Docket No . 108652.



### IN THE SUPRE ME COURT OF THE STAT E OF ILLIN OIS

RICHARD P. VA

NCUR A, A ppel l ee, v . PETE R KA

TRIS et al. , (Ki nko’ s In c., A ppel l an t).
Opinion filed October 7, 2010.

JUSTICE GARMA

N deliv ered t he j udg men

t of th e c our t, w i th op inion. Chi ef Justice Fi tzgerald an

d Justice s Freem

an, Thom as, Ki lb ride, Karmeier , a nd Bu rk e co ncur re d in t he judg ment a nd o pinion.

OPINI ON Pl ai ntif f Richard Va

ncura brought an action again

st Pet er Katris, GlennBrown, a

n d R an dal l Boa twri gh t, a l l eg i n g th at th e def en da n ts had coll uded to depri ve Van cura of his inter est in a mor t gag e no t e by for ging Vancur a’ s s i gn

atu reon an as si gn men t of th at i n terest. Van cura also sue d Gu st avo Albear, t he notar y publ ic wh ose seal was used to not arize the frau dulent mort gage assignment, and Albear’s
em ploye r, Ki nko’s, Inc. (Ki

nko’ s). Re lev an t t o t his a pp ea l, t he cir cu it courto f Co o k C o un t y held a b en ch t r ial a nd fo un d K ink o ’s liable to Va nc ura base d on a v i ol ati on of se cti on 7 –10 2 of t he Il l i noi s Notary Pu blic Act

(Act) (5 ILCS 312/7–102 (West 1996)) and a com mon l aw cla im bas ed o n t heo rie s o f ne gli gent t ra ining and neg ligent sup er vision. The appe l l ate court reversed the f

in din g of l ia bi li ty unde r t he Act , bu t it affirmed t he judg ment of the tri al courton th

e c om mon1 Rober t Br own was not a pa rt y to this ca se, n or di d h e appear as a wi tne ss; th e rec ord

do es no t e xpl ai n hi s a bs ence. T o avoi d confu sion, we ref er to Ro be rtBrow n and Gle nn Brow n, w ho are n ot re lated , wi th th ei r first
-2- la wne gl i ge nc e c l ai

m . W e gran

ted K i nk o’s pe ti ti on f orle ave to appeal pursuan t to Suprem

e Court Ru

l e 315 (210 Il

l . 2d R. 3 15). Kin ko’s argues thatth e c om

mon l aw du ty of c are f or em ploye rs of n ot aries is defi ned b y the Act. Thus, i

t mai ntain s that wh er e it s t ra ining an d sup er v i si on ad h ered to th e stan

da rd s s et f orth i n th e A ct, it ca n n ot b e l i ab l e. K i n ko’ s f ur th er as se rts that i t had no statutory

du ty t o t r ain it s no t ar y emp lo yee s, an d t he r efo r e t ha t it s lia bilit y is li mi ted to t he scope

of i ts un dertaki ng b y the v olu ntary undertakin

g doctr in e. See Frye v. Medicare-Glaser Corp. , 153 Il

l . 2d 26, 3 2 (199 2). Plaint iff re spo nds t hat t he Act is not t he onl y sou rce of comm on la w du ty for a no t ar y’s employer , a nd t hat Kinko’ s t ra ining and
su pe rvis io n w er e n eg lig en t r eg ar dl es s o f t he ex t en t o f Kin ko ’s du t y. For t he r eas ons given belo w, we r ever se t he t rial co ur t ’s judg ment agains t Ki nko’s an d reman d with di rections to enter judg ment i n f av or of Ki nko’s on bot h counts.

BACK GROUND Pla int iff Va n cu ra , a re al estate i n v estor, a gr ee d to help de fendant GlennBrown fi

nan ce t he pu r ch as e a nd r eh ab ilit at io n o f a s ing le- family ho me i n W h ea ton , Il l i n oi s, as an i n v estmen t. Vancura l

oaned $100,000 to a lan d tr ust Bro wn established, and in retu rn the tr ust e xecuted a $110,000 ins t allm en t no t e t ha t wa s s ec ur ed by a fi rst mor t gag e o n t he invest ment propert y. Brown al so personall

y gua ranteed the n ot e. Howev er, Brown had di

ff ic ulty sel li ng the W heaton house, and wh

en t he note matured he di

d not have the m

oney to repay Van cura

. Van cura and B ro wn ea ch so ught advi c e fr o m de fen da nt Ra nd all Boa twri gh t, another real estate i nv estor, wh o of f ere d sugg es ti ons

on how to im prove the propert y. Boatwrigh t t hen le ft town to l ook f

or i nv estors for his ow n pr ojec t , a ne w v ideo t ra nsmission co mpany cal l ed M ul ti P ath C omm

uni cations. Wh en Boat w ri ght returne d f

rom h i s tri p, hi s b usi ne ss p artne

r, Rob ertBrown, to ld h

im that Vancura was wi

ll in g to trade th e insta llm ent note f or a s ha re of Mul ti Path Com m uni cations. 1nam es.
-3- Bo at wr ight to ld Gl

enn Brown about the pot entia l trade wi th Van cura and off ered to accept $90,000 in pay me nt for the note, whic

h was then wort h $117 ,333 . Glenn Brown t hen asked another busin ess acquai ntance, defen

dant Peter Kat ris, t o p ay Bo at wr ight in exch ange f or$9 0, 00 0 a nd h alf o f t he p ro fits fro m t he s ale o f th e W he aton house, when

ever that occurred. Katris agreed, and Glenn Brown arranged f orh i s a ttorn ey , K arl Pa rk , to c on du ct a

re al estate clos ing to refl ect the transac tion s. Thus, Glenn Brown understood t hat Van cura wou l d r ec ei v e a sh are of Mu l ti Pa th Co mmunicatio ns and in return h e woul d as sign t he inst allment no t e and acc omp anying mortgage to Boa

twri gh t, wh o woul d a cc ep t $90 ,00 0 i

n s ati sf ac ti on of bot h. Gle nn B rown then pai

d the $90,000 to Boatwright with m oney borrowed f

rom Peter Katr

i s, wh om Gl en n Brown repai d w i

th $90,000, plus h

al f of the profi ts from the s al e of the house. Pri ort o t he cl osin

g, Park drafted an “

Assi gnm ent of Mortgage” f orVancura to sign, along wi th a loan di sco unt agree

men t f or Bo at wr ig ht an

d G l en n B rown to si gn an d a rel ea se de ed f or Bo at wr ight t o s ign. A cc ordi n g to B oatw

ri gh t, ag ain st wh o m a d efa ult judg ment was entered i

n thi s case an

d who testif

ie d by way o f a n evi dence depos i tion , Robe

rt Bro wn t oo k t he assi

gnm ent of m ort gage to Vancura f

or his s ign

ature t he n

igh t before the cl

osin g. When Bo at wr ight and R

o bert Brown met the ne

xt morni ng, they reali zed that the a ssi

gnm en t of m ort gag e and the rel

ease deed requi

red not ar izat ion, and they

to ok t he docum

ents to t he K

in ko’s store in Oak Lawn , Illino is. La t er , w hen t he clo sing wa s co nduc t ed, bot h t he assignment of m

ort gag e and t he r elease dee d bo re t he ap par ent si gna ture and notary

seal of Ki nko’s em ploy ee Gustavo D. Al

bear, an I llino is n o t ar y. At the b ench

tria l i n th i s ca se, i t was u ndi sputed that Va nc ura never si gned

the mortga geas si gn men t, an d he w asnot

present when t he do cument was not ar ized. Acco rd ing t o B oa t wr ight , w hen he a nd Robe rt Brown arriv

ed at the Oa k Lawn K

in ko’s, he wen

t t o make
so me ph o t o co pie s w hile Robe rt Brown greeted an em

ploy ee he kn ew as “Gus .” When Bo at wr ight app ro ache d Gu s and Ro ber t Bro wn at t he
coun ter, the em

ploy ee aske d fo r Boatwr igh t’s driv er’s l ic ense.2 Albear ’s s eal, which app ear s on bot h the as signment of mortga ge and the rel ea se de ed , li sts h is nam e as si m pl y “G ustav o A lb ea r.” -4- Bo at wr ight provided h

is li cense, and Gus notar ized the release deed bear ingBoatwrigh

t’s si gnat ure. Boat wrigh

t did not remem

ber whe ther he si gned t he de ed in Gu s’s p re senc e. Bo at wr ight claimed t o k no w not hingab out h

ow th e m ort gage assi

gnm ent beari ng Van cura’s f orged signature was notarized. At the trial , 10 years a

fter the occurrence, Gustavo Al bear , t he Kin ko’s em pl oy ee wh ose n otar y se al appe ar s on

th e n ota r iza t io ns, testifi ed t hat he did no t re membe r sp ecifically nota rizing t he
as sig nment o f

mortg ag e or

th e rel ea se de ed . W h en pr es en ted wi th b oth do cu men t s, he ac kn o wle dg ed t ha t t he no t ar y st amp on eac h appeared t o be his. Simila r ly, h e t es t ifie d th at t he signa t ur e o n t he releasedeed appeared to be hi s. However, he was“pretty certain ” that t he no tary si

gnature on the forged assi gnm ent of m ort gage was no t hi s. Accordin

g to A lbe ar , t he t wo sig na t ur es ap pe ar ed slig ht ly different f rom one an othe r, a nd the as si gn men t of mortgage si

gna ture read “G us t av o Da vidAl

bear” rather

than “ Gustavo D. Al

bear.” Al bear expl ai ned t hat he neve r signe d anyt hi ng wit h h

i s m i ddl e n am e “ f or so me pri va te reas ons a

nd r el i gi ous rea sons ,” an

d that he h

ad not used his mi ddle nam e for an of

fi ci al purpose sin

ce he h ad be co me a Uni

ted Stat es citize n. 2 Al

bear also t esti f

i ed th at h e h ad ke pt a lo gb o o k o f all not ar izat ions he pe rfo rmed while wo rk ing for Kinko’ s, bu t t hat lo gb o o k c o uld no t be lo ca t ed fo rt r ial. The closi ng oc curr ed as plann

ed, and whe

n Van cura dis covered t he frau dulent mor t gag e as signment , he bro ught suit aga ins t Boa twri gh t, Gle nn B rown, Katris, Al

bear, and K

in ko’s. Glen

n Brown and Kat ris also fil

ed c laims against Albear a nd Kinko ’s. Only t he cl aim s agai

nst Ki nko’ s are at i ssue i n th i s ap peal , and we th

eref ore review onl

y the f acts t hat are relevant to those claim s. Each of t he t hre e co mplaints a gainst Ki nk o ’s in clu de d a cla im based on c ommo n law t heo ries o f negligent sup er vision and negligent traini ng, as well

as a cl aim ba se d o n se ct io n 7 –1 02 o f t he I llino is Notary Publ ic Act (5 ILCS 312/7–102 (West 1996)). Section 7–102 pro vides: “§7–102. Li

abi li ty of Em ploy er of Notary. The em

ploy er of a n otar y pu b l i c is a l so l i ab l e to t he pe r so ns in vo lve d fo rall-5- dam ages c aused

by the notary’s

off i ci al m i scondu ct, if : (a) the notary publ

ic was actin

g withi n the sco pe o f the not ary’s emp lo ym ent at t he t ime the no t ar y engag ed in t he official misco nduc t ; and (b ) the em

pl oy er con se n ted to t he notary publ

ic ’s off ic ia l
m i scon duct.” 5 ILCS 312/7

–102 (We st 1996 ). “Of fi ci al mi sconduct” under the Ac

t is def in ed i n section 7–104: “The t er m ‘official mi

sco nd uct ’ ge ner ally m

eans t he wrongful exerc i se of a power or th e w

rongf ul pe rf orm an ceof
a du t y and is fu lly de fine d in Se ct io n 3 3– 3 o f t he Cr im in al Code of 1 961 . T he term

‘w rongf ul ’ a s u se d i

n th e d ef i ni ti on of off ic ia l miscond uct means u na

u thorized, unl

awful , abusi ve, n eg l i gen t, reckless, or inj urious.” 5 I LCS 312/7–10 4 (West 1996)

. Al be ar, who settled wi

th Vancura b efore trial , testifi ed that he be ca me a notary at the request of Ki nko’s i n 1995, and parti ci

pated in
a requ ired not ary tr aini

ng cou rse t aught by a K inko’s trainer

. Ac cordi ng to Al be ar, he le arned at the traini ng that there were three typesof n

otari zations. F i

rst, “notari

zation throug

h i den tif i cation, a c ard or so me type of w rit t en ident ifi cat ion”; s eco nd, not ar izat ion o f
a pers on kn

own p erson

al l y to Al be ar; and thi

rd, notar iz ation based

on an i den ti f i ca ti onmade b

y som eone know n pe rsonal l y to Al be ar. Howev er, Al

b ea r te sti f i ed th at h e a l wa y s req ue ste d i den ti f i ca ti on to “f eel com f ortab l e w i

th a si tua ti on. ” A cc or din g t o Albear, Kinko’s t aug ht him to ask for ident ifi cat ion wit h a signa t ur e, but t he i de nti f i ca ti on ne ed n ot in cl ude a photograph. W

hen a sked how an i de nti f i ca ti on wit h a signa t ur e but no ph o t o wo uld en ab le h im t o ver ify that t he bea re r o f the ident ify ing do cument wa s th

e p ers on he cl ai me d to be , Al be ar res pon de d, “ W el l , th at i s n ot my jo b. My jo b is t o ver ify your si gna ture b ase d on w

ha t I hav e i n f ront of me.” W i th re spe ct t o t he traini

ng program i

tself , Al bear t es t ified t ha t it
was a t wo- or t hree-day program that was “m

ore marketin

g than anything else. ” T he in

structo r taught Alb ear to keep a lo gb o o k o f his notar izations, and A

lb ear did. He was

al so instructed t o ke ep his notary seal and logboo k safe, so Albe ar ar r an ge d t o ke ep his ma t er ials i n th e m an ag er’ s des k a

t the Oa k L aw n K i nk o’s when the y were n ot in use. Neit her t he o ffi

ce no r t he dr awe r in which he kep t his seal and logbook were consi stently locked, but i f ei

ther or b oth of

them were-6- locked, Al

bear wo uld have t o as k a mana ge r t o o pe n t hem if a nota ri za ti on was reque st ed. Al

though the la

yout of the Oak Lawn Kin ko’s was “[v]ery op en,” t he manager’s off i ce was the

most secure part of the st ore . Al

be ar a l so te sti f i ed tha t when he tran sf erred to a different K

i nk o’s stor e in ear ly 19 96 , he t ur ne d h is s ea l an d s pir alboun d logbook ove

r to the Oak

Law n m anager. Daniel Be hnke, who was the m anager of the O ak Lawn

Kin ko’s in 1995, de ni

ed taki ng pos se ss i on

of Al bear’s notary seal

or logbook. He testifi ed that the OakLawn s

to re empl oyed two o r three notaries at the time, includi

ng A l be ar, an d tha t he d i d not rev i ew an y notary
a cts. He also stat ed that the sto re never received an y com plai nts o r allegat ions of i

m proper n otari zations, n

or was h e ev er a ske d to app ro ve any

notarizations . He agreed with A lb ear that the manager’s de sk wa s t he mo st se cu r e p ar t o f t he Oa k L aw n fa cili t y. Al Yam ni tz test if ie d that he was a regional traini ng m an ager at Kin ko’s i n 19 95, an

d he developed an

d conducted

Al be ar’s notary traini ng. Prior to working at Ki nko’s, Yam

ni tz had been

a trainer at
a num ber of re sta ur an ts and retail stores, incl

uding W algreens an

d T.J. Maxx. A l thou gh he wa s n ot a n otary , Ya m ni tz w asas ke d to de

ve l op a notary traini ng program f

or employees

who el ected to b ecom

e part of Kin ko’s new n

ot ary s ervice i

n m id-1995. He rev

ie wed the Act

and obtaine d a c o py o f t he No t ar y Pu blic H an db o o k fr o m t he I llino is Secret ary of State’s o ff

ice. Usi ng these materials, Yam

ni tz created a t eac hingman

ual f ort he notar y cl

ass and a student wo rkboo k. He also purchased

three videotapes from the Nati onal Nota ry A ss oci ati on f or use i n th e trai n i n g. W h en h e h ad com pl ete d h i s dev el opm en t o f t h e t ra ining pr og ra m, he se nt a

copy of h i s m ate rials to K i n ko’ s c orp ora

te off ic es, but he di d not hear back

from them. A fter he h ad devel oped t he cl as s, Ya m n i tz a l so p ut i n a req ue st t o att end a “t ra veling she lf” notary traini ng program at

a cost o f $300 or $400, buthi s request was deni ed. Ya m ni tz to ld the c ourt that t he cl asses h e taug h t c ons i ste d of lectures, the videos, and class discu ssio ns ab out “ dif

f ere nt asp ec ts of notarial acts.” He“ ty pical l y ” ta ugh t stude nts to i de nti f y pe ople on

t he ba sis o f “a st at e I D, dr ive r ’s li cen se, o r some ty pe of ID that had a pi cture, a des cri pti on, an d the si gna ture on i t.” Al thoughhe testif

ie d that h e ta ug h t stu den ts to loo k fo r a pho t o, he ac kno wledg ed t hat he also taught t hem

that only one f o r m o f i dentif ic ation was requi

red. Ya m ni tz als o r ec o mmend ed t ha t st ud en t s k ee p lo gb o o ks o f t he ir-7- notarial a ct s. Wit h r es pe ct t o t he se cu r it y o f t he lo gb o o k a nd se al, Ya m ni tz st at ed t ha t he t o ld

st ude nt s, “[ I] f the y were in the store, they sho uld keep the stamp on thei r person ***. When

they le f t th e bui ldi ng, if they di dn ’t h av e a pl ac e th ey cou l d l ock i t up , ta ke i t wi th them because they were the ones that [were] responsible for what was in th e b ook. ” O n

cross -e x am

i n ati on , Y am n i tz al so acknowledge d that t he class wasnot grad

ed, an d no testin

g was perf orme d to ens

ure co mpre hensio n. Van cura also p resented the test im ony of Mi chael Cl osen, an ex pert on n otary law an d p r ac t ice

. Clo se n, a lic en se d I llino is at t o rne y, retired from John Ma rshal l Law School af

ter 27 ye ars. He is

a m em ber of th e Na t ional No t ar y Assoc iatio n, a nd he s er ved o n t he dr aft ing
comm ittees for the Notary Code of Pro f es si on al Re sp on si b i l i ty and t he Model No t ar y Act o f 200 2. Clos en has wr itt en ext ensi vely on t he subj ect of n

otary la w and practi ce, and he served as a n Il l i noi s n otary f rom a pproxi matel y 1990 u nti l he l ef t the state i n 20 03. Cl osen t es t ified t ha t , in

his expe rt op inion, t he sta nd ard of ca re f or notariesis “reaso nab le

ness ,” and Ki

nko’s train

in g of Al bear was i n adeq ua te i n a nu m be r of ways. Acco rd ing t o C lose n, t he r e w er e o nly t wo pr evailing views abo ut t he pr op er way t o id ent ify a do cument signer i n 1 995 . In

one vi ew , onl y one f orm of i de nti f i ca ti on wa s required, but t hat identif

ication n eeded to in

clude at least

a si gna ture and a p h otogr

ap h . In th e oth er v i ew , a dop ted

b y th e Model

Notary Act o f 19 84 , t wo o r mo re fo rms o f i d entif ic ation were requi

red, at l east on e o f which need ed t o includ e a s ignat ur e, pho t og ra ph, and phy si cal descri ption. Closen opin

ed that Illin ois h ad adopted t he l

atter view, poi n ti n g to the v

ersi on of the Il l i noi s Notary

Publ ic Act i n f orce i n 1995 . The rel

eva nt portion of

that statute stated: “A notary publ

ic hassa ti sf ac tory ev i den ce th at a pe r so n is t he pe r so n w ho se t rue sig nature is on a documen

t if that per so n: ( 1) is p er so na lly kno wn t o t he no t ar y; (2) i s i de nti f i ed upon the oath oraf f i rm at io n o f a
cre di bl e w i tne ss pe rs ona l l y kn own to the nota ry ; or (3) i s ide nt ified o n t he b as is o f identification documen ts .” (Emphasi s added

. ) 5 ILCS 312/6–102(d) (We st 1996 ). A cc ordi n g to Cl osen, the pl

ural “docum ents” m eans that m

ore t han3 Although Kinko’s twice unsu ccess fully m ov ed to exc lude

Close n’s test imony abo ut th e pro pe r in te rpre tati on of th e stat ut e, it ha s not pu rs ued this issu e on appeal. -8- one form of identif yi ng docum ent was requi

red. 3 Based on his review of t he dep os itio ns o f Albear a nd Ya mnitz and
a sum mary of A l b ea r’ s tr i al testi mon y , C l ose n con cl uded th at Y am n i tz
was “un qualif ie d and unf am i l i ar wi th soun d notary practi ce.” He noted that Yam ni tz a ppa ren tl y em phas ize d the n

ee d f or j us t one

f orm of ide nti f i ca ti on with a signature, but “m

ore im port antly ” he foun d Alb ear’s f ocu s on t he signature a lone tr oubling. Based o n Al bear’s t es t imo ny, Clos en sp ecu late d t hat Albear w ou ld no t ha ve pa id any atte nti on to a ph oto or phys ic al

descri ption eve n if one h

ad been provi ded. Cl osen al so found that the traini

ng an d supervi si on of Al

bear was de fic i ent wi

th res pect to the f

orma t and conten ts of th e notary l ogb ook A l b ea r k ep t. A cc ordi

n g to Cl osen, a s pi ral -b oun d n oteb ook
was an un ac ce pta b l e f orm at f or a notary logbook, because pages c o uld eas ily

be r emove d. He t est ifi

ed t hat t he infor matio n Al bear recorded about each

notar ization was also “w o efu lly inco mple t e, ” in that Al bear di d not require si

gners to sign

the logbook. In add it io n , Cl osen noted that the l

ogbook sh

oul d be kept i n a sec ure loca t ion, and t he man ager’s offi

ce in which Al

bear kept his logbook wa s n ot
s uf ficie nt ly secure. Closen al so opined that Al bear ha d not been pr o pe r ly trai n ed on th e d i sp osa l of h i s s ea l an d l ogb ook. Fo r suppor

t, Cl osen not ed t hat Albear ha d simply tur ned t he notary se al o ve rt o his
ma nager wh en h e l ef t th e O ak La wn sto re , ra th er th an def acing or de st r o ying t he se al. Af ter seven day s of trial

pr o ceedi ngs h el d between Septem

ber 2005 and J anua ry 20 06, t he co ur t fou nd de fendant s joint ly and severall y l iab le to Vancura for t he damages. Re lev an t t o t his a pp ea l, th e c our t f oun d K i n ko’ s l i ab l e to Vanc ur a, GlennBr o wn , an d K at r is under bot h the stat uto ry and comm on law claim

s. The app ellate co ur t re ver sed in par t and a ffi rmed in par t , w ith o ne jus ticedis senti

ng. 391 Ill. App . 3 d 35 0. With r esp ect t o t he statutory cla im, the ma

jori ty concl uded that “the mate rial fact s re gar ding Alb ear’s conduct are undi sputed.” 391 Ill . App. 3d at 365. It noted Kin ko’s acknowl edgm

ent that either Al

bear not arized Vancur a’s4 The appe ll ate cour t opinion cites Rule 341(e)(7), the provi sions of w hich bec a me Rule 341(h )(7) i n 2006. We refer t o the cur rent ver sio n of t he r ule.

-9- si gna ture despi

te Vancura’s ab sence , or Al be ar k now i ngl y or un kn o win gly

allowed so meo ne t o ap ply

hi s notary stam

p. Under ei

ther
sc en ari o, the cour t reas one d, A l be ar wasgui

l ty of ne gl i ge nt or recklesscon

du ct s uf f i ci en t to co n sti

tute “ of f i ci al m i sc on du ct”

under
se cti on 7–1 04 of t he Act . H ow ever , t he co ur t fou nd t ha t Kink o ’s did not “co nsent ” t o Albea r’s official mi sco nduc t , a nd there f ore the c ourt rejected the tr ia

l court ’s determi

nation tha t Ki nko’s was l

ia ble under the Act. 391 Ill . App. 3d at 379-80. W i th re spe ct t o t he co mmon law claim, t he major ity initially fou nd that Ki nko’ s had wa

i ve d rev i ew b y f ail i ng to ci te re l ev an t au t ho r it y, in violation of

Supreme C ourt Rul e 341(h)(7) 4 (210 Ill . 2d R. 341(h )(7)). 391 Il

l

. App. 3d

at 3 68 . N on eth

el es s, th e m

aj ori ty conductedan ex

tensi ve revi ew of the com

mon l aw t heo ries,
co ncluding t hat “the negligenc e judg ment is c ons ist ent wit h t he
man if est wei ght of the e vi den ce,” and t hat it w ou ld have aff

irm ed even if Ki nko’s had compl

ie d with the rul

e. 391 Ill . App. 3d at 369. The maj ority agreed with Ki nko’s t h at Kinko’ s wa s und er no statutory obli gation to t rain

its n ot ary em ploy ees, but noted that Kin ko’s chose to prov

i detrai ni ng an d then sh owe d “ no c onc ern

” f or whether the traini ng was s uff ic ie nt. 391 Ill . App. 3d

at 369. Acco rd ing to th e c our

t, the ev i den ce

sh owe d th at Y am n i tz d i d n ot e ff ectiv ely t r ain Al bear in sound notary practic es; al though Yam

ni tz test if ie d that t he t ra ining he deve lop ed w as c ons iste nt wit h t he Act and the N otary Pu blic Hand boo k, t he co ur t fou nd that A l be ar’ s c l ea

r m i sa ppr eh en si on of his d ut ies co nfli cted with Ya mn itz’s cl ai ms . The court not ed that Al bear as ke d c us tomers

to “ sw ea r or affirm” tha t t hey wer e who they cl ai me d to be, a l

thou gh the A ct i nc l ude s n o such i de nti f i ca ti on pro cess. The c our

t also a dd re ss ed A l b ea r’ s te sti mon y th at a ph o t o gr ap hic i de nti

f i ca ti on was not required, opini ng wi thout referen ce: “In this day and age, an

ad eq ua te i de nti f i ca ti on do cument under the circumstances is one that in cludes at least

a pho t og ra ph and signature.” 391 Ill . App. 3d at 371. The maj ority poi nted out that it s op inion o n t his matt er was co nsist ent wi th th e M ode l Nota ry A ct of 1984. It also re ferr ed t o t he com men ts to th e 2 00 2 M ode l

Nota ry A ct, whi ch i t cal l ed “pa rticul arl y pe rti ne nt” to this cas e. The m

aj ori ty-10- ex pre ss ly decli ned to commen

t o n whether, as Pro fessor Close n testifi ed, two forms of i

dentif ic ation were requi

red by the Act i n 1995. Instead, it fo und tha

t Al be ar’ s te sti

mony es tab l i sh ed a p racti ceof
acc ept ing an o at h or affirmatio n and “s i gna ture exem pla r,” and such a pr act ice wo uld be in

suf fi ci ent under the Act regardless of whether t he law r equ ired one or t wo forms of ide ntif ic ation. 391 Ill . App. 3d at 373. W i th respec t t o Kinko’s sup er vision o f Albear, t he major ity fou nd that a reason

abl y caref ul em pl oyer would h

ave : “ensured th at s up er v i sor y pers on n el at th e O ak La wn sto r e un de rs tood Al bear’s responsi bi li tiessuch that they

ne ve r took pos se ss i on

of his seal

at the 24-hour store, that t hey provided
a se cu r e s t o r ag e p lac e t ha t o nly Al bear could access, and that they ref us ed pos se ss i on of

the se al on a perman ent basis when Al bear transferred to a Peoria store.” 391 Ill . App. 3d at 374. Thus, the cou rt o pin

ed, Kin ko’s h ad no reg ard for whether A lb ear un de rs tood his r es po nsib ilit ies an d a dh er ed t o t he m. Acco rd ingt o t he
ma jori ty, “[t]hi s i s negl

ige nce.” 391 Il

l. A pp. 3d at 374. The di ss en

ti n g j us ti ce wou l d h av e f oun d th at K inko’s wa s n

ot liable on ei

ther the stat utory claim

or t he co mmon law neg ligent trai ni ng an d supe rvi si on claim. Altho ugh t he disse nt agr eed wit h t he
maj ori ty that t he comm

on law st andard of

ca re wasone

of “reasonable

ness ,” the dis sent opin

ed that t he A

ct establishes

what is reasonabl e. 391 I ll. App. 3d a t 385 (O ’Malley, P .J. , d issent ing). The dissent criticized the m

aj ority an d the tr ial cou rt for re lyi

ng o n t he Model Nota ry A ct, noting that the Illi

nois le gis la ture has decl

in ed to adopt th e M ode l

Nota ry A ct i n to ei ther cu rrent I l l i noi s n otary l aw or t he Act as i

n e f f ect i n 19 95. T he di ss en

t opi ne d that the s cop e of Kin ko’s duties can

be de f i ne d on l y by the A ct or its own v

olu ntary undertakings. The dissent also fou nd

that Closen’s in

terpret ation of the A

ct was i n cor re ct. A cc ordi

n g to the

di ss en t, th e p hr

as e “i de nti

f i ca ti on documents” i

n se cti on6–102 of the Act m eans onl y tha t “i den ti f i ca ti on can be asc er t ained fr om a va riet y of differe nt docum en ts that various i

ndi vi dual s m ay present, such as

a d riv er ’s li cense, sta te i de nti f i ca ti on, i m m i gra ti on d oc um en ts, pas sport, etc.” 391 Ill. App. 3d at 386. Thus, t he dissent co ncluded, Yamnitz’s t est imony that he trained A

lb ear to r equi

re o n e f orm of ph oto5 The A ct was sub stantially

ame nd ed in 2008. Because

the ope rative f acts of thi s case occur red in 19 95 a nd

199 6, we refer to a nd cite only the version of t he Act in eff

ect at tha t t ime. -11- i den tif i cation demonstra

tes tha t Ki nko’ s prope

rl y trai ne d Al be ar.

AN AL YSIS Ill in ois Notary Publ

ic Act Several pr ovisio ns o f the I llino is Nota ry Pu b l i c A ct a rere l ev an t. 5 Al thoughwe hav

e al ready made some ref

erences to those pro vi sions,
we n ow reprodu

ce them i n f ull

. Sec ti on 6–1 02 e st ablishes t he func t io n an d d ut y of a notary publ ic

. “§ 6–102. Not arial

Acts. (a) In takin

g an ackn owl ed gm en t, t he no t ar y p ubl ic

mus t deter mi ne, ei ther from pe

rsonal kno w le dge or f

rom sa ti sf ac tory ev i de nc e, th

at the p ers on app ear ingbefo re t he no t ar y and making t he ack now ledgment i s th e p er son wh ose tru e s i gn atu rei s on th e i n str um en t. (b) In takin

g a verifi cation upo n oa t h or affirmatio n, t he notary publ i c m us t de term

i ne , ei the r f rom personal knowle dge
orfrom satisf actory evi dence, tha t the pe rs on appe ari ng b ef ore t he no t ar y and m

ak in g the verif

ication is the perso n whose true sign ature is on the stateme

nt veri fi ed. (c) In wi tne ss i ng orat t es t ing a s ign at ur e, t he no t ar y pu blic must determ i ne , ei ther f rom p ers o na l kn

owl edgeor f rom s a tis f actory ev i de nc e, th at the s i gnatu

re i s th at of the pe rs on app ear ing befo re t he no t ar y and named t her ein. (d) A n ot ary publi

c has s atisf

actory evi dence that a p ers on is t he pe r so n w ho se t rue sig na t ur e is o n a do cu men t if t ha t per so n: ( 1) is p er so na lly kno wn t o t he no t ar y; (2) is i de n ti fied up o n t he o at h o r a ffirmat io n o f a
cre di bl e w i tne ss pe rs ona l l y kn own to the nota ry ; or (3) is ide nt if i ed on th e b as i s of

i de nti f i ca ti on docum en ts.” 5 IL CS 31 2/6–1 02 (W est 199 6). Se cti on 7– 10 1 e sta

b l i sh es th e l i ab i l i ty of t he nota

ry : “Li ab i l i ty of Notary and S ur et y. A no ta ry publi c and t he suret y on the not ary’s-12- bond ar e liable to t he pe rso ns involved for all damage s ca use d by t he notary ’soff

i cial m i scon duct.” 5 ILCS 312/7

–101 (We st 1996 ). The vi ca riousl i ab i l i

ty of the no tar y publ

ic’sem pl oy er i s s et f orth in section 7–102: “§7–102. Li

abi li ty of Em ploy er of Notary. The em

ploy er of a notar y publ

ic is also liable t o t he pe r so ns in vo lve d fo rall da mag es ca us ed by t he n o t ar y’s o fficial misc o ndu ct , if: (a) the notary publ

ic was actin

g wi th in the s co pe o f the not ary’s emp lo ymen t at t he t ime t he no t ar y e ngaged i n t he official misco nduc t ; and (b) th e em ploye r cons en ted to the n

otary public’s off

ic ia l
m i scon duct.” 5 ILCS 312/7

–102 (We st 1996 ). Sec ti on 7–1 04 d efines “o ffi

cial miscond uct ” as it ap pea rs in t he ab ov e- qu oted

por ti on s of th e A ct: “§7–104. Off

ic ia l Mis conduct Defi

ned. The term

‘off ic ia l
m i sc on du ct’ general

ly me ans the wrongf

ul e xerci se of a power or th e w ron gf ul perf orm an ce of a d uty an d is fully

de fine d in Sec ti on 33–3 of the Cri m i na l Code of

1961. Th

e term ‘w r o ng ful’ as used i

n the def in ition of off

ic ia l m is conduct
means un au t ho r ize d, un law ful, abusi ve, negli gent, r eckless, or i nj urious.” 5 ILCS 312/7

–104 (We st 1996 ).
Compl ia nce wi th Supreme Court Rule 341 We fi rst addr ess the a ppellate co urt ’s det ermin ation t hat Kinko’s wai ved re view o f t he c o mmo n la w c laim by fa iling t o ap pr o pr iat ely supp ort it s a r gu men t

. I n r ea ch ing t ha t de t er minat io n, t he co ur t br iefly reviewed Ki nko’ s arg um en ts. It noted that Kin

ko’s argued the trial courtha d e rr o ne o us ly e xpected Al bear to be trained to a hi gher stan dard than that setfo r t h in

th e A ct, su pp orti n g i ts a rgum en t wi th
cases“indicat ingviolat ion o f a st at ut e may be a b asis f or a tort cla

i m .” As t he courtr ec o gn ize d, Kink o ’s maint ain ed t ha t it co uld no t be liable f ornegl ige ncei n th i s c as e b ec au se

i ts t ra ining was c ons iste nt wit h t he statut e. Wit h re spe ct to the negl i gen t-supe rvision cl ai m , the c ourt opine d that Kin ko’s had ci

ted au t ho r it y “r eg ar din g a n e nt ire ly different typeof tort , negl

ige nt hi rin g and retention of

an un fi t em plo yee,” ref err i ng to Ki nk o’s ci tation to Van Horne v. Muller , 185 Ill . 2d 299 (1999 ).-13- Su pr eme Court Rule 341(h) sets ou t t he requirem ents f or appe l l an ts’ b rief s. The r ul e l i sts the sections

of the bri ef t hat shall be in cl uded, as we llas

re qui re men ts f or e ach se cti on . W i th re sp ec t to
ar gument s, t he r ule st at es t hat t he br iefs shall co nt ain:

“ A rgum en t, which sha ll cont ain the co nt ent ions o f the app ellant and t he r eas ons t her efo r, wit h cita t ion o f the authorities

and t he pages of the record reli ed on. Evi dence sha ll n ot b e c opi

ed at l en gth , but r ef

eren ce sh al l b e m ade to t he pa ge s o f t he r ec o rd o n ap pe al o r a bst ra ct , if any , wher e evi dence may be found . C itat ion o f numero us a ut ho r it ies in supp ort of the s am e poi nt i s n ot fav ored. Poi nts n ot argued a

re wai ved and sh al l not be rai sed i n the repl

y bri ef , i n ora l
argu men t, or o n petition for reheari ng.” 2 10 Ill . 2d R. 341(h )(7). Co nsist ent with the pl

ai n l anguage of

the rule, thi s court has
r ep ea t ed ly

hel d that t he f

ai lure to a rgue a po int in the ap pellan

t’s op ening b rief

re su l ts i n f orfe i ture of the i ssue. See , e.g. , Elementa ry School District 159 v. Schiller , 221 Ill . 2d 130, 143 n.2 (2006) (issue forfe ited where i

t was raised f

or t he fi rst tim e at oral argum en t); Skolnick v. Altheimer &

Gray , 191 Ill . 2d 214, 237 (2 000 ) ( affirmative defense forfe ited wh ere i t wa s n ot rai se d i n b rief ). B oth ar gument and ci tation t o r elevant aut hor ity ar e r equ ired . An i ss ue th at is me r ely lis t ed or included in a vagu e allega t ion o f err or is not “arg ued ” and wil l not satisf

y the re qui

rem en ts of th e rul e. See , e.g. , People v

. Phillips , 215 Ill . 2d 554, 565 (2005) (iss ue forf ei ted wher e de fendant rais ed it but f

ai le d to ma

ke any argumen t o r citation to rel evan

t authority ); People v. Fran klin , 167 I ll . 2d 1, 20 (1995) (issues forfe ited wher e de fendant pr ovid ed no ar gu men t t o su pp o r t cla ims of error); People v. Guest , 166 Ill . 2d 381, 413-14 (1995) ( one sentenc e in br ief in dic at ing t ha t de fen da nt “inc o r po r at ed ” a ll cla ims ma de in earli er pr oc eed ings no t sufficient to s ati sfy Rule 34 1, r es ult ing in f orfe i ture of clai

ms ). Moreo ver, an argum

ent that is deve lop ed be yond
merelist o rva gu e a lleg at io n ma y be in su fficie nt if it does not incl

ude cita t ions to authority. See, e.g. , Dillon v. Evanston Hospital , 19 9 I ll. 2d 483, 493 (2 002 ) ( t hre e- par agr aph a rg ument insufficient t o sa t isfy Ru le 341 w

here arg um en t di d not i nc l ude a ny ci tations to authori

ty). The appe l l ate court has f urthe r hel d that even wh

ere the brief in cl udes b oth ar gument and cit at io n, a p ar t y may no ne t he les s fo r feit reviewif the ci ted author ity

is irrel evan t and doe s n

ot re pr es en t a-14- si nc ereattem

pt to compl

y wi th the rule. See , e.g. , Britt v. Federal Land Bank Ass’nof St. Louis , 153 Ill . App. 3d 605, 608 (1987) (“We do not v i ew the i nc l us i on of cita t ions to irrel

evan t author ity

scattered t h roughout [the p l ai

n ti f f s’ ] brief to co n sti

tute ev en an atte m pt to
co mply with the rul

e”). In the present ca se, with respe ct t o Kinko’s
ar gument on t he negl

ige nce cl ai ms , the court found that

“[t]he ci ted
case law has no bear ing o n t he judg e’s finding o f negligence and does not warrant further

di scu ssi on.” Th us, the court

concluded, Kin

ko’s forfe ited consi

deration of the argum

ent. 391 Ill . App. 3d at 368. Kin ko’s br ief t o t he ap pe ll ate c ou rt co nt ained mo re t han eight pages of argum

ent on the comm

on la wclaim and cit at ions to 17 cases, along with s

tatut es and seconda

ry authori ty. Ki nko’s argued there, as it do es he re , t hat t he Act go ver ns an em pl oyer ’s du t y to t ra in and supervise notary em ploye es, c i

tin g cas es i n w hi ch thi s court an

d others have dis cussed the role

of statutes in n

eglige nce cas es. See, e.g. , First Springfield Bank

& Trust v. Galman , 188 Ill. 2d 2 52 ( 199 9); Bier v. Leanna Lake

side Pro per ty As s’n , 305 Ill . App. 3d 4 5 ( 199 9) . As t he app ell ate cou

rt noted , m

ost of K i nk o’s ci tati ons are not d i rectl y on p oi n t. Inst ead , t he cit ed c ase s ar ise fro m violat ions o f sta t ut es, and they general ly dis cus s the u se

of sta tutory vi ol ati ons asev i de nc e of negl ige nce. See, e.g. , Callow

ay v. Kinkelaar , 168 Ill. 2d 312, 319 (19 95)(“ If

the pl ai nti f f i s a mem be r of the prot ectedcl

as s a nd hi s or her i nj ury is of the type the s

tatut e was i

ntended to pro tect aga inst, t he pla in tif f m ay rec ove r up on e sta

bl i sh i ng tha t the de f en da nt’ s v i ol ati on of the ordi

na nc e or statute prox

i matel y caus ed pl ai ntif f ’si nj ury ”). W i th respect to the negl

ige nt-sup e rvis io n c laimsp ec ific ally, Kin ko’s re lied on Van Horne , a s no t ed a bove . I n Va n Horne , t he pla int iff alleged t hat t he de fendant rad i o sta ti on wa s vic ar io us ly liable and directl

y l ia ble for dam

ages caused wh

en a disc j ockey m

ade de f am ator y sta tem en ts abo ut t he plai

ntif f on ai r. Van Horne , 18 5 I ll. 2d at 303-04. T he pl

ai ntif f al le ged direct liabili

ty again st the sta ti on f or de f am ati on based on i

ts public ation of the def

am ator y s tatements, but t he plaint iff

also alleged dire ct liabil

ity base d o n t he st at ion’s a ct ions
as an em pl oyer. Under the he adi

ng “ Neglige nt and Reckl

ess Hi rin g, Su per vision, an

d R ete n ti on ,” th is court explain

ed that “[c]ount s V through VII I [o f the plain

tiff ’s com pl ai n t] pur port to a l l eg e c l ai m s f or negligent and r eck less hiring a nd negligen t and reckless supe

rvision.” Van Horne , 18 5 I ll. 2d at 30 8- 09

. S pe cif ica lly, t he co ur t not ed t hat t he pla int iff alle ged “that the def

endan ts had a d uty to supervise thei

r disc-15- j ockey s,”along wit h allegat ions o f negligent hiring and re t ent ion. Van Horne , 185 Il

l . 2d at 31 0. In discu ssio n, ho weve r, t his co ur t foc use d so lely on negligent hiringand r et ent ion; t he plaint iff ’s claim of neg ligent su

pe rvi si on was not sep ar at ely discuss ed. No t ing that “Illi nois l aw reco gni

zes a cause of ac t io n a ga inst an emp lo yer fo rne glig en t ly hi rin g, or re tai n i n g i n i ts emp lo yment , an emp lo yee it kn ew , o rsho uld ha ve kn o wn , wa s u nfit f orth e j ob so as to crea

te a dan ge r of harm to third persons ,” the Van Horne court went on to explai

n that li ab ilit y “ in this context” arises
o nly when the em ploy ee has a “particul ar un f i tn es s” th at g i v es ri se to
a “p arti cul ar dan ger of ha rm to thi rd parti es.” (Em phasi s om

i tted.) Van Horne , 185 Ill. 2d at 3 10, 3 13. I t is this language t hat Kinko’s ci ted i n i ts b rief to th e a pp el l ate cou rt. Wh il e the ci ted lan guage m ay be unpe rsu asive o n the i ssu es in t his case , w e disa gr ee w ith t he appe l l ate cou rt’ s c on cl us i on th at Van Horne

ha s “ no b eari ng.” Thus, al th o ug h w e a ck no wle dg e t ha t cit at io n t o co mple t ely irre levant authority m

ay , in some cas es, be so i

nadequate as to run afoul o f Ru le 3 41 ( h) ( 7) , t he ca se at ba ris not such a case. In our view, ci tati o n t o c ase s t hat ar e mere ly unper sua sive o r inap po site , a s t he appe l l ate courtapp ar ent ly f

ou nd K i nk o’s ci ted au thor i ti esto be , i s n

ot t ant amou nt t o fa ili

ng t o c ite r elevant aut hor ity alt og et her . We there f ore fi nd that Ki

nko’s has not forfei

ted rev ie w o f

the com mon law n egli gence clai m, and we wi

ll review i t o n i ts merits. We n ot e that although

Rul e 3 41(

h) (7) appl i es on i ts f ac e on l y to appell ants’ b rief

s b ef oreth e a

pp el l ate cou rt, i t also a pp l i es to appell ees’ briefs t hro ugh R ule 34 1( i) and t o br iefs be f or e this court through Rul e 315 (210 Ill . 2d R. 315). Thus, whil e Rule 318(a) provides that anapp ellee may seek and o bt ain any re lief warr ant ed by t he r ec o r d o n a pp ea l wit ho ut filing a s ep ara te a ppe al or peti ti on f or leave to appeal

(155 Ill . 2d R. 318(a)), Rule 341 nonethel ess requi res that th e a pp el l ee pr ov i de adeq ua te arg um en t an d c i tation to au th ori ty f or any such re l i ef

. In hi s appell

ee’s bri ef to t hi s court , plai ntif f Vancura i

ncl udes a
se cti on entitled “A

dditional Issue Presented for Rev

ie w,” which reads, in to tal, “W hether the Fi

rst District pro perly

vacated the t rial court ’s
ru ling that Kin ko’s im pli edl y c onsented to its empl

oyee’s off ic ia l mi sconductin not ar izing t he f or ged Assi

gnm en t of Mortga

ge.” S imila r ly, plaint iff

’s “Co nclusio n” section i

ncl udes the sen

tence, “The-16- Fi rst Dis trict should n

ot have vacated the trial

court ’s f in din g that Kin ko’s was liab le f

or Alb ear’s off

i cial m i scon duct.”Asi de from these two sentences, howe

ver, plai ntif f makes no ref eren ce to the s tatutory l i ab i l i ty cl ai m a nd dev ot es no portion of his argum en t t o s upp or t ing that clai m . I n c ontra st to the sections of Ki nko’s b rief dis cussed above, pla

in tif f’ s brief co nt ain s no argumen t and no ci

tati on s to
auth ori ty o n t his p o int

. As d isc us se d a bo ve , a c laim o f er r o rt ha t is
mer ely l i ste d b ut not “a r gu ed ” w ill no t sa t isfy t he r eq uir eme nt s o f Ru le 341. See, e.g. , Phillips , 215 Ill . 2d at 565. We fi nd that pla

in tif f h as fai le d to co m pl y wi th our rules, and h

e has theref

ore forfei ted review of th e statu t o r y liabili

t y cou nt . C ons equ ent ly, with r esp ect t o t he statutory clai m , we af f i rm the a ppel l ate court an d reverse the tria

l
cour t’s judgmen

t against Kin

ko’s.

Standard of Revi

ew Plain tiff ’s r ema ining cla im ag ain st Kin ko’s a ll eges t hat Kinko’s

“ n eg l i gen tl y trai n ed an d sup er v i se d a n d f ai l ed to pr ope rl y con trol i ts
e mpl oyee, A l be ar, res ul ti ng i n th e i m prop er n otari za ti on of th e Assignment of M ort gage .” To succ eed i n a clai m f or neg l i gen

ce, a pla int iff mus t establish the ex

is tence of a duty , a br ea ch o f t he du t y, and an i n j ur y to th e p l ai

n ti f f th at w as p ro ximately cau sed by the bre ach. Hills

v. Bri dgeview Little Leagu e Ass ’n , 19 5 I ll. 2d 210, 228 (2000 ). Wh

ether a duty ex

is ts in a particul ar ca se i s a que sti on of la w, whi ch we rev ie w de novo
. Happel v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. , 19 9 I ll. 2d 179, 186 (20 02) ; Forsythe v. Clar k USA, Inc ., 224 Ill . 2d 274, 280 (2007 ). Br ea ch o f dut y an d c au sa ti on are g en eral l y f i n di n gsof f ac t, whi ch we will rej ect onl

y wh en they areag ai ns t the man i f es t we i gh t of t he evi den

ce. Jones v. Chicago &

Northw estern Transpor

tation Co. , 20 6 I ll. App. 3d 1 36, 139 (19 90) ; Corral v. Mervis Industr ies, Inc. , 217 Ill . 2d 144, 151-52 (2005). A f in din g is aga i n st the mani

fest weight of the evi

dence wh en an opposite co n cl

us i on i s a ppa ren t or when t he f

i n di n gsappe ar

to be un reasonabl e, arbi trary, or not based on the evi den ce. Eychaner v. Gross , 202 Il l . 2d 228 , 252 (2 002). Al thoughpla

in tif f f ormulated hi s comm

on la w cl ai m a s a sing le cla im of ne gligent sup er vision and ne glig en t t r ain ing , we no t e t ha t it in f ac t rai se s two disti

n ct t he ori esof

ne gl i ge nc e on the pa rt of Ki nko’s: liabilit y fo rne gli ge n t sup er vision and liabil ity for negligent t ra ining. We e valuat e ea ch in tu rn.-17- Ne gl i ge nt S upe

rvi si on The central que stion we m us t res ol ve i s w he the r, i n l i gh t of general comm on la wprin ci ple s and the statuto ry s chem e establ is hed by the A ct, Ki nko’ s ca n b e l i ab l e f or neg l i gen

t super vision of Al be ar. Kink o’s, as a ppe llant, begins it s ar gument by conc eding t hat t he statutory remedy provided i

n section 7– 10 2 of

th e A ct doesnot preempt a c om mo nlaw ca use of a ct ion fo r ne gligent sup er vision. Instead, Ki

nko’s argues, the A

ct fi xes the m easure of the com

mon l aw du ty ow ed byem

ploy ers of notaries . Thus, accordin g to Ki nko’s, an
em ploy er ca nn ot be l ia ble on the basi

s of a duty found outside

th e A ct. Pla int iff re spo nds t hat altho ugh t he Act establ is hes an d fi xesthe duties of a n otary publi c, th

e s tatute doe s n ot “pre em

pt”a c om

mo n la w cause of action b ased on the em ploy er’s own ne g li

gence. Thus, pla int iff maint ain s, he may a ss er t a c o mmo n la w c laim t ha t is unaf fected by t he statut e. Plai

ntif f rel ie s prim aril y on ge neral assertions of negl ige nceon t he pa rt of Kinko ’s and t he testi mony of Prof ess or Closen , des cri

be d ab ove. Because pla

in tif f as serts a comm

on la w cl ai m, we note that at
com mon la w an em ploy ee’s m al feas ance

may g en er ally

crea te l i ab i l i ty f orhi s or he remp lo yer in

two w ay s: vi ca riousl i ab i l i

ty f or th e actsof t he em ploy ee, or direct li

abi li ty f or t he em ploy er’s own acts. U nder the theory

of v i cari ous l i ab i l i ty, or respondeat super

ior , an em ploy er can be l ia ble for the tort s of an

em pl oyee t ha t ar e c o mmit t ed wit hin the s cope of

the em ploym en t. Wright v. City of Danville , 174 Ill . 2d 3 9 1, 405 (19 96) ; Pyne v. Witmer, 1 29 I ll. 2d 3 51, 359 (1 989 ). The employee’s

li abili ty is im put ed t o t he employer; that i s, wher e t he
em p loy ee is ac t ing w it hin t he s co pe o f t he e mplo yment , t he p laint iff gene r all y need not est ablish any malf eas ance on t he pa rt of t he
em ploy er. See Darner v. Colby , 375 Il l . 558, 56 0 (194 1). In co ntras t, a claim

of direct negli

gence, su ch as the plaintiff ’s cla im in this case, all eges that the employer was it se lf n eg l i gen

t. As in
an y cl ai m f ornegl ige nce, a pl ai ntif f m ust establi

sh the ex is tence o f a du t y, a breach

of the duty, an

d an i nj ury to the plai

ntif f that was proxi matel y caus ed b y the b reach. Hills , 19 5 I ll. 2d at 22 8. In direct negl ige nce, the plaintiff

must pr ove t hat t he employer’s breach –n ot simp ly the em ploy ee’s m al feas ance–w as a pr oximat e ca use of t he plain tiff ’s injury. I n a claim of neg ligent sup er vision su ch as t he o ne pla int iff has pleaded in thi s case, where there is no asse rt io n o f a particular dut y to sup er vise, t he duty upon whi ch pl ai ntif f rel ie s must-18- be based on the ge

neral re latio nship bet wee n employer and em ploy ee. The sc ope

of th at d uty i n th i s c as e, h owev er , i s th e he ar t o f t he dispute between the part ies. In sup po rt of it s ar gument that t he A ct alone f ix es the scope of t he employer’slegal

duty, Kin

ko’s cites several cases i

n wh ic hI llino is
cou rtshave d iscuss ed t he r elat ionship be t wee n st at ut es d esigne d t o prote ct l i f e or propert y a

nd ne gli gence actions. See Noyola v. Board of Education of the City o

f Chi cago , 179 Il

l . 2d 121 , 130 (1 997); Dunn v. Baltimore &

Ohio R.R. Co. , 127 Il

l . 2d 350 , 367 (1 989); Price v. Hickory Point B ank &

Trust , 362 Ill . App. 3d 1211, 1216-17 (2006 ). Ki

nko’s rel ie s pr imarily

on Noyola , c iting tha

t ca se ’s as sertion th at “st at ut es a nd o rd inances d esigne d t o p ro t ect human life o r propert y est abl ish t he st an da r d o f co nd uc t r eq uir ed o f a r ea so na ble per so n. [Citation.] I n other wo rds, they f i x the m eas ure of l egal duty .” Noyola , 17 9 I ll. 2d at 1 30. Accor din g to Ki nko’s, t he imp o sit io n o f a stan dard o f ca r e t ha t is hig he rt ha n t ha t pr es cr ib ed by the sta tute vi ol ates t he pr inciple expr esse d in Noyola and s imi lar ca ses. We dis agree. In Noyola , th

i s c our t co ns i de red

whether s ec ti on 18–8(A)(5)(i)(1)(a) of

th e S ch ool Cod e, wh i ch set f orth the ma nne r in whi ch certain s chool f

unds could be ex

pended, created an i

mpl ie d
cause of ac ti on ag ai n st th e def en da n t sc h ool b oard f or f ai l i n g to
co mply wit h t he statute. Noyola , 179 Il l . 2d at 12 4-28. Th

e court obse rve d tha t in the state courts of

thi s coun try, “j udges h av

e c om e to i den ti f y th e i m pl i ed sta tutor y ac ti on wi th
modern t or t act ions base d on

the l aw of t he r eas ona ble per so n. T he ir v i ew i s th at co nd uc t vio lat ing leg isla t ed rule s is negl ige n t, and if a statut ory vi

olation proxi

ma tely causes an injury of t he kind t he legislat ur e had in mi nd wh en it enacted t he st at ut e, t he o ffending pa r t y is ci vi l l y l i ab l e f or that i nj ury .” Noyola , 179 Ill . 2d at 129. “In Il l i noi s,” the court

noted, “this a

pproach is

refl ectedin those cases hold ingtha

t the vi ol ati on of a s tatute orordinan

ce desi gned to pro tect hum an li fe or pro pert y is prima facie evi dence of negl ige nce.” Noyola , 179 Il l . 2d at 1 29 . Th

us , a l th ou gh Noy ola went on to explai n that “statutes and ordi

na nc es desi gne d to protect hum

an l i f e or p rope rty establi sh the standard of conduct

r eq uir ed o f a r ea so na ble per so n,” t he courtme ant only

what i t asserted in the rem

ai nder of the quoted-19- par agr aph: “Where a de fend an t vi olates one

of the se sta tutes or ord in ances, a plaint iff

who belong s t o t he class intend ed t o be prot ectedb y

th at statu te or ordi na nc e an d wh ose i nj ury is of the type t he statut e or o rdin

ance was in tended to prot ect against may

recover upon es t ab lishin g t ha t t he de fen da nt ’s vio lat io n p r o ximat ely cause d plaint i ff ’s i nj ury .” (Em

phasi s ad ded.) Noyola , 179 Ill . 2d at 130. Kin ko’s re liance o n Noy ola for the i nve rse proposition–that is , that compliancewith a

stat ute pre clu de s a find ing o f ne glig en ce –is mi spl aced. See, e.g. , Indian apoli s & St. Lou is R.R. Co. v. Stables , 62 I ll. 313, 317-18 (18 72) (“Becaus e the statut e has i mposed spe ci fi

ed duties, i t doe s n ot f ol l owthat t he em

ployees of [railroads] are released f rom t he dict at es o f humanity o r t he co mmon legal du t y of re gar ding t he ri ghts of othe rs”); Christou v. A rlington Park- Washington Park Race Tracks Corp. , 104 Ill . App. 3d 257, 261 (1982) (“Compl ia nce wi th sta tute s a n d s af ety reg ul ati ons i s n ot co nclusive e vidence on t he que sti on of negligence” ); Belvi

der e Nat ional Bank & Trus t Co. v

. Leisher , 83 I ll. A pp

. 3d 17 9, 18 6 ( 19 80 ) ( “Alt ho ug h vio lat i on of stat utes, ordinan

ces or codes is co nclusive to show def endan t’s breach of duty (leavi

ng onl y the question of

proxim ate cause), complia

nce wi th co des a nd sa fet y reg ulat ions is no t co nclusive e vidence on t he question of n egl i gen ce” ). Cle ar ly , then, the m

ere exi stence of a statut e establ is hi ng legal duti esf or em pl oyers of nota ri esdoe s n

ot f orec l ose the pos si bi l i ty of
a com mon la w negl ige nce action based

on a n e xtr a-s tatutor y duty of
care. However, the legi

sl ature may

in tentional ly foreclose or li

mi t such
an ac ti on th rough th e statu te b y al ter i n g th e c om mon l aw . “ A sta tute will be construed as c hanging t he co mmon law o nly to t he ext ent t he t er ms thereof war

ran t, o ras ne ce ss ar ily implie d fr o m wh at is
ex pres sed .” Cedar Park

Cemetery Ass’n v. Cooper , 408 Ill . 79, 82 (1951 ). To de te rmine whet her t he legislat ur e has mod ifi ed t he
com m on la w li abi li ty of em ploy ers of notaries , we fi

rst exam in e th e statut e. Section 7–102 establ

is hesa c au se

of ac ti on agai nst the em

ploy er of a notary f or an e m ploye e’s off i cial m i scon duct wh ere: ( 1 ) th e notary publ ic was ac t ing wit hin t he sc o pe o f his em ploy me nt, and (2) t he em ploy er consented to t he n

ot ary’ s o ffi

cial miscond uct . T he
se cti on i s ti tl ed “ Li ab i l i ty of Empl oyer of Notary.” 5 ILCS 312/7–102 (West 1996). Wi

th respect to the second prong of the statute, t he appe l l ate cou rt con cl ude d that f

or an em pl oyer to b e f

oun d to h ave-20- “consen ted” to a notary’s of

fi ci al mi sconduct, there must be a sho wing that the employer had so me knowledge o f the not ary’s mi sconduct. We agree. Wh erethe la nguage of a

statut e i s clear, it m

ust be gi ven it s p lain and ordi na ry m ean i ng. King v. First Capital

Financial Services C

orp. , 215 Ill . 2d 1, 26 (2005). Here, the statut e provides that an em

ploy er ma y be fo und liable fo r t he ac ts of a notary onl y w here “ the em ploy er c onsented to the notary publ

ic ’s off ic ia l m is conduct.” 5 ILC S 312 /7 –10 2( b) (West 1996). The statut e does not define “consen t,” but Black’s Law Dictionary defi nes the term

in rel ev ant part as “[a]gree m en

t, ap prova

l , or perm

i ssi on as to some act or purp ose.” Black’s Law Dictionary

323 (8th ed. 2009). Whatev er the proof req ui red to es tab l i sh

“ consent”

on the pa rt of an em ploy er, it is cl ear that an em pl oyer c an not “[a ]gree [ ], appr

ov[e], or [g ra nt ] p er mission” f or an a ct or purpose

of w hi ch the em ploye r ha s n o knowl edge

. The le gis la

ture t heref

ore intended

for t he em

pl oy er of a n otar y to be li able where the employer has s ome m i ni m um threshol d of knowle dge of the notary pub l i c’s cond uct. T h is represents a cl

ear co nfli ct wi

th com mon l aw cl ai m s of ei ther respondeat superior or direct ne glig en ce

. A c o mmo n la w vi car io us liabilit y cla im t ypic ally requires no proo f of

the em ploy er’s kn o wl edge , con

sent, or cu lp ab ilit y. See Al

ms v . Baum , 3 43 I ll. App. 3d 6 7, 74 ( 200 3) (An
ac ti on f or respondeat

superior , “i s brought agai nst a m asterbase d on alle ge dly ne gl i ge nt a ctsof t he se rva nt [, ] a nd no ind ep en de nt wr o ng is charged o n be ha lf o f t he mas t er ”)

. S imila r ly, i n a d i re ct l i ab i l i ty cla im, t he pla int iff

may all ege t hat t he emp lo yer mer ely should have known of the employee’s malf

eas ance. W

e pres um e tha t the l egi slaturewas fam il ia rwith the c omm

on la wrequirem

ents. See People v. Hickman , 163 Ill . 2d 250, 262 (1994) (“it mus t be presum

ed that the l egi slature actedwi th kn o wle dg e o f t he pr ev ailing ca se law ”)

. We t he r efo r e h o ld that se cti on 7 –10 2 w asi

nte nd ed to modif y com mon l aw l i ab i l i ty f or em ploye rs of notar y publ

ics. Plai ntif fs who rais e a comm

on la wcla im agains t t he emp lo yer o f a n o t ar y pu blic mus t show, at a mi

ni mum , that t he em ploye r ha d som e kn owl edge of the notary

public’s m

i sc on du ct. In o t he rwo r ds , t he minimu m du t y of an em ploy er of notaries at
com m onl aw ex ten dsonl y asf ar a s th e d uty es tab l i sh ed by se cti on 7–102 of the A ct; the em ploye r ha s a du t y t o no t co nsent t o t he offi cial misconduct of its em

ployees. Our co nclusio n t od ay is co nsist ent wit h t he Act as a who le. T he-21- I llino is No t ar y Public Act was enac t ed “t o s impli fy, clarify, and moderni ze the la wgoverni ng notaries

publ ic ” and to “promote, serve, and pro tect the publi

c in terest .” 5 ILCS 31 2/1–102( b)(1) (West 1996)

. T he o ffice o f no t ar y pu blic , h owev er , e xten dswe l l i n to
com mon law h istory. Black’s Law Di

ctionary (9th ed. 20 09), citing J. Pro f f att, The Of

fi ce and Duti es of Notaries Pub li c § 1, at 1 (2d ed. 1892) ( “A no t ar y pu blic is an o ffi cer l ong kn own to the

ci vi l l aw”)

. Under t he Ac t an d c o mmo n la w, t he no t ar y pu blic “ se rve s a s a pu blic witnessof f

acts transactedby

pri va te parties.”

Black’ s La

w Di cti onary ( 9t h e d. 20 09 ) , qu o t ing S. Lit vino ff, 5 L o uis ian a C ivil Law Treatise: The Law of Ob li

gations 296-97 (2ded

. 20 01 )

. T hu s, t he no t ar y pu blic giv es his or her personal s eal

and si gnature when

compl eting a notarial
ac t, an d in so do ing he o rshe as su mes pe r so na l li abi lity for t he accuracy of his or her

not ar izat ion. 5 ILCS 312/3 –101, 3– 102 (West 1996) (se t t ing for t h t he requ irements for t he not ary’s official seal and si gna ture); 5 I LC S 3 12 /6–1 05 (West 1 996 ) ( set t ing for t h t he
re qui re men ts for certif

ic ates of notarial acts); 5 ILCS 312/7–101 (West 1996)(“A

notary pub l i c an d the surety on the n otary ’sbon

d are liable to t he pe rso ns in

volv ed for all damages caused by the not ary’s off ic ia l m i scon duct”). I n this way , the Act codif

ie s a l ong trad i ti on of imposing bur dens and liabilities o n a n otar y pu b l i c th at a repers on al

to the notary, rather than sh

ared wi th h i s or h er em

ploye r. Thus, under t he Ac t , wh en a n o t ar y pu blic wr ong fully or negligent ly exercise s t he powers of t he o ffi

ce, it is t he notary al

one who becom

es l ia ble. Under
se cti on 7–102, the empl

oyer is li able o nly i f the em ploy er “consen

ted to” the mi

sconduct of the notary; that is, if the em ploy er comm itted
so me malfeasance of it s o wn. Applying t hes e ho lding s t o t he p re se nt ca se , p laint iff d oesnot argue th at Kinko ’s

ha d a ny kn owl edgeof A l be ar’ s m i sc ond uc t, n or did the evi

dence at trial r ev ea l an y su ch kn o wle dg e. On t he co nt r ar y, t he evi dence establi

shed that Ki nko’s n ever recei ved an y com pl ai n ts about Albe ar ’s co nd uc t as a n o t ar y. P lain t iff ha s c laim ed o nly a general ne glig ence in f

ail ing to d iscover defect s in A lbear’s performa nce. Even i f we assum

e that su ch al

legations establ

ish a cause of ac ti on f or neg l i ge nt s

upe rvi si on of an em pl oyeege ne ral l y , se cti on 7–102 makes clear t he legislat ur e’s int ent to require som e knowl edge
on the p art of th

e em ploye r as a pre re qu isit e t o imp o sin g l iab ilit y. Theref ore, t he jud gme nt o f t he cir cu it courtim posing l iab il ity agai nst Ki nko’ s f or neg l i gen

t super vision m ust b e rev erse d.-22- Neg ligent Tr aining Pla int iff a ls o al l eg estha t Ki nk o’s wa s n eg l i ge nt i n i ts tra i ni ng of Al be ar. Ini tia l l y , we n ote that pl

ai ntif f ha s n ot arg u ed t hat Kinko’s breach ed a general iz ed duty to pro vi

de traini ng. Instead, pla int iff

has alle ged th at Kink o ’s wa s ne glig en t be ca us e t he t r ain ing Kink o ’s did provide was i nsuf fi ci ent or defectiv

e i n sev eral enum erate d ways. In ot her words, although plai

ntif f ackn owledges that Kin ko’s provided traini ng, it argues that Ki

nko’s di d so negl ige ntly. Ki nko’s responds that i ts l i ab i l i ty f ort r ain ing sho uld be limit ed in l i ght of the v olu ntary unde rt aking do ct rine, re lyi ng o n Frye v. Medicare-Glaser Corp. , 153 Il l . 2d 26 ( 1992)

. In Frye , t hi s court addressed t he question of whether a pharmaci st who was under n

o dut y to att ach warn

in g stickers to dispe

nsed
me dic a ti on

coul d b e l

i ab l e f or neg l i ge nc e w

he n s he un de rtook t o attach sti ckers

. Frye , 1 53 I ll. 2d a t 28- 29. The plaint iff alleged t hat t he pharmacist was negligent beca use she attached a sticker in dic ating tha

t t he med ica t io n ma y ca us e d r o ws ine ss , bu t she did not at t ach a sticker indicat ing th at t he med ica t io n sh o uld no t be t ak en wit h a lco ho l, al thoughshe kn ew t ha t dr ink ing alc o ho l wit h t he me dic ation was dangerous. Frye , 153 Il

l . 2d at 29 . This court

noted t hat , a ltho ugh t he pharmacist was in

itial ly under no dut y to warn pat ien ts, “[ p] ur sua nt to t he vol unta ry und ertaki ng th eory o f liab ilit y, o ne wh o gr at uit o us ly
orf or con si de rati on renders serv

ic es to anot her i s subj ect to li ab i l i ty f orbod ily har m caus ed t o t he ot her by one’s f ai lure to exerci se due
care or‘ “s uch com petence and s

kil l a s [one] possesses.” ’ ” Frye , 153 I ll. 2d at 32, quo ting Cross v. Wells Fargo Alarm Services , 82 Ill . 2d 313, 317 (1 980); Nelson v. Union Wire Rope Cor p. , 31 I ll. 2d 69, 86 (1964)

. T he co ur t als o ap plie d sec t ion 3 23 o f the Rest at ement (Seco nd) of Tor ts, which provides:

“§323. Ne gl

i ge nt P erf orm an ceof Un derta ki n g to Render Services One wh o un de rtak es , gratui tous l y orf orcon si dera ti on , to render servi ces to anot her whi

ch h e should reco gnize as ne ces sary f orthe prote cti on of t he o t he r ’s pe r so n o rt hing s, is subj ect to li ab i l i

ty to the othe r f or ph y si cal ha rm res ul ti ng f rom his f ail ure t o e xe r cis e r ea so na ble ca r e t o pe r fo rm his
un de r t ak ing , if (a) his failure t o e xer cise su ch c a re i nc rea se s th e ri sk of6 Sect ion 32 4A o f t he Rest at emen t, which this cou rt ap plied in Pippin v. Chicago Housin

g Autho rity , 78 Ill. 2 d 204 , 21 0-1 1 (19 79) , does pr ovide for limit ed li abili ty to thi rd pe rs on s based o

n the neglige nt perfo rmance of a service or un de rtakin g. Ho we ve r, lik e se ctio n 323, se ct ion 3 24 A pr ovides li ability on ly w he re th e pro vi sio

n o f se rvice s re sul

ts i n “physic al h

arm ,” and Kin ko ’s has n

ot claim ed that se ctio

n 324A applies. -23- such ha rm, or (b) the harm is suff

ered beca use o f the ot her’s re li ance upon the undertakin

g.” Restatement (Second) of Tort s §323 (1965 ). Kin ko’s arg ue s th at, b ec au se

i t wa s u nd er n o duty to t ra i n i ts notar y publ

ic em ployees, t he t r ain ing pr o gr am it pr ovid ed s hou ld be subj ect to the pro vi si onsof Frye an d s ec ti on 3 23. W e di sa

gre e f or several re as on s. Fi

rs t, b oth the Restatemen

t and Frye co nt emplat e t he l i ab i l i ty of a s erv i ceprov i de r f or th e p rovi si

on of serv i ces . In our view, t he traini ng of an em ploy ee cann ot reas ona bly beviewed as t he employer’s“render[ing] servi ces” to an em pl oyee . Mor

eover, se cti

on 323 and our precedents expl ic i t ly limit t he mse lve s t o sit ua t io ns in wh ic h the p l ai ntif f ha s suf f ered “ phy sical ” or “bodi l

y ” harm . In

th e pr ese nt case, plai

ntif f h as suf fered onl y e conomi

c dam ag es

. Fin ally,
se cti on 323 provides

fo rliabilit y o f t he se rvic e p r o vid er in favo r o f the pe rs on to whom the s ervi ces

were negl ige ntly rendered. Here, even

if
we co uld view Kinko ’s t ra ining as prov i di ng a s erv i ce“ gra tui tous l y or f orco nsid er at io n, ” t hat se rv ice wa s c lea rly no t pr o vide d t o pla int iff. 6 We t her efo re re

ject Ki nko ’s ar gument t hat plaint iff ’s neg ligent t ra ining cla im is c o nt r o lled by Frye or s ec ti on

32 3 of th e R estate men t. Instead, whether an

d to what extent Ki nko’s had a

du ty to tra i n i ts notary employee s is best ana ly

ze d u nd er pr inc iple s g en er ally a pp lica ble to n eg l i gen ce

ca se s. A s w e h

av e state d, w

h eth er a d uty exi st s in a particular ca se i s a que sti on of la w, which we review de novo

. Happel v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. , 199 Ill . 2d 179, 186 (2 002 ), quo t ing Ward
v. K mart Corp. , 136 Ill . 2d 132, 140 (19 90) ; For syth e v. C lark USA, Inc ., 22 4 I ll. 2d 2 74, 280 (2 007 ). “The t ou chst one of t he du t y ana lysis is to ask whether the pl ai ntif f an d defen dant st oo d in suc h a
re l ati on sh i p to one ano t her t hat t he la w im poses on the defe

ndan t an obl i ga ti on of r eas ona ble co nd

uc t for th e b enef

i t of the plai ntif f .” Kryw in v. Chicago Transit Authority , No. 108888, slip op. at 8 ( Ju ly-24- 15, 20 10 )

. T he inq uir y invo lve s fo ur fac t o r s: ( 1) t he r ea so na ble f ore se ea b i l i ty of th e i nj ury ; (2 ) t he likelihoo d o f the injury; (3) t he
ma gni tude of th e bur den o f gua rd ing aga inst t he injury; and (4 ) t he
con sequence s of p l aci

ng th e burden on the def endan t. Marsh all v

. Burger King Corp ., 222 Il l . 2d 422 , 436-3 7 (200 6). I nit iall y, we note that t he A ct im poses no duty on the em

ploy er of
a no t ar y p ubl ic , except to refrain from consenting to the no tar y’s
m i sc on du ct, as di scussed a bov e. C o nsis t en t wit h t he Ac t ’s o ve r all emp ha sis on

th e p er son

al re sp on si b i l i ty of the no tar y, the not ary’s
em ploy er is not char ged wit h pr ovid ing t ra ining, su pplies, or any

ot her assi stanceto the notary. Indeed, the notary is not required to undergo any special traini ng be fore or during h

is or her tenure a s a no t ar y. Moreov er, plai

ntif f h as n ot a sked

usto i m pos e a ge ne ral duty on em ploye rs t o t r ain no t ar y e m

pl oy ees; as

noted above, pla

in tif f h as alle ged that Kin ko’s t raini ng was negligent, no t t hat Kinko’s breach ed a g en eral du ty to train . We

there f ore express n

o opinion on whether
a ge ne ral duty to trai n e xi sts , an d w e m ov e instead t o d efining the scope of the em

ploy er’s duty once

traini ng has been

provided. Pla int iff urges us to ado pt a duty

would requ

i re emp lo yer s t o t r ain
n otary em

ploy ees i n the b est practices of n ot aries general ly , as expresse d in Clo se n’s t es t imo ny. Clo se n ba se d h is t es t im ony alm ost
en t ire ly on the Model Notary A

cts of 1984 and 2002, opi ning t ha t Kin ko’s wa s ne glig ent fo r fai li ng to t each A

lb ear about several practicesre qui

re d u n der the M ode l

A cts b ut n ot mentio ned in t he I llino is No t ar y Pu blic Act, including maint aining a log boo k and de st ro ying

the nota ry se al when he res i gned hi s c om m i ss i on

. Howev er, the l egi slature of

Il linois has n ever adopted the Model Nota ry Act . T hou gh it co uld have do ne so when it co nsider ed a nd revi sedthe A ct in bot h 198 6 and 200 8, it d id no t enac t any of t he pr ovisio ns of t he Mo del Act s into law. The st at ed p ur po se o f the Act in cl udes “to sim

pli fy , clari fy , and m odernize the la w g o ve r nin g notariespublic, ” and t he legislat ur e may well have de cline d s o me of t he more stringent r equirements, incl uding tho se in Cl

osen’s t es t imo ny, in the in

ter ests o f si

mpl ici ty and clarity. 5 ILCS 312 /1 –10 2( b) (W es t 1996). We note als o t hat the Act’s reduced
re qui re men ts makes i t ea si er to ob tai n a n otar iza ti on , th us a llowing more of the publi

c access to notar y servi

ces. If we were to impose a du ty on e mployer s who pr ovid e t ra ining th at req ui re d suc h trai n i n g to teach propo sed and m

odel standards rather

than the standards

selected-25- by our legi sl ature and express ed i n the Act, we wo uld be und er mini ng the l eg i sl atu re’ s c are f ul de term i na ti on of what s hou

l d b e re qui

red of
a n otary. Th i s w e w i l l not d o. Instead, we ho ld t hat whe re a n em pl oy er pr ov i de s trai

n i ng to notary publi c empl oyees, it ha s a d ut y to ensu re t hat its t ra ining
co nfo rms to the pro vi si ons ad op t ed by t he I lli nois leg islatu re in the A ct. This ho lding is co nsist ent wit h t he fo ur fact or s we hav e enum erated: (1) t he reaso na ble for ese eability of t he injury; (2 ) t he l i ke l i hood of the i njury; ( 3) th

e m ag ni tude of t he bur den o f gua rd ing agains t t he inju ry; an

d (4 ) th e c ons eq

ue nc esof pl ac i ng the bu rde n on th e de f en da nt. Fi rs t, wh ere an em pl oyer trai ns nota ri esaspa rt of a program to o ffer t ha t no t ar y’s se rvic es t o it s c us t o mer s, it is hig hly fo r es ee ab le t ha t er r o r s in t he t r ain ing pr o gr am c o uld lea d t o inju r ie s such as those that occurr ed i

n thi s cas e. W i th re spe ct t o t he se co nd f actor, wh er e t he t r ain ing is i nc orre ct or m

i sl eadi ng , th e l i ke l i hood of
a r es ult an t inju ry is a lso r ela t ive ly high

. No t ar y pu blics ar e r o ut ine ly asked to wi tn es s i n str um en ts of great legal

and f in anci al signifi cance, including loan d oc ument s, mo rt gag es, and pro pert y transactions. The pot entia l f or fra ud i n s uch tra nsac t ions is g re at , a nd pa rt ies t o t he t ra nsac t ions r ely o n t he pr op er per for mance o f the not ar y. If t he
em ploy er pr o vid es inc o rr ec t o rina de qu at e in struct ion, the potential f or i n j ur y i s pre se n t. Furtherm ore, where the emp l oy

er h as al re ad y un derta ken to provide t r ain ing, t he bur den impo sed on t he emplo yer by re quir ing that the traini

ng com ply with the A

ct is m in im al . The Act

sh ou ld be t he starti ng p oin t of an y trai ni ng program

f or notary pu blics in Ill in ois, and we ex pect that any

em ploy er who seeks to train Il

li nois notaries
wo uld at t empt t o c onfo rm t he t ra ining to t he Act . T he last fact or , t he consequenc es of plac in

g t his b ur de n o n e mplo yer s o f no t ar ies , is simila r ly not a co ncer n. A l

th oug h som e em pl oy er s m ay de ci de n ot to provide t rai ni ng programs to their n

ot ary em ploy ees, notary pub li

cs are n ot requi red to undergo an

y trai ni ng u nde r the A ct. Having de term

i ne d that on

ceK i nk o’s un de rtook traini ng, i t had a du ty t o t r ain it s e mplo yee s c o nsis t en t ly wit h t he Act , w e next ev

al ua te plain tiff ’s claim that Kinko’ s br ea ched its duty. Breach of duty is a finding o f f ac t , w hich we w ill

re ject only when it is aga inst t he
man if est wei ght of the evi den ce. Corr al v. Mervi s Industries, Inc. , 217 I ll . 2d 144, 151-52 ( 2005). A f in din g is agai nst the mani

fest weight of the evi

dence wh en an opposite conclus ion i

s appar e nt or7 T he cou rt al so f oun d th at Kink o’s mana ger s were not tr ained “in t he
res pon sib ilit ies of nota ries. ” Although this is fr amed in terms of t ra ining, plaintif f’s argu men t was tha t the la ck of mana geria l tr aining wa s a fac tor in the ne gl ig ent sup erv is io

n o f A lb e ar. We

th ere fore need no t co ns id er th at find ing her e. -26- wh en t he find ing s a pp ea rt o be un r ea so na ble , ar bit r ar y, or not based on the evi den ce. Eychaner v. Gross , 202 Il l . 2d 228 , 252 (2 002). The tria l court f ound th at “K i nko’ s f ail ed to meet the

ne ces sary stan dard o f care.” Ho wever, i

t did not directl

y e xpl ai n the f actual fi ndi ngsth at l ed i t to thi s c on cl

us i on . Inste ad , the c ourt reviewed several por tions o f Professo r Closen’s t est imony, no t ing t hat t he t est imony was “n ot im peached” a

nd that Ki

nko’s off ered no e xpe rt witnessof i ts ow n. The court specif

ie d several

way s i n wh ic h Cl osen opine d that K i nko’ s f ail ed to meet the

stan dard of ca re: the i ns tructor of t he no t ar y t r ain ing pr o gr am, Ya m ni tz, “ wa s n ot a n o t ar y at t he t ime he trained A

lb ear and h

ad nev er been a notary”; Yam

ni tz did not teach Al bear “tha t informat ion r ega rd ing no t ar izat ions was t o be kep t in a journal ”; Ya m n i tzdid n ot teach notaries about “steps to take to se cure t he n otar y se als a n d j our n al ”; Ya m n i tz d i d n ot i nstruct Kin

ko’s notaries“on the n

eed to preserve the notary seal and l ogb o ok ”; and Ya m ni tz d i d n ot p rope

rl y trai n A l be ar a bou t the proc ed ure s f or “i den tif y i ng d ocum en t signe rs.” 7 Fi rs t, Kinko’ s wa s no t unde r a dut y to pr ovid e no t ar y tr aining cl asses taught excl

usi vel y b y n ot aries . As we h

ave stated, all

that was required of Ki nko’s tr ain

in g pro gram was that it t each notaries i n a ma nne rconsi stent with the A

ct. The credentials of the tra i ner are there f ore i rre l evan t, so l on g as he o rshe t ea ch es t he cla ss in conf ormi ty w i th thi s duty

. W i th re spe ct t o t he j our

n al, w e n ote th at b oth A l b ea r a n d Y am n i tz testifi ed that Alb ear was taught to ma in tain a journal

o f his notar izations, and Profess or Closen r efe rr ed t o t he ir

t est imony on t he
ma tt er when he opi ned that the j ournal

A l b ea r k ep t wa s i

n suf f i ci en t. Th us , the c our

t’s f i n di n g th at K i n ko’ s b re ach ed i ts d uty by fail ing to te ach A l be ar to k ee p a j ourn al i s a gai ns t the man i f es t we i gh t of th e evi dence

. Eve n i f

i t were n ot, however, the

Act di d not req

ui re notariest o main t ain a jo ur na l o rlo gb o o k o f a ny k ind in 1 995. Theref ore Kin ko’s was under n

o dut y to train A

lb ear to keep o ne.-27- S imila r ly, Ki

nko’s was un

der no duty to t rain

its n ot ary em ploy ees to secure or pres e rve t he log boo k. With r esp ect t o t he se cur ity and pre serv ati on of the se al , th e A

ct c onta i ns no r eq ui rem en ts a bou t ei ther. Alt ho ug h se ct io n 7 –1 07 o f t he Ac t mak es it a m i sdem ea n or to
un law fully

po sses s a no t ar y’s seal, t he Act makes no c omm and, sp ec ific or general, ab out the n eed to sec ure t he seal . The Act also
co nt ains no r eq uir eme n t th at t he se al o f a n o t ar y wh o r es ign s his
com m i ss i on be preserv

ed or destro ye d, as Closen suggested was required. Fin ally, the trial

court al so found that Ki

nko’s b reach ed its du

ty because Yamnitz did no t pr op er ly tra in Albear abo ut “ident ify ing do cu me nt si

gn er s. ” A l th oug h Pro f es sor Cl ose n f oun d s ev eral f aul ts wi th Al bear’s identif

ication process, t he court repeat ed just one such defi ci ency in its s u m mary of Cl osen’ s te sti

mony : “ A l be ar d i d n ot requi re ph oto iden tif i cation f rom a docum en t signe r.” Wh erethe l an gua geof a statu te is c lea r , it mus t be giv en it s p lain and ordi na ry m ean i ng. King v. First Capital

Financial Services C

orp. , 21 5 I l l . 2d

1, 2 6 ( 20 05 ). In

addi ti on , the statu

te “sho uld be read as a wh o le wi th al l re l ev an t pa rtsconsidered.” Kraft, Inc. v. E dgar , 13 8 I ll. 2d 178 , 1 89 ( 199 0) . As w e have al ready di scussed, t he no t ar y pu blic giv es his or her personal s eal

and si gnature when

compl eting a notarial
ac t, an d in so do in g h e o r she assu mes pe rso nal liabil ity for t he accuracy of his or her notarization. 5 ILCS 312/3–101, 3–102 (West 1996) (se t t ing

fort h the req uirements for t he not ary’s official seal and si gna ture); 5 I LC S 3 12 /6–1 05 (West 19 96 ) (s etti n g f orth th e re qui re men ts for certif

ic ates of notarial

acts); 5 ILCS 312/ 7–10 1 (West 1996)(“A

notary pub l i c an d the surety on the n otary ’sbon

d are li abl e to t he persons i

nvol ved f or all dam ages caused

by the nota ry’s off i cial m i scon duct”). It is in this co nt ext t hat t he Act pr ovid es t hat a no t ar y m ust determi ne, “ ei the r f rom personal knowle dge or sati sf

actory evi den ce,” that t he person seeki

ng notarization is

the person whose true si

gna ture is on the do cum

ent. “Satisf

actory evi dence” i s general ly defi ned as “[e]vi dence that

is sufficient t o s at isfy an unpr ejudice d mind see king t he t rut h. ” B lac k’ s L aw Dic t io na ry 6 3 9 (9th ed. 2009). Thus, under t he A ct a nota ry publ i c, w

hos e inhe rent fun

ction i s to serve as an unprej udic ed witness , must sa tisfy him self of the t rut h of a signer’s ide ntity . The specifi

c m ann er in which the no t ar y sho uld do so is left to the n otary , but a s n

oted ab ove, the Act establ i shes that a notary-28- who does so in a

negl ige nt or reckless m

ann er has com mi tt ed “off ic ia l
m i sc on du ct”

and i s li

able for any dam

ages so caused. 5 ILCS 312/7 –101 (We st 1996 ). Cl osen ci ted th e M ode l

Nota ry A ct of 19 84 as estab l i sh i n g th at a photo graph

wa s req ui re d, a n d th e a pp el l ate cou rt ac ce pt ed t his
asse rt ion, noting that Illi

nois court s hav

e occasi onally

turned to such persua si v e a uth ori ty to de fine a s t at ut o ry t er m. See Lohr v. Havens , 377 Il l

. App. 3d 2 33 ( 200 7); Hasem ann v. Wh ite , 177 Ill . 2d 414 (1997 ). Thu s, t he ap pellat e co ur t indicat ed t hat re ading in t he
re qui re men ts of th e M ode l

Nota ry A ct w as appr opri ate

t o he lp define “sa t isfa ct ory

evi dence.” In our vi

ew, however, adopting the Model Notary Act’s approa ch in this manne r w ou ld no t merely define “s ati sf actory evi dence,” a term

that is cl ear as it i s used

in the Act, but
wo uld in stead suppl

y a dditional requirem ents not in

dic ate d by t he stat ut e’s pl

ai n l an gu ag e. W h ere th e A ct d i d n ot s pe cif y t ha t o nly ph o t o gr ap hic i de nti

f i ca ti on c oul d pr ovi de“ sa ti sf ac tory ev i de nc e”of i den tity , we de cl i ne to read i n s uch a requ i rem en t. We th eref oref i n d th at u n der the 1 99 1 I l l i

n oi s N otar

y Pu b l i c A ct, Al bear was n ot re qui

re d to obt ain pho t og ra phic ident ifi cat ion t o ha ve “s ati sf actory evi den ce” of a pers on’ s identity, and t he tr ial cou rt ’s reli ance on Closen’s test imo ny t o the cont rary was i ncorrect as a ma tt er of law . Instead , th e A

ct re qui red A l be ar to s ati sf

y hi m se l f of t he signer’s i

dentity in a nonn eglige nt man ner, ei ther by personal knowle dge or on t he ba si s of “i den tif i cation docu

men ts.” A s a re su l t, K inko’s was n ot un

der a du ty to tea ch i ts n otar y em pl oy ee s th at a ph oto i den ti f i ca ti on wa s req ui re d; i ts d uty was si mpl y to teach notaries that t he y co uld us e id en t if ic at i on docu

men ts to ful f i l l thei r statutory obl i ga ti on to r ec eiv e “ sa t isfa ct o ry ev id en ce ” o f id en t it y. The evi dence cl ea rl y es tab li sh estha t the y di d s o. Ya m ni tz t est ifi ed t hat he inst ruc t ed his nota ry stude nts to l ook f or a photo, say

in g:

“ Ty pi ca l l y wh at I told m y stu den ts o r m y pa rti ci pa n ts was to ask f or a sta te ID, dri ve r’ s l i cens e, or som e ty peof ID that had
a picture, a desc ri

ption, and the si

gnature on it so that they
co uld use a picture t o verify , use a description to more or less
ver ify he i ght a nd weight, a

nd th en be ab l e to com

pare t he si gna ture.” Al thoughAlbea r t es t ifi ed that he wa s ta ugh t a p hotog

rap h wasnot-29- required, he no net heless c or ro bor at ed Y amnitz’ s claim tha t h e was taught t o ask for iden

tif ic ation. He testif

ie d, “ I as k f orident ifi cat ion. The maj ori

ty of the tim

es I ask people

for a driv er’s l ic ense. If at that t im e th ere w ere d

ri v er ’s l i cen se s wi

th ph otos on i t, that is w

h at I recei ved. If n ot , then I recei

ved ot he r identifi

cat ion.” Albear’s t es t im ony was corr

obor ate d by Boa twri gh t, wh o tes ti f i ed tha t on Decem ber 20, 199 5, when he ap proa ched t he co unt er for t he nota ri za ti on of his si gnature, Al

bear asked h

im to show a dr ive r’s li cense. A lbe ar also t est ifi

ed t hat Kinko’ s t ra ined him to make s ur e t he pe rs on whose s i gna

ture he was n

ot arizi ng wast he pe rso n app ear ing be f ore hi m. W hen asked “So y

ou wouldn’t notarize

a sign atur e unl ess that person was phy

si cally in your presen

ce?” A lb ear responded, “That is t he wa y we we re t aug ht .” Mo re ove r, altho ugh he acknowl edged

t hat the Ac t pe rmit t ed him t o pe r so na lly id en t ify a signer orto al low a

person known to hi

m to swear or aff

irm an i den ti f i ca ti on, he tes ti f

i ed tha t he al wa y s a sked f or ide nti f i ca ti on bec ause he felt mor e co mfort able t hat way. He a lso t est ifi ed t hat he
as ked all o f his cu st o mer s t o “s we ar o raf fir m” t ha t t he y were wh o they clai med to be , be caus e tha

t was h i s “ pref eren ce.” Cl osen also expr esse d co ncer ns abo ut one an sw er Albe ar ga ve in whi ch he st at ed t ha t his jo b w as mer ely to “verif y [a] si gnature” based
on the ide ntif ic ation provided, not t o determin e t h at the

pe rs on pr ovid ingthe

i de nti f i ca ti on wasthe

pe rs on w hos e n am e a ppe are d on t he ide ntif ic ation. Af

ter po si ting a h ypothetic al

si tuation in whi ch counsel app ear ed be for e Albear and provided a s oci al se cu ri ty ca rd f or i de nti f i ca ti on , co uns el

asked, “How would y

ou know that I am ac t ua lly Richard Hirsh?” and Albe ar r es po nd ed , “We ll, t ha t is no t my job. My job i s to verif y y our signat ur e bas ed o n what I ha ve in fro nt of me. ” C l ose

n cri ti ci ze d th i s a n sw er , noti

n g th at Al

be ar’ s f ocu s on si gna ture rat he rt ha n id en t ifica t io n w as inapp r o pr iat e. Ho we ve r , in Alb ear’s nex

t answer, he cl

arif ie d his s t at eme nt , sa ying , “We ll, myjo b
was t o r ece iveide nt ificat io n an d ve rify base d o n t he signa t ur e and t he si gna ture on th

e i de nti f i ca ti on t ha t it was the person they said they were.” The evi dence at trial

therefore sup ports Kink o ’s cla im t ha t it ful fi ll ed its d ut y to ensu re t hat its t ra ining pr og ra m complied w ith t he
re qui re men ts o f th e A ct. To the extent that the trial c ourt found that Kin ko’s br ea ch ed it s d ut y, we c onc lude t hat suc h a fi ndi ng i s against-30- t he man i f es t we i gh t of the ev i de nc e. Thu s, th

e tri al cou rt’ s f i nd i ng of li abi li ty agai nst Ki nko’s f or negli gent traini ng i s reversed.

CONCLUSION Based on the foreg oin

g, w e fi

nd that the t rial court ’s de term i na ti on t hat Kinko’ s wa s liable on t he bas is of neg ligent
su pe rvi si on and t ra ining

is agai nst the mani

fest wei ght of the evi

dence. Wi th respect to the statut ory l ia bi li ty cl ai m, we f in d that plai ntif f h as forfe ited re v i ew of th e a pp el l ate cour t’s judgmen

t. Thus, we affir m in part an d reverse in part the judgmen t o f the appell

ate co urt , reverse t he ju dg men t o f t he cir cu it co ur t ag ain st Kink o ’s in it s e nt ir et y an d
re mand to th e c i rc ui t cou rt w i th di re cti on s to en t er jud gme nt in

f av or of Ki nko’s on bot h counts.

Appella te court judg ment af firmed i n part and rev erse d in part; circuit co urt j

udgm ent r

everse d; cause remanded with directions.