### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT JAC KSON N ove mb er

19, 200 8 S es sio n
MATTI E PIANA, ET AL 

### . v. OL D TOW N OF JACKS ON, ET AL 

### . Direc t Appeal from the Circ uit Court forMadison Cou nty No. C-03- 225 RogerA. Page, Judge

No. W2007-02832-C OA-R3-C V - Filed February 6, 2009

This is an wrong ful death action ar ising under a theory of premises liability

. Plaintiff’s husband died
as a r esult of injuries h e s u s t ai n ed after tripping over a piece of conc rete embedde d in a dirt path. Pla int if f a lle g e d th a t tw o o f t

he de fe nd ants , w ho we re un de r a se pa rate ma int e na

nc e c on tr a c t w ith the owner of the proper

ty , failed to e x erc ise the require d due car e in the maintance , inspection, and repa irs of the path. The trial cour t gra n t ed direc ted ver dicts for both def endants a fter f

inding that neither ow ed a duty

t o P l ai n t i ff ’s h usband. We ag ree that defe ndant B rooks Shaw did not have a duty to maintain the path. Howeve r, we have deter mined that defe ndant Town a nd Country

did owe
a duty to Plaintiff’ s husband. Viewing the evidenc e in the light most fa vorable to the plaintiff, we find that there are g enuine issues of material fa ct for the jury to decide. We ther efor e re verse and
rema nd for f urther pr ocee dings.

Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 App e al a s o f R igh t; Judg me nt of th e Ci r c uit

Co ur t A ff

ir me d in P ar t a nd Reve rsed in Part

J. S TE VE N S TA FF O RD , J., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which A LA N E. H I G H ERS , P.J., W.S., and D AVI D R. F ARMER , J., joined.

Da vidW . Ca mp, Ja c ks on , T N, fo r A pp e lla nt, Ma tti e Pia na , e t a l. David I. Feige lson, Memphis, TN, for Appe llee, Brooks Shaw & Son Old Country St ore I nc. Ky le C. Atk ins a nd Te rri Smith Cri de r, Hu mbo ldt , TN, fo r Ap pe lle e , T ow n a nd Cou ntry Pr op e rt y Ma na ge me nt

OP IN ION

Fa cts and Proce dural HistoryI n a ddi t i on t o ow ni ng O l d Tow n, M r

. Sm i t h ha s a f i f t y pe r ce nt ow ner s hi p i nt er es t i n Tow n a nd Count r y. 1

-2- I n 1 97 8, De fe nd ants Ol d T ow n of Jac ks on , I nc

. (“ Ol d To wn ” ) and B ro ok s Sh aw & Son Ol d Country Store, I nc. (“ Br ooks Shaw”) be g an construc ting the c omm erc ial development known a s Casey J ones Villag e in J ackson, Te nnessee . Casey J ones Villag e consists of four acr es. Old Town
ow ns on e a c re , a

nd B ro ok s Sh aw o wn s th e oth e r thr e e . Old To wn ’s on e a c re lot

lie s d ir e c tly

no rt h of prope rty

owned by

Def endants Dona ld G

. Taylor and Br enda Taylor d/b/a Day s I nn of Jackson (“D ay s I nn”).

P r i o r t o 1 9 9 9 , t h e r e w a s a

t h i rt y- f i v e f o o td i t c h o n t h e s o u t h e r

np arto f O l d T o w n ’ s p r o p e rt y. Th e n, the City of Jac ks on ins ta lle d an e ig ht fo ot c ulv e rt and pa rt ia lly fi lle d the dit c h. Af te rw a rd s, customers wa lked over

a dirt path, c reated by

foot tra ff

i c, o n t he ditch to appr oach Ca sey J ones V i l l a g e f r o m t h e D ays In nh o t e l

. T h e p a t h i s l o c a t e d o nO l d T o w n ’ s p r o p e rt y.

I n 1984, J . Reg inald Smit h, on behalf of Old T o wn , an d C l ar k Shaw, on beha lf of B rooks Shaw, oral l y en t er ed into a maintenanc e ag ree ment. Under the ag ree ment, eac h party would take
car e of its own buildings. Br ooks Shaw also ag ree d to maintain the common g rounds of Case y J ones Vi lla g e . M r. Smith te sti fi e d th a t th e c omm on g ro un ds c on sis te d of “ the pa rk inglot , th e fl ow e r b e ds , and the g ra ssy are a s on the e dg e of the bu ild ing s. ” Whe n the a g re e me nt wa s r e a c he d, the dir t path did not ex ist. After 1999, Br ooks Shaw did not inspect or per form maintena nce on e ither the ditch or the path, and Mr. Smith did not ask B rooks Shaw to do so.

I n 1993, Old Town ente red into a w ritten ag ree m en t wi t h Def endant Tow n and Country Property Manag ement, Inc. (“Tow n and Country ”). Under the contra ct, Town a

nd Country

ag ree d 1 to maintain and mana ge al l of Old Town’ s proper ty at Casey J ones Villag e. The ag ree ment sp e c if ic a lly a uth or ize d T ow n a

nd Countr y to m a ke “ a ll o rd ina

ry re pa ir s and

re pla c e me nts r e a s on a

bly
nece ssary to preser ve the Pre mises in its prese nt condition and for the ope ration ef ficienc y of the Premises.” B eca

use Brooks S haw also had maintena nce oblig ations, the ag ree ment did not require Town and Country to maintain the parking lot. Town and Country ’s prim ary obligation under the ag ree ment was to maintain Old Town’ s building and to collect r ent from tena nts. Mr. Smi th did not specific ally

discuss the maintenanc e of the ditch with Town and Country

.
Fr ank P iana, Sr., his wife, Mattie, and their g randson we re guests at Day s I nn in J uly 2002. On J uly 13, 2002, Mr. Pi an a wa n t ed to t ake his g randson to play miniature g olf at Casey

J ones Villag e. The y

left the hote l an d b ega n crossing the dirt path betwe en the hotel a nd the Villag e. Whil e c ro ssi ngthe path, Mr

. Piana tr ipp e d o ve r a

sma ll p ie c e of

c on c re te that w a s c ov e re d b y g ra ss. He suff ere d sever e injuries and ultimately died from those injuries on A pril 25, 2003.

On J uly 3, 2003, Mattie Piana, individually and as Mr . Piana’s per sonal repr esentative, filed a Complaint in the Madison Country Circuit Court. The Complaint allege d neg lige nce on the part of sever al Def

endants: Old Town, Br ooks Shaw, the City of J ackson, Day s I nn, and To wn and Country . Wit h respe ct to Br ooks Shaw and Town a nd Country , Ms. Piana alleg ed that they failed to exercise the re quired due car e in the maintena nce, inspe ction, and re pair of the dirt path and/orBec aus e D ays I nn ha d not yet pre s ent ed i t s proof , t he t r i al cour t s houl d have w ai t ed, purs uant t o T enn. R. Ci v. 2
P. 50. 01 , t o rul e on t he m ot i on s f or di r ect ed verdi ct

. N on e of t he part i es , ho w ever , r ai s ed an ob j ect i on at t r i al or r ai s es th e issu e o n a p p e a l. W e sim p ly n o te th e p ro c e d u ra l m isste p b u t fin d a n y e r r o r w a iv e d

. See Y eu b a n k s v. M eth o d i st H ea l t h ca re-M em p h i s H o sp s. , N o. W 2001- 02051- CO A

- R3- CV , 2003 W L 21392411, at *7- 8 ( Tenn. Ct

. A pp. J une 10, 2 0 0 3 ).
-3- to properly

war n Mr. Piana of the dang ers e x ist i n g o n t h at p ath. The City of Jackson and seve ral oth e r de fe nd ants we re g ra nte d s umm ary

jud g me nt a

nd are no t pa

rt ie s to thi s a

pp e a l. L ike wi se , M s. Piana re ache d a settlement with Old Town pr ior to trial
At trial, three defe ndants rema ined: Day s I nn, Br ooks Shaw, and Town a nd Country

. At the close of Plaintiff’ s proof, a ll three de fenda nts moved for dire cted ve rdicts. The trial court took the motions under advisement, and Town and Country prese nted its proof. When Town and Country conclude d, the trial cour

t gr anted dire cted verdicts for both Tow n and Country and B rooks Shaw. 2 The trial c ourt found that B rooks Shaw did not owe a duty to the Plaintiff be cause it ne ither owne d nor maintained the premises where Mr . Piana fe ll. Si milarly , the trial cour t found that Town and Count ry d i d n o t owe a

duty to Mr. Piana. The tria l court stated that a ny duty owed by Town and Country must stem from the t erms of its maintenanc e agr eeme nt with Old Town. Afte r examining tho se te rm s, the tr ia l c ourt c on c lud e d th a t To wn and Countr y wa s no t ob lig a te d to ins pe c t or re pa ir t h e d i rtp a t h o nO l d

T o w n ’ s p r o p e rt y.
As the sole re maining D efe ndant, Day s I nn prese nted its proof, and the case was submitted to the jury . The jury

only considere d the fa

ult of Mr. Piana, Old Town, the Cit y o f J ac k s o n , and Da y s Inn . T he jur

y a ttr ibute d 70% of the fa ult to Old To wn and 30 % to Mr. Piana

. Th e jur y a lso found $3,000,000 i n d am ag es. The pla intiff, howeve r, had a lrea dy settled with Old Town, and there fore , could not rec over a dditional damag es base d upon the jury verdic t. Ms. Piana now appe als the trial cour t’s decision to g rant direc ted verdic ts f or B rooks Shaw and Town a

nd Country

Standard of Re view

A tri a l c o u rt’ s d e c is io n to g r an t a mo ti o n f o r d ir e c te d v e r d ic t in v o lv e s a qu e s ti o n o f law. Underwood v. HCA Health Servs. of Te nnessee, Inc. , 892 S.W .2d 423, 425 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994). O na p p e a l , w e a

p p l y t h e s a m e s t an d ar d

u s e d b y t h e t r i a l c o u rt w h e n r

u l i n g o nt h e m o t i o ni n i t i a l l y. United Brake Sys., Inc. v. Am . Envtl. Prot ., Inc. , 963 S.W .2d 749, 7 5 4 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997). Acc ording ly , we do not we igh the evi d en ce o r evaluate the cr edibility of witnesses. Id . (citing Underwood , 8 92 S.W. 2d a t 42 5). Ra the r, we c on sid e r a ll o f t he e vid e nc e , ta

kin g the str on g e st leg itimate v i ew o f i t in the non-moving pa rty ’s favor. Eat

on v . M c La in , 891 S.W .2d 587, 590 (T e nn . 199 4) . The c ourt sh ou ld g ra nt the mot ion , “o nly if

, af te r as se ssi ng the e vid e nc e a c c or din g to the fore g oing sta

ndards, it deter

mines that rea sonable minds could not differ as to the conc lusions to be dra wn from the e vidence .” Id

.
L aw a nd An a ly sis-4-

A neg lige nce c laim require s proof of the following elements: (1) a duty of ca re ow ed by

the defe ndant to the plaintiff; (2) conduct by the defe ndant falling below the standar d of ca re a mounting to a breac h of t hat dut y ; (3) an injury or loss; (4) ca

usation in fact; and ( 5) proximate or leg al ca use. Hale v. Ostrow , 1 66 S.W. 3d 71 3, 71 6 ( Te nn . 2 00 5) ; Coln v. City of Savannah , 966 S.W .2d 34, 39 (Tenn. 1998)

. The foc us in the prese nt case is on the first element of ne g lige nce, the duty of ca re. The exis tence of a duty

is a question of law. Hal e , 166 S.W. 3d

a t 71 6; Col

n , 966 S.W .2d at 39. L eg al duty has bee n define d as the leg al obliga tion owed by a d ef

en d an t to a plaintiff to confor m to a
rea sonable pe rson standard o f ca re for the pr otection ag ainst unrea sonable risks of ha rm. West v. East Tenn essee

Pioneer Oil Co. , 172 S.W .3d 545, 551 (Tenn. 2005). A “r isk is unreasonable and g ives rise t o a duty

to act with due c are if the for seea ble proba bility and g ravity

of har m posed by de fe nd ant' s c on du c t outw e ig h th e burd e n upo n de fe nd ant to e ng a g e in a lte rn a tiv e c on du c t th a t w ou ld have preve nted t he har

m.” McCall v. Wilder , 913 S.W .2d 150, 153 (Tenn. 1995) . When deciding whether a duty is owed in a spec ific ca se, “cour ts a pply a balanc ing a

pproac h, based upon pr inciples of fa irness, to identify

whether the risk to the plaintiff wa s unrea sonable.” Burr oughs v. Magee , 118 S.W .3d 323, 328-29 (Te nn. 2003). When balanc ing the rele vant fa ctors, the “ forse eability prong is paramount bec ause ‘for seea bility is the test of neg lige nce.’ ” Hal e , 166 S.W .3d at 716-17 (quoting Bis c an v . Br own , 160 S.W .3d 462, 480 (Tenn. 2005)

. A. B rooks Shaw

The trial c ourt found that B rooks Shaw did not owe a duty to Mr. Piana bec ause the common ma int e na nc e a g re e me nt b e tw e e n B ro ok s Sh aw a nd Ol d To wn

did no t r e qu ir e B ro ok s Sh a w t o ma int a in t he dit c h a re a or the path. B ro ok s Sha

w did no t ow n th e pr op e rt y on wh ic h M r. Piana

fe ll. A c c o r d in g ly , B r o o k s Sh aw c o u ld n o t o w e a d u ty to M r

. Pi an a a s th e o w n e r o f th e p r e mi ses. S ee Hal e , 1 66 S.W. 3d

a t 71 7- 18 ; Benson v. H.G. Hil l Stor es, Inc. , 6 99 S .W .2 d 5 60 , 5 62 (T e nn . Ct

. Ap p. 19 85 ). Th e re fo re , the tr ia l court c or re c tly c on c lud e d th a t any

du ty B ro ok s Sh aw m ig ht o we to Mr. Piana must stem from its common maintenance ag ree ment with Old Town.

The ora l ag ree ment between Br o o k s S haw a nd Old Town wa s rea ched in 1984. The
a g re e me nt r e qu ir e d B ro ok s Sh aw t o ma int a in i ts b uil din g and the “ com mo n g ro un ds .” Th e path along the ditch, howeve r, did not e x ist in 1984; it was cre ated by pedestria ns after the ditch was f

illed in b y the City of Jac ks on in 1 98 9. I n 1 98 4, ne ith e r B ro ok s Sh aw n or Ol d T ow n c ou ld h a ve po ssi bly contemplated the maintenanc e of a path that did not y et exist

. Ms. Pi ana insists that Br ooks Shaw undertook a duty to maintain the path bec ause B rooks Shaw occ asionally

perf ormed maintena

nce on a rea s owned by

Old Town. When it did s o, Br ooks Shaw could see k reimburse ment from Town a nd Country

for twenty five perc ent of the c ost of the
re pa ir s. Ac c or din g ly , B ro ok s S haw c ou ld h a ve ins pe c te d a nd re pa ir e d th e path. B e c a

us e of thi s possibili ty , Ms. Piana argues that B rooks Shaw under took a duty

to do so.-5-

This Court, howeve r, re

jected a simil ar a rg ument in Thom

pson v. Ruby Tuesday, Inc. , No. M2004-01869-COA- R3-CV, 2006 WL 468724 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 27, 2006). I n Thom pson , the defe ndant was bound to a lease ag ree ment un d er wh ich it had the rig ht to repair a common are a owned by its lessor. Id ., at *6. This Court found that a contra ctual rig ht to repair is not sy nony mous with a leg al duty

. Id . Her e, B rooks Shaw also ha d the rig ht to enter Old T o wn ’s p roper ty and
ma int a in t he dir t path. Th is rig ht, ho we ve r, did no t pla c e a du ty up on B ro ok s Sh aw t o p ro te c t g ue sts on Old Town’s prope rty . I nst ea d , we f ind that Old Town reta ined this duty as the owne r of the pr e mis e s.

Ne xt, Ms

. Piana c on te nd s that B ro ok s Sha w wa s a “ po sse sso r” of

the pr op e rt

y and thu s li a ble to the same e x tent as the owne r. To support this contention, Ms. Piana relies on this Court’s de cision in Sm ith v. In m an Realty Co. , 846 S.W .2d 819 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992). I n Smith , w e he ld t ha t a
re a lto r, wh o s ho we d a

ho us e un de r a

lis tin g a g re e me nt wit

h the ow ne r, ha d th e same du ty of c a re to an invitee a s would the owner

. Id . at 823. To re ach this conc lusion, the Court found that the rea ltor
was a “possessor” of the proper ty as define d by the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 328(E) ( 1965). Se c tio n 3 28 (E ) p ro vid e s: A p os se sso r o f l and

is (a) a per son who is in occupation of the land with intent to control it or (b) a person who ha s been in occupation of land wit h intent to control it, if no other person ha s subsequently

occupie d it with int ent to control it, or (c) a per son who is entitled to imm ediate occupation of the land, if no other pe rson is in possession under Clauses (a) and (b)

. Ms. Piana, howeve r, did not prese nt ev i d en ce s h o wing that Br ooks Shaw is a “possessor ” of the rele vant prope rty

under this def

inition. The realtor, in Smith , had the rig ht to enter the prope rty and actua lly took a

n invitee onto the proper

ty

. Smith , 846 S.W .2d at 823. B rooks Shaw, on the other hand, did not have a

ny re l at i onship with Mr. Pi ana. F urthermor e, the maintena nce a g ree ment betwee n Br ooks Shaw and Old Town did not give B rooks Shaw the e x clusive rig ht to maintain any pr op e rt y oth e r t ha n it s own bu il di ngand

the pa rk inglot . A c c or din g ly , B ro ok s Sh aw i s n ot a “possessor” under Sec tion 328(E), and Smith is inapplicable. Havingrevie wed the f

acts in the light most fa

vorable to Ms. Pi ana, w e find that the tria l court did not e rr whe n g ranting a dire cted ve rdict in favor of B rooks Shaw. B rooks Shaw did not own the proper ty wher e the injury

occur red or wher e the a lleg ed defec tive condition exis ted. Nor did B rooks Shaw undertake a duty , under its maintena nce ag ree ment with O ld T own, to inspect or r epair the dirt path. Th e re fo re , th e tr ia l c ourt pr op e rl y g ra nte d B ro ok s Sh aw’ s mo tio n f or dir e c te d v e rd ic t.

B. Tow n and Country

Th e tr ia l c ourt

fo un d th a t T ow n a

nd Cou ntr y did no t ow e a du ty to Mr

. Pia na

. To re a c h th is conclusion, the trial court considere d the M anag ement Agr eeme nt betwee n Old Town and Tow n and Countr y . T he a g re e me nt d e sc ri be d th e pr op e rt y to b e mana g e d a s “ 40 Ca se y Jone s V ill a g e, Old-6-

To wn ,” wh ic h is sim

ply the a dd re ss fo r Old To wn

. To wn and Countr y ’s a uth or ity , with

re sp e c t to ins pe c tio ns and

re pa ir s, c ome s f

ro m se c tio n 6 (b ) o f t

he a g re e me nt: Ag ent is authorized to make or c ause to be made, throu gh co n t ra cted services or otherwise, a ll ordinary

repa irs and re place ments rea sonably nece ssary to preser ve the Premises in its present condition and for the oper ation eff

iciency of the Premises; and
a ll a lte ratio ns re qu ir e d to c omp ly wi th l e a se re qu ir e me nts , g ov e rnme nta l mate ri a ls, supplies a nd other items ne cessa

ry for the manag ement, maintena nce or operation of the Pr e mis e s.
The trial c ourt ana ly

zed this parag raph a

nd conclude d that it “does not contemplate inspecting the dirt path to se e if there is a one-a nd-a- half inch piece of concr ete in it cover ed b y grass.” A c c o r d i n g l y, t h e t r i a l c o u rtg r an t e d a d i r e c t e d v e r d i c ti nf

a v o r o f T o w nan d

C o u n t r y.

L iability in case s like this one follows the rig ht to control the premises. B eca use Old Town is the sole owner

of the prope rty , the trial cour t corre ctly

found that the ter

ms of the Mana g em ent Ag re e me nt d e fi ne To wn and Countr y ’s ri g ht to c on tr ol the pr op e rt y . T he tr ia l c ourt

the n im pli c itl y fo un d th a t T ow n a

nd Countr y ha d th e ri g ht to c on tr ol t

he dir t pa th. Ho we ve r, To wn

and Countr y did
no t ow e a du ty to Mr . Pian a be c a us e the da ng e r an d pote nti a l har

m wa s not fo rs e e a

ble . On a pp e a l, Town and Country

first argues that it did not o we a duty to Mr. Piana bec ause it wa s not require d to perfor m any maintenanc e on the ditch

Acc ording ly , our fir s t t as k is to determine the e x tent of Town a nd Country ’s obligations
un de r the Mana g e me nt Ag re e me nt. Te nn e sse e c ourt s h a ve e xami ne d s imi lar w ri tte n a g re e me nts to deter mine whether

a par ty has a duty

to inspect or maintain a pie ce of proper ty

. Thom pson , 2006 WL46 87 24 , at *5 ); De nto n v . Ha hn , No. M2003-00342-COA- R3-CV, 2004 WL2083711, at *8 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 16, 2004). The int erpr etation of a written ag ree ment–here , the Mana g ement Ag ree ment–is a matter of law. Guilian o v. CLEO, Inc. , 995 S.W .2d 88, 95 (Tenn. 1999) . When interpre ting the w ritten ag ree ment, our primar y task is to asce rtain the intention of the pa rties. Jaffe v. Bolton , 817 S.W .2d 19, 25 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991). We must consider the words of

the instrument in the context of the instrument as a whole and give those words their usua l, natural, a nd ordinary meaning

. Ballard v. North Am

. Life & Cas. C o. , 6 67 S.W. 2d

79 , 8 2 ( Te nn . Ct . App . 1 98 3) ; Barber
v . W estmor e lan d, 601 S.W .2d 712, 714 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980).

T h e p r emises desc ribed in the Mana g ement Ag ree ment is Old Town’s addr ess at Casey J ones Villag e. T h e d e s c r ip ti o nit s e lf d o e s n o t l im it

T o w nan d

Co u n tr y ’ s o b li g a ti o n s to O ld

T o wn’s building. Town a

nd Country

argues that the Ag ree ment ex cluded the ditch a nd path bec ause Mr

. Smit h, the owner

of Old Town, did not spec ifically reque st Town and Country to maintain this area. F ur the rm or e , T ow n a

nd Countr y did no t insp e c t, nor wa s it re qu e ste d to insp e c t, the dit c h or t he path when perf

o rm i n g its annual inspections. I nstead, Town a nd Country

insists that its maintenance obligations were limited to the structura l integr ity of Old Town’ s buildings on the prope rty

.-7-

The fir st question then is whether the de scription of the pre mises, “40 Casey J ones Villag e, Old Town,” in the Manag ement Ag ree ment encompa sses the dirt path. At trial, Mr. Smith offer ed contra dictory

statements about h i s u n d er s tanding of the c ontrac t. At first, Mr. Smit h testified that the Ag re e ment de fi ne s th e pr e mis e s a s th e “ fu ll o ne a c re of Ol d T ow n’ s p ro pe rt

y .” On c ro ssexamination, however , M r. Smith t estified that he ne ver e x pecte d Town and Country to perfor m m a i n t e n an c e o nt h e d i t c h o r d i rtp a t h

. P a t r i c i a

F o x , t h e p r o p e r t y m a n a g e r f o r T o w nan d

C o u n t r y, also testified that the ter

ms of the ag ree ment did not ex clude a ny part of O ld Town’s prope rty at the Casey J ones Villag e. L ike Mr. Smit h, Ms. F ox testified that Town a nd Country ’s primary

obligation was to maintain the building s o n Old Town’s prope rty . Ms. Fox did not believe that Town and Country was re quired unde r the Mana g ement Ag ree ment to maintain the d i rt path behind the buildings. F inally , both Mr. Smit h and Ms. Fox testified that they did not know that the dirt path was l o c a t e d o nO l d T o w n ’ s p r o p e rt y.
After examining the entire rec ord, we conc l u d e that the languag e of the Manag ement Ag ree ment require d Town and Country to maintain the entire premises, including t he dirt path on Old Town’s proper

ty

. Both parties to the Ag ree ment testified that the premises descr ibed a s “40 Casey J ones Villag e, Old Town” did not ex clude the dir t path. Be cause the par

t i es admit that the descr iption is unambig uous, we must disreg ard their attempts at t rial t o limit the ag ree ment’s scope

. Town and Co u n tr

y c an n o t a v o id a c le ar c o n tr a c tu a l d

u ty b y s im p ly c la im in g ig n o r an c e o f

the obligation. W ere we to hold otherwise, other property manag ers could avoid liability to invitees by ignor ing the unambig uous terms of their maintenanc e contra cts. Acc ording ly , we a g ree with the trial court’s implicit finding that Town and Country had an oblig ation under the Manag ement Ag ree ment to maintain all of Old Town’s pr operty at Casey J ones Villag e, including the path.
Next, we must determine the e x tent of Town and Country ’s authority under the Manag ement Ag ree ment. I n Lawrence v . HCA H ealth Servs. of Tennessee, Inc. , No. M2 00 7- 01 12 8- CO A- R3- CV , 20 08 WL 34 51 79 9 (T e nn

. Ct. Ap p. Au g . 1 2, 20 08 ), we fo un d th a t a proper ty manag er, a cting under a simil ar c ontrac tual ag ree ment, b ec am e the “ operator” of the proper ty that it manag ed. Lawrence , 2008 WL 3451 7 99, at *5. L ike the mana g er in Lawrence , Town and Country

was a uthorized, in addition to its maintenanc e obli g ations, to find tenants, collec t rent, a nd hire staff. There fore , we c onclude that Tow n and Country was the ope rator of

Old Town’s proper ty at Casey J ones Villag e.

L ike an owne r, the ope rator of a plac e of business ha s a dut y “t o ex er ci se re asonable car e with reg ard to social g uests or business invitees on the pre mises.” Ric ev . Sa bir , 979 S.W .2d 305, 308 (Tenn. 1998) . The ope rator’ s duty “includes ma intaining the prem i s es in a re asonably safe condition either by

removing or re pairing potentially dang erous c onditions or by helping customers
and g ue sts a vo id i nju

ry by wa rn ingthe m of

the e xiste nc e of da

ng e ro us c on dit ion s th a t c ann ot, a s a prac tical m atter, be remove d or re paire d.” Psillas v. Hom e De pot, U.S.A., In c. , 66 S.W .3d 860, 864 (Tenn. C t

. Ap p

. 2001). The ope rator of a pre mises, however , does not have a duty to “re move or war n ag ainst ‘conditions from which no unr easona ble risk was to be anticipated, or from thos e which the occ upier ne ither knewabout nor c ould have discove red w ith reasona ble ca re.’ ” R i c e v

. Sa bir , 979 S.W .2d 305, 309 (Tenn. 1998) (quoting W. P ag e Ke aton, Pr os se r a nd Ke ato n on Tor ts , § 61 at-8-

426 (5 ed. 1984)). I n this reg ard, “the m ere exis tence of a defe ct or dang er is gene rally insufficient th to establish liabilit y , unless it is shown to be of such a c hara cter or of such duration that the jury may rea sonably

conclude that due ca

re w ould have discove red it.” Id . (citation omitted).

The trial c ourt appa

rently found that the piec e of c oncre te on t he path was not a condition that prese nted an unrea sonable risk to guests. I n Ne ev . Bi g Cre e k P

artne rs, 10 6 S.W.3 d 6 50 (T e nn . Ct

. App. 2002), we descr ibed a plaintiff’ s evidentiary burden on this issue:
[F]or an owner or

occupie r to be found ne g lige nt, there must be some e vidence that there was a

dang erous or defe ctive condition on the pre mises. A jury cannot c onclude that an o wn e r o r o c c up ier fai led to e xer c ise re a so na ble c are to p re ve nt i nju

ry to persons on their pr operty if there is no evi dence of a da ng erous or

defe ctive condition. I f no dang erous or defe ctive condition exis ts, an owner or occupier cannot be held liable f

or fa iling to take a ction in order to r emedy the supposed condition.

Id

. at 653-54. L ike the pre sent ca se, the Court in Nee considere d the suffic iency of the plaintiff’ s evidenc e af

ter the tria l court g rante d the def endant/owne r’s motion for dire cted ve rdict. Id . at 651. I n Nee , th e pl ain tiff

, w ho tr ipp e d w hil e g oin g do wn sta ir s o n th e de fe nd ant’ s p ro pe rt y , s imp ly descr ibed the acc ident at trial and introduced photogr aphs of the sta irs. Id . at 654. The photog raphs
wer e an acc urate repr esentation of the stairs, but standing alone, did not show that there was a ny thing wrong with the stairs. Id

. Acc ording ly , we a ffirme d the ver dict beca use “[a] finding that the ste ps we re de fe c tiv e or

da ng e ro us ba se d o n th e ph oto g ra ph s w ou ld r e qu ir e the jur y to e ng a g e in speculation, conjecture , and g uesswork.” Id

. The e vidence prese nted by Ms. Piana is simi lar to the plaintiff’ s evidenc e in Nee. M s. Piana testified about the condition of the path and introduced photogr aphs showing the piece of conc rete

. Considering this evidence in the light most favor able to Ms. Piana, we f ind that there w as suffic ient evidenc e for

a jury to decide if

the condition was da

ng erous or

defe cti v e. Un like the plaintiff’s photogr aphs in Nee , Ms. Piana showed that the piece o f concrete itself c ould be a da ng erous condition. Accor dingly , a re asonable person c ould find that the condition was dang erous without
e n g a g in g in

s p e c u lati o no r

g u e s s w o r

k

. B e c a u s e r e a s o n a

b le p e r s o n s c o u ld

dr aw c o n f

lic ting conclusions from this evidenc e, the issue should ha ve been submitt ed to the jury rathe r than be ing settled by direc ted ver dict. Finally , we must addre ss wh et h er M s

. P i an a p re s en t eds u ff

i ci en tev i d en ce s h o wi n g t h at Town and Country

had notice of

the condition. I f the plaintiff a lleg es that an ow ner o r o p er at o r o f the pr e mis e s a llo we d a

da ng e ro us or

de fe c tiv e c on dit ion

to e xist o n th e pr emi ses , the pla int if f m us t prove, in a ddition to t he ele ments of neg lige nce, that: “1) the condition was caused or cre ated by the
owner , operator, or his ag ent, or 2) if the condition w as cre ated by someone other than the owne r, operator, or his ag ent, that the owne r or ope rator ha d actua l or construc tive notice that the c ondition exis ted prior to the acc ident.” Bla ir v . W est T own M all , 13 0 S.W. 3d 76 1, 76 4 (T e nn

. 20 04 ). Ms. Piana has not alleg ed that Town and Country cre ated the c ondition. L ikewise, she ha s not alleg ed that Town and Country

had ac tual notice that the conditi on exis ted prior to the a ccide nt. There fore ,-9-

she was require d to prese nt evidence showing that Town and Country had construc tive notice of the condition. A plaintiff may

prove c onstructive notice by showing that “the da

ng erous or

defe ctive condition exi sted for suc h a leng th of time that the defe ndant, in the exercise of re as o nable c are , should have be come a

war e of the condition.” Bla ir , 1 3 0 S

. W

. 3 d at 7 6 4 (c i t i n g Simm ons v . Se ar s, Roebuck & Co. , 713 S.W .2d 640, 641 (Tenn. 1986) . Alternatively , th e p l aint iff may prove constructive notice by showing “a pattern of c onduct, a r ecur ring incident, or a

g ener al or c ontinuing condition indicating the dang erous c ondition’s ex istence.” Bla ir , 130 S.W .3d at 765-66. I f notice is proven, the owne r take s on a duty “to take r easona

ble steps to reme dy

this commonly

occur ring dang erous c ondition.” Id . at 766. Ms. Piana only prese nted evidenc e that the c ondition had exi sted for suc h a leng th of time that Town and Country should have be en aw are of it. Although the issue of duty is a question of l aw for t he court to decide , “it is ge nera lly for the jury to say whether the condition causingthe injury ...had existed long e noug h that a re asonable man exercising rea sonable c are would have disc overe d it.” All iso n v . Bl ount Na t. B ank , 390 S.W .2d 71 6, 71 9 ( Te nn . Ct . App . 1 96 5) . B e fo re the qu e sti on c an g o to the jur

y , h ow e ve r, the pla int if

f m us t prese nt “some mater ial competent e vidence from which it ca n be log ically

inferr ed [that] the proprietor , by

the exercise of

ordinary car e, would have or s h o uld have discove red the dang erous condition.” Paradiso v. Kroger , 4 99 S.W. 2d 78 , 8 0 ( Te nn . Ct . App . 1 97 3) ; se e als o Cham bliss v. Shon ey’ s Inc. , 742 S.W .2d 271, 273 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987) ( “When there is a complete a bsence of proof a s to when and howthe dang erous c ondition came about, i t would be im proper to permit the jury to speculate on these vital ele ments.”).
At trial, Ms. Piana t estified that she had seen the piece of concrete on the path seve ral times pr ior to t he a c c ide nt. She did

no t sp e c if

y any pr e c ise date s, bu t sh e state d that the pie c e of c on c re te ha d b e e n o n th e path f

or a t le a st a fe w y e ars . D ur inghe r p re vi ou s vi si ts , th e c on c re te wa s c le a rl y visible, but at the time of the ac cident, it had been covered by g rass. Reviewing this evidence in the light most favor able to the plaintiff, w e find that the question of notice should have been submitted to the jury

. M s

. P i an a p resented uncontra dicted testimony that the def

ect ha d exis ted for se vera l y ear s prior to the ac cident. While her testimony lacke d specific ity , it is for the jur y to evaluate the quality and re liability

of her statements. By pree mpting the jury ’s re view of this question, the trial court e rre d. When considering a motion for direc ted verdic t, the trial court is not permitted to weig h, let alone disre g ard, material e vidence prese nted by the non-moving party

.
For these rea sons, w e rema

nd this matter to the trial court. We ha ve deter mined, as a matter of law, that T ow n a

nd Countr y ow e d a du ty to M r. Piana . We have no t de te rm ine d that th e c on c re te constituted a dang erous c ondition or that Town and Country had noti ce of the condition. We have
on ly de te rm ine d th a t Ms . Pi ana pr e se nte d s uf

fi c ie nt e vid e nc e fo r a jur

y to c on sid e r t

he se qu e sti on s.
Conclusion-10-

Ba sed upon the foreg oing rea sons, we af firm the trial c ourt’s g rant of dir ecte d verdic t in favor of B rooks S haw. Howeve r, we reve rse the trial court’s gr ant of direc ted verdict in favor of Town and Country . This case is hereby rema nded for further proce eding s consistent with this opi nion. Costs of this appeal a

re a ssessed equa lly

to Ms. Pi ana a

nd Town and Country , for whic h execution
m ay i s s u e i f

n e c e s s ar y.



### ______________________________ J. S T E V E N S T A FF O RD , J.