Docket No . 104468.



### IN THE SUPRE ME COURT OF THE STAT E OF ILLIN OIS

THE PE OP LE O F TH E S TAT E OF I L LIN OI S, Appe llee, v.

ED W ARDSM ITH , A

pp el l an t.
Opinion filed February 22, 2008.

JUSTICE FRE EMAN deliver ed t he judg ment o f the cou rt, w i th op inion. Chi ef Jus t ice T homas and Justice s Fitz ger ald, Kilbride, G ar man, Karmeier , a nd Bu rk e co ncur re d in t he judg ment a nd o pinion.

OPINI ON

De f en da n t, Ed wa rd Smit h, ple ad ed gu ilty t o po ss es sio n o f a contro ll ed su b sta n ce wi th i n ten t to deliv er. 720 ILCS 570/401(c)(2) (West 2002). The ci

rc uit court o f Ch

am pai gn County

entered judg ment ag ain st defendant and sentenced hi m to 10 years’ i m pri son men t. The circui

t co urt deni ed defendant’s su bsequent moti on t o w ithd ra w his gu ilty plea, and t he appe l l ate court af f i rmed. People v. Smith , No

. 4– 05 –0 10 4 ( 20 05 ) ( un pu blish ed o r de run de rSu pr eme CourtRul e 23 ). Defen

dant thereafter f

il ed a pro se plead ing in the cir cu it co ur t ent i t led “Mo t ion t o C or re ct Sent ence ,” challenging t he
con sti tuti on al i ty of the term

of man dato ry supervi sed release (MSR) that had be en

i m posed as p art of h

i s se nten ce. T he co ur t denied t he
moti on sua sp onte

. The

appe l l ate court

aff irm ed. 371 Ill . App. 3d 817.1 Acc or ding t o th e amended motio n, it i nclu ded a reasse rtion of “all facts, claims and argume

nts set forth in De fend

ant’s pr o se fil

ing.”
-2- We granted lea

ve to appeal (210 Ill. 2d R. 315 ), and no w r emand t he cause to the appellate court with di rections.

BACK GROUND In Decem ber 2003 the State charged defe ndan t with unl

awful pos se ss i on

wi th i n te n t t o deli

ver m ore t han 1 gram b ut less than

15 gr ams of a substance contain

in g cocain e–a Cl as s 1 f el ony –i n v i ol ati on of s ect ion 401(c)(2) of the Il li nois Contro ll ed Substances

Act (720 ILCS 570/401(c)(2) (We st 2 002 )). B ec au se of de f en da nt’ s p rior co nvi ctions, he was s

ubj ect to sentenci

ng as a C lass X off

ender , pursuant t o s ect ion 5 –5– 3( c) (8 ) o f the Unified Co de o f Cor re ct ions (Cor recti on s Co de) (730 ILCS 5/5–5–3(c)(8) (West 2002)). On Novem ber 10, 2004, defend ant plead ed g uilty in exchang e fo r t he St ate ’s recom

mendation, inter al

ia , that h e b e s en ten ce d to 10 years’ impriso nment and gi

ven credit f or 125 days al

ready served in c us t o dy. Dur ing t he ple a coll

oquy, the ci

rcuit court admoni shed

defen dant as t o his p os sible sent ence . I nclude d in t he court ’s adm onis hm ents was a w ar ning t ha t , if

de fen da nt we r e s en t t o pr iso n, “t he r e is a p eri od of
ma nda tory supervised release of three years.” The cou rt ask e d defend ant if

he un derstoo d hi s potential

ma xi mum pen alties , a nd defend ant answered “

Yes.” Followi

ng the S t at e’ s p re se nt at io n o f a fac tualba sis , t he cir cu it co ur t ac ce pt ed de fe nd an t ’s gu ilt y ple a , entered j udgm en t a g ai nst def endan t, and sentenced h

im –in accordance wi th the ple a agree m en

t–to 10 y ea rs ’ i m prison men t wi th c red i t f or time s erved of 125 days. In Decem ber 2004 def

endan t file d a pro se “peti

tion to withdraw gui l ty plea” al legi ng, among other t hi

ngs, t hat (1 ) he was unawa re that t he MSR term was in addition to hi s 10-year prison term, rather than in corpo rated withi

n i t, and (2) t he ev

ide nce was insu fficie nt t o su st ain his co nvictio n. C ou nsel wa s ap po inted t o r epr ese nt defend ant , a nd counsel f i l ed an am en de d m oti on to wi th dr aw th e g ui l ty ple a. 1 The cir cu it co ur t denied t he moti on. On ap pea l, de fendant ’s so le arg ument was that t he f

actual b asi s presented by

the Stat e at the plea h

ear ing
was insu fficie nt t o su st ain his co nvictio n. T he appella te court rejected-3- t his argum

en t, and af f i rmed th e tri al

court’s j udgm en t. P eoplev. Smith , No. 4–05– 0104 ( 20 05 ) ( un pu blish ed o r de run de rSu pr eme Court Rul e 23). In February 2006 defen

dan t f i le d a pro se “Motion to Correct Sentence” and a memor andu m of law in sup po rt . I n t his plead ing and
acc omp anying memor andu m, de fend ant challeng edth e con sti tuti on al i ty of the term of M SR that had been im posed– i n add it io n to hi s te

rm of i m pri son men t–a s p ar t of h i s s en te nce
. Acco rd ingto defen

dant, it was a v

iolation of the Il

li nois and Un ited Stat es consti

tutions to req ui re th at a term of MSR be s erved after t he successf ulco mplet ion o f a judicially i mpo sed sent ence . D efenda nt all eged that , because his term of MSR was in addition to hi

s term of i m pri son men t, rather than i

ncorporat ed within it, his sen tence “is v o id and doe s n

ot co m por [t] wit h t he co nst itu t ions. ” De fendant ask ed t he courtto “en

co mpass”his MSR t er m within his pr ison s ent ence . As alte rna t iverel

i ef , def endan t aske d, am

ong othe r t h ings, t hat he be released f rom i nc arc era ti on t o s er ve t he rem

ai nd er of hi s s en ten ceon MSR, or t hat hi s term of M SR be v acated. The ci rcuit court denied

t he m oti on sua sp onte . In an order dated F e bruary 21, 200 6, th

e c ourt state d: “

Th e D ef en da nt’ s m oti on f or sentence co rr ec t io n is d en ied by t his court . Al so, t he court deter mi nes that the pleadi ngs are f ri vol ous an d paten tly wi thout m eri t.” On the sam e day , the court sent a letter to the war den of t he prison wher e de fendant was incarc er at ed, informing the warden of t he
cou rt ’s fi ndi ng an d pointi ng spe c ifi cally to sec t ion 3 –6– 3( d) of t he Cor r ec t io ns Code (730 ILCS 5/3–6–3(d) (West 2002)). T he l etter stated: “ Encl

ose d pl ea se f i nd an Ord er d en y i ng Mr . Sm i th’ s m oti on f orsentence

correct ion. The

Court co nside rs t his plead ing t o be fri volousan

d p ate n tl y wi th out m eri t

. I am inf

o rming yo u o f t his pur sua nt to 730 ILCS 5/3–6– 3(d) wi th reg ard to the i nm ate ’s good cond uct cre di t.” Se cti on 3–6–3( d) prov i de s, i

n perti n en t pa rt: “If a laws uit is fil

ed bya pris oner

*** aga inst t he St at e, t he Dep ar t ment of

Corr ec ti ons , or

t he Prison

er R ev i ew Boa rd, or agains t any of thei r off i cers or employees, an

d the court ma

kes
a specifi c fi ndi ng that a pl eadi ng, m ot ion, or other paper file d by the pr is one r is frivo lou s, t he De par t ment o f Cor re ct ions-4- sha ll con duc t a hea ri ng to rev okeup to 1 80 d

ay s of good conduct cr edit by

bringing char ges aga inst t he pr isone r so ught to be depri

ve d of the good conduct credits bef

ore t he Pri soner Revi ewBoard asprov i de d i n s ub pa rag raph ( a)( 8) of

Sec ti on 3–3–2 of thi s Code. *** * * * (2) ‘Lawsui

t’ mean s a pe ti ti on f

or post-con

vi cti on reli ef under Articl e 122 of

the C ode of

Cri m i na l Procedu re of 196 3, a m oti on pursuant to S ection 116–3 of the Code of Cri m i na l Procedu re of 196 3, a ha be ascorp usac ti on under Art icle X o f the Code of Ci vi l Procedure or under federal la w (28 U.S.C. 2254), a pe ti t ion f or clai m un der t h e Court of Cl

ai ms Act or an action un

der the federal Civil Ri gh ts Act (42 U.S.C. 1983). ” 730 ILCS 5/3–6–3(d) (We st 2002 ). On Mar ch 16 , 2 006 , d efenda nt sent a le t t er t o t he cler k o f the cir cu it cou

rt as ki ng f ora co py of t he o rd er denying his mo t io n. I n his l etter, defend ant stated that he “was w ri tten a d i sci pli ne reportfor t he
motion , and the

ticket sa i d se e the Judg e’s order.” On March 20, 2006, def

endan t t im el y f il ed a p ro se noti

ceof ap pe al. However, def

en da nt ’s no t ice r efe rr ed o nly t o t he cir cu it
cou rt ’s judg ment o f co nvictio n on N ove mber 1 0, 200 4, ra t her t han t he
cou rt ’s o r de rde nying his moti on f or s en ten cecorrec ti on

on F ebruary 21, 2006. I

n his brief t o t he ap pellat e co ur t , d efenda nt ident ifi ed t he judg ment appe al

ed f rom as the ci rcuit court’s denial , on February 21, 2006, of hi s m

ot ion to correct sentence

. On ap pe al, de fen da nt did no t ch alle ng e t he cir cu it co ur t ’s finding that hi s m

ot ion was f

riv olous and patentl

y w ithout meri

t. Instead, defend ant focused on the l etter from

the ci rcuit court judge to t he
war den, wh

i ch men ti on ed se cti on 3–6–3( d) “wi

th reg ar d t o t he inm ate ’s good

con du ct cre di t.”A cc ordi

n g to de f en da n t, t he jud ge –in t his letter–“advised the warden *** t hat due t o t he di smi ssa l o rder, [d ef en da n t] wa s s ubje ct t o lo ss o f hi s go od conduct credit under [s ec ti on 3–6–3(d)].” Defendan

t argued t hat , in r ea ch ing t his
co nclusio n, th e c i

rc ui t c ourt necessarily

found t hat de fendant’s

“ Moti on t o Co rr ec t Se nt enc e” wa s a “law su it ” a s d efi ned i n s ec ti on 3–6 –3(d) a nd t her efo re fell within the sco pe o f tha t pr ovisio n.-5- Howev er, def endan t not ed that a “m

ot ion to correct sentence ” was not am ong the ca us esof ac ti on d ef i ne d a s a “ l aw sui t” i n s ec ti on 3–6–3 (d)(2). A cc ordi

n gl y , de f en da n t ar gu ed th a t the ci

rcui t court erredin f indi ng that defendant’s “ Mot i on to Corr ect Sent ence” was a

“ l aw su i t” for purpo ses of section 3–6–3(d) . In defendant’s v ie w , he
was no t su bje ct t o t he lo ss o f go o d- co nd uc t cr ed it under t his pr ovisio n. Defend ant argued, in

addi tion, that “it ca nnot be inferr ed t hat t he cir cu it court recharacterized the m oti on as a post-con vi cti on petiti

on,” wh ich is one of

the ca us esof ac ti on d ef i ne d a s a “ l aw sui t” i n s ec ti on 3–6–3 (d). Def

endan t noted tha

t, unde r People v. Shellstrom , 216 I ll. 2d 45 (20 05), a

cir cu it court m

ust f oll ow certai n pr ocedure s b ef

ore re char act er izing

a pro se ple ad ing as a fir st po st co nvic t io n p et it io n. Acco rd ingto de f

en da nt, the ci rcu i t cou rt i n th e c as e a t ba r di d n ot adh ereto these p ro cedur es. I n defendant’s view, any rec ha racteri za ti on of h i s m oti on as a p ost con

v i cti o n p et it io n w o uld ha ve be en i m proper. Fin ally, de fendant arg

ue d that the c i

rcu i t cou rt’ s determ

i na ti on that hi s m

ot ion was subj ect to section 3–6–3(d) was “a n i ssue p ro pe r ly be fo r e t his C o ur t

. ” A cc o r din g t o de fen da nt , t he cir cu it
cou rt ’s ch ar ac t er iza t io n o f hi s p l eadi ng asa “l aw sui

t” u nd er s ec ti on 3–6–3(d) was a pr ecu rso r t o t he court ’s f in din g that his motion was fri volousan d p at en t ly

withoutme

rit. Defe ndan t t heref ore argued t hat his “ chal le nge to the circui

t cour t’s order denyi

ng hi s m ot ion a l s o pr o pe r ly in cl udes a challe nge to the

cou rt’ s f i nd i ng tha t the moti on wasa ‘l awsui t’ asdef i ne d [i n s ection 3–6

–3(d)].” The appe l l ate

courtr eje ct ed de fen da nt ’s ar gu men t t ha t t he cir cu it courterred i n f

i nd i ng tha t hi s m oti on wasa “l aw sui

t” u nd er s ec ti on 3–6–3 (d). A cc ordi

n g to th e a pp el l ate cou rt, “ th e tr i al cou rt a pp ea rsto have treat ed the motion as a pe ti ti on u nd er th e [P ost-C onv

i cti on Hearin g] A ct, w hi ch i s i nc l ude d i n th e d ef i ni ti on of ‘l aw su i t’ set f orth in se cti on 3– 6–3( d) (2 ) * ** .”37 1 I l l . A pp . 3d at 8 20 . Th

e a pp el l ate cou rt also reject ed defendant ’s argumen t t hat an y rec ha racteri za ti on of hi s m ot ion as a postco nvi

ction petition would ha

ve b een i m proper. The cou rt concl uded that, in def

endan t’s case, the ci

rcuit court was not required to foll

ow Shellstrom ’s rech

aracter i za tion pro ced ur es. The ap pe l l ate co ur t affirmed, st at ing: “[ T] he t rial co ur t did no t err b y tre ati ng de fen da nt ’s mo t io n a s a po st co nvic t io n p et it io n, an d t hu s it2 As noted, defenda nt pr eviously cha llenged his convi ct ion o n direct app eal, and

the appellate

co urt af fi rmed

. People v

. Smith , No. 4–05–

0104 (2005) (unpubli shed

orde r unde r Supr em e Court Rule

23).

-6- also did no t er r in finding

section 3–6–3(d) of the [Corrections] Code applie d to defen

dant’s m ot ion.” 371 Il

l. A pp. 3d at 821. We gr an ted de f en da n t’s peti ti on f or l ea v e to a pp ea l pu rsua n t to Supreme Court Ru

l es 3 15 an

d 612( b) (2 10 Il l . 2d Rs . 315, 61 2(b )).

AN AL YSIS Bef ore t his co ur t , d efenda nt ar gue s, a s he did b elow , t hat t he cir cu it court erred in

fi ndi ng t hat hi s “M ot ion to Correct Sentence”
was a “lawsu it” w ithin t he meaning of se ct ion 3 –6– 3( d) . D efenda nt also poi n ts to th e a

pp el l ate cou rt’ s conc l usi on tha t the ci rcui t court treat ed hi s m ot ion as a peti ti on f or p ost con

v i cti on re l i ef . Acc ordi n g to defen dan t, an y ch ara cteri za ti on of hi s m oti on as a

pos tcon vi cti on pe ti ti on wasi m proper b eca

use the c i rcui t court fai le d t o a dher e t o t he procedures th at Shellstrom hel d mus t be fol

lowed wh

en recharacterizin

g a pro se plead ing as a first po st co nvictio n pet itio n. Defend ant do es no t ch alle ng e t he cir cu it co ur t ’s de nia l o f his
moti on to correct sentence, nor d oes he challenge the co urt ’s finding th at h i s m oti on wa s f ri v ol ous an d p ate n tl y wi th out m eri t. Bef ore we can address the part ies’ arguments, we fi rst must n ote a po t ent ial jurisdict ional de fect t hat we u nco ver ed in o ur re view o f the record. As previously i

ndicated, defendant’s noticeof appeal referred
o nly to the ci rcuit court’s judgm

ent of convi

ction on Novem

ber 10, 2004, 2 rather than the court’s order deny i ng hi s m oti on f orsentence correc ti on

o n Fe br ua ry 21 , 20 06

. T his thus r ais es t he t hr es ho ld que sti on of whether d

ef en da nt’ s n oti ceof appeal eff ectivel y c onferred j urisd i cti on on t he app ellate co ur t t o c ons ider t he ci rcuit court’s order of Feb ruary 21, 2006. The filing o f a n o t ice o f ap pe al “is t he j urisdi ctional step which in itiates appella

te review .” Niccum v. Botti, Marinaccio, Desalso & Tameling, Ltd. , 18 2 I ll. 2 d 6 , 7 ( 19 98 ) , cit in g 1 55 I ll . 2d R. 301. Unless there is a

properly fi le d notice of appe al , a revi ewi ng court has
no jurisdi ction over

t he appeal

and i s oblige d to dis

mi ss i t. See People
v. Anderson , 375 Ill . Ap

p. 3d 12 1, 131 ( 2006)

. I t is t hu s e ss en t ial, in-7- t he case at

bar, that we address the suf fi ci ency of def endan t’s notice of ap pe al, ev en t ho ug h t he iss ue ha s no t be en r ais ed pr ev io us ly in t his
case. A revi

ewi ng court has an

i n de pen den t du ty to consi der i ss ue s of jurisd ictio n, reg ard

l es s of whether ei

ther party ha s rai sed them

. People v. Gargani , 371 Il

l . Ap p. 3d 72 9, 731 ( 2007)

. Su pr eme Court Rul e 303(b)(2) pr ovide s that a notice of appeal “sha llsp eci fy

the judgm

ent or part thereof or ot her orders appeal ed fr om and the rel i ef sough t from the re vi ewi ng c ourt.” 210 Il

l

. 2d R

. 303(b)(2). Illino is co ur t s ha ve h eld t hat a no t ice o f appeal co nf ers j u ri sd i cti on on a cou rt of rev i ew to con si der onl y the j udg men ts or part s there of s

peci f i ed i n the notice

of a ppea l

. Illinois He

alth Maintenance Organization Guaranty Ass’n v. Shapo , 357 Ill . App. 3d 122, 148 (20 05) ; Citizens Against Regional Landfill v. Pol lutio n Control Bo ard , 255 Il

l . Ap p. 3d 90 3, 909 ( 1994)

. We n ote th

at, wh i l e a n oti ce o f ap pe al is jur isd ict io na l, it is ge ne r ally accepted that such

a n o t ice is to be construed l i beral l y
. Lang
v. Consumers Ins ur

ance Service, Inc. , 222 Ill . App. 3d 226, 229 (1991 ); Burtell v. Firs t Charter Service Corp. , 76 Ill . 2d 427, 433 (1 97 9) . T he p ur po se o f a

noticeof a ppe al is to inform t he pr evailing p arty int he t rial co ur t t hat t he o t her par t y seek s re view o f the j udgm en t. Lang , 222 Il

l . A pp. 3d a t 2 29; Burtell, 76 Ill . 2d at 433; McMahon v. McMahon , 97 Il l . Ap p. 3d 44 8, 449- 50 (19 81). “Ac co r di ng ly, noticeshoul d b e co nsider ed a s a w hole a nd will be deem ed suf f i ci en t to co n f er j uri sd i cti on on an appe l l ate co ur t wh en it fair ly and adequatel

y s ets out the j ud gm

en t co mplained o f and t he reli ef sought, t husadvising t he suc ces sful litigant of t he nat ur e o f the
a ppea l .” Lang , 22 2 I ll. A pp
. 3d at 22 9. “Whe r e t he de ficie nc y in noticei s on

e of f orm, ra the r th an su bs tan ce , an d the a ppe l l eei s n

ot prejudi ced, t he failu r e t o co mply

str i ctl y wi th the f orm of noti cei s n ot fatal .” Lang , 222 Ill . App. 3d at 230. Defe ndan t’s notice of appe al , no matter how li beral ly construed,
ca nn ot be said t o ha ve fairly and a deq uat ely set ou t t he judg ment compl ai ned of–the co urt’ s order of February 21, 2006–or t he rel

ie f
sou gh t. The notice n

ot only fai le d to me ntion the F ebruary

21, 2006, order; it speci

fi cally me ntioned a dif feren t jud gm en t, and onl y tha t j udgm en t. Thi s wa s m ore than a mere defect in f or m. Defendant’s noticefailed t o a ppr ise t he St at e o f the nat ur e o f the app eal. The notice, as i

t appea rs in the record, fail

ed to co nf

er jurisd ictio n on t he ap pe llat e c o ur t t o he ar de fen da nt ’s ap pe al.-8- In the re cord

be f or e us , t her e is no indicat ion t hat defend ant move d to am end h is noticeo f ap pe al p ur su an t t o Su pr eme Co ur t Ru le 303(b)(5) (210 Ill. 2d R. 303(b)( 5)). Rule 303(b)(5) pro vides:

“The notice of appe al

ma y b e am ended wi thou t l ea ve of courtwit hin

th e or i gi n al 30 -d ay period to fi

le the notice as s et f orth in paragr aph (a) above. Thereaf ter it may be am ended
o nly on moti on , i n th e rev i ewi n g c our t, pur sua nt to paragraph (d) of thi s rule . Am

endm ents rel ate back to t he t ime of t he f i l i ng of the n otice of a ppea l .” 210Ill . 2d R. 3 03(b )(5). If defend ant did amend his not ice, t he jur isdict ional de fect might ha ve been correct ed. It is thus unc le ar whether the a p pellat e co ur t might ha ve ac qu ire d ju r isd ict io n t o r ev iew de fen da nt ’s ap pe al. We t her efo re re mand t he cause to t he appel la te court to consider t he jur is dic t io n al

qu esti on th at w e h

av e raise d w i

th re ga rd to defend ant’s noti ce of

appe al . An

y f urthe r action by

thi s court re gar ding defendant’s app eal must awa it a r esp ons e by th e a pp el l ate co ur t on t his jurisdict ional qu est ion. We t ake t his op po rt unit y to re mind ou r a ppe llate c ou rt of t he im port ance of as certai ni ng whether i t has j urisd

i cti on in an ap pea l. “A
re viewing cou

rt m us t be certai n of it s jurisd ictio n pr ior t o p ro cee ding in a cause of a

ction.” R.W. Du ntem an Co . v. C/G En terp rises, Inc. , 181 Ill . 2d 1 53, 159 (1998). Indeed, the ascertain me nt of i ts own juri sd i cti on i s on e of th e two m

ost i m por tan t tas ksof an appe l l ate courtpanel

when begi nni ng the revi

ew o f a ca se . Th

e oth er i s to det er mine which issue or issues , if any, have been fo rfeit ed. By giving careful atte nti on to each of

these tasks, a court can av o id t he po ss ibly unnecessary

expendi tur e of judi

cial resour ces. In light of o ur dispo sitio n of t his app eal, we c anno t co nsider any of def endan t’s argumen

ts at t hi s tim

e.

CONCLUSION We reman

d the cause to the appel la te c ou rt t o c ons ider t he jurisdi ctional

quest ion that we have raised with re gard to defendant’s
no t ice o f ap pe al.

Remanded with directio ns.