COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Elder, McClanahan and Senior Judge Coleman 

Argued at Salem, Virginia 

MICHAEL LEE FITZGERALD 

 OPINION BY 

v. Record No. 0572-05-3 JUDGE LARRY G. ELDER 

 JUNE 6, 2006 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

 FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PITTSYLVANIA COUNTY 

Charles J. Strauss, Judge 

 Jesse W. Meadows III for appellant. 

 Eugene Murphy, Senior Assistant Attorney General (Judith Williams 

Jagdmann, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee. 

 Michael Lee Fitzgerald appeals from his jury trial convictions for two counts of indecent 

liberties with a child in his custody and one count of object sexual penetration. On appeal, he 

contends the court abused its discretion by allowing a licensed professional counselor to give 

testimony regarding her psychiatric diagnosis of the victim. We hold the trial court did not err in 

admitting this testimony. Thus, we affirm appellant’s convictions. 

I. 

BACKGROUND 

 Appellant was indicted for the instant offenses involving his stepdaughter, S.L.W., who 

was twelve years old when the offenses were alleged to have occurred. 

At trial, after S.L.W. and her mother testified about the incidents, the Commonwealth 

called Linda Giles, a licensed professional counselor who treated S.L.W. after the charged 

offenses occurred. Giles testified that, after taking a history from S.L.W., which included a 

report that appellant “allegedly” “had had an inappropriate sexual penetration with her” on July 
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27, 2004, and “working with [S.L.W.] and her mom,” Giles determined S.L.W. was 

“experience[ing] moderately severe symptoms of post traumatic stress disorder [PTSD].” 

Counsel for appellant objected that Giles was not “clinically qualified to make that diagnosis” 

and that such a diagnosis had to be made by a psychiatrist or medical doctor to a reasonable 

degree of medical certainty. Counsel was unable to cite any authority to the court supporting 

that assertion, and the trial court overruled appellant’s objection. 

At the close of the evidence, the jury convicted appellant of the charged offenses. After 

sentencing, appellant noted this appeal. 

II. 

ANALYSIS 

 Appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion by allowing Giles, a licensed 

professional counselor, to give a psychiatric diagnosis and that only a psychiatrist or other 

medical doctor was qualified to make such a diagnosis. We hold Virginia’s rules of evidence 

and statutory scheme support the trial court’s decision to admit Giles’s opinion testimony, and 

we affirm the convictions. 

 “In any proper case, an expert witness may be permitted to express his opinion upon 

matters not within common knowledge or experience.” Cartera v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 516, 

518, 248 S.E.2d 784, 786 (1978). “The record must show that the proffered expert possesses 

sufficient knowledge, skill, or experience to render him competent to testify as an expert on the 

subject matter of the inquiry.” King v. Sowers, 252 Va. 71, 78, 471 S.E.2d 481, 485 (1996). 

Ordinarily, a witness need not have specialized training in a particular field and may gain his 

expertise solely through work experience. Wileman v. Commonwealth, 24 Va. App. 642, 

647-48, 484 S.E.2d 621, 624 (1997) (qualifying bank official as expert in comparing signatures 

to determine authenticity). However, “[w]here a statute designates express qualifications for an 
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expert witness, the witness must satisfy the statutory criteria in order to testify as an expert.” 

Commonwealth v. Allen, 269 Va. 262, 273, 609 S.E.2d 4, 11 (2005). Also, where a statute 

requires an individual to be licensed before working in a particular field, a witness not licensed 

in that field may not testify as an expert in that field. See Lee Gardens v. Arlington County Bd., 

250 Va. 534, 539-40, 463 S.E.2d 646, 648-49 (1995) (holding witness not licensed as real estate 

appraiser could not testify as expert on real estate valuation where statute made it unlawful to 

engage in real estate appraisal without license). In keeping with this principle, “[t]he medical 

expert is normally an M.D., but need not be. Other medical personnel, e.g., nurses, technicians, 

etc., may testify as to matters within their own areas of competence.” Charles E. Friend, The 

Law of Evidence in Virginia § 17-17 (6th ed. 2003). “Whether a particular witness is qualified 

to testify as an expert is ‘largely a matter in the discretion of the trial court, and its rulings 

allowing a witness to testify will not be disturbed unless it clearly appears that [the expert] was 

not qualified.’” Wileman, 24 Va. App. at 647, 484 S.E.2d at 624 (citation omitted). 

 Here, the expert whose opinion testimony was challenged, Linda Giles, testified she was 

a licensed professional counselor practicing in Danville, Virginia. Pursuant to Subtitle III of 

Title 54.1, which details the professions and occupations regulated by boards within the 

Department of Health Professions, a “professional counselor” is “a person who practices 

counseling as defined in § 54.1-3500,” Code § 54.1-2400.1, and “a person trained in counseling

interventions designed to facilitate an individual’s achievement of human development goals and 

remediating mental, emotional, or behavioral disorders and associated distresses which interfere 

with mental health and development,” Code § 54.1-3500 (emphasis added). The general 

provisions of Chapter 35 of that Subtitle, which covers “Professional Counseling,” provide as 

follows: 

As used in this chapter, unless the context requires a different 

meaning: 
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* * * * * * * 

“Counseling” means the therapeutic process of: 

(i) conducting assessments and diagnoses for the purpose of 

establishing treatment goals and objectives and (ii) planning, 

implementing, and evaluating treatment plans using treatment 

interventions to facilitate human development and to identify and 

remediate mental, emotional or behavioral disorders and associated 

distresses which interfere with mental health. 

Code § 54.1-3500 (emphasis added); see 2000 Va. Acts, ch. 473 (noting amendment that 

changed name of governing board from “Board of Licensed Professional Counselors, Marriage 

and Family Therapists, and Substance Abuse Professionals” to “Board of Counseling”). Thus, 

Virginia law expressly permits professional counselors to diagnose--as well as treat--mental, 

emotional, and behavioral disorders. Compare Code § 54.1-3500 (allowing professional 

counselors to make diagnoses), with In re Johnson, 58 S.W.3d 496, 499 (Mo. 2001) (in 

proceeding charging defendant as sexually violent predator, holding Missouri statutes permit 

psychiatrists, psychologists, and licensed clinical social workers “to make diagnoses of mental 

disorders” but do not define “professional counseling” as including authority to make 

“diagnoses”). 

 In addition to the diagnostic authority granted Giles by the laws of the Commonwealth, 

the evidence adduced at trial supported a finding that Giles was, in fact, qualified to exercise that 

diagnostic authority in this case. See Grubb v. Hocker, 229 Va. 172, 176, 326 S.E.2d 698, 700 

(1985) (“‘[T]he expressed belief of a witness that he is an expert does not ipso facto require his 

qualification. The facts must show that he possesses sufficient knowledge, skill or experience to 

make him competent to testify as an expert on the subject matter of the inquiry.’” (quoting Noll 

v. Rahal, 219 Va. 795, 800, 250 S.E.2d 741, 744 (1979) (citation omitted))). 

Giles testified that, in order to become a licensed professional counselor, she obtained a 

Master’s degree in counseling and underwent an additional three years of clinical training under 
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a licensed psychologist or counselor. Giles’s “initial training was . . . working with children[,] 

primarily abuse victims, particularly ritualistically abused children,” and she said she “started 

doing family work after that.” After completing her supervised training, Giles practiced nine 

years on her own as a licensed professional counselor prior to appearing in court to testify in this 

proceeding. 

 Giles testified about the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Health Disorders

(DSM), which she described as “the standard printed by the American Psychiatric Association 

and used by psychologists, licensed professional counselors [and] licensed clinical social 

workers” in making psychiatric diagnoses. She said that the DSM “is an effort to organize 

symptoms and organize thoughts in such a way that we can effect a treatment.” She also testified 

that, based on her training as a licensed professional counselor, she was qualified to make 

psychiatric diagnoses in consultation with the DSM. Giles said she studied the particular DSM 

mental disorder at issue, PTSD, while in her Master’s program and “in much much more detail 

later in [her] clinical training.” She also gave specific testimony about the symptoms of PTSD as 

described in the DSM. 

 In sum, it was uncontested that the nature, symptoms, and possible causes of PTSD, a 

recognized mental health disorder, were things not within the common knowledge or experience 

of the jury, and the evidence supported a finding that Giles was both (1) permitted by state law 

and (2) qualified by training and experience to testify about PTSD. Thus, we hold the trial court 

did not abuse its discretion in allowing Giles to testify to her opinion that S.L.W. suffered from 

PTSD. 
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III. 

For these reasons, we hold the trial court did not err in admitting the challenged expert 

testimony, and we affirm appellant’s convictions. 

Affirmed.