F OR P UBLICATION



### UNIT E D ST AT E S CO URT O F APPE AL S FO R T H E NINT H CIRCUIT

D A L E D O W

E R S ; D E B R

A D O W E R S , Plaintiffs-Appellants

,

v

.

N A T I O N S T A R M O R

T G A G E , L L C; W E L L S F A

R G O B A N K , NA; W E L L S F A R G O B A N K M I N N E S O T A , NA, Trustee B anc of America Alternative L o an trust series 2003–2007,

Defendants-Appellees. N o. 15-15178

D.C. No. 2:14-cv-01679- J CM-PAL

OPI NI ON

A ppeal from the United States District Court for the District of Nevada J ames C. Mahan, District J udg e, Presiding

Arg ued and Submitted December 15, 2016 San F rancisco, California

F iled March 31, 2017

B efore: Diarmuid F . O’Scannlain, Ronald M. Gould, and Milan D. Smith, J r., Circuit J udg es.

O pinion by

J udg e GouldD O W E R S V

. N A T I O

N S T A R M O R

T G A G E 2

SUMMARY *

Hom e Loans

The panel affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court’s F ed. R. Civ. P. 1 2(b)(6) dismissal of p laintiffs’ action asserting claims relating to the d e f e ndants’ servicing o f plaintiffs’ home loan.

Affirming i n p art, the panel held that plaintiffs’ F air Debt Collection Practices Act claims under 15 U .S.C. §§ 1 692c(a)(2), 1692d, and 1692e failed because the defen d ants did not eng ag e in “ debt c ollection” and were not acting as “ debt collectors.” Reversing in part, t h e p anel disag reed with the di s t r i ct court’s dismissal with respect to the claim under 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(6), an d h e l d t hat that provision g overned defendants’ alleg ed condu c t because it

ex p ressly applied to the enforcement of securi t y interests such as a d eed of trust. The p anel concluded that the district
court should not have dismissed Count F our on the g r ound that Nationstar Mortg ag e, L L C w as e n ga g ing in conduct related to non-judicial foreclosure.

The panel held that the district court correctly dismissed plainti f f s ’ c l aim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. The panel concluded that p laintiffs’ alleg ations did n ot meet the first element of ex treme a nd outrag eous conduct for such a claim under Nevada law.

* T h is su m m ary co n stitu

tes n o p art o f th e o pin io n o f th e co u rt. It h as b een p rep ared b y

co u rt staf

f f o r th e co n v en i en ce o f

th e read er.D O W E R S V

. N A T I O

N S T A R M O R

T G A G E 3

The p anel held that t h e d istrict court properly dismissed plaintiffs’ claim of a violation o f the Nevada Deceptive Trade Practices Act. The panel ag r eed with the district cour t ’s prediction that the Supreme Court of Nevada would hold that real estate loans did not fall within the Act.

COUNSEL

Mark C. F ields (arg

ued), L aw Offices of Mark C. F ields, L os Ang eles, California, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Ariel Stern (arg

ued) and N atalie L

. W inslow, Akerman L L P, L as Veg a s, Nevada, for Defendants-Appellees.

OP INION

GOUL D, Circuit J udg e :

Plaintiffs Dale and D ebra Dowers filed this action ag ainst Defendants Nationstar Mortg ag e, L L C (“Nationstar”), W ells F arg o B a

nk, N.A. (“W F B ”), and W ells F arg o B a nk M i nnesota, N.A. (“W F B Minnesota”), asserting c laims relating to Defendants’ servicing of Pl a i n t iffs’ home loan. Pla i n t iffs alleg ed violations of the F a ir Debt Collection Practices Act (“F DCPA”), intentional infliction of emotional distress (“I I ED”), and a violation of the Nev a d a Deceptive Trade Practices A ct (“DTPA”). The district court dismissed Plaintiffs’ complaint. W ith respect to the F DCPA claims, the district court f

ound that Plaint i f

f s d id n ot state a claim for relief because Defendants’ alleg ed cond u ct was a non-judicial foreclosure attempt, not debt c ollection

. W e a ffirm the district court e x c ept for its dismissal of Coun t Fo u r , whichD O W E R S V

. N A T I O

N S T A R M O R

T G A G E 4

asserts a violati o n o f 1 5 U.S.C. § 1692f(6). That provision—unlike the other three F DCPA provisions under which Plaintiffs alleg e violations—g overns a “business the principal purpose of wh i c h i s the e nforcement of security interests.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a ( 6 )

. B ecause Plaintiffs a lleg e conduct r elated to the enforcement of a security interest, that claim should not h ave been dismissed o n t h e g round that Defendants were not collecting a debt.

I

A

I n May 2003, P laintiffs refinanced a loan on their L a s Veg as home by ex ec u ting a Note and Deed of Trust with B ank of America, N.A. (“B ank o f A m e r ica”). 1 I n Aug ust 2003, B ank of America assig ned the Note to W F B M innesota. On J anuary 2 8, 2010, ReconTrust Company
, N.A. (“ReconTrust”), acting as B ank of America’s ag ent, recorded a notice of default on Plaintiffs’ loan. The n ex t day

, B ank of America assig ned the Deed of T r u s t to W F B Minnesota, and W F B Minnesota substituted ReconTrust a s the trustee u nder the D eed of T rust. On April 12, 2010, Plaintiffs f

iled a v oluntary petit ion for protection under

1 T h ese f acts are tak en f

ro m th e alleg atio n s in P l a in tif f s’ co m p lain t, th e ex h ib i ts attach ed to th e co m p lain t, an d th e p u

b licly

- re c o r d e d d o cu m en ts Def

en d an ts attach ed to th eir m o tio n to d ism iss. S ee Akh ta r v. Mesa
, 69 8 F.3 d 1 2 0 2
, 1 2 1 2 (9 t h Cir. 2 0 12 ) (“ W h en r e v iew i n g a m o tio n to d ism iss w e co n sid er o n ly alleg atio n s co n tain ed in t h e p lead i n g s,

ex h ib its attach ed to th e co m p lain t, an d m atters p ro p erly su bj ect to j u d icial

n o t i c e.” (in tern al q u o tatio n m ark s o m itted )); Lee v. City o f Lo s An g eles

, 2 5 0 F.3 d 6 6 8
, 6 89 (9 th Cir. 2 0 0 1) (“ [A ] co u rt m ay tak e j u d icial n o tice of

m atters o f

p u b lic reco rd .” (in tern al q u o tatio n m ark s o m itted )).D O W E R S V

. N A T I O

N S T A R M O R

T G A G E 5

Chapter 7 of the B ankruptcy Code, and on J uly 21, 2010, they received a discharg e under 11 U.S.C. § 727.

On September 23, 2013, B ank of America, acting “as attorney in fact” for W F B, substituted MTC F inancial, I n c., doing b usiness as Trustee C orps (“Trustee Corps”), as the
trustee under the Deed of Trust. A week later, Trustee Corps recorded a n otice of default on Plaintiffs’ loan. On November 1 3, 2013, Nationstar sent Plaintiffs a letter stating that B ank of America had assig ned to Nationstar the servicing rig hts to Plaintiffs’ loan.

I n lig ht of t h e notice of default, a Nevada f oreclosure mediator held a mediation between Plaintiffs and the lenders. During the mediation, the lenders could not produce the orig inal loan documents. On F ebrua r y 1 3
, 2014, the mediation office se n t the parties a notice stating that, based

on the mediator’s r ecommendation, it wou ld not issue a Certificate of F oreclosure.

On Marc h 2 5
, 2014, Nationstar sent Plaintiffs a letter stating

, “You are in default under the terms of the conditions of t h e mortg ag e loan for f ailure to pay the r equired installments when due. Nationstar intends to enforce the provision of the Note and related security instrument[ ] .” I t also stated, “I f y o u do n ot p ay the full amount of the default, Nationstar may accelerate the e n t i r e sum of both principal and interest due and pay able, and invoke any remedies provided for in the Note and security instrument, including but not limited to the f

oreclosure sale of the property .” At the end o f March 2014, a N ationstar representative called Plaintif f s a n d was “rude, bully ing

, and abusive.” I n lig ht o f these communications—and h is belief that the outcome of the foreclosure mediation rendered Defendants incapable o fD O W E R S V

. N A T I O

N S T A R M O R

T G A G E 6

foreclosing on Plaintiffs’ home—Mark F ields, Plaintiffs’ attorney , w rote Nationstar a letter on April 2, 201 4

. F ields

a sserted that Nationstar’s threat to foreclose w as unlawful a n d also r equested that all c o mmunications from Nationstar be directed to F ields, rathe r than to Plaintiffs. F ields also demanded that N ationst a r repudiate its threat to foreclose, confirm that the Note owner had possession of the o r i g inal loan doc u ments, and confirm that Nationstar would not initiate any foreclosure proceeding s until it o b t ains a certificate of foreclosure fr om the f oreclosure mediation
prog r am.

B e tween May a n d J une of 2014, Nationstar called Plaintiffs three times and placed w ritten notices on Plaintiffs’ door, stating in bold capital letters: “important,” “please call,” “please be ready to g ive y our a ccount number,” and “we are

ex p ecting y our c all today

. ” On J une 1 8
, 2014, Nationstar
sent a loan statement d irectly to Plaint i f f s. F ields sent Nationstar and Trustee Corps an email on J une 25, 2014, reasserting his previous d emands and ad d i n g a d e mand that Trustee Corps rescind the notice of default it h ad recorded on J anuary 29, 2010. Nationstar sen t a l e t ter to F ields stating that it intended to respond b y J u l y 23. On J uly 15, F ields emailed Nationstar and T r ustee Corps objecting to the delay ed response a n d a g ain demanding that the n otice o f default be r escinded. Trustee Corps rescinded the notice o f default on J uly

16.

On J uly 21, 2 014, a Nationstar representative sent F ields

a letter asserting that Nationstar did not receive n otice o f F ields’s representation of Plai n t i f f s until J uly 3, 2013, a

nd that the owner o f the Note w as W F B Minn esota. W ith respect to F ields’s demand that Natio n star confirm W F BD O W E R S V

. N A T I O

N S T A R M O R

T G A G E 7

Minnesota’s possession of the loan docume nts, the letter stated:

[ T ] h e re are some circumstances where the

owner has g iven temporary p ossession o f th e loan note to the servicer. The o wner does this i n o rder to ensure that the servicer is able t o perform the services a

n d duties incident to the servicing of the mo rtg ag e loan, such a s foreclosure a ctions, bankruptcy c a ses, a nd other leg al proceeding s.

Nationstar sent a letter directly to Plaintiffs on Aug ust 26, stating that P laintiffs’ h ome may be r eferred to f oreclosure within f ourteen day s. On Aug ust 2 7
, a Nationstar representative sent F ields a letter r efusing to answer whether it “ or the lender” could provide the d o c u m e nts F ields h ad requested because such information “does not pertain directly
to the servicing of the loan, d oes not ide ntify any current

s ervicing errors, and/or is considered p roprietary a nd confidential.” F ie lds responded with two emails to a Nationstar representative on Aug ust 27, accusing Nationstar of falsely claiming to possess the N o t e and demanding that Nationstar prove that it or WF B Minnesota had possession o f the N ote. Two d a y s l ater, F ields sent further emails to the

same Nationstar representative a s w e ll as Nationstar’s CEO and COO, r epeating his prior demands. Nationstar responded
to F ields on September 4, but did not respond to the demands.

As a result of these events, Plaintiffs alleg ed t h a t t h e y moved out of L as V eg as, have ex p e r ienced severe emotional distress, and that Ms. Dowers “cries herself to sleep from the abuse, stress, uncertainty , and lies she has suffered.”D O W E R S V

. N A T I O

N S T A R M O R

T G A G E 8

B

Plaintiffs sued Defendants in N e v a d a s t ate court, asserting six causes o f action. Counts O ne throug h F our assert violations of four diffe r en t F D CPA provisions: 15 U .S.C. §§ 1692c(a)(2), 1692d, 1 692e, an d 1 692f(6). Count F ive
asserts a claim o f I I ED, a n d Count Six asserts a violation o f the D TPA. Defendants removed the case to federal c ourt a nd successfu lly moved to d ismiss the entire complaint under F ederal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Plaintiffs timely appealed.

II

W e have jurisdiction to review the d i s t r ict court’s order dismissing Plaintiffs’ complaint, 28 U.S.C. § 1291, which we review de n ovo , O’Brien v

. W elty

, 818 F .3d 920, 929 ( 9th Cir. 2016). To d etermine whether dismissal under Rule 1 2(b)(6) was appropriate, we accept as true Plaintiffs’ nonconclusory factual a lleg ations, construe all reasonable inference in favor of Plaintiffs, and ask whether the facts are sufficient to state

a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. See A shcroft v

. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

III

Defendants contend that Plaintiffs’ F DCPA counts fail to state a claim f

or relief b ecause Defendants did not e ng ag e in “debt c ollec t ion” and were n ot acting as “debt c ollectors.” W e ag ree that th e c l a i ms under 15 U .S.C. §§ 1692c(a)(2), 1692d, a n d 1 692e fail for that reason. W ith respect to the Section 1692f(6) claim, however, we dis a gr e e. That provision g overns Defendants’ alleg e d conduct because itD O W E R S V

. N A T I O

N S T A R M O R

T G A G E 9

ex p ressly applies to the enforcement of security interests such as a deed of trust.

A

The F DCPA defines a “debt collector” in relevant part a s:

any person w ho

. . . [ eng ag es] in any business the principal purpose of which i s t h e collection o f any debts, or who reg ularly collects or attempts to col lect, directly o r indirectly

, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed o r due anoth er

. . . . F o r the purpose o f section 1692f(6) of th is title, such term also includes any person w ho

. . . [ e ng ag e s] in any business the principal purpose of which is the enforcement of security

interests.

15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6). A “debt” is “any o blig ation or alleg ed

o b l i gation of a consumer to pay money arising out of a transaction.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5). Each of the four F DCPA provisions under which Plaintiffs sue app l ies to only the conduct of a “ debt collector.” S e e id. § 1692c(a)(2) (“[ A] debt c ollector may not communicate w ith a cons u m e r in connection with t h e c o l l e c tion of any debt

. . . if the d ebt collector knows the c onsumer is r e p r e s ented by an attorney with r espect to such debt

. . . .”); id. § 169 2 d ( “ A d ebt collector may n ot eng a g e in a ny conduc t t he natural
consequence o f w hich is to harass, oppress, or abuse any person in connection with th e c o llection of a d ebt.”); id. § 1692e (“A debt collector may not use any f alse, d eceptive,

or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection o f

any debt.”); id. § 1692f (“A debt collector may not use unfair or unconscionable means to collect o r attemptD O W E R S V

. N A T I O

N S T A R M O R

T G A G E 10

to collect any

debt.”). I t follows that if D efendants w ere not acting as “debt collectors” when interacting with P l a i ntiffs, these claims should be dismissed.

B

Our decision in Ho v. ReconTrust Co.
, 8 40 F .3d 618 (9th Cir. 2 0 1 6), makes clear that the district court properly dismissed P laintiffs’ claims under Sections 1692c(a)(2), 1692d, a n d 1 6 92e. There, H o purchased a home using borrowed funds secure d by a deed of trust, of which ReconTrust w as the trustee. Id. at 619–20. After Ho missed

a pay ment, ReconTrust mailed to H o notices of default a nd sale, both of w hich advised Ho that ReconTrust would initiate

a non-judicial fore c l osure if Ho d id not make her loan
current. Id. a t 620. Ho broug ht a claim u nder Section 1692e
ag ainst ReconTrust, alleg ing that the notices misrepresented the amount she owed. Id.

W e affirme d t h e dismissal of Ho’s Section 1 6 92e claim because ReconTrust’s conduct, as alleg e d, did not amount to debt collection activity

. ReconTrust was enforcing a security interest, not collecting a debt, which, “[ f] or the purposes o f the F DCPA,

. . . is sy

nony mous with ‘money

. ’ ” Id. at 621 (quoting 15 U.S.C

. § 1 6 92a(5)). “The object of a non[

- ] judicial foreclosure is to retake a n d resell the security

, not to collect money

. . . . Thus, actions taken to f ac i l i t a t e a nonjudicial foreclosure

. . . are not a t t empts to collect ‘debt’ a s that term is defined b y the FD C P A. ” I d

. W e rejected Ho’s
arg ument that ReconTrust’s n otices amounted to d ebt collection b ecause they had the effect o f prompting Ho to pay money she owed, ex plaining that it was the lien that p rompted Ho to pay off her loan, not ReconTrus t ’ s a c t ions. Id. (“The fear of having y our car impounded may induce y ou to pay offD O W E R S V

. N A T I O

N S T A R M O R

T G A G E 11

a stack of accumulated parking tickets, but that doesn’t make the g uy with the tow truck a debt collector.”); see also id. at 623–24.

W e a lso reasoned that Section 16 9 2 a(6)’s clause establishing a more e x pansive definition of “debt c o l l e ctor” for purposes of Section 1692f(6) compels the conclusion that security interest enforcers are not debt collectors for purposes of the e ntire F DCPA. Id. at 622. As noted, that clause states, “[ f] or the purpose of section 1 692f(6),” a debt collector “ also includes ” a security interest enforcer. 1 5 U.S.C

. § 1692a(6) (emphasis added). Not only does the “ a l s o i ncludes” lang uag e make clear that, for purposes of the F DCPA outside of Section 1692f(6), a security interest enforcer is not a debt collect o r , b ut also this clause “would b e superfluous if all entities that enforce security interest were already included in the definition of debt collector for purposes o f t h e entire F DCPA.” H

o , 840 F .3d at 622.

At bottom, Ho h eld th a t while the F DCPA r eg u lates security interest enforcement activity

, it does so only throug h Section 1 692f(6). As f

or the remaining FDCPA provisions, “debt collection” refers only to th e c ollection of a money debt.

This controlling prece d e n t precludes Plaintiffs’ c laims under 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692c(a)(2), 1692d, and 1692e. Nothing in Plaintiffs’ complaint sug g ests that Defendants eng ag ed in the collection of a money debt. The c o m p laint does not alleg e that WF B or W F B Minnesota eng ag ed i n a n y collection-related activity

, an d t h e alleg ations sug g est only that Nationstar was eng ag ed in enforcement of the D e e d o f Trust, a security

interest.D O W E R S V

. N A T I O

N S T A R M O R

T G A G E 12

Plaintiffs try to d i s ting uish Ho by arg uing that Nationstar’s alleg ed conduct was not necessary to enforce the
trust beneficiary ’s security interest. B ut that fact, even if true, does not lead to the conclusion that Nationstar e ng ag e d in debt collection

. 2 Nationstar’s conduct was not an attempt to collect a money debt, which is a n ecessary element of a claim under Sections 1692c(a)(2), 1692d, o r 1692e. Ho commands that Plaintiffs cannot assert a claim unde r t hose F DCPA provisions unless Nationstar was collecting a money debt. 3

C

T h e district court erred, h owever, when it dismis s e d Plaintiffs’ claim under Section 1692f(6) on the g round that Nationstar was not collecting a debt.

Unlike under Sections 1 692c(a)(2), 1692d, and 1692e, the definition of debt c ollector under Section 1692f(6) i ncludes

2 In Ho
, th e in ab ility u

n d er Calif

o rn ia law to o b tai n a d e ficien cy j u d g m en t f

ollo w in g n o n

-

j u d icial f

o reclo su re w as in teg ra l to ou r

co n clu sio n th at Reco n T ru st’ s actio n s tak en to f ac i l i t a t e a n o n

-

j u d icial f o reclo su re w ere n o t attem

p ts to co llect d eb t. H

o , 8 4 0 F.3 d at 6 21

. Here, Nev ad a law w o u l d h av e sim ilarly p ro h i b ited Natio n star f ro m ob tain in g a d ef icien cy j u d g m en t ag ain st t h e Do w ers h ad Natio n star n o n

- j u d icially f o reclo sed o n

th e p ro p erty

. S

ee Nev . Rev . Stat. § 4 0 .4 5 5 (3 ).

3 P lain tif f s also co n ten d th at co n stru i n g th e ter m “d e b t co l lecto r” in th is m an n er am o u n ts t o g ran tin g secu rity in terest en f o rcers “ b lan k et im m u n ity .” W e disag ree. A s ex p lain ed b elo w , Sectio n 1 6 9 2 f (6 ) d irectly
reg u lates th e co n d u ct o f secu rity in terest en f o rcers. Fu

rth er, Ho ’ s h o ld in g th at th e FDCP A d o es no t reg u late th e co n d u ct o f secu rity in terest

en f o rcers (o u tsid e o f Sectio n 1 6 92 f (6 )) in n o w ay im

m u n izes Def

en d an ts fr o m claim s arisin g u n d er o th er so u rces o f law

. It o n ly clarif i e s t h a t P lain tif f s can n o t in v o k e th e FDCP A (o u tsid e of Sectio n 1 6 9 2 f

(6 )) o n th e f acts alleg ed

.D O W E R S V

. N A T I O

N S T A R M O R

T G A G E 13

a person enforcing a security interest. 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6). Section 1 692f(6) reg

u lates more than just the collection of a money debt. I t prohibits:

[ t] aking or threatening to take a ny nonjudicial action to effect dispo ssession or disablement of property if – (A) there is no present rig ht to possession o f the property c l a imed a s collateral throug h an enforceable security interest; (B ) there is n o p resent intention to t a k e p o ssession of the property ; or (C) the property is ex e mp t b y law from such dispossession or disablement.

15 U.S.C. § 1692f(6).

The district court dismissed all four o f Plaintiffs’ F DCPA

c l a i m s b e c a

u s e Defendants’ conduct “relate[ d] to n on-judicial foreclosure attempts.” B ut Section 1692f( 6 ) r e g u lates nonjudicial foreclosure activity

. Ag a in, Ho is instructive: when contrasting Section 1 692f(6) w ith the o ther F DCPA
pr o v i s ions, we n oted that ReconTrust was clearly a d ebt

c o llector for purposes of Section 1692f(6) beca u s e ReconTrust was enforcing a s e c u r ity interest. See Ho
, 840 F .3d a t 622. Here, Plaintiff s a l l e g ed that Nationstar threatened to take non-judicial action to dispossess Plaintiffs of their home without a leg al ability to do so. Such conduct is ex actly what Section 1692f(6) protects borrowers ag ainst. As a r e sult, the district court should not have dismissed Count F our on the g round that Nationstar was eng ag ing in conduct related to non-judicial foreclosure.D O W E R S V

. N A T I O

N S T A R M O R

T G A G E 14

IV

The district court correctly dismissed Plaintiffs claims o f I I ED and of v iolation of the DTPA. To state a claim of I I ED under Nevada law, Plaint i f fs must alleg e “(1) ex treme a nd outrag eous conduct with either the intention of, or r e c kless disreg ard for, causing emotional distress, (2) t h e plaintiff’s having s u f

f ered severe o r ex treme emotional distress a nd (3) actual or prox imate causation.” Olivero v. Lowe
, 995 P.2d 1023, 1025 (Nev. 2000) (quoti n g S t a r v. Rabello

, 625 P.2d 90, 91–92 (Nev. 1981)). Plaintiffs’ alleg ations did not meet the first element of e x treme and outrag eous co n d u ct. Such conduct must b e “outside all possible bounds of decency ” a nd “reg a rded as utterly intolerable in a civiliz ed community

. ” Maduike v. Agency Rent-A-Car
, 953 P.2d 24, 26 (Nev. 1 998) (internal q

uotations marks omitted). T h e complaint a lleg e s that Nationstar threatened to foreclose on a property without authority to do so b e c ause it did not possess the orig inal loan documents, contacted Plaintiffs d irectl y after Plaintiffs’ attorney told it not to do so, and d elay ed the resciss i on of a previously -recorded notice of d efault. Assuming these facts
to be true, Defendants’ conduct d o e s n ot meet the threshold of ex treme and outrag e o us a s it has b een d e s cribed by the Supreme Court of Nevada. S ee State v

. Eighth Judicial Dist. C t

. e x r e l. Cty. of Clark

, 42 P.3d 233, 241 (Nev. 2 002); Barm et tler v. Reno Air, I nc. , 956 P.2d 1382, 1386 (Nev. 1998); Maduike , 953 P.2d at 26.

W ith respect to Plaintiffs’ D TPA c laim, the complaint does n ot identif

y w h i ch provision of the DTPA Plaintiffs contend Defendants h ave violated. W hile the Supreme Court of Nevada has not settled this issue, we ag ree with the district
court in predicting that the Supreme Court of Nevada would hold that real estate loans do not fall w ithin the DTPA. TheD O W E R S V

. N A T I O

N S T A R M O R

T G A G E 15

DTPA g overns transactions relating to “g oods and services,”

see Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 598.0915–598.0925, 598.0934, and a real estate loan is neither a go o d n o r a service within the meaning of this statute.

V

The district court properly d ismissed Plaintiffs’ claims o f violations of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1 6 9 2c(a)(2), 1692d, and 1692e; I I ED; and v i o l a t i o n of the DTPA. T h e district court erred, however, by dis missing Plaintiffs’ claim under 1 5 U .S.C. § 1692f(6) on the g round that D efendants’ alleg ed conduct constituted enforceme n t o f a security interest. Section 1692f(6) reg

ulates such conduct.

AF F IRMED in part, R EVERSED in part, a nd REMANDED.