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v

Strategic Studies Institute

and

U.S. Army War College Press

CORRUPTION, LEGITIMACY, AND STABILITY:

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE U.S. ARMY

Shima D. Keene

June 2017

The views expressed in this report are those of the author and 

do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the 

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copyrighted.
vi

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vii

FOREWORD

The relationship between corruption and stability 

is complex. What is clear is that corruption increases 

the level of instability and the risk of conflict by undermining the legitimacy and credibility of state institutions. For peacekeeping and state-building interventions to be effective, careful consideration must be 

given as to the reason the problem occurs, and to its 

broader impact, as well as ways to manage it.

In this Letort Paper, British academic and practitioner Dr. Shima Keene provides a comprehensive 

assessment of the relationship between corruption, 

legitimacy, and stability in fragile states, and explores what must be done by the U.S. Army to counter these issues that directly impact its operational 

effectiveness.

Dr. Keene is a subject matter expert in the fields 

of asymmetric warfare, counterterrorism (CT), and 

country stabilization. In her current role as Deployable Civilian Expert (DCE) for the United Kingdom 

(UK) Stabilisation Unit (SU) specializing in security 

and justice, she has developed considerable insight 

into the impact of corruption in fragile states, in theaters that include Afghanistan and Iraq.

This Letort Paper explores the subject of corruption as both a cause and effect of poor leadership and 

governance, as well as how Western interventions can 

exacerbate the problem. It suggests ways in which 

these unintended consequences may be mitigated in 

future operations. Dr. Keene also highlights the need 

for anti-corruption measures to be integrated into existing policy and operational procedures, and offers 

insights as to how this could be achieved. 
The Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) considers that 

this Letort Paper provides a useful assessment of the 

key issues relating to corruption, legitimacy, and stability as well as their collective implications for the 

U.S. Army, and makes a valuable contribution to the 

debate on how to plan and shape future U.S. peace 

and stability operations.

 

 DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

 Director

 Strategic Studies Institute and

 U.S. Army War College Press

viii
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ABOUT THE AUTHOR

SHIMA D. KEENE is a British academic and practitioner specializing in defense and security. She is a Director of the Conflict Studies Research Centre, Oxford, 

and a Senior Fellow at the Institute for Statecraft, London. Dr. Keene is also a Deployable Civilian Expert 

(DCE) for the United Kingdom (UK) Government’s 

Civilian Stabilisation Group (CSG), specializing in 

intelligence and security sector reform within the security and justice function of the CSG. She is a former 

Senior Research Fellow and Advisor at the Advanced 

Research and Assessment Group, Defence Academy 

of the UK, and Special Advisor to the UK Ministry of 

Defence (MoD), where she had responsibility for assessment and recommendations for the development 

of financial-counterinsurgency (FIN-COIN) strategies 

in Afghanistan.

Dr. Keene advises and works closely with a number 

of UK government departments and law enforcement 

agencies, to include the MoD, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Department for International Development, and the National Crime Agency, as well as 

a number of regional law enforcement agencies. Outside the UK, Dr. Keene works with international organizations to include: the Organization for Security 

and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the Council of 

Europe, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

(NATO), as well as U.S. Government departments, the 

military, and law enforcement agencies. Dr. Keene has 

27 years of practitioner experience obtained through 

investment banking, defense intelligence, and academia, and is a former British Army reservist soldier 

with 7 years military service, most of which was spent 

with 4th Battalion, the Parachute Regiment.
x

Dr. Keene has published numerous internal and 

external government and corporate reports, as well as 

award-winning academic journal articles, and is the 

author of “Threat Finance: Disconnecting the Lifeline 

of Organized Crime and Terrorism” and a book chapter in the Research Handbook on International Financial 

Crime. She is a visiting lecturer at the BPP Law School, 

London, and the Centre for Development Studies, 

Cambridge University. Dr. Keene holds a Ph.D. in 

international criminal law and an M.Phil. in defence 

and security studies, and graduated with honors in

business studies.
xi

SUMMARY

Corruption increases the level of instability and 

the risk of conflict by undermining the legitimacy and 

credibility of state institutions as well as of peacekeeping and state-building interventions by the international community, to include the U.S. Army. 

Post-conflict states, or states emerging from conflict, 

are particularly vulnerable to corruption, due to the 

lack of good governance infrastructures, which makes 

it difficult to detect, disrupt, or bring about successful 

prosecutions against those who are involved in activities such as bribery, extortion, false accounting, and 

embezzlement. 

Where corruption is rife, it is widely acknowledged 

that funds intended for country stabilization projects 

often do not reach their intended recipients. This, in 

part, is the reason that tackling corruption has become 

a high priority in some post-conflict transitions. In addition, anti-corruption efforts, whether direct or indirect, are seen as having a potentially legitimizing and 

stabilizing effect. However, such measures can only 

be successful if implemented with strong, high-level 

leadership, as corruption has the potential to contribute to legitimacy as well as to erode it. Lack of legitimacy is a common feature of fragile states, which have 

failed to establish good governance.

Poor governance, in turn, results in an environment where corruption and criminality can flourish. 

Corrupt individuals holding senior public roles of 

influence are able to abuse their positions to further 

their own personal goals and accumulate personal 

wealth, to the detriment of the people who they are 

intended to serve. This results in instability through 

the inevitable sense of injustice and desperation that 
develops amongst the citizens of that regime, which 

can drive populations to civil war and leaves citizens 

susceptible to crime and radicalization, both as perpetrators and as victims. 

History has repeatedly illustrated that this problem, if not dealt with effectively, will inevitably lead 

to conflict and instability, not only in the country directly affected, but in the global community, as fragile or failed states become fertile breeding grounds 

for insurgency, terrorism, and organized crime. This 

has direct consequences for the United States both at 

home and abroad. 

For the U.S. Army, the threat of force and the 

ability to use force will always remain an important 

part of the military remit, but there is an increasing 

acknowledgment that such measures must be used as 

a last resort. Consequently, it is appropriate that the 

U.S. Army familiarize itself with alternative measures 

to achieve stability other than force. In tackling corrupt or hostile leadership, there are other effective 

ways in which corrupt leaders can be dealt with, such 

as the confiscation of assets, including funds that are 

the proceeds of bribery. 

As such, it is essential that the U. S. Army develop 

an understanding of the ways in which corrupt leaders exploit funds, as well as the roles that the U.S. 

Government and the international community play 

in bringing such individuals to justice—the threat of 

which in itself can serve as a deterrent to such behavior—or bring individuals who have committed such 

crimes against their own people to justice. In addition, 

it is vital that the U.S. Army appreciates the unintended consequences of international interventions, like 

the mismanagement of international aid and funding, 

which exacerbates bribery and corruption and may do 

more to destabilize, rather than stabilize, a country.

xii
xiii

The answer is to develop an integrated approach 

whereby anti-corruption measures are combined with 

existing policy and operational procedures so that

corruption is not treated as a standalone problem. This 

can only be achieved through developing a contextual understanding of the interconnected challenges 

in relation to corruption, leadership, and stability, as 

well as addressing existing knowledge gaps through 

effective training and education. Furthermore, it is 

essential to implement monitoring and evaluation 

policies to promote a culture of transparency that assists with the prevention of corruption; and that intelligence assessments—to include the use of financial

intelligence—are fully exploited toward that aim.

xv

LIST OF ACRONYMS

AML anti-money laundering

ANP Afghan National Police

CJIATF Combined Joint Interagency Task Force

COIN counterinsurgency

CPS Crown Prosecution Service (United 

Kingdom)

CSG Civilian Stabilisation Group

CT counterterrorism

DCE Deployable Civilian Expert

DoD Department of Defense

EFCC Economic and Financial Crimes 

Commission (Nigeria)

FATF Financial Action Task Force

FinCEN Financial Crimes Enforcement Network

FIN-COIN financial-counterinsurgency

FIU Financial Intelligence Unit

GDP gross domestic product

IMF International Monetary Fund

ISAF International Security Assistance Force

ISIL Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant

ISR Information Submission Reports

JCOA Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis
JIEDAC Joint Improvised Explosive Device 

Analysis Centre

JNAC Joint Narcotics Analysis Centre

MoD Ministry of Defence

MONUSCO United Nations Organization 

Stabilization Mission in the Democratic 

Republic of the Congo

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NCA National Crime Agency

NGO Non-Governmental Organization

OCG organized crime groups

OSCE Organization for Security and 

Co-operation in Europe

PEP politically exposed persons

PoCA Proceeds of Crime Act

PRT Helmand Provincial Reconstruction Team

SAR Suspicious Activity Report

SOP Standard Operating Procedures

SSI Strategic Studies Institute

SU Stabilisation Unit

UK United Kingdom

UN United Nations

UNCAC United Nations Convention against 

Corruption

xvi
xvii

UNDP United Nations Development 

Programme

UNOCI United Nations Operation 

in Côte d’Ivoire

UNTAET United Nations Transitional 

Administration in East Timor

USAWC U.S. Army War College

xvii

1

CORRUPTION, LEGITIMACY, AND STABILITY:

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE U.S. ARMY

INTRODUCTION

Corruption increases the level of instability and 

the risk of conflict by undermining the legitimacy 

and credibility of state institutions, as well as peacekeeping and state-building interventions by the international community, to include the U.S. Army. 

Post-conflict states or states emerging from conflict 

are particularly vulnerable to corruption, due to the 

lack of good governance infrastructures, which makes 

it difficult to detect, disrupt, or bring about successful 

prosecutions against those who are involved in activities such as bribery, extortion, false accounting, and 

embezzlement. History has repeatedly illustrated that 

this problem, if not dealt with effectively, will lead to 

further conflict and instability. This is problematic for 

the country immediately affected, and also has global 

security implications, because a fragile or failed state 

can become a fertile breeding ground for insurgency, 

terrorism, and organized crime. This has direct consequences for the United States, both at home and 

abroad.

Furthermore, there is evidence to suggest that 

corruption undermines interventions by the international community involved in peacekeeping and nation building. Additionally, corruption can increase 

the physical security risk to U.S. Army personnel 

and potentially damage the reputation of the Army 

itself if it is perceived to be working with personnel 

deemed to be corrupt. Consequently, the subject of 

corruption should be a key consideration when attempting to tackle conflict as well as related threats 
2

such as organized crime, insurgency, and terrorism. 

However, corruption is often viewed by the military 

and other stakeholders involved in peacekeeping and 

state-building operations as an unfortunate characteristic of the “local culture” and tolerated as something 

that is too difficult to tackle. Alternatively, too often, 

it is considered to be a specialist topic or a side issue 

outside the immediate objectives of the mission. 

The general neglect of the problem of corruption 

by militaries was evidenced in the 2013 Transparency 

International Government Defence Anti-Corruption Index Report, which found that only Australia, Sweden, 

and Spain provided training in counter corruption for 

commanders at all levels to ensure that they were fully aware of the corruption issues they may face during 

deployment.1 The report also highlighted that two different countries, the United States and Greece, were 

the only ones to have written military doctrine addressing corruption as a strategic issue on operations. 

If achieving stability and security is a top priority for 

any intervention by the international community in an 

unstable or war-torn country, then countering corruption needs to be considered a priority objective by all 

states involved in overseas operations. 

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE U.S. ARMY

In addition to its traditional combat functions, the 

military is increasingly becoming recognized as playing a key role in conflict resolutions as well as immediate post-conflict peacekeeping and state-building interventions.2

 In recent years, peacekeeping operations 

have served as a vehicle for the delivery of wider state 

functions, such as border security and crime fighting, 

as well as a coordination mechanism for other actors, 
3

becoming a focal point for longer-term capacity building. One lesson from previous missions that has been 

repeatedly underscored is the inability to tackle corruption, which is recognized as a central factor undermining international interventions and requires 

immediate attention. 

A case in point is Afghanistan. Since the fall of 

the Taliban in 2001, a considerable investment has 

been made by the United States—including the U.S. 

Army—and its international partners to attempt to 

establish and professionalize Afghan state institutions that are key to delivering and sustaining stability within Afghanistan. To that aim, international 

assistance has been provided to a number of Afghan 

institutions such as the Ministry of Interior, to include 

the police and the judiciary. However, recent research 

shows that widespread corruption, coupled with other challenges, such as the worsening security environment, has seriously undermined these interventions, 

making it highly questionable whether any achievements to date were effective, let alone sustainable. 

Helmand Province in Southern Afghanistan is 

one example of the failure to achieve meaningful 

and sustainable results.3 When American and British 

troops began their withdrawal from the province in 

October 2014, a return to Helmand was considered 

unlikely. However, in February 2016, only 16 months 

after withdrawal, the U.S. Army’s 10th Mountain Division was redeployed as a result of the inability of 

the Afghan army to operate effectively without international assistance.4

 According to Brigadier General 

Charles Cleveland, Chief of Communications for the 

U.S.-led coalition, the deteriorating security situation has led to renewed concerns regarding the threat 

from international terrorism, resulting in the need to 
4

re-establish an international presence in Helmand to 

combat the threat.5 Although, it would not be possible 

to provide definitive comment on the extent to which 

corruption played a role in the resurgence of the most 

recent insecurity, interviews carried out with military 

and civilian personnel involved in the Helmand campaign suggest that corruption played a major role in 

the failure to achieve sustainable stability there.6 This 

most recent development in the deteriorating security 

situation also confirms the concern that lessons were 

not adequately learned from the initial campaign, and 

failure to tackle corruption is likely to result in history repeating itself. This in turn will inevitably result 

in an ongoing need for U.S. military involvement as 

the threat of international terrorism re-emerges in the 

region. 

Outside the Afghan campaign, the impact of corruption on peacekeeping and state-building missions 

is also becoming increasingly relevant to the U.S. 

Army as demand for peacekeeping and stabilization 

missions around the globe continues. Other missions 

requiring international assistance include Somalia, 

Mali, Nigeria, and Ukraine, all of which are affected 

by corruption. It is essential, therefore, that the U.S. 

Army not only understands, but also absorbs, the 

lessons from Afghanistan and other campaigns and 

adapts and applies those lessons to future missions, 

both at strategic and operational levels, in order to 

achieve long-term stability not only for those countries directly affected, but also as part of a global security agenda.
5

CORRUPTION: DEFINITION, PERCEPTION, 

AND SCOPE

Despite the wide use of the term “corruption,” 

there is rarely agreement as to what the word means 

in practice. According to one definition, “corruption,” 

from its Latin root cor, meaning “altogether” and 

rumpere, “break,” suggests that if someone or something is corrupt, they have broken the moral code of 

behavior by performing immoral or illegal acts for personal gain without apology.7

 Corruption can also be 

defined as a deviation of practice or behavior from 

previously established purposes or expectations. However, what constitutes “corruption” in practice varies 

according to cultural perspective. For example, Western cultures would consider the offering, payment or 

receiving of “bribery” money to be corruption, even 

though what may constitute “bribery” differs greatly.8

 At the same time, such activities may be deemed 

perfectly acceptable in other cultures. 

A case in point is the payment of a user fee or gratuity to low-ranking civil servants in Afghanistan. 

According to a report produced by the International 

Security Assistance Force (ISAF), most Afghans consider the practice of baksheesh (a user fee or gratuity 

for services rendered) to be acceptable and justifiable.9

This is because there is a general consensus amongst 

the Afghan people that payment is needed to supplement low wages and because the “beneficiaries of 

‘corruption’ were often not ‘private’ individuals, but 

members of ethnic and/or tribal patronage networks 

who looked upon these payments as providing traditional means for survival.”10 A comparable situation 

pertains to Russia, where anti-corruption programs 

habitually fail, in part because ordinary people see 
6

additional payments or gifts to officials as an essential—in fact, the only—means of inducing them to 

carry out their functions.11

These and other examples of widely varying cultural practices around the world raise the consideration of whether U.S. Army internal policies can be 

adjusted to match local interpretations of corruption 

and to what extent should unacceptable and corrupt 

activities be tolerated or leveraged when operating 

abroad. 

A second consideration is to what extent should 

U.S. military personnel adjust their own behavior with 

respect to actions and customs considered acceptable 

on home soil, but offensive to local populations and 

deemed corrupt according to the host culture. For 

example, a recent report published by Transparency 

International highlighted that Afghans consider managerial incompetence or ineptitude to be corruption.12

One example provided was the waste generated by 

the mismanagement of international contracts, in 

which the hiring of multiple subcontractors for one 

contract led to inefficiencies, resulting in only 5 to 10 

percent of the original contract value being delivered 

on the ground.13 Although subcontracting is entirely 

legal and the West would consider this to be an issue 

of poor performance, not necessarily involving malfeasance, from the Afghan perspective this constitutes 

corruption. This again is something that directly affects the U.S. Army, especially where contractors are 

utilized. Similarly, it is important for the Army—and 

for the Department of Defense (DoD) more broadly—

to ensure effective oversight and to properly manage 

contracts and be directly responsible for the behavior 

and performance of subcontractors in order to protect 

its own reputation as the “owner” of those contracts. 
7

It is also interesting to note that there are over 15 

words for corruption in Dari and Pashtu, the two official languages spoken in Afghanistan.14 This is relevant in that linguistics can provide insights into the 

importance a culture places on certain matters. Generally speaking, the more words there are to describe 

something, the more prevalent that subject is in that 

society. For example, Japan has a deep-rooted shame 

culture and has at least seven words to describe various types of emotions relating to various aspects of 

shameful behavior.15 Similarly, the fact that so many 

words exist for corruption in Dari and Pashtu can 

be seen as indicative of the significance corruption 

has in Afghan society. It also further highlights the 

differences between the Western and Afghan cultures in terms of the perception of what constitutes 

corruption, as well as the complexities associated with 

the issue.16

Despite these differences in attitudes, establishing 

an agreed-upon definition for corruption is the first 

vital step, because without an agreement on exactly 

what the problem is, any measures taken to counter 

it will be ineffective. Nevertheless, it is no surprise 

that there is no universally agreed definition of corruption. According to the World Bank, corruption is 

“the abuse of public office for private gain.”17 This is 

similar to the ISAF definition as “the misuse of positions of power for personal gain.”18 Unfortunately, 

these definitions proved problematic in some countries where the words “abuse” and “private” are often 

not appropriate in this context, as highlighted in the 

aforementioned example of baksheesh in Afghanistan.

As such, this Letort Paper will adopt the definition provided by Transparency International, which 

appears to be the best suited for describing corruption in the context of conflict environments, namely, 
8

“the abuse of entrusted [public or private] power for 

[illegitimate] private [or group] gain.”19 To elaborate 

further, practices that are deemed as corrupt include 

bribery, extortion, mismanagement of public funds, 

stealing by public servants, neglect of duty, causing 

financial loss to the government, making false claims, 

embezzlement of funds, and the abuse of office, such 

as nepotism, forgery, and false accounting in public 

institutions and others.20

The Corruption Cycle.

In attempting to tackle corruption as a means of 

preventing or mitigating conflict, it is important to understand how corruption affects conflict and leads to 

insecurity. However, when examining the relationship 

between corruption and conflict, it is difficult to determine whether corruption leads to conflict, or whether 

corruption occurs as a result of the conflict environment. This is because corruption is both a cause and a 

consequence of conflict. Therefore, the relationship is 

better described as a cycle fueled by a number of factors, such as poor leadership, lack of legitimacy, and 

poor governance. Each of these factors, as well as their 

interrelated nature, needs to be fully appreciated by 

the U.S. Army if its stability deployment missions are 

intended to have longer-lasting effects.

A government with good leadership, deemed to be 

legitimate in the eyes of its citizens and supported by 

good governance structures that operate effectively, is 

able to reduce the incidence of corruption. Although 

corruption cannot be totally eliminated, these positive 

factors can assist in reducing corruption to a manageable level at which conflict and instability may be 

avoided, as illustrated in Figure 1. 
9

Figure 1. Reduced Corruption Risk.

Figure 2, on the other hand, illustrates the opposite 

scenario, in which the combination of negative influences, such as corrupt leadership, lack of legitimacy, 

and poor governance, exacerbates the existing problem of corruption and leads to conflict and instability. 

Figure 2. Elevated Corruption Risk.
10

The linkages between corruption, governance, and 

conflict are interrelated and complex, and, as the drivers of corruption, are capable of increasing or lowering 

corruption risk. The relationship between corruption 

and governance, leadership and legitimacy, respectively, deserves further attention.21

Governance.

Governance has been defined as the manner in 

which power is exercised in the management of a 

country’s economic and social resources for development, or as the exercise of political, economic, and administrative authority in the management of a country’s affairs at all levels, to include the private sector 

and civil society.22 It is a subject highly relevant to the 

U.S. Army not only in terms of the impact of poor governance on the stability of nations, but also because it 

has very real and practical implications for the successful completion of a post-conflict or stabilization 

mission. This is because poor governance structures 

characterized by corruption will undermine any external intervention, including efforts to strengthen the 

capability of the domestic security forces to include 

the army and the police.

Poor governance occurs when the management of 

public resources is inadequate and unable to meet the 

critical needs of the society.23 The key characteristics 

of poor governance are a lack of transparency and accountability, poor legislative oversight, abuse of human rights, societal inequality, and the general absence 

of rule of law. Collectively, poor governance results 

in an environment where corruption and criminality 

can flourish. Corrupt individuals holding senior public roles of influence are able to abuse their positions 
11

to further their own personal goals and accumulate 

personal wealth, to the detriment of the people who 

they are intended to serve. However, the application 

of “good governance” principles can make it more difficult for corruption to take root.24

The importance of establishing effective rule of law 

as a key component of a government’s governance 

infrastructure cannot be overstated. Rule of law is an 

inherently vague term and has no universally agreedupon definition. One interpretation is that everyone 

should be governed by and equal before the law and 

constitution established by the legitimate government 

of the country in which they live, that they enjoy human rights, and that justice is open and accountable 

to independent oversight. Institutions that enable the 

rule of law include law enforcement, the judiciary, 

and the penal system. The term is commonly used 

to describe civil institutions, as opposed to military 

institutions, which generally have their own parallel 

legal systems and institutions. However, in countries 

where the police are heavily militarized, the distinction between civilian and military becomes less clear. 

Without rule of law, corrupt individuals are able 

to enjoy impunity as a consequence of a dysfunctional 

law enforcement and judicial system.25 Where rule of 

law prevails, citizens have equal standing under the 

law regardless of their political affiliation, social status, economic power, or ethnic background. In countries such as Afghanistan, the absence of rule of law 

is almost axiomatic. Afghanistan is a country where 

access to fair, efficient, and transparent justice continues to be limited. Senior judicial appointments are often made based on patronage or payment, as opposed 

to merit or qualification. In addition, formal Afghan 

courts are often difficult to access, especially for peo-
12

ple in the provinces. The courts are widely viewed by 

Afghan citizens as corrupt and lacking efficacy, partly 

because of the time it takes for the system to reach a 

verdict, and even when a verdict is reached, money 

can be paid to overturn the conviction. 

This lack of justice characterized by corrupt practices is exacerbated by the complexity of the Afghan 

justice system, which incorporates hundreds of years 

of informal traditions, Islamic Shari’a law, former Soviet judicial practices introduced during the 1980s, as 

well as various Western influences since the fall of the 

Taliban in 2001.26 Afghanistan’s legal landscape is occupied by three competing sources of law operating 

simultaneously; namely, the formal state legal system 

reflected in various codes and legislation and enforced 

through a system of state courts; the informal customary system based on tribal mediation; and the Taliban 

legal system.27

The various shortfalls in the state system and its 

reputation for being corrupt, slow, and ineffective 

have resulted in continued reliance on the informal 

justice system, including the Taliban system of justice, 

which continues to be a popular system, as it is better 

able to reach verdicts quickly and effectively and is 

believed to be the least corrupt. This is problematic 

for two reasons. First, the punishments passed by the 

Taliban justice system, such as stoning an adulterer 

to death, conflict with commitments to human rights 

under both the Afghan Constitution and international 

law. Second, reliance on this system of justice gives 

the Taliban legitimacy, authority, and power, which 

is detrimental to interventions to counter the Taliban 

insurgency. The latter point is particularly relevant 

to the U.S. Army, whose resources continue to be in 

high demand in the ongoing conflict with the Taliban, 

which has now entered its fifteenth year.28
13

Despite intentions to reduce American military 

personnel on the ground in Afghanistan, former U.S. 

President Barack Obama’s remarks made on May 23, 

2016, with respect to the justification of the drone attacks to eliminate Mullah Mohammed Akhtar Mansour, indicate the trouble the United States has had 

in developing the Afghan security infrastructure to a 

level that it can operate on its own against Taliban attacks.29 If the U.S. Army is serious about tackling the 

threat from the Taliban, it needs to not only focus on 

the combat capability of Afghanistan’s security forces, 

but also consider further the reasons the Taliban is 

able to maintain its power and authority. Part of the 

answer is its ability to deliver better rule of law and 

justice compared to the “legitimate” rule of law infrastructure of the Afghan authorities.

A further problem is that law enforcement in Afghanistan is also riddled with corruption.30 District 

police chiefs, for example, are able to buy their positions for $100,000.31 The Afghan National Police (ANP)

views itself as a military organization and does not see 

itself as a service for the community. It views the local 

population as a target for corruption, from which to 

extract bribery money, as opposed to a community to 

protect.32 It also sees itself as above the law, going unpunished for any crime committed. In an environment 

where human rights abuses are commonplace, this 

causes further resentment amongst Afghan citizens.33

This is particularly problematic in more “traditional” regions, such as Helmand Province, where women 

and children continue to be seen as disposable possessions, and customs that are in serious violation of 

international human rights law continue to be practiced by the police on a regular basis.34 When a state 

institution such as the police, whose notional purpose 
14

is to protect the citizens of its country, is corrupt, it 

inevitably leads to a sense of great injustice and desperation, which in turn fosters instability.

Another important aspect of good governance 

is the ability to manage public administration effectively. Depriving the state of resources through misallocation and corruption weakens the ability of the 

state to provide key public services, such as justice 

and security. For example, if police officers remain 

unpaid or receive inadequate equipment or training 

to carry out their tasks as a result of embezzlement, 

their ability and motivation to serve are likely to decline, directly impacting the security of the state. In 

Afghanistan, such scenarios have led to police officers 

leaving their posts to join the insurgency on economic 

grounds as opposed to on the basis of ideology.35 This 

has had the effect of further exacerbating the security 

situation by tipping the scales in favor of the enemy, 

further hampering the U.S. Army in its fight against 

the insurgency.

Legitimacy.

Poor governance characterized by corruption also 

brings into question the legitimacy of the leadership 

and the regime. It is problematic for the U.S. Army 

on several levels if the political leadership and its regime are considered to be illegitimate by its citizens, 

regardless of how they came to power. First, achieving security and stability requires the support of the 

local populations. It will be difficult to win the hearts 

and minds of local populations if the Army is assisting a political regime that is viewed as “illegitimate” 

in the eyes of its people. In fact, those who resent 

the regime will de facto deem the U.S. Army as the 
15

“enemy.” As such, not only will the Army suffer a lack 

of credibility among local populations, but its actions 

may also come under criticism by American citizens at 

home, who are likely to question why their taxes are 

being spent on supporting a corrupt regime that is not 

viewed by its citizens as a legitimate source of authority. The situation will be further exacerbated as soon 

as the instability results in civilian or military casualties and deaths. 

Corruption also has the ability to undermine the legitimacy of the state, in cases where the government’s 

failure to fulfill its citizens’ expectations increases their 

willingness to violently challenge the existing regime. 

This was witnessed in the Arab Spring, where corruption was a central narrative and addressing it was a 

central demand of protesters.36 The ability of corruption to undermine the legitimacy of the state holds 

true even when the state and its leadership have been 

established through legitimate means. This is because, 

although that government may technically be deemed 

as “legitimate” in the way it came into existence and 

operates according to the laws of that country, several 

other factors may exist that override its legitimacy.37

For example, if there are no laws as to how a government and its leaders are appointed or re-appointed, 

or if the system is so corrupt that electoral procedures 

are deemed meaningless, then the government will 

lack legitimacy.

A legitimate government has justifiable authority 

and power, which enable it to maintain public order, and can exercise moral justification to induce its 

citizens to obey its laws. A corrupt government loses 

legitimacy on the grounds of morality as well as in 

practical terms, as a result of its inability to deliver 

basic services to its citizens. 
16

At the same time, despite the importance of tackling corruption, consideration must be given to the fact 

that attempting to implement anti-corruption measures too aggressively and too quickly may do more 

to erode legitimacy than to contribute to it.38 This is 

especially true when proper governance systems are 

not yet in place that are capable of supporting such 

measures. This is because corruption often permeates not just one single individual or group of individuals, but the entire political network, and taking

apart entire networks can do more harm than good 

because they are a component of the overall system. 

If the problem has become an institutional trait within 

that country, caution needs to be exercised in trying to 

remove it. For example, corruption may have become 

a way of life in many societies, as described in the case 

of Russia above, or may be a necessary evil for survival when the systems, institutions, and processes that 

should protect the safety and well-being of citizens 

are weak or completely lacking.39 Instead, corruption 

needs to be tackled carefully, thoughtfully and over 

time.40 To use a medical analogy: if corruption is a 

cancer affecting a vital organ, then a less immediate 

treatment than excision is required in order to prevent 

the patient from dying. 

Consequently, governments emerging from conflict, along with the international community that 

provides support to those governments (to include 

the U.S. Army), face a major dilemma in deciding the 

approach to be adopted in tackling corruption. The 

dilemma is whether to attempt to increase legitimacy 

by bringing former senior officials involved in crimes 

(like corruption and drug trafficking) to justice, or to 

reinstate these individuals, who have established a 

support network out of concern that removing them 
17

may have a destabilizing effect in that region.41 There 

is also the question, if corruption is to be tackled over 

time in a piecemeal manner, which corrupt individuals 

in positions of power and influence should be tackled 

first. The decision is likely to depend partly on whether there is a suitable candidate to take their place. If 

not, simply removing those individuals is likely to result in instability. Such decisions can be made only if 

there is sufficient intelligence on corrupt networks in 

order to make these assessments. Analysis of this kind 

would require the U.S. military to establish or access 

appropriate resources within the intelligence community, with the ability to make short-, medium-, and 

longer-term impact assessments of the effects of dismantling corruption networks and infrastructures, in 

order to be able to guide military commanders on the 

action they should take in tackling corruption. Given 

the current lack of analysis of corrupt networks, it is 

unsurprising that some consider tolerating corruption 

in the short term an acceptable price to pay for stability over legitimacy.

The problem is that this further encourages a 

short-term approach to tackling the problem. This is 

particularly true in the case of the U.S. Army and other militaries whose units are deployed to countries on 

an annual or 6-month cycle. Commanders are placed 

under enormous pressure to achieve often very unrealistic goals within their tours of duty, as well as to 

make this achievement demonstrable to further their 

careers within the military.42 Since tackling corruption 

requires a long-term sustained effort likely to extend 

over several tours of duty, it is essential that senior 

leadership recognizes this problem and adjusts its 

expectations of commanders accordingly.
18

Corrupt Leadership.

The third factor to be considered in the corruption 

cycle is the matter of national leadership. This issue is 

particularly important for the U.S. Army, as military 

interventions often take the form of action to support 

the current leadership of the country. Corrupt leadership not only will have operational consequences 

for the U.S. Army in terms of that particular mission, 

but is likely to risk wider reputational damage with 

longer-term consequences. Furthermore, if the leaders 

that the U.S. Army is working with emerge as being 

corrupt during a mission, it is important that steps are 

taken to ensure that the problem is recognized and 

addressed in order to protect the Army’s own integrity and reputation. It is therefore essential that U.S. 

military personnel are able to recognize corrupt leadership, and understand the motivations for it, as well 

as to establish Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) 

to ensure that adequate steps are taken to tackle the 

problem.

Corrupt leaders are driven by self-interest and 

motivated by the pursuit of power. Powerful leaders, in turn, seek to obtain even more power. Money 

plays a key role in achieving that power and lifestyle, 

and it is widely recognized that corrupt senior officials throughout the world abuse funds intended for 

the public good. In such cases, there is much that the 

international financial system can achieve in interdicting and confiscating such funds with the cooperation 

of in-country authorities as well as the wider international community, to include law enforcement and the 

judiciary.

One example of the abuse of public funds by a corrupt leader is the case of Pavel Lazarenko, the former 
19

Prime Minister of Ukraine. Lazarenko acquired $20 

million of public funds through theft and extortion 

during his time in office between 1996 and 1997. He 

then laundered the money through U.S. banks in the 

period that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union. 

An American jury convicted Lazarenko in 2004 for 

money laundering and sentenced him to 9 years in 

prison.43 The significance of this case is that this was 

the first time that a senior politician of a foreign jurisdiction was put on trial in a U.S. court for crimes 

committed in his own country. Furthermore, the U.S. 

ruling is believed to have supported Ukraine’s efforts 

to strengthen its own legislation with respect to corruption and money laundering whilst reinforcing a 

strong anti-corruption message in Ukraine.44

Another example is the case of Joshua Dariye, the 

former governor of the Plateau State in Nigeria, who 

was in office between 1999 and 2007. In 2003, a credit 

card fraud investigation in London led by the Metropolitan Police found that Dariye had laundered approximately $5 million through associates and front 

companies, which led to his arrest in 2004. After being released on bail, he fled England and managed to 

avoid arrest as a result of his constitutional immunity. 

However, the British Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) 

filed an international freezing order for his assets outside of Nigeria. Consequently, the Nigerian Economic 

and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), through 

the assistance of the London Metropolitan Police and 

the CPS, was able recover a house and around $8 million from multiple bank accounts in London. When 

Dariye eventually stepped down from office in 2007, 

he lost his political immunity, and the EFCC was finally able to bring about a successful prosecution against 

him in Nigeria.45
20

Other examples of large-scale theft of public resources from developing countries by former leaders 

include Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines, former 

Nigerian President General Sani Abacha, and former 

President Mobuto Sese Seko of Zaire.46 A common 

denominator of these cases is the way in which the 

illicit proceeds of corruption were channeled to bank 

accounts in foreign countries, typically jurisdictions 

with high levels of banking secrecy, and in all cases, 

large amounts of money were recovered after these 

leaders left power. As such, the U.S. Army should 

develop a basic familiarity with money-laundering 

methods as part of its intelligence capability, in order that such activity can be recognized, monitored, 

and interdicted as appropriate, at the earliest possible 

opportunity, and ideally with the cooperation of incountry authorities.

MONEY LAUNDERING

Money laundering is the process by which the existence, illegal source, or illegal application of income is 

concealed and then disguised to make it appear legitimate.47 The money-laundering process is recognized 

as having three stages: “placement,” “layering,” and 

“integration.” In the first stage of “placement,” cash is 

placed into circulation through a number of vehicles, 

including financial institutions, such as banks. Next, 

in the “layering” phase, a complex web of transactions 

is created to enable the disassociation of the funds 

from their illicit source. This can be achieved through 

the creation of “dummy” accounts, multiple transfers, 

and international transfers. Finally, during the “integration” phase, the laundered funds are brought back 

into circulation in the form of clean and often taxable income through methods such as property deal-
21

ing, the use of front companies, false loans, and false 

invoicing.48

However, this model describing the money-laundering process has been criticized by some practitioners who argue that it is misleading from an operational perspective, in that criminals do not necessarily 

follow the steps identified sequentially. As a result, 

the model has been simplified more recently to be described as “raise, move, and store.”49 In terms of the 

specific methods used, the United Kingdom’s (UK) 

National Crime Agency (NCA) describes them as 

falling into one of two broad categories: cash-based 

money laundering or high-end money laundering.50

Cash-based money laundering can occur in several 

ways. One is currency smuggling, which involves the 

physical movement of currency over national borders 

through, for example, the use of cash couriers. This is 

particularly relevant for the U.S. Army and its international partners when operating in conflict environments, as large amounts of cash are easily detectable. 

Any currency transaction reports (CTR) carried out 

should note the presence of large volumes of cash, and 

observations of regular movements of cash transported via vehicle, truck, helicopter or fixed-wing aircraft 

should be collated, identifying the travel origin and 

destination wherever possible. 

Once the money enters jurisdictions where strict 

banking compliance practices exist, other techniques 

to get the cash into the banking system are used. One 

well-known technique is “smurfing,” where cash is 

deposited in random quantities less than the amount 

when reporting is required in that jurisdiction. For example, in the United States, the threshold is $10,000; 

therefore, random amounts of less than $10,000 can 

be deposited into various accounts, including those 
22

held by relatives or friends at many different banks, 

in order to minimize detection. This is where understanding corruption networks becomes particularly 

relevant, as these networks are likely to be utilized for 

money-laundering purposes. In addition, businesses 

with high cash throughput may be used as a cover, 

with payments being broken down even further into 

smaller amounts to avoid detection.51 After all, the 

best place to camouflage “bad” money is with “good” 

money and as such, money launderers often utilize 

cash businesses for this purpose. The key is to determine whether these businesses are proving to be more 

“profitable” than they should be, indicating that additional cash, possibly the proceeds of crime, is being 

added to the takings. 

High-end money laundering, on the other hand, 

usually involves transactions of substantial value, and 

the abuse of the financial sector by so-called “professional enablers.”52 Examples include the use of currency exchanges and securities brokerage houses, 

shell companies, tax havens, and offshore financial 

centers.53 Shell companies are usually non-publicly 

traded corporations, limited liability companies, and 

trusts that typically have no physical presence other 

than a mailing address and generate little to no independent economic value.54 Their purpose is to provide 

opacity in order to confuse even the most dedicated 

and well-resourced investigators and to defeat any 

attempt to reconstruct a money trail. Intelligence 

analysts investigating corruption in particular should 

be alert to the existence and nature of these entities 

and incorporate them into their analysis of networks 

wherever possible.

Another method of laundering money that intelligence officers should consider is the purchase of 
23

assets.55 The criterion is that they must be of high value in relation to bulk, making them physically easy 

to smuggle as well as relatively easy to reconvert into 

cash at the point of destination. Examples include diamonds, gold, precious stamps, and other collectibles. 

High-value assets such as property, vehicles, and 

business assets can also be bought, which can then be 

sold as part of the money-laundering process.56 The financial audit trail can be further obscured when these 

assets are bought in the name of family members or 

companies. The properties have also been known to 

be used as vehicles for money laundering through additional financial arrangements such as mortgages.

Countering Money Laundering.

According to Global Financial Integrity, approximately $1 trillion of illicit funds were estimated to 

have been removed from developing countries between 2002 and 2006.57 A considerable proportion of 

these funds are likely to be the result of corruption 

either directly, as proceeds of bribery, corruption, and 

theft of public funds or indirectly, resulting from willful blindness to crimes including human trafficking, 

narcotics trafficking, or arms trafficking, where both 

senior and junior officials may have played a part in 

allowing crimes to be committed and go unpunished. 

In this context, intelligence analysts trying to piece 

together a money-laundering pattern based on corruption will not be starting from scratch, since there 

is likely to be considerable intelligence captured from 

activities such as narcotics trafficking and arms trafficking. What is required is to bring together these 

strands of available intelligence and re-interpret 

the information from a counter money-laundering 

perspective.
24

In terms of action that could be taken when the proceeds of crime stay within the country of origin and 

circulate within that country, interdiction and seizures 

of these criminal funds through normal legal means 

may prove difficult. This is because fragile states tend 

to suffer poor governance structures and lack effective 

rule of law institutions, which are likely in themselves 

to have been affected by corruption. Nevertheless, 

capturing this information will be invaluable for intelligence analysts, because understanding financial 

flows can be fundamental to understanding key networks and their vulnerabilities. 

Another characteristic of fragile states is the lack of 

a developed economy, making investment and expenditure more difficult. As part of the laundering process, a likely scenario is that the bulk of illicit funds will 

leave that country to make their way to economically 

stable countries where the money can be laundered 

and invested more effectively. For example, for an investor, it is far more prudent to invest in real estate in 

countries where property prices are higher, property 

rights are strong, the value of the property is likely to 

increase, and resale of that property is guaranteed.58

Similarly, the purchase of financial instruments or 

commodities in financial markets where the economy 

is stable provides a greater degree of security for the 

investment.

When illicit financial flows leave the country of 

origin into developed economies such as the United 

States or the United Kingdom, anti-money laundering (AML) interventions by the international community can play a key part in reducing them through 

detection, interdiction, and confiscation. Here, the 

U.S. Army could work with its U.S. and international 

partners in several ways. It could share intelligence on 
25

corrupt networks and suspected money-laundering 

activity. If intelligence analysts are trained appropriately, this could be achieved through sanitized reporting, thus protecting sensitive intelligence, whilst sharing information for the mutual benefit of the whole 

counterterrorism (CT)/counterinsurgency (COIN)/

counter-crime community. As such, the concept of 

“Need to Know” can operate simultaneously with the 

concept of “Need to Share.”

The concept of “Need to Share” has become 

recognized as particularly important within the 

financial community as well as in government 

departments that have set up various intelligence fusion cells in recent years. Initially the concept was met 

with much skepticism and resistance—unsurprisingly, 

as this inevitably involved sharing sensitive information that each party felt could make them more vulnerable to a number of security threats. This concern was 

felt within financial institutions in the private sector 

as well as in government departments. For example, 

private sector organizations were concerned about 

protecting their commercial interests from other similar organizations whom they regarded as competitors 

as opposed to partners. Equally, organizations operating in the public space were concerned about sharing 

sensitive material for fear that the broader significance 

of that information might not be immediately apparent to other stakeholders, therefore remaining open to 

potential abuse. 

Despite these challenges, significant progress has 

been made in recent years to share information to the 

benefit of all stakeholders. Although the use of fusion cells has enabled better cooperation among the 

military, government agencies, and law enforcement, 

meaningful collaboration with the private sector con-
26

tinues to be rare, and the analysis and use of financial 

intelligence is basic at best. This is particularly relevant with respect to financial intelligence, as the AML 

regime globally has been considerably strengthened 

since the 9/11 attacks. This highlighted the importance of considering the financial aspects of terrorism 

as part of the overall CT effort.59

To begin with, private sector organizations such 

as banks, law firms, accountancy firms, and real estate agencies serve as the first line of defense in the 

detection of suspicious funds.60 International AML 

regulations, supported by the Financial Action Task 

Force (FATF) recommendations, stipulate that these 

businesses must become familiar with their customers prior to commencing business with them.61 This is 

referred to as the “Know Your Customer” rule, which 

is the process of basic due diligence to verify the identity of clients. The purpose is to enable businesses to 

effectively manage their money-laundering risks by 

reducing the likelihood that they will take on a client 

who will be using them to launder money. This in turn 

helps organizations manage their regulatory risk by 

ensuring compliance with domestic legislation and 

regulations relating to money-laundering and terrorist finance.62

Additional due diligence is required when dealing with individuals who are considered to be higher 

risk, known as politically exposed persons (PEP). A 

PEP is an individual who is or has been entrusted 

with a prominent function that has the potential to be 

abused for the purpose of laundering illicit funds or 

other predicate offences such as corruption or bribery.63 However, many challenges face the international financial community with respect to PEPs. To 

begin with, there is no universal definition of a PEP. 
27

For example, the FATF explicitly limits PEPs to individuals with prominent functions in a foreign country, while the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) defines PEPs (without employing 

the term itself) as “individuals who are, or have been, 

entrusted with prominent public functions, and their 

family members and close associates,” widening the 

definition to include those close to a prominent official, while leaving open whether these should include 

domestic or foreign officials. A further dilemma is 

deciding how wide the circle of PEPs should be.64

Some jurisdictions restrict the definition to spouses; others to spouses and their children—whilst other 

broader definitions include current and former spouses, their children, as well as their girlfriends or boyfriends.65 One consideration is that, once individuals 

have been identified as a PEP, they retain their PEP 

status, adding considerable burdens on the institutions that need to monitor their financial activity as 

the circle of PEPs grows larger and larger. If this additional monitoring volume resulted in the increase in 

the detection of suspicious transactions, there would 

be justification in adopting the wider definition. However, there is no concrete evidence to suggest that this 

is the case, with some arguing that the wider definition simply leads to data deluge and may have the opposite effect by overburdening the system.66

Regardless of who may or may not constitute a 

PEP, it is a requirement in most jurisdictions that all financial institutions have a system in place to monitor 

financial transactions.67 If there is suspicion about the 

nature of a financial transaction, a Suspicious Activity 

Report (SAR) is required to be submitted to the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) of that country, stipulating whether the transactions represent either potential 
28

money-laundering or terrorist financing activity, and 

stating the reason for the suspicion together with details of any internal investigations carried out to date.68

However, the international AML regime is far 

from being a perfect system. There has been criticism that AML is more about managing regulatory 

risk for financial institutions as opposed to tackling 

the problem of money laundering itself.69 In addition, 

as a result of inadequate cooperation between FIUs, 

law enforcement agencies, and the private sector, data 

captured are not adequately shared or utilized. However, despite these imperfections, one positive aspect 

of the AML regime is that the data have at least been 

captured, and where early detection was missed, these 

can still be used retrospectively to bring about a successful prosecution at a later date. 

One challenge that U.S. Army intelligence officers should be aware of is that financial intelligence 

alone is often insufficient to arouse suspicion. For example, research into the financial transactions of the 

9/11 hijackers in the 6 months leading to the attacks 

highlighted the fact that the financial transactions in 

themselves were unlikely to have indicated impending terrorist activity, even if a better AML regime had 

existed at that time.70

However, when financial intelligence is combined 

with other intelligence, its real usefulness emerges. 

Not only is financial intelligence able to provide evidence that can be presented in an international court 

of law, but analysis also can lead to the discovery of 

networks, and the use of big data is capable of detecting financial flow patterns at a macro level, which can 

reveal new leads for investigations. Consequently, 

better awareness of AML capabilities coupled with 

inter-agency cooperation and improved information 
29

sharing can enable the interdiction of funds flowing 

out of developing countries raised through the proceeds of corruption.

It should also be noted that financial information 

that can then be turned into financial intelligence 

through analysis could be obtained through numerous sources. This is true, not only for “financial” intelligence but for intelligence in general. For example, in 

UK law enforcement agencies, all police officers, and 

police staff submit “intelligence” in the form of Information Submission Reports (ISRs). In other words, 

information collection and submission for intelligence 

purposes is considered the duty of all police officers, 

not just those directly tasked with intelligence duties.71

This is equally true in the U.S. Army, where non-intelligence Soldiers collect raw data, typically during 

patrol. All Soldiers are considered part of the intelligence collection process, especially in light of the past 

decade of COIN lessons learned.72 For example, in the 

U.S. Marines, intelligence collection has been part of 

pre-deployment briefs for infantry units since 2002, 

prior to the invasion of Iraq, where “every Marine was 

considered a collector.”73

Unfortunately, financial information or intelligence is often overlooked, as it has not traditionally 

been part of patrol collection requirements.74 However, if the significance of financial intelligence is fully 

understood in the context of the anti-corruption mission, and the collection of financial information is part 

of the intelligence collection requirements for military 

personnel on patrol, then it is likely that highly relevant information can be captured.

It is worth noting that channels of communication on financial intelligence between the military and 

other agencies, the private sector, and the judiciary are 
30

generally deficient or poor at best. This is because the 

organizations involved with financial intelligence are 

not aware of how useful and relevant military intelligence can be, and equally, the military are not aware 

of the organizations and capabilities that are potentially available to them. Military commanders and 

their intelligence analysts at all levels should be aware 

of this potential, and seek to develop ways in which 

financial intelligence can be shared and nurtured to 

the benefit of all stakeholders involved in tackling corruption networks. Platoon- and company-level commanders, in addition to their S-2/G-2 colleagues (as 

lieutenants and captains), may be some of the more 

suitable individuals to take the initiative and develop 

information-sharing suggestions and identify local 

financial intelligence sources. In addition, it is worth 

noting that new leads often come from the junior enlisted, who are often the most tactically engaged in data 

aggregation.

IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL 

AID ON CORRUPTION

There has been a general tendency not only for the 

U.S. Army but also the West in general to adopt a onesided narrative blaming corruption on local culture. 

Afghanistan is a case in point: “corruption” within 

Afghanistan is identified as the reason so many international stabilization interventions have to date been 

unsuccessful.75 However, it is interesting to note that 

most Afghans tend to think of corruption as a relatively new problem for their country, introduced in 

2001 when international troops arrived in the country. 

They believe that corruption evolved progressively 

since that time, driven by international aid. Many in 
31

the international community also agree that it was 

the sustained volume of mismanaged international 

funding that has created a new culture of corruption 

in Afghanistan, which has since become an epidemic.76 According to recent Transparency International 

reporting: 

20 years ago corruption was a shame among Afghans. 

If you were corrupt, your life was hell because people 

would stop talking to you. And now that’s completely 

changed. A new culture has risen: if you’re not corrupt, people think you’re stupid.77

There is a broad body of evidence to suggest that aid 

can distort the economies of conflict-affected countries, especially if the volume of funding exceeds the 

country’s capacity to absorb these funds, fueling rentseeking and providing incentives for corruption in the 

process.78 Karl Eikenberry, former Commander of the 

U.S.-led Coalition Forces in Afghanistan and former 

U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan, has acknowledged 

this problem:

The net result of our well-intentioned efforts is that the international and national development agencies, along with 

the NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] and US 

military forces, flooded Afghanistan with cash to such an 

extent that efforts to build accountable institutions suffered

[italics in original].79

In the case of Afghanistan, the sums of money 

flowing into Afghanistan have been extremely large. 

Total U.S. spending since 2001 has exceeded $760 billion, which included approximately $104 billion in 

reconstruction funding up to mid-2014.80 However, 

the inability of post-conflict countries to absorb the 
32

sheer volume of incoming financial flows is not a new 

problem, nor an issue that is unique to Afghanistan.81

Peacekeeping and country stabilization operations 

are inevitably accompanied by large amounts of aid 

and financial assistance, while the lack of local infrastructure and economy make it difficult to spend the 

money in country. Liberia is another example where 

aid and other financial contributions, such as security 

expenditures by foreign militaries, have exceeded the 

local gross domestic product (GDP) by multiples. The 

inability to absorb funding is often exacerbated by the 

need to disburse funds quickly in order to address 

emergency situations, or achieve highly visible “quick 

wins” through rapid impact projects, and to proceed 

without robust procurement and auditing procedures. 

For example, there has been wide criticism of the 

tendency for the international community, in particular the United States, to prioritize the speed and scale 

of the disbursement of funds over the achievement 

of concrete project goals. In fact, recent research has 

shown that many projects were implemented without 

adequate consideration of local concerns or the potential impact on similar projects already in operation 

by other donors from the international community. 

Instead, many of the projects were considered to be 

“throwing” funding at a project as a way to demonstrate commitment without giving adequate consideration to the effectiveness or impact of the project. 

Consequently, the desire to be seen as “doing” overrode many other concerns, including accountability 

and corruption.82
33

Mismanagement of International Aid and Funding.

Evidence from stabilization and peacekeeping operations suggest that international interventions and 

aid can develop and exacerbate the problem of corruption if not managed effectively.83 This is relevant 

to the U.S. Army because it may not be aware that 

well-intended actions may in fact create and worsen 

the problem of corruption, which may hinder future 

efforts. In the case of Afghanistan, problems relating 

to corruption were manifested at operational levels 

during the early stages of the intervention as a consequence of a lack of control over early inflow of funds. 

According to one senior policymaker interviewed by 

Transparency International:

Much of the corruption was introduced by some elements of the very poorly planned aid response and 

the flood of unaccountable money through multiple 

channels.84

In addition to the sheer volume of money entering Afghanistan, pressure from international donors 

to deliver results within a short time frame resulted in 

a climate of perverse spending.85 For example, in April 

2013, it was reported in “International Policy Maker” 

that the heads of the United Nations (UN) agencies 

on the ground were given 10 days to write $2.7 billion 

worth of projects.86 One consequence was that much 

of the work was outsourced to external contractors, as 

governments lacked the capacity to deliver the projects internally. The use of external contractors in itself 

is not a problem. However, a general lack of coordinated planning and management led to the creation 

of numerous opaque deals, with minimal monitor-
34

ing and evaluation. As both local and international 

individuals and institutions profited quickly in an 

environment of fast-moving deals and general lack of 

transparency, coupled with the absence of corruptionreducing measures, these factors combined to encourage a climate of corruption. 

Absence of central coordination of effort adds to 

the confusion. This is particularly problematic, given 

the number of international donors and agencies routinely operating in the same space, to include the U.S. 

Army. The situation is further exacerbated by the fact 

that if a state is considered to be incapable of self-management, as well as being generally corrupt, most aid 

and interventions will bypass it.87 The understandable 

concern of most donor countries is that if aid is given 

directly to the state, the money will be mismanaged or 

stolen rather than being used for its intended purpose. 

Consequently, donors prefer to provide funding off 

budget to ensure better control of their investments.

However, this approach has two problems.

First, bypassing the state is often found to further 

weaken state authority, which directly contradicts 

the purpose of funding intended to put governance 

measures in place to strengthen the state and give it 

legitimacy. Research into the impact of aid and informal social service delivery by Non-Governmental 

Organizations (NGOs) or communities at a local level 

has shown that this often revives and reinforces the 

patronage power of local elites, who become the gatekeepers to aid and services.88 Notably, the way that 

the 2002 Loya Jirga (grand assembly) was run in Afghanistan was denounced as “throwing money . . . at 

corrupt and predatory local actors.”89 This situation 

was compounded when no steps were taken to rein 

in the warlords, and consequently their power and 
35

influence grew, further exacerbating corruption as 

well as bringing further security concerns.

The second problem is that direct delivery of aid 

and interventions (i.e., bypassing the state) does not 

necessarily result in successful delivery of projects free 

from corruption. Indeed, there is an internal dimension to corruption risks that must also be considered.

Despite the expectation of peacekeeping and statebuilding missions to be conducted with integrity, 

the record is replete with instances where they have 

directly contributed to increased corruption levels either by the misdeeds of a few individuals or a failure 

to understand the consequences of not tackling corruption. In the case of the military involved in peacekeeping operations, there is potential for corruption 

in financing troops and equipment, which often lacks 

effective oversight. As such, it is likely that U.S. Army 

commanders will need to be extra vigilant and have 

oversight structures in place to ensure that equipment 

and money are used by in-country troops as intended 

by donors.

The areas that require particular attention in terms 

of corruption risk are theft, fraud, and waste, especially in relation to external contracting. Many cases of 

theft from within peacekeeping missions involve saleable commodities, such as food and fuel. For example, fuel mismanagement, theft, and fraud have been 

found across a number of UN peacekeeping missions, 

including UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI), 

UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), and UN Organization Stabilization Mission in 

the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO).90

Resulting from inadequate supervision and poor record-keeping, several cases of large-scale theft by local 

and/or UN staff, and collusion with nationals to sell 
36

the goods to local markets, have been reported. Fraud 

and waste is another significant issue. For example, 

according to the Commission on Wartime Contracting, “at least $31 billion, and possibly as much as $60 

billion” of U.S. funds were lost because of contracting waste and fraud in Afghanistan and Iraq between 

financial years 2002 and 2011.91

These are not new problems; the challenges were 

familiar from earlier interventions. Consequently, 

better measures should have been in place to ensure 

that all funding included proper conditionality and 

much-tighter oversight of disbursement. However, 

this oversight and effective management of funds and 

assets continue to be lacking. As peacekeeping operations are large consumers of international funds, they 

can unintentionally fuel and entrench corruption in 

fragile and conflict-affected environments.92 Since corruption is likely to account for a larger proportion of 

illicit flows coming out of the least developed countries, which are dependent on aid, it is of paramount 

importance that the dual internal-external nature of 

corruption threats to missions—which are a function 

of local conditions and the impact of international actors—are acknowledged and tackled.93

HOW CORRUPTION FUELS CONFLICT 

AND INSTABILITY

The main reason for the U.S. Army to engage with 

peacekeeping operations and state-building missions 

is to encourage peace and bring stability to the region 

it has been tasked to assist. As such, it is essential the 

the U.S. Army is aware of factors that will undermine 

this mission—such as corruption. Yet, systematic evidence of the impact of aid on corruption is lacking. 
37

This is partly because of the unavailability of reliable 

data, especially in conflict-affected countries, but also 

because of the challenges of measuring corruption in 

a meaningful way. However, there is evidence to suggest corruption fuels conflict and instability. As highlighted above, the relationship between corruption 

and conflict is symbiotic in that corruption increases 

the risk of conflict and, in turn, conflict increases the 

risk of corruption. Together, this relationship threatens peace and stability in states already besieged by 

violence. Corruption-fueled conflict and instability 

that the U.S military should be aware of is discussed 

next in several ways.

Social Grievances.

Corruption often leads to a sense of inequality 

and injustice as a result of discrimination felt by individuals and groups who are excluded from the elite 

who benefit from it. In addition, corruption distorts 

government decisions and undermines the provision 

of public services such as education and healthcare.94

This in turn can drive populations to civil war, as well 

as leave them susceptible to crime and radicalization, 

both as perpetrators and as victims. 

Rents.

“Rents” refer to incomes that are higher than 

would otherwise have been earned.95 The rent-seeking 

opportunities that come with corruption can provide 

incentives for violent conflict as those excluded from 

power and rents use violence to seek access and control over these opportunities.96 This is especially true 

in countries that are resource-rich.97 If corruption has 
38

transformed the state from a set of institutions providing public goods into a set of institutions to be exploited for private gain, the state becomes a prize to 

be fought over.

Criminality.

The relationship between corruption and organized crime is symbiotic. Criminal entities use a combination of violence, intimidation through the threat 

of violence, and corruption to establish control. Organized crime groups (OCG) take advantage of corruption, whilst corrupt officials also benefit from OCGs by 

maintaining their personal position of power as well 

as financially in the form of kickbacks. In some cases, 

“political patronage” creates a vertical system of corruption that functions from top to bottom in all public 

institutions, to include politicians, government administative agencies, and judiciary and law enforcement 

agencies.98

Corruption also facilitates the operation of illegal 

markets such as narcotics, extortion, and human trafficking. This is particularly the case for fragile states, 

which lack stable markets where transactions are organized according to entrenched rules and order is 

maintained through strong leadership, hierarchy, and 

authority.99 In unstable markets, disputes over the control of territory and markets are likely to result in the 

use of violence by the criminal organizations in competition. In certain drug markets, for example, sudden 

changes in demand and supply for a drug can create 

instability between the organizations involved in the 

drug trade and, consequently, increase the chances of 

violence. Organized crime enables conflict, and the illicit sources of funding derived from the proceeds of 

crime extend the duration of conflicts.100
39

Insurgency.

Corruption can fuel insurgency in several ways.

First, if money intended to be used to pay the salaries of soldiers or police officers is siphoned off by 

their corrupt leaders, those men will not be paid and 

will be unable to feed themselves or their families. 

One consequence is that they will leave their post to 

join the local insurgency based purely on economic, 

as opposed to ideological, grounds. As such, the 

men who were meant to be fighting the insurgency 

switch sides to become the enemy, further adding 

pressure on national and international security forces. 

In Afghanistan, where this has been a common occurrence, recent interventions have included the deployment of UK Technical Advisors for the purpose 

of ensuring that each police officer is identified and 

paid directly to prevent this. Second, corrupt activities can fund insurgencies directly, which then can 

fuel instability as well as pose direct physical threats 

to peacekeeping troops on the ground.101 Third, an 

insurgency leader, through effective information 

operations aimed at winning over the population as 

well as external supporters, can exploit moral outrage over corrupt practices by the state to support the 

insurgency.102

Terrorism.

There is a substantial body of terrorism research 

demonstrating how individuals become radicalized as 

a result of a sense of injustice.103 Corruption augments 

this sense of injustice and may consequently contribute to radicalization. Once part of a terrorist organization, terrorists may finance themselves through crimi-
40

nal activities facilitated by corruption. Alternatively, 

the terrorist organization may have linkages with 

OCGs, where corruption is used to further criminal 

activities. Evidence with respect to the financing of the 

Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), for example, 

highlights the fact that terrorist groups continue to depend on illicit networks and appropriate their tactics 

to help finance their operations.104 According to the 

FATF, ISIL:

manages a sophisticated extortion racket by robbing, 

looting, and demanding a portion of the economic resources in areas where it operates, which is similar to 

how some organized crime groups [and nonstate conflict actors] generate funds. This vast range of extortion, including everything from fuel and vehicle taxes 

to school fees for children, is done under the auspices 

of providing notional services or protection.105

UNDERSTANDING THE CHALLENGES

Numerous challenges exist in tackling corruption. 

These challenges need to be understood by the U.S. 

Army and its partners so that appropriate action can be 

taken to amend existing policies and practices and incorporate effective anti-corruption measures in existing and future operations. In addition, there is a need 

to raise awareness of the issues relating to corruption 

and its impact on wider peacekeeping missions and 

state-building interventions in order to be able to better manage the expectations of future missions. 
41

Short-Term Stabilization Effect.

Corruption undermines the long-term goals of 

peacebuilding, but at the same time, it has the potential 

to help stabilize post-conflict situations in the short- to 

medium-term.106 This paradox makes it very difficult 

for peacebuilding actors to devise anti-corruption 

policies that will not backfire and contribute to more 

violence in the years immediately after the conflict.107

Increase in Short-Term Instability.

Anti-corruption interventions in the immediate 

short term can have negative side effects. In Afghanistan, for example, interventions aimed at stemming 

corruption associated with the production and trade 

of opium controlled by local warlords led to an immediate increase in violence.108 This is particularly 

problematic for commanders, who are typically in 

post for a year, because there is considerable pressure to achieve visible results, which may be unrealistic, especially during the period of a single mission/

deployment.109

Conflict of Interest.

Where anti-corruption measures exist as part of 

the overall peacekeeping and stabilization program, 

stabilization advisers and peacekeeping missions are 

likely to be forced into a conflict of interest in that they 

are forced to work with corrupt regimes, since removing those regimes outright would do greater harm and 

risk the collapse of the entire regime.
42

Political Support.

Eliminating corruption requires genuine political 

buy-in driven by top leadership, extending throughout the entire political elite and down to the grass roots 

level of society. This can be difficult if corruption has 

become an institutionalized practice. Even where the 

leadership is committed to tackling corruption, it is 

likely to be confronted with considerable resistance. It 

is highly unlikely that progress can be made quickly, 

with positive results unlikely to be evident until the 

next generation.

Economic Dependence.

The political elite are the main beneficiaries of corruption and are likely to be receiving payments that 

they should not be getting, driven by greed as a result of corrupt practices. At the same time, many officials at the grass-roots level receive low rates of pay. 

To make matters worse, even those payments may be 

inconsistent, especially when senior officials siphon 

off payments intended for lower-ranking officers. As 

such, corrupt payments are needed to supplement 

salaries in order to be able to provide basic economic 

support for themselves and their families. 

Lack of Rule of Law.

There is no internally recognized court in international criminal law, except for crimes committed 

against international humanitarian law, making the 

prosecution of corrupt officials difficult, especially 

when they cannot be prosecuted domestically due to 

the corruption in the judicial system. 
43

Short-Term Strategy.

The problem of corruption cannot be resolved 

overnight. Nevertheless, there is a tendency for peacekeeping missions to consider short-term gains in the 

quickest possible timeframe. Unfortunately, shortterm strategies for a long-term problem never work. 

Lack of Continuation of Missions.

Due to the long-term nature of the problem, anticorruption measures will be an ongoing issue that 

needs to be handed over to successive missions. 

However, research has repeatedly shown that the continuity between missions necessary to achieve longerterm objectives is absent.110

CONCLUSION—CORRUPTION AND STABILITY

The relationship between corruption and stability 

is complex. It is often difficult to establish whether unstable environments result in corrupt regimes or vice 

versa, as corruption is both a cause and an effect. In 

addition, the perception of what constitutes corruption will differ from country to country. As such, there 

cannot be a single universal resolution to tackling the 

problem. Instead, assessments need to be made on a 

case-by-case basis to determine the best way of implementing anti-corruption measures. 

Furthermore, an understanding of the requirement 

for delicacy and circumspection in tackling corruption is essential. Peacekeeping forces have to balance 

a number of competing goals and objectives. An overaggressive implementation of anti-corruption measures carried out in haste is likely to do more harm 
44

to stability—making careful consideration of whom to 

target and how, a must. There may be no option but to 

work with local actors involved in corruption in order 

to help stabilize a particular region. However, what 

is important is to discard the existing paradigm that 

corruption is somehow an inevitable part of the context in which peacekeeping missions must operate, as 

those beliefs will be counterproductive to the longerterm objectives of the missions. 

In many ways, the relationship between corruption 

and instability is not only symbiotic, but also multidimensional. Positive factors such as good governance, 

establishment of effective rule of law institutions and 

practice, as well as good leadership will have the effect of negating corruption. On the other hand, poor 

governance and corrupt leadership will have the opposite effect and exacerbates the problem, ultimately 

leading to instability and the need for further international interventions. The following recommendations 

are designed to help commanders and policymakers 

avoid this eventuality. 

RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendation 1: Develop an Integrated 

Approach.

Develop an integrated approach whereby anti-corruption considerations and measures are integrated 

into existing policy and operational procedures, and 

not treated as a standalone problem. Approach the 

subject in a multidisciplinary manner to ensure that as 

many “solutions” as possible are considered.
45

Recommendation 2: Develop Contextual 

Understanding.

Assess how and why corrupt leadership and poor 

governance can lead to conflict and instability, and 

their impact on wider global security. Also, develop 

an appreciation of the broader political agenda and 

the work of partner agencies in the field of anti-corruption, which have direct relevance to U.S. peacekeeping operations.

Recommendation 3: Address Knowledge Gaps.

Highlight knowledge gaps that must be filled in 

order to be able to make an accurate assessment of the 

success/failure of existing measures to counter the 

threat. Consider also how anti-corruption efforts, direct or indirect, can have a legitimizing and stabilizing 

effect. 

Recommendation 4: Prepare for Unintended 

Consequences.

Develop awareness of the possible side effects of 

existing countermeasures to tackle corruption, which 

may be counterproductive in protecting U.S. national 

security interests in the medium to long term.

Recommendation 5: Training and Education.

Enable personnel at all levels to develop a deeper 

understanding of corruption and its impact on peacekeeping missions as well as on broader security implications through operationally relevant training and 

education. 
46

Recommendation 6: Exercise Diplomacy.

Exercise particular caution when working with officials from corrupt governments and be fully aware 

of the implications and power balances at play when 

tackling corruption. 

Recommendation 7: Achieve Transparency Through 

Monitoring and Evaluation.

Encourage the implementation of monitoring and 

evaluation policies where possible to promote a culture of transparency that will assist in the prevention 

of corruption. This is of particular importance when 

outsourcing projects to external contractors.

Recommendation 8: Intelligence Assessments.

Ensure that corruption is addressed as a key 

component of security risk assessments. Increase the 

number of personnel assigned to examine elements of 

corrupt networks and their operations. Areas of focus 

should include network structures, facilitators, preferred sources of revenue, patterns of life, protection 

mechanisms, and vulnerabilities.

Recommendation 9: Financial Intelligence.

Design and develop intelligence collection requirements aimed at filling existing knowledge gaps in 

corrupt networks, in order to leverage financial intelligence to support the broader intelligence picture on 

networks sustained by corruption. 
47

Recommendation 10: Know the Global 

Financial System.

Be aware of the global system that exists to combat 

threat finance, and take full advantage of the different 

authorities that monitor potentially suspicious financial transactions, especially with respect to PEPs. 

ENDNOTES

1. Robert Bosch Stiftung, “Corruption as a Threat to Stability 

and Peace,” Berlin, DE: Transparency International Deutschland 

e.V., February 2014, p. 7.

2. Transparency International, “Defence Corruption: Why it 

matters,” available from ti-defence.org/defence-corruption/?id=239, 

accessed January 24, 2016.

3. Alexander Powell, Larry Lewis, Catherine Norman and Jerry Meyerle, “U.S.-UK Integration in Helmand,” Occasional Papers, 

Arlington, VA: CNA Corporation, February 2016.

4. Tim Craig, “U.S. troops are back in restive Afghan province, a year after withdrawal,” The Washington Post, April 8, 2016.

5. These concerns are based on recent observations highlighting renewed linkages between al-Qaeda and the Taliban’s new 

leader, Akhtar Mohammad Mansour, as well as the Haqqani 

network.

6. Interviews conducted by the author between April and May 

2016 with former military and civilian personnel deployed to the 

Helmand Province of Afghanistan between 2004 and 2013 to include: Tim Gurney OBE, former Stabilization Advisor, Helmand 

Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT); Anthony Fitzherbert OBE, 

Director of Afghan Aid, and former Ministerial Adviser, Kabul;

Justice Advisor, Stabilisation Unit (SU) Rule of Law Team, Helmand PRT; and Commander (Rtd.) Steve Tatham, Royal Navy, 

the former Commanding Officer of 15 (UK) Psychological Operations Group from 2010-2013.
48

7. Richard Lotspeich and Eric Lutz, “Economic Analysis of 

Persistent Civil Conflict: Violence, Corruption and Rent-Seeking,” 

Working Paper Draft, Terre Haute, Indiana: Indiana State University, December 2015, available from contests-conference-2016.

qut.edu.au/documents/Lotspeich-WP-EAPCC.pdf, accessed April 24,

2016.

8. Discussions with anti-corruption experts, international 

law enforcement, and judiciary from countries to include: the 

United States, the United Kingdom, Brazil, and Nigeria, see 

“WORKSHOP 16 Specialised workshop organised on the prevention and control of corruption,” held September 7, 2014, at the 

Thirty-Second International Symposium on Economic Crime, “Information—Shield, Sword and Achilles Heel in the fight against 

economic crime?” Jesus College, Cambridge, UK.

9. “Foghorn Wave 16 Survey Report,” International Security 

Assistance Force (ISAF), October 2013, p. 18.

10. Major General Ricky Waddell, USA, former Combined 

Joint Interagency Task Force (CJIATF)—Shafafiyat commander, 

quoted in “Operationalizing Counter/Anti-Corruption Study,” 

Suffolk, VA: Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis (JCOA), 

Joint Staff J-7, February 28, 2014, p. 3, available from https://www.

hsdl.org/?view&did=756004.

11. As explored in detail in Keir Giles, “Moscow Rules,” Chatham House forthcoming publication.

12. Mark Pyman, “Corruption: Lessons from the international 

mission in Afghanistan,” Defence & Security Programme Report, 

London, UK: Transparency International, February 2015, p. 24.

13. Ibid.

14. Ibid.

15. Stephen Pattison, “Shame: Theory, Therapy, Theology,” 

Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2000; also, see “Behind the Paper Screen: Japan’s Culture of Shame,” The Daily Yomiuri, May 18, 2006. The Japanese words for shame include “fumeiyo,” “haji,” “shuuchishin,” “zan-nen,” “hazukashii,” “chijoku,” 
49

and “mottainai,” which express different individual emotional 

states of shame that cannot be expressed in the English language.

16. For more on the importance of linguistics in avoiding cultural clash, see Steve Tatham and Keir Giles, “Training Humans 

for the Human Domain,” Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army 

War College, November 2015, available from ssi.armywarcollege.

edu/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1294, accessed June 22, 2016.

17. World Bank website, available from www.worldbank.org, 

accessed November 8, 2015.

18. “Operationalizing Counter/Anti-Corruption Study.”

19. Transparency International, “FAQs on corruption,” available from www.transparency.org/whoweare/organisation/faqs_on_

corruption/2/, accessed November 8, 2015.

20. Robert Umutoniwawo, “Impact of Corruption on Democratic Governance in Africa: The Case of Central Africa,” presented at the International Conference on Democratic Governance: 

Challenges in Africa and Asia, in Philadelphia, PA, August 7-9, 

2012.

21. “Governance, Corruption, and Conflict,” Study Guide Series on Peace and Conflict, Washington, DC: United States Institute 

of Peace, 2010, p. 7.

22. David Dollar and Lant Pritchett, “Assessing Aid: What 

Works, What Doesn’t and Why,” World Bank Policy Research Report, New York: Oxford University Press, 1998; United Nations 

Development Programme (UNDP), “Governance for Sustainable 

Human Development: A UNDP Policy Document,” New York: 

United Nations Development Programme, 1997.

23. Samson Kassahun, “Good Governance: An Antidote to 

Corruption in Africa,” Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa, 

Vol. 13, No. 5, 2011.

24. “Governance, Corruption, and Conflict,” p. 11.

25. Integrity Watch Afghanistan and Transparency International, “National Integrity System Assessment: Afghanistan 
50

2015,” New York: United Nations Development Programme, 

2016, p. 15.

26. Naina Patel, “Building the Rule of Law in Helmand: Testing the Bingham Principles,” Bingham Centre Working Paper No 

2014/05, London, UK: Bingham Centre for the Rule of Law, 2014.

27. Interview by the author with Professor Fletcher Baldwin, 

Professor of Law, University of Florida, conducted on April 7, 

2016.

28. Paul D. Shinkman, “The Coming Changes to the Afghan 

War,” U.S. News & World Report, May 23, 2016. 

29. See video footage of former U.S. President Barack 

Obama’s speech on May 23, 2016, in Hanoi, Vietnam, available from www.nytimes.com/2016/05/24/world/asia/obama-mullahmansour-taliban-killed.html?_r=0, accessed June 21, 2016: 

He [Mullah Mansour] is an individual who as head of the 

Taliban was specifically targeting U.S. personnel and troops 

inside of Afghanistan who are there as part of the mission I 

have set to be able to maintain a counterterrorism [CT] platform and provide assistance . . . we’re going to protect our 

people.

President Obama also referred to the killing as “an important 

milestone,” and said the United States had “removed the leader 

of an organization that has continued to plot against and unleash 

attacks on American and Coalition forces,” see “Statement by the 

President on the Death of Taliban Leader Mansur,” Washington, DC: Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, May 23, 

2016, available from https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-pressoffice/2016/05/23/statement-president-death-taliban-leader-mansur.

30. Interviews conducted by the author with British Embassy Kabul, Afghanistan staff, former Police Advisor (ISAF), and 

Head of Police Reform European Union Police Mission (EUPOL) 

between February and March 2016.

31. Pyman, p. 15.
51

32. Interviews conducted by the author with former Heads of 

Rule of Law, Embassy of United Kingdom in Kabul, Afghanistan, 

from February to March 2016. 

33. Interview conducted by the author with Anthony Fitzherbert OBE, Director of Afghan Aid, and former Ministerial 

Adviser, Kabul, April 3, 2016.

34. Interviews conducted by the author with Commander

(Rtd.) Steve Tatham, Royal Navy, the former Commanding Officer of 15 (UK) Psychological Operations Group from 2010-2013

and Tim Gurney OBE, former Stabilization Advisor, Helmand 

Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT), in April 2016. 

35. Interviews conducted by the author with former Director, 

Joint Narcotics Analysis Centre (JNAC), and former officers from 

the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Analysis Centre (JIEDAC), 

Joint Narcotics Analysis Centre (JNAC) and the United Kingdom Serious Organised Crime Agency (now the National Crime 

Agency [NCA]) between February 2016 and March 2016.

36. Stiftung, p. 11-13.

37. Michael Lacewing, “Authority and Legitimacy,” White 

Paper, London, UK: Routledge, 2008, available from cw.routledge.

com/textbooks/alevelphilosophy/data/AS/WhyShouldIBeGoverned/

Authorityandlegitimacy.pdf.

38. Sarah Dix, Karen Hussmann, and Grant Walton, “Risks of 

corruption to state legitimacy and stability in fragile situations,” 

U4 Issue Paper, May 2012, No. 3, Bergen, NO: Chr. Michelsen 

Institute, Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, p. X.

39. “Governance, Corruption, and Conflict,” p. 17.

40. Susan Rose-Ackerman, “Good Governance and the 

Fight against Corruption,” From the proceedings of forum held 

on April 12-13, 2007, at the Fletcher School, Tufts University, 

Boston, MA.

41. Dix, Hussmann, and Walton, p. VII.
52

42. Interview conducted by the author with Lieutenant Colonel (Rtd.) Nick Jermyn, 45 Commando, Royal Marines and former 

Chief of Staff to the Afghan National Police, May 16, 2016.

43. Bob Egelko, “Ukrainian ex-prime minister’s sentence 

reduced,” San Francisco Chronicle, November 19, 2009, available 

from www.sfgate.com/world/article/Ukrainian-ex-prime-minister-ssentence-reduced-3280967.php.

44. Matthew J. Spence, “American Prosecutors as Democracy 

Promoters: Prosecuting Corrupt Foreign Officials in U.S. Courts,” 

The Yale Law Journal, Vol. 114, No. 5, March 2005, pp. 1185-1192, 

available from www.yalelawjournal.org/comment/american-prosecutors-as-democracy-promoters-prosecuting-corrupt-foreign-officials-inus-courts.

45. Quentin Reed and Alessandra Fontana, “Corruption 

and illicit financial flows: The limits and possibilities of current 

approaches,” U4 Issue Paper, January 2011, No. 2, Bergen, NO: 

Chr. Michelsen Institute, Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, 

pp. 25-26.

46. Of the funds looted by former Nigerian President Sani 

Abacha, $800 million were recovered within Nigeria.

47. U.S. Senate, Crime and Secrecy, The Use of Offshore Banks and 

Companies, Hearings before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate, 98th Congress, 1st session, March 15, 16, and May 24, 1983, 

Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, p. 7; and see 

R. C. H. Alexander, Insider Dealing and Money Laundering in the 

EU: Law and Regulation, Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2007; Barry Rider, Kern Alexander, Lisa Linklater, and Stuart Bazley, Market Abuse and Insider Dealing, 2nd ed., Haywards 

Heath, UK: Tottel Publishing Limited, 2009, Ch. 7; and Barry Rider and Michael Ashe, eds., Money Laundering Control, Dublin, IE: 

Round Hall, Sweet and Maxwell for the University of London, 

Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, 1996.

48. Shima D. Keene, “Threat Finance: Disconnecting the Lifeline of Organised Crime and Terrorism,” Farnham, UK: Gower 

Publishing, 2012, p. 159.
53

49. “UK national risk assessment of money laundering and 

terrorist financing,” London, UK: HM Treasury, October 2015, 

available from www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/468210/UK_NRA_October_2015_final_web.pdf, 

accessed April 12, 2016.

50. National Crime Agency (NCA), “Money Laundering,” 

NCA website, n.d., available from www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.

uk/crime-threats/money-laundering, accessed April 12, 2016.

51. Keene, “Threat Finance,” p. 159.

52. NCA, “Money Laundering.”

53. Robert Thomas Kudrle, “Did blacklisting hurt the tax 

havens?” Journal of Money Laundering Control, Vol. 12, Iss. 1, 

2009, p. 33.

54. U.S. Money Laundering Threat Assessment Working 

Group, “U.S. Money Laundering Threat Assessment,” Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Treasury, December 2005, p. 4, 

available from https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/terroristillicit-finance/Documents/mlta.pdf, accessed November 11, 2015.

55. Petrus C. van Duyne and Melvin R.J. Soudijn, “Hot money, hot stones and hot air: crime-money threat, real estate and 

real concern,” Journal of Money Laundering Control, Vol. 12, Iss. 2, 

2009, p. 173.

56. Evan Bell, “Concealing and disguising criminal property,” 

Journal of Money Laundering Control, Vol. 12, Iss. 3, 2009, p. 268.

57. Reed and Fontana, p. 9.

58. Provided that the property is not associated with 

criminality, it can be seized as the proceeds of crime.

59. Keene, “Threat Finance.”

60. Kris Hinterseer, Criminal Finance: The Political Economy 

of Money Laundering in a Comparative Legal Context, The Hague: 

Kluwer Law International, 2002.
54

61. The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) is an inter-governmental body established in 1989 by the Ministers of its Member jurisdictions. The objectives of the FATF are to set standards 

and promote effective implementation of legal, regulatory, and 

operational measures for combating money laundering, terrorist 

financing, and other related threats to the integrity of the international financial system. The FATF is therefore a “policymaking 

body” that works to generate the necessary political will to bring 

about national legislative and regulatory reforms in these areas.

62. This is to ensure compliance with domestic legislation 

such as the U.S. Patriot Act in 2001 in the United States, and the 

Money Laundering Regulations 2007, Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 

(PoCA) and the Counter Terrorism Act 2008 in the UK; see also 

Financial Services Authority, “Reducing money laundering risk: 

Know Your Customer and anti-money laundering monitoring,” 

Discussion Paper, London, UK: Financial Services Authority, August 2003, available from www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/discussion/dp22.pdf, 

accessed April 20, 2016.

63. FATF Guidance: Politically Exposed Persons (Recommendations 12 and 22), Paris, FR: The Financial Action Task Force (FATF), 

June 2013, available from www.fatf-gafi.org/documents/documents/

peps-r12-r22.html, accessed April 20, 2016.

64. Reed and Fontana, p. 35.

65. “Politically Exposed Persons—the compliance issues,” 

Workshop 31, held September 11, 2015, at the Thirty-Third International Symposium on Economic Crime, “The Limits of the 

Law: The role of compliance in the 21st Century,” Jesus College, 

Cambridge, UK. 

66. Ibid.

67. Trifin J. Roule and Jeremy Kinsell, “Legislative and Bureaucratic Impediments to Suspicious Transaction Reporting 

Regimes,” Journal of Money Laundering Control, Vol. 6, Iss. 2, 

2002, p. 151.

68. Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), a bureau of the U.S. Department of the Treasury, is the financial intel-
55

ligence unit (FIU) for the United States; Shima D. Keene, “Operationalizing Counter Threat Finance Strategies,” Strategic Studies 

Institute, U.S. Army War College, December 2014, p. 17.

69. Keene, “Threat Finance.”

70. Shima D. Keene, “Al-Qaeda: Financing Terror,” The Resilience Centre, Dept. of Defence Management & Security Analysis, Cranfield University, DCMT, Defence Academy of the United 

Kingdom Report produced for the Airey Neave Trust, December 

1, 2005.

71. Interview with Detective Chief Inspector Philip Standish, 

Force Intelligence and Specialist Operations, Thames Valley 

Police, March 25, 2016. 

72. Stew Magnuson, “Army wants to make ‘every soldier 

a sensor’,” National Defense Magazine, May 2007, available from 

www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/archive/2007/May/Pages/ArmyWantSensor2650.aspx, accessed June 22, 2016; Association of the 

U.S. Army, “ES2: Every Soldier is a Sensor,” Torchbearer Issue Paper, August 2004, available from www1.ausa.org/publications/torchbearercampaign/torchbearerissuepapers/Documents/IP_Sensor08_04.

pdf. accessed June 22, 2016.

73. Interview conducted by the author with Andrew Borene, 

Fellow at Georgetown University’s Center for Security Studies, 

former U.S. Marine military intelligence officer in Iraq, and former acting Company Commander for the 1st Marine Division’s 

Headquarters and Service Company at Camp Pendleton, conducted on June 22, 2016.

74. Author’s personal experience. 

75. Astri Suhrke, When More is Less: The International Project in 

Afghanistan, New York: Columbia University Press, 2012.

76. Kevin T. Carroll, “Afghan Corruption—The Greatest Obstacle to Victory in Operation Enduring Freedom,” Georgetown 

Journal of International Law, Vol. 43, Iss. 3, 2011–12, pp. 873–896.

77. Pyman, p. 22.
56

78. Stiftung, p. 14.

79. Pyman, p. 31.

80. Ibid., p. 15.

81. Suhrke.

82. “Operationalizing Counter/Anti-Corruption Study.”

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3, September 2008, pp. 169-194.

84. Pyman, p. 23.

85. Interview conducted by the author with Anthony Fitzherbert OBE, Director of Afghan Aid, and former Ministerial 

Adviser, Kabul, March 20, 2016.

86. International policymaker, 02.04.2013, Cited in Pyman, 

p. 32.

87. Ashraf Ghani and Clare Lockhart, Fixing Failed States: A 

Framework for Rebuilding a Fractured World, New York: Oxford 

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88. Paul Jackson, “Chiefs, money and politicians: rebuilding 

local government in post-war Sierra Leone,” Public Administration 

and Development, Vol. 25, Iss. 1, 2005, pp. 49–58; Sumie Nakaya, 

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York: Program on States and Security, The Graduate School and 

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89. Pyman, p. 22.

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Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET),” 

Past peacekeeping operations, United Nations Peacekeeping Official website, n.d., available from www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/
57

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92. Stiftung, p. 14.

93. Reed and Fontana, p. 8.

94. Stiftung, p. 13.

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96. Rabah Arezki and Markus Brückner, “Oil Rents, Corruption, and State Stability: Evidence From Panel Data Regressions,” 

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58

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role of corruption in armed conflicts,” Journal of International 

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as a Driver of Insurgency,” Paper presented at the Australian 

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19, 2015, Brisbane, AU.

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England and Wales, January 2012, p. 27.

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59

107. Dominik Zaum and Christine Cheng, “Corruption and 

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108. Jonathan Goodhand, “Corrupting or Consolidating the 

Peace? The Drugs Economy and Post-conflict Peacebuilding 

in Afghanistan,” International Peacekeeping, Vol. 15, Iss. 3, 2008, 

pp. 405-423.

109. Interview conducted by the author with Lieutenant 

Colonel (Rtd.) Nick Jermyn, 45 Commando, Royal Marines and 

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110. Frank Ledwidge, Losing Small Wars: British Military 

Failure in Iraq and Afghanistan, London, UK: Yale University 

Press, 2011.

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General William E. Rapp

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

and

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE PRESS

Director

Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Research

Dr. Steven K. Metz

Author

Dr. Shima D. Keene

Editor for Production

Dr. James G. Pierce

Publications Assistant

Ms. Denise J. Kersting

*****

Composition

Mrs. Jennifer E. Nevil