Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 02A03-1501-CR-29 | July 31, 2015 Page 1 of 5

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this 

Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as 

precedent or cited before any court except for the 

purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Anthony S. Churchward

Deputy Public Defender

Fort Wayne, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Gregory F. Zoeller

Attorney General of Indiana

Jesse R. Drum

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Christopher M. Knight,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff

July 31, 2015

Court of Appeals Case No.

02A03-1501-CR-29

Appeal from the Allen Superior 

Court

The Honorable Wendy W. Davis, 

Judge

Cause No. 02D04-1404-FD-426

Baker, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 02A03-1501-CR-29 | July 31, 2015 Page 2 of 5

[1] Christopher M. Knight appeals the sentence imposed by the trial court after he 

pleaded guilty to class D felony Domestic Battery.1 Knight argues that the trial 

court abused its discretion by failing to find his guilty plea to be a mitigating 

factor. Finding no error, we affirm.

Facts

[2] Knight and Miranda Jones have one child together. They separated in August 

2013 and had not spoken to one another until the evening of April 14, 2014. 

That evening, Knight was kicked out of a substance abuse rehabilitation center 

because he was intoxicated. Jones picked him up; her two minor children were 

in the backseat of the vehicle. While Jones was driving her vehicle, Knight 

began striking her in the head and face with a closed fist for no apparent reason, 

causing pain, redness, and swelling. Jones called 911. Knight continued 

striking her during the 911 call, so the battery can be heard on the 911 tape. 

Eventually, Jones stopped the car and ordered Knight to get out. He refused 

and she attempted to exit the vehicle. He grabbed her by the hair, pulling her 

back into the car, and yelled at her. He fled, but was later found and arrested 

by law enforcement officers.

[3] On April 18, 2014, the State charged Knight with class D felony domestic 

battery. On September 22, 2014, Knight pleaded guilty as charged without a 

 

1

Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1.3(b)(2). The Indiana criminal code has been substantially amended as of July 1, 

2014, but we refer to and apply the version that was in effect at the time Knight committed the offense herein.
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plea agreement. The trial court held a sentencing hearing on November 10, 

2014, and found Knight’s extensive criminal history, the fact that he committed 

new offenses while out on bond for the instant offense, the fact that prior 

rehabilitation has failed, and the facts and circumstances of the instant case as 

aggravating factors. The trial court also stated that “I will note as mitigating 

circumstances his plea of guilty; however, I don’t put a lot of stock in that 

considering it’s all on tape.” Sent. Tr. p. 15. In the end, the trial court found 

that the aggravators outweighed the mitigating circumstance and imposed a 

three-year sentence. Knight now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[4] Knight’s sole argument on appeal is that the trial court abused its discretion by 

failing to find his guilty plea to be a mitigating circumstance. Sentencing is a 

discretionary function of the trial court, and we afford considerable deference to 

the trial court’s judgment. Eiler v. State, 938 N.E.2d 1235, 1238 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2010). When sentencing a defendant for a felony, the trial court must enter a 

sentencing statement “including reasonably detailed reasons or circumstances 

for imposing a particular sentence.” Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490 

(Ind. 2007), clarified on reh’g, 875 N.E.2d 218. We no longer review a trial 

court’s weighing of mitigators and aggravators. Id. at 490-91.

[5] Initially, we note that during the sentencing hearing, the trial court explicitly 

stated that it did find the guilty plea to be a mitigating circumstance. Sent. Tr. 

p. 15. It merely found that the aggravators outweighed it. As noted above, we 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 02A03-1501-CR-29 | July 31, 2015 Page 4 of 5

no longer review the way in which a trial court weighs aggravators and 

mitigators, so this argument is unavailing. 

[6] We acknowledge, however, that the written sentencing order states that there 

were no mitigators. Appellant’s App. p. 38. Solely for argument’s sake, we will 

address Knight’s argument that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to 

consider the guilty plea as a mitigator. It is well established that the significance 

of a guilty plea is dramatically reduced if substantial admissible evidence exists 

against the defendant. Primmer v. State, 857 N.E.2d 11, 16 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). 

In this case, Knight can be heard hitting Jones during the 911 call, and his 

battery caused visible injuries to Jones. Given the substantial evidence of his 

guilt, Knight’s decision to plead guilty was pragmatic. See Wells v. State, 836 

N.E.2d 475, 479-80 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). Consequently, we cannot say that the 

trial court abused its discretion in failing to find Knight’s plea as a mitigator.

[7] Even if we were to find that the trial court should have found the guilty plea to 

be a mitigator, we would affirm. If we conclude that the trial court has abused 

its discretion—by, for example, neglecting to find a mitigator—we will remand 

for resentencing only “if we cannot say with confidence that the trial court 

would have imposed the same sentence had it properly considered reasons that 

enjoy support in the record.” Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 491. Here, Knight’s 

criminal history included three juvenile adjudications, twenty-six misdemeanor 

convictions, five felony convictions, three suspended sentence modifications, 

and five suspended sentence revocations. He was charged with two offenses 

while on bond for the instant case—public intoxication and invasion of privacy. 
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He failed to appear at his first scheduled sentencing hearing in this case. As for 

the facts and circumstances of the offense, Knight’s estranged girlfriend agreed 

to pick him up because he was too intoxicated to attend substance abuse 

treatment. He began hitting her repeatedly, while she was driving, for no 

reason, causing her to sustain visible injuries. All of this occurred with two 

minor children, one of whom was his child, in the backseat of the car. We are 

confident that even if the trial court had found the guilty plea to be a mitigator, 

the aggravators would have easily outweighed it, and the same sentence would 

have been imposed. In any event, therefore, we affirm.

[8] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Bailey, J., and Mathias, J., concur.