97-084

 No. 97-084

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

 

 1998 MT 85

 ROBERT G. STEELE,

 Plaintiff and Appellant,

 v.

 DANIEL B. McGREGOR, JOSEPH V. MARONICK,

 and six unnamed members of the State Bar of Montana

 in their individual capacities,

 Defendants and Respondents.

 APPEAL FROM: District Court of the First Judicial District,

 In and for the County of Lewis and Clark,

 The Honorable Jeffrey M. Sherlock, Judge presiding.

 COUNSEL OF RECORD:

 For Appellant:

 Robert G. Steele, pro se, Missoula, Montana

 For Respondents:

 Paul D. Johnson, Assistant Attorney General, 

 Helena, Montana

 Submitted on Briefs: June 19, 1997

 Decided: April 14, 1998

 Filed:

 __________________________________________

 Clerk

Justice Karla M. Gray delivered the Opinion of the Court.

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¶1 Robert G. Steele (Steele) appeals from the order and judgment of the

First Judicial District Court, Lewis and Clark County, dismissing his complaint

brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (§ 1983) for failure to state a claim upon

which relief can be granted. We affirm. 

¶2 The dispositive issue on appeal is whether Joseph Maronick and Daniel

McGregor are entitled to judicial or quasi-judicial immunity.

 BACKGROUND

¶3 Steele's complaint alleges the following facts, which we accept as true

for purposes of this opinion. Steele is a certified public accountant (CPA) who

has been licensed to practice that profession in Montana since 1970. After

Steele was denied admission to the State Bar of Montana (State Bar) in 1992,

he co-founded an organization called "Montanans for Due Process" through

which he is attempting to expose the purportedly corrupt practices of the State

Bar. Montanans for Due Process sponsored an initiative entitled "Access to

Justice" which proposed to amend the Montana Constitution to eliminate

attorney licensing requirements and allow any person to represent another

person in civil and criminal court proceedings.

¶4 Steele further alleges that, in 1995, he represented Neville Log Homes

(Log Homes) at a prehearing conference in a case involving unemployment

insurance taxes before Montana Department of Labor and Industry (DOL)

hearing examiner Bernadine E. Warren. Shortly thereafter, Daniel McGregor

(McGregor), a DOL attorney, sent a letter to the Montana Supreme Court's

Commission on Unauthorized Practice of Law--with copies to Steele, the State

Bar, and the Montana Supreme Court--advising of his concern that Steele was

practicing law without a license. McGregor also advised Steele that, as a

licensed attorney, he was precluded from assisting Steele in activities which

constituted the unauthorized practice of law. 

¶5 Steele had represented numerous clients in administrative hearings

during his career as a CPA and had been involved in hearings where other

nonattorneys had represented clients. After McGregor raised the issue, Steele

discussed his representation of Log Homes at the upcoming substantive

hearing with three DOL hearing examiners, including Joseph Maronick

(Maronick). All three advised that the DOL routinely permits CPAs to

represent clients at DOL hearings. 

¶6 In the meantime, Log Homes' unemployment insurance tax case was

transferred to hearing examiner Maronick. McGregor moved to preclude

Steele from representing any party to the contested case proceeding because

Steele was not an attorney and Maronick granted the motion. Nancy Neville,

who is not an attorney, subsequently represented Log Homes at the hearing.

¶7 Steele filed his civil rights action for damages under § 1983 in the

Fourth Judicial District Court, Missoula County, in May of 1996. He

contended therein that the actions of Maronick and McGregor (collectively,

the Named Defendants) violated his rights to due process, equal protection and

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free speech. Steele also asserted that the Named Defendants, together with six

unnamed members of the State Bar (Unnamed Members), conspired to deprive

him of his constitutional rights for unspecified personal gain and to retaliate

against him for his political views. The Unnamed Members were never named

or served.

¶8 The Named Defendants moved to dismiss Steele's complaint for failure

to state a claim upon which relief could be granted and for a change of venue. 

Venue was changed to the First Judicial District Court, Lewis and Clark

County. The District Court granted the Named Defendants' motion to dismiss

for failure to state a claim, concluding that Steele did not allege the violation

of a federally protected right which could provide the basis for a § 1983

action, and dismissed Steele's complaint accordingly. Steele appeals.

 STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶9 "Rule 12(b)(6), M.R.Civ.P., motions to dismiss are viewed with

disfavor and a complaint should be dismissed only if the allegations in the

complaint clearly demonstrate that the plaintiff does not have a claim." 

Kleinhesselink v. Chevron, U.S.A. (1996), 277 Mont. 158, 161, 920 P.2d 108,

110 (citations omitted). In considering a motion to dismiss, "the complaint is

construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and all allegations of fact

contained therein are taken as true." Hollister v. Forsythe (1996), 277 Mont.

23, 26, 918 P.2d 665, 667 (citations omitted).

¶10 The District Court's determination that Steele's complaint failed to state

a claim upon which relief can be granted is a conclusion of law. See Hollister,

918 P.2d at 667. We review a district court's conclusion of law to determine

whether the interpretation of the law is correct. Hollister, 918 P.2d at 667

(citation omitted).

 DISCUSSION

¶11 Are Maronick and McGregor entitled to judicial or quasi-judicial

 immunity?

¶12 Steele contends on appeal that the District Court erred in dismissing his

complaint because the complaint alleged the violation by Maronick and

McGregor of three federally protected rights--due process, equal protection

and free speech--and, therefore, properly stated claims under § 1983. The

Named Defendants contend, on the other hand, that the District Court's

dismissal should be affirmed without regard to whether Steele's complaint

sufficiently alleges the violation of a federally protected right because they are

entitled to absolute judicial or quasi-judicial immunity. They advanced these

immunities in the District Court but that court dismissed on the grounds set

forth above and did not reach the immunity issues. 

¶13 For the reasons discussed below, we conclude that Maronick and

McGregor are entitled to absolute judicial and quasi-judicial immunity,

respectively, from Steele's § 1983 action for damages. Since absolute

immunity is a complete bar to Steele's action, this issue is dispositive without

regard to the technical sufficiency of Steele's allegations to state a § 1983

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claim. As a result, because the issue was timely raised in the District Court

and provides a proper basis for affirming the result reached by the District

Court (see State v. Parker, 1998 MT 6, ¶ 20, ___ P.2d ___, ___, 55 St.Rep. 16,

19, ¶ 20 (citation omitted)), we need not address Steele's assertions of error.

¶14 We begin by observing that federal immunity principles apply in § 1983

actions. In analyzing immunity in the context of a violation of federal

constitutional rights, the Supreme Court has stated that "[t]o create a system

in which the Bill of Rights monitors more closely the conduct of state officials

than it does that of federal officials is to stand the constitutional design on its

head." Butz v. Economou (1978), 438 U.S. 478, 504, 98 S.Ct. 2894, 2909, 57

L.Ed.2d 895, 914. Therefore, no distinction should be made for immunity

purposes between a suit brought against a state official under 1983 and a suit

against a federal official brought directly under the Constitution. Butz, 438

U.S. at 504. 

¶15 In addressing immunity questions, the Supreme Court applies a

functional approach. Forrester v. White (1988), 484 U.S. 219, 224, 108 S.Ct.

538, 542, 98 L.Ed.2d 555, 563. This approach examines the nature of the

functions with which a particular official or class of officials has been lawfully

entrusted, seeking to evaluate the "effect that exposure to particular forms of

liability would likely have on the appropriate exercise of those functions." 

Forrester, 484 U.S. at 224. 

 a. Judicial Immunity

¶16 Judicial immunity provides judges with absolute immunity from suit for

civil damages for acts performed in their judicial capacities. Dellenbach v.

Letsinger (7th Cir. 1989), 889 F.2d 755, 758. Judges are immune due to the

nature of their responsibilities rather than their location in the government. 

Butz, 438 U.S. at 511. This immunity results from the independence judges

need to make decisions in matters involving such things as monetary and

liberty interests without fear of reprisal from dissatisfied litigants. See Butz,

438 U.S. at 509. Moreover, "[t]he essence of absolute immunity is its

possessor's entitlement not to have to answer for his conduct in a civil damages

action." Mitchell v. Forsyth (1985), 472 U.S. 511, 525, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 2815,

86 L.Ed.2d 411, 424 (citations omitted). Simply stated, absolute immunity is

immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability. Dellenbach, 889

F.2d at 758 (citation omitted). 

¶17 In Butz, the United States Department of Agriculture (the Department)

issued an administrative complaint against a corporation which was a

registered commodity futures commission merchant. The complaint alleged

that the corporation had failed to satisfy the minimum financial requirements

established by the Department and sought to revoke or suspend the

corporation's registration. Butz, 438 U.S. at 481. After additional

investigation, an amended complaint was issued and a hearing was held before

the Department's chief hearing officer, who recommended sustaining the

complaint. Butz, 438 U.S. at 481. The corporation subsequently filed a §

1983 suit in federal district court naming the chief hearing officer and others

involved in the investigation, issuance, and review of the complaint as

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defendants. Butz, 438 U.S. at 481-82. 

¶18 The Supreme Court observed that the "conflicts which federal hearing

examiners seek to resolve are every bit as fractious as those which come to

court[,]" often resulting in post-adjudication disappointment and associated

venting by the losing party similar to those which follow adverse judicial

determinations. Butz, 438 U.S. at 513 (citation omitted). It also observed that

federal administrative law provides many of the same safeguards as are

available in the judicial process, such as the adversarial nature of the

proceedings, the insulation of the trier of fact from political influence, and the

requirement that each party have the opportunity to present oral and

documentary evidence. Butz, 438 U.S. at 513 (citations omitted). Moreover,

the Supreme Court noted that both the role and the powers of a modern federal

hearing examiner--to rule on motions, issue subpoenas, regulate the course of

the proceeding and make decisions via findings of fact and conclusions of

law--are functionally comparable to those of a judge. Butz, 438 U.S. at 513

(citation omitted). For those reasons, the Supreme Court ultimately held that

federal hearing examiners performing agency adjudicatory functions are

entitled to absolute immunity from liability for damages for their judicial acts. 

Butz, 438 U.S. at 514.

¶19 The Supreme Court's reasoning in Butz is equally appropriate in the

present case involving DOL hearing examiner Maronick. The proceedings

before state hearing examiners are adversarial in nature. See § 2-4-102(4),

MCA. In addition, state hearing examiners generally have the power to issue

subpoenas, regulate the course of hearings, and provide for the taking of

depositions. Section 2-4-611(3), MCA. They also have the authority to render

or recommend decisions and must issue findings of fact and conclusions of

law in support of their decisions. See §§ 2-4-611, 2-4-614(1)(f), and 2-4-623,

MCA; see also §§ 39-51-2402 and 39-51-2403, MCA. Furthermore, the

DOL's hearing examiners or appeals referees must be impartial, salaried

employees. Section 39-51-305, MCA. We conclude, therefore, that the

DOL's hearing examiners perform adjudicatory functions comparable to those

performed by judges under similar safeguards. As a result, we further

conclude that those hearing examiners are entitled to absolute judicial

immunity when acting in their adjudicatory capacities. The question remains

whether Maronick was acting in an adjudicatory capacity when he ruled on

McGregor's motion to preclude Steele from representing Log Homes in the

contested administrative hearing.

¶20 It cannot be disputed that ruling on a motion in a proceeding to

adjudicate legal rights and liabilities is a judicial function whether it is

performed by a judge in court or a hearing examiner in a contested

administrative proceeding. Nor can it be disputed that Maronick's act of

ruling on a pending motion was within the authority granted him under 

§ 2-4-611(3), MCA, to regulate the course of the proceedings before him. That

Maronick enforced § 37-61-201, MCA, against Steele, but not against other

CPAs, does not change the fundamental judicial nature of Maronick's action

in ruling on McGregor's motion. Judicial immunity "is dependent on the

challenged conduct being an official judicial act within [the judge's] statutory

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jurisdiction, broadly construed." Dennis v. Sparks (1980), 449 U.S. 24, 29,

101 S.Ct. 183, 187, 66 L.Ed.2d 185, 190 (citations omitted). It is not

dependent on acting correctly. Indeed, a person acting in a judicial capacity

will not be deprived of immunity because he or she acted maliciously,

mistakenly, or in excess of authority. See Stump v. Sparkman (1978), 435

U.S. 349, 356-57, 98 S.Ct. 1099, 1105, 55 L.Ed.2d 331, 339 (citation omitted).

¶21 Steele argues, however, that Maronick's action of precluding him from

representing clients was a legislative, rather than a judicial, action and, as a

result, that Maronick is not entitled to judicial immunity. He relies on

Supreme Court of Va. v. Consumers Union (1980), 446 U.S. 719, 100 S.Ct.

1967, 64 L.Ed.2d 641, but his reliance is misplaced.

¶22 In Consumers Union, the Supreme Court addressed whether the

Virginia Supreme Court (Virginia Court) and its chief justice were immune

from suit in a § 1983 action "challenging the Virginia Court's disciplinary

rules governing the conduct of attorneys. . . ." Consumers Union, 446 U.S. at

721. The Supreme Court concluded, inter alia, that judicial immunity was not

available because the attorney disciplinary rules were propounded in the

Virginia Court's legislative--rather than adjudicative--capacity. Consumers

Union, 446 U.S. at 731.

¶23 Here, Maronick was not promulgating, or attempting to promulgate,

attorney disciplinary rules when he ruled on McGregor's motion to preclude. 

Those rules have been promulgated by this Court. Maronick was simply

ruling on the merits of a pending motion as a matter of law and, as discussed

above, ruling on a motion is a judicial function. Thus, the Consumers Union

conclusion on which Steele relies has no application in the present case. 

¶24 We hold that Maronick is entitled to absolute judicial immunity from

suit for civil damages for the act of ruling on McGregor's motion to preclude

Steele from representing Log Homes.

 b. Quasi-judicial Immunity

¶25 The doctrine of immunity evolved to protect not only judges, but also

certain participants in the judicial process whose functions are closely

associated with those of judicial officers. See Butz, 438 U.S. at 509-10. 

Indeed, grand jurors and prosecutors have been extended absolute immunity

as "quasi-judicial officers" because their judgments are functionally

comparable to those made by judges. The immunity they receive is termed

quasi-judicial immunity. Butz, 438 U.S. at 512 (citation omitted).

¶26 Quasi-judicial immunity is the same absolute immunity from suit as

judicial immunity; it is not a mere defense to liability. Dellenbach, 889 F.2d

at 758 (citation omitted). Like judicial immunity, quasi-judicial immunity

benefits the public--not the person being sued--by ensuring that quasi-judicial

officers exercise their functions unfettered by fear of legal consequences; also

like judicial immunity, quasi-judicial immunity extends only to acts within the

scope of the actor's jurisdiction and with the authorization of law. See Turner

v. American Bar Ass'n (N.D. Tex. 1975), 407 F.Supp. 451, 482 (citation

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omitted). To be protected by quasi-judicial immunity, the person asserting the

immunity must have acted in a quasi-judicial capacity. See Anderson v. Boyd

(9th Cir. 1983), 714 F.2d 906, 909. 

¶27 The Named Defendants assert that DOL attorney McGregor is an

officer of the court who merely discharged his duty under the Montana Rules

of Professional Conduct in notifying the hearing examiner that Steele was

practicing law without a license. As a result, they argue that McGregor is

entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity. We agree.

¶28 Article VII, Section 2(3) of the Montana Constitution expressly

authorizes this Court to make rules governing the conduct of attorneys in this

state. Indeed, we have interpreted that provision as vesting this Court with the

exclusive authority to make such rules regulating attorneys, who are officers

of the court. Harlen v. City of Helena (1984), 208 Mont. 45, 49-50, 676 P.2d

191, 193 (citations omitted). We exercised that constitutional authority by

issuing our Order Adopting Rules of Professional Conduct in Cause No. 84-303

on June 6, 1985. Our order specifically made the Montana Rules of

Professional Conduct (M.R.Prof'l Conduct) applicable to all members of the

State Bar, which includes all persons admitted to the practice of law in

Montana. See In re Unified Bar of Montana (1975), 165 Mont. 1, 2-3, 530

P.2d 765, 765. 

¶29 Rule 5.5(b), M.R.Prof'l Conduct, prohibits an attorney from assisting

"a person who is not a member the bar in the performance of activity that

constitutes the unauthorized practice of law." McGregor is an attorney subject

to the Rules of Professional Conduct. It was McGregor's opinion that Steele's

representation of Log Homes at the DOL hearing would constitute the practice

of law by Steele, who is not an attorney. Thus, as McGregor saw it, such

representation by Steele would constitute the "unauthorized practice of law"

as that phrase is used in Rule 5.5(b), M.R.Prof'l Conduct.

¶30 Under these circumstances, attorney McGregor was required by Rule

5.5(b) to refrain from assisting Steele in what McGregor perceived to be the

unauthorized practice of law. He met that court-ordered obligation by moving

to preclude Steele's representation of Log Homes. His motion was within his

jurisdiction as a lawyer and authorized by our order promulgating the conduct

rules and, specifically, by Rule 5.5(b), M.R.Prof'l Conduct. We conclude that

McGregor was acting as an officer of the court when he moved to preclude

Steele from representing Log Homes and, therefore, that his motion was a

quasi-judicial act carrying out this Court's order and directives in an area

within our exclusive purview. To conclude otherwise would produce the

anomalous and untenable result of subjecting an attorney acting in direct

response to an order of this Court to legal consequences. We hold, therefore,

that McGregor is entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity from suit for

civil damages for his action in moving to preclude Steele from representing

clients in DOL proceedings.

¶31 Because Maronick and McGregor are entitled to judicial and quasi-judicial

immunity, respectively, we hold that the District Court did not err in

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dismissing Steele's complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief

could be granted.

¶32 Affirmed. 

 /S/ KARLA M. GRAY

We concur:

/S/ JAMES C. NELSON

/S/ WILLIAM E. HUNT, SR.

/S/ JIM REGNIER 

Justice Terry N. Trieweiler specially concurring.

¶33 I concur with the majority's conclusion that defendant Joseph V.

Maronick is entitled to judicial immunity from liability for the acts complained

of by the plaintiff, Robert G. Steele. However, I disagree that judicial or

quasi-judicial immunity applies to defendant Daniel P. McGregor who was

merely a state attorney acting in a non-judicial, adversarial capacity when he

moved to have Robert B. Steele disqualified from representing Neville Log

Homes. 

¶34 I do, however, specially concur with the result of the majority opinion. 

I conclude that McGregor was entitled to qualified immunity pursuant to

Harlow v. Fitzgerald (1982), 457 U.S. 800. In this case, based on rules of this

Court pertaining to unauthorized practice of law, and based on advice from the

Commission on the Unauthorized Practice of Law, McGregor could

reasonably assume there was an ethical basis for challenging Steele's

representation, even though other non-lawyers had been permitted to represent

clients in the same proceedings in the past. Pursuant to Harlow, government

employees are "shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their

conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights

of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818. 

I conclude that the allegations in this case are insufficient under the

circumstances in this case to establish that McGregor violated clearly

established statutory or constitutional rights about which a reasonable person

would have known.

¶35 For these reasons, I would affirm the judgment of the District Court,

and specially concur with the majority opinion.

 /S/ TERRY N. TRIEWEILER

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