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EMERGING UNITED STATES DEFENSE CHALLENGES 

AND WORLDWIDE THREATS 

HEARINGS 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

FEBRUARY 9 AND DECEMBER 6, 2016 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov/ 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona, Chairman 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma 

JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama 

ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi 

KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire 

DEB FISCHER, Nebraska 

TOM COTTON, Arkansas 

MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota 

JONI ERNST, Iowa 

THOM TILLIS, North Carolina 

DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska 

MIKE LEE, Utah 

LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina 

TED CRUZ, Texas 

JACK REED, Rhode Island 

BILL NELSON, Florida 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri 

JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York 

RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut 

JOE DONNELLY, Indiana 

MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii 

TIM KAINE, Virginia 

ANGUS S. KING, JR., Maine 

MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico 

CHRISTIAN D. BROSE, Staff Director 

ELIZABETH L. KING, Minority Staff Director 

(II)

C O N T E N T S 

FEBRUARY 9, 2016 

Page 

WORLDWIDE THREATS .............................................................................................. 1 

Clapper, Honorable James R., Jr., Director of National Intelligence .................. 5 

Stewart, Lieutenant General Vincent R., USMC, Director of the Defense 

Intelligence Agency .............................................................................................. 43 

DECEMBER 6, 2016 

Page 

EMERGING UNITED STATES DEFENSE CHALLENGES AND WORLDWIDE THREATS .. 95 

Keane, General John M., USA (Ret.), Chairman, Institute for the Study 

of War, and Former Vice Chief of Staff of the Army ........................................ 99 

Brimley, Shawn, Executive Vice President and Director of Studies, The Center for a New American Security ........................................................................ 110 

Kagan, Robert, Senior Fellow, Project on International Order and Strategy, 

The Brookings Institution ................................................................................... 121 

(III)

(1) 

WORLDWIDE THREATS 

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 9, 2016 

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m. in Room 

SD–G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator John McCain 

(chairman) presiding. 

Committee members present: Senators McCain, Inhofe, Sessions, 

Ayotte, Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Sullivan, Lee, Reed, Nelson, McCaskill, Manchin, Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Donnelly, 

Hirono, Kaine, King, and Heinrich. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN, CHAIRMAN 

Chairman MCCAIN. Well, good morning. The Senate Armed Services Committee meets this morning to receiving testimony on the 

global threats faced by the United States and our allies as part of 

our oversight of the President’s Defense Budget Request for Fiscal 

Year 2017. 

I’d like to welcome back Director of National Intelligence James 

Clapper and the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, General Vincent Stewart. 

As this is likely his final appearance before this committee at our 

annual Worldwide Threats hearing, I’d like to thank Director Clapper for over five decades of service to protecting our country. Director Clapper, and particularly we thank you for leading the men and 

women who strive every day to collect and analyze the information 

that helps keep America strong. I thank you for being with us 

today. I’ve had the honor of knowing you for a long time, and I 

know of no individual who has served this Nation with more distinction and honor. We’re grateful for your service. We know that 

that service will continue in the years to come. 

The list of the threats confronting our Nation is drearily familiar, 

yet it is impossible to say we have seen much improvement. In Afghanistan, 9,800 American troops are still in harm’s way, the 

Taliban, al-Qaeda, and the Haqqani Network continue to threaten 

our interests in Afghanistan and beyond. Now ISIL [the Islamic 

State of Iraq and the Levant] has arrived on the battlefield, raising 

the specter of yet another ISIL safe—to plan and execute attacks; 

regional order in the Middle East is breaking down, and this power 

vacuum is being filled by the most extreme and anti-American of 

forces; Sunni terrorist groups such as ISIL and al-Qaeda; Shiite extremists, such as the Islamic Republic of Iran and its proxies; and 

the imperial ambitions of Vladimir Putin. ISIL has consolidated 

2 

control over key territories in Syria and Iraq. It is metastasizing 

around the region and expanding globally from Afghanistan, as I 

said, as well as to Lebanon, Yemen, Egypt, and, most worryingly, 

to Libya. It has also conducted or inspired attacks from Beirut to 

Istanbul, Paris to San Bernardino. More than a year into our military campaign against ISIL, it’s impossible to say ISIL is losing 

and we are winning. 

At the same time, Iran continues to challenge regional order in 

the Middle East by developing a ballistic missile capability, supporting terrorism, training and arming pro-Iranian militant groups, 

and engaging in other malign activities in places such—Iraq, Syria, 

Lebanon, Gaza, Bahrain, and Yemen. As the Islamic Republic receives tens of billions of dollars in sanctions relief from the nuclear 

deal, it’s obvious that these activities will only increase. 

Russia annexed Crimea and continues to destabilize Ukraine 

with troubling implications for security in Europe. Putin’s intervention in Syria has undermined negotiations to end the conflict by 

convincing Assad and his allies they can win. 

In Asia, North Korea continues to develop its nuclear arsenal 

and ever more capable ballistic missiles, one of which it tested this 

weekend, in violation of multiple U.N. Security Council resolutions. 

China continues its rapid military modernization while taking coercive actions to assert expansive territorial claims. At the time of 

this hearing last year, China had reclaimed a total of 400 acres in 

the Spratly Islands. Today, that figure is a staggering 3,200 acres, 

with extensive infrastructure construction underway or already 

complete. 

I look forward to our witnesses’ assessment of the nature and 

scope of these challenges and how the intelligence community 

prioritizes and approaches the diverse and complex threats we face. 

As policymakers, we look to the intelligence community to provide 

timely and accurate information about the nature of the threats we 

face and the intentions of our adversaries. We have high expectations of our intelligence community, as we should, and as they do 

of themselves. However, we cannot afford to believe that our intelligence agencies are omniscient and omnipresent, especially after 

years of sequestration and arbitrary budget caps that have damaged our Nation’s intelligence every bit as much as they have the 

rest of our national defense. 

Unfortunately, this misperception is only fed by the prideful assertions of politicians seeking to justify their policies. For example, 

during the Iran deal, we were told that the United States has, 

quote, ‘‘absolute knowledge about Iran’s nuclear military activities.’’ 

We were told that the deal, quote, ‘‘absolutely guarantees that we 

will know if Iran cheats and pursues a nuclear option.’’ This hubris 

is dangerously misleading and compromises the integrity of our debate over important questions of U.S. national security policy. 

Americans must know that intelligence is not like in the movies. 

Although our intelligence professionals are the best in the world, 

there will not always be a satellite in position or a drone overhead, 

and not every terrorist phone call will be intercepted. Whether it 

is Russian military activities on the border of NATO [the North Atlantic Treaty Organization] or the movement of terrorist groups 

across the world or of any of the other number of hard targets that 

3 

we expect our intelligence community to penetrate and understand, 

we will not always know how our adversaries make decisions, let 

alone understand their implications. 

This is doubly true if we further constrain our Nation’s intelligence professionals through policy decisions that limit their effectiveness. Our intelligence capacity and capability are just like anything else, constrained by the limitations of time, space, technology, 

resources, and policy. As one senior U.S. official acknowledged 

about limited understanding of ISIL 2 years ago, quote, ‘‘A lot of 

the intelligence collection that we were receiving diminished significantly following the United States withdrawal in Iraq in 2011, 

when we lost some of the boots-on-the-ground view of what was 

going on.’’ Put simply, if our national leaders decide not to be 

present in places, we should not be surprised later when we lack 

sufficient intelligence about the threats and dangers that are 

emerging there. 

As we receive this important intelligence update today, we must 

remember that it is the responsibility of policymakers, from the 

White House to the Pentagon to here on Capitol Hill, to invest in 

cutting-edge capabilities that can provide early indication and 

warning as well as to provide our intelligence professionals with 

sound policy decisions and support, including, at times, military 

support that enable them to perform their often dangerous and always important work on behalf of our Nation. If we fail to make 

these commitments, we will continue to be surprised by events at 

an ever increasing cost to our national security. 

Senator Reed. 

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED 

Senator REED. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me join you in welcoming the Director of National Intelligence, General Clapper, and Director of Defense Intelligence 

Agency, General Stewart. Your long service, both of you gentlemen, 

to the Nation is deserving of praise. 

I particularly want to echo the Chairman’s comments, General 

Clapper, about your distinguished service and your continued service, I’m sure. 

Thank you, gentlemen. 

We live at a time when there is a complex array of threats facing 

the United States, some immediate, some in the future. It is a challenge to both the administration and Congress to decide how to allocate our Nation’s finite resources to address those threats. Your 

testimony today will provide needed insight for our committee on 

that challenge. 

In Afghanistan, for example, the security and political environments both remain challenging. The Taliban have sought to take 

advantage of the still maturing Afghan Security Forces by increasing their operational tempo, especially in rural areas. Also, an ISIL 

affiliate has entered the battlefield in the form of the so-called Islamic State in the Khorasan Province, or ISKP. All the while, remnants of al-Qaeda continue to seek a resurgence. Pakistani army 

operations across the border have added to the dynamic by pushing 

other bad actors, including the Pakistan Taliban and Haqqani Network into Afghanistan. I look forward to the assessment of our witVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:59 May 30, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\25336.TXT WILDA
4 

nesses of these security challenges for the coming year and the 

prospects of reconciliation between the Afghan government and the 

Taliban. 

While ISIL controls less territory in Iraq and Syria than it did 

a year ago, it remains a significant threat to regional stability, the 

United States, and our allies. As our efforts to support the Iraqi Security Forces and local forces in Syria continue, there are a number 

of questions we may not—must ask. What local forces will serve as 

the whole force once ISIL is removed from Mosul, Raqqa, and the 

surrounding areas? How will Iran seek to advance its interests in 

Iraq? How will Turkey respond to the threat posed by ISIL within 

its borders? Will our partners across the Gulf unify their efforts in 

Syria? How will ISIL react within Iraq and Syria and 

transregionally as it is put under increasing amounts of pressure? 

These are questions our military forces must factor into their planning efforts in order to ensure the success of our campaign. Again, 

I look forward to your assessments on these important issues. 

The past year has seen substantial changes in the nature of the 

international community’s relationship with Iran. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action [JCPOA] between the so-called P5+1 and 

Iran has halted and rolled back dangerous elements of Iran’s nuclear program and, critically, has placed it under the most comprehensive and rigorous verification regime ever assembled. I hope 

our witnesses will provide their assessment of the likelihood of Iran 

complying with this agreement over its term. 

While the JCPOA made substantial progress with respect to 

Iran’s nuclear program, it also enabled Iran to return to the international economic community. This presents the United States and 

our partners in the Middle East with an adversary with additional 

resources they may use to support its proxies in places like Syria, 

Lebanon, Yemen, and other locations in the Gulf. Iran may also 

choose to use these additional resources to advance its missile program. Iran’s decisions in these respects will be a key metric as we 

evaluate how to array our forces across the Gulf and what assistance our partners across the region will require to confront Iran. 

I would welcome our witnesses’ assessment of the Gulf nations’ current capacity to counter Iran’s proxies and unconventional forces, 

and where this committee should consider additional investments 

to better support our partners’ requirements. 

Russia’s posturing and increasingly aggressive acts in eastern 

Europe and in the Middle East are something we must continue to 

monitor, contain, and, when necessary, counter. The President’s decision to increase funding for the European Reassurance Initiative 

is a critical step. We must keep a watchful eye on the Putin regime, particularly his use of conventional and unconventional tactics to bully its neighbors and others. 

Russia’s Syrian campaign has, for the moment, eclipsed its aggression into Crimea and Ukraine as the most serious flashpoint 

in United States-Russian relations. In Syria, Russia continues to 

bolster the military of the Bashar al-Assad regime while simultaneously running an information operations campaign to suggest 

that its military operations are instead focused against the Islamic 

State. Unlike Russia’s obscured hand in Ukraine, its actions in 

Syria are being played out in daily headlines that report on RusVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:59 May 30, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\25336.TXT WILDA
5 

sia’s indiscriminate bombing and its support of the Syrian regime 

in areas where moderate forces are aiming to get out from under 

the rule of the Assad regime. This is a complex problem for the 

United States, the coalition fighting ISIL, and our friends and allies in the region. I look forward to hearing how the intelligence 

community sees this situation and how the United States can best 

protect and advance our interests. 

North Korea presents an immediate and present danger to global 

security. The regime conducted a rocket launch just a few days ago, 

in violation of multiple U.N. [United Nations] Security Council resolutions following its January nuclear test. While China could exert 

pressure on North Korea through economic sanctions to encourage 

the regime to desist, the Xi administration prefers to remain on 

good terms with the North Korean regime, putting the entire region at risk. Without China’s cooperation, it is clear that North 

Korea will continue to develop its nuclear and ballistic missile capability. 

China continues to invest aggressively, itself, in its military, particularly in capabilities that allow China to project power and deny 

access to others. While China’s economy has experienced the most 

significant challenges in recent memory, China is continuing its aggressive efforts to solidify its claims in the South China Sea, despite the protests of its sovereign neighbors. It is critical that we 

enhance our partnerships with others across the region to bring 

China into the rule of law based on a global regime that will guarantee peace and prosperity across the region. 

It’s also critical that we use all of the Nation’s tools to ensure 

that China’s continued theft of our intellectual property is put to 

a halt. I will look forward to your views regarding China’s adherence to President Xi’s pledge to President Obama to cease such economic espionage. 

An area of equal concern is the threats and opportunities presented by cyberspace. From a military standpoint, our forces remain dependent on our ability to collect intelligence, conduct defensive cyberoperations to protect our networks and also our intellectual property, and, as appropriate, to counter with offensive 

cyberoperations, including actions against certain adversaries who 

utilize the Internet for recruitment, propaganda, and command and 

control. We look forward to our witnesses’ assessment of these approaches. 

Again, let me thank you, gentlemen, for your service. I look forward to your testimony. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Director Clapper. 

STATEMENT OF HONORABLE JAMES R. CLAPPER, JR., 

DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE 

Mr. CLAPPER. Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed, and 

distinguished members of the committee, first, thank you both for 

your acknowledgment of my service. It was—last week marked 55 

years since I enlisted in the Marine Corps Reserve. I’m very proud 

of that. 

Chairman MCCAIN. In an auspicious—— 

Mr. CLAPPER. I’m proud to be sitting next to one. 

Chairman MCCAIN. In an auspicious beginning. 

6 

Mr. CLAPPER. I also, Chairman McCain, would want to thank 

you for your acknowledgment of the great men and women who 

work in the intelligence community for both of us. I also appreciate 

your, I thought, very accurate statement about the capabilities of 

the intelligence community, what we can and can’t do, and what 

it is reasonable to expect and not to expect us to do. I appreciate 

that. 

General Stewart and I are here today to update you on some, but 

certainly not all, of the pressing intelligence and national security 

issues facing our Nation. After listening to both of your statements, 

I think you’re going to hear some echos here. So, in the interest of 

time and to get to your questions, we’ll just cover some of the wave 

tops. 

As I said last year, unpredictable instability has become the new 

normal. This trend will continue for the foreseeable future. Violent 

extremists are operationally active in about 40 countries. Seven 

countries are experiencing a collapse of central government authority. Fourteen others face regime-threatening or violent instability, 

or both. Another 59 countries face a significant risk of instability 

through 2016. 

The record of level of migrants, more than 1 million, arriving in 

Europe is like to grow further this year. Migration and displacement will strain countries in Europe, Asia, Africa, and the Americas. There are now some 60 million people who are considered displaced globally. Extreme weather, climate change, environmental 

degradation, rising demand for food and water, poor policy decisions, and inadequate infrastructure will magnify this instability. 

Infectious diseases and vulnerabilities in the global supply chain 

for medical countermeasures will continue to pose threats. For example, the Zika virus, first detected in the western hemisphere in 

2014, has reached the U.S. and is projected to cause up to 4 million 

cases in this hemisphere. 

With that preface, I want to briefly comment on both technology 

and cyber: 

Technological innovation during the next few years will have an 

even more significant impact on our way of life. This innovation is 

central to our economic prosperity, but it will bring new security 

vulnerabilities. The Internet of Things will connect tens of billions 

of new physical devices that could be exploited. Artificial intelligence will enable computers to make autonomous decisions about 

data and physical systems, and potentially disrupt labor markets. 

Russia and China continue to have the most sophisticated 

cyberprograms. China continues cyber espionage against the 

United States. Whether China’s commitment of last September 

moderates its economic espionage remains to be seen. Iran and 

North Korea continue to conduct cyber espionage as they enhance 

their attack capabilities. 

Nonstate actors also pose cyberthreats. ISIL has used cyber to its 

great advantage, not only for recruitment and propaganda, but also 

to hack and release sensitive information about U.S. military personnel. As a nonstate actor, ISIL displays unprecedented online 

proficiency. Cyber criminals remain the most pervasive cyberthreat 

to the U.S. financial sector. They use cyber to conduct theft, extortion, and other criminal activities. 

7 

Turning to terrorism, there are now more Sunni violent extremist groups, members, and safe havens than at any time in history. 

The rate of foreign fighters traveling to the conflict zones in Syria 

and Iraq in the past few years is without precedent. At least 38,200 

foreign fighters, including at least 6900 from Western countries, 

have traveled to Syria from at least 120 countries since the beginning of the conflict in 2012. As we saw in the November Paris attacks, returning foreign fighters with firsthand battlefield experience pose a dangerous operational threat. ISIL has demonstrated 

sophisticated attack tactics and tradecraft. 

ISIL, including its eight established and several more emerging 

branches, has become the preeminent global terrorist threat. They 

have attempted or conducted scores of attacks outside of Syria and 

Iraq in the past 15 months. ISIL’s estimated strength worldwide 

exceeds that of al-Qaeda. ISIL’s leaders are determined to strike 

the United States homeland, beyond inspiring homegrown violent 

extremist attacks. Although the United States is a much harder 

target than Europe, ISIL external operations remain a critical factor in our threat assessments for 2016. 

Al-Qaeda’s affiliates also have proven resilient. Despite counterterrorism pressure that’s largely decimated the core leadership in 

Afghanistan and Pakistan, al-Qaeda affiliates are positioned to 

make gains in 2016. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, or AQAP, 

and the al-Nusra Front, the al-Qaeda chapter in Syria, are the two 

most capable al-Qaeda branches. The increased use by violent extremists of encrypted and secure Internet and mobile-based technologies enables terrorist actors to, quote, ‘‘go dark’’ and serves to 

undercut intelligence and law enforcement efforts. 

Iran continues to be the foremost state sponsor of terrorism and 

exert its influence in regional crises in the Mideast through the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, Quds Force, its terrorist partner, 

Lebanese Hezbollah, and proxy groups. Iran and Hezbollah remain 

a continuing terrorist threat to United States interests and partners worldwide. 

We saw firsthand the threat posed in the United States by homegrown violent extremists in the July attack in Chattanooga and the 

attack in San Bernardino. In 2014, the FBI arrested nine ISIL supporters. In 2015, that number increased over fivefold. 

Turning to weapons of mass destruction, North Korea continues 

to conduct test activities of concern to the United States. On Saturday evening, Pyongyang conducted a satellite launch and subsequently claimed that the satellite was successfully placed in orbit. 

Additionally, last month North Korea carried out its fourth nuclear 

test, claiming it was a hydrogen bomb, but the yield was too low 

for it to have been successful test of a staged thermonuclear device. 

Pyongyang continues to produce fissile material and develop a 

submarine-launch ballistic missile. It is also committed to developing a long-range nuclear-armed missile that’s capable of posing 

a direct threat to the United States, although a system has not 

been flight tested. 

Despite its economic challenges, Russia continues its aggressive 

military modernization program. It continues to have the largest 

and most capable foreign nuclear-armed ballistic missile force. It 

8 

has developed a cruise missile that violates the Intermediate-Range 

Nuclear Force, or INF, Treaty. 

China, for its part, continues to modernize its nuclear missile 

force and is striving for secure second-strike capability, although it 

continues to profess a no-first-use doctrine. 

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA, provides us 

much greater transparency into Iran’s fissile material production. 

It increases the time the Iranians would need to produce enough 

highly enriched uranium weapon for a nuclear weapon from a few 

months to about a year. Iran probably views the JCPOA as a 

means to remove sanctions while preserving nuclear capabilities. 

Iran’s perception of how the JCPOA helps it achieve its overall 

strategic goals will dictate the level of its adherence to the agreement over time. 

Chemical weapons continue to pose a threat in Syria and Iraq. 

Damascus has used chemicals against the opposition on multiple 

occasions since Syria joined the Chemical Weapons Convention. 

ISIL has also used toxic chemicals in Iraq and Syria, including the 

blister agent, sulfur mustard; first time an extremist group has 

produced and used a chemical warfare agent in an attack since 

Aum Shinrikyo used sarin in Japan in 1995. 

In space and counterspace, about 80 countries are now engaged 

in the space domain. Russia and China understand how our military fights and how heavily we rely on space. They are each pursuing destructive and disruptive anti-satellite systems. China continues to make progress on its anti-satellite missile program. 

Moving to counterintelligence, the threat from foreign intelligence entities, both state and nonstate, is persistent, complex, 

and evolving. Targeting and collection of U.S. political, military, 

economic, and technical information by foreign intelligence services 

continues unabated. Russia and China pose the greatest threat, followed by Iran and Cuba, on a lesser scale. As well, the threat from 

insiders taking advantage of their access to collect and remove sensitive national security information will remain a persistent challenge for us. 

I do want to touch on one transnational crime issue; specifically, 

drug trafficking. Southwest border seizures of heroin in the United 

States have doubled since 2010. Over 10,000 people died of heroin 

overdoses in 2014, much of it laced with Fentanyl, which is 30 to 

50 times more potent than heroin. In that same year, more than 

28,000 died from opioid overdoses. Cocaine production in Colombia, 

from which most United States supplies originate, has increased 

significantly. 

Now let me quickly move through a few regional issues. In East 

Asia, China’s leaders are pursuing an active foreign policy while 

dealing with much slower economic growth. Chinese leaders have 

also embarked on the most ambitious military reforms in China’s 

history. Regional tension will continue as China pursues construction at its outposts in the South China Sea. 

Russia has demonstrated its military capabilities to project itself 

as a global power, command respect from the West, maintain domestic support for the regime, and advance Western—Russian interests globally. Moscow’s objectives in Ukraine will probably remain unchanged, including maintaining long-term influence over 

9 

Kiev and frustrating its attempt to integrate into Western institutions. Putin is the first leader since Stalin to expand Russia’s territory. Moscow’s military venture into Syria marks its first use since 

its foray into Afghanistan of significant expeditionary combat 

power outside the post-Soviet space. Its interventions demonstrate 

the improvements in Russian military capabilities and the Kremlin’s confidence in using them. Moscow faces the reality, however, 

of economic reception—recession driven, in large part, by falling oil 

prices as well as sanctions. Russia’s nearly 4 percent GDP [gross 

domestic product] contraction last year will probably extend into 

2016. 

In the Middle East and South Asia, there are more cross-border 

military operations underway in the Mideast than at any time 

since the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. Anti-ISIL forces in Iraq will probably make incremental gains through this spring, some of those 

made in Beiji and Ramadi in the past few months. ISIL is now 

somewhat on the defensive, and its territory and manpower are 

shrinking, but it remains a formidable threat. 

In Syria, pro-regime forces have the initiative of having made 

some strategic gains near Aleppo and Latakia in the north, as well 

as in southern Syria. Manpower shortages will continue to undermine the Syrian regime’s ability to accomplish strategic battlefield 

objectives. The opposition has less equipment and firepower, and 

its groups lack unity. They sometimes have competing battlefield 

interests and fight among themselves. In the meantime, some 

250,000 people have been killed as this war has dragged on. The 

humanitarian situation in Syria continues to deteriorate. As of last 

month, there were approximately 4.4 million Syrian refugees and 

another 6 and a half million internally displaced persons, which together represent about half of Syria’s pre-conflict population. 

In Libya, despite the December agreement to form a new Government of National Accord, establishing authority and security across 

the country will be difficult, to put it mildly, with hundreds of militia groups operating throughout the country. ISIL has established 

its most developed branch outside of Syria, in Iraq and Libya, and 

maintains a presence in Sirte, Benghazi, Tripoli, and other areas 

of the country. 

The Yemeni conflict will probably remain stalemated through at 

least mid-2016. Meanwhile, AQAP and ISIL’s affiliates in Yemen 

have exploited the conflict and the collapse of government authority to recruit and expand territorial control. The country’s economic 

and humanitarian situation also continues to worsen. 

Iran deepened its involvement in the Syrian, Iraq, and Yemeni 

conflicts in 2015. It also increased military cooperation with Russia, highlighted by its battlefield alliance in Syria in support of the 

regime. Iran’s Supreme Leader continues to view the United States 

as a major threat. We assess that his views will not change, despite 

the implementation of the JCPOA deal, the exchange of detainees, 

and the release of the ten sailors. 

In South Asia, Afghanistan is at serious risk of a political breakdown during 2016, occasioned by mounting political, economic, and 

security challenges. Waning political cohesion, increasingly assertive local powerbrokers, financial shortfalls, and sustained countrywide Taliban attacks are eroding stability. 

10 

Needless to say, there are many more threats to U.S. interests 

worldwide than we can address, most of which are covered in our 

statement for the record, but I will stop my litany of doom here and 

pass to General Stewart. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Clapper follows:] 


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Chairman MCCAIN. General Stewart. 


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STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL VINCENT R. STEWART, 

USMC, DIRECTOR OF THE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 

General STEWART. Chairman McCain, Ranking Members—Ranking Member Reed, members of the committee, thank you for this 

opportunity to provide the Defense Intelligence Agency’s [DIA] assessment of global security environment and the threats facing the 

Nation. 

Mr. Chairman, my statement for the record details a range of 

multifaceted challenges, adversaries, threats, foreign military capabilities, and transnational terrorist networks. Taken together, these 

issues reflect the diversity, scope, and complexity of today’s challenges to our national security. In my opening remarks, I would 

like to highlight just a few of these threats. 

The Islamic State in the Levant: With coalition forces engaged 

against the Islamic State of Iraq in the Levant, DIA is helping the 

warfighter and our policymakers better understand both the ideology and the capabilities of ISIL. ISIS—ISIL, as well as like-minded extremists are born out of the same extreme and violent Sunni 

Salafist ideology. These Salafi jihadists are determined to restore 

the caliphate and, as they have shown, are willing to justify extreme violence in their efforts to impose their social order on others. As the Paris attacks demonstrated, ISIL has become the most 

significant terrorist threats to the United States and our allies. In 

2015, the group remained entrenched in Iraq and Syria, and expanded globally. Spectacular external attacks demonstrate ISIL’s 

relevance and reach, and are a key part of their narrative. ISIL 

will probably attempt to conduct additional attacks in Europe and 

attempt to direct attacks on the United States homeland in 2016. 

ISIL’s foreign fighter cadre is core to its external attack capability, 

and the large number of Western jihadists in Iraq and Syria will 

pose a challenge for Western security services. 

On the ground in Syria and Iraq, ISIL continues to control large 

swaths of territory. In 2015, coalition airstrikes impeded ISIL’s 

ability to operate openly in Iraq and Syria, curtailed its use of conventional military equipment, and forced it to lower its profile. In 

2016, the growing number of anti-ISIL forces and emerging resource shortfalls will probably challenge ISIL’s ability to govern in 

Iraq and Syria. However, the group will probably retain Sunni 

Arab urban centers. 

In Afghanistan: In their first full year in the lead, Afghan Security Forces increasingly conducted independent operations. However, these forces struggled to adapt to a lack of coalition enablers 

and the high operational tempo, which led to uneven execution of 

operations. As a result, insurgents expanded their influence in 

rural areas, limiting the extension of government control. The deployment of Afghan specialized units and their enablers will be 

necessary to continue securing key population centers. 

In Russia: Russian military activity has continued at historical 

high. Moscow continues to pursue aggressive foreign and defense 

policies, including conducting operations in Syria, sustaining involvement in the Ukraine, and expanding military capabilities in 

the Arctic. Last year, the Russian military continued its robust exercise schedule and aggressively and occasionally provocative outVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:59 May 30, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00047 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\25336.TXT WILDA
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of-area deployments. We anticipate similar high levels of military 

activity in 2016. 

China is pursuing a long-term comprehensive military modernization program to advance its core interests, which include 

maintaining its sovereignty, protecting its territorial integrity, and 

projecting its regional influence, particularly in the South China 

Sea. In addition to modernizing equipment and operations, the 

PLA has undergone massive structural reforms, including increasing the number of navy, air force, and rocket force personnel, establishing a theater joint command system, and reducing their current 

military regions down to five joint theater of operations. China has 

the world’s largest and most comprehensive missile force and has 

prioritized the development and deployment of regional ballistic 

and cruise missiles to expand its conventional strike capabilities 

against U.S. forces in the region. They field an anti-ship ballistic 

missile, which provides the capability to attack U.S. aircraft carriers in the western Pacific ocean. China also displayed a new intermediate-range ballistic missile capable of striking Guam during 

its September 2015 military parade in Beijing. 

North Korea’s nuclear weapons program and evolving ballistic 

missile programs are a continuing threat. In early January, North 

Korea issued a statement claiming that it had successfully carried 

out a nuclear test. A couple days ago, they conducted their sixth 

space launch. This launch was the second launch to place a satellite into orbit. The DPRK display of a new or modified mobile 

ICBM during their recent parade, and its 2015 test of a new submarine-launch ballistic missile capability, further highlight 

Pyongyang’s commitment to diversifying its missile force and nuclear delivery options. North Korea is—also continues to its effort 

to expand its stockpile of weapons-grade fissile material. 

In space, China and Russia increasingly recognize the strategic 

value of space and are focused on diminishing our advantage, with 

the intent of denying the U.S. the use of space in the event of conflict. Both countries are conducting anti-satellite research and developing anti-satellite weapons, making the space domain increasingly competitive, contested, and congested. 

In cyberspace, DIA remains concerned about the growing capabilities of advanced state actors, such as Russia and China. These 

actors target DOD personnel, networks, supply chain, research and 

development, and critical infrastructure information in cyber domain. Iran and North Korea also remain a significant threat to 

conduct disruptive cyberspace attacks. Nonstate actors’ use of 

cyberspace to recruit, propagandize, and conduct open-source research remains a significant challenge. 

Mr. Chairman, the men and women of your DIA are providing 

unique defense intelligence around the world and around the clock 

to warfighters, defense planners, the defense acquisition community, and policymakers to provide warning and defeat these and 

other threats. I look forward to the committee’s questions. 

[The prepared statement of General Stewart follows:] 

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Chairman MCCAIN. Thank you very much, General. 

Director Clapper, in all these many decades you have served this 

country, have you ever seen more diverse or serious challenges to 

this country’s security? 

Mr. CLAPPER. No, sir, I have not. I have said that—something 

like that virtually every year I’ve been up here. This is my fifth or 

sixth time. I decided to leave it out this year because it’s kind of 

a cliche, but it’s actually true that, in my 50-plus years in the intelligence business, I don’t—I cannot recall a more diverse array of 

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68 

Chairman MCCAIN. Your job has been made considerably more 

difficult because of sequestration. 

Mr. CLAPPER. Yes, sir, it has. I think the biggest problem with 

it, frankly, over time, is the uncertainty that it injects in a context 

of planning, and particularly—and it plays havoc with systems acquisition. So, it’s—the uncertainty factor that we now have is—that 

has also become a normal fact of planning and programming. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Thank you. 

Just in the last few days, the issue of torture has arisen again. 

General David Petraeus made a statement that I’d like to quote to 

you. He says, ‘‘Our Nation has paid a high price in recent decades 

for the information gained by the use of techniques beyond those 

in the Field Manual. In my view, that price far outweighed the 

value of the information gained through the use of techniques’’— 

i.e., waterboarding—‘‘beyond those in the manual.’’ The manual obviously prohibits waterboarding and other forms of torture. Do you 

agree with General Petraeus’s assessment? 

Mr. CLAPPER. I do. I believe the—the Army Field Manual is the 

standard, and that is what we should abide by. It serves the purposes of both providing a framework for the elicitation of valuable 

intelligence information, and it comports with American values. 

Chairman MCCAIN. That’s the point, I think. Isn’t it the fact that 

this is—American values are the—are such that just—no matter 

what the enemy does, that we maintain a higher standard of behavior, and, when we violate that, as we did with Abu Ghraib, that 

the consequences are severe? 

Mr. CLAPPER. Yes, sir. 

Chairman MCCAIN. An erosion of our moral authority. 

Mr. CLAPPER. I would agree with that. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Isn’t it already proven that Mr. Baghdadi is 

sending people with this flow of refugees that are terrorists, that— 

in order to inflict further attacks on Europe and the United States? 

Mr. CLAPPER. That’s correct. That’s—one technique they’ve used 

is taking advantage of the torrent of migrants to insert operatives 

into that flow. As well, they also have available to them, and are 

pretty skilled at, phony passports so they can travel ostensibly as 

legitimate travelers, as well. 

Chairman MCCAIN. They’re pretty good at establishing secure 

sites for them to continue to communicate. 

Mr. CLAPPER. That’s true. That—I alluded to that in my opening 

statement, about the impacts of encryption and the growth of 

encrypted applications, which has—having a negative impact on intelligence-gathering. I recently traveled to Texas, and this is affecting not only us in the national security realm, but State and local 

officials, as well. 

Chairman MCCAIN. As you know, in addition to the Atlas rocket, 

which uses the Russian RD–180 rocket engine, the United Launch 

Alliance also maintains an American rocket with an American engine. As we continue to have this important debate about how to 

break our Nation’s dependency on Russia for national security 

space launch, do you believe we need to look seriously at that 

American rocket, the Delta, as an alternative way to get off the 

RD–180 and encourage competition from other organizations capable of providing us with this ability? 

69 

Mr. CLAPPER. I’m a customer, Chairman McCain, of the launch 

industry in the United States. My interest is in seeing to it that 

our overhead reconnaissance constellation is replenished, and replenished on time. There is a capability with the Delta that—as 

you allude—which is, we think, from our standpoint, since we pay 

the freight when we use these systems—which is both effective and 

cost-efficient. I certainly do agree on—you know, a fundamental 

American tenet of the competition. That’s why I’m quite encouraged by the aggressive approach that SpaceX has taken. Our plan 

is to certify SpaceX for carrying national security payloads into 

space. 

Chairman MCCAIN. It’s not in our interest in any way to continue our dependency on Russian rocket engines. 

Mr. CLAPPER. Well, I—from—just speaking as a citizen, I’d rather we didn’t—we’re more dependent on the RD–180s. We have 

been, and they’ve worked for us. Again, my interest, though, is getting those payloads up on time. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Thank you very much. 

Senator Reed. 

Senator REED. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

General Clapper, to date what’s your assessment of the compliance by the Iranians with the JCPOA, your—the community? 

Mr. CLAPPER. Right now—and I think the key milestone here 

was implementation day on the 16th of January. The Iranians did 

comply with the requirements that were—that they were required 

to live up to. I think we, in the intelligence community, are very 

much in the distrust-and-verify mode. There are a half a dozen or 

so ambiguities—maybe others, but certainly a half a dozen or so 

ambiguities in the agreement that we have identified, and we’re 

going to be very vigilant about Iranian compliance. 

Senator REED. Well, that’s exactly what you should be doing. I 

commend you for that. 

Just going forward, are you confident that you could detect a serious deviation from the agreements in sufficient time to give the 

executive options? 

Mr. CLAPPER. Yes, sir, I am confident. I will—my fingerprints are 

on the infamous Weapons of Mass Destruction National Intelligence Estimate of October 2002. I was serving in another capacity 

then. So, I think we approached this with confidence, but also with 

institutional humility. 

Senator REED. Thank you, sir. 

There are many challenges that are being posed by the Russians, 

but the Russians are facing a challenge of unexpectedly low oil 

prices that seem to be continuing. Has the intelligence community 

made an assessment of the impact, medium to long term on this, 

on the ability of the Russians to maintain their military posture 

and their provocative actions? 

Mr. CLAPPER. Well, the price of oil has had—the falling price of 

oil has had huge impacts on the Russian economy. It’s—the price 

of Ural crude is running around $28 a barrel. The Russians’ planning factor for their—planning and programming for their budget 

is around $50 a barrel. So, this is causing all kinds of strain, if you 

look at all the classical measurements—economic measures—inflaVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:59 May 30, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00073 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\25336.TXT WILDA
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tion, the value of the ruble, which has sunk to an alltime low, unemployment, stresses on their welfare system, et cetera, et cetera. 

That said, the Russians appear to be sustaining their commitment to their aggressive modernization program, particularly in 

the—with their strategic missiles. 

Senator REED. Looking ahead, though, is there any indication 

or—this is an area that you’re picking up information through 

many sources that are reflecting great concern by the Russians on 

their ability to keep this up, or looking at—— 

Mr. CLAPPER. Well, that determination will be made by one man. 

I think, for lots of reasons, he will sustain the expeditionary activity in Syria, although I think perhaps even the Russians are seeing 

that this is headed for stalemate, in the absence of a substantial 

ground-force insertion, which I don’t believe the Russians are disposed to do. 

Senator REED. Thank you. 

Quickly changing topics in the remaining minute and a half. In 

Afghanistan, multiple challenges. President Ghani is trying to pursue a reconciliation with the Taliban. In that regard, there is at 

least a four-nation process: China, Pakistan, the United States, and 

Afghanistan. Any insights about the possibility of reconciliation or 

the motivation of any of the parties to the—to this action? 

Mr. CLAPPER. Well, I think that—you know, the Taliban position 

has consistently been not to do that, not to negotiate. They’re the 

first—the precondition they always ascribe is the removal of foreign 

forces. I don’t see them changing that position. 

Senator REED. Thank you very much. 

General Stewart, thank you for your distinguished service. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Inhofe. 

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

This is a very accurate litany of doom. You covered a lot of stuff 

in a short period of time. We’ll have to go back and reread that. 

When you look at what—right now, we’re kind of in a situation 

where, ‘‘Russia is pursuing new concepts and capabilities and expanding the role of nuclear weapons, that security strategy.’’ That’s 

a quote out of the U.S. National Intelligence—so, you covered that 

also in your—briefly in your opening remarks. 

When we talk to people on the outside and they say, you know, 

‘‘You have Russia saying—stating they’re going to make these advances, they’re going to modernize, and yet we have a policy where 

we’re not doing it.’’ What’s a justification? What kind of answer can 

we give people who ask that question, including me? 

Mr. CLAPPER. Well, sir, that’s a policy issue. I worry about the 

adversaries. I’ve used this metaphor before this committee. General 

Stewart and I and the rest of the intelligence community are just 

down in the engine room shoveling intelligence coal—— 

Senator INHOFE. Yeah. 

Mr. CLAPPER.—and people on the bridge get to decide where the 

ship goes, and how fast, and arrange the furniture on the deck. So, 

I—that’s a policy issue that others decide. 

Senator INHOFE. Well, I personally don’t think it’s a good policy, 

but we all have opinions on that. 

71 

I was fortunate enough to be over in the Ukraine, back when 

Poroshenko and Yatsenyuk were successful in their parliamentary 

elections, and the first time in 96 years there’s not one Communist 

in the Parliament. That’s really kind of exciting, although I was 

upset with our lack of—when Putin came in and started killing 

people—with our lack of support, at that time, as a policy for 

Ukraine. As we’re looking at it now, and in—there’s been statements made from Russia saying that, ‘‘As the NATO becomes more 

aggressive and we become more aggressive, they’re going to become 

more aggressive’’—does it look to you like it’s—that’s going on right 

now? What’s—what’ll be the end game of that? 

Mr. CLAPPER. I think—answer your last question on what the 

end game is, I don’t know, but I will say that the Russians—I 

might ask General Stewart to comment on this—but, I think the 

Russians fundamentally are paranoid about NATO. They’re greatly 

concerned about being contained and, of course, very concerned 

about missile defense, which would serve to neuter what is their— 

the essence of their claim to great-power status, which is their nuclear arsenal. 

So, a lot of these aggressive things that the Russians are doing, 

for a number of reasons—great-power status to create the image of 

being coequal with the United States, et cetera—I think could probably—could possibly go on, and we could be into another Cold Warlike spiral, here. 

Senator INHOFE. Well, that—the Cold War, that—I was thinking 

of that at the time. Isn’t that what we went through for such a long 

period of time, where you had Russia—or USSR—making the statements and preparing themselves and wanting to outdo us—I mean, 

just for the image? I see this as something kind of similar to that. 

Director Clapper, in your prepared statement, you said the—and 

this is a quote—‘‘United States air campaigns have made significant gains in ISIL.’’ Then we have reports that the United States 

fights against ISIL is actually benefiting al-Qaeda. Is there a relationship—or, what is that relationship between al-Qaeda and ISIL? 

Mr. CLAPPER. Well, I’ve seen that. I don’t know that I could say 

that the airstrikes against ISIL are somehow benefiting al-Qaeda, 

because we’re still keeping the pressure on—— 

Senator INHOFE. Yeah. 

Mr. CLAPPER.—al-Qaeda. 

Senator INHOFE. You’re familiar with those reports, though. 

Mr. CLAPPER. I’ve read them. 

Senator INHOFE. Yeah. 

Mr. CLAPPER. I’m not sure I would subscribe to them. There have 

been—you know, I think we have—there has been progress made 

against ISIL in its Iraq-Syria incarnation, because that assumes 

some of the accouterments or characteristics of a nation-state, and 

that, in turn, presents vulnerabilities that we can exploit. I think 

the important thing is to keep the pressure on, on multiple fronts, 

and keep attacking those things which are near and dear to ISIL, 

which is the oil infrastructure that it owns—— 

Senator INHOFE. Yeah. 

Mr. CLAPPER.—and its access to money. 

Senator INHOFE. Yeah. 

72 

One last question. My time’s expired. The RD–180 issue, it’s one 

we’re looking at. I think there is a recognition that we need to keep 

using for a period of time as we make any transition that might 

be in the future. Now, we have—in the defense authorization bill 

of 2016, I guess it was, we talked about nine additional ones. I 

think the Air Force has requested, at one point, in some form, 18 

additional ones. What is your thinking about that? 

Mr. CLAPPER. Well—— 

Senator INHOFE. The transition. 

Mr. CLAPPER. I’ll tell you, Senator. I—my position here is, I’m a 

user or a customer. I have to have certain payloads delivered on 

time to sustain the health and viability of our overhead reconnaissance system, which is extremely important to the Nation’s security. I don’t get into too much, other than I have to pay the bills, 

because I pay the Air Force whenever we avail ourselves of their 

launch services. 

How they design their systems, that’s kind of up to them. I’m interested in delivery. The Delta is—worked great for us. It’s—appears to me to be cost-efficient, and it is effective, in terms of— 

when we’ve used it, it delivers. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Blumenthal. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to join my colleagues in thanking both of you for your extraordinary service to our Nation. 

Director Clapper, you made the point, in response to Senator 

Reed and also in your testimony, that the international community 

is, in your words, ‘‘well postured’’ to detect any violation by Iran 

of the nuclear agreement. Has there been any indication so far that 

it is moving toward a violation? 

Mr. CLAPPER. No, not yet. The—no, we have no evidence, thus 

far, that they have—they’re in a—moving towards violation. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. I’m sure you would agree that this Nation 

and the international community need to be vigilant and vigorous 

in enforcing this agreement. 

Mr. CLAPPER. Absolutely, sir. As I said earlier, I think we, in the 

U.S. intelligence community, are in the distrust-and-verify mode. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. The distrust-and-verify mode includes not 

only the IAEA, but also other investigative tools that you have at 

your disposal. 

Mr. CLAPPER. Absolutely. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Going to the ballistic missile issue, which 

I believe is profoundly important—and General Stewart makes this 

point in his testimony, as well—I urged the President to impose 

sanctions and enforce them as a result of Iran’s continued development of ballistic missiles, which are a threat, not only to the region, but also to our allies in Europe. Fortunately, he has heeded 

those calls from myself and letters that were joined by my colleagues. 

How important do you think it is that we continue to enforce 

sanctions in response to Iran’s development of ballistic missiles? 

Mr. CLAPPER. Well, I think it’s quite important that sanctions be 

enforced, not only for missiles, but for terrorism or any other things 

that are covered under the sanctions. The Iranians have a very formidable missile capability, which they continue to work on. They’ve 

73 

fired some 140-or-so missiles since the original UNSCR [United 

Nations Security Council Resolution] 1929 of 2010. About half of 

those firings were going on during the negotiations, which were— 

of course, were—as you know, were separate from the actual negotiations. 

So, for our part, this is a challenge that we must attend to by 

being as vigilant as possible on gleaning intelligence about these 

capabilities and reporting that to our policymakers. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Speaking for myself—and I believe my 

view is joined by other colleagues—I will continue to insist on vigorous enforcement of those sanctions because of the threat that you 

have very powerfully outlined. 

General Stewart, in your testimony, you make the point that the 

economic relief that Iran will see as a result of the JCPOA is unlikely, in the short term, to increase its military capability. Is that 

correct? 

General STEWART. I think it is—it is unlikely immediately, because I believe that the focus will be on internal economic gains. 

However, after 35 years of sanction, Iran has developed, as we’ve 

just discussed, the most capable missile force in the region. It’s extended its lethality, its accuracy. It’s got all the ranges covered. It 

can reach all of its regional targets. In the long term, I fully expect 

that they’ll invest some of the money into improving the rest of 

their military capabilities. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. What is the ‘‘long term’’? In other words, 

how many years is ‘‘long term’’? 

General STEWART. Yeah. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Are we talking 5 years, 10 years? Secondly, what should be our response—and I believe it has to be a 

robust and strong response—to that increase in longer-term military capabilities that threatens our allies and friends in the region, 

most particularly Israel, with terrorism and other conventional 

military capabilities, as well as the kinds of counterincentives we 

can provide? 

General STEWART. So, the long term might not be as far as 5 

years. We’ve already seen an agreement between Iran and the Russians for the S–300 Air Defense System. We’re seeing Russia demonstrate tremendous capabilities as they’ve done their out-of-area 

deployment into Syria. So, there’s lots of weapons technology being 

displayed. I suspect, within the next 2 to 5 years, we can expect 

Iran to invest in some of those weapons technology that’s being displayed in the Syrian battlefield by the Russians today. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. What should be our response? 

General STEWART. I think I’m going to punt that to the policymakers on the response to how Iran arms and how they might use 

this weapons capability. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. You would agree that we should respond 

robustly and strongly. 

General STEWART. I would agree that we should have a policy to 

be prepared to respond—— 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thank you. 

General STEWART.—appropriately. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thank you, General. 

Thank you, Director Clapper. 

74 

Senator REED [presiding]. On behalf of the Chairman, Senator 

Sessions. 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you, Senator Reed. 

Well, we thank both of you for your service. 

Director Clapper, thank you for your decades of service to the 

country. That’s something we all respect and value. 

General Stewart, I appreciate seeing you again. You’ve been in 

the battlefield, and you’ve seen it from both sides and know the importance of intelligence. 

Director Clapper, it seems to me that we are about to see a tremendous expansion of proliferation in the numbers actually of 

weapons and the countries that possess nuclear weapons on something that the world is united behind, trying to stop—the U.N. and 

the whole world. NATO has fought to maintain a limited number 

of nations with nuclear weapons, and we’ve been particularly concerned about nuclear weapons in the Middle East. Where do we 

stand on that from a strategic position? Your best judgment of the 

risk we’re now facing. 

Mr. CLAPPER. Well, the—of course, we worry about North Korea 

in this respect. I think—in the Mideast, I think the agreement, the 

JCPOA, which does prevent, if it’s complied with, a nuclear capability in Iran, at least in the foreseeable future, that should serve 

as a tempering factor for the likes of—for other countries that may 

feel threatened if, in fact, Iran proceeded on with its nuclear weapons program. 

Senator SESSIONS. Well, we’ve got India and Pakistan. Secretary 

Kissinger testified here a year ago, I suppose, in which he said that 

we could see multiple nations in the Middle East move toward nuclear weapons. We do know that North Korea will sell weapon technology, do we not? Have done so in the past? 

Mr. CLAPPER. That’s true, that particularly North Korea is a 

proliferator. That’s one of the principal ways they attempt to generate revenue, is through proliferation. I worry, frankly, about 

more mundane things, like MANPADs, which the North Koreans 

produce and proliferate throughout the world, which poses a great 

threat to aviation. 

So, I think our role in the intelligence community is to be as vigilant as we can about this, and report when proliferants spread. 

That—it is a great concern, and certainly—particularly in the Mideast. 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you. That is a serious subject. 

General Stewart, tell us where we stand in Iraq. You served 

there, and you were involved with the Sunnis in al-Anbar Province. 

You saw them flip and become turned against al-Qaeda. Can we 

replicate that now? What are the prospects for the Sunnis once 

again turning against the terrorists? 

General STEWART. I think if the Sunnis believe that they have 

a real prospect, either for an involvement with the Iraqi government or some other confederation construct where their views and 

interests are represented—I think they will likely turn against 

ISIL. I don’t think that that message is—been effectively communicated yet. I think Abadi would like a more inclusive government, 

but I’m not sure that he has all of the members of his ruling body 

behind such inclusivity. Until that occurs, then the Sunni tribes 

75 

are very likely to remain either on the fence or choose the least 

worst option, which is to not antagonize, and maybe even support, 

ISIL in the western part of Iraq. 

Senator SESSIONS. That would be the decisive action that needs 

to occur, that, once again, the decisive action would be if the 

Sunnis would turn against ISIL as they turned against al-Qaeda. 

General STEWART. I think that would absolutely be decisive, but 

I think they’ll be very cautious to ensure that we will not leave 

them hanging out there after they’ve turned against ISIL. This is 

pure pragmatism. If they’re not—if we’re not successful, we’re not 

supportive of the Sunni tribes, they will die. Al-Qaeda—or ISIL will 

be brutal, they’ll be ruthless. If we’re going to support them, we’re 

going to try to convince them to turn and fight against ISIL, then 

we have to have the true commitment of the Government of Iraq 

and all of the parties to encourage them to fight against ISIL, because this is purely about survival for those tribes. 

Senator SESSIONS. Our effort to push back against ISIL would be 

a extremely important action—development. 

General STEWART. Yes, sir, I believe it would be. 

Senator SESSIONS. What about Mosul, city of a million, that 

would not have the heritage of ISIL and that kind of extremism? 

What are the prospects for turning the situation around in Mosul 

and freeing Mosul from ISIL’s—— 

General STEWART. I’m less optimistic in the near term about 

Mosul. I think there’s lots of work to be done yet out in the western 

part. I don’t believe that Ramadi is completely secure, so they have 

to secure Ramadi, they have to secure the Hit-Haditha Corridor in 

order to have some opportunity to fully encircle and bring all the 

forces against Mosul. Mosul will be complex operations. I’m not as 

optimistic—as you say, it’s a large city. I’m not as optimistic that 

we’ll be able to turn that, in the near term; in my view, certainly 

not this year. We may be able to begin the campaign, do some isolation operations around Mosul, but securing or taking Mosul is an 

extensive operation, and not something I see in the next year or 

so. 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you very much, General Stewart. 

Chairman MCCAIN [presiding]. Senator Heinrich. 

Senator HEINRICH. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Welcome back, Director Clapper, General Stewart. Thank you for 

that predictably cheery briefing. 

Director Clapper, I’ve always believed that the ground war 

against ISIS [the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria] must be won by 

our Arab partners rather than by American ground forces. It was, 

therefore, pretty encouraging to finally hear Saudi Arabia and the 

UAE [United Arab Emirates], over the weekend, voice some openness to putting ground forces in Syria. What’s the intelligence community’s assessment of the capability of Saudi and, UAE ground 

forces? How realistic do you think this proposal is? In other words, 

do you assess that they actually have the political will to potentially do that? 

Mr. CLAPPER. Well, let me start with UAE, which is a very, very 

capable military, although small. Their—the performance of their 

counterterrorist forces in Yemen have been quite impressive. 

76 

I think—certainly appreciate and value the Saudi willingness to 

engage on the ground. I think that will be a challenge—would be 

a challenge for them if they were to try to take that on. 

General STEWART. If I could add—— 

Senator HEINRICH. General, absolutely. 

General STEWART. I fully concur with the UAE forces. Whether 

they have the capacity to do both Yemen and something in IraqSyria is questionable for me. 

Senator HEINRICH. Yeah. 

General STEWART. I think they’re having a tough—they’re doing 

extremely well in Yemen, but the capacity to do more is pretty limited. 

Senator HEINRICH. Thank you both. 

Director Clapper, one of the things we’ve been struggling with, 

obviously, is trying to crack down on ISIS’s financing. They have 

multiple sources of revenue that include illicit oil sales, taxation, 

extortion of the local population, looting of banks, personal property, smuggling of antiquities, and, to a lesser extent, even kidnapping for ransom, and foreign donations. I’m certainly pleased to see 

some progress has been made, where the U.S.-coalition forces have 

escalated tactics by targeting wellheads, targeting road tankers, 

even cash storage sites. These efforts have certainly helped force 

ISIS to cut its fighters’ pay; in some reports, by up to 50 percent. 

What, additionally, do you believe that we can be doing to further 

restrict their financial resources? 

Mr. CLAPPER. I think the main—sir, you’ve outlined pretty much 

the sources of revenue for ISIS. They have a very elaborate bureaucracy for managing their money. I think the important thing 

is to sustain that pressure on multiple dimensions, to include going 

after the oil infrastructure. I know they—ISIL has displayed great 

ingenuity by setting up thousands of these mom-and-pop refineries. 

Senator HEINRICH. Yeah. 

Mr. CLAPPER. We just have to stay at it. I—and, as well, the recent bombing of the financial institution in Mosul had big impact 

on them. I think we’re starting to see some success with the Iraqi 

government in reducing payments to Iraqi citizens who were—live 

in ISIL-controlled areas. There’s a downside to that. When they do 

that, that alienates—potentially alienates them further about the 

central government in Baghdad. 

To me, the important aspect, here, and the important theme 

would to sustain the pressure. 

Senator HEINRICH. You know, one of the sources that has been, 

I guess, surprisingly consequential is black-market antiquity sales 

from the looting that’s occurred. One of—it’s my understanding 

that the United States has sanctions that it can impose on anyone 

who imports antiquities stolen by ISIS, but it doesn’t have separate 

abilities to sanction individuals who actually purchase looted Syrian antiquities. Would it be helpful to authorize sanctions that are 

not just against the buyer or the seller of those, but against other 

middlemen who are involved? 

Mr. CLAPPER. I would want to take that under advisement and 

consult with my colleagues in the Department of Treasury. I will 

tell you that, in the relative scheme of things, the sale of antiquities is not a big revenue-generator, and it’s really kind of tapered 

77 

off some. I’d be for exploring whatever—whatever ways we can 

pressure the—ISIL financially, we should. 

Senator HEINRICH. Great. Thank you both. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Ayotte. 

Senator AYOTTE. I want to thank you both for your service. 

I want to thank you, Director Clapper, for your many decades of 

service to our country. We appreciate it. 

I wanted to follow up on a—your written statement, where—in 

it—and I think you reiterated it today—that Iran probably views 

the JCPOA as a means to remove sanctions while preserving some 

of its nuclear capabilities. In a second part, you said, ‘‘as well as 

the option to eventually expand its nuclear infrastructure.’’ Can 

you expound on that? 

Mr. CLAPPER. As the period of the agreement plays out, I think 

it’s—we should expect that the Iraqis will want to push the margins on R&D [research and development] to—they’ve already done 

work on—on research and development on centrifuge design. Now, 

they’ve sustained the position they’ve taken, and the—you know, 

there’s one man that makes the decision, here, as the Supreme 

Leader, that they’re not going to pursue nuclear weapons. There 

are many other things they could do, in a nuclear context, that 

serves to enhance their technology and their expertise. 

Senator AYOTTE. Let me ask you. We saw Iran actually have ballistic missile tests on October 10th and November 21st, postJCPOA, and even pre-receiving the sanctions cash relief, that they 

recently received, of billions of dollars. We also know that, recently, 

North Korea had a space launch developing—continuing to develop 

their ICBM [intercontinental ballistic missile] program. I wanted to 

ask you, first of all, do you—we know that, in your statement, 

you’ve mentioned, and historically, that there has been cooperation 

between North Korea and Iran on their ballistic missile program. 

Can you tell us what that cooperation has been? Can we expect 

that North Korea will sell or share technology with Tehran that 

could expedite Iran’s development of ICBM missiles? 

Mr. CLAPPER. Of late—I have to be mindful of the setting here— 

there has not been a great deal of interchange between Iraq and 

Iran—or between North Korea and Iran on the subject of nuclear 

or missile capabilities, but there’s been—there has been in the 

past. We have been reasonably successful in detecting this. So, 

hopefully we’ll—with appropriate—— 

Senator AYOTTE. Let me ask—— 

Mr. CLAPPER.—vigilance, we’ll be able to sustain that. The 

North—— 

Senator AYOTTE. Let me ask you—sorry. 

Mr. CLAPPER.—Koreans, though, will—they’re interested in cash. 

This is one of their—— 

Senator AYOTTE. We now know Iran has more cash, correct? 

Mr. CLAPPER. Well, they do now. As General Stewart indicated, 

a lot of the cash, at least in the initial tranche, is encumbered. The 

Iranians have a lot of obligations to fulfill, economically with—— 

Senator AYOTTE. Let me follow up on—— 

Mr. CLAPPER. It’s a debtor nation. 

Senator AYOTTE.—on the two. What do you—when you—what do 

you make of other fact that the Iranians did, in fact, post-JCPOA, 

78 

in violation of existing U.N. resolutions, make two launches of ballistic missiles? I think you were asked about the sanctions that 

were put in place. Let’s just be clear; those sanctions weren’t very 

tough. Do you think that those are going to deter Iran from continuing to develop its ICBM program? 

Mr. CLAPPER. Well, the Iranians have conducted some 140 

launches since the original U.N. Security Council Resolution 1929 

that was imposed in 2010. Seventy of those, about half of them, 

were done during the negotiations, given the fact that missiles 

weren’t a part of the negotiation. So, as far as these two launches 

are concerned, I think this was a deliberate message of defiance, 

and that the Iranians are going to continue with an aggressive program to develop their missile force. 

Senator AYOTTE. As you and I have talked about in the past, just 

to be clear, we judge that Tehran would choose ballistic missiles as 

its preferred method of delivering nuclear weapons, if it builds 

them. That’s—that is obviously why you would build a ballistic 

missile, if you choose to build a nuclear weapon. 

Mr. CLAPPER. Well, and they have hundreds of them—— 

Senator AYOTTE. Right. 

Mr. CLAPPER.—that threaten the Mideast. Of course, the two 

under development could potentially, given the technology, although the immediate one that’s most—I guess the most proximate 

that would be launched, the GAM, is built by civilians and is ostensibly for space launch—— 

Senator AYOTTE. I only have 5 seconds left, but I want to follow 

up on the heroin question. I believe you said that heroin and 

Fentanyl, which is, of course, 30 to 50 times more powerful, is coming over our southern border. That has doubled by the Mexican 

drug cartels, going back to 2010. Do you believe that that’s something that we—General Kelly has raised this when he was commander of SOUTHCOM as—that delivery system and those cartels 

could actually deliver almost anything with the sophisticated networks they have established, but do you believe we should be focused also on more interdiction, particularly on the heroin problem 

at the southern border? 

Mr. CLAPPER. I do. The experience, at least what I’ve observed— 

and I think General Kelly has said this consistently when he testified—is that it wasn’t for lack of intelligence; it was lack of operational capacity to actually react and interdict. I’m a big fan of the 

Coast Guard, and the Coast Guard’s done some great things. These 

new national security cutters are fantastic capability against 

drug—to—for drug interdiction purposes. 

Senator AYOTTE. Thank you. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Kaine. 

Senator KAINE. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Thanks, to the witnesses. I have many questions to ask, but I 

think what I’ll do is focus on one. 

I just—I’m struggling with this, and I would love to hear your 

thoughts about low oil prices and how they affect our security posture. This is not in a litany of gloom; this is a good thing. It’s got 

some elements to it that are—I think are challenging. 

I was in Israel once, in April of 2010, and meeting with President 

Shimon Peres, and I asked him what would be the most important 

79 

thing the U.S. could do to enhance security in the region. He said, 

‘‘Wean yourself off dependence on oil from the Middle East.’’ As I 

talked to him, his basic logic was, to the extent that we developed 

noncarbon alternatives or our own native energy sources, our demand for Middle Eastern oil would drop. We’re a market leader. 

That would have a effect of reducing prices. A lot of the nations in 

the Middle East—Iran and other nations—Russia or Venezuela— 

they’ve used high oil prices to finance bellicose adventurism. If they 

get more strapped on the cash side, they have a harder time doing 

it. 

So, we’ve seen a dramatic development in American native energy. We’ve seen development of noncarbon energy. We’ve seen oil 

prices go to dramatic lows. They’re not going to stay there forever, 

but many are predicting that they’re going to stay significantly 

lower than historic lows. It’s good for American consumers. It’s 

good for American businesses. It poses challenges for some of our 

principal adversaries; Russia, for example. It puts a cap on, to 

some degree, what Iran would get from being back in a global economy and selling their oil. It also poses some risks, as well. I’ve 

heard European counterparts say that they’re really worried about 

an aggressive Russia, but they’re even more worried about a economic basket-case Russia. 

So, from the intel side, as you look at intel and threats, talk a 

little bit about the prospect of low oil prices and any negatives associated with that, please. 

Mr. CLAPPER. Well, I think you’ve painted the picture pretty 

well, Senator Kaine. The—it’s working, I guess you would say—one 

could say, to our advantage. Russia—I spoke about that earlier— 

and the price—current price of Ural crude, for example, is $28 a 

barrel, when Russia’s planning factor for their national budget is 

$50 a barrel. This has affected—for example, they have been unable to invest in the Arctic, so it’s had profound impact, and will, 

I think, for some time, just structurally in Russia. 

Venezuela is another case, a country that was—that’s been completely dependent, almost, for its revenue for a long time, on oil 

revenue. Of course, with the precipitate drop in oil, it’s had a huge 

impact on their economy, which is status managed anyway and is 

laced with all kinds of subsidies for its people. Now they’re having—they’re facing insolvency. 

So, that—it has that effect. Of course, to the extent that we become independent and not dependent on anyone’s oil, that’s a good 

thing. Countries caught in the middle, I think, it’s going to be a 

mixed bag as to how well they manage themselves, where they are 

dependent on others for oil. If the price stays low, that’s great. If 

it—if it’s hiked, either by virtue of the natural forces or artificially, 

that could have a very deleterious impact on the economy, say in 

Europe. So, it’s a very mixed picture. 

Senator KAINE. Just a followup about Russia, in particular. It 

seems that sometimes they’re more likely to engage in some, you 

know, adventurism outside their country when their internal politics and economy is in trouble. I mean, Putin seems like a guy who, 

when things are going bad at home, he wants to divert attention. 

Whether it’s throwing an Olympics or a World Cup or invading another country, that seems to be kind of a move that he’ll make 

80 

when he’s got dissatisfaction at home driven by economic challenges. So, is there some degree to which these lower oil prices, 

they negatively affect an adversary, but they may make them a little more unpredictable and, hence, dangerous? 

Mr. CLAPPER. That’s true. Of course, all decisionmaking in Russia is essentially made by—is done by one person. The Russians 

have a great capacity for enduring pain and suffering. The polls 

that are taken in Russia still indicate very high levels of popularity, 80-percent range, for Putin. It is interesting, though, his 

speeches of late in—domestically, have taken a different turn or a 

different tone, in that they are much more exhorting patriotic spirit 

and the great history of Russia as, I think, probably a way of diverting attention from the poor economic performance of the Russian economy. By any measure—you look at unemployment, inflation, the worth of the ruble—its alltime low—and investment, et 

cetera, whatever measure you want to use, the—it’s all not good 

for—from a Russian perspective. 

Now, the issue would be, How does that affect the street, and 

what point does the people start turning out and demonstrating, 

which—that’s what makes them—they’re very nervous. If people 

get organized and restive on a large scale throughout the— 

throughout Russia, they—Russians are very concerned about that. 

Senator KAINE. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Fischer. 

Senator FISCHER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Director Clapper, in your statement, you assess that foreign support will allow Damascus to make gains in some key areas this 

year. General Stewart, you state that the Assad regime is unlikely 

to be militarily defeated or collapse in the near term, and it’s 

poised to enter 2016 in a stronger military position against the opposition because of their increased support that they’re receiving 

from Iran and Hezbollah and Russia. Given Assad’s apparently improving fortunes that we’re seeing, do you assess that he will negotiate any kind of transition from power? 

General STEWART. He’s certainly in a much stronger negotiating 

position than he was just 6 months ago. His forces, supported by 

Russian air forces, supported by Iranian and Hezbollah forces, are 

having some effect, but not decisive effect across the battlefield. 

They’ve isolated Aleppo, for instance. They’re now sieging Aleppo. 

So, he’s in a much stronger negotiating position, and I’m more inclined to believe that he is a player on the stage longer term than 

he was 6 months to a year ago. He’s in much better position. 

Senator FISCHER. General, what—how would you define ‘‘longer 

term’’? 

General STEWART. Yeah, that’s—I think this—this one’s interesting, because I think the Russians are very comfortable with the 

idea that, if they have a regime that supports their interests in 

Syria, Bashar al-Assad might not be as important to them as— 

Bashar al-Assad is far more important to the Iranians to maintain 

their relationship with Syria and status around Lebanon. So, I 

think getting all the parties to agree on whether he should go, the 

timeline with which he should go, who might be an—a better alternative, because that’s important to all the parties—this is such a 

81 

dynamic space—and then you sow the Turks in with their interest 

that Assad should go, also. So, I think, long term, I’m not seeing 

any change in the status here for the next year or so. Beyond that, 

we’ll see how the fight on the battlefield unfolds. 

Senator FISCHER. Before I turn to you, Director Clapper—General, when you mention about Iran and Moscow being able to work 

together on this, and maybe they’re—what I heard was, maybe 

they’re diverging in their support for Assad in keeping him in 

power or giving him more leverage in a transition. Do you believe 

that is going to come to a head—again, in the short term, long 

term—and what are the consequences of that? 

General STEWART. In—— 

Senator FISCHER. I mean, I can remember—and it wasn’t that 

long ago—when we would all sit up here and say, ‘‘it’s not a question on if Assad is leaving, it’s when he’s leaving.’’ That obviously 

has changed. 

General STEWART. The Russian reinforcement has changed the 

calculus completely. The tactical relationship that Iran and Russia 

has today, I suspect, at some point—and it’s pretty hard to predict 

that some point—will diverge, because they won’t share the stage. 

Iran wants to be the regional hegemon. If it has to compete with 

Russia in the longer term—and again, I can’t put months or 

years—I suspect that their interests will diverge because of competition as a regional power. 

In the near term, though, their interest is simply to prop up the 

regime. The regime, in my mind, is not necessarily Assad; it’s the 

regime, first of all, that allows Russia to maintain its interests and 

allows Iran to control Syria—greater Syria and parts of Lebanon. 

When those two things become tension points, where their interests—where Russia jettisons Assad or Russia pushes for his removal—I suspect that they will have at least a tactical breakdown. 

However, it’s still in Iran’s interest to maintain a relationship with 

Russia, because of what we talked about earlier, the ability to procure weapons from Russia without any preconditions. They would 

like to modernize all of their military forces, and Russia seems to 

be an option for doing that. 

So, the relationship might be tense, it might break down at some 

point because of regional desires for control, but they’ll still have 

the enduring relationship from a weapons procurement standpoint. 

Senator FISCHER. Director Clapper, I’m out of time, but if you 

had just a couple of comments you’d like to add there—I apologize 

for giving you less time. 

Mr. CLAPPER. That’s fine. 

The thing that I find interesting is that both the Russians and 

the Iranians are growing increasingly interested in using proxies, 

rather than their own forces, to fight in Syria. The Russians are 

incurring casualties. The Iranians are. To the extent that they can 

bring in others—and, of course, in Iran’s case, Hezbollah. 

I think Russians are not wedded to Assad personally, but they 

have the same challenge as everyone else, ‘‘If not Assad, who?’’ I 

don’t know that they’ve come up with an alternative to him, either. 

Senator FISCHER. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator King. 

82 

Senator KING. Gentlemen, thank you for being with us this 

morning. 

I was discussing, yesterday with one of our ‘‘Five Eyes’’ partners, 

overall long-term intelligence and worldwide threats. I’m afraid— 

and you touched on this, Director Clapper, in your report—I’m 

afraid that the Syrian refugee crisis is a precursor of a larger refugee crisis that we could be facing over the next 10 to 20 years, 

based upon predictions of climate change, the band of the world 

that is going to be subject to droughts, famine, crop loss, flooding 

in some areas, over—incredible heat in the band around North Africa, Central Africa, into Southeast Asia. We could see mass migrations that could really strain the Western countries. Would you 

concur in that, Secretary—— 

Mr. CLAPPER. Well, I think you’re quite right. I alluded to that, 

at least briefly, in my oral statement, about the fact that we have 

some 60 million people around the globe displaced in one way or 

another. I think the—— 

Senator KING. If that increases, it’s going to create—because all 

of those people are going to want to go where things are better—— 

Mr. CLAPPER. Exactly. 

Senator KING.—which happens to be the northern hemisphere. 

Mr. CLAPPER. So, that’s why that is going to—that will place ever 

greater stresses on the remainder of the countries, whether here in 

the Americas, Europe, Africa, Asia, wherever. The effects of climate 

change, of weather aberrations, however you want to describe 

them, just exacerbate this. You know, the—what we have in the 

world is sort—in the—by way of resource to feed and support the 

growing world population is somewhat of a finite resource. There’s 

only so much water, only so much arable land. The conditions that 

you mention, I believe, are going to foment more pressure for migrants. That on top of the instability that—of governance that I 

spoke briefly about in my oral statement, as well—I think are 

going to make for a challenging situation in the future. 

Senator KING. Thank you. 

Again, turning to something that you touched on. The lack of capacity to deal with drug imports, it seems to me, is something that 

is a real strategic and tactical challenge. We’re suffering terribly, 

in my home State of Maine, with heroin. New Hampshire has one 

death overdose a day. In Maine, it’s 200 a year, one death every 

weekday, if you will. We’re trying to deal with the demand side and 

with the treatment and prevention. Keeping this stuff out to begin 

with—and heroin’s cheaper than it’s ever been, which tells me that 

the supply is up. What do we—where should we be putting our efforts on the interdiction side? 

Mr. CLAPPER. Well, on—to the extent—I think the—working with 

the Mexican government, particularly since that’s where a great 

deal of this comes from, is Mexico, and I think the partnership that 

we can engender with them is crucial to this. 

Senator KING. Are they—— 

Mr. CLAPPER. Obviously—— 

Senator KING.—a serious partner? Do they want to stop this, or 

does—or are they conflicted? Do they see this as a cash crop? 

Mr. CLAPPER. Well, I think it’s who—it depends on who ‘‘they’’ 

is in Mexico. I think the national leadership would obviously like 

83 

to stop the flow. There are very—as you know, very, very powerful 

economic forces in Mexico that auger against that, and we’ve got 

a lot of money. They also have a corruption problem, frankly, to 

deal with. So, I think we need to be as aggressive as we can be 

in interdicting what we can. I mentioned earlier, for example, the 

tremendous impact of the Coast Guard capabilities, when they’re 

brought to bear. As we discussed earlier, General Kelly, one of— 

the former commander of SOUTHCOM—has spoken to this many 

times, about not so much a lack of intelligence, but rather the lack 

of an operational capability to respond to the intelligence to interdict. We have the intelligence capability and the intelligence capacity, but that needs to be matched by a concomitant resource commitment. 

Senator KING. We need a greater commitment, in terms of interdiction capacity. 

Mr. CLAPPER. Exactly. 

Senator KING. With just a few seconds left, and perhaps you 

could take this for the record. We always, at these hearings, talk 

about the cyberthreat. We’ve done some actions here. We finally 

got though a cyber bill last year about information-sharing. I’m still 

concerned about critical infrastructure. Perhaps, for the record, you 

could give us some thoughts about what further we should be doing 

here in Congress or in the country, in terms of critical infrastructure. Because that’s, I think, our—one of our areas of greatest vulnerability. 

Mr. CLAPPER. I share your concern and we’ll provide some for the 

record. 

Senator KING. Thank you. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

[Deleted.] 

Chairman MCCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Cotton. 

Senator COTTON. Gentlemen, thank you both for your many 

years of service to our country. 

First, I’d like to say that it’s reassuring to hear so many members of this committee, who voted to give the world’s worst state 

sponsor of terrorism tens of billions of dollars, express their grave 

concerns about what Iran might do with that money. I wish we had 

heard more of those concerns during the debate and before the vote 

on it. 

Director Clapper, you testified last year that, in your 45 years of 

public service, this was the worst global threat environment you 

had ever seen. Is that correct? 

Mr. CLAPPER. Yes, sir. I had occasion to say it again in a—response to a question earlier. 

Senator COTTON. That’s a—and that’s—was your point with Senator McCain earlier, is that it’s the worst global threat environment now in 46 years? 

Mr. CLAPPER. Well, it’s certainly the most diverse array of challenges and threats that I can recall. 

Senator COTTON. Why is that? 

Mr. CLAPPER. Well, I think it’s—frankly, it’s somewhat a function 

of the change in the bipolar system that did provide a certain staVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:59 May 30, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00087 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\25336.TXT WILDA
84 

bility in the world, the Soviet Union and its community, its alliance, and the West, led by the United States. Virtually all other 

threats were sort of subsumed in that basic bipolar contest that 

went on for decades and was characterized by stability. When that 

ended, that set off a whole range of a whole group of forces, I 

guess, or dynamics, around the world that have changed. 

Senator COTTON. You both have long and deep experience in the 

Middle East. In your experience, is the Middle East a place that 

prizes concessions in negotiations or strength in toughness? 

General STEWART. I would argue that, in almost all these cases, 

strength is preferred over signs of weakness. 

Senator COTTON. Do you believe that the appearance and reputation for power is an important part of the reality of power in national security affairs? 

General STEWART. Yes, Senator. 

Senator COTTON. What would you believe is our current reputation for power in the Middle East after, say, 12—10 American sailors were videotaped kneeling at gunpoint by Iranian Revolutionary 

Guard Corps forces? 

General STEWART. I don’t know that that incident alone reflects 

the perception of our strength and power. I think, over the last several years, there have been some concerns among our partners 

about our commitment to the region, our willingness to employ the 

force, where our interests—both national and strategic interest lies. 

I think that’s caused just a little bit of concern among our partners 

about our commitment to the region. 

Senator COTTON. I would like to return to a question that Senator Heinrich raised. He raised the news that the Saudi Defense 

Ministry and now the Emirati Foreign Ministry have both suggested that they would be willing to deploy their troops to the 

ground in Syria. He asked you to assess the capability of those 

militaries. Threats, for good or for ill, are part of—are both capability and intention. In both of the statements from Saudi Arabia 

and the UAE, they both insisted that they would need to see 

United States leadership in that effort. 

Director Clapper, do you have any idea what kind of leadership 

they’re talking about, what more they would expect to see from the 

United States that they apparently are not seeing at the moment? 

Mr. CLAPPER. Well, I don’t know what—I—and I took it to mean 

specifically with respect to if they deployed a significant military 

force into Syria. I took it to mean the command-and-control capability that, you know, the U.S. is pretty good at. I—that’s what I 

took it to mean. 

Senator COTTON. General Stewart? 

General STEWART. I think the Arab countries, led by Saudi Arabia and the Emiratis, would like to see more ground forces to 

match their commitment. Having said that, I do not assess that the 

Saudi ground forces would have either the capacity to take this 

fight on—as I’ve said earlier, the Emiratis, very capable, acquitted 

themself well in Yemen, but lack the capacity to take on additional 

fight elsewhere. I think the idea is, How do we get more U.S. skin 

in the game? 

Senator COTTON. Thank you. 

85 

Director Clapper, in early October, shortly after Russia began its 

incursion into Syria, President Obama called it, quote, ‘‘a big mistake,’’ and, quote, ‘‘doomed to fail.’’ Do you believe, 4 and a half 

months later, that Russia’s incursion into Syria is ‘‘a big mistake’’ 

from their standpoint, and ‘‘doomed to fail’’? 

Mr. CLAPPER. It could be a big mistake. One of the concerns the 

Russians have, of course, those with long memories, is a repeat of 

Afghanistan. Of course, that’s why the Russians, to this point, have 

avoided a significant ground force presence. They have about 5,000 

personnel tied up in supporting the air operations—advisors, intelligence, et cetera. So, long term, it could be a mistake for them. 

They haven’t enjoyed the success, I think, that Putin anticipated. 

I think he believed that he would go in quickly and be able to leave 

early. That is not turning out to be the case. They are getting into 

a long-term stalemate, themselves. 

Senator COTTON. Thank you. 

My time is expired. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Nelson. 

Senator NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Good morning, gentlemen. I repeat what so many have said here. 

Thank you for your public service. 

Given what you just said, General Clapper, about Russia being 

concerned about being bogged down, and going back to the comments of Senator Kaine about the cash reserves of Russia diminishing because of the price of oil, and you mentioned that, at some 

point, the street in Russia going—these are my words—to erupt. 

Can you give us any sense of when that might occur, given these 

factors that has been discussed in the whole committee meeting? 

Mr. CLAPPER. Senator Nelson, I cannot. I don’t know when that 

tipping point might occur. As I said, the Russian people have a 

great capacity for enduring discomfort and inconvenience and pain. 

I think, at some point, they will reach a breaking point. I think the 

Russian leadership is mindful of that and are very concerned about 

it. The sustained economic recession, which will go well into 2016, 

I think it’s somewhat of an imponderable to try predict when—if 

this is sustained, when that will cause a breaking point and when 

the street will say something. 

Senator NELSON. From an intel standpoint, Putin can continue 

his diversions—Crimea, Syria, whatnot—to get the nationalistic 

fervor of the Russian people continually stoked up. When they can’t 

get butter and they get to the point that they realize that that’s 

going more to guns, do we have any sense, from the history of Russia, of all—or from an intel standpoint—do we hear anything of the 

rumblings going on in Russia that would give us a better idea of 

how to predict that timing? 

Mr. CLAPPER. Well, no. I don’t think—predicting, you know, sociological dynamics is very difficult, when people will collectively 

reach a breaking point. That’s, you know, kind of what happened 

with the demise of the Soviet Union, when the—you know, ‘‘the big 

lie,’’ I think, became evident to more and more people. That’s another thing that the Russians worry about, is information and—information from the outside world. The Russians expend a lot of energy, time, and resource on controlling information and controlling 

the message in Russia. So, the combination of these factors—their 

86 

ability to endure the gradual erosion of the economy of Russia, 

their tight control of information, not unlike the heyday of the Soviet Union, makes it, to me at least, very difficult to predict when 

all those forces will collide. 

Senator NELSON. Let me ask about assured access to space, 

which is essential to our national security. We have a great deal 

of optimism as a result of what we’re seeing, a number of companies now producing rockets that seem to be quite successful. We 

have the likelihood of new engines being produced. This Senator is 

concerned, not in the long term, but more in the short term, of— 

Is there a gap there that, if we do not have that Russian-supplied 

engine, the RD–180, that we will not have the assured access to 

space because of the alternative being, number one, that the Delta 

4 cannot be produced quickly enough, and number two, that it 

would be prohibitively expensive compared to the alternative of the 

Atlas 5? 

Mr. CLAPPER. Well, as I said earlier, Senator Nelson, I—I’m in 

the customer mode. I have certain imperatives, in terms of our assured access to space for overhead reconnaissance purposes. This 

is extremely crucial capability for the Nation’s safety and security. 

I look to the providers of those who get those things into space, 

which, for me, is the Air Force—— 

Senator NELSON. I understand that. 

Mr. CLAPPER.—to decide that. So, I—you know, the Delta has 

worked great for us. We felt it was responsive, it was cost-effective—— 

Senator NELSON. Right. 

Mr. CLAPPER.—and it worked for us. 

Senator NELSON. Are you concerned that there could be a gap? 

Mr. CLAPPER. Well, I certainly would be. I mean, when we’ve had 

to manage gaps, not so much from a—because of launch, but simply because of the capabilities in space, that is a great concern to 

us in the intelligence community. So, yes, I would be very concerned about gaps. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Rounds. 

Senator ROUNDS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Director Clapper and General Stewart, thank you both for your 

service to our country. We most certainly appreciate the participation that you have in this meeting today. 

In October of last year, the United States Naval Institute published a rather chilling article detailing the long list of advanced 

weaponry that the Chinese military has cloned by stealing from 

other nations either through cyber espionage or reverse engineering. What roles do you see the intelligence agencies taking to prevent this hemorrhaging of American technological advantage? 

Mr. CLAPPER. Well, I think it’s our responsibility to ensure that 

our policymakers, and particularly the Department of Defense, are 

aware of the—this hemorrhage, if you will, of technological information that the Chinese have purloined. So, I think our duty, our 

obligation is—from an intelligence community standpoint, is to 

make sure people know about this, and, where we can, suggest 

ways to try to stop it. 

Senator ROUNDS. General Stewart? 

87 

General STEWART. I don’t know if I could add anything more to 

that. We detect, we get an appreciation, understanding of the 

threat vectors, we inform, and, if we can, we provide some potential 

solutions. It then becomes up to those who have the technology, 

who have been threatened—their intellectual property threatened, 

to take those countermeasures. So, I think we identify, we warn, 

we report, and it’s over to the users. 

Senator ROUNDS. Would you both—with regard to the tools that 

you have available today, do you have the appropriate equipment, 

tools, and technology to be able to detect and report these attacks? 

Mr. CLAPPER. Yes, we do. I do think—and this gives me an opportunity for maybe a small commercial that we do sustain our 

R&D. This is particularly the—important for, well, all the IC, but 

particularly NSA [the National Security Agency], that we stay 

ahead of cyber technological developments in the world domain for 

foreign intelligence purposes to stay abreast of these. 

Senator ROUNDS. What do you believe constitutes an act of war 

in cyberspace? What do you assess it would look like? When does 

it become an act of war? 

Mr. CLAPPER. That’s a great question, Senator, that—one that 

we’ve wrestled with. A certain extent, it’s—I guess it’s in the eye 

of the beholder. This gets to the whole issue of cyberdeterrence and 

all those kind of complex questions. I think that’s a determination 

that would almost have to be made on a case-by-case basis, depending on the impact. 

Senator ROUNDS. So, if we were to suggest that it was time to 

define what an act of war in cyberspace would be, it would not be 

appropriate? Or should we be looking at clearly defining what an 

act of war constitutes with regard to cyber activity? Would that be 

helpful, or not? 

General STEWART. I think it would be extremely helpful to have 

clear definitions of what constitutes cyber events versus acts of 

war. We generally look at all cyber events, and we define it as an 

‘‘attack.’’ In many cases, you can do reconnaissance, you can do espionage, you can do theft in this domain we call cyberspace. The 

reaction always is—whether it’s an adversary doing reconnaissance, an adversary trying to conduct HUMINT [human intelligence] operations in this domain, we define it as an ‘‘attack.’’ I 

don’t think that’s terribly helpful. So, if we can get a much fuller 

definition of the range of things that occur in cyberspace, and then 

start thinking about the threshold where an attack is catastrophic 

enough or destructive enough that we define that as an act of war, 

I think that would be extremely useful. 

Senator ROUNDS. Have we done enough, or a sufficient job, in deterring cyber aggression? 

General STEWART. I think we have a pretty robust capability to 

understand the adversaries. I think most potential adversaries understand that we have a capability. Whether or not we are ready 

to use that, because that’s the essence of deterrence that an adversary actually feels, that we will use the capability that we have, 

I’m not sure we’re there yet. That goes beyond our ability to understand and to counter with military capabilities. So, I think there’s 

another dimension of convincing, from a policy standpoint, that 

we’re willing to use that capability. 

88 

Chairman MCCAIN. Wouldn’t it be a good idea to have a policy, 

General? As I understand it, we have no policy as to whether we 

should deter, whether we should respond, whether—if so, how. Is 

it—wouldn’t it be good if we had a policy? 

General STEWART. Mr. Chairman, I always find it good to have 

a policy that guides the things that I can do as a military officer. 

Chairman MCCAIN. I think that’s not a earth-shaking comment, 

to tell you the truth. I don’t think we’ll stop the presses. The fact 

is, we don’t have a policy. I don’t know how you act when there’s 

no policy as to how we respond to threats or actual acts of penetration into some of our most sensitive information. 

Senator Sullivan. 

Senator SULLIVAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Welcome, gentlemen. Great to see two marines at the table. As 

the Chairman knows, the terms ‘‘marine’’ and ‘‘intelligence’’ are 

considered synonymous by most, so glad to see you’re—— 

Chairman MCCAIN. Really? 

[Laughter.] 

Senator SULLIVAN.—glad to see you’re bolstering that fine tradition. 

I wanted to focus a little bit on the—what’s going on in the South 

China Sea. Director Clapper, last time you were here, you expressed concerns over the possible militarization of some of the formations that are being built up in that part of the world by the 

Chinese. As you know, here we are, a year later, and that’s exactly 

happened, in terms of 3,200 acres of new land, seven large land 

features, an airfield, one of which is 10,000 feet long. What do you 

believe the Chinese—what do you believe their goals are in the region? 

Mr. CLAPPER. Well, I think the Chinese are very, very determined to sustain their exorbitant claims in the South China Sea. 

They’ve had this ‘‘nine-dash line’’ playing for some time. They have 

sustained that. I think they will continue with building up their capabilities on these outcroppings and islands. 

Senator SULLIVAN. Do you think they’re clearly looking to militarize those outcroppings? 

Mr. CLAPPER. Well, I think—not sure what—you know, what the 

definition of ‘‘militarize’’ is. Apparently, President Xi may have a 

different view than—definition than we do. I think when you put 

in runways and hangars and start installing radars, doing port 

calls with Chinese navy and Chinese coast guard ships—they have 

not yet, I don’t believe, actually landed any military fighter aircraft 

yet, but they have tested the airworthiness, so to speak, of their 

air drones there with civilian aircraft. So—— 

Senator SULLIVAN. So, I want to follow—— 

Mr. CLAPPER.—I think it’s very clear that they will try to exert 

as much possessiveness, if you will, over this area and the South 

China Sea in general. 

Senator SULLIVAN. I want to follow up on a point the Chairman 

just made. As far as our policy to counter that, you know, this committee, in a bipartisan way, has certainly been encouraging the 

White House, the military, to conduct regular FONOPs [freedom of 

navigation operation] in the region, preferably with our allies. I 

think our allies are all very motivated to see American leadership 

89 

here. Do you think that we have clearly articulated what our policy 

is? Do you think that regular FONOPs by U.S. military vehicles— 

ships, aircraft—with our allies, is an important way to counteract 

the strategy that seems to have very little pushback on it right 

now? 

Mr. CLAPPER. Well, again, this is a policy, and we’re just down 

in the engine room, shoveling intelligence coal. I do think that we 

have made clear the policy on freedom of navigation, and have 

done at least two FONOP missions. 

Senator SULLIVAN. Do you think our allies understand what our 

articulated policy in the region is? 

Mr. CLAPPER. I think they do, and I think they welcome our freedom-of-navigation operations. I think they are a bit reticent to 

speak publicly as supportively as they do in private. 

Senator SULLIVAN. Let me turn to the Arctic. I appreciated 

your—both of your focus on the Arctic in your testimony. As you 

know, there’s been a dramatic increase in the Russia’s military 

buildup in the Arctic. There’s been statements by the Deputy 

Prime Minister about how we should colonize the Arctic. You even 

mentioned, Director, in your testimony, that the Russians would be 

prepared to—unilaterally, to protect their interests in the Arctic. 

Let me just ask a couple of questions, and you—both of you can answer them to the—however you want, in terms of prioritization. 

What do you believe the Russians are up to with their dramatic 

buildup in the Arctic? President Putin certainly is somebody who 

probes for weakness. How do you think he’s reacting to our actual 

plans for dramatically withdrawing the only Arctic-trained forces in 

the Active Duty U.S. military? Do we need to be looking at, kind 

of, FONOP kind of operations in the Arctic, particularly given that 

the Russians have such a significant interest in the Arctic? They’ve 

built up their northern fleet, they have 40 icebreakers, and the 

strategic northwest passage is only going to become more important. Is that something we should be looking at doing on a regular 

basis—— 

Mr. CLAPPER. Well, I can—— 

Senator SULLIVAN.—in terms of our FONOPs? 

Mr. CLAPPER.—I can—— 

Senator SULLIVAN. You can answer any of those—all three of 

those questions, if you’d like. 

Mr. CLAPPER. I can comment on—from an intelligence perspective, that we are turning attention to the Arctic. There’s about a 

6,000-kilometer-long coastline that the Russians have on the Arctic. They’ve established a—built around their northern fleet a joint 

command to oversee their military activities. They are refurbishing 

bases there. They’re—quantitatively, they appear to have what— 

where they’re going would be actually less than what they had in 

the Arctic regions during the heyday of the Cold War, but, qualitatively, it’ll probably be better. 

What has stymied the Russians, as I alluded to earlier, though, 

was—their grand plans for investing there, particularly with energy extraction, have been stymied because of the economic recession. So—and they need foreign investment, from a technological 

standpoint, and they are not getting it, because of the economic 

extremis they’re in. 

90 

So, yes, Arctic is important. We engage with the countries that 

are a part of the Arctic Council, notably Canada and Norway. We 

are stepping up our intelligence-sharing with those countries. In 

terms of what the Russians are doing there. As far as what we do 

about it and troop deployments, that’s kind of not our department. 

Senator SULLIVAN. You can give us assessment on what you believe Putin would think as he builds up the Arctic, we’re withdrawing forces from the Arctic. In your assessment of how he operates and thinks, what does he think about that? How will he view 

a reduction in Arctic forces by the United States when he is dramatically building up forces? You can certainly answer that question. 

Mr. CLAPPER. Well, I don’t know what he thinks. I don’t read his 

mind. I guess anytime he sees an opportunity where he believes 

we’re reducing or not being prevalent, then if he—if that serves his 

purpose, he’ll take advantage of it. 

Senator SULLIVAN. General, any views? 

General STEWART. The Russians intend to increase their ability 

to control the Arctic regions. They’ve built air bases, they’re building missile defense capability, both coastal and naval missile defense capability. They’re doing that for economic and military reasons. In the absence of something that counters that, they will continue to expand. So, there is, I think, an imperative that we have 

both the willingness and the capacity to push back on their control 

or dominance of the Arctic region. 

I think they’re probably in a place where they are—they’d be 

willing to negotiate and discuss how you conduct operations in the 

Arctic, but they need to have something to push against. 

Senator SULLIVAN. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator King feels compelled to ask an additional question. 

Senator KING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I think. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator KING. Quick question about money. Two questions, actually. 

Where does North Korea get its money? It doesn’t seem to have 

much of an economy, and yet it’s building missiles, nuclear capability, military buildup. Where’s their funding? 

Mr. CLAPPER. Well, the—their primary trading partner, of 

course, is China, by far, probably 90 percent of their trade. They— 

and the biggest single export from North Korea to China is coal. 

Runs around a—they get about a billion-point-two a year from coal 

sales. Then, of course, it’s illicit finance—illicit finances. They have 

a—an organized approach to laundering money and this sort of 

thing. So—but, most of their trade in the—in North Korea is natural-resource-heavy. The Chinese exploit that. So, that’s where 

they get the lion’s share of the—— 

Senator KING. Is it safe to say that if China decided they didn’t 

like the direction of North Korean policy, they could have a significant influence over it? 

Mr. CLAPPER. I don’t think there’s any question that, to the extent that anyone has leverage over North Korea, it’s China. 

91 

Senator KING. A second followup question, this time about Russia. What percentage of the Russian budget is funded by oil revenues? 

Mr. CLAPPER. Oh, I’ll have to take that for the record, but a large 

part is—a significant proportion of their budget is—I think is from 

oil revenue. I don’t know exactly what it is. I could—— 

[The information referred to follows:] 

[Deleted.] 

Senator KING. You’ve talked about a 4-percent contraction, I believe, in their economy over—— 

Mr. CLAPPER. Yes. 

Senator KING.—the past year, which is projected to continue into 

this year. 

Mr. CLAPPER. Correct. 

Senator KING. At some point, it seems to me, they’re going to 

reach a point where they just run out of money. I wouldn’t imagine 

they would be too good a credit on the world—— 

Mr. CLAPPER. Right. 

Senator KING.—credit market. 

Mr. CLAPPER. They do have very significant reserves—financial 

reserves that they’ve built up over the years, which they’re starting 

to eat into. You’re quite right, I mean, over an extended period, it 

can’t sustain them. 

Senator KING. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Very quickly, Director. General Kelly testified before this committee about this issue of this manufactured 

heroin, which has now become a major issue all over America, particularly the northeast and the midwest, this dramatic increase in 

heroin drug overdoses. Some of it comes across the land border. 

General Kelly testified before this committee that he—because of 

his lack of assets, he watches, sometime, seaborne transportation 

of drugs that land in various places in the Caribbean and come up 

into the United States. Isn’t that an issue that you can trace, to 

some degree, to sequestration, but also the old squeezing-the-balloon theory? 

Mr. CLAPPER. Well, I can’t say specifically whether this is attributable to sequestration, or not. I just do know that there is a great 

deal of intelligence that the intelligence community produces on 

drug flow into the United States. And—— 

Chairman MCCAIN. And some of that is—— 

Mr. CLAPPER. I’ve heard—I’ve—— 

Chairman MCCAIN.—shifted to seaborne—— 

Mr. CLAPPER. Yes—— 

Chairman MCCAIN. Yeah. 

Mr. CLAPPER.—exactly. Seaborne interdiction with these semisubmersible vehicles that are sailed to the American coast. The difficulty has been: not enough operational resources, and particularly 

Coast Guard or Navy resources, that could be used to take advantage of the intelligence that is produced. I saw General Kelly speak 

to that, just about every year he testified. 

Chairman MCCAIN. The interesting thing about this is that if 

you talk to literally any Governor in the northeast or midwest of 

92 

this country today, they would say that this is practically an epidemic of—a dramatic increase in heroin drug overdose deaths. Now 

we’re going to have this agreement with the FARC [Revolutionary 

Armed Forces of Columbia], which all of us want, in Colombia. 

Does that mean that a lot of these FARC people will go into the 

drug business? 

Mr. CLAPPER. It certainly could, sir. The other thing I—and I alluded briefly to this in my statement—was, of course, the—we’re 

seeing an increase in cocaine, which is occasioned by—comes from 

Colombia and, as part of this agreement and also, I think, President Santos, the—took heed of what were presented to him as environmental impacts of the eradication program that have been existent in Colombia for some years. They’re stopping the drug eradication and trying to appeal to the farmers to grow other crops, 

which probably will be a challenge. So—— 

Chairman MCCAIN. We saw that experiment in Afghanistan, trying to get the farmers to go to other crops rather than poppies. It 

was a failure. 

Mr. CLAPPER. Well, it didn’t seem to work, no. I mean, that— 

there is so much money to be made, and it is such a huge moneymaker that it’s very hard, I think, to find other—alternate crops 

that are equal—that are legitimate, that are equally profitable. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Finally—I apologize for imposing on your 

time, but one thing we know is the Energomash, the company that 

sells the Russian rocket engines to the United States, is rife with 

people who are cronies of Vladimir Putin, people who have been 

sanctioned, part of criminal activities. Wouldn’t it better for us to— 

rather than giving tens of millions of dollars to Russia—Putin and 

his cronies, to buy more Deltas as part of the solution? I know your 

answer is going to be: you’re the purchaser. I also think that this 

almost borders on a national security issue, because, if we’re going 

to give tens of millions of dollars to people who are known thugs 

and Putin, himself, who was just recently implicated by the British 

for the murder of a former KGB agent in London, the assassination 

of Boris Nemtsov in the shadow of the Kremlin, that—for us to unnecessarily provide the Russians with tens or hundreds of millions 

of dollars, it doesn’t seem to me to be a logical way to do business, 

particularly if the we have the opportunity to buy more Deltas and 

have the development of Russian rocket engines here in the United 

States, which people like SpaceX and others are working on. Do 

you have any comment? 

Mr. CLAPPER. I would agree with you. I—I’m interested in the 

service, in lift, in getting—in launch, in getting our reconnaissance 

satellites deployed on time. I would much prefer that the totality 

of the system that gets those satellites into orbit were American. 

Chairman MCCAIN. I thank you. 

Senator Reed, do you have—— 

Senator REED. I simply want to thank both General Stewart and 

General Clapper for their testimony and their service. 

Particularly, again, General Clapper, thank you for your extraordinary service to the Nation. 

Mr. CLAPPER. Thank you very much. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Can I say, sometimes we have hearings that 

are, maybe, not too productive. I view this as one of the more helpVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:59 May 30, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00096 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\25336.TXT WILDA
93 

ful hearings that we have had before this committee. I thank the 

witnesses for their candor and their wisdom. 

This hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:37 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

(95) 

EMERGING UNITED STATES DEFENSE 

CHALLENGES AND WORLDWIDE THREATS 

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 6, 2016 

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:33 a.m. in Room 

SH–216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator John McCain (chairman) presiding. 

Committee members present: Senators McCain, Inhofe, Wicker, 

Ayotte, Fischer, Rounds, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, Lee, Graham, Cruz, 

Reed, McCaskill, Manchin, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Donnelly, Hirono, Kaine, King, and Heinrich. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN, CHAIRMAN 

Chairman MCCAIN. Good morning. The Senate Armed Services 

Committee meets this morning to receive testimony on emerging 

U.S. defense challenges and worldwide threats. 

We’re fortunate to have with us three distinguished witnesses: 

General Jack Keane, Chairman of the Institute for the Study of 

War and former Vice Chief of Staff of the Army; Mr. Shawn 

Brimley, the Executive Vice President and Director of Studies at 

The Center for a New American Security; and Dr. Robert Kagan, 

Senior Fellow at The Brookings Institute, Project on International 

Order and Strategy. 

Our next President will take office as the United States confronts 

the most diverse and complex array of global security challenges 

since the end of the second World War. Great power competition, 

once thought a casualty of the End of History, has returned as Russia and China have each challenged the rules-based order that is 

the foundation of our security and prosperity. Rogue states like 

North Korea and Iran are undermining regional stability while developing advanced military capabilities that threaten the United 

States and our allies. Radical Islamist terrorism continues to pose 

a challenging threat to our security at home and our interests 

abroad. The chaos that has spread across the Middle East and on 

which our terrorist enemies thrive has torn apart nations, destroyed families, killed hundreds of thousands of men, women, and 

children, and sent millions more running for their lives. 

Today—today—President Obama will deliver a speech in Florida 

touting his counterterrorism successes. I’m not making that up. 

Yet, even a glimpse at the chaos enveloping the Middle East and 

spreading throughout the world reveals the delusion and sophistry 

of this President and his failed policies. In short, when our next 

96 

President is inaugurated, just 6 weeks from now, he will look out 

on a world on fire and have several consequential strategic choices 

to make: how to address Russian or Chinese aggression; how to 

confront threats from North Korea; whether to alter our relationship with Iran; how to improve and quicken our campaign against 

ISIL [the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant]; how to counter the 

instability radiating from Syria; how to ensure victory in the war 

in Afghanistan—and I could go on—not to mention the overwhelming challenge of cybersecurity. Our next President will not 

have the benefit of time and cautious deliberation to set a new 

strategic course for the Nation. That work begins with a series of 

decisions that will present themselves immediately on day one. 

That’s why it’s so important to get these things right from the outset. 

As we ponder these strategic questions, we must also consider 

our military posture around the world. We must decide the appropriate military presence in Europe and reverse reductions made by 

the Obama administration under the assumption that Russia was 

a partner. We also need a fresh look at further steps to enhance 

U.S. presence in the Asia-Pacific region. We need to uphold our 

commitments to allies and partners, including by finally providing 

lethal assistance to Ukraine and standing by the opposition in 

Syria. We need to push back against the spread of Iranian malign 

influence in the Middle East. This starts in Iraq, where the eventual liberation of Mosul will intensify the sectarian struggle for 

power and identity. We need to finally give our troops in Afghanistan what they need to succeed: permanent and flexible authorities 

to engage the enemy and troop levels based on security conditions 

on the ground. 

Here at home, we need to return to a strategy-based defense budget. Our next President would need more than $100 billion over 

and above the Budget Control Act caps just to execute our current 

defense strategy, which is insufficient, since it predates Russian invasion of Ukraine and ISIL’s rampage across Syria and Iraq. This 

will require our next President to negotiate a broad bipartisan 

agreement on the budget that brings an end to the dangerous and 

misguided Budget Control Act. Such an agreement has eluded 

President Obama and the Congress, not because of disagreements 

on defense policy, but because we’ve lacked the political will to 

prioritize defense. 

Since the election, many have discussed domestic priorities, including reviewing Obamacare, increasing information spending, 

and implementing tax cuts. These can be no—there can be no 

greater priority than preserving and increasing America’s position 

of strength and military advantage in the face of increasing global 

dangers, that rebuilding our military must be a political priority, 

not just a talking point. We must not only provide stable and increased defense budgets, but the next President’s administration 

must also implement reforms to the Nation’s defense. This will include changes to the defense enterprise passed by the Congress 

over the last 2 years. 

I’m proud of the work we’ve done on modernization—on modernizing military retirement, improving military healthcare, reforming 

defense acquisition, trimming Pentagon bureaucracy, and more. 

97 

The ultimate success of these reforms will depend on years of faithful implementation and dedicated follow through by the Department of Defense. 

The President-elect’s selection of General James Mattis to serve 

as Secretary is an encouraging sign in this regard, but there are 

dozens of senior civilian and military nominations still to come, and 

it will be the job of this committee and the full Senate to provide 

advice and consent on these nominations. We will be watching 

closely to see what choices the next President makes. 

I encourage the next President to be bold. We need innovators 

for the future, not imitators of the past. We need thinkers open to 

new ideas, not functionaries wedded to old ways. We need people 

who understand the bureaucracy but will not be captured by it. Put 

simply, to ensure the success of defense reform, we need reformers 

throughout the leadership of the Department of Defense. 

Finally, our next President needs to repair the relationship between the executive and legislative branches. The constitutional 

mandate to provide for the common defense is one the President 

and the Congress share together. This is not a defect, but the design of our founders. To deter adversaries and defeat our enemies, 

fix our defense budget, and implement critical reforms on—to our 

defense enterprise, the executive and legislative branches must 

work together as coequals. We need our next President, our next 

Secretary of Defense, and those elected to the next Congress to uphold this essential constitutional principle. The American people 

and the men and women who serve in our Armed Forces deserve 

and expect nothing less. 

Senator Reed. 

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED 

Senator REED. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank 

you for holding this very important hearing. 

I also want to thank the witnesses for their participation, not 

only their participation, but their service in so many different capacities to the Nation over many, many years. Thank you all very 

much. 

The most immediate threat to the safety of Americans at home 

and abroad still remains the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, 

or ISIL, and the remnants of al Qaeda. I recently returned from 

the region, where I met with our military commanders, diplomats, 

and senior political leaders. Militarily, ISIL is on the path to defeat 

in Iraq. The Iraqi Security Force, enabled by U.S. and coalition 

train, advise, and assist efforts, coupled with airstrikes, intelligence, and other support, are in the process of displacing ISIL 

from Mosul and are expected, in the coming months, to significantly disrupt the ability of ISIL to hold any key terrain within 

Iraq. Nevertheless, ISIL will likely continue to act as the subversive force in Iraq for the foreseeable future; and also, as the Chairman indicated, with the final capture of Mosul, that will start a political process in which the sectarian groups will vie for power, and 

that could be a decisive and critical theater arena of action in Iraq. 

In Syria, isolation operations around Raqqa have commenced, 

but the task of supporting forces on the ground who will ultimately 

enter, clear, and hold Raqqa is months away. Unlike Iraq, we have 

98 

no partner in Syria for humanitarian, stabilization, and reconstruction efforts. Even after Raqqa is retaken, the security situation will 

remain extremely difficult as the remnants of ISIL seek refuge in 

the largely ungoverned areas of eastern Syria along the Euphrates 

River as the broader Syrian civil war is likely to rage on. 

I also recently visited Afghanistan, where political tensions between President Ghani and Chief Executive Officer Abdullah appear to be receding as the 2016 traditional fighting season comes 

to a close. Our commander in Afghanistan, General Nicholson, recently described the conflict between the Afghan government and 

the Taliban as, in his words, ‘‘an equilibrium in favor of the government because they are controlling the majority of the population.’’ 

Decisions earlier this year by the President to maintain approximately 8400 U.S. troops in Afghanistan into 2017 and to provide 

robust support to the Afghan national defense and security forces 

has laid the foundation for a sustainable U.S. and international security presence in Afghanistan. The decision also sent an important 

message to Afghans, the Taliban, and others in the region, including Pakistan, regarding the commitment of the United States to 

continue progress in Afghanistan. Assuming the continued support 

of the Afghan government and the support of its people, I hope the 

next administration will follow a conditions-based approach to U.S. 

presence in Afghanistan that provides flexibility on the number of 

military personnel deployed in support of our longer-term strategy 

there. 

Over the past few months, the implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, the JCPOA, has largely proceeded as 

planned. While the JCPOA is having its intended impact in the nuclear arena, Iran’s behavior with respect to its proxy forces across 

the region has not improved, and, as I discussed during my recent 

visit with the commander of our naval forces in the Middle East, 

Iran’s unsafe and unprofessional actions in the maritime arena 

continue. How the new administration chooses to proceed with respect to Iran will be an important decision. It is critical that we 

need cede space or territory to Iranian influence, but it’s similarly 

critical that we not take actions that escalate tensions unnecessarily and can be blamed on the United States. For example, as 

many experts have pointed out, the likely result of the U.S. unilaterally withdrawing from the JCPOA would be a resumption of the 

Iranian nuclear program without the ability to reimpose effective 

sanctions, which rely on enforcement by our partners around the 

world. 

In Europe, we continue to be a witness to a number of destabilizing factors, including adversarial actions by Russia, acts of terrorism, and sustained refugee and migrant flows. Such instability 

is acutely on display in Ukraine, where Russian-based separatists 

commit daily cease-fire violations with seemingly endless resupply 

from Russia, and disinformation campaigns continue to undermine 

public confidence in Ukrainian government institutions. This confluence of destabilizing factors makes the multinational effort underway to strengthen Ukraine’s capability to defend itself and to 

decrease corruption, increase accountability, and reform institutional structures all the more important. 

99 

In the Pacific, China has alarmed its neighbors in the South 

China Sea by militarizing land features in a body of water that is 

critical for trade and regional peace, and refusing to acknowledge 

the international norms and laws that govern those waters. 

In Korea—North Korea—Kim Jung-un continues to destabilize 

the Korean Peninsula with nuclear ballistic missile developments, 

and sanctions are not working as effectively as they should to bring 

the North Koreans to the negotiating table. Regimes as authoritarian and insulated as North Korea’s are brittle and prone to collapse. How we would deal with such a collapse and the security 

and humanitarian problems that would ensue is an ongoing debate 

and challenge to U.S. Forces Korea and the PACOM [United States 

Pacific Command] Commander. 

Finally, defense budgets should be based on a long-term military 

strategy, which requires the Department to focus at least 5 years 

into the future. Last year, Congress passed the 2015 Bipartisan 

Budget Act, or BBA, which established the discretionary funding 

levels for defense spending for fiscal years 2016 and 2017. While 

the BBA provided the Department with budget stability in the near 

term, there is no budget agreement for fiscal year 2018 and beyond. Therefore, without another bipartisan agreement that provides relief from sequestration, the military services will be forced 

to adhere to the sequestration-level budget caps and could undermine the investments made to rebuild readiness and modernize 

platforms and equipment. 

Again, Mr. Chairman, thank you for this important hearing. 

Chairman MCCAIN. I thank you. 

I thank the witnesses. 

General Keane, given your advanced age, we will begin with you. 

STATEMENT OF GENERAL JOHN M. KEANE, USA (RET.), CHAIRMAN, INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF WAR, AND FORMER 

VICE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMY 

General KEANE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Love that introduction. 

[Laughter.] 

General KEANE. Good morning, everyone. Listen, I’m delighted to 

be here with Dr. Kagan and—my good friend. Let me just say 

something about Dr. Kagan, here, and his family. His father, himself, his wife, his brother, and his sister-in-law all—— 

Chairman MCCAIN. All have exceeded—— 

General KEANE.—make a great contribution—— 

Chairman MCCAIN.—exceeded his—— 

General KEANE.—to this country, believe me. 

Mr. Brimley, as well, thank you to be here. 

Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed, and distinguished 

members of the committee, thank you for inviting me once again. 

Listen, I so appreciate what this committee has done through the 

years in taking care of our men and women in the Armed Forces. 

Just let me say straight out, my congratulations to the committee 

and to your leadership, Senators McCain and Reed, for your seminal achievement with the FY17 NDAA [National Defense 

Auhtorization Act]. We’ve not had such a critical transformational 

piece of defense legislation in 30 years, not since Goldwater-Nichols 

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in 1986. You’ve stopped the drawdown of our ground forces, particularly the Army, who’s borne the brunt of 15 years of war. 

They’re still doing heavy lifting around the world. You know, it was 

the Army who was asked to reduce its force structure to pay for 

the needs of the other Departments. Makes no sense whatsoever. 

I applaud your bold reforms on defense acquisition, military 

healthcare, security cooperation, and the reduction of flag officer 

and SES billets—I know you will eventually get around to compensation, which is in dire need— and, of course, the much needed 

increase of funding to depleted readiness accounts. 

Let me summarize what you have in front of you with my written statement, which has an unusual amount of verbosity in it, but, 

given the subject matter was so important, I decided to write a little bit more than I usually do. Let’s start with the defense challenges. 

You know as well as I do, there’s a lot more that we have to— 

done here. You have made an incredible first start with the FY17 

NDAA, but we have major capability gaps, and we’ve got serious 

funding issues. The BCA has to end. We can’t do anything if that 

continues. We can’t get out our hole, and it’s going to put us in a 

worse hole. 

It’s—you know, it’s not sufficient, you know, to be the best military in the world. Certainly, we take pride in that, as we rightfully 

should. We’ve—we spend more money than many other nations do 

if you add them all up, by comparison, in defense. What is really 

needed is, we have to be so superior in our capability that our adversaries are not willing to challenge us. The reason is because 

we’re a credible deterrent. We had that for many years in the Cold 

War. We were, indeed, a credible deterrent. I believe that deterrence, with other issues, helped to force the collapse of the Soviet 

Union. 

So, since that time, we’ve had two and a half decades since the 

end of the Cold War, and—which has been reasonably successful, 

in terms of foreign policy and national security. I don’t dispute 

that. With some exceptions. We have been continuously 

decrementing the United States military during that whole period 

of time. Our adversaries are closing the technology gap. They are 

catching up. 

We are ill-prepared, as we sit here today, to meet all the threats 

that we’re facing. I don’t make that statement lightly. You’ve had 

a Chief of Service come in here—[General Mark A.] Milley, straight 

talker—tell you, in no uncertain words, that he’s at high military 

risk to win a conventional war. Now, that didn’t get a headline in 

any newspaper, it didn’t even cause a stir with the administration. 

We haven’t had a service chief make a statement like that in 40 

years. Other service chiefs could make the same statement. The Air 

Force, they’ve got a 1947 air force, in size. They’ve got 60-percentplus combat aircraft than what we used to have when we began the 

decline. Sixty-plus percent. The Navy—you know, you’re aware of 

it—they’ve got 270 hulls, and they’re going to 308. The 270, as part 

of that, they’re going to retire more ships than they can replace 

during the timeframe to get to the 308. They’ve gone through a 50- 

percent-plus reduction during this two-and-a-half-decade decline. If 

you look at it in spending dollars, constant dollars, we’re spending 

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about the same amount of money that we did three decades ago, 

but we’re considerably smaller. We’ve got so—less to show for it. 

So, we’ve got to fix the shortfall. The reality is, we need more combat brigades. The reality is, we need more ships. The reality is, we 

need more aircraft. It’s indisputable. 

The technology gap, it’s closing, and closed. Precision-guided munitions, space-based technology, stealth, offensive and defense missiles, long-range artillery, they’re all there. That capability exists 

in our adversaries. 

Russia and China, they have a brilliant strategy. They’re not stupid. They’ve got an asymmetric strategy to minimize the greatpower advantage that we have in our air and maritime capability. 

So, what have they done? They’ve made long-range anti-ship missiles, and they’ve made long-range anti-aircraft missiles. Those 

things matter. They’ve deployed them in eastern China. That’s a 

major challenge for us. They’ve deployed them in western Russia, 

and it’s also a major challenge for us. 

Russia’s got a new tank. It’s a T–14 Armata. The crew is no 

longer in a turret. The first time that’s ever happened. It’s in the 

main body. They’re in a special protected capsule. It has advanced 

reactive armor, second generation, on it that we believe—we don’t 

know for sure—but our main tank sabot round, long penetrator, 

it’ll stop it. It also has active protective system on it, their second 

generation. The United States has not fielded a single Active Protective System on a tank yet, or any other combat vehicle. Your 

committee has mandated they do it. You put some money in there 

for them to do it. 

Now, listen, if you don’t know what Active Protective System is, 

let me take you through it for a second. You put sensors on a vehicle that track an incoming round to the vehicle, and, as the vehicle—as the round is about to hit the vehicle, you actually have a 

kill system on the vehicle that kills the round before it hits. Brilliant technology. Where do we get all of that from? Private sector. 

It has to do with microchip technology and incredible software programs. Out there on the private sector, smart guys, small business 

guys got it. DARPA [Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency] 

had a program, over 10 years ago, to look at this. Technology’s 

proven, and the United States military ground forces still haven’t 

put it on anything. What’s wrong with that? It has nothing to do 

with money. It doesn’t have anything to do with the White House. 

It doesn’t have anything to do with Congress. Doesn’t, I mean, have 

anything to do with OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense]. You 

know what it is? It’s the damn bureaucracy inside the Army. They 

push back on new technology, because they want to design it themselves because you give them money to do it. These are the laboratories and the tech bases. It’s the acquisition bureaucracy that 

stalls this. 

When I was Vice Chief of Staff for the Army, I had no idea about 

all of that, and it took me a year or two to figure out what I was 

really dealing with, bureaucrats and technocrats that were stalling 

the advance of a great army. That’s out there. You’ve got to bore 

into that with this committee. The military and Defense Department needs help to break down that bureaucracy. 

102 

Listen, some—all the service chiefs know what they want to do 

with their service, but allow me a little bit of allowance here, as 

an observer, to throw out a couple of tidbits. You know, for my 

Army, the Army that you’re looking at is a 1980s Army. That’s the 

equipment it’s got. It hasn’t had a new major end item since the 

1980s. The Stryker vehicle was bought off-the-shelf. That’s a legacy 

system out there. The problem is, they’re 200,000 shorter—smaller 

than what the 1980 Army was. 200,000 smaller. If you have Active 

Protective System like I just said, and you can kill anything that 

comes at a tank, should we design a tank that looks different than 

what it is? Does it really have to be 70 tons? I don’t think so. 

So, the Army’s got to do some thinking about where it’s going. 

I—also, I believe it has to rethink its organization, how it fights, 

and go after the technology that is available, and press the R&D 

[research and development] community to get you the new technology that you can conceptually even think through yourself. 

The Navy—lookit—what the Chinese have is serious, in terms of 

long-range anti-shipping. Long-range anti-ship missiles are here to 

stay. Nineteen ship surface carrier battle groups, does that still 

make sense in the face of that threat? They can put—they can 

swarm those missiles. They can bring them en masse against that 

carrier battle group that will really test our air defense systems. 

Doesn’t it make sense to look at undersea warfare and take a look 

at all the functions that are taking place on the surface, and whatever functions on the surface we can do undersea, put it there. 

Why? You’ve got protection and you’ve got stealth. Seems to make 

sense. Some of this is cultural, to be sure, inside services. You 

know, these things are not easy. There are good people there. You 

can push it a little bit. Goldwater-Nichols changed the United 

States military. FY17 NDAA is going to do some of that, as well. 

The Air Force—lookit, we know—we know it intuitively. It’s obvious. It’s right in front of us. Unmanned flight is here. It’s here. 

We’ve got to get serious about it. If you put, in a remote station, 

a pilot and a multifunctional crew versus a single pilot or a dual 

pilot in the air, that is an enhanced airpower capability. That’s 

here. We can do that. We’ve got to think about doing it. 

I also think—and comes through our flag officers, it got at something that Senator McCain was saying—we’ve got to look for our 

flag officers who are not risk-averse, who themselves are not bureaucrats, and who have—they’re willing to take risk and are innovative. The reason why they got that rank on their shoulder has 

nothing to do with cars, airplanes, and all them other stuff that 

goes with it. It all has to do about taking the rocks out of the 

rucksack of our soldiers and moving that system forward. We’ve got 

to get the best that we can to do that kind of work. 

Let me just say that modernizing a military is challenging. We 

can do it, even though we’re facing all these threats, as Senator 

McCain and Senator Reed took out. General Marshall, Admiral 

King, General LeMay, Admiral Rickover, General Abrams, they all 

met those challenges, and they transformed our land, air, and sea 

forces. They are the ones that are responsible for winning on the 

battlefield from Normandy to the Philippines and from Kuwait to 

Iraq. 

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Let me just say something about the DOD [Department of Defense] business side of the house. Certainly, we are the best fighting force in the world. We’re first-rate at that. We’re absolutely 

third-rate at running the businesslike functions of DOD, because 

we’re not good at it. We don’t know enough to be good at it. We’re 

managing huge real estate portfolios, we’re managing huge lodging 

capabilities. We’re one of the great—biggest motel owners in the 

United States. We’re managing the largest healthcare enterprise in 

the world. The amount of maintenance that we’re doing, from a pistol to an aircraft carrier, is staggering. Those are all business functions. Business functions. They’re all non-core functions. We’re also 

managing new product design and new product development, using 

business terms. We don’t do well at this. There’s a ton of money 

involved in it. We’ve got to get after that money, and we’ve got to 

do better at it. I think we should bring in, as the number-two guy 

in the Department of Defense, a CEO [Chief Executive Officer] 

from a Fortune 500 company in the last 5 years that’s done a major 

turnaround of a large organization. We need businesspeople to help 

us do this. We need a CFO [Chief Financial Officer], not a comptroller, in DOD. That CFO has the background that’s necessary to 

look at business practices in the DOD, where cost is a—cost-based 

analysis and performance, internal control, auditing, rigorous financial reviews, cost efficiency, and dealing with waste. Those are 

the kind of things we need. Desperately need them, because the 

money is there. We want to—you want to do so much more. Some 

of that money is sitting right there in the budget. 

You know as well as I do that these global security challenges 

we’re—facing us are enormous. Senator McCain laid them all out. 

I won’t go through them all. I’ll just touch on a couple of things. 

One is American leadership. That is where we have to start. 

American leadership is crucial and indispensable in this world to 

global security and stability. The world economy absolutely depends on that global stability and security. We need to reassure 

our allies that we’re going to stand behind them. They don’t trust 

us. They don’t believe we’re the reliable ally we used to be. If you 

travel the world, you’re getting the same thing that I’m getting. 

This is real. They—as a result of it, they’re making decisions based 

on that fear. Some of those decisions are not very good. 

Radical Islam. We know it’s a multigenerational problem of the 

21st century. We know we have to name it, we have to define it, 

and we have to explain it to the American people. My God, if 

they’re going to deal with this for the 21st century, we’re going to 

have people killing them on some kind of episodic basis, they certainly need to understand a little bit about it, you would think, 

that we can explain what this is, what this ideology is, what are 

the signs, symbols, dress, and behavior and speech of those who 

radicalize themselves to it, so their eyes and ears can identify it 

and report it to somebody. Just makes sense, but we’re not doing 

it. 

The other thing is, we need to develop a comprehensive strategy, 

but we can’t do that until we form a global alliance to push back 

against what is a global threat. We haven’t done it. 

ISIS [the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria]. ISIS is the most successful terrorist organization that’s ever been put together. We’re 

104 

making progress against them in Iraq, to be sure. We do not have 

an effective strategy to defeat them in Syria, because we don’t have 

an effective ground force. We have no strategy to deal with the 

spread of ISIS to 35 other countries. I’m not suggesting for a 

minute that we’re involved in all of that, but I think we can tangibly help the people who are. This administration’s going to have 

to deal with, How do we defeat ISIS? Not just how we succeed in 

Iraq. I think they’re going to ask for a comprehensive campaign 

plan to do it. I don’t think there has been one, to be frank about 

it. 

In Iraq, we will retake Mosul. How long will depend on how 

much ISIS wants to defeat—to resist. They didn’t resist in Fallujah 

and Ramadi that much. After we take Mosul, if we have sectarian 

strife in Mosul, where we do not have unity of governance and 

unity of security, then that is going to contaminate the political 

unity in the country as a whole which is so desperately neeed. That 

is a major issue for us. 

The major geopolitical issue for the United States in Iraq is political unity with that government and diminishing Iran’s strategic 

influence on Iraq. That is what we should be working on. Frankly, 

we have not. We have not worked on that anywhere near as hard 

as we could be. We can’t get the Secretary of State to make regular 

visits there to work on that very project. The Iranians are there all 

the time. That is a major issue for us. This administration’s going 

to have decide, as the previous one did, Are we going to leave 

troops in Iraq? Yes? No? How much? What are they going to do? 

How long? Those are decisions in front of them. I would hope that 

we would avoid the disastrous pullout we did in 2011, which had 

incredible consequences, as we all know. The Syrian civil war, a 

major human catastrophe, to be sure, and as intractable a problem, 

I think, as any of us have had to deal with. 

The reality is, we squandered the opportunities to change the 

momentum against the regime. I won’t list them all. You’re aware 

of it. Right in front of us, I still believe we could put safe zones 

in there to safeguard some of those humans up near the Jordanian 

and Turkish border. That, de facto, would be a no-fly zone. I think 

it would also aid the Syrian moderates, and likely attract some others to that movement. Many of the people that were helping the 

Syrian moderates, the Islamists, moved way when we did not execute the 2013 chemical redline. 

Chairman MCCAIN. General, we’re going to have to—— 

General KEANE. Okay, I’ll wrap it up. 

Afghanistan. Let me just say, the war is not winnable under the 

current policy. We cannot win. That’s the reality of it. We’ve got 

sanctuaries in Pakistan. No insurgency’s ever been defeated with 

sanctuaries outside the conflict area. Pakistani and Afghan National Security Forces do not have the enablers they need to be 

able to overcome the Taliban, who have resurged. There’s ways we 

can deal with that, to be sure. I’ll take it on in questions-and-answers. 

With Russia and China, I’ll just tell you that my view is strength 

and resolve in dealing with both of them. They would recognize 

that. I truly believe that Russia’s aggression needs to be stopped. 

Credible deterrence is the way to do it. The resolve in that deterVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:59 May 30, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00108 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\25336.TXT WILDA
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rence. Russia certainly wants to be an equal partner with the 

United States to be on the world stage. Grant them that. We 

should make no concessions to them until they change their behavior. 

I’ll just stop right there, Mr. Chairman, and I’ll take your questions later. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of General Keane follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY GENERAL JOHN M. KEANE, USA (RET) 

Chairman McCain, ranking member Reed and distinguished members of the committee thank you for inviting me once again to provide testimony on our major defense issues and global security challenges. 

Let me say, straight out, my congratulations to the committee and to your leadership, Senators McCain and Reed for your seminal achievement with the FY 17 

NDAA. We have not had such a critical transformational piece of defense legislation 

in 30 years since the passage of Goldwater-Nichols in 1986. You have stopped the 

drawdown of our ground forces, particularly, the Army who has borne the brunt of 

15 years of war, is still doing heavy lifting around the world, yet, it was the Army 

who was asked to reduce its force structure to pay for needs in the other departments. Makes no sense. I applaud your bold reforms on defense acquisition, military 

healthcare, security cooperation and the reduction of flag officer and SES billets. Of 

course the much needed increase of funding to depleted readiness accounts. 

DEFENSE CHALLENGES: 

It will take the help of the new President and the new Congress to complete what 

you have begun because there are major capability gaps and serious funding issues 

remaining. The Budget Control Act (sequestration) must be ended. Frankly, it’s not 

sufficient to be the best military in the world, or to spend more money on defense 

than the next five or so militaries combined, what is critical is that the US military 

is so superior in capability that our adversaries are unwilling to challenge us because we are such a credible deterrent. We achieved this during the Cold War and 

it was a factor in the Soviet Union collapse. Regrettably, this superiority is dangerously eroding. Over the course of the past 2 ‡ decades since the end of the Cold 

War, the capacity of US armed forces has been continuously decremented and coupled with the rapid closing of the military superiority gap by potential adversaries, 

the US military is ill prepared to meet the many and various security challenges 

it faces around the world today and in the future. Readiness is down across the 

board in all the services with pilot training, safety and aircraft maintenance reaching critical levels. The Army Chief of Staff, General Milley, known for straight-talk, 

in testimony before this committee told you that because only one third of his combat units were ready for combat, that the Army is at ‘‘high risk’’ for winning a conventional war. We have not had a service chief make a statement like that in 40 

years. Other service chiefs could make similar statements. As you know, we have 

the smallest Air Force since 1947, and a 270 hull Navy, while moving to 308 ships, 

the Navy will be retiring ships faster than they can be replaced. In constant dollars 

we are spending about the same on defense as we did almost 3 decades ago. Alarmingly, for today’s defense budget we are fielding 35% fewer combat brigades, 53% 

fewer combat ships, 63% fewer combat aircraft squadrons along with a dramatic increase in overhead not directly related to war fighting combat power. 

The technology advantages that were enjoyed from the end of the Cold War are 

closing rapidly and in many cases have closed: precision guided munitions, spacebased technology, stealth, offensive and defensive missiles, long range rocket artillery and ground warfare. Our revisionist adversaries Russia, China and to a lesser 

degree North Korea and Iran are developing asymmetric capabilities to minimize 

the air and sea power technology advantage we have enjoyed for years by fielding 

significant long range anti-shipping and anti-aircraft missile capability. These forces 

are forward deployed in Eastern China challenging western Pacific access and Western Russia at Kaliningrad challenging Baltic Sea access. The Russians who are 

fielding a revolutionary tank, the T14, Armata, the first ever, no crew in the turret 

(they are in a protective capsule in the forward main body), has an improved gun 

system, and has their 2nd generation active protection system (APS). The Israelis 

launched an Armor brigade, their very best, to conduct an approach march from 

West to East Gaza, during the last conflict in 2014, with APS on each combat vehiVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:59 May 30, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00109 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\25336.TXT WILDA
106 

cle in order to destroy the rockets/missile infrastructure that they could not accomplish with air power. They rode through a gauntlet of sophisticated, anti-tank systems and did not lose a single vehicle, due primarily to APS. 

The US Army has not fielded a single combat vehicle with APS, (although with 

your mandate and funding they will begin soon) despite that the US defense industry has had this proven technology for over 10 years, which was a DARPA initiative. 

While funding is usually an issue with new technology this is not a funding issue 

nor is it the White House, the Congress, or OSD, this is the Army’s acquisition system, their labs and tech base, who steadfastly pushed back on this technology preferring in-house design as part of a risk averse culture to new, outside technology. 

Thank you to this committee and the Congress at large in seeking acquisition and 

innocation reform which demands not only major organization and systemic changes 

but a fundamental cultural change in accepting risk and failure as part of the innovation process. 

Given the challenges our adversaries are presenting and the decades of military 

decline in capability, we now must fix it, but we cannot rely on the much maligned 

acquisition system to get us there. This must be an urgent, high priority effort and 

your directed changes help: service chiefs back in the acquisition process to help 

drive it, separating out the research and development function at OSD (they are the 

future), rapid prototyping to dramatically accelerate production of what works, trial 

and error experimentation and accepting that failure is an answer and not a necessarily bad answer. 

The service chiefs certainly know what future capability they desire but it’s also 

appropriate for others to make observations that at times seem quite obvious. A few 

tidbits of my own: 

a. The joint force is how we fight and while our success is technology dependent 

equally important are adaptable, flexible JT force organizations that can react 

to the unexpected and are grounded in up to date doctrine that truly advantages our technology. 

b. The ground force today is essentially organized and equipped as it was in the 

1980s, yet considerably smaller (Army 200K less). Furthermore enabling forces 

like artillery, armored reconnaissance, engineers, air defense, theater support, 

etc. have been reduced to levels that compromise our ground force ability to 

field campaign quality forces. Our ground force is not in balance and they must 

rethink their organization, doctrine and put together a modernization program 

that moves away from the 1980 legacy systems and embrace advance technology that is available and push the R&D hard for new technology. 

c. The Navy battle formations are vulnerable to long range anti-shipping missiles 

which can be sent en masse, challenging the best of our air defenses. Doesn’t 

it make sense to embrace the reality that the undersea affords our combat 

power significant protection and stealth and therefore charge our fleet design 

around the principle that whatever is on the surface as to capabilities that can 

be accomplished under the sea, we should get on with it, and therefore redesign 

our fleet? Don’t we need to move from the large aircraft carrier to smaller platforms yet more of them to give us some redundancy and flexibility? 

d. The time is here to recognize that the future of air power is unmanned. It’s 

not a technology issue, it’s largely about culture. A pilot with a multi-functional team at a remote station is an enhanced air power capability. 

Modernizing while supporting significant operational demands is not easy, but it 

has been done before. Leaders like General Marshall, Admiral King, General 

LeMay, Admiral Rickover and General Abrams transformed our land, sea and air 

forces before in periods of great challenge. Their efforts fielded trained, disciplined 

and modernized formations that won on battlefields from Normandy to the Philippines, from Kuwait to Iraq. 

The Defense Department capability to fight is second to none, as the record 

speaks for itself, but its ability to manage effectively the business like functions of 

the DoD are, at best, third rate. In as much as DoD is not a business, it does have 

vast business-like functions that it must manage; real estate (housing, barracks, 

maintenance facilities, warehouses, training areas, ship yards, airfields), lodging 

(transient and guest quarters), utilities ( power plants, electrical grids, water treatment facilities), new product development and production (research, development 

and acquisition) maintenance (from a pistol to an aircraft carrier) and the largest 

healthcare enterprise in the world. Much of these non-warfighting functions lend 

themselves to major reform as public-private partnerships (PPP) similar to the highly successful PPP, the Army residential initiative, or RCI, which led to the transformation of 88,000 Army units. Quality of life and family satisfaction rose exponentially while cost and maintenance were driven down. 

107 

The new Secretary of Defense should consider appointing as his deputy a successful Fortune 500 CEO who has executed a turnaround of a large business in the last 

5 years. The comptroller should no longer be someone that simply has knowledge 

of the DoD federal budget and programming process but rather is a major corporate 

CFO, who should be the DoD CFO, therefore understands rigorous financial review, 

cost basis analysis, auditing, internal reporting, cost controls and holding the organization accountable for financial efficiency as well as waste. 

GLOBAL SECURITY CHALLENGES: 

Our new President and his national security team will be confronting global security challenges on a scale not seen since the rise of the Soviet Union to super-power 

status following WWII. Radical Islam is morphing into a global jihad; ISIS is the 

most successful terrorist organization in history despite losing major territory in 

Iraq, it has expanded into 35 countries and is motivating followers to kill their fellow citizens around the world; Al Qaeda is a thriving revitalized organization; the 

Taliban control more territory in Afghanistan than at any time since the successful 

invasion of 2001; revisionist powers Russia, China and Iran are seeking some form 

of regional domination; North Korea is a rogue nation with an unsteady leader who 

is building a nuclear and ballistic missile arsenal and threatening to use it; and advanced adversarial states are conducting cyber attacks and espionage activities at 

exploding levels in stealing intellectual property, technology and critical information. 

What makes this such a dangerous situation is that unlike previous security challenges, the US today is failing miserably to adequately meet these threats, so much 

so that our adversaries are emboldened and our friends and allies no longer trust 

us. 

WHAT CAN BE DONE: 

1. American Leadership—Recognize that American leadership is crucial and indispensable to global stability and security which is so vital for a progressive 

and growing world economy. Without strong American leadership the world becomes a more dangerous place. As such, we should reassure our allies that the 

US will stand with them against regional aggression and help them organize 

to meet the challenges of radical Islam. 

Also, it is critical that our allies are not simply relying on the US defense umbrella but are tangibly contributing to their own local and regional defense 

while investing their fair share. 

2. Radical Islam—must not simply be named as a political and religious ideology 

fighting a war within a great religion, which does not mean that the US is at 

war with Islam, but radical Islam must also be defined and explained so that 

the American people can be informed and educated. As such they can better 

understand why this is the multi-generational security challenge of the 21st 

century and equally important for the American people, who are our eyes and 

ears, in how to recognize the dress, behavior and speech of a radicalized 

Islamist terrorist who is living among us. Similar to the communist ideological 

threat where the US helped craft a strategy and organize a regional political 

and military alliance, we must now form a global alliance and develop a comprehensive strategy to defeat the movement and its ideology. 

3. ISIS: Iraq/Syria and the World Beyond— 

—Overall—First and foremost the POTUS as CINC needs an assessment of 

the current situation, future plans and if the desired end state is less than 

satisfactory then what will be needed is a comprehensive campaign plan to 

defeat ISIS, not simply in Iraq and Syria but a strategy as well for the 35 

countries where ISIS has expanded , particularly with its external terrorist 

network. 

—Iraq—The military campaign led by Iraq and supported by the US will eventually succeed in retaking Mosul. How long it will take depends on ISIS desire to resist. They eventually abandoned Fallujah and Ramadi after initially 

resisting. How Mosul ends is very important because if it winds up in sectarian strife and there is no unity in governance and security after, then it 

will contaminate any chance of political unity in Iraq, at large, which is as 

significant to success as the military campaign. US policy should be all-in 

on its focus for political unification in Iraq and diminishing Iranian influence 

which has grown exponentially at US expense since Iraq was abandoned politically in 2009 and militarily in 2011. Iraq is a country of consequence in 

the region with wealth, an educated class of people, and a huge potential for 

108 

political and economic progress. US policy must counter the Iranian desire 

that Iraq remain a weak, but stable country, and allied with Iran as part 

of its strategic objective to dominate the Middle East region. Our diplomatic 

effort to date has been feeble with the Secretary of State rarely visiting the 

country and not surprising, as a result, a lack of focus in achieving our strategic political objectives. The new administration will face near term decisions of withdrawing or keeping U.S. forces in Iraq and, if so, how many will 

stay, how long and for what mission. Certainly if we have learned anything 

after the disastrous 2011 pull out, is that US forces are a stabilizing factor 

that not only impacts security but the vital issue of political growth and 

unity. Post WWII Europe and Japan, South Korea after the Korean War, 

Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo are vivid examples. 

—Syria—There is no effective plan to defeat ISIS in Syria as there is not a 

capable ground force. The Syrian Arabs and Kurds assisted by US SOF is 

simply not sufficient. The CINC must be presented with alternative ground 

force options which includes neighboring countries, NATO and the US along 

with the associated risk. 

—ISIS beyond Iraq and Syria—With ISIS in 35 countries as part of its external terrorist network, the US and our allies should assist these countries 

where needed with intelligence, training and technology. 

4. Syrian Civil War—A frustrating calamity and a growing human catastrophe 

where so many opportunities to at least try to change the momentum against 

the Assad regime were squandered. No one has seriously proposed a military 

solution to the Syrian civil war, although a military victory in a civil war is 

not without its historical precedence. What was proposed by national security 

team key leaders and by analysts outside the administration were limited military options that could change the momentum against the regime and force a 

political solution. Clearly some of these options are not as viable now with the 

Russian incursion and increased Iranian assistance. However to continue to 

simply negotiate when all the opposition parties are not at the table and the 

Russians and Iranians or not serious, is futile. The U.S has no leverage in the 

negotiations, particularly, as Russian and Syrian air power focuses on destroying US backed and other moderate opposition forces. It was a major policy failure to permit Russian airpower to bomb the Syrian opposition forces the CIA 

was directly assisting. We warned the Russians not to bomb but they did it 

anyway. 

They should have been told if they did bomb US backed Syrian forces, then 

the US would reply in kind and bomb the Russian backed Syrian forces, particularly their air power. I still believe that establishing safe zones inside Syria 

near the Turkish and Jordanian borders is a credible option. It would be a 

major morale boost for the Syrian opposition and enhance the role and support 

of the Syrian moderate opposition groups with other groups, to say nothing of 

the tens of thousands of Syrian civilians who will be protected. 

5. Afghanistan—After 15 years the war is not winnable. The security situation is 

worsening and as such the government of Afghanistan is getting weaker. While 

there are many Afghan issues that contribute to the current situation, it is 

critical to understand how US policy contributed to the current outcome if we 

are to turn it around. 

a. When the Bush administration decided to go to war in Iraq in December 

‘01, after the successful invasion of Afghanistan in November, Afghanistan became an economy of force effort, with the minimum military resources applied. 

As such, the Afghan security forces were not developed fully, the Taliban reemerged in 2004/2005 and no increase in force levels occurred until 2008 when 

President Bush was able to deploy additional forces that year because of the 

availability of forces due to the military success in Iraq. 

b. In 2009, faced with a still worsening security situation, President Obama 

decided to employ a counter—insurgency strategy that was successful in Iraq 

and escalate the forces required. However, he did not provide the recommended forces that Generals McChrystal and Petraeus requested as the 

minimum force to defeat the Taliban. The POTUS cut the force request by 25% 

and decided to withdraw the same forces in 15 months regardless of the situation on the ground. At this decision point, Afghanistan was doomed to a protracted war. All US combat forces were withdrawn eventually by 2015. 

c. Two Taliban sanctuaries exist in Pakistan where the Pakistan military provides intelligence, training, and logistics assistance to enhance the Taliban 

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operational performance while providing continuous safe haven. No insurgency 

has ever been defeated while it maintains sanctuary outside the conflict area. 

We are in this current situation largely because the war in Iraq itself became 

protracted and much needed forces could not be applied to Afghanistan, US 

ground forces, particularly the Army is too small to fight two counter 

insurgencies simultaneously, and the Obama policy was not to win the war but 

to end US involvement. The new administration must call for a political and 

security assessment and face the harsh realities of possibly squandering 15 

years of US combat in Afghanistan in a war not winnable. What’s required is 

a new strategy with a commitment to force the elimination of sanctuaries in 

Pakistan and a commitment to provide to the ANSFs the enablers they need 

to turn the momentum: intelligence, attack helicopters, strike fighter support, 

medevac, anti-IED capabilities, much needed logistics and increased CT Special Operations Forces. Without an on-the-ground assessment, I honestly cannot tell you if that is sufficient, how many additional troops are required to 

support those functions and for how long. I do know this, without the US and 

Afghan resolve to win, we never will. 

6. Russia—The US once again faces the need to prepare for great power competition and confrontation. Russian aggression along the eastern and southern 

front of NATO presents military challenges to European security not seen in 

decades. Russia desires to be a global power operating with considerable influence on the world stage. As such Putin wants to be treated as an equal with 

the US. Our basic strategy in dealing with Russia should be through strength 

and resolve. Rebuilding the military, closing capability gaps, moving beyond a 

troop trip wire in Eastern Europe are major factors in a credible deterrence. 

Deterrence is not achievable simply with enhanced capabilities, your adversary 

must believe you intend to use it. Putin has known for several years now that 

the US is paralyzed by the fear of adverse consequences and therefore he is 

quite emboldened. That must change. Of course the US should continue to dialogue with Putin but US concessions should not be on the table as a condition 

for better relations as the Obama administration did with the ‘‘reset’’ strategy 

in giving up missile defense systems in Eastern Europe. The result, no reset, 

but increased Russian aggression in Crimea, Eastern Ukraine, Syria and 

provocations in the Baltics. For progress in US / Russia relations we can try 

to find common interests but Russia’s aggressive behavior toward US allies 

must stop. That must be the US condition for an improved relationship. 

7. Iran—The Islamic Republic of Iran is totally committed to their number one 

strategic objective: to dominate and control the Middle East by spreading the 

Islamic Revolution. They regard the US as their enemy and the major impediment to achieving this objective. US strategic policy toward Iran should be to 

counter their number one goal in concert with our allies. They will continue 

to use proxy fighters and terrorists and provocations against US capabilities 

to humiliate the US in order to weaken the relationship between the US and 

our regional allies. We should counter these activities to strengthen not weaken our commitment to our allies. Adverse aggressive Iranian behavior that violates UN sanctions, the nuclear deal or the international order should not be 

tolerated. Action should be taken beginning with sanctions and escalating as 

needed. It is likely as the US and allies express a resolve and intent to thwart 

Iran’s strategic goals that they may indeed terminate the nuclear deal. If they 

do not the US should not terminate until such time as they begin to cheat as 

we know they will if they are not already. Tough, demanding inspections and 

priority targeting by US and allied intelligence services is crucial to effective 

monitoring of the nuclear deal. It was Iranian informants who gave up the secret underground nuclear sites in Fordow. It’s just a matter of time. 

8. China—The most important bi-lateral relationship of the 21st century. Two 

economic giants who have global interests in the world economy, expanding 

trade, stimulating the economic growth of developing countries while insuring 

the global commons continues to be a major pathway for enhancing stability, 

security and economic well being. The Chinese have become hard-core capitalists and their outreach to every region of the world is staggering. Their global 

investment portfolio is beyond anything the world has seen. 

All that said, what is clear is that China desires to dominate and influence 

the Pacific in a way that the U.S. has done for 70 years after WWII. The 

thought that China had only a defensive military strategy is no longer the situation. China is projecting military power into the South China Sea by establishing forward military bases and capabilities as part of a strategy to enhance 

their influence over the countries in the region as well as the global commons. 

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The US also has valid interests in the region as an ally to every Pacific nation. 

Our allies doubt our resolve given the US selective disengagement policy and 

it is critical for the new administration to be clear with China about US Pacific 

interests and that we will go and come as we please and that we intend to 

back our allies’ self interest. Avoiding confrontation is desirable, certainly, but 

at times, may not be avoidable. We cannot let our desire to avoid confrontation 

lead us to a point of concession and weakness. The US has many shared economic and environmental interests that can be pursued in enhancing the Pacific Asia economy and quality of life but these interests should always be pursued from a position of strength and resolve. 

In closing, the complexity of the global security challenges the US is facing cannot 

be over stated, they are diverse, formidable and dangerous. The FY 17 NDAA is attempting to begin to stop the precipitous multi-decade decline of the US military 

which drove by necessity the strategy change from the ability to wage two major 

regional conflicts to something far less. Sadly to demonstrate how far we have fallen, we could not fight two low tech ground insurgencies, void of air and naval 

power, in Iraq and Afghanistan simultaneously. We fought them sequentially, a reality from which we have not recovered. 

President-elect Trump must return American leadership to meet these global 

challenges and do so in cooperation with our allies. His national security team as 

priority one must develop a comprehensive national security strategy which is 

threat and national interest based. It should see the world as it truly is, based on 

honest, straight forward assessments. As such it should be the foundation for US 

foreign policy and US defense strategy. DoD defense strategy must drive force sizing 

and force capabilities. Not the budget or available funding. DoD also must responsibly make tough choices on priorities because there never are unlimited resources. 

A strong military force is essential to maintaining the credibility of President-elect 

Trump’s foreign policy. The existence of sufficient, capable and ready military forces 

combined with a credible intent to use them, when our national security interests 

are at stake, serves to prevent war and confrontation. Much must be done to rebuild 

the US armed forces and this committee as well as the House Armed Services is 

critical for success. 

Thank you and I look forward to your questions. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Mr. Brimley. 

STATEMENT OF SHAWN BRIMLEY, EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT AND DIRECTOR OF STUDIES, THE CENTER FOR A NEW 

AMERICAN SECURITY 

Mr. BRIMLEY. Thank you, Chairman McCain, Senator Reed, 

members of the committee. I’m honored to testify before you again, 

and have the distinct feeling of being out of place again as I sit 

next to titans like Robert Kagan and General Keane, two men I 

greatly admire. 

President-elect Donald Trump will take office next January and 

shoulder the formidable burden of a complex national security inheritance, which I’ll summarize briefly right now. 

The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, as you know, remain incredibly complex. Although President Obama deserves credit, in my 

mind, for undertaking the significant surge of combat forces into 

Afghanistan 2009, the difficulty in supporting Afghan Security 

Forces was complicated by the public timelines for withdrawal. In 

Iraq, I believe the reduction of forces between 2009–2012 was far 

too steep, making it difficult for the U.S. to retain adequate leverage over the sectarianism of the government in Baghdad, which, in 

turn, enabled the rise of the Islamic State and the rapid advances 

in both Iraq and Syria. While I largely agree with the parameters 

of the operational approach in countering ISIL on the ground in 

Iraq and Syria—for instance, airpower, Special Operations forces, 

and combat advisors, of which I think we could do more—the ultimate question of how to deal with Bashar al-Assad remains unanVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:59 May 30, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00114 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\25336.TXT WILDA
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swered, and Russia’s involvement and support of the barbarism 

we’re seeing every day in places like Aleppo is horrifying. We ought 

to do more to stop it. 

I am concerned, but not particularly surprised, by the behavior 

of Russia and China. Vladimir Putin is no friend of the United 

States, and he clearly sees the long arc of history bending against 

the maintenance of an extensive Russian sphere of influence that 

acts as a break on democracy, civil society, and full economic integration—or integration with a wider Europe, and a global liberal 

economic order. The unlawful incursion of Russia into Ukraine 

should not be legitimized by the United States, and ongoing steps 

to shore up our deterrence posture in the region ought to be sustained and increased, and increased soon. 

China’s behavior, in my mind, is perhaps the most consequential, 

in terms of its lasting impact on the global order. China’s aggressive behavior towards its neighbors, and, in particular, its rapid 

land reclamation efforts in the South China Sea, are destabilizing. 

The eventual placement—and I think it will happen—of military 

platforms on these so-called ‘‘islands,’’ things like antiship cruise 

missiles, advanced air defense systems, and the like, would further 

upset the military balance of power in the region, which I think 

would dramatically risk escalation and miscalculation and conflict. 

DOD has a significant role to play in enhancing our military posture in the region, and I hope the Trump administration will quickly do so. The predictable provocation from North Korea, I should 

add, will come soon, as well. I believe urgency is important in this 

regard. 

From the perspective of the Secretary of Defense tasked to oversee the development, sustainment, and employment of U.S. military forces, it is clear that our vaunted military technological edge 

that has allowed our men and women in uniform to deploy rapidly 

around the world and engage our adversaries with unrivaled speed, 

precision, and staying power, has begun to erode. We’ve seen this 

over the last few years, for sure. I worry that our edge is eroding 

to the point where the task of maintaining conventional deterrence 

in key theaters around the world is becoming difficult—more difficult, more expensive, and more risky to our men and women in 

uniform. Moreover, the era of tight defense budgets and the disaster of sequestration, as you know, has made it very difficult for 

the Pentagon to keep investing in game-changing defense technologies and to properly enable a culture of experimentation and 

exercising that can advance new concepts of operation and displace 

old and outdated ways of keeping our forces on the cutting edge. 

I sincerely hope that sequester caps can be eliminated and the Pentagon’s defense budget can both increase and the uncertainty which 

has imperiled rational strategic and budgetary planning can finally 

be alleviated. 

Finally, like General Keane, I would like to commend this committee and its staff for the work done in assembling an impressive 

conference report for the NDAA. Beyond the budget levels, the 

NDAA advances a comprehensive and important defense reform 

agenda that includes reforms in OSD, the number of general and 

flag officers, DOD’s acquisition and healthcare systems, and adds 

important rationality to our security assistance architecture, which 

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is so vital for our defense strategy. These and other reforms must 

be implemented, and others initiated in the years to come, not only 

because they will save significant amounts of taxpayer money that 

will allow for investment in other important areas in the defense 

program, but they will make the Department more agile and more 

effective in supporting and advancing America’s security interests 

around the world. 

Thank you again for inviting me. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Brimley follows:] 


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Chairman MCCAIN. Dr. Kagan. 

STATEMENT OF ROBERT KAGAN, SENIOR FELLOW, PROJECT 

ON INTERNATIONAL ORDER AND STRATEGY, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION 

Dr. KAGAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, thank you, all the committee members, for holding this hearing, for inviting me. It’s an 

honor to be here. It’s an honor to be on this panel. I just want to 

say that every one of the family members that General Keane mentioned is deeply in love with General Keane. So, it’s a mutual admiration society. 

I want to talk about a subject that we don’t like to talk about 

in polite company, and it’s called ‘‘world order.’’ You know, we naturally focus on threats to the homeland and our borders, and we 

talk about terrorism, as we must, as something that’s obviously of 

utmost importance, has to be a top priority to protect the homeland. As we look across the whole panoply of threats that we face 

in the world, I’ve—I worry that it’s too easy to lose sight of what, 

to my mind, represent the greatest threats that we face over the 

medium- and long-term, and possibly even sooner than we may 

think, and that is the threat posed by the two great powers in the 

international system, the two great revisionist powers international 

system: Russia and China. Because what they threaten is something that is, in a way, more profound, which is this world order 

that the United States created after the end of World War II, a 

global security order, a global economic order, and a global political 

order. This is not something the United States did as a favor to the 

rest of the world. It’s not something we did out of an act of generosity, although, by historical terms, it was a rather remarkable 

act of generosity. It was done based on what Americans learned in 

the first half of the 20th century, which was that, if there was not 

a power, whether it was Britain or, as it turned out it had to be, 

the United States, willing and able to maintain this kind of decent 

world order, you did not have some smooth ride into something 

else. What you had was catastrophe. What you had was the rise 

of aggressive powers, the rise of hostile powers that were hostile 

to liberal values. We saw—we all know what happened with two 

world wars in the first half of the 20th century. What those who 

were present at the creation, so to speak, after World War II wanted to create was an international system that would not permit 

those kinds of horrors to be repeated. Because the understanding 

was that, while Americans believed very deeply, in the 1920s and 

’30s, that they could be immune from whatever horrors happened 

out there in the world, that it didn’t matter to them who ran Europe or who ran Asia or who did what to whom, as long as were 

safe, they discovered that that was not true and that, ultimately, 

the collapse of world order would come back and strike the United 

States in fundamental ways. 

Americans have decided to take on an unusual and burdensome 

role of maintaining world order because the United States was the 

only power in the world that could do it. The critical element of 

maintaining that world order was to maintain peace and stability 

in the two big cockpits of conflict that had destroyed the world and 

had produced repeated conflicts from the late 19th century onward. 

122 

That was Europe and Asia. The United States accomplished something that no other power had able to accomplish before. It essentially put a cork in two areas that had been known for the constant 

warfare, put an end to an endless cycle of war between France and 

Germany, between Japan and China. That was the stable world 

order that was created after World War II that America gradually 

thrived in, that produced the greatest era of great-power peace that 

has been known in history, the greatest period of prosperity, the 

greatest period of the spread of democracy. I think it’s very easy 

to take that for granted, to focus on some nearer-term threats that 

we may face, which are, as I say, understandable, but lose sight of 

how precious that world order is and the degree to which it may 

be threatened. 

My concern right now is that that world order is more at risk 

than we may want to realize. It is at risk because of two trend— 

intersecting trend lines that I think are things to be worried about. 

They are the trend line of increasingly activist revisionist great 

powers, Russia and China, together with the other trend line, 

which is a United States which is increasingly lacking both the will 

and the capacity to continue playing the role that it’s played since 

the end of World War II. As those two lines intersect, we begin to 

enter a period of increasing danger, because, as the willingness and 

capacity of the United States to maintain the order meets the increasing desire of those revisionist powers to change the order, the 

risk of conflict grows proportionately. If you think about a historical analogy, I don’t know whether it’s 1920, 1925, or 1931, but we 

are somewhere on that continuum, in my view. 

I think, with everything else that we have to do—and this puts 

enormous strain on our defense budget resources, because we cannot ignore what’s going on in the Middle East, we cannot ignore 

Iran, we cannot ignore North Korea, we cannot ignore ISIS, but we 

especially cannot take our eye off what I believe is ultimately the 

main game, which is managing these two revisionist powers and 

understanding what they seek. We cannot be under any illusions 

about Russia and China. We will find areas of cooperation with 

them. They both partake and benefit from and, in some case, sort 

of feed off of, the liberal world order the United States has created. 

Let us never imagine that they are content with this order, that 

they do not seek, fundamentally, eventually to upend this order, especially on the security side, to create a situation which they think 

ought to be the natural situation, which was—which is they being 

hegemonic in their own region. China has a historical memory of 

being hegemonic, dominant in its region. Russia has a historical 

memory, which Putin has expressed on numerous occasions, of restoring its empire, which stretched right into the heart of central 

Europe. As far as they are concerned, the order that the United 

States has created is unfair, disadvantageous to them, temporary, 

and ought to be overturned. I can only say that, in the process of 

overturning that, the history teaches, that overturning does not 

occur peacefully. It should be our task both to prevent them from 

overturning it and to prevent them in a way that does not produce 

another catastrophic war. That is the great challenge we face. 

Now, are we up to this challenge? Unfortunately, that is, I think, 

very much in question. I do believe that the policies of the outgoing 

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administration have indicated a general desire for a degree of retrenchment in the world, a sense that the United States was too 

involved, too engaged. It focused, to some extent, on the Middle 

East, but, I think, overall, the message that was sent, whether intentionally or unintentionally, although, in some cases, I think it 

was intentional, was that the United States is not really going to 

be in this business of world-order upholding as it used to be, and 

that we would really like others to step up and play that role while 

we pull back and tend to some of our business. Entirely understandable, entirely dangerous, because it has, as the other panelists have said, led both our allies to question whether the United 

States is really there for them, and it has emboldened those who 

seek revisions in the international system to take increasing steps 

to do so. 

It’s unfortunate, that, after these 8 years which—in which this 

signal has been sent, that, during his political campaign, the President-elect’s comments during the campaign, as well as those of his 

surrogates, have only reinforced the impression that the United 

States is out of the world-order business. Comments about whether 

the United States really should support NATO [North Atlantic 

Treaty Organization] allies. Comments about Estonia being in the 

suburbs of St. Petersburg. Complaints about the need to defend 

Japan, and is that an equitable thing? The fact that both candidates came out against the Trans-Pacific Partnership, which is 

really, in my eyes, a strategic deal more than a trade deal designed 

to pull the United States and its Asian partners together. All the 

elements of this campaign have only sent even greater shockwaves 

throughout the world about what the United States stands for. 

So, in a certain sense, yes, the next administration has a big hole 

to dig out of. It is—also has to dig out of a hole, to some extent, 

of its own making. We need to see, in the early stages—in the very 

early stages, I would say, a clear repudiation of all that rhetoric, 

some clear signs that this new administration understands the importance, not only of reassuring allies, but a willingness to bolster 

our commitment to those allies. Because, after all, the challenge 

from the revisionist powers is increasing; therefore, it’s not enough 

to say we’re committed to the defense of allies. We have to show 

that our capacities are increasing along with those of the increasing threat, which, of course, gets to the defense budget, which I 

don’t have to talk to this committee about the need to do that. 

Let me just end—I know I’m going on too long—let me just end 

on one point, and it has to do with Russia. Both China and Russia 

are revisionist powers. They have different tools in their kit. China 

has been the more cautious, so far, although I don’t presume caution indefinitely, focusing more on their economic clout. Russia has, 

by far, been the most aggressive, willingness to use military force. 

It’s invaded two countries, projected force into a third, but also has 

a whole panoply of geostrategic weapons that it has used, from energy resources to cyber. Now, especially in the past few years, to 

political information warfare, direct meddling in the political processes of the Western democracies. We’ve seen it in central and 

eastern Europe. We’ve seen it in Western Europe. We saw it in the 

Italian referendum. We’re going to see it in the French elections. 

We’re going to see it in Germany. This is a full-bore strategic tool 

124 

being used by Russia for two basic purposes: one, to affect the outcome of these elections; but, I would say, more importantly, to discredit the democratic process entirely. Because, after all, Russia 

and China are both autocracies. They feel threatened by democracies. One of their objectives—and this is an objective that Putin 

is particularly pursuing—is to discredit democracy, in general. This 

is his major tool. 

Unfortunately, as we’ve seen in this last campaign, the United 

States has now become the target of this Russian strategy. What 

I’m about to say, I’m going to say because I have all you Senators 

in front of me. This’ll probably be the last time I’ll be invited to 

have all these Senators in front of me. This is not a partisan question. This is a strategic question. If Russia, every 4 years, is allowed to come in and weigh in in our elections in the way that it 

did right now—this—in this election, we are going to be at a serious strategic disadvantage, going forward. 

Now, I understand that we live in a partisan world. I used to be 

a Republican. I—the only administration I ever served in was Republican. I understand the reluctance of Republicans to raise questions about this last election. This has got to go beyond partisanship, because this tool is not going away, this Russian effort is not 

going away. 

So, I would just—I would hope that Congress takes this threat 

seriously enough to hold serious investigations on what happened, 

how it happened, and, most importantly, how are we going to prevent it happening in the future. Because this is a major strategic 

tool that the Russians are going to continue using here and 

throughout the democratic world. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Kagan follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY DR. ROBERT KAGAN

Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member, members of the Committee, thank you very 

much for inviting me to testify this morning. 

Since the end of the Second World War, American foreign policy has aimed at defending and extending a liberal world order that conforms to American interests and 

principles. It has done so not as a favor to others but based on the hard-won understanding that in the absence of such a world order, both American interests and our 

cherished principles will eventually be imperiled. This was the lesson that those 

who were ‘‘present at the creation’’ of the American-led world order learned 70 years 

ago, after two world wars and the rise of fascism and totalitarian communism. If 

we are not vigilant, we will have to learn that lesson all over again, and perhaps 

at even greater cost. 

It has become common to say that the last 25–30 years of American foreign policy 

have been a failure. This betrays both a lack of historical memory and a lack of 

imagination. Which 25-year period of the last century would we rather have: the 

first 25 years of the 20th century, which gave us World War One, the breakdown 

of British-dominated world order, the Bolshevik revolution, and the birth of fascism? 

The second 25 years, which gave us the rise of Hitler and Stalin and Imperial 

Japan, World War Two, the communist revolution in China, and the imprisonment 

of half of Europe behind the Iron Curtain? The thirty years between 1950 and 1980, 

which despite the extraordinary success of the United States in establishing the secure basis of what used to be called the free world and which eventually produced 

the liberal world order we today enjoy, nevertheless also gave us the Korean War, 

the Vietnam War, three major wars in the Middle East, the Arab oil embargo, the 

Iranian Revolution, and the Iran hostage crisis? 

The fact is that for all the difficulties of the past 25–30 years, for all the errors, 

of which there have been many—because this is the real world in which failure is 

more common than success—for all the costs in lives and treasure, this period has 

125 

been by any reasonable historical measure one of remarkable success. From the 

1980s onward, we saw the fall of Soviet communism and the Soviet empire, the liberation of central and eastern Europe, the spread of democracy in Asia and Latin 

America, a global prosperity unmatched in human history, and, very importantly, 

no conflict between the great powers. Throughout much of this period, in crises in 

the Balkans and in the Middle East, the United States and its allies have operated 

effectively to stem humanitarian disasters and put an end to brewing conflicts. 

Democratic government has spread throughout Asia and Latin America, regions 

which were dominated by dictatorships in previous decades. Despite the economic 

downturn following the 2008 financial crisis, this is has been a period of extraordinary prosperity by historical standards. 

These past 25–30 years have also provided us a clear formula for success, a formula inherited from those early years after World War Two. By building and maintaining strong alliances with democratic nations and by supporting an open global 

economy that allows those nations to prosper, and which lifts billions of others in 

developing nations out of poverty, the United States can best protect its own security and the well-being of its own people. One need only think of the strong democratic alliances maintained during the 1980s, the relationships between Ronald 

Reagan and close allies like Margaret Thatcher, Helmut Kohl, Franc ̧ois Mitterrand, 

and Yasuhiro Nakasone. Those bonds, together with a strong U.S. military and 

strong U.S. economy, prevailed in the Cold War, convinced Soviet leaders to concede 

peacefully, and established this extraordinary period in the history of international 

relations. It has not been perfect, because perfection in human affairs is not possible. By any reasonable standard, this formula has been successful—and successful 

for the American people. It created a world order conducive to American interests 

and American values. 

Today that order faces severe challenges, both from without and from within. The 

external challenges are obvious enough. Since 9/11 we have faced the threat of radical Islamic terrorism, which has proved resilient and to which we have responded 

inadequately. Iran’s efforts to acquire a nuclear weapon, and to spread its influence 

by military means throughout the Middle East and Persian Gulf, have helped destabilize a region that remains strategically relevant despite the declining American reliance on its oil. North Korea’s nuclear capabilities as well its ballistic missile capacities are growing. 

Today, however, I would like to focus on what I believe to be the greatest threats 

that we are going to face in the years and decades, and those are threats posed by 

China and Russia. For while the other threats I have mentioned pose serious challenges, and in the case of terrorism obviously require the utmost vigilance, only 

these two great powers have the capacity to upend the world order which has long 

provided for Americans’ security and well-being. The unmistakable hegemonic ambitions of China and Russia threaten the stability and security of the world’s two most 

important regions, East Asia and Europe. These regions are vital to the United 

States both economically and strategically. They are the regions where two world 

wars originated in the first half of the 20th century and would be the locus of the 

next great war should the United States fail to play the role it has played over the 

past 70 years in undergirding their security and stability. The simple fact is, the 

era of great-power rivalries has returned. In the past these great-power competitions have led invariably to great-power wars. Managing these rivalries, avoiding 

war, and doing so without abandoning the liberal world order in the misguided belief that we will be spared when it collapses, is the greatest challenge we face today 

and in the years and decades to come. 

Both China and Russia have much in common. Both are classic revisionist powers. Although both China and Russia have never enjoyed greater security from foreign attack than they do today—Russia has never been more secure from attack by 

its traditional enemies to the west, and China has never been more secure from attack by its traditional enemy in the east—both are dissatisfied with the current configuration of power in the world. Both seek to restore a hegemonic dominance in 

their regions that they enjoyed in the past. For China that means dominance of 

East Asia, with nations like Japan, South Korea, and the nations of Southeast Asia 

both acknowledging Chinese hegemony and acting in conformity with China’s strategic, economic, and political preferences. For Russia, it means hegemonic influence 

in the areas of Central and Eastern Europe which Russia has traditionally regarded 

as either part of its empire or part of its sphere of influence. Both seek to redress 

what they regard as an unfair distribution of power, influence, and honor in the 

American-led postwar global order. Being autocracies, both feel threatened by the 

dominant democratic powers in the international system and by the democracies on 

their borders. Both regard the United States as the principal obstacle to their ambitions, and therefore both seek to weaken the American-led international security 

126 

order which stands in the way of their achieving what they regard as their rightful 

destinies. 

The two great powers differ, so far, chiefly in their methods. China has until now 

been the more careful and cautious, seeking influence primarily through its great 

economic clout in the region and globally, and using its growing military power 

chiefly as a source of deterrence and intimidation. It has not resorted to the outright 

use of force yet, although its actions in the South China Sea are military in nature 

and carry the risk of producing military conflict. China’s willingness to use force 

cannot be ruled out in the future, and possibly in the near future. Revisionist great 

powers with growing military capabilities invariably make use of those capabilities 

when they believe the possible gains outweigh the risks and costs. If the Chinese 

perceive America’s commitment to its allies and its position in the region to be 

weakening, or its capacity to make good on those commitments to be declining, then 

they will be more inclined to attempt to use the power they are acquiring in order 

to achieve their objectives. 

Russia, on the other hand, has already been far more aggressive. It has invaded 

two neighboring states—Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014—and in both cases 

has hived off significant portions of those two nations’ sovereign territory. It has 

also projected military force into Syria, lending its military support to the Syrian 

regime’s efforts to crush all opposition, including by the aerial bombing and massacre of civilian populations. Russia has also been aggressive in other ways. It has 

wielded its control of European energy resources as a weapon. It has used 

cyberwarfare against neighboring states. It has engaged in extensive information 

warfare on a global scale. It has interfered directly in Western electoral processes, 

both to try to influence their outcomes and more generally to discredit the democratic system. This past year, Russia for the first time employed this powerful weapon against the United States, heavily interfering in the American electoral process 

with as yet unknown consequences. 

Although Russia, by any measure, is the weaker of the two great powers, it has 

so far had more success than China in accomplishing its objective of dividing and 

disrupting the West. Its interference in Western democratic political systems, its information warfare, and perhaps most importantly, its role in creating increased refugee flows from Syria into Europe have all contributed to the sapping of Europeans’ 

confidence in their political systems and their established political parties. Its military intervention in Syria, contrasted with American passivity, has exacerbated already existing doubts about American staying power in the region. China, until recently, has succeeded mostly in driving American allies closer to the United States 

out of concern for growing Chinese power. That could change quickly, however, and 

especially if the United States continues on its present trajectory. We could soon 

face a situation where both great revisionist powers are acting aggressively, including by military means, which would pose an extreme challenge to American and 

global security. 

The return of this great-power challenge has come just at the moment when 

American and Western will, confidence, and capacity to meet the challenge have 

been in decline. The present administration has emphasized global retrenchment at 

the expense of engagement and although its stated policy has aimed to ‘‘rebalance’’ 

American foreign policy, the overall effect of its statements and actions has been to 

raise doubts around the world about America’s staying power as the critical supporter of the present global order. Its early attempt to ‘‘reset’’ relations with Russia 

was a first blow to America’s reputation as a reliable ally, partly because it came 

just after the Russian invasion of Georgia and thus appeared to be almost a reward 

for Russian aggression; partly because the ‘‘reset’’ came at the expense of planned 

programs of military cooperation with Poland and the Czech Republic that were jettisoned to appease Moscow; and partly because this effort at appeasement came just 

as Russian policy toward the West, and Vladimir Putin’s repressive policies toward 

the Russian people, were hardening. Then in 2014, the West’s collective response 

to the Russian invasion of Ukraine and seizure of Crimea, though better than the 

Bush administration’s response to the invasion of Georgia—Europe and the United 

States at least imposed sanctions after the invasion of Ukraine—still indicated reluctance on the part of the U.S. administration to challenge Russia in what the 

American President regarded as Russia’s own sphere of interest. In Syria, the 

present administration practically invited Russian intervention, if only through 

American passivity, and certainly did nothing to discourage it, thus reinforcing the 

already prevalent impression of an America in retreat in that region (an impression 

initially created by the unnecessary and unwise withdrawal of all American troops 

from Iraq). Subsequent Russian actions which increased the refugee flow from Syria 

into Europe also brought no American response, despite the evident damage of those 

127 

1On CBS This Morning on July 21, 2016, Newt Gingrich characterized Estonia as ‘‘in the suburbs of St. Petersburg.’’ See: Flores, Reena (2016, July 21) Newt Gingrich: NATO countries 

‘‘ought to worry’’ about U.S. commitment. CBS This Morning. Retrieved from http:// 

www.cbsnews.com/news/newt-gingrich-trump-would-reconsider-his-obligation-to-nato/. 

President-elect Donald Trump described a ‘‘real problem’’ in the U.S.-Japan defense relationship in his March 2016 interview with David Sanger and Maggie Haberman of The New York 

Times, see Haberman, Maggie and David Sanger (2016, March 26) Transcript: Donald Trump 

Expounds on His Foreign Policy Views. The New York Times. Retrieved from http:// 

www.nytimes.com/2016/03/27/us/politics/donald-trump-transcript.html?—r=0. 

refugee flows to European democratic institutions. The overall impression given by 

the present administration has been that none of this is America’s problem. 

In East Asia this administration’s otherwise commendable efforts to assert America’s continuing interest and influence have been undermined by a failure to follow 

through with policies to support the rhetoric. The military component of the socalled ‘‘Pivot’’ has been hollow due to inadequate defense spending which has made 

it impossible to enhance the American military presence in a meaningful way. The 

important economic component of the pivot, meanwhile, represented most prominently by the Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement, was undermined this year when 

both leading presidential candidates announced their opposition to the agreement. 

The general perception of American global retreat and retrenchment, encouraged 

both by presidential rhetoric and by administration policies, especially in the Middle 

East, has also been noticed in Asia, where allies are left wondering how reliable the 

U.S. commitment may be when facing the challenge posed by China, for instance, 

in the continuing conflict over the South and East China Seas. 

The perceived weakness and withdrawal of the United States as a result of the 

present administration’s policies and rhetoric has unfortunately been greatly exacerbated by the comments of the president-elect and his proxies during this year’s campaign. Suggestions that the United States might not come to the defense of NATO 

allies if attacked by Russia, that it is not worth going to war over a country that 

is ‘‘in the suburbs of St. Petersburg,’’ that it is a ‘‘real problem’’ that the United 

States has to come to Japan’s defense if it is attacked, and in general that the 

United States should fulfill its security commitments to other nations only if it 

makes economic sense—all these have only increased doubts about America’s reliability as an ally and partner. 1 They have given the clear impression to both friends 

and potential adversaries that the United States is turning inward, abjuring responsibility for global security, and effectively ceding hegemonic dominance of Europe 

and East Asia to Russia and China. 

The conjunction of these two trends—the growing ambition and aggressiveness of 

the two revisionist great powers and the increasing global perception (and perhaps 

reality) of a United States withdrawing from its international responsibilities to provide security—is at some point going to produce a dangerous crisis, or more likely, 

multiple simultaneous crises. Americans have tended to take the fundamental stability of the international order for granted, even while complaining about the burden the United States carries in maintaining that stability. As history has shown, 

however, a world order collapses with remarkable rapidity and with great violence. 

The apparent calm of the 1920s became within a decade the crisis-ridden 1930s, 

eventually culminating in world war. Continued American withdrawal from its global role could quickly tempt the rival great powers to seize the moment and try to 

reshape fundamentally the power structures in East Asia and Europe, both of which 

are of vital strategic and economic importance to the United States. At that point 

the United States would be faced with the choice of responding with the necessary 

force or acquiescing. 

The goal of American policy now should be to avoid those crises and confrontations by moving quickly to re-establish the U.S. position as the principal upholder 

of the international order. That means reaching out immediately both publicly and 

privately to reassure allies in both Europe and Asia that the United States will not 

only make good on its commitments but intends to bolster its capacity to do so. 

These reassurances must therefore be accompanied by an immediate end to the sequester and a substantial increase in defense spending in line with the recommendations of recent secretaries of defense. Nothing would send a stronger signal 

that the United States is not engaged in a withdrawal from the world but means 

to continue playing its role as the principal upholder of the international order. 

The incoming administration must also find a way to move forward with the 

Trans-Pacific Partnership in some form. That agreement, like most trade agreements, is not just about trade. It is a strategic investment in security and stability 

in East Asia, a low-cost and low-risk way of ensuring the United States and its 

friends and allies in the region remain close and united in the face of possible Chinese pressures. 

128 

Finally, there is the question of Russian interference in the most recent American 

presidential election. Some may not view this as a strategic and national security 

matter, but it is. Russian interference in Western democratic political processes has 

become a major element of Moscow’s strategy to disrupt, divide, and demoralize the 

West. The tactics it has recently employed in the United States it has already used 

in elections and referendums across Europe, including most recently in Italy, and 

will likely use again in France and Germany. For the United States to ignore this 

Russian tactic, and particularly now that it has been deployed against the United 

States, is to cede to Moscow a powerful tool of modern geopolitical warfare. It is extraordinary that the United States government has taken no act of retaliation. It 

is unconscionable, and an abdication of responsibility, that Congress has not 

launched an investigation to discover exactly what happened with a view to preventing its recurrence in the future. One hates to think that because the Republican 

Party was the beneficiary of Russian intervention in this election that as the majority party in both houses of Congress it has no interest in discovering the truth about 

the foreign government’s assault on American democratic processes. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Thank you, Doctor. 

That leads to my first question for the panel. This morning, we 

had a briefing with the Commandant of the Marine Corps, and I 

asked him what was, he felt, the highest priority that the Marine 

Corps has to combat as—not to combat, but as far as challenges to 

our Nation’s security. His first answer was cyber. He put it in the 

realm of the ability of our adversaries to cripple our ability to wage 

war. I understand very well the side of it—the aspect of it you just 

described, but I’d also, maybe, like to ask the witnesses to elaborate on the absolute military threat that—and national security 

threat that cybersecurity, or our lack of cybersecurity, capabilities 

to combat and pose to the future of the military and our national 

security. 

General Keane. 

General KEANE. Sure, certainly. Well, cyber represents another 

major battlefield capability and function that is going to be part of 

us in any future conflict, particularly dealing with any country that 

has advanced technology. That’s the reality of it. We are attempting to harden our cyberdefenses, you know, for our systems so that 

we can adequately protect them. We are totally reliant on spacebased—— 

Chairman MCCAIN. I don’t mean to interrupt, but isn’t it true we 

don’t have a policy—— 

General KEANE. That’s true. 

Chairman MCCAIN.—as to how to combat—— 

General KEANE. We—— 

Chairman MCCAIN.—cyberthreats? 

General KEANE. That’s correct. The reality is that we are completely dependent on space-based technology, which also, obviously, 

can be interfered with, with cyber. 

Now, the one—we have a decided advantage, and we don’t want 

to minimize this. The United States cyberattack capability is second to none. I’m assuming some members of the committee have 

had compartmentalized briefings on what that capability is, but it 

would make your eyes water. So, I mean, it’s quite extraordinary, 

our offensive capability. Every other nation that’s dealing with us 

knows that, as well. So, there is a built-in mechanism there, much 

as we had with nuclear weapons. The reality—in terms of mutually 

assured destruction—but, the reality is, in a tactical and operational setting, which John McCain—Senator McCain is getting at 

129 

here, yes, we’ve got a ways to go. There’s—we’ve got deficiencies 

there, but owe have enormous offensive capability, as well. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Mr. Brimley. 

Mr. BRIMLEY. Thank you, Senator. Just maybe a quick anecdote, 

to your point about the lack of a policy. I was a policy advisor in 

OSD in 2009, in the first years of the Obama administration, and 

passed down through the chain of command from Secretary Gates, 

at the time, was a question, What constitutes an act of war in 

cyberspace? I was part of a small team that put together a memo 

that apparently was very unsatisfactory, because one of the first 

questions that Secretary Panetta asked, upon assuming office, was, 

What constitutes an act of war in cyberspace? I think, in my mind, 

that just reflects the notion that there’s lots of memos being written, lots of folks inside the bureaucracies thinking about and pondering these questions, but we have yet to sort of establish the 

basic rules of war. Rules of war as it pertains to cyberspace. What 

constitutes a conflict? 

Chairman MCCAIN. Including what constitute an attack? 

Mr. BRIMLEY. Absolutely. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Do you take action to prevent it if you know 

it’s coming? What do you do to respond to an attack? Is that what 

you were discussing? 

Mr. BRIMLEY. Absolutely. Another quick anecdote. Early in ’09, 

and maybe it was 2010, we tried to come up with a DOD 

cyberstrategy. Eventually we did and it got released. As part of 

those discussions, there was this question of speed. So, for instance, 

I believe, at the time, inside the Pentagon, there was this debate 

about preauthorizing offensive use of cyber. The argument was, 

things happen in cyberspace so quickly, there’s not going to be an 

opportunity for humans—i.e., the President or the interagency—to 

be involved in deliberating, discussions about whether to take out 

a cyberserver farm, say, in Singapore that happened to be harboring—hypothetically harboring a third state’s cyberoperations. 

So, there’s this complex question of, How do we authorize use of 

force and think about the use of force in cyber, when you’re not 

going to have the ability, in a—on a case-by-case basis, to have, you 

know, long, deliberative discussions about policy. You’re going to 

have to think about preauthorizing steps in advance, up to and including going beyond our own networks and attacking the networks 

of others. So, that could create second- and third-order effects. 

It’s a long way of saying, it remains incredibly complex, it remains incredibly unclear, at least from a public perspective, what 

our policies are. I would think there’s a role for the committee in 

this regard in, sort of, legislating DOD, for instance, to finally come 

up and answer that basic question, What constitutes an act of war 

in cyberspace? 

Chairman MCCAIN. Thank you. 

Dr. Kagan, did you want to add anything to the—— 

Dr. KAGAN. It’s well out of my range, but I would just say that, 

as with all weapons, unless you can demonstrate a retaliatory capacity, you’re never going to deter the use of it. That goes for cyber 

and the use—in a war setting and also in a political setting. So, 

unless there was retaliatory action for Russian actions, they have 

no incentive to stop doing it. 

130 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Reed. 

Senator REED. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Also, let me thank the witnesses for their comments on NDAA. 

Let me state the obvious, also. The—this reform initiative was a 

result of the constant and gentle urgings of the Chairman. I 

think—— 

Chairman MCCAIN. It could not have happened unless it was totally partnership. 

Senator REED. That nudging constantly was noticed. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator REED. Dr. Kagan, you made a—I think a very insightful—no surprise—analysis of two lines that could intersect disastrously, the—a revanchist Russia and China and a disengaging 

United States. This tracks, I think, to a basic, fundamental issue 

we’ve all talked about. We have to get a military—not just the military, but our national security enterprise—the Department of 

State, Homeland Security—to a much higher level that requires 

more resources. We can find some of those resources within a context of savings—General Keane pointed out, and—that there’s 

money there. I think, even exhausting all the feasible savings, we 

still have a critical issue before us. It’s—goes to the points that you 

raised, in some respects, just—as a nation, are we ready to take 

on the challenge and pay for it? General Keane, how do we pay for 

the extra margin? If we can get out of sequestration, how do we 

pay for the extra margin we’ll need to do all the things we have 

to do—enhance our security, in space, undersea, et cetera? I’ll ask 

everyone else to comment. That probably exhausts my time. 

General KEANE. Well, you know, some of that gets back to what 

Dr. Kagan was talking about, is a lack of will. I actually am absolutely convinced this is—this is fundamentally American presidential leadership, because, you know, security of the American 

people shouldn’t have a pricetag. That means we have to educate 

the American people about what is really going on. We have to 

make honest assessments about this threat and what it portends 

for the future of America if we do not engage it. Frankly, we have 

not been doing that. I hope and trust that this new administration 

will face up to that. I think that’s where it starts. It starts with 

American leadership, and it starts with the education of the American people so that they really do understand that there is danger 

here, that it is threatening our livelihood as we know it. We have 

to make sure that they understand that and they’re informed. They 

obviously influence this body, the House of Representatives and the 

Senate, if they are educated, if they are informed. Because that’s 

where the decision is going to be made about resources, largely. I 

would trust that the new American president would make the commitment to invest in the defense budget, which it desperately 

needs. 

All that said, this is not just a windfall for the Department of 

Defense, because, at the end of the day, they’re going to support 

a national security strategy, foreign policy would emanate from 

that, and a defense strategy would emanate from that national security strategy. It’s also up to them to make the hard choices about 

priorities. There’s never enough money to go around. They’ve got 

to really make some tough choices here, to be sure. We have such 

131 

gaps and such holes that some of those choices are not too hard to 

understand what needs to be done. So, yes, I understand what 

you’re saying, Senator, and I’m sympathetic to it, but I’m absolutely convinced the Nation doesn’t understand. They really don’t 

understand. We’ve got to start with them. 

Senator REED. Mr. Brimley, then Dr. Kagan. 

Mr. BRIMLEY. Thank you for your question, Senator. 

I would just say, without disagreeing at all—I would never disagree with General Keane—but, I would say, to the committee at 

large, it’s not just a question of money. I mean, hypothetically, if 

sequester caps were lifted in the next few months, and for FY18 

[fiscal year 2018], if there’s a radical increase in defense spending, 

what do you think would happen? I mean, you know, absent anything else, the Pentagon will simply just keep doing what it’s 

doing, and will just do more of it. They’ll buy more short-range tactical fighters, they’ll buy more vulnerable surface ships that are 

particularly vulnerable to antiship cruise missiles, et cetera. 

Senator REED. I think—— 

Mr. BRIMLEY. The military services, left to their own devices, I 

think, will basically just keep doing what they’re doing. Moreover, 

absent the reforms—and, you know, again, appreciate the reforms 

the committee pushed during this last NDAA—but, if we don’t 

make progress on personnel reform, if we don’t bend the cost curve 

on military healthcare, if we don’t bend the cost curve on personnel, no amount of money is going to fix these problems. When 

I was in government, I spent a lot of time thinking about posture— 

overseas military posture. We found ways, at least in the Asia-Pacific, to start what we dreamed of as a significant rebalance. I 

think there’s a lot more to do, but things like getting marines in 

Darwin, opening the door, at the time, to the Philippines, getting 

the Littoral Combat Ship forward-deployed to Singapore, starting 

to negotiate with Japan to maybe forward-station more aircraft carriers. I think there—you know, frankly, a mistake that the administration did was taking the BCTs our of Europe. We ought to put 

those back in. 

I think there are ways where we could do a lot more without necessarily having to add dramatic amounts of more dollars to the defense budget. We need to be more engaged in the world. We need 

to forward-station our troops and capabilities around the world. 

The pushback you get in the Pentagon when you talk about overseas posture is this notion that if I’m going to put something, say, 

in Europe or put something permanently in Asia, that gives the— 

potentially, the services and DOD writ large—it starts to lock them 

down. It somewhat decreases your global flexibility. So, there’s this 

argument inside the Pentagon that, if we bring the troops home, 

and we bring capabilities home, that gives us more flexibility to 

rapidly deploy anywhere in the world where we may be needed. 

That comes at the cost of being forward and present in key theaters. We ought to be making bets on Europe, as Dr. Kagan said. 

We ought to be making bets on Asia and forward-station capabilities, and be very creative, and hold the military services to account. 

There’s a lot we can do to be more engaged in the world without 

necessarily having to increase the defense budget. 

132 

Senator REED. Dr. Kagan, again, you raised this issue of the will 

of the American people. To be blunt, that will is most—or sometimes most directly expressed in, What are you willing to pay for, 

and how are you willing to pay for it? Can you comment? 

Dr. KAGAN. Yeah, I mean, I—I’m not an expert on Pentagon 

budget and what can be saved and what can’t be saved. I’m very 

dubious that, unless you actually increase the top-line, that you’re 

going to get what you need, because I just think, you know, you 

can only squeeze so far and be as brilliant as you can be. Brilliant 

is never going to be your answer. So, I think the answer is, there’s 

going to have to be more spending. I’m not a budget expert, writ 

large, either, but I would say we have to do whatever we need to 

do. We have to—if we need to raise taxes and we need to have 

some package that does that, if we need to find other ways of, you 

know, dealing with problems like entitlement spending to do it, we 

have to do it. I mean, I lived through the Reagan years. There were 

increases in defense budget which were offset by political bargains 

of one kind or another that required increase in domestic spending, 

which led to increased defense budgets. We survived the—I mean, 

in overall deficits—we survived the deficits and won the Cold War. 

So, I would say we are going to have to, as a Nation, take this seriously enough to pay for it. 

Senator REED. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Inhofe. 

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The—let’s start off—there are some differences between the 

NDAA—and I appreciate the comments that you’ve all made about 

the—this NDAA; we’re going to get it through, and it’s going to improve things—but differences between the administration and the 

NDAA. I happened to be in the Ukraine when they had their elections. It’s the first time, as all of you know, in 96 years, there’s not 

one Communist on the Parliament at—in the Ukraine. Immediately afterwards, Putin came in and started killing people. We 

were wanting—a lot of people were wanting to get defensive weapons over to the Ukraine. They’re in this bill. The administration 

was saying that the—they refused to provide defensive legal assistance to the Ukrainians, for fear of provoking Putin. 

First question I’d ask you, Do you think Putin really needs provocation? Or isn’t he going to do it anyway? 

Mr. BRIMLEY. He doesn’t need provocation. I think—you know, I 

absolutely support being as—you know, as—as forward-leaning as 

possible in helping our Ukrainian friends, you know, counter—— 

Senator INHOFE. Well—— 

Mr. BRIMLEY.—counter the aggression. 

Senator INHOFE. Yeah. In my—the reason I asked the question, 

my feeling was, at the time, that he was doing this because he— 

the outcome of the—of Parliament. He didn’t like that. He’s getting 

bolder and bolder, as you have said. 

Yes, General Keane. 

General KEANE. Well, I—there’s a larger issue here. I mean, I 

think there’s been a thought on part of the administration that any 

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133 

sion, could possibly create an escalating situation. I think we get 

paralyzed by the fear of adverse consequences. 

There’s clearly a pattern here. You know, after—not only did we 

not provide largely defensive lethal aid to the Ukrainians, but, 

after the—Libya and Qaddafi was taken down, you could argue, 

Well, should we have done that, or not? We did it. The only thing 

the new elected Islamic moderate government asked for us was to 

help them create a defensive force to stop the radicals. We said no. 

As a result of that, we lost our Ambassador, the Consulate, and 

eventually the Embassy. The radicals are running around the entire country, the Syrian moderates. You’ve probably met some of 

them. They were so desperate, they talked to me. They wanted— 

′′Look it, we don’t want your troops, we don’t even want your airplanes. Just give us some weapons to be able to fight this guy, 

Assad, because he’s got a modern—he’s got modern equipment. He 

doesn’t have very good soldiers. They lack will. They’ve got tanks 

and artillery and airplanes, and that makes a difference on the battlefield. Let us fight them. Give us some antitank weapons, some 

antiaircraft weapons.’’ We said no. Look at the problem we have. 

I mean, that lack of support and engagement is mystifying to me. 

To fear that because it may escalate into something else? We get 

paralyzed by the fear that it may be something else that—it’s—— 

Senator INHOFE. Yeah. 

General KEANE. Some of it’s shameful. 

Senator INHOFE. I appreciate that. 

Let me just, real quickly, on—my time is running out here—I 

was at the meeting also this morning with General Neller. I commented, and he agreed, that the problem—one of the problems that 

we’re having is that we don’t—we have the wrong priority on defending America. I think you just said it a minute ago, that defense 

of the American people shouldn’t have a pricetag. Well, we had a 

policy from the administration that, when we’re getting into sequestration, that we’re not going to put additional funding into the 

military unless an equal amount’s going to be given to the nondefense portion of the budget. What does that tell you? It tells you 

that there’s not a priority in defending America. Do you in—feel 

the same way? Do you feel that the next administration should 

have that priority changed? 

General KEANE. Well, yeah, absolutely. Given the threats that 

we’re facing, and given the leaders of our military who are coming 

before this committee and telling us what major challenges and security deficiencies that they have, that we can’t meet the threats 

that are out there. I’m—and I—what I tried to explain to you is 

that, yes, we have to make investments; yes, we have to grow the 

capability of this force; but, also, we have to look inside this Department as to how it does its business, and hold it accountable for 

that. 

Yeah, absolutely, these—this situation that’s in the world today 

is going to get worse if we don’t stand up to it. I think we’ve 

learned a couple of lessons from history. Our adversaries look at 

us in terms of real capability. They see that gap closing, just as we 

see it. Rebuilding the military and putting that capability on the 

table is real. In and of itself, it becomes a deterrent. That is the 

wonderful aspect of this. We learned that through the Cold War. 

134 

The other thing that has to be present, even though you have the 

capabilities there, and they know those capabilities are real, and 

they don’t want to deal with those capabilities, if we don’t have the 

intent to use that capability, it is not a credible deterrent. They 

have to clearly understand where those lines are. Russia’s aggression has to stop. China wants to dominate and control the Pacific, 

and they resent the United States having done it for 70 years. 

They are forward-deploying forces to do that. That kind of aggression that’s taking place that will lead to confrontation, they have 

to know that we’re not going to stand for that. They have to understand that. So, the intent, as well as the credible military capability, is what is a credible deterrence. You have to have both. 

Senator INHOFE. Mr. Chairman, I’ve got to say, this is— I think, 

may be the best panel that we’ve had in recent years. 

I appreciate your honesty, all of you. 

Thank you. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Thank you. 

Senator Blumenthal. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I joined Chairman McCain at the Marine Corps Caucus Breakfast this morning, where the Commandant of the Marine Corps, in 

some sense surprisingly to me, identified cyber as the major threat 

and, in fact, I think, clearly indicated that we need a more robust 

and clear policy and strategy regarding cyber. One of the aspects 

of cyber that is perhaps most troubling is that, first of all, it 

spreads across many different spheres. Chairman McCain identified the potential for crippling our warfighting ability by literally 

disabling our ships or planes that are dependent on cyber communication, but also the attacks on civilian targets—our utilities, our 

financial system, and our election. 

So, I take it, Mr. Kagan, you would agree that we need a more 

clear and strong policy regarding cyber. 

Dr. KAGAN. Yes. As I say, I’m not a cyber expert, so I couldn’t 

tell you what that policy actually would be, other than, as I say, 

I think, you know, we need to—first of all, we, as a Nation, need 

to be clear about what has happened. I think—I mean, I’m only 

talking about the political side here. I mean, there’s still a lot of 

uncertainty about what exactly has happened. I think it’s very important that the American public know what happened, who did it, 

and how. That then we can begin to fashion a response to it, which 

I think must include retaliatory action as a deterrent. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. That investigation of its most recent effort 

to interfere in our elections is one that really should be done soon, 

it should have bipartisan support, and it should be sufficiently 

resourced so that it can be effective. Would you agree? 

Dr. KAGAN. Yes. Again, because it’s as—it should be understood 

as a strategic—it’s a strategic issue, because Russia deploys this 

political weapon as part of its overall strategy. So, the United 

States needs to respond as if this were a strategic issue, and forget 

about who won and didn’t win the election. This really is a fundamental strategic question. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Without going into any of the details that 

may be, preferably, discussed in a classified setting, no doubt there 

has been work done—investigative work done into the Russian acVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:59 May 30, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00138 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\25336.TXT WILDA
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tions that were designed to destabilize or interfere with our electoral process. Separately, you would recommend that the Congress 

undertake such a study. 

Dr. KAGAN. Yes. Partly, again, for the reasons that Congress is 

uniquely suited to then explaining things to the American people 

in a way that the administration is not likely to do. I mean, it’s 

just not enough to come up with a secret report on what happened. 

I think the American people need to understand. 

By the way, I also think this needs to put in—be put in a global 

context, because this activity has been conducted in elections 

throughout Europe and in a—as I say, is about to be conducted in 

elections that are coming up in Europe. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. You mentioned, Mr. Kagan—and I’d be interested in the opinions of other individuals on this observations— 

that the two trends that are troubling are not only the changes in 

policy on the part of the revisionist powers, but also the growing 

doubts about our Nation’s commitment to our alliances, including 

recent statements by the President-elect that we ought to, in effect, 

withdraw from our commitments to NATO, that our commitments 

to Japan also perhaps are not worth fulfilling. I wonder whether 

you would expand on the effects of those kinds of statements on the 

world order. 

Dr. KAGAN. Well, as I say—and I want to be, you know, clear 

about this—I think that, unfortunately, the policies of the outgoing 

administration had already shaken confidence in—from the very 

beginning. I mean, I think the way the initial Russian reset was 

carried out, which wound up canceling military cooperation programs with Poland, and the Czech Republic send a very early signal about whether the United States was going to be a reliable 

ally. I think premature withdrawal from Iraq, the whole redline 

episode with Syria—I mean, there’s a background here. When I 

look at what happened during the campaign, I see it as part of a 

continuum. 

Yes, the statements made by the President-elect and his proxies 

during the campaign have definitely raised alarm bells around the 

world about what the United States role is going to be, and have 

suggested that it is going to be a different role than the world has 

been accustomed to. 

Now, you know, we can—are told that the—people don’t mean 

anything they say in election campaigns. Maybe that’ll turn out to 

be true. That’s why I think that a very high priority, and a first 

priority of the administration, must be to go out and reassure, publicly and privately, the allies that we are fully committed to all of 

our defense commitments. As I say, more than that, to say that we 

are going to keep up with the rising challenges that those countries 

face by taking the necessary steps, in terms of our own capacities 

to do that. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thank you very much. 

My time is expired. At some point during the hearing, I’d be interested in what the two other witnesses have to say about both 

those areas. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Blumenthal, in order for continuity, 

we could have those comments now. 

136 

General KEANE. Well, let me just add, as much as there are 

issues in the cyber area with the United States military, it also is 

the most protected function that we have. You know as well as I 

do that our critical infrastructure is exposed. By that I mean our 

banking and financial system, our utility infrastructure, our transportation system. They’re all relatively exposed. The Congress here 

tried to work public-private partnerships in some legislation a few 

years ago. I think Senator Lieberman led that effort with others, 

and we couldn’t get it done, mainly because the private sector did 

not want to make the commitment that it would take, largely in 

terms of dollars, to provide that kind of security. 

There’s a presidential commission reporting out this week that’s 

got a number of recommendations, so I think we need to take a 

hard look at what they’re looking at. This mostly deals with—because they’re not—they don’t have access to the—what the militaries do, in a classified sense—this largely has to do with the private sector. It will take public-private partnership to provide that 

kind of security. Let’s face it, I mean, cyberattacks on the United 

States have been absolutely exploding, you know, in terms of stealing technology, intellectual property, and obviously also in just 

stealing critical information. Largely, we have not been responding. 

I don’t know how you stop something like that if they’re not paying 

a price for it. Largely, they’re not paying a price for it, Senator. 

That clearly has to be a part of our strategy. 

So, yes, we—but, we have to find ways to defend that critical infrastructure, and hopefully the presidential commission will give us 

some ideas on what the Congress needs to do to help do that. There 

are some things on the military side that we need to shore up. 

Mr. BRIMLEY. I would just say, sir, quickly, on the allies-andpartners question. I agree with Dr. Kagan. I’m somewhat worried 

about the comments I saw from the President-elect and his team. 

I’m inclined to give them the benefit of the doubt, certainly during 

the transition. I would think that, upon taking office—to execute 

any of the at least rhetorical policies I’ve heard, vis-a`-vis China or 

Iran, or even the comments on Taiwan, all of those things require 

robust alliances and partnerships. Moreover, the selection, I would 

think, of General Mattis, who spent years fostering strong alliances 

and partnerships in places like Central Command, for instance, I’m 

hopeful that the next team will be—at the Cabinet level, will have 

folks that are deeply versed in the value to us of having a strong 

strategy buttressed by strong alliances and partnerships. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Rounds. 

Senator ROUNDS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I appreciate the direction that this committee meeting is focused 

on. In particular, I’m curious as to whether or not perhaps the committee has gone far enough with the NDAA proposal this year. 

We’ve directed, for the first time ever, that the President of the 

United States must now define when an act in cyberspace would 

require a military response. It started out with a discussion that 

we had as to whether or not we should define a cyber act of war. 

It’s been refined a little bit in the discussion. I think it’s a very appropriate item to have. 

137 

Would it be fair to say that—have we gone far enough, or do we 

have to go farther, in terms of what we’re expecting from the administration? 

Mr. BRIMLEY. I’m happy to go first with that, sir. 

It’s hard to know from the outside. I think a lot of the most useful strategic guidance in this domain would be highly classified. 

Just from my own basic experience in this, wrestling with this actof-war question, I think that’s something that can and should be 

debated openly and publicly. I think we ought to do more. Like I 

said, the second- and third-order consequences of getting involved 

in offensive operations, for instance, are problematic. 

Just to the earlier point on cyber, writ large, I do worry a little 

bit about the military services and sort of running to the ball on 

cyber. You know, I want the Marine Corps focused on closing with 

and destroying the enemy, you know, from amphibious operations 

and the like. I want the Army focused on, you know, major combat 

operations. I want the Air Force focused on what it does best. I— 

sometimes I worry that, sort of, the lack of—the necessity to have 

each military services investing in cyber, along with the broader 

architecture of Cyber Command and the NSA [National Security 

Agency], it—I’m not sure the incentives are properly there. Each 

military service chief feels compelled to focus on cyber, because 

they have to. I—sometimes I worry that that focus sometimes can 

protract from what the military services, in my mind, their core 

missions ought to be. Thinking about seapower, thinking about airpower. Obviously, cyber is a component of this. You know, but 

sometimes I worry that they are—that the demands for each military service detract from their core mission. I think cyber ought to 

be, you know, a stronger voice, perhaps, from Cyber Command and 

maybe even OSD is appropriate. 

Senator ROUNDS. Dr. Kagan? 

Dr. KAGAN. Senator, forgive me, I’ve already exceeded my knowledge of cyber in this hearing. 

Senator ROUNDS. General Keane. 

General KEANE. Well, I think the committee focus with the military portion of cyber deals with Cyber Command, itself. They have 

responsibility for the function, both from a defense perspective and 

from an offense perspective. I don’t believe that this is an area 

that’s going to require major investment strategy that compares 

anything to the lack of combat brigades, the lack of proper type of 

combat aircraft, or the lack of proper types of submarines and 

ships. I would leave it to the commander there to understand exactly what he needs to properly defend the military. Also, I know 

he’s got the offensive tools. It’s the defensive tools that are the 

issue. 

Senator ROUNDS. Interesting to me. I—my time is—I’ve got a 

short amount of time left, but I’m just curious. Throughout this discussion, we’ve talked cyber, we’ve talked some readiness issues, 

we’ve talked some challenges with regard to our naval forces, air 

forces, army. We really have not said much at all about space. Yet, 

everything everybody’s got is dependent upon our ability to protect 

our own assets within space. How vulnerable are we? Should we 

be placing additional emphasis on the protection of our own assets 

from kinetic attack in space? 

138 

General KEANE. Well, the short answer is yes. As our adversaries 

have acquired all the technology that we have, you—we know for 

a fact it’s part of their asymmetric strategy to deny us as much of 

our space-baked technology as possible. They practice it routinely. 

You know as well as I do, the Chinese have been shooting satellites 

down for years, getting ready for that asymmetric strategy against 

us. So, most definitely, there’s—we’re not going to go back, in terms 

of that technology and our dependence. Protecting it is an investment strategy, to be sure, but it is not on the scale of what is needed for our offensive capability, which is lacking. 

Senator ROUNDS. Thank you. 

My time is expired. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator King. 

Senator KING. I also want to associate myself with the comments 

of Senator Inhofe, and thank the Chairman and the Ranking Member for arranging this hearing. This is—this has been a very insightful and important. 

To follow up on this—just a quick question on the cyber issue. 

I wonder your opinions of splitting the cyber from Cyber Command 

and NSA. It strikes me that those are two different, very important, very engaging functions, and I wonder if the time has come 

to acknowledge the importance of each and make those two different individuals. 

General Keane, your thoughts? 

General KEANE. Yeah, I wouldn’t split it. I mean—— 

Senator KING. You would not. 

General KEANE. No, no, absolutely not. Because the main tool 

that you’re actually going to use is NSA. That is— that’s where 

most of our capability truly is. If Keith Alexander was sitting 

here—he’s a good friend of mine, and I’ve talked to him at length 

about this—he would argue against splitting it. 

Senator KING. I—— 

General KEANE. You’re going to wind up—— 

Senator KING. I’ve had that discussion with him—— 

General KEANE.—creating more bureaucracy than we actually 

need if we do that. 

Senator KING. Mr. Brimley? Mr. Kagan? 

Mr. BRIMLEY. I’ve been back and forth on this particular question, myself, over the years. You know, I think one of the major 

problems we have with cyber, as it pertains to the government and 

also the military, is, you know, we’re competing for talent. We’re 

competing for talent with the private sector, we’re competing for 

talent from the international community, as well. Which leads me 

to believe that, you know, splitting, you know, one rather—you 

know, one bureaucratic entity into two bureaucratic entities, you 

know, I think that could—you know, and setting those bureaucratic 

entities in some sort of competition with one another for talent, 

whether it’s civilian talent or military talent—it’s probably not the 

real issue. I would be more interested in, you know, making sure 

that, from a military perspective, we have the ability to direct-commission folks from, say, Silicon Valley who want to serve as reservists or who can serve on Active Duty for 1 or 2 years; you know, 

flexible hiring authorities for the civilian side; you know, flexible 

spending incentive programs to be able to compensate our best and 

139 

brightest. Maybe not, obviously, from a private-sector level, but 

making it more attractive for folks to serve, both on the civilian 

side and military side, I think that’s where we ought to focus much 

of our energy. The wiring diagrams, I think, are less important in 

that regard. 

Senator KING. Thank you. Thank you. 

General Keane, I was struck by your testimony about the bureaucracy in the Army which stalled the development of new weapon systems and the deployment. That’s a structural issue and a 

cultural issue. It’s hard—these aren’t bad people saying, ‘‘We don’t 

want to do good things.’’ How do we deal with the cultural structural issue? Because we’re seeing this across the—all the services, 

and in procurement, generally, of new technology. It takes too long, 

and it’s too expensive. 

General KEANE. Yeah, the—it’s a great question. The only way 

you get at that is with absolutely strong leadership that is not 

going to tolerate that. You’ve got to bore down on it. First, you’ve 

got to get educated, yourself, because—most people, like I do—I 

came to the Pentagon, because I ran effective organizations at different levels. I didn’t know anything about the business side of the 

Army. The first time I got exposed to it was when I was a fourstar general. I was handicapped, initially, because I didn’t know 

what was going on. It took me, what, a year, year and a half, to 

understand this issue. 

So, having people there who are strong leaders, want to get these 

results, holding the system accountable for it, really driving innovation and technology, who you put in there as Secretary of the 

Army, the civilian Under Secretary of the Army—a lot of times— 

just be frank with you—we put people in there, you know, who 

enjoy the ceremonial aspect of it, they enjoy being Secretary of the 

Army, but they don’t drive change in the culture because they’re— 

it’s a reward for something they’ve done. 

Senator KING. So, selection of leaders is a crucial element, looking for innovative and willingness to move. Let me—— 

General KEANE. You’ve got to force the R&D effort, and you’ve 

got to talk to civilian—you’ve got to talk to the defense industry on 

a regular basis, because the defense industry is spending their time 

thinking about your function. They’re all—they’re also spending research dollars on it. You have to have regular communication with 

them, let them know where you’re trying to go, bring them into it 

to help contribute to it, drive your own people to work with them, 

as well. We can accelerate this process rather dramatically. 

Senator KING. I would suggest that we have to. 

Let me quickly move on to one other question. There’s an extraordinary story in this morning’s Washington Post about a report 

done by McKinsey and by the Business Board a the Defense Department, $125 billion of savings identified over 5 years. That 

would be enough to fund the nuclear modernization program. Do 

we need to take seriously—because we’re talking about increasing 

the defense budget, but how about talking about using the dollars 

we have more effectively? 

Mr. Brimley, your thoughts? 

Mr. BRIMLEY. Quickly, sir. Absolutely. I mean, that report—I 

think it was the Defense Business Board Report—I mean, I rememVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:59 May 30, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00143 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\25336.TXT WILDA
140 

ber reading that a few years ago when it came out. I’m glad to see 

it’s finally being reported on, you know, at significant levels now. 

Senator KING. Well, it’s pretty disappointing that—— 

Mr. BRIMLEY. Absolutely. 

Senator KING.—it took digging to get it out. 

Mr. BRIMLEY. Absolutely. I—and I would just say, as part of your 

hearings, your posture hearings in 2017, as part of the budget debates, I mean, you ought to hold the next Pentagon team to account in not only advocating for more defense dollars, but making 

sure those defense dollars are better spent. That’s going to take advancing the reform agenda that this committee has laid out in the 

NDAA. 

Senator KING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Ernst. 

Senator ERNST. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Thank you, gentlemen. 

This has been a great discussion this morning. I hope that, Mr. 

Chairman, we can continue and not just discuss it, but actually see 

some actions behind the words. So, I’m really encouraged about 

what we’re touching upon today. 

I would like to get your thoughts on ISIS in Southeast Asia, because I do think it’s something that we haven’t spent a lot of time 

focusing on. We’re not talking about it nearly enough. Islamic extremist groups in Southeast Asia, like the Abu Sayyaf group, they 

are all coming together under the flag of ISIS. It’s a bit concerning. 

Earlier this year, both General Dunford and Secretary Carter 

agreed on my assessment of ISIS in the region, and they shared 

those concerns, as well. Since that time, ISIS-linked groups have 

carried out a number of attacks. Just last week, we saw an attack 

against the Philippine President’s security detail, and we saw a 

bombing near the U.S. Embassy. So, continuing escalation of violence in that area by those extremist groups. 

Mr. Brimley, I’d like to start with you, because you did mention 

the rebalance towards the Pacific, and—you’ve mentioned that rebalance. I think, when that first started, the focus was very much 

on China and maybe North Korea, some of those aspects, but now 

we have ISIS engaging heavily in the Philippines. You spoke about 

the Marines in Darwin and other activities. Can you talk a little 

bit what you think our administration, the incoming administration, should do to really address this rising threat of ISIS in Southeast Asia? 

Mr. BRIMLEY. Sure. Thank you, Senator. 

I would just say, we saw this before, you know, in 2001–2002, 

you know, terrorist groups in the region that have their own, sort 

of, particular interests as it pertains to the countries in which they 

operate. I mean, I think there’s a lot of branding going on. We saw, 

in—after 9/11, a lot of terrorist groups around the world, but somehow they’re affiliated with al Qaeda, and that gave them some, sort 

of, I guess, marketing prowess. It’s—it doesn’t surprise me that 

we’re seeing that again with ISIS. I would just say, from a DOD 

perspective, one of the ways—you know, I think our posture in the 

region ought be focused on maintaining the regional order. We 

need to be able to prepare to go toe-to-toe with countries and 

threats. I’m worried about China. I’m worried about North Korea 

141 

and the like. One of the tangible second-order benefits that we get 

from forward-deploying our troops and capabilities overseas is, we 

have that daily connectivity, and we have that daily deterrent 

prowess in places around the region. 

One of the debates that you see and hear inside the Pentagon, 

or one of the debates that we had in the—inside the Pentagon as 

it pertains to, say, the Marines in Darwin, for instance, is, you 

know, you start to break apart these larger entities, like a Marine 

Air/Ground Task Force [MAGTF], for instance, and you start to 

put—you know, put a company here in southern Philippines, and 

put a—you know, a task force of some kind in Australia, and 

there’s a tradeoff between doing that, which gives you that kind of 

daily interaction with local communities, the ability to do counterterrorism operations, for instance, but there is some risk that it becomes more difficult to quickly bring those capabilities back together for a larger threat, responding to a larger threat. That’s the 

balance that DOD, particularly OSD, has to grapple with every 

day. 

I would just encourage the committee, as you think about the— 

what—the Defense Strategy Review, what used to be the QDR 

[Quadrennial Defense Reviews], that the next administration will 

do next year, that you—you’re very aggressive with them in articulating, you know, what you want to see out of the strategy, classified briefings for all these factors, and making sure that all these 

different constituent elements are part of that strategy and it’s 

not—it’s not just a public-relations document, which is what QDRs, 

I think, unfortunately, have tended to evolve into, which is part of 

the reason the committee took its action it did to make the QDR 

a Defense Strategy Review with a classified component. 

Senator ERNST. Very good, thank you. 

General Keane, could you talk a little bit more about, militarily, 

what we could be doing in that region, and the uses of forces? 

General KEANE. Yeah, absolutely. 

ISIS [the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria] has expanded into 35 

countries. We don’t really have a strategy to deal with any of that. 

We’re focused on the territory that they took, certainly, in Iraq and 

Syria. I’m not saying that’s not appropriate. That should be a priority. Commensurate with that priority, we should be addressing 

these other areas, as well. A lot of the identification with ISIS is 

aspirational, but they also have affiliates in these countries. This 

is one of them. What they—with an affiliate, they actually sign a 

document together to abide by certain ISIS principles and rules. In 

some cases, they direct; some cases, they provide aid; but in most 

cases, there’s no direction. That’s largely the case here. 

I believe what the United States can do, with its allies, is that— 

you know, we’ve been at war with organizations like this now for 

15 years, and our reservoir of knowledge and capability here is 

pretty significant. It far exceeds anybody else in the world. We 

have allies that are participating with us. There’s much we can do 

with them, in sharing intelligence and helping them with training 

and also helping them with technology—not expensive technology, 

but things that can truly make a difference, you know, with those 

troops. I don’t think we necessarily have to be directly involving in 

fighting these forces ourselves, but aiding and supporting these 

142 

forces, and having a strategy to do that, and lining up some priorities for ourselves—because we have limited amount of resources— 

but, make some choices, you know, based on what that threat is 

and what it may be—its implications for the region could help 

guide us to what those priorities should be. 

Senator ERNST. I appreciate your input. 

Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Shaheen. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, both 

to the Chair and Ranking Member, and also to all of our panelists, 

for giving us a lot to think about this morning. 

Dr. Kagan, I want to begin with you and with your comments 

about Russia’s interference in our elections, because this is something that I have found very troubling. In fact, before Congress 

went out, before the October recess, called on hearings to better 

look at what was going on. We know that we’ve had Secretary 

Johnson and other Homeland Security officials say that there is 

evidence of Russian hacking into our electoral system that goes to 

the highest levels of the Russian government. That was done, not 

to influence the outcome of the election, necessarily, but to sow confusion about whether our electoral process was working. Yet, to 

date, there has not been one hearing on this issue in this Congress. 

What I was told when I asked about a hearing—and I have, again, 

called on the Foreign Relations Committee, on which I sit, to do a 

hearing, and I know that they’re considering it— but I was told 

that there was concern that this might be viewed as a partisan 

issue. 

So, I am very heartened by your point that this is not a partisan 

issue. In fact, the first person I heard raise it in Congress was Senator McCain, the Chairman of this committee, who talked about 

the efforts to hack into the Arizona and Illinois voter files. 

So, I couldn’t agree more, this is a hearing that we ought to undertake because it’s important to our American democracy, it’s important to European democracy, when we look at what Russia’s 

doing in eastern Europe, as you point out, in Germany, in France, 

the potential for them to continue to sow mischief. 

What kinds of—you also talked about taking retaliatory action 

against Russia for what they’re doing—what kinds of efforts would 

you suggest we look at, in terms of trying to retaliate or respond 

to what Russia is doing in the United States? 

Dr. KAGAN. Well, there are—I’m sure there are people better 

equipped to answer that question than I am, but I would, you 

know, publish the Swiss bank accounts of all the oligarchs 

around—I mean, just these—there are all kinds of things that you 

could do that would cause—— 

Senator SHAHEEN. Yeah, keep—— 

Dr. KAGAN. Well, I mean—— 

Senator SHAHEEN.—saying a few more of those, because I think 

those are helpful. 

Dr. KAGAN. You know, you could talk about all the ways in 

which—you know, you could reveal stuff about the way Putin has 

manipulated his own elections. I mean, there’s all kinds of stuff out 

there, which, if you were of a mind to do it, you could do that 

would be embarrassing, of one kind or another. I mean, these peoVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:59 May 30, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00146 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\25336.TXT WILDA
143 

ple have money stashed all over the world. They have dachas, they 

have villas, et cetera. They—this is a kind of a mafia organization, 

where, you know, part of the game is everybody holding together. 

There’s ways to create divisions and difficulties. I mean, it—I’m 

sure, as I say, there are people who could—if you put them to the 

task—and I’m—for all I know, they have been put to the task—you 

could come up with a whole list of things. 

By the way, I wouldn’t make an announcement of it. They’ll— 

they would understand what had happened. Until we do something 

like that, it’s just open season for them to do this. So, I think we’ve 

already—we need to treat this like any other weapon system that’s 

being deployed, because they are treating it like a weapon system. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. 

Well, Mr. Chairman and Senator Reed, I hope that this committee will also consider hearings on this topic. 

Let me follow up on Senator King’s issue that he raised with respect to the Pentagon study that was reported in the Washington 

Post, because—I haven’t read the study. I don’t know whether the 

concerns that are raised by some of the Pentagon officials in this 

news story are accurate, or not, but the very fact that it was buried—or the attempt was to bury it by Pentagon officials, I think, 

is a very bad message to be sending, especially in an organization 

that can’t even get ready for an audit until 2017. I don’t know how 

long we’ve been asking for an audit. It’s been since I got on this 

committee, in 2011, so that’s at least 6 years. I suspect it’s been 

longer than that. So, there are clearly, as all of you pointed out, 

bureaucratic changes that need to be made in the Department. 

One of the things, General Keane, that you pointed out is that 

there is a predilection to try and kill some of the innovative programs so that the Pentagon can actually do those themselves. We 

had this experience with the Small Business Innovation Research 

Program [SBIR] as we’re going into this NDAA, because the initial 

effort was to try and increase the amount of money that DOD is 

making available to small businesses to do innovation. I think 

we’ve heard from a number of panelists previously that this is one 

of the best research programs that still exists within—for small 

businesses to produce innovation that’s used by the Department of 

Defense. 

So, is this the kind of initiative that you’re talking about that 

there may be, for whatever reason, efforts to try and keep it from 

putting more money into that small-business effort to produce innovation? 

General KEANE. I certainly encourage that. The—you know, the 

Active Protective System that I was talking about and that, when 

DARPA, you know, made a call to the people to come forward, and 

they knew that this would be an advanced technology that could 

actually change warfare, the contractor that the United States 

Army has gone to is a small-business contractor. So, here’s this 

small-business contractor, conceptualized this capability themselves, and it will revolutionize combat warfare as we go forward. 

They also have technology, interesting enough, and they brought 

military leaders out to see it. They can stop a bullet. In other 

words, a 50-caliber bullet, they can kill the bullet. It’s all because 

of—everything—all of this is available on the private sector. 

144 

Senator SHAHEEN. Right. 

General KEANE. Microchip technology, as I mentioned, and unbelievable software applied to that technology. Well, that’s revolutionary technology, what I just mentioned to you. It changes warfare. That is something we should be investing in. We should put 

money behind this. I have no affiliation with this organization, let’s 

get that straight, so—but, yes, this is—absolutely right, this is 

America. We’re the most innovative, creative people on the planet. 

It’s out there, and we have to unleash it and bring it in. It doesn’t 

have to necessarily be a giant organization that does it. There are 

Americans out there doing this stuff. They’re creative. Lookit, they 

changed a—the whole dot-com aspect of our lives out there in California by the innovation and creativity that these engineers have. 

We’ve got to tap into it. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Well, my time is up. Thank you, General 

Keane. 

I would point out that the reauthorization of the SBIR program 

is in this NDAA for 5 years, which I think is very positive, and I 

applaud the Chairman and Ranking Member for that. Unfortunately, the increase in spending on that program did not make it 

into the bill. 

Thank you all. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Lee. 

Senator LEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thanks, to each of you, for being here. Thanks for all you do to 

keep Americans informed and to keep Americans aware of what 

we’re discussing today; that is, the emerging threats to our security. 

There are a number of threats we face around the world, and it’s 

important to keep those threats in mind as we approach this exciting new period in our history, in which we’ve got a new administration coming. One of the many threats that we face in any era, in 

any administration, relates to the threat posed by the excessive accumulation of power in the hands of a few. We see that happen 

around the world, and sometimes we see it within our own government. It’s one of the reasons why our system is set up the way it 

is. The Constitution of the United States is designed specifically to 

protect us against that kind of threat here at home, and it does so 

by wisely dividing that authority between Congress and the presidency. 

The framers believed that forcing the two political branches of 

government—that is, the two political branches that are not the judiciary—to collaborative, to interact with each other; where necessary, to serve as a check and as a balance on each other—and 

that this would provide us the best means toward achieving a stable, successful, and, hopefully, relatively popular foreign policy; 

that is, one that, in one way or another, reflects the will of the people, or at least is likely to be geared toward their interests. 

For several decades, Congress, quite regrettably, in my opinion, 

has deliberately abdicated many of its constitutional responsibilities. It’s just sort of handed it over to the executive branch, being 

willing to take a backseat role—a backseat role, at best, in determining America’s role around the world on how we’re going to combat threats that face us. The result ends up being a foreign policy 

145 

that is made primarily within the executive branch bureaucracy 

and Washington insider circles, informed, as they tend to be, by the 

interests and the aspirations of the so-called international community. This is a circle that increasingly becomes untethered from any 

clear lines of accountability connecting policy, policymakers, and 

the American people. 

For instance, the U.S. military is currently operating in the Middle East under a very broad—I believe, irresponsibly broad interpretation of a 15-year-old Authorization for the Use of Military 

Force, using it as justification to engage in a pretty broad range of 

actions, from intervening in two separate civil wars to propping up 

a failing Afghan government. Meanwhile, the executive branch 

seems increasingly inclined to choose and identify and engage 

threats through covert actions. That further helps the executive 

branch to avoid the scrutiny that would be available if stronger 

congressional oversight existed. They avoid that kind of scrutiny 

and public accountability. 

Now, this may be convenient for Members of Congress who want 

nothing more than to just have someone else to blame for decisions 

that turn out to be unpopular or unsuccessful, but it’s an affront 

to the Constitution. It’s more than that. It’s more than just an affront to a 229-year-old document. It’s an affront to the system of 

representative government that we have dedicated ourselves to as 

Americans. I think it’s an insult to the American people, who are 

losing patience with a foreign policy that they feel increasingly and 

very justifiably disconnected from. Notwithstanding the fact that 

they’re still asked, from time to time, to send their sons and daughters into harm’s way to defend. 

So, as we discuss these emerging threats to our national security, 

I’d encourage this committee and all of my colleagues to prioritize 

the threat that will inevitably come to us if we continue to preserve 

the status quo and to exclude the American people and their elected representatives—in many cases, ourselves—from the process. 

So, I have a question for our panelists. One of the focuses of this 

committee has been on the readiness crisis within the military 

brought about by the conflicts we’re facing in the Middle East and 

by a reduction in the amount of money that the Pentagon has access to. Easy answer to this is often, ‘‘Well, let’s just increase 

spending.’’ That’s not to say that that’s not necessary, now or in 

other circumstances, in particular, but setting aside that, that is 

one approach that people often come up with. Another option that 

I think has to be considered, and perhaps ought be considered first, 

is to reexamine the tasks and the priorities that we’re giving to our 

military leaders and to ask whether these purposes that we’re 

seeking readiness for are truly in the interests of the American 

people, those we’re representing, those who are paying the bill for 

this, and those who are asked to send their sons and daughters—— 

Chairman MCCAIN. The Senator’s time has expired. 

Senator LEE.—into harm’s way. So—— 

Chairman MCCAIN. The Senator’s time has expired. 

Senator Kaine. 

Senator LEE. Could I just ask a one-sentence question, Mr. 

Chairman, to—— 

146 

Chairman MCCAIN. Yes, but I would appreciate courtesy to the 

other members that if—make one long opening statement, it does 

not leave time for questions. 

Senator is recognized for a question. 

Senator LEE. Do you believe that the Congress, the White House, 

and the executive branch agencies have done an adequate job in 

reaching consensus on what the American people’s interests are 

and on calibrating the military and diplomatic means to appropriate ends? 

Dr. KAGAN. Do we answer? 

I don’t accept this dichotomy that you’ve posited between what 

the Congress and the President do and what the American people 

want. I mean, when I think of some of the—first of all, historically, 

the executive has always had tremendous influence on foreign policy, much—whatever the Constitution may say, although the Constitution did give the executive tremendous power to make foreign 

policy, if you go back to Jefferson, the willingness to deploy force 

without congressional approval; you can go all the way through 200 

years of history. I’m not sure it’s substantially different. In any 

case, that’s been the general prejudice. The founders wanted energy in the executive, and particularly in the conduct of foreign policy. That was the lesson of the Revolutionary War. That’s why they 

created a Constitution which particularly gave power to the executive. 

Also, I just don’t believe that the American people are constantly 

having things foisted on them that they didn’t approve of. So, one 

of the most controversial things that’s happened, obviously, in recent decade, that people talk about all the time, is the Iraq War, 

which was voted on, debated at length, and Congress, 72-to-28 I 

think was the vote, something like that, the American people—public opinion was in favor of it, just as the American people was in 

favor of World War I, the Spanish-American War. Later, these 

wars turn out to be bad or badly handled, the American people decide that it was a terrible idea, and then people start saying, ‘‘Well, 

who did this?’’ The American people want to find somebody to 

blame for doing these things. They don’t want to take responsibility 

for their own decisions. 

I don’t believe we have a fundamentally undemocratic way of 

making foreign policy decisions. I think it’s complicated. I think 

mistakes are made. Foreign policy is all about failure. People don’t 

want to acknowledge that failure is the norm in foreign policy, and 

then they want to blame people for failure. I think the American 

people are participants in this process. 

Senator LEE. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General KEANE. The only thing I would add is, I do think Congress should be more involved with the use of force when we’re deploying force overseas. I think Congress has walked away from that 

responsibility recently. You have a colleague here who’s been banging on this for some time: Senator Kaine. I would hope that this 

new administration would welcome congressional involvement 

when the Nation is going to commit its forces. 

Mr. BRIMLEY. Sir, very quickly, I would just say, you know, the 

Defense Strategy Review that the Pentagon is mandated to provide 

147 

this committee and Congress and the American people, that’s a 

great forum to engage in these questions. What—readiness for 

what? Force structure for what? Modernization priorities. These 

are all things that can be debated openly. These are things which 

the Pentagon is congressionally required to submit. I think that’s 

a great forum for these discussions. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Kaine. 

Senator KAINE. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Thanks, to the witnesses. 

An observation and two questions. 

Observation. I was chairman of the Democratic National Committee [DNC] from 2009 through early 2011, and we had a file cabinet in the office, with a plaque over it, and it was a file cabinet 

that was invaded in 1972 at the Watergate complex when materials were taken out of the DNC. The materials that were taken 

were modest, and it made no outcome on what was one of the biggest landslide elections in the history of the United States. Yet, it 

led to one of—a very searching congressional inquiry, not because 

of the outcome of the election, but it led to a searching inquiry because of a desire to uphold the integrity of our electoral processes. 

I associate myself with comments of Dr. Kagan and some of the 

witnesses here. There have been requests of the Foreign Relations 

Committee, Armed Services Committee. There was a letter to the 

President from Democrats on the Intel Committee, dated November 

29, asking that the President declassify information with regard to 

the engagement of Russia in activity concerning the American presidential election. I think it’s absolutely critical that the American 

public know what happened, that Congress know what happened, 

and that we then figure out what we can do to avoid such instances, by Russia or anybody else, in the future. My fear is, if we 

don’t do what we did, back in the ’70s, in such an instance—and 

that wasn’t a foreign government undertaking to influence an 

American election—but, if we don’t, as Congress, stand up to protect the integrity of the system, that we’re going to regret it in a 

lot of ways in the future. That’s observation. 

Question. I thought it was interesting, Dr. Kagan, you talked 

about two trends: the historical rejuvenation project ambitions of 

certain nations and a retreating American willingness to be engaged. A third trend that I’m kind of interested in—I certainly see 

the first two—a third one is the increase of the power of nonstate 

organizations that don’t follow any of the rules, Geneva Conventions, et cetera, and whether that—it be ISIL or al Qaeda or alNusra or ah-Shabaab, or whether it be, you know, global organizations that can offshore everything or the Sinaloa Cartel, there’s a 

lot of nonstate organizations that use violence to achieve their end 

or use a nonstate capacity to avoid accountability. I think that is 

a trend that is also a pretty important trend that is hard for us 

to completely get our minds around, because so many of our doctrines are doctrines that we have developed thinking about state 

versus state. So, I’m just curious, in my first question, if you would 

just say something briefly about that trend, the rise of a nonstate 

willing to use violence or other nefarious ends, and how we should 

factor that into our strategic thinking. 

148 

Dr. KAGAN. Well, obviously, it’s a problem, and—although I always find it ironic that these nonstate actors, all they really want 

to do is become a state. I mean, that’s ISIS’s great goal, is to be 

a state. So, you know, when I hear about how the state is becoming 

less important, that’s all that these nonstate actors want to be. It’s 

obviously something that we are engaged in, must be engaged in 

dealing with. 

What I would just say is, it’s not going to be the rise of nonstate 

actors that upends the world order. It is going to be a constant 

problem, a constant threat, and, in some paradoxical way, a greater 

threat to the homeland in particular instances. It is only the great 

powers, the great revisionist powers that are capable of undoing 

this world order that the United States created after World War II. 

While we have to do everything, I just don’t want us to lose sight 

of what I consider to be the main game, because we can fight a 

kind of low-level battle against nonstate actors for a long time. We 

will be. Once the order has blown up—well, we’ve seen what happens when the order blows up. That’s what—we’ve got to make 

sure that we are preventing that from happening. 

Senator KAINE. Let me ask one other question. Dr. Kagan, again, 

you said something interesting about how China wants to be a 

hegemon in Asia and the Pacific. Russia wants to be a hegemon in 

Europe. They resist and resent the fact that the U.S. has played 

this role, post World War II, in engagement in international institutions and our own unilateral activity around the globe. You 

know, as they think about the future, when they think about a future where they would be hegemons in their regions and the U.S. 

would be a hegemon in the Americas. Because I—one of the things 

I’m questioning is, by trying to do a little bit everywhere, we’re actually not doing very much in the Americas; and the activity of 

China, for example, in the Americas is very significant. So, I’m not 

sure we’re committing the resources to do the global mission, nor 

are we committing the resources even to play the kind of leadership role that I think we could play in the Americas. I’m curious 

as to any of your thoughts on that. 

Thank you. 

Mr. BRIMLEY. Well, sir, I would just say quickly, again, I don’t 

think it’s simply a matter of dollars and money. I think there are 

things we can do in Asia, there are things we can do in Europe 

that won’t break the bank. I remember when we put together what 

became this Asia rebalance, and we came up with a briefing for 

then-Secretary Gates, you know, and there were three maps that 

we gave him. One map was the status quo of our posture in the 

region. One map was a—sort of a 20-year—what things could like 

in 20 years, and it was pretty, you know, ambitious, in terms of 

what the posture would look like. The third slide was what we 

called, sort of—at least I called ‘‘baby steps.’’ Here are things that 

we can do inside the FYDP that are not going to break the bank, 

that are politically doable, that aren’t going to be, you know, politically controversial, in the sense of taking things away from, say, 

our bases here at home. That’s when we came up Darwin and Littoral Combat Ships in Singapore, and some other things in the 

Philippines at the time. The vision was that we could do these 

sorts of small episodic baby steps year after year, administration 

149 

after administration. If we had that political will, over the course 

of 20 years, it would amount to something truly strategic. That’s 

still my hope. I don’t think it requires huge amounts of new defense dollars to reinvest in our posture in places like the Asia-Pacific in ways that would detract from doing more in, say, North and 

South America. 

General KEANE. I’d just add one thing on your nonstate actors. 

You know, in—they certainly know that they cannot defeat the 

United States military or militaries that exist in Europe. That’s not 

their objective. I mean, their objective is to break our will, to force 

us back into ourselves so that they can have their way, you know, 

with the caliphate that they want to establish. They think by routinely killing us, it would force us to disengage and withdraw. 

That’s, in my judgment, not going to happen. They dramatically 

underestimate the character and will and strength of the American 

people. Bin Laden did the same thing. He thought he was going to 

break our will by doing 9/11, and quite the opposite occurred as a 

result of it. 

There is something that we have to be very careful of. We don’t 

want to be very dismissive of this kind of warfare, because we’ve 

known for years the al Qaeda’s pursuit of WMD [Weapons of Mass 

Distruction]. Make no mistake about it, obviously if one of these organizations got their hands on it, they would certainly use it, as 

brutal and fanatic as they are about killing people. One of the 

things that troubles us—the Director of the National Security 

Agency would—could speak better on it than I—but, we’ve been 

concerned, for a number of years, that radical Islamic organization 

will likely buy a offensive capability from the Russians, who are— 

half of what they devote to cyber is criminal. Buy that capability, 

and do some real damage to the United States in a way that 9/11 

could never have done. So, the—you—we cannot underestimate the 

intent of the nonstate actors while we attempt to control what 

they’re doing. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Graham. 

Senator GRAHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for holding an important hearing on a very difficult topic, and to all the 

committee members for showing up. We’re talking about important 

things to an empty room. Just look. Just look. 

So, Iran with a nuke. Number one—I’m going to ask, like 45 

questions in 5 minutes. Give brief answers if you can. If you can’t, 

don’t say a word. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator GRAHAM. Do you believe that the Iranians, in the past, 

have been trying to develop a nuclear weapon, not a nuclear powerplant for peaceful purposes? 

Mr. BRIMLEY. Yes. 

General KEANE. Nuclear weapon, yes. 

Dr. KAGAN. Yes. 

Senator GRAHAM. All right, three for three. 

Do you believe that there’s—that’s their long-term goal, in spite 

of what they say, is to have a nuclear weapon? 

General KEANE. Yes. 

Senator GRAHAM. Do you believe that would be one of the most 

destabilizing things in the world? 

150 

Mr. BRIMLEY. Yes. 

Senator GRAHAM. Do you believe the Arabs will get one of their 

own? 

Mr. BRIMLEY. Yes. 

Senator GRAHAM. Do you believe the Iranians might actually use 

the weapon if they got one? The Ayatollah? 

General KEANE. Well, I think the—before I answer that, I think 

there’s just as great a chance that the Arabs would use their weapon—— 

Senator GRAHAM. Okay. Well, so—— 

General KEANE.—as a first strike—— 

Senator GRAHAM.—we don’t know—well, let’s—Bob, you should 

your hand. Do you—if you’re Israel, what bet would you make? 

Dr. KAGAN. I would bet my 100-plus nuclear weapons would be 

a deterrent to their use of nuclear weapons. 

Senator GRAHAM. Okay. What if he wants to die and doesn’t 

mind taking you with him? What does he want? Does he want to 

destroy Israel, or is he just getting—when the Ayatollah says he 

wants to wipe Israel out, is that all talk? 

Dr. KAGAN. I don’t know if it’s all talk, and I don’t blame people 

for being nervous. We lived under—the United States, we all lived 

under the shadow of possible nuclear war for 50 years. 

Senator GRAHAM. Yeah, but, you know, on their worst day, the 

Russians didn’t have a religious doctrine that wanted to destroy everybody. Do you believe he’s a religious Nazi at his heart? Or you 

don’t know? Answer maybe you don’t know. 

Dr. KAGAN. Well, look, I believe that they—he clearly is that— 

believes in a fanatical religion, but—— 

Senator GRAHAM. Well, here’s what I believe. 

Dr. KAGAN.—I’m not—okay, go ahead. 

Senator GRAHAM. Okay. I believe that you ought to take him seriously, based on their behavior. Number one—— 

General KEANE. I think we should take him seriously. How— 

whether they’re religious fanatics or not, I don’t think is that relevant. Clearly, their geopolitical goals to dominate the Middle East 

strategically, to destroy the state of Israel, and to drive the United 

States out of the Middle East, they have talked about it every single year—— 

Senator GRAHAM. Well, do you think that’s their goal? 

General KEANE. Yes, that—— 

Senator GRAHAM. Okay. 

General KEANE. Of course it’s their goal. 

Senator GRAHAM. So—— 

General KEANE. Not only is it their goal, but they’re succeeding 

at it. 

Senator GRAHAM. Do you think we should deny them that goal? 

Dr. KAGAN. Yes. 

Senator GRAHAM. Good. 

North Korea. Why are they trying to build an ICBM [intercontinental ballistic missile]? Are they trying to send a North Korean 

in space? What are they trying to do? 

Mr. BRIMLEY. They’re trying to threaten us and our allies—— 

Dr. KAGAN. To put a nuclear weapon on it to—— 

Senator GRAHAM. Do you believe it should be the policy 

151 

of the United States Congress and the next President to deny 

them that capability? 

Mr. BRIMLEY. I believe so. 

Senator GRAHAM. Would you support an Authorization to Use 

Military Force that would stop the ability of the North Koreans to 

develop a missile that could reach the United States? Do you think 

Congress would be wise to do that? 

Mr. BRIMLEY. I think Congress should debate it. I remember distinctly the op-ed that Secretary William Perry and Ashton Carter—— 

Senator GRAHAM. Well, I’m going to introduce one. Would you 

vote for it if you were here? 

Dr. KAGAN. Only if Congress was willing to do what was necessary to follow up—— 

Senator GRAHAM. Well, do you think Congress should be willing 

to authorize any President, regardless of party, to stop North Korea 

from developing a missile that can hit the homeland? 

Dr. KAGAN. Only if Congress is willing to follow up with what 

might be required, depending on North Korea’s response. 

Senator GRAHAM. Well, what might be required is to stop their 

nuclear program through military force. That’s why you would authorize it. 

Dr. KAGAN. No, but I’m saying that if—I’m—the answer is yes, 

but then you also have to be willing, if North Korea launched—— 

Senator GRAHAM. Would you advise me—— 

Dr. KAGAN.—North Korea, that you’d have to be willing to—— 

Chairman MCCAIN. You have to let the witness—— 

Senator GRAHAM. Yeah, but he’s not giving an answer. 

Dr. KAGAN. Well, I thought I was giving an answer. 

Senator GRAHAM. So, here’s the question. Do you support Congress—everybody’s talking about Congress sitting on the sidelines. 

I think a North Korean missile program is designed to threaten the 

homeland. I don’t think they’re going to send somebody in space. 

So, if I’m willing, along with some other colleagues, to give the 

President the authority, he doesn’t have to use it, but we’re all onboard for using military force to stop this program from maturing. 

Does that make sense to you, given the threats we face? 

General KEANE. I don’t believe that North Korea is going to build 

an ICBM, weaponize it, and shoot it at the United States. 

Senator GRAHAM. Okay. Then you wouldn’t need the Authorization to Use Military Force. 

General KEANE. Right. The reason for that is—— 

Senator GRAHAM. That’s fine. 

General KEANE. The reason for—Senator, the reason they have 

nuclear weapons is—one reason. To preserve the regime. They 

know, when you have nuclear weapons, we’re not going to conduct 

an invasion of North Korea. South Korea is not going to do it, we’re 

not going to do it. 

Senator GRAHAM. Why are they trying to build ICBM? 

General KEANE. They want to weaponize it. 

Senator GRAHAM. Do what with it? 

General KEANE. I don’t—— 

Dr. KAGAN. Preserve their regime. 

152 

Senator GRAHAM. Okay. All right. So, you would be okay with 

letting them build a missile? 

Dr. KAGAN. No. 

Senator GRAHAM. Would you, General Keane? 

General KEANE. They’re already building a missile. 

Senator GRAHAM. Well, would you be willing to stop them? 

General KEANE. I would stop them from using it, yes. 

Senator GRAHAM. Okay. 

General KEANE. I’m not going to stop them from building it. 

Senator GRAHAM. Assad. Final question. Do all of you agree that 

leaving Assad in power is a serious mistake? 

Dr. KAGAN. Yes. 

General KEANE. Yes, absolutely. 

Senator GRAHAM. Finally, do you believe 4 percent of GDP [gross 

domestic product] should be the goal that Congress seeks because 

it’s been the historical average of what we spend on defense since 

World War II. 

General KEANE. Pretty close. 

Senator GRAHAM. Thanks. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Sullivan. 

Senator SULLIVAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to thank the witnesses for their testimony today and their 

years of service and helping the Members of Congress understand 

some of these very difficult issues. 

Dr. Kagan, your ‘‘Of Paradise and Power’’ was one of the most 

insightful books I’ve ever read. So—I’m not sure that’s saying 

much, but—from me—but, it was a great book. So, thanks. 

I want to follow up on Senator Graham’s questions. Also, Mr. 

Brimley, I actually really appreciated your point about cyber, how 

it, you know, can become the bright shiny object that every service 

is pursuing, and forgetting their comparative advantages. I think 

that’s a really important point. A number of us had breakfast with 

the Commandant this morning, and that—the Marine Corps—and 

that came up. 

With regard to—I want to go back to North Korea. The issue of— 

you know, one of the concerns that we clearly have is that, within 

the next 2 to 3 to 4 or 5 years—and, you know, nobody’s sure when, 

but it’s certainly going to happen—is that they’re going to have an 

intercontinental ballistic missile that’s likely going to be able to 

range continental United States. They’re already probably close to 

ranging my State of Alaska and Hawaii. The concern I have, along 

the lines of what Senator Graham was saying, is that the American 

people are going to wake up, whenever that happens, and all of a 

sudden it’s going to be in the news and it’s going to be wild reports 

and, you know, ‘‘The President has to do something.’’ If we know 

that’s coming—and it is coming—my view is—and I’m wondering 

what your view is—that we should be doing a lot more on missile 

defense, because if—let’s say he’s able to get—you know, let’s say 

he—he is an irrational actors, and let’s say he has the ability to 

launch one or two, and we have a very robust missile defense. We’ll 

be able to confidently shoot that down, retaliate massively, which 

should be really strong deterrence. 

So, can you just comment on that, but, more broadly, just on 

North Korea, all three of you? I’m really stuck by the—or struck 

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by—you know, obviously, President Obama’s strategic patience was 

a nice phrase, but didn’t do anything. This is going to be a really, 

really big issue, maybe for this administration. You’re already seeing the concerns we have here. If we know that, in 1 to 5 years, 

this guy, who’s not very stable, is going to be able to range our 

country with an intercontinental ballistic nuclear missile, shouldn’t 

we be doing something right now, missile defense or otherwise? 

General KEANE. Well, we are doing missile defense, to a certain 

degree, as you well know. 

Senator SULLIVAN. Yeah, but it’s not nearly as strong as it—— 

General KEANE. Some of it is in your State. I think what the new 

administration has to do is take a look at that threat that we’re 

discussing, and also, you know, a rogue actor, not trying to destroy 

the United States, but firing a couple of missiles at the United 

States for some motivating reason. Is it appropriate that we have 

a capability to defend against that? A number of years ago, we 

identified Iran as a potential actor that could do something like 

that, and also North Korea. We began to put in place a missile defense strategy to deal with that. Now, we’ve pulled it out of Europe 

as a part of the ridiculous reset we did with the Russians, a major 

concession we made to them. I think this should be on the table 

with the new administration when they’re looking at a national security strategy in dealing with both of those actors along this line, 

because I’m convinced the Iranians are going to get a nuclear 

weapon. Also, what North Korea has, to this day. I would—I agree 

with, I think, what you were feeding back to me, is that that missile defense infrastructure that we have is not adequate. 

Senator SULLIVAN. No. 

General KEANE. So, let’s take a look at what it would take to 

make it adequate, see what the investment strategy is, and see if 

that is a priority that we want to make. I would admit it is. 

Senator SULLIVAN. Wouldn’t that buy time for the President, 

whoever that—if it’s President Trump—you know, when this becomes the big news in 2 years, ‘‘Oh, my goodness, he can range 

Chicago with a nuke.’’ If we have a strong missile defense, the 

President’s going to have some additional options that he might not 

have if we don’t have anything or if we have a weak one, like we 

do now. 

Mr. BRIMLEY. Senator, I agree. I worry deeply about the nature 

of the regime and if we see the mating of a nuclear capability with, 

say, a KN08 or one of the variants. I think that’s deeply concerning. I think it’s not just missile defense. It’s comprehensive ISR 

[intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] architecture. Frankly, it’s both of those things forward-deployed in places like South 

Korea and Japan and other places. This gets back to the alliancesand-partnerships question. I mean, the—missile defense and forward-deployed missile defense and all the concepts and operations 

and communications that requires with allies and partners ought 

to be a focus of the next defense strategy, for sure. 

Senator SULLIVAN. Dr. Kagan? 

Dr. KAGAN. Well, this is a way—my answer answers a lot of the 

things that have been raised, including this issue, including space, 

including cyber, which is that we have been living in a series of delusions for years that somehow all these countries are not going to 

154 

develop every capability they can possibly develop. We have been 

holding off or slowing down or not moving sufficiently quickly to 

develop the capabilities to stay ahead of their capability. So, we 

slowed down, I think, dumbed down our missile defense—— 

Senator SULLIVAN. Yeah. 

Dr. KAGAN.—efforts, because we decided it was somehow a violation of one thing or another. That was just foolish. I don’t know— 

you guys that—know better than I do—whether he can build an 

ICBM faster than we can build the missile defense capability necessary to deal with it. Yes, and we ought to be—and, by the way, 

that will be useful in dealing with China, too. I mean, I’ve always 

felt that one of the major ways to get the Chinese to put pressure 

on North Korea is for us to build up capabilities that have direct 

implications for Chinese strategic interests. So, a missile defense 

capability that we build up in response to Korea will also affect 

China’s nuclear force. That gives them more incentive than any of 

these other efforts we’ve been making to try to push. So, I would 

say full speed ahead. What I don’t know, as a technical matter, is, 

What does full speed ahead mean when we have been artificially 

capping what we even are trying to do? 

Senator SULLIVAN. Well, it means more than we’re doing now. 

Dr. KAGAN. Yeah. 

Senator SULLIVAN. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Cruz. 

Senator CRUZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Good morning. Welcome. Thank you for testifying here today. 

As all of you know, our Nation faces mounting challenges. State 

actors have become increasingly belligerent in recent years. Radical 

Islamic terrorism has metastasized in the Middle East and spread 

globally. We have failed to fund and build a military that is designed to meet the entirety of our strategic commitments. I look 

forward to working with the incoming administration to ensure 

that the security of our country and the welfare of every serviceman and -woman is among the very highest priorities. 

General Keane, as the next administration begins the process of 

designing our national security strategy, what advice would you 

give them with respect to the prioritization of our resources and efforts? 

General KEANE. Well, first of all, the national security strategy 

should be job one and—in putting that together. Just as a—it’ll 

drive foreign policy, and it’ll drive the defense strategy. I think the 

Congress should also be informed about it as they’re going through 

this process, because you have much to contribute, particularly this 

committee and Foreign Relations. 

Clearly, from a priority standpoint dealing with national security 

strategy, we start with the Nation’s interests, and we also start 

with the threats. We start with the threats that are the most significant to us. We’ve spent a lot of time talking about this already. 

Those threats are coming at us from the revisionist powers: Russia, 

China, and Iran. That’s—certainly are our top priorities. We’ve got 

radical Islam, which has morphed into a global jihad. ISIS, most 

successful terrorist organization in history, affiliating now with 35 

country—even though it’s still losing its caliphate. The Taliban, 

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frankly, have more territory in Afghanistan under their control 

than at any time since 2001. That war, under current policy, is not 

winnable. We have to deal with that issue. Particularly frustrating 

after 15 years of involvement. This is the United States of America. 

Fifteen years of involvement, and we’re still involved in a war that 

we can’t win. I’m not suggesting we pull out of it. 

Those are major issues that we have to deal with. Another one 

is cyber. We’ve spent a lot of time talking about cyber here today. 

Our critical infrastructure is exposed. Our military needs to be 

hardened. This capability is growing, and our adversaries are exploding in the use of it. 

So, those are strategies that’ll eventually lead to a defense strategy, which this committee has to deal with. I would hope, when the 

Department comes over here to discuss their defense strategy, that 

there really is some discussion about it. Because, listen—look 

what’s happened to us. Do you remember, a number of years ago, 

that we had a defense strategy that was built around the anchor 

of defeating two regional conflicts? Remember that thought? We 

moved from defeating two regional conflicts to something less, that 

I can’t even define. I don’t know what it is. To tell you how sadly 

this is, we are fighting two—we fought two insurgencies in Iraq 

and Afghanistan—low-tech insurgencies, no air force, no navy involved—and we could not fight those two low-tech insurgencies simultaneously, Senator. We could not do it. We fought them sequentially. That’s one of the reasons why we’ve got this problem in Afghanistan, because the ground forces were not large enough to 

fight two low-tech insurgencies simultaneously. We used to have a 

strategy that we were resourcing at one time to fight two major 

conflict simultaneously. We have to have a discussion about what 

it is we really are trying to do, and then resource it. That has— 

and that’s what we haven’t been doing, and that’s the point you are 

making. 

Senator CRUZ. Thank you, General. 

Let me shift—— 

Chairman MCCAIN. That’s—— 

Senator CRUZ.—to a different issue, which is the potential for 

Iranian and North Korean nuclear proliferation. This is a question 

for Dr. Kagan. What concrete policy steps would you recommend to 

prevent cooperative nuclear proliferation between Iran and North 

Korea, and to promote enforcement of sanctions by China? 

Dr. KAGAN. I’m trying to get Chinese leverage against North 

Korea. I believe—and I was saying this to the Senator before—the 

best incentive to get Chinese to put more pressure on North Korea 

is to up our own strategic capabilities in East Asia, and making it 

clear that, for as long as North Korea continues to have—pose a 

growing threat, that means an increase in the American military 

presence along all different levels. So, particularly—we were just 

talking about missile defense. Any missile defense increase that we 

do in response to a North Korean potential ICBM with a nuclear 

weapon on it also impacts the Chinese nuclear force. That is an incentive for the Chinese to put more pressure than they’re currently 

putting on North Korea right now. 

I think that, in terms of—I don’t—diplomacy and sanctions, we 

can tighten sanctions, but, at this point, we need to put sufficient 

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pressure on China, but it has to be pressure that’s meaningful to 

them, and that’s of a strategic nature if we’re going to get any 

progress on dealing with North Korea. 

Second—other than that, we should be building up our missile 

defense capabilities much more in technologically advanced way 

and in—much faster to deal with that potential threat. 

As far as Iran is concerned, I don’t believe we are ultimately 

going to prevent Iran from getting a nuclear weapon. They are determined to get it. We can slow them down. Whether we are ultimately going to prevent that, I think, it’s highly unlikely. We either 

have to be— your—the options are then obvious, we’re either going 

to have to contain them when they have a nuclear weapon or we’re 

going to have to prevent them from getting it, by force. That is 

the—those are the—in my view, those are the only real alternatives that we face. 

Senator CRUZ. Thank you. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Any additional comment on that? 

General KEANE. I have one. I will disagree with the Doctor, here. 

I think we—this administration, despite the nuclear deal that has 

been made—I’m not suggesting that we tube the nuclear deal. I do 

believe we have to hold them accountable and have a tough inspection protocol, turn all of our intelligence agencies on it, and the rest 

of it. We know they’re going to cheat. They have, before. It was an 

informant that gave us the Fordow secret site. I believe we need 

a policy, an unequivocal policy that says we are not going to let 

Iran have a nuclear weapon, and we would use the means necessary to stop it, if necessary. Iran with a nuclear weapon, I think, 

should be unacceptable to us, as a matter of national security policy. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Mr. Brimley? 

Mr. BRIMLEY. I disagree with General Keane’s comments. 

Chairman MCCAIN. You want to elaborate on that? 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. BRIMLEY. Well, I just think—similar to North Korea, I mean, 

I worry about—particularly with North Korea and the nature of 

the regime itself, I think—you know, at the end of the day, I 

think—as objectionable as the Iranian regime may be, I think that 

they have proven to be rational actors. They have a strategy that 

makes sense from their perspective, that—and we are countering 

it through various means. We can debate whether we need to do 

more. 

I worry more about North Korea. That’s why—I mentioned the 

op-ed, I think before you got in, Senator, but that the Secretary of 

Defense Perry wrote with Dr. Carter—Dr. Ash Carter, who’s now 

the Secretary of Defense, about 10 years ago, that argued in favor 

of preemptively taking out any long-range ballistic missile from 

North Korea that was mated with a nuclear capability. I think that 

debate ought to be had again, because that’s the one scenario that 

I worry about probably more than most. 

Dr. KAGAN. Could I—— 

Chairman MCCAIN. It was—go ahead, Dr. Kagan. 

Dr. KAGAN. I just want to make sure I’ve slid myself in exactly 

where I want to be, here, because I don’t like General Keane disagreeing with me. I’m not saying we should not be willing to use 

157 

force to deal with Iran. I’m saying let’s not kid ourselves that there 

is a middle option between containment and ultimately using force, 

because of their determination. 

The only thing that I would say, in both Iran and North Korea’s 

case, is, let’s also not assume that there is an easy, quick option, 

where we do a surgical strike and then it’s all over and we can all 

go home. They have options, too, after that strike, and we—we 

can’t walk into that unless we are willing, ourselves, to take next 

steps that may be necessary. That’s the only—it’s not what—if Senator Graham had been here, that’s what I wanted to say to Senator 

Graham. 

Chairman MCCAIN. I’ll relay that to him. 

[Laughter.] 

Chairman MCCAIN. Only a President of the United States can 

make decisions along the lines of what we are discussing, with or 

without, in some cases, the approval of Congress. 

I want to thank the witnesses. It’s been extremely helpful, as 

every member who attended had commented. I thank you for your 

knowledge. I thank you for your service to the country. We’ll be 

calling on you again. 

Thank you. 

This hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:00 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

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