~ 1:11:::: Tim U.S. ARMY AND THE REcoNS'IWC'I10N OF KUWAIT 

JANET A . M CDONNELl. 

Alter DESERT STORM 

The U.S. Army and the 

Reconstruction of Kuwait 

by 

janet A. McDonnell 

DEPARTMENT OF TI-lE ARMY 

WASHINGTON, D.C., 1999 
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data 

McDonnell, janet A., 1952-

After Desert Storm : the U.S. Army and the reconstruction of 

Kuwait I by Janet A. McDonnell. 

p. em. 

Includes bibliographical references (p. ) and index. 

I . United States. Army-Civic action. 2. Persian Gulf War, 

1991-Desnuction and pillage- Kuwait. I. Title. 

UH723.U54tvt33 1999 

953.67--dc21 99-14015 

ClP 

Ctvlll Pub 70-59 

EP870-l-58 

For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office 

Superintendent of Documents, Mail Stop: SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-9328 

ISBN 0-16-049770- 1 

ISBN 0-16-049770-1 

90000 

9 780160 497704 
Foreword 

One of the most striking feaLUres of Operation DESERT STORI\•I:S aftermath was the facility with which American soldiers transitioned from 

offensive warfare to humanitarian relief. Throughout history our soldiers-and the civilians who accompany them-have been quick to 

assist populations in need, whether the viclims of natural d isaster, military operations, or calculated oppression. The increasing number of 

noncombat military operations in recent years underscores the significance of this rehabilitative role of the American soldier. 

Not since World War ll had U.S. Army soldiers and civilians played 

as large a role in rebuildi ng a foreign nation as they did in Kuwait after 

the Gulf War. After DESERT STORM tells the compelling story of how the 

Army helped to bring a proud but battered country back to life. Our soldiers found themselves performing such diverse roles as repairing police 

cars, rebuilding damaged power systems, restoring the water supply, and 

feeding zoo animals. ln the process they touched the lives of every 

KLI\.vaiti resident, forging bonds of trust and contributing immeasurably 

to stability in the region. 

Though immensely successful, the Km.vaiti recovery operalion was 

not perfect; After DESERT STORM highlights key lessons learned. The 

reconstruction of Kuwait clearl y demonstrated that post-hostilities activities can be as imponam as conflict itself, and that military leaders must 

plan carefully for such a recovery mission if they are to capitalize fully 

on battlefield success. After DESERT STORM illuminates appropriate roles 

for American soldiers and civilians in a post-hostilities environmem. We 

would be wise to take its lessons to heart. 

jOE N. BALLARD 

Lieutenant General, USA 

Chief of Engi neers 

Washington, D.C. 

4 june 1999 

iii 

jOHNS. BROWN 

Brigadier General, USA 

Chief of Military History 
The Author 

Janel A. McDonnell, chief historian, Defense Logistics Agency, 

received her Ph.D. from Marqueue University. Dr. McDonnell has published The Dispossession of the American Indian: Indian Land Policy, 

1887-1934, as well as several articles on Indian land policy. As a senior 

historian with lhe U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, she published 

Supporting lhe Troops: Tile U.S. Army Corps of Engineers in the Persian Gulf 

War, The U.S. Army Corps c~f Engineers' Response 10 the Exxon Valdez Oil 

Spill, and Response to lhc Loma Prieta Ear£11quahe. She has wrillen brief 

histories of Hurricane Andrew and Operation RESTORL: ll cWI· (Somalia). 

iv 
Pre/ace 

The effort to rebuild Kuvvait was unique, complex, and challenging. 

The reconstruction was rooted in various aULhorities and paid for from 

various pots of money. Both the funding and the work itself were diffuse 

and diverse in unprecedemed ways. My goal was to give a structure and 

sense of order to the complex story or how a small , independent country recovered in record time from the devastating effects or a sevenmonth occupation by lraqi troops, in large part through the efforts of the 

U.S. Army. To promote greater order and clarity, l have presented the 

operation both topically and chronologically. 

This book originated in 1991 when I ¥vas documenting the US 

Army Corps of Engineers' involvement in the Persian Gulf War. 

Documenting the Corps' critical role in the Kuwait recovery operation 

after the end of the war was a natural progression. The Corps of 

Engineers, however, was not the only Army element with significant 

involvement in the recovery operalions. Recognizing this, the U.S. Army 

Cemer of Military History requested that 1 broaden my account Lo 

encompass the activities of the other Army elemems. 

The sLaty of how American soldiers, working alongside Kuwait's resiclems, helped bring the country back to life within a few short months is 

truly remarkable. I feel fonunate to have witnessed some of the recovery 

process firsthand, to have talked to some of the participants, and now to 

tell their story. I made two trips to Kuwait to collect records, interview 

participants, and tour project sites such as the Parliament Building and 

Doha power plant. l made the first trip into Kuvvait a week after the Iraqi 

withdrawal when the sky was still dark with smoke from the oil fires and 

water and electrical power were in short supply. There I marveled at the 

courage and commitment of the soldiers and civilians who worked in that 

dangerous and stressful environment. vVhen 1 returned the following 

September, few visible signs of the occupation remained. The city was 

again bustling, as residents went about their clay-to-day activities. There 

could be no better tribute to the hard work and dedication of the 

American soldiers and civilians and their Kuwaiti partners. 

As this project comes to a close, I have many to thank. Over the past 

six years, l have received continued assistance from many individuals at 

v 
the headquarters of the Army Corps of Engineers, the Corps' Transatlantic 

Programs Center, Task Force f reedom, Third U.S. Army, and the 

Pentagon. These individuals provided me with documents and patiently 

explained critical events or processes. I am panicularly indebted to retired 

Lt. Col. Michael Fisher, retired Lt. Col. Gordon Quesenberr>'.John jones, 

the G-3 staff at Third U.S. Army, officials in the Office of the Assistant 

Secretary of the Army for lnstallalions, Logistics and Environment, and 

the many individ uals at Transatlantic Programs Center. 

Retired Brig. Gen. Ralph Locurcio deserves special thanks. From its 

inception, he gave this project his enthusiastic support, read various 

drafts, and has waited patiently for its completion. Both Locurcio and 

retired Maj. Gen. Patrick Kelly LOOk time for interviews and gave me 

unrestricted access to their files and to their staffs. Like Locurcio, Kelly 

graciously reviewed the final manuscripL. 

Fonner Ambassador Edward Gnehm, Dr. Ibrahim AI-Shaheen, Maj. 

Gen. Howard Mooney, Maj. Gen. RobertS. Frix, and many other soldiers 

and civilians agreed to be interviewed and took time out of their often 

hectic schedules to share their insights, fill in factual details, or explain 

complex processes to me. Since the record of written documents was 

incomplete, their interviews became an invaluable source of information 

and perspective. 

Col. David E. Peixotto, Russell Plaisance, Wynne Fuller, and LL. Col. 

Albert F. Kaminsky-all key participants in the recovery operations-sat 

for interviews, read draft chapters, and provided comments. Maj. Gen. 

Howard Moone}'. Col. Ed King, and Col. Anhur H. Walz, who led the 

civil affairs effort in Kuwait, were particularly helpful in reviewing the 

chapters dealing with civil affairs activities. 

Several historians and many subject matter expens reviewed parts or 

all of the manuscript. Frank Schuben with the joint llistory Office read 

the entire manuscript and contributed his own keen perspective and 

analysis. Martin A. Reuss and Paul Walker of the Corps of Engineers 

Office of History read the entire manuscript and offered comments. joan 

Kibler at the Transatlantic Programs Center read the manuscript twice 

>vith a careful eye for detail. My friends and coworkers at the Corps of 

Engineers, Fran k Bizzoco, Harry Painton, and Jim Parker also read the 

draft manuscript. 

Jim Parker from the Corps' ofricc in Savannah, Georgia, who at the 

time was serving as General Kell}''s public affairs ofricer in Kuwait, made 

sure that l got where I needed to be during tn}' second visit. jonas 

Jordan, also from the Savannah office, provided almost all of the superb 

photographs that so vividly capture not only the damage in Kuwait but 

the strength and resilience of the Ku\.vaiti people. l am grateful to 

vi 
Marilyn Hunter for her skilled editing and unnagging enthusiasm for this 

project. At the Center of Military History, Beth MacKenzie and John 

Birmingham designed and formatted the book. Susan Carroll compiled 

the index. 

The views expressed in this volume are mine and do not refiect official 

policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. government. 

Washington, D.C. 

4 June 1999 

vii 

JANET A. McDONNELL 

Chaplet 

INTRODUCTION 

Contents 

Page 

3 

PROLOGUE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 

J. PLANN ING FOR EMERGENCY RESPONSE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 

Origins of I he l<uwail Emergency Recovc1y Program . . . . . . . . . 13 

The Pentc1gon Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 

Formation of the Kuwait Tash Porce . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 

Kuwait Iasl? Force Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 

Civil Affairs Operations Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Involvement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 

Kuwaiti and Kuwait Tasll Force Deployment 

to Saudi Arabia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 

2. PLANN ING IN THEATER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . 43 

The Kuwait Tash Force in TheCIWr . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 

CENTCOM Planningfor Civil-1\llilitcll)' Operations . . . . . . . . . . 4 7 

ARCEJ'.JT Planningfor Civii-Milita1y Operalions . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 

Ponnalion of tile Combined Civil !\[fairs Tasll Force . . . . . . . . . . 51 

Creation of Task Force Freedom . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 

Kuwait Emergency Recovel)' Office Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 

Tile Push Into Kuwait . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62 

3. EMERGENCY RESPONSE PI lASE: TASK FORCE FREEDOM.. 71 

Tash Force Freedom Elements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73 

Tash Force Freedom Missions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79 

Tash Force Freedom Command, Control, and Coordination . . . . . 91 

Tasl? Force Freedom/l<t11vaiti Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92 

Tash Force Freedom Closeout . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93 

EMERGENCY RESPONSE PHASE: THE PENTAGON . . . . . . . . . 99 

ix 
Clwpler Page 

4. EMERGENCY RESPONSE PHASE: l<UWAlT EMERGENCY 

RECOVERY OFFICE ACTIVITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107 

Coordination and Communicati.011 . .. . . . . .... 0 • • •• 0 • • • • • • 107 

Organizational Stn1cture .. . .. . . . 0 • • •••••• • •••• 0 • • • • • • 110 

Command and Control .. . . . 0 • • •• 0 • • • • •••• 0 ••• • 0 • • • • • • 117 

Damage Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119 

Corps Contracting Strategy .. 0 0 • 0 0 • 0 • 0 • 0 •• 0 0 0 ••• 0 0 ••• 0 • 120 

Contracting Activities . . . . .. 0 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 127 

Problems for Contractors . 0 ••• • •• • • • •• 0 ••• • 0 ••• • 0 • •• • 0 14 3 

Funding Authorities .. . ... .. . . .. 0 0 • • • •• • • • 0 • • • 0 • • • • • • 145 

SUPPORT TO EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL 

5. RECOVERY PHASE: THE DEFENSE RECONSTRUCTION 

ASSISTANCE OFFICE AND KUWAlT EMERGENCY 

149 

RECOVERY OFFICE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155 

Command, Control, and Communications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158 

Financial Managemenl/607 A Process .... . . . .. 0 ••• • 0 • • • • • 160 

Contracting Strategy .. . . . .. . .... . ......... 0 • • • • 0 • • • • • 166 

Contractingfor Civillnfrastnlcture Repair ....... . . 0 ••• 0 • 175 

FIGHTING KUWAIT'S OIL FIRES . . . . .. . ... . . o • • • • • • • • • • 183 

6. SUPPORTING KUWAIT'S MINISTRY OF DEFENCE . . 0 • • • 0 . 191 

Initial Damage Assessments . . ....... . . . 0 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 191 

Planning Foreign Militmy Sales Cases .for Defense Facilities . . . . 196 

Foreign Militmy Sales Case .for Phase I Air Base Work . . . . . . . . 202 

Foreign Militmy Sales Case for Phase II Air Base Wor/? . . . . . . . 205 

Construction Contracts for Phase I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 209 

Problems With Phase l Contracts . . . 0 • 0 •• • 0 •• 0 0 0 • • •• 0 • • • • 212 

SUPPORT TO U.S. TROOPS .. 0 • 0 • ••••• 0 •• • • • •••••• • ••• 217 

AFTERMATH . 0 ••• 0 0 ••• • •••••• • ••• • • 0 • 0 • • • • • • • • • • • • • 22 7 

CONCLUSION ... 0 •• • • 0 •• • 237 

ACRONYMS 243 

NOTES ........ . .. ... . ...... . ..... o •• • • • ••• o •••••• 245 

X 
Clwpter 

BIBLIOGHAPHY .. . .... . ........ . . . . . ............... . 275 

INDEX 

Tables 

No. 

I. Civil Arfairs Functional Areas 

2. Kuwait Task Force Teams .......................... . 

Charts 

283 

19 

28 

1. National Security Council . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 

2. Task Force Freedom . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 

3. U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78 

4. Kuwait Emergency Recovery Office, Emergency 

Response Phase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111 

5. Kuwait Emergency Recover>' Office, Recovery Phase . . . . . . . 114 

6. Ddense Reconstruction Assistance Office . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157 

7. 607 A Work Flow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163 

8. Kuwait Program Office . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 208 

Figures 

1. Overhead Power Distribmion System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129 

2. Main Roads . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133 

3. Water System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137 

4. Sanitary System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138 

Map 

1. Kuwait 14 

Illustrations 

Kuwaiti child in the ruins of the Seif Palace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 

Kuwaiti children celebrate liberation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 

Defaced monument to Saddam Hussein . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 

U.S. Ambassador Edward W Gnehm, Jr., 

with Col. Ralph V Locurcio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 

xi 
Pag..: 

Destroyed Iraqi Lank at Al-Magwa oil fi eld . . . . . . . 64 

Typical Iraqi-constructed bunker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 

lraqi artillery in downtown Kuwait City . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 

Damaged hotel in downtown Kuwait City . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 

Iraqi bunkers fortifying Kuwaiti beach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72 

Damage assessment team inspects Seif Palace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72 

Task Force Freedom headquaners . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74 

Checkpoim Charlie, southern Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75 

Power cable repair . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79 

Electrical contractors work on damaged power cables . . . . . . . 81 

Damaged facilities at Shll\.vaikh port . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85 

U.S. soldier f'eeds an injured elepham . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90 

KERO press briefing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108 

Corps member outside Seif Palace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112 

Kuvvaili volunteer at the Amiri Hospital . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ] 13 

Corps contractor and Kuvvaiti volunteer discuss road repair . . . . . 116 

U.S. and Kuwaiti engineers inspect electrical damage . . . . . . . . . . 128 

Assessing power line damage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130 

Ambassador Gnehm and Kuwaiti officials at the Doha 

power plant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131 

lraqi escape route toward Al-Abclaly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134 

Road repair south of Kuwait City . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134 

Contractors repair roads . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135 

Damaged conference center at Bayan Palace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141 

Unexploded ordnance in the desert . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150 

French marines remove mines and clear beach obstacles, 

Kuwait City . ... .... ... . . . ....... .. . . . . . .. . . . . ... . 151 

Colonel Locurcio with Maj. Gen. Patrickj. Kelly .... . ..... . .. 156 

Al-Ferdous Girls Middle School . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177 

Al-Asmah Gi.rls High School . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 77 

Views o[ damaged and renovated executive office wailing area, 

Kuwait Parliament building . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178 

Kuwait International Airport Terminal 2, with damaged 

control tower . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179 

The terminal a year later . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179 

Pools of oil from damaged oil wells . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184 

Oil well firefighter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186 

Firefighters cap oil well . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187 

Aerial view of Al-jaber Air Base . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192 

Destroyed aircraft hangar at Al-jaber . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193 

xii 
P<IP,C 

Iraqi T-55 tank inside damaged aircraft hangar ........ . ..... 203 

Building 9, Al-jaber Air Base . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203 

Repair work at Al-jaber . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211 

Col. David E. Peixouo with Ambassador Gnehm at Al-jaber .. . . 215 

Air conditioning units at Doha Blackhorse Base . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 220 

Soldiers relax at 6th Brigade Army Base . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 221 

LL. Gen. Henry J. I latch with troops at 13lackhorse 13ase . . . . . . . . 225 

David Leach, Corps of Engineers, reviews renovations with 

Dr. Ibrahim Al-Shaheen and Fatima Al-Sabah . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 1 

Interior view of Parliament building . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 233 

Parliament general assembl)' hall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 233 

General Hatch visits Corps engineers at the Parliament . . . . . . . . 234 

Cover: Top, Kuwaiti children celebrate liberation; CC/liCI; aerial vievv or 

Kuwait City; bottom, destroyed lraqi tank, Al-Magwa oil field. 

Ill ustrations from Depanment of Defense files. All photographs except 

those on pp. 68 and 74 were taken by jonas jordan, Corps of Engineers, 

Savannah District. 

xiii 

Aller DESERT STORM 

lnlrlldut:lion 

In the wake of the 100-hour ground wa r against Iraq, the U.S. Army 

mounted the largest civil-mili tary reconstruction operation since World 

War ll in an effort to restore the shattered country of Kuwait. Never having faced a disaster of this magnitude, the l<uwaili governmem simply 

could not provide for all of its o•vn recovery needs. The U.S. Army 

played a critical role in rebuilding Kuwait and smoothing the fragile 

transition from hostilities to peace. Army soldiers and civilians conducted damage assessments, restored electrical power and water supplies, 

cleared tons of debris, and provided emergency medical care and other 

essential services. ln doing so, they comributecl significamly not only to 

the physical well-being of the Kuwaiti people but also to political and 

economic stability in the region. 

The diffuse, complex Kuwait operation included four basic phases: 

planning, emergency response, recovery, and the aftermath. But these 

phases were not always neatly separated nor easily defined. Although the 

Secretary of Defense defined the emergency response phase as the first 

90 days, the distinction between the emergency response phase and the 

recovery phase quickly became blurred. Sometimes the Army and its 

contractors made emergency repairs in one area, while more substantial, 

long-term repairs were undertaken elsewhere. The goal of emergency 

construction generally was to restore facilities and services to their prewar condition, not to make improvements. Yet, in Kuwait, operators 

found that there was no clear definition of "emergency construction." 

For example, did it mean boarding up vvindows rather than replacing the 

glass or clearing rubble from a building bm not cleaning it? As the recovery proceeded, the expectations of the l<uwaitis understandably 

increased and the definition of "emergency repairs" expanded. 

To further complicate matters, various agencies shaped and executed eacb phase. The planning phase, for example, was dominated by the 

Kuwait Emergency Recovery Program made up of Kuwaiti representatives, the 352d Civil Affairs Command and its Kuwait Task Force, and 

tbe U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and its I<U\vai t Emergency Recovery 

Office. The 352d Civil Affairs Command focused on municipal functions 

such as the police and fi re departments. It ultimate ly spent nearly half a 
4 AFTER DESERT STURM 

billion dollars of Kuwaiti money to get and keep government agencies 

running. The Corps' Kuwait Emergency Recovery Office, by contrast, 

dealt with fac ilities and the physical infrastrucwre such as power and 

sanitation facilities and the buildings that housed that infrastructure. lt, 

too, spent just under half a billion dollars, mostly in contracts, 1.0 repair 

this physical infrastrucwrc. 

On the eve of the ground war against lraq, the Army also created 

Task Force Freedom, made up primarily of civil affairs and various 

support elements, to help execute the emergency response. 

Meanwhile, back in Washington, the Army Staff created the Kuwait 

Recovery Task Force to coordinate emergency response and later 

recovery issues within the Pentagon. 

As emergency repairs were completed and the operation gradually 

transilioned into a recovery phase, Task Force Freedom gave way to the 

newly created Defense Reconstruction Assistance Ofrice representing the 

Secretary of Defense. The Corps of Engineers, through its Kuwait 

Emergency Recovery Office and its civilian conLractors, continued to 

play a key role during both the emergency response and recovery phases. Finally, nearly a year after the liberation of Kuwait, most repairs to the 

civil infrastructure were complete, and the Defense Reconstruction 

Assistance Office closed. The focus then shifted to the reconstruction of 

Kuwait$ military facilities, two air bases in particular. The Corps created 

the small Kmvait Program Office to administer this effort. Although the 

role of civil affairs diminished during the recove1y phase, the role of the 

Corps of Engineers expanded. 

Although over half a million American soldiers participated in the 

Persian Gulf War, relati vely few were directly involved in the recovery 

operations. Most of the acwal recovery work was done by Corps civilians and contractors. There were certainly areas where U.S. troops could 

have been more involved. For example, Army engineers could have been 

used to deliver water and clear debris, but they were not. Using civilian 

contractors let the military reduce the U.S. force in Kuwait and freed up 

U.S. troops for redeployment. Military and political leaders were anxious 

LO redeploy American troops-many of whom had been stationed in the 

Persian Gulf for months-as quickly as possible. ln addition, there was 

concern abouL how the l<uwaitis would view a prolonged presence of 

U.S. troops and how the Ame rican people would respond to televised 

images of American soldiers performing nonmilitary functions such as 

hauling trash. 

The Kuwait recover>' effort was much more than a humanitarian 

assistance mission. It was closely linked to U.S. strategic imerests in the 

region. The United States had fought the Persian Gulf War, in part, as a 
INTRODUCTION 5 

response to a major regional security threat to the worlds oil supply. 

General Gordon R Sullivan, Chief of Staff of the Army during much of 

the reconstruction, observed, "Economically, the !Middle East) region 

will ren1ain of great imponance to other regions of the world-particularly the West-because of their dependence on its energy resources."! 

Defense officials resisted taking on the recovery mission until they 

acknowledged these strategic interests; until they realized that although 

they had won a military victory, they could "lose" the peace. 

The goal of the United States was to promote long-term political and 

social stability and economic recovery in Kuwait. U.S. policymakers 

were anxious to help the Kuwaiti government develop the capability to 

provide the infrastructure and institutions its citizens expected. Fulfilling 

those expectations, it vvas argued, would ensure the legitimacy of the 

government. This was not the first time that the United States had used 

humanitarian assistance to achieve its strategic goals. Nor was it the first 

time that policymakers in Washington had used civil-military construction as an instrument of foreign policy, particularly in the Middle East. 

The Kuwait operation must be viewed within the framework of 50 

years of U.S. presence in the region, specifically the Corps' large construction programs in Saudi Arabia and lsrael. The Corps first became 

involved in Saudi Arabia in 1951 when it began building an airfield at 

Dhahran using U.S. Air Force funds. The involvement expanded dramatically after 1965 when the United States and Saudi Arabia signed an 

engineer assistance agreemem in vvhich the United States agreed to 

advise and assist the construction of cenain military facilities for the 

Saudi Ministry of Defense and Aviation. The Corps worked on a fully 

reimbursable basis with the government of Saudi Arabia paying for all 

design and construction. Through its Middle East Division, created in 

1976 and headquartered in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, the Corps managed 

design and construction programs that by the 1980s totaled an estimated $14 billion. The Corps built many facilities that the U.S. military 

would use during the Persian Gulf War: Shaikh Lsa Air Base in Bahrain , 

King Khalid Military City in northern Saudi Arabia, King faisal Military 

Cantonment at Khamis Mushayl, King Abdulaziz Military Cantonment, 

and other air and navy bases.2 Elsewhere in the region (as part of the 

Camp David Accords), between 1979 and 1982 the Corps constructed 

two ultramodern air bases in lsraels Negev Desen.3 

Through these programs, governments in the region had come to 

know lhe Corps' work and respected its ability and responsiveness. They 

also purchased American military equipment creating a need for 

American construction and, as a side benefit, provided infrastructure 

that the United States could use in emergencies such as the Gulf War. 
6 AFTER DESERT STORM 

During that connict, American planes could ny right in and use Saudi air 

bases because they had been built to U.S. specifications. The large and 

lengthy construction programs had created alliances, trust, and useable 

facilities and had given the United States valuable knowledge of the 

region and its construction needs and practices. 

The Kuwait program had sin1ilarities to the Corps' previous work in 

the Middle East. As with the Israeli air base program, the l<uwait operation was characterized by a tight schedule, long supply lines, and nagging political pressures. But major differences also set the Kuwait program apart. Although the Israelis covered some of the cost of their air 

base program, it was funded, for the most pan, b)' the United States. In 

this case, however, the Kuwaiti government paid the bills. Kuwaiti control of the funding presented some special challenges. Also, unlike the 

Israeli and Saudi programs, the Kuwait program was a complex series of 

projects that involved providing se rvices as well as canst ruction for both 

civil and military facililies. When the Corps arrived, most of the countl")"s civilian work force had ned, and equipment and materi als were desperately scarce. The pace of construction was faster than with any previous projects in the Middle East and certainly faster than normal military 

construction in the States. In the States, a t)1pical milita1y construction 

project takes five )'ears from programming to construction. In Kuwait, 

where the Corps had contracts already in place, a similar project LOok 

just 30 clays, though the standards and thus the final quality were somewhat lower fo r emergency construction.4 

The l<u,vait operation must also be viewed not only in the context 

of previous construction in the Middle East, but also in the framework 

of the American military's long history of humanitarian relief operations, 

both at home and abroad. Through the years, U.S. forces have been 

employed in noncombat uses. Soldiers helped combat malaria in 

Panama and cholera, hunger, and illiteracy in Cuba, Haiti, and 

Nicaragua. They also established schools, promoted public health, organized elections, and encouraged democracy in those countries. Closer to 

home, soldiers have repemeclly assisted victims of earthquakes, hurricanes, and other natural disasters since the 19th cemury. '> 

Rooted as iL was in U.S. involvemem in the region, the complicated, 

often remarkable recovery operation would have a lasLing impact on 

U.S.-I<uwaiti relations and the political sLabilily of the Middle East. 
l'lvlogue 

As Ceasar Santucci gazed out from the 16th noor of the Kuwait Plaza 

Hotel, he surveyed the ruins of dowmown KuwaiL. He \vas distressed to 

see the sparkling, modern city that he remembered now coated with oily 

soot and littered with abandoned vehicles, trash, and broken glass. The 

once noisy, bustling downtown streets were nearly deserted. Before the 

lraqi invasion in Augustl990, Samucci, a civilian engineer with the US. 

Arm.y Corps of Engineers, had spem six years in Kuwait, part of that time 

overseeing the construction of a Oight crew training center for Kuwait's 

Air Fo rce. L Now in early March, he was among the first o f hundreds of 

U.S. Anny soldiers and civil.ians who, over the ensuing months, would 

struggle to bring Kuwait back to life. 

Kuwait, an Arab state sandwiched between lraq on the nonh and west 

and Saudi Arabia on the south and west, was founded in the early 1700s 

by a nomadic tribe that migrated into the Persian Gulf. The small Gulf 

nation derived its early prosperity from pearling, fishing, and trading. 

Oil wealth later transformed Kuwait into a modern naLion with a 

high standard of living. Oil exploration in Kuwait began in the 1920s. 

When oil revenues soared in the early 1950s, Kuwaits ruling AI-Sabah 

fami ly devised a scheme to distribute the windfall. The Emir began 

transforming the cluster of mud huts into a clean, modern metropolis 

with skyscrapers. By 1990, more than half the country's population, 

roughly l million people, lived in Ku,vait City, the "pearl of the Gulf " 

Each neighborhood became a self-contained microcosm o r a city 

wilh its own supermarkets, schools, medical centers, and municipal services. These neighborhoods were established as cooperatives. This system of neighborhood communities became especially important after the 

Iraqi invasion. During the occupation, neighborhoods provided services 

ranging from food distribution lO rudirnentary medical assistance and 

hid scores of foreigners from lraqi authorities. 

Kuwait is 6,880 square miles of desert, slightly smaller than New 

Jersey. Bm, for the most pan, Kuwait.s desert is nor scenic dunes and 

sand seas spri nkled with groves of palm trees. ln contrast to images from 

Lawrence of Arabia, the land varies from Cirm gravel and clay in the north 

to sandier, looser terrain in the south. The vast sea of beige is broken 
8 AFTER DESERT STORM 

occasionally by small shrubs and plants. Only 3 percent of the land is 

marginally arable and only l percent is under cultivation. llowever, 

Kuwait exports over I billion barrels of oil each year. 

Kuwait$ wealth, coupled with the small size of its armed forces, 

made the country an auractive target for neighboring Iraq. Iraq was having financial difficulties because of its military buildup and irs exhausting eight-)'ear war with Iran. The war had left Iraq heavily in debt and 

had impaired its ability to export oil. The annexation of oil-rich Kuwait 

would ease the financial strain. Iraqi leaders maintained that Kuwait 

overproduced oil in violation of the OPEC (Organization of Petroleum 

Exporting Countries) guidelines and thus drove down the price of oil. 

They estimated that the lower price cost Iraq billions of dollars. Iraqi 

leaders later demanded $2.4 billion in compensation for oil Kuwait 

pumped from the disputed Rumaila nelds. They also insisted that Kuwait 

forgive $10 billion to $20 billion in loans that helped fund the war 

against Iran. Finally, Iraq saw in l(uwait a vvay to overcome the disadvantages of being virtually landlocked. For years, Iraq had been trying to 

annex or lease two of Kuwait$ islands, Bubiyan and Warbah, but Kuwait 

had ref usecl.2 

On 18 july 1990, lraq's President Saddam Hussein accused Kuwait 

of driving down the price of crude oil and reasserted Iraq$ claim to oil 

in a disputed border area inside Kuwait. During negotiations, Kuwait 

indicated that it would pay a sizeable sum for peace. The Iraqis, however, demanded total capitulation on all counts, and discussions between 

the two nations broke down. 

The United States, with growing concern, watched events unfold in 

the Middle Easl. The United States had a long-standing interest in supporting its allies in the region and ensuring conlinued access to the 

region's rich oil supply. In 1980, President jimmy Carter announced, in 

what became the Caner doctrine, that the United States would regard 

any auempt by an outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region 

as a threat to its vital interests and would repulse that threat by military 

force if necessary. The U.S. Liaison Office, Kuwait, an arm of the Defense 

Securit)' Assistance Agency, had been administering a foreign military 

sales case to provide Kuwait with certain military equipment. A foreign 

military sales case, administered by the Secretary of Defense, is a process 

through which eligible foreign governments purchase defense equipment and services from the U.S. government. 

In the summer of L990, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), the 

joint command responsible for military operations in the Middle East, 

began planning for a possible Iraqi invasion. On 31 july and 1 August, the 

commander of CENTCOM, General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, presented 
PROLOGUE 

Kuwaiti child stands in the 

ruins of the Sei/ Palace, 

March 1991. 

9 

deployment options to Chairman 

of the joint Chiefs of Staff General 

Colin Powell, Secretary of Defense 

Richard Cheney, President George 

Bush, and the National Security 

Council. 

Before dawn on 2 August, 

three divisions from Iraq's elite 

Republican Guard forces-some 

140,000 soldiers-pushed across 

the Kuwaiti border. Within hours 

they gained control of Kuwait 

City and drove Kuwait's royal 

family into exile in Saudi Arabia. 

The United Nations Security 

Council quickly passed a resoluLion condemning lraqs actions 

and demanding the unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi troops from 

Kuwait. When Saddam Hussein 

refused to comply, Lhe council 

imposed economic sanctions on 

lraq. President Bush invoked the 

Carter doctrine and decided thaL, if invj.ted, Lhe United Stales would 

deploy a force large enough to defend Saudi Arabia and deter further 

Iraqi aggression. 

General Schwarzkopf already commanded all U.S. forces in the theater 

and Lt. Gen. john Yeosock, commander of Third U.S. Army, would command ARCENT, the Army component of CENTCOM. After discussion with Secretary Cheney on 6 

August, Saudi Arabia$ King Fahcl 

bin Abdul Al-Aziz AI Saud agreed 

to let U.S. forces enter his country. 

Two days tater, President Bush 

announced Lhe deployment of U.S. 

troops Lo Saudi Arabia as part of a 

coalition force in what was designated Operation DESERT SHIELD. 

The first soldiers from the 

82d Airborne Division, XVlll 

Airborne Corps, deployed on 8 

Kuwaiti children celebrate the 

liberation of their country. 
10 

Defaced monument to 

Saddam Hussein at the 

Kuwait Ministries CompleX; 

March 1991 

AFTER DESERT STORM 

August. During the next few 

months, over half a million U.S. 

soldiers poured into Saudi 

Arabia. This massive deployment 

of U.S. forces culminated in 

Operation DESERT STORI\1: a fiveweek air campaign ( 17 

j anuary-24 f-ebruary 1991) and 

a brief ground operation (24-28 

February l99l). As a result of 

these militat")' operations, the 

United States and its allies liberated Kuwait. By 1 March, the 

combat situation stabilized 

enough that the emergency relief 

and reconstruction of Kuwait 

could begin. 3 

Senior U.S. officials determined that the United States 

would help Kuwait recover. If the 

problems of the postwar period 

were not adequately addressed, 

they reasoned, the people of 

Kuwait would suiTer tremendous physical and economic hardship that 

could lead to further unrest and instability in the region. The U.S. officials 

realized that winning the war was not enough; they must also secure the 

peace. The Department of Defense would have the primary responsibility 

for the recovery operations, and the Army would act as its executive agent. 

Several key factors shaped the recovery effort. First, the rapid completion of the ground war meant that the transition from a rnilitary offensive to an active restoration effort had to occur much faster than anticipated. Military leaders had not planned nearly as well for the recovery 

operations as the)' had planned for the war. As a result, the)' quickly had 

to develop various ad hoc organizations to administer the recovery operations: the imeragency steering group committee, the Kuwait Task Force, 

the Combined Civil Affairs Task Force, Task Force Freedom, and the 

Defense Reconsnuction Assistance Office. 

In addition, damage caused by the month-long air campaign, especially to roads and power lines, made the recovery work particularly 

challenging. Political factors, such as the pressure to limit the role of the 

U.S. Army and to use small and small disadvantaged American firms, 

also complicated the recovery operation. 
PROLOGUE 11 

Elemems of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers' culture also shaped 

the operation. Al though during the Persian Gulf vVar the Corps had performed a number o( construclion projects in Saudi Arabia on a compressed time schedule, for the most pan, the Corps was not used to fasttrack construction overseas. Nor was it used to operating without being 

able to describe the scope of the work in advance. Unlike in Saudi 

Arabia, no labor force or equipment \vas available in Kuwait. The existing procurement regulations became cumbersome. Oecisionmakers in 

\t\lashington often did not operate with the same sense of urgency as did 

Corps personnel in Kuwait and granted few exemptions from the federal acquisition regulallons.4 

Finally, the operation was shaped by the extensive, day-to-clay 

involvemem of the Kuwaitis in making decisions and executing the 

"vork. As both the bill payer and the customer, the Kuwaitis established 

priorities and shaped recovery operations. 

Military planners ultimately found that damage LO l<uwait was less 

extensive than anticipated. With the invaluable assistance of soldiers and 

civilians from the 352d Civil Affairs Con1mand, the U.S. Army Corps of 

Engineers, and other Army units, Kuwait came back to life faster than 

anyone could have envisioned. ln the process, the people of the United 

States and l<uwait forged a bond that would continue long after the 

recovery work was completed. 

Chapter 1 

Planning lor Emergency 

Response 

Within weeks of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, as U.S. forces in Saudi 

Arabia reinforced Operation DESERT SHIELD, some U.S. and Kuwaiti officials were already turning their attention to the period after Kuwait$ liberation. They recognized early that careful planning would be crucial to 

the recovery of that nation and the restoration of its government. 

AILhough the United States had a long history of providing humanitarian assistance to other countries, this siLUation was unique: Kuwait had 

many well-educated, qualified individuals to direct the effort and the 

financial resources to pay for what it needed and wanted. Although U.S. 

military leaders were initially relucram to take on major responsibility 

for the Kuwait recovery effort, they ultimately recognized that the 

Department of Defense was the only agency that could provide the level 

of assistance th.m the Kuwaitis required. Army civil affairs personnel and 

the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, in particular. provided the Kuwaitis 

with invaluable assistance in planning the emergency response effort and 

helping ensure its success. 

Origins of the Kuwait Emergency Recovery Program 

The Emir of Kuvvait, Sheikh Jaber AI-Ahmed Al-Sabah, who was in 

the United States to appear before the United Nations General Assembly, 

traveled to Washington, D.C. on 27 September 1990 to visit Presidem 

George Bush. During a series of meetings with the President and his 

advisors, the Emir and his Minister of Foreign Affairs asked the United 

States to help their government plan for the reconstruction and recovery 

of Kuwait. (Map .1) Some of the ministers also talked to the newly designated U.S. Ambassador to Kuwait, Edward W "Skip" Gnehm,jr. (a wellrespected and experienced diplomat who was in Washington awaiting 
.I R .. \ Q 

.. -'·· 

' •'I 

)" ' ' 

... ;;,// 

,/ 

I 

I 

/! .' 

/ 

/ 

I 

s 4\ LJ D rr 

.\ R A B I .~ 

MAPl 

l R .\ . 

,, \ . : '.. I & 

'\ I ~ ·--· -----· ---------· l 

KUWAIT 

"' 0 

40 

!\Iiies 
PLANNING FOR EMERGENCY RESPONSE 15 

confirmation), about geuing assistance from the U.S. governmenl. 

Kuwaiti officials realized all that the United States had done to restore 

occupied Germany after Vlorld War II. They believed that the United 

States was probably the only country in the modern world that ever 

helped put a devastated, occupied country back on its feeL 

Kuwait$ Minister of Foreign Affairs asked his traveling companions, 

the Minister of Finance and the Minister of Planning, to bring a group of 

senior Kuwaiti officials back to Washington the following vveek. He wanteel them to auend a briefing at the Pentagon on the U.S. Department of 

Defense's capabilities to respond, specifically its civil affairs capability. ' 

tvleanwh ile, exiled l<uwaili officials who had set up operations in the 

Sheraton Hotel in Tail', Saudi Arabia, 40 miles southeast of Mecca, gathered to p lan the reconstrucli.on of their nalion. They dispatched a team 

of 20 specialists to Washington to plan for the emergency response after 

Kuwait was liberated and to enlist U.S. government assistance in the 

planning. The mix of Kuwaiti planners, oil officials, and health care 

experts set up operations in 24 glass-paneled offices on K Street in northwest Washington, five blocks from the White House. This group, called 

the Kuwait Emergency Recovery Program, was headed by Fawzi AISultan, Kuwait$ dynamic represemative to the Worlcll3ank. He was anxious to enlist panners from the U.S. government as quickl)' as possible. 

Most of the Kuwaiti representatives were English-speaking, U.S.-

eclucated government officials. Fawzi Al-Sultan himself attended Yale 

University. Another team member, Bader Al-Qabancli, who had been the 

deputy chief engineer of the Ministry of Public Works, graduated from 

Arizona State University and had a masters degree in civil engineering 

from the University of California, Los f\ngeles. He had been directly 

involved in designing and constructing all the hospitals in Kuwait, as 

well as schools, ports, and airports. Bader AI-Qabandi and other 

1vtinistry of Public Works personnel each had 15 to 20 years of experience in Lheir fields. 

By the end of December, the Kuwait Emergency Recovery Program 

would grow w 40 members with a broad range of expertise, working 

long hours, seven days a week. AILhough very capable, Bader AIQabancli observed, Lhese leaders had been stunned by nevvs of the invasion and sometimes fe lt disoriemed and overwhelmed. They worried 

constantly about family members left behind, some o r whom had been 

arrested by the lraq is. 2 

The Kuwait Emergency Response Program quickly organized itself 

into 10 teams or work groups: communication, transportation, educaLion , health and food, airports and ports, electricity and water, oil, public works, information, and the legal and political system. Members 
16 AFTER DESERT STORM 

focused on the damage the Iraqis might leave behind. The)' compiled 

information on which buildings the Iraqis were using, the condition of 

the roads, the status of the sanitation and electrical S)'Stems, and the 

amount of maLerial stolen from the hospitals. They used this information, collected from Kuwaitis who had remained behind and from other 

sources, to plan the reconstruction. 

The Kuwait Emergency Recovery Program then coordinated with 

federal officials and American businessmen to replace the infrastructure 

and equipment that the Lraqis had destroyed such as sewer pipes, lamp 

posts, telephone li nes, public buses, and police cars. The Kuwai ti planners assumed that Kuwait would be left without power and water after 

the Iraqis retreated. The)' projected that even if the Iraqis left peacefully, 

the restoration of services could take up to two years. The)' developed 

computerized lists of potential suppliers and contractors interested in 

contributing to the recovery progran1.3 

The huge cost, estimated fi·om $80 billion to $100 billion, would be 

paid from Kuwait$ extensive investment portfolio. The Kuwaiti government had large accounts in foreign banks to fund the recovery effort. 

According to Time magazine, Kuwait$ foreign-asset portfolio approached 

$100 billion, invested in stocks, bonds, and entire companies around the 

world. lts investments reportedly brought in $20 million a day. 4 

The Pentagon Response 

Although the Kuwaiti representatives had conside rable business acumen, they had no experience responding to natural disasters or other 

catastrophes and were uncertain how to proceed. Kuwaiti officials quickly realized that they would need assistance from the United States. 

ln late September, the Kuwaitis discovered the civil affairs capability 

in the U.S. Army. The link might have occurred, in part, through the initiative of an Army Reserve colonel-Randall Elliott. As a civilian, Elliou, 

a career foreign service officer, headed the State Department's Middle 

East Division. As a reservist, he served as the deputy chief of staff, 

Capstone Operations (G-5), for the 352d Civil Affairs Command. 

Recognizing that the Kuwaiti element needed some planning assistance, 

Ellion raised the issue with State Department orficials, including 

Ambassador designate Gnehm. Gnehm discussed the malter with 

Kuwaiti Ambassador Saud Nasir AI-Sabah and the Kuwaiti delegation, 

who were immediately receptive to the idea of using civil affairs personnel. Some members of the Army Starr-such as Anthony J. Auletta and 

Col. Allen W Keener with the Operations, Readiness and Mobilization 
PLANNING FOR EMERGENCY RESPONSE 17 

DirecLOrate, who were very familiar with the Army's civil affairs capability-might have already been considering a possible civil affairs role. 

Ambassador Gnehm asked Pentagon officials to tell the Kuwaiti represematives about the military's civil affairs capabilities. Having served in 

the Pentagon just two years earlier as Deputy Assistant Secretary of 

Defense for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Gnehm knew some 

key Pentagon officials and understood the procedures for insening such 

a request into the military system. The State Department passed the 

request to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security 

Affairs, Henry S. Rowen. Rowen, a tall , lean man, professional in bearing, had held a number of senior government posts and academic positions. He had come to the Pentagon from the Stanford University 

Graduate School of Business. Fortunately Rowen and Assistant Secretar)' 

of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity ConOict james R. 

Locher Ul, men of vision and action, overrode the Army Staff's tepid 

response and arranged a briefing for the l<uwaitis.5 

On 3 October, Rowen asked the Director of the joint Staff, LL Gen. 

Michael P C. Carns, to arrange a briefing on civil affairs capabilities for 

the Kuwaitis. Lt. Col. Dennis C. Barlow from the Psychological 

Operations/Civil Affairs Branch of the Directorate for Currem 

Operations 0-33) of 1 he joint Staff delivered the briding the next clay. 

Barlow had invited Army officials to present the brief"ing because the 

Army acted as the executive agem for civil affairs on the joint Staff, but 

they declined. In attendance \vere Fawzi AI-Sultan, Minister of Planning 

Sulayman Abdul Razaq AI-Mutawa, Minister of Finance Sheikh Ali AIKhalifa Al-Sabah, Ambassador Gnehm, and the joint Staff Director of 

Operations 0-3) Lt. Gen. Thomas W Kelly, along with representatives 

from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low 

Intensity ConOict, the Assistam Secrewry of Defense for International 

Security Affairs, the General Counsel, and the Army Staff. 

The Kuwaiti representatives apparently liked what they heard. After 

the briefing, they inquired about the proper procedures for requesting 

assistance from Artn)' civil affairs. Sam Routson, director of mission activities for the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low 

Intensity Con!1ict, suggested that they submit a formal request to President 

Bush.o ln a letter dated 9 October 1990, Ambassador AI-Sabah formally 

requested U.S. assis1ance in the restoration o[ Kuwait. Specifically, he 

asked for expertise resident in the U.S. Department of Dcfense.7 Although 

Secretaty of State james A. Baker Ill did not formally respond to the letter 

until mid-December, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Near 

East and South Asian Affairs received verbal confirmation from the White 

House staff that President Bush would support the effonH 
18 AFTER DESERT STORM 

Meanwhile, plans to assist the Kuwaitis continued to unfold. General 

Carns wrote back to Assistant Secretary Rowen that the Joim Staff agreed 

with the idea of provid in g advice to the Kuwaiti gove rnment. 

Representatives of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International 

Security Arfairs, the Assistant Secreta I")' of Defense for Special Operations 

and Low lmensity ConOict, the Joint Staff Director for Operations 0-3), 

the Joint Starr Director of Strmegic Plans and Policy 0-5), and the Army 

Staff met three limes during the week after the 4 October briefing to discuss a response to the Kuwaiti request.9 The joint Staff and Army Staff 

continued to discuss the Kuwaiti request for weeks. 

The Directorate of Strategic Plans and Policy was instructed to develop a course of action for a Department of Defense response Lo the 

Kuwaiti request. On l 7 October, the directorate's Middle Eastern Affairs 

Division hosted a meeting with represematives from lmernational 

Security Arfai rs, Special Operations and Low Intensity ConOicl, the 

Army Staff, and the State Depanmcnt. Panicipanrs agreed that if the 

State Deparunem specificall)' requested civil affairs suppon, the joint 

Staff would develop guidelines for using Defense Department resources. 

They discussed the relationship between the Defense and State departments, which agency should take the lead within the Defense 

Department, and what agreemems should be made with the Kuwaiti 

government. 

Two clays later, a committee of the President's National Security 

Council, consisting or the deputy secretaries of selected cabinet clepanmems, met to consider the Kuwaiti request. The committee members 

agreed that the United States would assist Kuwait in its planning. To 

make the process more timely and efficient, they recommended that the 

State Department and the Defense Department, including thejoint Staff, 

establish a steering comminee to make the necessary arrangements. The)' 

also recommended that the Assisrant Secretary for International Security 

Affairs take the lead for the Defense Department. 

Rowen's staff prepared a draft "Terms of Reference for U.S. Civil 

Arfairs Assistance to the StaLe of Kuwait" and submitted it to the joim 

Staff for review. Rowen also asked that a military service be designated 

the executive agem for the operations and that qualified personnel be 

assigned to the various working commiuees outlined in the draft. 

The draft specified that the goal of the United States would be to 

help the legitimate government of Kuwait plan the post-liberation 

restoration efforts. Although the proposed terms of reference provided 

ror the involvement of a number of federal agencies, the State 

Department and the Defense Department would have the primary 

responsibilit)' for developing the restoration program. 
PLANNING FOR EMERGENCY RESPONSE 19 

The draft also proposed the creation of a U.S. steering group committee, chaired by the State Department, \.Vith represematives from the 

State Department and the Defense Department to oversee the planning effon. It also provided for the fo rmation of a U.S.- Kuwaiti 

Committee on Emergency and Recovery Programs, consisting of the 

U.S. steering group committee and Kuwaiti government officials in 

exile. Working groups ·would undertake planning in 20 traditional 

civil affairs functional areas. (Table 1) 

TAI3LE 1-CIVIL AFFAIRS F UNCTIONAL AREAS 

Arts and Monuments 

Civil Defense 

Civil lnformation 

Civilian Supply 

Cultural Affairs 

Dislocated Civilians 

Economics and Commerce 

Food and Agriculture 

Labor 

Legal 

Property Control 

Public Admi nistration 

Public Communications 

Public Education 

Public Finance 

Public Health 

Public Safety 

Public Welfare 

Public Works and Utilities 

Transportation 

The Kuwaiti government would execute all contracts for services 

and equipmelll with civilian firms. The U.S. government could request 

reimbursement fo r the cost of various services rendered. 10 

On 22 October, Assistant Secretary Locher met with representatives 

from the Stale Department, Defense General Counsel, Joint Staff, and 

Army Staff to develop a memorandum of understanding between the U.S. 

and Kuwaiti governments that wo1.1ld provide for Depanmem of Defense 

assistance. The State Department agreed to draft the memorandum. 11 

On l November, the deputy secretaries committee of the National 

Security Council formally created the steering group committee described 

in the terms of reference to ensure that Kuwait received assistance and to 

coordinate State Department and Defense Department efforts. (Chart 1) 

The steering group committee consisted of Ambassador Gnehm; Arthur 

H. Hughes, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Near Eastern and 

South Asian Affairs (or his alternate Frederick C. Smith); Rear Aclm. J. R. 

Fitzgerald, Deputy Director for Current Operations 0-33); Rear Aclm. 

Merrill W Ruck, Assistant Deputy DirectOr of Politico-Military Affairs 

0-5); and Brig. Gen. Charles E. Wilhelm, Deputy Assistant Secretary of 

Defense for Missions and Applications. On 2 November, they met for the 

first Lime to review the proposed terms of reference and sent the draft forvvarcl for final approval.'2 
20 

National Security 

Council 

Deputies Committee 

Policy Coordinating 

Committee 

Kuwaiti Reconstruction 

I 

Policy Coordinating 

Committee Working 

Group 

'---

Interagency Steering 

Group 

AFI'ER DESERT S TORM 

The draft circulated throughout the 

Defense Deparunent in early November. 

The responses rcnected difTerem opinions on the required level of civil affairs 

support and the appropriate mechanism 

for managing the effort. Final comments 

on the terms of reference contained a 

mmrix that showed responsibilities split 

among 27 clifferem U.S. governmcm 

agencies. The comments also renectecl a 

growing sense that some civil affairs 

support would be needed. 

Rowen approved the terms of reference on 5 November, and working 

groups were established under the steering group commiuee to oversee the execution of the projecl. A U.S.-Kuwaiti 

civil affairs working group consisted of 

representatives from the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense, the joint Staff, and 

the Army Staff and Kuwaiti officials.u 

f-rederick Smith assumed the day-to-clay 

leadership of the vvorking group. 

Ambassador Gnehm took the 

lead for the State Depanmem and 

auenclecl many Pentagon briefings. 

He later recounted that there were 

Chart 1- National Security some awkward moments when the 

Council Defense Depanmen.L lawyers questioned whether the committees activities violated existing regulations. The 

joint Staff posed many questions about the number of people to be 

called up and the length of service. The constam "bureaucratic tussle," 

he observed, continued throughout january and f-ebruary. 

Gnehm envisioned civil affairs soldiers moving into Kuwait alongside the exiled Kuwaitis to run a command ccmer for civil-military 

operations. The Ambassador denied hav ing any desi re to comrol the 

civil affairs group but insisted that these soldiers be collocated with 

him and work beside him. Gnehm knew that he would be working 

closely with Kuwaiti governmem officials and that they would issue the 

taskings and requirements. The relationship between the State 

Department and the Defense Department would improve over time as 
PLANNING FOR EMERGENCY RESPONSE 21 

the clay-to-day activities funher deli neated the responsibilities between 

the two agencies. H 

While the terms of reference circulated, the Joint Staff had drafted a 

message directing the Army Staff to create a task force of civil affairs and 

other qualified personnel to assist Kuwait in the 20 designated functional areas. General Kelly approved the basic concept for using civil affairs 

soldiers, bULthe activation of a Reserve unit required final approval from 

the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and coordination with the Offi ce 

of the Secretary of Defense. When the message circulated within the 

JoinL Staff, some rnembers questioned whether assisting the Kuwaiti government ·was more appropriately a role for the State Department. They 

decided to delay activating a civil affairs uniL. 15 

Civil affairs units o riginated during World War II to meet the need 

for military personnel with the appropriate education and training to 

administer areas liberated from German and j apanese occupation and to 

govern areas in Germany and Japan occupied by the U.S. Army during 

and after the war. In the decade after the 'var, the mission of these newly 

formed units, now called civil affairs units. became less obvious. Most 

civil affairs capability was placed in the Army Reserve. 

ln the l960s. as interest in counterinsurgency grew, the value of the 

special skills and abilities of civil affairs soldiers to improve the living 

conditions of local populations became more apparenL. During the 

Vietnam War. the Army relied heavily on civil affairs methods to counter 

the Viet Cong. After the war, units were focused primarily on the support of convemional operations in a European banlefield. But civil affairs 

became a low priority within the Arm)'· ln 1987. the Secretary of the 

Army decided to include civil affairs units in special operations forces. 

Civil affairs units typically conduct missio ns for theater commanders 

in support of U.S. nation-building activities, regional planning, and intelligence collection. They provide civil assistance to local populations and 

help host nations maintain stable, viable civil governments. They support 

tactical commanders at the corps. division. brigade. or regiment level. 

Tl1ey identify local resources, facilities. and supponthat could be useful to 

those commanders, minimize civilian interference with U.S. military operations. and act as the staff representative for consideration of civilian and 

cultural factors that could affect military operations. At the time of the Gulf 

War, Army civil affairs units included 172 Active and 4,650 Reserve personnel. The force structure at the time consisted of four kinds of civil 

affairs units: commands. brigades. groups. and companies. 16 

The 352d Civil Mfairs Command, headquartered in Riverdale, 

Maryland, •vas the Reserve unit designated for CENTCOM:S area of operations. lt had been working with Third U.S. Army and ARCENT since 
22 AFI'ER DESERT STORM 

1982 under the Armys Capstone program, which had been designed to 

beuer integrate Reserve components into the Active force by letting them 

train and plan during peacetime with their designated wartime commands. As an added benent, members of the 352d Civil Affairs 

Command could begin work immediately without relocating because 

their home base was just outside Washington, D.C. 

Assistam Secretary Locher maintained that planning for the reconstruction of l<uwait was a doctrinally correct civil affairs mission. As long 

as the possibility of hostilities as pan of the liberation of Kuwait existed, 

he argued, the Defense Departmem, and specincally civil affairs, had to 

be involved in the planning. Locher and his staff saw civil affairs as a 

medium for bringing the resources of government and private industry 

to bear on the problem and ensuring that these resources were fully 

coordinated with military plans. After meeting with Locher, General 

Carns and Assistant Secretary Rowen agreed to call up the 352d Civil 

Affairs CommanciY 

Meanwhile, the State Department and the Defense Department continued their effort to involve other federal agencies in the mission. Both 

departments agreed to use civil affairs soldiers initially to assist the 

Kuwaitis, but after the liberation, when the military's role changed, they 

wanted to involve other federal agencies. They could not, however, agree 

on when and bow quickly to bring in those other agencies. They focused 

primarily on the Federal Emergency Management Agency, created in 

1972 to coordinated the federal response to national emergencies and 

natural disasters, and the State Departments Office of Foreign Disaster 

Assistance. The Federal Emergency Management Agency, however, only 

conducted domestic emergency response work. The Office of Foreign 

Disaster Assistance performed assistance missions outside the United 

States, but only in developing nations. 1s 

Because of 1 he general reluctance of Defense Department officials 

to take on the mission, the Pentagon made little progress between 5 

November when Rowen signed the terms of reference and 19 

November when the Office of the Secretary of Defense began actively 

pushing the effort. 

During those nrst weeks in November, senior ofri cials on the Army 

Staff and the joint Staff continued to debate the appropriateness of the 

military providing such assislancc to the Kuwaiti government. They also 

debated whether the Army was the appropriate agency to lead the effort. 

These officials were reluctant to involve themselves in a long-term nonmilitary project that might diven critical resources from ongoing operations. They believed the State Department was the proper agency to lead 

the effort. 
PLANNING FOR EMERGENCY R ESPONSE 23 

Pemagon officials, particularly the Army Staff, feared they would be 

saddled with a mission that could last for months or even years. They 

recalled that during Operation j us·1 CAUSE, a military operation to 

remove Panamanian dictator Manuel Noriega from power, the Defense 

Department had found itself serving as "lead" agency long after the fighting stopped. Pentagon officials did not believe they had ever received 

adequate support from the State Department and other federal agencies 

that should have assumed a greater role in restoring basic services in 

Panama. General Carns and other Pemagon orTicials wanted to ensure 

that this time other government offices, panicularly the State 

Department, would participate fully. Army leaders did not want to be left 

again with the bulk of the responsibility for a recover)' operation, especially if problems developed. 

In addition, Army leaders emphasized the importance of integrating 

the civil affairs effon into other Army S1aiT activities. They favored the 

creation of a composite task force with representatives from various 

Army elements (medical, military police, communications, engineers, 

quartermaster) augmented by civil affairs, with the overall structure 

commanded by an Active Arm)' general officer.1

9 

Gnehm and other State Department officials emphasized the important differences between the situations in Panama and I<uwait. Unlike 

Panama, Kuwait had requested technical expertise and \>vas willing to pay 

lor it. Moreover, the U.S. governmem needed to support the elTon because 

restoring the legitimate government had important political implications. 

Pentagon orficials reluctantly acknowledged the importance of the 

mission. Assistant Secretary Locher and others argued that no other 

agency could handle the emergency phase. The Executive Branch could 

not mobilize other government agencies in the early period when hostilities were still underway. The Assistan t. Secretaries of Defense for 

International Security Affairs, Special Operations and Low Intensity 

Connict, and Reserve Affairs continued to push for the usc of Army civil 

affairs assets. 2o 

Formation of the Kuwait Task Force 

The 352d Civil Affairs Command had been preparing for its Capstone 

role in support of ARCENT since 2 August. Brig. Gen. l Iowarcl Mooney, a 

high school administraLOr who had assumed command in May 1989, had 

placed 15 soldiers on volumary active duty to coordinate civil affairs issues 

with his higher headquarters, the U.S. Army Civil Affairs and 

Psychological Operations Command at Fon Bragg, North Carolina. 
24 AFTER DESERT STORM 

On l November, the Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations 

Command notified the 352d and some of its subordinate units that they 

might be called up to support Operation DESER'I $1t1ELD. After a series of 

alen orders and cancellations, Mooney's superiors, on 15 November, 

informed him that pan of his unit would be activated. On 17 November, 

the chief of staff for the Army Special Operations Command indicated 

that the unit -.vas on alen , but the next day the Civil Affairs and 

Psychological Operations Command canceled the alen order. 

On 19 November, the commander of the Special Operations 

Command, Lt. Gen. Michael F. Spigelmire, and the commander of the 

Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command , Brig. Gen. 

joseph C. Hurteau, arrived at the 352cl's headquarters to follow up on 

the Defense Department initiative to activate that command. During 

the hour-long meeting, General Mooney and his staff outlined their 

concept of civil affairs operations for the themer. Genera l Spigelmire 

wanted assurance that the command could find individuals with the 

qualifications the Kuwaitis requested. After gathering the information 

they needed, the two men departed. Spigelmire's staff awakened 

Mooney at 4 1\.M. the next morning with the news that pan of his unit 

had once again been activated.21 

When the mauer of the activation finally reached General Carns, he 

again insisted that assisting the Kuwaiti governmem was more appropriately a role for the State Department. He directed his staff Lo cancel the 

a len of the 352cl Civil Affairs Command. Hearing this, General Wilhelm 

armed Assistant Secretar)' Locher with background information for a 

meeting with General Carns. That evening Locher convinced General 

Carns and Rowen that this was a doctrinally correct civil affairs mission. 

They agreed to restore the call up or the 352d. 

On 21 November, General Carns reluctantly approved the formation 

of a task force made up of civil affairs soldiers. The next day, Chairman 

of the joint Chiefs of Staff General Colin Powell sent a message lO the 

Chief of Staff of the Army and to General Spigelmire requesting that the 

Chief of Staff activate elements of the 352d Civil Affairs Command designated as the 352d Civil Affairs Command HHC (Augmented), a derivative unit. This small unit would be called the Kuwait Task rorce.l2 Later 

that clay, General Hurteau informed General Mooney that 50 or 60 of his 

soldiers would be called up. Unfortunately, by this Lime the on-again, 

off-again alerts had caused considerable confusion within the unit. 

At a working group committee meeting on 26 November 1991, 

Frederick Smith, General Mooney, General Wilhelm, and other participants discussed who would command the civil affairs soldiers. Two days 

later, Moone)' briefed the comminee on his units capabilities, and 
PLANNING FOR EMERGENCY RESPONSE 25 

Pentagon officials at the meeting established guidelines for the proposed 

Kuwail Task Force23 

The oiTicial notification to mobilize 57 civil affairs soldiers came on 

29 November. On 1 December, the reservists, who had been selected 

from the 352d Civil Affairs Command and the 354th Civil Affairs Brigade, 

gathered at the Army Reserve Center in Riverdale and drove to nearby 

Fon Meade, M.aryland, for processing. The same day, General Mooney 

and Colonel Elliou visited the Director of Civil Works, M~. Gen. Patrick 

j. Kelly, at the Corps of Engineers headquarters in Washington to enlist 

the Corps' help in locating office space for the task force ~ 

General Mooney was activated along with his command on l 

December, but Lwo days later General Huneau informed him that the 

Army Staff had disapproved his activation. The reason for the reversal is 

unclear. Officials on the Army Staff might have been upset that Mooney 

had been called up without advanced approval from the Chief of Staff of 

the Army, General Carl E. Vuono. General Schwarzkopf bad not been 

informed about Mooneys activation either. Another factor might have been 

the Armys characteristic reluctance to activate Army Reserve generals.25 

Although General Mooney was directed to remain at the 352d headquarters, he retained an active interest in the task forces activities and provided guidance. Colonel Elliott was placed in charge of the task force. 

Elliotts extensive experience vvith the State Department and the Middle East 

proved valuable. Yet the failure to activate t-.1looney would create significant 

problems for the task force. Without a general orficer, the task force would 

have greater dirficulty coordinating with ARCENT and CENTCOM.26 

On 3 December, Mooney and members of the newly fonned Kuwait 

Task Force traveled to the Pentagon to receive briefings from Frederick 

Smith, Capt. Pete Bolton, Admiral Ruck, and other members of the Joint 

Staff. No Army Staff representatives attended, perhaps another indicator of 

the Annys reluctance to take on the mission. later that afternoon, the tasl< 

force crossed the Potomac River to meet with their Kuwaiti counterparts on 

K StreeL.27 The tasl< force members quickly set up operations in leased 

office space that the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers bad located three blocks 

from the Kuwaiti headquarters. They acquired Curniture from a General 

Services Administration facility in Alexandria, Virginia. By 5 December, 

they had attended all the requisite briefings, met their Kuwaiti counterpans, gathered the resources they needed, and were hard at work.lS 

The creation of the Kuwail Task Force caused some friction between 

the 352d members who were selected and those who were not. Given 

the origins and circumstances of the task force, some of its members 

might have felt closer ties to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of 

Defense for International Security Affairs than to their parent unit. 
26 AFTER DESERT STORM 

The relationship between the task rorce and the Army Staff was also 

strained. "A lot of people did not want us !the Kuwait Task Forccj to exist," 

Elliotts deput}', Col. C. H. Sadek, observecl.2" Army officials were concerned that task force members came from high-level civilian jobs and had 

direct access to powerful senior leadership in Washington. Also, at the 

request of their Kuwaiti counterparts, who did not want to sec American 

soldiers in uniform in their K Street headquarters, the reservists sometimes 

wore civilian clothes. Mooney briefed the Director of Operations, 

Readiness and Mobilization, M~j. Gen. Glynn C. Mallory, Jr., about the 

task forces missions and activities, but some on the Army Staff continue to 

believe that the task force was an elite group. Mooney observed that there 

was a perception that reservists brought added complications to the mobilization effort. He also candidly noted that some of the task force members 

had an elitist attitude that conuibuteclto the friction. At least one task force 

member confirmed this perception, conceding that his group might have 

been somewhat "prideful." He maintained that the friction would impede 

the mission once the 352cl Civil Affairs Command arrived in Saudi Arabia. 

The friction continued until the task force proved its worth. 30 

Army leaders worried that no clear lines of authority existed for the 

Kuwait Task Force. lt was created as a planning staff, without an operational function. CENTCOM was not its parent organization. Rather, it took 

its directions from the steering group committee and the working group, 

which met often to monitor the task forces progress and provide guidance. 

Task force members gave weekly briefings on their activities to the steering group committee, which was responsible for sharing information with 

the Army Staff. lt evalumed the plans that the task force developed and 

shared them with the State Department and the Ambassador, who 

approved the plans and made decisions about implementation. The Army 

Staff criticized the task force for not sharing information, but the task force 

members maintained that the steering group committee, not the task force, 

was responsible for sharing the infonnation.31 

The friction reflected two opposing perspectives on the role of civil 

affairs. Historically, civil affairs soldiers have coordinated closely with the 

State Department. They occasionally dressed in civilian attire and physically located themselves with the State Department. In the 1980s, however, a new perspective evolved. Mili tary leaders began to argue that civil 

affairs units were part of the military structure and should be treated as 

such. Civil affairs soldiers, they insisted, should dress in uniforms, be 

physically located with Army units, and take their direction through the 

military chain of command. 

Colonel Elliott and some of the l<uvvait Task f-o rce members upheld 

the traditional view. They believed they should collocate with 
PLANNING FOR EMERGENCY RESPONSE 27 

Ambassador Gnehm and the Kuwaitis and work as pan of the 

Ambassadors staff. Some on the Army Staff and other task force members, however, believed the task force should remain within the military 

chain of command. 

The message that activated the task force had directed that it work 

in support of and report to the Assistant Secretary for International 

Security Affairs. Yet Anthony Auleua speculated that members of the 

international Security Affairs staff did not fully recognize their responsibility to exercise control over the task force. The task force members, he 

observed, ended up working too much in isolation, either because Army 

Staff elements did not accept them or because they wanted it that way. 

Moreover, Auleua added, the task force did not have an Active Army 

general orficer in charge who could coordinate with the Army Staff. 

Because of the Army's obvious reluctance to use civil affairs 

reservists, the Secretary of Defense staff initially decided not to designate 

the Army as the executive agent for the operation, as would normally 

have been the case. They did not believe the Army would vigorously execute the operation. Auletta indicated that if the Army had been the executive agent, there would have been a smoother process and greater 

supervision of the task force. The Army Staff, Auletta noted, could have 

provided invaluable support to the task forces activities. Also, as the 

executive agent, the Army Staff would have become more involved in 

directing the recovery operation. The Army's operations and mobilization directorate provided office space, furniture, and computer equipment, but the reservists fu nctioned as an extension of the Jntcrnalional 

Security Assistance Middle East officeY The Secretary of Defense did not 

designate the Army as the executive agent for the Kuwait recovery mission until 30 April 1991, after the recovery work had already begun. 

Kuwait Task Force Activities 

The l<uwait Task Force helped the Kuwaitis understand and coordinate with various federal agencies. The reservists immediately organized 

a series of training briefings and visits. Arthur Walz, who as a civilian 

vvorked for the Army Corps of Engineers, arranged for Corps representatives to talk lo the Kuwaitis about rebuilding infrastructure. Corps represematives also presented a two-hour disaster management class. Walz 

also arranged for the Federal Emergency Management Agency to give a 

two-clay seminar on disaster response. The Office of Foreign Disaster 

Assistance gave the Kuwaitis a tour and a class.33 Since no one could predict the level of fighting and destruction, the reservists developed plans 
28 AFTER DESERT S TORM 

for varying degrees of conl1ict. lnitially, they based their plans on the 

belief that Saddam Hussein \vould leave Kuwait volumaril)' on 15 

January 1991 in accordance with the United Nations' provisions and that 

few repairs would be needed. BUL as the deadline approached, intelligence sources indicated that the Iraqi dictator would not leave voluntarily and military actions probably would be required, so the planning scenario shifted from best case (minor damage) to worst case (great devastation). Planning for the worst case left the task force better prepared to 

handle the shortages it eventually found in Kuwait, especially in food, 

medical supplies, and water. Mooney directed the reservists to convince 

the Kuwaitis to stockpile large amounts of those supplies. 

34 

The Kuwaitis emphasized seven areas in their early planning: public 

safety, public health, public works and utilities, transportation, public 

administration, public communication, and public ·welfare. ln response, 

the Kuwait Task Force organized itself into five teams that LOgcther covered the 20 ci,ril affairs functional areas.35 (Table 2) The activities of the 

five teams sometimes overlapped. 

TABLE 2-KU\VAIT TASK FORCE Tt::AI\·IS 

Public Security and Safety 

Legal 

Public Safety 

Property Control 

Civil Defense 

I Iuman Services 

Public Health 

Public Education 

Dislocated Civilians 

Infrastructure 

Public Works and Utilities 

Transportation 

Public Services 

Public Administration 

Ans and Monumems 

Civil Information 

Cultural Affairs 

Public Communications 

Commerce 

Labor 

Public Finance 

Food and Agriculture 

Civilian Supply 

Economics and Commerce 

Public Welfare 

Initiall y the task force consisted of 56 people-a command management clement with 3 and a planning element with 7 plus the five teams: 

public security and safety with 7, human services with 9, infrastructure 

with 8, public services with 10, and commerce with 12. 

t-.1lost of the people were identified through a computerized 

"Civili an Skills Data Base" that the 352d Civil Affairs Command had 

developed a[Le r Operation j UST CAUSE. The compilation listed each 

member of the command, along with individual skills, work experi-
PLANNING FOR EMERGENCY RESPONSE 29 

ence, and even hobbies. lt allowed planners to search for specific 

civilian skills to complement the military skills of the civil affairs personnel. Planners used the database to identify many potemial task 

force members. 

As task force members became more involved in the planning, they 

found that the Kuwaitis needed help in additional functional areas. I r no 

352d members had that particular expertise, Mooney requested it from the 

Special Operations Command. For example, the task force needed military 

police, psychological operations experts, and medical personnel. Using the 

database, planners identified the appropriate individuals within the Civil 

AITairs and Psychological Operations Command and then transferred them 

LO the 352d. They arrived in Riverdale on 20 january, in time to deploy 

with the main force. The task force also had to bring in additional skills 

not originally planned for, including explosive ordnance disposal specialists and a petroleum. engineer (to deal with the oil fires).J<> 

Some team members such as Maj. Tom Wilson, a vice president with 

Hum Oil in civilian life, brought a weaiLI1 of experience. Maj. George 

Thomas specialized in international banking, a specialty rarely found in 

the militar>'· and had helped restore the Panamanian financial system 

after Operation jUST CAUSE. Having someone who could deal with such 

questions as how to prim a new currency proved very helpfuiY 

As pan of the planning elTon, task force members helped their 

Kuwaiti partners contract for the supplies and services they would need 

after their country was liberated. The Kuwaitis \vere knowledgeable 

about contracting and had already initiaLed a few contracts on their own. 

The task force immediately joined the contracting process. 

When the Kuwaili government identified a need, various U.S. government agencies provided the task force with the names or potemial 

U.S. contractors, and the reservists presented the list to their Kuwaiti 

counterparts. The task force helped the Kuwaitis review the bids that the 

firms submiued, but the Kuwaitis made the final decisions about contract awards. The reservists helped the Kuwaitis define the requirements 

and locate contractors and also provided advice about contracts. Legal 

restrictions prohibited them from participating in any comract negotiations or arranging meetings betvvecn the Kuwaitis and interested contractors. It was clear from the beginning that the Kuwaitis would sign 

and pay for all contracts, not the Kuwait Task Force. Task force members 

had no authority to sign contracts or obligate U.S. or Kuwaiti funcls. 38 

Most of these early contracts were for food, water, medical supplies, 

power generation, emergenC>' communications, uniforms, and vehicles. 

The U.S. Treasury Department agreed to release part of the Kuwaiti governments assets to pay for the contracts. The U.S. government had 
30 AFTER DESERT STORM 

frozen all of Kuwait's assets when Iraq entered the country to prevent 

Iraq from approprialing them. 

The effort to contract for the emergency items proceeded slowly. 

Kuwaiti officials tended to delay contract awards. Some speculated that 

the Kuwaitis did not fully comprehend the urgency of the silllation. ln 

one glaring example, despite urging from the task force, the Kuwaitis 

failed to hire any oil firefighters until late February, after Iraq had blown 

or set fire to hundreds of Kuwait's oil wells. The Kuwaitis were concerned about the $22,000 per-team per-day cost and were only willing 

to pay $20,000. The difference amounted to about $16,000 a clay Yet 

they were losing millions of barrels of oil a clay. Elliou demonstrated that 

they would lose close to $ L billion over 30 clays. By the time they finally signed contracts with the firefighting companies, the Kuwaitis were in 

the worst possible bargaining position. Having a fi rm on retainer would 

have allowed firefighters to move into [(U\.vait much soone r than they 

did, since firms needed a six-week lead time to move in heavy equipment to suppon their operations. The Kuwaitis ullimately had to airlift 

fircfighting equipment, which increased their costs. Each trip between 

llouston and Kuwait Cit)' cost the Kuwaiti government $500,000. 

Kuwait EmergenC)' Response Program members also delayed signing 

the contract for truck drivers to deliver water. Moreover, despite urging 

from task force members, the Kuwaitis made no provision to support the 

truck drivers logisticall y. 

As with the Israeli air base program, strong cultural innuences also 

affected the contracting process. One Kuwaiti orficial later explai ned that 

for the Kuwaiti represematives forcing a contractor to pay auention to 

them and reduce his price was more important than the actual dollar 

savings. The reservists learned to accommodate this way or thinking and, 

according to Elliott, ultimately established a close relationship with their 

Kuwaiti partners. 39 

American relief organizations quickly offered to help with refugee 

problems, food distribution, and other requirements. Yet the Kuwaitis 

balked at signing contracts with these organizations and reimbursing 

them [or their services. lt was enough, they maintained, to stockpile the 

provisions. Why did they need an agency such as the Red Cross to handle cl istribution? 

The Kuwaiti representatives in Washington struggled with logistics 

details. Ambassador Gnehm observed that these planners had difficulty 

understanding that the U.S. military was not going to take complete 

responsibilil)' for the recover)' operation. Both Gnehm and the Kuwait 

Task Force tried to persuade them to hire a single contractor as program 

manager to administer the entire recovery effort. The Kuwaitis knew 
PLANNING FOR EMERGENCY RESPONSE 31 

they needed help planning and managing the recovery. Initially, they 

thought of hiring a private firm to perform this function and solicited 

proposals from some large construction firms such as Brown and Root, 

Bechtel Group, Inc., and Parsons. Although at one point the Kuwaitis 

considered hiring Parsons, a construction and engineering firm that had 

operated in Kuwait for 30 years, they were never comfortable with the 

concept of having a private company serve as the project manager and 

ultimately decided not to do so.40 

By ll j anuary, just four clays before the United Nations' deadline for 

a peaceful iraqi withdrawal, Kuwaiti officials had signed only ll contracts. By 16 january, the Kuwait Task Force had developed over $30 

million in contracts for computer equipment, communications equipment, medical supplies, and other necessities with Motorola, lnc., IBM, 

Martin Marietta, and other firms. The task force ul timately developed 

$528 million in contracts, and 75 percent of that money went back to 

the U.S. businesses that provided services or commodities. 41 

Another part of the task force effort focused on human rights. The 

reservists recognized, all too well, the potential for massive human rights 

abuses after liberation. In mid-December their Kuwaiti counterparts 

began making threatening remarks about Kuwait$ Palestinian residents, 

whom they apparently viewed as lraqi collaborators. Palestinians made 

up 25 percent of the prewar population in Kuwait, dominating whole 

business sectors such as the construction industry, the governmem 

bureaucracy, and the lega l profession. The Palestinian Liberation 

Organization had openly supponed the Iraqi invasion, and stories of 

Palestinians colluding '''ith the Iraqis filte red out of the country, much to 

the distress of Kuwait$ representatives in Washington. 

Some Kuwait Emergency Recovery Program members indicated that 

they planned to exact retribution. For example, when Colonel Elliott 

asked how many people in Kuwait "voulcl have to be feel after the liberation, Fatima Al-Sabah, a [orceful, outspoken member or the royal family, responded 200,000. Elliott questioned this figure because he had 

heard that over 500,000 people remained in the city. She informed him 

that the Palestinians would not have to be feel. Another offi cial quickly 

explained that the Kuwaiti government planned to deport half of the 

remaining Palestinians because the Kuvvailis had become too dependent 

on foreign labor. 

After this meeting, the reservists expressed their concerns about 

treatment of the Palestinians to the Kuwaiti Ambassador. The 

Ambassador denied that his government was deliberately excluding the 

Palestinians from its planning for food distribution and assured that all 

Palestinians would be fed. 
32 AFTER DESERT STORM 

The reservists received strong support from Ambassador Gnehm, 

who was also concerned about the potential for human rights abuses. 

Early on, the Ambassador had discussions with Kuwaiti officials about 

the importance of protecting human rights after Kuwait's liberation. He 

emphatically warned that if the Kuwaitis shot any Palestinian residents 

U.S. forces \.vould pull out and the international community "vould conclude that the Kuwaitis were worse than the Iraqis. 

Civil Affairs doctrine on preventing human rights abuses was not 

well developed. Providing water, electricity, food, medical care, and sanitation seemed more immediate. Yet M~ . Andrew Natsios, DirecLOr of 

the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance in civilian li fc; Col. Raben 

Ward, chief of the politico-military division in the CENTCOM j-5; and 

other CENTCOM j-5 officers recognized the potential for abuses. 

NaLsios drafted a phased operations plan based on the kind of behavior expected in the three weeks following liberation. The final plan recommended that during the first 72 hours no residems be allowed to leave 

their homes, that during the following two weeks (when the bulk of the 

abuses were amicipated) there be a dusk-to-dawn curfew, and that the military patrol Paleslinian neighborhoods. The CENTCOM j-5 staff showed 

little interest in implementing the recommendations at the time, so Natsios 

put away the document. The clay the ground invasion began, however, 

Natsios resurrected the plan and presented it to Rear Adm. Grant Sharp, 

the CENTCOM j-5. At the admirals request, General Schwarzkopf adopledthis plan as commanders guidance for all the coalition forces and asked 

the Saudi Arabian commander of all the Arab forces to issue the plan as 

commanders guidance. But the Arab forces clidliulc LO implement the plan 

until the Kuwait Task Force arrived in KuwaiL.4 2 

Civil Affairs Operations Plan 

Pan of the Kuwait Task Force's mission was to prepare a civil affairs 

annex to ARCENT's operations plan. Members of the 352cl had begun 

drafting annexes to the CENTCOM and ARCENT operations plans 

after a joint exercise in the summer of 1990 called INTERNAL LOOK. 

Moone)' wamed the task force to develop and execute a plan that 

would incorporate and elaborate on the Kuwait EmergenC)' Response 

Program's plan. 

Elliou directed M~j r Natsios to write a civil affairs annex to the 

operations plans, a reconstruction plan for Kuwait. This plan became 

Annex G (Civil Action Plan) LO the CENTCOM and the ARCENT operations plans. The reservists completed the draft of Annex G in january 
PLANNING FOR EMERGENCY RESPONSE 33 

and formally presented it to the Kuwaitis before the task force deployed. 

They also sem copies to CENTCOM and ARCENT.~3 The reservists had 

difficulty gathering all the information they needed for their planning. 

"We couldn't function properly for lack of relatively simple intelligence," 

one member complained. CENTCOM planners possessed detailed information about the situation in Kuwait Cit)', such as which buildings had 

been rigged with explosives, that could have been useful to the task 

force. The reservists needed to know how many structures remained 

standi ng and where. The military intelligence community, except for the 

military medical imelligence service at Fon Detrick, Maryland, refused 

to share information even though the reservists had the appropriate 

security clearances.H 

The reluctance to share information may have been due to the placement of the task force under the steering group commiuees command 

and control. The task force had no formal relationship with CENTCOM, 

and Schwarzkopf$ staff provided almost no information concerning its 

plans until members of the 352d arrived in Saudi Arabia to work for the 

CENTCOM j-5 and the ARCENT G-5 (Plans and Policy Directorate). 

CENTCOMs j-5 planning cell in Riyadh apparently made no effort 

to keep the Kuwait Task Force in Washington informed of its plans for 

civil-military operations. CENTCOM personnel, in turn, knew nothing 

about the task forces mission and activities until after Elliou came to 

Riyadh to brief them. From CENTCOMs perspective, the reservists who 

worked closely with the Kuwaitis were not authorized access lO classified 

information about the mission. There was much sensitivity about sharing information with the Saudis and Kuwaitis. CENTCOM had, in fact, 

tried to prevent coalition members from having access to the operations 

plans being developed for fear that the Arabs might compromise the 

ope ration before its execution. 

Operational security, combined with the Kuwait Task Force's position outside the CENTCOM and the ARCENT command chains, prevcmcclthe degree of coordination needed to prepare an cfkctive plan for 

employing civil affairs. The CENTCOM J-5 asked the task force w send 

a representative to Riyadh, but the task force cleclinecl. The task force 

asked CENTCOM to send a representative to Washington, but that made 

liule sense to CENTCOtvl orfi.cials because the plans were being drafted 

in Riyadh. With liule inl'ormation l'rom ARCENT or CENTCOM in the 

first months, the reservists relied heavily on informalion that 352d members who worked in the Defense Intelligence Agency and the Central 

Intelligence Agency provided.-+5 

The Kuwait Task Force had clifferem priorities than ARCENT and 

CENTCOM had. Task force members focused on the long-term restora-
34 AFTER DESERT STORM 

tion of Kuwait$ infrastructure, while ARCENT and CENTCOM planners 

focused on short-term emergency services. Unfortunately, no one would 

compare the plans until the task force arrived in Saudi Arabia. At that 

lime, ARCENT and CENTCOM officials found the reservists' early planning efforts inappropriate and of little value. The reservists had developed an elaborate plan that had little relationship to the plans CENTCOM developed in Riyadh. Some officials later speculated that the lack 

of coordination could have caused serious problems if there had been 

great loss of life in Kuwait City. 46 

In response to the charge that ARCENT withheld information from 

the task force, the ARCENT G-5, Col. james T. l<err, Jr. , observed that 

ARCENTs own staff knew liule about the plan for offensive operations 

umil December. Moreover, the staff would have been reluctant to share 

such sensitive information with the task force. The ARCENT commander, Lt. Gen. j ohn Yeosock, with characteristic bluntness, observed that 

he saw no need to keep the civil affairs planners in Washington inforn1ed 

about the planning in theater. "Washington had nothing to do with the 

plan," he insisted. He did, however, believe that the reservists should 

have been mobilized to Saudi Arabia early on to keep ARCENT informed 

of their activities. 47 

During the planning process, Kuwait Task Force members presemecl a series of briefings to the Kuwaiti Ambassador. Ambassador AI-Sabah 

became convinced that the Kuwait Emergency Recovery Program had 

not prepared adequately or quickly enough for the liberation of Kuwait 

and the restoration of civil services, so he temporarily discontinued the 

briefings while he attended to internal problems."8 

As the director of the Kuwait Emergency Recove ry Program, Fawzi 

Al-Sultan reported directly to the Crown Prince and the Emir and \.vas 

not accountable to Ambassador Al-Sabah. Tensions between those two 

strong personalities intensiried. In mid-December, Fawzi AI-Sultan was 

called back to Taif to repon on his group's progress. Despile his positive report, Kuwaiti officials, who were perhaps concerned that Fawzi 

AI-Sultan was operating too independemly, removed him from his 

position. They replaced him with the U.S.-eclucatecl Dr. Ibrahim AIShaheen, a director in Kuwait's National Housing Authorily at the time 

of the invasion. The t\vo men had eli fferent personalities and styles. AtSultan was an energetic worker who displayed tremendous initiative. 

Dr. Shaheen, by contrast, was less dynamic and perhaps more cautious. vVhile at the housing ministry, Dr. Shaheen, a deeply religious 

man with high principles, had demonstrated his adeptness handling 

contentious issues and had inspired the confidence and trust or the 

royal family He demonstrated this same abilit}' throughout the recov-
PLANNING FOR EMERGENCY RESPONSE 35 

ery operation. Dr. Shaheen's calming manner, gentle appearance, and 

low-key rnanagement style belied the authority and responsibility he 

carried. He was pulled many different directions and felt a deep personal responsibility for the success of the recovery operation:19 

U.S Army Corps of Engineers Involvement 

Along with the Kuvvait Task Force, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 

became more deeply entrenched in planning for the reconstruction. 

Some task force members were already very familiar with the Corps' 

unique capabilities, especially james Evans, Arthur Walz, and James P 

Huber, who worked for the Corps as civilians. Kuwaiti leaders knew of 

the work the Corps had done for Saudi Arabia's Min istry of Defense and 

Aviation in the previous two decades and the Corps' extensive experience responding Lo natural disasters. Dr. Shaheen and his advisors correclly assumed that tbe Corps could apply its disaster response expenise 

as successfully in Kuwait. 

In addition, the Corps had been constructing facili ties in l<uwait 

long before the Iraqi invasion. Corps involvement in Kuwait actually 

dated back to the end of World War 11 when three Corps employees 

arrived to supervise contracts for the assembly of prefabricated barges 

used to carry "var materials up the Tigris and Euphrates rivers. During 

the late 1970s and early 1980s Corps personnel evaluated several buildings used by the American International School in Kuwait. 

ln the early 1980s, the Corps' Middle East Division worked with 

Kuwait's Air Force to house a Ha•vk missile system that it had purchased 

from the United States. The division established a small resident office in 

Kuwait headed by Ceasar Santucci. Meanwhile, the Kuwaitis hired an 

American firm to expand their computer system as a database management system for their personnel records, logistics, and other items. They 

asked the Corps to review the proposed design. The Corps modified the 

contract and opened it to competitive bidding, saving Kuwait an estimated $500,000. Over the next six years, the small Corps office in 

Kuwait became involved in nltmitions storage and helped design and 

develop a night simulator and training center at Ahmed Al-jaber Air 

Base. 5° At the time of the invasion, the Corps' Middle East/Africa Projects 

Office abandoned two main projects in Kuwait: the construction of the 

nearly complete training center and the construction o [ a hal[ complete 

maintenance shop [or Hawk antiaircraft missiles. 

On 12 December, Corps members met informally with representatives from the KuwaiL Task Force and the Kuwait Emergency Recovery 
36 AFTER DESERT STORM 

Program to provide an overview of the Corps' emergency response to 

catastrophic disasters and its application to the restoration of Kuwait. 

!:;or the next few weeks, the Corps took liule action. The Kuwaitis were 

considering hiring a private firm to act as the con tract manager, and 

Corps officials did not want to interfere. The Corps traditionally avoids 

pulling itself in the position of competing with a private firm. 

At the request of the Kuwaitis, on :3 January the Corps provided an 

informal briefing on its ability to provide emergency and long-term 

recovery assistance, particularly the capabilities of its Middle East/Africa 

Projects Office, located in Winchester, Virginia, 80 miles west of 

Washington. This office was a successor organization to a long line of 

Corps elements that had worked for decades in the Middle East. 

Recognizing the importance of the mission, the Chief of Engineers, Lt. 

Gen. Henry J Hatch, personally briefed Dr. Shaheen. The director of 

military programs, Maj. Gen. james 'vV Ray, and the commander of the 

South Atlantic Division, M.aj. Gen. John Sobke, also attended. The 

Kuwaiti government was represented by its director of public works and 

members of his staff. 

At the 3 January meeting, Dr. Shaheen indicated that he wanted the 

Corps immediately lO begin providing reimbursable technical assistance 

and design and construction management services in accordance witl1 

the agreement in the 15 December letter from Secretary Baker Lo the 

Kuwaiti Ambassador. The Kuwaitis promised to give the Corps their specific requirements the following day.:;1 

The next day, Dr. Shaheen formally requested that rhe Corps provide 

assistance in the follo\:ving areas: the Ministry of Public Works- roads and 

bridges, sanita1y collection, pumps and treatment, all public buildings, 

ports (civil aspects), and airports (civilian airport)- and the vlin stry of 

Elecnicity and 'vVater-water desali nation and distribution (ground 

water), power distribution and generation, and National Guard facilities 

repairs. Dr. Shaheen asked General Ray r.o propose a draft agreement.:;2 

B)' now U.S. military officials and the Kuwaitis recognized that the 

effort would be primarily construction, not civil affairs. Dr. Shaheen 

requested another meeting on 7 january to discuss the details of the 

Kuwaiti requirements and the nature of the Corps' emergency assistance. 

He also wanted to discuss the development of an agreement between the 

United States and Kuwait. on emergency assistance and related matters 

that vvould govern the Corps' activities. 

On 7 January~ the Corps forwarded its response to the I<uwair.i government's request to the steering group committee for approvaL The 

same day, at a meeting in the Kuwaitis K Street office, General Sobke and 

Richard \Niles from the 1vliddle East/Africa rl~jects Office described the 
PLANNING FOR E MERGENCY RESPONSE 37 

Corps' past experience in Hurricane Hugo (Sep tember 1989), the Loma 

Prieta earthquake (October 1989), and Operation jusT CAlSf-: (December 

1989) and its current involvement in Operation DESERT SHtt::w. They 

then presented a proposal for how the Corps would organize, prepare 

for, and execute the recovery work. They outlined the terms of a proposed letter of agreement. 53 

The Kuwaiti representatives realized that 1 he Corps had more experience in recovery and response work than any of the priv<:lte companies 

that they had been considering for project manager. They became convinced that the Corps had a level of expertise in emergency response not 

available elsewhere and was the only agency that could respond immediately. Working with a private firm, they had discovered, would require 

two to three months of planning and paperwork. Also, as a federal 

agency. the Corps would be bound by federal requirements and have 

greater legitimacy The Kuwaiti government would not have to pay the 

Corps any profit margin. Moreover, Kuwaiti government agencies would 

have the security of working with a U.S. government agency.~4 

After meeting with Dr. Shaheen, General Sobke asked Ceasar Santucci 

and Wayne Henry from the Middle East/Africa Pr~jects Office to draft a 

scope of work Since they did not know the extent or the damage, their 

est irnates were very rough. One great advantage was that Santucci knew 

some of the Kuwaiti representatives personally and understood how the 

ministries functioned. He was very familiar with the infrastructure of 

Kuwait City. Santucci and other Corps members talked with the Kuwaitis 

at length over the ne.,xt few weeks. The Corps enlisred some of its most 

experienced emergency managers to work on the project. :S~ 

The Kuwaitis decided to work witb the Anny Corps of Engineers not 

only because or tl1e Corps' unparalleled emergency response ex perience 

and capability but also because the Corps planned to incorporate Kuwaiti 

volurlleers in it-; efron. At the suggestion of Dr. Shaheen, Bader AIQabandi, and other Kuwaiti officials, the Corps agreed to integrate Kuwaiti 

nationals into its organization. The Kuwaitis wanted their engineers to 

learn about and contribute to the reconstruction process by working 

alongside the Corps' engineers. lncorporal ing local nationals was very 

important, Dr. Shaheen later observed, because it allowed them to fee l that 

they were contributing to their country. It also fo rged strong personal relationships between the Americans and the Kuwaitis. The Kuwaiti volunteers received invaluable firsthand experience and training.'6 

On 20 November, the Army Sraff directed the Chief of Engineers 

to serve as the subject matter expert and lead agent for dealing with the 

Kuwai.ti represe ntatives on all publi c works and utilities issues. The 

Army Staff also directed that working groups established for function-
38 AFTER DESERT STORM 

al areas report their findings and recommendations to the steering 

group committee for interagency coordination, validation, and 

approval. Hatch now in formed the 352d Civil Affairs Command that 

the Kuwaiti government had requested the Corps' help in planning and 

initiating emergency and long-term recovery efforts related to public 

works and utilities. The Km.vaitis, he reported , were requesting reim.-

bursable planning and technical assistance and design and construction management services. 

. Harch explained that the Kuwaiti government's priorities were to 

determine the condition of the water system and the qualit y of the 

water itself, evaluate the condition of the electrical distribution system, 

and provide for temporary e lectrical supply needs. The quickest and 

best way to obtain funding was to use foreign military sales procedures. Hatch enclosed a proposed foreign military sales agreement and 

a letter of offer and acceptance for the steering group commiuee's 

approval. The 352d, in mm, informed the steering group committee 

about the Kuwaiti request.H 

On 8 january the steering group committee approved the Corps' 

proposal. The next day, the Defense Security Assistance Agency 

approved the 546.35 million foreign military sales case ($45 million plus 

$1.35 million as a 3 percent surcharge for the Defense Security 

Assistance Agency to cover administrative expenses). Kuwaiti offici als 

signed the agreement on 14 january and quickly transferred a $20 million acceptance payment to the U.S. Treasury 

Meanwhile, General Hatch directed CoL Ralph V. Locurcio, commander of the Corps' Savannah District, to establish an area office in 

Kmvait ro oversee public works restoration. Locu rcios energetic and 

even-handed leadership would contribute greatly to the success of the 

operation. Locurcio traveled to the Middle East/Africa Projects Office 

headquarters on 13 january On 16 j anuary he met for the first Lime with 

the Kuwaiti representatives in Washington. At the meeting, representatives from the Corps, the 352cl Civil Affairs Command, and the Kuwait 

Emergency Recovery Program began developing a detailed scope of 

work. As he hurried back to Winchester later that day, Locurcio heard on 

the car radio that the air war against Iraq had begun. 51l 

Representatives from the Corps, the Kuwait Task force, and the 

Kuwait Emergency Recovery Program began developing a detailed scope 

of work. On 19 January, Locurcio met with Fatima Al-Sabah and 

Kuwaits ·Minister of Electricity and Water to discuss various contracting 

options. They agreed vvith Hatchs plan to expedite the recovery effort hy 

initially awarding letter contracts to prequalified contractors. Later contracts would be opened to competition . .:;9 A few days later, General Ray 
PLANNING FOR EMERGENCY RESPONSE 39 

met with Dr. Shaheen to clarify the contracting procedures that the 

Corps planned to follow. 

Meanwhile, Hatch sent out a call for volunteers to go to l<uwait, 

specifically to perform damage surve)1S and assessments, contracting, 

and other services. The response was tremendous. Over 2,000 Corps 

members, mosLiy civilians, volunteered.60 

While the volunteer effort was being organized, Corps leaders made 

key decisions about mobilizing for the operation. They had decided to 

draw on personnel throughout the Corps who had emergency experience. The Corps did not have a read)1-made district office it could deplo)'. 

Locurcio decided to create a structure similar to a Corps district office so 

these volunteers could quickly orient themselves and to move an 

advance pany into Saudi Arabia as quickly as possible. The advance 

pany was panicularly imponant because the Corps would find it nearly 

impossible to transport items purchased in the United States into a war 

theater. The advance team would be able to buy these items locally and 

obtain logistics support.61 An eight-person advance team left for Saudi 

Arabia on 28 januar)'. 

As Corps leaders launched their effort, they continued trying to 

involve other fede ral agencies in the reconstruction process. As early as late 

October, Col. Thomas j. Sheehy, from the Assistant Chief of Engineers' 

office, had recommended that "the full Federal emergency response apparatus should be used as a starting point for organizing this effort. " Based 

on the likely requirements, he added, the U.S. response would involve various government agencies as well as the private sector. Sheehy recommended that Pentagon ofricials consider using the Federal Emergency 

Managcmem Agency model for responding to nawral disasters in the 

United States and that the State Department coordinate the entire effort. 

Corps officials questioned whether the 352d Civil Affairs Command 

could provide the necessat)' coordination. Hatch, a man of perception and 

insight, expressed concern to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Lt. 

Gen. Dennis j. Reimer, that the Corps' emergency assistance activities be 

an "integral pan" of a broader war-to-peace transition in the region. "l 

believe that such a transition to peacetime support will set the LOne for 

regional stability into the next century," Hatch explained. Although a steering commiuee had been created, Hatch did not believe the CLIITCnL doctrines and plans dealt with this situation. The State Department and the 

Defense Department had not yet adequately coordinated the execution of 

the war-to-peace transition. The theater commanders hand-off to the U.S. 

Ambassador, Hatch noted, should not mark the end of the Defense 

Departments involvement. The Defense Department had to establish the 

necessar)' mechanisms to provide these nation assistance capabilities, ini-
40 AFTER DESERT STORM 

tially in support of the theater commander and later for the Ambassador 

to support recovery and reconstruction. 

No single depanment or agency controlled all the capabilities and 

resources that might be needed in the recovery and postwar period, he 

continued. Hatch recommenclecl that an interagency group linked to the 

National Security Council policy group be established to coordinate and 

implement the operation. He also recommended an executive order or 

national security decision memorandum directing and clarifying U.S. 

government assistance in Kuwaiti civil restoration and the relations 

between the Defense Department and the State Department. As much 

planning should go into coordinating and executing the recovery as went 

into fighting the war, he insisted. The Defense Department, and particularly the Army, had much to lose if efforts at managing the peace failed. 

"Our governments actions," Hatch warned, "will be judged in the years 

ahead more on how we promoted the conditions for lasting peace than 

how we waged the war." In closing, he urged Defense Department officials to ensure a successful transition from war to reconstruction by having the theater commander execute the initial civil affairs actions and 

then support the State Department after the transition.62 

Kuwaiti and Kuwait Task Force Deployment to Saudi Arabia 

As planning progressed, Kuwaiti officials decided to move most of 

the Kuvvait Emergency Recovery Program members from Washington to 

eastern Saudi Arabia where they could prepare for their return to 

Kuwait. The members would go home with their government and 

become the focus of emergency operations. 

In early Januat)', Secretary Baker had lengthy discussions with senior 

Kuwaiti ofricials about restoring civil services. After a Kuwaiti cabinet 

session on 12 january, which endorsed the civil affairs efforts, Deputy 

Prime tvlinister Sheikh Sabah AI-Ahmed Al-jaber AI-Sabah formally 

requested that Ambassador Gnehm ask the U.S. government to permit 

the Kuwait Task Force to continue working with the Kuwaitis to complete their planning and procurement. He also asked that the task force 

be allo'vved to deploy immediately vvith the Kuwaiti team-first into 

Saudi Arabia:S Eastern Province and then into Kuwait, where 1 hey could 

continue to provide guidance and act as a link between the Kuwaiti team 

and the U.S. military. "The close association of team members," Gnehm 

explained, "has built confidence and relationships that can now be 

invaluably used during the crisis." Close cooperation between the two 

teams, Gnehm argued, was "absolutely essential" to ensure that the 
PLANNING FOR EMERGENCY RESPONSE 41 

Kuwaiti government could provide critical services to the civilian population and thus relieve the U.S. military from these tasks. The primary 

goal of the United States was to restore the legitimate government of 

Kuwait quickly and effectively, the Ambassador added. The Kuwaiti government had to provide basic services to its population quickly to 

clernonstrate its legitimacy and to relieve U.S. troops of this requirement. 

Gnehm indicated that he needed the experience and expertise of the civil 

affairs unit to help him monitor and guide the Kuwaiti governmem during the crisis period. Secretary Baker, who recognized the need for continued close coordination in reconstruction planning, concurred with 

the Kuwaiti request.63 

The Kuwaitis invited the reservists to travel with them from 

Washington in their chartered aircraft on 16 january. State Depanment 

officials asked the Director of the joint Staff to secure the appropriate 

orders. General Powell supported Ambassador Gnehm's plan to have the 

reservists work closely with the Kuwaiti government, Ambassador 

Gnehm, and General Schwarzkopf. Both Powell and Gnehm believed 

that the civil affairs team would be the appropriate mechanism for 

involving other federal agenciesM Although senior State Department and 

Defense Department o!Ticials favored accepting the Kuwaiti offer to ny 

the Kuwait Task Force to Saudi Arabia, the Army Staff insisted that the 

reservists ny on military aircraft. The Army Staff was perhaps anxious to 

reaffirm its control over the task force . Liability and policy issues were 

also involved. As U.S. soldiers. the task force members were required to 

be processed at a designated mobilization station and deploy in gove rnment aircraft. Also, as Mooney explained to Gnehm, the military could 

not accept gifts over a cenain dollar amoum, and the Oight could be considered a "gift. " 

On 26 januar)', 48 of the original task force members climbed aboard 

a military aircraft at Dover Air Force Base in Delavvarc and headed for 

Saudi Arabia. Four members remained in Washington a rew days longer 

to continue working with the Kuwaitis. Despite the uproar, the separate 

travel arrangements had no impact on the task force 's mission.65 

Upon their arrival, the Kuwait Task Force members rejoined their 

Kuwaiti counterparts in Dammam, Saudi Arabia, just outside Dhahran. 

The Kuwaitis invited the reservists to join them at the Oberoi Hotel, but 

the hotel did not provide adequate security, so the reservists set up operations at the huge Khobar Towers housing complex in Dammam. But the 

facility had no telephones, work space, furniture, or transportation and 

was off-limits to Arabs, which would hinder coordination with their 

Kuwaiti partners. The l<uwaitis lobbied hard to get the reservists out of 

that facility. When that fai led, they paid the Saudis to provide addition-
42 AFTER DESERT STORM 

al security at the Oberoi Hotel. They even offered to acquire a facility 

behind the hotel where another Army unit was housed to keep all sensitive information and computers. After four clays at the Khobar Towers, 

the task force members moved to the Oberoi Hotel.b6 

By the time the Kuwait Task Force deployed to Saudi Arabia, the 

roles of the State Depanment and the Defense Department had become 

better defined, and Pentagon officials had reluctantly agreed to assume 

major responsibility for assisting the government of Kuwait. The early 

planning and contracting effons of the Kmvait Task Force proved to be 

very valuable, though the lack of early coordination between the task 

force and both ARCENT and CENTCOM would create problems once 

the task force arrived in theater. 
Chapter 2 

Planning in Theater 

In late january, as the fi rst members of the Kuwait Task Force and the 

Kuwait Emergency Recovery Office arrived in Saudi Arabia, the center of 

Kuwait reconstruction planning activities shifted from Washington to the 

theater of operalions. Military leaders in theater slowly realized that 

when the hostilities ended the people of Kuwait would urgently need 

emergency supplies and services. 

Not until the eve of the air war in mid-january, ho ... vever, d id CENTCOM and ARCENT ofricials position themselves to play a significant role 

in the immediate postcombat phase. Only then did they begin to craft 

the organizations-specifically the Combined Civil Affairs Task Force 

and Task Force Freedom-that would enable them to d irect a large-scale 

recovery operation in Kuwait. 

The Kuwait Task Force in Theater 

After the Ku>vait Task Force arrived in Saudi Arabia, a controversy 

ensued about command and control. The basic question was wou ld the 

task force continue to exist and, if so, to whom would it report? The task 

force was a stepchild of the Army Staff, yet its personnel remained members of the 352d Civil Affairs Command attached to ARCENT through 

the Army$ Capstone program. As in Washington, 1nilitary leaders in theater held d ifferent views on the appropriate role fo r civil affairs-specifically the Kuwait Task Force. 

The task force members had assumed that when they arrived in 

Saudi Arabia they would continue to work alongside Kuwaiti officials, 

helping them prepare for long-term restoration and reconstruction. But 

some CENTCOM and ARCENT officials had a differem plan. They wanteel to integrate the reservists into the existing chain of command and 

en'lploy them in emergency reswralion missions. These o!Ticials wanted 

to pull individual reservists from the task force to augment their own 
44 AFTER DESERT STORM 

staffs. Reservists have often been used in this manner. Rumors that the 

CENTCOM J-5 planned to dismantle the task force alarmed the newly 

arriving members. I 

El liott vvas anxious to keep the group imact and focused on its 

long-term planning mission. CENTCOM staff members, however, 

argued that they were fighLing a war, and every soldier had to focus on 

the present events. The task force, they insisted, was no longer an independent planning emity but a CENTCOM asset to be used as the theater commander saw fit. The theater commander, they added, was in 

charge until the end of the hostilities when Ambassador Gnehm and 

the Kuwaitis assumed responsibility. Some staff members later complained that initially Gnchm and the task force members had difficulty understanding this relationship.2 

The task force members, in turn, reported that CENTCOM and 

ARCENT staff were "suspicious" of and even "hostile" towards them. 

Neither command had been involved in the task force's acLi vation nor in 

its shift from a planning cell to an operational, in theater asset, and neither knew exactly what to do with this asset. The task force had been 

operating in Washington under the direction of the high-level steering 

group committee. It had developed and maintained close ties to 

Ambassador Gnehm and to the Kuwaiti government, but not to U.S. 

forces in Saudi Arabia. 

ARCENT and CENTCOM had never requested the task force and 

knew little about it. Colonel Kerr indicated that ARCENT and the 

CENTCOM commander "never fe lt sufficiently plugged into" the process 

of establishing the task force. Kerr had not been kept well informed of 

the task forces activilies in the States. Kerr observed that many ARCENT 

ofricials believed that the task force mission was self-generated, that 

Elliou had initiated the mission using his civilian connections at the 

State Department. They were concerned that the reservists were "getting 

themselves in an area where they didn't belong."J At one point, Kerr 

blunt!)' informed Elliott that he worked for ARCENT. 

Rcnecting the level of ARCENT's skepticism about the task force, 

General Yeosock later complained that he had "no earthly idea of what 

this Kuwait Task Force was doing in Washington or what it 'vvas they 

thought they were doi ng or what utility il had to me once it got there." 

I lc suggested that a task force representative should have briefed him 

because the civil work function could not be performed independently 

in a vacuum. Moreover, General Yeosock initially questioned whether 

this relatively small group of reservists could make a significam contribution. The ARCENT and CENTCOM staffs viewed the Kuwait Task 

Force as an "orphan" thrust upon them, with no sponsor in theater. The 
PLANNING IN THEATER 45 

task force, they insisted, was not their responsibility and would have to 

provide its own logistics suppon.4 

While CENTCOt--t! and ARCENT questioned the usefulness of the 

task force, Ambassador Gnehm, vvho had moved to Taif in the first \.veek 

of january, had a different view. He was delighted to have the reservists 

aL hand because they gave him capabilities that he would not otherwise 

have had with his small five-person staff. Gnebm was understandably 

anxious to keep the task force intact. When the time came to m.ove imo 

Kuwait, he wanted the reservists nearby where they could consult with 

him and apprise him of any problems and, more important, where they 

would be close to the Kuwaiti planners. 

Ambassador Gnehm joined in the struggle to preserve the integrity 

of the task force, but quickly met resistance from General Schwarzkopf, 

Admiral Sharp (the CENTCOM J-5), and General Yeosock. Gnehm did 

not believe General Yeosock understood the importance of the task force 

nor the concept that this group would collocate in Dhahran and prepare 

itself to go imo Kuwait and establish a civil-military operations center. 

Yeosock, in turn, mainLained that Gnehm had the '\vhole Army" to help 

him restore l<uwait, not just the Kuwait Task Force.5 

Ambassador Gnehm had a CENTCOM representative on his staff, Maj. 

Teny Pouer, who provided regular updates on the military operations. 

Potter 'vvas Gnehm's liaison on reconstruction issues with General 

Schwarzkopf's staff. However, the Ambassador often dealt directly with 

Admiral Sharp and occasionally with General Schwarzkopf. During his 

discussions at CENTCOM headquarters, Gnehm detected little interest in 

preparing for post-liberation in Kuwait. General Schwarzkopf's staff was 

understandably preoccupied wi.lh executing the offensive operations. 

The Ambassador later noted that after failing to find a senior CENTCOM official who would argue the case for reconstruction, he assumed 

that mission himself. Gnehm was particularly anxious to avoid massive 

deaths caused by shortages of food and water. like General Hatch, he 

found himself reminding military officers that the success of the operation 

after liberation, not the ground war, would determine whether victory 

"was sweet or sour." The military victory and liberation of Kuwait would 

be clouded if people were dying in the street. He argued that the goal of 

the President and the theater commander was to restore the legitimate governmem of Kuwait as quickly as possible so the U.S. forces vvere not 

viewed as an occupying army The Kuwait Task Force, he explained, was 

designed to help meet this goal. The Ambassador pleaded with General 

Schwarzkopf to leave the task force intact so it could continue its work.6 

As a result of private discussions, General Schwarzkopf and the 

Ambassador agreed that some task force members wouldjoin the CENT-
46 AFrER DESERT SroRM 

COM and ARCENT staffs to help vv1th planning, but they would later 

rejoin their unit to execute the plans. Meanwhile, other task force members would continue their own planning effort.7 

The Ambassador's vision of the task force working alongside himself 

and the Kuwaitis never materialized. Although the State Department 

encouraged Kuwait's exiled government officials Lo return to their country as quickly as possible, they were reluctant to do so. As a result, 

Gnehm would enter Kuwait City on l March, before a single exiled 

Kuwaiti government official arrived. The Crown Prince arrived a few 

days later, followed in time by other ministers and their staffs. The Emir 

would not follow umil much later, after suitable accommodations had 

been prepared and safety concerns had been adequately addressed.S 

With the Ambassador's help, Kuwait Task Force members successfully fended off those who would dismember their organization. Their 

work took on a new urgency. The members had not planned to enter 

Kuwait until at least a month after hostilities ceased, but both they and 

the CENTCOM staff began to see a need to get the task force and emergency supplies into Kuwait as soon as possible. lL became increasingly 

clear to CENTCOM and to General Mooney that no one had planned 

adequately for the initial emergency phase in Kuwait. General Yeosock 

and Lt. Gen. William "Gus" Pagonis, commander of the 22cl Suppon 

Command, directed Mooney to expand the focus of the task force to 

include short-term recovery, concentrating on food, water, medical supplies, transportation, telecommunications, sanitation, and electrical 

povver. The reservists encouraged their Kuwaiti counterparts to step up 

efl'on to assemble supplies and trucks, and the number of l<uwaili contracts climbed dramaticall y in February. 

Task force members in Dammam worked feverishly to obtain food, 

water, and medical supplies; prepackage supplies for distribution; stage 

supplies for loading; and arrange for trucks and drivers to deliver these 

items into Kuwait immediately after liberation. General Mooney; Brig. 

Gen. Kenneth Guest, the deputy commander of the 22d Support 

Command; and Col. William Mercurio, the commander of the 30lst 

Area Support Group, planned to deliver so-called "push packages"-

flatbed trucks loaded with food, water, and medical supplies. The 

rese rvists put together these packages, sometimes with help li·om the 

U.S. Navy. t'-ilooney wanted three-day packages that could go into specific areas so the U.S. military would not have to replenish supplies every 

day. The packages would be trucked up the coast road because the airport was heavily damaged.<> 

Although the task force originally planned for each truck in the initial 

convoy to carry the same proportion of food, water, and medical supplies, 
PLANNING IN THEATER 47 

in case of an accident or mechanical failure, they found that medical supplies had to be distributed differently than the other items. Ultimately they 

created separate truckloads of food, water, and medical supplies, and these 

trucks went forward to do partial distribution. The medical supplies were 

delivered directly to the hospitals. The "push packages" allowed civil affairs 

personnel LO provide critical items on site faster. JO 

As the ground war approached, the task force not only massed supplies, it also increased pressure on the Kuwaitis to make beuer preparations for medical assistance. During one tense exchange, task force member Maj. John W Harbell asked Dr. Shaheen how many dead Kuwaitis 

the Emir would tolerate, because without adequate preparalion, the 

number would climb with each passing day. If the deaths were unacceptable, Harbell \.varned, the Kuwailis had to take certain measures. The 

reservists and the Kuwaitis began to stage medical supplies on Arm>' pallets in a small warehouse in Dammam owned by a Saudi trash collection 

service. The first truck that pulled up with emergency medical supplies 

was fi lled with antacid, which the Kuwailis had purchased in bulk 

because stomach ulcers were a common afniction in Kuwait. II 

Despite the task forces efforts, ARCENT planners remained concerned that the Kuwaiti government would not be able to deliver enough 

supplies. The task force had reponed onl>' the food purchased by the 

Kuwaiti government that was already loaded on flatbeds ready tO move 

north on short notice. lt had not reponed the additional emergency supplies stored in a Dhahran warehouse that had not yet been loaded on 

trucks. Receiving the task forces understated reports, on 26 February the 

ARCENT staff ordered nearly $10 million in emergency food and water 

to be delivered in U.S. Army trucks by the 30lst Area Support Group. 

When they discovered the reporting problem, they reduced this amount 

to $1.4 million. 

The trucks that the task force loaded with the Kuwaiti purchases 

reached Kuwait Cit}' several days before the area support group. Thus, 

the Kuwaiti government, rather than ARCENT, provided the bulk of the 

relief supplies in the emergency response period. Although the supplies 

that the reservists had encouraged the l<uwaiti government to buy were 

not originall y intended for emergency relief, they turned out to be the 

only supplies available immediately after the liberation.I2 

CENTCOM Planning for Civil-Military Operations 

Before mid-January, CENTCOM gave little attention to planning for 

civil- military operations in Kuwait after the liberation. CENTCOMs 
48 AFTER DESERT STORM 

operations plan for DESERT STORI\·1 basically stopped with eliminating the 

threat of I raqs Republican Guard and did not add ress the post -connict 

phase. Under the plan, the coalition forces. particularly Arab members, 

would liberate Kuwait Cit}', rather than American soldiers. joim Forces 

Command-East, made up of Saudi and other Arab forces, would move 

nonh along the Persian Gulf coast imo Iraq. 

The Marines, situated to the west of joint Forces Command-East, 

vvould also push north, but they would stop at the outskirts of Kuwait City 

and secure the area around Kuwait lmernational Airport. Arab forces from 

joint Forces Command-North, situated on the Marines' western nank, 

would sweep north and enter Kuwait from the west. U.S., British, and 

French troops would push north and west of Kuwait City to seal Iraqi 

units inside, but would not be directly involved in retaking the city. 13 

Although neither CENTCOM nor ARCENT originally envisioned 

playing a large role in the immediate response phase, they had asked several officers from the 352d Civil Affairs Command to plan civil-military 

operations. Col. Lawrence C. Blount had arrived in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, 

on 18 December with a team of seven soldiers from the civil affairs command to form the Civil Affairs Branch of Colonel Wards politico-military 

division in CENTCOMs Plans and Policy Directorate. Blounts group now 

became CENTCOMs principal link with the Kuwait Task Force. The task 

force coordinated with Blount as much as possible as he struggled to integrate the emergency services and reconstruction into the war plan, sending him copies of its repons and plans by registered mail. 

When the Kuwait Task Force arrived in Saudi Arabia in january, 

Colonel Elliou went to Riyadh to brief the ARCENT and CENTCOM 

Plans and Policy direcLOrates. Three task force members remained in 

Riyadh for about two weeks until the task force moved into Kuwait. 

They completed contracts for food, water, and other essentials. At that 

time, ARCENT remained focused exclusively on attacking Iraqi forces, so 

the CENTCOM Plans and Policy DirecLOrate, particular!}' Blounts group, 

did most of the planning for emergency relief in Kuwait. Admiral Sharp 

remained keenly interested in the task forces plans for restoring emergency services and received daily briefings.I4 

The civil affairs specialists who worked in the directorate provided 

civil- military operations planning and policy guidance for the theater 

and coordinated the deployment of the remaining civil affairs units to the 

theater. Their planning focused on five areas: minimizing hazards to the 

civilian population in Saudi Arabia, establishing temporary civil authority in occupied areas of southern Iraq, handling large numbers of dislocated civilians in Kuwait, restoring emergency services in Kuwait, and 

repatriating enemy prisoners or war. 
PLANNING IN THEATER 49 

The planners drew on information provided by members of the 

resistance operating in Kuwait. Reports indicated that food and water 

were generally available. llowever, the lraqis had stripped most of the 

sophisticated equipment and supplies from hospitals and shipped them 

to lraq. The)' had looted communications equipment, radios, telephones, and computers; confiscated commercial and privately owned 

vehicles; and placed mines around the oil wells, roads, and bridges.l 5 

Ward and Blount occasionally drove to the Kuwaiti EmbaSS)' in 

Saudi Arabia to gather information from Kuwaitis who had recently 

escaped. Blount had on his planning staff a battalion commander for one 

of Kuwait$ armo red brigades who had stayed in Ku•vait until midNovember as pan of the resistance. He worked with the staff until a week 

before the ground campaign started, when he rejoined his unit. Blount 

indicated that he and others on the J-5 staff had "remarkably good" 

information about the siLUation in Kuwait. The planning effort went 

extremely well , he observed. They bad anticipated virtually all of the 

problems they later encoumered.t6 

ARCENT Planning for Civil-Military Operations 

lnitiall)', Admiral Sharps staff had favored retaining responsibility for 

civil affairs at the CENT COM level. But on 4 januar)' 1991, Admiral Sharp 

designated ARCENT as the executive agent for civil-militar)' operations for 

Operation DESERT STORt-I. As the executive agem, ARCENT exercised command and control over all echelons above corps civil a!Tairs units in themer. 1l was also responsible for restoring civil order and emergency services 

to Kuwait. CENTCOM directed ARCENT to provide all necessaty emergency food, water, medical care and supplies, temporal')' shelter, and public services after the liberation of Kuwait. General Schwarzkopf placed 

General Yeosock in charge of restori ng Kuwait$ essential services and 

infrastrucwre, and Yeosock delegated this task to his subordinate commander, Brig. Gen. (later Maj. Gen.) Robert S. Frix.t7 

Back in December, the same da)' that Blount and his team joined the 

CENTCOlvl staff, six members of the 352d Civil Arfairs Command 

joined ARCENT's Plans and Polic)' Directorate (G-5), which assumed the 

lead for civil-rnilitar)' operations. The staff worked hard to convince 

ARCENT or the need to purchase emergency relief supplies for dislocated civilians in southern Iraq, but they encountered opposition. Other 

civil affairs members in the directorate focused almost exclusive!)' on the 

final version of the operations plan for DL:SERT STOR~ I. But, as indicated, 

in late December neither ARCENT nor CENTCOtvl were overl)' con-
50 AFTER DESERT STORM 

cerned about requirements in the period after the liberation of l<uwail. 

Their operations plan for "defense and reconstruction of Kuwait" envisaged a peaceful withdrawal leaving U.S. forces with liLLie to do. The 

ARCENT G-5 began planning for Kuwait only after Admiral Sharp 

ordered him to do so.JS 

By mid-January, the realization grew that the Iraqis were not going 

to leave l<uwait City peacefully. Elliolls early briefing for the ARCENT 

G-5 and CENTCOM j-5 highlighted the gap between the time when 

coalition forces liberated the city and Kuwaiti officials could safely 

return. No one knew how long that gap would last, and no one had 

planned for providing emergency relief during that period.l9 

ARCENT officials recommended the immediate activation of the 

entire 352d Civil Affairs Command to oversee the Kuwait reconstruction 

effort and to provide command and control for nearly 2,220 civil affairs 

personnel. Planning for the post-liberation period, they explained, was a 

"potentially enormous undertaking" li kely to consume a substantial 

number of civil affairs companies. This reconfirmed the need for a civil 

affairs command and control element.20 

As the massive air war progressed, officials became even more convinced that Kuwait City would be heavily damaged. Reports indicated 

that as many as 600,000 people could be left in need of food and water 

and without communication and electrical power. Thus, the Army 

would have to build up its civil affairs capability to respond effeclively.2l 

Meanwhile, General Schwarzkopf warned General Powell and 

Secretary of Defense Cheney that the period after Iraqi forces left Kuwait 

'vvould be critical. Until l<uwait:S legitimate government was reestablished, he explained, coalition forces must be prepared to help that government pro,ride for its people. As the largest force in the coalition and 

the predominate leader in the liberaLion, the Un ited States vvou ld be 

expected to provide the necessary services. 

General Schwarzkopf asked that his command be given the missions 

of conducting disaster relief operations and administering civil affairs 

operations in l<uwail. Without such authority, CENTCOM could noL 

legally use U.S. manpower, equipment, or materials to provide relief to 

the civilian population. The next day, General Schwarzkopf issued guidance on U.S. involvement in l<uwait City, which stipulated that he would 

be responsible for emergenc)' relief until the Crown Prince and his cabinet returned. 

The draft operations plan for the defense and restoration of 

Kuwait governed planning fo r the theater commander's eme rgency 

relief mission. Within the ARCENT Plans and Policy Directorate this 

planning effort gave birth to the Civil Affairs Task Force Planning Cell, 
PLANNING IN THEATER 51 

headed by Col. Richard C. Brackney from the 352d Civil Affairs 

Command. The directorate closely coordinated its planning dfon 

with its CENTCOM counterparts. 

Toward the end of January, hovvever, a separate group was organized 

within the ARCENT Plans and Policy Directorate to consider both the 

organization and staffing of the Kuwait relief effort. Only within the context of planning for the emergency relief of Kuwait City did ARCENT 

consent to mobilize General tVlooney and the rest of his command.22 

Formation of the Combined Civil Affairs Task Force 

General Mooney arrived in Riyadh on 2 February. The rest of his 

command, under his chief of staff, Col. Edward A. King, foll owed on 

15 February. As soon as the general arrived at his hotel, he call ed 

ARCENT headquarters to arrange for a meeting with General Yeosock 

At this initial meeting, Yeosock emphasized that Mooney:S mission 

was to turn management of the reconstruction over to the Kuwaitis as 

quickly as possible.23 

After the meeting, a member of the ARCENT staff politely informed 

Mooney that, contrary to Army doctrine, he would not serve as the 

ARCENT G-5, commanding all the civil affairs troops in theater. Rather 

he would command a newly formed Civil Affairs Task Force (CATF), 

vvhile Colonel Kerr continued to serve as the G-5. Yeosock later 

explained that he placed Mooney as commander of the task force, rather 

than as G-5, to make the best use of his skill and experience. Moreover, 

because of the imponance of the Kuwait mission and the shorL execution 

period, Yeosock wanted Mooney in a position where he could use his 

authority and his general officer rank to put together the task force. He 

needed Mooney w command troops and direct the clay-to-day reconstruction, rather than serve as a staff advisor and get involved in policy 

issues. Mooney later conceded that he did not need the additional burden of being responsible for all civil affairs. 

Yeosock:S decision refiectecl certain political sensitivities. Plans before 

Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM called [or the commander of 

the 352d to be both a staff advisor to the ARCENT commander and the 

commander of a major subordinate command. Early on, however, Yeosock 

had attached tbe various civil afrairs companies to the corps and divisions. 

lf 11looney became the G-5, the whole attachment versus operational control issue would resurface, something Yeosock did nol want.24 

On 14 February 1991, ARCENT formally established the Civil 

Affairs Task Force, a group of 550 soldiers, mostly reservists, with a 
52 AFI'ER DESERT STORM 

broad range of skills in the public service areas. The Civil Affairs Task 

Force consisted of the Kuwait Task Force; the 352d Civil Affairs 

Command (-); the 43lst Civil Affairs Company out of LiLLie Rock, 

Arkansas; the 432d Civil Affairs Company out of Green Bay, Wisconsin; 

and the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion (-) out of Fort Bragg, North Carolina. 

The 96th Civil Affairs Battalion (-), though assigned to the task force, 

remained under ARCENTs operational control. 

Stafring the Civil Affairs Task Force proved challenging. The new 

task fo rce needed civi l affairs companies to conduct civil- military 

operations in Kuwait City, but these were hard to find. Twelve Army 

Reserve civil affairs companies were in the theater. Existing Army civil 

affairs doctrine dictated that these units be auached to the 352d Civil 

Affairs Command for further auachn1ent to combat units. As noted, 

hovvever, ARCENT had already auachedthese un its to divisions and 

corps. Division and corps commanders, uncertain about what they 

would face as hostilities ended, were understandably reluctant to surrender those civil affairs units. Ultimately, the ARCENT G-5 persuaded the XV!ll Airborne Corps and the Vll Corps each to release a single civil affairs company, the 43lst and 432d respectively, to join the 

task force. 

Planners quickly recognized the need to coordinate the activities of 

the task force with the civil affairs activities of the coalition partners. The 

Civil Affairs Task Force became a Combined Civil Affairs Task Force 

(CCATF) with the addition of civil affai rs elements from France, Canada, 

Britain, Saudi Arabia, and KuwaiL. The task force was also a de facto joint 

task force, embracing elements from the Army, Air Force, Navy, and 

Marine Corps. It even included representatives from the International 

Commiuee of the Red Cross, the Kuwaiti Red Crescent, and a team from 

the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance.25 

The task force incorporated some unusual organizational concepts. 

First, it had a deputy chief of staff for security, plans, and operations who 

oversaw both the task forces intelligence (G-2) and operations (G-3) 

funclions. The deputy was considered the centerpiece of the operation, 

gathering information on the status of Kuwait City, setting priorities, and 

assigning relief tasks. 

Second, the task force formed a coalition warfare branch to provide 

a much-needed link to the Arab forces, specifically the Easlern and 

Northern Area Commands. At an earlier meeting in AI Khobar, Maj. Gen. 

Jaber l<halid AI-Sabah, commander of Kuwails Land Forces, had indicated that his fo rces needed civil affairs suppon. Afler thal, G-5 planner 

Maj. Chuck Trombcua trieciLo provide General Jaber with a civil affairs 

liaison team, an effort that did not bear fruit until just before the task 
PLANNING IN THEATER 53 

force deployed to Kuwait City. Trombeua worked to crystallize the concept of civil affairs support to coalition forces by creating and leading the 

coalition warfare branch. 

Initially, the relationship of the new task force to ARCENT vvas 

unclear. Early planning placed the task force firmly at the center of the 

emergency relief effon, with ARCENT medical, engineer, military police, 

and supply assets attached to it as needed. Yeosock strongly opposed this 

concept. Rather, he decided lO place the task force under a small 

ARCENT (Forward) control element and provided that element with all 

the support it required. 

The Combined Civil Affairs Task Force would coordinate the delivery of emergency relief to Kuwait City, but would control no assets 

except its people. Food, water, trucks, medical supplies, and other essentials would belong to the government of Kuwait or the 301st Area 

Support Group.26 

Most of the task force members assembled at Camp #l near Jubail, 

50 miles north of Dhahran on the Saudi Arabian coast, on 14 February 

to begin planning and training for Kuwait reconstruction. The headquarters element of the 352d Civil Affairs Command, which had just 

arrived in Dhahran, moved to Camp #1 on 15 February. Mooney arrived 

the next day after a series of meelings with Generals Frix, Yeosock, and 

Pagonis. Formal training began on 18 February. 

By the end of the first week of training, Mooney had divided Kuwait 

City into sectors and given each company responsibility for various sectors. Training increasingly focused on detailed analysis of each sector. By 

the time task force personnel entered the city, they would be very familiar with the locations of key facilities such as hospitals and power plants. 

Their training ultimately contributed to their success.27 

The 96th Civil Affairs Baualion (-) moved from Riyadh to join the 

Combined Civil Affairs Task Force at Camp #l on 17 February. h trained 

the Reserve companies on communication and military operations in 

preparation for combat in Kuwait City. It placed representatives in the 

headquarters of the joint Forces Command-East and the Joint Forces 

Command-North to serve as critical links between U.S civil affairs 

forces and coalition forces preparing to enter Kuwait City. The battalion 

provided the coalition troops with some initial civll affairs training. The 

baLtalion's support to the planned coalition assault was critical because 

no coalition forces were dedicated to tactical civil affairs.28 

Mooney apportioned the 70 l<uwaiti interpreters assigned to rhe 352cl 

tO the civil affairs companies. Their knowledge of the language and the city 

made these interpreters "a tremendous asset," he observed. They would 

make the task of damage assessmem easier for the civil affairs personnel.29 
54 AFTER DESERT STORM 

Creation of Task Force Freedom 

In January, amid growing concern about the immediate post-liberalion period, General Schwarzkopf directed ARCENT to provide a command and control headquarters for civil-military operations in Kuwait. 

On 12 January, General Yeosock dispatched General Frix and a small 

staff to the vicinity of King Khalid Military City in northern Saudi Arabia 

\Vith a mobile command post called LUCKY TAC (after General Patton$ 

fon.vard headquarters). 

Frix's command post \ovould monitor the movement of U.S. forces 

into western Saudi Arabia and direct the echelons above corps elements 

in the forward areas. ARCENT established a forward headquarters at 

King Khalid Military City, a self-contained command and control element that would operate forward during the ground campaign and 

ensure communication with ARCENT headquarters in Riyadh.30 As the 

ground war approached, Frix and his staff solidified their operations. A 

special cell in ARCENT (Forward) planned the restoration of Kuwait, 

while other elemems crafted the ground campaign.3' 

ARCENT officials concluded that they needed a command and control element that would combine the assessment capabilities of the civil 

affairs command with the logistics support capabilities of an Army area 

support group. Planners recognized that the Combined Civil Affairs Task 

Force could not accomplish the recovery mission without support from 

other Army elemems. The civil affairs element, though a key player, 

would need Army vehicles, communications capability, and other types 

of logistics support. The task force they envisioned was not a doctrinal 

organization but a small version of a corps support command tailored to 

the specific mission. It was designed to provide area suppon, not to support combat. Planners began with an area support group, then added 

military police, engineer, medical, and other clements. 

The ARCENT (Forward) staff and General Guest put together the 

organization during January. lt consisted of military personnel who were 

not fully occupied with the combat operations. Since these units had never 

had to perform their intended missions during the combat phase, they 

were able to turn their auention more quickly to the post-combat phase.32. 

ln mid-February, after the planning had been undervvay for some 

weeks, General Frix requested a briefing by all the elements involved in 

restoring emergency services and rebuilding Kuwait. On 20 February, 

Frix held a meeting at I<ing Khalid Militaty City to review the operations 

plan for the defense and restoration of Kuwait. General Guest attended 

along with more than 40 representatives from CENTCOM, ARCENT, the 

special operations element of CENTCOM, and key echelons above corps 
PLANNING IN THEATER 55 

units such as signal, engineer, and medical commands. ln his opening 

remarks, Frix expressed concern that tl1e United States might win the 

war, but lose the peace. 

CENTCOM had advocated forming a task force with Army civil 

affairs and Marine Corps representatives, but hazardous weather prevented the Marines from traveling to King Khalid Military City for the 

meeting. The Marines had already indicated they had limited resources 

and would have lO defer to the Army for the bulk of the recovery effort. 

Arter presenting their concepts for operations, CENTCOM, 

ARCENT, and Special Operations representatives discussed issues related to command and comrol, operations, and civil affairs. Genera l Frix 

realized that even if Arab rather than U.S. forces liberated Kuwait, U.S. 

military assets would be needed quickly. He stressed the importance of 

establishing clear missions, responsibilities, and timelines33 

The meeting highlighted the need for much closer coordination than 

any operations plan could provide. At the meetings end, Frix announced 

the establishment of Task Force Freedom to bring together the Combined 

Civil Affairs Task Force and other elements. (Chart 2) He indicated that 

General Guest would be his main support, particularly for transportation, 

engineers, and military police. He also announced that once inside 

Kuwait City, he vvould operate out of Kuwait International Airport34 

initially, Frix would use the n10bile command post as Task Force 

Freedom headquarters, and staff elements would report to him each 

evening on the progress in their particular areas. Using the command 

post was a good decision because it could perform a variety of missions. 

Task Force Freedom would function as an umbrella organization for all 

U.S. military relief and reconstruction activities in Kuwait. lL would 

resolve outstanding issues and coordinate the activities of the various 

Army elements.3S 

Task force freedom was not a standard military organization. ln 

deciding which elements would go into the task force, frix and others 

looked at the anticipated requirements. The organization, which grew t.o 

over 3,500 soldiers and civilians at one point, included the Combined 

Civil Affairs Task force; an element of the 22d Support Command 

l30lst Area Support Group and 7th Transportation Group (-)] under 

General Guest that provided all the logistics, transponation, and food; 

the 416th Engineer Command (Forward), an Army Reserve unit out of 

Chicago under its deputy commander Brig. Gen. Max L. Schardein; the 

2d Aviation Brigade (-);an element of the ARCENT Medical Command; 

elemems from the 11th Signal Brigade; military police from the 720th 

Military Police Battalion; the 8th Psychological Operations Battalion; the 

513th Military intelligence Brigade(-); and the lst Explosive Ordnance 
Chart 2- Task Force Freedom 

432 OPCON 
PLANNING IN THEATER 57 

Disposal Group. As the senior commander in Kuwait, Fri x would also 

oversee and coordinate the activities of the Corps' Kuwait Emergency 

Recovery Office. The beauty of Task Force Freedom, Frix's executive officer Lt. Col. Mark Yates observed, was that it allowed the civil affairs units 

to concentrate on uniquely civil affairs missions, while other clements in 

the task force handled all the support missions. ARCENT (Forward) provided Frix with a small staff for command, control, and communication. 

Col. Glenn Lackey from ARCENT directed that a ponion of ARCENT's 

mobile command post provide an operations element for the task force, 

and he became Frix's operations officer.36 

The task force's mission, Yeosock indicated, was "LO ensure unity of 

effort in the restoration and reconstruction of Kuwait and provide for the 

transition of responsibility to the Secretary of the Army." The mission 

was short-term-to provide emergency support only. Task Force 

Freedom was to accomplish certain tasks specified by CENTCOM: help 

reswre emergency services in Kuwait, serve as CENTCOM's executive 

agent for civil affairs, and serve as coordinating authority for CENTCOM 

tactical military psychological operations. lt was designed to conduct 

damage assessments and provide interim emergency services during the 

initial phase of restoring Kuwait.37 The task force "vas similar to the organization that had been created to execute civil-military operations in 

Panama a few years earlier. Both the task force and the U.S. Military 

Support Group in Panama contained civil affairs, combat support, and 

combat service suppon elements. Both integrated Reserve and Active 

Army components.38 

Kuwait Emergency Recovery Office Organization 

As ARCENT stepped up its planning for the post-liberation period, 

the Corps of Engineers did the same. However, as the ground war 

approached, many key questions remained. Who would the Corps' 

Kuwait Emergency Recovery Office work for in theater? How much 

would U.S. troops do to repair the pons and airport, and how much 

would be left to Corps contractors? Who would tell the Corps when to 

initiate the recovery operations? How soon after hostilities ended would 

Corps members be able to enter Kuwait and begin work?W 

At a 6 February meeting, General Hatch reminded Colonel Locurcio 

and others that the theater commander's policy was to "provide maximum opportunity fo r U.S. private sector involvement in Kuwait recovery." He reiterated the Corps' longstanding policy of hiring contractors 

rather than competing with private industry. 
58 AFTER DESERT S TORM 

A few days lmer, Locurcio met with Dr. Shaheen's representative, 

Fatima AI-Sabah, and representatives from the ministries served b)' the 

Corps' foreign military sales agreement. Locurcio provided copies of the 

memorandum of understanding that the Corps had signed with Dr. 

Shaheen on 24 january and then presented the Corps' plan for comracting operations for emergency recovery in Kuwail. 

Arter Locurcios presentation,julius "Bo" Bounds, an experienced contracting specialist from the Middle East/Africa Projects Ofnce, outli ned the 

contracting procedures the Corps planned to follow. He explained that the 

Corps would obtain competitive proposals before I<uwaits liberation. If 

time did not allow for full competition, the Corps would use letter contracts as an emergency measure. Later, the Corps would convert the letter 

contracts into definitive documents. Locurcio emphasized that the Corps 

intended to obtain as much competition as possible.40 

Each Kuwaiti ministry and the Corps would formally agree on a contracts scope of work. Before solicitations went out, the Kuwaiti ofricials 

would decide whether they or the Corps \ovould award the final contract. 

Together, the Kuwaiti ministries and the Corps would develop a list of 

prequalified contractors, solicit proposals from them, and form a joint 

U.S.-Kuwaiti committee to review the proposals and select the most 

qualified firm. 

If the Corps was to award the contract, the Kuwaiti ministry would 

provide a written request to award the contract to the firm the committee had selected. lf the Ku'.vaitis planned to award the contract, the 

Corps would help prepare the contract documems for signature by the 

appropriate ministry.4t 

Locurcio and his deputy, Ben Wood, met with Ambassador Gnehm 

and his sta[T in Taif on l2 f-ebruary 1991 to discuss the Corps' mission 

in Kuwait. They explained the Kuwait Emergency Recovery ornces organization and deployment plans, the damage assessmem and damage survey repon process, and the budget and contracting plans. ln laying out 

the Corps' extensive capabil ities for the Ambassador, Locurcio drew on 

his own experience as a district engineer and a facilities engineer, as well 

as his experience responding to natural disasters, where the Corps often 

handled debris removal, water supply, and other missions. Gnehm indicated his support for all plans, especially the plan to contract with eight 

different firms to handle various sectors of the city. He also favored giving preference to U.S. firms when awarding comracts, as long as the mission did not suffer. 

After the formal briefings, however, the Ambassador pulled Locurcio 

and Wood aside. During this private two-hour meeting, Gnehm complained that he had not been adequately informed about the Kuwait 
PLANNING IN THEATER 59 

Ambassador Gnehm confers with Colonel Locurcio, March 1991. 

Emergency Recovery Offices mission and activities. The breakdown in 

communications, Locurcio quickly explained, resulted from the absence 

of nnn information with which to plan and the physical separation of the 

Ambassador and Kuwaiti ministers. Gnehm stressed the importance of 

coordinaling with him and the Kuwait Task Force bdore and after entering Kuwait.42 

Gnehm had apparently interpreted Locurcios discussion of the 

Corps' capabilities as an effort by the Corps to expand its role. He 

emphasized that the Kuwait Task Force was the primary agent for U.S. 

involvement in planning and implementing the recovery program. The 

role of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers would be limited. "While the 

Corps of Engineers has a significant role to play in the emergency recovery program," he emphasized, "they are only one part of a much larger 

picture." Gnehm made it clear that the Corps was responsible only for 

damage assessment and contracting for infrastruclUre repair and that he 

would oppose any Corps involvement in life support activities such as 

providing food, medical supplies, and transportation. He directed 

Loeurcio to refer missions beyond his scope to the task force. 

After the meeting, Gnehm reponed to the Secretary of State that he 

strenuously objected to any expansion of the Corps' role beyond its orig-
60 AFTER DESERT STORM 

ina! scope, especially the role of a management services contracLOr. 

Gnehm insisted that 1 he Kuwait Task Force remain in the forefront. The 

absence of an overall project manager, he added, was causing serious 

coordination problems. '13 

When General Hatch heard of Gnehm~ concerns, he quickly reassured the Ambassador that he supported the Ambassadors concept for the 

Corps' role in the recovery elTon. Hatch agreed that the Corps' greatest 

contribution would be repairing the infrastructure and supported the 

Ambassadors idea of hiring a civilian contractor as the project manager.H 

At Hmch's insistence, locurcio tried to shape an organizational structure that would be responsive to the needs of the Kuwaitis without pushing the Kuwaiti government in a particular direction or taking over the 

recovery elTon. Locurcio wanted a self-sufficient organization that would 

resemble a small district ofri ce so individuals from throughout the Corps 

would already be familiar with the organization when they arrivecl.45 

Locurcio could finclliule information about similar Arm)' operations 

in the past from which to dra-..v. In shaping his organization, he relied 

heavily on some of the Corps' most. experienced emergency management 

specialists. for example, he recruited Wynne Fuller from the Mobile 

District and Ronald Moore from the South Atlantic Division, both of 

whom had helped reconstruct the Virgin Islands after Hurricane Hugo 

struck in 1989. 

fuller and others helped the Middle East/Africa Prqjects Office 

develop an organizational structure. Planners drew on their knowledge 

of the types of damage they had seen after nalUral disasters such as lack 

of water and power. They also used information that Kuwait Emergency 

Recovery Program members and the Central Intelligence Agency provided to get a picture of what the)' would be facing. Before leaving the 

United States, the Kuwaiti members gave the Corps a prioritized list of 

public buildings that would have to be inspected, along with information about the status of the water and power distribution systems. They 

had indicated that restoring power, sanitation, and other emergency services and cleaning and repairing cenain ministry buildings were the 

highest priorities. This provided the framework for shaping the mission 

and organizing the Kuwait Emergency Recovery Offi ce. 

After determining the areas to be addressed, the planners defined the 

skills that would be needed and began recruiting personnel-primaril)' 

those with previous disaster experience. Planners took into consideration the type of organization they could support logistically in Kuwait. 

Fuller emphasized the need for a nexible organization, one that could 

expand as needed and shift from emergency response to restoration. 

locurcio, too, wanted a nexible organization with an emergency man-
PLANNING IN THEATER 61 

agement office that could later convert into a resident engineer or area 

office to manage construction.46 

Determining the proper size of the organization was difficult because 

planners were unsure of what they would be facing in Kuwait. They initially planned to have 275 Corps members, but the decision to integrate 

Kuwaiti nationals let Locurcio reduce this number. Later, as planners 

received reports that the damage was less than anticipated, they reduced 

the number still further. All Corps members who deployed to Kuwait 

would be processed through the Midd le EastJAfrica Projects Office in 

Winchester. This ofrice had successfully deployed hundreds of Corps 

members to Saudi Arabia in support of Operations DESERT Sl-llELD and 

DESERT STORM.47 

While Locurcio crafted his organization, Corps leaders struggled to 

sort out thorny command and control issues. They did not knovv at the 

time what kind of command structure U.S. military leaders would establish for the post-liberation period. For the present, Hatch directed the 

Kuwait Emergency Recovery Office to work for the U.S. Ambassador 

through the 352d Civil Affairs Command. He also directed Locurcio to 

coordinate with the 352d and the Ambassador to ensure that the Corps 

could accept taskings directly from Kuwaiti ministries as long as it kept 

the 352d and the Ambassador informed. 

Initially, Locurcio and his staff were not to enter Kuwait until the 

Ambassador had established himself, and they would work under the 

Ambassador in support of the Kuwaiti governmenl. Gnehm did not want 

to be left without a work force or the resources to respond tO the 

l<uwaitis. He wanted the Corps' office to imeract direclly with Kuwaiti 

ministers, and he wanted direct access to that office without going 

through the civil affairs command.48 

ln addition to addressing command and control issues, Corps planners 

also had to provide for critical logistics support. They recognized that engineers could not perform their mission if they did not eat and sleep properly and have the necessary materials and suppli.es. "ln short," Locurcio aptly 

observed, "the success of an operation of this magnitude and duration 

revolves around the efficiency and effectiveness of its logistics operation."49 

ln mid-january, planners in Winchester spent three days compiling 

a list of all the items that Corps personnel might need in Kuwait: from 

food , vvater, and vehicles to rubber bands, file folders, paper, pencils, 

cameras, tooLhpaste, detergent, sunscreen, and shampoo. Much to their 

credit, they anticipated everything Corps members wou ld need-except, 

as they later discovered, saline solution for contact lens wearers. 

Corps planners had to assume that absolutely no resources would be 

available in Kuwait, except perhaps a structure for shelter. Since the 
62 AFTER DESERT STORM 

Kuwait Emergency Recovery Office was a newly formed ad hoc organizalion, it had no organic equipmem and no property book. Also, since 

the l<uwaiti governmem had agreed to cover the costs, new equipmem 

would have to be purchased on shon notice with Kuwaiti funds and 

turned over to the Kuwaitis at the end of the operation. 

Corps personnel in Saudi Arabia had just 10 days to purchase everything they needed to sustain ope rat ions for 30 clays-food, water, vehicles, copiers, and other items-and load those supplies on semitrailers 

for the journey to Kuwait. Locurcio later recalled the stan led expression 

on a local automobile dealers race when a Corps representative strolled 

imo his showroom and purchased 62 four-wheel-drive vehicles for 

immediate delivery. 

Planners tried to buy as many items as they could in the Middle East 

because transporting goods from the States on military nights could take 

three to four weeks. Transporting soldiers and supplies in suppon or 

Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORlll took priority. What the Corps 

could not buy locally, it shipped imo Saudi Arabia, often as carry-on baggage. Each Corps member who deployed carried as many as 20 bags.so 

The Kuwait Emergency Recovery Office had difficulty procuring 

equipment. After the money provided in the foreign military sales agreement came to the U.S. government, it became subject to federal procurement regulations. The regulations provided no exemptions for emergency situations, which resulted in l"rustrating delays. For example, the 

Kuwaiti government asked the Corps to purchase computers, but federal regulations required General Services Administration approval. A 

General Services Administration official challenged the request, delaying 

the purchase for several days. Locurcio later insisted that when the Corps 

responds to a disaster, it should not be encumbered by the regulations of 

the General Services Administration and other federal agencies. He recommended that the acquisition process be strcamlined.51 

The Push Into Kuwait 

The coalition forces launched their ground campaign against the 

lraqis on 24 l;;ebruary 1991. According to General Schwarzkopf, in his 

book It Doesn't Take a llero, the reports arriving late morning on 24 

February of the Iraqis blowing up tbe Kuwaiti desalinization plant convinced him that the lraqis were leaving l<u·wait. ln consultation with 

Saudi Lt. Gen. l<halicl bin Sultan, commander of the multinational joint 

Forces Command, he decided to accelerate the timetable to 24 February 

for the Arab forces to begin their assault. 
PLANNING IN THEATER 63 

The XVlll Airborne Corps quickly sealed the western flank of the 

theater of operations while the Vtl Corps surrounded and began its 

assault on the Republican Guard. joint Forces Command-North, with its 

Egyptian corps, composite Saudi-Kuwaiti division, and Syrian division, 

auacked through the obstacle belt and moved east to liberate Kuwait 

City. The 1st Marine Expeditionary Force moved north toward Kuwait 

City, and joint Forces Command-East auacked along the coastal plain 

and also moved toward the city. As CENTCOM had planned, Arab 

forces, not American, liberated Kuwait City.52 

On 28 February, just two hours after the coalition forces suspended 

offensive operations, a Black Hawk helicopter carrying the advance command and control element of Task Force Freedom landed at Kuwail 

International Airport. Frix described the dramatic scene they encountered: 

"Even though it was early afternoon, it was so dark because of billowing 

smoke from burning oil wells .. . we had to use flashlights to read the maps 

and journals we were keeping. The atmosphere that we went in was dramatic, like Dames Inferno, the dark billowing smoke, there was still a rattle of gunfire, towering flames from oil fields, damage at the airport."53 

The soldiers quickly set up operations in one of the damaged support buildings under the tower of the airport. They later discovered Iraqi 

soldiers hiding in the tower and underneath Lhe bunkers surrounding 

the airfield. This first group established communications with ARCENT 

headquarters using an Emerson Marconi satellite telephone. The satellite 

telephone also let them talk direclly to CENTCOM headquarters and to 

General Mallory back in the Army Operations Center in the Pentagon. 

General Frix searched for a suitable location for his headquarters. 

The extensive damage at the airport prompted him to move the forward 

command post to the Subhan lndustrial Complex, a large warehouse 

compound used by the Ministry of Education to store books and supplies. The heavy equipment needed to suppon Lhe task force began moving in. Hours after offensive operations were suspended. the Kuwait Task 

Force's forward command post and "L UCKY TAc" were fully operational at 

the Subhan complex-now designated Camp Freedom. The rest of Task 

Force Freedom arrived over the next two days.54 

When the ground war began, the Combined Civil Affairs Task Force 

had been alerted to go into Kuwait City as soon as the city was reasonably 

secure. At midnight on 27 February, General Frix directed General 

Mooney to have the entire task force at the Kuwaiti airport within 24 

hours. A convoy with the 43lst and 432d Civil Affairs companies and the 

main body of the 352d left Camp #l at 2:30 P.M. on 28 February. Seven 

members of the Kuwait Task Force who worked in the critical areas of 

food, water, medical supplies, transportation, telecommunications, san ita-
A destroyed Iraqi tank sits in the Al-Magwa oil /ieldi below, a typical 

bunker constructed by Iraqi soldiers throughout the cifYt particularly on 

highway overpasse~ to impede coalition forces. 
PLANNING IN THEATER 65 

tion, and power joined the convoy. The convoy included 76 flatbed trucks 

loaded with emergency food, water, and medical supplies that the Kuwait 

Task Force bad helped the Kuwaiti government purchase.55 

As the convoy crawled northward toward Kuwait, troops encountered a "black fog" of smoke from the oil fires so dense that drivers had 

to use their headlights in the middle of the afternoon. The soldiers soon 

found their faces and clothing coated with a clark, oily film. Driving up 

the coastal road, the soldiers witnessed firsthand the chilling destruction 

of the ground war. As they passed through the town of Kha(ji, despite 

the smoke-darkened sky, they saw signs of the recent baule-the shattered windows and bullet-riddled buildings. 

Inside Kuwait, the convoy passed the small bunkers that Iraqis had 

erected to guard the roads and btidges. Wrecked vehicles littered the highway. Oil [ires glowed in the distance. Soldiers later reported that the fires 

reminded them of Dantes description of the journey into the "ninth circle 

of hell." Around 2:00A.M. on 1 March, after an arduous 12-hour journey, 

the convoy entered the suburbs of Kuwait City and pulled into the Sub han 

complex. After a few hours of sleep, the ordnance experts examined the 

building for booby traps. The soldiers would eventually carve one of the 

warehouses into small cubicles that served as their living space.s6 

Representatives of other agencies and organizations also arrived that 

first night-to include an ARCENT teleconnnunications team and a 

Navy preventative medicine team. The first damage assessment survey 

team left the Subhan complex atl0:30 A.M. on l March, only eight hours 

after the 352d arrived. By that afternoon, British medical, ordnance, and 

engineering teams had arrived, as well as U.S. soldiers from the medical 

command and the engineer command. Distribution of food, water, and 

medical supplies began the next day.57 

Meanwhile, Colonel Locurcio sent four search parties into l<uwait to 

locate the key power plants and determine their status. He also sent Maj. 

james Brooks, a self-reliant Army engineer, to Kmvait to locate the Army 

engineers, serve as a liaison with Task Force Freedom, and oversee clamage assessments by the 416th Engineer Command. Brooks left Dhahran 

on 27 February with elements of the 416th Engineer Command and met 

up with elements of the 352d Civil Affairs Command, some British engineers, and an Air Force engineer at Jubail. The next morning, he moved 

forward in the darkness, through KhaQi and into Kuwait where he joined 

elements of Task Force Freedom at the Subhan complex. 

Brooks joined two Corps civilians, Ken Grey and Jim Cobb, whom 

Locurcio had sent ahead to find a place where his staff could set up operations. Brooks drove through the city to survey the damage. Then, using 

a tactical telephone aL Task Force Freedom, he reported back to the 
66 AFTER DESERT STORM 

Corps staff in Dhahran that although vandalism and Hre damage was 

extensive, the structural damage was less than anticipated.58 

At 10:30 A.M. on Monday, 4 March, just three clays after the cease-fire, 

37 members of the Kuwait Emergency Recovery Office, mostly civilians, 

left for Kuwait City vvith 66 Kuwaiti volunteers. No one at ARCENT had 

been able or vvilling to provide Locurcios staff with the necessary identification cards and convoy clearances, so they designed their own using the 

Kuwait Emergency Recovery Office symbol and Arabic Wliting, and fabricated them using Harvard Graphics, a laminating machine, and a camera. 

The convoy changed up to the last minute as elements were added and 

subtracted. 1L included approximately 60 newly purchased four-wheeldrive vehicles, several late model sedans, two tour buses, and seven Oatbed 

trucks. The convoy was an unusual mix of American soldiers and civilians, 

Kuwaitis, and Syrian truck drivers. It included Kuwaiti ministry representatives and an advance electrical power team from Blount International. 

Many of the Kuwaitis had never seen a convoy before and were unfamiliar with the concept. lt took Locurcios logistics officer, Maj. Larry 

Jinkins, nearly an hour to get everyone out of the hotel and into their 

vehicles. Finally, the vehicles vvere lined up and began to pull ouL. 

Although Corps officials tried to have a professional, well-organized 

convoy, it became what Locurcio described as "a 115-vehicle circus 

parade full of buses, trucks, and civilian vehicles." The trucks, which 

moved very slowly, soon fell behind. The odd-looking convoy crawled 

through Khafji and on toward the Kuwaiti border. Shortly before reaching the border, a Kuwaiti contingent left the convoy abruptly and pulled 

into a gas station for prayer call and last-minute shopping. Locurcio 

stopped the entire convoy and regrouped. 

At the border, the convoy encountered a long line of vehicles waiting 

to pass though the Saudi and Kuwaiti checkpoints. The convoy vehicles 

had clearance numbers posted and passed through without difficulty. 

Jinkins waited al lhe border crossing for the seven rather rough-looking 

Syrian truck drivers to make sure that the Saudi guards let them through. 

Once inside Kuwait, all traffic had to use the southbound lane of the 

highway for the first 15 to 20 kilometers because the Iraq is had ripped 

up the northbound lane. The convoy, now stretching out over 24 kilometers, crept past the charred hulks of military and civilian vehicles and 

other mili tary equipment. The convoy stopped at a rest area about 10 

kilometers from the city. The l<uwaiti volunteers could no longer contain 

their excitement about reLUrning home and reuniting with their fam ilies 

and friends. Recognizing this, Locurcio released them from the convoy 

Lo locate their loved ones and directed them to rejoin the group early the 

next morning. The Kuwaitis sped off into the night. 
PLANNING IN THEATER 67 

While at the rest area, Locurcio established radio contact with his 

advance pany. Cobb and Grey informed him that the Kuwait Plaza Hotel 

had the best facilities in the city and the only elevalOrs that worked and 

provided directions through the city to a designated parking lot. Locurcio 

reorgani zed the convoy with the remaining vehicles. 

As the convoy neared Kuwait City, one of the trucks hit a bomb crater 

so the trucks fell further behind. A small team from the convoy waited 

for Jinkins and the trucks at an intersection in l<uwait City to warn them 

about the various checkpoims that were manned by nervous Kuwaiti 

resistance fighters. Jinkins and others decided to have all the vehicles 

turn on their Oashing lights. Nearly 60 vehicles, driving bumper to 

bumper with blinkers Oashing, moved through the checkpoints. 

As the weary Corps members entered Kuwait City after their strenuous 1 0-hour journey, they discovered the remnants of a living nightmare. Thousands of burnt-out Iraqi tanks and abandoned vehicles littered the streets. Everywhere were the physical reminders of the Iraqi 

occupation. The city was totally dark except for the glow from the oil 

fires in the distance. The streets were desened . The Corps civilians easily traveled the final distance into the business district, despite the 

darkness. They pulled into the parking lot and walked two blocks to 

the hotel. 

The Corps members discovered that some of the Kuwaitis had headeel directly to the hotel after leaving the convoy and checked in. The 

lower Ooors were uninhabitable and many of the remaining rooms were 

already taken, so the Corps members had to double up. They also found 

that the elevators were not operating after all. They had to climb 18 

Oights of stairs to their rooms. 

The Kuwait Emergency Recovery Office established its base of operations on the 16th Ooor. Dr. Shaheen and his Kuwait Emergency 

Recovery Program later set up operations directly above them. Locurcios 

staff was cramped for space but, after they connected one of the generators they had brought, they had electricity. They initially had no running 

water and relied on bottled water for drinking and bathing. Locurcios 

staff also augmented the hotels food supply and repaired its air conditioning system. A second group of Corps members arrived on 12 March, 

bringing the total in Kuwait to 86.59 These first Corps members were 

apparemly unfazed by the physical hazards and discomforts. The)' 

arrived with a spirit of adventure and a deep commitment to the mission, 

jokingly dubbing themselves "KERO heroes." 

ARCENT and CENTCOM officials in the theater had begun planning 

relatively late for the immediate post-li beration period. Army leaders created the Combined Civil Affairs Task Force and Task Force Freedom on 
Iraqi soldiers placed artillery throughout the downtown area; 

bela""' before Beeinflt Iraqi soldiers turned their tank guns on the 

major hotels in downtown Kuwait City 
PLANNING IN THEATER 69 

short notice in response Lo immediate requirements. Neither ARCENT 

nor CENTCOM had envisioned playing a significant role in the recovery 

effon, and they had not effectively coordinated with the civil affairs 

reservists who were developing plans back in the States. Yet, through the 

determined efforts of civil affairs planners and operators, Army Corps of 

Engineers soldiers and civilians, and others, the United States and its 

partners had hundreds of troops and dozens of tmckloads of supplies on 

site ready to provide emergency assistance to Kuwait$ residents within 

48 hours of the end of the ground war. The abrupt end to the 100-hour 

ground war meant that the Iraqis did not have time to carry out all the 

destruction they had planned. Thus, Task Force Freedoms mission to 

provide emergency services would not be as great as anticipated. 

Chapter 3 

Emergency Response Phase 

Task Force Freedom 

Task Force Freedom's primary mission was to provide the legitimate 

government of Kuwait with military and civilian assistance and to plan 

and implement a program to restore as quickly as possible the funcLions and services of that government after the Iraqi forces withdrew. 

The New York Times highlighted the varied nature of this assistance, 

reponing: "It is the American Army that has turned the electricity back 

on here, gotten the water running, cleared the highways of shrapnel 

and wrecked cars, hooked up those telephones that worked, dredged 

the main port of Shuaiba and unloaded the ships, brought the drinking water and food, fixed the police cars, and fed the animals in the 

zoo."l Task Force Freedom procured and distributed large quantities of 

medical supplies, food, and water until the Kuwaitis could mobilize 

their own resources. 

Upon their arrival, Ambassador Gnehm and U.S. military leaders 

quickly discovered that Kuwait City was in better shape than anticipated. The once gleaming city had been damaged, but not destroyed. Closer 

inspection revealed that the Iraqis had prepared to fight house-to-house. 

They had stockpiled huge amounts of weapons and ammunition, placed 

mines throughout the city and especially along the beaches, erected barriers, and bricked up windows to make firing ports. The major road system consisted of a series of east-west ring roads around the city and 

nonh-south radial roads leading to the center. Damage to these roads 

reflected a pattern of attempting to stop coalition forces from entering 

the heart of Kuwait City. 

ln contrast to post-World War ll Germany, little structural damage 

existed. However, hundreds of schools and other public buildings had 

been looted and vandalized, heaped with debris, and ravaged by fire. 

Iraqi soldiers had burned encyclopedias to heat their tea. Some of the 

hardest hit structures included the Seif Palace, the Bayan Palace com-
Above, Iraqi soldiers 

fortified the beaches in 

Kuwait with bunkersi right, 

KERO damage assessment 

team inspects the Seil 

Palace, March 1991. 
EMERGENCY RESPONSE PHASE: TASK FORCE FREEDOM 73 

plex, the National Assembly building, Kuwait International Airport, and 

the four-lane highway from Dhahran. 

Since its construction in 1903, the elegant Seif Palace, silting on the 

waterfront from which it Lakes its name, had been the center of power, 

where the Crown Prince and many of the ministers had their offices. lL 

was the equivalent of the White House and executive offices in the 

United Stales. Iraqi soldiers had burned the building and then fired tank 

rounds that dropped the l1oor slabs 3 to 4 inches. The fire exposed traditional construction techniques, revealing that the Hoors were made 

from reeds woven together and matted wilh mud. Initially it was unclear 

whether the historic building could be repaired.2 

Kuwaits residents had been spared severe shortages of food and 

water. They had managed to store some water in rounded rooftop tanks 

and hoard enough food to last until the city's food distribution system 

operated again. They had also stockpiled medical supplies. No serious 

medical crisis, such as cholera or malaria, existed. Yet Kuwaits residents 

had no running water, electricity, or functioning sanitation system.3 

In the first 48 hours after the liberation of the city, the U.S. Army 

delivered 18 truckloads of medical supplies to two hospitals and sent out 

four teams to assess existing medical, food, sanitation, and water supplies. Convoys began delivering food to two designated distribution centers. Soldiers placed seven large generators at hospitals and other sites to 

provide power. The psychological operations radio transmissions provided public service announcements. The situation looked so promising 

that one civil affairs officer optimistically reported, "There is no real 

emergency phase to restoration."4 

Task Force Freedom Elements 

Task Force Freedom consisted of engineer, signal corps, military 

police, explosive ordnance disposal, logistics support, medical, aviation, 

and civil affairs elements. Army engineer missions were Lo help assess the 

damage, identify the engineer effon required to repair the roads in 

Kuwait, supply the construction materials needed to provide interim 

emergency services, coordinate with the Kuwait Task Force and the 

Kuwait Emergency Recovery Office, and perform emergency repairs to 

vital Kuwaiti facilities.s 

Shortly past midnight on l March, a Chinook helicopter carrying the 

first Lwo soldiers from the 416th Engineer Command (Forward) liJted off 

from King Khalid Military City bound for Kuwait City. landing at Kuwait 

International Airport, the soldiers found that the terminal building, 
74 AFTER DESERT STORM 

Task Force Freedom headquarters in Kuwait 

hotel, maintenance facilities, and aprons had been vandalized, though 

the airfield itself was not badly damaged. Moving through the city, they 

discovered that the bridges, roadways, and public buildings were, for the 

most pan, intact. Based on the initial assessment of these engineers, 

General Schardein canceled a planned firefighting detachment and 

added a reinforced vertical construction platoon with electrical, plumbing, and carpentry capability. 

Over the next two days, others from the engineer command drove 

north from King Khalid Military City and seuled into a Ministry of 

Education building a few miles north of Camp Freedom.6 By the end of 

the first week, the engineer command reached 31 members, most from 

the 864tb Engineer Battalion (Combat Heavy), the 43d Engineer 

Battalion (Combat Heavy), a team from the 535th Engineer Detachment 

(Prime Power), and the 259th Engineer Company (Combat Support). 

Two vertical platoons from the 864th Engineer Battalion (Combat 

Heavy) conducted damage surveys; performed electrical, plumbing, and 

carpentry missions at various sites; and provided initial emergency 

plumbing and water service to the U.S. Embassy in Kuwait and several 

hospitals in tbe city A particularly challenging mission involved using 
EMERGENCY RESPONSE PHASE: TASK FORCE FREEDOM 

Checkpoint Charlie in southern Iraflt staffed by C Company; 

5th Battalion, 5th Cavalry; 3d Armored Division 

75 

two miles of petroleum distribution pipeline to connect the fuel pump 

house of one of the desalinization/electrical power plants at Doha to the 

boilers of another, basically combining elements of two heavily damaged 

plants to make one operational plant. 7 

A team from the 43d Engineer Battalion (Combat Heavy) followed 

the maneuver units into Kuwait to repair roads damaged or destroyed by 

retreating Iraqis. One of the battalion's earthmoving plaLOons repaired 

the main roads between Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, filling bomb craters 

and clearing burnt-out vehides, while Company B cleared debris from 

Kuwait International Airport and other sites. 

The 535th Engineer Detachment provided power for the headquarters building and the medical building at Camp f reedom. The team did 

not bring in its own power generation equipment, but it repaired dozens 

of existing generators at hospitals, fire stations, police stations, and bakeries. The main problem was a shortage of batteries because lraqi soldiers had stolen the batteries from most cars and generators in the city 

Engineers provided electrical generators to illuminate the airport runways and installed 16 generators to provide security lighting in tense 

areas of the city.s Although the Army engineers had the equipment, 
76 AfTER DESERT STORM 

training, and expertise to provide even greater assistance, Army leaders 

limited their role, possibly to redeploy soldiers who had supported 

Operations 013SERT SHIELD and DESERT STORIII quickly and to limit the 

presence of American soldiers in Kuwait. 

Another task force element, the 44th Signal Baualion of the 1 J th 

Signal Brigade, extended the echelons above corps tactical command 

and control network for the task force. These soldiers extended this network through UHF and satellite transmission systems, tactical voice and 

record switching, and telephone installation. Within days, they installed 

more than a hundred telephones and successfully connected Camp 

Freedom to the theaterwide communications network.9 

The task force also included military police and explosive ordnance disposal specialists. ln the first week of March, the 720th 

Military Police Battalion and its subordinate units escorted convoys 

carrying food and supplies th rough the city and provided security for 

visiting dignitaries. They patrolled the main roads and joint checkpoints and secured the airfield. tO 

The Iraqis had rigged various facilities for demolition. The lst 

Explosive Ordnance Disposal Group cleared ammunition and mines 

from city buildings, giving residents a renewed sense of security. It 

cleared the ports and billeting areas used by the U.S. military and helped 

Army engineers demolish lraqi bunkers. ln the first 10 clays, the unit 

destroyed 3,500 pounds of captured ammunition. It operated an explosive ordnance disposal center incorporating resources from the U.S. Air 

Force, Army, and Navy, plus the French and British armies. The ordnance disposal experts coordinated with the 352d Civil Affairs 

Command and contractors who cleared power line rights of way. 

However, clearing the extensive minefields in 1 he countryside was 

beyond the units capabilities.'' 

A "jump cell" from the 22d Support Command deployed to the 

Kuwaiti airport on l March 1991 as part of Task Force Freedom. The 

command used forward area support coordination offices, ranging 

from three people to a company-sized element, as points of contact for 

all logistics and service suppon. The command provided logistics support not only to Lhe task force but also to the U.S. and allied embassies. 

It negotiaLed and contracted for approximately two hundred civilians 

to clean Camp Freedom and provide sanitation services; helped local 

businesses resume operations; and provided temporary shower, dining, and sleeping facilities for convoys and allied troops moving 

through Kuwait City. The 30lst Area Support Group arrived in Kuwait 

City on 3 March and established its headquarters at the port of AI 

Shuaiba, several miles southeast of the city. 
EMERGENCY RESPONSE PHASE: TASX FORCE FREEDOM 77 

The logistics support requirements gradually shifted from bringing 

forward materiel and equipment to distributing and maintaining those 

items. Supplies and services flowed without interruption, and the command provided food, water, showers, and laundry for 3,000 people. lt 

also provided generators, fork! i fts, transportation assets, water bladders, 

and an emergency hospital. Soldiers removed all pork products from the 

militarys prepackaged "meals ready Lo cat" for distribution to Kuwait's 

Islamic residents and provided modified versions of the prepackaged 

meals for )'Oung children.l2 Soldiers from the ARCENT Medical 

Command (Forward) served on damage assessment teams, implemented a livestock feeding program, instituted a program to treat enemy prisoners of war, examined the city's reservoirs, inspected the soldiers' food , 

and provided them with health care.• > 

Special operations forces with Task Force Freedom served as advisors to the Kuwaiti soldiers who took over police stations and manned 

roadblocks. They soon expanded their role. With the help of Kuwaiti 

resistance fighters who had remained in the city during the occupation, 

the special operations forces cleared booby traps and minefields. Kuwaiti 

resistance fighters guided special forces teams to key lraqi headquarters 

buildings and torture sites where they collected five truckloads of lraqi 

documents. Many of these documents indicated possible violations of 

the Geneva Convention.14 Another small but important element of Task 

Force Freedom, the 2d Aviation Brigade, flew hundreds of missions, 

transporting hundreds of soldiers and tons of supplies. 

At the core of Task Force Freedom was its largest e lement, General 

Mooney's Combined Civil Affairs Task Force. As previously determined, the 43lst Civil Affairs Company assumed responsibility for 

the downtown and western areas of the city; the 432d for the eastern 

area. Each company had detailed maps of its assigned sectors showing 

the locations of designated food and water distribution poims and 

hospitals. Throughout March, the civil affairs companies coordinated 

the delivery of food and water, performed damage assessments, 

worked with hospitals and clinics, and even cared for injured zoo animals. The 96th Civil Affairs Battali on (Airborne) monitored food and 

water distribution sites and patrolled the city. These civil affairs troops 

drafted a plan for Kuwait's Army to remove tons of Iraqi munitions 

and mon itored this effort.lS 

The Kuwait Task Force had deployed to Kuwait City with the other 

task force elements on l March. Their Kuwaiti counterparts remained 

behind in Dhahran two weeks longer for security reasons. When these 

Kuwaitis finally arrived, their individual ministries quick!)' claimed them. 

They found that they had to surrender their power to returning Kuwaitis 
78 

Transatlantic 

Division 

I 

(-) 

CENTCOM 

I 

ARCENT 

u.s. 

Embassy 

Kuwait 

AFrER DESERT SroRM 

Kuwait 

Ministries 

I 

Task Force 

Freedom 

I 

8~1 -!- -------' (X) . 

' 

352d 

Civil Affairs 

' 

(.;.) 

' ' ' 

KTF-352d 

Civil Affairs 

Cell 

Kuwait Task 

Force (KTF) 

(Kuwaitis) 

I I I 1 

~--------------- -- ---------- --- ---- -- -~ ----------- --------

---Command 

-(X)- Oporntional Control (OPCON) 

-H- Command (less OPCON) 

- - - - - - - - · Coordination 

Chart 3-U.S Central Command {CENTCOM) 

who had greater social stalUs or political stature. Although the Kuwait 

Task Force was never relieved from its fundamental planning mission, the 

352d Civil Affairs Command often pulled members to prepare briefings, 

perform damage assessments, or deliver emergency relief. (Chart 3) 

Colonel Elliott became concerned that the Kuwait Task Force~ mission was being disrupted and worried that it might be absorbed into the 

broader civil affairs mission. l ie wanted to move his unit from Camp 

Freedom on the outskirts of the city to the dowmown area where, he 

believed, it could better maintain its integrity, have more freedom to continue planning, and coordinate more closely with the various ministries. 

He emphasized the importance of maintaining strong ties with the 

Kuwaiti representatives as they reestablished their 111inistries. Elliott sem 

Colonel Walz to find a suitable hotel. General Frix initially opposed the 

move, primarily because of concern about providing adequate security 

for the reservists, but General Mooney convinced him that the task force 

members needed to locate near their Kuwaiti partners. 

Not all task force members agreed that relocation was as critical as 

Elliott maintained. lts fundamental planning mission, they insist, was 
EMERGENCY RESPONSE PHASE: TASK FORCE FREEDOM 79 

Power cable repair south of Kuwait City 

never in jeopardy, and, in fact, after moving into a downtown hotel, task 

force members found themselves often traveling back and forth to Camp 

Freedom to do their work.l6 

Elliott, however, was correct in that the relationship each member 

had developed with his Kuwaiti counterpart became the solidifying factor driving the program forward. For example, the health experts on the 

task force knew the Ministry of Health officials well and toured medical 

facilities with them. During the first weeks, problems were often resolved 

through the cooperative relationships forged between the task force 

members and the Kuwaitis. 

Gnehm saw the Kuwait Task Force as operating, in large pan, under 

his supervision and maintained the dose relationship that he had established in the States. He remained keenly interested in and supportive of 

the task force's activities. 17 

Task Force Freedom Missions 

Based on General Frixs priorities and the results of preliminary damage assessments, soldiers quickly repaired essential facilities and func-
80 AFTER DESERT STORM 

tions such as food distribution centers, hospitals, electricity, water, and 

transportation corridors (sea, land, and air) to meet the immediate 

health, safety, and security needs of the Kuwaiti people. They left the 

repair of less critical facilities for later. 

Task Force Freedoms first priority was to assess damage in the areas 

of l'oocl, water, electric power, communication lines, public buildings, 

transportation, telecommunications, disease/vector control, police protection and security, and medical facilities and supplies. The task force 

created damage assessment survey teams to determine how long it would 

take to get facilities and services functioning again. The teams evaluated 

essential facilities to determine the extent of the damage and whether or 

not emergency repairs would restore minimal operations. The teams prepared formal reports and recommended and coordinated short-term 

remedial action. 

The Combined Civil Affairs Task Force quickly established a standard civil-military operations center to coordinate the various assessment teams and other support elements. On arrival day, l March, the 

operations center dispatched three damage assessment survey teams; 

four clays later, it dispatched 72 teams, each with four to eight members. 

Over the next six weeks, team members conducted over 1,400 damage 

surveys. Many teams included representatives from other services or 

other nations. For example, a British preventative medicine team surveyed two of the hospitals, a Navy team surveyed another two, and an 

ARCENT Medical Command team surveyed the rest. IS 

Civil affairs troops complcLed the last of the planned high-priority 

assessments on 8 March, eight days into the mission. These damage 

assessments, however, were preliminary inspections and did not provide 

all the detail the Corps' Kuwait EmergenC)' Recovery Office required to 

let contracts for the repairs. 

Also on 8 March, the civil affairs damage assessment teams began 

conducting joint surveys with Kuwait Emergency Recovery Office teams 

and continued to transfer engineer requirements to that office. After the 

Combined Civil Affairs Task Force turned its assessment over to the 

Kuwait Emergency Recove ry Office, that office conducted its own 

inspection and made its recommendations to the appropriate minister. 

Civil affairs soldiers had established cooperative relationships with certain ministries, such as electricity and water, that would make the Corps' 

survey work easier. The civil affairs teams smoothed the transfer of the 

damage survey work to the Corps, not only by conducting joint facilities 

inspections, but also by conducting a workshop and providing their 

damage reports and database to Locurcio's emergency operations chief, 

Wynne Fuller, on 8 March. 
EMERGENCY RESPONSE PHASE: TASK FORCE FREEDOM 

The involvement of Army 

engineers, civil affairs troops, and 

Corps members in damage assessments created some duplication of 

effort. At times, there was poor 

coordination within the civil 

affairs community itself. As a 

result, civil affairs damage assessment teams visited some sites five 

or six limes. In perhaps the most 

extreme exan1ple of failure to 

coordinate, one food cooperative 

was inspected 27 times.19 

Infrastructure 

Beyond the damage surveys, .,.,.. 

restoration activities occurred primarily in the five categories into 

which the Kuwait Task Force had 

originally d ivided its teams: infrastructure, commerce, public security and safety, public services, and 

human services. Task Force 

Freedom focused its attenlion on 

repairing Kuwait$ infrastructure, 

Electrical contractors remove 

a spacer from damaged 

power cables. 

81 

panicularly its electrical grid. Ground and aerial observations of Kuwait 

and early reports from the damage survey teams indicated that restoring 

electric power was the most critical element for the success of the total 

civil-military mission. No utilities and critical infrastructure could function without electricity. The large desalinization plants needed power to 

produce fresh water; normal food distribution through supermarkets 

and shops required lighting and refrigeration. 

Restoring power had a profound psychological, as well as physical, 

impact on the well-being of the Kuwaiti people. Smoke from oil fires had 

transformed clay into night and feel the despair that gripped the city. The 

lack of electricity and consequent darkness and the sound of gunfire at 

night contributed to the perception of danger. 

For months, Kuwait's residents had lived with lraqi terror. Lighted 

stt·eets symbolized an end to that ten·or and provided the sense of 

security residents needed to start rebuilding their lives and their 

country. For Bader AI-Qabandi and probably many other Kuwaiti residents, the restoration of electricity was the most tangible and gratify-
82 AFTER DESERT STORM 

ing sign of recovery. AI-Qabandi described the city as a "ghost town." 

The perpetual darkness, he explained, had left residents feeling lonely and frightened. 

To a great extent, restoring electrical power signaled the return to 

normal life and became a measure of how successfully the government 

responded to the needs of its people. Task force member Col. jack 

Lichtenstein agreed that restoring electric service would significantly 

boost public confidence in the government of Kuwait. "l believe that the 

restoration of municipal water and electric services is the key to returning l<uwait City to normalcy," he reponed.20 

The civil affairs infrastructure team directed the shipment and placement of Army and contractor generators at critical intersections and 

facilities, helped locate sources of temporary power for key facilities, and 

supervised installation. The Kuwaiti government had awarded a $19.5 

million contract to Caterpillar, lnc., to provide roughly 250 generators 

ranging in size from 8 to 1,275 kilowatts and a team to install them. The 

first Caterpillar generators arrived without their operators, so the 416th 

Engineer Command provided 40 additional 5-10 kilowatt generators 

from its own stock. 

Working with the Ministry of Electricity, the U.S. Army map ped 

out the power grid. Engineers from the 416th Engineer Command and 

the 535th Engineer Detachment (Prime Power) strategically placed 

generators next to panel boxes to light city streets. Once the generators 

were in place, Army leaders encouraged the Kuwaitis to maintain and 

refuel them. 

Damage to the electrical power infrastructure was much worse than 

amicipatecl. Electricity had 11owed through the city until the first day the 

of the ground war, but task force members now found power lines down 

and power plants needing major repairs. The main obstacle to delivering 

power to the city was the damage to transmission lines and distribution 

centers. Transmission cables between two plants and the communities 

they served were out in 4 7 places over a distance of 22 kilometers-the 

result of deliberate sabotage by retreating Iraqis. The Iraqis had cut the 

transmission cables, sometimes removing entire five-foot sections, and 

had destroyed over 40 distribution towers. 

Kuwait had four very large power plants: Do ha (east and west 

plants) nonh of Kuwait City; Shuwaikh near the downtown area; 

Shuaiba (north and south plants) at the pon of Shuaiba; and Al-Zour 

near the Saudi Arabian border. All except Al-Zour were badly damaged. Shuaiba and Doha sustained moderate to heavy damage to boilers, turbines, cooling pumps, transformers, and control rooms. Doha 

also suffered heavy damage Lo its fue l storage and pumping facilities. 
EMERGENCY RESPONSE PHASE: TASK FORCE FREEDOM 83 

The antiquated Shuwaikh plant, though heavily damaged, had been 

out of service before the invasion and was not scheduled to be 

repaired. Soldiers from the 416th and the 352d worked 24 hours a 

day at the Doha and Shuaiba power plants. Army engineers convinced 

the Kuwaitis to focus their resources and effort on Doha because its 

transmission lines were in better shape and most of the substations 

leading from Doha had escaped damage.21 

ln addition to electrical power, the city needed enough potable water 

to restore a reasonable quality of life and maintain viable health standards. The water system, with its fresh and brackish (nonpotable water 

pumped from below ground) water components, had no production 

capability, and the reservoirs were badly depleted. The depleted reserves, 

low water pressure, and broken pipes left most sections of the city without water. Plant operators blended the brackish water drawn from wells 

in the central region of the country with potable, distilled water to provide navor. The brackish water system, however, could not funclion 

because of damage to the pumping stations and associated distribution 

lines. Also, deadly mines and munitions linered the water well fields. 

The loss of these brackish wells caused shonages in the drinking water 

supply and left no water for irrigalion, an essential element in the ariel 

desen environment. 

After the Navy Preventative Medicine Detachment detennined that 

the water left in the reservoirs was safe for consumption, Mooney directeel operators to open the main valves to feed water into northern Kuwait. 

But water still had to be trucked into southern Kuwait. The 22d Support 

Command transported the water, and civil affairs troops distributed it at 

predesignated sites.22 

The Kuwaitis had a very efficient system that combined power production and water desalinization. They pumped crude oil directly out of 

the ground into oil-n red boilers creating super-heated steam to run the turbines. After the steam degraded partially, they used it to generate water, 

roughly 250 million gallons a day. Three desalinization plants, collocated 

with the Doha, Shuaiba, and Al-low· power plants, normally provided the 

distilled water for Kuwait. But without electricity, these plants could not 

resupply the reservoirs. Also, the pumping stations and distribution lines 

had been damaged or destroyed. The water shortage prompted the 

Kuwaiti government to curtail house service to four days a week. 

Based on their initial planning estimate that 1 million people in 

Kuwait City would require 40 million gallons of water a clay, the Ku•.vait 

Emergency Recovery Program staff, before leaving Washington, had 

hired three tanker ships to transport water to the city. Two of these ships 

provided roughly 16 million gallons to the reservoir system. They had 
84 AFI'ER DESERT STORM 

also contracted for the delivery of more than 3 million gallons of bulk 

water from Turke)'· The Turkish contractor brought over 500 water 

tanker trucks into Kuwait City. Finally, the Kuwaitis had purchased bottled water for delivery to Kuwait. ln the first few days after liberation, 31 

Oatbed trucks carrying bottled water arrived in the city.23 

The Civil Affairs Task Force oversaw the delivery and distribution 

of the water, a job sometimes complicated by violence. During the 

second week of March, a Saudi eomractor was reportedly shot and 

killed 'vvhile delivering water in llawalli, a Palestinian neighborhood. 

Two other drivers and their vehicles were unaccounted for. The task 

force also received reports that Kuwaiti police and military personnel 

forced truck drivers to make special water deliveries to the homes of 

certain officials. 

The water shortage soon eased. By late April, Kuwait's power plants 

were producing 82 million gallons of fresh, desalinated water a day.24 

Repairing the sewage collection and disposal system was also a high 

priority for Task Force Freedom. The sanitary system, one of the oldest 

components of Kuwait$ infrastructure, had been serviced by three 

major treatment plants-Ardiya, Jahra, and Rikka. An extended period 

of disuse of the sanitary system during the occupation caused major 

blockages, stagnation, and mechanical failures. Moreover, the Iraqis had 

looted and destroyed all the water treatment offices, laboratories, and 

workshops and stolen all the portable equipment. The Rikka plant was 

totally inoperable. Both the Ardiya and the jahra treatment plants 

required major maintenance before operations could resume. Not only 

were the mechanical systems damaged, the collection and distribution 

lines had numerous breaks. As a result of war damage, millions of gallons of raw sewage bypassed the treatment facilities each day and 

poured directly into the Gulf of Arabia. Repair of the sewage system 

would continue long past the emergency phase. 

Repairing the pons, roads, and airport was critical to executing the 

recovery dfon and restoring the country$ economic life. Shuwaikh port, 

Kuwait$ largest, in the northern pan of the city, consisted of four harbors 

with berths for small craft and comainer/breakbulk operations, as well as 

drydock and shipyard racilities. The port suffered damage lO its cargohandling facilities, buildings, fenders, and cranes, while s unken ships 

clogged the channel. Shuaiba port, south of the city, consisted of three 

harbors with 20 berths and containcr/breakbulk operations. It also suffered damaged to buildings, pavements, and cranes, though its shipping 

channels were clear. Although neither port had a central backup power 

system, the piers remained structurally sound so ships with their own 

cargo-handling capability could use the pons. 
EMERGENCY RESPONSE PHASE: TASK FORCE FREEDOM 85 

Facilities at Shuwaikh port were badly damaged. 

An unimpaired llow of air n·amc was also critical. Located 15 miles 

from the dowmovvn area, Kuwait International Airpon served over 3,500 

people on more than 20 llights per day before the Iraqi occupation. It was 

a major center of commerce and primary gateway for passenger traffic. 

The airport, site of a major battle between the lst Marine Division and 

lraqi forces, had suffered extensive strucLUral, mechanical, and electrical 

damage. Battle damage and iraqi sabotage left the two major runways 

inoperable. The charred hulk of a British 74 7 sat prominendy on the runway The ground control tower had been destroyed. Artillery fire had left 

one terminal so badly damaged that it had to be demolished. The second 

terminal, though also badly damaged, remained structurally sound. 

Other damage ranged from severe vandalism throughout the airport complex to crater damage from cluster bombs, numerous barriers (abandoned 

vehicles and demolished commercial aircraft), and destruction of runway 

lighting and instrument landing systems.25 

The lraqi occupation and the ground and air wars had left aU major 

roads leading imo Kuwait badly damaged. Coalition bombing had 

cratered AI-Abclaly Road, the main route running north into Iraq. 

Damage to the roads caused by obstacle preparation \.vas significant at 
86 AFTER DESERT STORM 

places along the Saudi border where Iraqis had concentrated their 

defense. Eleven miles of the nonhbound Nuwaisib Road, a six-lane 

expressway connecling Saudi Arabia and Kuwait City, had been completely destroyed. Iraqi soldiers had ripped up 12.4 miles of the southbound lane to impede traffic. Six tank barrier trenches (2.5 meters wide 

and lO meters deep), nanked by minefields, cut through the lanes in 

both directions. AI-Salmi Road, leading southwest to Saudi Arabia, was 

also badly damaged. 

Mines and bombs had carved craters in the major roads within 

Kuwait City. At major intersections Iraqi soldiers had erected barriers 

and guard houses that obstructed traffic. They had set up crude masonry bunkers on major overpasses to prevent coalition partners from moving into the center of the city.26 

Commerce 

The civil affairs commerce team helped Kuwaiti officials purchase 

and deliver emergency supplies and helped them contract for over $500 

million of emergency supplies including electrical generators. Largely as 

a result of the team's activities, 68,000 tons of emergency food, water, 

and medical supplies were shipped into Kuwait in the first three weeks 

of March. The team also helped the Kuwaitis rebuild their labor force, 

bring in commercial vendors who had been stuck at the border, and 

reestablish the banking and currency system.27 

Public Security ancl SafeLy 

Task Force Freedom also promoted public security and safety. 

Sprinkled throughout the city were checkpoints manned first by Kuwaiti 

resistance, then by Kuwaiti soldiers, and finally by Kuwaili police. 

Military police from the task force manned the various checkpoims 

alongside Kuwaiti soldiers and police to smooth this last transition. 

Civil alTairs personnel helped the Kuwaiti police repair their vehicles, communications systems, and buildings. Ten automotive 

mechanics from an Army Reserve maimenance company and two 

from the Tennessee Army National Guard cannibalized parts from 

nearly 500 wrecked police cars to piece lOgether 50 vehicles. They 

gathered all the abandoned police cars at one place and performed 

"automotive triage."28 

Two members of the 308th Civil Affairs Group, S. Sgt. Roben 

Haglund and lst Lt. Michael Wanta, both police officers from Green 

Bay, Wisconsin, were dispatched to the police academy. They grappled 

with the problem of a huge number of guns left behind by lraqis in a 

city that had one of the world's lowest crime rates. The Kuwaiti police, 
EMERGENCY RESPONSE PHASE: TASK FORCE FREEDOM 87 

who had never carried guns before, worried about possible violence as 

they took control of the city from Kuwait~ Army. Haglund and Wama 

trained them in weapons use and taught basic SWAT team tactics. They 

also developed a police manual for translation into Arabic. Civil affairs 

soldiers helped bui ld the police force up to 6,100 and reopen the police 

stations. On 25 March 199 J, the Ministry of Interior took over the operalion of all police stations in the city, and Kuwaiti soldiers returned to 

their barracks.29 

Public Services 

The civil affairs public service team worked with Kuwait's Ministry 

of Information to establish a media support center and reestablish government radio and television stations. Soldiers installed Motorola radios 

in police vehicles and distributed hundreds of portable radios in Kuwait~ 

neighborhoods. Task Force Freedom's rad io broadcasts and leafiets provided residents with vital information about food distribution, medical 

care, and othe r public service announcements. The task force ultimately 

provided two truckloads of telecommunications equipment)O 

During the occupation, the Kuwaitis had burned trash once a week, 

but this response was inadequate. Officials worried that the mounting 

trash could create serious health problems. Civil affairs personnel encouraged the Kuwaitis to award a contract for trash collection. After weeks of 

delay, the 'Kuwaiti government signed a $750,000 contract with Waste 

Management, lnc., to remove garbage, debris, and junked vehicles from 

Kuwait City. Waste Managemem, Inc., had already moved into Kuwait in 

hopes of receiving a lucrative contract and was picking up garbage, tearing down Iraqi "pill-box" fortifications, and filling foxholes. Kuwaiti officials eventually signed a 12-month, $13.8 million contract with that firm. 

When task force members later discovered that trash removal was not 

being conducted equitably in all neighborhoods, they complained to the 

Minister of Health. Civil affairs personnel also gave the Kuwailis the supplies and training needed to control insects and rodents.3t 

Civil affairs soldiers even arranged the printing and distribution of 

new postage stamps and encouraged the Minisuy of justice to reestablish the court system quickly. 

Hu ma11 Services 

The civil affairs human services team struggled to ensure that the 

food supply was adequate and distributed equitably. lmmecliately after 

the liberation, the 22d Support Command brought in food that the 

Kuwaiti government had purchased. Transporting food by truck from 

the staging areas in Saudi Arabia "vas difficult. Early on, the push pack-
88 AlTER DESERT STORM 

ages that Mooneys command had put together proved to be critical. In 

the first three clays, dozens of truckloads of food arrived and were turned 

over to the Kuwaiti authorities for distribution. The truck drivers and 

food distributors were reservists and guardsmen who worked in shipping and receiving in civilian life. 

Sadly, food distribution fell victim to partisan politics. The Kuwaiti 

government ultimately owned most of the available food supplies, and 

the ministers who had recently returned wanted to participate in the distribution. Emergency food relief thus became a Kuwaiti operation with 

civil affairs personnel acting as advisors. 

At a meeting between civil affairs and Kuwaiti representatives on 3 

March, the Kuwaitis revealed that their government was divided on the 

most politically acceptable way to distribute food. The easiest method 

would have been to usc the existing neighborhood cooperatives. Ho..,vever, 

during the occupation, these cooperatives had been run by members of the 

Kuwaiti resistance, and the rewrning ministers preferred lO take credit for 

food purchases by establishing separate distribution cemers. Officials 

debated for 10 days, during which time little food was distributed. The 

government ultimately used the existing cooperatives. After the cooperatives had been fully stocked, the remaining food went into a central warehouse from which the cooperatives could be resupplied.J2 

Kuwaiti politics affected not only the location of food distribution 

sites, but also the equity of food distribution. Many foreign nationalssuch as Palestinians, Filipinos, Sri Lankans, and lraqis-livcd in Kuwait 

at the lime of the invasion. Some Kuwaiti orficials were anxious that the 

governments resources nm be used to benefit the foreign nationals, particularly Palestinians, whom they perceived as Iraqi collaborators. 

Initially, some long-time Iraqi and Palestinian residents were denied food 

at the distribution sites in certain neighborhoods such as El-Achmady, 

llawalli, and Salymia. ln the first weeks, at some distribution sites, the 

Kuwaitis received more food and water than the Palestinian residents or 

other foreign nationals.J3 

Civil affairs personnel who preferred a more equitable distribution of 

food and water became frustrated. They investigated reponed inconsistencies in the operation of the cooperatives and worked with the 

IV!inistry of Commerce to improve food distribution. They monitored the 

distribution of food, water, and cooking gas in neighborhoods with 

many foreign nalionals and reponed that the discrimination in food and 

water deliveries caused increased tension in those neighborhoods. 

Ambassador Gnehm, characteristically outspoken, charged that the 

cooperatives operated under confusing, overly bureaucratic restrictions 

that resulted in unfair food distribution. He insisted that all residents be 
EMERGENCY RESPONSE PHASE: TASK FORCE FREEDOM 89 

treated equally. With his supporL, Task Force Freedom recommended to 

Kuwaiti officials that they adopt more uniform and equitable procedures. 

By late March, Kuwaiti officials had resolved many of the distribution problems, and tensions eased. By early April, vendors were selling 

fresh chickens, fruits, vegetables, sugar, and other commodities on the 

street (though at twice the preinvasion prices), and more products 

reached the shelves of food stores around the city each clay.J4 

Civil affairs officers and enlisted personnel also documented human 

rights abuses. They made hundreds of visits to Hawalli and many other 

Palestinian neighborhoods to interview residents and gather information. Looking for emerging patterns, they carefully recorded the extent 

and types of abuses, the geographic location, and the perpetrators. Civil 

affairs personnel visited some neighborhoods unannounced in the middle of the night.35 

Based on discussions with Palestinians and other sources of information, task force members estimated that 400 to 500 Palestinians were 

arrested and roughly 40 to 50 were executed by the Kuwaiti resistance 

or died while being tortured. Although the figures were alarming, task 

force member Maj. And re\N Natsios observed, they could have been 

much higher, given the fact that Kuwait City had 250,000 Palestinian 

residems.J6 The efforts of the civil affairs soldiers and others from Task 

Force Freedom reduced the number of violent incidents, particularly 

during the first critical clays following the cease-fire. There were no largescale systematic human rights abuses. 

Task Force Freedom quickly organized medical teams to assess 

Kuwait$ health care systems. They concluded that the Kuwaiti health 

care systems were capable of providing emergency services to the residents. There were enough medical supplies for three to six months. Iraqi 

soldiers had completely Looted some of the specialty hospitals for cancer 

treatmem, kidney transplant, and maternity care. Although the soldiers 

had stolen most of the equipment and supplies from the city's medical 

facilities, the buildings remained structurally sound. The Iraq is had 

allowed the general hospitals to function because they needed them. 

These hospitals had emergency generators for povver but no water for 

cooling or any other purpose. 

The ARCENT medical command helped resolve the problem or evacuating Iraqi prisoners of war from the civilian hospitals. The l05th Medical 

Detachment provided outpatient clinics, three medical evacuation helicopters, and six ambulances fo r troops and conducted a daily medical evacuation Oight between KU\vait City and King Khalid Militaty City.J7 

ln the first weeks, soldiers delivered dozens of truckloads of donated 

medical supplies to hospitals and a central medical supply point and 
90 

A soldier from Camp Freedom 

leeds an injured elephant. 

AFTER DESERT STORM 

steered them to the locations 

where the need was greatest. 

Medical personnel received an 

unexpected bonus when civil 

affairs soldiers working with VII 

Corps units in southern lraq made 

an imponant discovery. First Lt. 

William Burke of the 418th Civil 

Affairs Company, a police officer in 

civilian life, had led a small team 

imo abandoned bunkers near 

Safwan , Iraq. The team had stumbled onto an underground field 

hospital, only recently vacated by 

the Republican Guard, complete 

with beds and equipment for 

about sixty patients. They found 

several bunkers loaded 'vvith all 

types of medical suppliescrutches, X-ray machines, wheelchairs, and literally tons of bandages. Having spent 12 years in Saudi Arabia as a child, Burke was able to 

read the Arabic markings on the equipment and supply containers. He 

realized that most of the supplies and equipment had been looted from 

Kuwaiti hospitals. Over the next four da)'S, he and his team made over 20 

round trips trucking the supplies to the Ministry of Health building in 

Kuwait City.1ll 

The human services team also coordinated the activities of the U.S. 

Agency for International Development, the International Commiuec of 

the Red Cross, and other relief organizations, as well as the activities of 

civil affairs volunteers. For example, on 1 March l991 , U.S. soldiers discovered 300 severely handicapped and retarded patients at a social hospital, starving and cold, helpless in their barred cribs, crying and lying 

in the dark in their own waste. Amhills dotted the Ooor of the filthy 

room. Over the following weeks, a dozen volumeers from the 432d Civil 

Affairs Company diligernly scrubbed noors, washed windows, fixed generators, bathed and spoon-fed the patients, changed their sheets, and 

pushed their wheelchairs. 39 

Civil affairs personnel assisted both people and animals. During the 

occupation, large dairy herds had been brought frorn farms imo the city 

and hidden in backyards and garages. After over a week witholll food 

and water, the animals were dying. A U.S. Army veterinarian warned 
EMERGENCY RESPONSE PHASE: TASK FORCE FREEDOM 91 

Mooney that hundreds more would soon die without water. To save 

them, Mooney temporarily divened the water that soldiers at Camp 

Freedom had planned to use for long overdue showers. Col. Phil Aim, 

chief of food services assessment , organized a program to feed and water 

the animals. During the rirst two clays of the program, he personally 

brought water trucks to the herds. Soldiers delivered 30,000 gallons of 

water a day to more than 1,000 cows and expanded their feeding program to include zoo animals."~O 

Task Force Freedom Command; Contra~ and Coordination 

Senior Task Force freedom officials developed a close, cooperative 

working relationship that enabled the task force to function dfeclively. 

General Frix handled the day-to-clay administration of the task force and 

dealt with Ambassador Gnehm, General Yeosock, and the maneuver 

commanders. General Guest focused on logistics support, and General 

Mooney oversaw civil affairs. Frix, Guest, and Mooney were in constant 

communication. They shared their office space, their housing, and often 

their meals. They held daily staff meetings to discuss priorities and often 

tried to resolve the pressing issues of the day over dinner. Each evening, 

Mooney provided Frix with a simple account of current civil affairs activities and highlighted the civil affairs issues requiring Frixs attention. 

Mooney described the relationship between his command and the task 

force as "superb." His command, he later recalled, quickly established 

credibility within Task Force Freedom and was left to perform its mission with li LLie interference.4l 

The close working relationship that Frix and his staff established 

with the U.S. Embassy also contributed to the success of the recovery 

operation. Both Frix and Mooney developed cordial, cooperative relationships with Ambassador Gnehm. Frix had received explicit instructions to cooperate and coordinate with the U.S. EmbaSS)' but not to take 

direction from the Ambassador. Frix became an integral pan of the 

Ambassadors "country team," but took his direction from General 

Ycosock at ARCENT headquarters. Mooney and Gnehm met frequently, 

even daily during one period, traveled together to meetings with the 

Crown Prince, and forged a bond of mutual respect. To enhance the 

coordination, Mooney kept civil affairs representatives on Gnehms staff. 

Ambassador Gnehm understood and enthusiastically supported 

Task Force Freedoms mission; in turn, the task force assisted the 

embassy. For example, civil affairs troops repaired the embassy$ roof, 

purged its water tanks, repaired its plumbing, and ran communication 
92 AFTER DESERT S TORM 

wires. The cooperative spirit among team members, Gnehm noted, uiLimately made the operation succeed. He praised the U.S. military in 

l(uwait [or being "highly responsive" and bri nging to bear resources not 

available elsewhere. A few military ofricials from CENTCOM and the 

Army Staff, however, expressed concern that the Arm}'S relationship 

with the Ambassador was becoming too close.-12 

Coordination between Task Force Freedom and CENTCOM proved 

more challenging. The CENTCOM J-5 staff complained that they did 

not receive the task forces daily reports directly. The reports went to the 

Army Staff in the Pemagon, but CENTCOM did not receive its copy until 

24 hours later, through the U.S. Embassy. These repons provided the 

J-55 only communication link with Kuwait. When the joint Staff called 

Colonel Bloum on the CENTCOM J-5 staff for information, Blount had 

to call Mooney$ task force directly or rely on the wriuen reports received 

through the embassy. Blount rarely spoke to the embassy by te ph e.~3 

Task Force Freedom/Kuwaiti Relations 

The relationship between the task force and the Kll'vvaiti government, though generally good, had occasional strains resulting from cultural differences. Barbara Leaf, a Kuwait specialist with the State 

Department's Bureau of Near East and South Asian Affairs, aptly 

observed that the Kuwait is, though a gentle, sociable people, did not 

often make decisions quickly or work with the same sense of urgency as 

U.S. officials. Moreover, the}' had suffered a great trauma, which affected their ability to respond to and resolve problems, panicularly during 

the nrst six wecks."-t General Frix occasionally became frustrated by the 

lack of direction from Kuwaiti officials. He sometimes found their practices to be slow and inefficient and conceded that his troops were not 

well prepared to deal vvith the Arab culture."'> 

The civil affairs troops, experienced in disaster relid, brought an 

understanding of emergency response that the Kuwaitis lacked. Without 

their help, the Kuwaitis would have had greater difficulty coping with 

the situation, and the government's critics might have raised questions 

about its effectiveness and legitimacy.46 

The more relaxed work ethic of the Kuwaitis, who had relied heavil y 

on a labor pool of foreign nationals before the war, sometimes disappointed and frustrated Army officials. Mooney conceded that he had diffi culty getting the Kuvvaitis to administer tbe water distribution, food supply, and other systems that his soldiers had established. For example, 

Mooney visited a telecommunications site that was out of service. He 
EMERGENCY RESPONSE PHASE: TASK FORCE FREEDOM 93 

found that a lithe system needed was a new battery and gas in the generator, but no one had refueled the generator. Gnehm and Mooney repeatedly urged the Crown Prince and other Kuwaitis to assume more responsibility for maintaining the systems that were in place. The Kuwaitis had 

traditionally hired foreign nationals to manage these systems but now 

were reluctant to usc those workers. The government wanted to control 

the number of foreign nationals who lived and worked in the country, but 

it also needed these people to operate elements of the infrastructure.47 

Task Force Freedom Closeout 

Planning for the closeout of Task Force Freedom began soon after its 

creation. In early March, General Yeosock and his senior staff briefed 

General Schwarzkopf on the suppon that the Army was provided in 

Kuwait. They also discussed when and how to transfer responsibility for 

the effort to other Department of Defense agencies. 

The damage assessment teams had completed their final reports, and 

emergency services in the areas of food, water, medical supplies, and 

transportation were complete. ARCENT proposed that Task Force 

Freedom be disestablished as soon as Iraq signed the cease-fire agreement and a Department of Defense representative could assume the mission. General Schwarzkopf directed that the task force remain in place 

until ARCENT forces left Kuwait. At the same time, he authorized 

ARCENT to phase out task force elements that were no longer needed.48 

On 15 March, Secretary of the Army Michael P. W Stone and General 

Kelly met in Kuwait with General Mooney, General Frix, Colonel 

Locurcio, and Ambassador Gnehm. Secretary Stone, apparently anxious 

to move the operation to its conclusion, asked Kelly and Frix to indicate 

the conditions that would have to be met before the theater commander 

transferred authority through the Secretary of Defense to the Secretary of 

the Army.49 

As critical supplies were distributed and more essential services 

restored in Kuwait, military leaders found that they could reduce the 

number of soldiers involved. They could release the tactical civil affairs 

companies to ARCENT for redeployment or other missions. The 

ARCENT operations staff drafted a plan to reduce the Las!< force and pull 

oul nonessential personnel. 

At General Yeosock's direction, the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion (-) 

was released to ARCENT on 30 March and returned lO Saudi Arabia 

for redeployment. ARCENT released the 431st Civil Affairs Company 

to the XVIll Airborne Corps for redeployment on 31 March and the 
94 AFTER DESERT STORM 

432d to the VU Corps on 6 April. General Yeosock ordered the 22d 

Support Command to reduce its operations to the minimum level 

required to support the remaining task force units by 6 April. By that 

time, ARCENT planned to reduce the task force from over 2,000 to 

1,4 70 people. so 

After receiving a very positive report from General f'rix:S representative on 8 April, General Schwarzkopf recommended to Secretary of 

Defense Cheney that he declare 30 April as the official end of the emergency phase of the Kuwait operation and shift the executive agency from 

the theater commander to the Secretary of the Army. The Secretary of 

Defense adopted the recommendation.51 

lts mission complete, Task Force Freedom was formally disestablished on 30 April. By that time, there had been significant improvements in the country's infrastructure. The task force had sought to provide sufficient electrical power to support food and water distribution, 

medical services, and minimum essential communications requirements 

for public information- an estimated 3,200 megawatts. Now, 91 percent 

of Kuwait City was serviced by central station power and 9 percent by 

portable generators. Electrical production (2,100 megawatts) outstripped demand (1,020 megawaus) by 2 to 1. The city had more than 

enough water. The goal had been to produce 120 million gallons a day, 

and Doha, AI-Zour, and Shuaiba now produced 82 million gallons a day. 

Corps contractors had nearly completed emergency repairs to the 

major highway connecting Saudi Arabia and Kuwait and had begun 

repairing other roads and bridges. The Shuaiba port had reopened. 

Kuwait International Airport, where civilian and military aircraft Oowed 

freely, returned to Kuwaiti control on 30 April. All bunkers, abandoned 

combat vehicles, and impediments had been cleared from the highways. 

The last "derelict" tank in Kuwait City had been removed on 15 March, 

a key event in the return to normalcy. Telephone service had been 

restored to Kuwait City's downtown commercial center. 

Kuwaiti ministries had assumed responsibility for public security. 

Kuwait established mobile units (military or other law enforcemem) to 

patrol and secure points of departure and the border, as well as key food 

and water distribution points. The police force numbered 6,100 with 

250 police cars and 16 police stations in operation. or the existing 15 

fire stations, 10 had reopened. All six general hospitals were open, but 

not all of the specialty hospitals. Most of the needed medical supplies 

were in stock. The public health system operated effectively with solid 

waste removal and treatment systems in place. 

Critical information could be disseminated over two FM radio and 

two television stations. About 90 percenL of the city had local telephone 
EMERGENCY RESPONSE PHASE: TASJf FORCE FREEDOM 95 

service, and 35 percem of Lhe prewar internaLional telephone line capability had been restored. Public bus service had begun on 18 April. Final 

distribution of essential food items had been completed on 15 April. 

Commercial facilities and cooperatives operated smooLhly.s2 

Frixs staff submiued its final status report on 1 May, marking the 

official end of the Lask force. The closeout of Task Force Freedom also 

marked the end of Lhe restoration of emergency services in KuwaiL and 

the beginning of Depanment of Defense recovery activities. 53 

Despite the remarkable improvements in the city, by May few of the 

Kuwaitis who had sat out the occupation in exile in neighboring counLries or in London and Paris had returned. Roughly 150,000 KuwaiLis 

and 170,000 Palestinians (out of I<uwaits prewar population of 2.2 million) had [led Lhe country. MosL of the Sri Lankans, Indians, and other 

nationalities who fonned the bulk of Kuwaits labor force were gone. 

Despite urging from the Kuwaiti government, only 5 percenl of the 

countr/s laborers had returned to their jobs. The population of Lhe 

counll')' was roughly half what iL bad been before the invasion. Some 

hesiLated to return Lo the city until it had been fully restored. The power 

plants produced so much electricity that residems were encou raged Lo 

leave their lights on day and nighL to keep the turbines running smoothly, but the eleCLrical distribution system had yet to be rebuilL. Without 

schools and air conditioning for the hot months approaching, mosL of 

Lhe exiles were expected Lo sLay away awh ile longer. 54 

General Yeosock's decision Lo use ARCENT (Forward) headquarters 

as the core for operaLions in Kuwait proved to be a good one. lt effectively represented ARCENT and CENTCOM in the area, besides functioning as Task Force Freedom. The task force coordinated the Army's 

civil and military operations. lt held daily meetings with Lhe Kuwaiti military, all coordinated with the U.S. Embassy. Task Force Freedom was a 

versatile, nexible organization capable of responding to the broad range 

of needs in Kuwait. The Lask force continually reshaped itself to meet the 

mission. It could grow or shrink by as many as 300 people a day 

depending on its missions. Frix brought forward the resources and capabilities such as engineering that he needed aLa given time. The task force 

could effectively execute a number of missions simultaneously. The organization allovved civil affairs troops to concentrate on uniquely civil 

affairs missions, while another element handled the logistics support 

missions. The task force could help set up the cease-fire talks al Safwan, 

lraq, or assist displaced persons, while leaving its civil affairs elemem 

free to restore the city.Ss 

The Combined Civil Affairs Task Force was also uniquely suited to 

the Kuwait mission. The civilian expertise of the civil affairs soldiers was 
96 AfTER DESERT STORM 

invaluable. Mooney confidently observed that the 352d demonstrated to 

the Active Army that civil affairs was an "untapped resource. "56 Secretary 

Cheney later congrawlated the civil affairs command for its key role in 

restoring basic services in Kuwait. "Your outstanding performance," he 

wrote, "proved that a vital link exists between military service in our 

country and the civilian sector. "57 

The Kuwait operation also highlighted the contributions of the Army 

Reserves. More than 80 percent of the soldiers in the operation came 

from the Reserve components. These soldiers, vvho in civilian life were 

doctors, lawyers, city planners, bankers, and even a veterinarian, 

brought to the operation unique experience and skills that did not exist 

in the Active Army. 

Twenty-seven civil affairs reservists who had served in Panama 

avoided problems they had experienced during Operation jUST CAUSE. 

For that operation, Army officials bad patched wgether a civil affairs 

structure. They requested individual volunteers, rather than activating 

entire units, so these volumeers had to spend lime becoming familiar 

with each other. For the Kuwait operation, by contrast, Army officials 

activated entire units. Mooney noted, "lthink we did it [the mission! in 

a far quicker fashion than people suspected we would do it. l tend to 

believe that our planning and the relationship that we established with 

Kuwait was pan of that process."5B 

The experience left General Frix with a favorable impression of 

civil-military operations in the Reserve components. It was, he concluded, "a great example of the total Army in action." The Reserve components, particularly civil affairs, Frix noted, was "ideally suited" for operations such as the Kuwait recovery. The general, who had little previous 

experience with civil affairs, was apparently so impressed with the civil 

affairs soldiers that he asked to be their senior rater so he could sign their 

performance evaluations and recommend them for awards.s9 

Although the civil affairs soldiers performed their tasks extremely 

well, they would have been even more effective if they had been included in the early planning. Mooney later complained that his command 

and the Kuwait Task Force planned their operations in a vacuum. They 

did not know how CENTCOM was shaping the war plan and were not 

familiar with CENTCOMs timetable. "l think we would have done a little better job, made some improvements," Mooney conceded, "if we 

would have known what the war fighters were thinking."60 

The civil affairs units and the other elemems of Task Force Freedom 

contributed significantly to the nation-building process. Army leaders 

remained keenly aware of the need to make Kuwait self-sufficient as 

quickly as possible. The task force provided administrative support and 
EMERGENCY RESPONSE PHASE: TASX FORCE FREEDOM 97 

logistics capabilities, but the Kuwaili government purchased most of the 

food, water, and other assets. ln its after action report, the Combined 

Civil Mfairs Task Force noted, "the Command always saw its mission as 

that of working itself out of its job, by advising the Kuwailis on how to 

do something rather than simply doing that something itself."61 Mooney 

and others feared that if U.S. troops stayed very long, the Ku\>vaitis would 

become dependent on them. 

Equally important was the sense of good will that these soldiers left 

behind. Many of them experienced firsthand the warmth and gratitude 

of Kuwait$ residents. For example, when soldiers brought their water 

trucks into local communities, residents poured out to greet them and 

brought them tea. Children asked them for autographs. "What registered," explained one Army captain, "was the experience of being with 

the people-seeing the kids smili ng."62 

The soldiers advised the Kuwaiti governmen t about receiving contract proposals, awarding contracts, and delivering services necessary to 

support the postwar population. Under th is contracting program, which 

totaled over $550 rnillion, the Kuwai tis procured 746 vehicles for police, 

sanitation, public transportation, and other government ministries. 

Task Force Freedom provided 12,500 metric tons of food, 12.8 million liters o[ water, 2.8 milli.on li ters of fuel, 25 truckloads of compressed 

gas, 64 generators, 200 batteries, 1,250 tons of medical supplies, and 2 

truckloads of telecommunications equipment. The Combined Civil 

Mfairs Task Force coordinated 35 supply convoys (over 1,700 vehicles) 

and 48 aircraft missions to deliver firefighting and other essential equipment. "Nowhere in modern history," observed General Frix, "has any 

fie ld army made the rapid transition from an aggressive ground offensive 

to an active restoration effort in the manner that ARCENT/Third Army 

did in the wake of DESERT STORivl." Colonel Elliott perhaps best summed 

up the task forces work when he observed that through its effon s not a 

single Kuwaiti died from lack of vvater, food, or med ical care.6J 

As Task force Freedom executed the emergency response phase, 

another Army element, the Kuwait Emergency Recovery Office, did 

the same. 

Emergency Response Phase 

The Pentagon 

As the Army Corps of Engineers and Task Force Freedom personnel in 

Kuwait execULed the emergency response, Pentagon officials continued 

their effons. Discussions among senior officia ls at the Defense 

Department, State Department, and White House aboUl the scope and 

administration of the projected recovery efforL resulted in a more definitive policy statement on l March, immediately fo llowing the liberation. 

Secretary of Defense Cheney informed the chairman of the j oint Chiefs 

of Staff, General Colin Powell , and the three service secretaries that U.S. 

defense agencies would provide recovery assistance to Kuwait in two 

phases. During the initial "emergency phase" the theater commander, 

General Schwarzkopf, wou ld have operational control over all 

Depanmem of Defense elements in Southwest Asia that were involved in 

planning or executing Kuwait reconstruction. Further, such assistance 

would be done only \.Vith the approval of "the President's senior representative to Kuwait," Ambassador Gnehm. The initial emergency work 

would remain a CENTCOM responsibility. The emergency phase, 

Secretary Cheney indicated, would focus on restoring emergency life 

support services. 

lt would be fo ll owed by a second phase called "reconstruction," the 

date of vvbich he would detennine later. During the reconstruction 

phase, the Secreta ry of the Army would serve as the executive agent for 

all Department of Defense assistance to Kuwait reconstruction. Lt vvas 

understood that the Army would have the largest role in reconstruction. 

The Secretary of the Army's authority would encompass all elements and 

offkes previously controlled by the theater commander and would be 

exercised through a Department of Defense representative from the 

Army assigned directly to Kuwait.' 

t Secretary Richard Cheney, Memorandum for Secretaries of the Military Departments, 

Chairman of the joint Chiers of Staff, Under Secrewry of Defense fo r Policy, 1 Mar 1991, 

Subj: Organization of the Department of Defense for Assistance in the Reconstruction of 

Kuwait, Kuwait Reconstruction: General, ASA(ILE) Files. 
100 AFI'ER DESERT STORM 

Army leaders debated whether the Assistant Secretary of the Army 

for Civil Works or the Assistant Secretary of the J\rmy for Installations, 

Logistics and Environment should have primary responsibility for the 

recovery effort. They determined that although the work involved reconstruction of civil infrastrucLUre, which normally came under the 

Assistant Secretary for Ci\ril Works, it would be clone in a military environment. Therefore, the Assistant Secretary for Installations, Logistics 

and Environmem, Susan Livingstone, who had responsibility for the 

Army$ military construction, should have the lead. The Secretary of the 

Army had already given Livingstone's office responsibility for overseeing 

all Army actions associated with emergency and reconstruction assistance to Kuwait, in coordination with the Assistant Secretary for Civil 

Works and the Army General Counsel.2 

On 14 March, Assistant Secretary Livingstone created the Kuwait 

Reconstruction Task Force (l<RTF) within the Army operations staff to 

act as focal point for all Kuwait recovery issues and information passing 

to or through the Army Staff and the Army Secretarial. The task force 

monitored the recover)' effort and regularly reponed directly to 

Livingstone$ office. More specifically, its primary responsibility was to 

maintain daily communication between the Corps' Kuwait Emergency 

Recovery Ofrice and Livingstone$ staff. The task force coordinated 

importanL recovery issues and prepared detailed briefings for the Army 

Chief of Staff. 

Livingstone also chaired an oversight group called the "KRTF 

General Officer Steering Comminee," with senior leaders representing 

the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works; the Assistant 

Secretary of the Army for Financial Management; the Army Corps of 

Engineers; the General Counsel and the Auditor General; and Army 

Staff members involved with ope rations, logistics, plans, congressional liaison, public information , research and development, and legal 

services. The committee functioned as a forum for sharing infonnation, not as a decisionmaking body. It enabled Livingstone to develop 

a unified Army position on key issues. The committee met monthly; 

representatives from the same offices met more informally as a 

"Council of Colonels." 

The Kuwait Reconstruction Task force and the sLeering commillee 

gave the Kuwait mission heightened visibility wilhin the Army Staff. They 

2Susan Livingstone, interv b}' author, Washington, D.C., 18 jun 1992, pp. 2-3; Kell}', 

inter.• b}' author, 7 Scp 1991, p. 13; john 'vV Shannon, Under Secretary or the Arm}', 

Memorandum ror Principal OrHcials or IIQDA, 24 jan 1991, Kuwait Reconstruction: 

Command and Control, Orrice or llistory Files. 
EMERGENCY R ESPONSE PHASE: THE PENTAGON 101 

also provided a mechanism for staff coordination and for identifying and 

resolving problems.J 

Involving the Army Staff and specifically Assistant Secretary 

Livingstone was important for several reasons. The effon to reconstruct 

Kuwait was politically sensitive. Army leaders and others were concerned about the Dood of media reports predicting billions of dollars 

worth of construction work in Kuwait. They hoped that Assistant 

Secretary Livingstone could help lo,ver unrealistic expectations. 

Members of Congress asked her to attend public meetings to publicize 

the fact that the Defense Department had a relatively small role in contracLing for Kuwait reconstruction work.4 This effort, however, had only 

limited success because the widely publicized, exaggerated media 

reports continued. Hundreds of anxious contractors and individuals 

rtooded Corps offices in Washington and Winchester with calls seeking 

work. New telephone lines installed to handle the calls were quickly 

clogged. Another reason for Livingstones involvement was that some 

Army officials believed the Army Corps of Engineers operated too independently and was trying to carve out a large, long-term role for itself in 

Kuwait. They did not want to see a repeat of the massive Saudi construction program or the 1980s. Army officials wanted to exert greater 

control over the Corps, especially since the Army did not yet have a welldefined role. They wanted to focus on the immediate requirements in 

Kuwait and minimize any discussion of follow-on roles for Army agencies, including the Corps. 

From Livingstones perspective, civil affairs soldiers and Corps personnel in Kuwait initially had a "tremendous degree of power with very 

liule oversight," in pan because the theater commander was hundreds of 

miles away in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. She charged that the Corps had 

issued public statem.ents about its involvement in Kuwait before they 

had been approved in the Pentagon. lt was her responsibility, she 

explained, to ensure that public statements made by Army agencies 

accurately reflected U.S. government policy.5 

The Army Staff had, in fact, directed the Corps to coordinate media 

announcements 'vvith its public affairs office, and the Corps made a 

determined effort to comply. But the coordination process ofLen became 

complicated and frustrating. At one point, Pentagon officials directed the 

3Kuwait Reconstruction Task Force (KRTF) HistOI) ' (d rart), n.d., Kuwait 

Reconstruction: KRTF History, Orfice or History Files; LL Col. joseph Alexander, interv 

b)' author, Washington, D.C., 27 Apr 1992, pp. 6, 13. 

"Livingstone interv, p. 28. 

5ibid. , pp. 5- 7, 16, 19. 
102 AlTER DESERT STORM 

Corps to refer reponers to a State Department official, but the State 

Department official referred the reporters back to the Corps. On another occasion, Army officials vacillated, first approving and then disapproving a Corps public statement.6 

After his initial meeting with Locurcio, Gnchrn had written a blistering memo reminding the Corps that its role was limited to technical 

support such as repairing buildings, roads, and utilities. The memo 

made its way back to the Pentagon and seemed to confirm fears about 

the Corps' involvement. Army officials recognized that the Ambassador 

had the lead in foreign affairs. lt would have been "unseemly," 

Livingstone explained, for Army officials to tell the KU\-vaiti government 

what it could do or what the U.S. government could or would do. 

Rather, Army officials had to wait for the State Department and the 

Kuwaiti government lO develop a policy. Livingstone and the other officials wanted to ensure that the Corps' activities were coordinated with 

Gnehm and fit within the framework of official U.S. policy_7 

Assistant Secretat')' Livingstone recognized that the Defense 

Department planned to assist the Kuwaitis only until they could get back 

on their feet. Its role would be that of a support organization whose 

actions were defined by national command authorities.s 

LivingsLOne also believed part of her job involved insulating the 

Corps from U.S. businesses looking for work and from congressional 

queries. She indicated that she wanted to free the Corps from the politics of the situation so it could focus on the actllal recovery operations. 

She and her staff reviewed acquisition and contracting strategies, evaluated small business opponunities and policy, and ensured that those 

policies were coordinated with the Assistant Secretary of the Army for 

Research, Development, and Acquisition. She served as the link between 

the Army Staff, U.S. businesses, and Congress to ensure that the proper 

authorities and funding were in place. Reconstruction also required 

much coordination with other federal agencies, especially with the 

Commerce and State departments. Livingstone also coordinated with the 

Kuwaiti Embassy. She provided Ambassador Al-Sabah with information 

about the situation in his country and discussed with him mauers related to U.S. business concerns9 

In his 1 March memo, Secretar)' Cheney also provided for a 

Secretary of Defense representative to the reconstruction effort, per0 Memo, joan F. Kibler to author, 24 Feb 1997. 

7Uvingstonc interv, pp. 8, 2 t-23. 

81bid., p. 27. 

<l lbid., pp. 8, 13. 
EMERGENCY RESPONSE PHASE: THE PENTAGON 103 

haps panty om of concern that he was not adequately represented in 

KuwaiL. Special assistant to the Secretary of Defense David S. 

Addington drafted a charter for a Secretary of Defense representative to 

put the recovery operation under one person and take some of the burden ofT the theater commander. Generals Po·well and Schwarzkopf 

approved the charter. But Addington failed to coordinate with the State 

Department, which did not receive the charter until after Secretary 

Cheney signed it. Ambassador Gnehm was understandably upset that 

he had not been consultedW 

Secretary of the Army Stone debated whether to fill the newly created 

position with a political appoimee, retired civilian, or active duty officer. 

He ultimately decided to appoint a general officer, preferably an engineer 

because the mission involved construclion. The political environment 

required high-level, general officer leadership. At Secretary Stones request, 

Hatch submitted the names of both a two-star and a one-star general: Maj. 

Gen. Patrick j. Kelly, Director of Civil Works, and Brig. Gen. Eugene 

Witherspoon, commander of the Middle East/Africa Projects Office. The 

Secretary selected Kelly, in pan because of his expetience building air bases 

in Israel and responding to natural disasters. Certainly, a strong case can 

be made that the scope of the project and the critical interactions with 

high-level Kuwaiti, State Department, and Defense Department officials 

dictated the need for a general officer. 'vVhether the mission required a general with two stars can be debated. AddinglOn, who had worked with Kelly 

a fevv years earlier on the cleanup of the Exxon Valdez oil spill in Alaska, 

approved the selection. II Secretary Cheney formally designated General 

Kelly as his representative on 7 March.l2 

Secretary Stone later outlined General Kelly$ duties and responsibilities. During the emergency phase, Kelly would coordinate reconstruction assistance planning, through the joim Staff, with the CENTCOM commander or his designated representative to ensure a smooth 

transition from the emergenC)' to the reconstruction phase. lie would 

also identify and request staffing requirements for one year, identify and 

request all Department of Defense assets required to execute reconstruction activities, and coordinate with the U.S Ambassador and other 

federal agencies. 

I OM<~. Gen. Pmrick J. Kelly, imcrv b>• Lt. Col. Douglas Coffq, Kuwait Cit>'· n.d., p. 5; 

Locher intcrv, p. 31. 

111-.l<lJ. Gen. Pmrick j. Kelly, inten• by author, Kuwait City, 7 Apr 1991, pp 1-3; Kelly, 

mten• by Coffey, pp. 7-10. 

2~ mo, Cheney for the Secretary of the Ann>'• 7 ~tar J 991, Kuwan Reconstruction: 

Command and Control, Office of I hstory Files 
104 AFTER DESERT S TORM 

When the reconstruction phase began, Stone cominued, Kelly 

would assume control of the planning and execution of the Defense 

Departments assistance to the Kuwaiti government. He would also oversee the Corps and civil affairs elements in Kuwait and other clements 

directed by the Secretary of Defense. He would coordinate vvith the U.S. 

Ambassador and the CENTCOM commander. He would submit a 

biweekly report on Defense Depanmem assistance through Livingstone 

to the Secretary of the Army, pass taskings on to the l<uwait 

Reconstruction Task Force in the Pentagon for action, and pass policy 

questions through the task force to Livingstone for resolution.13 

Soon after his appointment, Kelly visited the State Depanmem, the 

Office of the Secretary of Defense, and members of the Army Staff. He 

traveled to Kuwait with the Secretary of the Army the second week of 

March. They met brieny with Ambassador Gnehm, who made it clear 

that he was unhappy that he had not been consulted about Kelly$ position. However, he favored having one person in charge to coordinate all 

Defense Department activities. At the end of the meeting, Gnehm asked 

who his point or contact for security assistance would be. Normally 

CENTCOMs Director of Logistics handled security assistance. Secretary 

Stone promised to study the matter. 

Secretary Stone returned to the States, but General Kelly stayed on 

for two weeks to gather more infonnalion. When Kell y visited Riyadh, 

General Schwarzkopf indicated that he opposed giving Kelly responsibility for security assistance. Kelly, he observed, would have enough to 

do. After the meeting, Sch'vvarzkopf issued a statement that Kelly would 

be the overall coordinator but would not be in charge of security assistance. Security assistance would ultimately be handled by a reestablished 

U.S. Liaison Office, Kuwait (USLOK). 14 

Recognizing that Kelly would be the senior military officer in 

Kuwait, Schwarzkopf appointed him the U.S. Defense representative and 

U.S. Central Command representative for military coordination matters.l5 Kelly considered this action particularly significant because that 

responsibility was not pan of his original charter. Before leaving the 

Middle East, General Kelly also visited Lt. Gen. William G. Pagonis, the 

dynamic commander of the ARCENT SupporL Command. General 

Yeosock had directed this talented logistician to assist Kelly and his organization. Specifically, Kelly asked Pagonis for support in the areas of 

UMemo, Secret:U')' Stone for SECDEFRE ~ 16 Apr 1991, Reading File l, Dlv\0 Files. 

HKelly, mterv by Co!Te}'. pp. 13- 14, 17- 18. 

15Msg, USCINCCF.NT to American Embassy, Kuwait, 21 Mar 1991, Kuwait 

Reconstruction: Miscellaneous Messages, #6, OACE Reference Files. 
EMERGENCY RESPONSE PHASE: THE PENTAGON 105 

medical care, military police, explosive ordnance disposal, and air transponation, and found him "extreme!)' supponive."t6 

During his trip, Kelly had concluded that he would need at least 50 

people, but wanted to minimize overhead expenses. He kne ... v he did not 

need engineering and contracting in his organization because the Kuwait 

Emergency Recovery Office had that expertise. But he did need budget 

specialists, auditors, and a lawyer to prevent fraud and abuse. Because 

Kelly would be operating in a military environment, he wanted his staff 

to include soldiers as well as civilians.17 

The designation of a Secretary of Defense represemalive further 

strained the already tense relationship between the Corps and the Army 

Staff. Corps leaders had a very different perspective than the Pentagon 

had. Hatch insisted that the Corps keep Pentagon officials informed of 

its early interactions with the Kuwaitis, but they failed to pay adequate 

auemion. Pent agon officials, he observed, showed liulc imerest until 

mid-january when the Corps signed the foreign military sales agreement 

with the Kuwaitis. At that point, the Department of Defense and the 

Army Secretariat decided to become more involved. Rather than use 

existing authorities and procedures, Hatch explained, Pentagon officials 

concluded that they needed a Depanmem of Defense representative in 

charge. Yet they had not developed plans for this. To compensate for 

their own lack of auention, he added, Pentagon officials charged that the 

Corps had been doing its planning surreptitiously. They insisted that 

they had to exert more control over the Corps. Although Hatch received 

repeated requests for information from media represcmatives, at one 

point Pentagon officials prohibited him from having any direct contact 

with the media. Soon after, Corps and Pentagon officials worked out a 

compromise that permitted Corps officials in Kuwait to talk to reporters 

there, while Corps officials in Washington remained silent. Later, an 

elaborate clearance procedure for information released to the media was 

instituted at Hatch$ urging, wi th approval from Livingstone's offi ce. t8 

Locurcios perspective was the same. Not until the war began winding 

down, he observed, did officials begin to sec the extent of the Department 

of Defense involvement in postwar Kuwait. They created Kelly$ organization, loeurcio rcmarl<ed, because they feared that, if left to its own devices, 

the Corps would continue operating in Kuwait inclefinitely.lCJ 

t<>Kcll)•, interv by Coffey, p. 19. 17Kclly, interv by author, 7 Apr 1991, pp. 3-5; Kcll)•, interview by muhor, 7 Scp 1991, 

pp. 2-3. 

IS Lt. Gen. llcnry J. Hatch, intcrv b)' author, Washington, D.C., IS Feb 1991, pp. 51-53. 

t9Locurcio, imcrv by author, 7 April 1991, pp. 14- 15. 
106 AFTER DESERT STORM 

General llmch later contended that Pentagon oiTicials created Kell)"s 

organization to exercise greater control over the Corps because they 

believed the Corps was operating too inclependemly. He did not believe 

such a high-level organization was necessary. The Corps, he explained, 

had taken on more expensive and sensitive emergency operations in the 

StaLes with authority delegated through the Defense Depanment.20 The 

strains between the Corps and the /\rmy Starr and bet"veen the Kuwait 

Emergency Recovery Office and the Defense Reconstruction Assistance 

Office continued throughout the operation. 

lOffmch imcn·. pp. H , 45. 
Chapter4 

Emergency Response Phase 

Kuwait Emergency ReciiJIBI7 

Of/ice At:tivities 

The members of the Corps' Kuwait Emergency Recovery Offi ce arrived 

in Kuwait City shortly after Task Force Freedom. They immediately 

began conducting damage assessments and implementing their emergency contracting strategy. At the same time, they put in place a Oexible, 

responsive organization to oversee the emergency repairs. During the 90-

clay emergency phase, the Corps, li ke Task Force Freedom, focused on 

restoring essential serv ices to the Kuwaiti people. The Kuvvait 

Emergency Recovery Office and its contractors would successfully bring 

much of Kuwaits crippled infrastructure back to life. 

Coordination and Communication 

For the Corps me1nbers, the rirst few weeks in Kuwait were confusing, frustrating, and challenging. They had coordinated their early planning with the Kuwaiti representatives who were in Washington. At that 

time, these officials did not have a full understanding of the situation in 

their homeland thousands of miles away. As a result, when Locurcio and 

his staff arrived in l<uwait, they found that Kuwaiti officials who had 

remained there during the occupation had taken different actions than 

those for which the Corps had planned and committed funds. For 

example, at rhe request of the Kuwait Emergency Recovery Program, 

arriving Corps members mobilized a contractor to resLOre electrical 

transmission lines only to find that ministry officials in Kuwait had let 

their own contract. 

Coordination with the ministries was supposed to be done through 

Dr. Shaheens Kuwait Emergency Recovery Program. Each ministry had 
108 AFrER DESERT STORM 

JfERO holds its first press brielinUt March 1991. 

a representative with that organi zation who determined the requirements and established priorities. Locurcio:S staff sometimes had to 

push the ministries to get lists of priorities. Locureio did not believe 

the ministries full y understood the function and purpose of his organization. He found that they tended to view the Corps as a contractor 

raLher than a partner and would not give his staff access LO all the information needed for planning. Occasionally, the Kuwaitis appointed 

inspectors to review the Corps' management of the contractors. This 

caused some duplication of the Corps' effon and interfe red with the 

progress of the work. 

The Kuwaitis rarely integrated outsiders in their planning and were 

not accustomed to a participatory process. Also, because of their depleted staffs and damaged equipment and facilities, the ministries functioned 

at only 20 to 30 percent effectiveness. Locurcio and his staff uiLimately 

lOok it upon themselves to develop some of the priorities and broad 

plans needed to coordinate repairs such as project lists and various planning systems maps for electricity. They then obtained approval of these 

plans from ministry representatives. 

The Kuwaitis' failure to coordinate effectively with the Corps was particularly striking in the area of damage assessment. Locurcio had assumed 
EMERGENCY RESPONSE PHASE: KERO ACTIVITIES 109 

the Kuwaitis would rely on the Corps for all damage assessment and limit 

their role to policymaking. But occasionally the Kuwaitis created their own 

damage assessment teams, and ministries began operating their own 

recovery systems. The Corps and the ministries sometimes discovered that 

they had conducted damage surveys at the same facilities. 

Initially, Corps members had difficulty getting access to planning 

and decisionmaking by senior ministry officials, so they worked through 

their subordinates. The situation improved as Corps members gradually 

learned more about ministry operations and the Kuwaitis developed 

greater confidence in Locurcio and his staff.L 

Securing an adequate communications capability also proved difficult. lnitially, the Corps relied on the Kuvvaiti government's promise to 

provide communicati011s capability, but nearly a month passed before 

the necessary equipment materialized. Communications capability during those first weeks was limited. Locurcio could not telephone either 

the U.S. Embassy in Kuwait or his higher headquarters in Winchester. 

Locurcios staff also had difficulty communicating with other Corps 

personnel in Dhahran. They could not telephone them until the 

Dhahran office sent a tactical satellite telephone to Kuwait, but even 

these communications were unreliable because sotnetimes the signals 

could not penetrate the thick clouds of oil and smoke. 

Corps members were equipped with Motorola radios, repeaters, and 

small generators to power the repeaters. The single sideband radios were 

one of the few available forms of communication in Kuwait City. 

Locurcio relied on hand-held radios to communicate with his damage 

assessment teams and other field personnel. 

In late March, American Telephone and Telegraph (AT&T) set up a 

36-foot earth station satellite dish in Kuwait. Locurcio arranged to use 

the facsimile transmission capability to send daily reports to the 

Transatlantic Division. He later purchased from AT&T five dedicated 

telephone lines, vvhich the Kuwaitis funded. As a result, communications 

and coordination with the Transatlantic Division and with the Army Staff 

in Washington improved dramatically. Some of the misconceptions 

about the Corps' intentions diminished. By late lvlarch, the offices communications were, Maj. la'vvrence Jinkins concluded, "as good or beuer 

than anybody elses in town at the time."2 

Corps members and contractors found themselves in an unhealthy 

and dangerous environment. Not only was the air quality poor due to 

smoke from the oil fires and the political environment unstable, but vast 

quantilies of unexploded munitions lay everyvvhere-on the streets, 

around key infrastructure, and stockpiled in schools, ministry buildings, 

police stations, and other sites throughout the city. Coalition forces had 
110 AFTER DESERT STORM 

dropped large quantities of cluster bombs around work sites; some 

bombs had sunk into the soft sandy ground without detonating. 

Corps members and comractors constantly worked around the 

unexploded ordnance. Many of the facilities they entered had been 

rigged for demolition, bm because of the rapid execution of the ground 

war, Iraqi soldiers had not had time to detonate the explosives. Working 

in such an environment was dangerous and sometimes fataL One contractor was killed when he left the road and stepped on a mine. A truck 

driver for Blount lost his right arm when a cluster bomb exploded as he 

brushed sand awa)' from a Oat tire. A subcontractor for Blount fell to his 

death while working on a tower, possibly after receiving an electrical 

shock. Overall, there were surprisingly few accidents given the amount 

of unexploded ordnance littering the desert. 

Driving in Kuwait became very dangerous clue to damaged roads, 

inoperative or missing traffic signals. and, later, after residents returned. 

heavy traffic. Despite the Corps' emphasis on safety, one member, Allen 

Kimbrell, was accidentally struck by a tractor-nailer as he left his work 

site and later died from his injuries) 

Organizational Structure 

Planners had little time to organi ze, staff, and train the initial Corps 

organization. The office \.vould be staffed by volumeers from the various 

Corps districts and divisions who rotated in and out of Kuwait on a 

three-month C)'cle. Locurcio decided to use the Corps' traditional organization for a small district office, which included offices for project 

managemem, emergency operations, engineering services, contracting, 

and support. He '..Vanted a fam iliar structure where new personnel could 

orient themselves quickly. 

Since planners envisioned that the Kuwait Emergency Recovery 

Office would have a damage recovery mission, they set up an emergenC)' 

management structure similar to those used in responding to natural disasters. (Chart 4) The organization was made up predominantly of structural engineers wl1o could conduct damage surveys and provide detailed 

estimates for repairs, rather than contract management and quality 

assurance specialists. 

Locurcio established field offices called damage assessment groups and 

an emergency management division to provide direction. There was a 

damage assessment group for each functional area-such as buildings, 

roads, and sanitation-that the Kuwait Emergency Recovery Program 

members had idemified. The groups assessed damage to ports, the airpon, 
Chart 4-lfuwait Emergency Recovery Office, Emergency Response Phase 

Project 

Management 

DAG* 

Emergency 

Operations 

DAG 

KERO 

Commander 

Engineering 

Services 

DAG DAG 

Public & 

State 

Buildings 

~ 

L::J 

I 

Sanitary Electricity 

& Water 

Defence 

T 

! ?Teams I 14 Teams I 

*DAG=Damage Assessment Group 

Contracting I [ --Support \ 

DAG I I DAG 

Airport I I Ports 

13TLsl I tTL I 
112 

A Carps member outside the 

Seif Palace 

AFTER DESERT STORM 

fresh and waste vvater treatment 

systems, power production facilities, roads, public buildings, and 

defense installations. Each group 

was aligned with a specific minisuy public and state buildings, 

roads, sanitary, electricity and 

water, defense, airport, and pons. 

The damage assessment 

groups were subdivided into 

damage assessment teams. For 

example, the public buildings 

damage assessment group was 

responsible for seven geographic 

areas, so it had seven teams. The 

roads damage assessment group 

divided the country into four 

areas, so it had four teams. The 

ports damage assessment group 

required only one team. Each 

team consisted of a U.S. engineer, 

a Kuwaiti engineer, and a contractor representative . Having all 

three on the team expedited the process of developing a scope of work, 

negotiating an appropriate price, and issuing a notice to proceed. 

Locurcio wanted his organization to be Oexible enough that he could 

shift personnel among the various damage assessment groups as the 

workload shifted. Later, as the operation progressed, the damage assessment groups convened into resident offices staffed with engineers experienced in contract administration. 

In addition to damage assessment groups and teams, the Corps' 

organization included suppon elements such as logistics and resource 

management that were similar to those found in a small district office. lt 

could perform a limited design function, project management, resource 

management, and contracting. One of the greatest advantages was that 

the organization could effectively carry the work through the entire construction process, after the damage assessment groups were fully convened to resident engineer offices.4 

A final key element of the organization was its Kuwaiti volunteers. 

Corps members held a week-long series or \vorksbops and pannering 

exercises in Dhahran to familiarize the Kuwaitis with their Am.erican counterparts, instruct them in pr~ject management, and foster teamwork.5 
EMERGENCY RESPONSE PHASE: KERO ACTIVITIES 113 

A Kuwaiti volunteer outside the Amiri Hospital 

Locurcio used the damage assessment group and team structure for 

the first 45 days to develop a complete assessment of the damage, while 

other staff members mobilized comractors. During this period, the teams 

developed and prioritized over 1,000 individual "work orders," which 

included detailed scopes of work and cost estimates. Meanwhile, emergency repair teams removed debris and rubble. 

During the subsequent recovery phase, the emergency management 

division with its damage assessmen t groups shifted to a more traditional 

project management strucLUre with four resident offices to oversee contractors in the field. This strucLUre ensured that the Corps members 

could administer their contracts and complete the projects according to 

Corps and Department of the Army quality standards. The four resident 

ofrices were not linked to a specific site such as an Army air base as traditional Corps operations were. Rather they vvere organized by [unction-buildings, transportation, utilities, and defense-and reponed 

directly to Locurcio. The emergence of the resident offices marked a shift 

in emphasis from damage assessment to construction. (Chart 5) 

At this point, primary responsibility for the opermion transferred 

from the emergenC)' managemem division to the project management 

division. The project managers served as the primary link with inclivid-
114 AFTER DESERT STORM 

KERO 

Commander 

Deputy Commander 

Department for Programs & Project Management 

I I I I I 

Programs & Emergency Project Technical Contracting Support Management Management Support Division Staff Division Division 

I I I I 

Transportation Utilities Buildings Ministry 

of Defence ResOle Res Ole ResOfc Res Ofc 

Roads Electrical Schools Group 1 Air Force 

Airports Water Schools Group 2 Army Public Buildings Ports Sanitation State Buildings Navy 

Chart 5- Kuwait Emergency Recovery Office, Recovery Phase 

ual Kuwaiti ministries. Each project manager handled the full range of 

projects associated with a panicular ministry across all functional areas. 

The project managers were assigned to each ministry sector to coordinate with the appropriate Kuwaiti officials responsible for that sector. 

They developed a program to administer all projects for that sector, from 

conception to completion when the Kuwait Emergency Recovery Office 

turned the project over to the ministry. The project managers established 

priorities, developed budgets, and determined project f'eawres and quality standards. They also monitored and reported progress th rough the 

design, contracting, and construction phases and supervised LUrnover of 

the project to the Kuwaitis. 

This was the first time that an entire Corps operation "vas rooted in 

the relatively new concept of project management. In the late 1980s, the 

Corps had taken steps to improve its procedures for planning, designing, 

constructing, and managing its civil works projects. The Corps had tradilionally used a "stovepipe approach" in which planning documents 

pass back and forth among the engineering, planning, and construction 

divisions. In J 988, at the urging of the Assistant Secretary of the Army 

for Civil Works, Robert Page, the Corps adopted a new methodology 

called project management that involved coordinating engineering, construction, contracting, and other orfices. A project management team, 

rather than an individual, remained responsible for a project from its 

inception to its completion. In this instance, the project management 
EMERGENCY RESPONSE PHASE: KERO AcTIVmES 115 

system provided a single contact for each ministry and complete "cradle 

to grave" management of that ministry$ entire program. 

The transition from emergency management to project management 

and from damage assessment groups to resident offices created a few 

problems as Corps members sonecl out their new roles and responsibilities. Some friction resulted when project managers found that even 

though they were responsible for particular engineering programs and 

were supposed to be the focal point for information, they still had to turn 

to the emergenC)' management branch and the damage assessment 

groups for information. 

The transition to project management began in late March, earlier than 

amicipated, and perhaps before the Corps was fully prepared. The first 

CoqJs members had been brought in for 90 days, but the transition to project management occurred only 45 clays into the operation because the 

damage assessmems were complete and construction was underway. The 

Kuwait Emergency Recovery Office did not bring in contracting specialists 

early enough and had fevv experienced quality assurance specialists on site. 

When firms began submitting contract proposals, Locurcio found that he 

did not have enough contracting personnel to administer those contracts. 

Planners had assumed that the engineers conducting the damage surveys 

would also perform the quality assurance for the contracts, but these engineers were still tied up with surveys. Moreover, they were primarily design 

engineers who had not been trained for quality assurance. 

Locurcio conceded that the Corps did not have all the necessary 

people in place for the shift to project managemenL. He needed civil 

engineers who specialized in comract administration, not design engineers, to staff the resident engineer offices. The Corps quickly recruited 

and deployed additional contract administration specialists. 

As the role of the project managemem division expanded, the role of 

the emergency managemem division decreased. Eventually, the emergency management division was dismantled and the emergency management function was placed within the project management division. 

The organization ultimately included a project management division, an 

engineering division, a contracting division, and a support division but 

no construction division since the resident offices reponed directly to 

the commander.6 ln the first three weeks, the Corps' office in Kuwait 

grew to include 14 military officers, 112 Corps civilians, over 60 Kuwaiti 

engineers, and nearly 1,000 contract workers.7 

The Kuwaiti volunteers made significant contributions. They were well 

educated, some with degrees from universities in the United States, well 

qualified, and fluent in English. They had access to important information 

and documents that the Corps required and helped Corps members locale 
116 AFTER DESERT STORM 

A Corps contractor and Kuwaiti volunteer discuss road repair. 

desperately needed plans and specifications for government and public 

buildings. lVlore importanL, they were familiar v.rith existing systems and the 

engineering philosophy behind those systems. The volunteers saved Corps 

personnel many hours and much frustration by steering them to the key 

decisionmakers in the various minisuies. The Kuwaiti volunteers were, 

Bader AI-Qabandi observed, initially fmstrated by what they perceived to 

be the slowness of Corps procedures, but they soon came to understand 

that the Corps was moving as quicl<ly as it could, considering the need to 

control over 1,000 projects and several hundred million dollars. A bond of 

muLUal respect and friendship developed betvveen KuwaiLi and American 

engineers. The Corps personnel formed a particular!)' close bond with 

Bader Al-Qabandi and Fatima AI-Sabah. AI-Sabah held a degree in architecture from Catholic University in Washington, D.C., which perhaps 

accounted for some of her western assertiveness, and had served in the 

Ministry of Public vVorks for nine years. 

The Kuwaiti volunteers, in turn, benefiuecl greatly from the experience of their U.S. counterparts. The female engineers vvho worked with 

the Corps received valuable field experience normally not available to 

them. Locurcio viewed training local nationals as pan of the overall US. 

effort to promote stability in the Middle East.B Commenting on this spe-
EMERGENCY RESPONSE PHASE: KERO ACTIVITIES 117 

cia! relationship, Dr. Shaheen noted, "From the time we left Dammam tO 

return to Kuwait, I have watched the Corps people as they do their 

work-not just as the responsible thing to do, but they were pushed by 

their own beliefs. Everyone (Corps and Kuvvaiti) worked together anyLime day or nighL Our relationship has been very successful."9 

Locurcio commanded an organization made up of Corps civilians 

and soldiers from throughout the United States >vho had never worked 

LOgether and were accustomed to different ways of doing business. He 

administered a new life cycle project management organization with an 

unusual variety of contracting mechanisms. The organization of the 

Kuwait Emergency Recovery O[[ice provided enough flexibility for the 

transition from damage assessment to construction and from emergency 

response Lo recovery. The concept of life cycle project managemem, 

implemented for the first time on a large scale, proved effective. Some 

project managers were involved in the entire process from surveying 

damage through the completion of the projects. 

By contrast, the rotation of key leaders, such as deputies, division 

chiefs, resident engineers, the chief of project management, the resource 

manager, and the propeny book manager, every three rnonths was very 

disruptive. When a senior official rotated out, the organization lost a 

degree of continuity and accoumability for his or her decisions. 

ln addition tO the disruptions caused by the 90-day tour of duty, 

Locurcio had difficulty recruiting enough contracting specialists and 

electrical engineers. Sometimes supervisors refused to release them from 

their home ornces because of their critical expertise. The early Corps 

organization also lacked auditors who could help minimize costs and 

establish an adequate paper trail.IO 

Despite some organizational weaknesses, Corps members and their 

Kuwaiti partners worked diligently to fill the gaps and accomplished a 

great deal in a very short time. They maintained a high level of professionalism and commitment and were justifiably proud of their accomplishments. Julius "Bo" Bounds, Locurcios director of contracting, recalled 

the satisfaction of having children ask for his autograph or families stopping in the road to thank him. Ben Wood, Locurcios deputy, later 

observed, "I learned thal wiLhin the Corps there$ a trern.endous ... capability l never knew existed .... lt makes me proud to be a pan ofit."ll 

Command and Control 

Corps headquaners provided the Kuwait Emergency Recovery Office 

with personnel, logistics support, and technical direction through the 
118 AlTER DESERT STORM 

South Atlantic Division and the Transatlantic Division. The SoULh Atlantic 

Division had provided such suppon to Corps personnel during 

Operations DESERT SHIELD and Dt:SERT STORM and had served as the higher 

headquaners to the Middle East/Arrica Projects Office until late February 

199 1 when that office became the Transatlantic Division. Corps headquaners maintained command but had less operational control. 

During the recovery planning stage, the Ambassador gave direction 

through the Ku·wait Task Force on the type and extent of the mission that 

the Kuwait Emergency Recovery Office would undertake. llowever, as 

the operation developed, the Kuwait Emergency Recovery Office and the 

352cl Civil Affairs Command worked as parallel organizations, each 

reporting directly to the Ambassador and receiving taskings and prioriLies from him. Those taskings and priorities had lO be within the parameters of the original foreign milita ry sales case authority. For the first 

month, Locurcio and other representatives gathered daily in the 

Ambassador's kitchen at 7:00 A.M. to eat C-rations. At 7:30 A.M. they 

moved into the dining room where they sat around the dining room 

table as they briefed the Ambassador. Armed with this current information, the Ambassador would then leave for his daily meeting with Dr. 

Shaheen, some of the Kuwaiti ministers, and the Emir.t2 

When ARCENT created Task Force Freedom, the Kuwait Emergency 

Recovery Office~ relationship to the task force was unclear, especially 

since the office operated on Kuwaiti funds. Locurcio was instructed to 

place his organization under the operational control of Task Force 

freedom umil responsibility for the Kuwait recovery transferred from 

the theater commander, General Schwarzkopf, to the Ambassador. The 

formal cease-fire agreement ending the war, and consequently this transition, took longer than anticipated. The lraqis did not aeceptthe United 

Nation~ terms for a permanent cease-fire until 7 April. After some discussion, General Frix instructed Locurcio to take operational direction 

from the Ambassador but to coordinate all actions and report regularly 

to Task Force Freedom. Locurcio or his representative attended Frix~ 

daily staff meetings. Without a close relationship with Task Force 

Freedom, Locurcio's group might have stayed out of Kuwait until authority passed to the Ambassador, when the Ku\.vait Emergency Recovery 

Office would have come under the "official" control of the Ambassador. 

The confusing transition period stretched out for over a month. 

Although Locurcio and his staff technically were not pan of Task 

Force Freedom, they were placed under the operational control of 

General Frix. Three times a week, Locurcio provided Frix with detailed 

status reports and occasional supplements. These reports circulated 

through CENTCOM headquarters to the Army Staff. Meanwhile, 
EMERGENCY RESPONSE PHASE: KERO ACTIVITIES 119 

Locurcio maintained his direct link with the Ambassador, attending daily 

staff meetings, receiving taskings, and providing updates. Locurcio later 

observed that he reported to "everybody" on a daily basis- to the 

Ambassador, to Task Force Freedom, and to the Transatlantic Division. 

His patience and management skills were surely tested by the delicate 

reporting structure. Yet he apparently vvas able to satisfy all the demands 

for information.lJ 

Damage Assessment 

As with Task Force Freedom, the Corps' first task after setting up 

operations in Kuwait was to assess the damage. To ensure that the 

assessments were well documented, Locurcios staff developed report 

forms much like the ones the Corps nonnally used in responding to 

natural disasters in the States. The damage assessment teams consisted 

of one or two Corps employees (usually one was a military officer who 

could provide security and explosive ordnance d isposal assistance), 

one or two Kuwaiti engineers, and a contractor representative. The 

assessment would determine the feasibility of making expeditious 

repairs. The plan was for team members to agree on the scope of work 

while visiting the site and write the damage survey report so repairs 

could begin within days.l4 

Some problems quickly developed. Because of delays mobilizing 

contractors, some teams initially had no contractor representative. Also, 

the lists of structures and fac ilities requiring surveys that Kuwaiti representatives in Dammam had given the Cor ps were incomplete. To further 

complicate matters, Kuwaiti priorities changed after the Corps members 

arrived in Kuwait. Finally, some duplication occurred in the assessment 

process. The 416th Engineer Command and civil affairs troops performed some damage assessments and shared their survey information 

with the Corps, but Locurcios teams had to go back to the same structures to conduct the more detailed assessments needed for scopes of 

work and cost estimates. Occasionally, representatives from all three 

Army elements showed up at meetings with the Kuwaitis and peppered 

them with questions about in frastructure.15 

Corps members performed over a thousand damage surveys. Their 

reports included the scopes of work and the government estimates for the 

projects. AfLer the damage assessment groups reviewed the reports and 

approved the estimates, Dr. Shaheen approved the projects and authorized 

construction. Thus, emergency work orders became task orders that the 

Corps issued to its contractors. If a facility could not be easily repaired, the 
120 AFTER DESERT STORM 

damage assessmem team noted this on its survey report and filed the 

report with the damage assessment group for future action. 

Before the task orders were issued, representatives from the various 

ministries had the opportunity to revie·w the reports The ministries provided continuous input into the Corps' priorities and commitment oF 

funds. Dr. Shaheen ensured that the expenditure was within the priorities that the Kuwaiti government had established fo r the Corps. The contracting o[[icer then issued a notice tO proceed tO the COntracLOr. 

Locurcio:S resource rnanager ensured that the Corps did not overobligate 

funds and provided accountability in the process.l6 

Corps Contracting Strategy 

As the Kuwait Emergency Recovery OlTice assessed damage and 

mobilized its contractors, iL drew on a contracting strategy that it had 

developed in the United States before deploying. A key element of that 

strategy vvas to ensure that U.S. firms received pre ference. 

Before the August invasion, Kuwait had not been inclined to give 

U.S. firms access to its markets. Germany and japan bad been the dominant trad ing partners. Moreover, for most business opportunities, 

t<uwait required that the fo reign contractor form a joint vemure contract 

with a Kuwaiti firm. 

After the invasion, the situation changed dramatically. t<uwaiti officials pledged to award the contracts proportionately to firms from the 

countries that had sent troops to help liberate Kuwait. The United States 

would have the largest share of work, followed by Britain, France, and 

Saudi Arabia. Countries that did not send troops to join the coalition 

forces and quibbled about their financial contributions, such as 

Germany and Japan, found themselves effectively cut out. 

Early estimates projected that reconstruction in Kuwait (a country 

the size of New jersey) would total $100 billion over the following five 

years. Media reports predicted that the reconstruction of Kuwait would 

be "one of the biggest and most rapid construction programs in history," 

and firms began scrambling for comracts. 

By late February, 70 percent of the nearly 200 contracts that the 

Kuwaiti government had awarded to restore basic services and repair oil 

wells had gone to U.S. firms; contracts worth more than $800 million 

according to Kuwaiti officials. Caterpillar, lnc., for example, sold the 

Kuwaitis hundreds of diesel po"verecl electric generator sets. Motorola, 

lnc., supplied thousands of portable telephones. AT&T installed a satellite station in Kuwait Cit)' for emergency long-distance service. General 
EMERGENCY RESPONSE PHASE: KERO A CTIVITIES 121 

Motors Corporation, Ford Motor Company, and Chrysler Corporation 

provided vehicles. 17 

Some Americans believed that U.S. contractors should receive the 

bulk of the reconstruction work as a revvard for the U.S. role in successfully liberating Kuwait. As early as 3 January 1991, Representative Helen 

Delich Bentley had introduced a resolution calling on the President to 

instruct the State Department to inform Kuwaiti officials that their contracts for the reconstruction work should reflect the troop commitment 

or the coalition forces. "Because of the United States unequivocal suppon 

for Kuwait," she explained, "1 strongly believe it appropriate that U.S. 

industries, including U.S. dredging firms, be afforded the first opportunity to panicipate in all reconstruction efforts when they ultimately are 

initiated." More specifically, Representative Bentley urged Secretary 

Stone to help ensure that American companies received a large portion 

of the work restoring navigation and reopening harbors in l<uwaiL. 

Assistant Secretary Livingstone assured Representative Bentley that the 

Army was "making every effon to give interested American firms appropriate consideration" for potential Kuwait recovery work. IS 

American firms of all types and sizes deluged government agencies, 

industry organizations, and private placement firms with inquiries about 

opportunities in Kuwait. The Department of Commerce established a 

Gulf Reconstruction Center to coordinate efforts to help American businesses obtain contracts. Commerce Secretary Robert A. Mosbacher, 

Ambassador Al-Sabah, and General Hatch formally opened the center 

The centers 16-line telephone bank started getting inquiries the clay the 

ground war started and was soon receiving 2,000 calls a clay from large 

contractors, small companies, and individuals seeking work.19 

Prospective contractors and eager job seekers flooded Corps offices 

with calls. The Transatlantic Division had to install 20 additional telephone lines, which were quickly jammed. Corps headquarters in 

Washington also set up special telephone lines to handle hundreds of 

calls from job seekers. Meanwhile, by mid-March the Kuwaiti representatives in Washington rece ived 2,000 pieces of mail a day from individuals, firms, and industry associations seeking work20 

As the letters and calls poured in, the Corps and the l<uwait.is struggled to resolve Lhe sensitive issue of giving preference to U.S. contractors. 

The Federal Acquisition Regulations prohibited the Corps from limiting 

contractor participation unless the Kuwaiti govemment so requested. 

General Ray asked Ambassador Gnehm to encourage Kuwaiti officials to 

give preference to U.S. firms. 

htleanwhile, Locurcio and Dr. Shaheen held lengthy discussions on the 

issue. For example, how would they define U.S. preference? Did it mean 
122 AlTER DESERT STORM 

51 percent of construction "vent to U.S. firms or 99 percem? Ultimately, 

the)' agreed that U.S. preference meant that if all the bidders had roughly 

the same technical merits, the contract should go to the U.S. firm. 

ln a 21 February memo, Dr. Shaheen authori zed the Corps to give 

maximum preference to U.S. firms in awarding contracts for Kuwait 

reconstruction. A few days later, Dr. Shaheen explained to Locurcio that 

the Kuwaiti government wanted the Corps to give preference to U.S. 

firms in a ... varding the emergency recovery contracts provided they could 

respond and perform within the required time frames. In fact, he had no 

objection if all of the contracts went to U.S. firms as long as they could 

perform the work expeditiously. 21 

Another key element of the contracting strategy was to limit the 

Corps' contracting effort to design and construction during the emergency response phase. The Corps' Kuwait office would decline any 

work that involved services or maintenance operations. At a 16 

February meeting with Dr. Shaheen, Locurcio had explained that 

under the current foreign military sales case, the Corps could only 

accept taskings for design and construction work for the repair and 

recovery of Kuwait's infrastructure. Gnehm had insisted on this stipulation so the Corps would not become overwhelmed with providing 

services, which would detract from its primary mission and area of 

expertise-construction. Services such as purchasing furniture, collecting garbage, operating warehouses and depots, maintaining buildings and equipmem, and operating facilities or equipment were considered beyond the intended scope of the Corps' fo reign military sales 

case. Locurcio informed Dr. Shabeen that the Kuwaiti government 

should contract directly for these things.22 

The Corps' initial contracting strategy for repairing Kuwaits infrastructure and restoring emergency services was based on two key 

assumptions: that there would be enough time to solicit bids from potential contractors and that there would be no well-defined scope of work. 

Therefore, they decided to use competitive, indefinite delivery type contracts (1 DTC), with work issued to contractors through a series of delivery orders. Contracts would list the estimated types and quantities of 

various of labor, equipment, and supplies. The Corps would compete 

these contracts among potential vendors who had been prequalified on 

the basis of low unit prices for a typical scope of work. 

The Corps used a "prequalification" process for all interested contractors, a process outlined in the Department of Defenses Federal 

Acquisition Regulations, to obtain a list of those firms that exhibited the 

best capabilities and skills for the mission in Kuwait. Prequalifying the 

contractors let the Corps screen out firms that probably could not sue-
EMERGENCY RESPONSE PHASE: KERO ACTIVITIES 123 

cessfully complete a project in Kuwait, sparing those firms the large 

expense of preparing a proposal. 

When the first members of the Kuwait Emergency Recover)' Office 

went to Dhahran in early february, contracting specialists in Winchester 

believed they wou ld have over 60 days to award contracts for emergency 

work in Kuwait. In mid-February, they initiated the normal steps for 

awarding competitive contracts by publishing three notices in the 

Commerce Business Daily, the normal government vehicle for informing 

industry of available contracts. The notices invited firms or joint ventures that wanted to prequalify for future contracts to submit what were 

called expressions of interest. The announcements, one for construction 

contracts, one for architect-engineering contracts, and one for supplies 

and services, were to be open for 30 days. 

The announcements described the general scope and approximate 

cost of the contracts as well as the evaluation factors to be used in the 

prequalification process. Firms were asked to complete and submit a 

specific form by the closing date of the Commerce Business Daily 

announcement. The announcement sparked the interest of thousands of 

design, construction, and supply firms around the world. Contracting 

specialists in Winchester quickly excluded hundreds of finns that had no 

experience working overseas and rated the remaining l86 firms. The 

Corps planned to use the responses in conjunction with the bidders list 

that the Middle East/Africa Projects Office had established to develop its 

prequahfied list. 

Each firm's submittal was evaluated indepenclemly by three engineering and construction specialists. Contracting specialists at the 

Middle East/Africa Projects Office averaged the three scores and gave the 

averaged ratings to a prequalification board along with the firm's original 

submiual. The board, made up of representatives from various directorates and a lawyer, first heard a presentation on the location, sco pe, 

schedule, and cost of a potential project and then established minimum 

scores for specific rated factors. The board then examined each firm to 

determine if it met Lhe established criteria for prequalification and sent 

requests for proposals to the firms that met the minimum criteria.23 

On 17 February, while the announcements were still on the street, 

Ambassador Gnehm arrived at the l<uwait Emergency Recovery Office 

headquarters in Dhahran to inform Locurcio and his staff that they had 

only 10 to 14 days to award all the contracts for the emergency work. 

The Corps would have to compress its original 60-day contracting 

process into less than two weeks, he explained, because the ground war 

was likely to begin sooner and be much shorter than originally thought. 

lt also appeared that the Corps members and other noncombatants 
124 AFI'ER DESERT STORM 

would be allowed into Kuwait City within days, rather than weeks, of the 

liberation. Gnehm emphasized that the United States would need to 

secure the peace in the region after it won the war by restoring Kuwaits 

infrastructure as rapidly as possible. 

The compressed schedul e forced contracLing specialists in 

Winchester to ignore the responses to the Commerce Business Daily 

announcemenl. Locurcios staff could not wait for them to receive and 

assemble the responses and transmit them to Saudi Arabia. They needeel to accclcraLe the award of contracts to the contractors in whom the 

Corps had a high degree of confidence and "vho could mobilize quickly. 

Locurcio and his contracting specialists decided to use a list of construction contractors that the Corps had compiled for Operations DESERT 

SIIICLD and DESERl STOR~I. plus a list of qualified companies that Kuwaiti 

officials and engineers requested. They would rely on firms all·ead)' operaLing in Saudi Arabia who had the required resources, capability, credit, 

experience, tenacit)', and integrity The Corps asked these firms to report 

on both their past experience and their currem capabilities (since many 

firms had moved their assets out of Saudi Arabia to safer areas). 

Because of the compressed schedule, Corps leadership concluded 

that they would have to use noncompetitive letter contracts instead of 

competitive, indefinite delivery type comracts. These leuer contracts 

became the foundation for the Corps' contracting strategy Locurcios 

comracling specialists requested authority to award up to eight letter 

contracts, citing Section 2304(c)(2), Title 10, United States Code, 

"Unusual and Compell ing Urgency," as the basis for limiting competition. While the request for Section 2304 authority worked its way up to 

Corps headquaners, the Kuwait Emergency Recovery Office proceeded 

with its prequalification process. On 18 February, the staff sent facsimile letters to over 100 major international construction firms that had 

either been prequalified for work for Operation DESERT SHIELD or that the 

Corps knew from experience to be qualified. They gave interested firms 

72 hours to respond. Although Locurcios staff semthe letter to only 100 

firms, it received more than 300 replies. tvluch LO their surprise, staff 

members even received proposals from bicycle companies and umbrella 

companies, as well as proposals for beach and playground equipmem, 

because some agencies passed the lcuer on to other firms regardless of 

their expertise. Only 85 of the responses, less than a third, came from 

what Locurcio and his starr considered to be qualified general construction firms.-H 

On 22 February, a combined Kuwaiti-Kuwait Emergency Recovery 

Office prequalification and selection board evaluated the proposals of 

each of the 85 firms and determined that 36 met the boards minimum 
EMERGENCY RESPONSE PHASE: KERO ACTIVITIES 125 

qualifications for building, paving, sanitation, and marine survey and 

dredging operations in Ku\vait. Another nine firms were qualified to perform electrical work. The Kuwait office then gave each of these prequalified l"irms just 48 hours lO submit by facsimi le more detailed data on 

their technical capabilities, specific mobilization plans, subcontracts, 

equipment, and general costs pursuant to a broad-based scope of work. 

Locurcio and his staff received the additional information from the 

contractors by 28 February, the day the ground war ended. Using that 

new informalion, they ranked the contractors on the basis of their estimated costs and ability LO meet the emergency needs in Kuwait. 

Although Corps officials had not yet received the required waiver 

for "other than ful.l and open competition," they decided to proceed 

with noncompetitive letter conuacts. or the funds provided in the initial $46.35 million foreign military sales case, the Corps had $22.5 

million available to spread among eight contracts. Pan of the money 

had been used to pay for a $5.7 million contract avvarclecl to Raytheon 

Services Co. of BurlingLOn, t-.11assachuseus, back in january, to provide 

a temporary air traffic control tower and lighting system for Kuwait 

International Airport. This contract was intended as an emergency 

measure if the original tower could not be repaired. Much of the 

remaining money had been set aside to cover the cost of mobilizing 

and deploying Corps members.25 

On 2 March, Locurcios senior staff and Kuwaiti officials held a final 

prequahlkation meeting to determine which contractors would receive 

letter contracts in the following areas: expedient building repairs in 

Sectors C, E, and G of Kuwait City; expedient building repairs in Sectors 

B, D. and F; expedient building repairs in Sector A; expedient survey and 

clearing of the Shuaiba port; road and runway repair throughout L<uwaiL; 

expedient electrical repair throughout Kuwait; expedient water and sanitary systems repairs throughout Kuwait; and expedient repairs Lo the 

Bayan Palace complex. 

Kuwaiti officials oversaw the contract award process through their 

representatives on the prequalification and selection board. The board, 

chaired by Locurcio, included three U.S. and two l<uwaiti representatives, giving the Corps the final say. 

The Kuwaitis vvanted Lo divide the work among the coalition partners, and as chairman of the selection board, Locurcio came under pressure to make sure that some of the initial contracts wem to contractors 

from other coalition countries. The two l<uwaiti representatives who saL 

on the board lobbied to award contracts to two Saudi Arabian firms. The 

board ultimately selected three American firms, two Saudi Arabian firms, 

one Kuwaiti firm, and one British firm. 
126 AFTER DESERT STORM 

On 3 March, just one day before the Kuwait Emergency Recovery 

Orfice moved into Kuwait, it awarded eight unpriced letter contracts 

totaling $22.5 million, using Section 2304 as juslification. Brown and 

Root International based in Houston, Texas, received a $3 million contract to repair public buildings in Sectors C, E, and G. Blount 

Construction International of Montgomery, Alabama, received a $3 million comract lO do expediem electrical repairs and a $3 million comract 

lO make temporary repairs to public buildings in Sectors B, D, and [: 

Ametican Dredging Company of Camden, New j ersey, received a 

$400,000 contract for expedient survey work at the Shuaiba porL. 

Khudair Group, a Saudi firm, signed a $1 million contract for repairs to 

the Bayan Palace complex, while another Saudi firm, AI-Harbi Trading&: 

Contracting Co., Ltd., signed a $4.5 million contract for expediem road 

and runway repairs. Mohammed A. Kharafi, a Kuwaiti firm, received a 

$5 million contract for emergency repairs to public buildings in Sector 

A, while Shand Construction Ltd., a British firm, received a $2.6 million 

contract to repair Kuwait$ sanitar)' and water systems. Corps orficials 

then asked each contractor to develop a mobilization plan specifically 

tailored to the scope of work and to place their best estimated price on 

the total mobilization plan.26 

The decision to use the "compelling urgency" justification would 

have a profound effect later on. It created an environment that was ripe 

for future audits. If a comract "vas advertised for fewer than 30 days, 

Congress considered it less than "full and open compelition," no matter 

how many firms were contacted. Contracts over $500,000 that had no 

evidence of competition required a formal audit by the Defense Contract 

Audit Agency, so that agency would have some oversight responsibility 

for the life o[ the contract. 

The Kuwait Emergency Recovery Orfice did not have a large enough 

pool of contractors in Saudi Arabia to provide the required price and 

technical competition. Also, since Locurcios contracting specialists did 

not know the extent of the damage in Kuwait, they could not develop a 

scope of work that adequately reflected conditions there. By contrast, 

during Operations DESERT St-IIELD and DESERT STORM, Corps contracting 

specialists knew that troops wanted certain supplies or projects and had 

a chance to discuss the requiremems with the users in advance. Thus, 

they were able to develop a scope of work that accurately renected the 

needs of the customer. ln Kuwait, they could only develop a very general scope of work such as "repair buildings in Sector A."27 

Corps representatives met with Commerce Department officials 

several times in mid-March to explain their contracting strategies and 

activities. They assured the Commerce Departmem that if they identi-
EMERGENCY RESPONSE PHASE: KERO ACTIVITIES 127 

fied additional requirements for engineering and design assistance 

beyond the 90-day emergency period, they would use the previously 

issued Commerce Business Daily announcements to select firms. lf they 

identified addilional requirements fo r construction comractors beyond 

the 90-day emergency period, they would issue a new announcement 

for each project.28 

Despite the Corps' assurances, the basic acquisition strategy did not 

change significantly after the initial contract awards. Although Corps 

officials always planned to increase the number of contractors in Kuwait 

by going back to the original Commerce Business Daily list, during the 

emergency response phase they found that the scope of the additional 

contract work was too small to justify the cost of mobilizing additional 

contractors. Also during those first months, given the urgency of the 

work, they never felt that they had enough Lime to go back to the list. 

Corps officials concluded that the most responsive thing to do was simply to mod ify the original contracts. The original scopes of work for each 

contract were extremely broad because Locurcio and his staff had no 

good information about the actual conditions in Kuwait. Also, a competitive business environment would not be truly reestablished in 

Kuwait until long after its liberation. Thus, even if the Corps had wanted to solicit competitive bids for new emergency response work, there 

were no viable contractors on site except the ones that originally accompanied Co rps members into Kuwait.29 The broad scopes of work allowed 

the Co rps to award additional work LO the same contractors through 

unpriced change orders or comract modifications. 

Contracting Activities 

Electricity 

The focus of the U.S. effort during the emergency response phase 

was on Kuwait$ essential services and structures. The key to this effort 

was restoring electrical power. Therefore, this became the Corps' highest 

priority. Before the invasion, Kuwait$ three operating power plants had 

over 7,000 megawatts of installed electrical generation capacity, even 

though l he peak prewar electrical generation requirement was only 

4,500 megawaus. Using an elaborate grid system, Kuwaiti officials had 

been able to route the power supply in any direction from one corner of 

the country to another. 

The chief of Locurcios electricity damage assessmem group, Kesh 

Vadlamani, and his staff found that the redundancy in the citys electrical 

system made the repair effort easier. It let the Corps and its contractors 
128 AFTER DESERT STORM 

Jim Wong; US. Army Corps of Engineer~ and Suhalla Mara!~ a 

Kuwaiti enginee~; inspect electrical damage at Ali Al-Salem. 

cannibalize one plam for the sake of another or completely bypass a particular plam and use its distribution system LO supply power to an electrical function elsewhere in the grid. Corps members could move a transformer from one damaged electrical substation to another and make the 

second substation functional. In several instances, they/bypassed a particular substation altogether, converting it to a switching station, and accomplished the povver transformation at a nearby substation.JO (Figure 1) 

Damage to overhead power lines was much greater than anticipated, 

and contractors had difficulty getting to repair sites because of large 

quamiti.es of unexploded ordnance on the ground. Although Corps personnel had been warned aboUL the hazards of booby traps and land 

mines, they were not prepared for the vast amount of ordnance that they 

encountered. Coalition forces had dropped a large quamity of cluster 

bombs around the high tension power lines and other work sites. lraqi 

forces had thought they 'vvould be safe from air auacks under these lines. 

but coalition planes bombed and strafed them, causing heavy damage. 

A large percentage of the bombs lodged without cletonati.ng in the 

soft, sanely desert terrain. Cluster bombs injured and killed a number of 

contractor personnel who inadvertently disturbed those sensitive muni-
EMERGENCY RESPONSE PHASE: KERD A CTIVITIES 

JABRIEH 

~---------------- ~c=> 

; 

D AL-JABER 

AIR BASE 

OVERHEAD POWER 

DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM 

SCHEDULED WORK - - - - - - - · 

PLAN: Not to scale 

FINTASO 

Figure 1- 0verhead Power Distribution System 

SHUAJBA 

POWER 

STATION 

\ 

129 

0 MINA ABDULLA 

\ 

tions while working or moving under power lines. For example, two 

linemen were injured when a bomb exploded while they were coiling up 

damaged cable.Jt 

The initial survey of damage to the transmission lines had been done 

with binoculars from the nearest roads, some distance away. When 

workers began actually walking mile after mile under the lines and 

inspecling them more closely, they found the damage greater than originally thought. The cables had been frayed or completely severed by bullets. Fonunately, most of the poles suspending the lines were intact, as 

were most of the towers. Replacing these custom-made towers would 

have taken months. 

Of the roughly 4,000 substations in Kuwait, more than 235 were 

seve rely damaged. The Kuwait Emergency Recovery Office and its con-
130 

\ 

.. I 

AFTER DESERT STORM 

Kuwaiti volunteer Eman Al-Ourba and Corps Capt. Bob Jrby 

assess damage to power lines. 

tractors identif'ied 29 key substations requiring immediate repair. They 

repaired them using parts cannibalized from other substations. By the 

end of 1991, the Corps and its contractors had repaired roughly 10,000 

kilometers of transmission lines and the most critical substations.32 

The Kuwait Emergency Recovery Office and its contractors also 

immediately began making emergency repairs to the least damaged 

power plants. The heroic acts of Kuwaiti o[[icials during the occupation 

simplified the repair effon s. The director of the Al-Zour plam remained 

on site throughout the occupation and end ured repeated beatings by the 

lraqi soldiers to save this 2,400-megawatt plant from destruction. 

The bravery of the director and chief engineer at the Doha East and 

West plants also saved that 2,400-megawau facility. Doha West had a 

master control center where the plants eight turbine/generator units 

were coordinated and balanced. The Kuwaiti officials were shrewd. They 

co1winced the Iraqis that the control room. was the key element in the 

operations of the plant so the Iraqis would focus their destruction on the 

comrol room and spare other more critical parts of the plant that would 

be more difficult to repair. They also secretly replaced canisters of hyd rogen with oxygen to keep the Iraqis from destroying the hydrogen 
EMERGENCY RESPONSE PHASE: KERO ACTIVITIES 131 

Ambassador Gnehm, left, with Kuwaiti oHicials at a press conference 

at the Doha power plant 

required to operate the generators. This switch also reduced the risk of 

an explosion. 

With these precautions, the plams remained ope rational until the 

vet')' end. A large clock on the wall in the control room at Doha West 

remained frozen at 4:30A.M. on 23 February, the exact moment when 

the Iraqis detonated explosives that turned the master control panel 

into a useless heap of mangled metal and wire. The Iraqis also damaged 

two turbines and a master pump house at the Doha East plant. 

However, all eight turbines at Doha West remained intact and essentially undamaged. 

The power plants staff managed to salvage a few control switches 

and other pans and later turned them over to engineers from British 

Electricity lnternational, the London-based firm that had operated the 

facility before the war under a 12-year contract with the Ministry of 

Electricity and Water. Working 18-hour clays, the British engineers 

painstakingly sorted through thousands of wires from the original control panel to isolate key control strands. The)' carefully threaded these 

key wires into a small, crude-looking box-a handmade control panel 

that would let operators manually synchronize the power generating 
132 AFrER DESERT STORM 

units. Normally, the eight generators were synchronized in the control 

panel before the power could come on line. Only two of the eight could 

be synchronized with the box, but that would provide enough power for 

Kuvvait.s population. 

While the British and Ku\ovaiti Learns struggled to repair the generator controls, the Kuwait Emergency Recovery Ofnces electrical team 

worked around-the-clock to repair the transmission lines and substations required to distribute the power once the generators came back on. 

The Ministry of Electricity conducted nightly meetings at its headquarters to coordinate these activities and prioritize the numerous requests 

for electrical service. At a meeting on 24 March, the Minister of 

Electricity gave the order to throw the power switch connecting the generaLOrs to the power grid. The order was transmillecl by radio to the 

Doha power plant. 

When the engineers at Doha turned on the synchronizer for the first 

time, the dials on the control panel jumped up and down at different 

speeds, indicating that 1 he generators were out of sync. Suddenly, as if 

on cue, the needles on each dial shifted into the same position, 3,000 

revolutions per minute. Expressions of relief and jO)' crept across the 

faces of many of the 20 or so anxious spectators. Others wiped tears from 

their eyes. With the repair of the panel and previous repairs to transmission lines, the plant sent the first power to the city. At precisely 8:20P.M. 

Locurcio and the others back at the tvlinistry of Electricity headquarters 

peered out the nimh-noor window to watch the waves of lights illuminate the city-a very emotional moment fo r many.33 

The Corps of Engineers and its contraclOr had helped restore the 

electrical power just 20 clays after they signed the initial contract for the 

repairs. By late March, the)' had restored enough capacity to produce 

over 150 megawatts. Residents began once again to leave their homes 

and move about freely after clark. Work continued on the rest of the electrical grid system. To many, restoration of electrical power marked the 

end of the "emergency" phase of the recovery operations)'~ 

Transportation 

The Corps' immediate goa l was to clear debris and make emergency repairs to major roads and highways south of' l<uwaiL City to 

expedite the 11ow of supplies from Saudi Arabia. (Figure 2) Setting priorities for clearing vehicles and bunkers from the highways was difficult because initially it was not obvious which roads needed to be 

cleared first. Corps contractors rebuilt 12 kilometers of the Nuwaisib 

Road from subgracle to a surface course of asphalt within 45 days. The 

road was open to returning citizens on 11 May 1991. Similar work was 
EMERGENCY RESPONSE PHASE: KERO AcTIVITIES 133 

MAIN ROADS 

PLAN: Not to scale 

Figure 2- Main Roads 

also completed on 30 kilometers of AI-Salmi Road, which led southwest to Saudi Arabia. 

On AI-Abdaly Road, a main route leading north from Kuwait City to 

Basrah in Iraq, Corps contractors removed 166 vehicles, repaired over 

170 craters, and removed roughly 600 bunkers that were blocking travel routes. In Al-Abdaly Roads Mutla Pass, known as the "Valley of 

Death," where Iraqi soldiers had tried to nee the coalition air assault, 

debris removal was particularly challenging because of the huge volume 

of unexploded ordnance and hundreds of damaged trucks, cars, and 

buses looted from the Kuwaitis. 

Paving these roads required some ingenuity. Corps contractors had 

to haul asphalt over 322 kilometers from Saudi Arabia. Despite the challenges, by late November 1991, contractors had repaired over 90 percent 
Iraqis used this roa~ heading north out of Kuwait toward Al-Abdal}l 

as an escape routei below, road repair south of Kuwait City. 
EMERGENCY RESPONSE PHASE: lfERO ACTIVITIES 135 

Contractors repair roads in Kuwait. 

of the bomb craters on Kuvvaits major roadways and had removed 

roughly 2,800 wrecked vehicles, 600 Jersey barriers, and 200 Iraqi 

defensive bunkers from over 200 kilometers of roadway. 

The Kuwaitis decided to handle repairs to the pons with their ovvn 

contractors, except for resLoring a ferry terminal and clearing the channel 

aL Sl1uaiba. A Corps contractor, American Dredging, used side scan sonar 

to locate sunken vessels in the channel. Much to the Corps' dismay, either 

Lhe comractor or its consultant misinterpreted the survey results and overlooked a tugboat, 38 meters long, at the bottom of the channel, wedged 

under the north pier- a major Lhreat to marine traffic. The port auLhority 

discovered the tug when it tried to berth a ship in the same slot. 

Fortunately, the ship was not damaged.3S The U.S. Navy agreed to clear all 

the mines from the channel Lo create a safe shipping lane. 

The Kuwait Emergency Recovery Office was also responsible for 

emergency repairs aL Kuwait International Airport, the main port of 

entry for KuwaiL's citizens and businesses. Its operaLions were essential 

to the recovery. The airports two main terminals had sustained m~jor 

artillery damage and arson. With help from a civi.l affairs officer with 

experience in civil airport operations, the office implemented a repair 

strategy aimed at restoring electricity so the airports radar and commu-
1:56 AFTER DESERT STORM 

nication systems could funclion. Corps contractors removed over 1,200 

obstacles from the runways and taxi\.vays; 36 major structures and fac ilities required damage assessment and repair. 

Before the liberation, the Corps had contracted with Raytheon to 

fabricate and test an emergency airport control tower in the United States 

and then ship it to Kuwait. Delivering the 14-story control tower, broken clown into shipping containers no taller than J 6 feet, proved particularly challenging. The containers were too large for 747s, so the company had to contract for military C-5 aircraft. 

When Corps personnel discovered that the airport was not as badly 

damaged as anticipated, they revised Raytheon's work order. The control 

tower was given to the Kuwait Air Force and installed at Ali Al-Salem Air 

Base, 30 tniles northwest of Kuwait City. The change in venue made the 

task of erecting the to•ver more difficult and added $600,000 to 

Raytheons $5.7 million contract. Locurcios staff oversaw the emergency 

repairs to the central tower and receplion area in the main terminal so 

passenger traffic could resume. Emergency repairs proceeded so smoothly that on l May the Kuwaiti government reopened the air lanes during 

daylight hours.36 

Water/Sanitation 

In acldilion to the transportation infrastrucLUre, Kuwaits water and 

sanitation systems required immediate repair. The Kuwaitis had given 

the Corps a preliminary list of the water mains they knew were broken 

during the occupation so the Kuwait Emergency Recovery Office could 

begin planning for tbe repairs. (Figure 3) 

The sanitary and water damage assessmenL group headed by Mar)' 

'vVeber, a young environmental engineer from Corps headquarters, coordinated closel)' with Kuwaits 1vlinistry of Electricity and Water for water 

S)'Stem repairs and the Ministry of Public Works ror sanitar)' system 

issues. Upon arrival. Weber and her staff quickly had to familiarize 

themselves with two emire systems. The Iraqis had stolen or destro)'ecl 

all of the drawings for the S)'Stems, so the group had to rely on Kuwaiti 

volunteers ramiliar vvith the systems. For example, the chief of Kuwaits 

sanitary system contributed his expenise. With the help of the volunteers, \vVeber's group pieced together information from various sources 

and then repaired the damaged pipes. ln some instances breaks in the 

water mains were detected b)' observation from helicopters. Major 

breaks often produced noticeable wet areas in the desert. The Kuwait 

Emergency Recover)' Office then sent repair crews to those sites. 

The situation Weber found did not always correspond to her expectations. For example, wartime media reports had claimed that the lraqis 
EMERGENCY RESPONSE PHASE: KERO ACTIVITIES 

0 MUTLALOW 

RESERVOIR 

J.. JAHRA 

U PUMP STATION 

WATER SYSTEM 

GRAVITY LINE • • - - - • -

PLAN: Not to scnlo 

137 

MESILLA 

PUMP STATION 

0 

~ AL-ZOUR 

PUMP STATION 

~ AL-ZOUR 

POWER STATION 

Figure 3- Water System 

had stolen all the manhole covers in the city. Upon her arrival, Weber 

quickly discovered that the reports were false and canceled the order for 

over 1,200 manhole covers. 

Two of l<uwait:S main water pumping stations were Oooded. Corps 

contractors pumped the water out of one station, dried the pump 

motors, and put the station back in operation. As with the power plants, 

the Iraqis had destroyed the electronic control systems, so the pumping 

stations had to be operated manually. Kuvvait had 2 billion gallons of 

storage capacity in water towers and reservoirs. Fortunately most of this 

storage system escaped damage. 

Six emergenC)' crews from the Corps office repaired major pipeline 

breaks throughout the city. Shand had the contract to repair the water 

system. With over 40 breaks to be repaired, water rationing continued in 

the early days. Fortunate!)', as with the electrical system, the water sys-
138 AFTER DESERT STORM 

DATA MONITORING 

, , , , f7;5~R , , ~. ------ '10..2..9610 17.5M M2 0 ------ ---------- -.. , 12 • AROIYA 

TREATMENT 1------------. PLANT 

SANITARY SYSTEM 

Q PRIMARY PUMP STATION 

0 SECONDARY PUMP STATION 

0 SCREW LIFT STATION 

TERTIARY WATER 

PLAN: Not to scale 

RIKKA TREATMENT 

PLANT 

65KM3/0AY 

Figure 4- Sanitary System 

tcm had much redundancy. The Kuwaitis could send water anywhere in 

the city through many clifferem pumping stations by simply opening and 

closing a series of valves. This made the resLOration easier because the 

Kuwaiti government and the damage assessmem group could direct the 

water through one line at a time rather than having lO rebuild all the 

pumping stations before distributing any water, which would have taken 

more than six months. The)' could establish priorities and funnel the 

water to the most heavily populated areas first.37 

After officials began pumping water through the network on 20 

Apri l, the damage assessment teams identified additional leaks. By 

ea rly May, they had complctccl 26 assessments tota ling $1 million, 

repaired six major breaks in the Al-Zour to Mina Abdulla pipeline, 

and converted three brackish water lines to fresh water lines to double the flow to the West Finatees reservoir, which provided most of 

the water to the residential and main business districts. Daily water 

service resumed in early june 1991, and on 31 july the Ministry of 

Electricity and Water assumed responsibility for all water production, 

storage, and distribution. 38 
EMERGENCY RESPONSE PHASE: KERO ACTIVITIES 139 

Kuwait's sanitation system consisted of 4,700 kilometers of gravity 

sewers, 160 kil ometers of pressurized water mains, 17 major and 57 

secondary pumping stations, and l46 odor control stations. (figure 4) 

Kuwait had three very modern treatment plants. When the Iraqis invaded, the Kuwaitis began systematically shutting down the entire system. 

They knew the lraqis would not be able to operate the system, and without constant supervision and maintenance the whole system would have 

been destroyed. 

Shuuing down the system proved to be a smart decision. By doing 

so, the Kuwaitis ultimately saved themselves some expensive repairs. But 

after siuing idle for seven months, the electrical and mechanical systems 

required major repair. While the system was shut clown, raw sewage 

poured directly into the Gulf, bypassing all pumping stations and treatment plants. 

Also, the Iraqis had extensively vandalized the treatment plants and 

destroyed their electrical panels. At the Rikka treatment plant, for example, Iraqi troops had ripped all fixtures from the bathrooms and used the 

rooms for cooking, eating, and sleeping. They stole all the laboratory 

equipment and air conditioners andlcft large piles of trash. The facilities 

had to be cleared and cleaned before the teams could even begin assessing the damage. 

The pumps and control valves in the sanitary system could not operme without electricity. Corps members could not test the system until the 

112 pumping stations had power. They used some mobile generators to 

test individual pumps, but they could not check the whole system unless 

they brought in a generator for each station.39 

The Corps' role in repairing the sanitation system was limited. It prepared 24 damage survey reports on 77 sanitary facilities as well as a comprehensive assessment of the sanitary system. The Kuwait Emergency 

Recovery Office provided government officials with technical support 

and helped them purchase equipment. After that, its contracLOr, Shand, 

repaired six major pipeline breaks. Repair of each break in the huge, 

ducti le iron pipe, 1,200 millimeters in diameter, took the contractor 

three days. The remaining repairs were turned over to the Ministry of 

Public 'vVorks. 

The Kuwaiti governmem ultimately awarded a two-year contract to 

Operations Management International Corporation from l(ingwood, 

Texas, to repair and maintain the entire sanitat")' system, including repair 

of the treatment plants, pumping stations, and sewer lines.-10 Before the 

invasion, there had been about thirty pipe Oushing crews who regularly 

vacuumed out the sewers. By the end of the occupation, the sewer system could have easily kept l 00 crews busy. The backup was so severe 
140 AFTER DESERT STORM 

that raw sewage popped the manhole covers and poured across the 

lawns of l<uwait's residents. 

The sanitary and water damage assessment group had only one crew 

initial!)'· Early each morning the crew chief received his assignment for 

the day and wem to the specified location. When residents heard that he 

was operating in the area, they brought him drinks and candy bars and 

encouraged him to bring his crew to their neighborhood next. Each day, 

at the end of his L2-hour shift, the crew chief returned to the office with 

a large supply of treats, much to his supervisor's surprise. 

The repair work sometimes brought danger rather than rewards. 

When one crew removed a manhole cover to clean the debris, the startled 

\.vorkers discovered a group of lraqi soldiers hiding below. After some initial resistance, the soldiers were arrested. Although Operations 

Management International implemented safet)' precautions, three of its 

workers became trapped below a grating while repairing a sewer line. The 

workers were overcome by hydrogen sulfide and drowned in the sewage.41 

Governme11t and Public Buildings 

The Corps' mission also incl uded emergency repair of public and government or state buildings. Almost all of the buildings had been looted and 

vandalized, and some had sustained minor fire damage. Often they were 

littered with unexploded ordnance and stockpiled Iraqi munitions. 

The emergency restoration of government and public buildings 

became the largest effort of the Kuwait Emergency Recovery Office and 

its contractors. Initially, Kuwaiti officials had identified more than 700 

damaged public buildings and established priorities for their repair. The 

Kuwait Emergency Recovery Office hired three contractors for building 

repair (Brown and Root, Kharafi, and Blount) and divided the cit)' into 

Sectors A th rough G. The repairs would stretch well beyond the initial 

90-day emergency period. 

Public service suppon buildings damaged during the lraqi occupation included hospitals; food distribution centers; fire and security, communication, and transponalion faci lities; and schools. Damaged state 

buildings included the Bayan Conference Center, the National Assembly 

building, and most ministry headquarters. 

With the Seif Palace badly damaged, Kuwaiti officials decided to use 

the vacant Sayan Conference Center as a temporary residence for the 

rulers and seat of government. The sprawling Bayan center, with its 

meeting rooms and dining area, had originally been built to hold the 

Islamic Conference in 1987. Later, the Emir had relocated to the Bayan 

Conference Center, and it was renamed the Bayan Palace. The term 

"palace" in Kuwait is used to describe any residence of a member of the 
EMERGENCY RESPONSE PHASE: KERO ACTIVITIES 141 

Damage to the conference center at the Bayan Palace 

royal family or the administrative offices for the Emir and the Crown 

Prince. The Ba)ran "palace" was really a complex of government offices. 

ll consisted of six clusters of three-building o!Tice and re..c;idential 

complexes. Each cluster bore the name of one of the islands off Kuwait$ 

coast and contained a number of separate suites-one for each head of 

state who came to the Islamic Conference. Bayan also included a security command building, an energy plant, and a conference center with a 

large auditorium. Thus, the 13ayan center was ideally suited for governn'lent operations. 

Hovvever, during the occupation, Iraqi soldiers had vandalized and 

looted the office and residential buildings in the complex and then 

sprayed the exteriors with artillery fire. They had set fire to the giant 

auditorium, nearly destroying iL 

The Kuwaiti government gave the Corps $1.5 million for repairs. 

Specifically, the Corps' task was to convert a building in the Bubiyan 

cluster into orfices and administrative areas for the Crown Prince and the 

Emir. The Kuwaitis also asked the Corps to fix up the rest of the building as a temporary residence for the rulers. Until these buildings were 

repaired, the Crnir and the Crown Prince had to stay at a wealthy Kuwaiti 

businessman$ home, which had no facilities for conducting government 
142 AFTER DESERT STORM 

business. The Corps awarded a fixed-price comractto Khudair to repair all 

three buildings in the Bubiyan cluster. In the first two weeks, Khudair convened two wings into office space, allowing government offices to begin 

operations. Nearly 400 workers installed fixtures, doors, and furniture salvaged from the most severely damaged buildings. They carefully cleaned 

and repaired the impressive ltalian marble Ooors and Moroccan tiles and 

patched and rehung the delicate silk brocade on the walls. 

The renovation attracted much media attention and sparked sharp Ciiticism, especially when Corps members were observed installing gold-plated bathroom flxlUres and doorknobs. The opulence of the restored palace 

was presented in sharp contrast to the hardship of most Kuwaiti citizens 

three weeks after the liberation. Responding to media criticism, Corps officials insisted that they were putting no more emphasis on the palace than 

on their other missions in Kuwail. The marble and wood-paneled offices 

and apartments being renovated, they added, had actuall y been constructed long before the invasion and were appropriate for a head of slate and his 

cabinel. Moreover, the work was pan of a larger emergency repair effort. 

The Corps made basic repairs and had nothing to do with "gold-plated fixtures," except those salvaged from other buildings.42 There had been a similar uproar in 1977 when the Corps had purchased furniture, china, and silver for the Saudi Naval Expansion Program. Although no U.S. funds were 

spent, there was heavy criticism in the media and in the U.S. House of 

Representalives. Many of the luxurious furnishings that the Saudis bought 

were intended for special occasions and celebrations.43 

The Corps and its contractor finished renovating the Bubiyan complex and the energy plam in just 30 clays. They later began repairing the 

Warbah complex and the security building for an additional $2 million. 

The National Assembly or Parliament building, a facility equivalent to 

the U.S. Capitol, had been completely gutted by fire and artillery and tank 

rounds. The large assembly hall suffered the greatest damage. The Corps 

and its contractor, Kharafi, performed the reconstruction work. 

Transatlantic Division awarded a contract for the reconstruction work to 

l<harafi on 4 july 1991 with an original completion date of 29 April1992. 

Corps contractors also repaired the heavily damaged Ministry of 

Planning headquarters. Projects critical to the return of law and order 

included the Police Special Forces Camp, the Police Academy, and the 

National Guard complex. Repairs to each of these facilities involved 

extensive architectural and electrical work and the installation of new 

mechanical systems. 

The Kuwait Emergency Recovery Office also undertook a program to 

remove debris, clean structures, and install new mechanical systems in 

roughly 8 hospitals and 49 medical clinics. By early May, the Kuwait 
EMERGENCY RESPONSE PHASE: KERO ACTIVITIES 143 

office bad completed nearly 200 damage assessments and conducted 

emergency repairs to 22 government faciliLies.44 

Finally, the Ku .. vait Emergency Recovery Office was responsible for 

damage assessment and expedient repair to Defense and National Guard 

facilities including six major staff-headquarters office complexes, one 

hospital, two air bases, three brigade-size camps, one air defense camp, 

one engineering depanment office building, one supply and storage 

camp, one navy base, two National Guard training camps, a National 

Guard headquarters buil ding, and severall<uwaiti Coast Guard faci lities. 

By early May it had completed damage surveys on Ras AI-Qalayah Navy 

Base, Ali Al-Salem Air Base, Ahmed Al-jaber Air Base, three brigade 

camps, and 40 other facilities.-15 

Problems for Contractors 

Corps contractors encountered serious problems. Initially, they had 

difriculty mobilizing because the Kuwaiti and Saudi Arabian governments changed the procedures for crossing their common border. In late 

january 1991, U.S. officials infonnec\ the Kuwaitis that access for contractors was a critical issue but failed to address any specific measures. 

When the Corps' Kuwait office awarded the emergency repair contracts 

on 3 March 1991, it gave each contractor a paper that listed a point of 

contact with the Kuwaiti government and explained the procedure for 

mobilizing their workers and equipment in Kuwait. 

Under this procedure, contractors provided a list of names and 

copies of work permits directly to a representalive from Kuwait$ 

Ministry of lmerior, Abdul Aziz AI Kulaz, at the Oberoi Hotel in 

Dammam. Kuwaili orficials approved the list by attaching a signature 

document. Upon receipt of the approved list, the contractor took the signature document to the AI Gosaibi Hotel in Khobar to obtain another 

Kuwaiti officials signature. Next, the contractor had to obtain a signature 

from a Saudi official in Dammam, but this official was available for only 

a few hours each clay. After secUting all three signatures, the contractor 

presented the document to the border officials in KhaQi to secure passage into Kuwait. 

Throughout March, government ofncials repeatedly modified the 

procedures, further hampering the contractors' efforts to mobilize. On 9 

March, a Brown and RoOL representative complained that officials had 

changed the procedures and the signature document so comractors had 

to redo all the paperwork. A rew clays later, officials again revised the 

procedures to require additional copies or documents with original pho-
144 AFTER DESERT SroRM 

tographs. This caused more delay. Lacking specific instructions, one contractor complained, "the process remains unsure." Corps officials warned 

that imprecise procedures for moving contractors and their equipment 

from Saudi Arabia to Kuwait would delay mobilizing contractors and 

might result in claims from the contractors. Yet, within 15 days, contractors overcame security problems at the Saudi border and mobilized 

roughly 900 workers in Kuwait.46 

To complicate mauers, businesses operating out of Saudi Arabia 

could not get multiple entry visas, which would allow them to travel in 

and out of Kuwail freely as they did business. This was a special problem because of limited housing and transportation in Kuwait. Most 

hotels were uninhabitable. Supervisors, who no doubt were accustomed 

to more comfortable accommodations, sometimes ended up sleeping on 

the noor in power stations. Blount later transformed several abandoned 

buildings into a work camp and mess hall where the company$ nearly 

400-person team could cat, sleep, and rest.47 

Contractors also had difficulty getting their machinery and equipment into Kuwait. Sea access was limited because the Iraqis had mined 

Kuwait's ports. Commercial airlift was impossible because initially air 

traffic was limited to military and tactical requirements. The only feasible access was by land through Saudi Arabia, but all ground traffic in 

and out of Kuwait traveled on the same north-south, two-lane road. 

Convoys of heavy equipment loaded on trailers moved slowly. ln addition , for 8.5 kilometers north of the Saudi border, all traffi c was restricteel to the west lane and had to snake around torn up sections of the 

road. Traffic boulenecks at the Saucli-Kuwaiti border slowed the shipment of building materials. Once in Kuwait City, contractor convoys 

cncoumered huge traffic jams because the traffic lights did not work. 

The obstacles to moving equipment had a particularly great impact on 

the ability of the Corps' electrical repair contractor to restore critical 

overhead electrical lines and towers. 

Corps contractors and other U.S. businesses operating in Kuwait 

faced other significant challenges as well. Communications with U.S. 

hcadquaners or with suppliers in the Middle East during the first three 

weeks was nearly nonexistenL. There was no electrical povver except that 

provided by portable generators and no operable local telephone system. 

In early March, AT&T set up an earth station satellite and established 

120 lines for free public use at the request of the Ministry of Public 

Service, but the waiting lines were long. This was not suitable for business communication, so contractors had to rely on cellular telephones in 

vehicles and individual satellite telephones. Blount purchased a car 

equipped with a cellular telephone, but supervisors had to drive within 
EMERGENCY RESPONSE PHASE: KERO ACTIVITIES 145 

30 miles of the Saudi border to communicate with their office in the 

States or their local suppliers. ContracLOrs had no mail service.48 

Despite the thousands of hours that companies and individuals 

spent pursuing business opportunities in Kuwait, most found information to be scarce and job opportunities limited. The Kuwaitis channeled 

most 'vvork through the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers or through a 

handful of large corporations that had long-standing ties in the Gulf. 

Even companies experienced in doing business in Kuwait found that 

they could easily spend large sums of money to develop proposals and 

end up without contracts.<~9 The Kuwaitis might require companies to 

expend some effort with no guarantee of reimbursement.50 

Funding Authorities 

As the Corps began emergency response work, it relied on its initial 

foreign military sales funding authority under the terms of a 19 February 

199 L memorandum of understanding bet ween the U .$. and Kuwaiti governments. On 21 February, after determining that the original $46.35 million foreign military sales agreement would be inadequate to complete the 

emergency recovery cffon, Kuwaiti officials requested permission to send 

an acldilional $53.65 million to the Department of Defense for use by the 

Corps under an expanded foreign military sales case. They added Kuwaits 

Ministry of Defence to the list of ministries receiving support. 

The Army General Counsel, however, determined that although the 

Corps had initially used foreign military sales funds to expedite the initial 

recovery work, at this point, Section 607 A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 

1961 (Public Law 87-195, as amended) was a more appropriate funding 

mechanism because the work requested was for civil reconstrucLion not 

military security. By 25 February, Kuwaiti officials had already asked the 

Corps to expand its letter contracts by $53.65 million. 51 

General Hatch argued that the current foreign military sales agreement did not provide enough funding to restore the countrys electtical 

distribution system, and without electricity the rest of the recovery program would be "severely crippled." If the Corps did not rapidly restore 

the electrical power grid and other essential infrastntcture, Hatch 

warned, "we shall appear to have visibly failed in our mission, with 

attendant embarrassment of the U.S. Government." Funding for the foreign military sales case was nearly exhausted, he added, and unless the 

U.S. government agreed to the Kuwaiti request for additional assistance 

through Section 607 A, the Corps would have no legal aULhority to perform additional work.52 
146 AFTER DESERT STORM 

The 607 A procedures required that the United States and Kuwait 

first negotiate a leuer of exchange specify ing the scope and nature of the 

work and the financial reimbursement procedures. The imponant letter 

of exchange wou ld serve as the implementing agreemem for Section 

607 A. Defense officials developed a detailed 10-page legal document for 

coordination with the State Depanmenl. Recognizing that the $46.35 

million was nearly gone and vvork would soon come to a halt, General 

Kelly asked David Addington in the Pentagon to help expedite the 

approval. When Addington read the draft agreement, however, he decided to change the wording, much to Kelly$ dismay. The revised agreement 

would have to go through the whole review and approval process again. 

The State Department objected to some of the new language. Despite the 

urgent need for a completed agreement so operations could continue in 

Kuvvait, the two agencies haggled over the wording for three weeks 

before approving the document. 

During negotiations with Colonel Locurcio, Dr. Shaheen requested 

changes in some of the wording. Specifically, Dr. Shaheen objected to the 

clause giving preference to U.S. contractors. Rather, he wanted Kuwaiti 

Finns to have preference. Locurcio, however, recognizing that Congress 

and the Depanment of Defense would never agree to this, held fi rm. 

Dr. Shaheen also objected to the clause stipulating the use of U.S. 

law for all contracts. He preferred to use Kuwaiti laws and procedures. 

Locurcio explained to him that the Corps had to abide by U.S. law and 

contracting procedures. Locurcio added that he could not write a 

Ku•vaiti contract because he did not have enough expertise in their legal 

system. The two men ultimately agreed that if the Kuwaiti government 

asked the Corps to prepare and award a contract, the Corps would use 

U.S. law. lf Kuwaiti officials prepared and awarded a comract with the 

Corps' assistance, they could use Kuwaiti laws and procedures and 

would serve as the contracting officer. Finally, Dr. Shaheen wanted his 

government to have the authority to select the contractors. Locurcio convinced him that if the Kuwaiti government wanted the United States to 

be its contracting officer and use U.S. law and contracting procedures, 

the Corps would have to make the selection.53 

On 4 April, General Kell y and Colonel Locurcio discussed the draft 

leuer of exchange with Dr. Shaheen. Over the next 24 hours, they negotiated to get Kuwaiti acceptance of the Defense Depanmem and State 

Department revisions. The draft allowed Kuwait Lo let its own contracts 

in addition to those being performed under Lhe letter of exchange. The 

negotiators now added a sentence specifying that contracts let by the 

Kuwaiti government would be governed by Kuwaiti law. Any comracts 

let by the United StaLes would be governed by U.S. law. 
EMERGENCY RESPONSE PHASE: KERO ACTIVITIES 147 

The draft lwer of exchange required the Defense Department to 

report to the Kuwaiti government on the "resulting costs" of the supplies 

and equipment it procured for its administrative functions. Negotiators 

now replaced the words "resulting costs" with "estimated costs" to give 

the Defense Department greater nexibil ity in reponing its administrative 

expenses. 

General Kelly and Dr. Shaheen signed the final agreement on 5 April. 

The agreement served as the vehicle for all civil restoration assistance 

provided by the Defense Dcpanmem, including damage surveys and 

assessments; design and construction services; equipment , supplies, and 

materials procurement; ordering procedures; finance arrangements and 

financial management; and contracting and procuremem. Under the 

agreement, the contracting procedures would adhere to U.S. laws and 

follow standard Federal Acquisition Regulation procedures with which 

most firms had some familiarity. 5-t The agreement helped mark the move 

from the emergency response phase to the recovery phase. 

The Corps' nexible organization in Kuwait and its emergency contracting strategy both proved to be well suited to the pressing requirements in Kuwait. The Corps and its comractors restored pans of Kuwaits 

infrastructure in record time. Within the first 30 days, they restored 

power to Kuwait City, opened the airport to international traffic, and 

made the major roads functional. Soon after that, they brought the water 

S)'Stem into operation. 

Slowly Kuwait$ ministries began to let their own contracts directly. 

The Ministry of Electricity and Water gradually assumed responsibility 

for major repairs and rebuilding of electrical substations. The Ministry of 

Public \Norks assumed responsibility for final repairs to the Bayan 

Conference Center, the telecommunications tower, and Kuwait 

University. The minisuy also awarded its own contract for the interior 

design to refurbish the National Assembly building. The Ministry of 

lligher Education named jones Group Incorporated from Charlotte, 

North Carolina, as the construction manager on a $120 million project 

to restore technical training schools and facililies for the Public Authority 

of Applied Education and Training. The project involved renovation and 

some new construction of over 100 buildings on 17 campuses, plus 

some admi nistrative offices.s~ Although some of the Corps' emergency 

repair work extended into the summer months, through the dedication 

and hard work of Task Force Freedom and the Kuwait EmergenC)' 

Recovery Office, the designated 90-day emergency response phase effectively came to a close on 30 April 1991. 

Support to Explosive 

Orrlnance Disposal 

After the liberation, the U.S. Army provided valuable suppon to explosive ordnance disposal. Kuwait was liuered with mines, bombs, and bullets, creating major obstacles for farme rs and city dwellers. Throughout 

the city, tons of lraqi ammunition, hand grenades, rocket-propelled 

grenades, tank rounds, and monar shells sat in boxes or lay open along 

streets and highways. Scatte red throughout the countryside were lens of 

thousands of baseball-shaped cluster bombs dropped by allied forces. An 

estimated 5 million mines sat on top of the ground, three or four feet 

apart, for as far as one could see. Over time, blowing sand would conceal some of the mines, creating an even greater threat. I 

The effort to remove the mines and munitions was one of the 

most extensive ever undertaken. ll began soon after the I iberation of 

Kuwait when French, Canadian, British, and American divers headeel by the U.S. Navy swam Kuwait's two harbors looking for mines. 

They cleared the loading docks and channels so vessels could safely 

deliver their cargo. 

The U.S. Army conducted only limited mine-clearing operaLi ons, only those actions necessary to support current U.S. military 

aclions and protect the troops. Army officials maintained that the 

host nation was responsible for the extensive long-term clea rance 

operati ons. Army explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) units redeployed when the war ended, and ordnance specialists with Task 

Force Freedom left when the task force closed out. By contrast, a 

French explosive ordnance disposal company launched a highly visibl e effort to clear a popular beach recreation area as a favor to the 

Kuwaiti government. The British Roya l Ordnance Corps cleared the 

coast where the French left off and performed limited c learance e lsewhere in the city. Bangladeshi troops, whose equipmen t and techI John Arundel, "The Baulc to Make Kuwait Safe," Washington Post, 20 May 1991, 

Washington Business Section, p. 14. 
150 AFTER DESERT S TORM 

Unexploded ordnance could be found throughout the desert in Kuwait. 

niques were primitive by comparison, went door-to-door working 

west to east clearing the cit)'.2 

Kuwaiti officials indicated they would award their own contracts to 

clear the ordnance within Kuwait's borders. They decided to carve the 

country into six large sectors and divide the work among coalition 

forces, specifically Britain , Egypt, Bangladesh, Pakistan, the United 

States, and France. The countries approached the problem differently. 

Egypt, Bangladesh, and Pakistan used their engineer troops to clear ordnance. Britain used a British contractor who hired British soldiers to 

clear its sector. The Unit ed States and France planned to use contractors. 

The arrangements for ordnance disposal greatly affected the operations of the Kuwait Emergency Recovery Office. The staff and its contractors could not enter buildings to conduct damage assessments or make 

repairs until munitions and mines were cleared. Initially, a five-person 

Army explosive ordnance disposal team cleared the areas where the Corps' 

damage survey teams would be working. The Corps office had no contractor to perform this work. Kuwaiti officials feared that a Corps contractor would fail to coordinate closely with the contractor that they had hired 

21-.laj. Kirk ~1. Bergner, imerv br author. Kuwait Cit)', 12 Scp 1991, pp. 2-3, 11-12, 

15; Lt. Col. Gordon Quescnberr)'. Information Pnper, 9 Apr 1991, Kuwait 

Reconstruction: ~liscellnneous essages, #7, OACE Reference Files; memo, Bergner to 

Col. jesse Gmlin. 13 Oct 1991, Opcrauons-EOO, Geneml Correspondence: DRAO Files. 
French marines remove mines from a Kuwait City beachi below, French 

marines clear beach obstacles in Kuwait Ci(Yt March 1991. 
152 AFTER DESERT STORM 

to remove ordnance in the secLOr where the Corps was working. lf a Corps 

contractor and one of the Kuwaiti governments contractors were removing ordnance in the same area, the oiTicials feared they would have difficulty evaluating their contractor's perrormance. This situalion could also 

pose a safety risk. The best way to meet the needs of Locurcios staff 

seemed to be to use the Kuwaiti governments contractors who vvere 

responsible for specific geographic sectors. 

The Defense Reconstruction Assistance Office decided to request 

that the Kuwaiti government insen a contract clause requiring each contractor to coordinate with the Kuwait Emergency Recovery Office and 

respond quickly to clearance requests within their specific sectors. When 

delays in signing the explosive ordnance disposal contracts began to 

hamper the Corps' emergency work, Kelly directed the Kuwait 

Emergency Recovery Office to award small contracts to clear specific 

areas where its personnel and contractors were working.J Removing ordnance from the areas where the Corps and its contractors worked continued to be very challenging. 

A separate issue involved the United States' handling of ordnance 

removal in its geographic sector. General Kelly and Maj. Gen. Abdul Aziz 

AI-Sayegh, director of supply in the Ministry of Defence, who was responsible for ordnance clearing operations in Kuwait, met on 25 May to discuss 

ordnance removal in the U.S. sector, which included southwest Kuwait 

(minus the oil fields), Ali Al-Salem Air Base, Ahmed Al-jaber Air Base, and 

the Texaco oil fields (joint Saudi-Kuwaiti oil fields on the border). Even 

though the United States traditionally uses soldiers to clear mines, in this 

instance officials decided to use contractors. The soldiers who specialized 

in mine clearing had already redeployed. 

General AI-Sayegh indicated that the U.S. firm se lected for ordnance clearing would have 18 months to complete operations, with a 

3-momh grace period. After that time, the Kuwaili government would 

assess a penalty of $75,000 per clay. Many firms bid for the contract for 

the U.S. sector. 

In july, the Kuwaili government awarded a $134 million contract to 

Conventional Munitions Systems of Tampa, Florida, to clear the 1,200-

square-mile U.S. sector. The contractor cleared a third of the sector within a year. During 1992, it dismamlecl and filled 65,000 lraqi defensive 

earthworks, cleared almost 200,000 mines, and removed nearly 10,000 

tons of unexploded ordnance. 

3 Bergner inten•, pp.6-9; memo, Bergner for DRAO Director of Plans & Operations, 

Subj: Unexploded Ordnance, 8 May 1991, FMS MOD: DRAO Files; LL Col. Alben F. 

Kaminsk)', imen• b)' author, Kuwait Cil)'. 12 Sep 1991, p. 9. 
S UPPORT TO EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL 153 

By October 1991, the British and Egyptians were the furthest along 

in clearing their sectors. Contracts for the French and Pakistani areas had 

not yet been let. Limited clearance had been clone along selected sites at 

the 6th Brigade Camp, where U.S. fo rces were locatecL4 

Ordnance removal innicted a heavy price, both in dollars and in 

human lives. Over 100 people died in the cleanup operations, including 

two U.S. Army explosive ordnance disposal specialists. Despite the massive effort, operators found it impossible to detect all of the mines strewn 

in the sand. The mines and small bombs would conlinue to threaten the 

safety and well-being of Kmvait's residents, particularly the children . 

~Lt. Col. Alben F. Kaminsky, Memorandum For Record, 25 May 1991, er<~tions

EOD, Gcner<~l Correspondence: DRAO Files; "Kuwaiti Cleanup," 1\lli/itary Engineer, 

jan- Feb 1993, v. 85, no 554, p. 17; memo, Bergner to Gatlin, 13 Oct 1.991. 

Chapter 5 

RecDifBIY Phase: The Defense 

Reconsl:rut:tion Assistance 

0/lke and Kuwait 

Emergency Recovery 0/lice 

At Secretary Cheneys direction, the Defense Departments Kuwait effort 

moved from the emergency response phase to the recovery phase on 30 

April. Authority for that dfort transferred from the theater commander 

to the Secretary of the Army, the executive agent for the Secretary of 

Defense. Responsibility for the recovery shifted from Task Force 

Freedom to the Defense Reconstruction Assistance Office headed by the 

Secretary of Defenses representative, Maj. Gen. Patrickj. Kelly. Over the 

next eight months, the Kuwait Emergency Recovery Office and the 

Defense Reconstruction Assistance Office successfully completed the 

repair of Kuwait's civil infrastructure. 

The Defense Reconstruction Assistance Ofllce, a 48-person organization crafted by General Kelly, was almost equally split between soldiers 

and civilians. Kelly personall y interviewed and selected nearly all civilians on his staff to ensure that they could function well as part of a team. 

To ensure continuity, he required a 6- to 12-month commitment from 

his staff rather than the 90-day commitment that the Corps required. 

Much like a standard military organization, the office included branches 

for personnel, security and in telligence, plans and ope rat ions, logistics, 

and resource management to oversee and coordinate the Kuwait 

Emergency Recovery Offices program and contracts. Kell)' also absorbed 

the Kuwait Emergency Recovery Offices public affairs function and the 

remaining civil affairs effort. 

Kelly had tO satisfy Defense Depanmcnt, State Department, and 

Kuwaiti requirements to account for all expcndiwres. I I is experience 

with the Israeli air base work convinced him to have auditors on his 
156 AFrER DESERT 5 7VRM 

Colonel Locurcio with General KellYt August 1991 

team to ensure that the Army's execution of its contracts was above 

reproach. Assistant Secretary Livingstone concurred. She encouraged 

him to bring in representatives from the U.S. Army Audit Agency from 

the beginning to help develop the overall management plan and ultimately audit the activities. Livingstone did not warn to find the Army 

performing work without sufficient Kuwaiti deposits on hand or without 

the appropriate controls in place.l Integrating the auditors from the 

beginning helped Kelly avoid confusion and criticism later on. 

The Defense Reconstruction Assistance Office assumed responsibility for the Army civil affairs mission in Kuwait and retained a small 

civil affairs clement with 19 soldiers from the 352d Civil Affairs 

Command to provide expertise in public services, public assistance, 

and commerce. (Chart 6) lnitially, Kelly relied on Task Force Freedom 

for logistics and administrative support. Later, when the task force 

withdrew, Locurcio's office provided that suppon. As Kelly's staff grew, 

Locurcio's staff had to double the existing office space, office equipment, food service, apartments, and furniture to accommodate them. 

Kelly's staff moved into apartments in the Arab Fund building where 

most of the Corps personnel then lived. 
Chart 6- Defense Reconstruction Assistance OHice 

DRAO 

Executive 

Office 

I 

I I I I I I I 

Planning & Security& Resource PAO& Support 

I 

Counsel Mission Audit Operations Intelligence Management Relations Services 

I I 

Civil Support Group KERO Affairs 

Task Force (ARCENT/SUPCOM) 
158 AFTER DESERT STORM 

By 7 May, the number of people assigned to the Defense 

Reconstruction Assistance Orrice reached 272, including Kelly$ immediate staff, Kuwait Emergency Recovery Orfice personnel, civil affairs soldiers, an explosive ordnance disposal detachment, and military police 

personnel. The Corps of Engineers' element alone included 15 military, 

114 civilians, and 68 Kuwaiti civilian volunteers.2 

Kelly's stated goals were to centralize policies, budgeting, and 

procurement strategies at his headquarters, while leaving the actual 

execution to Locurcio's staff; to establish and maintain strong financial controls to ensure that the Arm)' complied with U.S. law and 

policies and the procedures agreed to in the letter of exchange; and 

to provide for sound management of the 607 A Foreign Assistance Act 

program. He also wanted to ensure that major decisions were coordinated with and approved by the appropriate Kuwaiti officials and 

he lp Kuwaiti ministries resume their management responsibilities as 

quickly as possible. 

Secretary Stone had directed Kelly to evaluate the possibi lity of a 

long-term role for the Corps in Kuwait. Kelly's inilial visit to Kuwait 

had convinced him that the damage was less extensive than Pentagon 

officials had anticipated. He found extensive damage from vandalism 

but, he concluded, not enough to qualify as "a disaster. " Kell)' reported to Secretary Stane that the repair work would take only 6 to 12 

months and that he would work himself out of a job as quickly as possible. Kelly did not believe the U.S. Army should have a long-term 

role in repairing Kuwait's civi l infrastructure. He recommended that 

the Corps complete the emergency repairs as quickly as possible and 

not involve itself in the long-term reconstruction phase, except for 

work supporting the Ministry of Defence. Secretary Stone concurred.3 

Command; Contra~ and Communications 

General Kelly requested succinct guidelines to define both his role 

and his relationship to the U.S. Ambassador. In response, Secretary 

Stone provided a "letter of instruction" outlining Kelly$ specific responsibilities and relationships with the theater commander, Ambassador 

Gnehm, the Army Secretariat, the Army Staff, and the parent headquarters of the units and personnel auached to the Defense Reconstruction 

Assistance Office. The instructions gave Kelly an independent mission 

and command in the field under the oversight of Assistant Secretary 

Livingstone.4 Kelly was to coordinate directly with Ambassador Gnehm 

and the CENTCOM commander. 
RECOVERY PHASE: DRAO AND KERO 159 

The scope and uniqueness of the Kuwait recovery operation sparked 

intense media interest Stone directed Livingstone to establish a procedure to keep senior Army and Defense Departmem officials well 

informed and ensure that Kellys organization complied with Army guidance. Livingstone, a forceful personality, required that Kelly and his staff 

provide what she described as a "fairly minute" level of detail. 

Livingstone wanted to maintain a single line of authority between Kellys 

office and the Secretary of the Army. Kelly reported to the Secretary of 

the Army through Livingstone. 

initially, communication with the Defense Reconstruction Assistance 

Office was difficult because fevv telephone lines worked in Kuvvait, but 

with the restoration of more normal communication services, Kelly and 

Livingstone spoke daily. Kelly often sought guidance from Livingstone 

and faxed draft memorandums for her review. "We kept a fairly tight 

oversight control on the process," Livingstone explained. She conceded 

that she and other Army officials placed many regulations on Kelly that 

were technically not required to "insure that our process ... would never 

be questioned, land was]totally full of imegrity. "5 Although Kelly appreciated being able to go directly to Livingstone or to General Mallory for 

quick decisions, he sometimes found the level of detail they required to 

be excessive.6 

Kellys relationship with Locurcios orfice was more complex and perhaps more sensitive. The Corps headquarters in Washington commanded the Kuwait Emergency Recovery OrTice through its Transatlantic 

Division. Kelly, however, had operational control over that office and 

served as its link to Assistant Secretary Livingstone. The Transatlantic 

Division provided administrative and contracting support to the Kuwait 

ofnce. It often communicated with that office direcLiy, without going 

through Livingstone. Although Kelly clearly controlled the Defense 

Departments reconsLruction effort, the division retained some autonomy 

For example, the Kuwait Emergency Recovery Office and the 

Transatlantic Division handled all of Kelly's contracting because he had 

no warram-the authority to sign contracts on behalf of the U.S. government. Also, the Transatlantic Division provided the funding mechanism and performed the official accounting and financial services for the 

Defense Reconstruction Assistance Office. 7 

Kelly explained to the Army Staff that he provided all programmmic 

guidance and direction to the recovery effort and insisted that the Corps 

office remain under his operational control to ensure that his guidance was 

convened into project execution. "In other words," he continued, "l have 

program responsibility while KERO [the Kuwait Emergency Recovery 

OfficeJ has the responsibility for project execution. " Kelly conceded that 
160 AFTER DESERT STORM 

the command channel for the Kuwait Emergency Recovery Office fiowed 

through the Transatlantic Division to Corps headquarters but insisted that 

he had a uni.que authori.ty and position. From his perspective, he \vas the 

person ultimately responsible for the success of the reconstruction mission-to include Kuwait Emergency Recovery Office activities.s 

Kelly and his staff assumed a larger role than some Corps officials 

had anticipated. Locurcio had thought that the Defense Reconstruction 

Assistance Office would [unction as a command and control and policy 

headquarters but leave the day-to-day planning and execution to his staff 

and the Transatlantic Division. Kelly, however, was a trained engineer 

officer with a broad range of experience in Corps districts, divisions, and 

headquarters. He was very fam iliar with the Corps' procedures and felt 

comfortable delving into the decisions and actions of the Kuwait 

Emergency Recovery Office. He soon involved himself in that offices 

programming and budgeting, even though the Transatlantic Division had 

previously performed these functions. He did this, he explained, because 

those activities involved coordination with the U.S. Embassy, the KLI\·vaili 

government, and Pentagon officials. He also wanted to free Locurcio 

from the burden of coordinating with the embassy and the Kuwaitis so 

he could concentrate on execution.9 This rationale had meril. Unlike 

most district engineers, Locurcio was deeply absorbed in the clay-to-day 

management of a single project-the l<uvvait recovery Kelly successfully 

freed him from some of the coordinating, reporting, media interactions, 

and other requirements to focus more on project execution. Yet, at times, 

friction developed between the two organizations as Kelly and his staff 

executed their oversight role. 

Financial Management/607 A Process 

The Defense Reconstruction Assistance Office assumed a major 

financial management role. It controlled its own overhead money and 

had approval authority over the Kuwait Emergency Recovery Office's 

expenses. The Kuwaiti funds deposited in the U.S. Treasury were allocated, in turn, to the Department of Defense, the Army Corps of 

Engineers, and the Transatlamic Division for Locurcios organization to 

execute in accordance with the previously approved program. The 

Transatlantic Division provided the overall accounting support for the 

entire Section 607 A Kuwait reconstruction assistance program. Although 

f<elly's staff monitored its own operating expenses as well as Kuwait 

Emergency Recovery Office costs, Locurcio's staff kept track of the actual costs of the projects. to 
RECOVERY PHASE: DRAO AND KERO 161 

One of Kelly$ major responsibilities was financial management of the 

program to repair the civil infrastructure under Section 607 A of the 

Foreign Assistance Act. The financial management sysLem was shaped, in 

large part, by the fact that the 607 A program required that the United 

States provide Kuwaiti officials with a detailed account of how i.L had spent 

their money. The letter of exchange, Lhe implementing agreemem for the 

607 A program, required the Kuwaiti government to fund all Defense 

Departmem assistance in advance, to include operating costs and contractual obligations. Because of the size and scope of the program and the high 

level of accountability required, Pentagon officials soon found that existing 

procedures for accounling and reimbursement were inadequate. 

As with the Israeli air base work, an effective information management system was critical. During that operation, the construction contracts required information systems that tracked the progress of the work 

and expenditures. The Corps initially relied on existing contractor systems until they proved inadequate. lL lacked realistic and usable managemenL data. II 

Developing an effective financial management process for the work 

in Kuwait presented challenges. The Defense Department had never 

managed such a large 607 A program. The Corps was the only Defense 

agency that had previous experience with a 607 A program, and the project that the Corps had executed undel· this program was small (under 

$100,000). The large, complex Kuwaiti program required a financial 

management process that satisfied both U.S. and Kuwaiti requirements 

for fiscal accountability.l2 (Chart 7) 

Before deploying, Kelly had met with representatives from the Office 

of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Financial Management and the 

Army Audit Agency. The Assistant Secretary's staff agreed to develop 

proper fiscal procedures. One experienced staff member, Russell C. 

Plaisance, continued to provide Kelly with financial policy guidance and 

eventually became his chief of resource management. 

The staff considered various t\rmy systems for tracking 607 A expenditures, including th.e Army Standard Finance System, but none encompassed project accounting, the most im.ponant aspect of the Defense 

Reconstruction Assistance Office~ effon. At the recommendation of the 

Assistam Secretary, that office turned to the Corps for finance and 

accounting suppon. 1L adopted the Corps of Engineers Management 

information System (COEM!S), a project-oriented accounting system 

that the Corps had developed for its civil and military construction programs, to track the obligation and expenditures of 607 A funds. Although 

the system met U.S. reporting requirements, it did not provide all the 

information that the Kuwaitis needed. Kelly$ and Locurcio's staffs had to 
162 AFTER DESERT STORM 

develop a manual process to maintain additional information that the 

cusLOmer required.l3 

Initially, the Ku•vait Emergency Recovery Office had manually maintained its financial records, but it became increasingly difficult to provide 

timely and accurate fund balances using this method. In August 1991. 

Kelly directed his auditors to help locurcio's staff develop an automated 

funds control system. Within weeks, the two offices had developed a 

computer program to track obligations and expenditures, along wi th a 

users manual. The Kuwait Emergency Recovery Office Funds Control 

System provided an autOmated way to periodically reconcile miscellaneous commitment documents, obligations, and disbursements with the 

official accounting records-the Corps of Engineers Management 

lnformation System.l4 

Army Audit Agency officials favored the use of project cost accounting 

for Defense Reconstruction Assistance Office activities. Project cost 

accounting, the auditors insisted, was the appropriate way to allocate all 

direct and indirect costs to specilk projects to provide full disclosure of the 

total coslS. This mechanism would enable Kelly to provide project cost 

estimates to the Kuwaitis and budget effectively for the direct and indirect 

costs of each project. Direct costs included payments to contractOrs or inhouse costs of providing services and materials. Indirect costs included the 

costs of administering and awarding contracts, movemem of personnel in 

and out of Kuwait and their support, and program oversight. 

Project cost accounting would also let Kelly's staff quick!>' identify 

problems and potential or actual cost overruns and better account to 

both governments for their expenditures. His staff would be able to produce accurate reports on the status of their programs. At Kelly's request, 

the Army auditors reviewed the Corps' cost accounting process and concluded that the Corps had sufficient internal controls to ensure that costs 

were charged to the proper projects.t5 

At the heart of the financial management system was the need to 

monitor the process fo r approving and fu nding projects under the 607 A 

program. Plaisance and the Transatlantic Division staff established procedures for transferring funds from the Kuwaiti government to the U.S. 

Treasury in accordance with the letter of exchange. 

The letter of exchange required the United States to operate on a 

quarterly budget and give the Kuwaitis a 90-clay obligation plan at least 

15 days in advance. The initial Kuwaiti deposits into the U.S. Treasury 

had to equal the Defense Department's estimated costs and financial 

obligations during the first 90 days. U.S. regulations required that the 

Corps have the money in hand before signing a contract. lt could not 

obligate the U.S. government beyond the funds available. Moreover, 
DRAO 

Review 

List Damage 

Survey Reports 

Ministry 

Priority 

Final 

List 

Work 

Agreement 

Amend 

Letter of Credit 

KERO 

Review 

Chart 7-607A Work Flow 
164 AFTER DESERT STORM 

Army officials refused Lo go into a 90-day program unless it was fully 

funded and they had access to the money. Subsequent deposits to the 

U.S. Treasury had to equal the Defense Departments anticipated costs 

and financial obligations during each successive 90-day period. Defense 

officials would withdraw funds as necessary to fund the authorized civil 

restoration activities. t6 

Locurcios staff developed a database with the status and budget of 

each projecl. It prepared a weekly report, and Locurcio met with Dr. 

Shaheen each Thursday. Dr. Shaheen presented the package to the council of ministers each Friday. The staff m.et with the commiuee (Ministers 

of Finance and Public Works, Dr. Shaheen, Bader Al-Qabandi, and 

Fatima Al-Sabah who represented the royal family). Under the 607 A 

process Locurcios staff developed and prioritized lists of projects for 

each ministry using damage survey reports. Staff members then discussed these priorities with the ministries and consolidated those final 

lists of projects into a work agreement-a formal agreement between the 

Ku·wait and U.S. governments that the U.S. government would perform 

certain work at an estimated cost. l7 

After Ambassador Gnehm approved the draft work agreement, the 

Ddense Reconstruction Assistance Office and Kuwaiti officials gave it 

final form. A policy commiuee headed by Dr. Shaheen with representatives from the Ministries of Public Works, Electricity and Water, and 

Finance approved the budget for the work agreement. The Kuwait 

Investment Office in London then made the money available through a 

letter of credit established at the Chemical Bank of New York. The 

Kuwaiti government transferred the funds electronically from the letter 

of credit to a nevvly established account in the U.S. Treasury called the 

Kuwaiti Civil Reconstruction Trust Fund. From there the money was 

transferred to the Department of Defense and through the Corps of 

Engineers to the Transatlantic Division. To avoid an unnecessary cash 

drain on the Kuwaitis, Kelly$ staff divided the first 90-clay program into 

three parts and planned to draw out the money in 30-day increments. 

Using information that Locurcio's staff had provided and program 

guidance from Kelly, the Transatlantic Division then prepared the work 

directives. These directives provided the internal allocation of the 

Kuwaiti funds to support the Corps' costs and contract actions. 

There were three separately funded work agreements under 607 A. 

ln April , Locurcio and Bader Al-Qabandi, representing the Kuwait 

Emergency Recovery Program, visited each minister to find out what 

work he needed. Locurcio used this information to develop a scope for 

the next quarter. Meanwhile, his stall consolidated the damage survey 

reports and coordinated with the Kuwaitis on priorities. Together with 
RECOVERY PHASE: DRAO AND KERO 165 

Dr. Shaheen, they outlined a $30 million, 30-day budget for April that 

became the Orst work agreement. On 26 April, the Kuwaiti government 

transferred the initial $30 million via the leuer of credit into the Treasury 

accounl. 13y that time, the Corps had committed almost all of the funds 

from the original $46.35 million foreign military sales case. The funding 

shortage was so severe that, for a brief time, the Corps had to stop giving its contractors work. When the l<uwaitis transmiLLed the first $30 

million installment, the money was quickly spent. IS 

In May, Locurcio again met with representatives from each ministry 

to determine their requirements. lie obtained from each a short list of 

priority projects that could be used as the basis for the next 607 A funding request. He took the resulting list to Kelly and Shaheen and then to 

the Ambassador for approval. Using the list, they developed a budget for 

May and June, the second work agreement. On 13 May 199 1, Dr. 

Shaheen approved the revised obligation plan for May and june, which 

required an additional $141.8 million. The Assistant Secretary of the 

Army for rinancial Management, Douglas A. Brook, asked the Kuwaiti 

government to deposit that amount immediately so Kelly's and Locurcios 

operations would not be disrupted. The letter of credit was subsequently increased b)' $141.8 million.19 

To complicate matters, the l<uwait Emergency Recovery Program 

had only been created for 90 days and its functions officially ended on 

26 May. The members returned to their ministries. Duringjune and july, 

the United States would have to transition from working with the l<uwait 

Emergency Recovery Program to dealing direclly with the individual 

l<uwaiti ministries. During the Kuwait EmergenC)' Recovery Program's 

short tenure, both project authorization and funding authority had been 

consolidated with the program's chairman, Dr. Shaheen. Project authorization authority would remain with Kuwait$ new Minister for Public 

Works, Abdulla AI-Qatami, but funding authority transferred to the 

Minisuy of Finance. 

ln late june, Dr. Shaheen prepared to take up a new position as 

Minister of Municipalities. He informed the Crown Prince that he would 

be lUrning over his responsibilities as the director of the Kuwait 

Emergency Recovery Program to AI-Qatami. The Crown Prince, however, recognized that the current system was operating smoothly and 

responsively, and his ministers were pleased with it. The Crown Prince 

did not want to upset the program by changing leadership. He directed 

Dr. Shaheen to cominue as the l<uwaiti governments point of comact for 

the Armys reconstruction effon. Kelly and Locurcio continued to meet 

with Dr. Shaheen each week, give him progress reports, and sometimes 

negotiate additional work agreements.20 
166 AFTER DESERT STORM 

Dr. Shaheen convinced the Minister of Finance not to change the 

existing funding procedures and processes. At Dr. Shaheen's request, in 

june Locurcios staff drafted the basic work agreements for the next l'..VO 

quarters, July-September and October- December. During a meeting on 

15 june, Dr. Shaheen, Kelly, and Locurcio finalized the cost estimate l'or 

the remainder of the 607 A program for inclusion in Kuwait's 1992 budget. Dr. Shaheen indicated that he wanted all the funds for the 607 A program obligated by 31 December 1991, including the cost of eventually 

closing the Defense Reconstruction Assistance Office. Kelly and Locurcio 

vvere to include enough funds in these obligation plans to cover any 

costs incurred after that date. Kuwaiti officials wanted to budget for the 

entire six-month period from july to December because they were in the 

midst of finali zing their budget ror the 1992 fiscal year, which would 

begin on 1 July, and they wanted to integrate the budget for the recovery operations into the national budget. 

Rather than develop another 90-day program, Kelly and Locurcio 

devised a six-month program ending 31 December 1991, with the 

understanding that the actual work wou ld extend to April 1992. The 

'tvlinister of Finance approved the $212 million budget that the Kuwait 

Emergency Recovery Office proposed. Kelly and Locurcio now knew the 

scope of work for the rest of the calendar year. On 26 july, the Kuwaiti 

government deposited $150.1 million for July-September plus $62.75 

rnillion for October-December program obligation and the Defense 

Reconstruction Assistance Office's close-out costs21 

Contracting Strategy 

The Defense Reconstruction Assistance Office also assumed a major 

role in shaping the basic contracting strategy for the civil infrastructure 

work. Locurcio:S staff, however, continued to develop the specific 

approaches for individual projects. ln developing these strategies, the 

staff considered several factors: opportunities !'or employing small businesses, potential for U.S. firms, possibilities for increasing competition, 

and schedule and technical constraints. Kelly reviewed these strategies, 

modified them as necessary, and submitted them to Assistant Secretaty 

LivingsLone. Only after both Kelly and Livingstone had approved the 

strategies could the Corps begin the work. 

ln evaluating the contracting and acquisition plans, Livingstone and 

her staff considered Congress' desire to provide opportunities for U.S. 

businesses, particularly small businesses. They also kept in mind the 

goal of developing joint ventures between U.S. and Kuwaiti businesses 
RECOVERY PHASE: DRAO AND JfERO 167 

"that would ensure a longer lasting business relationship, well past the 

era of reconstruction."22 

One key clement of the contracting snategy for civil infrastructure 

repair was using original contracts where possible, rather than awarding 

new ones, because of the urgency of the work. No one could accurately 

estimate the extent of the damage, so modifying the original contracts 

seemed to be the only quick way to meet the requirements. During the 

summer of 1991, the Corps assigned additional work to the original contractors through unpriced contract modifications. For example, it modified the original $2 million contract with Blount umil it reached approximate!)' $100 million. The initial foreign military sales contracts, in 

effect, became 607 A contracts. 

As the urgency diminished, the Transatlantic Division and the 

Kuwait Emergency Recovery Office awarded several contracts on a limited competitive basis. lt screened firms that had responded to the 

February Commerce BLtsiness Daily announcements to create a list of prequalified firms. Then Locurcio's staff asked those firms to submit proposals. lt had more time to solicit and evaluate those proposals. For 

example, the Corps awarded contracts on a competitive basis to prequalified firms for repairs to the 707 and 747 hangars and the flight crew 

training center at Kuwait International Airport, repair of the Failaka 

Island Ferry Terminal, and channel dredging.23 

The Corps, however, handled most new work by simply modifying 

existing contracts. By 20 November 1991, contract modifications 

brought the total amount obligated on those contracts to $2 11 million. 

Although the use of unpriced contract modifications allowed work to 

begin immediately, it also increased the need for effective internal controls. The Federal Acquisition Regulations required more adrninistrative 

controls over undefinitized contracts than over competitive contracts. 

During the ensuing months, auditors spent many hours ensuring that 

proper controls were in place. 

Another key element of the Defense Departments contracting strategy was to limit the duration of the contracts. The Pentagons and 

General l<ellys goal had always been to assist the Kmvaiti government for 

a fevv months and then leave. Pentagon officials worried that., in time, Lhc 

l<uwaitis would come to resent the presence of the U.S. military. 

As the government ministries resumed normal operations, Army 

leaders recognized that the Kuwaiti government was ready to minimize 

foreign involvement in its internal affairs and manage its own contracts. 

Livingstone made it clear that the Defense Department would not be 

involved in long-term contracts to repair Kuwait's civil infrastructure. As 

one member of her staff explained, "We did not want to have DRAO 
168 AFTER DESERT STORM 

[Defense Reconstruction Assistance Office] or any U.S. Army organization perceived to be staying beyond that absolute minimum time 

required to reestablish civilian control in Kuwait."24 

LivingsLOne and Kelly refused to let the Corps accept any civil 

•vork that extended beyond December 1991. By that time, Kelly predicted, most ministries would be fully operational with enough staff to 

handle the remaining recovery work, except for repairs at the National 

Assembly building, Kuwait International Airport, and Ministry of 

Planning heaclquarters.25 

The Army continued giving preference £O U.S. firms and worked to 

increase the involvement of small and small disadvantaged American 

businesses. The issue of using small and small disadvantaged businesses 

had nothing to do with the actual needs of the recovery program; it was 

rooted in politics. Media reports had fed expectations of lucrative contracts for American firms. As U.S. small businesses struggled to get a 

piece of the amicipated multibillion dollar rebuilding of Kuvvait, they 

became increasingly frustrated. Small businesses could not travel to 

Kuwait initially because the airpon was closed to civil air traffic. They 

could not get through to Kuwaiti representatives by telephone or often 

did not know whom to contact. Moreover, they often lacked the experience and resources to mobilize and operate efficiently overseas. Kuwaiti 

officials, in turn, were overwhelmed with the volume of requests for 

information about contracts. The senior vice presidem of one small 

Atlanta firm, joseph Middleton, articulated the frustration of many small 

businesses when he complained, "We're out in left field, we're on the 

sidelines and the game is moving on."26 

So great were the obstacles that unless the U.S. government paved 

the way, small businesses would not be able to participate in the Kuwait 

work. Small businesses turned to Congress and the Army for assistance. 

Congress pressured the Army and the Department of Commerce to do 

more to help U.S. businesses, particularly small and small disadvantaged 

businesses. In response, Livingstone directed Kelly to devise innovative 

ways to do this such as establishing small business subcontracting goals 

or setting aside specific work for small firms. Some of these mechanisms, 

however, were of questionable legality. Also, most small firms lacked the 

capabilily to mobilize quickly and handle the work.27 

The House Appropriations Committee directed the Secretary of the 

Army to make every effort to use-and encourage the Kuwaiti government to use-small and small disadvantaged businesses in any contracts 

or subcontracts awarded for the reconstruction of Kuwait$ infrastructure. Committee members noled lhal, at a minimum, the Army should 

provide such businesses with fair and equal access to information about 
RECOVERY PHASE: DRAO AND KERO 169 

any contracts or subcontracts that might be awarded and include them 

on the list of prequalified companies that the Corps provided to the 

Kuwaiti government.2S 

In early March, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for 

Installations, Housing, and Environment Michael W Owen testified 

before the House Subcommittee on Exports, Tax Policy, and Special 

Problems and the Senate Committee on Small Business about the Army!> 

efforts to promote small business interests. Owen explained that the 

emergency nature of the initial assistance funded by foreign military 

sales, the limited solicitation period because of the rapid collapse or Iraqi 

forces, and the difficulties of transporting supplies, equipment, and personnel to Southwest Asia had made incorporating small businesses more 

difficult. But, he assured the committees, the 607 A program would provide more opportunities for such businesses29 

Many in Congress were particularly alarmed by the small number of 

minority-owned businesses involved in the reconstruction of Kuwait, 

especially when minorities accounted fo r a significant pan of the U.S. 

forces in the Persian Gulf War. Representative Mervyn .M. Dymally 

(California), for example, asked the Secreta1y of the Army for specific 

information about involving minority-owned businesses. Representative 

Charles B. Rangel (New York) had heard that American firms had $500 

million in contracts for the reconstruction of Kuwait but none had gone 

to minority-owned firms. He asked Secretary Cheney to ensure that 

minority participation in the Persian Gulf was "not limited to their performance on the battlefield." Kelly, too, linked minority participation in 

the war to involvement in postwar reconstruction. Minorities made up 

17 percent of the U.S. armed forces, he insisted, and the same proportion of U.S. minority-owned businesses should have the opportunity to 

enjoy the fru its of victory)O 

Section 606 of the Persian Gull' Conflict Supplemental Authorization 

and Personnel Benefits Act of 1991 (PL 102-25), enacted on 6 April 

1991, staled that it was the "sense of Congress" that the Corps award contracts first to U.S. firms who used small and minority-owned businesses 

and were committed to employing U.S. workers, then to other U.S. firms, 

and finally to other coalition force members. It further stated that U.S. 

firms receiving contracts should employ U.S. citizens, give preference to 

veterans, and award subcontracts to small and minority-owned firms as 

much as possible. 

The legislation required the Army to provide Congress with a 

detailed report on the involvement of small and small disadvantaged 

businesses. The report would indicate the number of prime contracts 

and subcontracts awarded to firms by country and by the total dollar 
170 AFTER DESERT STORM 

value, the number and percentage of contracts awarded to small businesses and to small disadvantaged businesses compared to the total 

number of contracts awarded LO U.S. firms, and the number of subcontracts awarded to small businesses and to small disadvantaged businesses under each prime contract awarded to a U.S. firm.JL 

Meanwhile, Army leaders pressured General H<llch to encourage 

awards to small businesses as prime contractors. Because of the highlevel imerest in small business involvement, Deput)' Assistant Secretary 

o[ the Army for Procurement George Dausman wrote, "it is incumbent 

on us to record the effectiveness of our effons."32 tvleanwhile, Army oiTicials reminded Congress that the Corps had awarded only nine contracts 

totaling $28.2 million. Although no small or small disadvantaged U.S. 

businesses had received these contracts, they insisted that the Army was 

"aggressively encouraging" their panicipalion.>3 

ln line with this policy, the Corps modified the original letter contracts to include clauses encouraging the award of subcontracts to small 

and small disadvantaged business. When negotiating for supplemental 

agreements, change orders to existing comracts, or future contracts, the 

Corps vvould incorporate two clauses.J4 One clause required contractors 

to agree to encourage small and small disadvantaged business participation. The other required each contractor to submit a plan for subcontracting with small and small disadvantaged businesses. 

Since the original contracts did not require the use of small business 

subcontracts, the Corps could only encourage its contractors to do so. 

Large contractors, however, had difficulty subcomracting to small firms 

because few operated in the lidclle EasL. Moreover, some large firms 

lacked familiarity with the small business requirements.35 

Under Secretary of the Army john Shannon made the involvement 

of small and small disadvantaged businesses a high priority. Arter a visit 

to the Transatlantic Division on 7 May, however, Shannons special assistant William Takakoshi concluded that there was probably little opportunity to increase small and Slllall disadvantaged business opportunities 

with the original eight contractors.36 

Livingstone, too, recognized that the emergency phase provided few 

opportunities for small and small disadvantaged businesses, but she 

wanted to maximize those opportunities. She asked the director of the 

Office for Small and Disadvantaged Business Utilization for advice on 

how to increase small and small disadvantaged business participation. 

Meanwhile, she directed Kelly to expand competition in the long-term 

strategy for recovery projects. "We must take this opportunity to stan 

demonstrating our commitment to utilize small and small disadvantaged 

businesses in the restoration of Kuwait," she insisted.37 
RECOVERY PHASE: DRAO AND KERO 171 

First, the Army had to determine the legality of expanding opportunities for small businesses. The Transatlantic Divisions lawyers could 

find no statutory or regulatory requirement to implement any small and 

small disadvantaged business programs in contracts awarded overseas. 

Section l9(b) of the Federal Acquisition Regulations, "Small and Small 

Disadvantaged Business Concerns," specifically stated that small business and small disadvantaged business requirements applied only inside 

the United States, its territories and possessions, Puerto Rico, the Trust 

Territory of the Pacific Islands, and the District of Columbia. Therefore, 

the regulations did not apply to recovery contracts for Kuwait. 

In june, Kelly and Locurcio sent Livingstone their proposals for 

involving small businesses. One option for future contracts was to have 

the prospective contractors provide a small business plan that could be 

used as a selection criterion. Kelly suggested that Livingstone and her 

staff seek an exception to the Federal Acquisition Regulations allowing 

them Lo evaluate the small and small disadvantaged business plans of 

prospective contractors. Second, he recommended that the Corps develop a list of qualified small businesses that the U.S. Embassy could use to 

promote small business involvement in Kuwait. Finally, he recommended that Lhe Army set aside certain work !'or small and small disadvantaged businesses38 

At the time, the Army was limited to encouraging prime contractors 

already under contract to hire small businesses as subcontractors. For 

example, the Kuvvaiti firm restoring the National Assembly building, 

Kharafi, hired an American small business fi rm, American Catastrophics 

Environmental Services, for smoke damage restoration. Livingswne 

found the results of such negotiations "less than satisfactory."39 

Army leaders now determined that they had the authority to make a 

contractors plan for using small businesses a criterion in the formal evaluation process. The Army judge Advocate concluded that while this action 

was "unusual," nothing in the Federal Acquisition Regulations or relevant 

statutes prohibited il. He concluded that including small and smalJ disadvantaged business subcontracting plans as an evaluation fac ror did not 

require a formal deviation from the Federal Acquisition Regulations. 

However, he cautioned, an evaluation plan that puts an "unreasonable 

amount or weight" on small business subcontracting "could be challenged 

in a protest as arbitrary."40 In other words, the proposal vvas permissible if 

the Army did not give the factor too much weight. 

The Defense Reconstruction Assistance Office instituted a new procurement process by which the Corps would evaluate contract proposals on the basis or the contractor's small disadvantaged business plan as 

well as price and past performance. Next to price, the contractors plan 
172 AFTER DESERT STORM 

for using small and small disadvantaged businesses would be the second 

or third most important (actor. This process paid immediate dividends. 

For example, Morrison Shand Construction, Ltd. planned to subcontract 

nearly $2 million (25 percent) of its $7.8 million contract for the restoration of aircraft hangars and other facilities at Kuwait International 

Airport to small disadvantaged businesses.41 

In add ilion to requiring small business plans from prospective contractors, Army officials discussed setting aside specific work for small 

businesses. Army lawyers found this issue to be complex and controversial. Thomas A. Duckenfielcl Ill with the Army General Counsel 

observed that no statute prohibited the Army from implementing small 

business set-asides for Kuwait reconstruction projects. However, Section 

l9(b) of the Federal Acquisition Regulations specifically stated that the 

rules applied only in the United States and certain U.S. territories and 

possessions. Therefore, Duckenfielcl recommended that the Army obtain 

a deviation from that provision before implementing small business setasides. The deviation '"'ould protect the Army if a contractor protested 

that the Army violated its own regulations. Duckenfield recommended 

that the Army use subcontracting plans w promote small disadvantaged 

business participation instead of establishing set-asides. Othervvise, he 

warned, large corporations excluded from contracts would probably 

challenge the legality of the Army's set-aside p lan.42 j ames King, also 

with the Army General Counsel, warned that establishing such a program "raises uncomfortable constitutional questions that we would prefer not to address at this time. "43 

ln mid-july, the Transatlantic Division reponed that it planned to 

encourage its original comractors to use small businesses by requiring 

them lO submit a small business subcontract plan. The division commander, General Witherspoon, established a goal that, effective 20 j uly 1991, 

5 percent of the contract value of all future foreign military sales [as 

opposed to contracts under Section 607 A] contract awards and modifications go to small and small disadvantaged businesses. The division staff 

would include the small business source selection criteria and subcontract 

clauses discussed above in the foreign military sales solicitations and 

review their foreign military sales program to set aside work for small businesses. The division had already set aside an indefinite delivery architect-engineer contract for design work (estimated at $245,000), explosive 

ordnance removal work at Ali AI-Salem Air Base and Ahmed Al-Jaber Air 

Base (estimated at $1 million 1.0 $2 million for each base), and work at a 

fire station at Kuwait International Airport (estimated at $600,000).44 

Shortly after Witherspoon announced his plan, on 26 july, 

Livingstone d irected that 5 percent of the value of all contracts and mod-
RECOVERY PHASE: DRAO AND KERO 173 

ifications for Kuwait reconstruction be set aside for small businesses. 

Corps officials pleaded with Livingstone to drop her 5 percent goal and 

let them establish their own internal goal. "We will make every effort to 

auain our goal," one Corps official explained, "but the imposition of a 

goal by the ASA [Assistant Secretary of the Armyl could paint us into a 

corner from which it may be difficult to move."45 

In August, Kelly asked Corps headquarters for a list of small and 

small disadvantaged businesses that could perform specific work in 

Kuwait. He apparently planned to provide this list to Locurcios staff as a 

resource for future contract actions. The list would also go to current and 

future prime contractors to use as a source list of subcontractors and to 

Kuwaiti ofricials to give to their prime and small contractors for possible 

subcontracts and joint ventures. The Transatlantic Division sent a database containing the required information to both Kellys and Locurcio's 

staffs. At Kellys request, the Corps used the database to identify small 

disadvantaged businesses and compiled information evaluating the perfonnance of firms that had Army contracts. 

Corps leaders and members of the Army Staff, however, expressed 

concern about Kelly$ request for a list of small disadvantaged businesses who had been "proven performers" for specific types of work. 

Livingstone warned Kelly Lo handle the information with care and not 

use it to exclude any firm from consideration for a contract. Providing a 

list of small disadvantaged businesses for specific contract actions could 

be construed as creating a set-aside for such businesses, and the Army 

General Counsel had already cautioned against such set-asides. Army 

leaders had testified before Congress that firms responding to the 

Commerce Business Daily announcements would be given equal consideration. As one senior Corps official noted, the Army could not risk the 

appearance that it was using information about past performance to 

restrict competition .46 

Small Kuwaiti firms clamored for work much like their American counterparts. Kelly suggested to Dr. Shaheen that they set aside work for small 

American and Kuwaiti rirms. Al Kelly$ urging, Dr. Shaheen drafted a letter 

directing the Defense Reconstruction Assistance Office to establish a program that would result in the award of contracts to U.S. small disadvantaged businesses that had entered into joint ventures with Kuwaiti firms. 

"Competition," Dr. Shaheen explained, '\viii be limited to U.S. small disadvantaged businesses that you determine can satisfactorily perform in 

Kuwait, preferably firms already presem in Kuwait." Kuwaiti participation, 

he added, should total 50 percent of the value of these contracts:+? 

General Kelly and Dr. Shaheen developed a program to set aside 

work for American small disadvantaged businesses that had formed part-
174 AFTER DESERT STORM 

nerships (joint ventures) with small Kuwaiti firms. The Defense 

Reconstruction Assistance Office and Kuwait Emergency Recovery Office 

provided the U.S. firms >vvith lists of small Kuwaiti firms so they could 

l"ind partners and bid on the contracts competitively.4S 

As pan of the small and small disadvantaged business outreach program, on 24 OcLOber 1991, the Corps awarded a $731,704 contract to 

MME Contractors International of Mclean, Virginia, and Abdullah Al 

Naser General Trading of Kuwait City to repair and restore two fire stations at Kuwait International Airport Two days later, the Corps avvarded 

a $565,000 contract to American Techno Trade, Inc., of New York City 

and Fadden General Trading of Kuwait City to repair the main Coast 

Guard Station. lt awarded a $780,000 contract on 20 November 1991 to 

yet another small disadvantaged finn, BEC Construction/joim vemure, 

to repair and restore seven fire stations in Kuwait City. By September, out 

of the $180,517,620 total for contracts, small businesses accounted for 

$6,879,351 (3.81 percent) and small disadvantaged businesses accounteel for $1,898,100 (1.05 percent).-19 

ln October 1991, Livingstone reported more optimistically that the 

small business program in Kuwait had become "an upbeat program 

which is producing positive results." The 5 percent goal and the use of 

small business utilization plans as a major evaluation factor, she claimed, 

were paying "immediate dividends." Of the $208 million in contracts 

awarded under the Foreign Assistance Act and foreign military sales case, 

$9.3 million (4.4 percent) had gone to small businesses, \.Vith $2.0 million to small disadvantaged businesses. Not renected in any figures, but 

nonetheless important, she added, was the considerable time the Army 

had spent helping small businesses. lL had provided the Commerce 

Department, prime contractors, and Kuwaiti government vvith names 

and addresses of small and small disadvantaged businesses that were 

interested in working in Kuwait; participated in over 75 small business 

seminars lo provide information on business opportunities and methods 

in Kuwait; and met with many firms w discuss business opportunities in 

Kuwait. SO 

By mid-April 1992, the Corps awarded $24 million (6.85 percent of 

the value of all its contracts) to small and small disadvantaged U.S. businesses, primarily through subcomracts awarded by its prime contractors. 

Awards LO small disadvantaged businesses totaled over $11 million (3.13 

percent of the value of all contracts).51 

Kuwaiti officials never fully understood the intense political pressure 

to use small businesses. The Kuwaitis general!)' opposed giving preference to small American businesses, which they believed would increase 

their costs. Critics charged that at times Congress seemed more anxious 
RECOVERY PHASE: DRAO AND KERO 175 

to satisfy American business interests than the Kuwaiti governmem-the 

Armys customer. Locurcio maintained that the small business policy vvas 

very shortsighted. The main goal of the United StaLes should have been 

to demonstrate to Kuwait that it was a responsive partner, he insisted, 

not to push its own objectives. Locurcio believed that if the United States 

was responsive Lo the needs and concerns or the Kuwaitis, the result 

would be long-term American business ties. The appropriate role for 

small businesses in an overseas environment, he argued, was not as 

prime contractors but as subcomractors under large rirms that could 

intercede to prevent problems with personnel, equipment, or other 

aspects of the opermion.52 To place such tremendous emphasis on small. 

businesses, most of wh.om could not get into Kuwait, contact Kuwaiti 

officials, or put together the resources to mobilize in Kuwait, made liLLie 

sense, except from a political standpoint. H the damage in l<u•..vait had 

been more severe, government officials would probably have had less 

Lime to focus on the small business issue. 

Contracting for Civil Infrastructure Repair 

The reconstruction phase included additional repairs to the electrical and water supply systems, government and public buildings, and 

transportation networks. As the various ministries resumed operations, 

the requirements for additional work increased. To handle the mounting 

construction requirements, the Corps expanded the size of its Kuwait 

office. By mid-August it included 178 Corps employees and Kuwaili volumeers. Civil infrastructure work under the 607 A program peaked in 

july and August with the repair of the schools, one of the great successes of the reconstruction phase. 

The schools in Kuwait, which had been closed nearly a year, were 

the main focus of civil infrastructure repair during the summer of 1991. 

During the seven-month occupation, lraqi soldiers had used the schools 

as barracks, maimenance faci li ties, hospitals, and ammunition storage 

areas. Most of the damage was the result or vandalism, malicious fires, 

and looting. The l raqis had broken thousands of windows, kicked in 

doors, and stolen air conditioners and fans. Graffiti covered classroom 

walls. At one school, every room had been firebombed. At another, the 

soldiers had used the gymnasium as a motor pool and burned studem 

records as fuel for cooking. 

Kuwait's Ministry of Education asked the Corps to comract ror emergency repairs to more than 300 of its 500 schools. Locurcio negotiated 

with school officials and agreed to complete repairs on 152 schools by 
176 AFTER DESERT STORM 

opening clay, 24 August. Because of the time constraints, Kelly and 

Locurcio decided to use 607 A authority to issue work orders under the 

existing conuacts and, where necessary, modify these contracts Lo accomplish the school repairs. Livingstone concurred. Corps contractors Brovvn 

and Root and l<hm·afi conducted the surveys and performed most of the 

repairs with the help of local subcontractors. Blount also performed 

work.53 

The scope of the damage and the tight schedule made the repair 

work particularly challenging. The contractors never had enough 

workers. At one point, one of the contractors had to hire an additional l ,200 workers. To complicate matters, the Ministry of Education 

repeatedly changed the list of schools to be renovated until two weeks 

before the scheduled opening. Also, local residents sometimes depositeel ammunition from other sites at Lhe schools at night because they 

knew the Corps' contractors would rencove it. The Ministry of 

Electricity and Water never provided the electrical panels and personnel Lo hook up the wires as promised. A week before the schools vvere 

to open, there were still no panels or workers, so the Kuwait 

Emergency Recovery Office directed each of its contractors to provide 

them. Finally, since the liberation, some soldiers from Kuwait's Army 

and other coa lition forces had been using the schools as barracks. 

Kelly's staff had to move Egyptian forces out of several schools to begin 

repairs. The issue became so thorny that the Egyptian Ambassador had 

to imervene.54 

Working feverishly, the contractors repaired 145 schools in just over 

two months and in time for opening clay. Nearly 1,800 contract workers 

spent rough ly 500,000 hours removing trash, debris, ammunition, and 

vehicles; repairing or replacing thousands of windows, doors, air conditioners, fans, plumbing and electrical fixtures, and lights; repairing and 

replacing water systems; painting walls; repairing brick fences; and 

removing bunkers and thousands of rounds of ammunition. Repair costs 

reached $35 million. 

On the first day of school, 465 schools opened with 254,000 students. 

The occasion was marked by a nationally televised ribbon-cutting ceremony. The reopening was an important indicator of a return to normalcy in 

Ku,vait. The Minister of Education, Dr. Suliman Al-Bader, expressed his 

gratitude to the United States and the Coq)s. "Without their help," he 

observed, ''it would not have been possible." Ministty of Education officials 

were so impressed with the results that they assigned 14 more schools. 

Kelly later observed that his staff and the Kuwait Emergency Recovery 

Office had performed "an absolutely impossibte task." The Kuwait 

Emergency Recovery Office, he said, did a "magnificent" job managing the 
Al-Ferdous Girls Middle Schoo~· below, AJ-Asmah Girls High School. 
Damage to the executive office waiting area in the Parliament 

buildinflt August 1991i below, the same area a year later, 

after renovations were complete. 
Kuwait International Airport Terminal 2 with the damaged control 

tower in the background, 5 August 1991; below, a year later the 

terminal was bustling with travelers from around the world. 
180 AlTER DESERT SWRM 

elTon. Secretary Stone proudly reponed to Secretary Cheney that the government of Kuwait was pleased with the work.55 

As the school repairs neared completion, Kelly and Locurcio shifted 

their emphasis to the remaining work at the National Assembly building, 

the Ministry of Planning heaclquaners, and Kuwait International Airport. 

The damage assessment and emergency repairs at the 400,000-squarefoot National Assembly building were already underway at an anticipated cost of roughly $24 million. The Emir had decreed that elections for 

the National Assembly would be held in October 1992, and the building had to be fully restored by April 1992. 

Originally, the Corps planned to use one of its existing contractors 

to clean and repair the building. However, Kuwait's Council of Ministers, 

who viewed the building as a symbol of Kuwaiti sovereignty, insisted that 

a Kuwaiti firm do the work. Specifically, Dr. Shaheen asked Kelly to use 

Kharan to reconstruct the building, and Livingstone acquiesced. ln midJuly, the Corps awarded a $19.5 million contract to Kharafi for structural repairs. Also, at the direction of the Kuwaiti government, the Corps 

awarded a $2.5 million interior design contract to Hellmuth, Obata, and 

Kassabaum, a U.S. architect-engineer firm.56 

Repair of the Ministry of Planning headquarters proved challenging 

as well. The prime contracLOr, Kharafi, resisted hiring a subcontractor 

that specialized in smoke damage restoration. Only after some cajoling 

from Locurcio did Kharafi do so. By late May 1991, 90 percent of the 

first phase of repairs (to the basement and ground floors) was complete. 

The second phase involved minor repairs to the second and third floors 

on the north wing. The third phase was to finish removing fire damaged 

portions of the second and third floors of the south wing.57 

The Kuwait Emergency Recovery Office and its contractors also continued repairs at Kuwait International Airport. They completed work on 

two runways and the apron area in July. By late August, the Corps had 

repaired nearly all of the terminals passenger gates. The Kuwaiti government also requested help restoring the airports catering and cargo 

fac ilities. lt hoped to occupy the catering facility on 31 July and the cargo 

terminal on 31 October. On 12 September 1991, at the request of the 

Kuwaitis, the Transatlantic Division awarded a $7.8 million contract to 

Morrison Shand to clear, repair, and rehabilitate the two hangars and a 

flight crew training center at the airport. 58 

Kelly reponed in early November that the airport remained a "primary project." The repairs LO the two hangars and the training center 

were only 5 percent complete. Workers had discovered asbestos in one 

hangar, requiring the contractor to prepare an abatement and removal 

plan. Other pans of the project were further along. Repair of the 60-
RECOVERY PHASE: DRAO AND KERO 181 

meter control tower was 99 percent completed, and the catering building was 50 percent complete. Terminal two was operational. The airport 

reopened in May 1991 and resumed 24-hour operations on 3 August 

1991, a year after the lraqi invasion. By December, comracLOrs had finished repairing the reception area, all gates at the imernalional terminal, 

bomb craters on runways, and the instrument landing system. 59 

During the summer, the Corps and its comractors continued repairing 

the other pans of Kuwait$ water supply and transportation infrastructures. 

The Corps focused its effon on pumping stations and leaks in the pressurized feeder lines. The three plants produced over 100 million gallons of 

water a clay, more than enough to meet the current demand. The Corps 

contracted with Daniel, Mann, johnson, and Mendenhall of los Angeles to 

develop plans for repairing the bridges. Two of the company$ engineers 

and an engineer from the Corps' Waterways Experimem Station in 

Vicksburg, Mississippi, surveyed damage to the bridges, and the contractor completed the designs for the repairs by early November.60 

The Corps and its contractors ultimately restored more than I ,000 

public buildings. ln November 1991, the capacity to produce 3,760 

megawaus of electricity far exceeded the demand of 1,670 megawaus. 

Electrical power had been restored to 99 percent of Kuwait City at a total 

cost of $53.6 million. By December, three desalinization plams were in 

operation and water was continuously available in every sector of Kuwait 

Ci t)~ The reservoirs were full. Operations had resumed at two plants in 

the sanil ary sewer system, and an assessment of the entire sanitary system had been completed. All major pump and lift stations were operational, and the Ministry of Electricity and Water handled n1ost repairs. 

The ministry had assumed total responsibility for water distribution, 

production, and storage capabilities on 31 july. Some 200 kilometers of 

roads had been repaired and 3,700 bunkers, barriers, and vehicles had 

been removed. Bridge repair work, however, continued.61 

By )'Cars end, repairs to Kuwait's civil infrastructure were nearly 

complete, except for the National Assembly building. Virtually all of 

Kuwait$ civil infrasuucture had been rebuilt in only eight months. As 

that work declined, the workload supporting Ku·wait's Ministry of 

Defence increased. Damage to Kuwait$ military infrastructure was much 

more extensive, and the repairs vvoulcl take longer. 

Fighting Kuwaits Oil Fires 

The US. Army supported what was by all accounts the largest oil firefighting- campaign in history. Overall responsibility for firefighting operations rested with the Kuwaiti government and its :Vlinistry of Oil. Kuwaiti 

leaders decided early on that the Ku\.vait Oil Company would manage and 

direct all firefighting operations. 

Before the Iraqi invasion, Kuwait had roughly l ,300 producing wells 

in its primary oil fields. Approximately 75 of these were high-pressure 

wells in the important Burgan field that produced 20,000 to 50,000 barrels of oil a J ay Kuwait had a production quota of 1.5 million barrels per 

Jay, set by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPI::C), 

though it could produce much more. 

As Iraqi soldiers withdrew from Kuw·ait, they blew up over 600 oil 

we lls, resulling in the loss of an estimated 5 to 6 million barrels per 

day. Rough ly 520, or 85 percent, of the '..Veils burned at temperatures 

as high as 2,000 degrees Fahrenheit. The rest gushed thousands of 

barrels of crude oil into large dark, lifeless "lakes," up to six feet deep. 

Onlookers hundreds of feet away could fee l the intense heat and hear 

the roar of the burning wells, similar to the sound of a jet engine. 

Thick smoke shrouded the fields. To further complicate maners, 

unexploded ordnance and Iraqi mines littered the oil fields. The country's three refineries-Shuaiba, Mina Abdulla, and tv1ina al Ahmadiwere also damaged.l 

The Kuwait Oil Company directed the early planning for the firefight 

in \Vashington. The Kuwaitis requested U.S. Army civil affairs support in 

the planning effort. Kuwait Task Force members helped the Kuwaitis 

gather information about the oil well flres, plan logistics support, and 

develop an emergency plan of action. The Kuwait Oil Company hired 

t LL. Col. Chriswpher Werle, lnrormation Paper, Subj: Status of Kuwait Oil Field 

Cleanup, 16 .Jun 1991, Kuwnit Reconstruction: Oil fires, Office of llistory Files; 

Matthew L Walcl, "Surge ofvVat{'l' Due to vVell Fires to Cut future Kuwaiti Oil Output," 

New Yrnk Time.~, 9 Apr 1991, p. t\13: LL. John A. Miller, "After the Storm, the Effects 

Linger On," The Militwy C:ngi11ccr, v. 8-t, no. 547, Jan- Feb, 1992; "Slow Progress 

frustrates Alllnvol\'ed L\!> Oil Wells Bum m $ 1.000 a Second," t>.'ew loril Times, 22 Apr 

1991, p. A8. 
184 AFTER DESERT S TORM 

The damage to the oil wells created large pools of oil in the desert. 

O'Brien, Goins and Simpson as the executive agent to coordinate the 

firefighting activities. lt signed contracts with Red Adair Company, Boots 

and Coots, and Wild Well Control, Inc., all skilled Texas-based worldrenowned firms, and with Safety Boss of Calgary, a well-qualified 

Canadian company. The Kuwait Oil Company also eventually hired 

Bechtel to reconstruct the oil infrastructure and LO provide food, housing, and other support to the firefighters, but Bechtel had no direct role 

in puuing om the fires.2 

IL took the Kuwaitis four months to award the first firefighting contract, and they hired firefighters before hiring a contractor to supporL 

them. A severe shortage of heavy equipment such as bulldozers, backhoes, and trucks hampered the firefighting effort. Because of theft or Iraqi 

destruction, virtually everything needed to suppon operations had to be 

imponecl. The challenges of feeding, housing, and equipping a work 

force that would eventually grow jnto the thousands were staggering) 

ZMemo (draft), Under Secrel<ll')' of the Army john W Shannon for Deputy Secretary 

of Defense, Kuwait Reconstruction: Oil Fires, ASA(ILE) Files; memo, Maj. Marc 1<. 

Collins for Asst. Director of tvli litary Programs, 17 Apr 1991, Kuwait Reconstruction: Oil 

Fires, ASA(ILE) Files. 

3vVerle, Information Paper, 16 .Jun l99l. 
FIGHTING KuwAIT's OIL FIRES 185 

Firefighters arrived to surve)' the damage, assess their personnel 

requirements, and determine where they could stage their equipment. 

The first experts from Reel Adair, Boots and Coots, and other companies 

arrived in Kuwait City on 4 March and toured the burning oil fi elds by 

helicopter. They estimated that extinguishing the fires and repairing the 

wells could take two years. 

lnitially, the contractors could not bring in workers because they had 

no way to feed or house them. The companies also had trouble getting the 

necessaty equipment. The Kuwaitis were initially reluctant to invest the 

tens of millions of dollars needed for equipment, even though the fires 

consumed roughly $100 million worth of oil each day." 

Members of the Kuwait Task Force provided the immediate logistics and communications support to the firefighting teams. They also 

provided ground and air transportation to assess damage in the burning fie lds. Civil affairs troops coordinated the use of C-SA ai rcraft to 

bring in the heavy firefighting equipment from Texas and provide firefighters with food, water, lodging, and helicopter and truck transportation. This gave the Kuwaiti government enough time to bring 

Bechtel on-site to take over the support operations. The Kuwait Task 

Force also provided explosive ordnance disposal support and training 

and coordinated engineer support until Kuwaiti equipment arrived.5 

Army explosive ordnance disposal specialists steered the firefighters 

safely through unexploded ordnance to the wellheads and checked the 

wellheads for explosives. 

Kuwait Task Force members Maj. Tom Wilson, a procurement specialist with Hunt Oil in civilian life, and Lt. Col. Phil Huber focused on 

oil fire issues. The task force members coordinated between the firefighters and Ambassador Gnehm. They also coordinated between contractors looking for work and Bechtel or the Kuwait Oil Company. 

Because of the shortage of equipment and firefighters, the work got 

off to a painfully slow stan. lnitially, the Kuwait Oil Company used nine 

teams representing the four firefighting companies. Firefighting equipmem began arriving in Kuwait on military aircraft throughout March, 

and on 7 April a Boots and Coots team used liquid nitrogen and water 

to extinguish the first oil well fire. righting the wellhead infernos was 

dangerous and difficult. The firefighLers worked in intense heat, amid 

blowing sand and smoke, and their brightly colored jumpsuits quickly 

became coated with an oily mist. 

"KRTF History, p. 12. 

~~ latthew Wald."Kuwait \Villllire ~lore Firelighters," New Yorll Times, 14 Apr 1991; 

Wald, "Slow Progress Frustrates All Involved," ibtd., 22 Apr 1991, p. AS. 
186 

Oil well firelighter soaked 

with oil 

AFrER DESERT STORM 

In April, Kuwaits oil minister, 

Dr. Rashid AI-Amiri, announced 

that the nalional oil company 

would bring in fi rcfighting Leams 

from several clillcrent companies, 

breaking the American and 

Canadian monopoly. With only 25 

well fires extinguished, he wanted 

to quicken the pace. The Kuwaiti 

government later brought in teams 

from three additional U.S. companies, as well as Brilish, German, 

French, Russian, Chinese, and 

Iranian firms. Ultimately, however, 

the original American and 

Canadian firms puL out most of the 

oil fires. Meanwhile, firms and 

individuals from around the world 

continued to inundate U .5. and 

Kuwaiti officials with proposals for 

extinguishing the fires.o 

The slow pace of the firefight 

worried U.S. officials. In April, the Office of the Principal Deputy Under 

Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Plans hosted a meeling for represenLa l ivcs of the Army, Navy, Air f-orce, and Department of Energy to address 

th is issue. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Energy for Export Assistance, 

George Helland, warned that the administration would come under anack 

if it did noL act quickly to put out the oil fires. Participants decided to forward all proposals for extinguishing the oil fires to the Under Secretary of 

Energy who would screen them before forwarding them to David Tarbell, 

the Director of International Economic and Energy Affairs, in the Office of 

the Principal Deputy Under Secretat)' of Defense for Snatcgy and Plans. 

The participants, however, made no auempt to define the problem. They 

failed to develop any specific format or guidance for drafting proposals and 

failed to develop any in itiatives to get support from high levels in the 

Pentagon or the Bush administration. These were imponant oversights.? 

<> Col. Anhur Walz, Information Paper. Subj: "Petroleum Restoration Activnics," 8 Apr 

1991, Reading File 1: DRAO Files: Kelly commems on draft manuscript, 19 Aug 1997. 

7 352d CA Command Snrcp, n.d., Tactical Operations Center Log (TFF 1-lO ~lar 

1991 ), TUSA G-3; Harbellmten•, p. 44; I Iuber imen•, pp. 46--49; New )(llh Times. 8 Apr 

1991, p t\6; Wald, "Ku\\'att Willi lire ~\lore firefighters" ; Wald, "Skm Progress Frustrates 

All hwolvcd." 
FIGHTING KUWAIT'S OIL FIRES 187 

Oil well firelighters cap an ail well. 

After the close-out of Task Force Freedom, the Army continued to 

suppon the firefighting effon through the Defense Reconstruclion 

Assistance Office. Neither the Kuwaiti government nor any of the commercial firms could quickly bring in needed supplies and heavy equipmem. As a result, \.vith liule legal or funding amhority, the Military Airlift 

Command found itself nying the cargo on U.S. Air Force C-SA transpons. The Defense Reconstruction Assistance Office later helped broker 

over $13 million in transportation expenses bet"veen the Mili tary Ai rlift 

Command and the Kuwaiti government. Other Defense Department 

agencies provided support through satellite imagery photographs, airfield repair, and environmental surveys.s 

General Kellys staff monitored the work, gathered information, and 

kept Ambassador Gnehm informed . Gnehm had no environmental specialists on his staff, so he relied on l<ellys environmental officer, Lt. Col. 

S!vlemo, LL Col. Wilson to Col. Keener, 15 Apr 1991, Subj: DOD Meeting on H ighTech Oil Firefigluing, 12 Apr 1991 , Kuwait Reconstruction: Oil Fires, ASA(ILE) Files. 
188 AFTER DESERT STORM 

Christopher Werle, to advise him and coordinate environmental issues. 

Where appropriate, Kelly$ staff helped coordinate the delivery of heavy 

equipment on C-5A transports, the tracking of oil fires and spillage with 

Landsat imagery, and the stabilization of work sites vvith airfield malting. 

Werle, who performed much of the day-to-clay coordination with the 

firefighting organizations, developed a particularly good rapport with 

the firefighters and their support crews. Kelly and his staff considered all 

activities related to the environment and the oil well fires to be "embassy 

business" and took no action without the Ambassadors approval.9 

The Army also provided combat engineer vehicles (CEVs). These 

vehicles are tanks with turret-mounted demolition guns and hydraulically operated debris blades. They give engineers in forward cornbat 

areas a versatile means of clearing rubble and filling tank ditches. Over 

80 Kuwaiti oil fires were encircled by huge, hardened mounds of cokesolids produced when the unburned oil mixed with sand-which had to 

be removed before the firefighters could work. Firefighters used dynamite and backhoes to remove the searing mounds, but the process was 

hazardous and slow. Werle developed a plan to use existing combat engineer vehicles to fire rounds of high explosive plastic (HEP) at mounds to 

break them up so the firefighters could remove the debris. This plan, he 

argued, would speed the capping effort and save the Kuwaiti government $300,000 per well. Moreover, it would provide unique training for 

the combat engineer vehicle cw..vs and positive Army public relations. 

The Kuwait Oil Company covered the costs of using the combat engineer 

vehicle crews and equipment. 

On 31 July, the Kuwaiti government and Bechtel conducted a very 

successful experiment firing the large-caliber gun on a combat engineer 

vehicle to remove mounds from wellheads. Rounds from the vehicle 

shattered four out of five of the coke mound targets. Soldiers cleared t•vo 

wells using this method. 

Soon after the initial experiment, however, the focus of the firefighting e[fort shifted to Burgan, Kuwait$ densest oil field. Officials concluded that using the combat engineer vehicles there would be too dangerous because the wells were so close together. lO 

9Werle, Information Paper, 16 jun 1991, Kuwait Reconstruction: Oil Fires. Office of 

History Files; \<\lerle. Information Paper, 22 lvlay 1991. Kuwait Reconstruction: 

Miscellaneous tvlessagcs, #8, OACE Reference Files; Llr, Col. jesse C. Gatlin Ill to Larry 

and Carl, 28 Sep 1991, Miscellaneous, Personnel: DRAO Files. 

IO Lt. Col. Wilson. DAMO-ODP, SIGACT, 7 Aug 1991, Kuwait Reconstruction: Oil 

Fires, Subj: Use of Combat Engineer Vehicles (CEV) to fight Kuwait oil fires, ASA(ILE) 

Files; memo, 1vlichael W Owen for Secretary of the Army, 16 Aug 1991. Kuwait 

Reconstruction: Oil Fires, ASA(ILE) Files. 
FIGHTING KUWAIT's OIL FIRES 189 

As the oil fires continued to burn, the U.S. Army and other agencies 

became increasingly concerned about the short- and long-term health 

risks of the smoke and other emissions. ln March 1991, an imeragency 

team headed by the Environmental Protection Agency collected samples 

at several sites in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and else'vvhere in the Middle 

EasL. They attempted to ascertain the presence of potentially harmful air 

pollutants, specifically carbon monoxide, sulfur dioxide, and hydrogen 

sulfide and particulates-tiny particles that lodge in the lungs. The team 

found each of these gases but not in concentrations that exceeded current standards. The Environmemal Protection Agency subsequently concluded that no imminent health risk existed. 

Some experts questioned the validity of the agency's study because 

it included only the samples the team could collect within 20 minutes, rather than samples collected over 18 to 24 hours. The team 

found an abnormally high level of particulates. "Soldiers may become 

concerned because they find soot in their nostrils," they conceded, 

but the smoke was "only an irritant and a nuisance." For the long 

term, though, scientists needed to know more about the composition 

of the smoke to determine the potential health hazard. Meanwhile, at 

the request of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

Environment, a special health risk assessment team from the Army 

Environmental Hygiene Agency conducted a 60-clay study. The 

agency coordinated its effort with the Environmental Protection 

Agency's interagency assessmenL team to exchange information and 

prevent duplication of effort.ll 

At the request of President Bush, the administrator of the 

Environmental Protection Agency, William K Reilly, traveled to Kuvvait in 

june tO assess environmental damage from the Iraqi invasion. "The horrors 

endured by the people of Kuwait and the unprecedented level of intentional environmental destmction," Reilly reported, "reminds us all that 

there is still evil in the world." He praised the "environmental sensitivity" 

of the soldiers he met. "One of the untold stories," he added, "is the dazzling performance of the Army Corps, which essentially jump-staned the 

infrastructure of a country." The military, he informed Chene)~ had greatly 

assisted the scientists working in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, and those 

responsible for sewage treatment and pollution control. Upon his return, 

Reilly reported that the environmental damage was not as great as predicted. He cited the interagency team:S finding that the levels of sulfur and 

II vVerle, Information Paper, Subj: "Environmemal Impacts or Desert Storm on 

Kuwait," 17 jun 1991, l<uwait Reconstruction, Office of History Files; Werle. 

Information Paper, 22 May 1991. 
190 AFTER DESERT STORM 

heavy metals in the air were not abnormally high. Environmental groups, 

however, questioned those findings.t2 

On 2june 1991, Kuwait resumed oil production in an offshore field, 

averaging 130,000 barrels a day. Later that month, it began producing 

30,000 barrels a day onshore. On 25 july, Kmvait announced that for the 

lhst time since the Iraqi invasion, it would resume exporting crude oil, 

though only on a small scale. Half of the oil fires had been extinguished. 

Firefighters were snuffing out more than six well fires a day. By 

November 1991, all of Kuwait$ oil wells had been capped. On 6 

November, a ceremonial capping in the Burgan field of the final oil well 

was anenclecl by the Emir. The Kuvvaitis, delighted to see the end of this 

tragic and costly episode, celebrated the event as a national holiday. 

Ku,vait lost over L billion barrels or oil (or l percem of its sole natural resource) as a result of the Gulf War, but its huge reserves escaped lasting damage. The country still retained 10 percent of the worlds crude oil 

reserves.IJ With assistance from the U.S. Army and the ded icated, skilled 

private contractors, the Kuwaiti government. had extinguished the oil fires 

and recapped the wells in record time. 

12tvlemo, William K. Rcill}' to Sccrctar)' Richard B. Chene)', 3 jul 1991, Kuwait 

Reconstruction: General, ASA(ILE) Files; New Yorl1 Times, l l.Jun 1991 ; "fires in Kuwait 

Not a Threat to Global Climate, Federal Stlld)' Finds," \\lasltingtotl Post, 25 jun 1991. 

11 "0il Production in Kuwait,'' New Yorl1 Times. 21 jun 1991, p. Dl6; Youssef E. 

Ibrahim, "Kuwait Set to Resume Oil Exports," New Yorll Times, 26 jul 1991, p. D t; 

"Kuwait Toda)•," \Vasl1ing1on Post, 27 Feb 1996, Advertising Supplemen1, p, B5. 
Chapter 6 

Supporting Kuwaits 

Ministry of Defence 

As the emergency repairs to Kuvvait's civil infrastructure neared completion, the U.S. military shifted its focus to restoring the country$ military 

facilities. Generally, Kuwait$ military facilities had been damaged more 

heavily than its civil infrastructure. The lraqi occupation and the vvar 

had nearly leveled the defense facilities in Kuwait. The military infrastructure, particularly Air force and Navy fac ililies, had been heavily 

damaged by the Iraqi soldiers who occupied them and by coalition 

"smart bombs" intended to deny the lraqi military the use of these facilities. While the Kuvvait lvlinistry of Defences administrative offices and 

the facililies that housed Kmvait's Land Forces (Kmvait's Army) 

remained, for the most part, structurally sound, the Iraqis had looted 

and severely vandali zed them. 

Moreover, there was a growing realizalion that Kuwait had to be prepared to defend itself in the future. Iraq remained a potential security 

threat. Although the U.S. military had decided to limit its involvement 

in Kuwait's civil infrastructure to emergency repairs, it was willing to 

promote more permanent repairs to the defense infrastructure. Most of 

the defense faci lities did not lend themselves to emergency repairs. The 

damage was far too severe to accommoclaLe a quick fix. Corps leaders 

recognized that the civil reconstruction work was short-lived but that the 

long-term work would be in the foreign military sales arena and managed by the TransaLlamic Division. 

Initial Damage Assessments 

The Kuwait Emergency Recovery Office had identified 19 major 

defense installations in l<uwail. Under the authority of the initial $46.35 

million foreign military sales case, Corps personnel surveyed the damage 
192 AFTER DESERT STORM 

Aerial view of the damage to Ahmed AI-Jaber Air Base 

at each one. The heavy destruction made this a huge job. Five teams 

under the direction of Tommy E. Reynolds, a civil engineer from 

Nashville who headed the l<uwait Emergency Recovery Offices Ministry 

of Defence damage assessment group, evaluated the l 9 sites. Team 

members first conducted a general assessment to determine if a particular facility was repairable and then determined the extent of the damage. 

Corps engineers and their Kuwaiti partners ultimately inspected 

more than 700 buildings and facilities at three brigade camps, two air 

bases, one navy base, and the National Guard and the Ministry of 

Defence headquarters. The engineer teams often conducted their inspections amid explosives, live ammunition, and unexploded bombs. 

The Corps completed the damage assessments in june and presented the Ministry of Defence 'vVith the final report, including rough schedules for repairing 135 key facilities. The individual damage surveys provided detailed cost estimates for materials, labor, and services to help 

Kuwaiti officials decide whether to repair or rebuild a particular facility. 

The reports provided information about the level of effort required to 

restore the sites to their prewar conditions and resume minimum operations. After revie,ving the survey results, Corps orficials concluded that 

the total repair costs could reach $1 billion. Reynolds estimated that the 
SUPPORTING KUWAIT'S MINISTRY OF DEFENCE 193 

A destroyed aircraft hangar at Al-Jaber Air Base 

cost of renovaLing some of the defense fac ilities would amount to 90 percent of the cost of constructing new facilities. I 

Faced v.rith such a staggering price tag, the Ministry of Defence identified three installations-Ali Al-Salem Air Base, Ahmed Al-Jaber Air 

Base, and Ras Al-Qalayah Navy Base-as immediate priorities. The air 

bases, constructed by Yugoslavians in the mid-1970s, consisted of 

3,000-meter runways, concrete aircraft shelters, maintenance hangars, 

and other structures. Ras Al-Qalayah Navy Base on Kuwait:S southern 

coast housed I<uwait:S Navy. lt contained a port, sophisticated ship-lift 

and dry-clock facilities, and maintenance and administrative buildings.2 

Coalition forces had heavily bombed the two air bases du ring the 

war to drive out Iraq i forces, reducing most of the facilities to rubble. 

Often the mangled metal "skins" of buildings could be found up to half 

a mile avvay, even though the structural frames remained intact. The 

bombing had destroyed nearly all of the 50 hardened aircraft shelters, 

despite their 15-foot-thick earthen and reinforced concrete shells. 

Coalition cluster bombs had cratered the taxiways, and the Iraqis had 

run a ripper across the runways every 200 feet to make them unusable. 

Barracks, administrative facilities, and n1edical fac ilities, though structurally intact, had been heavil y vandalized by Iraqi troops.J 
194 AFTER DESERT STORM 

Kuwaiti orficials indicated that the air bases would have to be 

repaired by August so they could bring back aircraft currently housed in 

neighboring countries and accommodate the F-18 aircraft that they had 

purchased from the United States. The first phase of work at the air bases 

would focus on making emergency repairs to allow minimal operations 

at each facility. Specifically, it would involve clearing and cleaning the 

facilities, repairing runways and taxiways, and building temporary shelters for the airplanes. 

The lack of utilities and communications, the presence of unexploded ordnance, and the poor condition of the buildings still standing made 

the air bases virtually uninhabitable. An estimated $ 1 million would be 

needed initially at Ali AI-Salcm Air Base to have a comractor sweep for 

live ordnance, clear debris, and repair parts of the electrical distribution 

system. The focus of the emergency repairs would be to make the airfield 

opera1ional; provide limited maintenance faci lities; repair existing aircraft shelters and provide additional ones; repair selected buildings for 

medical services, barracks, and mess; and repair one hangar, the utility 

systems, and the fuel distribution system. 

Ras Al-Qalayah Navy Base had sustained only moderate damage. Yet 

it too was uninhabitable because utility services and communications 

had been destroyed. Although most buildings remained structurally 

sound, they had been heavily damaged by explosives and vandalized by 

the Iraqis. Kuwait:S Navy wanted to reoccupy that base as soon as possible and relocate its remaining boats there. The estimated cost for emergency repairs to the utili ty systems, administrative ofrices spaces, barracks, and mess faci lities was $1 mill ion.4 

At General Kelly:S direction, the Corps had set aside roughly $5 million from the original foreign military sales case for what it called "preemergenC)' repairs" to defense facilities such as resLOring electrical power. 

Locurcio now suggested that $3 million from the case be used to fund 

the initial emergency work at Ras AI-Qalayah Nav)' Base, Ali AI-Salem 

Air Base, and Ahmed Al-jaber /\ir Base.s 

Locurcio argued that the original foreign military sales case provided 

enough authority for the United States to provide design and construction 

services to restore Minisll')' of Defence facilities. He explained in his 4 

january 1991 letter to General Ray that Dr. Shaheen had requested assistance for the National Guard rather than the Ministry of Defence, but he 

had also asked the Corps to propose a draft agreemcm for discussion. The 

scope of the lener, Locurcio argued, was "not inLended to be final." The 

foreign military sales case contained the phrase "assistance provided shall 

include but not be limited to the following." 1L also cited "other taskings as 

ma)' be required" as pan of the scope of work. Since no one knew the 
SUPPORTING KUWAIT's MINISTRY OF DEFENCE 195 

scope of reconstruction efforts at the time this case was prepared, oiTicials 

intentionally made these items broad to allow for additional emergency 

work such as repairs to Ministry of Defence facilities. 

At their 16 Februar}' meeting, Locurcio added, Dr. Shaheen had 

specilkally directed the Corps to include that ministry$ work as pan of 

the original foreign military sales case. He had also emphasized that for 

the reconstruction activities, the United States could combine the 

National Guard and tvlin istry of Defence work. Dr. Shaheen had inLended lO accomplish this work under the foreign military sales case or an 

amendment to the case.6 

Soon after, Kelly informed Livingswne that his office and the Kuwait 

Emergency Recovery Office intended to conduct roughly $3 million 

worth of design and construction services for emergency resloration of 

the defense facilities under the original foreign military sales case. The 

work that Kuwait had requested included restoring minimal operations 

w the Ministry of Defence headquarters and providing the Kuwait Air 

Force with emergency facilities at Kuwait International Airport. 

Although U.S. regulations prohibited using funds under Section 607 A 

of the Foreign Assistance Act for such work, Kelly argued, the existing foreign military sales case vvas clearly wriuen with the intenL to provide for 

such contingencies. The $46.35 million foreign military sales case, he 

added, had been written broadly enough lO provide for additional reconstruction efforts. Livingstone agreed with l<elly and authorized the Corps 

to execute contracts under the foreign military sales case.? 

Using the money set aside from the existing foreign military sales 

case, Corps contractors removed debris; made temporary repairs to 

walls, roofs, windows, and doors; reinstalled pilfered mechanical sysLems; and made architectural repairs. By 1 june 1991, four military infrastructure projects were under way or planned using the existing foreign 

military sales case. Locurcio's staff administered an emergency repair 

program of an estimated $4.7 million. This included emergency repairs 

on five l1angars at Kuwait International Airport for use by Kuwait's Air 

Force at an estimated cost of $800,000. When completed, these hangars 

were the only facility that l<uwait's Air Force had for its operations until 

emergency repairs were completed at Ali AI-Salem Air Base. 

The second project was $1.5 million to remove debris and repair 

walls, floors, and ceilings at the Ministry of Defence headquarters so the 

minister and his staff could return LO their permanem offices. Third, the 

Ministry of Defence requested $1.4 million to restore ut.ility services and 

repair critical facilities at Ras AI-Qalayah Navy Base. Finally, there was $1 

million in emergency work at Ali AI-Salem Air Base to include debris 

cleanup and repairs to the electrical distribution system.s 
196 AFTER DESERT STORM 

By late june, the Corps and its contractors bad completed 50 percent 

of the emergency repairs at four of the five hangars at Kuwait 

lnternational Airport and had completed 65 percent or the emergency 

repairs at the Ministry of Defence headquaners. Work would soon begin 

at Ras AI-Qalayah Navy Base, and the Kuwait Emergency Recovery 

Office vvould soon award the contract for emergency repairs at Ali AlSalem Air Base. As a result, in the first week in july, Kuwait$ Air Force 

was able to relocate 18 Mirage and 14 A-4 Skyhawk planes from 

Dhahran to Kuvvait lnternational Airport.9 

Planning Foreign Military Sales Cases for Defense Facilities 

ln April 1991, Kuwaits Under Secretary of Defence, Faisal Ali AlDawoud, approached U.S. officials about rebuilding his country$ damaged 

military facilities. As a result of a series of meetings wiLh Corps representatives, Ministry of Defence officials asked the Corps to draft one or more 

foreign military sales agreements to help reconstruct their defense installations. Al-Dawoucl asked that the agreements include initial repair activities 

as well as planning, designing, and constructing new and existing facilities 

at all installations designated by the ministry. Al-Dawoud emphasized that, 

based on the damage assessments then underway, initially the Kuwaiti government would need help reconstructing Ali At-Salem Air Base, Ahmed Aljaber Air Base, Ras AI-Qalayah Navy Base, and associated facilities.IO 

Corps personnel in Kuwait and back in Winchester hurriedly prepared a new foreign military sales case that included damage survey 

reports, emergency restoration, and planning and engineering. The case 

encompassed the Ministry of Defence headquarters restoration, 6th 

Brigade Camp, 15th Brigade Camp, 35th Brigade Camp, 80th Brigade 

Camp, Ali At-Salem Air Base, Ahmed Al-jaber Air Base, Ras Al-Qalayah 

Navy Base, the air defense camp, and other sites. Kelly proposed to AlDawoud that the Corps manage the entire program. 

Rather than process a separate foreign military sales case for each 

installation, Kelly$ staff and Corps officials decided to adopt a twophased approach separating emergency repairs from long-term reconstruction. ln mid-May, David L. Chambers on Kelly's staff informed 

Defense Security Assistance Agency officials about the new strategy. The 

Defense Security Assistance Agency; the Assistant Secretary of the Army 

for lnstallations, Logistics and Environment; and the Army General 

Counsel agreed to a two-phased approach. 

The relatively small foreign military sales case for phase I included 

planning, design, and emergency repairs at military installations in 
SUPPORTING KUWAIT's MINISTRY OF DEFENCE 197 

Kmvail. Phase ll, vvhich could cost more than $600 million, covered any 

more permanent follow-on construction that the Kuwaiti governmem 

wanted. ll required congressional notification, which included a 20-day 

advance notice [or review by congressional starr and an additional 30-

day period for Congress to act.ll 

The Defense Reconstruction Assistance Office and the Kuwait 

Emergency Recovery Office proposed two foreign military sales casesone for $131.8 million in emergency work, substantially below the $200 

million ceiling that would trigger congressional review, and another for 

$600 million for long-term repairs. The draft $131.8 milli on foreign military sales case went through the Transatlantic Division lO Corps headquarters where General Ray signed it. Back in Kuwait, however, Kelly 

began to sense that Ministry of Defence officials were reluctam to 

approve the case. He requested that General Ray hold it at Corps headquarters until the problems could be resolved. 

Kelly did not want the foreign military sales case to go rorward until 

he was sure that all the parties involved had agreed to il. Kuwaiti officials 

were still debating how to handle the defense work. They were reluctant 

to give the Corps all the work. Political considerations dictated that the 

Kuwaitis divide the work among Britain, France, Turkey, and the other 

coalition countries that had assisted Kuwait. Yet they also realized that 

their first line of defense was the air bases, and they wanted these bases 

built to U.S. standardsi2 

After meeting with Al-Dawoud on 19 lay, Kelly concluded that the 

Kuvvaiti government was ready to proceed with a f'oreign mili tary sales 

case for phase l. The next clay, he submiueclthe draft $131.8 million foreign military sales case to Livingstone for approval.l3 

On 21 May, General Kelly and his staff presented the two-phased 

plan to the Assistam Under Secretary of Defense for Military Engineering 

Projects, Sheikh Sabah AI Nasser. Kelly emphasized the need to ensure 

thattbe air base facilities could accommodate all U.S. weapons systems. 

This would make future combined operations much easier.H 

On 26 May, Kelly met again with AI-Dawoud and Sheikh Sabah AI 

Nasser to deLermine when their government planned to fund phase I of 

the military reconstruction program and to discuss any remaining questions about the proposed foreign military sales case. AL-Dawoud 

observed that the Minister of Defence, Sheikh Ali Al-Sabah Al-Salem AISabah, was currently reviewing the agreement and anticipated no major 

problems. He also noted that the Minister of Defence had made Sheikh 

Sabah AI Nasser the principal poim of contact [or all issues and decisi.ons 

concerning the foreign military sales cases. He would coordinate all comments from the military services and provide the necessary information. 
198 AFTER DESERT STORM 

The participants established priorities for the work. Al-Dawoucl stressed 

that work on the two air bases and the navy base had Lo begin immediately. Work at the other installations could begin later. He reiterated that 

Ali AI-Salem Air Base had to be able to receive Kuwaiti military aircraft by 

fall 1991 and Ahmed Al-jaber Air Base had to be ready for the first F-18 

aircraft by late January 1992. Ras Al-Qalayah Navy Base had to be ready 

by fa ll l99l to move Ku·waiti naval vessels to their permanent base.t5 

The next day Robert Kiesling, a Navy captain on Kelly's staff, met 

with the Director of Technical Affairs for Kuwait's Air Force, Brig. Gen. 

Gahzi Abdul Razzak, and his staff to discuss the reconstruction of Air 

Force facilities. Air Force Col. Saber AI-Suwaidan provided a new list of 

priorities for Ali Al-Salem Air Base. He wanted the Corps to rebuild at 

least one large maintenance hangar at Ahmed !\\-Jaber Air Base, vvhich 

would have to be ready by January 1992, though he realized that not all 

the faci lities would be completed by then. General Razzak asked the 

Corps to mal<e refueling facilities a priority.t6 

On 10 june, Kiesli ng and Colonel Al-Suwaidan met again to discuss 

the status of reconstruction projects for the two air bases and Kuwait 

international Airport. Suwaiclan indicated that Sheikh Sabah AI Nasser 

had given the Air Force broad authority Lo work with the U.S. Army 

Corps of Engineers on plans to reconstruct its facilities. Sheikh Sabah f\l 

Nasser also wanted the director of Military Engineering Projects (the engineering agency in the Kuwaiti military, much like the U.S. Army Corps of 

Engineers) to be more involved in the reconstruction process. Suwaidan 

acknowledged the need to have all of Kuwait$ Air Force facilities capable 

of handling any U.S mili tary aircraft including the large C-5s.17 

A week later, Kelly and his staff again met vvith AI-Dawouc\, Sheikh 

Sabah AI Nasser, Chief Engineer Fahad Al-jaleel, and Ahmed AI-Fahac\. 

Initially, the Kuwaiti represematives could not agree among themselves 

on the inforn1ation presented. During the meeting, they decided to 

reduce the $800 million scope of the proposed foreign military sales 

work so they could give other coalition countries a large share of the 

reconstruction effon. Yet they also realized that the air base work 

required sophisticated technology and that their airfields had to be built 

to U.S. standards to accommodate U.S. aircraft. 

lvlinistry officials requested that the U.S. Army limit its role to the 

emergency repairs, planning and design, and permanent construction at 

the two air bases. They intended to administer the reconstruction of tile 

other military installations themselves. They had already set aside the work 

at Ras AI-Qalayah Navy Base for British firms. The Kuwait Emergency 

Recovery Office rewrote the proposed foreign military sales case to rellect 

Kuwait's decision to limit the United States' role to the two air bases. 
S UPPORTING KuwAIT's MINISTRY OF DEFENCE 199 

The foreign militat")' sales case now proposed would cost an estimated $50 million to $100 million. A separate foreign military sales case for 

permanent reconstruction at the air bases, which would follow after the 

scope was determined, would potenLially cost from $250 million to 

$350 million. U.S. offi cials vvere dissatisfi ed with this plan. l<elly, who 

continued to push for a more extensive agreement, argued that U.S. personnel were already in Kuwait incurring costs, and it would be more 

effective to cominue to use their services.IR "We were frankly disappoimed that we did not get all the Ministry of Defence reconstruction 

effort totally (about $800 million)," Kelly conceded. 19 Despite l<eii)'S 

protests, the Kuwaitis remained firm in their decision. 

During a series of meetings in late june, representatives from the 

Defense Reconstruction Assistance ornce, 1v!inistry of Defence, and 

Kuwait's Air Force fi nalized the scope of requirements for rebuilding the 

two air bases. They reduced the scope of work fo r the phase I emergency 

restoration and the planning and design fo rt he long-term reconstruction 

from $131.8 million to $105 mill ion.zo When Kelly's and Locurcio's 

staffs presented their plan for reconstructing the two air bases at a meeting on 4 july, Sheikh Sabah AI Nasser and other ministry representatives 

agreed on the general scope and terms of the proposed $105 million foreign military sales case, but they disagreed on the issue of contractor eligibility. The Kuwaitis insisted that contracLOrs from all the coalilion 

countries be allowed to compete for the work and that all contractors 

who were selected be required to form a joint venture with a Kuwaiti 

fi nn. llowcver, since both bases had to accommodate U.S. military aircraft, Kelly insisted that the architect-engineer contracLOr be limited to 

U.S. firms or U.S.-Kuwaiti joim venture firms and that construclion contractors be limited to U.S. firms, U.S.-Kuwaiti joint vcmurcs, or 

U.S.-I<uwaiti-coalition partner joint ventures. Moreover, the U.S. firm 

would be the senior partner in each joint venture. 

With Li\·ingstone's approval, l<ell)' included the following wording 

in the proposed phase 1 foreign n1ilitary sales agreement: "Construction 

contract awards pursuant to this agreement will be limited to U.S. Finns, 

U.S.-I<uwaiti joint Venwres, or U.S.-I<uwaiti-Coalition Partner joint 

Ventures. In the case of the Joint Ventures, the U.S. nrm will be the 

senior managing partner. " He also added the statement "A-E !architect-engineer! contract awards pursuant to this agreemern will be limited to U.S. firms or U.S.-Kuwaiti joint Ventures with the U.S. firm being 

the senior managing panner."2t 

Khalccl AI-Oraifan from t-.lilitary Engineering Projects and David 

Chambers met to finalize the details of the revised foreign military sales 

case. They concluded their meelings on 13 july, with an agreement on a 
200 AfTER DESERT STORM 

draft set of notes that Kelly and Sheikh Sabah AI Nasser would discuss 

on IS july. At the same time, discussions continued on the scope of 

work. Military Engineering Projects representatives formall y fixed the 

total amoum o[ the phase I foreign military sales case at $105 million.22 

At the meeting with l<cll y on 15 j uly, Sheikh Sabah AI Nasser agreed 

to the fina l $105 mi llion scope of work. Kelly added a statement to the 

proposed foreign military sales case indicating that this figure represented the Corps' best estimate of the cost of the emergency repairs to the 

two air bases that the Ministry of Defence had requested. The estimate 

also included the cost of planning future work at these air bases. 

Sheikh Sabah AI Nasser insisted that Kuwaiti firms be included in all 

projects. He and Kelly agreed to limit all the phase I construction contracts to U.S.-Kuwaiti joint venture firms or U.S.-Kuwaiti-coalition 

panner joim venture fi rms, with the U.S. fim1 in the joint venture as the 

senior managing partner. 

After the meeting, the Defense Reconstruction Assistance Office 

transmitted the proposed revisions to the foreign military sales case to 

the Transatlantic Division. General Ray accepted the offer on 18 july 

1991 on behalf of the Corps, and the Defense Security Assistance Agency 

countersigned the offer on 26 July. It was delivered to the Kuwaitis two 

days later.23 Kelly reponed that the agreemem on the phase I foreign military sales case marked "a significant milestone in establishing a longtenn Department of Defense construction program in l<uwait."2-l 

Soon after, representatives from the Defense Reconstruction 

Assistance Office and l<uwait Emergency Recovery Office met with 

Ahmed AI-Fahad to discuss the process for selecting an architect-engineer 

firm under the new fo reign military sales case. The Corps was under pressure to divide the extensive architect-engineer work at the air bases 

between two or three U.S. firms. Kuwaiti officials, however, insisted that 

the Corps use the same architect-engineer firm for all the planning and 

design work at both air bases. The)' believed that using a single contractor would be more cost effcctivc.2s 

For the phase I construction contracts, the Corps proposed using a 

different contractor at each base. Each contract vvould amount to $30 

mill ion to $50 million. The Corps would thus open up work for a new 

contractor and complete the work faster. 

Due to the urgency or the request, Kelly planned to limit competition 

to firms that had responded to the February 199 1 Commerce Business 

Dc1ily announcement and had been prequalified by the Transatlantic 

Division. Though Kelly emphasized urgency, in order to create opportunities for new U.S. contractors Corps contractors already working in 

Kuwait would not be allowed to compete for work at AI-Salem Air Base. 
SUPPORTING KuwAIT'S MINISTRY OF DEFENCE 201 

For the phase I planning and engineering work, Kelly proposed 

using a single architect-engineer firm, a U.S.-Kuwaiti joim venture, 

selected from the February 1991 prequalified lisl. Additionally, the 

architect-engineer firm would develop the scope and cost estimates that 

the Corps needed to prepare a foreign military sales case [or the phase 

ll permanent reconstruction. Then the finn vvou ld develop both a concept design with a detailed scope of work for Ministry of Defence 

approval and the fina l designs for each air base. Kelly proposed using 

the normal architect-engineer selection process with a letter contract to 

start the planning effort and a firm fixed-price contract for the subsequent design work.26 A firm fixed-price contract assured that the contractor was reimbursed for legitimate expenses incurred during construction and received a guaran teed fee above those costs. 

Assistant Secretary Livingstone, however, was reluctant to limit competition to the prequalified firms. Using the February 1991 prequalification list instead of soliciting new contractors vvas required, Kelly argued, 

because of the urgency of the situation. Until the two air bases became 

operational, he insisted, Kuwait$ ability to defend itself would be severely 

limited. He added that enough construction contractors had responded to 

the original solicitation to ensure adequate competition. Over 1,300 architect-engineer firms and over 1,000 construction contractors bad respondeel to the February 1991 Commerce Business Daily announcement. The 

Corps planned to use the resulting prequalification list to select one architect-engineer firm for the initial and the final design work at both air bases. 

This was the normal process for selecting an architect-engineer firm. The 

Corps would negotiate a firm fixed-price contract for the remaining work. 

Officials later observed that using the February prequalification list might 

have saved as much as two months in the contracting process27 

Livingstone approved L<ellys contracting strategy but remained concerned abom providing adequate opportunities for small and small disadvantaged businesses. She adopted a list of Kelly$ recommendations, directing him to take several steps in executing the contracting strategy for the 

proposed phase l foreign m ilitary sales case and any future cases; channel 

at least 5 percent of the contract value of the foreign military sales contract 

awards and modifications to small and small disadvantaged businesses; 

add provisions to the contracts with prime contractors that emphasized 

the critical nature of subcontracting v.rith small and small disadvantaged 

businesses; develop and employ a set of source selection evaluation factors 

that reflected a commitment to subcontracting with small and small disadvantaged businesses; and encourage prime comractors to subcontract 

with small and small disadvantaged busi ness. She also wanted Kelly to set 

aside certain work for such businesses, if possible. 
202 AlTER DESERT STORM 

The small business issue remained complicated. Congress and the 

Pemagon were pressuring the Corps to use small businesses. Yet the 

Corps had a responsibility to protect the imerests of its l<uwaiti customer 

and ensure that high-quality air bases were constructed quickly and economically. As confirmed by the Corps' civil reconstruction effort, doing 

business overseas was clifricult, especially for small firms inexperienced 

in establishing sources of supplies, labor, and equipment. Large businesses, which had greater assets, generally could mobilize and complete 

projects faster and often more economically than small businesses. Corps 

officials opposed an)' small business requirements that would slow the 

completion of the projects. The)' did, however, agree 10 require comractors 10 have small business plans outlining how thC)' intended lO incorporme sn1all businesscs.l~ 

Foreign Military Sales Case for Phase I Air Base Work 

The Kuwaiti governmem delayed approving the foreign militar)' 

sales case for the phase I air base work until early August because of 

internal funding problems. On 6 August 1991, AI-Dawoud signed the 

$105 million foreign military sales case in which the U.S. Depanmem of 

Defense agreed to make emergency repairs at Ali AI-Salcm Air Base and 

Ahmed Al-jaber Air Base and to prepare initial design and a master plan 

for the phase I I permanent reconstruction at those facilities.29 The 

Security Assistance Accounting Center processed the initial paymem of 

$15.8 million from the l<uwaitis. The Corps received authority to obligate the money on l4 August.30 

The differences between l<uwaiti and American goals and business 

procedures soon became apparent. Before signing the foreign military 

sales case on 6 August, Kuwaiti officials had a choice-either use U.S. 

selection procedures or select a contractor themselves and have the 

Corps negotiate with that firm. In signing the foreign militat")' sales case, 

they agreed to use U.S. contracting procedures for the architect-engineer 

contract. Kuwaiti officials would have some input in the selection 

process, but Lhe United States would make the final determination. 

Despite this provision, some Kuwaiti officials later tried to modify the 

selection process to which they had agreed. The Minister of Defence 

indicated that he wanted to revie'vv and approve all contractor selections. 

tvlinistry officials wanted the Corps to go through all the steps in its 

selection process but allow them to make the final determination. Corps 

officials explained that if the)' agreed to this, all the cffon they had put 

into the selection process would be wasted. 
An Iraqi T-55 tank inside the remains of an aircraft hangar at 

Al-Jaber Air Basei below, Building 9 at Al-Jaber Air Base. 
204 AFTER DESERT STORM 

Under the foreign military sales case, Kuwaiti officials could participate in each step of the selection process, but they did not control the 

selection. For example, they could participate in the Corps' technical 

evaluation board, but they could not determine vvhich firm was the most 

qualified. lf the Kuwaitis wameclthe contract to go to a specific contractor, they had to provide for this in the foreign military sales case before 

the selection process began. If the Corps allowed the Kuwaitis to select 

the contractor at this point, especially a poor contractor, it would be 

heavily criticized. The Corps had a reputation for implementing a fair 

and honest. selection process, Captain Kiesling observed, and its procedures were "above reproach." Yet Kuwaiti officials were distressed to find 

that even though they were paying for the work, they would not have the 

authority to make the final selection)! 

Defense Reconstruction Assistance Office, Kuwait Emergency 

Recovery Office, and ministry representatives spent many hours trying 

to resolve the thorny issue of contractor selection. At a meeting on 11 

August, Ahmed Al-Fahad continued to insist that the Minister of Defence 

reserved the right to approve all contract awards and would not be 

bound to the prequalified firm that the United States had selected. 

Kelly reminded Al-Fahadthat the ministers representatives had participated in a selection board meeling on 22 july 1991 at which the board 

developed the list of construction firms that had been prequalifiecl to 

receive requests for proposals. At that time, those representatives had not 

objected to either the prequalification criteria or the short list of firms that 

the board selected. Kelly observed that the Corps had issued requests for 

proposals to the prequalified firms on 9 August 1991, so the decision about 

the prequalHied lists had already been made. The U.S. government had to 

use contracting procedures that ensured fair and open competition. Any 

change or reversal of its contracting process at this late elate, he added, 

could embarrass the U.S. governrnenL. At this point, the Kuwaitis relented. 

The approval of the $105 million foreign military sales case marked 

the return lo normal U.S. contracting procedures for the Kuwaiti eff'on. 

The urgency had diminished. The Corps could now describe the scope 

of work more accurately than it had clone with the civil infrastructure 

work. The Kuwaitis were now able to take into account other factors 

such as their desire to distribute the '..vork among various coalition counlries. Also, fo r the first time, their costs would exceed their revenue, so 

they had to borrow money for lheir projects and carefully prioritize 

those projects. At the same time, the new agreement gave the United 

States the opportunity to involve other U.S. firrns.32 

The scope of the agreement included damage survey work along 

with a rough estimate of the cost Lo repair or replace facilities. lt also pro-
SUPPORTING KUWAIT'S MINISTRY OF DEFENCE 205 

vided for emergency repairs designed Lo restore fac ilities to provide minimal operational and living standards. Finally, the agreement included 

master planning to determine the scope and price of the phase ll longterm reconstruction work. 

The Corps narrovved the initial list of prospective architect-engineer 

contractors to 16. All these l'irms had excellent reputations, had built airfields, and had worked in the Middle East. A selection board at the 

Transatlantic Division narrowed the list of 16 firms to 6 and ranked them. 

Stanley Consultants, lnc., of Muscatine, Iowa, received the highest rating. 

Though a small firm, Stanley had successfully worked on water supply and 

waste water treatment facilities in Egypt, Yemen, and Saudi Arabia and had 

performed design work for the Transatlantic Division on air bases in Oman. 

The Corps awarded an architect-engineer letter comract to Stanley 

and its joim venture partner, Associated Kuwait Office, on 17 August. 

Under this $8.75 million arrangement, the firm would perform site survey, master planning, and design services. On 21 August, the Corps 

directed Stanley to prepare a rough scope of work for the phase n longterm reconstruction. A planning team with contractor and Transatlantic 

Division personnel arrived in Kuwait on 28 August. It surveyed 150 to 

200 buildings at each ai.r base. 

Stanley conducted a preliminary review to develop a master plan, 

which listed all the buildings in different facilities that the Kuwait Air 

Force needed or vvould need in the fmure. The contractor had sent out 

a questionnaire to Kuwait Air Force officials to determine the service~ 

needs.33 Stanley was scheduled to present the phase 11 master plan and 

list of facilities to the Defense Recovery Assistance Office, the Kuwait 

Emergency Recovery Office, and Lhe Ministry of Defence in early 

November. The approved plan would be the basis for determining the 

schedule and scope of phase l1 work. 

Meanwhile, the emergency reconstruction projects for the ministry 

continued on schedule. Work on the Ministry of Defence headquarters 

met the 15 August beneficial occupancy date (when the work was 99 percent complete). The debris had been cleared from Ali Al-Salem Air Base. 

The temporary air traffic control tower at that base was 99 percent completed. Emergency repairs at Ras AI-Qalayah Navy Base were 98 percent 

complete, although vvork continued on the chilled water piping system.34 

Foreign Military Sales Case for Phase II Air Base Work 

In late August, Pentagon officials formally notified Congress of 

their plans to execute a $315 mill ion foreign military sales case for the 
206 AFTER DESERT STORM 

phase 11 long-term reconstruction of Kuwait. Congress raised no 

objections.35 l-lowever, by October the prospect of having the Corps 

manage the long-term reconstruction of the t•vo air bases vvas becoming less likely. Kelly glumly reported that the entire foreign military 

sales construction program was "at risk. " There were tvvo thorny 

issues. First, the Minister of Defence insisted on making the final 

se lection of the contractor for the long-term reconstruction despite the 

written agreement that contract awards would be in accordance with 

U.S. laws and procedures. Second, his ministry had recently indicated 

that it would scale back the role of the Corps and its contractors in the 

phase li air base reconstruction to less than $30 million. Neither Kelly 

nor Corps leaders believed involvement at this reduced level would be 

wonhwhile. 

Ambassador Gnehm and General Kelly held firm on the issues of 

source selection and maintaining the original level of Corps involvement. 

l<elly was prepared to limit U.S. involvement to the $105 million phase 

I work and forego the phase II work if necessary. Yet he reported to the 

Secretary of the Army that he did not believe the situation was "irretrievable." Gnehm continued to maintain that the Corps had a valid role 

in helping Kuwait rebuild its defenses and supported Kelly wholeheanedly.36 The siwation improved after a meeting on 28 October in which 

Gnehm, Kell y, and the Minister of Defence discussed the impasse over 

the procedures for se lecting construction comractors. The Kuwaitis 

reluctantly agreed that U.S. regulations would govern the comractor 

selection process for the phase ll air base work. 

Both sides agreed on a procedure that would allow the Ministry of 

Defence to provide a list of acceptable Kuwaiti joint venture firms for 

each air base. The pre-approved Kuwaiti firms could form a consortium. 

The U.S. contractors who bid on the work would have to enLer into a 

joint venture with a consonium of l<uwaiti firms. The renewed spirit of 

cooperation apparently spread quickly through the ministry. l<elly 

reponed that after his meeting with the minister, the working level meetings between the Corps and the ministry$ engineering staff had suddenly become "both productive and congenial. "37 

Kelly informed Livingstone that the l\l[inistry of Defence planned to 

provide only one Kuwaiti finn or consortium of smaller firms to form 

joim ventures with competing U.S. firn1s for each air base. Such an 

approach, he conceded, "makes sense from their perspective." Kuwaiti 

orncials wanted to spread the work among the l<uwaiti firms that had 

survived the lraqi occupation to help restore the coumrys vveaken.ecl 

construction industry. They also wamed Lo ensure the selection of 

Kuwaiti firms with good reputations. 
SUPPORTING JfUWAIT'S MINISTRY OF DEFENCE 207 

This approach, however, had drawbacks for the United States. 

Finding qualified Kuwaiti firms to perform the work could be difficult. 

As a result of the Iraqi occupation, many Kuwaiti construction firms no 

longer existed or existed only on paper because their equipment had 

been damaged, destroyed, or moved out of the country. With only a single Kuwaiti source for a joint venture, few U.S. firms would be willing to 

compete for the work, and the decreased competition would drive up 

the cost of the work. Also, if the joint venture partnership did not work 

well together, some U.S. firms might later file claims against the U.S. 

government.38 

Moreover, as the single source, the Kuwaiti firm or consortium 

would have to negotiate with each American firm seeking the contract. 

Livingstone worried that this situation could lead to graft and kickbacks. 

Instead, she favored a compromise that would set aside a certain amount 

of the air base work to be contracted by the Kuwaiti government.39 

The United States agreed to split the phase l air base work so the 

Ministry of Defence could award its own contract for 30 percent of the 

value of the construction effort at each air base. The Department of 

Defense would award the contract or contracts for the remaining 70 percent. Dividing the work would result in the U.S. contractor doing most of 

the temporary new construction, with the Kuwaiti contractor doing the 

repair work. The defense ministry, however, requested that the United 

States manage all air base contracts, including the Kuwaiti contracts. 

In addition, the Ministry of Defence requested that a different 

American contractor be awarded work at each air base. This would preclude a single contractor doing the work at both air bases. U.S. officials 

agreed to continue to follow the approved strategy of prohibiting contractors already working in Kuwait, such as Brown and Root and Blount 

International, from working at both air bases to allow other U.S. companies to compete. 

For phase II work, ministry ofncials also requested that the 

Department of De!'ense award a U.S. contract to perform, as a minimum, 

all F-18 related construction, to include new facilities, aircraft shelters, 

and utility restoration. The ministry would hire Kuwaiti firms to do the 

remaining work. Details of the phase ll arrangements were tied to the 

approval of the master plan, which ministry officials were reviewing, and 

the approval of the phase ll foreign military sales case. I<elly optimistically reported that he now had a process that would satisfy both parties.40 

Meanwhile, in December, Corps leaders decided to establish the 

Kuwait Program Office to execute the air base reconstruction. (Chart 8) 

Col. David E. Peixotto, who had replaced Locurcio in November, would 

command this small office. Peixotto, with masters degrees in civil engi-
Chart 8- Kuwait Program Office 

OFACE OFTHE COMMANDER 

Commander, COL 

Deputy Commander* 

I 

I I I I 

ENGINEERING 

Support Contracting Project SERVICES 

Services Services Management Technical Services 

Contract Administration 

I 

I I I AHMED AL-JABER II 

Resident Office 

All AL-SALEM I 

Resident Office 

*Deputy Commander dual hatted as Chief, Project Management 
SUPPORTING KuwAIT's MINISTRY OF DEFENCE 209 

neering and business administration from Stanford and Long Island 

University, had served as a military assistant to the Secretary of the Army 

for Civil Works before taking command of the Louisville District. 

Because of the uncertainty about the phase 11 work, Peixouo decided to 

continue bringing in Corps members on temporary duty rather than as 

a permanent change of station. The only exceptions would be a few 

senior personnel such as the chiefs of contracting, programs, and logistics and the resident engineers. The Kuwait Program Office, with roughly 40 people, included a contract administration organization, a program/project management organization with a resident engineer at each 

air base, an auorney, a design manager, and a small support organization 

with logistics and information management. Peixotto reported directly to 

the Transatlantic Division commander. The division provided financial 

and technical support. Peixotto auended Ambassador Gnchms country 

team meetings, advised him, and kept him informed, but the 

Ambassador was not in Peixottos chain of command." I 

At a 19 December 1991 meeting with Colonel Peixouo, Ahmed AIFahad informed Corps represemat ives that the ministry wanted to continue giving 70 percent of the work to U.S. firms and 30 percent to 

Kuwaiti firms for phase ll under the proposed $315 million foreign military sales case. This meeting effectively ended discussions about a joim 

venture approach for phase 11.42 

With Livingstone$ approval then, the U.S. government and the 

Ministry of Defence agreed Lo split the contract value of the work at each 

air base between U.S. and Kuwaiti firms. The Kuwaitis would primarily 

perform repair work, while the United States tackled new construction. 

Corps officials maintained that this strategy was a sound alternative to 

the joint venture approach. lt satisfied the requirement that 30 percent 

of the comract value be spent for Kuwaiti materials and services and 

allowed the Kuwaiti government to award contracts using its own procedures. This approach also relieved American bidders from the requirement to negotiate joint vemure arrangements and simplified the process 

for evaluating proposals and awarding the U.S. contracts. 

As the details of phase ll contracting were refined, an amendment to 

the phase I foreign military sales case, which would reduce its value from 

$105 million to $80.74 million, circulated at the Pentagon.43 

Construction Contracts for Phase I 

In january 1992, the Corps awarded two construction contracts for 

phase I, representing most of the new facilities. Combined, those two 
210 AFTER DESERT STORM 

contracts constil uted roughly 70 percent of the value of the phase I work. 

On behalf of the Ministry of Defence, on 16 january, the TransaLlanlic 

Division awarded a $24.1 million contract to a joint venture of 

Morrison-Knudson, an Idaho-based firm with worldwide operations, and 

Mohammed 1\. Kharafi, a large Kuwaiti firm, to repair Ahmed Al-jaber Air 

Base and build new temporary facilities to support F-18 aircraft. The contract amount later increased to $32 million, primarily because of additional work requested by the ministry. Facilities included three F-18 

maintenance hangars with l2 maintenance shops, three open aircraft 

shelters, two closed aircraft shelters, and a concrete apron measuring 500 

by 356 meters (the length of five football fields strung end to end). 

Morrison-Knudson and Kharafi also restored the utilities that had 

been knocked out by coalition bombing. The joint venture firm rehabilitated the sewage and water pumping stations, an underground communications cemer, an avionics building, and a guard house. 

At peak operations, the contractors had on site t vvo batch plants that 

produced roughly 180 cubic meters of concrete every hour-a load of 

fresh concrete every ll minutes. On the apron were two open aircraft 

shelters capable of housing 40 F-l8s and two closed aircraft shelters 

capable of accommodating 20 F-18s each. 

The Corps awarded an $18.5 million contract for emergency construction at Ali At-Salem Air Base to the joint venture Firm George A. 

Fuller and American International Contractor Incorporated of Arlington, 

Virginia (Fuller/AICl). The value of this contract later rose to $25 million. The firm built 12 new buildings to include warehouses for aircraft 

and repair pans, helicopter maintenance hangars, administrative offices, 

substations, and a water pump plant. 

Fuller/AlCl restored commercial power at Ali At-Salem Air Base on 

l3 january, but not without some anxious momems When orficials 

turned the switch to bring the power on, they saw rising plumes of 

smoke in the distance. Much to their relief, the smoke came from the 

other side of the base where Bangladeshi soldiers had exploded ordnance 

at the same moment. 

In addition to emergency repairs to restore facilities to a minimal 

level of operations, the foreign military sales agreement provided for a 

damage survey of facilities at the air bases. lL also provided for planning 

and engineering work to cletern1inc the requirements for long-term construction and the development of designs for permanem facilities needed to support current and future operations. Corps personnel helped 

KuwaiL's Air Force idemify its requirements and sta)' within its budget. 

jim Ruyak, resident engineer for Ali At-Salem Air Base, later conceded 

that coordinating with both the Corps' customer (Military Engineering 
SUPPORTING KuwAIT's MINISTRY OF DEFENCE 211 

Repair work at Al-Jaber Air Base 

Projects) and the user (Kuwait's Air Force) was nol always easy. The 

Corps had faced similar frustrations coordinating with the U.S. and the 

Israeli Air Forces when it constructed the air bases in the Negev. 

Two months after the Corps awarded the two major phase l construeLion contracts, the Kuwaiti governmem awarded its own construction contracts. On 1 April1992, the Kuwaiti government awarded a $10.5 million 

contract to AL-Fulaij United Group to rehabilitate 39 buildings at Ali AtSalem Air Base and construct a new petroleum, oils and lubricants (POL) 

warehouse, helicopter maintenance hangar, and microwave tower. 

Kuwaiti officials also awarded a $12.1 million contract to Ahmadiah 

Trading and Contracting Company to build new facilities at Ahmed Aljaber Air Base such as warehouses, administration buildings, a Hawk 

(Brilish aircraft) maintenance hangar, and other maintenance buildings. 

Ahmadiah was also rehabilitating 32 buildings and roads, as well as 

street lighting in the main base area. 

The Corps administered both contracts for the Kuwaiti government 

through an international contracting formaL known as Federation 

lnternationale Des lngenieurs-Conseils (FlDlC), advanced by the 

International Federation of Consulting Engineers. An FlDlC contract 

was between the employer and the contractor. A third party, in this case 
212 AFTER DESERT STORM 

the Army Corps of Engineers, was the "engineer" who acted as a neutral 

party to resolve any disputes between the employer, in this case the 

Kuwaitis, and the contractor. The engineer was similar to a contracting 

office r, except a contracting officer was party to the contract and responsible for paying the contractor. 

Other contracts awarded under the air base program included a $5.3 

million contract to an American and Saudi Arabian joint venture firm, 

Groves and Tamimi, for airfield lighting at both air bases. Finally. 

Engineering Services Company installed a safety barrier system at both 

bases under a $1.7 million contract.44 

Problems With Phase I Contracts 

The phase 1 work soon encountered serious problems. Corps and 

l<uwaiti representatives had not had enough time to develop an effective 

management plan and clearly define their respective roles and responsibilities. Therefore, representatives from Military Engineering Projects 

and the Kuwait Air Force were assigned to each air base to work on a 

daily basis with Corps resident engineers and their staffs. Corps project 

managers were assigned to the Kuwait Program Office. The parties 

involved met each week for coordination. Colonel Peixotto met regularly with Fahad Al-jaleel. ln addition to coordination meetings among 

senior leaders, Corps representatives met regularly with their counterpans in Military Engineering Projects and the Kuwait Air Force. This 

intensive coordination helped the two governments get the projects 

through some difficu lt periods. Initiall y, Corps personnel were not sure 

who spoke for the Kuwaiti government on specific project requirements-the Kuwait Air Force or Military Engineering Projects. Military 

Engineering Projects officials indicated that they were the only ones with 

the authority to give directions to the Corps and that they had to approve 

all l<uwait Air Force requests. 

Delays were caused by unforseen conditions at the work sites such 

as the lack of electricity, the overall poor condition of the utility systems, 

and unexploded ordnance. The large amounts of ordnance on the 

ground had made it difficu lt for the Corps and its comractors to assess 

damage accurately. The poor site conditions increased the contractor:S 

cost, forcing Corps ofricials to modify the contract. 

To further complicate mauers, the Kuwait Air Force requested many 

changes that drastically modified the original scope of work after the 

contractors had already begun their work. The initial concept for phase 

I was to do only the emergency repairs necessary to make the air bases 
SUPPORTING KUWAITS MINISTRY OF DEFENCE 213 

minimally operational. However, the Kuwait Air Force detennined that 

it needed permanent repairs and greater operational capability. The 

Corps and the Kuwaitis had reached agreement on the facilities and budget in july 1991, but the Corps did not award the contracts untiljanuary 

1992, nearly a year after the liberation. During that time, the preferences 

of Kuwait Air Force officials shifted from temporary emergency repairs 

to a more permanent solution that would better meet their operational 

needs. They wanted the contractors to perform more work than had 

originally been scheduled. The Ministry of Defences definition of emergency facilities apparently differed from the United States' concept. Yet 

the Kuwaiti government had neither approved the changes nor provided enough additional funds to cover the changes45 Spiraling costs due 

to changes requested by the host nation was a familiar theme. During the 

Saudi construction program in the 1980s, Saudi officials requested 

numerous change orders, particularly at the Ministry of Defense and 

Aviation Complex and at the Khamis Mushayt Cantonment, that 

increased costs significanlly.46 

As with its earlier Saudi and Israeli air base work, the Corps now 

faced the challenge of an expanding scope of work. The changes in 

scope and siting that the Kuwait Air Force requested forced the Corps 

to direct its contractors to stop work temporarily. ln j une 1992, the 

Corps suspended contractor work on l3 facilities at Ahmed Al-jaber 

Air Base and 5 facilities at Ali Al-Salem Air Base. The Corps wanted to 

keep the contractors from doing unnecessary work while it renegotiated the actual requirements, schedule, and costs with the Ministry of 

Defence and the Kuwait Air Force. After intense negotiations, whi.ch 

culminated in a meeting between Ambassador Gnehm and the Minister 

of Defence, the parties agreed to a revised scope of work. ln August 

1992, the Kuwaiti government provided an additional $14 million to 

cover the expanded scope of work, increasing the total amount of the 

phase 1 foreign military sales case to $95 million, only $10 million less 

than the original estimate.47 

The contractor al Ahmed AI-Jaber Air Base was slow lo mobilize and 

slow to submit the safety plan and design/build plan required in the contract. As a result, the work schedule slipped 45 to 60 days. The contractor claimed that the site had not been cleared of unexploded ordnance. 

ln add ition, lhe Ministry of Electricity refused to repair the 11-kilovolt 

high voltage system. By late June, the contractor had cornpleled only 26 

percent of the work and was 60 days behind schedule. 

The contractor at Ali At-Salem Air Base had also fallen 60 days behind 

schedule with only 24 percent of the work completed. He was sl.ow to 

mobilize because of problems securing visas and base access passes for his 
214 AFTER DESERT STORM 

workers. The contractor auributedthe delay to the unforeseen rocky conditions in the worker camp area and the stop work orders. 

With all the delays and expanded scope, emergency construction at 

the air bases took 12 months instead of the amicipatecl 6. The Corps 

notiriecl Kuwait Air Force officials of the revised sched ule. The Air Force 

could stan occupying facilities in late August 1991, they reponed, but 

the last facility would not be completed and turned over until late 

November 1991. Kuwait Air Force officials, though disappointed, 

accepted the revised schedule:•s 

In October 1991, Military Engineering Projects and the Department 

of Defense agreed that the Corps would provide phase li planning and 

engineering, construction, and construction managemem services for 

the two air bases. ln November, the Corps presented its master plan for 

the long-term reconstruction of the air bases to the Kuwait Air Force. 

The Corps presemed a $315 million fore ign military sales case fo r phase 

ll long-term reconstruction to the Ministry of Defence and Military 

Engineering Projects. 49 

Political pressures had forced the Kuwaitis to give the Corps the 

phase I work. Military Engineering Projects officials preferred to handle 

the work themselves and did not believe they needed the Corps' assistance. The defense work differed from the civil reconstruction where the 

need for the Corps' assistance was obvious. The reluctance of the 

Kuwaitis to give the United States the defense work created problems. 

The agreement that Kelly had signed with the Kuwaitis provided for an 

acceptable level of authority and responsibility, but the Kuwaitis later 

rejected that agreemenl. This was a cominuing challenge for Peixotto. 

The Kuwaitis wameclto retain the decisionmaking authority for all matters, but they also wanted the Corps to assume all the responsibility for 

accomplishing the work on time and within budget. Colonel Peixouo 

observed, however, that Corps officials did not allow the work to stop 

while awaiting consensus decisions. Occasionally, they made the decisions necessary to keep the work on schedule. The Corps believed it had 

the authority as comracting officer and the engineer (for the contracts 

awarded by the Kuwaitis) to make the necessary decisions. Yet the issue 

remained a source of friction between the Kuwaitis and the Corps. For 

phase ll , the Kuwaitis offered the Corps the mission without giving it 

adequate authority to execute that mission.50 

At a meeting in Kuwait in August, Secretary Stone urged the Minister 

of Defence to continue with phase ll as planned. Upon his return, Stone 

wrote to the Sheikh, "lt is most distressing to me that the Government of 

Kuwait is considering ending the Corps' involvement in the air base 

reconstruction. l write this letter to you to stress our wish to remain 
SUPPORTING KUWAIT'S MINISTRY OF DEFENCE 

Colonel Peixotto, far left, and Ambassador Gnehm, center, tour 

AI-Jaber Air Base. 

215 

involved in military reconstruction and our confidence that we can agree 

on terms of mutual advantage."5L In September, Gnehm and Peixouo 

meL with the Minister of Defence to discuss possible Corps involvement 

in phase ll. The Ambassador reaffirmed Stones position that the limited 

role offered by the Ministry of Defence was unacceptable and reiterated 

the importance of the phase n work to both governments. 52 

Despite repeated urgings from Ambassador Gnehm and Secretary 

Stone throughout the summer of 1992, Kuwaiti officials ultimately 

decided to handle the contracting for the extensive permanent reconstruction of the air bases themselves. They never signed the foreign military sales case for phase ll. The struggle in the defense work had 

strained the relationship between the U.S. military and the Ministry of 

Defence. The differences between American and Kuwaiti business 

philosophies, which had become increasingly apparent by the summer 

of 1992, created more problems with the defense work than with the 

civil reconstruction. The Corps' business philosophy of "fair and reasonable" pay for work ran counter to the Middle Eastern philosophy of 

keeping comractor costs as low as possible and not paying the contractor for changes Ll1at the user made. 
216 AFTER DESERT STORM 

The underlying problem, hovvever, was the Minisll)' of Defences 

reluctance to surrender any amhority or control to the United States. 

With the civil work, Kuwait had specifically asked the Corps for assistance and had given that agency the necessary comractual and financial 

authority. The situation with the defense work was different. U.S. mil itary officials, including the Corps, were disappointed that they wou ld 

not have the permanent reconstruction work, especially given their concern about assuring that the facilities could accommodate U.S. military 

aircraft supporting the Kuwaitis. Six years later, the phase II work had 

not yet been performed, and the Kuwait Air Force continued to operate 

the two bases using the temporary facilities that the Corps and its contractors had built. 
Support to U.S. Troops 

B)' early May 1991, the U.S. Army was ready [0 withdraw the lst 

Brigade, 3d Armored Division, from southern Iraq. The soldiers 

needed a secure environment where they could prepare for redeployment. Military leaders gave the Kuwait Emergency Recovery Office 

just 24 hours to rind suitable facilities for the brigade. The Kuwait 

Emergency Recovery Office and Ddense Reconstruction Assistance 

Offi ce staffs searched for a complex large enough to accommodate a 

brigade, remote enough to provide security, and that also included a 

training area. 

U.S. forces could not use Kuwaiti military installations because they 

had been too heavily damaged, so Kelly and Locurcio focused on 

schools, warehouses, and other facilities. After inspecting several warehouses and discussing the matter with government officials, Corps personnel recommended the Doha Village Complex, approximately 15 

miles west of Kuwait City. The strategically located complex, part of 

which was currently occupied by British soldiers, offered 16 large warehouses with 1.4 million square feet of space and several paved areas for 

equipment. LL Col. Albert F. Kaminsky from Kelly:S staff recommended 

several sites, including Doha, to Kelly. 

Before the Iraqi invasion, the Kuwaitis had used the warehouses at 

Doha for commercial slOrage. During the occupation, Iraqi soldiers had 

looted and vandalized the buildings, leaving behind over 500,000 cubic 

yards of debris. Moreover, the warehouses, which had not been designed 

for military housing, lacked basic life suppon systems. Corps members 

examining the facilities noted the need to expand the electric, water, air 

conditioning, shower, and sewerage facilities to make troops comfortable 

in summer. 

Meanwhile, during a visit with the Crown Prince in early May, 

Secretary Cheney agreed that the United States would maintain Task 

Force Victory-a brigade-size force of roughly 5,000 soldiers-in 

Kuwait for up to 60 days until the Kuwaiti government could provide its 

own security. Cheney insisted that these troops be housed in "comfortable" facilities. The Crown Prince concurred and also agreed that his 
218 AFTER DESERT STORM 

governmem would pa)' all the costs associated with maintaining these 

forces from mid-June through September 1991.1 

When the project first arose on 7 ~~lay, the lst Brigade was scheduled 

to move into Doha within two weeks, followed by the 11th Armored 

Cavalry Regiment on L5 June. The Ministry of Defence, however, had no 

contracting mechanism in place that would meet these time constraints. 

The 22cl Support Command, which was responsible for housing the 

troops, did not have the necessary contracting expertise. At the direction 

of General Pagonis, Kelly directed the Kuwait EmergenC)' Recovery Office 

to award and administer contracts to renovate the facilities at Doha. 

U.S. officials, however, could not readily identify funding for such 

contracts. The support command considered using money provided 

under Section 607 A of the Foreign Assistance Act, but such funds could 

only be used for civil purposes. No preexisting foreign military sales 

agreement could cover the Doha work. The approval process for a new 

l'oreign militmy sales case could take 30 clays or more. The support command sought approval from the Secretary of the Army to use Operations 

and Maimenance, Army (OMA) funds and have the Kuwaiti government 

reimburse the U.S. government later through a foreign military sales 

case. Corps members questioned whether such funds were appropriate 

for this type of project. 

On 17 May, Kellys staff formally requested $20 million in operations 

and maintenance funds to repair facilities at Doha along with the 6th 

Brigade Camp (an installation northwest of Kuwait City) and a nearby 

firing range. The Army Staff approved this request on 20 May. The 

approval had been delayed at the Army Staff level for three days while 

the Army General Counsel grappled with the question of how to reimburse Army operations and maintenance funds from a l'oreign military 

sales agreement.2 

U.S. combat forces housed at Doha needed a training site to maintain 

their combat readiness. After a review of all available facilities, Kuwait 

Ann)'S 6th Btigade Camp was selected. The camp had been heavily damaged during the war, and many of its buildings had collapsed. It would 

require extensive repairs before it could properly house and support an 

Army mechanized battalion, a large direct support element, and a small 

I Kaminsky interv, pp. 4-5; memo, Kelly for Assistant Under Sccrctar)' of Defense for 

ll'lilitary Projects and Engmcering Support, 3 Jul 1991, Kuwait Reconstruction, Troop 

Support: DRAO Files. 

l f\lsg, Cdr 22d SUPCOI\1 to DAI\10- AOC, 031730Z ivla)' 199 I, DRAO files; 21 Ma)' 

1991, Kuwait Reconstruction: Opcrntton Positi\·c Force, Doha Warehouse Information, 

OACF Reference Files. 
SUPPORT TO U.S. TROOPS 219 

training staff. The 22d Support Command asked the Corps to award and 

administer the necessary contracts. 

The buildings at the camp had to be cleaned and repaired so the 

Army could house and feed the baualion for 6 to 12 months. This task 

included removing debris; installing windows and doors; supplying 

electrical power connection from generator sets; and providing latrines, 

shower stalls, and washstands. The Corps asked several of its contractors (Brown and Root, Kharafi, and Khudair) if they could mobilize the 

number of workers required for this project without affecting their current workload. Khudair was the only contractor that could respond 

immediately.3 

On 23 May, the Corps awarded an urgent letter contract to Khudair, 

not to exceed $6.9 million, for emergency repairs to billeting areas at the 

6th Brigade Camp and for essential life suppon. The contraelOr began 

work the following day. At the same time, the Corps awarded an urgent 

letter contract to Kharafi, not to exceed $ 12 million, to install essential life 

support systems at Doha. The contract work included air conditioning, 

electrical wiring, and lighting.4 

While the contractors mobilized, engineer troops helped prepare the 

facilities. Soldiers from the 864th Engineer Battalion constructed a 

chapel; PX facility; telephone center; and morale, welfare, and recreation 

(MWR) facility at Doha, along with seven 64 x 122-foot tents. The units 

electricians brought in power for telephones and outlets to improve the 

quality of life for the soldiers. Later the engineers constructed a 1,200-

foot security fence, seven guard towers, and a tank range.5 

iraqi soldiers had sLOlen many of the lights and electrical fixtures, 

and severed many electrical lines. The Corps had its contractor, Kharafi, 

on site within 24 hours. Kbarafi began debris removal literally overnight, 

and restored elecu"icity within two clays. Extensive bombing also had 

caused two breaks in major water lines. With the help of the 23cl 

Engineer Brigade and Shand Construction, water was running within 

three days. 

The next challenge was to install within 30 days badly needed air conditioners in all the warehouses. During his initial visit, General Kelly had 

J Information Paper, "6th Brigade Area Repair," 28 Ma)' 1991, Kuwait Reconstruction: 

U.S. Presence, DRAO Files; DRAO Information Paper, Subj: Arm>' Base Camp, 15 t-.11ay 

1991, Kuwait Reconstruction: Operation Positive Force, OACE Reference Files. 

-+ t\ lemo. Kelly for Ass•stam Under Secretary of Defense for tvliluar)' Projects and 

Engineering Suppon, 3 Jul 1991, Kuwait Reconstruction: Troop Support, DRAO Files; 

memo, jesse M. Ross to ~lohammed A. Kharafi, 23 Ma)' 1991, Kuwait Reconstruction: 

Operation Positive Force, Doha Warehouse, OACE Reference Files. 

'>Griffin, ·'Pacemakers 111 Southwest Asia," p. I 5. 
220 AFTER DESERT STORM 

Air conditioning units at Doha Blackhorse Base 

discovered firsthand just how hot and uncomfortable the warehouses could 

be without air conditioning. The Kuwait Emergency Recovery Office gave 

Kharafi a notice to proceed on 29 May and directed the firm to provide air 

conditioning in all the warehouses at Doha by 30 June before the onset of 

the most oppressive summer heat-the Iraqis had stolen every air conditioner in Kuwait. This meant installing over 200 12-ton units that would 

provide each soldier 100 square feet of air conditioned sleeping space. The 

contract also included installing 3,000 electrical outlets, providing temporary generator power and perimeter security lighting, and replacing field 

latrines and wooden showers with permanent, prefabricated units. 

Kharafi began purchasing units throughout Europe and Southwest 

Asia wh ile the Army Directorate of Engineering and Housing for Doha and 

Corps members helped the comractor develop a phased plan for installing 

them. Warehouses were quickly transformed from spartan storage areas 

into military barracks as the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment arrived at 

Doha. At peak, Kharafi had 500 workers on site 14 to 16 hours a clay, 7 

days a week. The warehouses were fully air conditioned by 28 June.6 

6Mar>' Allingham, "KERO moves fast to help soldiers in Saudi," Engineer Update , v. 

15, no. 8, Aug l991, p. 3; tvlary Allingham and Ron Ruffennach, "KERO helps troops 

nnd comforts of home," Transatlantic News, V. 6, no. 6,Jun-Jul 1991, pp. 6- 7; Maj. Gen. 

Patrick Kelly, telephone conversation with author, 19 Aug 1997. 
SUPPORT TO U.S. TROOPS 221 

Soldiers relaxing at the 6th Brigade Army Base at Doha 

Funding the renovations at Doha presented special problems. Work 

at the 6th Brigade Camp and the live firing range was classified as 

"repair. " Convening the Doha warehouse complex to a cantonment area, 

however, required both new construction and repair work. New construction included providing water, sewer, and electrical systems; latrine 

and shower facilities; security and lighting; air conditioning for sleeping 

areas; and morale, welfare, and recreation facilities. Repair work consisted of clearing debris and repairing or replacing doors, windows, electrical equipment, and fire suppression S)'Stems. 

When Army officials reviewed the 23 May contract, they concluded 

that most of the specified work at Doha was actually new construction. 

Therefore, the use of Army operations and maintenance funds was not 

appropriate. To avoid potential Legal problems, they concluded, the 

Army needed construction authorization and $20.5 million to replace 

the operations and maintenance funds that had a lready been obligated. 

Officials from the Corps; the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the 

Army for Installations, Logistics and Environment; the Office of 

Management and Budget; and the Office of the Secretary of Defense 

decided to use emergency construction authority provided in Section 
222 AFTER DESERT STORM 

2808, Title 10, U.S. Code, and use uncommitted Military Construction, 

Army (MCA) funds already appropriated from the Defense Cooperation 

Account-a special account in the U.S. Treasury that had been established by the March 1991 Persian Gulf War Supplemental Appropriation 

Bill to reimburse the Defense Department with contributions from foreign nations. Later, they would ask the Kuwaiti government to deposit 

more money in the Defense Cooperation Account since it had agreed to 

pay for these facilities.7 

Section 2808 gave the Secretary of Defense the authority to expend 

unobligated military construction funds immediately after notifying 

Congress, but only after the President had declared a national emergency. President Bush had issued an executive order on 24 November 

1990, declaring a national emergency and invoking emergency construction (2808) authority. 

On 12 June, the Secretary of the Army formally requested emergency 

authorization of a $20.5 million construction project to upgrade warehouse facilities at Doha under the provisions of Section 2808. The Kuwaiti 

government had agreed to deposit additional funds in the Defense 

Cooperation Account to reimburse the funds that had been withdrawn to 

upgrade the facilities for U.S. troops. The Secretary of Defense approved 

the request. On 20 July, Deputy Secretary of Defense Donald]. Atwood 

made the mandatory notification to the chairmen of the Senate and House 

Armed Services and the Senate and House Approptiations committees. a 

Funding was not the only controversial issue. Pentagon officials 

questioned why U.S. contractors were not performing the repairs at 

Doha and questioned the urgency of the work. Kelly responded that 

the two prime American contractors who had been solicited were 

already committed to other projects. Considering the magnitude of the 

work that would be required to make troop living conditions "comfortable," as Secretary Cheney had directed, Kelly continued, time was 

critical. With the rapidly approaching summer season, living condi7 Army Information Paper, 31 May 1991, Kuwait Reconstruction: Facilities for U.S. 

Forces (Doha), Office of History Files; msg, DAMO- ODO-AOC to Cdr 22d SUPCOM, 

010250Zjun 1991, ibid. 

SExecutive Order 12734, 24 Nov 1990; memo, Secretary M. P. W. Stone for the 

Secretary of Defense, l2jun 1991, Kuwait Reconstruction: Troop Support, DRAO Files; 

memo, Donald Atwood to Rep. Jamie L. Witten, 20 Jul 1991, Kuwait Reconstruction: 

Operation Positive Force, OACE Reference Files; DAEN-ZCM, Executive Summary, 9 

Aug 1991, OACE Reference Files, Kuwait Reconstruction: Operation Positive Force, 

Doha Warehouse Information. Corps headquarters sent the $20.5 million to the 

Transatlantic Division, but the division never used the money because the Kuwaiti government paid the contractors directly. 
SUPPORT 7V US TROOPS 223 

tions inside the unventilated metal structures would become unbearable. Temperature could rise to over 130 degrees Fahrenheit. 

Moreover, repairs to the Doha sanitation system would require 

more money than currently authorized. The original requirement for 

supporllng 5,000 troops at Doha included an enlarged sanitation system, but because of the cost of air conditioning, there were only 

enough funds for temporary latrine and shower facilities. As troops 

continued to use the temporary facilities that drained into the existing 

storm sewer system, it became clear that the sanitation system, 

designed for a few hundred people at most, would be inadequate. 

Kelly warned that the sanitary situation could become a significant 

health hazard. The only satisfaclOry solution was to reinstate the original design of an enlarged sanitation system with drainage to a collection lagoon, at a cost of $5 million to be added to the cost of air conditioning and funded from the $20 million 2808 authority.9 

By early july, work at the 6th Brigade area and the initial improvements at the Doha complex were nearly complete. Kelly asked the Kuwaiti 

government to take over the two contracts and pay the contractors directly for Lheir work. He also asked the Ministry of Defence to award two additional contracts needed to support U.S. forces: one for showers, latrines, a 

sewer system, and additional air conditioning at Doha and another for 

general maintenance of the warehouse complex. Kellys staff began negotiating with the Kuwaiti government to transfer the existing contracts and 

have the Kuwaiti government pay directly for the Doha work. tO 

Meanwhile, the Doha renovations faced a tragic setback. At 11 A.M. 

on 11 july, an explosion ripped through the ammunition storage area at 

Doha, raining shrapnel and engulfing nearby vehicles in Oames. The 

powerful explosion rattled windows in Kuwait City, miles away. The 

chain-reaction blasts, which continued for nearly an hour, apparently 

had begun with an electrical fire on a self-propelled howitzer carrying 

155-mm. shells. Fifty U.S. and six British soldiers were injured, and the 

recently renovated "Blackhorse" base, as the Doha complex was called, 

was badly damaged. Firefighters responded within minutes, but it took 

four hours to contain the blaze. Injuries ranged from minor cuts to serious shrapnel wounds. Corps personnel, who rushed to the site to help, 

directed traffic, helped compile lists of the wounded, and donated blood. 

9Memo, Kelly for ASA(ILE), Subj: Kuwait Doha Project, 26 Jun 1991. Kuwait 

Reconstruction: U.S. Presence, DRAO Files. 10Memo, Kelly for Asst Under Secretary of Defense for Military Projects and 

Engineering Support, 3 Jul 1991, Troop Support, DRAO Files; memo, Col. Leon R. 

Younce Ill for Larry Kelly, 24 Jull991, Kuwait Reconstruction: Doha, ASA(ILE) Files. 
224 AFTER DESERT STORM 

Locurcios staff began performing damage assessments the next 

morning. The investigatOrs found l ,400 shattered windows, clowned 

temporary panilion walls and duct work, sprung sliding doors, perforated roofs, and minor electrical damage. By noon on 12 july, they had 

completed their surveys, reporting over $1.7 million in structural clamage. By late afternoon, they had developed and presemed a comprehensive emergency repair plan to the brigade commander. Later that 

evening, Locurcios stafF issued a contract to l<harafi to clean up the site 

and make emergency repairs to 16 buildings damaged by the blast. The 

contractor began work at 7 A.~l. the next morning. II 

ln late july, the Defense Reconstruction Assistance Orfice asked the 

Ministry of Defence to have a U.S. firm that specialized in explosive ordnance disposal clear the Doha accident site, and a U.S. Army explosive 

ordnance disposal specialist prepared the contract specifi cations. 

Because of the ministry's slowness in letting ordnance disposal comracts 

and the need to begin the cleanup as soon as possible, Kelly proposed 

that the United States award and administer the contract using U.S. 

funds. The Kuwaiti government could then reimburse the U.S. government from the $15 million it would soon be depositing in the Defense 

Cooperation Account. The Minister of Defence, however, had not yet 

approved this proposal. The 22d Support Command had set aside $l.5 

million for this effort, but Kelly needed approval from the Pentagon 

before he could proceed with U.S. funds and a U.S. comractor.12 

By late july, Kharafi had completed its contract work at Doha, and 

Khudair had finished its work at the 6th Brigade Camp. Kelly asked the 

Kuwaiti government to pay the final contract costs agreed to by the contract.ors-$11.78 million for the Kharafi contract. and $4.74 million for 

the Khudair comract.. The Ministry of Defence agreed to pay rough ly $20 

million for repairs and upgrades to facilities att.he 6th Brigade Camp and 

Doha and deposit $15 million in the Defense Cooperation Account to 

cover food, water, and other supplies and services for maintaining U.S. 

troops through 15 September J 991 .IJ 

li"Scores Hurt in Explosion at U.S. Base in Kuwait,» \Vashmgton Post, 12jull991 , p. 

A25; James N. Parker, "KERO assists dunng and after the explosion," Engineer Updatr, v. 

15, no. 8. Aug 1991, p. l;James N. Parker, "Doha explosion required cooperation, sacrifice," n·ansat/anlic News, v. 6, no. 6,Jun-Jul 1991, p. 7; Livingstone, Memorandum For 

Record, Subj: "Saudi Arabia/Kuwait Trip Report," 23 J ul 1991, Kuwait Reconstruction: 

Trip Report, Office of History Files. 

120RAO, Fact Sheet, 26 Aug 1991, Kuwait Reconstruction, Miscellaneous Projects: 

DRAO Files. 

13?-.femo, Kelly to Sheikh Sabah AI Nasser, Assistant Under Secretary for Military 

1>rojects and Engmccring Support, 1 Aug 1991, Kuwait Reconstruction: Troop Support, 

DRAO Files; memo, Kelly to Faisal Ali AI-Dmvoud. 7 Aug 199 1, ibid. 
SUPPORT 7U US. TROOPS 225 

General Hatch at Blackhorse Bas~ 2 August 1991 

Because the Kuwaili government paid the comract costs as agreed, 

Kelly and the Corps never had to use the emergency construction 

authority provided in Section 2808 or spend any Army funds. In early 

September, the Kuwaili governmem deposited $15 million in the 

Defense Cooperation Account and paid the contractors over$ L6 million. 

The U.S. comracts were terminated, and the Army operations and maintenance funds were deobligated.l'l 

Over the ensuing years, the Doha complex, later called simply 

"Camp Doha," became increasingly valuable as a site where the United 

States could stage troops and equipment ready to react quickly to any 

future threat to Kuwait. The complex housed a forward deployed element of ARCENT in Kuwait and was considered a major base of operalions for U.S. forces in the Middle East. It was used several times a year 

for U.S. military training exercises. 

At ARCENT's req uest, in Februa ry 1995, the Transatlantic 

Division awarded a $20 million contract to American International 

Contractors, Inc., of Dallas, Texas, to renovate the complex, specifi11Memo, Cot. lan ·1. Pauerson for james DeWire, 5 Sep l991. Kuwait Reconstruction: 

Doha, Fisher Files. 
226 AITER DESERT STORM 

cally Lo conven 17 warehouses to maintenance facilities, vehicle and 

supply sLOrage, and troop billeting. The contractor also provided 171 

duplex trailer units for housing, 5 laundry units, 5 television day 

rooms, and a modular kitchen unit. The renovations were completed 

in 1997.1 5 

15"Rcnovmion work begins m Camp Doha," Tmnsatlcmtic Nt•ws, v. 10, no. 3, ~lar-Apr 

1995, p. I; "Camp Doha construction wmpping up," ibid .. v. 12, no. 2, Peb- Mar 1997, 

p. 6; "Camp Doha renovations nearing completion," ibid., pp. 6-7. 
Alle1711alh 

As Kcll)' labored to put the final foreign military sales case for the air 

bases back on track, the civil reconstruction work neared completion. By 

1 November, the cost of the Kuwaili program had reached more than 

$395 million-$349.3 million under the Section 607 A civil reconstruction program and $46.3 million under the initial foreign military sales 

case.l The l<uwaili governn1en1 made its final cash paymem to the U.S. 

Treasury for the 607 A program on 14 November. Dr. Shaheen directed 

that all comracts in the 607 A program be awarded by 31 December. 

Kelly had played a key role in opening doors to the Kuwaiti ministers and the Crown Prince and focusing their attention on the civil 

reconstruction program. With the program now well established, Kelly$ 

direct involvement was no longer needed. Nor was his staff needed any 

longer to oversee the program.2 

Yet, because of uncertainties surrounding the military reconstruction 

program, Kelly remained in Kuwait. Each day Kelly pushed back his 

plane reservations in hopes of securing a last minute agreement with the 

Ministry of Defence for the phase ll air base work. And each clay he was 

disappoimed. Kelly$ staff submiuecl its last formal repon on 22 

November, and he left Kuwait soon after. As he clepaned, Kelly praised 

Colonel Locurcio for "a superb job of commanding the effort through the 

difficult early postwar days 10 the present." The last member of the 

Defense Reconsuuction Assistance Office departed in December 1991.3 

As that ofrice phased out, Col. john Macel from the U.S. Liaison 

Ofrice, Kuwait, took over Kellys CENTCOM coordination responsibilities. Simultaneously, the Defense Reconstruction Assistance Office's 

financial management functions transferred to the Transatlantic 

Division. The Kuwait Emergency Recovery Office and the newly 

formed Kuwait Program Office absorbed all of Kelly's administrative 

and logistics responsibilities. 

The close out of the Defense Reconstruction Assistance Office coincided with the termination of the Army$ executive authority for the 

reconstruction of Kuwait. On 1 December 1991, the Secretary of Defense 

formally terminated the Armys executive agent responsibility and the 

position of Secretary of Defense representative. 
228 AFrER DESERT STORM 

At the same time, oversight responsibility for the reconstruction 

transferred from the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Installations, 

Logistics and Environment to the Assistant Secretary of the Army for 

Civil Works, Nancy P. Dorn. Under Army General Orders #l7, the 

Assistam Secretary for Civil Works was responsible for program direction of the Corps' foreign activities, except those that were exclusively in 

suppon of U.S. military forces overseas:+ 

Dorn, a young, well-connected political appointee who had served 

in both the Reagan and Bush administrations as a special assistant for 

legislative affairs, had become AssistanL Secretary in july 1991. On 1 

December, she orficially assumed imerim responsibilities for the Army's 

Kuwaiti program. Soon after, Dorn wrote a strong letter to the Chief of 

Engineers reminding him of her authority. Although the Corps had significant planning, engineering, and construction expertise and valuable 

capabili ties in the international arena, she informed General Hatch, it 

did not have separate program and funding sources for international 

work. "Accordingly," she continued, "the Corps must take a cautious, 

selective approach to its international activities." She insisted that the 

Corps' international work be consistent with the policies of the Bush 

administration, be fully coordinated with the State Department and the 

Defense Department, and have her approval. 

The Assistant Secretary emphasized that only she could commit the 

Corps' resources for imernational activities. She would sign all agreements with foreign governments, imernational organizations, and U.S. 

agencies that involved international work. The Corps, Dorn observed, 

should focus on managing its ongoing work rather than seeking new 

international work. Echoing the concerns expressed by Pemagon officials earlier in the operation, she added, "The Corps should maintain a 

low profile internationally, with no marketing or aggressive promotion."5 

Dorn expressed caulious suppon for the concept of "nation assistance" or "nation-building." This concept "if properly developed, coordinated, and executed," she observed, "may provide significant benefits 

to the Army and DOD !Department of Defense!, as well as to the recipient nations." She gave the Corps credit for promoting this concept within the Army and the Defense Department but reiterated that the Director 

of Strategy, Plans, and Policy was the appropriate proponent within the 

Army Staff for peacetime engagement and Army assistance.6 

Nancy Dorns strong statement reOected her extensive authority and 

involvement. In the l970s and early 1980s, the Corps had pursued its 

large civil construction programs in the Middle East with minimal oversight from the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works. But 

Dorns predecessors, Will iam R. Gianelli (appointed in 1981) and Robert 
AFrERMATH 229 

K. Dawson (appoimecl in 1985), were both known for their unprecedented "micromanagemem" of the Corps. By the time Dawson left in 

1987, the Orfice of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works 

had assumed control over man)' decisions that had previously rested 

with the Chief of Engineers.7 

In the 1980s, the civil works directorate in the Corps' Washington 

headquarters administered the Work for Others program along •..vith the 

domestic Support for Others program, in which the Corps per(onnecl 

work for other federal agencies. Through these reimbursable programs, 

the Corps markeled its expenise to customers who were willing to pay, 

whether they were federal agencies or other governments funded in pan 

through U.S. foreign aiel. As noted, Hatch championed both programs, 

especially foreign assistance, or "nation-building" as he called it. He saw 

these programs as the best way for the Corps to survive the uncertain fiscal times ahead.8 

Reflecting the views of the Reagan and Bush administrations, Oorn 

questioned Hatch$ vision of an expansive Support for Others program and 

was particularly opposed to aspects of the Work for Others program. She 

believed the Corps should not be looking for more work to justify a larger 

staff and a higher budget. Rather, the Corps should limit itself to traditional missions and not try to be an international engineering force. She 

opposed using the Corps to build civil works projects in foreign countries.9 

Although in late 1991 responsibility shifted within the Army 

Secretariat and the Defense Recovery Assistance Office completed its 

operations, the Corps had not finished repairing the National Assembly 

building. In November l991, Corps orficials realized that the design 

work for the building had fallen roughly three months behind schedule 

clue to customer changes and insufficient oversight by the Corps, which 

was focused on other civil reconstruction efforts. 

The Transatlantic Division members met with Hellmuth, Obata, and 

Kassabaum to review the firm's progress. Hellmuth, Obata, and 

Kassabaum, though under contract to the Corps, had begun taking 

directions from Kuwaiti officials. It submitted design proposals that were 

tens of millions of dollars greater than the funds available. Since the 

design proposal was unacceptable, the construction contractor could not 

begin work. The Corps had planned to have the construction contractor 

begin work in October 1991, but the work did not begin until March 

1992. The Corps lost six months of work because the design firm failed 

to follow the instructions of the contracting ofricer. Moreover, Peixotto 

maintained, the quality of the design was poor. The architect-engineer 

firm had a great concept, he added, but did not always translate that 

concept into effective construction drawings.lO 
230 AFI'ER DESERT STORM 

When Peixouo took over in November 199 L, he quickly concluded 

that the project was "out of control." Communication between the 

Corps, the Kuwaitis, and the contractors needed immediate improvement. There was no clear plan for getting the work done or obtaining a 

good estimate of the cost. The urgency to complete the project in time 

for the Kuwaiti national elections had created strains among the parties 

involved. Also, the 90-day rotations of most Kuwait Program Office staff 

had made it more difficult for that office to establish and maintain the 

close coordination it needed with its partners. The four panies 

involved-the Corps; the Kuwait is; Kbarafi (l he construction contractor); and Hellmuth, Obata, and Kassabaum (the designer)-had no common objectives. I J 

Peixotto quickly adopted the practice of partnering, bringing all parties involved together (in this case, senior Kuwaiti, Corps, and contractor representatives) to establish common goals and procedures for 

resolving problems. lle bad used this concept successfully as commander of the Albuquerque and Louisville districts.t2 

The Corps hosted its first partnering meeting in Kuwait City on 4 

and 5 February 1992 with representatives from the Kuwaiti government; 

Kharafi; and Hellmuth, Obata, and l<assabaum. Peixotto gleefully reported that the session "made all the difference in the worlcl."t3 At this first 

meeting, participants identified 13 critical issues and established common goals, objectives, and procedures to improve communications. The 

partners agreed that if they could not reach a consensus on decisions in 

a timely manner, the Corps would make the decisions and keep the project on schedule. They decided to place their representatives together in 

one office at the job site. Each partner signed a one-page pannering 

agreement committing itself to the common goals. Each agreed to a common objective of having the building ready for occupancy by 29 july, 

which, at the time, appeared to be nearly impossible ~'~ 

Peixotto recognized that the Corps and its partners could never 

meet the july deadline if they continued making changes in the project. He directed that no party could make any changes without his 

personal approval. He also recognized the need to devote some of his 

staff to the project for its duration to provide continuity. At his request, 

selected staff members agreed to extend their 90-day tours until the 

project was finished. 

In early January 1992, the Corps initiated weekly meetings to discuss schedules, design and construction issues, iclemification and procurement of long lead items, and customer requested changes. 

Representatives from the Ministry of Public Works; the National 

Assembly; Kharafi; the Corps; and Hellmuth, Obata, and Kassabaum 
Dr. Ibrahim Al-Shaheen, left, with David Leach Corps of Engineers 

Parliament reconstruction manage~· below, Leach and Fatima 

Al-Sabah head of the Architectural Division, Design Departmen~ 

Ministry of Public Works. 
232 AFrER DESERT SroRM 

attended the meetings. As a result, the pace of the project began to 

advance more quickly.! s 

Despite some improvement, the problems of delays and cost overruns persisted. By February the project was 30 clays behind schedule and 

$6.5 million over budget. The total project budget was $62 million, over 

half of which ($32 million) was allocated for the design work. But the 

Corps did not supervise the design contractor closely enough, and the 

contractor finally submitted a design that would cost $69 million. The 

Corps directed the architect-engineer contractor to submit a remediation plan within seven days. The design was later modified to $32 million with approximately $5.5 million of options. The budget also had 

cost overruns for furnishings and electronics. The Transatlantic Division 

worked with Kuwaiti officials and the design firm to reduce costs and 

stay within the $62 million budget.l6 

The Transatlantic Division successfully reduced the budget shortfall 

and mitigated its impact by establishing options to complcle the faci lity 

within the budget. The division also successfully reduced sli ppage of the 

projected schedule.l7 

As noted, the contract, awarded on 4 july 1991, had an original 

completion date of 29 April 1992. Later, as a result of the pannering sessions, the Corps and Kuwaitis established a revised but still ambitious 

completion date of 29 july 1992. On 17 February, however, Dr. Shaheen 

formally asked the Corps to complete the National Assembly Hall by 19 

june 1992 so the National Council could hold a special meeting there in 

late june. Subsequently, Kuwaiti orficials requested that the lounge for 

assembly members and the ornccs of the Emir and the Crown Prince also 

be completed by 19 june. 

Peixottos staff met with Kharafi and Kuwaiti representatives to determine how much more it would cost to expedite construction. Even with 

additional funds, the Corps was not sure it could meet the new deadline. 

Peixouo informed Dr. Shaheen that the Corps had only a 50 percent 

chance of completing the work by this deadline but would make every 

possible effort to do so. 

For the Corps to meet the new deadline, the Kuwaitis would have to 

reallocate $6 million from other 607 A activities. The Corps would use 

this additional money to add extra shifts and equipment, and it would 

work with its suppliers to improve delivery schedules. All material and 

furnishings required to meet this completion date would be nown into 

the country. The airfreighting would be done under a Kuwaiti logistics 

contract, managed by the Transatlantic Division, and would be paid for 

with 607 A funds. The division began negmiating with vendors to expedite delivery of light fixtures, carpet, furniture, and millwork. IS 
Interior view of the Parliament buildin{!t· below, Parliament 

general assembly hall. 
234 

General Hatch, left, visits 

Corps engineers at the 

Parliament building. 

AFTER DESERT SroRM 

Dr. Shaheen divened funds 

from other projects scheduled 

under the 607 A program to raise the 

additional $6 million, and secured 

the Crown Pri nces approval to 

spend the addit ional money to 

accelerate the project. With all the 

necessary approvals now in place, 

the Corps chanercd 74 7 and 

DC-10 aircraft to transport the 

necessary materials and supplies. 

For example, the Transatlantic 

Division spent $500,000 of the 

Kuvvaiti funds to ny in marble 

from Italy for the noors. It spent 

another $7 million on furniture, 

carpels, and wall coverings. In 

addition to the $6 mill ion, Dr. 

Shaheen provided another $3 million specifically for airfreight.19 

On 22 Februar>' 1992, the 

Corps directed Kharafi to complete 

the Assembly Hall by l 9 June. Kharafi quickly mobilized additional 

workers, materials, and equipment to meet the deadline. At peak, the 

firm had roughly 1,000 workers in the building. The Corps had awarded almost all of the 29 contracts for carpet and rurniture by 6 March. lt 

could only meet the June deadline if these vendors deli vered the items 

on time.20 The Kuwaitis had to purchase interior furnishings worth 

roughly $8 million to replace those that the Iraqis had looted or burned. 

The Transatlantic Division had the major responsibility for procuring and shipping the new furnishings. The division formed a team to 

do this and conducted a quality assurance program during the purchasing, manufacturing, and delivery process to ensure that all manufacturers met the contract specifications and schedules. Hellmuth, 

Obata, and Kassabaum began with a list of 250 vendors and narrovved 

it down. Fatima Al-Sabah, along with other Kuwaiti and Corps representatives, made the final se lections. Ultimately, 27 manufacturers 

rece ived contracts to furnish the massive building. Vendors provided 

5,600 sofas, tables, chairs, and mirrors; 1,000 auditorium seats; 

20,000 square yards of carpeting; and 17 area rugs. These high-quality items came primarily from the United States, but also from Britain, 

Malaysia, France, Italy, and Spain.21 
ArrERMATH 235 

Coordination and communication continually improved. The Corps 

staff met \.vith Fatima Al-Sabah and her staff; Kharafi; and Hellmuth, 

Obata and Kassabaum for two to three hours each clay to resolve problems and keep the projeci on schedule. Decisions were made quickly. 

Through nothing less than what Peixotto called "a herculean effort" by 

the Corps and its contractor, the Assembly Hall was finished on 19 june 

1992, six weeks ahead of schedule. The rest of the building vvas compleled as scheduled on 29 july 1992, well in advance of the October 

national elections.22 

The completion of this $67 million restoration project marked an 

important milestone for the people of Kuwait and for the Corps. For the 

Kuwaitis, il marked the transformation of a darkened shell of a building 

into a gleaming center of government operations. More significant, it 

marked an important step in the return of Kuwait$ legislative process. 

The restoration of the building also effectively marked the end of the 

Corps' civil reconstruction program in Kuwait. 

Condusion 

Although the Kuwait operation was unique and un likely to be repeated, 

some lessons can be learned from the Armys experience. In add ition to 

the specific lessons about operational planning, organizational structure, 

command and control, contracting strategy and regulations, and funding 

authorities are the broader, more important lessons about the contributions the U.S. Army can make in assisting other nations. What role is 

appropriate for the Army in a post-hostilities environment and how can 

it best prepare for that role? 

Events in Kuwait illustrate the need to plan carefully for the period 

after hostilities end. How the Army handles the postwar period can be as 

important as the war itself when it comes to promoting the political and 

social stability and the economic well-being of the host nation. 

When the short ground war against Iraq ended abruptly, the 

Un ited States bad no comprehensive, cohesive pian-as it does for 

responding to natural disasters-that encompassed the various federal 

agencies and provided a mechanism for those agencies to communicate 

and coordinate wi.th each other. Outside the State Department and the 

Defense Department, there was no overall structure or direction for 

planning, coordinating, and executing the recovery effort. Other federal agencies might have been used more effectively if they had been 

included in the planning process. The deficiencies in planning and 

directing the recovery effort might have had a greater impact if the 

damage had been more extensive. 

Neither the Defense Department nor the Anny adequately planned 

for the postwar period. Missions, goals, and political constraints were 

not clearly defined. U.S. political leaders at times seemed to be pushing 

their own objectives. This was particularly true in the area of contracting 

strategy, specifically the strong emphasis on awarding contracts to small 

and small disadvantaged U.S. businesses. Pemagon officials responded 

to the challenges of the recovery operations in an ad hoc fashion, creating various organizations to execute the mission as the need arose. 

Planning in theater, at CENTCOM and ARCENT, was also inadequate. 

No detailed procedures existed for coordinating ci\ril affairs activities. 

The civil affairs units arrived in the theater late, with the theater-level 
238 AFTER DESERT STORM 

civil affairs headquarters, the 352d Civil Affairs Command, deploying 

last. As a result, the civil affairs annexes to the theaters operations plans 

were tardy. 

During the long months of Operation DESERT SIIIELD, the Army 

understandably focused its attention on the conflict with Iraq rather than 

on plans for the aftermath. Task Force Freedom and the Combined Civil 

Affairs Task Force were provisional organizations quickly crafted to meet 

the specific circumstances and immediate needs in Kuwait. 

The meticulous, detailed tactical planning that contributed to the 

Armys success in the ground war did not exist for the postwar period. 

In their after action report for Operations DESERT StiiELD and DESERT 

STORM, Army officials conceded that although the Army executed its missions successfully, the U.S. government did not have a cohesive plan for 

the recovery period after the war ended. It had no plan that delineated 

the responsibilities of all the federal agencies that should be involved or 

that provided a mechanism for organizations to communicate effectively 

with each other. "Unambiguous doctrine, approved by our Government 

and governments of nations which are our allies, to support transition to 

post-hostility nation support," the report concluded, "is not available to 

Army planners-or anyone else in the Government."! 

Events further demonstrated that the post-hostilities plans must provide for adequate logistics suppon for units entering a disaster area. 

With power, food, and water supplies disrupted in Kuwait, Task Force 

Freedom and the Kuwait Emergency Recovery Office had to be fully selfsupporting in the first months. ln addition, recovery operations require 

simple, clear organizational. structures, good communications, leaders 

with vision and stamina, and an effective partnership with the host 

nation. Without such a partnership, the Kuwait operation could have 

easily gotten off course. Differences over costs and construction standards could have ended the program. 

The Kuwait recovery operation also highlighted the need for doctrine concerning nation assistance. Although the U.S. Army had conducted nation assistance activities for many years, there was no doctrine 

at the time that specifically addressed it.2 As one civil affairs officer 

noted, "lf we think [of) our focus now as not large global warfare, but 

low-imensity conflicts or wars of liberation or at least situations where 

we are restoring a legitimate government, then the focus on restoring services, and the civil infrastructure, schools, so forth, really has to be a 

major focus for the Army because we're the ones that are going to be on 

the ground doing it. "3 

The Army, General Hatch insisted, must develop better doctrine and 

concepts for nation assistance rather than implementing nation assis-
CONCLUSION 239 

Lance on an ad hoc basis.4 He emphasized the link between nation assistance and national security. The Army, Hatch warned, might have a mission to support and execute the governments national securit)' efforts in 

ways that had not been given rigorous attcmion in the pasl. "We must be 

ready to 'promote peace' while we also 'clcLer war,"' he added. ln peacetime operations, Hatch observed, the United States could focus on 

auaining enduring regional stability by addressing the root causes of 

instability such as poverty, social and economic strife, and environmental degradation. 5 

Hatch and others never lost sight of the fac t that 1 he purpose of 

nation assistance was to help the host nation develop its own capabilities and its own public and private institutions. "You don't do that," he 

explained, "by going in and just building projects; it is a training, imparting of information, a building of a capability in the country." Thus, integrating host country nationals was a key clement of the Corps' concept 

of nation assistance.6 I3y incorporaLing Kuwaiti engineers inLo its organization and giving them hands-on experience, the Corps was able to leave 

behind improved facilities, expanded engineering expertise, and 

stronger personal relationships. 

One of the brightest aspects of the recovery operation was the bond 

of mutual respect forged between Corps members and l<uwaiti volunteers. "The humanitarian spirit of the participants easily bridged the cultural and professional dirferences and paved the way for close cooperation and good working relations," Locurcio noted. "What resulted from 

this cooperation," he added, "was the prospect of a long-term relationship- based on trust and good will-that is probably more important 

than the opera lion itself. "7 

Despite some successes in bridging culLUral differences, the Army left 

room for improvement. Colonel Lackey conceded that he had not prepared his soldiers at Task Force Freedom to deal with the Arab culture as 

well as he could bave.s Reflecting on his experience in I<uwait, General 

Frix conceded that the Army needed to improve its understanding of cultural differences when operating outside the United States. He noted that 

he and his staff quickly faced the challenges of dealing with the Arab cuiLUre. The lack of understanding caused strains initially, he noted, until the 

soldiers and the Kuwaitis "learned to get along with each other. "9 

An important lesson for any nation assistance effon is that U.S. 

forces must withdraw before the host government loses emhusiasm for 

their presence. From the beginning, U.S. policymakers recognized the 

need to hand over responsibility for the recovery to the Kuwaiti government and people as expeditiously as possible. Since their l'irsl meeting, 

Kelly had continually emphasized to Livingstone the need to leave 
240 AFTER DESERT STORM 

Kuwait as soon as the work had been completed successfully, a lesson he 

had learned from the Israeli air base program. Kelly, Livingstone, Hatch, 

and other ofricials recognized the importance of knowing when to move 

from a civil-military operation conducted by U.S. forces to one directed 

by the host nation. to 

The Kuwait recovery operations highlighted the concept of the Total 

Army. The Army$ recovery effort succeeded only th rough combining the 

diverse strengths of its active duty soldiers, reservists, and civilians. 

Except for a small active duty battalion, all Army civil affairs capabilities 

were in the Reserve components. The civil affairs reservists provided 

experience not generally found in the Active Army. Although traditionally some individuals in the Active Army have had a low opinion of 

them, the civil affairs reservists in Kuwait did much to overcome such 

bias. Drawing on a broad range of experience from their civilian jobs, 

they involved themselves in banking, currency, food clisu·ibution, health, 

water, and sanitation. Individual reservists worked closely with the 

Kuwaiti ministries to help them reconstruct their management structures. General Kelly praised the civil affairs soldiers for "an absolutely 

magnificent job." Their work in Ku\ovail, Secretary Cheney noted, was 

"exceptional" both for its speed and the depth of expertise.t J 

Equally imponam were the contributions of hundreds of Army Corps 

of Engineers members who served in Kuwait-most of whom were civilian volunteers-and their counterpans back in the States. Their engineering, project management, and contracting capabilities were critical to 

the success of the recovery operation. They completed nearly $330 million worth of construction work in just 16 months, returning key clements of Kuwait$ infrastructure to operation in record time. 

Locurcio later observed that the Corps' ability to mobili ze a group 

of Corps members in Kuwait and successfully execute such a large, 

complex mission in a hazardous environment with only one fatality 

and no other injuries to Corps personnel gave him "a tremendous 

sense of satisfaction. " A Corps contracting specialist, Edward Slana, 

echoed this sentiment. "There is nothing in the annals of Corps history that even comes close to this kind of mission," he added. Another 

member of Locurcio's staff, Ben Wood, observed that, despite tremendous challenges, at the end of the operation the Corps would have 

"done the best that can be done and will have clone it faster than people would have thought possible."t2 

After visiting Kelly, Locurcio, and their staffs in the summer of t 991, 

Assistant Secretary Livingstone reponed that she had never been around 

such a highly motivated group of people. The soldiers and civilians she 

met said that "they would never have a job that would mean as much to 
CONCLUSION 241 

them."n Senator Donald Mitchell, who visited Kuwait in the summer of 

1992, called the Corps' work there "an American success story."14 As the 

Corps completed its air base work in late 1993, Ambassador Gnchm told 

Col. Charles S. Cox, the Transatlamic Division commander at that time, 

"The comribuLion of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to the reconstruction of Kuwait is a source or pride to the emire U.S. mission here. 

The achievements of your engineers have won high praise from both the 

government of Kuwait and its pcople."15 

The success of the Kuwait recovery operation can be measured in 

several ways. Was the U.S. Army proud of the quantit}' and quality of its 

work? Were the Kuwaitis satisfied with the help they received? Were 

relations between the Americans and the Kuwaitis stronger than before? 

Was the Middle East more stable and secure? Livingstone had addilional criteria: Did the Army follow its own guidelines and meet its internal 

controls? Could its work withstand public scrutiny? Was the /\rmy fair 

in providing opportunity for American businesses? Were the Army$ 

actions consistem with implementing the Presiclems policy?16 

Using these criteria, the Army measured up well. Army auditors 

were, for the most pan, satisfied with the controls that Arm}' officials had 

put in place. The results of congressional hearings and General 

Accounting Ofrice investigations were generally favorable. 

The Kuwaiti government and people very much appreciated the 

efforts of the U.S. Army, particularly the Corps' efforts to repair the civil 

infrastructure. Except for the strains surrounding the air base work, the 

Kuwaitis were pleased with the scope and quality of the assistance they 

received. Without the work of civil affairs soldiers and Corps members, the 

Army would not have been able to transfer responsibility to the Kuwaiti 

government as quickly and smoothly as it did. The civil affairs soldiers, 

and Corps members in particular, not only pla}red a critical role in planning and executing the recovery operations but also left behind an enduring spirit of goodwill. "We may not remember their names," a grateful Dr. 

Shaheen observed, "but we will never forget what they did here."17 

By the end of the recovery period, the prewar political status quo 

and the Oow of oil had been restored in Kuwait. The bond between the 

two nations was strong enough that tbe l<uwaili government asked the 

United States to station a small force there temporarily and agreed to 

joint military exercises, something that would have been unheard of a 

year earlier. 

In large pan through the efforts of the U.S. Army, not a single 

Kuwaiti died from lack of food, water, or medical care. Within 30 days, 

primary power in Kmvait was restored and roads were cleared. Within 

45 days, the water supplies were replenished. Within 90 da}'S, the air-
242 AlTER DESERT 57VRM 

port was reopened. The country$ civil infrastructure was resLOred within nine months. The U.S. Army was able to make a rapid transition from 

offensive ground force to nation assistance. lt successfully translated its 

victory on the battlefield into an environment of political and social stability and economic recovery. 
AICI 

ARCENT 

ASA(CW) 

ASA(lLE) 

ASD(SO/UC) 

AT&T 

BDE 

BN 

CATF 

CCATF 

CECW 

CENT COM 

CEV 

COEJvllS 

DAST 

DFARS 

DRAO 

DSAA 

DSDS 

EOD 

FIDIC 

Fuller/AICI 

G-2 

G-3 

G-5 

Acronyms 

American International Contractor incorporated 

Army Component, U.S. Central Command 

Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works 

Assistant Secretary of the Army for Installations, 

Logistics and Environment 

Assistam Secretary of Defense for Special Operations 

and Low Intensity ConOict 

American Telephone and Telegraph 

Brigade 

Battalion 

Civil Affairs Task Force 

Combined Civil Affairs Task Force 

Corps of Engineers, Civil Works 

U.S. Central Command 

Combat engineer vehicle 

Corps of Engineers Management Information System 

Damage Assessment Survey Team 

Defense Federal Acquisition Regu lations 

Defense Reconstruction Assistance Office 

Defense Security Assistance Agency 

DESERT STORM/DESERT SH IELD 

Explosive ordnance disposal 

Federation lnternationale Des Ingenieurs-Conseils 

George A. Fuller and American lnternational 

Contractor Incorporated 

Army lmelligence staff section 

Army Operations staff section 

Army Plans and Policy staff section 
244 

HEP 

HHC 

HQUSACE 

IDTC 

J-3 

]-5 

J-33 

KERO 

KRTF 

I<TF 

MCA 

MWR 

NDU 

OACE 

OMA 

OPEC 

POL 

SADBU 

SlTREP 

IFF 

TUSA 

USAES 

USLOK 

AFTER DESERT STORM 

High explosive plastic 

Headquarters and Headquarters Company 

Headquarters, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 

l ndefinite delivery type contracts 

joint Operations staff section 

joint Plans and Policy staff section 

joint Current Operations staff section 

Kuwait Emergency Recovery Office 

Kuwait Reconstruction Task Force 

Kuwait Task Force 

Military Construction, Army 

Morale, welfare, and recreation 

National Defense University 

Office of the Assistant Chief of Engineers 

Operations and Maintenance, Army 

Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries 

Petroleum, oils and lubricams 

Small and Disadvantaged Business Utilization 

Situation report 

Task Force Freedom 

Third U.S. Army 

U.S. Army Engineer School 

U.S. Liaison Office, Kuwait 
Noles* 

Introduction 

t Gordon R. Sullivan, "Power Projection and the Challenges of 

Regionalism," Parameters, Summer 1993, in Tlte Collected Worhs, 

1991- 1995, n.p., n.d., p. 189. 

2. Janet A. McDonnell, Supporting the Troops: Tile U.S. Army Corps of 

Engineers in the Persian GL1([ War (Alexandria, Ya.: Office of History, U.S. 

Army Corps of Engineers, 1996), pp. 33-34; see also John T. Greenwood, 

"Diplomacy Through Construction: The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers in 

Saudi Arabia," Desert Shielci!Desen SLOrm, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 

Office of llistory Files (hereafter cited as Office of History files). 

3 for a detailed account of the Israeli air base project, see frank N. 

Schubert, Building Air Bases in the Negev: Tile U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 

in Israel, 1979-1982 (Washington, D.C.: Office of History, Corps of 

Engineers, and Center of Military llistory, 1992). 

'* Wayne Urbine, interv by author, l<uwait City, 7 Sep 1991 , p. l5. 

5 Samuel P. Huntington, "New Contingencies, Old Roles," joint 

For-ces Quarterly, Autumn 1993, no. 2, p. 39. 

Prologue 

t Ceasar Santucci, interv by author, Kuwait City, 5 Apr l991, p. 58. 

2 "State of Kuwait," pp. 5-6, Kuwait Reconstruction: llistorical 

Background, Office of History Files; Michael Kramer, "Toward a New 

Kuwait" Time, 24 Dec 1990, p. 30. 

3 for more on the Persian Gulf War, see Frank N. Schubert and 

Theresa L. Kraus, eels., The Whirlwind War: The United States Army in 

Operations DESERT SHIELD and D ESERr STORM (Washington , D.C.: U.S. 

Army, Center of Military History, 1995); Brig. Gen. Roben H. Scales, Jr., 

et al., Certain Victory· Tl1e United States Army in the Gu(f War 

(Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, 1993); 

Michael R. Gordon and Gen. Bernard E. Trainor, The Generals' War: The 

*All records are at the U.S. Arm)' Corps of cngmeers Office of History. unless otherwise inchcatcd. 
246 A fTER DESERT STORM 

Inside SL01y of the Conflict in the Gulf (Boston: LiLLie. Brown and 

Company, 1995). 

·I HousLOn Townsend, interv by aULhor, Kuwait City, 13 Sep 1991, 

pp. I 0-1.3; Maj. Gen. Pmrick j. l<elly, intent by author, l(uwait City, 7 

Sep 1991, p. 44; Edward Slana, interv by author, l<uwaiL City, 13 Sep 

1991' pp. 49-50. 

Chapter l. Planning Emergency Response 

IAmb. Ed•.vard Gnehm, interv by Col. Patrick W Carlton, 13 Mar 

1992, pp. 3-5, Box 3, Papers of Col. Patrick W Carlton: Civil Affairs in 

the Gulf War, National Defense University (hereafter cited as Carlton 

Papers); Barbara Leaf, interv by Col. Patrick W Carlton, n.d., p. l, Box 

4. Carlton Papers. 

2Leaf intent, pp. 6-7; Bader AI-Qabandi, interv by author, Kuwait 

City, I 0 Sep 1991, pp. 2-6, 8. 

3AI-Qabandi interv, pp. 8, 11; Leaf interv, p. 6; "l<uwaitis in 

WashingLOn Plan Rebuilding of Nation," New Yorh Times, 30 Dec 1990; 

"l<uwaitis Look Beyond Crisis to Nations Rebuilding," Washington Post, 

14 jan 1991, p. A7. 

""Gulf Reconstruction Report," v. 1, no. 2, Kuwait Reconstruction, 

Gulf Reconstruction Report, Office of Histot')t Files; Dr. Ibrahim AlShaheen, interv by author, l<uwait City, 12 Sep 1991, pp. 1-3; Kramer, 

'Toward a New Kuwait," p. 28. 

5Amb. Edward Gnehm, interv by author, Kuwait City, 1 1 Sep 1991, 

p. 20; "The Kuwait Task Force," Civil Affairs in t.hc Gulf War: A 

Symposium, Proceedings, 25-27 Oct L99l , Fort Bragg, N.C., p. 263 (hereafter cited as Civil Affairs Symposium); john R. Brinkerhoff, "Waging the 

War and Winning the Peace: Civil Affairs in the War with Iraq," Civil 

Affairs Symposium, p. 176. Sec Col. Patrick W. Carlton, 'The Kuwait Task 

Force: A Unique Solution to l<uwaits Reconstruction Problems," p. 6, 

Box I, Carlton Papers (hereafter cited as "KTF Paper"). 

<>Routson volunteered to help the Kuwaitis draft the leuer and they 

accepted. He helped prepare the initial draft though some thought this 

was inappropriate since ASD(lSA) had sponsored the meeting. LL . Gen. 

Kelly apparently was uncomfortable with Routson writing the letter. 

Sec I<TF Paper, p. 8; Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

Special Operations and Low Intensity Conr!ict (hereaft er cited as 

ASD[SO/UCJ) Fi les, "Readahead for the Civil Affairs Symposium," 25 

Ocl l99l, Civil Affairs Symposium, p. 213; Brinkerhoff, "Waging the 

War," p. 177. 

7Memo, Amb. Saud Nasir Al-Sabah to President George Bush, 9 Oct 

1990, Kuwait Reconstruction: Kuwait Request for Assistance, Office of 
NOTES 247 

History Files; Col. Randall T. Elliott, interv by Col. Patrick W Carlton, 6 

Dec 1991, pp. 4-5, Box 2, Carlton Papers. 

BCapl. Peter K BelLOn, interv by Col. Patrick W Carlton, 8 jan 

1992, p. 12, Carlton Papers. On 15 December, Secretary james Baker 

formally responded to Sabahs request for assistance from the U.S. government in drawing up a civil restoration plan for Kuwait and indicated 

that planners from both nations were already working LOgether. Ltr. , 

james Baker to Sheikh Saud Nasir AI-Sabah, 15 Dec 1990, Kuwait 

Reconstruction: Kuwait Request for Assistance, Office of History Files. 

9Brinkerhoff, "Waging the War," p. 177. 

IOCarlwn, KIF Paper, p. 9; "Terms of Reference-United States 

Emergency and Reconstruction Assistance to the State of f<uwait" (draft), 

l3 Nov 1990, pp. l-2, KU\.vait Reconstruction, Office of History Files; 

Brinkerhoff, "'vVaging the War," pp. 178- 79; ASD(SO/UC), "Reaclaheacl," 

pp. 213- 14. 

llASD(SO/LlC) "Readaheacl," p. 214. 

1.2 "US--Kuwait Civil Affairs Working Group," Kuwait Reconstruction: 

Miscellaneous Messages, #5, Office of the Assistant Chief ol' Engineers 

(OACE) Reference Files; ibid. , Kuwait Reconstruction: Civil Affairs 

Activities, Assistant Secretary of the Army for Installations, Logistics and 

Environment (hereafter ci.ted as ASA[lLE]) Files; "Interagency 

Organization," (attached to Brig. Gen. Montgomery memo, 21 Feb 

1991), ibid. 

13Brinkerhoff, "Waging the War," pp. 178- 79; ASD(SO/UC), 

"Readahead," p. 214; Carlton, KIF Paper, p. 10; Gnehm, interv by 

Carlton, p. 9; Ellioll, interv by Carlton, p. l5. 

14Gnehm, imerv by Carlton, pp. 9, 13; Leaf interv, p. 3; Gnehm, 

interv by author, pp. 10, 12. 

lSASD(SOILIC), "Readaheacl," p. 214. 

16Brinkerhoff, "Waging the War," pp. 8-11. For more on civil affairs 

in World War ll, see Harry L. Coles and Albert K Weinberg, U.S. Army 

in 'vVorld War II: Civil Aifairs: Soldiers Become Govemors (Washington, 

D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1992). 

17 ASD(SO/UC), "Reaclaheacl," p. 214. 

ISCol. Anhur vValz, interv by Thomas Crouch, 3 May 1992, Center 

of Military History/Center for Low Intensity ConflicL, no transcript; Leaf 

interv, pp. 3-5. 

19Brinkerho[f, "Waging the War," p. 179; Carlton , "KIF Paper," pp. 

10- 11; Brig. Gen. Howard Mooney, interv by Thomas Crouch, 25 Mar 

1992, Cemer of Military History/Center for Low Intensity Conflict, no 

transcript; Leaf imerv, pp. 3-5; Anthony Auleua, imerv by Col. Patrick 

W. Carlton, 12 Nov 1991, Box l , Carlton Papers. 
248 APTER DESERT STORM 

20Leaf interv, pp. 3-5; james R. Locher, interv by Dr. Carnes Lord, 

18 Mar 1992, p. 17, Box 4, CarlLOn Papers; Brinkerhoff, "Waging the 

War," p. 179. 

21 Mooney, inlerv by Crouch; Brinkerhoff, "Waging the War," pp. 

180-81; Brig. Gen. Howard Mooney, "352d CA Command Briefing," 

presented 17 Dec 1990 at 1.-IQUSACE, Kuwait Reconstruction: 352d CA 

Command Brie!'ing, Office of History Files. 

22CarlLOn, "KIF Paper," p. 12; Brinkerhoff, "Waging the War," p. 

179; msg, C]CS, Subj: Restoration of Kuwait, 22 Nov 1990, Kuwait 

Recovery, Office of 1.-lisLOry Files. 

23 Lt. Col. Quesenberry, notes, n .cl ., Kuwait Reconstruction: 

Miscellaneous Messages, #5, OACE Reference Files; Brinkerhoff, 

"Waging the War," p. 181; Mooney, "352d CA Command Briefing," 17 

Dec 1990, presented at HQUSACE. 

HEllion, interv by Carlton, p. 15; Mooney, imerv by Crouch; Auletta 

imerv, p. 29. 

25Brinkerhoff, "Waging the War," p. 182; Elliott, imerv by Carlton, 

p. 8; Auletta interv, pp. 20, 34-36; Brig. Gen. Hovvard Mooney, interv by 

Col. Patrick W CariLOn, 4 Dec 1991, p. 20, Box 5, Carlton Papers; 

Carlton, "KIF Paper," p. 17. Brig. Gen. joseph C. Hurteau indicated that 

Lt. Gen. Carns was the one who said Mooney could not go on aclive 

duty Brig. Gen. joseph C. Huneau, interv by Col. Patrick W Carlton, 31 

jan 1992, p. 22, Box 2, Carlton Papers. Mooney would later be o rdered 

onto active duty on 25 january 1991 with the rest of the 352cl, but not 

without special pressure from the joint Staff and the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense, including a call from Henry Rowen to Secretary of 

the Army Michael Stone. Brinkerhoff, "Waging the War," p. 183; 

Mooney, imerv by Crouch. 

26Mooney, interv by Crouch; Maj. john W Harbell, interv by 

Thomas W Crouch, 2 May 1992, CMH, pp. 13-15, 17; Col. Charles H. 

Sadek, interv by Thomas W Crouch, 3 May 1992, Cemer of Military 

History/Center for Low lmensity Conflict, no transcript; Lt. Col. james 

Huber, imerv by Thomas W Crouch, 2 May 1992, Center of Military 

History/Center for Low lnLensity Conflict, p. 40. 

27Brig. Gen. Howard Mooney, imerv by Dr. Richard Stewan, 14 jul 

1991, pp. 15-16, Box 5, Carlwn Papers. 

28Auletta interv, p. 44. 

29Sadek imerv; Harbell imerv, pp. 61-62. 

30Auleua interv, p. 29; Walz interv; Harbell interv, pp. 11-12; 

Mooney interv by Crouch; Mooney comments on draft manuscript. 

31 Mooney interv by Stewart; Brinkerhoff, "Waging Lhe War," p. 183; 

Mooney interv by Crouch. 
NOTES 249 

32Auletta interv, pp. 14, 23-24, 49-51; Carl ton, "KTF Paper," p. 12; 

Elliott, intent by CariLOn, pp. 14-15; Anhur Walz comm.ents, 16 Apr 

1997. 

33Walz intent; "The Kuwait Task Force," Civil Affairs Symposium, pp. 

266-67; Huber intent, p. 36. 

34 Brig. Gen. Howard T Mooney, interv by author, Kuwait City, 5 Apr 

1991, pp. l-2; 'The Kuwait Task Force," p. 265. 

JSBrinkerhorr, "Waging the War," p. 183; Mooney, "352d Civil Affairs 

Command Briefing, 17 Dec 1990; "The Kuwait Task Force," p. 263. 

36Carlton, "KTF Paper," p. 17; "The Kuwait Task Force," p. 264; 

Scales, Certain Victo1y, p. 334; Mooney, interv by Crouch; Harbell imerv, 

p. 20; Mooney comments on d raft manuscript. 

371:-larbell intent, pp. 3-4, 11. 

JSCariLOn, "l<TF Paper," pp. 18-19; "Combined Civil Affairs Task 

Force Operations Desert Shielcl/Storm After Acti.on Repon," Apr 1991, 

in Civil Affairs Symposium, p. 290 (hereafter cited as "CCATF After Action 

Report"); Huber interv, pp. 30, 32. 

39"CCATF After Action Re pon," p. 291; Col. Randall Elliott, 

imerv by Dr. Richard Stewart, 14 jul 1991, pp. 17- 19, Box 2, Carlton 

Papers. 

40Gnehm, interv by author, p. 16; Lea[ imerv, pp. 10-12; ElliotL, 

interv by Stewart, pp. ll-12; Al-Qabandi iruerv, pp. 15-16. 

41 Men:w, Will Baker to Randall Elliott, n.cL, Kuwait Reconstruction: 

Miscellaneous Messages, #5, OACE Reference "Files; Mooney, interv by 

Crouch. 

42Eiliotl, intent by Stewart, p. 12; Maj. Andrew Natsios, "Preventing 

Human Rights Abuses in Kuwait," p. 1-2, Box 9, Carlton Papers. 

43Maj. Andrew Natsios, interv by LL Col. 'vVilliam McGrew, 2 May 

1992, Center of Military History/Center for Low Imensity Con[lict; 

Brinkerhoff, "Waging the War," p. 183; Mooney, interv by Crouch. 

44 1:-larbell intent, pp. 22-24. 

45Carlton, "KTF Paper," pp. 15-16, 20-21; Col. Lawrence Blount, 

intent by Dr. Richard Stewart, LJ jul 1991, pp. 13, 27, Box 1, Carlton 

Papers; Col. Lawrence Blount, interv by Col. Patrick W Carlton, 5 Dec 

1991 , pp. 20-21, 27, Box 1, Carlton Papers; Mooney, interv by Crouch; 

'vValz interv. 

46Carlton, "KTF Paper," p. 21; Sadek interv; Blount, inten' by 

Stewart, pp. 13-14, 39. 

47(o\. james T Kerr, interv by Col. Patrick W Carlton, 2 Apr 1992, 

p. 28, Box 4, Carlton Papers; Maj. Gen. john]. Yeosock, interv by Col. 

PaLrick W Carlton, 18 Mar 1992, pp. 51-52, Box 7, Carlton Papers. 

48Harbell interv, pp. 25-26. 
250 AFTER DESERT STORM 

-!<>Carlton, "KTF Paper," p. 5; Leaf interv, pp. 6-10; Maj. Gen. Patrick 

J. Kelly, telephone conversation with author, 19 Sep J 997. 

501-Luber interv, p. 18; Maj. Gen. james W Ray, LL. Col. Michael j. 

Fisher, and LL. Col. Stephen Sheppard, "Emergency Recovery Assistance 

lO Kuwait," The Milila1y Engineer, v. 83. no. 52, May-jun 1991, p. 11; 

Brig. Gen. Ralph V Locurcio, "Nation Assistance in L<uwait ," Engineer, 

Apr 1992, p. 2; Walz interv; Santucci interv, pp. 4-5. 

51 CECW-OE-P, Memorandum For Record, 1 Feb 1991, Kuwait 

Reconstruction, Oct 1990-Feb 1991, Ll. Col. Michael Fisher Files; 

Kuwait Reconstruction: Miscellaneous Messages, #5, OACE Reference 

Files; memo, LL Gen. Henry Hatch for Cdr 352d CAC, 7 jan 1991, 

Kuwait Reconstruction: Maj. Gen. Ernest Edgar File, Office of History 

Files. 

s.2 Llr, Ibrahim AI-Shahecn to Maj. Gen. William Ray, 4 jan 1991, 

Edgar File. 

'>1Transatlantic Division, "Discussion Prepared for Representatives of 

GOK [Government of Kuwaiti on Emergency Recovery by USACE," 7 

jan 199 1, Kuwait Reconstruction, Office of History Files. 

54Santucci interv, p. 56; AI-Qabandi interv, pp. 16, 18, 20. 

sssantucci interv, pp. 48-50, 52. 

'>6Lbid., p. 57; Al-Shahecn interv, pp. 10-11. 

57Msg, DAMO-ODP-AOC to CDRUSASOC, msg 201230Z Nov 

1990, Kuwait Reconstruction: 352d Civil Affairs Command, Office of 

llistory Files; memo, Lt. Gen. I latch for Cdr 352d CAC, 7 jan l 991; 

memo, Cdr 352d for Stee ring Committee, 8 j an 1991 , l<uvvait 

Reconstruction: Miscellaneous Messages, #5, OACE Reference Piles. 

58 Paul W Dobie, memo for file, Subj: USACE Emergency Response 

to Kuwait, 1 Feb 1991, Kuwait Reconstruction Chronology, Office of 

I listory; Col. Ralph Locurcio, imcrv b)' author, Kuwait City, 7 Apr 1991, 

pp. 2-3. 

59 HQUSACE, Briefing for Hatch, 22 jan 199 J, Kuwait 

Reconstruction: Briefings, Office of History Files. 

60 Memo, Hatch for Cdrs, Major Subordinate Commands/Districts, 

22 jan 1991, Kuwait Reconstruction: Personnel, Office of llistory Files. 

61 Col. Ralph Locurcio, inten, by Ron Roffennach, n.d., Kuwait 

Reconstruction: Locurcio intcn' and leuer, Office of History Files. 

6.lMemo, Col. Thomas j. Sheehy for Tony AuiCLLa, 25 Oct 1990, 

Subj: Engineer Suppon to Civil ResLOration Operations, Kuwait 

Reconstruction: Fisher files; Maj. Gen. Patrick Kelly comments in 

IIQUSACE Briefing, 11 jan J 991; Ltr, LL Gen. Hatch toLl. Gen. Dennis 

J Reimer, DCSOPS, 25 jan 1991, Kuwait Reconstruction: Miscellaneous 

Messages, #5, OACE Reference Files; memo, G. Edward Dickey for the 
NOTES 251 

Chief of Engineers, 15 Feb 1991, Kuwait Reconstruction: Background, 

Ofrice of History Files. 

63Msg, Amb. Gnehm to Secretary of State, 12171 6Z jan 1991, 

Kuwait Reconstruclion: 352d CAC, Office of History Files; msg, 

Secretary of State to Am b. Gnehm, 220 146Z jan 1991, ibid. Meanwhile, 

on L 4 january, the CINC requested that the Kuwait Task Force be 

deployed to the theater and the order followed on 17 january. Lt. Col. 

Dennis Barlow, 'joint Staff Civil Mfairs Actions During Operations 

Desen Shield and Desert Storm," Civil Ajfairs Symposium , p. 2 17. 

64 Memo, Arthur II. 11 ughes, Dep. Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, 14 jan 1991, Kuwait 

Reconstruction: 352d CAC, Office of llistory Files. 

M"The Kuwait Task Force," pp. 267- 68; Walz interv; Mooney, interv 

by Stewart, pp. 22-23; Ed King telephone conversation with author, 5 

feb L 997. 

66 Brinkerhoff, "Waging the War," p. 268; Mooney, interv by Stewart, 

p. 23. 

Chapter 2. Planning in Theater 

t Elliott, interv by Stewart, p. 16; Elliott, interv by Carlton, pp. 2, 17, 

35; Col. Patrick W Carlton, "The Kuwait Task Force: A Un ique Solution 

to l<uwaits Reconstruction Problems" ("KTF Paper"), p. 22, Box I, 

Carlton Papers; Brinkerhoff, "Waging the War," p. 190; Au letta inten', p. 

33. 

2Blount, imen' by Carlton, 5 Dec 1991, p. 32. 

3"CCATF After Action Report," p. 297; Kerr, inten• by Carlton, pp. 

27,3L. 

4Yeosock interv, p. 26; Eltiou, inten• by Carlton, p. 18; Sadek inten•. 

Some speculate that the ARCENT staff was not receptive to civil affairs 

because they were reservists (M~ . Les M. Caplan, interv by LL Col. 

William A. McGrew, 3 May 1992, Center of Military History/Center for 

Low Intensity Conflict). 

s Leaf interv, p. 13; Gnehm, intcn' by Carlton, pp. lO-ll; Yeosock 

inten•, pp. 27-28. 

6Gnehm, inten1 by Carlton, pp. 13-15a. 

7 Blount, interv by Carlton, p. 35; Elliott, interv by Carlton, p. 17; 

Brinkerhoff, "Waging the War," p. 190; Carlton, "KIF Paper," p. 23. 

8Leafinterv, pp. 14-15. 

9Biount, inten1 by Carlton, p. 19; Brinkerhoff, "Waging the War," pp. 

184-85; Sadek interv; Mooney, interv by Crouch. Maj. Gen.(P) Pagonis 

told Col. Elliott that no trucks in Saudi Arabia were available for lease, 

but the Kuwaitis were part owners of a large trucking firm in Saudi 
252 AFI'ER DESERT STORM 

Arabia. The day al'ter their meeting, 150 trucks were made available to 

the Kuwait Task Force. U.S. Army Special Operations Command 

(USASOC), "Army Special Operations in Operations Desert 

ShielcVDesert Storm," p. 133, Kuwait Reconstruction, Office of History 

Files. 

IOHarbcll imerv, p. 59. 

II Ibid., pp. 34-37. 

tl"CCATF After Action Report," pp. 299-300. 

ncol. Lawrence Bloum, "Civil-Military Operations During 

Operations Desert Shield/Storm From a U.S. CENTCOtvl Perspective," 

Civil Affairs Symposium, pp. 232-33; Blount, interv by Carlton, p. 14-16; 

Col. james Kerr, interv by Lt. Col. john Fishel, 20 Dec 1991, pp. 3-4, 9, 

Box 4, Carlton Papers. 

H Blount, interv by Stewan, pp. 17-18, 26; Bloum, interv by 

Carlton, p. 28; "CCATF After Action Report," pp. 29 L-92. 

J5Blount, "Civil-Military Operations," pp. 231-32. 

t6Blount, imerv b)' Carlton, pp. 26-27, 36. 

t7Maj. Gen. RobertS. Frix and Capt. Archie L. Davis 111, "Task Force 

Freedom and the Restoration of Kuwait," MilitGiy Review, Oct 1992, p. 

3; "CCATF Arter Action Report," pp. 284-85. Col. l<err complained that 

the CENTCOM j-5 staff did not relinquish enough operational control 

to allow ARCENT to perform its executive agem mission effectively. The 

G-5 was one of the few clements on the ARCENT staff without Saudi 

counterparts because the j-5 preempted this relationship. Kerr dealt 

with thej-5 who, in turn, dealt directly vvith the Saudis (Kerr, interv by 

Carlton, p. 27; Kerr, imerv by Fishel). 

IBBiount, interv by Stewart, p. 26; Blount, interv by CarllOn, p. 28; 

"CCATF After Action Report," pp. 291-93. 

19 lbid., p. 294. 

20Msg, COMUS ARCENT Main/AFRD-GE to CINCCENT .J-5, 16 

j an L 991, Kuwait Reconstruction: Miscellaneous Messages, #5, OACE 

Reference Files. 

ll Mooney, interv by Crouch. 

HMsg, USClNCCENT to SECDEF, l71800Z jan 1991, Kuwait 

Reconstruction: Corps of Engineers Activities, ASA(ILE) Files; "CCATF 

After Act ion Repon," p. 294. 

23Col. Allen W. l<cener, "Civil Affairs Operations in SoULhwest Asia," 

Civil Affairs Symposium, p. 225; Mooney, imerv by Crouch. 

24Ycosock imerv; Kerr, interv by Carlton, p. 38; Kerr, imerv by 

Fishel, pp. ll-12. Mooney imerpreted Yeosocks decision as an indication of the rear in ARCENT headquarters that no one was comrolli ng the 

Kuwait Task Force. Sec Mooney, interv by Ste,vart, p. 28. 
NOTES 253 

.25 frix and Davis, 'Task Force Freedom," p. 4; JaneL A. McDonnell , 

"Rebuilding Kuwait," Milital)' Review, Jul 1993, p. 52; "CCATF Arter 

Action Report," p. 297. 

26"CCATF Afler Action Repon," pp. 295-97. 

27lbid., pp. 297-99; Mooney, interv by amhor, p. 27. 

28 HQ, 96th CA BN (Airborne), "Memo fo r Panicipants in Civil 

Affairs Symposium, 25-27 Oct 1991," ll Sep 1991, Civil Affairs 

Symposium, p. 442; Mooney, interv by author, p. 27. 

29Mooney, interv by author, p. 30. 

30Maj . Gen. Robert S. Frix, interv by author, Kuwait City, 5 Apr 

1991, pp. 2-3; Frix and Davis, 'Task Force Freedom," p. 4. 

J J Frix, interv by author, pp. 2-4; Maj. Gen. Robert S. Frix, inten' by 

LL. Col. John Fishel, 8 Nov 1991 , p. 3, Box 2, Carlton Papers. 

32 l<err, inLerv by Fishel, p. 10. 

33Blount, interv by Carlton, pp. 17- 18; memo, Lt. Col. Peler J. 

Skells, G-3, AFRD, foT Assistant Chief of Staff, 21 Feb 1991, Third U.S. 

Army (hereafter cilecl as TUSA) G-3 Files: Lucky Tac, Miscellaneous 

Papers and Fragos; Blount, interv by Carlton , pp. 16- 17; Blount, imerv 

by Stewan, p. 23; Brinkerhoff, "Waging the War," p. 192. 

34 8\ount, interv by Stewan, p. 20; BlounL, intenr by Carlton, p. 17. 

35Memoranclum For Record , LL. Col. Peter J. Skells to Task Force 

Freedom representatives, n.d., Ske lls, G-3 Operations memo, Box 68, 

Task Force Freedom Records, TUSA G-3 Tactical Operations Center 

Logs; Frix, interv by Fishel, p. 8. 

36Briefing slide, n.cl., TFF Records, Box 67/68, TUSA G-3; Frix, 

interv by Fishe l, p. 8; Frix, imerv by author, pp. 2-5; McDonne ll , 

"Rebuilding Kuwai t," p. 52. The task force also included a Disaster 

Assistance Response Team from the Office of Foreign Disaste r 

Assistance, pan of the U.S. Agency for International Development, 

and a contract suppon team from the lmertect Corporation in Dallas, 

Texas. 

>?j ohn T. Fishel, Liberation, Ocwpalion and Reswe: War TerminaUon 

and Desert Storm (Fort Leavenworth, Kans: U.S. Army Command and 

General Starr College, 1992), p. viii. 

38Col. Richard M. Swain, '"Lucky War' Third Army in Desert Storm," 

29 Mar 1993, unedited draft, p. 465; Lt. Col. Mark B. Yates, "Coalition 

Warfare in Desert Storm," MiliLwy Review, Oct 1992, p. 50; briefing 

slide, n.d., TFF Records, Box 67/68, TUSA G-3. 

39 Memo, Col. Ralph Locurcio for Col. William Miller, n.d., #25: 

Kuwait Recovery, Col. William Miller Files. 

-IOLocurcio, Memorandum For Record , 7 Feb 1991, Subj: l<uwait 

Update with Lt. Gen. Hatch, 6 Feb 1991, TAD Incoming Msg File, Desert 
254 AFTER DESERT STORM 

Storm, #45; Locurcio, Memorandum For Record, 10 Feb 1991 #25: 

Kuwait Reconstruction, Miller Files. 

41Briefing slide, 7 Feb 1991, Kuwait Reconstruction: Briefing Slides, 

Office of History Files. 

42Ben Wood, Memorandum For Record, n.d., Message Reading File, 

Book #4, Desert Storm, South Atlantic Division, Emergency Operations 

Center Files; Locurcio comments to author, 23 May 1997. 

43 Msg, Am b. Edward Gnehm to Secretary of State, l22057Z Feb 

1991, Kuwait Reconstruction: Miscellaneous Messages, #3, OACE 

Reference Files. 

HMemo, Lt. Gen. Henry Hatch to Amb. Edward Gnehm, 14 Feb 

1991, Kuwait Reconstruction: Background, Office of History Files. 

45Locurdo, interv by author, 7 Ap r 1991, pp. 2-3, 14. 

46Locurcio, interv by author, 7 Apr 1991, pp. 3, 8; Wynne Fuller, 

interv by author, 6 Apr 1.991, pp. 1, 3-7; Slana interv, p. 32. Wynne 

Fuller had recently spent three months in the Virgin Islands and a month 

and a half in Panama after Operation jUST CAUSE, providing support to 

SOUTH COM. 

47Maj. Larry Jinkins, interv by author, Kuvvait City, 5 Apr 1991, p. 

3; memo, Col. Herndon for Directors/Office Chiefs, 5 Feb 1991, Km.vait 

Reconstruction: Personnel, Office of History Files. 

48Locurcio, Memorandum For Record, 7 Feb 1991, Subj: Kuwait 

Update with Lt. Gen. Hatch, 6 feb 1991, TAD Incoming Msg File, 

Desen Swrm, #45; Locurcio, interv by author, 7 Apr 1991, pp. 

22-24; Col. William A. Miller, Memorandum For Record, 26 jan 

1991, Kuwait Reconstruction: Oct 1990-Feb 1991, Fisher Files. 

Locurc io indicated that he took his mission priorities not from the 

Ambassador but from the Kuwaitis because he was spending their 

money (Col. Ralph V Locurcio, interv by author, Kuwait City, 8 Sep 

1991, p. 2). 

49Locurcio, "Nation Assistance in Kuwait," p. 8. 

50jinkins interv, pp. 9- 11, 13; Locurcio, "The Reconstruction of 

Kuwait Following Desert Storm," Site World, World Development 

Council, 1992, p. 36. 

51 Locurcio, interv by author, 7 Apr 1991, p. 4 7 ;Jinkins interv, p. 11. 

52Yates, "Coalition Warfare," p. 50. 

53Frix, interv b)' Fishel, p. 5. 

54 Frix, int.erv by Fishel, pp. 4-6; Frix and Davis, "Task Force 

Freedom," p. 3. 

S:>Carlton, "KIF Paper," p. 24; Brinkerhoff, "Waging the War," p. 

193; Mooney, interv by auLhor. pp. 3-5; "CCATF Arter Action Repon," 

pp. 299-301; McDonnell, "Rebuilding Kuwait," p. 52. 
NOTES 255 

56"From Green Bay to the Persian Gulf: 431st Civil Affairs Company 

in Operation Desert Storm," Civil Affairs Symposium, pp. 555-56; 

McDonnell , "Rebuilding Kuwait," p.52; Scales, Certain ViclOI)', p. 355. 

57Mooney, inten' by author, pp. 3-5; "CCATF After Action Report," 

pp. 300-30 I . 

58Maj. james Brooks, interv by author, Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, 26 

Mar 1991, pp. 65, 72-78. 

59Kuwait Emergency Response Project Executive Summary, #2, 4 

Mar 1991, Kuwait Reconstruction, Office of History Files; ltr, Col. 

Locurcio, n.d. , Locurcio intCI'\' and lette r, Kuwait Reconstruction, Office 

of History Files; Brooks interv, p. 83; KERO Executive Summary #9, 11 

Mar 1991; james N. Parker, jr., "Corps j ournalist Recounts Trip Into 

Kuwait City," Engineer Update, May 1991, p. 4;jinkins interv. 

Chapter 3. Emergency Response Phase: Task Force Freedom 

I "US Army Doing the Work in Kuwait," New Yorh Times, 5 Apr 199 1, 

p. 10. 

2 Blount, "Civil-Military Operations," p. 233; "CCATF After Action 

Report," p. 302; Heike Hasenauer, "Corps Rebuilds Kuwait," Soldiers, 

Aug 1991, p. 14; john j. Kosowatz, "ReLUrn trip is bittersweet," 

Engineering News-Record, 6 May 1991, p. 42. 

JTask Force Freedom Briefing, n.d., Kuwait Reconstruction: TFF 

Briefing, Office of History Files; Frix, interv by author, p. 7; j ohn 

Whelan, eel. , t<uwait: A MEED Practical Guide (London: Middle East 

Economic Digest Limited, J 985), p. 136. 

'~Memorandum For Reco rd , AFRD-GE, 1 Mar 1991, Kuwait 

Reconstruction: Miscellaneous Messages, #6, OACE Reference Files; 

Memorandum For Record, AFRD-CE, 2 Mar 1991, Kuwait 

Reconstruction: Civil Affairs Activities, ASA(lLE) Files. 

54 16th ENCOM Sitrep, 5 Mar 1991: Tactical Operations Center Log 

(TFF 1-10 Mar 1991), TFF Records, TUSA G-3. 

6"416th Engineer Command at Kuwait City, Task Force Freedom," 

n.d., Tactical Operations Center Logs, 1-9, 10-11, 13 Apr 1991 , TUSA 

G-3; memo, 4 L6th ENCOM, TFF, to ARCENT (F) G-3, 10 Mar 1991, 

Tactical Operations Center Logs, 1-ll, 13 Apr 199 L, TUSA G- 3. 

7416th ENCOM Sitrep, 5 Mar 1991 , Tactical Operations Center Log 

(TFF l-10 Mar 199l), TUSA G-3; Lt. Col. Robert H. Griffin, "Pacemakers 

in Southwest Asia," Engineer Officer Bulletin , no. 13,jul l 99l, p. 14. 

BCol. Anthony R. Kropp, "Engineers Build For Victory ln Operation 

Desert Shield," pp. 6-7, Desert Shield/Desen Storm: 41lth EN BDE, 

Office of llistory Files; mcn1o, 43d En Cmb Bne (Hvy) for 4 L6th 

ENCOM Commander, 8 Apr 1991, Desert Shield/Desert Storm: USAES 
256 AFTER DESERT STORM 

Materials, Office of llistor)' Files; 416Lh ENCOM Sitrcp 4 Mar 1991, 

Tactical Operations Center Log (1- 1 0 tvlar 1991), TUSA G-3; Brooks 

interv, pp. 89-90; 416th ENCOM Sitrep, 13 Mar 1991, Tactical 

Operations Center Log (IFF 11-17 Mar 1991.), TUSA G-3; memo, 

4 16th ENCOM, 1TF, to ARCENT (F) G-3, lO Mar 1991, Tactical 

Operations Center Log (TFr L-11, l3 Apr 1991), TUSA G-3. 

944th Signal Battalion Sit rep, 4 Mar 1990, Tactical Operations 

Center Logs (TFF J- 10 Mar 1991), TUSA G-3. 

I0720th MP BN Sitrep, n.d., Tactical Operations Center Log, TUSA 

G-3. 

Ll l st EOD Group (F) Sit rep, 6 Mar 1991, Tactical Operations Center 

Log (IFF 1-10 Mar 1 991), TUSA G-3; 1st EOD Group (F) Sitrcp, 10 

Mar 1991, ibid. (IFF ll-17 Mar 1991); ibid., 13 Mar 1991; ibid., 21 

Mar 1991 (TFF 18-24 Mar 1991). 

12Capt. Bonnie E Wilson, "Forward-Area Support in Desert Storm," 

1\rmy Logistician, Sep-Oct 1992, pp. 2-4; "CCATF After Action Report," 

p. 301; 22d SUPCOM Sitrep #2, 6 Marl 991, Tactical Operations Center 

Log (IFF 1-10 Mar 1991), TUSA G-3; 22cl SUPCOM Sitrep #3, 7 Mar 

1991, ibid.; Frix and Davis "Task Force Freedom," p. 6; Moone)', imerv 

by Stewart, p. 34. 

13Memo, Lt. Col. Donald j. Bruss, Subj: Significant Activities, 

ARCENT Med ica l Com mand (For.,vard), LO Mar 1. 991, Tactical 

Operations Center Log (IFF 1-10 Mar 1991), TUSA G-3. 

HScalcs, Certain Vict01y, p. 337. 

L5Mooney, interv by Stewart, p. 35; "From Green Bay to the Persian 

Gulf: 43lst CA Company in Operation Desert Storm," Civil 1\.Ifairs 

Symposium, p. 528, 558; memo, Lt. Col. James A. Christopherson. 432d 

CA Co, ror CG 352d, Subj: After Action Report, 7 Apr 1991, ibid .. p. 

531; memo, HQ, 96th CA BN (Airborne), ror Participants in CA 

Symposium, 25-27 Oct 1991 , ll Sep 1991 , ibid., p. 443. 

16"The Kuwait Task Force," Civil Affairs Symposium, p. 270; !Iuber 

interv, p. 63; "CCATF After i\ction Repon," p. 309; Elliou, inten' by 

Stewan, pp. 3-5; Walz comments, 16 Apr 1997; Ed King telephone conversation with author, 5 Feb 1997. 

17Gnehm, inten' by Carlton, pp. 17-18; Harbell interv, p. 64; 352d 

CA Command Sit rep, 052000 Mar 1991, Tactical Operations Center Log 

(TFF 1-10 Mar 1991), TUSA G-3. 

l8352d CA Command Sitrep 062000 Mar 1991, ibid.; "CCATF Arter 

Action Report," p. 303. 

l9Mooney, intcrv by author, pp. 6-1 0; Lt. Col. Noel W Kohl, 416th 

ENCOM, "Engineer DAST After Action Report" (draft), 9 Mar 1991, 

Tactical Operalions Center Logs, l-9 Apr., 10, 11, 13 Apr 1991 , TUSA 
N OTES 257 

G-3; memo, Lt. Col. Noel W Kohl for t-.'laj. Gen. Mulcahy, "DAST After 

Action Repon ," 13 Mar 1991 , Defense Reconstruction Assistance Office 

(DRAO) Files: Reading File 1; Elhou, interv by Stewart, p. 6; USASOC, 

"Army Special Operations," p. 135. 

20Al-Qabandi interv, pp. 45, 50, 51; Locurcio, intenr by aULhor, 7 

Apr 1991, p. 41 ; 352d CA Sitrep 201803Z Mar 1991, Tactical 

Operations Cemer Log (TFF 18-24 Mar 1991), TUSA G-3. 

21 "CCATF After Aclion Report," p. 309; DRAO Completion Report, 

p. 14- 17; Brooks inten', pp. 89-91; Kohl , "Engineer DAST After Action 

Report" (draft), 9 Mar 199 L; memo, Kohl orM~. Gen. Mulcahy, 13 Mar 

1991; Mooney, interv by author, pp. 21-22; Frix and Davis, "Task Force 

Freedom," p. 6. 

22DRAO Completion Report, pp. 18-20; Frix and Davis, "Task Force 

Freedom," p. 8; Mooney, inten r by Crouch, 25 Mar 1992. 

23"CCATF After Action Report," p. 309; memo, AFRD-GE for Col. 

Kerr, 3 Mar 1991, Kuwait Reconstruction: Miscellaneous Messages, #6, 

OACE Reference Files. 

24 352d Sit rep #32, 2 Apr 1991, Tactica l Operalions Center Log (TFF 

1-9 Apr 1991), TUSA G-3. 

2S DRAO Completion Report, pp. 21, 24; l<ERO, Fact Sheet, 7 j un 

1991 , Kuwait Reconstruction: Ports, DRAO Files; Kohl, "Engineer DAST 

After Action Report" (draft), 9 Mar 1991; memo, Kohl fo r Maj. Gen. 

Mul.cahy, l3 Ma r 1991. 

26DRAO Completion Report, p. 22. 

27"CCATF After Action Repon," pp. 310-ll; 352cl CA Command 

Sitrep #24, 25 Mar 1991 , Tactical Operalions Center Log (TFF 25-31 

Mar 1991), TUSA G-3. 

28"Putting Kuwait Back on its Feet," Chicago Tribune, 8 Apr 1991. 

29Frix and Davis, "Task Force Freedom," pp. 6-8; "Putting Kll\.vait 

Back on its Feet," Chicago Tribune; "CCATF After Action Report," p. 311 . 

30 [bid., p. 312; 352d CA Command Sitrep 122000 Mar 1991; Frix 

and Davis, "Task Force Freedom," p. 8. 

31 Mooney, intenr by author, pp. 16-18; Craig Forman and Tony 

Horwitz, "Desert Mirage?" Wall StreeL]ournal, 8 Jull99l. 

32 Memo, AFRD-GE for Col. Ke rr, 3 Mar 1991, Kuwait 

Reconstruction: Miscellaneous lvlessages, #6, OACE Reference File; Frix 

and Davis, "Task Force Freedom ," p. 8; Kohl, "Engineer DAST After 

Action Report" (d raft), 9lvlar 1991; memo, Kohl !'or Maj. Gen. Mulcahy, 

13 Mar 1991 ; Walz interv. t-,1[ooney favored using the food and water distribution points that the Kuwaitis were accustomed to because communication was poor and it would be difficult lO notify them of new locations. Mooney, interv by Stewan , p. 36. 
258 AFrER DESERT STORM 

33352d CA Command Sitrep #14. 15 Mar 1991; "CCATF After 

Action Report," pp. 304-05; llarbell interv, pp. 39-40; Elliott. interv by 

Stewan. p. 16. 

34352d CA Command Sitrep 092000 Mar 1991; ibid., 122000 Mar 

1991, Tactical Operations Center Log (TFF 11- 17 Mar 1991), TUSA 

G-3; 352d CA Command Sitrep 192000 Mar 199l, (TFF 18-24 Mar 

1991). TUSA G-3; 352cl Sitrep #24, #32, 2 Apr 199 1, and #41, 10 Apr 

199 1, TUSA G-3. 

35Natsios, "Preventing Human Rights Abuses," pp. 1-2. 

36 fbid., pp. 2-7; Elliott, interv by Stewan, pp. 14-15. 

37Memo, ARCENT MEDCOM (F), Subj: Significant Activities, 10 

Mar 1991 , Tactical Operations Center Log (TFF 1-1 0 Mar 1991), TUSA 

G-3. 

38Harbell interv, p. 69; Scales, Certain Victo1 y, p. 336. 

>9"CCATF After Action Report," pp. 313- 14; "Puuing Kuwait Back 

on its Feet," Chicago 1i'ibune; "f-rom Green Bay to the Persian Gulf: The 

432cl Civil Affairs Company in Operation Desert Storm," Civil Affairs 

Symposium, p. 559. 

40Memo, ARCENT MEDCOM (F). 10 Mar 1991; Mooney, intent by 

author. pp. 30- 31; "CCATF After Action Report," p. 303. 

41 Mooney, intent by Stcwan, pp. 32-33; Maj. Gen. Roben S. Frix, 

interv by Col. Patrick W Carlton, 6 Apr 1992, p. 15; Mooney, interv by 

author, p. 32; Huber interv, pp. 70-71; Mooney, interv by Crouch. 

42 Frix and Davis, 'Task Force Freedom," p. 1 0; Prix, interv by 

fishel, p. 6; Gnehm, intcrv by author, pp. 13, 16; memo, Maj. Gen. 

Glynn C. Mallory,jr. , 12 Mar L991 , Tactical Operations Center Log (TFF 

l L-17 Mar 1991), TUSA G-3; Blount, interv by Carlton, pp. 32-33. 

43 Blount, interv by Carl LOn, p. 33-34; Blount, imerv by Stewart, pp. 

27-28. 

44 Leaf interv, pp. 20-2 t. 

'~'>Frix, interv by Fishel, p. 15. 

46Elliou, intent by Stewart p. 7. 

47Mooney, intent by Stewan, pp. 40-42; Frix, interv by Fishel, p. 15. 

4BARCENT Briefing for CINC, faxed from ARCENT (Main) G- 3 on 

Ll Mar 1991, Taclical Operations Center Log (TFF l l- 17 Mar 1991), 

TUSA G-3. 

W'Draft Itinerary for Sec Army visit to Ku'vvait City/Camp Freedom 

on 15 Mar 1991," Tactical Operations Center Log (TFF l- lO Mar 1991), 

TUSA G-3; Maj. Gen. Glynn C. Mallory, Jr., 12 Mar 1991 (TFF 11-17 

Mar 1991), TUSA G-3. 

'>OMsg, COMUS ARCENT Main/G- 3 to Cdr TFF/G-3, 26 Mar 1991, 

ibid. (TFF 25- 31 Mar 1991); 416th ENCOM Sitrep, 24 Mar 1991, ibid.; 
NOTES 259 

memo, HQ 96th CA BN, for participants ... , Civil ~{fairs Symposium, p. 

443; Brinkerhoff, "Waging the War," p. 193. 

51Scales, Certain Victo1y , p. 337; Brinkerhoff, "Waging the War," p. 

193. On 15 April ARCENT (Forward) headquarters moved from Kuvvait 

City back lO Riyadh and Mooney temporarily assumed command of Task 

Force Freedom. 

52Msg, Cdr Task Force Freedom lO ARCENT G2/3/5, 10 May 1991, 

Subj: IFF Freedom Sitrep, 1 May 1991, Operations-IFF Sitrep (closeout): DRAO Files; 352cl CA Command Sitrep 211803Z Nlar 1991, 

Tactical Operations Center Log (IFF 18- 24 Mar 1991), TUSA G- 3; 

352d CA Command Sitrep 222003Z Mar 1991, ibid.; 352d CA 

Command Sitrep 232003Z Mar 1991, ibid.; memo, CINCCENT to 

C]CS, 111200Z Apr 1991, ibid. (TFF 1- 13 Apr 1991); TFF Briefing, 

n.d., Kuwait Reconstruction: TFF Briefing, Office of History Files. 

53 Msg, Cdr Task Force Freedom to ARCENT G2/3/5, 10 May 

1991, Subj: TFF Freedom Sitrep, 1 May 1991, Operations-IFF Sitrep 

(closeout), DRAO Files; msg, Cdr Task Force Freedom to ARCENT 

G2/3/5 , 30 Apr 1991 , Subj: Task Force Freedom Sitrep, 30 Apr 1991, 

ibid . 

54"Political lnfighting Paralyzes Kuwait," Chicago Ii·ibune, 22 Apr 

1991, p. 4; Hasenauer, "Corps Rebuilds Kuwait," p. 15; Baltimore Sun, 19 

May 1991. 

55Frix, interv by Fishel, pp. 8-9. 

56Mooney, interv by Crouch. 

57Memo, Cheney to Mooney, 4 Aug 1991, Kuwait Reconstruction: 

General, ASA(TLE) Files. 

58Mooney, interv by Stevvan, p. 44. 

59Mooney, interv by author, p. 34; Mooney, interv by Stewart, p. 44; 

Frix, interv by Carlton, p. 17. 

60Mooney, interv by author, p. 25. 

61 "CCATF After Action Report," p. 315. 

62Mooney, interv by Stewart, p. 44; "Putting Kuwait Back on its 

Feet," Chicago Ii·ibune. 

63DRAO Completion Report, p. 14; Frix and Davis, "Task Force 

Freedom," pp. 8, 10; Elliott, interv by Stewart, p. 8. 

Chapter 4. Emergency Response Phase: Kuwait Emergency Recovery 

Office Activities 

llocurcio, int.erv by author, 7 April 199 J, pp. 15- 21; Fuller interv, 

6 Apr 1991, p. 21. 

.2 Memorandum For Record, Dr. Ibrahim Al-Shaheen/Locurcio, n.d., 

FMS MOD: DRAO Files; Locurcio, interv by author, 7 Apr 1991, pp. 
260 AFI'ER DESERT SroRM 

49-50; Brooks interv, pp. 93, 95;jinkins interv, pp. 32, 34-35; Locurcio 

comments on draft manuscript. 

JCol. Ralph V Locurcio and Maj. Charles R. Maggio, "The Corps in 

l<uwait," E11gineer Officer Bulletin, jul 1991, no. 13, p. 16; Fuller interv, 

pp. 38-39; Hasenauer, "Corps Rebuilds Kuwait," p . .1 6; judy Schriener, 

"Kuwaitis reth inking management plans," Engineering News-Record, jul 

J/8, 1991, p. 28. 

'*Locurcio, imerv by author, 8 Sep 1991, p. 29; Locurcio and 

Maggio, "The Corps in Kuwait," p.l6; Locurcio, interv b)' author, 7 April 

1991, pp. 5-7. 

'>AI-Qabandi inten', pp. 21-22; Locurcio, inten' by author, 7 April 

1991,p.9. 

6 Graves, "Water Resources Policy and Issues," pp. 7-8; Locurcio, 

interv by author, 8 Sep J 991, pp. 34-41; Locurcio, HQUS/\CE Briefing, 

16 Aug 1991, Ku>vait Reconstruction, Office of History files; Slana 

interv, p. 36; Locurcio, "Nalion Assistance in Kuwait," pp. 4-5. Resident 

offices sometimes shared contractors. In one instance , three resident 

engineers managed a single contract with Brown and Root. This situation 

caused confusion and some dirficulty in managing funds. 

7 Transatlantic Division briefing slide, 6 Apr 1991 . 

s Locurcio and Maggio, "The Corps in Kuwait," p. 16; Fuller interv, 

pp. 18-19; Locurcio, inten' by author, 8 Sep 1991, pp. 10-12, 23-25; 

AI-Qabandi interv, pp. 23, 57. 

9 joan F Kibler, "Kuwait parliament building complete," Transatlantic 

News, v.7, no. 6, Aug-Sep, 1992, pp.3-7. 

IOMemorandum For Record, l2 Feb 1991, Message Readi ng File, 

Book #4, Desert Sto rm, South Atlantic Division, Emergency Operalio ns 

Ccmcr Files; Locurcio, "Nation Assistance in Kuwait," pp. 4-5; Locurcio, 

intcn' by author, 8 Sep L 991, pp. 69; 72. Urbine inten', pp. 13, 38. 

II Hasenauer, "Corps Rebuilds Kuwait," pp. 15-16. 

12Memo, Ll. Gen. Henry Hatch for ASA(lLE), 27 Feb 1991 , Kuwait 

Reconstruction: Command and Control, Office of History Files; Locurcio 

comments, 'vVashington, D.C., 23 May 1997. 

13Locurcio, inten' by author, 7 April 1991, pp. 25-28. 

Hfuller interv, pp. 23-25. 

15$\ana interv, p. 33; Urbine interv, p. 2; Locu rcio, imerv by author, 

8 Sep 199 1, pp. 3-4. 

16Locurcio, interv by author, 8 Sep 1991, pp. 31-32; Fuller interv, 

pp.25-29. 

17 Los Angeles Times, 28 f-eb l991; "U.S. Finns First in Line to do the 

job," USA Today, 14 Feb 199L; Washington Post , 22 Feb 1991; "U.S. 

Corporations Win Kuwait Rebuilding jobs," New Yorh Times, 28 Feb 
NOTES 261 

1991. The Governor of Kuwait's Central Bank, Sheikh Salem AI-Sabah, 

predicted the cost of rebuilding could climb to $500 billion. 

18Memo, Rep. Helen Delich Bentley to Sec. Michael P. W Stone, 22 

Jan 1991, Kuwait Reconstruction: Contracting, ASA(ILE) Files; memo, 

ASA(lLE) to Bentley, 7 Mar 1991, ibid. 

19Executive Summary, Col. t>.tlichael Fellows, n.d., OACE Book, 

"Kuwait Aclivities, 25 February-presem"; "Contracts Awarded [or 

Kuwait Cleanup," Washington Post, 5 Mar 1991. 

20Memo, frederick W Volcan.sek, 18 Mar 1991, Kuwait 

Reconstruction: Contractors, Office of History Files. 

2 1 Memo, Maj. Gen. James W Ray for Amb. Edvvard VV. Gnehm, 18 

Feb 1991, Kuwait Reconstruction: COE Activities, ASA(lLE) Files; memo, 

Director General of Kuwait Public Works, 21 Feb 1991, Kuwait 

Reconstruction (not on letterhead), Office or History Fil.es; Locurcio, interv 

by author, 8 Sep 1991, p. 9; Memorandum For Record, Locurcio, 25 Feb 

1991, Kuwait Reconstruction: Comracting, Orfice of History Files. 

22Memorandum For Record, Dr. Shaheen/Locurcio, n.d., FMS 

MOD: DRAO Files. 

B DFt\RS, Subpart 236.273; memo, Cecil Hutchinson to Col. 

William Miller, 22 Jul 1991, Kuwait Reconstruction: Contracting, 

ASA(lLE) Files; copy of Commerce Business Daily notice in Kuwait 

Reconstruction: Phase l FMS Case KU-B- HAQ, john Jones Files. 

24 At their 16 February meeting, Locurcio had informed Shaheen 

that the Corps intended to use full and open competition to award construction contracts, but if the tactical situation moved faster than anticipated, it would use letter contracts and an accelerated comracling procedure. Locurdo and Shaheen agreed that the overriding goal was to 

have construction contractors ready to meet the needs of the Kuwaiti 

population as soon as the transition to Kuwaiti government control 

occurred. Memorandum For Record, Dr. Ibrahim Al-Shaheen/Locurcio, 

n.d., FMS MOD: DRAO Files; memo, Volcansek for Trade Development 

Deputy Assistant Secretaries, 25 Mar 1991, Kuvvait Reconstruction: 

Contractors, Office of History Files; Memorandum For Record, Edward 

M. Slana, 2 Apr 1991, Kuwait Reconstruction, Office of History Files; 

Slana interv, pp. 8- 10; Memorandum For Record, Ben Wood, n.d., 

Message Reading File, Book #4, Desert Storm, South Atlantic Division, 

Emergency Operations Center Files; Locurcio, interv by author, 8 Sep 

1991, pp. 45-47. The British Department of Trade and Industry complained that 72 hours was not enough time, but the fax machines in 

Dhahran were jammed with prequalification applications. "U.S., UK Vi.e 

Over Rebuilding Postwar Kuwait," Wall SLreeL}ournal, 21 Feb 1991. 

25DRAO Completion Report, 20 Nov 1991, p. 9. 
262 AFTER DESERT STORM 

26Memorandum For Record, Slana, 2 Apr 1991; Slana inten7

, pp. 

14- 17. 

27Siana interv, pp. 10-J 3. 

28 Memo, Volcansek for Trade Developmem Deputy Assistant 

Secretaries, 25 Mar 1991, Kuwait Reconstruction: ContraclOrs, Office of 

l I is10ry Files. 

29Locurcio, imerv by author, 8 Sep 1991, pp. 47-48. 

30Locurcio, imerv by Ruffennach, p. 2; Kesh Vadlamani, interv by 

author, Kuwait City, 8 Apr 199 L. p. 5. 

31 Locurcio and Maggio, "The Corps in Kuwait," p. 16. 

32 DRAO Completion ReporL, p. 18; Locurcio, "The Reconstruction 

of Kuwait," p. 37; McDonnell, "Rebuilding Kuwait," p. 54; Vadlamani 

interv, pp. 7, 13. 

33Vadlamani interv, pp. 8-9, 19-21. Author notes from damage survey tour with Maj. Gen. Kelly, 4 Apr 1991. Locurcio comments on manuscript; john j. Kosowatz, "Brits brought first power," Engineering 

News-Record, 6 May l991, p. 43. 

J4 Brooks interv, pp. 9 1-92. 

35 DRAO Completion Report, pp. 22-23; Maj. Robert Underwood, 

intenr by author, Kuwait City, ll Sep 1991, pp. 2-3, 15. 

36DRAO Completion Report, pp. 23-24. 

37 Mary Weber, imerv by author, Kuwait City, 7 Apr 1991, pp. 3, 9, 

12-19. 

38 DRAO Completion Repon, pp. 20- 21; TAD Fact Sheet, 6 May 

199 1, Subj: Water, in Transatlantic Division Briefing, 7 May 1 99 1. 

39 Weber interv, pp. 4, 7-8. 

<~OMemo, Shaheen to Locurcio, Kuwait Reconstruction: Contracting, 

Offi ce of History Files; DRAO Completion Report, p. 2 1. 

41 Weber interv, pp. 14- 17; Sehriener, "Kmvaitis rethinking management plans," pp. 28-29. 

42Samucci imerv, p. 61; TAD "Kuwait Briefing," jul 1991, Fisher 

Files; Bob Drogin, "Amid Deprivation, Emir's Palace is Gleaming Again," 

Los Angeles Times, 19 Mar 1991, pp. A1, All; Ltr, Lt. Col. Michael]. 

Fisher to Rep. Tom Andrews, 10 jul1991, General, Fisher riles; KLiwait: 

1\ MEED Practical Guide, p. J 36. 

-n RoberL P. Grath·wol and Do nita M. Moorhus, "History of the U.S. 

Army Corps of Engineers Europe Division and its Predecessors," Office 

of llistor)' Files. 

""TAD Fact Sheet: Subj: Public Buildings, Transatlantic Division 

Briefing, 7 May 1991. 

4STAD Fact Sheet, Subj: Defense/National Guard Facilities, 6 May 

1991 , Transatlantic Division Briding, 7 May 1991. 
NOTES 263 

46Memorandum For Record, David Greemvood, 11 Mar 1991, 

Kuwait Reconstruction: Contracting, Office of History Files; memo, 

julius Bounds for TAD Contracting, 5 Mar 1991, ibid. Locurcio's staff 

worked with Kuwaiti officials to smooth the way for contracLOrs, to 

include vvriting letters of introduction. See Townsend interv, p. 24; 

Locurcio and Maggio, "Corps in Kuwait," p. 16. 

47Paul Tarricone, "The Incredible Shrinking Rehab," Civil 

Engineering, Sep 1991, p. 44. 

48Slana, Memorandum For Record, 2 Apr 1991. 

49"Kuwait Not Yet Open for Business," New Yorh Times, 22 Mar 

1991, p. D1; Schriener, "Kuwaitis rethinking management plans," pp. 

26-30. 

SOTAD Brief to Dept of Commerce, n.d., Kuwait Reconstruction: 

Contracting, Fisher Files; "Examples of U.S. Army Corps Role in 

Reconstruction," Mar 1991, Kuwait Reconstruction: Contracting, Office 

of History Files. 

51Memo, Lt. Gen. Henry Hatch for ASA(lLE), 25 Feb 1991, Kuwait 

Reconstruction: Miscellaneous Messages, #5, OACE Reference Files. The 

19 February memorandum of understanding served as an "umbrella" 

agreement under which individual U.S. government agencies could provide services or commodities to the Kuwaiti government on a reimbursable basis through a single exchange of letters with Kuwaiti government ministries and agencies. 

52M.emo, Hatch for ASA(lLE), 8 Mar 1991, Kuwait Reconstruction: 

Contracting, ASA(ILE) Files. 

53Locurcio, interv by author, 7 Apr 1991, pp. 35-37; l<elly, interv by 

author, 7 Sep 1991, pp. 22-23. 

54Kelly, interv by author, 7 Sep 1991, pp. 24-25. Army lawyers 

anticipated problems with the provision that contracts let by the 

Kuwaitis were to be governed by Kuwaiti law. U.S. officials could not be 

expected to know the requ irements of Kuwaiti law. The letter of 

exchange committed the U.S. to supporting Kuwait in regard to contracts for Kuwait reconstruction, they observed. This might apply even 

in regard to contracts the Kuwaitis made on their own initiative. U.S. 

auLhorities were then supporting contracts governed under Kuwaiti law. 

Kuwaiti laws might have provisions that were unacceptable to LJ.S. interests such as a law prohibiting contracts with lsraelis. Talking Paper, Col. 

Burger, DAJA-lA, 11 Apr 1991, Kuwait Reconstruction: Miscellaneous 

Messages, #7, OACE Reference Files; KERO Executive Summary #32, 4 

Apr 1991; ibid. , #33, 5 Apr 1991; Locurcio, interv by author, 8 Sep 

1991 , pp. 11- 12. 

55"Kuwaitis rethinking management plans," p. 28. 
264 AFTER DESERT SroRM 

Chapter 5. Recovery Phase: The De fense Reconstruction Assistance 

Offi ce and Kuwait Emergency Recovery Office 

' Kelly, imerv by author, 7 Scp 1991 , pp. 4-5; Charles l less, interv 

by author, Kuwait City, 9 Sep 1991 , pp. 9, 20, 26; Alexander imcrv, pp. 

43-44; james DeWire, imerv by author, Washington, D.C., 16 .Jun 1992, 

p. 39; Livingstone imerv, p. 28. 

2Memo, Col. j ames R. Carlson, for ASA(lLE), 10 May 1991, Subj: 

Information Memo# 26, Opcralions/DAMO- ODP: DRAO Files; memo, 

Secretary Richard Cheney to the Secretar>' of the Army and the Chairman 

of the joim Chiefs of Staff, 15 Apr 1991, Kuwait Reconstruction: 

Command and Control, Office of History Files; DRAO Sitrep #l, 3 May 

1991; Locurcio, imenr by author, 8 Sep 1991, pp. 14-17; DRAO 

Biweekly Repon, 15 May 199J, l(uwait Reconstruction: DRAO Biweekly 

Reports. As a result of the Secretary of Defense:S visit, DRAO vvas tasked 

to serve as liaison to the Kuwaiti governmem and assisted ARCENT/22d 

Suppon Command in housing U.S. soldiers who remained in Kuvvait 

temporarily. DRAO Biweekly Report, 15 May 199l. 

3Kelly, interv by author, 7 Apr 1991, pp. 9, 11, 21, 63; Kell>'· interv 

by Coffe>'· pp. 21-22. 

"'Memo, Secreta1y Stone for SECDEFREP, 28 May 1991, Subj: 

Instructions to the SECDEFREP, Operations (Fax Trarfic, Apr-May): 

DRAO Files. Kelly found the original draft Letter of lnstruct ion to be too 

restrictive and burdensome, so military officials modified it. Kelly, interv 

by author, 7 Sep 1991, pp. 25-26; Alexander interv, p. 20. 

5J<elly, interv by author, 7 Apr 1991, p. 15; Livingstone interv, pp. 

JO, 13, 27. ° Kelly, i nterv by author, 7 Sep 199 1, pp. 14-J 5. 

7Memo, Lt. Col. i\lcxander for LivingsLOne, 8 May l99L, Kuwait 

Reconstruction: Corps of Engineers Activities, ASA(I LE) Files. 

8Memo, Kelly for ASA(ILE), 29 May 1991, Kuwait Reconstruction: 

Command and Control, Office of HistOI)' Files. 

9Kelly, imerv by author, 7 Sep 1991, pp. 10-ll; Kelly, imerv by 

Coffey, pp. 22, 26. 

IO Locurcio, interv by author, 8 Sep 1991, p. 18; Urbine imen', p. 29. 

II Schubert, Building Air Bases in the Negev, pp. 197-98. 

12 DRAO Completion Report, p. 12; Locurcio, intc rv by author, 8 

Sep 1991, p. 67; Russell Plaisance, interv by author, l<uwait City, ll Sep 

1991, pp. 27-28. 

llBronel Jerrell, Memorandum For Record, 11 Mar 1991, Resource 

Management Files, Desert ShielcVDesen Swrm: Reswralion of Kuwait; 

Plaisance imen', pp. 1-2, 23-24; memo, Douglas A. Brooks for 
NOTES 265 

ASA(lLE), 22 M.ar 1991, Kuwait Reconstruction: Miscellaneous 

Messages, #6, OACE Reference Files; DRAO Completion Report, pp. 

12- 13. 

L4Note, Kelly to Lt. Gen. Henry]. Hatch, 6 Sep 1991, Budget and 

Funding, Fisher Files; "Kuwait Emergency Fund Control Systems Users 

Manual," p. 3, Fisher Files; Kelly, interv by author, 7 Sep 1991, pp. 

77- 78; memo, Thomas L. Brockman, Jr., for the Chief of Engineers, n.cl., 

Kuwait Reconstruction: Miscellaneous, jones Files. 

ISMemo, Thomas A. Grant, Director, Acquisition and Force 

Management Audits, Army Aud it Agency, for SECDEFREP, 6 May 1991, 

Kuwait Reconstruction: Audits, ASA(ILE) Files; memo, Grant for 

SECDEFREP, 23 Apr 1991, Major Dunford Book, #36: DRAO Files. 

L6Memo, Plaisance to Mohammed Farhatullah, 22 Apr 1991 , Kuwait 

Reconstruction: Memorandum. of Understanding, ASA(ILE) Files; 

memo, Plaisance to Dr. Abdulahadi Al-Awadi, 23 Apr 1991, Kuwait 

Reconstruction: Funding, ASA(ILE) Files; Plaisance interv, p. 3; DRAO 

Completion Report, p. 12. 

17Plaisance imerv, pp. 5- 6; Urbine interv, p. 6. 

J8Locurcio, interv by Ruffennach, pp. 3-4; Locurcio, Memorandum 

For Record, Subj: Budget Review and Analysis vvilh Dr. Shaheen on l l 

Apr 1991 , Col. Gatlin Book: DRAO Files; Urbine interv, pp. 7- 8. 

Throughout March KERO complained of a shortage of funds and warned 

of the negative impact this shonage would have on the mission. See 

I<ERO Executive Summary #27, 29 Mar 1991; ibid. , #28, 31 Mar 1991. 

19 SAFM- FOI, In formation Paper, 17 May 1991, Kuwait 

Reconstruction: Funding, ASA(lLE) Files; l<elly, imerv by author, 7 Sep 

1991, pp. 49-52; Locurcio, Memorandum For Record, 3 May 1991, 

Subj: Weekly Meeting with Dr. Shaheen , 3 May 1991, Gatlin Book: 

DRAO Files; DRAO Biweekly Report, 15 May 1991; ibid., 1 Jun 1991. 

20J<elly, interv by author, 7 Sep 1991, pp. 53-57; Locurcio, 

Memorandum For Record, 30 May 1991, Subj: transition meeting vvith 

Dr. Shaheen and Mr. Qatami, Gatlin Book: DRAO Files; DRAO Biweekly 

Repon, 7 jul 1991. 

21 Locurcio, "The Reconstruction or Kuwait," pp. 36-37; Plaisance 

interv, pp. 7-12; Kelly, interv by author, 7 Sep 1991, pp. 58-62; DRAO 

Biweekly Report, l 8 j un 1991; ibid., J 7 jull991; ibid., l. Aug 1991. The 

date for beginning Kuwait's new fiscal year subsequently slipped from 1 

July to l October. The State Department and the Defense Department 

signed a memorandum of understanding on 29 March L 991 that prohibited the DOD representative from accepting any work from the Kuwaili 

government unless the US. Ambassador concurred. Deputy Secretary of 

Defense Donald j. Atwood not only signed the agreement but told the 
266 AFI'ER DESERT STORM 

Acting Secretary of Deknse that Ambassador Gnehm and Kell)' had 

already established an "excellent" working relationship. "Memorandum of 

Understanding Between Departments of State and Defense Regarding 

/\ctivilies of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers in Kuwait," 29 Mar 1991, 

Kuwai t Reconstruclion : Policy, Directives, Guidance, ASA(lLE) Files; 

memo, DJ Atwood for Acling Secretary of State, 30 Mar 199 1, ibid. 

22DeWire imerv, pp. l5-16. 

23Memo, Maj. Gen. james W Ray to ASA(ILE), 30 Apr 1991, Kuwait 

Reconstruction: Contracting, Office of History Files; Kelly, inten' by 

author, 7 Sep 1991, pp. 47-48; DRAO, Completion Report. p. 10. The 

contract with American Dredging had been closed out. 

2-IMemo. LH. McElroy for commander DRAOII<ERO, 8 jul 1991, 

Comracting: DRAO Files; Livingstone interv. pp. 24-26; DeWire interv, 

pp. 17, 19. 

25 Kelly, interv by autho r, 7 Sep l 991, pp. 67-68; DRAO Completion 

Report. 

26"Small U.S. Firms Frozen Out of Kuwait Rebuild Effort," Wall 

Street journal, 8 Mar 1991 , p. B2. 

27 DeWire imerv, pp. 26-27, 3 1-32; Livingstone interv, p. 30. 

28U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, "Operation Desert 

Shielcl!Desen Storm Supplemental Appropriations Bill, 1991," 5 Mar 

1991, To accompany H.R. 1282, 102d Cong., lst sess., Repon 102-10, 

p. 7. 

29U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Commiuee on Small 

Business, Subcommiuec o n Exports, Tax Policy, and Special Problems, 

l learing, "The Role of U.S. Small Business in Rebuilding Kuwait," 102 

Cong .. 1st sess., 11 Mar l99 1, pp. ll- 12; U.S. Congress, Senate, 

Committee on Small Business, llcaring, "Small Business Opportunities 

in the Postwar Reconstruction of Kuwait," l02 Cong., 1st sess., 12 Mar 

1991, pp. 10-ll. 

30 Ltr, Rep. Mervyn Dymally to Secretary M. P. W Stone, 28 Feb 

1991, Kuwait Reconstruction: Miscellaneous Messages, #6, OACE 

Reference Files; Rep. Charles B. Rangel to Secretary Richard Cheney, 15 

Mar 1991, Kuwait Reconstruction: Contracting, ASA(ILE) Files; Kelly, 

intcrv by author, 7 Sep 1991, p. 42. 

31 Congressional Record, Section 606, 2 1 Mar 1991 , p. II J 981; memo, 

Hatch for ASA(lLE). 17 Apr 1991, Kuwait Reconstruction: Contracting. 

ASA(l LE) Files. 

lZ Memo, George E Dausman for the Chief of Engineers, 22 Mar 

199 L, Kuwait Reconstruction: SADBU. Fisher Files. 

33Memo, Secretar)' M. P. W. Stone for the Secretal')' of Defense, 18 

Apr 1991, Kuwait Reconstruction: Contracting ASA(I LE) Files. 
NOTES 267 

34Memo, Maj. Gen. james W Ray to ASA(lLE), 30 Apr 1991 , Kuvvait 

Reconstruction: Contracting, Office of History Files. 

35Slana interv, pp. 27-28; Townsend interv, p. 6. 

36Memo, vVill iam K Takakoshi for Secretary Shannon, 8 May 1991, 

Kuwait Reconstruclion: Contractors, Offi ce of History Files. 

371n a handwritten note, Livingstone suggested a targeted outreach 

strategy to alel'l small and small disadvantaged businesses to opportunities and how to pursue them. Memo, Livingstone for Director of the 

Office of SADBU, 22 May 1991, Kuwait Reconstruction: Contracting, 

ASA(lLE) Files; memo, Livingstone for SECDEFREP, 17 May 1991, 

Ku...,vait Reconstruction: Contracting ASA(ILE) Files. 

38Memo, Michael A. Rea for Chief, Office of Counsel, TAD, 7 Mar 

1991, Kuwait Reconstruction: Comracting-SADBU, Office of History 

Files; memo, Kelly to ASA(lLE), 8 jun 1991, Kuwait Reconstruction: 

Contracting, ASA(ILE) Files. 

39 ASA(ILE) Information Paper, 22 Oct 1991, Kuwait 

Reconstruction: Contracting, ASA(ILE) Files; memo, Livingstone for the 

Secretary of the Army, 21 Oct 1991 , ibid; memo, Col. jesse Gatlin to Lt. 

Col. joseph Alexander, 17 Oct 1991, Congressional Correspondence, 

ASA(ILE) Files. 

40Memo, Col. Maurice]. O'Brien, DAJA-KLC, to DAMO-ODP-KRTF, 

21 jun 1991, Kuwait Reconstruction: Miscellaneous Messages, #9, 

OACE Reference Files. 

41 Memo, Gatlin to Alexander; Info Briefing for Ms. Nancy Dorn, 

ASA(CW), 17 Dec 1991. 

42Thomas A. Duckenfield Ill, Assistant to General Counsel, HQDA, 

to LL Col. Ty Hughes, Chief Counsel, DRAO, 26 jun 1991, Kuwait 

Reconstruction: Contracting, ASA(ILE) Files. 

43Memo,james A King, Assistant to the Army General Counsel, for LL 

Col. Alexander, 17 Aug 1991, Kuwait Reconstruction, ASA(ILE) Files. 

44Memo, Brig. Gen. Witherspoon for Al Carton, 22jul 199l, Kuwait 

Reconstruction: Miscellaneous Messages, #9, OACE Reference Files; 

memo, Hatch for ASA(lLE) 26 jul 1991, Kuwait Reconstruction: 

Contracting, ASA(lLE) Files. 

45Memo, Lt. Col. Michael Fisher for Lt. Col. joe Alexander, 26 jul 

1991, Kuwait Reconstruction: Contracting, ASA(ILE) Files. 

46Memo, Allen M. Carton for ASA(lLE), 21 Aug 1991, Kuwait 

Reconstruction: Contracting, ASA(ILE) Files; memo, Livingstone for 

SECDEFREP, 10 Sep 1991, Kuwait Reconstruction: Contracting, 

ASA(lLE) Files. 

47tvlemo, Dr. Ibrahim AI-Shaheen LO Kelly, 26 Aug 199l,jones Files. 

48Kelly, inten' by author, 7 Sep 1991, pp. 37-41. 
268 AFTER DESERT STORM 

49"UPDATE: SADB ParticipaLion ... ," 5 Sep 199 L, SADBU: DRAO 

Files; DRAO Monthly Report, J Nov 1991. In a handwritten note at the 

bottom of Livingstone$ memo, Under Secretary Shannon indicaLed 

"Poor show-fair play is not going on here." He suggested bringing the 

approval of awards to the ASA(lLE). Memo, Livingstone for Under 

Secretary of the Army, 9 Sep 1991, Kuwait Reconstruction: Contracting, 

ASA(ILE) Files. 

50ASA(ILE) Information Paper, 22 Oct 1991, Kuwait 

ReconstrucLion: Contracting, ASA(I LE) Files; memo, Livingstone for the 

Secretary of the Army, 21 Oct 199 1, ibid. 

51 DeWire imerv, pp. 33-34; "Additional Information Concerning 

Kuwait," encl. in memo, Nancy P. Dorn to Helen Delich Bentley, 28 Apr 

1992, Kuwait Reconstruction: Contracting, Office of History Files. 

52Siana imerv, p. 29; Locurcio, imerv by author, 8 Sep 1991, pp. 

60-61. 

53tvlemo, Kelly for ASA(lLE), 30 Apr 1991, Kuwait Reconstruction: 

Contracting, ASA(lLE) Files; memo, Livingstone for SECDEFREP, l 

May 1991, ibid; Mary Allingham, "Kuwait Recover)' Efforts Reach 

Damaged Schools," Engineer Updclle,jul 1991, p. J3; Urbine imerv, pp. 

29-30. 

5-+Townsend interv, p. 25; Urbine imerv, pp. 31-32; Kaminsky 

imerv, p. 11. 

55 Lt. Col. Douglas Coffey, "l(uwaili Studems Enjoy First Day of 

School," TI·cmscrtlantic News, v. 6, no. 7, Aug-Sep 1991; Kelly, interv by 

author, 7 Sep 1991, pp. 73-74; memo, Michael P. W Stone for the 

Secretary of Defense, 22 Aug 1991, Kuwait Reconstruction: General, 

ASA(lLE) Files. Contractors could not enter 6 of the 152 schools because 

of ordnance and the seventh school was one that the lvlinistry of 

Education decided not to reopen. 

56 Kelly, interv by author, 7 Scp 1991, pp. 27-28; memo, Livingstone 

for SECDEFREP, 24 May 1991, Kuwait Reconstruction: Contracting, 

ASA(ILE) Files; DRAO Biweekly Repon, 17 jul 1991. 

57 Hess imerv, p. 35; KERO, Fact Sheet, 31 May 199 J, Infrastructure: 

DRAO Files. 

58Memo, Kelly for ASA(lLE), 12 May 1991 , Kuwait Reconstruction: 

Contracting, Orfice of History Files; memo, l<elly for ASA(lLE), 15 May 

1991, Kuwait Reconstruction: Comracting, ASA(JLE) Files; DRAO 

Completion Report; Ltr, Brig. Gen. Eugene S. Witherspoon to Family 

Members, 13 Sep 1991, jones Files. 

59DRAO Momhly Repon, 1 Nov 1991; "Information Briefing for Ms. 

Nancy Dorn, ASA(CW)," 17 Dec 1991, Kuwait Reconstruction: TAD 

Briefings, Office of History Files. 
NOTES 269 

60DRAO Biweekly Repon, 18 jun 1991; DRAO Biweekly Repon, 7 

Jul1991; DRAO Monthly Repon, 1 Sep 1991. 

61 "lnformalion Briefing for Ms. Nancy Dorn, ASA(CW)," 17 Dec 

199 1. 

Chapter 6. Support to Kuwait's Ministry of Defence 

I Mar)' Allingham, "Kuwait defense facilities leveled by war," 

Transatlantic News, v. 6, no. 5, May 1991, pp. 8-9; DRAO Completion 

Repon, p.27. 

2 DRAO Completion Repon, p. 27. 

3 Joan F l<ibler, "Corps to assist with Kuwait air base restoration ," 

Transatlantic News, v. 6, no. 7, Aug-Sep 199 L, p. 18; Joan F Kibler, 

"Rising from the rubble in Kuwait," Transatlantic News, v. 8, no. 2, Feb 

J 993, p. 4; Col. David E. Peixotto, inter\' by author, Winchester, 

Virginia, 19 Aug 1991 , pp. 3-4. 

'~ Memo, Kelly for ASA(ILE), 3 jun 199 L, Kuwait Reconstruction: 

Contracting, ASA(ILE) Files. 

5Kelly, imen' by author, 7 Sep 1991 , p. 74; Tom McReynolds, 

Memorandum For Record, 12 Apr 1991, Major Dunford Book, #1 7, 

DRAO Files. 

6Memo, Locurcio for l<elly, 19 Apr 1991, Foreign Military 

Sales/Ministry of Defence, DRAO Files. 

7 Memo, Kelly to Livingstone, 22 Apr 1991, Kuwait Reconstruction: 

Contracting, ASA(I LE) Files; memo, Livingstone to Kelly, 25 Apr 199 J, 

ibid. 

BDRAO Biweekly Repon, 1 Jun 199 1; DRAO briefing for Lt. Gen. 

llenry Hatch, 2 Aug 199 L, Subj: MOD Ongoing FMS Work; Nancy Dorn 

briefing, 17 Dec 1991. 

9DRAO Biweekly Repon, 18 Jun 1991; ibid., 7 Jul199l. 

JOLtr, Faisal Ali AI-Dawoud to l<elly, 11 May 1991, Kuwait 

Reconstruction: Contracting, 1\SA(lLE) Files. 

II Section 36(b)(l) of the Arms Control Export Act required that 

Congress be notified before initiating a Letter of Offer to sell construction services for over $200 million. Congress had 30 clays to accept or 

reject the proposed foreign military sales case. Moreover, the Defense 

Security Assistance Agency (DSAA) had agreed to provide Congress with 

20 days advance notice before formally submitting a foreign military 

sales case under Section 36. If Congress had not objected to the proposed sale after 30 days, the DSAA Comptroller would countersign the 

Letter of Offer. Then the appropriate DOD component could forward the 

original signed agreement to the prospective purchaser for signature. 

David L. Chambers, Information Paper, Subj: History of the Phase l FMS 
270 AFTER DESERT STORM 

case, 7 Aug 1991, Ku,vait Reconstruction: Kuwait FMS Case, Office of 

History Files; David L. Chambers, 14 May 1991, Memorandum of 

Briefings for DSAA and ASA(lLE), FMS MOD: DRAO Files. 

12 Kelly, interv by author, 7 Sep 1991, pp. 74-75. 

L3Chambers, Information Paper, 7 Aug 1991; memo, Kelly to 

Livingstone , 20 May 1991, Kuwait Reconstruction: Contracting, 

ASA(lLE) Files. 

14Capt. Steven V Mathews, Memorandum For Record, 22 May 

1991, FMS MOD, DRAO Files. 

LSCapt. Robert f Kiesling, Memorandum For Record, 26 May 1991, 

FMS MOD, DRAO Files; Chambers, Information Paper, 7 Aug 1991. 

16Capt. Mathews, Memorandum For Record, 27 May 1991, FMS 

MOD, DRAO Files. 

J7Capt. Mathews, tvlemorandum For Record, 11 jun 1991 , FMS 

MOD, DRAO Files. 

18 Merno, Capt. Kiesling (draft) for Lt. Col. joseph Alexander, 18 jun 

1991, Km.vait Reconstruction: FMS, ASA(lLE) Files; memo, Kelly to 

ASA(lLE), 17 Jun 1991, Kuwait Reconstruction: Phase l FMS Case, jones 

Files; Chambers, Information Paper, 7 Aug 1991. 

t9DRAO Biweekly Report, 7 j ul 1991.. 

20 Ibid. 

21Memo, Kelly to ASA(lLE), 4 jul 1991, Kuwait Reconstruction: 

Miscellaneous Messages, #9, OACE Reference Files; Livingstone to Kelly, 

ibid. 

22Chambers, Information Paper, 7 Aug 1991.. 

23Memo, Kelly for Roger Thomas, 15 jut 1991, FMS MOD, DRAO 

Files; Chambers, Information Paper, 7 Aug 1991. 

24DRAO Biweekly Report, 17 jul 1991. 

25 james W Cumper and Ahmed AI-Fahad, Memorandum For 

Record, Subj: Meeting with MOD/MEP, 20 Jul 1991, Kuwait 

Reconstruction: SADBU, Fisher Files; Peixouo interv, p. 32. 

26Memo, Kelly to ASA(lLE), 23 Jut 1991, Kuwait Reconstruction: 

Contracting, ASA(lLE) Files; Peixouo interv, pp. 33-34; CapL. Robert E 

Kiesling, interv by author, Kuwait City, 12 Sep 1991, p. 10. 

27Memo, Kelly for ASA(lLE), 25 jut 1991, Kuwait Reconstruction: 

Contracting, ASA(lLE) Files; Kiesling interv, p. 32. 

28Memo, LivingsLOne for SECDEFREP, 26 jul 1991, Kuwait 

Reconstruction: Miscellaneous Messages, #9, OACE Reference Files; 

Peixouo interv, pp. 9-10. 

29 !\tlemo, Kelly for ASA(lLE), 7 Aug 1991 , Kuwait Reconstruction: 

FMS, ASA(ILE) Files. 

30DRAO Monthly Report, 31 Aug 1991. 
NOTES 271 

3ll<iesling interv, pp. 15-21; Peixotto imerv, p. 17. 

32Chambers, Memorandum For Record, Subj: FMS Case 

KU- B- HAQ, 12 Aug 1991, Kuwait Reconstruction, Office of History 

Files; DeWire interv, pp. 23- 25; Peixotto inten', p. 15. 

33"Stanley goes to Kuwait," Engineering News-Record, 9 Sep 1991; 

Kibler, "Corps to assist with Kuwait air base restoration," p. 18; Peixotto 

interv, pp. 13- 14. 

3~ DRAO Monthly Report, 31 Aug 1991. 

35DRAO Monthly Report, 31 Aug 1991; ibid., 31 Oct 1991. 

36 Memo, Kelly for the Secretary of the Army, 24 Oct 1991, Kuwait 

Reconstruction: Miscellaneous Messages, #10, OACE Reference Files; 

"U.S. Corps Wins Air Bases Project," New Arabia, 15 Aug 1991. 

37Memo, Kelly for the Secretary of the Army, 7 Nov 1991 , Kuwait 

Reconstruction: Miscellaneous Messages, #10, OACE Reference Files. 

38 Memo, Kelly to ASA(ILE), 14 Nov 1991, ibid. 

39 Alexander interv, pp. 29-31. 

40Memo, SECDEFREP for ASA(ILE), 20 Nov 1991, Kuwait 

Reconstruction: FMS, ASA(ILE) Files. 

4lPeixotto inlerv, pp. 3, 8- 11, 14. Peixolto also commanded the 

Kuwait Emergency Recovery Office until it closed following the completion of the civil reconstruction program. 

42 "Notes on 70/30 Kuwait Airfield Work for Phonecon with Mrs. 

Dorn," n.d., Kuwait Reconstruction: Policy Guidance and Authorities, 

Fisher Files. 

~3 Memo , Lt. Col. Alexander for Livingstone, 21 Nov 1991 Kuwait 

Reconstruction: FMS, ASA(ILE) Files; memo, Maj . Gen. Peter]. Offringa 

toLL. Gen. Hatch, 18 Dec 1991, Kuwait Reconstruction: Miscellaneous, 

jones Files. 

44 "Comracts awarded for two Kuwait air bases," Transatlantic News, 

v. 7, no. 1, jan 1992, p. l; j oan F. Kibler, "Destroyed Kuwaiti air base 

rebuilt," Engineer Update , v. 17, no. 4, Apr 1993, p. 4; memo,johnjones, 

21 Jan 1991 , Kuwait Reconstruction: Miscellaneous, jones Files; Kibler, 

"Rising from the rubble," pp. 5-10; lnfonnation Briefing, "Kuwait 

Emergency Recovery and Kuwait Ministry of Defence programs," 25 jun 

l992, jones Files. 

+5Kibler, "Rising from the rubble," pp. 5-8; Joan Kibler, "Potential 

Questions and Answers" (draft), Kuwait Reconstruction: Kuwait 

Working, Fisher Files. 

46Grathwol and Moorhus, "Corps of Engineers Europe Division," ch. 

8 , pp. 44- 48, and ch. 10, p. 43. 

+7Lt. Col. Michael Fishe r, Executive Summary, n.cl., Kuwait 

Reconstruction: Air Bases, Fisher Files; memo, Brig. Gen. Pat M. Stevens 
272 AFTER DESERT STORM 

for ASA(CW), 12 jun 1992, Kuwait Reconstruction: Information Papers, 

jones Files; Ltr, Brig. Gen. Eugene S. Witherspoon to Sabah AI Nasser, 

n.d., jones Files. 

48Kibler, "Rising from the rubble," pp. 4-10; TAD lnforma!ion 

Paper, 26 Ma)' 1992, jones Files; Information Briefing: "Kuwait 

Emergency Recovery and Kuwait Ministry of Defence Programs," 25 jun 

1991, jones Files; lnfonnation Paper, 26 May J 992, Kuwait 

Reconstruction: Air Bases, jones Files. 

49 Denise Tatu, "Kuwail issues discussed during workshop," 

Transatlantic NeiVS, v. 8, no. l, jan 1993; TAD, "Monthly Summary, 

Kuwait Program," l Apr 1991, jones Files. 

50Peixouo interv, pp. 2-5; Peixotto comments on draft manuscript. 

51 Secretary M. P. W Stone to Sheikh Ali AI-Sabah At-Salem AISabah, 4 Aug 1992, Kuwait Reconstruction: Air Bases, Fisher Files. 

52 Peixotto, Memorandum For Record, 12 Sep 1992, Kuwait 

Reconstruction: Air Bases, jones Files. 

Aftermath 

I DRAO Monthly Report, l Nov 1991. 

2Piaisance interv, pp. 21-22. 

3DRAO Monthly Report, l Nov 1991; DRAO Sitrep#29, 22 Nov 1991. 

4 Department of the Army, General Order #17, "Assignn1ent of 

Functions, Responsibilities, and Duties within the Office, Secretary of 

the Army," 28 May 1991. 

SMemo, Nancy P. Dorn for Chief of Engineers, lO Dec 1991, Subj: 

Guidance on Corps of Engineers International Activities, Kuwait 

Reconstruction: Policy Guidance/Authorities, Fisher Files. 

6Memo, Nancy P. Darn for Secretary of the Army, 11 jan 1992, 

Kuvvait Reconstruction: Policy Guidance/Authorities, Fisher Files. On 3 

February 1992, the Secretary of Dc!'ense through the Secretary of the 

Army delegated to ASA(CW) oversight responsibility for Army reconstruction in Kuwait. On 2 March ASA(CW) further delegated that 

responsibility to the Chief of Engineers. The Chid or his designee would 

serve as SECDEFREP for purposes of the Letter of Exchange with the 

government of Kuwait and the Lcuer of Instruction for Financial 

Management of the Kuwait reconstruction program, elated 28 h1lay 199 1 . 

Memo, Secretary M. P. W Stone for ASA(CW), 3 Feb 1992, DRAO 

Phasedown/KPO transition, jones Files; memo, Nancy P. Darn for Chief 

of Engineers, 2 Mar 1992, Policy Guidance and Authorities, Fisher Files. 

7 Anna Kasten Nelson, "A llistory of the Office of the Assistant 

Secretary of the Army for Civil Works" (draft), pp. 314-15, 363-64, 

Office of History Files. 
NOTES 

BGraves, "Water Resource Policy and Issues," pp. 67-68. 

9 Lbid. 

JOPeixoLLo interv, p. 27. 

273 

1 L Kibler, "l<uwait parliament building complete," p. 4; Peixotto 

interv, p. 20. 

J2Memo, Col. David E. Peixotto to Tvlohammed lbrahim Alaskari, 30 

jul 1992, jones Files; j ames L. McFaul, "U.S.-Ku,vait team form repair 

partnership," Engineer Update, v. 16, no. 4, Apr 1992, p. l. 

t3Peixouo interv, p. 21. 

l4James L. McFaul, "KERO hosts first pannering session," 

Transailanlic News, v. 7, no. 2, Feb 1992, p. 4; Peixotto imerv, p. 23. 

L5Peixotto interv, p. 22; Information Paper, 21 jan 1992, Subj: 

Nalional Assembly Building, Contracting, Fisher Files. 

16Memo, Aly M. Samahy for Director of Military Programs, 4 Feb 

1992, General, Fisher Files. 

17lbicl. 

18Maj Gen. Peter J Offringa for ASA(CW), 21 Feb 1992, Subj: 

Status of National Assembly Building, Kuwait, National Assembly, j ones 

Files. 

19Peixono interv, pp. 24-26. 

20Memo, t-,tlaj. Gen. Peter]. Offringa for ASA(CW), 10 Mar 1992, 

jones Files. 

21 joan F Kibler, "Kuwait [ocus turns to parliament building," 

Transatlantic News, v. 7, no. 3, Mar- Apr 1992, pp. 3-4. 

22 Kibler, "Kuwait parliament building complete," p . 5; memo, Col. 

David E. Peixotto to Mohammed lbrabim Alaskari, 30 jul 1992, jones 

Files; Engi11eer Update, Apr 1992; Peixotto interv, p. 28. 

Conclusion 

J HQDA Arter Action Report- Desert Shield/Desert Storm (working 

paper), n.cl. , Kuwait Reconstruction: After Action/Lessons Learned, 

Office of History Files. 

2See Maj. Boyd D. Houck, "Nation Assistance: An Evolving (But not 

new) Concept," Engineer, v. 22, Apr 1992, pp. ll-16. 

3Harbell interv, 2 May 1992, p. 81 . 

4Hatch interv, pp. 41-42. 

5 Lt. Gen. Henry ]. Hatch, Ltr, "Our Nation Assistance Mission," 

Milila1y Review, jan 1992, p. 85. 

6Hatch interv, p. 47. 

7Locurcio, "Nation Assistance in Kuwait," p. 10. 

8Frix, inLerv by Fishel, p. J 5. 

9f ri x, imerv by Carlton, p. 13. 
274 AFTER DESERT STORM 

IOLivingstOne interv, p. 39; Kelly comments on draft 

manuscript/telephone conversation, 19 Aug 1997. 

ILMsg, Richard Cheney to Civil Affairs Symposium, 23 Oct 1991, 

Civil Affairs Symposium, p. 3; Kelly, interv by author, 7 Apr 1991, p. 23. 

12Locurcio, interv by author, 8 Sep 1991, p. 75; Slana interv, p. 47; 

Ben Wood, inLerv by author, Kuwait City, 6 Apr 1991. 

L3Livingstone interv, p. 37. 

L4Msg, Edward W Gnehm to Secretary of State, 20 jul 1992, Subj: 

Straub visit wrap-up, Kuwait Reconstruction, Fisher Files. 

L5Ltr, Edward W Gnehm to Col. Charles S. Cox, 5 Oct 1993, 

Information papers: jones Files. 

16Hatch interv, p. 38; Livingstone interv, pp. 31-33. 

L7"Kerp members awarded de Fleury medal,"Ji·ansatlantic News, v. 6, 

no. 2, Feb 1993, p. l. 
Bibliography 

Books 

Fishel, john T. Liberation, Ocwpation and Rescue: War Termination and 

Desert Storm. Fort Leavenworth, Kans: U.S. Army Command and 

General Staff College, 1992. 

Gordon, Michael R., and Gen. Bernard E. Trainor. The Generals' War: The 

Inside Sto1y of the Conflict in the GLLlj. Boston: Little, Brown and 

Company, 1995. 

McDonnell, janet A. Supporting the Troops: TI1e U.S. Army Corps of 

Engineers in the Persian Gulf War. Alexandria, Va.: Office of History, 

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 1996. 

Scales, Brig. Gen. Robert H., Jr., et al. Certain Victoty: The United States 

Army in the Gulf War. Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Staff, 

U.S. Army, 1993. 

Schubert, Frank N. Building Air Bases in the Negev: The U.S. Army 

Corps of Engineers in Israel, 1979-1982. Washington, D.C.: Orfice 

of History, Corps of Engineers, and Center of Military History, 

1992. 

--, and Theresa L. Kraus, eds. The Whirlwind War: The United States 

Army in Operations Desert Shield ancl Desert Storm. Washington, D. C.: 

U.S. Army, Center of Military History, 1995. 

Sullivan, Gordon R. The Collected Works, 1991-1995. n.p., n.d. 

Whelan, john, ed. Kuwait: A MEED Practical Guide. london: Middle East 

Economic Digest Limited, 1985. 

Articles 

Allingham, Mary. "KERO moves fast to help soldiers in Saudi." Engineer 

Update, v. 15, no. 8, Aug 1991. 

--· "Kuwait defense facilities leveled by war. " Transatlantic News, v. 6, 

no. 5, May 1991. 

--· "Kuwait Recovery Efforts Reach Damaged Schools." Engineer 

Update, jull99l. 

--,and Ron Ruffennach. "KERO helps troops find comforts of home." 

Transatlantic News, v. 6, no. 6,jun-:]ul 1991. 
276 AFTER DESERT STORM 

Coffey, Lt. Col. Douglas. "Kuwaiti Students Enjoy First Day of School." 

Transatlantic News, v. 6, no. 7, Aug-Sep 1991. 

"Contracts avvarded for two Kuwait air bases." Ji·ansatlanlic News, v. 7, 

no. 1,Jan 1992. 

Cook, Wilham J. "Rebuilding a Ruined Nation." U.S. News and World 

ReporL, ll Mar 1991: 26-28. 

Frix, Maj. Gen. Raben S., and Capt. Archie L. Davis Ill. "Task Force 

Freedom and the Restoration of Kuwait." Militmy Review, Oct 1992: 

3-10. 

Griffin, Lt. Col. Robert ll. "Pacemakers in Southwest Asia." Engineer 

Officer Bulletin, no. 13,jul 1991: 13-15. 

Hasenauer, Heike. "Corps Rebuilds Kuwait." Soldiers, Aug 1991: 14-16. 

Hatch, Lt. Gen. Henry J. Ltr, "Our Nation Assistance Mission." Milita1y 

Review, Jan 1992: 85. 

Houck, Maj. Boyd D. "Nation Assistance: An Evolving (But not new) 

ConcepL. " Engineer, v. 22, Apr 1992: ll-16. 

H.untington, Samuel P. "New Contingencies, Old Roles." joint Forces 

Quarterly, no. 2, Autumn 1993: 39. 

Kelly, Michael. "Rolls-Royce Revolutionaries." The New Republic, 8 Apr 

1991: 22-24. 

"Kerp members awarded de Fleury medal."Ii·ansatlanlic News, v. 6, no. 2, 

Feb 1993. 

Kibler, joan E "Corps to assist with Kuwait air base restoration." 

Ii·ansatlanlic News, v. 6, no. 7, Aug-Sep 1991. 

--·"Destroyed Kuwaiti air base rebuilt." Engineer Update, v. 17, no. 4, 

Apr 1993. 

--· "Kuwait focus turns to parliament building." Trclllsa£/anlic News, v. 

7, no. 3, Mar-Apr 1992. 

--· "Kuwait parliament building complete." Ji·ansatlantic News, v. 7, 

no. 6, Aug-Sep 1992. 

--· "Rising from the rubble in Kuwait." Ii·ansallantic News, v. 8, no. 2, 

Feb 1993. 

Kosowatz, john J. "Brits brought first power." Engineering News-Record, 

6 May 1991: 43. 

--· "ReLUrn trip is bittersweet." Engineeling News-Record, 6 May 1991: 

42. 

I< ramer, Michael. "Toward a New Kuwait." Time, 24 Dec "1990: 2 7-33. 

"Kuwaiti Cleanup." MiliLcuy Engineer, v. 85, no. 554,jan-Feb L993. 

Locurcio, Brig. Gen. Ralph V "Nation Assistance in Kuwait." Engineer, v. 

22, Apr 1992: 2-10. 

--· 'The Reconstruction of Kuwait Following Desert Storm." Site 

World, World Development Council, 1992. 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 277 

--· and Maj. Charles R. Maggio. "The Corps in l<uwait." Engineer 

Officer Bulletin, no. 13,jul 1991: 16-17. 

McDonnell, janet A. "Rebuilding Kuwail." Milila~y Review, v. 73, no. 7, 

jull993: 50-62. 

McFaul, james L. "L<ERO hosts first pannering session." Tmnsat/antic 

News, v. 7, no. 2, Feb 1992. 

--· "U.S.-Kuwait team form repair pannership." Engineer Update, v. 

16,no. 4,Aprl992,p. l. 

Miller, john A. "After the SlOrm, the Effects Linger On." The Military 

Engineer, v. 84, no. 547,jan-Feb 1992. 

Parker, james N., Jr. "Corps journalist Recounts Trip lrno Kuwait Cily." 

Engineer Updclle, May 1991. 

--· "Doha explosion required coopermion, sacrifice." Transatlantic 

News, v. 6, no. 6, jun-jul 1991. 

--· "KERO assists during and after the explosion." Engineer Update, v. 

15, no. 8, Aug 1991. 

Ray, Maj. Gen. james, LL Col. Michael j. Fisher, and Lt. Col. Stephen 

Sheppard. "EmergenC)' Recovery Assistance to Kuwait." The Milita1y 

Engineer, v. 83, no. 52. May-jun 1991: 10-15. 

"Renovation -.vork begins at Camp Doha." Transatlantic News, v. 10, no. 

3, Mar-Apr 1995: 1. 

Schriener, judy. "Kuwailis rethinking management plans." Engineering 

News-Record,Jull/8, 1991: 26-30. 

"Stanley goes to Kuwait." Engineering News-Record, 9 Sep 1991. 

Sul livan, Gordon R. "Powe r Projection and the Challenges of 

Regionalism." Parameters, Summer J 993, in The Collected Worhs, 

1991-1995, p. 189. 

Tatu, Denise. "Kuwait issues discussed during workshop." Transatlantic 

News, v. 8, no. 1, jan L 993. 

Tarricone, Paul. 'The Incredible Shrinking Rehab. " Civil Engineering, Sep 

1991: 42-45. 

"U.S. Corps Wins Air Bases Project." New Ambia, 15 Aug 1991. 

Wilson, Capt. Bonnie F "Forward- Area Support in Desen Storm." Army 

Logistician, Sep-Oct 1992: 2-4. 

Yates, Lt. Col. Mark B. "Coalition Warfare in Desert Storm." Milit.a1y 

Review, Oct 1992: 46-52. 

Printed Reports and Unpublished Manuscripts 

Brinkerhoff, john R. "Waging the War and Winning the Peace: Civil 

Affairs in the War with Iraq," in Civil Affairs in the Gulf War: A 

Symposium. Proceedings, 25-27 OcL 1991 . Fon Bragg, Nonb 

Carolina. 
278 AFTER DESERT STORM 

Civil A.ffclirs in the Gulf War: A Symposium. Proceedings, 25-27 Oct 1991. 

Fon Bragg, Nonh Carolina. 

Grathwol, Robert P., and Donita M. Moorhus, "History of the U.S. Army 

Corps of Engineers Europe Division and its Predecessors." Office of 

History Files. 

Graves, Gregory. Draft chapter for "Water Resources Policy and Issues," 

19 Aug 1997. Office of History Files. 

Greenwood, john T. "Diplomacy Through Construction: The U.S. Army 

Corps of Engineers in Saudi Arabia." Kuwait Reconstruction, Office 

of History Files. 

"Gulf Reconstruction Report," v. L, no. 2. Kuwait Reconstruction, Office 

of llistory Files. 

Nelson, Anna Kasten. "A History of the Office of the Assistant Secretary 

of the Army for Civil Works" (draft). Office of History Files. 

Swain, Col. Richard M. '"Lucky War': Third Army in Desert Storm" 

(unedited draft), 29 Mar 1993. 

U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC). "Army Special 

Operations in Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm." Office of 

History Files. 

Newspapers 

Baltimore Sun. 19 May L 991. 

Chicago Tribune. 8 Apr, 22 Apr 1991. 

Los Angeles Times. 28 Feb, 19 Mar 1991. 

New York Times. 30 Dec 1990; 28 Feb, 22 Mar, 5 Apr, 8 Apr, 9 Apr, 14 

Apr, 21 Apr, 22 Apr, 11 jun, 21 jun, 26 jul 1991. 

USA Tode~y. 14 Feb 1991. 

Wall Streel)ournal. 21 Feb, 8 jul, 8 Mar 1991. 

Washington PosL. 14 jan, 22 Feb, 5 Mar, 20 May, 25jun, l2jull99l; 27 

Feb 1996. 

Congressional Documents 

Congressional Record, Section 606, 21 Mar 1991, p. Hl981. 

U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. "Operation Desert 

Shield/Desert Storm Supplememal Appropriations Bill, 1991," 5 

Mar 1991, To accompany H.R. 1282, l02d Cong., 1st scss., Rpt 

102-10. 

U.S. Congress. House of Represematives. Committee on Small 

Businesses. Subcommittee on Exports, Tax Policy, and Special 

Problems. Hearing, "The Role of U.S. Small Business in Rebuilding 

l<uwait," l02d Cong., lst sess., ll Mar 1991. 
B IBLIOGRAPHY 279 

U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Small Business. Hearing, "Small 

Business Opponunities in the Postwar Reconstruclion of Kuwait," 

102d Cong., 1st sess., 12 Mar 1991. 

Ma nuscript Collections 

Papers of Col. Patrick W Carlton: Civil Affairs in the Gulf War, National 

Defense University. 

Defense Reconstruction Assistance Office Files. 

Maj. Gen. Ernest Edgar File. 

Lt. Col. Michael Fisher Files. 

john jones Files. 

Col. William Miller Files. 

Office of the Assistant Chief of Engineers Reference Files. 

Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Installations, Logistics 

and Environment Files. 

Third U.S. Army G-3. Tactical Operalions Center Logs. 

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Headquarters, Office of History Files. 

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, South Allamic Division, Emergency 

Operations Center riles. 

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Transallamic Division Files. 

lrtterviews 

Alexander, Lt. Col. joseph. Interviewed by author. Washington, D.C. 27 

Apr 1992. 

Auleua, Anthony. Interviewed by Col. Patrick W Carlton. I 2 Nov 1991. 

Carlton Papers, Box 1. 

Bergner, Maj. Kirk M. lmerviewed by author. Kuwait City. 12 Sep 1991. 

Blount, Col. Lawrence. Interviewed by Col. Patrick W. Carlton. 5 Dec 

.1991. Carlton Papers, Box l. 

Bloum, Col. Lawrence. Interviewed by Dr. Richard Stewart. l3 jul l99l. 

Carlton Papers, Box L. 

Bolton, Capt. Peter K. Interviewed by Col. Patrick W Carlton. 8 jan 

1992. Carlton Papers. 

Brooks, Maj. j ames. Interviewed by author. Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. 26 

Mar 1991. 

Caplan , Maj. Les M. lmcrviewed by Lt. Col. William A. McGrew, 3 May 

J 992. Center of Military History/Center for Low Intensity Conflict. 

DeWire, james. Interviewed by author. Washington, D.C. 16 jun 1992. 

Elliou, Col. Randall T. Interviewed by Col. Patrick W Carlton. 6 Dec 

1991. Carlton Papers, Box 2. 

Elliott, Col. Randall T. Interviewed by Dr. Richard Stewart. 14 jul 1991. 

Carlton Papers, Box 2. 
280 AFTER DESERT STORM 

Frix, Maj. Gen. Raben S. Interviewed by author. Kuwait City. 5 Apr 1991. 

Frix, Maj. Gen. Raben S. Interviewed by Col. Patrick W Carlton. 6 Apr 

1992. Carlton Papers, Box 3. 

Frix, Maj. Gen. Robert S. lmerviewed by Lt. Col. john Fishel. 8 Nov 

199 1. Carlton Papers, Box 3. 

Fuller, Wynne. Interviewed by author. Kuwait City. 6 Apr l 99l. 

Gnehm, Amb. Edward. Interviewed by author. Kuwait City. 11 Sep 

1991. 

Gnehm, Amb. Edward. Interviewed by Col. Patrick W CarlLOn . 13 Mar 

1992. Carlton Papers, Box 3. 

llarbell, Maj. john W Interviewed by Thomas W Crouch. 2 May 1992. 

Cemer of Military History/Cemer for Lo"v lmensity ConOict. 

I latch, Lt. Gen. Henry j. lmerviewed by author. Washington, D.C. 15 

Feb 1992. 

lless, Charles. Interviewed by author. Kuwait City. 9 Sep 1991 . 

I Iuber, Lt. Col. james. lmcrviewed by Thomas W Crouch. 2 May 1992. 

Center of Military History/Center fo r Low Intensity ConOict. 

Hurteau, Brig. Gen. joseph C. Interviewed by Col. Patrick W Carlton. 31 

jan 1992. Carlton Papers, Box 2. 

Jinkins, Maj. Larry. Interviewed by author. Kuwait City. 5 Apr 1991. 

Kaminsky, Lt. Col. Alben F. Interviewed by author. Kuwait City. 12 Sep 

1991. 

Kelly, Maj. Gen. Patrickj. lmerviewecl by author. Kuwait City. 7 Apr and 

7 Sep 1991. 

Kelly, Maj. Gen. Patrickj. Int erviewed by Lt. Col. Douglas Coffey. Kuwait 

City. n.d. 

Kerr, Col. James T. Interviewed by Col. Patrick W Carlton. 2 Apr 1992. 

Carlton Papers, Box 4. 

Kerr, Col. james T. Interviewed by Lt. Col. john Fishel. 20 Dec 1991. 

Carlton Papers, Box 4. 

Kiesling, Capt. Robert F. Interviewed by author. Kuwait City, 12 Sep 

1991. 

Leaf, Barbara. Interviewed by Col. Patrick W Carlton. n.d. Carlton 

Papers, Box 4. 

Livingstone, Susan. Imerviewed by author. WashingLOn, D.C. 18 jun 

1992. 

Locher, james R. Interviewed by Dr. Carnes Lord. 18 Mar 1992. Carlton 

Papers, Box 4. 

Locurcio, Col. Ralph V Interviewed by author. Kuwait City. 7 Apr and 8 

Scp 1991. 

Locurcio, Col. Ralph V Interviewed by Ron Ruffennach. Kuwait 

Reconstruction: Office of History Files, Locurcio lnterv. and Leller. 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 281 

Mooney, Brig. Gen. Howard. Interviewed by author. Kuwait City. 5 Apr 

1991. 

Mooney, Brig. Gen. Howard. Interviewed by Col. PaLrick W CarllOn. 4 

Dec 1991. Carlton Papers, Box 5. 

Mooney, Maj. Gen. 1-Ioward. Interviewed by Thomas Crouch. 25 Mar 

1992. Center of Military History/Center for Low Intensity Conflict 

(no transcript). 

Mooney, Brig. Gen. Howard. Interviewed by Dr. Richard Stewart. 14 jul 

1991. Carlton Papers, Box 5. 

Natsios, Maj. Andre,..v. Interviewed by Lt. Col. William McGrew. 2 May 

1992. Cemer of Military H istory/Center for Low Intensity Conflict. 

Peixotto, Col. David E. Interviewed by author. Winchester, Virginia. 19 

Aug 1991. 

Plaisance, Russell. Interviewed by author. Kuwait City. ll Sep 1991 . 

Al-Qabandi, Bader. lntervievved by author. Kuwait City. 10 Sep 1991. 

Sadek, Col. Charles E. Interviewed by Thomas W Crouch. 3 May 1992. 

Center of Military History/Center for Low Intensity Conflict (no 

transcript). 

Santucci, Ceasar. Interviewed by author. Kuwait City. 5 Apr 1991. 

Al-Shaheen, Dr. Ibrahim. Interviewed by author. Kuwait City. 12 Sep 

1991 . 

Slana, Edward. Interviewed by author. Kuwait City. 13 Sep 1991. 

Townsend, Houston. Imerviewed by author. Kuwait City. 13 Sep 1991. 

Underwood, Maj. Robert. Interviewed by author. Kuwait City. 11 Sep 

1991. 

Urbine, Wayne. Interviewed by author. Kuwait City. 7 Sep 1991. 

Vad lamani, Kesh. Interviewed by author. Kuwait City. 8 Apr 1991. 

Walz, Col. Arthur H. lnterviewed by Thomas Crouch. 3 May 1992. 

Center o f Military History/Center for Low Intensity Conflict (no 

transcript). 

Weber, Mary. Interviewed by author. Kuvvait City. 7 Apr 1991. 

Wood, Ben. Interviewed by author, Kuwait City, 6 Apr 1991. 

Yeosock, Maj . Gen. j ohn ]. Interviewed by Col. Patrick W Carlton. 1.8 

Mar 1992. Carlton Papers, Box 7. 

t\bdul Aziz AI Kulaz: 143 

Abdullah AI Naser General Trading: 174 

Accounting systems: 161 -62 

Addington, David$.: 103, 146 

Agency for International Development: 90 

Ahmadiah Trading and Contracting 

Company: 211 

Ahmed Al-jaber Air Base, Kuwait: 35, 

143, 152, 172, 193, 194, 196, 

198, 202, 210,2 11,213 

Air base construction programs 

in Israel: 5-6, 155-56, 161, 210-ll, 

213 

in Saudi Arabia: 5-6, 213 

Air bases, Kuwaiti. Sec also Ahmed AIJaber Air Base; Ali 1\1-Salem Air 

Base. 

assessment of damage to: 143, 192, 

193, 194, 210- ll, 2 12 

emcrgcnC)• repairs at: 136, 143, 193, 

194, 198-99, 200, 205, 210-16 

long-term reconstruction of: 

196-216,227 

need to conform to U.S. standards: 

197,198,207 

planning for reconstruction of: 194, 

198-99,200-201 ,205,207,209. 

210-16 

problems wilh unexploded ordnance: 

212-13 

Air conditioning systems 

inswlled: 219-20, 22 1, 223 

needed: 95,217,2 19 

repaired: 67 

stolen: 139, 175,219-20 

Atr quality problems: 109-10, 188, 

189-90 

Atr tmflk control towers: 125, 205 

Airborne Corps, XVIII: 9-10, 52, 63, 

93-94 

Airborne Division, 82d: 9-10 

Index 

Aircraft 

C-5A transports: 136, 187-88, 198 

F-18s: 194, 207,210 

helicopters: 73 

Kuwaiti: 196, 197-98 

/\1-Amiri, Rashid: 186 

i\1-Bader, Suliman: 176 

AI-Dawoud, Faisal Ali : 196, 197- 98, 202 

Al-l·ahad, Ahmed: 198, 200, 204, 209 

/\1-Fulaij United Group: 211 

Al-llarbi Trading & Contmcting Co., 

Ltd.: 126 

Al-jaleel, Fahad: 198, 212 

Al-Mutawa, Sulayman Abdul Razaq: 17 

AI Nasser, Sabah: 197-98, 199- 200 

Al-Oraifan, Khaled: 199-200 

Al-Qabandi, Bader: 15, 37, 8 1- 82, 116, 

164-65 

AI-Qatami, Abdulla: 165 

Al-Sabah, Ali AI-Khalifa: I 7 

AI-Sabah, Ali AI-Sabah At-Salem: 197-98 

AI-Sabah, Fatima: 31, 38-39, 58, 116, 

164,234-35 

/\1-Sabah, Jaber AI-Ahmcd, Emir of 

l<uwait: 7, 9, 13, 34, 46, 4 7, 118, 

140-42, 180, 190, 232 

AI-Sabah, Maj. Gen. Jaber Khalid: 52-53 

AI-Sabah, Sabah AI-Ahmed AI-Jaber: 40 

AI-Sabah, Saud Nasir: 16-17.34,36, 

102, 121 

AI Saud, Fahd bin Abdul AI-Aziz: 9 

t\1-Sayegh, Maj. Gen. Abdul Aziz: 152 

/\1-Shahcen, Ibrahim. See Shaheen, 

Ibrahim AI-. 

At-Sultan, Fawzi: I 5, 17, 34 

AI-Suwaidan, Col. Saber: 198 

Ali At-Salem Air Base, Kuwait: 152 

damage to: 143,210-11 

emergency repairs to: 136, 172, 193, 

194, 195-96, 197-98, 200, 202, 

205,2 10-11,2 13-14 
284 

Ali AI-Salem Air Bnse-Cominuetl 

long-term repairs to: 202, 210-J I 

Aim, Col. Phil: 91 

American Cata~troph1cs Environmental 

Services: 1 71 

Amencan Dredgmg Company: 126, 135 

American International Contractors 

Incorporated: 21 0, 225-26 

American Techno Trade, Inc.: 174 

American Telephone and Telegraph 

(AT&T): 109, 120-21, 144 

Ammunition 

abandoned: L 49 

cleared from pubhc buildings: 76, 77, 

176 

storage of: 223-24 

Animal feeding program: 7l, 90-91 

Arab forces (DESI 1<1 SroR~I): 48, 52-53, 

62-63 

ARCENT: 9, 66, 104-05 

and 352d C.v1l Affairs Command: 

21-22,23,49,52 

civil affairs annex to operations plan: 

32-33 

Civil Affairs Task Force Planning Cell : 

50-5 1 

coordination with CENTCOtvl on 

emergency response planning: 

S0-51 

as executive agent for civil-milital")' 

operations for DESERT STORM: 

49-51 

facilities in Kuwait: 225-26 

and Kuwait Task Force: 43-44, 45-46 

Medical Command : 55, 77, 80, 89 

planning for civil-military operations 

after liberation: 33-34, 43, 47, 

48-51, 57,67,69 

Plans and Policy Directorate: 33, 48, 

49,50-52 

relationship to Combined Civil 

Affairs Task force: 51, 53 

and Task Force Freedom: 54, 55, 63, 

91,93-94 

telecommunications team: 65 

ARCENT (Forward): 53, 54, 57, 95 

Area Support Group, 30lst: 46, 47, 53, 

55, 76 

Armored Cavalry Regiment, lith: 218. 

220 

AfTER DESERT STORM 

Annored Division, 3d: 2 17-18 

Army, Secretary of the: 21, 93, 94, 

99-100, I 04, 155, 159, 168-69, 

206.218,222 

Army Audit Agent:)•: 156, 161, 162 

Am1y component of CENTCOt\•1. Sec 

ARCENT. 

Army Directorate of Engineering and 

Housing for Doha: 220 

Army Environmental ll)•giene Agent)•: 

189 

ArmyStaff:4,17, 19, 104 

and Army role 111 recovery: 20, 

22-23, 100, 101-02 

and Brig. Gcn Mooney: 25 

directions from joint Staff: 18, 21 

Kuwait Emergency Recovery Office 

communications with: 100-101, 

109 

and Kuwait Recover)• Task Force: 4 

and Kuwait fask Force: 26-2 7, 4 I, 4 3 

oversight over Corps of Engineers: 

37-38, 100-102, 104, 105-06 

and relationship between Task Force 

Freedom and Ambassador 

Gnehm: 9 1- 92 

relationship with tvlaj. Gen. Kelly: 

158, 159-60 

and small business opportunities: 173 

and use of Operations and 

~lain1enance funds: 218 

and U.S.-Kuwaiti civil affairs working 

group: 20 

Assistant Secretar)' of Defense fo r 

International Security Affairs: 17. 

18,23.25. 27 

Assistant Secretill')' of Defense for 

Reserve Affairs: 23 

Assistam Secret<ll)' of Defense for Special 

Operations and Low lntcnsit)' 

ConOict: 17. 18,23 

Assistant Secrclar)' of the Army for Civil 

Works: I 00, I 0 I, 114, 228- 29 

Assistant Secretary or the Army for 

Financial Management: 101. 161, 

165 

Assistant Secretary of the Army for 

Installations, Logistics and 

Environment: 100, 169, 196. 

221 - 22, 228 
INDEX 

Assistant Secreta I)' of the Army for 

Research, Developmem, and 

Acquisition: 102 

Associated Kuwait Office: 205 

Atwood, Donald j.: 222 

Auditors: lOS, 117,155-56, 162, 167, 

241 

Audus: 126 

Aulcna, Anthony J.: 16-17, 27 

Avimion Brigade, 2d: 55. 77 

Bahrain: 5 

Baker, James A. Ill: 17, 36, 40-4 I 

Banking and currency system: 29, 86 

Barlow, Lt. Col. Dennis C.: 17 

Bancncs, shortages of: 75-76, 97 

Bayan Palace: 71, 73, 125, 126, 140-42, 

147 

BEC Construction/joint vemure: 174 

Bechtel Group, Inc.: 30-3 1, 184. 185, 

188 

BcntiC)', llclen Delich: 121 

"Bia khorse~ base: 223 

Blount, Col. L'lwrence C.: 48, 49, 92 

Blount Construction I ntcrnational: 66, 

II 0, 126, 140, 144-45, 167, 176, 

207 

Bolwn, Capt. Pete: 25 

Boob)' traps: 65, 77, 128 

Boots and Coots: 183-84, 185 

Bounds, Julius "Bo": 58, I 17 

BraeknC)', Col. Richard C.: 50-51 

Bridges: 181 

Brigade camps: 192 

6th: 153, 196,2 18- 19,22 1,223,224 

15th : 196 

35th: 196 

80th: 196 

British anr.cd forces: 48, 76, 120, 223 

ctvil rtffairs elements: 52 

cngmeering team: 65, 131-32 

medical team: 65 

ordnance team: 65, 76, 149 

preventive medicine team: 80 

Britbh Flectricity International: 131-32 

British Royal Ordnance Corps: 149 

Brook, Douglas A.: 165 

Brooks, :tj. J:-~mes: 65-66 

Brown and Root lmcrnation:-~1: 30-31, 

126, 140,143-44,\76,207,219 

Bubiyan: 8 

llunkers, Iraqi 

285 

bltilt to guard roads and bridges: 65 

demolished: 76, 94, 132-33, 135, 

181 

Burgan otl field: 183, 188-89, 190 

Burke, lst Lt. William: 90 

Llush, George: 8-9, 13, 15, 17, 121, 189, 

222 

Bush administration : 228, 229 

C:-~ mp #I Qubail, Saudi Arabia): 53, 63 

Camp Doha, Kuwait: 225 

Camp Freedom, Kuwan: 63, 74, 75, 76, 

78-79,90-91 

Can:-~da : 52, 149 

Capstone program: 16-17, 2 1-22,23, 

43 

Cnrns, Lt. Gen. Michael ~ C.: 17. 18. 

22-23,24 

Carpenters: 74-75 

C'lrtcr. Jimmy: 8 

Caner doctrine: 8, 9 

Cmcrptllar, Inc.: 82, 120 

CENTCOfvL. Sec U.S. Central Command. 

Central Intelligence Agcnc)•: 33, 60 

Chambers, David L.: 196, 199- 200 

Checkpoints: 66, 67, 76, 77,86 

Chemical Bank of New York: 164 

Chene)', Richard: 8-9, 50, 94, 96, 99, 

102-03, 155, 169, 180, 189-90, 

217-18,222-23,240 

Chtnrt: 186 

Chrysler Corporation: 120-2 1 

Civil Mrairs and Psychological 

Operations Command: 23-24, 29 

Civil affairs annexes to operations plans: 

32-33 

Ctvil Affatrs Baualion, 96th: 51-52, 53, 

77,93-94 

Civtl Affairs Brigade, 354th: 25 

Civil Mrairs Command, 352d: 3-4, 11, 

52-53, 156 

and Capstone progmm: 16- 17, 

21-22,23,43 

and coordination or emergency 

response effon: 95-96, 237- 38 

rtnd KERO: 61, 118-19 

and Kuwait Tnsk Force: 24, 28-29, 

38,39-40,43,48 
286 

Civil Affairs Command, 352dContinued 

mobihzation of: 24, 25. 50-52. 63, 

65,237-38 

relationship to Task Force Freedom: 76 

relationship to Third U.S. Army: 

2 1-22 

Civil affairs companies 

418th: 90 

431st: 51-52,63,65,77,93-94 

432d: 51-52,63,65,77.90,93-94 

Civil Affairs Group. 308th: 86--87 

Civil Affairs Task Force: 5 1-52, 84 

Civil affairs units: 158 

activauon of: 21. 24, 25, 50-52, 63. 

65 

command and control of: 49, 50, 

51-53, 54, 156 

composition of: 21, 96 

and damage assessment: 80, ll9 

history of: 2l 

and logistics aid to oil firefighters: 185 

logtsttcs support for: 54, 55, 57 

missions of: 20-21, 26, 57 

oversight of: 20-21, 24-25, 104 

and planning for the reconstruction 

of Kuwait: 21, 54, 96 

Civilian Sktlls Data Base: 28-29 

Cluster bombs, unexploded: 109-10, 

128-29, 149, 192, 193 

Cobb, Jim: 65-66. 67 

Combat engineer vehicles: 188 

Combined Ch'il Affairs Task Force 

(CCATF): 10. 43. 51-53,63,65, 

67,69, 238 

civil-military operations ccmer: 80 

composition of: 52, 77 

damage assessment tcnms: 80 

mission: 53, 97 

orgamzation of: 52-53, 95-96 

relattonship to Kuwatt Emergency 

Recovery Office: 80 

support for: 53, 54 

and Task Force Freedom: 55 

Commerce, U.S. Department of: 102 

and contractor inquiries: 121, 

126--27 

Gulf Reconstruction Cemer: 121 

and small business opportunities: 

168, 174 

AlTER DESERT STORM 

Commerce Business Daily: 123, l24, 127, 

167,173,200,201 

Communicauons equipment. Sec 

Telecommunications equipment. 

Communications net works, military: 76, 

144, 194 

Computer equipment: 31 

Construct ion 

contracts: 120, 124, 126--27, 

141--43, 172, 175,199,200. 

209-16 

of facilities for U.S. troops: 219, 

221-22 

Kuwaiti military facilities: 191-216 

materials: 73, 144 

b)' U.S. engineer troops: 219 

Construction plaroons: 74-75 

Contract admtnistration: 115. 146-47, 

212-16,218-20,223 

Comract award procedures: 10 I 

accelerated: 124 

and competition: 170. 199.201,204, 

207 

cultural innucnces on: 30, 202, 215 

discussions with Kuwaiti officials 

about: 58, 107, 121-22 

evaluation factors: 123, 171-72. 174, 

201-02 

and Kuwatt Task Force: 31, 38-39 

Kuwaiti-Kuwait Emergent)' Recovery 

Office prcquali fication and selection board: 124-25 

and Kuwaui laws: 146--47 

Kuwaiti role in: 58, 124, 125, 

146--47, 167-68, 180, 184, 199, 

200.202,204,206-07,209,234 

limiled competition: 167, 200, 201 

preference for Kuwaiti firms: I 46, 

180,206--07,209 

preference for U.S. fim1s: 58. 

120-22, 146--47, 166, 168, 

169-70,222-23 

requests for proposals: I 23 

selection of comractors: I 24, I 46--47, 

202,204-05,206-07,234-35 

selection criteria: 171. 201 

and small busmesses: 102, I 66, 

168-70,201-02,237 

and U.S. laws: 11, 62, 121-22, 123, 

146-47,202,204,206 
INDEX 

Contract awards made by Kuwaitis: 19, 

29-30,31,46,47, 58,86,97, 

]07, 120-21, 122, 115, 146-47, 

150,152,186,202,206-07,209, 

211,214-16,223 

Contmcung specialists: II 5, 117. 123, 

124, 126 

Contractors: 4, 57 

for air base construction: 195-96, 

200,201,204,207,210-16 

architect-engineer: 180, 199, 

200-201,205,229-30,232 

Briush: 120, 125, 126, 186, 197. 198 

butlding repairs: 126, 140, 219-20 

Canadian: 184, 186 

capabilities: 124-25 

construction: 124-25, 126-27, 

132-33,195-96,200,201,204, 

207,210-13,229-30 

design: 229-30, 232 

difficulties getting equipment to 

Kuwait: 144, 169 

cligibtlity: 199, 200, 206 

for emergency supplies: 28, 29-30 

emergency work orders to: 219-20, 

224 

eqLtipment: 124-25 

estimates of costs: J 24-25, 126, 127 

French: 197 

inquiries about work in Kuwait: 101, 

102, 121 

ktlled: 84, 110, 128-29, 140, 153 

Kuwaiti: 120, 124, 125, 126, 171, 

173-74, 176, 180, 199, 200-201, 

205,206-07,209-1.0 

mobilization plans: 1.13, J 19, 

124-25, 126 

need for civilian finn to serve as project manager for the recovery 

effort: 30-31, 35-36, 59-60 

oil firefighters: 30, 183-90 

payments to: 223, 224-25 

person11el: 176, 234 

potential: 16, 29, LO I, I 02, 121, 

124, 172-73, 206 

prequalified: 38-39, 58, 122-23, 

124-25,167,169,171.200-201, 

204,206-07 

problems mobilizing: 143-44, 168, 

213-14,219,222-23 

287 

Contractors-Continued 

representatives of, on damage assessment teams: 112, 119 

Saudi: 84, 125, 126, 211 

small and small disach•antaged: 10, 

102, 168-75, 201-02 

subcomractors: 124-25, 168-70, 

l 7 L-72, 173, 174-75, 176, 180, 

201,234 

task orders tO: J 19-20 

Turkish: 197 

U.S.-Kuwaiti joint ventures: 173-74, 

199,200-201,205,206-07, 

209-10 

used for explosive ordnance removal 

and disposal: 76, 172 

for water: 28, 29-30, 83-84 

work camps: 144 

Contracts 

architect-engineering: 123, 142, 172, 

199,200-201,202,205 

construction: 122, 123, 124-25, 126, 

172, 175, 199,200,209-16,229 

design: 122, 123, 180, 181, 199, 

200,229,232 

dredging: 121, 124-25, 126, 135, 

167 

duration of: 167 

electrical work: 125, 126, J 28-32, 

142, 144 

for emergenC}' supphes: 28, 29-30, 

46 

explosive ordnance disposal: 149-53, 

224 

fixed price: 142 

indefinite delivery type contracts 

(I DTC): 122, 172 

jotnt venture: 120, 166-67, 173-74, 

199,200-201,205,206-07, 

209-10,212 

marine survey: 124-25 

moclifications of: 127, 167, 170, 

172-73, l75-76,20J,210, 

212-13 

noncompetitive letter contracts: 

38-39, 58, 124, 125, 126. 145, 

170,201,205,219-20 

otl firefighting: 183-90 

paving: 124-25, 133, 135 

wtth relief organizations: 30 
288 

Contracts-Continued 

sanitation: 87, 124- 25, 136-37, 

139-40 

scope of work: 125, 126, 136 

sen•ice: 123 

supplies: 123 

to support U.S. forces: 219-20, 

222-23,224 

Conventional Munit ions S)•stems: 152 

Convoys. Sec Truck convoys. 

Corps, Vll: 52, 63, 89-90, 93-94 

Corps of Engineers tvlanagement 

Information System (COEMIS): 

161-62 

Cost estimates 

general: 120. 147, 162, 164-66, 

199-200,2 13,227 

for specific repair pr~jects: 113, 

119-20, 162, 164-66, 192- 93, 

194, 199-200,204-05,2 12-13 

Cox, Col. Charles S.: 24 1 

Cultural differences 

and comract award procedures: 30. 

202,215 

and relations between Task Force 

Freedom and Kuwaitis: 92-93, 

239 

Damage assessments 

b)• 416th Engineer Command: 73-74 

duplication of effort: 81, 108-09, 119 

b)' Kuwall Emergency Recovery 

Office: 73,108-09,110,112, 

ll9-20, 191 -92 

by Kuwaitis: I 08- 09 

planning for: 57 

by Task Force Freedom: 80, 93 

Damage surve)' reports: 119-20 

Dammam, Saudi Arabia: 41-42,46,47, 

143 

Daniel, 1-.lann, johnson, and Mendenhall: 

181 

Dausman , George: 170 

Dawson, Roben K.: 228-29 

Defense, O fl'ice of the Secretary of 

and call-up of reserve units: 2 L 

and funding for facilities for U.S. 

troops: 221-22 

and U.S.-Kuwmu Cl\' 11 affairs workmg 

group: 20, 22 

AFTER DESERT STORM 

Defense, Secretary of: 3, 4, 93, 94, 

102-03, I 04, LOS, 155, 222, 227. 

Sc" cllso ChenC)', Richard. 

Defense, U.S. Depanment o f 

administrative expenses for Kuwait 

recover)' effort: 147, 161, 162, 

164 

civil affairs capabilities: 15, 16 

and civil affairs support: 20 

contracting strategy: 166-75 

General Counsel: 19 

reimbursements from foreign nations: 

221-22 

relations wtth State Department: 18, 

20-21,22,39-42 

relations with State Department 

Representative to Kuwait: 99-100, 

101- 02 

responsibility l'or recovery operations: 

10, 13, 19,22-23,27,93, 

99-100, 101-03, 104-05, 155, 

167-68, 202 

Defense Comract Audit Agency: 126 

Defense Cooperation Account: 221-22, 

224,225 

Defense Intelligence J\gcnc)•: 33 

Defense Reconstruction Assistance 

Office: 4, 10, 155,166 

and civil affairs mission: 156 

and contracting strategy: 166-75, 

197,200,204 

and facilities for U.S. Army unus: 

2J7-26 

financirll management role: 155-56, 

158, 160-66, 227 

logistics support for: 156 

and long-term reconstruction of militar)' facihties: 199, 200, 205 

missions: 156, 158 

personnel: 155, 158 

relationship wuh Kuwait Emergency 

Recovery Office: 106, 152, 158, 

159-60, 197. 227, 229 

and small business opportunities: 

167-75 

and suppon for oil firefighters: 

187-88 

and support for U.S. troops: 217-26 

and Task Force Freedom: 156 

and work agreements: 164-65 
INDEX 

Ddense Security Assistance Agency: 8, 

38,196,200 

Desalinizat ion plams 

AI-Zour: 83, 94, 138 

Doha: 74-75,83,94 

repairs LO: 74-75, 84, 181 

Shuaiba: 83, 94 

Dr:sERr Slltf:I.D: 9, 24,36-37, 124 

DESERT 5TOR~ : 9-10, 47-48, 49, 124 

Dhnhran, Saudi Arabia: 5, 41-42, 45, 

47,65-66,71,73, 77,109, 11 2, 

123, 196 

Direcwnue of Strategic Plnns and Policy: 

18, 228 

Doha desalinization/electrical power 

plants: 74-75, 82-83, 94, 

l30-31, 132 

Doha, Kuwait: 217-26 

Dorn, Nancy P.: 228-29 

Duckenfield, Thomns A. Ill: 172 

Dymally, MerV)'ll M.: 169 

Educational facilities. See Schools. 

Egyptian armed forces: 63, 176 

Electrical engineers: 66, 117 

Electrical power, emergency provisions 

for: 46 

Electrical power system 

assessmelll of damage to: 38 

damage LO: 73 

repairs to: 125, 127, 144, 145, 175, 

181 

restoration of power to Kuwait City: 

71,79-80,81-82, 132,144,181 

restoration of power to militnry 

fac ilities: 194, 195-96, 2 l 0, 2 13, 

219 

Electrical transmission lines. See Power 

distribution system. 

Elliott, Col. Randall (Army Reserve): 

16-17, 25,30,50,97 

and human rights issues: 31 

and Kuwait Task Force mission: 

26-27,32-33,44,48,78-79 

Emir of Kuwait. See Al-Sabah, Jaber. 

Energy, U.S. Department of: 186 

Engineer battalions (combal heavy) 

43cl: 74-75 

864th: 74-75, 219 

Engineer Brignde, 23d: 219 

289 

Engineer Command (Forward), 416th: 

55,65, 73-74,82-83,1 19 

Engineer Company (Combat Suppon), 

259th: 74 

Engineer Dewchment (Prime Power), 

535th: 74-75, 82 

Engineering Services Company: 212 

Engineers, Kuwaiti: 112, 119, 239 

Engineers, U.S. Army Corps of: 3-4, 1l. 

See also Kuwait Emergency 

Recover)' Office. 

Army Staff control over: lOL-02, 

104,105-06,168,228-29 

briefings to Kuwaitis: 27-28, 36, 58 

and construction of Kuwaiti military 

facilities: 35, 158, 196, 198, 

211-16 

contracting strategy: 120-27 

and design of Kuwaiti militar)' facilities: 196, 197, 198,211- 12, 

214-16 

and facilities fo r U.S. troops: 219, 

221-22 

history of work in Kuwait: 35 

Kuwaiti funding of mobilization 

costs: 125 

leuer of agreement on nature of 

emergency assistance to Kuwait: 

36-37, 58, 145-47 

logistics support for emergency 

response operations: 25, 39, 

6 1-62, 117- 19 

Micldlc EasLIAfrica Projects Office: 35, 

36-37,38,58,60,61, 118,123 

Middle East Division: 35 

missions: 37-38, 58-59, 73, 122, 

127, 214, 229 

as project manager for Kuwait emergent)' response: 37-38, 101, 108. 

llO, 189-90 

prospects for long-term role in 

Kuwait: 101,158, 167-68, 191, 

196, 197. 198, 200, 205-07' 

214-16 

relationship with interagenC)' steering 

group committee: 37-38 

relationship with Kuwaiti officials: 

214-16 

and small business set-asides: 173, 

201-02 
290 

Lngineers, U.S. Army Corps ofContinued 

South Atlamic Division: 117-18 

Transatlantic Division: 109, ll7- 19, 

121 , 142, 159-60, 162, 164, 167, 

170, 171,172, 173, 180, 191, 

197,200,205,209-10,225-26, 

227,229,232,234,241 

usc of Kuwaiti volunteers: 37 

volunteers to go to Kuwait: 39, 110, 

117-18,240 

Env•ronmemal issues: 187-88, 189-90 

l:nvironmental Protection Agency: 189-90 

Evans, james: 35 

Explosive ordnance disposal center: 76 

xplosive Ordnance Disposal Group, 1st: 

55, 57, 76 

J":xplosivc ordnance disposal specialists 

comract: 149-53, 172, 176, 224 

military: 29, 65, 76, ll9, 149, 150, 

152-53, 185, 224 

Explosive ordnance disposal units: 73 

American: 76, 149, 150, 152-53, 

158, 185 

Bangladeshi: 149-50 

Bruish: 149-50, 153 

Canadian: 149 

Egyptian: 150, 153 

French: 149, 150, 153 

Pakistani: 150, 153 

Fadden General Trading: 174 

failaka Island Ferry Terminal: 167 

Federal Emergency Managemem AgenC)': 

22,27-28,39 

federal procurement regulations (U.S.): 

11 , 121, 122-23 

and foreign military sales agreements: 

62, 147, 162, 167 

lack of exceptions for dis.1ster 

response: 62 

<mel small business opportunities: 

171, 172 

Federation lmernationale des lngenicursConseils (FIDIC): 211-12 

Financial management 

Defense Reconstmction Assistance 

Office and: 155-56, 160-66 

Kuwait EmergenC)' Recovery Office 

and: 160, 161-62 

AFTER DESERT STORM 

Financial management-Continued 

and Section 607A of the Foreign 

Assistance Act: 160- 66 

Fire departments: 77, 94, 140, 174 

Firefighting equipment: 30, 1.84, 1.85, 

187-88 

Fitzgerald, Rear Adm. J. R.: 19 

Food distribution 

centers for: 73, 77, 79-80, 88, 140 

discrimination m: 88-89 

and partisan politics: 88 

Food supplies 

distribution of emergency supplies: 

30,46-47,65,71,87-89, 95 

for emergency relief: 28, 29-30, 

46-47,49,63,65,77,86,97 

purchased by Kuwaiti government: 

28,29- 30,46-47,87-88 

swckpiling of: 28, 73 

Ford Motor Company: 120- 2 l 

Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Section 

607A: 145-46, 158, 160-66, 167, 

169, 172-73, 174, 175-76, 195, 

218,227,232,234 

Foreign military sales case: 8 

allocation of funds: 125, 165, 

194-95,218,227 

and assessment of damage to defense 

facilities: 191- 92,204- 05, 

210-11 

cost estimates for repairs to military 

facilities: 192-93, 194-95, 

204-05, 213 

and emergency repairs at defense 

facilities: 194-96, 2 I 0-ll 

expanded: 145, 167 

and Kuwau Emergency Recovery 

Office: 62, 118, 122, 125, 145, 

167 

for planning, design, and construction or Kuwaiti military installations: 194-95, 196-209, 210-ll, 

214-16,227 

scope or work: 199-200, 204- 05, 

212-13 

and small business opportunities: 

169, 172-73, 174,201-02 

and U.S. Ann)' Corps of Engineers: 

38. 58, 62. 105. 122, 145 

and U.S. Congress: 169, 205-06 
INDEX 

Fon Bragg, N.C.: 23 

Forward area support coordination 

offices: 76 

France: 53, 120, 149, 186 

French anned forces: 48, 76 

Fnx, MaJ. Gen. Robert S.: 49, 53, 63, 

78,97,239 

and CCATF: 63, 65 

and Task Force Freedom: 54-55, 57, 

79-80,91,92,93.94,95,96 

Fuller, George A.: 210 

Fuller, W)mne: 60-61, 80 

Funding mechanisms. See Foreign military sales; Foreign Assistance Act 

of 1961, Section 607A. 

General Accounting Office: 241 

General Motors Corporation: 120-21 

General Services Administration: 62 

Generators 

brought 10 Kuwait by Kuwait 

Emergency Recovery Office: 67 

provided by contractors: 29-30, 82, 

86,120-21 ,219-20 

provided by U.S. Army: 73, 75-76, 

77,82,97 

for pumping stations: 139 

for radio repeaters: 109 

repaired: 75-76 

used to light city streets: 82, 94 

Geneva Convention, violations of: 77 

Germany: 21, 120, 186 

Gianelli , William R.: 228-29 

Gnehm, Edward W. "Skip," Jr.: 13, 15, 

16-17, 19, 20, 23, 103,241 

briefed by Locurcio: 58-59, 102 

and food distribution: 88-89 

and foreign military s.1lcs case: 122, 

206,213, 214-1 5 

and human rights issues: 31-32 

and Kuwait Emergency Recovery 

Office: 58-60, 61, 102, 118-19, 

123-24, 164-65 

and Kuwait Task Force: 26-27, 

30-31,40-41,44,45-47,59-60, 

79 

and oil well fires: 185, 187-88 

and preference for U.S. firms: 121-22 

and reconstruction of air bases: 206, 

2 13,214-15 

Gnehm, Edward W. "Skip," jr.-

Continued 

291 

relationship with Brig. Gen. Mooney: 

91 

relationship with CENTCOM: 44-47, 

99 

relationship with Col. Peixouo: 209, 

214-15 

relationship with Ibrahim AlShaheen: 118 

relationship with Kuwaiti officials: 

92-93, LlS-19 

relationship with Maj. Gen. Kelly: 

103-04, 158, 160, 187-88 

and Task Force Freedom: 71,91- 92, 

95 

and work agreements: 164-65 

Grey, Ken: 65-66, 67 

Groves and Tamimi: 212 

Guest, Brig. Gen. Kenneth: 46, 54-55, 

91 

Gulf of Arabia, sewage released to: 84. 

139 

llaglund, S. Sgt. Robert: 86-87 

llarbell, Maj. john W.: 47 

I latch, Lt. Gen. Henry j.: 36, 103, 

238-39.240 

and Ambassador Gnehm: 60 

and Army Staff: 105-06 

and contracting strategy: 121, 170 

and funding of recovery effort: 145 

and planning for emergency 

response: 38, 39-40, 45 , 57, 61 

relationship to Nancy Dorn: 228- 29 

llawalli , Kuwait City: 84. 88, 89 

llealth risks: 109-10, 189, 223 

Helland, George: 186 

llellmuth, Obata, and Kassabaum: 180, 

229-30,232,234-35 

Henry, Wayne: 37 

llighways. See Roads. 

Hospitals 

damage assessment: 77, 80, 89, 140 

emergency: 77 

generators for: 73, 75-76, 89 

material stolen from: 49, 89 

repa•rs to: 79-80, 142-43 

restoration of utilities at: 74-76, 77 

supplies for: 47, 73, 77, 89-90, 94 
292 

!Iuber, james P.: 35 

Huber, Lt. Col. Phil: 185 

Hughes, Arthur H.: 19 

Human rights 1ssues: 31-32, 89 

lluneau, Brig. Gen. joseph C.: 24, 25 

Hussein, Sacldam: 8, 9, 27-28 

IBM: 31 

Information management S)'Stcm: 161 

Interagency steering group comminee: 

10 

INTERNt\1 LOOK Goint exercise): 32 

International Federation of Consulting 

Engineers: 211-12 

lmcrnauonal Security Assis1ance Middle 

East office: 27 

Interpreters (Kuwaiti): 53 

Iran: 186 

Iraq: 8, 9 

collabomtors with, in Kuwait: 31, 88 

displaced civilians in southern areas 

of: 49-50 

occupation of southern areas of: 48, 

49-50, 217 

Iraqi fo rces: 9, 63, 90 

bunkers: 65, 86 

lootmg b)•: 49, 75, 84, 136, 140-41, 

217,219-20,234 

stockpiling of weapons b)•: 71, 

86-87, 149 

war crimes by: 77 

Israel 

air base program: 5, 30 

U.S. milnary construction programs 

in: 5 

It Doesn't falw a Hero, by II. Norman 

Schwarzkopf: 62 

Japan: 21, 120 

Jinkins, tvlaj. Lawrence: 66, 67, 109 

joint Chiefs of Staff, Chairman of the: 21 

Joint Forces Command-East: 48, 52, 53, 

62-63 

joint Forces Command-North: 48, 52, 

53.62-63 

Joint Staff 

bricnng to Kuwait Task force: 17 

and call-up of civil affairs personnel: 

2 1 

AFTER DESERT STORM 

joint Staff-Continued 

directions to Army Staff: 21 

Director of Operations: 18 

Director of Strategic Plans nnd Policy: 

18 

and military role in recovery: 22-23, 

103 

and U.S.-Kuwaiti civil affairs working 

group: 19, 20,41 

joint ventures wnh Kuwaiti firms: 120, 

166-67, I 73-74, 199, 200-201, 

205,206-07,209-10,2 12 

jones Group Incorporated: 147 

jusT CAusr:: 23, 28, 29, 36-37, 96 

Kaminsky, Lt. Col. Albert F.: 217 

Keener, Col. Allen W: 16-J 7 

Kell y, tv1aj. Gen. Patrick).: 17, 21, 93, 

L03, I 06, 240 

contracting stmtegy: 166-75, 196, 

199-202,204,206-07,222-23, 

224 

duties and responsibilities: 103-04, 

155-56, 158, 159-60, 161 

and explosive ordnance removal: 

104-05, 152 

and facilities for U.S. Army units: 

217,218,219-20,222-23 

and foreign militar)' sales c11sc: 

194-95. 196, 197-98, 199-200, 

204,206-07,214 

and funding of recovery effort: 

155-56 

and leuer of exchange: 146-4 7, 158 

and long-term reconstruction of 

Kuwaiti military facilities: 196, 

197-98, 199- 200, 205-07, 

239-40 

and ofnce space for the Kuwait Task 

Force: 25 

relationship with Ambass.1elor 

Gnehm: 103-04, 158, 160, 

187-88,206 

relationship with Col. Locurcio: 158, 

159-60. 164-65,166, 175-76. 

180, 196 

rei at ionsh1J> with Kuwan Emergency 

Recovery Office: 103-04, lOS, 

155, I 58, 159-60, 162, 164-65, 

166,168. 176.180.195 
INDEX 

Kelly, Maj. Gen. Patrick ).-Continued 

re lationship with Kuwaiti otTicials: 

L60, l65, 180, 197-98, 199-200, 

204,206,223,227 

relationship with Susan Livingstone: 

104, 158-59, 166, 195,201-02, 

240-41 

and small business opportunities: 

169, 170-71, 173-74 

I<ERO. See Kuwait Emergenc>' Recovery 

Office. 

Kerr, Col. James T., Jr.: 34, 44, 51 

Khafji , Saudi Arabia: 65, 143 

Khalid bin Sultan, Lt. Gen. (Saudi 

Arabia): 62 

Kharafi: 126, 140,142, 171, 176, L80, 

210,219-20,224,230,232, 

234-35 

Khobar Towers (Dammam, Saudi 

Arabia): 41~2 

l<hudair Group: 126, 142, 219, 224 

Kiesling, Capt. Robert, USN: l98, 204 

Kimbrell, Allen: 110 

King, Col. Edward A.: 51 

King, James: l72 

King Khalid Military City, Saudi Arabia: 

5, 54, 55,73-74,89 

Kuwait 

budget: 164- 66, 202 

civil affairs personnel: 52 

Council of Ministers: 180 

Crown Prince of: 91, 92-93, 

140- 142, 165, 217- 18, 227, 232, 

234 

elections: 180 

nnancing for recovery effort: 6, 16, 

19, 29-30, 120, 145-47, 155-56, 

158, 160-66 

foreign laborers in: 31-32, 88, 

92-93,95 

and foreign military sales agreement: 

145, 164, 192-2.16,218 

funding for construction of facilities 

for U.S. troops: 2 I 7- 18, 22 1- 22, 

224, 225 

funding for repairs to militaty faci lities: 197-99 

funding fo r Task Force Victory: 

217-18 

labor force: 86 

293 

Kuwait-Continued 

letter of exchange with U.S.: 146, 

158, 161, 162 

liberation of: 10, 47-48, 62-63 

Ministr>• of Commerce: 88-89 

l'vliniSll"}' of Defence: 145, 158, 181, 

191- 216,218,223,224,227 

Ministry of Education: 14 7, 175-76 

Ministty of Electricity and Water: 36, 

38-39,82,131-32, 136,138, 

147, 164, 176, 181, 213 

Ministry of Finance: 164, 165-66 

1\,linistry of Health: 87 

Ministry of Information: 87 

MiniSll"}' of Interior: 87, 14 3 

Minisu-y of justice: 87 

Ministry of Oil: 183 

Minisu·>' of Public Service: 144 

Ministry of Public Works: 15, 36, 

136, 139,147,164,165, 230,232 

National Assembl>•: 230, 232 

National Guard facilities: 36 

payments to U.S. Treasury: 38, 

160-61,162,164-65,202,227 

reconstruction plan for: 32-34 

reilnbursement for services rendered 

by U.S. government: 19, 161, 

187,217-18,221-22,224 

request for reimbursable design and 

construction m~nagemem services 

from Corps of Engineers: 35-39 

res st~nce figh ters: 49, 67, 77, 88, 89 

support for CCATF: 53 

willingness to pay for civil affairs 

assistance: 217-19 

Kuwait Air Force: 7, 35, 136, 191, 

195-96,198,199,205,210-11, 

212-16 

Kuwait Army: 77 

<lnd DESERT STOR~I: 63 

facilities for: 176, 191 

and removal of enemy munitions: 77 

Kuwait City: 7, 37, 46, 47,51 

divided into sectors fo r emergency 

response: 53, 58, 77, 125, 140 

foreigners in: 31-32, 84, 88, 89, 95 

liberation or: 47-48, 50, 63, 67, 

123- 24 

military intelligence regarding the situation in: 33, 53 
294 

Kuwait City-Continued 

restoration of services to: 81-82, 94, 

132, 144 

zoo: 77,91 

Kuwait Civil Reconstruction Trust Fund: 

164 

Kuwait Emergency Recovery Office: 3-4, 

107-47 

and budget proposals: 58, 114 

command and control of: 61, 

117-19,159-60,227 

communications problems: 109 

;md contract administration: 108, 

1) 2, 113, 115, 218-20, 223, 

229-30 

contracting procedures: 58, J 07, 

123-24, 126, 147, 166-75, 204 

cost estimates: 119, 162, 164 

damage assessment groups: 110, 

112-13, 115, 119-20, 127-28, 

136-38, 140, 192-93 

damage assessment teams: 80, 

108-09, 112,119, 138, 142-43 

damage survey report process: 58, 

119-20,139,164-65 

emergency management division: 

llO, 113-14,115 

emergency repair teams: 113 

engineering division: 110, 112, J 15 

and explosive ordnance removal and 

disposal: 150, 152 

facilities for 67 

and facilities for U.S. Army units: 

217-26 

and financial accounting: 160. 

161-62 

and foreign military sales case. 62, 

145,192-96,197,198-99,205, 

210-11, 218-19 

identification cards for: 66 

Kuwaiti funding of equipment for: 

61-62 

and Kuwaiti volunteers: 61,66-67, 

112, llS-17,136, 158, 175, 239 

logistics support for: 61-62, 112. 

115,238 

Ministry of Defence damage assessment group: 191-93, 210-11 

mission: 60-61, 110, 118-19, 140 

organizational strucwre: 110-17, 147 

AFfER DESERT 57VRM 

Kuwait Emergency Recovery OfficeContinued 

oversight of, by Frix: 57, 118-19 

personnel: 61,110,115-16,117-18, 

158, 175 

priorities for emergent)' repairs: 

107-08, 1J3, 114, 118-19, 120, 

127, 138. 140, 146, 164-65, 176, 

193, 194-96, 198 

and project management division: 

112, 113-15, 117,212 

quality control role: 113, 114, 115 

recruitment of personnel for: 60-61 

relationship to 352d Civil Affairs 

Command: 61, 118 

relationship lO Ambassador Gnehm: 

58-59,61. J 18-19 

relationship with Combined Civil 

Affairs Task Force: 80 

relationship with the Defense 

Reconstruction Assistance Office: 

106.156,158,159-60,227 

relationship with Kuwait Emergency 

Recovery Program: 107-08 

relationship with Kuwait 

Reconstruction Task Force: 100 

relationship with Kuwait Task Force: 

59, 118 

relationship with Kuwaiti ministries: 

61,107-09, 110, 112, 113- 15, 

116, 120 

relationship with Kuwaiti officials: 

107-09,113-14, 119-20, 136, 

164, 198-99 

relationship with Task Force 

Freedom: 73, 118-19 

relationshtp with Transatlantic 

Division: 117-19, 159 

relationship with U.S. Army Corps of 

Engineers headquarters: 117-18 

and repairs at Kuwait International 

Airport: 195-96, 198 

and repairs to military facilities: 

192-217 

and repairs to schools: 175-76 

resident offices: 112, 113, 115, 

212-16 

resource manager: 112, 120 

support for U.S. troops: 217-26 

workorders: 164-66,175-76 
INDEX 

Kuwait Emergency Recovery Office 

Funds Control System: 162 

Kuwait Emergency Recovery Program: 

3-4, 13, 15-16, 38 

composition of: 15-16 

contracts awarded b)•: 30 

facilities for: 67 

and human rights issues: 31 

move 10 Saudi Arabia: 40-42 

and priorities for emergency repairs: 

l, 164-65 

relationship with Kuwait Emergency 

Recovery Office: 164-65 

and scope of emergency response: 

32-33,34,60 

and water provisions: 30 

work groups: 15-16 

Kuwait International Airport: 48, 76 

air traffic control tower: 85, 125, 

136, 180-81 

assessment of damage to: 110. 112, 

135-36 

clearing of debris from: 75, 135-36 

damage to: 71, 73-74, 85 

emergency facilities for the Kuwait 

Air Force at: 195-96, 198 

<IS headquarters for Task Force 

Freedom: 55, 63 

repairs to: 94, 125, 126, 135-36, 

167, 168,172,174,180-81, 

195-96 

restOration of utilities at: 75-76, 125, 

135-36 

Kuwait Investment Office: 164 

Kuwait Land Forces: 52-53 

Kuwait military facilities 

assessment of damage to: 110, 1.12, 

143, 191-92 

damage to: 191- 93, 217, 218-19 

emergency repairs to: 158, 195-98 

long-term construction of: 196, 205, 

209-16 

Kuwait National Guard facilities: 

142-43, 192, 194-95 

Kuwait Navy: 191, 192, 193, 194, 198 

Kuwait Oil Compan>•: 183-84, 185, 

186, 188 

Kuwait Plaza Hotel, Kuwait City: 7, 67 

Kuwait Program Office: 4, 207, 209, 

212, 227, 230 

Kuwait Reconstruction Task Force 

(KRTF): 100-101, 104 

Kuwait Recovery Task Force: 4 

Kuwait Task Force: 3-4, 10 

briefings for: 25, 27-28 

295 

and Civil Affairs Task Force: 51-52 

command and control of: 26-27, 

43-47 

and contract awards: 29 

formation of: 23-2 7 

and human rights issues: 31, 32 

lack of military intelligence: 33 

lines of authority: 26-27 

logistics support fo r: 44-45 

mission: 26-27, 32-33.40-41,44, 

45,46, 59,78-79 

move to Saudi Arabia: 34, 39. 40-42, 

43,48 

and need for program manager to 

administer the recovety effort: 

30-31 

organization: 28, 81 

and planning for fighting oil well 

fires: 183-84, 185 

priorities: 33-34 

relationship bet ween individual 

members and Kuwaiti counterparts: 40-41,43,77-79,80 

relationship lO Ambassador Gnehm: 

40-41,45,79 

relationship to ARCENT: 25, 33, 

43-47,48 

relationship to Army Staff: 26, 43 

relationship to CENTCOM: 25, 33, 

43-47,48 

relationship to Task Force Freedom: 

73, 77 

and scope of emergency response: 

38-39 

use of individual members or. by 

CENTCOM and ARCENT: 43-44, 

45-46 

Kuwaiti funds 

released by U.S. Treasury 

Department: 162. 164-65, 166 

transferred to U.S. accounts: 164-65. 

166 

Kuwaiti governmem in exile: 9, 15, 19, 20 

briefings to: 27-28, 34 

rewrn to Kuwait: 46, 77, 95 
296 

Kuwaiti officials 

and CCt\TF: 52-53 

and contracting strategies: 174-75, 

202,204 

and Defense Reconstruction 

Assistance Office: 158, 164 

Director of Public Works: 36 

federal agent)' bnefings to: I 7, 164 

and Kuwait Emergency Response 

Office: 107- 09, 113-14, 119-20 

ivlinistcr of Defence: 202, 205- 06, 

214-16 

Minister of Finance: 15, 164, 166 

lvlinister of Foreign Affairs: 13, 15 

Minister of Planning: I 5 

priorities: 38, 60, 107-08, 119-20, 

132, 140, 197-98, 204 

and repairs to military facilities: 

197-98,2 12-16 

and repairs to National Assembly 

building: 229-30, 232 

return of cx1les 10 Kuwait: 77-78 

and Task Force Freedom: 92-93 

and U.S. Arlll)' Corps of Engineers: 

27-28,36,2 14-16 

and U.S.-Kuwait i civil affairs working 

group: 86 

and work agreements: 164-66 

Kuwaiti Red Crescent: 52 

L'lcke)•, Col. Glenn: 57, 239 

Laundry facilities: 77 

Leaf, Barbara: 92 

Letters of credit: I 64-65 

Lichtenstein, Col. jack: 82 

Livestock feeding program: 77 

Livingstone, Susan: 100-102, 105, 

240-41 

and contracting strategy: 121, 

166-68, 170-71, 201-02, 

206-07,209 

and foreign militar)' sales case: I 95, 

197, 199, 201, 206-07 

and opportunities for small businesses: 102, 166-67, 170-71, 

172-73, 174, 201-02 

relationship wuh Maj. Gen. Kell)•: 

104, 156, 158-59, 166, 176, 180, 

195,206,239-40 

Locher, james R. Il l: 17, 19, 22, 23, 24 

AFTER DESERT SroRM 

Locurcio, Col. Ra lph V.: 38, 93, l05 I 16, 

207,239,240 

and contracting strmcgy: 123-24, 

125,166, 171 

and establishment of Kuwait 

Emergent)' Recovery Office: 

57-62,65-66,67,109 

and facilities for U.S. t\rmy units: 2 17 

and fo reign rnilitmy sales case: 118, 

122, 194-95 

and Kuwait Emergency Recovery 

Office organization: 39, 60-62, 

ll0-17 

and letter of exchange: 146 

and preference for U.S. firms: 121-22 

relationship to Ambassador Gnehm: 

58-59, I 02, 118-19 

relationship with Kuwaiti officials: 

164-65 

relationship with Maj. Gen. l<ell)•: 

158, 159-60, 162, 180, 227 

and repa1rs to mdital')' facilities: 

194-95 

and rep;urs to schools: I 75-76 

and small businrss opportunities: 

171, 173, 175 

Logistics support fo r CCATF: 54 

Luck)' Tac (mobile command post): 54, 63 

Mace!, Col. john: 227 

Mallory. MaJ. Gen. Glynn C..jr.: 26, 63, 

159 

Marine Expeditionary Force, 1st: 63 

~~ n Marietta: 3 l 

Medical care: 47, 77 

Medical Detachmcm, 105th: 89 

Medical evacumion: 89 

Medical personnel: 29, 65, 89-90 

Medical supplies 

assessmcm of: 89 

distribution of: 46-47,65,71, 73 

for emergency relief: 28, 29-30, 31, 

46-47,49,63,65,71,86,97 

looted b)' Iraqis: 89-90 

stockpiled by Kuwait residents: 73 

stockpiling of: 28. 29-30, 31, 46-47 

Mercurio, Col. William: 46 

Middle East Division: 5 

Middleton,joseph: 168 

tvlilitary Airlift Command: 187 
INDEX 

lvlilitary Construction. Army. funds: 

221-22 

1vlilitary intelligence, lack of availabilit)' 

to Kuwait Task Force: 33-34 

Military Intelligence Brigade, 513th: 55 

Military police: 29, 55, 73, 86, 158 

Military Police BaLLalion, 720th: 55, 76 

Military reconstruction program: 191-216 

Mines 

cleared from air bases: 194 

cleared from power-line rights of 

way: 76, 128 

cleared from public buildings: 76, 77, 

150, 152, 153 

cleared from shipping lanes: 135, 149 

in Kuwait City: 71, 76, 77, 109-10, 

149, 150, 152 

in oil fields: 183, 185 

placement of, by Iraqis: 49, 71, 76, 

86 

in water well fields: 83 

Ministry of Defence headquarters building: 192. 195-96, 205 

l'vlinisuy of Planning headquarters building: 168, 180 

Minority-owned businesses: 169-72 

Mitchell, Donald: 241 

tvli'viE Comractors International: 174 

!ohammed A. Kharafi : 126, 140, 142, 

171, 176, 180, 210,219- 20,224, 

230, 232, 234-35 

Mooney, Brig. Gen. Howard: 23-26, 83 

activated: 51 

and CCATF: 51, 53, 63, 65, 77, 

95-96,97 

and Kuwait Task Force: 28, 29, 

32-33,41,46,78 

relationship with Ambassador 

Gnehm: 91 

and Task Force Freedom: 87-88, 

90-91,92-93,96 

Moore, Ronald: 60 

Morrison-Knudson: 210 

Morrison Shand Construction, Ltd.: 172, 

180 

Mosbacher, Robert A.: 121 

Motorola, Inc.: 31, 87, 109, 120-21 

Nation-building activities: 21, 39-40, 

96-97,228,229.238-40,241-42 

National Assembl)' building 

assessment of damage to: 180 

297 

cost of repairs: 180. 229, 232, 234 

damage to: 71, 73, 140, 142 

repairs to: 142, 147, 168, 171, 180, 

181, 229-35 

National Security Council: 8-9 

deput)' secretaries committee: 18, 19 

policy group: 40 

Nmsios, Maj. Andre: 32-33, 89 

New )'orll Times: 7 t 

Noriega, Manuel: 23 

Oberoi Hotel (Dammam, Saudi Arabia): 

41-42, 143 

O'Brien, Goins and Simpson: 183-84 

Office of Management and Budget: 

221-22 

Oil refineries: 183 

Oil well firefighters 

contracts with: 30 

equipment for: 30, 184, 185, 187-88 

logistics support for: 184, 185, 187-88 

shortages of: 185-86 

Oil well fires: 29, 30, 63, 65, 67, 81, 

109-10, 183-90 

Oil wells: 120- 21, 183, 185, 188, 190 

Opermions and Maintenance, Army, 

fund~ 218,221,225 

Operations Management lmernational 

Corporation: 139-40 

Organization of Petroleum Exporting 

Countries (OPEC): 183 

Owen, Michael W: 169 

Page, Robert: 114 

Pagonis, Lt. Gen. 'William "Gus": 46, 53, 

104-05, 218 

Palestinian Liberation Organization: 31 

Palestini<tns in Kuwait: 31-32, 84, 88, 

89,95 

Panama: 23, 29, 57, 96 

Parsons: 30-31 

P<trtnering: 112, 230, 232, 234-35 

Peixouo, Col. David E.: 207, 209, 212, 

214-15,229-30,232,235 

Persian Gulf ConnicL Supplemental 

Authorization and Personnel 

Benel'its 1\cL of 1991 L 69-70, 

22 1-22 
298 

Petroleum engineers: 29 

Plaisance, Russell C.: 16 1, 162 

Plumbing repairs: 74-75 

Police Academy (Kuwaiti): 86-87, 142 

Police cars: 71, 86, 87, 94, 97 

Police departments: 75, 77, 86-87, 94 

Police Special Forces Camp (Kuwaiti): 

142 

Pons 

assessment of damage 10: LlO, 112 

cleared of mines: 76, 149 

cleared of sunken vessels: 71, 135 

damage to: 84, 144 

Kuwait Navy: 193 

repairs to: 94, 125, 126, 135 

Shumba: 71, 76, 84, 94, I 25, 126, 135 

Shuwaikh: 84 

Pouer, Maj . Terry: 45 

Powell , General Colin: 8-9, 24, 41, 50, 

99, 103 

Power dtstribution system: 127 

assessment of damage to: 38, 60, 

128, 129 

contracts for repair of transmission 

lines: 107. 129-30, 132 

damage to: 82-83, 95, 128-30 

repatrs to: 76, 81, 129-30, 135-36, 

145 

sabotaged b)' Iraqis: 82 

Power plants 

Al-Zour: 82-83, 130 

assessment of damage to: 65, 110, 

112, 127-28 

capacity of: 127 

damage 10: 82-83, 130-32 

Doha: 74-75, 82-83, 130-31, 132 

repairs to: 74-75, 130-32 

Shuaiba: 82-83 

Shuwaikh: 82-83 

Prevenuve medicine teams: 65, 80, 83 

Prisoners of war, enemy 

medical care for: 77, 89 

repmriation of: 48 

Project nccounting: 161-62 

Project management S)'Stem: 112, 

114-15, 117 

Psychological Operations Baualion, 8th: 

55 

Ps)•chological ope rat ions experts: 29, 57, 

73 

AFTER DESERT STORM 

Public Authorit)' of Applied Education 

and Training (Kuwait): 14 7 

Public bUildings. See also Ba)•an Palace; 

National Assembly building. 

assessment of damage to: 60, 110, 

112, 14 1-43 

burned : 71, 73, 140, 14 1 

looted: 71, 73, 217 

repairs to: ll5-16, 126, 142-43, 

175, 181,217-26 

rigged for demolition by Iraqis: 110 

used by Task Force Freedom: 63, 74 

Public relations 

and Army Staff: 101-02, 105, 159 

and small business opportunities: 

168-69 

and U.S. Army Corps of Engineers: 

101- 02, 105, 155, 159, 188 

Public service announcements: 73, 87 

Quality assur.mce specialists: 115, 234 

Radio stations: 87, 94-95 

Radio transmissions by psychological 

operations units: 73 

Radios: 87, 109 

Rangel, Charles B.: 169 

R.'ls AI-Qalayah NaY)' Base, Kuwmt 

damage to: 14 3 

repairs to: 193, 194, 195-96, 198, 205 

Ray, Maj. Gen. james W: 36, 38-39, 

121,194-95, 197,200 

Raytheon Services Co.: 125, 136 

Razzak, Bng. Gen. Gahzi Abdul: 198 

Reagan administration: 229 

Red Adair Company: 183-84, 185 

Red Cross: 30 

Red Cross, International Committee of 

the: 52,90 

Refugees: 30 

Reilly, William K.: 189-90 

Reimer, LL Gen. Dennis j.: 39 

Relief organizations: 30, 90 

Relief supplies: 28, 29-30, 46-47, 63, 

65,87-88 

Reservoirs: 77, 138 

Re)•nolds, Tommy E.: 192-93 

Riverdale, Md.: 21, 25, 29 

Riyadh, Saudi Arabia: 5, 33-34, 48, 51, 

101, l04 
INDEX 

Roads 

/\1-Abdaly: 85-86, 133 

1\l-Salmi: 86, 132-33 

assessment of damage to: J 10. I 12 

clearing of: 71. 75, 132-33 

damage to: 66-67, 71, 73, 75, 

85-86, llO, 144 

in Kuwait City: 7 1, 86 

Nuwaisib: 86, 132-33 

repairs to: 73, 75, 94, 125, 126, 

132-33, 135, 181 

Routson, Sam: 17 

Rowen, llenry S.: 17, 18, 20, 22,24 

Ruck, Rear Adm. Merrill W : 19, 25 

Russ•a: 186 

Ruyak,Jim: 210-11 

Sadek, Col. C. H.: 26 

Safety Boss of Calgary: 183-84 

Safwan, Iraq: 90 

Samtary collection: 76, 84 

Sanitallon S)'Stem 

assessment of damage to: 136, 139, 

140 

d~ nage to: 73, 84, 136-37, 139 

repnirs 10: 125, 126, I 39-40, 223 

Santucci, Ceasar: 7, 35, 37 

Satellite transmission systems: 63, 76, 

109, 144, 187-88 

Saudt Arabia: 48, 62, 120, 132-33, 189 

border-crossing problems: 143-44 

nnd CCATF: 52 

Kuwait Emergent)' Recovery Program 

move to: 40-42 

Kuwait Task Force move to: 39-42, 

43, 48 

Kuwaitis in exile in: 9, I 5 

1\limstry of Defense and Avmtion: 5. 35 

U.S. military construction programs 

in: 5. I L, 101, 142 

Saudi armed forces: 48. 63 

Schardein, Brig. Gen. Max L.: 55, 74 

Schools: 71, 73. 95, 140, 1'+7, 175- 76, 

180 

Schwarzkopf, General II. Norman: 8-9, 

25, so. 62, 99, 103, 104. 118 

and Kuwait Task Force: 33, 41 , 

45-46,49 

;~nd prevention of human rights 

abuses: 32 

299 

Sc w;~ zkopf, General II. NormanContinued 

and Task Force Freedom: 54, 93, 94 

Secretary of Defense Representative to 

the reconstruction effort. See Kelly, 

Maj. Gen. Patrick). 

Secmity Assistance Accounting Center: 

202 

Seif Palace: 71, 73, 140 

Sewage pumping facilities: 139-40, 181 

Sewage treallnent plants: 84, 94, 110, 

112, 139-40, 181 

Shaheen, Ibrahim AI-: 34-35, 36, 37, 

47,58, 180,227,241 

and contracting procedures: 38-39 

<IS director of Kuwait Emergency 

Rccovety Program: 67, 107-08, 

165 

and Kuwait Emergency Recover)' 

Office: 119-20, 164-66 

and letter of exchange: 146-4 7 

and preference for U.S. firms: 121-22 

rclmionship with Ambassador 

Gnehm: 118 

and repairs to defense facilities: 

194-95 

and repairs to National Assembly 

building: 232. 234 

and small business opportunities: 

173-74 

and use of Kuwaiti volunteers in 

recovery effort: 116-L 7 

and work agreements: 164- 65 

Shaikha lsa Air Base, Bahrain: 5 

Shand Construction, Ltd.: 126, 137-38, 

139,219 

Shannon, john: 170 

Sharp, Rear Adm. Grant: 32, 45, 48, 

49-50 

Sheehy, Col. Thomas J.: 39 

Ships used to transport water: 83-84 

Shower facilities: 219- 20, 22 1, 223 

u~ti a pon , Kuwait: 7 1, 76, 84, 94, 

125, 126, 135 

Shuwaikh pon, Kuwait: 84 

Signal Battalion, 44th: 76 

Signal Brigade, lith: 55, 76 

Slana, Edward: 240 

Small business opportunities: 237 

ancl 607A og <~ : 167, 169, 172 
300 

Small business opponunities-Commued 

and conu'<lct modifications: 167, 170, 

172- 73,201 

:ts contractor selection criterion: 

171-72, 174,201 

Kuwaiti firms: I 73 

legality of expansion of: I 71, 172 

lists of qualilled potent in I com mctors: 

171, 171, 174 

and members of Congress: 166-67, 

168-70, 173 

seminars on: 174 

set-asides: 171, 172-74,20 1 

liS subcontractors: 168-70, 171, 172, 

173, 174,201 

and Susan lwingswne: 166-67, 

170-7l, 172-73, 201- 02 

Smith, l

0 rederick C.: 19, 20,24- 25 

Sobkc, Maj. Gen. john: 36-37 

Spigclmire, Lt. Gen. Michael F.: 24 

Stanlc)• Consultams, Inc.: 205 

State, U.S. Department of 

and coord inmion of emergency 

response effort: 17-19, 22-23, 39, 

99, 102-03 

and leuer of exch;mge: 146-4 7 

Middle East Division: 16- 17 

Ofrice of Foreign Disaster Assistnnce: 

22,27-28,52 

relations with DOD: 17, 18, 20-21 , 

39-42,99,101-02,146-47, 

155- 56, 228 

Stone, Michnel r. W: 93, 103- 04, 121, 

158, 159, 180.214-15 

Strategy and Plans, Office of the Under 

Secretary of Defense for: 186 

Subhan Industrial Complex, Kuwait 

City: 63,65 

Sullivan, General Gordon R.: 5 

Supplies for emergency relief: 28, 29-30, 

46-47,63,65,87-88 

Support Command, 22d: 46, 55, 76, 83, 

87-88, 93-94, 218-19,224 

Support for Others program: 229 

Syrian anned forces: 63 

Taif, Saudi Arabia: 15, 45, 58 

Takakoshi, William: 170 

Tarbell, David: 186 

AfTER DESERT STORM 

Task Force I reedom: 4, 10, 43, 63, 65, 

66, 67, 69,71-97, 149, 155, 156, 

238, 239 

command and control of: 55 

compos•tion of: 54-55, 57, 73 

damage assessmem survey teams: 

73-74,80 

and food distribution: 88- 89 

logistics support fo r: 54-55, 73, 

76-77,91,95 

medical teams: 89 

mission: 55, 57, 71, 73, 74-75, 

79- 80 

priorities: 79-80,81,84.91 

and public security and safet)•: 86-87 

radio broadcasts: 87 

relationship with Kuwaiti government: 92-93 

and sanit<~r)' system: 84 

and U.S. embassy: 91-92 

Tnsk Force Victory: 2 I 7- l 8 

Telecommunicntions equipment: 76, 87, 

97 

AT&T: 109, 120-21 , 144 

provided b)' U.S. military: 63, 65-66, 

76 

purchased b)' Kuwaitis: 29-30, 31, 

109, 120-21 

Telephone communications: 46, 71, 76, 

94-95, 144-45 

Emerson !llarconi satellite telephones: 

63 

tactical telephones: 65- 66, 109 

Television stations: 87, 94-95 

Tennessee Allll)' National Guard: 86 

"Terms of Reference for U.S. Civil Affmrs 

Assistance to the State of Kuwait" 

(drafL): 18 

Texaco oil fields: 152 

Third U.S. Army: 9, 21-22 

Thon1as, !1-laj. George: 29 

lime magazine: 16 

Tmining 

in civil affairs: 53 

of coahuon troops: 53 

for engineer units: 188 

explosive ordnance disposal: 185 

facilities for: 147, 180, 217,218-19, 

221 ,225-26 

for Kuwmt reconstmction: 53 
INDEX 

Training-Cont inuecl 

of Kuwaiti engineers: 37, 239 

of Kuwaiti police officers: 86-87, 142 

of Kuwaiti volunteers: 37, 116-17, 

239 

in pest control: 87 

Transportation 

airlifts of equipment: 77, 97, 144, 

185, 187-88, 232, 234 

of emergency supplies: 63, 65, 

83-84,87-88 

of equipment for Kuwait Emergency 

Recovery Office: 62 

of !I refighting equipment: 185, 

187-88 

for Task Force Freedom: 55, 77 

of water: 83-84 

Transportation Group, 7th: 55 

Trash collection: 87, 94 

Treasury, U.S. Department of the: 29-30, 

38, 160-61,162,164-65,227 

Trombetta, Maj. Chuck: 52-53 

Truck convoys: 97 

composition of: 66 

identification cards for: 66 

logistics support for: 76 

military escorts for: 76 

problems encountered by: 66-67, 144 

water tankers: 83-84, 91 

Truck drive rs 

contract: 30, 46-47 

guardsmen: 87-88, 97 

reservists: 87- 88, 97 

support fo r: 30 

Syrian: 66 

Trucks 

Army: 4 7 

contracts for: 46- 47, 83-84 

Turkey, water from: 83-84 

Uniforms purchased by l<uwaitis: 29-30 

United Nations Security Council: 9 

U.S. Air Force: 5, 52, 65, 76, 186 

U.S. Army 

civil affairs capability: 16-17,21,240 

as Defense Departmem executive 

agent for Kuwait recovery mission: 10, 27,227 

~Is executive agent for civil affairs on 

the Joim Staff: 21 

301 

U.S. Army-Continued 

General Counsel: 145, 172, 173, 196, 

218 

Judge Advocate: 171 

Operations Center: 63 

use of Operations and Maintenance 

fund~ 218,221,225 

U.S. Army Reserve: 96 

activmi.on of units: 21, 51 

Capstone Operations: 16-17, 21- 22. 

23 

civil affairs capabilities: 240 

maintenance company: 86 

U.S. Army Special Operations 

Command: 24, 29, 55, 77 

U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) 

and 352d Civil Affairs Command: 

21- 22 

Army component of. Sec ARCENT. 

civil affairs annex to operations plan: 

32-33 

planning for civil-military operations 

after liberation: 33-34, 43, 47-49, 

50-51,67,69 

Plans and Policy Directorate: 33, 48, 

50,92 

and potemial for human rights abuses: 32 

and prosecution of the Persian Gulf 

V/ar: 8-9 

and relationship between Task Force 

Freedom and Amb<~ssador 

Gnehm: 91-92 

relationship with DRAO: 158 

relationship with l<uwait Task Force: 

26,33,43-47,48,96 

relationship with Task Force 

Freedom: 55, 57, 63, 92, 95, 96 

representmive for military coordination matters: 99, 104-05, 227 

United States Code 

section 2304: 124, 126 

section 2808: 221-22, 223, 225 

U.S. Congress: 222 

and contractors: 101, ].02 

and foreign military sales case: 146, 

196-97,205-06 

and small business opportunities: 

102.166-67, 168-70, 173, 

174-75,202 
302 

U.S. Embassy in Kuwait 

logistics support for: 76-77 

restomuon of services to: 74-75, 91-92 

U.S. I louse of Representatives 

Appropriations Commiuee: 168-69, 

222 

Armed Services Commiuee: 222 

Subcommiuee on Exports, Tax Policy, 

and Special Problems: 169 

U.S.-Kuwaiti Commiuee on EmergenC)' 

and Recovery Programs: 19, 20 

U.S. Liaison Office, Kuwait: 8, 104, 227 

U.S. Marine Corps: 48, 52, 55 

U.S. Military Suppon Group in Panama: 

57 

U.S. Navy: 52, 186 

and clearing of mines from ports: 76, 

135, 149 

Preventative Medicine Detachment: 

65,80,83 

and transportation of emergency 

relief supplies: 46 

U.S. Senate 

Appropriations Commiuee: 222 

Armed Services Commince: 222 

Commiuec on Small Business: 169 

U.S. steering group commiuee: 19, 20, 

26,33,36-38,44 

U.S. troops 

redeployment of: 4, 75-76, 93-94, 

152,217 

suppon to: 217-26 

Vadlamani, Kesh: 127-28 

Vehicles 

abandoned: 67,85,94 

clearing of wreckage from highways: 

75, 94, 132-33, 135, 181 

clearing of wreckage from Kuwait 

Cit)•: 87, 94, 176 

pollee cars: 86 

purchased by Kuwaius: 29-30, 97, 

120-21 

repaired: 86 

roads blocked by wreckage of: 65, 

66-67 

Vietnam War: 21 

Volunteers, Kuwaiti: 37, 61, 66-67, 112, 

115-17, 158, 239 

Vuono, General Carl E.: 25 

AFTER DESERT STORM 

Walz, Anhur: 27-28, 35, 78 

Wanta, lst Lt. Michael: 86-87 

Warbah: 8 

Ward, Col. Robert: 32, 48, 49 

Waste Management, Inc.: 87 

Water 

for animals: 90-91 

distribution of emergency supplies: 

46-47,65,71,77,83-84,86 

emergency provisions for: 46-47, 49, 

63,65,67, 77,83,97 

for irrigation: 83 

quality: 38 

rationing of: 83, 137-38 

in reservoirs: 83-84, 137, 181 

stockp1hng of: 28, 29-30, 71 

transportation by truck: 30 

from Turkey: 83-84 

Water desalinization facilities. Sec 

Desalinization plants. 

Water distnbution system 

assessment of damage to: 38, 60, 

110, 112, 136-37, 140 

damage to: 73, 83, 84, 136-37 

repairs to: 71, 79-80, 94, 125, 126, 

137-38. 175,181,210,219 

Water wells: 83 

Weber, Mar)•: 136-37 

Werle, LL Col Christopher: 187-88 

Wild 'Nell Control, Inc.: 183-84 

Wiles, Richard: 36-37 

Wilhelm, Brig. Gen. Charles E.: 19, 

24-25 

Wilson, MaJ. Tom: 29, 185 

Winchester, Va.: 36, 61, 101, 109, 123, 

124, 196 

Witherspoon, Brig. Gen. Eugene: 103, 

172-73 

Wood, Ben: 58-59. 117, 240 

Work for Others program: 229 

Yates. Lt. Col. Mark: 57 

Ycosock, Lt. Gen . .John: 9, 104-05 

and Combined Civil Affairs Task 

Force: 5 1. , 53 

and Kuwait Task Force: 34, 44-45, 

46,49 

and Task Force Freedom: 54, 57, 91, 

93-94,95 

Yugoslavia: 193 

PIN : 076818- 000