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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAIʻI

---o0o---

STATE OF HAWAIʻI,

Respondent/Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

SIRIPORN NILSAWIT, 

Respondent/Defendant-Appellee,

and

HAWAII NEWS NOW, 

Petitioner/Applicant-Appellant.

 

SCWC-15-0000372

CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS

(CAAP-15-0000372; CASE NO. 1DCW-14-0001187)

NOVEMBER 10, 2016

RECKTENWALD, C.J., NAKAYAMA, McKENNA, POLLACK, AND WILSON, JJ.

OPINION OF THE COURT BY POLLACK, J.

The issue we resolve in this case is the manner in 

which a district court’s decision regarding a request for 

Electronically Filed

Supreme Court

SCWC-15-0000372

10-NOV-2016

03:08 PM
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extended coverage can be appealed. We hold that where the 

request for extended coverage originates from a member of the 

media, review of a district court’s decision regarding that 

request is limited to the procedure set forth in the Rules of 

the Supreme Court of the State of Hawaii (RSCH) Rule 5.1(f)(8). 

Relatedly, there is also no independent statutory authority that 

would allow the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) to review 

the district court’s decision.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A. District Court Proceedings

On April 29, 2014, Hawaii News Now (HNN) submitted an 

application for extended coverage1 to the District Court of the 

First Circuit (district court) for the criminal case, State v. 

Nilsawit, No. 1DCW–14–0001187 (Application for Extended 

Coverage). The district court granted HNN’s Application for 

Extended Coverage on the same day.

2 Among the circumstances

surrounding the criminal case was the controversy regarding the 

Honolulu Police Department’s then practice of allowing 

undercover police officers to engage in sexual conduct with 

 

1 “‘Extended coverage’ means any recording or broadcasting of 

proceedings through the use of television, radio, photographic, or recording 

equipment by the media or on behalf of educational institutions.” RSCH Rule 

5.1(c)(2) (2014).

2 The Honorable Russel S. Nagata presided. 
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persons selling sexual services during sting operations. On May 

16, 2014, the State submitted its objection to HNN’s Application 

for Extended Coverage (First Objection), which sought to 

prohibit HNN from televising or publishing a picture of the face 

or likeness of Officer Paul Goo, the officer involved in the 

events that culminated in the arrest of Siriporn Nilsawit. HNN 

thereafter submitted a Renewed Application for Extended Coverage 

(Renewed Application) on October 20, 2014. HNN requested that 

the district court deny any objection from a party in the 

criminal case and affirm the previously issued order that 

allowed HNN the right to full and complete coverage of the 

criminal proceeding, including the filming, televising, and 

photographing of Officer Goo and Nilsawit.

Nilsawit filed a Reply to the Renewed Application, 

which sought to preclude coverage of Nilsawit’s face. 

Nilsawit’s Reply did not object to HNN’s request to televise and 

publish Officer Goo’s face. The State filed its Objection to 

the Renewed Application (Second Objection), which expanded upon 

the First Objection and requested that the faces of Officers 

Goo, Caesar Lazaro, Ilso Pratt, Herbert Soria, and Zachary 

Plevel be excluded from HNN’s coverage. HNN submitted its Reply 

in Support of the Renewed Application, contending that neither 
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the State and Nilsawit provided no evidence in support of their 

objections to HNN’s Renewed Application. 

A hearing on HNN’s Renewed Application took place on 

November 14, 2014, and on that day, the district court issued 

its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law for Hawaii News 

Now’s Application for Extended Coverage and Order (FOF/COL). 

The court cited RSCH Rule 5.1(f)(3) and (5),

3 which enumerates 

 

3 RSCH Rule 5.1(f)(3) provides the following:

(3) A judge shall grant requests for extended coverage 

or extended audio coverage of a proceeding unless, by a 

preponderance of the evidence, good cause is found to 

prohibit such coverage. In situations where the judge has 

found good cause to prohibit extended coverage or extended 

audio coverage, the judge may permit extended coverage or 

extended audio coverage of only a portion or portions of 

the proceeding.

RSCH Rule 5.1(f)(3) (2014).

RSCH Rule 5.1(f)(5) states as follows:

(5) A presumption of good cause shall exist in the following 

circumstances:

(i) the proceeding is for the purpose of determining 

the admissibility of evidence; or

(ii) testimony regarding trade secrets is being 

received; or

(iii) testimony of child witnesses is being received; 

or

(iv) testimony of a complaining witness in a 

prosecution for any sexual offense under Part V of the 

Hawaii Penal Code is being received; or

(v) a witness would be put in substantial jeopardy of 

serious bodily injury; or

(continued . . .)
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instances in which a presumption of good cause exists for not 

allowing extended coverage. The district court found that

Officers Goo, Lazaro and Plevel were involved in ongoing 

undercover investigations such that, by a preponderance of the 

evidence, good cause existed to prohibit the extended coverage 

requested. Consequently, the court prohibited HNN from 

televising or publishing the faces or likenesses of Officers 

Goo, Lazaro, and Plevel, unless the faces of the officers were 

blurred or otherwise made indistinguishable. Finally, the 

district court determined that HNN could publish the names of 

witnesses in the criminal case, including the names of Officers 

Goo, Lazaro, and Plevel.

On January 21, 2015, relying on RSCH Rule 5.1(f)(9),4

HNN filed a motion for leave to appeal the district court’s 

FOF/COL to the ICA. The district court denied HNN’s motion

(Order Denying Leave to Appeal), reasoning that HNN exceeded the 

 

(. . . continued)

(vi) testimony of undercover law enforcement agents 

who are involved in other ongoing undercover 

investigations is being received. 

RSCH Rule 5.1(f)(5) (2014). 

4 “A party may seek appellate review of an order regarding extended 

coverage, including any such order issued by the administrative judge, 

pursuant to the procedures available for review of other interlocutory 

orders, but immediate appellate review of such an order shall not be 

available as a matter of right.” RSCH Rule 5.1(f)(9) (2014). 
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five-day period within which a motion for review of an order 

regarding coverage must be filed under RSCH Rule 5.1(f)(8).

5 The 

district court entered its Notice of Entry of Judgment And/Or 

Order in the criminal case on April 1, 2015. 

B. Appellate Proceedings 

HNN appealed to the ICA from the FOF/COL and the Order 

Denying Leave to Appeal. In its opening brief, HNN contended 

that the district court’s factual findings provided an 

insufficient basis for limiting HNN’s extended coverage “because 

they include no basis from which the State could have overcome 

the presumption in favor of extended coverage contained in RSCH

Rule 5.1(f)(3).” HNN also asserted that the Order Denying Leave 

to Appeal was erroneous because it was based on HNN’s decision 

not to seek administrative review of the FOF/COL, a course of 

 

5 RSCH Rule 5.1(f)(8) provides as follows:

The media or educational institution or any party may 

obtain review of an order regarding extended coverage by 

filing a motion for review addressed to the appropriate 

administrative judge, who shall have full power to vacate 

and modify the order. A motion for review shall be filed 

no later than 5 days after the filing of the order 

regarding coverage. In disposing of the motion for review 

the administrative judge shall comply with subdivision 

(f)(2) of this Rule. The record of the proceeding before 

the administrative judge shall be made part of the record 

of the underlying proceeding for which coverage is sought. 

Where a request for extended coverage is initially referred 

to an administrative judge and ruled upon, there shall be 

no further review. 

RSCH Rule 5.1(f)(8) (2014).
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action that HNN argued did not affect its right to appeal 

pursuant to RSCH Rule 5.1(f)(9). 

The State, in its answering brief, contended that the 

appeal was already moot because Nilsawit pleaded no contest to 

the charge, and consequently, there was not and there never will 

be a trial for which HNN could provide extended coverage. The 

State argued that the issue does not fall under the “capable of 

repetition, yet evading review” exception to the mootness 

doctrine because HNN could have filed (as it did in a previous 

case) a petition for a writ of prohibition and/or mandamus to 

this court if it wanted to appeal the FOF/COL. On the merits, 

the State contended that the evidence it adduced showed that a 

presumption of good cause pursuant to RSCH Rule 5.1(f)(5)

existed to prohibit the publication of the pictures of the 

undercover officers. In its reply brief, HNN contended that its

appeal satisfied the requirements of both the “capable of 

repetition, yet evading review” and public interest exceptions 

to the mootness doctrine.

The ICA resolved the appeal on jurisdictional grounds,

concluding that RSCH Rule 5.1(f)(8) is the exclusive procedure 

through which “[t]he media or educational institution” could 

seek “review of a court’s order regarding a request for extended 
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coverage.” State v. Nilsawit, 137 Hawaii 214, 216, 367 P.3d 

708, 710 (App. 2016) (quoting RSCH Rule 5.1(f)(8)). The ICA 

held that the alternative avenue provided by RSCH Rule 5.1(f)(9) 

was not available to HNN because it is not a “party” pursuant to 

RSCH Rule 5.1(c)(7), which defines “party” as “a named litigant 

of record who has appeared in the case.” Id. (quoting RSCH Rule 

5.1(c)(7)). Hence, the ICA concluded that “HNN was required to 

comply with the procedures under RSCH Rule 5.1(f)(8) in order to 

appeal a court’s order on extended coverage.” Id. Because HNN 

failed to file its motion for review within the five-day period 

to the administrative judge of the district court as required 

under RSCH Rule 5.1(f)(8), the ICA dismissed HNN’s appeal for 

lack of jurisdiction. Id.

In its application for writ of certiorari to this 

court, HNN contends that it was not bound by RSCH Rule 5.1(f)(8) 

because it is a “party” to this case, thereby allowing HNN to 

proceed under RSCH Rule 5.1(f)(9).

6 In support of its assertion 

that it is a party, HNN maintains that it litigated its 

Application for Extended Coverage and the Renewed Application

against the State and Nilsawit, it participated in the district 

 

6 We note that HNN’s application exceeds the twelve-page limit 

prescribed by Hawaii Rules of Appellate Procedure (HRAP) Rule 40.1(d). 

Counsel is cautioned that violations of the HRAP may result in sanctions. 
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court proceedings through its counsel, and it was frequently 

identified as a party in various documents in the record and in 

notices filed by the district court. As an additional basis for 

appellate review, HNN argues that the ICA has jurisdiction over 

its appeal pursuant to HRS § 641-1 (1993 & Supp. 2004) and that 

the ICA erred by completely ignoring HRS § 641-1 as a basis for 

its jurisdiction. On the merits, HNN makes the same arguments

it made in the ICA. 

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

“The existence of jurisdiction is a question of law 

that we review de novo under the right/wrong standard.” Lingle 

v. Haw. Gov’t Emps. Ass’n, 107 Hawaii 178, 182—83, 111 P.3d 587, 

591—92 (2005). Construction of rules promulgated by this court 

is also reviewed de novo. Barcai v. Betwee, 98 Hawaii 470, 479, 

50 P.3d 946, 955 (2002).

III. DISCUSSION 

The central issue on certiorari is whether the ICA has 

jurisdiction over HNN’s appeal. HNN proffers two alternate 

theories supporting the ICA’s jurisdiction: (1) HNN has the

right to appeal pursuant to RSCH Rule 5.1(f)(9), and (2) HRS § 

641-1 provides an independent source of jurisdiction to the ICA. 
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A. Appellate Rights Pursuant to RSCH Rule 5.1

HNN argues that it was not limited to the procedure 

provided by RSCH Rule 5.1(f)(8) in seeking appellate review of 

the FOF/COL and that RSCH Rule 5.1(f)(9) is an available 

alternative in obtaining appellate review. RSCH Rule 5.1(f)(9) 

provides as follows: 

A party may seek appellate review of an order regarding 

extended coverage, including any such order issued by the 

administrative judge, pursuant to the procedures available 

for review of other interlocutory orders, but immediate 

appellate review of such an order shall not be available as 

a matter of right. 

RSCH Rule 5.1(f)(9) (emphasis added). The plain language of 

RSCH Rule 5.1(f)(9) limits the availability of interlocutory 

appeal to parties. Hence, HNN could utilize the procedure 

contained in RSCH Rule 5.1(f)(9) only if it is a party. RSCH 

Rule 5.1(c)(7) defines a “party” as “a named litigant of record 

who has appeared in the case.” Contrary to HNN’s assertion, HNN 

is not a named litigant of record; only the State and Nilsawit 

are. The fact that HNN’s attorney appeared on its behalf for 

the limited purpose of litigating HNN’s Application for Extended 

Coverage; that HNN was identified in several pleadings, orders, 

and notices; that HNN was served online filing notices; and that 

the record referred to HNN as a “party” numerous times did not 

transform HNN into a named litigant of record because, 

essentially, this is a criminal case by the State against 
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Nilsawit, the only two named litigants of record under RSCH Rule 

5.1(c)(7). Indeed, the caption of the case for the two orders 

that HNN appealed to the ICA includes only the State and 

Nilsawit.7 

This conclusion is supported by the fact that “media” 

is defined separately by the RSCH as “any news gathering or 

reporting agencies and the individual persons involved, and 

includes newspapers, radio, television, radio and television 

networks, news services, magazines, trade papers, in-house 

publications, professional journals, or other news reporting or 

news gathering agencies whose function it is to inform the 

public or some segment thereof.” RSCH Rule 5.1(c)(10) (2014). 

Based on this definition, it is clear that HNN fits the 

definition of “media” and not the definition of a “party,” as

HNN is a news gathering or reporting agency. Hence, because HNN 

is not a party under RSCH Rule 5.1(c)(7), it was not authorized

to utilize the procedure provided by RSCH Rule 5.1(f)(9) in 

seeking an interlocutory appeal.

 

7 Although RSCH Rule 5.1(f)(4) provides that members of the media 

have “standing to be heard and . . . present evidence” in instances where a 

hearing is necessitated by an order of the court or a party’s objection to an 

application for extended coverage, even in such instances the members of the

media are not granted party status. RSCH Rule 5.1(f)(4) (2014).
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HNN, as a member of the media, could have timely 

sought administrative review of the FOF/COL pursuant to RSCH

Rule 5.1(f)(8), which states as follows:

The media or educational institution or any party may 

obtain review of an order regarding extended coverage by 

filing a motion for review addressed to the appropriate 

administrative judge, who shall have full power to vacate 

and modify the order. A motion for review shall be filed 

no later than 5 days after the filing of the order 

regarding coverage. In disposing of the motion for review 

the administrative judge shall comply with subdivision 

(f)(2) of this Rule. The record of the proceeding before 

the administrative judge shall be made part of the record 

of the underlying proceeding for which coverage is sought. 

Where a request for extended coverage is initially referred 

to an administrative judge and ruled upon, there shall be 

no further review.

RSCH Rule 5.1(f)(8) (emphases added). However, HNN did not 

utilize the procedure prescribed by RSCH Rule 5.1(f)(8) for 

obtaining administrative review of the FOF/COL. Instead, HNN 

filed a motion for leave to appeal the FOF/COL pursuant to RSCH

Rule 5.1(f)(9), which, as discussed, HNN was not authorized to 

do. 

B. Jurisdiction Under HRS § 641-1 

HNN also contends that the ICA has jurisdiction over 

this appeal pursuant to HRS § 641-1.8 The relevant portions of 

this statute provide as follows:

 

8 The ICA concluded that it lacked jurisdiction without discussing 

HNN’s assertion, in its statement of jurisdiction, that HRS § 641-1 provides 

the ICA with jurisdiction to review the FOF/COL and the Order Denying Leave 

to Appeal. 
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(a) Appeals shall be allowed in civil matters from 

all final judgments, orders, or decrees of circuit and 

district courts and the land court to the intermediate 

appellate court, subject to chapter 602.

(b) Upon application made within the time provided by 

the rules of court, an appeal in a civil matter may be 

allowed by a circuit court in its discretion from an order 

denying a motion to dismiss or from any interlocutory 

judgment, order, or decree whenever the circuit court may 

think the same advisable for the speedy termination of 

litigation before it. The refusal of the circuit court to 

allow an appeal from an interlocutory judgment, order, or 

decree shall not be reviewable by any other court.

HRS § 641-1 (emphases added). HNN’s argument fails for three

reasons: (1) it is not clear whether HNN’s appeal involves a 

“civil matter” within the meaning of HRS § 641-1; (2) even 

assuming that HNN’s appeal is a “civil matter,” the FOF/COL is 

not a final appealable judgment, order, or decree under this 

provision as required by HRS § 641-1(a); and (3) HRS § 641-1(b) 

does not allow interlocutory appeals of civil matters 

originating from the district court. 

As a general matter, HRS § 641-1 applies only if an 

appeal involves a civil matter. This court has previously 

construed “civil” to mean “noncriminal” unless there is an 

indication that the legislature has given that word a different 

meaning. See Application of Sanborn, 57 Haw. 585, 588 n.1, 562 

P.2d 771, 773 n.1 (1977). Black’s Law Dictionary defines 

“civil” as “[o]f, relating to, or involving private rights and 

remedies that are sought by action or suit, as distinct from 
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criminal proceedings.” Civil, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 

2014). Black’s defines “civil action” as “[a]n action brought 

to enforce, redress, or protect a private or civil right; a 

noncriminal litigation.” Action, Black’s, supra. 

Whether HNN’s request for extended coverage--the 

subject of the appeal to the ICA--is a civil matter raises a 

significant question. On the one hand, the dispute in this 

appeal is between HNN and the parties in the underlying criminal 

case, and the subject matter of the dispute--the scope of HNN’s 

extended coverage--is noncriminal; to this extent, it is 

arguably a civil matter. On the other hand, the matter raised 

by this appeal is part and parcel of the underlying criminal 

case on which HNN wishes to gain extended coverage, and the 

extended coverage has at least the potential to affect matters 

in the criminal action. In this way, this case may not be 

entirely “civil” in character. See Civil, Black’s, supra. In 

any event, whether HNN’s request for extended coverage is a 

“civil matter” need not be resolved because, even assuming that 

it is, HNN still cannot appeal from the FOF/COL under any of the 

subsections of HRS § 641-1.

The FOF/COL cannot be appealed under HRS § 641-1(a) 

because it is not “final” as required by that subsection. RSCH

Rule 5.1(f)(9) specifies that “an order regarding extended 
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coverage” is an interlocutory order. See RSCH Rule 5.1(f)(9) 

(stating that “[a] party may seek appellate review of an order 

regarding extended coverage, including any such order issued by 

the administrative judge, pursuant to the procedures available 

for review of other interlocutory orders” (emphasis added)). 

Therefore, even assuming that HNN’s request for extended 

coverage is a civil matter, the FOF/COL that resolved the case

cannot be appealed to the ICA as a matter of right pursuant to 

HRS § 641-1(a).

In addition, assuming that HNN’s request for extended 

coverage is a civil matter, the FOF/COL, which, as discussed, is 

interlocutory in nature, is not appealable under HRS § 641-1(b). 

The plain language of HRS § 641-1(b) does not appear to permit 

an appeal from a district court’s interlocutory order arising 

from a civil matter; the statute specifically limits appeals 

from a civil interlocutory judgment, order, or decree to those 

rendered by the circuit court. HRS § 641-1(b) (“[A]n appeal in 

a civil matter may be allowed by a circuit court in its 

discretion from an order denying a motion to dismiss or from any 

interlocutory judgment, order, or decree whenever the circuit 

court may think the same advisable for the speedy termination of 

litigation before it.” (Emphases added)). Hence, assuming that 

this appeal involves a district court civil matter under HRS § 
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641-1(b), the ICA would still not have jurisdiction over HNN’s 

appeal because, at the outset, the FOF/COL in this case does not 

qualify for interlocutory appeal pursuant to HRS § 641-1(b).9 

C. The Jurisdictional Analysis of the ICA and the District 

Court is Based on an Incorrect Reading of RSCH Rule 5.1

On appeal, the ICA held that it lacked appellate 

jurisdiction over the case because HNN did not follow RSCH Rule 

5.1(f)(8). This holding implies that, had HNN complied with 

RSCH Rule 5.1(f)(8), the ICA would have had jurisdiction to 

review the FOF/COL and the Order Denying Leave to Appeal. 

Nilsawit, 137 Hawaii at 216, 367 P.3d at 710 (“HNN was required 

 

9 The same is true if it were assumed that this case is criminal in 

nature because “there is no analogous statute authorizing interlocutory 

appeals from the district courts in criminal matters.” State v. Ontiveros, 

82 Hawaii 446, 449, 923 P.2d 388, 391 (1996)); State v. Valiani, 57 Haw. 133, 

134-35, 552 P.2d 75, 76 (1976) (“There is, however, no statutory warrant for 

interlocutory appeals in criminal cases from district courts.”). These cases 

involved the interpretation of HRS § 641-17, which, at the time when the 

cases were decided, provided as follows: 

Upon application made within the time provided by the rules 

of court, an appeal in a criminal matter may be allowed to 

a defendant from the circuit court to the supreme court 

from a decision denying a motion to dismiss or from other 

interlocutory orders, decisions or judgments, whenever the 

judge in his discretion may think the same advisable for a 

more speedy termination of the case. The refusal of the 

judge to allow an interlocutory appeal to the supreme court 

shall not be reviewable by any other court.

HRS § 641-17 (Supp. 1975) (emphasis added). It is noted that the State, in a 

district court criminal case, is authorized to file an interlocutory appeal 

in specified instances that do not include an appeal from an order involving 

extended coverage. HRS § 641-13 (Supp. 2006).
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to comply with the procedures under RSCH Rule 5.1(f)(8) in order 

to appeal a court’s order on extended coverage.”). However, 

RSCH Rule 5.1(f)(8) does not by its own terms provide an avenue 

for appeal following the administrative judge’s review, and in 

fact it provides that if the extended coverage decision was 

initially referred to and ruled upon by the administrative 

judge, then “there shall be no further review” of that decision. 

RSCH Rule 5.1(f)(8). The limitation that inheres in RSCH Rule 

5.1(f)(8) is qualified only to the extent that RSCH Rule 

5.1(f)(9) allows a party to file a motion for leave to appeal 

from an order issued by an administrative judge. RSCH Rule 

5.1(f)(9). Thus, in cases where a member of the media requests 

administrative review, the plain language of subsections (f)(8) 

and (f)(9) of RSCH Rule 5.1 does not allow further appeal to the 

ICA or to this court of the administrative judge’s ruling. See

Kahoohanohano v. Dep’t of Human Servs., 117 Hawaii 262, 288, 178 

P.3d 538, 564 (2008) (stating that the fundamental starting 

point in statutory interpretation is the language of the statute 

itself). Accordingly, while the ICA was correct in holding that 

it lacked appellate jurisdiction, it erred in implying that its 

lack of jurisdiction stems from HNN’s failure to follow the 

procedure under RSCH Rule 5.1(f)(8). The ICA would still have 
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had no jurisdiction over HNN’s appeal even if HNN strictly 

complied with RSCH Rule 5.1(f)(8) because this subsection does 

not provide an independent authority to appeal an administrative 

judge’s decision and categorically proscribes nonparties from 

seeking further review of such a decision. Thus, in that 

situation, HNN would be precluded from seeking leave to appeal 

pursuant to RSCH Rule 5.1(f)(9) as it is not a party and

because, as discussed supra, there is no statutory authority 

that would have allowed HNN to appeal to the ICA from an 

interlocutory order issued by the district court.

The ICA’s pronouncement that it had no appellate 

jurisdiction, and its underlying reasoning, appears to encompass 

the Order Denying Leave to Appeal. However, the reason for the 

ICA’s lack of jurisdiction over the Order Denying Leave to 

Appeal is not because of HNN's noncompliance with RSCH Rule 

5.1(f)(8); it is simply because such an order is not appealable. 

See generally HRS § 641-1(b) (“The refusal of the circuit court 

to allow an appeal from an interlocutory judgment, order, or 

decree shall not be reviewable by any other court.”); HRS § 641-

17 (“The refusal of the judge to allow an interlocutory appeal 

to the appellate court shall not be reviewable by any other 

court.”). Hence, even if HNN followed RSCH Rule 5.1(f)(8), the 

Order Denying Leave to Appeal would still not be appealable. 
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The district court also erred in the reasons it 

provided in denying HNN’s motion for leave to appeal filed 

pursuant to RSCH Rule 5.1(f)(9). Contrary to the district 

court’s reasoning, HNN’s motion for leave to appeal should have 

been denied not because “HNN exceeded the five (5) day period to 

file a motion for review of an order regarding coverage in 

violation of Rule 5.1(f)(8).” Instead, HNN was precluded from 

proceeding under RSCH 5.1(f)(9) because it was not a party and 

there is no statutory right to appeal from an interlocutory 

judgment, order, or decree entered by the district court in 

civil cases, see HRS § 641-1(b), and, similarly, in criminal 

cases (except by the State in prescribed instances), see supra

note 9; HRS §§ 641-13, 641-17. Thus, even assuming that HNN had 

adhered to the administrative review process outlined in RSCH 

Rule 5.1(f)(8), the district court would still have had to deny 

HNN’s motion for leave to appeal filed pursuant to RSCH Rule 

5.1(f)(9). 

Based on the foregoing, HNN does not have a right to

appeal, pursuant to HRS § 641-1(a), from the district court’s 

FOF/COL. Nor can HNN seek leave to appeal to the ICA pursuant 

to RSCH Rule 5.1(f)(9) because it is not a party and, under HRS 

§§ 641-1(b), 641-13, and 641-17, appeals from all civil 

interlocutory orders and from criminal interlocutory orders
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entered by the district court are not permitted, except as noted 

supra. Thus, HNN’s only opportunity for review of the FOF/COL 

would have been to seek administrative review pursuant to RSCH 

Rule 5.1(f)(8).10

D. Media Entities Have Alternative Avenues to Seek Redress

HNN and the media, under circumstances similar to this 

case, may commence an original proceeding in this court by 

filing an application for a writ of mandamus and/or prohibition.

In cases where a court enters an order that “is not immediately 

appealable or related to the merits” of the underlying 

proceeding--circumstances that appear to be present in this 

case--this court has intimated that “mandamus is the appropriate 

remedy.” Kema v. Gaddis, 91 Hawaii 200, 204—05, 982 P.2d 334, 

338—39 (1999); see State v. Hamili, 87 Hawaii 102, 104, 952 P.2d 

390, 392 (1998) (stating that where there is no right to appeal, 

a mandamus petition is the appropriate vehicle for challenging a 

 

10 Notably, HRS § 602-4 (1993) establishes this court’s inherent 

authority to control litigation before it. HRS § 602-4 states that “[t]he 

supreme court shall have the general superintendence of all courts of 

inferior jurisdiction to prevent and correct errors and abuses therein where 

no other remedy is expressly provided by law.” HRS § 602-4; see State v. Ui, 

66 Haw. 366, 370, 663 P.2d 630, 633 (1983) (stating that the court may 

exercise its supervisory power under HRS § 602-4 but declining to do so 

because the circuit court did not err in interpreting the statute involved); 

see, e.g., Gannett Pac. Corp. v. Richardson, 59 Haw. 224, 227, 580 P.2d 49, 

53 (1978) (trial court’s closure of hearing to public necessitated this 

court’s exercise of its supervisory power). HNN does not request this court 

to exercise its supervisory power in this case, and thus, the potential 

application of this statute need not be reached. 
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21

trial court’s actions alleged to have been made without 

statutory authority); e.g., Oahu Publ’ns Inc. v. Ahn, 133 Hawaii

482, 488, 331 P.3d 460, 466 (2014) (using writs of mandamus and 

prohibition as vehicles to challenge the circuit court’s order 

sealing portions of court proceedings and closing the courtroom 

to the public). Accordingly, HNN and the media at large are not 

deprived of means to obtain redress, as they may apply for a 

writ of prohibition and/or mandamus in challenging a trial 

court’s order regarding extended coverage.11

IV. CONCLUSION

We hold that, other than by applying for an 

extraordinary writ to this court, the only avenue through which 

HNN could have sought review of the district court’s FOF/COL was 

by filing a motion for review addressed to the appropriate 

administrative judge, as prescribed by RSCH Rule 5.1(f)(8). In 

addition, RSCH Rule 5.1(f)(9) does not authorize HNN to move for 

an interlocutory appeal to the ICA as HNN is not a party in this 

case, and HRS § 641-1, under the facts of this case, does not 

provide an independent source of appellate jurisdiction to the 

ICA. Therefore, the ICA was correct in dismissing HNN’s appeal 

for lack of jurisdiction, but it erred in its reasoning. 

 

11 The merits of HNN’s appeal need not be reached in light of our 

disposition of this case. 
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22

Accordingly, the ICA Judgment on Appeal is affirmed for the 

reasons presented in this opinion.

Bruce D. Voss and

David R. Major

for petitioner

/s/ Mark E. Recktenwald

/s/ Paula A. Nakayama

/s/ Sabrina S. McKenna

/s/ Richard W. Pollack

/s/ Michael D. Wilson