alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 98-7254

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, versus JEFFREY EVANS LARK, Defendant - Appellant.Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Robert D. Potter, Senior District Judge. (CR-92-53, CA-97-647-3-P) Submitted: October 8, 1998 Decided: October 29, 1998 Before WIDENER, NIEMEYER, and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges. Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Jeffrey Evans Lark, Appellant Pro Se. Brian Lee Whisler, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).2 PER CURIAM: Jeffrey Evans Lark seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying his motion filed under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West 1994 & Supp. 1998) and order denying his motion to reconsider. We have reviewed the record and the district court’s opinions and find that the § 2255 motion was filed beyond the one year limitation for such actions. See id ; Brown v. Angelone , 150 F.3d 370 (4th Cir. 1998). Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
# Official Journal L 153/2020

| | ISSN 1977-0677 |
| --- | --- |
| Official Journal
  of the European Union | L 153 |
| | |
| English edition | Legislation | Volume 6315 May 2020 |

ISSN 1977-0677

Official Journal

of the European Union

L 153

English edition

Legislation

Volume 6315 May 2020

---

| Contents | | II   Non-legislative acts | page |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| | | DECISIONS |
| | * | Council Decision (EU) 2020/649 of 7 May 2020 on the position to be taken on behalf of the European Union during the 56th session of the Committee of Experts for the Carriage of Dangerous Goods of the Intergovernmental Organisation for International Carriage by Rail as regards certain amendments to Appendix C to the Convention concerning International Carriage by Rail | 1 |
| | * | Council Decision (EU) 2020/650 of 8 May 2020 appointing a member, proposed by the Republic of Estonia, of the Committee of the Regions | 3 |
| | * | Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/651 of 14 May 2020 amending Decision (CFSP) 2019/797 concerning restrictive measures against cyber-attacks threatening the Union or its Member States | 4 |
| | * | Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/652 of 14 May 2020 amending Decision 2014/219/CFSP on the European Union CSDP Mission in Mali (EUCAP Sahel Mali) | 5 |

Contents

II   Non-legislative acts

page

DECISIONS

*

Council Decision (EU) 2020/649 of 7 May 2020 on the position to be taken on behalf of the European Union during the 56th session of the Committee of Experts for the Carriage of Dangerous Goods of the Intergovernmental Organisation for International Carriage by Rail as regards certain amendments to Appendix C to the Convention concerning International Carriage by Rail

1

*

Council Decision (EU) 2020/650 of 8 May 2020 appointing a member, proposed by the Republic of Estonia, of the Committee of the Regions

3

*

Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/651 of 14 May 2020 amending Decision (CFSP) 2019/797 concerning restrictive measures against cyber-attacks threatening the Union or its Member States

4

*

Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/652 of 14 May 2020 amending Decision 2014/219/CFSP on the European Union CSDP Mission in Mali (EUCAP Sahel Mali)

5

| EN | Acts whose titles are printed in light type are those relating to day-to-day management of agricultural matters, and are generally valid for a limited period.
  The titles of all other Acts are printed in bold type and preceded by an asterisk. |
| --- | --- |

EN

Acts whose titles are printed in light type are those relating to day-to-day management of agricultural matters, and are generally valid for a limited period.

The titles of all other Acts are printed in bold type and preceded by an asterisk.
AAM-11-371-E 

July 8, 2011 

 Exemption No. 10305 

 Regulatory Docket No. FAA-2011-0701 

Mr. Daniel J. Lipko 

Pine Bottom Aviation Services, LLC 

Pine Bottom Heliport 

1702 Pulpit Road 

Martinsburg, PA 16662 

Dear Mr. Lipko: 

This letter is to inform you that we have granted your request for exemption. It transmits our 

decision, explains its basis, and gives you the conditions and limitations of the exemption, 

including the date it ends. 

The Basis for Our Decision 

By letter dated June 25, 2011, you petitioned the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) on 

behalf of Pine Bottom Aviation Services, LLC (Pine Bottom) for an exemption from part 120 

of Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR), to allow Pine Bottom, which is operating 

under separate parts of 14 CFR, to cover its safety-sensitive employee under one testing 

program. 

The FAA has determined that good cause exists for not publishing a summary of the petition 

in the Federal Register because the requested exemption would not set a precedent, and any 

delay in acting on this petition would be detrimental to Pine Bottom. 

The FAA has issued a grant of exemption in circumstances similar in all material respects to 

those presented in your petition. In Grant of Exemption No. 9703 (copy enclosed), the FAA 

found that Solid Edge’s § 91.147 air tour operations were closely connected to its part 135 

operations. The FAA also found that combining the petitioner’s two testing programs into one 

would be in the public interest and would maintain an equivalent level of safety to that 

provided by the current regulations. Thus, the FAA concluded it was unnecessary to burden 

the petitioner by requiring it to conduct two separate testing programs. 

Having reviewed your reasons for requesting an exemption, I find that— 
2 

 they are similar in all material respects to relief previously requested in the enclosed Grant 

of Exemption No. 9703; 

 the reasons stated by the FAA for granting the enclosed Grant of Exemption No. 9703 

also apply to the situation you present; and 

 a grant of exemption is in the public interest. 

Our Decision 

Under the authority contained in 49 U.S.C. 40113 and 44701, which the FAA Administrator 

has delegated to me, I hereby grant Pine Bottom Aviation Services, LLC an exemption from 

part 120 to the extent necessary to allow Pine Bottom, which is operating under separate parts 

of the regulations, to cover its safety-sensitive employees under one testing program, subject 

to the conditions and limitations described below. 

Conditions and Limitations 

1. Employees of Pine Bottom are subject to the drug and alcohol regulations at all 

times while conducting operations under part 135 or part 91. 

2. The drug and alcohol testing program must be implemented under the auspices of 

the Pine Bottom part 135 operation, not under part 91. 

This exemption terminates on July 31, 2013 unless sooner superseded or rescinded. 

Sincerely, 

/s/ 

James R. Fraser, M.D. 

Deputy Federal Air Surgeon 

Enclosure
| (logo) WELLS  FARGO | **Commercial  Mortgage Servicing**D1050-084,  8th Floor  401 South Tryon Street  Charlotte, NC 28202  1-800-326-1334 |
|---------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

 

 

**ANNUAL STATEMENT OFCOMPLIANCE**

** **

ReferenceisherebymadetothatcertainPoolingandServicingAgreementdated as of July 1, 2015, by and among WELLSFARGO COMMERCIAL MORTGAGESECURITIES,INC.,as Depositor, WELLS FARGO BANK, NATIONALASSOCIATION,as Master Servicer, RIALTOCAPITALADVISORS,LLC,asSpecialServicer,PENTALPHASURVEILLANCELLC,as Trust Advisor, WELLS FARGO BANK,NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, as Certificate Administrator, as Tax Administrator and asCustodian and WILMINGTON TRUST, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, as Trustee, with respectto Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2015-NXS2 (the "Agreement").Capitalized terms used herein not otherwise defined shall have the meaningsassigned in theAgreement.

 

Pursuantto Section 11.12 of this Agreement, I, Daniel Bober, Executive Vice Presidentof Commercial Mortgage Services do hereby certify that:

 

1.       Areview of the activities of the Master Servicer during the period from January1, 2017 through December 31, 2017 (the “Reporting Period”), and of itsperformance per the Agreement during such period has been made under mysupervision,and

 

2.       To thebest of my knowledge, based on such review, the Master Servicer, has fulfilledall of its obligations under this Agreement in all material respects throughoutthe ReportingPeriod.

 

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned hasexecuted this Certificate as of the 28th day of February2018.

 

/s/ Daniel Bober

Daniel Bober

Executive Vice President

 

 

| Wells Fargo Bank,  N.A. | (logo)  Together we’ll go far |
|-------------------------|-------------------------------------|
#### § 895.101 Prosthetic hair fibers.

Prosthetic hair fibers are devices intended for implantation into the human scalp to simulate natural hair or conceal baldness. Prosthetic hair fibers may consist of various materials; for example, synthetic fibers, such as modacrylic, polyacrylic, and polyester; and natural fibers, such as processed human hair. Excluded from the banned device are natural hair transplants, in which a person's hair and its surrounding tissue are surgically removed from one location on the person's scalp and then grafted onto another area of the person's scalp.

[48 FR 25136, June 3, 1983]
Court of Appeals

of the State of Georgia

ATLANTA,____________________

The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order:

A19A0762. WILFTANG v. STATE.

The Supreme Court has exclusive jurisdiction over “[a]ll cases involving the

construction . . . of the Constitution of the State of Georgia or of the United States

and all cases in which the constitutionality of a law, ordinance, or constitutional

provision has been called into question.” Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VI, Par.

II (1);see Atlanta Independent School System v. Lane, 266 Ga. 657, 657-658 (1) (469

SE2d 22) (1996). Because appellant argues that OCGA § 40-5-67.1 (d.1) (2018) is

unconstitutional as it does not require notification that police may obtain a warrant

for his blood, it appears that jurisdiction over this appeal may lie in the Supreme

Court, despite the fact that the appeal may ultimately be resolved on other grounds.

See Harrison v. Wigington, 269 Ga. 388, 388 (497 SE2d 568) (1998) (“If a

constitutional question is raised and ruled on below, [the Supreme] [C]ourt has

exclusive appellate jurisdiction, and thisistrue, although upon a consideration of the

entire case, [the Supreme][C]ourt determinesthat a decision upon such constitutional

questions is not necessary to a proper solution of the case, and makes no decision

thereon.”) (citation and punctuation omitted). 

Asthe Supreme Court hasthe ultimate responsibility for determining appellate

jurisdiction, see Saxton v. Coastal Dialysis & Med. Clinic, 267 Ga. 177, 178 (476

SE2d 587) (1996), this appeal is hereby TRANSFERRED to the Supreme Court for

disposition.

June 17, 2019
Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia

Clerk’s Office, Atlanta,____________________

I certify that the above is a true extract from

the minutes of the Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Witness my signature and the seal of said court

hereto affixed the day and year last above written.

, Clerk.

06/17/2019
J-A02007-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellant

v.

JOSE LOUIS NEGRON

No. 1165 MDA 2015

Appeal from the Order Entered June 8, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-06-CR-0003826-2014

BEFORE: PANELLA, J., STABILE, J., and FITZGERALD, J.*

CONCURRING STATEMENT BY PANELLA, J. FILED JANUARY 04, 2017

I join in the Majority’s admonishment of the Commonwealth’s agents 

in this matter. Furthermore, I also conclude that Negron is not entitled to a 

new trial. However, my reasoning differs from the Majority’s. I therefore 

concur.

The Majority finds that Negron failed to establish that the murder 

identified by the CS was the same with which Negron had been charged. 

However, this Court reviews the decision of a trial court to grant a new trial 

on the basis of after-discovered evidence to determine if the court 

committed an abuse of discretion or an error of law which controlled the 

outcome of the case. See Commonwealth v. Padillas, 997 A.2d 356, 361 

____________________________________________

*

Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
J-A02007-16

- 2 -

(Pa. Super. 2010). Here, the trial court found that it was “more likely than 

not that CS was referring to this incident.” Trial Court Opinion, 9/2/15, at 6. 

I can discern no abuse of discretion in this finding, given the circumstances 

as set forth by the Majority at pages 7-8.

However, I conclude that Negron did not establish that he was 

prejudiced by the Commonwealth’s obstruction. “A Brady violation is 

established by showing that the favorable evidence could reasonably be 

taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine 

confidence in the verdict.” Commonwealth v. Chmiel, 30 A.3d 1111, 1130 

(Pa. 2011) (citation omitted). I reach this conclusion based upon a review of 

the testimony at trial, which reveals that investigator Driesbach’s testimony 

was not of prime importance. During direct examination, investigator 

Driesbach did not offer any independent evidence of Negron’s guilt.

To the contrary, the Commonwealth’s case was largely dependent on 

the testimony of eyewitnesses to the murder and the testimony of Negron’s 

neighbor. See, e.g., N.T, Trial, 1/12-15/15, at 216-217, 239-240, 292-295. 

These witnesses placed Negron at the murder, involved in a fight with the 

victim, and in possession of a firearm. Furthermore, these witnesses testified 

that Negron fled the scene of the crime while acknowledging to his girlfriend 

that he had done what he “needed to do.” It was clearly this testimony that 

the jury believed in convicting Negron.
J-A02007-16

- 3 -

As a result, I conclude that Negron failed to undermine confidence in 

the verdict. I would therefore reverse the trial court’s order granting a new 

trial on this basis.
H. R. 8057 

One Hundred Eighteenth Congress 

of the 

United States of America 

AT THE SECOND SESSION 

Begun and held at the City of Washington on Wednesday, 

the third day of January, two thousand and twenty-four 

An Act 

To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service located at 9317 Bolsa 

Avenue in Westminster, California, as the ‘‘Little Saigon Vietnam War Veterans 

Memorial Post Office’’. 

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 

the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

SECTION 1. LITTLE SAIGON VIETNAM WAR VETERANS MEMORIAL POST 

OFFICE. 

(a) DESIGNATION.—The facility of the United States Postal 

Service located at 9317 Bolsa Avenue in Westminster, California, 

shall be known and designated as the ‘‘Little Saigon Vietnam War 

Veterans Memorial Post Office’’. 

(b) REFERENCES.—Any reference in a law, map, regulation, 

document, paper, or other record of the United States to the facility 

referred to in subsection (a) shall be deemed to be a reference 

to the ‘‘Little Saigon Vietnam War Veterans Memorial Post Office’’. 

Speaker of the House of Representatives. 

Vice President of the United States and

President of the Senate.
(logo) **Rialto**

          CAPITAL

 

 

2015 Annual Statement of Servicer Compliance (Item 1123)

 

 

Pooling and Servicing Agreement (the “Pooling and Servicing Agreement”) dated as of August 1, 2015 by and among Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp. as Depositor, Midland Loan Services, a Division of PNC Bank, National Association as Master Servicer, Rialto Capital Advisors, LLC as Special Servicer, Pentalpha Surveillance LLC as Operating Advisor, Wells Fargo Bank, National Association as Certificate Administrator and Wells Fargo Bank, National Association as Trustee relating to the Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp., CSAIL 2015-C3 Commercial Mortgage Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2015-C3 

(CSAIL 2015-C3)

 

The undersigned, a duly authorized officer of Rialto Capital Advisors, LLC, as special servicer (the “Special Servicer”) herein certifies to the following:

 

1. All servicing activities and performance of such servicing activities under the Pooling and Servicing Agreement are performed on behalf of the Special Servicer.

 

2. A review of the servicing activities and performance by the Special Servicer for the period of August 18, 2015 to December 31, 2015 (the “Reporting Period”) in accordance with the Pooling and Servicing Agreement has been conducted under my supervision.

 

3. To the best of my knowledge, based on such review, the Special Servicer has fulfilled all of its obligations under the terms of the Pooling and Servicing Agreement, in all material respects for the Reporting Period and if there has been a failure to fulfill any such obligations in any material respect, each failure and the nature and status thereof has been specifically identified herein.

 

 

| Certified by: /s/ Adam Singer

Adam Singer, Managing Director

  | Date: March 1, 2016 |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------|
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Robert P. Young, Jr.

, Chief Justice

Stephen J. Markman

Brian K. Zahra

Bridget M. McCormack

David F. Viviano

Richard H. Bernstein

Joan L. Larsen,

Justices

I, Larry S. Royster , Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

October 26, 2016

d1017 

# Order

Clerk October 26, 2016

152264 (35)

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff

- Appellee,

v SC: 152264

COA: 325682

Grand Traverse CC:

ANTOINE EUGENE GOGINS, 2014

- 011877

- FH

Defendant

- Appellant.

_________________________________________/

On order of the Court, the motion for reconsideration of this Court’s March 29,

2016 order is considered, and it is GRANTED. W e VACATE our order dated March 29,

2016. On reconsideration, the application for leave to appeal the July 9, 2015 judgment

of the Court of Appeals is considered and, it appearing to this Court that the cases of

People v Steanhouse (Docket No. 152849) and People v Masroor (Docket Nos.

152946

- 8) are pending on appeal before this Court and that the decisions in those cases

may resolve an issue raised in the present application for leave to appeal, we ORDER that

the application be held in ABEYANCE pending the decisions in those cases.
§ 1.565-3 Effect of consent. ( a ) *General rule.* The amount of the consent dividend that is described in paragraph (a) of § 1.565-1 shall be considered, for all purposes of the Code, as if it were distributed in money by the corporation to the shareholder on the last day of the taxable year of the corporation, received by the shareholder on such day, and immediately contributed by the shareholder as paid-in capital to thecorporation on such day. Thus, the amount of the consent dividend will be treated by the shareholder as a dividend. The shareholder will be entitled to the dividends received deduction under section 243 or 245 with respect to such consent dividend. The basis of the shareholder's consent stock in a corporation will be increased by the amount thus treated in his hands as a dividend which he is considered as having contributed to the corporation as paid-in capital. The amount of the current dividend will also be treated as a dividend received from sources within the United States in the same manner as if the dividend had been paid in money to the shareholders. Among other effects of the consent dividend, the earnings and profits of the corporation will be decreased by the amount of the consent dividends. Moreover, if the shareholder is a corporation, its accumulated earnings and profits will be increased by the amount of the consent dividend with respect to which it makes a consent.
( b ) *Example.* The application of section 565
( c ) may be illustrated by the following example:
Example. Corporation A, a personal holding company and a calendar year taxpayer, has one shareholder, individual B, whose consent to include $10,000 in his gross income for the calendar year 1987 has been timely filed. A has $8,000 of earnings and profits at the beginning of 1987. A has $10,000 of undistributed personal holding company income (determined without regard to distributions under section 316(b)(2)) for 1987. B must include $10,000 in his gross income as a taxable income and is treated as having immediately contributed $10,000 to A as paid-in capital. See section 316(b)(2).
[T.D. 8244, 54 FR 10540, Mar. 14, 1989]
###### Editorial Note on Part 1

#### Editorial Note:

IRS redesignated the following sections to appear below the undesignated center heading “Regulations Applicable to Certain Bonds Sold Prior to July 8, 1997” and preceding the undesignated center heading “Deductions for Personal Exemptions.” See 62 FR 25507 and 25513, May 9, 1997 for the specific sections involved in the redesignation.

#### § 1.408A-0 Roth IRAs; table of contents.

This table of contents lists the regulations relating to Roth IRAs under section 408A of the Internal Revenue Code as follows:

§ 1.408A-1 Roth IRAs in general.

§ 1.408A-2 Establishing Roth IRAs.

§ 1.408A-3 Contributions to Roth IRAs.

§ 1.408A-4 Converting amounts to Roth IRAs.

§ 1.408A-5 Recharacterized contributions.

§ 1.408A-6 Distributions.

§ 1.408A-7 Reporting.

§ 1.408A-8 Definitions.

§ 1.408A-9 Effective date.

[T.D. 8816, 64 FR 5601, Feb. 4, 1999]
<PAGE>   1
                           IBIS TECHNOLOGY CORPORATION

                   STATEMENT RE: COMPUTATION OF PER SHARE LOSS

                                   EXHIBIT 11



<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
                                                      THREE MONTHS ENDED                       NINE MONTHS ENDED
                                                         SEPTEMBER 30,                            SEPTEMBER 30,  
                                                ------------------------------        ---------------------------------
                                                    1996               1997               1996                 1997
                                                -----------        -----------        ------------        -------------
<S>                                             <C>                <C>                <C>                 <C>           
Net loss reported .......................       $  (176,766)       $  (419,496)       $   (733,178)       $  (1,763,490)
                                                ===========        ===========        ============        =============

Primary and fully diluted loss per share:
   Weighted average common
   shares outstanding ...................         5,171,338          5,774,010           4,568,725            5,402,808
                                                ===========        ===========        ============        =============
Net loss per common share ...............       $     (0.03)       $     (0.07)       $      (0.16)       $       (0.33)
                                                ===========        ===========        ============        =============
</TABLE>


                                       19