alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1
<CURRENCY> U.S. DOLLARS
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1998
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                                      1
<CASH>                                      12,556,629
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                1,187,041
<ALLOWANCES>                                    49,971
<INVENTORY>                                    545,850
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                            14,570,963
<PP&E>                                      18,735,496
<DEPRECIATION>                               8,714,656
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              24,771,120
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        2,727,149
<BONDS>                                              0
<COMMON>                                        53,720
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<OTHER-SE>                                  20,343,935
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                24,771,120
<SALES>                                      1,006,698
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             1,696,901
<CGS>                                        1,312,538
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                1,803,649
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               801,070
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              34,720
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              (907,818)
<INCOME-TAX>                                     1,256
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          (909,074)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 (909,074)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   (0.14)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (0.14)
        

</TABLE>
## F IRST 

## D ISTRICT 

## C OURT OF 

## A PPEAL 

## S TATE OF 

## F LORIDA

_____________________________
No. 1D 17

- 4573

_____________________________
K ENNETH S

. F OUTS , Appellant,

v.

S TATE OF F LORIDA , Appellee.

_____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Columbia County

. Wesley R. Douglas , Judge

. May 2, 2018

P ER C URIAM

.
A FFIRM ED

.
R AY , B ILBREY , and W INOKUR , JJ., concur.

_____________________________ Not final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.331

.

_ ____________________________ Andy Thomas, Public Defender, and Steven L. Seliger, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee
, for Appellant.2 Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee
, for Appellee.
Exhibit 32.1



Exhibit 32.1





CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In connection with the Quarterly Report of Fonix Corporation on Form 10-Q/A for the period ending March 31, 2004, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), Thomas A. Murdock, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certifies pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



(1)

The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and



(2)

The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.





/s/ Thomas A. Murdock

Thomas A. Murdock

Chief Executive Officer







---

Exhibit 32.2





CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In connection with the Quarterly Report of Fonix Corporation on Form 10-Q/A for the period ending March 31, 2004, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), Roger D. Dudley, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



(1)

The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and



(2)

The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.







/s/ Roger D. Dudley

Roger D. Dudley

Chief Financial Officer
# C_2016296EN.01001201.xml

| 16.8.2016 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 296/12 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

16.8.2016

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 296/12

---

Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 7 June 2016 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Rechtbank Den Haag, sitting in Hertogenbosch — Netherlands) — Mehrdad Ghezelbash v Staatssecretaris van Veiligheid en Justitie

(Case C-63/15) (1)

1

((Reference for a preliminary ruling - Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 - Determination of the Member State responsible for examining an asylum application lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national - Article 12 - Issue of residence documents or visas - Article 27 - Remedies - Extent of judicial scrutiny))

(2016/C 296/16)

Language of the case: Dutch

Referring court

Referring court

Rechtbank Den Haag, sitting in Hertogenbosch

Parties to the main proceedings

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Mehrdad Ghezelbash

Applicant:

Defendant: Staatssecretaris van Veiligheid en Justitie

Defendant:

Operative part of the judgment

Operative part of the judgment

Article 27(1) of Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person, read in the light of recital 19 of the regulation, must be interpreted as meaning that, in a situation such as that in the main proceedings, an asylum seeker is entitled to plead, in an appeal against a decision to transfer him, the incorrect application of one of the criteria for determining responsibility laid down in Chapter III of the regulation, in particular the criterion relating to the grant of a visa set out in Article 12 of the regulation.

---

(1)  OJ C 138, 27.4.2015.

1

---
<page> EXHIBIT 32.01

CERTIFICATION OF PRESIDENT PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In connection with the Quarterly Report of Morgan Stanley
Principal Plus Fund L.P. (the ?Partnership?) on Form 10-Q for the
quarter ended September 30, 2007, as filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the ?Report?), I, Walter
Davis, President of Demeter Management Corporation, the general
partner of the Partnership, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section
1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
of 2002, that, to the best of my knowledge:
(1)	The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section
13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
(2)	The information contained in the Report fairly presents,
in all material respects, the financial condition and
results of operations of the Partnership.









By:  	/s/ Walter Davis

Name:		    Walter Davis
Title:	    President of Demeter Management Corporation,
			    the general partner of the Partnership

Date:		    November 14, 2007
# C_2014151EN.01002002.xml

| 19.5.2014 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 151/20 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

19.5.2014

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 151/20

---

Action brought on 10 February 2014 — Schniga v CPVO — Brookfield New Zealand (Gala Schnitzer)

(Case T-91/14)

2014/C 151/27

Language in which the application was lodged: English

Parties

Parties

Applicant: Schniga GmbH (Bolzano, Italy) (represented by: G. Würtenberger and R. Kunze, lawyers)

Applicant:

Defendant: Community Plant Variety Office (CPVO)

Defendant:

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal: Brookfield New Zealand Ltd (Havelock North, New Zealand)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal:

Form of order sought

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | Annul the decision dated 20 September 2013 of the Board of Appeal of the Community Plant Variety Office in Case A 004/2007; |
| --- | --- |

—

Annul the decision dated 20 September 2013 of the Board of Appeal of the Community Plant Variety Office in Case A 004/2007;

| — | Order the defendant to pay the costs of the proceedings. |
| --- | --- |

—

Order the defendant to pay the costs of the proceedings.

Pleas in law and main arguments

Pleas in law and main arguments

Applicant for a Community plant variety right: The applicant

Applicant for a Community plant variety right:

Community plant variety right concerned: Gala Schnitzer — Community Plant Variety Right No. EU 18759

Community plant variety right concerned:

Decision of the Committee of the CPVO: Upheld the Community plant variety right

Decision of the Committee of the CPVO:

Decision of the Board of Appeal: Found the appeal well founded and annulled the contested decision

Decision of the Board of Appeal:

Pleas in law: Infringement of Articles 61 (1) (b), 55 (4), 59 (3) and 62 of the Council Regulation No. 2100/94.

Pleas in law:

---
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS AS OF AND FOR THE THREE MONTHS ENDED SEPTEMBER
30, 2000, AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL
STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-2000
<PERIOD-START>                             JUL-01-2000
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-2000
<CASH>                                           8,802
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                    4,102
<ALLOWANCES>                                     (144)
<INVENTORY>                                      4,387
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                17,577
<PP&E>                                           6,542
<DEPRECIATION>                                 (4,512)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  33,709
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            4,554
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                            35
<OTHER-SE>                                       8,922
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    33,709
<SALES>                                          4,068
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                 4,068
<CGS>                                            2,595
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                    5,181
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 511
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                (1,490)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            (1,490)
<DISCONTINUED>                                      22
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   (1,468)
<EPS-BASIC>                                     (0.42)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (0.42)


</TABLE>
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 03-1641

ZIA UL HASSAN,

Petitioner,

versus

JOHN ASHCROFT,

Respondent.

No. 03-1642

LUBNA ZIA,

Petitioner,

versus

JOHN ASHCROFT,

Respondent.

No. 03-1643

MOHAMMAD ZIA,

Petitioner,
2

versus

JOHN ASHCROFT,

Respondent.

On Petitions for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration

Appeals. (A76-773-569, A76-773-205, A76-773-376)

Submitted: November 21, 2003 Decided: December 16, 2003

Before LUTTIG, SHEDD, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.

Petitions denied by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Twinckle K. Vaidya, Richard S. Bromberg, Washington, D.C., for

Petitioners. Peter D. Keisler, Assistant Attorney General, Margaret

J. Perry, Senior Litigation Counsel, Jacqueline R. Dryden, Office

of Immigration Litigation, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

Washington, D.C., for Respondent.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
*

 Finally, while we do not have jurisdiction to consider the

denial of the asylum claims as untimely, we retain jurisdiction to

consider the denials of the requests for withholding of removal and

protection under the Convention Against Torture as they are not

subject to the one-year time limitation. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.4(a)

3

PER CURIAM:

Zia Ul Hassan and his wife, Lubna Zia, and son, Mohammad Zia,

natives and citizens of Pakistan, petition for review of an order

of the Board of Immigration Appeals ("Board"). The order affirmed,

without opinion, the immigration judge's order denying their

applications for asylum, withholding of removal and protection

under the Convention Against Torture. For the reason discussed

below, we deny the petitions for review.

The immigration judge found Hassan’s and his family’s asylum

claims were untimely and they failed to offer any explanation to

demonstrate a change in circumstances or extraordinary

circumstances excusing the late filing of the applications for

asylum. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B) (2000); 8 C.F.R. §

1208.4(a)(4), (5) (2003). We conclude we lack jurisdiction to

review the immigration judge’s ruling pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §

1158(a)(3) (2000). See Castellano-Chacon v. INS, 341 F.3d 533, 544

(6th Cir. 2003); Tarrawally v. Ashcroft, 338 F.3d 180, 185-86 (3d

Cir. 2003); Tsevegmid v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 1231, 1235 (10th Cir.

2003); Fahim v. United States Attorney Gen., 278 F.3d 1216, 1217-18

(11th Cir. 2002); Hakeem v. INS, 273 F.3d 812, 815 (9th Cir. 2001);

Ismailov v. Reno, 263 F.3d 851, 854-55 (8th Cir. 2001).*
(2003). However, in their brief, Hassan and his family do not

specifically challenge the denial of these two forms of relief.

4

Accordingly, we deny the petitions for review. We dispense

with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are

adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument

would not aid the decisional process.

PETITIONS DENIED
N O T FO R PUB L ICAT IO N UNITED STATES C OUR T OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH C IR C UIT DW IGHT C LAYTON B E LTON, Plaintiff - Appe lla nt, v. R ANDY GR OUNDS, W arde n; e t a l., De fe nda

nts - Appe lle e s. No. 13-15927 D.C . No. 3:11-c v-06360-C RB M EM O R ANDUM *

Appe a l from

the Unite d

Stat e s Distric t C ourt for the Northe rn Distric t of C a lifornia C ha rle s R . B re y e r, Distric t

Judge , Pre siding Subm itte d

June 12, 2014 ** B e fore : M c KEOW

N , WA RDLAW , a

nd M . SM ITH, C irc uit Judge s. Form e r C a lifornia

sta te prisone r Dwight C la

yton B e l ton a

ppe a ls pro sefrom the d istric t c o urt’ s sum

m ary judgm e nt dismissing his 42 U.S.C . § 1983 a c tion a lle ging e qua l prote c t ion viola t ions a rising from

an a lle ge dly

ra c ia lly disc rim inatory

c a nte e n inc ide nt. W e have jurisdic tion under 28 U.S.C . § 1291. 

# FIL ED JUN 18 2014 M OLLY C. DW Y ER, CLERK U . S . CO URT O F APPEALS

* This disposition is not a ppropria te for public at ion a

nd is not pre c e de nt e xc e pt a s provide d

by 9th C ir. R . 36-3. ** The pa

ne l una nim ously c onc lude s this c a se is suita ble for de c ision without oral a

rgum e nt. Se eFe d. R . App. P. 34(a)(2).W e re vie wde novo, Ford v . C ity of Yak ima , 706 F.3d 1188, 1192 (9th C i r. 2013), and we a ffirm . The distric t c ourt prope rly grante d sum

m a ry judgm e nt be c a

use B e l ton fa ile d to ra ise a ge nuine issue of m ate ria l fa c t a s to whe the r de fe nda nts a c te d with a

n inte nt or purposeto disc rim inate a ga inst him on the ba sis of his ra c e . Se eFurnac e v . Sulliva n , 705 F.3d 1021, 1030 (9th C ir. 2013) (“ To sta te a c l a im unde r 42 U.S.C . § 1983 for a

viola tion of theEqua l Prote c tion C la u se of the Fourte e nth Am e ndm e nt a

pla intiff m

ust show tha

t the de fe nda

nts a c te d with a

n inte nt or purpose to disc rim inate a g a inst thepla intiff ba se d upon m e m be rship in a

prote c te d c la ss.” (c ita

tion a nd inte rna l quota

tion m a rks om itte d)). The distric t c ourt did not a buse its disc re tion in deny ing B e l ton’ s m otion for a ppointm e nt of c ounse l be c a use B e lton fa ile d to de m onstra te e xc e ptiona l c irc um s ta nc e s . Se ePalme r v . Valde z , 560 F.3d 965, 970 (9th C ir. 2009) (se tting forth sta nda rd of re vie w a

nd e xpla i ning “ e xc e ptiona l c irc um sta nc e s” re quire m e nt). The distric t c ourt did not a buse its disc re tion in deny ing B e l ton’ s re que sts to c onduc t a dditional disc ove ry of e y e witne sse s. Se eTatum v . C i ty of San Franc isc o , 441 F.3d 1090, 1100-01 (9th C ir. 2006) (se tting forth sta nda rd of re v ie w a

nd e xpla ining tha

t sum m ary judgm e nt is a

ppropria t e “ [a ] b se nt a showing by . . . [pla intiff] tha

t a d d itiona l disc o ve ry

would ha v e re ve a le d spe c ific fa c ts pre c luding 2 1 3 - 1 5 9 2 7sum

m ary judgm e nt” ). W e re je c t B e lton’ s c onte ntion tha t the distric t c ourt did not provide him with a fa i r opportunity

to prose c ute his c a se . AFFIRM E D .

3 1 3 - 1 5 9 2 7
III

103D CONGRESS

2D SESSION S. RES. 213

To express the sense of the Senate that May 18, 1994, should be recognized

as ‘‘Senior Power Day’’.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

MAY 11 (legislative day, MAY 2), 1994

Mr. RIEGLE (for himself and Mr. LEVIN) submitted the following resolution;

which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary

RESOLUTION

To express the sense of the Senate that May 18, 1994,

should be recognized as ‘‘Senior Power Day’’.

Whereas Senior Power Day is a Michigan organization which

annually brings together 4,000 to 8,000 senior citizens in

order to educate them about issues concerning senior citizens and to communicate with Federal and State lawmakers about those issues;

Whereas Senior Power Day is officially recognized by the

White House Conference on Aging;

Whereas on May 18, 1994, Senior Power Day again will

gather at the State Capitol in Lansing, Michigan;

Whereas this year’s gathering is the 20th such gathering;

Whereas the theme of this year’s gathering is ‘‘Senior Power:

Celebrating 20 Years of Effective Advocacy’’;
2

•SRES 213 IS

Whereas as part of this year’s gathering, Senior Power Day

will host a hearing of the Special Committee on Aging of

the United States Senate; and

Whereas Senior Power Day advocates issues of concern to

citizens of all ages and has emphasized the need to adopt

a national health insurance plan and has stressed the

intergenerational benefits of adequate health care, longterm care, and school reform: Now, therefore, be it

1 Resolved, That it is the sense of the Senate that May

2 18, 1994, should be recognized as ‘‘Senior Power Day’’.
#### § 1.263A-6 Rules for foreign persons. [Reserved]
#### Zach v. Bak et ux.

*James F. Swartz,*for plaintiff.

*Joseph Bah,*for defendants.

September 12, 1952.

Flood, J.,

Plaintiff’s bill seeks specific performance of an oral promise to give a mortgage on defendants’ home as security for loans made by plaintiff in the amount of $2,000. Defendants filed preliminary objections interposing the statute of frauds as to realty: Act of March 21, 1772, 1 Sm. L. 389, 33 PS §1.

Thus is raised a question which has never been directly decided in any reported case in Pennsylvania: whether the statute of frauds prevents specific performance of an oral promise to give a mortgage as security for a loan. Such a promise is one instance in the class of cases categorized as “equitable mortgages”, which have received attention in other jurisdictions. See 5 Tiffany, Law of Real Property, §1563 (1939); Osborne, Handbook on the Law of Mortgages (1951). As a result there is highly persuasive precedent on the specific question here.

The well-established view of other jurisdictions is that such an oral promise is within the statute of frauds: Pattillo v. Tucker, 216 Ala. 572, 113 So. 1 (1927); Watson v. Hobson et al., 401 Ill. 191, 81 N. E. 2d 885 (1948); Brown et al. v. Stapleton, 216 Ind. 387, 24 N. E. 2d 909 (1940); Lane et al. v. Lloyd et al., 33 Ky. L. Rep. 570, 110 S. W. 401 (1908); Kline et *120al. v. Inland Rubber Corp., (Md.), 69 A. 2d 774 (1949); Brown v. True et al., 123 Me. 288, 122 Atl. 850 (1923); Kelly v. Kelly, 54 Mich. 30, 19 N. W. 580 (1884); Hecht v. Anthony et al., 204 Minn. 432, 283 N. W. 753 (1939); Herring v. Whitford et al., 119 Neb, 725, 232 N. W. 581 (1930); Feldman v. Warshawsky et al., 125 N. J. Eq. 19, 4 A. 2d 84 (1938); Douglass v. Douglass et al., 199 Okla. 519, 188 P. 2d 221 (1947). And Justice Cardozo in the leading case of Sleeth v. Sampson et al., 237 N. Y. 69, 142 N. E. 355, 30 A. L. R. 1400 (1923), decided that the giving of the money was not such part performance as would take the case out of the statute. See Osborne, op. cit. supra, §60; cf. Walsh, Mortgages, 48, n. 30.

Plaintiff argues that a mortgage is personalty in Pennsylvania and hence not within the statute. But it is a familiar proposition that a mortgage has a double nature and is treated in this State both as an estate and as security. We think it mü'st be held to be such an “interest” in land as is within the meaning and spirit of the statute. A similar prohibition of verbal transactions governing realty can be found in the Act of 1881, P. L. 84, requiring a defeasance reducing an absolute deed to a mortgage to be in writing: Act of June 8,1881, P. L. 84, as amended, 21 PS §951. The common purpose of this act and the statute of frauds was noted in Burkhart v. Insurance Co., 11 Pa. Superior Ct. 280, 289 (1899). Defendants’ preliminary objections must therefore be sustained.

The family relationship of the parties here gives no ground on which relief can be predicated. Sympathy is not enough to take the case out of the statute. It appears to us that plaintiff is restricted to her action of assumpsit.

Preliminary objections sustained. Plaintiff may file an amended bill within 20 days.
#### Edward J. Pistey et al. *v.*Planning and Zoning Commission of the Town of Stratford et al.

Argued June 4

decided June *4, 1968*

J. *Roger Shull,*for the appellees (plaintiffs).

*Raymond B. Rubens,*for the appellant (defendant Walter B. Spencer).

The motion by the plaintiffs to dismiss the appeal from the Court of Common Pleas in Fairfield County is denied.