*

 Because of the procedural posture of this case (it was dismissed on

preliminary screening prior to service), the defendants are not participating in this

appeal. Thus, the appeal is submitted on the briefs and the record. See FED. R.

APP. P. 34(a)(2).

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted February 6, 2008*

Decided February 6, 2008

By the Court:

No. 07-2289

TERENCE B. RICHARDS,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

DANIEL KLEINHUBERT and

COUNTY OF LAKE, ILLINOIS,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Northern District of

Illinois, Eastern Division

No. 07 C 1732

Suzanne B. Conlon, 

Judge.

O R D E R

Terence Richards lost thousands of dollars to an acquaintance, Donald

Harrington. Richards complained to law enforcement, and Harrington was arrested

and charged in Lake County, Illinois, with felony theft. Harrington negotiated a

plea agreement with Assistant State’s Attorney Daniel Kleinhubert, which allowed

him to plead guilty to the lesser charge of misdemeanor theft and avoid paying any

restitution to Richards. Angered by this, Richards sent numerous threatening

emails to Kleinhubert and others involved in the events leading to the prosecution

of Harrington. Richards was then himself arrested by federal authorities. He

pleaded guilty to two counts of transmitting threatening communications in

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with 

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 07-2289 Page 2

interstate commerce, see 18 U.S.C. § 875(c), and is currently serving a thirty-month

sentence.

Richards then sued Kleinhubert and the county under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He

essentially claims that Kleinhubert erroneously believed he was stalking

Harrington and, as a consequence, violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights by

refusing to consult him during the prosecution of Harrington. See Rights of Crime

Victims and Witnesses Act, 725 ILCS 120/4 (establishing that victims of violent

crime in Illinois have right under Illinois statute to communicate with state

prosecutor). Richards also makes the patently frivolous claim that Kleinhubert

infringed his First Amendment right to free exercise of religion by breaking one of

the Ten Commandments, “Thou Shall Not Stand False Witness.” Richards alleges

that these events occurred between October 2002 and January 22, 2004.

The district court dismissed the case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),

counting it as a strike. See id. § 1915(g). First, the district court concluded that

Richards’s suit is time-barred. Richards tendered his complaint on March 28, 2007,

past the two-year statute of limitations for § 1983 claims arising in Illinois. See 735

ILCS 5/13-202; Williams v. Lampe, 399 F.3d 867, 869-70 (7th Cir. 2005). And even

if the complaint was timely, the court continued, it fails to state a claim because

prosecutors acting within the scope of their duties in initiating and pursuing

criminal charges are absolutely immune from civil damages under § 1983. See

Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431 (1976); Levy v. Pappas, No. 06-3182, 2007

U.S. App. LEXIS 29536, at *22-23 (7th Cir. Dec. 21, 2007). Moreover, the court

explained, Richards does not assert any claim against Lake County that is premised

on a theory of liability other than respondeat superior, so neither could he recover

from the county because there is no vicarious liability under § 1983. See Pacelli v.

DeVito, 972 F.2d 871, 878 (7th Cir. 1992).

On appeal Richards first contends that the two-year statute of limitations

should not bar his complaint. Richards says that he never knew about the Illinois

crime victims’ statute during the Harrington prosecution, and thus was unaware at

the time that Kleinhubert was violating his statutory rights. See 725 ILCS 120/1-

120/9. According to Richards, his cause of action did not accrue until he learned

about the statute’s provisions.

Richards’s argument is meritless. Although a federal complaint “need not

anticipate or overcome affirmative defenses such as the statute of limitations,”

dismissal on that basis is appropriate when the plaintiff effectively pleads himself

out of court by alleging facts that are sufficient to establish the defense. Hollander

v. Brown, 457 F.3d 688, 691 n.1 (7th Cir. 2006); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 8. It is

apparent from Richards’s complaint and from his brief in this court that the events

he complains of occurred well outside the statute of limitations. A § 1983 claim
No. 07-2289 Page 3

accrues on “the date that the plaintiff knew or should have known that his

constitutional rights had been violated.” Savory v. Lyons, 469 F.3d 667, 672 (7th

Cir. 2006). Richards obviously knew during the limitations period that Kleinhubert

had refused to communicate with him during the Harrington case; that Richards

may not have understood the legal significance of that refusal is not sufficient to

prove that his claim accrued later than the date of his injury. See Sides v. City of

Champaign, 496 F.3d 820, 826 (7th Cir. 2007). 

In light of the above, we need not address Richards’s remaining contentions. 

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. We further note that this appeal

counts as an additional strike against Richards, and that he now has incurred more

than three strikes. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g); George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 608 (7th

Cir. 2007); In re: Richards, No. 07-3158 (7th Cir. Sept. 21, 2007); Richards v. United

States, No. 07 C 50062 (N.D. Ill. July 31, 2007); Richards v. Flynn, No. 07 C 1528

(N.D. Ill. July 17, 2007). Should Richards attempt to file any further civil litigation

in any federal court without prepaying all required fees, or meeting the

imminent-danger standard of § 1915(g), we will enter an order under Support Sys.

Int’l, Inc. v. Mack, 45 F.3d 185 (7th Cir. 1995), precluding him from filing further

civil suits whether or not he pays in advance.