[Cite as Cheng v. Symmes Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 2024-Ohio-2882.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO

HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO

YIWEI CHENG,

JARROD TUCKER,

10007 BENTCREEK, LLC,

AARON LANDOLT,

 and

KRISTIN LANDOLT,

 Plaintiffs-Appellants,

 VS.

SYMMES TOWNSHIP BOARD OF 

ZONING APPEALS,

 and

SYMMES TOWNSHIP,

 Defendants-Appellees.

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APPEAL NO. C-230668

TRIAL NOS. A-2203841

 A-2203842

 A-2203843

 O P I N I O N.

Civil Appeal From: Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas

 

Judgment Appealed From Is: Reversed and Judgment Entered

Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: July 31, 2024
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

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Keating Muething & Klekamp, PLL, Sophia R. Holley and Taylor V. Trout, for 

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

Schroeder, Maundrell, Barbiere & Powers and Scott A. Sollmann, for DefendantsAppellees.
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

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BERGERON, Presiding Judge.

{¶1} Blowback against short-term residential rentals like Airbnb prompted 

Symmes Township to regulate, if not outlaw, the rentals by enacting new zoning 

restrictions requiring a conditional use permit for the operation of such rentals. The 

problem was that several property owners, including appellants Yiwei Cheng and 

Jarrod Tucker (“Cheng”), 10007 Bentcreek, LLC, (“Bentcreek LLC”), and Aaron and 

Kristin Landolt (“Landolts”) (together, “Appellants”) had previously purchased 

residential property and operated them as short-term rentals before the recent 

regulation. When the township zoning inspector came knocking, he issued Appellants 

notice of their respective zoning violations. Believing that the operation of their 

respective properties as short-term rentals constituted prior legal nonconforming 

uses, Appellants each appealed their notices of violation to appellee Symmes 

Township Board of Zoning Appeals (“Zoning Board”). The Zoning Board denied their 

appeals, and the trial court ultimately agreed, concluding that short-term rentals were

not a legal nonconforming use because the properties were never used as single-family 

dwellings by Appellants (a conclusion never reached by the Zoning Board). Appellants 

now appeal. Having carefully reviewed the evidence and the record, we sustain 

Appellants’ sole assignment of error and reverse the trial court’s judgment.

I.

{¶2} Appellants each purchased a property in Symmes Township with the 

intent to rent their respective properties as a short-term rental through Airbnb. 

Appellants exclusively operated the properties as short-term rentals—the use of the 

properties is not contested in the underlying case or on appeal. And all three 

properties were operational as rentals (with documented bookings) by February 2022.
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{¶3} The three properties fall within the “B” residential zoning district. 

Symmes Township permits the following uses in “B” districts: agriculture, public and 

private forests and wildlife reservations, and single-family dwellings. Additionally, 

Symmes Township permits certain uses (like bed and breakfasts) within “B” districts 

contingent upon the township’s approval of a conditional use zoning permit.

{¶4} In May 2022, the Symmes Township Board of Trustees adopted 

Resolution G2022-52, which amended the Symmes Township Zoning Resolution (“the 

Resolution”). Resolution G2022-52 defined “short-term rental” as “[a] dwelling unit 

or portion thereof, which is offered or provided to a guest by a short term rental owner 

or operator for a fee for a term of less than thirty (30) days.” And it classified shortterm rentals as conditional uses, requiring conditional use zoning permits.

{¶5} None of the property owners sought a conditional use permit. 

Resolution G2022-52 took effect in June 2022, and within a few weeks, a Symmes 

Township zoning inspector issued notices of violation to Appellants—determining that 

their properties were being operated as commercial short-term rentals without 

pending applications for conditional use permits. Asserting that their use of the 

properties as short-term rentals constituted a legal nonconforming use, Appellants 

each appealed their notices of violation to the Zoning Board.

{¶6} In October 2022, the Zoning Board heard the three appeals, ultimately 

concluding that because the Zoning Board had previously interpreted the properties 

as bed and breakfasts and later as hotels/motels (both of which require a conditional 

use permit), and Appellants failed to seek such permits, “the short-term rental use of 

the subject propert[ies were] not lawfully being made at the time the amendment 

became effective.” Appellants immediately appealed the administrative decision, and 
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pursuant to their joint motion to consolidate, the three appeals were consolidated. In 

June 2023, the magistrate heard oral arguments. And in July 2023, the magistrate 

issued her decision—reversing the administrative decisions of the Zoning Board and 

determining that the operation of the properties as short-term rentals constituted a 

legal nonconforming use (without explaining the reasoning underlying her

conclusion).

{¶7} The Township and the Zoning Board objected to the magistrate’s 

decision. In October 2023, the trial court heard oral arguments, and the following 

month, it issued its final decision, rejecting the magistrate’s decision and affirming the 

Zoning Board’s conclusion that the operation of the properties as short-term rentals 

was not a legal nonconforming use. Specifically, the trial court reasoned that because 

Appellants exclusively used the properties as short-term rentals (and never as singlefamily residences for themselves), the properties did not fall within the common 

definition of “single-family dwelling,” and thus, the initial use of the properties was 

not legal. Appellants now appeal, challenging the trial court’s determination in a 

single assignment of error.

II.

{¶8} In Appellants’ sole assignment of error, they contend that the trial court 

erred when it rejected the magistrate’s decision holding that their properties were legal 

nonconforming uses. To advance their argument, they present two issues for our 

review: (1) the trial court erred in its interpretation of the Resolution; and (2) the trial 

court erred in holding that the properties are not entitled to prior nonconforming 

status. We first outline the standard of review and then address each argument in 

turn.
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{¶9} Because courts generally defer to administrative agencies, the trial court 

can only “reverse a final decision of a board of zoning appeals if, after a review of the 

complete record, it finds that the board’s ‘decision is unconstitutional, illegal,

arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, or unsupported by the preponderance of 

substantial, reliable, and probative evidence.’ ” Willow Grove, Ltd. v. Olmsted Twp.

Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 169 Ohio St.3d 759, 2022-Ohio-4364, 207 N.E.3d 779, ¶ 16,

quoting R.C. 2506.04. This court’s review of a trial court’s decision on an appeal from

a zoning authority is even “narrower and more deferential.” Cleveland Clinic Found.

v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 141 Ohio St.3d 318, 2014-Ohio-4809, 23 N.E.3d 1161, ¶ 25,

citing Kisil v. Sandusky, 12 Ohio St.3d 30, 34, 465 N.E.2d 848 (1984). 

{¶10} But while we “must defer to the [trial] court’s factual findings, * * * we 

need not defer to any legal conclusions.” Willow Grove at ¶ 17, citing Siltstone

Resources, L.L.C. v. Ohio Pub. Works Comm., 168 Ohio St.3d 439, 2022-Ohio-483,

200 N.E.3d 125, ¶ 15. Thus, when questions of law exist regarding statutory 

construction, this court reviews the issue de novo. Id. at ¶ 16-17, citing Cleveland

Clinic Found. at ¶ 25, citing Lang v. Dir., Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Servs., 134 Ohio

St.3d 296, 2012-Ohio-5366, 982 N.E.2d 636, ¶ 12. And regarding questions of

interpretation, “[w]e interpret municipal ordinances and resolutions in the same

manner as statutes.” Id. at ¶ 18, citing Shampton v. City of Springboro, 98 Ohio St.3d

457, 2003-Ohio-1913, 786 N.E.2d 883, ¶ 30. Because this case hinges on a question

of interpretation of an ordinance—there are no factual disputes—we review the trial

court’s decision de novo.
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A.

{¶11} First, Appellants contest the trial court’s interpretation of the 

Resolution, ascribing error to its determination that the properties were not singlefamily dwellings (which was a lawful property use) because Appellants never occupied 

their respective properties. To determine whether the trial court erred when it 

interpreted the meaning of single-family dwelling, we first look to the language of the 

Resolution. When “the meaning of the resolution is clear by a plain reading of its text, 

[] we apply the resolution as written.” Id., citing Wilson v. Lawrence, 150 Ohio St.3d

368, 2017-Ohio-1410, 81 N.E.3d 1242, ¶ 11.

{¶12} The Resolution does not define single-family dwelling. It does, 

however, define the terms “dwelling” and “family,” and generally, we derive meaning

from a provision in the context of the ordinance in its entirety. Cleveland Clinic

Found., 141 Ohio St.3d 318, 2014-Ohio-4809, 23 N.E.3d 1161, at ¶ 35. The Resolution 

defines dwelling as “[a]ny structure or portion thereof which is designed or used for 

residential purposes.” And family is defined as “a person or group of persons 

occupying a premises and living as a single housekeeping unit but as distinguished 

from a group occupying a boarding house, fraternity/sorority house, hotel or other 

type of contractual living quarters.” Further, for words that are undefined, the 

Resolution provides that they “shall be construed as defined in the Hamilton County 

Building Code and in normal dictionary usage.” The Hamilton County Building Code 

also lacks a definition for single-family dwelling, so we are left with the related 

definitions and the common usage of the term. 

{¶13} The properties are indisputably dwellings: they are structures designed 

for residential purposes. And according to the plain language of the Resolution, the 
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properties are seemingly occupied by one “family” at a time. When examining whether

a property is occupied by a single “family,” the distinction between short-term and

long-term rentals largely collapses, creating logical inconsistencies with the Zoning

Board’s reliance on any distinction. A member of the Zoning Board, in the initial 

hearing on the violations, clarified that long-term rentals (rentals for periods of at least

30 days) constituted a legal use of property: “[W]e are not telling the individual that

you cannot have a rental. We’re just saying that you now have new restrictions, 30 days

or more, and you can still have your rental.” Like persons occupying long-term rentals,

persons occupying short-term rentals are “living as a single housekeeping unit” during

their rental period (regardless of whether that period happens to be 3, 29, or 30 days). 

And unlike the exceptions to the definition of “family” explicitly enumerated in the 

resolution (boarding house, fraternity/sorority house, and hotel), the properties at 

issue are rented as a whole unit by one group, not rented by distinct individuals or 

groups on a room-by-room basis. 

{¶14} Turning to the common usage of single-family dwelling, the trial court 

volunteered the following definitions in its decision:

a freestanding building designed for occupancy by one family 

(Cincinnati, Ohio, Code of Ordinances, Title XIV, Section 1401-01-S9); 

a dwelling either attached or semidetached, arranged, intended or 

designed to be occupied by a single family (Codified Ordinance of the 

City of Euclid, Ohio Section 1321.16); a residence housing one family or 

household or one that is designed for one family only (Definitions 

uslegal.com/s/single-family-dwelling-house/).
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Examining these definitions (and without explaining its rationale), the trial court 

concluded that because “[n]one of the three properties in this case was ever used as a 

single-family dwelling by the current owners * * * the initial use was not legal and 

cannot now qualify as a legal-nonconforming use.” (Emphasis added).

{¶15} These three definitions are certainly not the only ways to define singlefamily dwelling. But given that the trial court relied upon them and that the parties 

do not advance any alternative definitions, we proceed by reacting to the definitions 

presented to us. By their plain language, these definitions lack any requirement that 

the property owner ever occupied the property. Rather, the crux of these definitions 

is for what use the property was designed, not how it is currently operated. From these 

definitions, it seems clear that, at minimum, the term single-family dwelling 

encompasses property designed for use by a single family. We see no obligation in any 

of these definitions that any particular person, or indeed anyone at all, actually inhabit 

the property. For instance, if a single-family dwelling sits vacant, that does not change 

its character into something other than a single-family dwelling. The plain language 

of the term “single-family dwelling” thus supports Appellants’ interpretation of that 

term rather than the trial court’s. 

{¶16} And regardless, zoning regulations are “in derogation of the common

law and deprive the property owner of uses to which the owner would otherwise be

entitled.” Cleveland Clinic Found., 141 Ohio St.3d 318, 2014-Ohio-4809, 23 N.E.3d

1161, at ¶ 34, citing In re Appeal of Univ. Circle, Inc., 56 Ohio St.2d 180, 184, 383

N.E.2d 139 (1978). Therefore, even if after analyzing the plain language of the related 

definitions and common usage of single-family dwelling, we found the term 

ambiguous, we must “strictly construe[]” zoning regulations in favor of the property 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

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owner. Id., citing Saunders v. Clark Cty. Zoning Dept., 66 Ohio St.2d 259, 261, 421

N.E.2d 152 (1981). Because “single-family dwelling” is undefined, it does admit of 

some ambiguity, but no definition presented to us supports the Zoning Board’s 

determination. And even if we harbored some doubt on this point, we must construe 

the term in Appellants’ favor.

{¶17} Ratifying these conclusions, the Zoning Board and the trial court relied 

on inconsistent rationales to support their determinations that the properties were not 

legal nonconforming uses. In the Zoning Board’s decision, it found that, since 2021,

it interpreted the properties to require conditional use permits. In 2021, the Zoning 

Board’s inspector first cited the properties, claiming they needed conditional use 

permits because they were operating as bed and breakfasts. But later, seemingly 

acknowledging that the properties did not fall within the Resolution’s definition of a 

bed and breakfast (because, as the trial court concluded, they were not owneroccupied), the Zoning Board changed its mind, modifying its classification of the 

properties to hotels/motels, which also require conditional use permits. Because 

Appellants did not seek conditional use permits, the Zoning Board concluded that “the 

short-term rental use of the subject propert[ies] was not lawfully being made at the 

time the amendment became effective.” 

{¶18} Before the trial court, perhaps appreciating the problems with their 

positions, the Zoning Board and Symmes Township shifted their argument, claiming

that the use of the properties as short-term rentals was not a legal nonconforming use 

because it was “commercial activity” (and largely abandoning the argument that they

required conditional use permits as hotels/motels). But this created another 

inconsistency because, as mentioned above, the Zoning Board itself had previously 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

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conceded that the use of property as long-term rentals—also inherently commercial in 

nature—was legal. 

{¶19} Recognizing the logical problems in the Zoning Board’s interpretation,

the trial court relied on yet another rationale—determining that while a single-family 

dwelling was a legal use of the property, the “initial use was not legal” because 

Appellants themselves never used their respective properties as single-family 

residences. The court seemingly reached this conclusion on its own, as the Zoning 

Board never advocated this point. The lack of any consistency here across the 

justifications offered by the Zoning Board and the trial court betrays the weakness in 

their foundations. And notably, from the perspective of the homeowner, the 

conflicting justifications create further confusion regarding the purported restricted 

uses of their property (pointing us further in the direction of construing the definition 

in Appellants’ favor). 

{¶20} Accordingly, in light of the plain meaning of the terms defined in the

Resolution, the common usage of single-family dwelling, and the presumption to

construe any ambiguity in favor of the property owners, we interpret the term singlefamily dwelling to include the properties at issue.

B.

{¶21} Next, Appellants argue that because the trial court improperly

concluded that the properties were not single-family dwellings, it erred when it held

that the property owners did not lawfully operate the properties as short-term rentals

prior to the enactment of the Resolution. The Resolution defines a nonconforming use

as “[a]ny use lawfully being made of any land, building, or structure on the effective

date of these regulations or any amendment thereto rendering such use
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nonconforming, which does not comply with all of the regulations of this Resolution

or any amendment thereto.” To prove a nonconforming use, the party must show (1)

the use existed prior to the enactment of the regulation, and (2) the use in question

was lawful when it was commenced. Verbillion v. Enon Sand & Gravel, LLC, 2021-

Ohio-3850, 180 N.E.3d 638, ¶ 120 (2d Dist.). And “[t]he party asserting a nonconforming use of property has the burden of proving such use.” Id.

{¶22} Here, the parties have never disputed that the properties were

operated as short-term rentals prior to the enactment of the Resolution; rather, they

disputed the legality of this use. Thus, because we hold that the definition of singlefamily dwelling includes these properties (however utilized), we necessarily conclude

that the trial court erred when it determined the use of the respective properties as

short-term rentals was not a legal nonconforming use.

* * *

{¶23} In light of the foregoing analysis, we sustain Appellants’ sole assignment 

of error, reverse the judgment of the trial court, and enter judgment in favor of 

Appellants.

Judgment reversed and judgment entered.

CROUSE and WINKLER, JJ., concur.

Please note:

The court has recorded its entry on the date of the release of this opinion.