The Honor able Christopher A. Boy ko, United States District J udg e for the Northe rn District * of Ohio, sitting by

desig nation. NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 08a0187n.06 F iled: April 9, 2008 No. 06-3857 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT

TO B Y PA L ME R, Pe tit ion e r- Ap pe lla

nt,

v. J AMES HAVI L AND, Warde n, Respondent-Appe llee. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON AP P E AL F ROM THE UN I TE D ST AT ES D I STR I CT C O U R T F O R THE SOU T H E RN D I ST RI CT OF O H IO O P I N I O N

BEFORE: CLAY and McK EAGU E, Circuit Judges; and B OYKO, Distr ict Judge. * McK EAGU E, Circuit Judge. Can a defenda nt commit ag g ravated robbery but not robbery in O hio? I n essenc e, this is the question that Petit ioner Toby Palmer asks us to re solve. He a rg ues that a person cannot commit ag g ravated robbe ry without also committ ing r obbery and, ther efor e, he should have be en punished for o n l y o ne of the crimes, but not both, under the Double Jeopardy Clause of the F ifth Amendment to the U.S. Constit ution. We cannot, howe ver, r eac h that substantive question. The Ohio courts have inter prete d the rele vant Ohio statutes as pe rmitting punishment for both robbery and ag g rava

ted robbe ry . A fe dera l court on habea s revie w is bound by a state court’s interpre tation of state law. Ac cording ly , we a ffirm the district court’s de nial of habe as re lief to Palmer.No. 06-3857

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O.R.C. § 2911.01 Ag g ravated Robbery

. (A) No person, in attempting or committing a theft 1 offe nse, as de fined in sec tion 2913.01 of t he Revised Code, or in fleeingimmediately

afte r the attempt or off

ense, sha ll d o an y o f t h e fol lowing: ( 1) Have a de adly wea pon on or about the of fe nd e r’ s p e rs on

or un de r t he of fe nd e r’ s c on tr ol and e ith e r dis pla y the we a po n, br and ish

it, ind ic a te that the offe nder posse sses it, or use it; . . . . O.R.C. § 2911.02 Robbery . (A) N o person, in attempting or committing a theft off ense or 2 in f le e ingimm e dia

tel y aft er th e a tte mpt

or of fe ns e , s ha ll d o a

ny of the fo llo wi ng : . . . ( 2) I nf lic t, attempt to inflict, or threaten to inflict phy sical har m on another; . . . . - 2 - I Th e fa c ts o f t

his c a se are no t in

dis pu te . In M arc h 2 00 1, Jef fr e y Ho rt on pla

nn e d to v isi t hi s wife w ho had b ee n ad m i t t ed to the hospital for pre g nancy complications. When he ar rived at the hospital pa

rking g ara g e, he sa

w a mar oon For d Taurus w ith three men, one of whom wa s Palmer. Horton re cog nized the men beca use he ha d ear lier st ruck up a conversation with them at a f ast-food restaur an t. T h e me n c o mm an d e e r e d H o rto n an d h is c ar a t g u np o in t. T h e y dr o v e aw ay to an apar tment complex; once the re, the y took all of Horton’ s money and jewe lry

and orde red him to take some televisions out of the ca r. Be lieving tha t h is li f

e w a s in im mi n e n t d a

n g e r , H o rto ng r a

b b e d a f ir e ar m f r o m o n e o f

the robber s and esc aped. Police eventua lly arr ested the three men. Horton identified a ll three robbe rs fr om p ho tog ra

ph ic arr ay s. A H a m i l t o n C o u n t y g r an d j u r y i n d i c t e d P a l m e r o n o n e c o u n t o f a g g r a v a t e d r o b be ry in violation of O.R.C. § 2911.01(A)(1) , with a fire arm spec ification, one c ount of robber y in violation 1 of O.R.C. § 2911.02(A)( 2), and one c ount of kidnapping in violation of O.R.C. § 2905.01(A)(2), 2 with a fire arm spec ification. A jury found Palmer guilty

of ag g ravated robb ery

with a g unNo. 06-3857

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- 3 - sp e c if ic a tio n a nd of ro bb e ry , b ut n ot guil ty

of kidn app in g. Th e tr ia l c ourt se nte nc e d h im t o

consec utive terms of inca

rce ration of ten y ear s on the ag g ravated robbe ry conviction, eig ht y ear s on the robbe ry

conviction, and thre e y ear s on the fire arm spec ification convic tion. Pa l m e r f i l e d a t i m e l y a p p e a l i nw h i c h h e ar g u e d , i n t e r a l i a , t h a tt h e t r i a l c o u rte r r e d in imposing conse cutive maximum sentenc es. The Court of Appea ls of Ohio aff

irmed. State v. Palme r , 772 N.E.2d 726 (Ohio Ct. App. 2002). On his c laim involving consec utive maxi mum se ntence s, a

c la im g ro un de d in

do ub le -j e op ard

y c on c e rn s, the Oh io C ourt of Ap pe a ls e xpla ine d a s f

oll ow s: { 9} Palmer first ar g ues that his conviction s involved allied offe nses of similar import, and thus that his sente nces for ag g ravated robber y and robbe ry

should have merg ed pursua

nt to R.C . 2941.25. We disag ree . { 10} I n State v. Ranc e , [( 19 99 ), 85 Oh io S t.3 d 6 32 , 7 10 N.E.2 d 699] th e Oh io Supreme Court held that two statutory offe nses ar e allied offe nses of similar import if the ele ments of ea ch off ense “corr espond to such a de g ree that the commission of one cr ime will result in the commission of the other.” [I d. at 638, 710 N.E.2d 699.] The Rance test require s a strict textual comparison of the statutory elements, without ref ere nce to the pa

rticular fac ts of the case , to determine w hether one off ense r equire s proof of an element that the other doe s not. I f there are differ ing e lements, the inquiry ends, and multiple convictions and se ntence s are allowed. { 11} Although Palmer

acknow ledg es that this c ourt, in State v. Norman [, (199[ 9]), 137 Ohio App.3d 184, 7 3 8 N.E.2d 403,] and Sta te v . B e rry , [( Ap r. 14 , 2 00 0) , 1 st Dist. N os. C-990354 and C-990365, 2000 WL 376409,] applied the Rance test and deter mined that ag g ravated robbe ry and robbe ry are not allied offe nses bec ause e ach offe nse re quires proof

of an e lement that the other does not, he asks us to re consider those dec isions in l ight of State v. Grant [, ( M ar . 2 3 , 2 0 0 1 ) , 1 s t D is t. N o . C- 9 7 1 0 0 1 ]. I n Grant , a pane l of this c ourt commented that the Ohio Supreme Court, in State v. Fe ar s , [(19 99 ), 86 Oh io S t.3 d 3 29 , 7 15 N. E. 2d 13 6, ] ha d a

pp e are d to have imp lic itl y overr uled Rance

. { 12} This court has a lrea dy addre ssed that conc ern, holding that, des pite the comment in Grant , Be rry

and Norman re ma in c on tr oll ing be c a us e the Oh io S up re me Court ha s not ex plicitly

overr uled Rance and has not specific ally addre ssed whethe r ag g ravated robbe ry

and robber

y are allied offe nses. [ Sta te v . M c Ne al (Nov. 2, 2001),No. 06-3857

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- 4 - 1s t D is t. No. C- 00 07 17 , 2 00 1 WL 13 46 18 6. ] F ur

the rm or e , w e no te that th e Oh io Supreme Court continues to use the Rance test without citation to Fe ar s . [S ee Sta te v . Ch ild s (2000), 88 Ohio St.3d 558, 728 N.E.2d 379.] { 13} Whil e we may not c onsider the Rance test to be the best appr oach f or deter mining whe n char g ed off enses a re a llied offense s, beca

use it fails to consider the individual fac ts of a ca se, as some c ourts hav e d o n e whe n applying the Blockburge r test, [ Rance , supra, at para g raph thre e of sy llabus,] we a

re bound, “ as an interme diate appe llate cour t, until t he Ohio Supreme Court te lls us otherwise, [to] apply the clearly

define d test for c umulative punishments in Rance , no matter if we disapprove of

the re sult reac hed.” [ Norman , 137 Ohio App.3d at 203, 7 3 8 N. E .2d 403.] According ly , as robbe ry and ag g rava ted robber

y are not allied offe nses on the basis of Rance , the trial court properly imposed multi ple sentenc es. [See Norman , supra; see Be rry , supra.] Id. at 728-29 (f

ootnotes omitt ed). Pre siding Judge Painter dissented: { 1 7 } Rance i s n o t j u s t i n tu i t i v e l y w r o n g , i t i s l e g a l l y w r o n g . T h e O h i o Supr e me Court has the law of

double j eopar dy in jeopar dy of disappea

ring , in addition to the bollix it has made of the related problems o f al lied offe nses and lesse r-include d offe nses. [ State v. De em (1 98 8) , 40 Ohi o St .3 d 2 05 , 5 33 N. E. 2d 29 4; State v. Barnes (2 0 0 2 ), 9 4 Ohio St.3d 21, 759 N.E.2d 1240, especia lly LundbergStratton, J ., d i s s en t i n g.] I t seemed that the Supreme Court over ruled Rance , albeit by implication, in Sta te v . F

e ar s . [( 1 9 9 9 ) , 8 6 O h io St

. 3 d 3 2 9 , 3 4 4 , 7 1 5 N

. E

. 2 d 1 3 6

. ] We so held in State v. Grant , [(Mar. 23, 2001), 1st Dist. No. C-971001, appe al not allowed ( 2001), 92 Oh i o St.3d 1443, 751 N.E.2d 482,] which the Supre me Court declined to r eview. { 18} I n Sta te v . M

c In tos h , [(2001), 145 Ohio App.3d 567, 763 N.E.2d 704,] Iwrote, “While an ar g ument can be m ad e t h at beca use the syllabus in Rance was not overr uled in Fe ar

s , Rance is s til l via

ble , I pr e fe r to co nc lud e that th e Oh io S up re me Court re c og nize d its er

ro r; tho ug h it wo uld be muc h b e tte r i f t hat c ourt wo uld do so specific ally .” Eve n though the court ha s cited Rance af t er d ec i d i n g Fe ar

s , Ibelieve that is not nece ssarily sufficie nt to undo Fe ar s . I n Fe ar

s , th e c ourt

did no t e ve n c ite Rance , th ou g h s ur e ly

the c ourt mus t ha ve be e n a wa re of its ow n p ri or

de c isi on s. { 1 9 } T h e r e f

o r e , Id is s e n t a

n d jo in Ju s ti c e Lu n d

b e r g Str a tt o n [, Sta te v . B ar ne s (2002), 94 Ohio St.3d 21, 759 N.E.2d 1240 (L undberg Stratton, J., dissenting ),] in urg ing the Supreme Court to revisit this area and cor rec t its m istakes. The c onfusion cre ated f or the trial and a

ppellate c ourts of this state should be re solved.No. 06-3857

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Th e ma g istrate jud g e de te rm ine d tha t Palm e r ha d f a ir ly pr e se nte d h is d ou

ble -j e op ard

y c la im 3 befor e the Ohio courts and, there fore , had exhausted his state remedie s on that claim. The district c ourt a g re e d a nd ne ith e r p art

y dis pu te s th is m a tte r o n a

pp e a l. - 5 - Id. at 729-30 (f

ootnotes omitt ed). Palmer appe aled to the Supre me Court of Ohio. The court summarily dismiss ed his appe al as not involving a

ny substantial constituti onal question. P a l m e r s u

b s eq u en t l y

p et i t i o n edt h e f

ed er al d i s t ri ct co u rt fo r a wr i to f h ab ea s co rp u s . In support, he ra ised two g rounds for r elief, only one of w hich is releva

nt on appe al : “G round One : Pe tit ion e r’ s r ig ht t o b e fr e e fr om Do ub le Jeop ard y wa s v iol a te d w he n th e state c ourt punis he d h im twice f or the same offe nse, in violation of the Fif th and Four

teenth Amendme nts to the United States Constit ution.” The district cour t refe rre d the matter to a

mag istrate judg e, who r ecommende d that the petition be denied. The district c ourt acc epted the mag istrate judg e’s r eport a nd rec ommendation over Palmer ’s objection. 3 This appea l followed.

II A. Stand ard of Review We r eview de novo the district court’s de cision to deny habea s relief

to Palmer. Linscott v. Ro se , 436 F.3d 587, 590 ( 6th Cir. 2006). Palmer filed his petition after the ena ctment of the Antiterror ism and Effe ctive De ath Penalty Act of 1996 ( “AED PA”). AED PA is “ fore most” among the “multiple le nses of de fer ence ” throug h which a f eder al habe as cour

t views the questions befor eNo. 06-3857

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The Supreme Court a

pplied the double-jeopa

rdy provision of the F ifth Amendment to the 4 States in Benton v. M

aryland , 395 U.S. 784 (1969). - 6 - it. Ro ss v . P e tro , 515 F.3d 653, 660 (6th Cir. 2008)

. A fede ral court can g rant a w ri t o f habeas corpus only

wher e the sta t e co u rt ’s adjudication “resulted in a de cision that was contr ary to, or involved an unre asonable application o f, cle arly established F eder al law, a s determined by the Supreme Court of the U nited States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). “A f eder al habe as cour

t may issue the writ under

the ‘c ontrary

to’ clause if the s tate court applies a rule diff ere nt from the g overning law set for

th in [ Supreme Court] cases, or if the state c ourt appli es a ru l e differe ntly than [the Supreme Court has] done on a set of materially indisti ng uishable fa cts.” Bell v. Cone , 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002). “The [federa l] court may g rant relief under t he ‘unreasona ble application’ clause if

the state cour t corre ctly

ident i fi es t h e g overningleg al principle f rom [S upreme Court] decisions but

unrea sonably

applies it to the fac ts of the par ticular c ase.” Id. “[A] federa l habea s court may not issue the writ simply

beca use that cour

t concludes in it s i n d ep en d ent j udg ment that the re levant state-c ourt dec ision applied clea rly established fe dera l law er roneously or incorr ectly . Rather, that application must a lso ha

ve been unr easona

ble.” W alls v. Konteh , 490 F.3d 432, 436 ( 6th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted).

B. Double Jeopardy In volving Mul tiple P uni shme nts Th e Sup re me Court

ha s id e nti fi e d thre e wa

y s in wh ic h th e Do ub le Jeop ard y Cla us e pr ote c ts

a cr iminal defenda

nt’s rig hts. I t “protec ts ag ainst a second prosec ution for the same offe nse af ter 4

a c qu itt a l. It pr ote c ts a g a ins t a se c on d pro secu ti on fo r t he same of

fe ns e a ft e r c on vic tio n. An d itNo. 06-3857

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- 7 - protec ts ag ainst m u l t iple punishments for the same offe nse.” North C arolina v. Pearce , 3 95 U. S. 711, 716 (1969) (footnotes omitted), ov e rru le d on o the r g ro un ds by Alab am a v . S

mi th , 490 U.S. 794 (1989). Palmer ’s claim fa lls under t he latter cate g ory , a categ ory

which for

mer Chief Justi ce Re hn qu ist

de sc ri be d a s “ a ve ri ta

ble Sarg a sso Se a wh ic h co uld no t fa il to cha lle ng e the mos t in tr e pid judicial navig ator.” Albernaz v. United States , 450 U.S. 333, 343 (1981). Un lik e the fi rs t tw o c a te g or ie s, the mul tip le -p un ish me nts c a te g or y of do ub le je op a rdy

is pr ima ri ly on e of le g isl a tiv e int e nt. A le g isl a tur e de fi ne s c ri min a l a c tio n a nd c ri min a l pu

nis hme nt. W halen v. United States , 445 U.S. 684, 689 (1980). As long as they act within the broa d contours of the Eig hth Amendment and other fede ral (and possibly state) constitutional provisions, id. at 689

n. 3 ( c oll e c tin g c a se s) , Co ng re ss a nd st ate le g isl a tur e s c an p ro sc ri be mul tip le punis hme nts in

connec tion with the same criminal ac tivity , Albernaz , 450 U.S. at 344 (“Thus, the question of what punis hme nts are c on sti tut ion a lly pe rm iss ibl e is n ot d if

fe re nt f ro m th e qu e sti on

of wh a t pu nis hme nts the L e g isl a tiv e B ra

nc h inte nd e d to be impo se d. Whe re Con g re ss int e nd e d, a s it did he re , to imp os e multipl e punishments, imposit ion of such sen tence s does not violate the Constituti on.”). Acourt

c ann ot, ho we ve r, e xce e d th e a uth or iza tio n g ra

nte d to it b y

a le g isl a tur e by

imp os ingmul tip le punishments for ac tivity

that the leg islature intended to punish only once. Missouri v. Hunter , 459 U. S. 359 , 366 (1 98 3) (“ With re sp e c t to c umu la tiv e se nte nc e s im po se d in a sin g le tr ia l, t

he Do ub le J eopar dy Clause does no more than pre vent the sente ncing c o u r t f r o m p r e s c r ib in g

greater punishment tha n the le g isl a tur e in ten de d. ” ); Br own v . O hio , 432 U.S. 161, 165 (1977) (“ Where c onsecutive

se nte nc e s are imp os e d a t a sin g le c ri min a l tr ia l, the ro le of the c on sti tut ion a l g ua ra nte e is l imi te d to

a ssu ri ngthat th e c ourt

do e s n ot e xce e d it s le g isl ati ve auth or iza tio n b y imp os ingmul tip leNo. 06-3857

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- 8 - punishments for the same offe nse.”) . Thus, if a leg islature per m i t s m ultiple punishm ents, a c ourt

c an im po se su c h p un ish me nts ; if a le g isl a tur e pr oh ibi ts mult ipl e punis hme nts , a c ourt c ann ot i mpo se

s u c h p u n i s h m e n t s w i t h o u tr u n n i n g a f o u l o f t h e f e d e r a l p r o h i b i t i o na g a i n s td o u b l e j e o p ar dy. I n deter mining whe ther a

leg islature per

mits m ultiple punishm ents, a c ourt’s role is li mited to discerning“‘w hether

the leg islatu re i ntended to punish cumulatively the same c onduct which violates two statutes.’” Carter v. Carter , 59 F. App’ x 104, 107 (6th Cir. 2003) (unpublished) (q u o t i n g United States v. J ohnson , 22 F.3 d 1 0 6 , 107-08 (6th Cir. 1994)). I n g ener al, leg islative intent is discerne d from the statutory lang uag e, legislative hist ory , and by application of the test set out in Blockburge r v. United States , 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932). United States v. He beka , 25 F.3d 287, 290 n.5 (6th Cir. 1994). I n Blockburge r , the Supreme Court he ld that “where t h e s am e act or tr ans a c tio n c on sti tut e s a

vio lati on of two d ist inc t st a tut or y pr ov isi on s, the te st t o b e a pp lie d to deter mine whether

there are two offe nses or only one, is w hether eac h provision require s proof of a fa ct which the othe r does not.” 284 U .S. at 304. I n applying the test, the Supreme Court looked to the “fa ce of

the statute,” a

nd conseque ntly

found that the “plain meaning of the provision” a llowed multipl e pena lties. Id. at 304-05. I n W halen , the Supreme Court applied the Blockburge r test for the f

irst time to provisions defining compound and pr edicate offe ns es . 445 U.S. at 690-92 (using the Blockburge r te st t o deter mine whether

provisions of the District of Columbia crimin al code a uthorized consecutive sentenc es for

rape and for

a killing c ommitt ed in the course of the rape ). The W halen Court held that Congr ess did not intend to a uthorize c onsecutive se ntence s beca use the Blockburge r

test reve aled that “convic tion for killing in the course of a rape cannot be had without proving all the eleme nts ofNo. 06-3857

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O. R.C . § 29 41 .2 5 M ult ipl e Counts pr ov ide s: 5 (A) Wher e the same conduc t by defe ndant ca

n be construe d to constitute two or more a lli e d o ff e ns e s o f s imi lar i mpo rt , th e ind ic tme nt o r i nf or ma tio n ma

y c on ta in c ounts for a ll such offe nses, but the def endant may

be convic ted of only

one. (B ) Where the defe ndant’s conduc t constitutes t wo or more of fense s of dissimil ar import, or wher e this conduct results in two or more of fense s of the same or similar kind committed separatel y o r wi th a sepa rate animus as to eac h, the indictment or information may

contain counts for

all such off

enses, a nd the def

end an t may

be c on vic te d o f a ll o f t

he m. - 9 - the offe nse of r ape.” Id. a t 69 3- 94 . T he ma jor ity re ite ra te d th a t Blockburge r should be applied to the particula r statutory

provisions at issue and not “to t he facts allege d in a particular indictment.” Id. at 694 & n.8.

C. Statutory Constr uction Utiliz ing the test for statutory construction set for

th in Rance , Ohio courts have conclude d that the state leg islature intended to pe rmit c umulative punishments for both robber y and ag g ravated robber y . I n Rance , th e Sup re me Court of Oh io l oo ke d f

ir st t o th e state ’s mul ti- c ount s ta tut e , O .R. C. § 2941.25, to discern whe ther the le g islature intended for the possibility that a def endant c ould be 5 convicted a

nd punished for more than one “allied offense.” Under that statute, a de fenda

nt can be punis he d f

or c ri me s o f d iss imi lar i mpo rt , id. § 2941.25(A), or for c rim es o f si milar import if the de fe nd ant co mmi tte d th e m se pa rate ly or wi th s e pa rate anim us , id. § 2941.25(B ). Rance , 710 N.E.2d at 7 0 3

. To deter

mine whether

a cr ime involved allied offe nses of similar or dissimilar import, a court mu s t co n s i der w hether “the e lements of the c rimes cor respond to such a

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- 10 - commission of one crime will result i n the commi ssion of t he other .” Id. (interna l quotation marks omitted). I f so, then the c rimes ar e of similar import and a d ef en d an t ca n b e found guilty and punis he d f

or on ly on e un le ss h e c omm itt e d th e c ri me s se pa rate ly or w it h separ a te anim

us . I f n ot, the n a de fe nd ant c an b e c on vic te d o f bot h und e r O. R.C . § 29 41 .2 5( A) . T he Sup re me Court of Oh io explained that “the compa rison of elem en t s o f offe nses outlined in Blockburge r is r e fl e c te d in [ O. ] R

. C

. § 2 9 4 1

. 2 5 (A )” an d , t h er ef o re , “c as es d i s cu s s i n g an d ap p l y i n g Blockburge r

are h e lpf ul, though not c ontrolling, in [its ] ex amination of Ohio law.” Id. As noted in its decision on direc t a ppeal, the Court of Appea ls of Ohio has considere d on two

e arl ie r o c c a sio ns wh e the r r ob be ry and a g grava te d r ob be ry

we re a lli e d c ri me s o f s imi lar i mpo rt
. Ap p l y i n g Rance i ne a c h c a s e , t h e C o u rto f A p p e a l s c o n c l u d e d t h a tt h e t w o o f f e n s e s w e r e n o t
. In State v. Norman , 738 N.E.2d 403 (Ohio Ct. App. 1999), the de fenda nt, like Palmer, had be en convicted of

robber y under O .R.C. § 2911.02(A)(2) and ag g ravated robbe ry under O .R.C. § 2911.01(A)( 1). The c ourt ana ly zed the two su b s ec t i ons in the abstrac t and conc luded that ea ch require d proof of an element not require d in the other. Norman , 738 N.E.2d at 416. Under the state’s

m u l t i

- c o u n ts t a tu t e ( a s i n t e r p r e t e d b y Rance ), the two off

enses we re not a llied offen ses of similar import. Id. at 416-17. Thus, the def endant in Norman could be subjec t to cumulative punishment f o r t h e t w o o f

f e n s e s w i t h o u t v i o l a t i n g d o u b l e j e o p ar dy. Id. Th e state a pp e llate c ourt

he ld s imi larl y in the subsequent ca se of Sta te v . B e rry , Nos. C-990354/5, 2000 WL 376409, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 14, 2000) ( “An e lement of a g g ravated robbe ry , viz., brandishing or using a deadly wea pon, was not require d to prove robbe ry . An eleme nt of robber y , v i z ., the infliction, attempted infliction, orNo. 06-3857

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- 11 - thr e a te ne d in fl ic tio n o f p hy sic a l ha rm , wa s not r e qu ir e d to pr ov e a g g ra vate d r ob be ry . E a c h o ff

e ns e require d proof of

an ele ment that the other did not.”)

. Up on re c og nizi ngtha

t Oh io c ourt s h a ve c le arl y ans we re d th e qu e sti on

of le g isl a tiv e int e nt, our role is at an end. In Ba nn e r v . D av is , a case involving a simil ar double-jeopa rdy claim on habea s revie w, this court explaine d , “F or the purpose of double jeopa rdy analy sis, once a state cour t has de te rm ine d th a t th e state le g isl a tur e int e nd e d c umu la tiv e punis hme nts , a fe de ra l ha

be a s c ourt

mus t de fe r to th at deter

min a tio n. ” 88 6 F .2 d 7 77 , 7 80 (6 th C ir . 1 98 9) . We c ann ot i nd e pe nd e ntl y a pp ly ty pical rules of statutory

construction, including the Blockburge r test, to a state statute a

nd conclude that the state courts wer e wrong in the ir rea ding of leg islative intent. McCloud v. De ppisch , 409 F.3d 86 9, 87 5 (7t

h Cir. 20 05 ) (“ Th e state c ourt ’s us e of the Sup re me Court ’s Blockburge r test does not g ive a toehold into its ex amination of leg islative inte n t
. . . . [The Blockburge r te st] is no t a constitutional test in and of itself. Rather, it is simpl y a mea ns o f ev aluating leg islative intent.”). As lon g a s th e state c ourt ha s c on c lud e d th a t th e le g isl a tur e int e nd e d c umu la tiv e punis hme nt, thi s court is bound by

that conclusion. Banner , 886 F.2d at 782 (“Contrar y to [ the petitioner’s] asser

tion, then, we ma

y not use the Blockburge r te st— a ru le of statut or y c on str uc tio n f or fe de ra l st a tut e s—

to independe ntly

evaluate the scope of the Te n n es s ee s tatute her e, the Te nnessee Court of Criminal Appea ls and Supreme Court havingalre ady held that the leg islature intended c umulative puni sh men t. ”); see also Ohio v. J ohnson , 467 U.S. 493, 499 (1984) (“ We acc ept, as we must, the Ohio Supreme Court’s de termination that the Ohio leg islature did not intend cumulative punishment fo r the tw o pa ir s of c ri me s in vo lve d h e re .” ); c f. Pry or v . R os e , 724 F.2d 525, 531 (6th Cir. 1984) (e nNo. 06-3857

Palmer v. H

aviland

- 12 - banc) (finding that the state c ou rt h ad inferr ed leg islative intent and had not shown that the leg islature “c lear ly

indicated” multipl e punishments wer e intended)

. Othe r c ir c uit s h a ve sim ila rl y he ld t hat th e y are bo un d b y

state c ourt

int e rp re ta tio ns of

state la w a uthor izi ng multipl e punishments. For example, in McCloud , th e S ev en t h C i rc u i tconclude d that the petit ioner’s double-jeopar dy claim was prec luded by a Wisconsin court’s re ading of leg islative intent. The state c ourt had concluded that the l eg islature had authorized multi ple punishments for the offen s es o f wh i ch the pe titioner had bee n convicted. McCloud , 409 F.3d at 876. Whether the state cour t’s rea ding w as in some sense “ corr ect” was b ey o n d t h e federal c ourt’s “pur view as a n interpre tation of state law.” Id. The Seve nth Circuit noted that it “might have a diffe rent c ase if” the state cour t had dee med leg islative intent ir rele vant or, rathe r, had found that the leg islature had not int e nd e d mu lti ple punis hme nts bu t th a t th e pe tit ion e r’ s mu lti ple punis hme nts we re no nethe le ss

acc eptable despite the Double Jeopardy Clause. Id. “ Suc h n oti on s, ” the c ourt e xpla ine d, “ imp lic a te fe de ra l c on sti tut ional prin c ipl e s a s o pp os e d to the int e nt o f t he state le g isl a tor s w ho e na c te d s ta te law, [and] would be within [i ts] power to addre ss in a habea s proce eding .” Id. Th e state c ourt did nothing like that, howeve r, but instea d “re cog nized that the fede ral constitutional q u es t i o n t urned on the leg islature’s intent.” Id. Th e state c ourt “ c on du c te d a

n a pp ro pri ate inq

uir y int o th a t in te nt, and conc luded that the leg islature had authorized multipl e punishments for r obbery and oper ating

a ve hic le wi tho ut the ow ne r’ s con se nt. Th a t ans we r c los e [d] th e do or on [the pe tit ion e r’ s] do ub le jeopar dy claim,” a ccor ding to the Seve nth Circuit. Id. ; see also Birr v. Shillinger , 894 F.2d 1160, 1162 (10th Cir. 1990) (“ The [Wy oming Supre me Court] majority ’s interpre tation of the leg islative intent for the imposition of multi ple punishments is binding on this court irr espec tive of the view sNo. 06-3857

Palmer v. H

aviland

- 13 - of [that c ourt ’s ] d iss e nte rs . . . . [W]e fi nd no vio la tio n of the do ub le je op ard

y c la us e .” ); Deloach v

. W ainwright , 777 F.2d 1524, 1525- 26 (11th Cir. 1985) (c oncluding that it was bound by a finding by the Flor ida S u p re m e Court that the Florida leg islature intended multiple punishments for fe lony murder a nd the under ly ing f

elony ). The Court of Appe als of Ohio held that the state leg isl at u re intended for cumulative punishments for robbe ry

and ag g ravated r o b b er y . I n d oing so, it re lied upon the test for statutory construction set for

th by the Supreme Court of Ohio. Whil e both the majority and the dissent voice d

conce rns about the soundness of the Rance test, the majority corr ectly noted that it was bound by that decision unless and until the Supreme Court of Ohio takes up the issue ag ain. J oh ns on v . M

ic ro so ft Corp. , 805 N.E.2d 179, 181-82 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004) (explaining that whe n fac ed with controlling

a uth or ity by a su pe ri or c ourt and ano the r l ine of

de c isi on s, a c ourt of

a pp e a ls h a s o nly

on e c ours e —to follow the authority

of the court to which it is inferior , leaving to the hi g her c ourt the pre rog ative of

overr uling its own decisions). As the s tate appe llate cour t clear ly held that multiple punishm ents for the two cr imes are permissible under O hio law, the st ate trial court did not violate Palmer’s fe dera l rig ht ag ainst double jeopar dy

.

III For the re asons set for

th above, we AFF I RM the district court’s d en i al of a w rit of habe as corpus in this case

.