MAINE	SUPREME	JUDICIAL	COURT Reporter	of	Decisions Decision: 20 2 2 ME 14 Docket: Wal

- 21

- 203 Submitted

On	B riefs : December	21,	2021 Decided: February	17,	2022 Panel: STANFILL ,	C.J.,	and MEAD, GORMAN,	JABAR ,	HORTON , and CONNORS , JJ.

IN RE	CHILD	OF	KENNETH	S.

JABAR ,	J. [¶1] In	this consolidated appeal, the	father challenges	the	termination	of his	 parental	 rights	 as	 to	 his	 child	 entered	 in	 the	 District	 Court .	 	 ( Belfast, Worth, A.R.J. ).	 	 The	mother	 raises	 an	 appeal	 conditioned	 on our	 vac ating the District	 Court’s	 termination	 of the	 father’s	 parental	 rights

. 1 We	 affirm	 the judgment as	to	both	parents

. I
. BACKGROUND [¶ 2 ] The	facts are	drawn	from	the	court’s	findings,	which	were	entered after a	five

- day	consolidated	hearing and	are	supported	by	competent	record
evidence. See In	re Children	of Michelle	C. ,	2021	ME	61,	¶	2, 264 A.3d 1221

.

1 The mother argues	that,	if	we	were	to	vacate	the	trial	court’s	termination	of	parental	rights	to the	father	based	on	any	of	his	challenges,	it	would	not	be	in	the	child’s	best	interest	to	terminate	her rights.		Because	we	affirm	the	order	terminating	the	father’s	pa rental	rights,	we	need	not	reach	this argument.		Additionally,	as	discussed	below,	the	trial c ourt’s	determinations	as	to	parental	unfitness of	the	mother	and	best	interest	of	the	child	were	supported	by	competent	record	evidence.2 [¶ 3 ] Shortly	after	the	child	was	born	in	2010 , the	father was	granted sole parental	rights	and	responsibilities	and	primary	residence of the	child , and	the
mother ’s contact	was	limited	to	supervised	visits

. 2 Prior to	2018 ,	the	father	had sought	 mental	 health	 treatment	 for	 the	 child because the	 child	 was	 often dysregulated in	his	emotions	and	actions

. In	March	2018,	police	performed	a welfare	check	on	the	child’s	residence and found	the	child	locked	in	his	room.
In	an	interview , the	child stated that	his	father	dragged	him	up	the	stairs	by the hood	of	his	sweatshirt and locked him in	his	room

. The	father	was	charged	with domestic	 violence	 assault	 related	 to	 this	 incident	 and	 was	 prohibited	 from having	contact	with	the	child. 3 Pursuant	to	a	safety	plan	between	the	father	and
the Department of	Health	and	Human	Services , the child was	placed with	his maternal	grandparents but remained	in	the	father’s	custody. [¶ 4 ] After	 t he	 child	 had	 several	 behavioral incidents	 in	 April	 and May 2018 , and after healthcare	 and	 education al professionals had	 difficulty engaging	with	the	 father , the	 father	asked	the	Department	to	take	custody	of
the	child. On	May	15,	2018,	t he	Department	filed	a	petition	for	child	protection

2 Between	2010	and	201 8,	the	Department of	Health	and	Human	Services investigated	the	parents several	times	due	to	its	concern	about	the	parents’	ability	to	care	for	the	child	but	never	opened	a case.

3 This	charge	was	later	dismissed pursuant	to	a	plea	agreement	where	the f ather	pleaded	guilty to	disorderly	conduct	and	was	ordered	to	pay	a	fine.3 that	 included	 a	 request	 for	 a	 preliminary	 protection	 order.	 	 The c ourt ( Mathews, J. )	granted	the Department	custody	of	the	child	that	same	day .		The Department	continued	the	child ’s placement	with	the	maternal	grandparents. [¶ 5 ] On	August	16,	2018,	the court	( Fowle,	J. )	entered a jeopardy	order, by	agreement, as	to each parent.		The order	as	to	the	father stated	that the father caused	the	child	to	be	in	circumstances	of	jeopardy	due	to	the	threat	of	physical and	emotional	harm	and	the	deprivation	of	needed	medical	care.		The order	as to	 the	 mother stated	 that	 the mother	 posed	 “the	 threat	 of	 injury	 and the deprivation	of ad equate supervision	and	care.” [¶ 6 ] On	December	4,	2019,	the	Department	filed	a	petition	to	terminate
the parental	rights of both	parents.		On	March	9,	2020,	the	father	filed	a	motion to	 continue	 the	 termination	 hearing , and , on	March	 12,	 the	 father’s	at torney moved	for	leave	to	withdraw;	the	court ( Davis,	J. ) granted	both	motions. The father	requested	a	new	attorney

. He claim ed that his attorney	was	 to	delete certain	portions	of	the	agreed

- to	jeopardy	order ,	by	agreement	with	the	state, and	had	failed to move	the	court	to	amend	the	order	to	reflect those	deletions

. The court	 appointed	 a	 new	 attorney on	 March	 16,	 2020

. Following several further continuances ,	the petition	was	eventually	heard	over	five	days ,	almost a	year	later, on	January	25,	March 30,	April	1,	May 21,	and	May	24,	2021.4 [¶ 7 ] At	the	close	of the hearing,	the	court ( Worth,	A.R.J. ), made	no	findings or	 indication	 of	 its	 decision,	 instead	 stating	 that it was	 going	 to	 review	 the exhibits	and	statutes	and	write	a	decision	“as	quickly	as [it	could] .” T he	court , then, through	 a	 clerk,	 via	 email,	 notified	 all	 parties	 that	 it	 was	 requestin g	 a proposed	 order	 and	 findings only from	 the	 Department. The father filed	 a memorandum	objecting to the	court’s request and	“propose[d]	that no	parties provide	any	proposed	orders	and	findings	or	that all	parties provide	proposed orders	and	findings.” T he court	denied	the	father’s	objection	stating	that	it	“had ample	opportunity	to	understand	[the	father’s]	positions	taken,	and	his	likely proposed	 findings	and	 conclusions.”	 	The court received	 the	 proposed	 order and	findings	from	the	Department	on	June	9 ,	2021. [¶ 8 ] On	June	14,	2021,	the	court	entered	its	termination	order,	finding that	the	parents	were	unwilling	or	unable	to	protect	the	child	from	jeopardy	or take	 responsibility	 for	 the	 child	in	 a	 time	 reasonably	 calculated	 to	meet	 the
child’s	needs	and	that	terminat ion	was	in	the	child’s	best	interest. See 22 M.R.S. §	4055(B)(2) (a), (b)(i)

- (ii)

. [¶ 9 ] The	court	found	the	father	unfit	based	on the	child’s	high	needs,	the father’s	own	mental	health	needs , the	father’s erratic	therapy	attendance, the father’s claim	tha t	he	was	in	therapy only because	the	Department	demanded5 it, the Department’s need	 to	 suspend	 visits	 because	 of	 the	 inappropriate
interactions between	the	father	and	the	child that	upset	the	child	to	the	point where	 the	child	no	longer	wanted	 to	attend	 visits,	and the	 father’s continual denial	 of	 the	 inappropriateness	 of	 his	 actions	 that caused	 the	 need	 for the Department ’s involvement

. [¶1 0 ] The	court	found	the	mother	unfit based	on	her significant	health needs	 that	had	occasionally	led	 to	her	being	hospitalized,	and because ,	since April 2019, she ha d seen the	 child only while	 supervised. The	 mother had
declined to	have more	frequent	visits	with	the	child	and	ha d stated that she	d id
not	believe that	she could parent	the	child	on	a	regular	basis. [¶1 1 ] The	court	found	that	the child’s	well

- being	ha d improved	since	he began	living with	his	grandparents

. The	child	also	expressed	his	desire	to	stay with	his	grandp arents. [¶1 2 ] Both	parents	timely	appealed. See 22	M.R.S.	§	4006	(2021) ;	M.R. App. P. 2B(c)(1)

. [¶1 3 ] On	July	2,	2021,	the	father	also	filed	a	motion	for	relief	from	the judgment , alleging	 ineffective	 assistance	 of	 counsel	 by	 the	 father’s	 first attorney

. 4 M.R.	Civ.	P.	60(b). On	October	20,	2021, the court ( Martin,	J. ), denied

4 On	August	20,	2021,	we	permitted	the	trial	court	to	act	on	the	father’s	motion	for	relief.6 the	 father’s	 motion , stating that the	 father had failed	 to	 make	 a	 prima	 facie showing	of	ineffective	ass istance	of	counsel	and that the	motion	was	untimely filed.
II
. DISCUSSION [¶1 4 ] On	appeal,	the	father	raises	three	arguments.		He	argues that the court	erred	by	denying his	request	to submit	a	proposed	order	while	allowing the	Department	to	submit	a	proposed	order ,	and	such	an	error amount ed to	the denial	of	a	closing	argument	and	violate d his	procedural	due	process	rights .		He also	argues	that	the	trial	court	used	language	in	its	orde r	that	inappropriately shifted	 the	 burden	 of	 persuasion	 to	 the	 father. 5 Finally,	 he	 argues	 that	 his attorneys	provided	ineffective	assistance	of	counsel,	necessitating	remand.
A
. Due	Process [¶1 5 ] T he	father	contends	that	the	court	was required to	allow	him	to present	a	proposed	order	and	that	the	court’s	failure	to	allow	him	to	present

5 This	argument,	based	on	the	court’s	imprecise	use	of	language,	is	unpersuasive ,	a nd	does	not warrant	 extended	 discussion .	 	 A	 review	 of	 the	 decision	 as	 a	 whole	 demonstrates	 that	 the	 court properly	 placed	 the	 burden	 of	 persuasion	 on	 the	 Department.	 	 The	 burden	 remains	 on	 the Department	at	all	times	to	prove	parental	unfitness	by	clear	an d	convincing	evidence. See,	e.g. , In	re Forest	G. ,	2017	ME	26,	¶	4,	155	A.3d	879.7 proposed	 findings while	requesting	 that the Department present a proposed
order	and findings was	a	violation	of	due process. 6 [¶1 6 ] The	 state	 must	 use	 procedures	 that	 align	 with	 due	 process requirements	when	terminating	parental	rights. In	re	C.P. ,	2016	ME	18,	¶ 17, 132	A.3d	174

. This	requirement allow s	for “an	opportunity	to	be	heard	upon such	notice	and	proceedings	as	are	adequate	to	safeguard	the	right	which	the particular	 pertinent	 constitutional	 provision	 purports	 to	 protect.” In	 re Alexander	 D. ,	 1998	 ME	 207,	 ¶	 13 , 716	 A.2d	 222 (quotation	 marks	 omitted ). Courts	determine	if	there	has	been	a	due	process	violation	based	on (1)	 the	private	interest	 that	will	be	affected	by	 the	government ’ s action;	(2)	the	risk	of	an	erroneous	deprivation	of	such	an	interest through	 the	 existing	 procedure	 and	 the probable	 utility	 of additional	 or	 substitute	 procedural	 safeguards;	 and	 (3)	 the government ’ s	 interest	 in	 adhering	 to	 the	 existing	 procedure, including	 the	 fiscal	 and	 administrative	 burdens	 that	 additional procedures	might	entail.
Id. (quotation	marks	omit ted). We “review	de	novo	whether	an	individual	was afforded	procedural	due	process

. ” In	re Children	of	Benjamin	M ,	2019	ME	147, ¶	8 ,	216	A.3d	901.

6 The	father	also	contends	that	not	allowing him to	submit	a	proposed	order	is	akin	to	not	allowing him	 to	 make	 a	 closing	 argument.	 	 However,	 even	 if	 we	 equate	 a	 proposed	 order	 with	 a	 closing argument,	there	is	no	right	to make	or submit	a	closing	argument	in child	protection	proceedings

. See In	re	M.B

. ,	2013	ME	46,	¶¶	26

- 29,	65	A.3d	1260 (holding	that	parents	in	a	termination	of	parental rights	 proceeding	 “are	 not	 entitled	 to	 closing	 argument	 as	 a	 matter	 of	 right” (quotation	 marks omitted) ).8 [¶1 7 ] When	 addressing	 a	 due	 process	 challenge,	 the	 first factor	 we consider	is	the	private	interest	that	will	be	affected	by	the	court’s	action.		The private	 interest	 at	 issue	 here	 involves	 the	 termination	 of	 a	 parent’s constitutional	right	to	raise	his	children,	and we	have	held	that “ parents	must be	afforded the	utmost	in	procedural	protection	when	the	state	deprives	them of	their	parental	rights.” In	re	Chelsea	C. ,	2005	ME	105,	¶	11,	884	A.2d	97 (citing Santosky	v.	Kramer ,	455 U.S.	745,	753	(1982) ). This	 factor	weighs	heavily	in favor	 of	 requiring a court t o allow a	parent to	 submit a proposed order	and findings when allowing the	 Department	 to	 submit	 a	 proposed	 order	 and findings. [¶1 8 ] The	second	factor	involves	a	determination	of	whether	the	process adopted	carries	a	“risk	of an erroneous	deprivation	. .	.	and [of] the	probable utility	of	additional	or	substitute	procedural	safeguards.” In	 re	Alexander	D. , 1998	ME	207,	¶	13,	716	A.2d	222 (quotation	marks	omitted)

. At	the	conclusion of	the	hearings,	the	trial	court	did	not	render	a	decision

. R ather , it	indicated that	it	would	review	the	evidence	and	“write	a	decision	as	quickly	as	[it	could].” The	process	the t rial c ourt	used	here

— where	only	the Department was allowed
to	 submit a	 proposed	 order

— could	 have	 had	 a	 significant	 impact	 upon	 the9

cour t’s	decision.		The	obvious	procedural	safeguard	would	have	been	to	allow the	father	to	submit	a	proposed	order	and	findings. [¶1 9 ] The	 third	 factor	 in	 a	 procedural	 due	 process	 analysis

— the additional	fiscal	and	administrative	burden	associated	with	adopt ing	any	extra procedural	safeguards

— also	weighs	in	favor	of	the	father.		Allowing	the	father to	 submit	 a	 proposed	 order	 and	 findings	 would have	 imposed	 a	 negligible
administrative	burden on the	court. [¶ 20 ] After	considering	all	the	factors, we	conclude that the t rial c ourt erred because its	refusal to	allow the	 father to	submit	a	proposed	order	and findings	 while	 simultaneously requesting that the	 Department	 to	 submit	 a proposed	order and	findings involved	a significant	private	interest	and	carried an	inherent	risk	of	an	erroneous	deprivation	of	his	parental	rights. [¶ 2 1]	 	When	 the	 court	 chooses	 to	 allow or	 request	 the submission	 of proposed orders and	findings or	to	allow oral	argument , it may not extend	the opportunity	to	one	side	and	not	the	other.		If	the	court	has	yet	to	rule, a request for	argument	or	a	proposed	order is	in	substance	an	invitation	 for	advocacy, and	the	opportunity	to	advocate,	if	it	is	granted,	must	be	extended	equally. 7 The

7 If	the	court’s	request	is	made	after	the	court	has	ruled,	the	request	can	be	made	of	the	prevailing party	 only,	 but	 good	 practice,	 if	 not	 due	 process,	 calls	 for	 the	 opposing	 party	 to	 be	 allowed	 to comment	on	whether	the	prevailing	party’s	submi ssion accu rately	reflects	the	court’s	ruling.10 principle	of	equality	of	access	to	the	courts	is	rooted	in	the	Due	Process	Clause of	the	United	States	Constitution. See Harrington	v.	Harrington ,	269	A.2d	310, 314	(Me.	1970) (“[E]qual	access	to	the	civil	courts	was	among	the	Fourteenth Amendment’s	 prim ary	 objectives.”);	U.S. Const. amend. XIV .	 	 In	 this	instance, given	 that	 the	court	had	not	 yet	 ruled,	 the	court	should	not	have	invited	 the Department	to	submit	a	proposed	order	without	affording	the	father	the	same opportunity. 8 [¶ 22 ] Notwithstanding	the	trial	court’s	error, to	assert	a	procedural	due process	error	on	appeal , a	party	must	articulate	an	identifiable	prejudice. The	vacating	of	an	order	entered	after	a	procedural	error	is	not automatic. To	 vacate	 such	an	 order,	 this	 Court must	 determine that	 it	 was	 entered	 after	 a	 process	 that	 was	 “inconsistent	 with substantial	 justice.” M.R.	 Civ.	 P.	 61. We	 have	 held	 that	 an appellant,	 to	 be	 successful,	 must	 demonstrate	 both	 error	 and prejudice	resulting	to	the	appellant	from	the	claimed error. S

. Me.	Props.	Co.	v.	Johnson ,	1999	ME	37,	¶	9,	724	A.2d	1255

. [¶ 23 ] Here,	the	court’s procedural error did	not prejudice	the father

. In terms	 of	 prejudicing a parent ’ s	 case,	we	 have	 stated	 “[i]n	 termination	 cases, where	fundamental	interests	are	at	stake,	due	process	requires:	notice	of	the issues,	an	opportunity	to	be	heard, the	right	to	introduce	evidence	and	present

8 We	focus	on	the	requirements	of	the	U.S.	Constitution	because	the	father	has	based	his	appeal solely	on	a	claim	of	a	violation	of	the	Due	Process	Clause	of	the	U.S.	Constitution.11 witnesses, the	 right	 to	 respond	 to	 claims	 and	 evid ence,	 and	 an	 impartial fact

- finder.” In	re	Child	of	James	R. ,	2018	ME	50,	¶	17,	182	A.3d	1252 (quotation marks	omitted)

. Here,	 the	 father	had	notice	of	 the	issues	and	had a	 five

- day hearing where	 he testified	 and	 responded to	 the	 claims	 and	 evidence	 the Department	 presented	 against	 him.	 	 The	 concern	 is	 whether	 the t rial c ourt, having access only to	the	Department’s	proposed	findings,	could be an	impartial fact

- finder. The	 father does	not	challenge the	court’s	independent	judgment, stating	that	“[t]his	case	has	nothing	to	do	with	whether	the	trial	court	exercised its	 ‘judicial	 function’	 or	 ‘independent	 judgment.’” Even	 if	 this	 had	 been challenged , however, the	 record indicates that	 the	 court	 did ex ercise	 its independent	 judgment	 and	 did not	 adopt	 the	 Department’s	 proposed	 order
verbatim

. See In re	Marpheen	C. ,	2002	ME	170,	¶ 7,	812	A.2d	972 (“[A]	verbatim adoption	 of	 findings	 proposed	 by	 one	 party	 .

. . is	 disfavored,	 as	 such	 an approach	suggests	that	the	court	has	not	applied its independent	judgment in making	its	findings	and	conclusions. ”). [¶ 24 ] A r eview of the	record indicates that the t rial c ourt’s	decision	to accept a proposed	order	and	findings only from	the	Department did	not	affect the	outcome	of	the	case.12 [¶ 25 ] The t rial c ourt	identified	two	bases	of	parental	unfitness as	to the parent s — (1) the ir unwilling ness or inability to	protect	the	child	from	jeopardy
and the	 unlikelihood these	 circumstances would change	 within	 a	 time reasonably	calculated	to	meet	the	child’s	needs	and (2) their	unwillingness	or inability to	take	responsibility	for	the	child	within	a	time	reasonably	c alculated

to meet the	child’s needs. 22 M.R.S.	§ 4055(B)(2)(b)(i)

- (ii)

. The	court ’s findings with	 regard	 to	 the	 father’s	 unfitness	 were	 fully	 supported	 by	 the	 testimony presented	 during	 the	 trial	 that	 demonstrated, inter	 alia , that	 the	 father struggled	 to	 attend	 therapy,	 declined	 to	 engage	 with	 intensive	 outpatient therapy,	 did	 not	 engage	 in	 pare nting	 classes	 despite	 urging	 from	 the Department,	and	had	multiple	inappropriate	visits	with	the	child.		The	father himself testified	that	he	did	not	completely	recognize	that	locking	the	child	in his	room	was	inappropriate

. He	also	 testified	 that	he was attending	 therapy only	 because	 the	 Department	 required	 him	 to	 do	 so .	 	 The	 court ’s	 decision concerning	 the	 mother	 was	 supported	 by	 testimony that ,	 during the	 period between	the	jeopardy	hearing	and	the trial, the	mother	had	been	hospitalized several	times d ue to	her	mental	illness	and had	declined	to	expand	visitation because	she	did	not	feel	capable	of	being	a	mother.13 [¶ 26 ] With	 regard	 to	 the	 best	 interest	 of	 the	 child, the	 trial court ’s
conclusion was	supported	by testimony	 from	school	officials,	social	workers, therapists,	 and	 the	 father about the	 child’s	 extensive	 needs	 and	 the	 child’s improvements	since	living	with his grandparents. Notably,	the	mother agrees with the court’s	determination	on	best	interest, ass erting ,	on	appeal,	that	she “believ es it	 is	 in	 her	 child’s	 best	 interests	 that	 both	 parents’	 rights	 be
terminated.” [¶ 27 ] In	summary, the	 trial	court’s	procedural	error	did	not	prejudice the	father’s	due	process	rights	because	the	error	did	not affect	the	outcome	of
the	case.		T he	record	contains	overwhelming	evidence	 to	support	 the	court’s determinations	that	the	parents	were	unfit	and	that	termination	of	their	rights was	in	the	best	interest	of	the	child

. B
. Ineffective	Assistance	of	Counsel [¶ 28 ] The	father	also	argues	that	his first	attorney rendered	ineffective assistance	 of	 counsel	 when he failed to	 delete	 certain	 portions of the	 initial jeopardy	order, resulting	in some	facts being erroneously deemed	admitted for future	proceedings , and	t h at his	second	attorney then failed	to	make	a	timely challenge	 to	 the	 jeopardy	 order	 based	 on	 the	 first	 attorney’s	 ineffective
assistance. When	analyzing	a claim	of ineffective	assistance	of	counsel,	w e use14 the Strickland standard,	 which	 requires	 proof	 of deficient	 performance	 and resulting	 prejudice. See Strickland	 v.	Washington ,	 466	U.S.	 668,	 687	 (1984) ; In re	 M.P. ,	 2015	 ME	 138,	 ¶¶ 23

- 27,	 126	 A.3d	 718

. We	 have stated that the procedural	requirements	 for	a claim	of ineffective	assistance at	 the jeopardy stage	 are	 the	 same	 as those	 required	 at the	 termination

- of

- parental

- rights stage. In	re	Child	of	Radience	K. ,	2019	ME	73,	¶	59,	208	A.3d	380 .		These	claims can	be	raised	on	“direct	appeal	if	the	record	already	contains	the	basis	for	the claim.” Id. ¶	58. We	have emphasized that the	“need	for	a	swift	resolution	of ineffectiveness	claims	at	the	termination	stage	of	child	protection proceeding s applies just	as	forcefully	at	the	jeopardy	stage.” Id. ¶	59 ( citation	and quotation marks	omitted)

. [¶ 29 ] Although the	 initial	 jeopardy	 order	 was	 entered	 before our decision	in Radience	K. , either of	 the	 father’s attorneys	could	have	raised	 the
issue s with	the	jeopardy	order when Radience	K. was	published

. Because the father had	specifically	raised	issues	with	how	the	first	attorney	had	handled	the jeopardy	 order	 when	 the father’s	 first	 attorney was replaced,	 the	 father’s second	attorney	was	on	notice	of	the	issues. That	attorney failed	to	raise	those
issues until	after	the	c ourt	terminated	the	father’s	parental	rights

. A lthough	the father’s	claim	of	ineffective	assistance	of	counsel	concerning	the	jeopardy	order15 is	not	timely,	we	nonetheless	address	it	in	the	context	of	the	appeal	from	the order	terminating	his	parental	righ ts. 9 [¶ 30 ] We begin	 our	 analysis	 by considering	 the	 second	 prong	 of	 the Strickland test,	determining whether	any	potential	deficient	performance	was prejudicial

. W e review	 this	 prong	 by	 examining “whether [the] ineffective assistance	 of	 counsel	 rose	 to	 the	level	 of	 compromising	 the	 reliability	 of	 the judgment	and	undermining	confidence	in	it.” In	re	Children	of	Jeremy	A. , 2018 ME	 82, ¶	 21,	 187	 A.3d	 602 (alteration	 and	 quotation	 marks	 omitted)

. Importantly,	 this appeal is	 a	 challenge	 to	 the	 termination	 of the	 father’s parental	rights,	not to the	jeopardy	order	or	the	court’s	ruling	on	the father’s
Rule 60(b)	motion.		Ultimately,	while	the	father argues that there	were	several
ways in	which he was	prejudiced,	he	fails	to	show	how	the	court’s decision	to
terminat e his	parental	rights	was	affected	by his	attorneys’	failure	to move	the

court	to amend	the jeopardy	order ,	for	at	least	two	reasons .		First,	it	is	unclear how	much	of	 the	jeopardy	order the	 father	now	disputes.		Second,	while	 the

t rial c ourt	 referred	 to	 the	 jeopardy	 order	 in	 its order terminatin g parental

9 “To	bring	a	claim of	ineffective assistance	of	counsel	.	.	.	on	direct	appeal	.	.	.	the	parent	making the	claim	must	submit	a	signed	and	sworn	affidavit	stating,	with	specificity,	the	basis	for	the	claim.” In	 re	M.P. ,	2015	ME	138,	¶	21,	126	A.3d	718. The	 father	submitted	a	 two

- page	affi davit	with	 the appellant’s	brief	on	October	12,	2021.16 rights,	 it	 also	 relied	 on the testimony	 of numerous witnesses,	 including	 the father ’s	 testimony and	 reports	 of	events	 occurring	in	 the almost three	 years between	 entry	 of	 the	 jeopardy	 order	 and	 the	 termination	 of	 parental	 rights hearing. Nothing	in	the	record	indicates that	any	of	the agreed

- upon	findings
at	 issue made	 any	 difference	 in	 the	 trial	 court’s	 decision	 to	 terminate his parent al	rights. Because	the	father	fails	to	show	how	changes	to	the	jeopardy order	would	have	changed	that	outcome,	the	 father fails to prove the	second prong	of	the Strickland test, prejudice. [¶ 3 1] Because	we conclude that	any	potential	ineffective	assistance	of counsel	rendered	by	the	father’s	attorney s did	not result	in	any prejudice to	his

case,	 we do not	 address the	 first	 prong	 of	 the Strickland test, whether	 the
assistance	rendered to	him was deficient

. III
. CO NCLUSION [¶ 32 ] Although	we	conclude	that	the	trial	court erred	by requesting	and receiving a	 proposed	 order	 and	 findings only from	 the	 Department and rejecting	 the	 father’s	 request	 to	 submit	 a	 proposed	 order	 and	 findings ,	 the father	was not	denied	due	process	because	he	was not	prejudiced	by the trial court’s	error.		Furthermore,	 the	 father	 failed	 to	prove his claim	of ineffective
assistance of	cou nsel

.17 The	entry	is: Judgment	affirmed.

Rory	A.	McNamara,	Esq.,	Drake	Law	LLC,	York,	for	appellant f ather Joseph	W.	Baiungo,	Esq.,	Belfast,	for	appellant m other Aaron	M.	Frey,	Attorney	General,	and	Hunter	C.	Umphrey,	Asst.	Atty.	Gen.,	Office of	t he	Attorney	General,	Augusta,	for	appellee	Department	of	Health	and	Human Services

Belfast	District	Court	docket	number	PC

- 2018

- 11 F OR C LERK R EFERENCE O NLY