ing m a n d a to ry b y M a rc h 2 3 , 2 0 0 2

. See AT & T Ar ea Code H isto ry - M ic h iga n , avai l abl e atht t p : / / www . at t
. co m / gen/ general ? p i d = 1 7 2 0 (l ast vi si t ed June 2 6 , 20 0 8 ).

I af r at e a r gu es , un pers uas i vel y , t hat t hi s ch ang e i n ar ea cod es sh oul d af f ect o ur anal y s i s . B ut , t he s i mp l e f act i s t h at t h e ch an g e i n a r ea c ode di d n ot a dv er s el y a f f ec t I af r at e i n a n y w ay . I af

r at e subp oen ae d AT & T on J an u ar y 29, 20 07 , s eek i ng r ecor ds f or t el ephone nu mb er s wi t h a r ea code 81 0, i ncl udi ng (810 ) 7 92

- 49 79

. D es pi t e t hi s i ncor r ect ar ea code , AT & T r es pon ded wi t h r ec or ds f or ( 586 ) 7 9 2

- 4 979. Con s equ en t l y , t h e ch an g e i n a r ea c ode h ad n o e f f ec t on Iafrate’s ab i l i t y t o o b t ain the re co rd s — b efo re o r aft er tri al — an d si m i l arly ha s no eff ec t o n o ur p rese nt ana l ysi s. M r . H ar di n a r g u es , a cc u r at el y , t h at I af r at e cou l d h av e s u bpoen ae d AT & T du r i n g t h e pr e- t r i al di s cov er y pe r i od, o b ta ine d this p h o n e re c o rd b e fo re trial, a n d o ff e re d this e v id e n c e a t tr ia l to d isp ro v e the e x isten c e o f t h e a lleg e d c a ll. T h u s , M r . H ar di n c on t en ds t h at I af r at e i s a t faul t for f

ai l i n g t o e x er ci s e du e di l i g en ce du r i n g di s cov er y . W e ca n n ot di s ag r ee . I af

r at e wa s c er t ai n l y de f

i ci en t i n f

ai l i n g t o s u bpoen a AT & T f o r t hese reco r ds or s u bmi t a n y ot h er f or m of f o rma l dis co very (e. g. , i nt errogat o ri es, request s f o r prod uct i o n, request s f o r adm i ss i o n, e tc .). F o r thi s reason, am o ng o the rs , w e reje c t Ia fra te ’s cla im s b a se d o n ne w ly d isc o v e re d e v id e n c e o r fa lse tes tim o n y. B ut , t hat def

i ci enc y i s i mm at er i al t o t he pres ent anal y s i s , i n whi ch t he cr i t i cal poi nt i s not I af r at e’ s due di l i gen ce, b ut rat her, M r. H ardin’ s (mis )r ep res ent at i o ns at t ri al

. Fo r r easons t hat wi l l be dis cuss ed , Iaf rat e’ s d ef

i ci ent dis co very d o e s n o t ch a n g e , i n a n y m e a n ing ful w a y, o u r a n a lysis o f M r. H a rd in’s fra u d o n the c o u rt. 6 Som e time aft er tri a l and

the $1 mil lio n ju

ry ve rd ic t, I a fr ate de c ide d th at pe rh a ps it s ho uld have pur sued the missing phone rec ords, and subpoenae d AT& T for e very number listed in Okros’s 5 personne l file (seve n in all). Be cause , in O ctober 2001, Okros had be en living w ith his girlfrie nd, Carmen Pre ston, in an apar tment on Union L ake Roa d, I afr ate de termined t h at Okros would have

ma de the a lle g e d te le ph on e c a ll t o D ave Mic ha e l f ro m th e numbe r a sso c iate d w iththa t a dd re ss. 6 AT& T responde d to the subpoena by provi d in g a n O c to ber 2001 phone bill for phone number (586) 792- 4979, which wa s addre ssed to Carmen Pre ston at the Union L ake Roa d addre ss. And, 7 upon revie wingthe bill, I afr ate discove red that only four c alls had orig inated fr om that number on the eve ning of

October 4, 2001. Two calls eac h had bee n place d to two separate numbers, ne itherIafrate ha d also so ug ht t o d ep o se t elep ho ne co m p an y em p l o yee s. T he d i st rict co urt d en i ed Iafrate’ s req ue st 8 fo r th e se d e p o sitio n s. T h e c o u rt w a s re fer e n c ing this d e n ia l wh e n it sa id tha t i t wa s g ra n ting Ia fra te ’s m o tio n “in p a rt.”

W e i ncl ude t hes e port i ons of t hi s par agr aph onl y t o com pl et e t he s t ory an d expl ai n I af r at e’ s t heor y of

wh at 9 a c tua lly o c c u rr e d . T h is is no t t o b e c o n stru e d a s p ro p e rly a d m itt e d e v id e n c e o r a fi n d ing o f f a c t b y this c o u rt. 7 of which w as I afr ate’ s office number or Dave Michael’s direct line. Consequently , this telephone

rec ord conf

irmed that no ca ll had been pla ced f rom the phone line in Okros and Pre ston’s apar tment to either I afr ate’ s g ener al offic e number or Michae l’s direc t line, thus conclusively disproving Ok ro s’ s te sti mony

and that of his wi tne sse s who te sti fi e d to wh at th e y he ard on the c a ll. I afr ate then sought to subpoena AT& T ag ain, this tim e in pursuit of information about the tw o numbe rs that we re called from Okros’s apar tment on the nig ht of Octobe r 4, 2001. Okros f oug ht to quash these subpoe nas and, in rulingon Okros’s motion to quash, the district court opined: In light of the evidenc e that [Okros] commit ted perjury in his testim ony

about ca lling I afr ate Company

on the nig ht he was terminated, the Court w ill GRANT [ I afr ate]’s Motion in part, allowingit to subpoena AT& T’s re cords f or the purpose of [8] pr e se rv ingthe se [oth e r] r e c or ds sh ou ld [I a fr ate ]’s a pp e a l be su c c e ssf

ul. J A 352-53. F or these othe r two numbers, ne ither the subpoena s nor AT& T’s re sponses are contained in the prese nt rec ord, but all indications from the parties’ briefs on appea l are that I afr ate did ser ve the subpoena s and did obtain additional information about these two numbers fr om AT& T. Acc ordingto Okros’s Oc tober 2001 phone bill, the first two calls on the evening of Octobe r 4, 2001, wer e placed to one number, the first call occurring at 6: 48 p.m. (lasting one mi nute) a nd the second at 6:51 p.m. (ele ven minutes). In its brie f on appea l, I afr ate notes that these two c alls were 9 place d to the home of Rich Moore , a union hea d at For d and a friend of Okros’s, who was also one of the four

“witnesses” claimingto have be en pre s en t at Okros’s a partment to hea

r the c all. The thi rd and fo ur th c a lls , at 9: 42 p. m. (o ne min ute ) and 9:4 3 p. m. ( tw o mi nute s) , w e re pla c e d to an o utof-town attorney , Matthew Schwa rtz, who later conf

irmed t o I af

ra te that Okros ha d indeed c alledA r e v i e w of t h e e n t i r e ph on e r e c or d r e v e a l s t h a t 40 of t h e 50 ou t
- of

- t ow n c a l l s on t h e bi l l w e r e t o t h i s s a me 10 num b er ( i

. e. , t hi s same at t o rney ), be gi nni ng wi t h t he f i rs t cal l (Sep t em b er 1 6 ) and c o nt i nui ng t o t he l ast (O ct o b er 12 ). O f c ou r s e, n o e x pl an at i on h as e v er be en s ou g h t or g i v en as t o wh y O k r os w as c al l i n g t h i s a t t or n ey ( at t h e s u g g es t i on of a uni o n organi zer) al m o st da i l y , be gi nni ng at l east t wo weeks pri o r t o hi s “r et urn t o wo rk” or hi s t erm i nat i o n. 8 him that night on Moore’ s rec ommen d at i o n . Ba sed on this post-trial evidenc e, I afr ate theor izes 10 that the ca ll to Moore’s home was a st ag ed call, in which someone at Moore’s home ma squera ded

a s D ave Mic ha e l and

ma de the of

fe ns ive c omm e nts fo r t

he be ne fi t of

Ok ro s’ s w itn e sse s. II. The district cour

t entere d judgme nt on the jury verdic t on J anuar

y 25, 2007, and ther efor e, purs ua nt t o F e d. R. C iv. P. 5 9( b) , I a fr ate ha d te n d ay s to fi le a mot ion fo r a ne w tri a l; i .e ., until Mo nd ay , F e br

ua ry 5, 20 07

. B ut, a s o f F e br

ua ry 5, 20 07 , I a fr ate ha d n ot r e c e ive d A T& T’ s r e sp on se to its subpoena — I afr ate did not rece ive the re sponse from AT &T (i.e., Okr os’s Octobe r 2001 phone bill) until Fe bruar

y 7, 2007. I afr ate filed a new- trial motion on Fe bruar y 5, 2007, any

way , and, by order of the c ourt, filed a “ corr ecte d” new -trial motion on Febr uary 6, 2007, in which I afr ate r edac ted

cer tain names that ha d been inc luded in the first ver sion improperly . Consequently , the orig inal newtrial motion did not addre ss O kros’s phone rec ords or demonstrate that the telephone c onversation depicted at trial had not ac t u al l y o ccurred. I nstead, I afr ate a

rgued insuffic iency

of the e vidence , miscalculation of damag es, attorne y misconduct, and juror

err or. After obtaining the phone bil l on Fe bruar y 7, 2007, I afr ate moved the court (on F ebrua ry 9, 2007), for permission to f ile a supplemental brief in suppor t of its ne w-trial mot i o n . T h e c o u rt g r an t e d th i s r e qu e s t o n F e b r u ar y 1 2 , 2 0 0 7 , an d Ia f

r at e s u b m i t t e d i t s s u

p p l e m e n t a l b r i e f

th ats am e d ay. I afr ate a rgued that it had just obtained new l y discovere d evidenc e wa rra nting a new tria l, and

a p p e n d e d t o i t s m o t i o nth e p h o n e b i l l th atA T & T h a d s u p p l i e d i nr e s p o n s e t o th e s u

b p o e n a . In9

arguing its motion, I afr ate quoted a passag e fr om Okros’s trial testimony in which Mr. Ha

rdin had profe ssed his ha

ving subpoenae d AT& T for Okros’s phone bill, only to be told that phone rec ords for Okr os’s numbers did not exis t (to which Okr os had agree d). The a ppare nt purpose of I afr ate’ s ref ere nce to this testimony

was to demonstrate that this was newly discovere d eviden ce , that Mr. Har din had misled the court a bout its non-existence, that Okros had perjure d himself, or all of these. On Marc h 14, 2007 — some five we eks af ter I afr ate had rec eived AT&T’ s response to the subpoena — the d i s t ri ct cour t gr anted Okr os’s motion to quash that subpoena, and on Ma rch 19, 2007, Okros filed a

brief in opposition to I afr ate’ s new- trial motion. In his br ief, Okros ar gued that (1) the October 2001 phone bill was inadmissible beca use the c ourt had qua shed I afr ate’ s subpoena to A T& T, and (2 ) I a fr ate c ou ld no t satis fy the ne wl y dis c ov e re d e vid e nc e sta nd ard be c a us e I a fr ate had not conduc ted due dilig ence in seekingthis evidence duringdiscovery . I afr ate re p l i ed by arg uing , amo n g o th e r th in g s , th at th e c o urt s h o u ld r e - o p e n d is c o v e r y , a dmi t th e p h o n e b il l, and acknow ledg e Okros’s perjury

. The court hear d argument on the m otion on Marc h 23, 2007, at the conclusion of whic h the court expressed i ts opinion — including these st atements — on the recor d:

Th e re wa s some ind ic atio n in the br ie f ab out, at the tr ia l, whe re [Ok ro s] a g a in said that [Hardin had subpoena ed the r ecor ds], butat the tria l we d i d n’t g et to the actua l telephone number . The questioning was, ‘You knew I tried,’ I think it was by [Okros] ’s counse l [ Har din] , ‘You knew I tried to f ind this number and could not, not fi nd the numb e r

b u ts u b p o e n a th e r e c o r d s , ’ an d

th e y n o l o n g e r

h av e th e r e c o r d s. Well, [ Okros] would only know that from [Hardin]. So Idon’t consider that a lie. Iam very bothere d, and Ithink y ou both have to know that, by the fa ct that the re cords we re se cure d and there ap pare ntly is no call to that telephone numbe r [i .e., Dave Micha el’s number ], t hat par ticular telephone numbe r, but we don’ t know wh at th at numbe r w a s th at w a s c a lle d. Th e re ’s muc h w e do n’ t kn owa bo ut i t. But in any

event, that wa s a fa ctual issue and [ Okros] certa inly could have , cou ld ha v epu lle d a fra ud on theCou rt , b u t h o wh e w o u ld kn o wth at w e w o u ldn’ t find the number or that, not w e, I don’t mean the Court but [ I afr ate] wouldn’t find the number, I don’t know. When that number was rea dily available if looked for in theP endi ng appeal , M r . H ar di n moved t hi s cour t t o s t r i ke po r t i ons o f Iaf r at e’ s ap pel l at e br i ef

on t he t heor y t hat 11 we have no jur i sdi ct i o n t o hear cert ai n i ss ues beca use I af rat e (a lleg e d ly) d i d not p res erve t hem f o r app eal

. Fo r any n u mber of

r ea s on s , M r . H ar di n ’ s a r g u men t i s c ompl et el y u n t en abl e. Con s equ en t l y , t h i s mot i on i s de n i ed. 10 rig ht place. And I ’m not faultingeither side f or that. I ’m just saying it wa s there. JA 26 6- 67 (em

ph a sis a dd e d) . T his state me nt b y the dis tr ic t c ourt

duri ngthe dis po sit ion

of its opinion demonstrates that it c onsidered, albeit in a cursor y and g ener alized way , the possibilit y that Okros and Mr . Har din had committed a fra ud on the court. In the court’s ensuingorder , issued that same da y , the cour

t denied the motion for a

new tria l “[f] or the re asons stated at [ the] hearing .” On April 2, 2007, I afr ate moved the di strict court for relief from judg ment, see Fe d. R. Civ. P. 60(b), i n wh i ch i t specific ally asser ted fra ud on the cour

t (amongother thing s). In denying the

m o t i o n , th e d i s tri ctco urtex p re s s edi t s d i s m ay atOkro s ’s ev i d en tp er

j ury , b u td i s m i s s edMr. Hardin’s complicity

in this apparent hoax . Ultimately , the cour t concluded that beca

use the tele phone number

was c ontained in the file, I afr ate c ould have, through a more diligent investig ation, o b tained the

rec ords prior to trial a

nd, presumably , protec ted i tself aga inst this hoax. I afr ate did not appe al the denial of its Rul e 60(b) motion and, theref ore, the propriety

of that par

ticular de cision is not before

us . O n Apr il 1 0, 20 07 , I a fr ate tim e ly a pp e a le d th e de nia l of

its Rul e 59 mot ion

fo r a ne w tri a l. 11 III . “The decision to g rant or de ny motions for a new trial under Rule 59 or motions [ for r elief] under Rule 60(b) is discre tionary with the district court.” Davis by D avis v. J ellico Comty. Hosp. Inc. , 912 F.2d 129, 132 (6th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted). “Conseque ntly , we r eview whether the district court abuse d its discretion. Abuse of discretion is define d as a de finite and fir m conviction that the trial cour

t committed a clea

r er ror of judgme nt.” Id . at 133 (quotation marks omitted). On appe al, I afr ate c ontends that bec ause the only pro o f o f the re g arde d-as- disabled11

misconception or a

ny discriminatory

animus came from the c ontent of a c onversation that had never actua lly occur red, the entire ve rdict wa s undermined a nd a new trial is w arr anted. I afr ate a rgues that the district court e rre d by failingto find fra

ud on the court, despite clear a nd unrebutted e vidence

. Moreove r, I afr ate argues that the court abused its discr etion by expressly acknow ledg ing, dur ing the Marc h 23, 2007 hear ing, the possibili ty of fr aud on the c ourt, but failingto pursue the matter

. I a fr ate did no t e xplic itl y

fr ame its Rul e 59 mot ion fo r a ne w tri a l in fr a ud -o n- the -c ourt

te rm s, but that does not absolutely prec lude I afr ate from raising (nor prohibit from us from considering ) that argument on appea l. To the contra ry , we have discre tion to look past a party ’s fa ilure to prese rve formally an issue for

appea l. Se eSc ott

sd aleIn s. Co. v . F

low e rs , 513 F.3d 546, 5 5 2 -5 3 (6th Cir. 2008). Althoug h we e x erc ise that discre tion sparing ly , we will invoke it “in exception al case s or particula r circ umstances” or to a

vert “a plain miscarr iag e of justice,” id . at 552 (interna l quotation marks omitted), particula rly wher e the outcome is c lear , the underly ing evidenc e was befor e the dis tr ic t c ourt , a

nd the pa rt ie s h ave fu lly

br ie fe d th e iss ue on

a pp eal , redu cin gthe ri sk

of un fa ir surprise, cf. id. at 55 2- 53 ; Lexicon, I nc. v. Safe co. Ins. Co. of

Am., Inc

. , 4 36 F .3 d 6 62 , 6 70 n. 6 ( 6th Cir. 2006). Her e, I afr ate put for war d alleg ations and evide nce of fra ud by Okros’s c ou n s el, the dis tr ic t c ourt

its e lf a c kn ow le dg e d the po ssi bil ity of fr a ud , a nd bo th p art ie s h ave a dd

re sse d it in t he ir briefs to this court. Ac cordingly , we will consider I afr ate’ s fra

ud-on-the- court c laim in deciding wh e the r t he dis tr ic t c ourt

a bu se d it s d isc re tio n in

de nyingI a fr ate ’s mot ion fo r a ne w tri a l. IV. Upon obtainingthe phone bill that proved that the critical telephone c all descr ibed by Okros had neve r occ urre d and realizing t hat i t had been t he victim of an elabor ate hoax , I afr ate sought relief from the district cour

t under seve ral theor ies, one of which was “ fra ud on the cour

t.”W e ha v e a lso he ld tha t “inte n tio n a l, fra u d u le n t no n -d isc lo su re d u rin g d isc o v e ry c a n fo rm the b a sis o f a c la im 12 of f r aud u po n t he cour t
. ” B u e ll , 48 F. A p p ’ x. at 49 9 (ci t i ng D emj anj uk , 1 0 F .3 d a t 3 3 8 ). In the p re se n t ca se , Ia fra te c o n te n d s tha t M r. H ardin’ s co - co unsel , M s. T eresa G o rma n, m i sr ep res ent ed t o t hem — off t he reco rd, at O kros ’s d ep o si t i o n — t ha t she h ad sub p o en ae d A T & T f o r O kro s’ s p ho ne rec o rd s, b ut t ha t A T & T ha d resp o nd e d t h a t t ho se r ec or ds w er e u n av ai l abl e. I af r at e n ev er s u bmi t t ed an y f or mal di s cov er y , h owe v er , or obt ai n ed an y f or mal r es pon s e f

r om M r. H ardin o r M s. G o rma n. I t i s uncl ear whet her an i nf o rma l (p erhap s even unsol i ci t ed ) m i sr ep res ent at i o n m ad e d uri ng t he di s cover y per i od ( eve n i f i nt ent i onal an d f

r audul ent ) i s en ough t o es t abl i s h f r aud on t he cour t
. B ut , we f i nd t hat we n e e d no t re so lve this q u e stio n a t t h is ti m e . O u r p re se n t “f ra u d o n the c o u rt” inq u iry is d ire c te d a t M r. H a r d in ’s (m is)r e p re se n ta tio n s a t t ria l, a n d w e w ill lea v e fo r a n o the r d a y this q u e stio n re g a rd ing info rm a l d isc o v e ry. 12 Fr aud upon the c o u rthas bee n narr owly define d to embrac e: only that specie s of fra ud which does or

attempts to, defile the c ourt itself, or is a fr aud per petra t ed by office rs of the c ourt so the judicial machiner y can not pe rfor

m in the usual manner its im partial task of adjudg ing case s. I t g ener ally involves a deliberately planned a nd c are fu lly e xec ute d s c he me de signe d to su bv e rt the int e g ri ty

of the jud ic ia l pr oc e ss. Buell v. Ande rson , 4 8 F. Ap p ’x

. 4 9 1 , 4 9 9 (6 thC i r. 2 0 0 2 ) ( qu o t i n g True v. C.I.R. , 9 99 F .2 d 5 40 (6 th Cir. 1993) (unpublished table opinion)) (quotation marks a nd footnote omitted). We have e lsewher e de fi ne d “ fr a

ud on the c ourt ” — mo re c on c re te ly — a s c on sis tin gof

fi ve e le me nts : [C ]onduct: (1) On the par t of an off

icer of the c ourt; (2 ) That is di rec ted to the ‘judicial m achine ry ’ i tself; (3) That is intentionally false, wilfully blind to the truth, or is i n r e c kle ss d isr e g ard fo r t he tr uth ; ( 4) Th at is a

po sit ive ave rm e nt o r i s c on c e a lme nt whe n o ne is und e r a duty to d isc los e ; ( 5) Th at de c e ive s th e c ourt
. Demjanjuk v . Petrovsk

y , 10 F .3 d 3 38 , 3 48 (6 th C ir . 1 99 3) (p are nth e se s a dd e d) ; see also H.K. Porter Co. v. Goodye ar Tire &Rubber Co. , 536 F.2d 1115, 1118 ( 6th Cir. 1976). Only one of the se five 12

e le me nts , th e thi rd , is a c tua lly at is su e he re , a s th e oth e rs we re fu lly e sta bli sh e d. F or

e a se of ana ly sis , we wi ll a dd

re ss t he m out of

or de r, dis pe ns ingwi th t

he mor e ob vio us e le me nts fi rs t. 1. Of fic e r o f th eCou rt . Ok ro s him se lf c ou ld no t have c omm itt e d fr a ud on the c ourt be c a

us e he is n ot ( and

wa s n ot)

an o ff ic e r o f t he c ourt . T he same c ann ot b e sa id o f M r. Ha rd in o r hi s co-c ou ns e l, M s. Te re sa Gorman, how ever , as they are most de finitely office rs of the cour t. See Comp. Leasc o, Inc. v . NTP, Inc. , 194 F. App’x, 328, 338 (6th Cir. 2006) (“ A lawyer is an of fice r of the c ourt while pre paringher“In o rd er to m erit a ne w t rial b ase d o n ne w l y disco ve red ev i d en ce , a d efen d an t m ust est ab l i sh f o ur e l em en t s: 13 (1) t hat t he evi d ence wa s d i scovered af t er t he t ri al ; (2) t hat t he evi d ence co ul d no t ha ve b een d i scovered earl i er wi t h due d ili g e n c e ; (3 ) th a t t h e e v id e n c e is m a te ria l a n d n o t m e re ly c u m u la tive o r im p e a c h ing ; a n d (4 ) th a t t h e e v id e n c e w o u ld l i kel y produce [ a di f

f er ent out com e] i f

the c ase were r et r i ed. ” Uni t ed St at es v . Bar l ow , 69 3 F.2d 95 4 , 96 6 (6t h C i r. 19 82 )

. I af

r at e c ann ot s at i s f

y t hi s s t andar d, as i t di d not conduc t di s cover y wi t h due di l i gen ce. “A ne w trial sh o u ld b e gr a n te d w h e re the c o u rt is re a so n a b ly we ll sa tisf ie d t h a t th e t e stim o n y giv e n b y a 14 mat er i al wi t nes s i s f

al s e; t hat , wi t hout i t , a j ur y mi gh t ha ve r eac hed a di f f er ent conc l us i on; t hat t he part y s eek i ng t he new tria l wa s ta k e n b y su rp rise w h e n the false tes tim o n y w a s g ive n a n d w a s u n a b le to m e e t it o r d id no t kn o w o f i ts falsity un t i l af t er t r i al

. ” G ordon v. Uni t ed St at es , 178 F. 2d 896, 900 ( 6t h Ci r . 1949)

. I af r at e ca n n ot me et t h i s s t an dar d. 13 cl i en t ’s ca s e. ”) (c i t i n g Hickm an v. Taylor , 329 U.S. 495, 510 (1947)). This disti nction merits further mention, in that it helps ex plain why s urprise a nd due dil i gen ce are not elements of this test. Mr. Har din argues — and the district court agree d — that I a fr ate wa s at f

a ult for fai lin gto e xer c ise du e dil ig e nc e duri ngdis c ov e ry , a nd thi s argume nt a

bly rebuts a claim of newly

discovere d evidenc e. Simi larly , Mr. Har din argues that I afr ate wa s awa re 13 pr ior to t ri a l — i.e ., it c ou ld n ot h ave be e n s ur prise d — that O kr os int e nd e d to te sti fy that th e c a ll happene d but he had no r ecor d of i t, and thi s argument ably rebuts a c laim of false testimony

. The 14 standards f

or new ly discovere d evidenc e and f alse testimony

are based, at least in part, on the f act that witnesses ar e subjec t to cross-examination, “the greatest leg al eng ine ever i n v en t ed for the discovery of truth.” Ca l i

f o rnia v. Gree n , 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970) (quotation marks and citation omitted ). But, unlike a

witness, opposing c ounsel is not subject to cross-e x amination; opposing counsel is instead oblig ed to oper ate in conf ormity with the oath he or

she has taken as a

n office r of the cour t. See H olloway v. Arkansas , 435 U.S. 475, 486 (1978). Thus, counsel is e ntitled to rely on opposing c ounsel to be for thrig ht, and is not obligate d to ferr et out the truth of opposingcounsel’s

s tate me n ts o r

s ati s f y d u e d il ig e n c e in

p r o te c ti n ga g a in s t a

no p p o s in gc o un s e l’ s h o a x. 2. Positive Ave rment (

or Concealment when O ne is Under a Duty to Disclose) The second element — positive a verme nt — was clea

rly satisfied and is not in any dispute.14

Mr . H ard in’ s r e pr e se ntatio ns to the jur y at tr ia l are qu ote d in

the re c or d. Whe n I a fr ate atte mpt e d to

cr o s s -e x am i n e O kro s ab o utth e p h o n e r ec o rd s , M r. Ha rd i ns p o n t an eo u s l y o b j ec t ed , ar gu i n g: MR. HARDI

N: Your Honor, I ’m g oing to pla ce an objection to this beca use counse l knows that the EEOC, both he and my self have tried to g et the phone bills and they ar e n o tav ai l ab l e. Io b

j ec tt o th i s l i n e o f qu es t i o n i n g. J A6 0 3

. O nr e d i r e c te x am i n at i o n , M r . H ar d i nl e d O kr o s th r o u g hth e f

o l l o w i n gt e s t i m o ny: [Mr. Hardin]: There wer e questions [by I afr ate] about the phone bill, your telephone bil l f ro m O c tob e r o f 2 00 1, c or re c t? [Ok ro s]: Ye s. [Mr. Hardin]: You ar e aw are that Ihave subpoe naed those ? [Ok ro s]: Ye s. [Mr. Hardin]: And the EEOC subpoena ed these ? [Ok ro s]: Ye s. [Mr. Hardin]: And you are awa re that the phone compa

ny has dispositively

said they do n’ t e xist? [Ok ro s]: Ye s. [Mr . H ard in]: Th e y

do n’ t r e ta in t

ho se , c or re c t? [Ok ro s]: Ye s. [M r . H ar d in ]: So to y o ur kn o w le d g e , is th e r e any w ay p o s s ib le th at anyo n e other

th an m y s e l f an d th e E E O C an d I b e l i e v e [I a f r at e ] c o u l d g e ttho se re c or ds ? [Okros] : No. J A 663-64. The se ar e “positive averme nts.” In its arguments on appea l, I afr ate a ssert s t hat Mr. Har din essentially

m ad e a t h re e- part averme nt: (1) that the ca ll actually occur red; (2) that he had soug ht (indeed, subpoe naed) the re cords to prove that it had occur red; a n d (3 ) t h at those rec ords “don’t e x ist,” and that AT& T could not produce the re cords be cause “they don’t reta in those .” The pressingquestion, which we will address in some deta il, is whether these aver ments are untrue. 3. Di re c te d to theJ

ud ic ial Ma c hin e ry

It se lf.15

T h e th i r d e l e m e n t—

d i r e c t e d t o th e “

j u d i c i a l m a c h i n e r

y” i t s e l f

—

i s a m at t e r o f m at e r i a l i ty,

and the re c an b e no do ub t, i n th e c onte xt of thi s c a se , th at th e se re pr e se ntat io ns we re mate ri a l. Simp ly put: if the te le ph on e c a ll n e ve r h a pp e ne d ( a s Mi c ha e l and

I a fr ate c onte nd ), the n M r. Ha rd in and Okr os had no evide nce of discrimination and no re asonable jury could find in their fa

vor. Th e e vid e nt p ur

po se (a nd e ff ect ) o f M r. Ha

rd in’ s r e pr e se ntatio ns wa s to ov e rc ome thi s g laringdefic iency

in his evidence — to persuade the jury that he had c onducted a

n exhaustive searc h and, but for A T& T’s obviously defic ient re c o r d s - r e te nti o n policies, would have produce d the re cords and p ro v ed co nclusively

that the ca ll had indeed ha ppened. T he assoc iated implication was that I afr ate wa s unfa i rl y at t empting to por tray Okros as a

liar whe n I afr ate kne w that Mr. Ha rdin had

atte mpt e d to g e t th e re c or ds and that th e re c or ds we re un ava ila ble fo r r e a so ns be yon d h is c ontr ol. 4. De c e iv es th eCou rt The four th element — dec eives the c ourt — is a matter of prejudi ce, a

nd there can be no doubt, in the c ontextof this case , that these re prese ntations were prejudicia l. Wi thout Mr. Hardin’s

re pr e se ntatio ns a

bo ut h is p ur

po rt e d s e arc h, the jur

y wo uld have be e n lef

t to qu e sti on

why Ok ro s d id not keep his phone bil l and why Mr. Hardin did not obtain a re cord of it from the phone c ompany

w h e n c o n f

r o n t e d w i th D av e M i c h a e l ’ s e mp h at i c d e n i a l th atth e c a l l h a d e v e no c c ur

r e d

. C e rt a i n l y, if the jur y ha d s e e n th e re c or d d isp ro vin gthe e xiste nc e of the c a ll, it wo uld

ha ve de c ide d th e c a se differ ently . Moreove r, the j u ry wa s aware that the burden w as on Mr. Ha rdin, as counse l for the plaintiff , to p r o d u c e e v id e n c e th at t

h e a ll e g e d

c a ll h a d a c tu a ll y o c c ur r e d

. H a d th e ju r y k n o w n , or

rea sonably

su specte d, that Mr. Har din had not even se arc hed for (or ha d suppressed) the phone

rec ord that would have shown conclusively the ex istence or non-existence of the critica l telephone

c a l l , th e nth e r e c a

nb e l i t t l e d o u

b tth atth e j ur

y w o u l d h av e d e c i d e d

th e c a s e d i f

f e r e n t l y.16

5. In te nti on all

yFa lse , W ilf ull yBl ind , o r I n R e c k le ss D isre ga rd This final eleme nt conce rns Mr. Ha rdin’s state of

mind and, in this case, the pr oper inquiry is whe the r h e e ith e r k

ne w h is s tate me nt w a s f

a lse , o r h e wa s w ilf

ully bli nd to t he tr uth or a c te d in

rec kless disreg ard for t he truth. See D emjanjuk, 1 0 F .3 d at 34 8. As no te d in the fo re g oin gse c tio ns , I afr ate c ontends that Mr. Ha rdin made a three -par

t misrepre sentation: (1) the call ac tually occur red; (2) he soug ht (indeed, subpoe naed) the re cords to p ro v e i t; and (3) the r ecor ds “don’t exist,” or AT& T could not produce them beca use “they don’t reta in those.” B ut, the rec ord bef ore us shows that th e c a ll did no t occ ur — at le a st n ot a s O kr os de sc ri be d it . And , b y a ll a pp e ara nc e s, Mr . H ard in

cer tainly did not subpoena the re cords, a nd likely conducte d no sear ch for them — at least not in the way he repr esente d. Finally , the phone r ecor ds in question do e x ist — a s w a s p ro ve n whe n I a fr ate obtained t h em fr o m AT& T afte r trial, mer ely by submitt ing a

subpoena. The falsity

of this third repr esentation is, by

this pointin time, beyond di s p u t e, but the other two wa rra nt some further discussion. As for the s ec o n d

re p re s en t at i o n—

th atM r. Ha rd i ns o u gh t , i n d ee d s u b p o en ae d , th es e r ecords — I a fr ate e xpla ins that th e re is e ve ry re a so n to su sp e c t th is i s untr ue and no re a so n to su sp e c t it

is true. F or e mos t is the sim ple fa c t th at whe n I a fr ate su bp oe na e d th e re c or ds a ft e r t ri a l, A T& T provided them. AT& T did not alleg e, as Mr . Har din had claimed, that the rec ords did not exis t or that they did not reta in the m. Assuming, howe ver, that Mr. Har din might have been misled by either Okros or AT& T, it is notable that there is no documentation to support the claim that Mr. Ha rdin, Ms. Gorman, or an y o n e else at their law fir m ever subpoenae d any

rec ords, and this otherwise

un e xpla ined abs ence of

any do c ume ntatio n is ampl if ie d b y the re qu ir e me nt o f F e d. R. C iv. P. 45 (b )( 1) that a

pa rt y se rv inga dis c ov e ry

su bp oe na no tif y the oth e r p art ie s. B e c a

us e Mr . H ard in d id17

no t no tif y I a fr ate or the c ourt that he or his fi rm ha d ser ve d any su c h sub po e na s, on e c an r e a so na bly presume — a

bsent evidenc e to the contr ary — that this failure to c omply with Rule 45(b)( 1), mea ns that Mr . H ard in s e rved no such su bp oe na s and

his a sse rt ion

at tr ia l th at he ha d s e rv e d th e se

su bp oe na s w a s untr

ue . T he re is a lso no e vid e nc e that th e EE OC e ve r s ub po e na e d th e re c or ds

. In looking f

or evide nce to the c ontrary , we f ind it telling that Mr. Hardin has still produced no documentation of a

subpoena or

evidenc e of an y s earch for the re cords, de spite numerous opportunities to do so. I n fac t, since I afr ate f irst acc us ed M r. Hardin of lying a bout this search or

su bp oe na , M r. Ha

rd in h a s n e ve r a g a in a sse rt e d th at he did , in fa c t, sear ch for or su

bp oe na tho se

re c or ds . T hat is , M r. Ha

rd in h a s n e ve r d e nie d t hi s accus ation, wh ic h r a ise s a n a dd iti on a l a dv e rs e infere nce. SeeFe d. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(b) (f ailure to de ny

an ac cusation ca

n serve as an a dmission); Ne um an v . R iv e rs , 125 F.3d 315, 320 ( 6th Cir. 1997) (discussingadoptive admissions). Mr. Har din continues to repr esent Okr os on appea l and appe are d b ef o re this cour

t for ora l argument, duringwhich he ma de y et another telling a dmission by omission. I n an unprompted statement at the c onclusion of his argument , M r. Ha rd in said: “And, also whe n, post-trial, when I af ra t e d i d s u b p o en a t h e r ec o rd s , h e u s ed th e 8 1 0 ar eaco d e o nth e s u b p o en a, s o th e 8 1 0 5 8 6 ch an ge — it c ha ng e d f ro m 81 0 to 58 6 —

Ido n’ t bel ie ve that wa s of any c on se qu e nc e .” Th at is , M r. Ha rd in argued to this court that I afr ate c ould have a nd should have obtaine d the re cords e arlier beca use the

re c or ds we re ava ila

ble e ve n by se rv ing a su

bp oe na wi th the wr on gare a c od e , a nd he su pp or te d th is argument by

citing to the f

act that I afr ate obtained the rec ords by submitt ing a

subpoena f

or phone number (810) 792-4979. Notably absent fr om this argument is any asser tion that he or hi s firm had subpoenae d these re cords or any explanation as to why

AT& T would have told him that the re cords

wer e unava ilable, but then provided those sa me re cords to I afr ate. Ba sed on this evidence , a finde r18

of fa ct could conc lude that Mr. Ha rdin’s ave rment that he se arc hed for the re cords is untrue. We are left with o n l y t h e first part of the thre e-pa rt ave rment — the que stion of whether Okros ac tually

called D ave Mic hael. F or our pr esent purpose , we c onsider whe ther ther e is sufficie nt evidenc e i n t h e re co rd t o sug g est that Mr. Ha rdin either kne w his statement was f alse or he was wilfully blind to the truth or acte d in r eckle ss disreg ard f or the truth. See D emjanjuk, 10 F.3d at 348. Th e qu e sti on

of wh e the r M r. Ha

rd in a c tua lly

kn e w h is s tate me nt w a s f a lse le a ds ine luc ta

bly into questions of Mr. Hardin’s vera city and credibility

. Certain st atements a re te lling. Dur ing or al argument befor e this court on appe al, Mr. Ha rdin seized the opportunity to i n s i s t t h at the ca ll had

a c tu a l l y o c c ur

r e d an d e x p l a i n e d

th e a p p ar e n td i s c r e p an c y i nth e p h o n e r e c o r d s th i s w ay: The Court: Are y ou still maintaining that Okros ca lled I afr ate? M r . H ar d i n : O h , a

b s o l u t e l y. Ab s o l u t e l y. The Court: Then what’s y our explanation . . . Mr

. Ha rd in: Th is ph on e c a ll ha pp e ne d. An d I wa

nt to make on e thi ng ve ry c le ar b e c a us e it w a s r a ise d in

the re ply br ie f t hat at no po int

did we say we dis a g re e wi th their position that this phone call didn’t happen. Unequivoca lly , this phone call happe ned. T h e Co urt: Okay , tha

t’ s r e a ll y g r e at to h av e a lo t o f c o n v ic ti o n a b o u t it

. Wh at’ s y our e xplanatio n f

or the ph on e re c or ds

. Mr. Har din: . . . The phone ca l l co u l d h av e o cc u rr ed on any one of pr obably five telephones that were in that apar tment at the time; on October Four th of 2001. I f you want my

opinion, I ’ll g ive it to y ou. I t’s not in the rec ord, but it was probably Rich Moore’s te lephone.

“ [A]ny on e of pr ob a bly fi ve te lep ho nes . . . pr ob a bly Ric h M oo re ’s [ce ll p ho ne ].” Th is c e rt a inl y appears t o b e a

c o n c e iv a b le e xp la n ati o nan d

M r . H ar d in

c e rta in ly e xp r e s s e d

“ a lo t o f c o n v ic tion about i t.” And, as Mr. Hardin for ewa rned, this explanation is not i n the re cord. B ut that is because , in t he re c or d, Mr . H ard in w a s une qu ivo c a l a bo ut whic h p ho ne Ok

ro s u se d in

makin gthe a lle g e d c a ll to D ave Mic ha e l. D ur inghis op e nin gstate me nt t o th e jur y , M r. Hard in pr oc la ime d — wi th19

r e c o g n i z a b l e v i g o r — th ath e kn e we x a c t l y w h i c hp h o n e O kr o s u s e d an d w h y: J ohn Okros went home to his apar tment .
. . [a] nd he picked up his phone and he put it on sp eaker ph on e , fo r tw o re a so ns : On e , Ric h Mo or e wo rk e d fo r the UA W a s a committeeman and he instructed [Okros] t o do so beca use he thought it would be g ood for pe ople to hear

this. S econdly , the phone wasn’t working

. The rec eiver , the part that you listen to was, you couldn’t hea r fr om it, so i n o rd er to he ar what somebody

was say ing, you actua lly

did have to put him on speake r phone. J A 423-24. So, ac cording to Mr. Hardin’s ear lier version of t he st ory — also rec ounted wit h “a lot of conviction” — Okros used “ his phone” a nd put it on speaker be cause it was broken. So, then , Okros used his own phone , now Okros proba bly used Rich Moore’ s phone — these two contra dictory

statements ca

nnot both be true . Either wa y , this is s ufficie nt to impugn Mr. Ha rdin’s

c r e d i b i l i ty. During cross-e x amination, I afr ate pressed Okros about t he phone call and the rec ords, which le d to Mr . H ard in’ s o bje c tio n o n th e ba sis that he ha d s ub po e na e d th e re c or ds : I a fr ate : An d you dia le d D ave Mic ha e l, i s th at c or re c t? O kr o s : I d i a l e d Ia f r at e C o mp any. I afr ate: Okay , y ou dialed the main number ? Okros: Yes, I did. I a fr ate : An d th at w a s o n s pe ake r p ho ne , c or re c t? Ok ro s: Ye s, it w a s. I a fr ate : An d it wa s th e ph on e in your b e dr oo m? Ok ro s: Ye s, it w a s. I afr ate: Now the phone in the dining room, which is muc h larg er, is ther e any

rea son y ou didn’t use that phone? Okros: Idon’t eve n reme mber if I had a phone

. . . in that room or not, I can’ t re me mbe r. Iliv e d in

the a pa rtme nt. Iha d a

c ou ple of ph on e s b ut I d o n ’ tr e m e mb e r

e x a c t l y. I a fr ate : Ok ay , a nd tha t w a s your a

pa rt me nt, c or re c t? Ok ro s: Ye s, it w a s.20

I a fr ate : Di d you pa y the ph on e bil l? Okros: Yes, I did. I afr ate: . . . When y ou made a cal l b ac kin 2001, in fact, on Oc tober 4th, 2 0 0 1 , wh en yo u p i ck u

p th e ph o n e fr o m yo ur ap artm en tb u i l d i n g, which is wher e? Okros: My apar tment was on Union L ake Roa d, Har rison Township. I a fr ate : Whe n you dia l f ro m th at numbe r t o th e I a fr ate he a dq ua rt e rs in Warren, Ce nter L ine, when you g et the phone bill at the e nd of the month d oe sn ’t

it s ho w that a s a

tol l c a ll? [Objection] Mr. Har din: Your Honor, I ’m g oing to place an objection to this beca use counse l knows that the EEOC, both he a nd my self have tried to g et the phone b i l l s an d th ey ar e n o tav ai l ab l e. Io b

j ec tt o th i s l i n e o f qu es t i o n i n g. J A 602-03. This is a peculiar objection for severa l rea sons. First, the c ontent of the testimony and the construction of the objection demonst rate that, at t hat poi nt at l east, it was a fore g one conc lusion that the phone line in question, and the critica l phone re cord, w as Okros’s home phone line. There w as no question as to whether it was Okros’s phone line, no indication that there was a ny other phone line (e.g ., five or mor e possible phone lines), and no s ug g estion that the ca ll might have be en made from anyone else ’s phone ( e.g ., Rich Moore’s c ell phone). It was cle arly Okros’s phone line. Second, this is not merely an objection to I afr ate’ s questioning; it is a fra nk statement to the court that Mr. H ardin ha d “tried to g et t h e p h o n e bills and they [we]re not available.” Third, the ob je c tio n is fr ame d a s a

state me nt o f what I a fr ate ’s “ c ouns e l kn ow s” ; ye t, M r. Ha rd in a tte ste d to thi s court , at o r a l ar gume n t o n a p p e a l, th at “ I w a s n e v e r a s k e d f o r th o s e p h o n e r e c o r ds; not in an interrog atory , not informally , not in any way , shape, or

form did counse l for I afr ate e ver a sk me for tho se ph on e re c or ds .” Th is be g s the qu e sti on of ho w I a fr ate wo uld have “ kn own” that Mr . H ard in21

ha d s e arc he d f

or the re c or ds , if

counse l ha d n e ve r a sk e d, no t e ve n in fo rm a lly . And , f ourt h, thi s objection sug g ests — and it is made expli cit later in the transcr ipt — that Mr. Hardin subpoena ed AT& T for this par

ticular re cord, i.e ., the rec ord for the particula r phone on which Okr os claims he called I afr ate; yet, as discussed pr eviously , this is i nsupportable a nd almost certa inly

untrue. Ba sed on the fore g oing, we have doubts about Mr. Har din’s vera city and re servations about assuming that Mr. Har din did not know that Okros lied about placing the ca ll. But, the standar d — “intentionally

false, w ilfully

blind to the truth, or [ ] i n rec kless disreg ard for the truth,” Demjanjuk, 10 F.3d at 348 — does notrequire a finde r of f act to dec ide whethe r Mr. Ha rdin ac tua lly

knew. The fi nd e r o f f a c t w ill ne e d on ly

de c ide wh e the r M r. Ha

rd in h a d c a

us e to k no w; i.e ., wh e the r M r. Ha rd in acte d in rec kless disreg ard f or the truth, g iven the information available. Unless t h er e i s signific ant, mater ial evidenc e as of y et unadmitted, Mr. Ha

rdin had c lear

cause to know that he did not actua lly subpoena the rec ords, conduct a search, or rec eive the a lleg ed response from AT& T, and this would likely be sufficie nt to satisfy this e lement. But, it also appe ars from the recor d that Mr. Hardin also had cause to know t hat Okros ha d lied to him about placingthe

c a ll. F ir st, Da

ve Mic ha e l veh e me ntl y de nie d that it ev e r h a pp e ne d. As wa s d isc us se d e arl ie r i n th is op ini on , th is i s an o dd

de nia l, d e se rv ingof

so me c on sid e ra

tio n. B ut t

his is c e rt a inl y

no t a ll. Ok ro s’ s f or me r l ive -i n g ir lf

ri e nd , Ca rm e n Pr e sto n ( n. k. a . Ca

rm e n D e an) — who wa s a

rec eptionist at I afr ate a

nd t h e o n l y p otential witness, other than O kros, who ac tually knew Da ve Michae l a nd could re cog nize his voi ce — te stified at deposition that the ca ll did not occur and that she consider ed Okr os the ty pe of person who would fabr icate the story , even acc using him of having

e ng a g e d in

ins ur anc e fr a

ud in t he pas t. M s. Pr e sto n’ s te sti mony wa s a lso no te wo rt

hy be c a us e it dir e c tly c ontr a dic te d O kr os ’s pr ior a sse rt ion that sh e ha d b e e n p re se nt t o he ar the c a ll. Th is c ou ld22

have g ive n M r. Ha

rd in c a us e to q ue sti on wh e the r O kr os ha d b e e n tr uth fu l a bo ut t he c a ll. F ina lly , w e no te the inc on sis te nt a nd c ontr a dic tor

y tes ti mony

of the de fe ns e wi tne sse s,

conce rningsuch sign i fica nt issues as who was pr esent a nd what wa s said. Okros and K empkens te sti fi e d that fo ur wi tne sse s we re pr e se nt; Da vis te sti fi e d thr e e we re pr e se nt; Watts t e sti fi e d to on ly two; and no two of them testified c onsistently about the eve nts prec edingthe ca ll or the content of the ca ll. This could have g iven Mr. Ha rdin ca use to question whether

the ca ll actually

occur red. Ba sed on the available f

acts a nd the prope r standar d, as set for th in Demjanjuk , 10 F.3d at 348, we f ind that a finder of fa ct could re asonably conclude that Mr. Har din committed fraud on the court. That is, one could find that Mr. Hardin, an officer of t he court, made mate rial ave rments that dece ived the cour

t, which he kne w or should have known wer e untrue
. V. We conclude that the district court abused its discr etion by ignor ing the prospec t of fra ud on the cour t. We also conclude that a re mand is warr anted so that the district c ourt ca n decide this iss ue using the proper

standard. T here fore , we RE VE RSE the di strict court’s de nial of I afr ate’ s motion for a new tria l and REMAND this case f or fur ther proc eeding s consistent with this opi nion.