FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

JOEL ALEXANDER WRIGHT,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 20-50361

D.C. Nos.

3:16-cr-00354-DMS-1

3:16-cr-00354-DMS

ORDER AND 

AMENDED OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of California

Dana M. Sabraw, Chief District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted December 9, 2021

Pasadena, California

Filed July 29, 2022

Amended August 29, 2022

Before: Marsha S. Berzon and Carlos T. Bea, Circuit 

Judges, and Richard D. Bennett,* District Judge.

Order;

Opinion by Judge Bennett

* The Honorable Richard D. Bennett, United States Senior District 

Judge for the District of Maryland, sitting by designation.
2 UNITED STATES V. WRIGHT

SUMMARY**

Criminal Law

The panel amended an opinion filed July 29, 2022, 

affirming the district court’s denial of Joel Alexander 

Wright’s motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) in which Wright requested a reduction to 

time served and immediate release, or, in the alternative, 

home detention for the balance of his sentence. 

The panel amended the opinion to clarify that its holding 

applies equally to district court decisions that predate and 

postdate United States v. Aruda, 993 F.3d 797 (9th Cir. 

2021) (per curiam).

Wright contended that the district court abused its 

discretion by denying his motion based on the dangerousness 

finding imposed by U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13. In Aruda, this Court 

held that the current version of § 1B1.13 is not an applicable 

policy statement for § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) motions filed by a 

defendant. Following Aruda, while the Sentencing 

Commission’s statements in § 1B1.13 may inform a district 

court’s discretion for § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) motions filed by a 

defendant, they cannot be treated as binding constraints on 

the court’s analysis. Here, the district court did precisely 

what Aruda proscribes: it denied Wright’s motion by 

holding that he failed to demonstrate that he is “not a danger 

to others or [to] the community” pursuant to § 1B1.13. The 

panel wrote that this holding is an abuse of discretion. 

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It 

has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
UNITED STATES V. WRIGHT 3 

The panel held that Aruda error is harmless if the court 

properly relied on 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors as 

an alternative basis for its denial of a compassionate release 

motion, as the district court did here when it held in the 

alternative that the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors 

weighed “squarely against” granting Wright’s 

compassionate release motion. The panel wrote that 

although Wright may take issue with the balance the court 

struck, mere disagreement with the weight of these factors 

does not amount to an abuse of discretion. The panel 

therefore held that the district court’s reliance on § 1B1.13 

was harmless error.

 Wright also contended that the district court abused its 

discretion by failing to respond to his alternative request to 

serve the rest of his sentence under home confinement. The 

panel held that the district court adequately addressed that 

request, as Wright did not adduce any evidence or advance 

any arguments in support of it, which rested on the same 

legal and factual foundation as his request for a time-served 

sentence. Given the arguments made and the judge’s 

knowledge of the record, the panel was satisfied that the 

judge adequately considered Wright’s motion and had a 

reasoned basis for exercising his own legal decision-making 

authority. 

COUNSEL

Jessica Agatstein (argued) and Katie Hurrelbrink, Federal 

Defenders of San Diego Inc., San Diego, California, for 

Defendant-Appellant. 
4 UNITED STATES V. WRIGHT

Joseph S. Green (argued), Assistant United States Attorney; 

Daniel E. Zipp, Chief, Appellate Section, Criminal Division; 

Randy S. Grossman, Acting United States Attorney; United 

States Attorney’s Office, San Diego, California; for 

Plaintiff-Appellee.

ORDER

The opinion filed July 29, 2022, is amended by the 

opinion filed concurrently with this order. These 

amendments clarify that our holding applies equally to 

district court decisions that predate and postdate United 

States v. Aruda, 993 F.3d 797 (9th Cir. 2021) (per curiam). 

No future petitions for rehearing or rehearing en banc 

will be entertained. The mandate issued on August 22, 2022, 

remains in effect.

OPINION

BENNETT, District Judge:

After pleading guilty in 2016 to the attempted enticement 

of a minor, Joel Alexander Wright was sentenced to 

188 months’ imprisonment followed by lifetime supervised 

release. After serving about five years of that sentence, 

Wright petitioned for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3582(c)(1)(A), requesting a sentence reduction to time 

served and immediate release, or, in the alternative, home 

detention for the balance of his sentence. After reviewing 

Wright’s motion and his briefings, the district court denied 

this motion. On appeal, Wright contends the court abused its 
UNITED STATES V. WRIGHT 5

discretion by denying his motion based on the dangerousness 

finding imposed by U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13, and by declining to 

consider his alternative request to serve the rest of his 

sentence under home confinement.

We affirm the holding of the district court as to both 

issues. We have recently held that a district court abuses its 

discretion by construing the U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 policy 

statement as binding. See United States v. Aruda, 993 F.3d 

797, 799, 802 (9th Cir. 2021) (per curiam).1 Nevertheless, 

any error by the district court here in relying on § 1B1.13 

was harmless in light of the court’s alternative holding under 

the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors. Additionally, as 

Wright did not adduce any evidence or advance any 

arguments in support of his alternative request for home 

confinement, the district court adequately addressed that 

request.

BACKGROUND2

In January 2016, Wright was arrested at the San Diego 

Airport for the attempted enticement of a minor and related 

charges. In April 2016, Wright waived indictment and 

pleaded guilty to violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b). During 

his sentencing in July 2016, defense counsel recommended

the statutory mandatory minimum 120 months’ 

1 Wright’s motion for compassionate release was filed in September 

2020 and denied in December 2020, approximately four months before 

this Court issued its opinion in Aruda on April 8, 2021. The principles 

articulated in this opinion apply equally to district court decisions that 

predate and postdate Aruda.

2 To the extent that record information referenced in this opinion has 

been filed under seal, we hereby unseal it for the limited purpose of this 

opinion.
6 UNITED STATES V. WRIGHT

imprisonment, while the Government requested 168 months. 

Defense counsel spoke to the unusual hardships Wright 

would experience in custody, and argued that “the reality of 

supervision, combined with his disabilities . . . should speak 

somewhat to the court’s legitimate concern for 

incapacitation.” The Government highlighted the very 

serious nature of Wright’s offenses and noted that he had 

made “a sophisticated attempt” to commit them “despite all 

of his physical struggles.”

On balance, the district court found that the facts of 

Wright’s case were “most deserving of punishment for 

punishment’s sake alone, and most deserving of imposing a 

sentence that will protect society.” The court recognized that 

Wright’s “overwhelmingly positive” personal history and 

characteristics—including his family support, his faith, and 

his remorse—counselled mitigation. Nevertheless, the Court 

noted that Wright had “continued to pursue this activity” 

despite his “remorse and misgivings,” and notwithstanding 

his physical disabilities. Accordingly, commensurate with 

the advisory United States Sentencing Guidelines, and the 

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors, the court sentenced 

Wright to 188 months’ imprisonment followed by a lifetime 

period of supervised release. Wright is housed at the Federal 

Correctional Institution (“FCI”) Danbury, Connecticut, and 

is projected to be released in June of 2029.

Wright has struggled with disabilities throughout his life. 

Although Wright received some treatment in the custody of 

the Bureau of Prisons, his health continued to decline.

In September 2020, Wright filed a motion for 

compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), 

pursuant to the First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, 

132 Stat. 5194. Through this motion, Wright requested a 

reduced sentence of time served, and argued in the 
UNITED STATES V. WRIGHT 7

alternative that his sentence “be modified to allow him to 

serve the rest of his sentence under home confinement as a 

condition of supervised release.” At the time of this motion, 

Wright had served about five years of his 188-month 

sentence, with approximately ten years remaining. In 

support of his request for a time-served sentence, Wright 

argued that his medical conditions rendered him particularly 

susceptible to COVID-19 and that the prisons were not 

equipped to protect him from the spread of the virus. In 

addition, Wright argued that the prison’s COVID-19 

lockdown protocols had prevented him from receiving the 

assistance he requires due to his disabilities.

Although Wright argued in favor of a time served 

sentence, he provided no additional arguments to support his 

alternative request for home confinement. Home 

confinement was mentioned in passing throughout the body 

of the motion, and Wright concluded by “respectfully 

request[ing] that the Court grant a reduction in his sentence 

to time served with a condition of home detention for the rest 

of his sentence,” but he failed entirely to discuss why this 

request was appropriate. Nowhere in the motion was there 

any discussion of the specific conditions to be imposed, how 

such conditions would suffice to protect the public and 

prevent Wright from reoffending, or why such conditions 

would amount to just punishment in this case.

The district court denied Wright’s motion on December 

21, 2020. Declining to address whether Wright’s medical 

conditions constitute “extraordinary and compelling” 

reasons for a sentence reduction, the court found that the 

U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 policy statement and the 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3553(a) sentencing factors weighed against a sentence 

reduction. Under § 1B1.13, the court found Wright had 

failed to show that he was “not a danger to others or the 
8 UNITED STATES V. WRIGHT

community” given “the disturbing nature of Defendant’s 

crime” and the fact that he had committed it while he “was 

already” suffering from the same disabilities. Under 

§ 3553(a), the court reiterated its concerns about 

dangerousness, and concluded that the “overarching goals of 

punishment, deterrence, protection of society, and 

rehabilitation” weighed “squarely against” compassionate 

release. The court did not specifically address Wright’s 

request for home confinement as a condition of supervised 

release.

This appeal followed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A district court’s ruling on a compassionate release 

motion under § 3582(c)(1) is reviewed for abuse of 

discretion. Aruda, 993 F.3d at 799. “A district court may 

abuse its discretion if it does not apply the correct law or if 

it rests its decision on a clearly erroneous finding of material

fact.” Id. (quoting United States v. Dunn, 728 F.3d 1151, 

1155 (9th Cir. 2013)); see United States v. Hinkson, 585 F.3d 

1247, 1251 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (holding that a district 

court’s ruling is an abuse of discretion if it reaches a 

conclusion that is “illogical, implausible, or without support 

in inferences that may be drawn from the facts in the 

record.”); Dunn, 728 F.3d at 1159 (“[M]ere disagreement 

does not amount to an abuse of discretion.”).

DISCUSSION

I. The District Court’s Aruda Error was Harmless in 

Light of its Alternative Holding Under § 3553(a)

Ordinarily, “a federal court ‘may not modify a term of 

imprisonment once it has been imposed.’” United States v. 
UNITED STATES V. WRIGHT 9

Keller, 2 F.4th 1278, 1281 (9th Cir. 2021) (quoting 

18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)). Through the Comprehensive Crime 

Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837, 

Congress created a limited exception to this rule by 

authorizing courts to grant compassionate release when 

“extraordinary and compelling reasons” warrant a reduction 

in sentence. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). As compassionate 

release derogates from the principle of finality, it is a 

“narrow” remedy, see Freeman v. United States, 564 U.S. 

522, 526 (2011), and the court’s disposition of a 

compassionate release motion “is discretionary, not 

mandatory,” United States v. Jones, 980 F.3d 1098, 1106 

(6th Cir. 2020) (citing United States v. Curry, 606 F.3d 323, 

330 (6th Cir. 2010)).

The First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 

Stat. 5194, established significant changes to the procedures 

for filing a motion for compassionate release. As originally 

enacted, § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) vested the Bureau of Prisons 

with exclusive discretion to file compassionate release 

motions. Aruda, 993 F.3d at 799. The Department of Justice 

found in 2013 that this process was marked by delays and 

mismanagement, and that the Bureau exercised this 

discretion so “sparingly” that “an average of only 

24 imprisoned persons were released each year by BOP 

motion.” United States v. McCoy, 981 F.3d 271, 276 (4th 

Cir. 2020); United States v. Brooker, 976 F.3d 228, 230–32 

(2d Cir. 2020) (observing that out of 208 prisoners approved 

for compassionate release, 13% died awaiting a final 

decision by the BOP Director). Accordingly, “Congress 

amended § 3582(c)(1)(A) to ‘remove the Bureau of Prisons 

from its . . . role as a gatekeeper over compassionate release 

petitions,’” and to expand the use of the compassionate 

release process. McCoy, 981 F.3d at 276. Following the 

passage of the First Step Act, defendants are authorized to 
10 UNITED STATES V. WRIGHT

directly petition the court for compassionate release after 

exhausting their administrative remedies within the Bureau 

of Prisons.3 Keller, 2 F.4th at 1281.

The First Step Act grants courts the discretion to 

consider compassionate release motions on an 

individualized basis. See Brooker, 976 F.3d at 230. As the 

Sixth Circuit recently observed, the exercise of this 

discretion is controlled by three substantive considerations. 

See Jones, 980 F.3d at 1107–08 (citing Dillon v. United 

States, 560 U.S. 817, 827, 829–30 (2010)). First, the district 

court must determine whether “extraordinary and 

compelling reasons warrant” a sentence reduction. Id.

at 1107–08 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i)). Second, 

the court must evaluate whether a reduction would be 

“consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the 

Sentencing Commission.” Id. at 1108 (quoting 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3582(c)(1)(A)). Third, the court must consider and weigh 

the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) to decide whether 

the requested sentence reduction is warranted “under the 

particular circumstances of the case.” Id. (quoting Dillon, 

560 U.S. at 827).4 Although a district court must conclude 

3 Specifically, a defendant may file a motion for compassionate 

release only if he or she has submitted a request to the warden of his or 

her facility, and either: (1) the warden has denied that request and the 

defendant has exhausted all rights to appeal within the Bureau of Prisons; 

or (2) thirty days have lapsed since the request was submitted. Keller, 

2 F.4th at 1281; 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).

4 These factors include, among other things: (1) the defendant’s 

personal history and characteristics; (2) his sentence relative to the 

nature and seriousness of his offense; (3) the need for a sentence to 

provide just punishment, promote respect for the law, reflect the 

seriousness of the offense, deter crime, and protect the public; (4) the 

need for rehabilitative services; (5) the applicable sentence guidelines; 
UNITED STATES V. WRIGHT 11

that a defendant satisfies all three predicates before granting 

a motion for compassionate release, it may deny 

compassionate release if a defendant fails to satisfy any of 

these grounds. Keller, 2 F.4th at 1284.

The Sentencing Commission’s policy statement located 

at U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 governs the analysis of compassionate 

release motions. This policy requires a court to determine 

that “[t]he defendant is not a danger to the safety of any other 

person or to the community” before granting compassionate 

release. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(2).5 However, U.S.S.G. 

§ 1B1.13 has not been updated to reflect the passage of the 

First Step Act. Consequently, in United States v. Aruda, this 

Court held that the current version of U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 “is 

not an ‘applicable policy statement[]’ for 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3582(c)(1)(A) motions filed by a defendant.” 993 F.3d 

at 802 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)) (alteration in 

original).6 Following Aruda, while “[t]he Sentencing 

and (6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities among 

similarly situated defendants. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).

5 To make a dangerousness finding, a court must consider: (1) the 

nature and circumstances of the offense; (2) the weight of the evidence 

against the defendant; (3) the defendant’s history and characteristics; and 

(4) the nature and seriousness of the danger the defendant would pose to 

others upon release. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g).

6 In so holding, we joined a growing consensus among the federal 

circuits that § 1B1.13 is not an “applicable policy statement” to defensefiled compassionate release motions in light of the First Step Act. United 

States v. Long, 997 F.3d 342, 355 (D.C. Cir. 2021); Brooker, 976 F.3d 

at 235–36; McCoy, 981 F.3d at 281–82; United States v. Shkambi, 

993 F.3d 388, 392–93 (5th Cir. 2021); Jones, 980 F.3d at 1109–11; 

United States v. Gunn, 980 F.3d 1178, 1180–81 (7th Cir. 2020); United 

States v. McGee, 992 F.3d 1035, 1049–50 (10th Cir. 2021). But see 

United States v. Bryant, 996 F.3d 1243, 1247 (11th Cir. 2021) (“1B1.13 
12 UNITED STATES V. WRIGHT

Commission’s statements in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 may inform 

a district court’s discretion for § 3582(c)(1)(A) motions filed 

by a defendant,” they cannot be treated as binding 

constraints on the court’s analysis. 993 F.3d at 802.

In the case before us, the district court did precisely what 

Aruda proscribes: It denied Wright’s motion by holding that 

he failed to demonstrate that he is “not a danger to others or 

[to] the community” pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13. This 

holding was an abuse of discretion. However, the court also 

held in the alternative that the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) 

sentencing factors weighed “squarely against” granting 

Wright’s compassionate release motion. Accordingly, this 

case requires us to decide whether an Aruda error requires 

reversal if the district court denies the defendant’s motion 

under § 3553(a) in the alternative. For the reasons stated 

below, we hold that such an error is harmless.

As an initial matter, we must determine whether Aruda 

controls this issue. “[W]here a panel confronts an issue 

germane to the eventual resolution of the case, and resolves 

it after reasoned consideration in a published opinion, that 

ruling becomes the law of the circuit,” United States v. 

McAdory, 935 F.3d 838, 843 (9th Cir. 2019) (quoting 

Cetacean Cmty. v. Bush, 386 F.3d 1169, 1173 (9th Cir. 

2004)) (alteration in original), and “the matter is deemed 

resolved, unless overruled by the court itself sitting en banc, 

or by the Supreme Court.” Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 

1155, 1171 (9th Cir. 2001). To determine the scope of a prior 

holding, a court must evaluate not only “the rule announced, 

but also the facts giving rise to the dispute, other rules 

considered and rejected[,] and the views expressed in 

is still an applicable policy statement for a [compassionate release] 

motion, no matter who files it.”).
UNITED STATES V. WRIGHT 13

response to any dissent or concurrence.” Id. at 1170–71 

(citing Fisher v. Prince, 97 Eng. Rep. 876, 876 (K.B. 1762)).

Wright claims Aruda forecloses any harmless error 

analysis, as the district court in that case also weighed the 

§ 3553(a) sentencing factors, and we did not hold that its 

reliance on § 1B1.13 was harmless. See United States v. 

Aruda, 472 F. Supp. 3d 847, 856 (D. Haw. 2020). We 

disagree. Whatever factual similarities may exist between 

these cases,7 the Government did not argue harmless error in 

Aruda, and the Aruda panel did not mention this issue 

anywhere in its opinion, much less grant it “reasoned 

consideration.” McAdory, 935 F.3d at 843 (quoting 

Cetacean, 386 F.3d at 1173); accord United States v. 

Murguia-Rodriguez, 815 F.3d 566, 572 (9th Cir. 2016) (“As 

a general and consistent rule, ‘when the government fails to 

argue harmlessness, we . . . do not consider the harmlessness 

of any errors we find.’”) (quoting United States v. Kloehn, 

620 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2010)); United States v. 

Gonzalez-Flores, 418 F.3d 1093, 1100 (9th Cir. 2005)).8

7 We are skeptical that Aruda is analogous. The district court in 

Aruda conflated its assessment of § 3553(a) and § 1B1.13 and analyzed 

the two standards in tandem. See id. at 856 (assessing “Section 3553(a) 

Factors & Risk of Danger to the Community”). Here, the district court 

kept the analyses largely distinct. Although the court incorporated 

related facts from the dangerousness analysis by reference, this was not 

error—both standards explicitly require the court to consider “the nature 

and circumstances of the offense” and “the history and characteristics” 

of the defendant, as well as the need to protect the public. Compare 

18 U.S.C. § 3142(g) (dangerousness), with 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), (2) 

(sentencing factors).

8 Wright argues that the Government in Aruda addressed this issue 

in the closing paragraphs of its brief. This contention mischaracterizes 

the Government’s position, which is better viewed as an argument for 

judicial restraint. The Government argued only that the Aruda Court 
14 UNITED STATES V. WRIGHT

Accordingly, the holding in Aruda does not stretch as far as 

Wright contends.

This Court’s subsequent decisions suggest that the 

district court’s error in this case was harmless. In United 

States v. Keller, decided after Aruda, we held that “a district 

court that properly denies compassionate release need not 

evaluate each step” in the “sequential step-by-step analysis” 

required by 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). 2 F.4th at 1284 

(emphasis in original). Such a reading is compelled by the 

structure of the compassionate release statute, which treats 

its requirements as conjunctive. Id. This structure 

necessarily dictates that a court may deny compassionate 

release at any stage of the § 3582(c)(1)(A) pipeline. See, e.g., 

United States v. Keitt, 21 F.4th 67, 73 n.4 (2d Cir. 2021) 

(collecting cases); United States v. Elias, 984 F.3d 516, 519 

(6th Cir. 2021); United States v. Tinker, 14 F.4th 1234, 

1238–40 (11th Cir. 2021). The logical endpoint of this rule 

is that when a district court properly denies a compassionate 

release motion on at least one ground, improper 

considerations at other steps of this analysis have no effect 

on the final disposition. Such errors are harmless, and do not 

require reversal.

should rule on the § 3553(a) factors without deciding whether § 1B1.13 

was an “applicable policy statement”—it did not claim that any 

erroneous application of § 1B1.13 had no effect on the result. To the 

extent that this may be construed as a harmless error argument, it was 

undeveloped and was not addressed by the court. See MurguiaRodriguez, 815 F.3d at 572–73 (emphasizing that this court will 

ordinarily decline to address harmless error “even when the government 

‘mentions’ that harmless error applies in its brief but fails to advance a 

developed theory about how the errors were harmless.’” (quoting 

Gonzalez-Flores, 418 F.3d at 1100 n.4)).
UNITED STATES V. WRIGHT 15

Consistent with this proposition, other circuits to address 

the issue have held that an erroneous application of § 1B1.13 

is harmless if “the court’s weighing of the § 3553(a) factors 

independently supports its decision.” United States v. 

Sanders, 992 F.3d 583, 588 n.3 (7th Cir. 2021); see, e.g.,

United States v. Tomes, 990 F.3d 500, 503 (6th Cir. 2021) 

(“[E]ven if a district court wrongly constrains itself to 

§ 1B1.13 to define extraordinary and compelling reasons for 

release, we can still affirm if the court uses § 3553(a) as an 

independent reason to deny relief.”).9 We hold that although 

a district court addressing a compassionate release motion 

filed by a defendant may not construe U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 as 

a binding constraint on its discretion, such an error is 

harmless if the court properly relied on the 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3553(a) sentencing factors as an alternative basis for its 

holding.

Such is the case here. In its opinion denying Wright’s 

motion, the district court improperly relied on U.S.S.G. 

§ 1B1.13 to conclude that Wright presents a danger to the 

community. However, the district court held in the 

alternative that the § 3553(a) factors “weigh squarely against 

9 This Court has consistently reached the same conclusion in nonprecedential memorandum dispositions interpreting Aruda and Keller. 

See, e.g., United States v. Washington, No. 21-10017, 2021 WL 

5399861, *1 (9th Cir. Nov. 18, 2021); United States v. Smith, No. 21-

50017, 2021 WL 4922412, *1 (9th Cir. Oct. 21, 2021); United States v. 

Decano, No. 21-10099, 2021 WL 4922348, *1 (9th Cir. Oct. 21, 2021); 

United States v. Granderson, No. 20-10407, 857 F. App’x 407, 407 (9th 

Cir. Aug. 23, 2021); United States v. Tadios, No. 20-10434, 854 F. 

App’x 804, 804 (9th Cir. Aug. 2, 2021). Although memorandum 

dispositions are “not precedent, except when relevant under the doctrine 

of law of the case or rules of claim preclusion or issue preclusion,” 

Grimm v. City of Portland, 971 F.3d 1060, 1067 (2020) (quoting U.S. 

Ct. of App. 9th Cir. R. 36-3(a)), we find the reasoning in these 

memorandum dispositions persuasive.
16 UNITED STATES V. WRIGHT

release.” In its evaluation of the § 3553(a) sentencing 

factors, the court concluded that the severity of Wright’s 

offense underscored “the need to provide just punishment 

and promote respect for law” and the “strong need to protect 

the public.” The court correctly weighed these 

considerations against Wright’s “history and characteristics, 

including [his] positive support from family members and 

others as well as his various health ailments and difficult 

childhood.” And it concluded that “[t]o so dramatically 

reduce [Wright’s] sentence . . . would neither be just nor 

promote respect for the law; if anything, it would promote 

disrespect for the law.” Although Wright may take issue with 

the balance the court struck, “mere disagreement” with the 

weight of these factors “does not amount to an abuse of 

discretion.” Dunn, 728 F.3d at 1159. We therefore hold that 

the district court’s reliance on § 1B1.13 was harmless error.

II. The Court Adequately Explained its Denial of 

Wright’s Motion

Wright also contends that the district court abused its 

discretion by failing to respond to his request for home 

confinement. “It is a general principle of federal sentencing 

law that district courts have a duty to explain their sentencing 

decisions.” United States v. Emmett, 749 F.3d 817, 820 (9th 

Cir. 2014) (citing United States v. Carty, 520 F.3d 984, 992–

93 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc); United States v. Trujillo, 

713 F.3d 1003, 1009 (9th Cir. 2013)); accord Concepcion v. 

United States, ___ S. Ct. ___, 2022 WL 2295029, at *12 

(2022) (“It is well established that a district court must 

generally consider the parties’ nonfrivolous arguments 

before it.”). As the duty to provide a reasoned explanation is 

ultimately grounded in the sentencing court’s responsibility 

to consider the § 3553(a) factors, Trujillo, 713 F.3d at 1009, 

it applies both “to the initial sentence imposed by the district 
UNITED STATES V. WRIGHT 17

court, and . . . to rulings on requests for a sentenc[e] 

reduction,” Emmett, 749 F.3d at 820; accord Chavez-Meza 

v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1959, 1963 (2018) (anchoring 

this duty in the statutory requirement that judges their 

explain sentencing decisions “in open court” (quoting 

18 U.S.C. § 3553(c))). Such explanations facilitate 

“meaningful appellate review” of sentencing decisions, Gall 

v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 50 (2007), and reinforce “the 

public’s trust in the judicial institution,” Rita v. United 

States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007), by “communicat[ing] that 

the parties’ arguments have been heard, and that a reasoned 

decision has been made,” Carty, 520 F.3d at 992.

To fulfill this responsibility, a sentencing judge must 

articulate “a sufficient explanation of the sentencing 

decision to permit meaningful appellate review.” Trujillo, 

713 F.3d at 1009; accord United States v. Cook, 998 F.3d 

1180, 1183–84 (11th Cir. 2021); United States v. High, 

997 F.3d 181, 188–89 (4th Cir. 2021). What constitutes 

sufficient explanation depends on “the complexity of the 

particular case,” including the exhaustiveness of the record 

and the nature of the parties’ arguments. Carty, 520 F.3d at 

995–96. Ordinarily, a judge should address any “specific, 

nonfrivolous argument tethered to a relevant § 3553(a) 

factor in support of a requested sentence,” and “explain why 

he accepts or rejects the party’s position.” Id. at 992–93. 

Nevertheless, a judge is not required to exhaustively analyze 

every factor or to expound upon every issue raised by a 

defendant. Id. at 995–96; accord High, 997 F.3d at 188–89 

(rejecting a “categorical rule” that a sentencing court must 

“invariably acknowledge and address each of the 

defendant’s arguments on the record” (emphasis in 

original)). Rather, the judge “need only ‘set forth enough to 

satisfy the appellate court that he has considered the parties’ 

arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising his own 
18 UNITED STATES V. WRIGHT

legal decisionmaking authority.’” Chavez-Meza, 138 S. Ct. 

at 1964 (citation omitted). Provided this standard is met, the 

length and exhaustiveness of a judicial explanation is a 

matter of “professional judgment.” Rita, 551 U.S. at 356; 

accord United States v. Ugbah, 4 F.4th 595, 598 (7th Cir. 

2021) (“Section 3582(c)(1) concerns the length of 

imprisonment, not the length of judicial opinions.”). 

Consistent with these principles, in United States v. 

Trujillo, this Court held that a district court erred when it 

overlooked extensive, nonfrivolous arguments and evidence 

filed in support of relevant § 3553(a) factors. 713 F.3d 

at 1010. In Trujillo, the defendant filed a motion for sentence 

reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), citing “his family 

ties, his lack of other criminal history, his post-sentencing 

rehabilitation, and the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing 

disparities.” Id. at 1005. The district court denied his motion, 

highlighting only the nature and circumstances of the 

offense, and offering no discussion of Trujillo’s evidence. 

Id. On appeal, we reversed, observing that the court had 

failed to address “fairly extensive arguments and evidence 

concerning the ‘characteristics of the defendant,’ . . . and 

‘unwarranted sentencing disparities,’” two § 3553(a) 

factors. Id. at 1009–10 (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a)(1), 

3553(a)(6)).10 Reasoning that the Supreme Court has 

10 The appellant in Trujillo presented evidence of “his educational 

history including graduation from technical school as a mechanical 

electrician; the support of his siblings and two children; his considerable 

involvement in constructive prison activities; his post-sentencing 

rehabilitation; and his failing health.” See Trujillo, 713 F.3d at 1009. He 

also cited two decisions by this Court as evidence of the sentencing 

disparities he claimed in his motion. See United States v. Zakharov, 

468 F.3d 1171, 1171, 1175 (9th Cir. 2006); United States v. Perlaza, 

439 F.3d 1149, 1155, 1158 (9th Cir. 2006). The sentencing court failed 

to address any of these materials.
UNITED STATES V. WRIGHT 19

emphasized the importance of this evidence, we held that the 

court’s “total omission” of Trujillo’s “nonfrivolous 

arguments” pursuant to these factors contravened “the 

explicit policy considerations” articulated in Rita and its 

progeny. Id. at 1010–11.

Comparatively, if “the ‘context and the record’” reflect 

that the sentencing judge considered the defendant’s 

substantive arguments and offered “a reasoned basis” for his 

or her decision, a judge need not “provide a lengthy 

explanation” for his or her sentencing decision. ChavezMeza, 138 S. Ct. at 1966 (quoting Rita, 551 U.S. at 356, 

359). In United States v. Chavez-Meza, the petitioner filed a 

motion under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), seeking to reduce his 

sentence to 108 months following an intervening change in 

the Guidelines range applicable to his conviction, and 

offered evidence of rehabilitation in support of this motion. 

Id. at 1965, 1967. The district court granted Chavez-Mesa’s 

motion in part, but reduced his sentence only to 114 months, 

rather than the 108 he requested. Id. at 1965. The judge 

issued his decision on a form order on which he merely 

checked boxes certifying that he “had ‘considered’ 

petitioner’s ‘motion’ and ‘tak[en] into account’ the 

§ 3553(a) factors.” Id. (alteration in original). The court 

offered no further explanation or analysis.

Chavez-Meza appealed, arguing “that the judge did not 

adequately explain why he rejected petitioner’s 108-month 

request.” Id. at 1965. The Supreme Court rejected this 

assertion, placing particular emphasis on “the simplicity of 

[the] case, the judge’s awareness of the arguments, his 

consideration of the relevant sentencing factors, and the 

intuitive reason” for his decision. Id. at 1967–68.

Additionally, the Court observed that petitioner’s motion 

under § 3582(c)(2) had been denied by “the same judge who 
20 UNITED STATES V. WRIGHT

had sentenced petitioner originally,” and at the original 

sentencing hearing, the judge had rejected a downward 

departure from the Guidelines range due to the severity of 

the offense. Id. at 1966–67. These features of the case were 

sufficient to explain why the judge issued “a sentence 

somewhat higher than the bottom of the reduced range” in 

response to Chavez-Meza’s motion. Id. at 1967. 

Accordingly, the “record as a whole satisfie[d]” the Court 

that the sentencing judge had “considered the parties’ 

arguments” and offered “a reasoned basis for exercising his 

own legal decisionmaking authority.” Id. (quoting Rita, 

551 U.S. at 356).

Wright attempts to analogize Trujillo, arguing that the 

district court “failed to even consider” his alternative request 

for home confinement, and that this “total omission” violates 

its responsibility to explain its sentencing decisions. He 

argues that his request for home confinement would allow 

the district court to maintain his 188-month sentence, 

ameliorating the court’s penological concerns regarding 

deterrence, just punishment, and respect for the law, while 

accounting for his medical conditions and mitigating the risk 

that he would pose to the public upon release. He also argues 

that “going from a no-confinement sentence to a homeconfinement sentence tilts the entire § 3553(a) balance in the 

movant’s direction.” Wright did not present these arguments 

in his motion to the district court. His failure to do so is 

dispositive of any claim that the court failed to explain its 

decision.11

11 Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 28(j), Wright filed a citation of 

supplemental authorities referencing the Supreme Court’s recent 

decision in Concepcion v. United States for the principle that a district 

court is “required” to “demonstrate that it has considered the arguments 
UNITED STATES V. WRIGHT 21 

As a preliminary matter, a modified time-served 

sentence is a “necessary predicate” to Wright’s home 

confinement request. Although the compassionate release 

statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), allows a court to reduce 

a defendant’s term of imprisonment, it does not authorize a 

judge to alter the location of a prisoner’s confinement, a 

matter committed to the discretion of the Bureau of Prisons. 

United States v. Ceballos, 671 F.3d 852, 855 (9th Cir. 2011) 

(per curiam) (“While a [district court] judge has wide 

discretion in determining the length and type of sentence, the 

court has no jurisdiction to select the place where the 

sentence will be served. Authority to determine place of 

confinement . . . is delegated to the Bureau of Prisons.” 

(quoting United States v. Dragna, 746 F.2d 457, 458 (9th 

Cir. 1984) (per curiam) (alteration in original)). Instead, 

upon granting a sentence reduction, a court “may impose a 

term of probation or supervised release with or without 

conditions that does not exceed the unserved portion of the 

original term of imprisonment,” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A),

including a condition of home detention “as a substitute for 

imprisonment.” U.S.S.G. § 5F1.2; see also 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3583(c). 

before it.” ___ S. Ct. ___, 2022 WL 2295029, at *12 (2022). This 

language is largely reiterative of the principles announced in Rita and 

Chavez-Meza. Cf. 551 U.S. at 356 (“The sentencing judge should set 

forth enough to satisfy the appellate court that he has considered the 

parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising his own legal 

decisionmaking authority.”); 138 S. Ct. at 1964 (“At bottom, the 

sentencing judge need only ‘set forth enough to satisfy the appellate 

court that he has considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned 

basis for exercising his own legal decisionmaking authority.’”). In any 

event, Concepcion does not help Wright, who failed to offer the district 

court any independent arguments in favor of his alternative request for 

home confinement.
22 UNITED STATES V. WRIGHT

Accordingly, Wright’s request for home confinement

would not allow the district court to “keep his 188-month 

sentence” intact, and would not address the court’s concerns 

regarding just punishment, deterrence, and respect for the 

law. (emphasis omitted). Granting this request would require 

the district court to reduce his sentence to time served and 

impose home detention as a condition of supervised release. 

The district court provided “a reasoned basis” for its refusal 

to do so, Chavez-Meza, 138 S. Ct. at 1966, when it observed 

that Wright had committed his crime while he “was already 

[disabled],” and held that the “overarching goals of 

punishment, deterrence, protection of society, and 

rehabilitation” weigh “squarely against” a time-served 

sentence.

In his briefing before this Court, Wright argues that a 

condition of home confinement would shift “the entire 

§ 3553(a) balance in the movant’s direction,” and ameliorate 

the district court’s concerns about dangerousness and 

recidivism by enhancing the level of supervision imposed in 

his original sentence. However, it was Wright’s burden to 

establish his eligibility for compassionate release, and he did 

not present these arguments to the district court. 

Accordingly, Trujillo is inapposite: In that case, “Trujillo 

presented nonfrivolous arguments, and the district court did 

not at all explain the reasons for rejecting them.” 713 F.3d

at 1011. In this case, Wright advanced no arguments and 

presented no evidence in support of his alternative request 

for home confinement. The motion he filed in the district 

court did not discuss any proposed conditions of home 

confinement, the efficacy of those conditions as a 

mechanism of deterrence, or how a condition of home 

confinement might serve as a “substitute for imprisonment” 

and address the district court’s pronounced penological 
UNITED STATES V. WRIGHT 23

concerns. Cf. U.S.S.G. § 5F1.2.12 Absent such arguments, 

the district court was not required to provide any further 

explanation.

As Wright failed to offer any “specific, nonfrivolous 

argument[s]” on this issue, cf. Trujillo, 713 F.3d at 1009, his 

home confinement request rests on the same legal and 

factual foundation as his request for a time-served 

sentence.13 The district court fully considered and rejected 

those contentions in its opinion. As the court provided a 

sufficient basis for meaningful review, it did not err by 

declining to address home confinement in greater detail. See 

United States v. Amezcua-Vasquez, 567 F.3d 1050, 1053 (9th 

12 The United States Sentencing Guidelines specify that “[h]ome

confinement may be imposed as a condition of probation or supervised 

release, but only as a substitute for imprisonment.” U.S.S.G. § 5F1.2. 

The Guidelines provide that this condition may or may not include 

various exceptions—such as for employment, education, and religious 

services—and may or may not include electronic surveillance. Id. 

Accordingly, a mere request for home detention, without details as to the 

proposed conditions or evidentiary support regarding their efficacy as 

appropriate security and monitoring measures, leaves the district court 

no basis to determine whether home confinement could serve as an 

appropriate “substitute for imprisonment.” See id.

13 For the most part, Wright’s arguments in favor of home 

confinement in his motion are coextensive with the medical concerns 

that the district court addressed in its analysis regarding Wright’s request 

for a sentence reduction to time served—such as access to sex offender 

treatment, difficulties created by his disabilities and vulnerability to 

COVID-19. Wright states in his motion that “home detention . . . will not 

detract from the punitive effect of the sentence,” but offers no support 

for this assertion. As in Chavez-Meza, the response is made obvious by 

the record of Wright’s sentencing: The district court concluded that his 

offense was “most deserving of significant punishment for punishment’s 

sake alone,” and incarceration is more onerous than being in a private 

home with relatives. Accordingly, there is no need for the sentencing 

judge to respond to this statement. Cf. Chavez-Meza, 138 S. Ct. at 1967.
24 UNITED STATES V. WRIGHT

Cir. 2009) (“[T]his obligation does ‘not necessarily require 

lengthy explanation.’” (quoting Rita, 551 U.S. at 356)); 

United States v. Sherwood, 986 F.3d 951, 954 (6th Cir. 2021) 

(“[A] brief order may well be sufficient for purposes of 

denying compassionate release.”); Ugbah, 4 F.4th at 598 

(“Section 3582(c)(1) concerns the length of imprisonment, 

not the length of judicial opinions.”). Although Wright may 

insist that more weight be placed on his disabilities or the 

conditions of his incarceration, “mere disagreement does not 

amount to an abuse of discretion.” Dunn, 728 F.3d at 1159.

This conclusion is buttressed by the features and 

background of the case. Here, as in Chavez-Meza, Wright’s 

motion was decided by the same judge who sentenced him 

originally. During Wright’s initial sentencing, that judge 

considered the effect supervised release would have on the 

potential for recidivism following Wright’s term of 

incarceration, accounting fully for Wright’s disabilities. In 

response to these concerns, the district court imposed no less 

than eleven lifetime supervised release conditions that 

directly address this issue, including computer monitoring 

and “significant intervention and oversight [by] the 

Probation Department.” Whether or not additional 

conditions may further protect the public has no pertinence 

to whether Wright’s incarceration should have been 

terminated early and a more stringent form of supervised 

release substituted. Given the arguments made and given the 

judge’s knowledge of the record, we are satisfied that the 

judge adequately “considered [Wright’s motion] and [had] a 

reasoned basis for exercising his own legal decisionmaking 

authority.” Cf. Chavez-Meza, 138 S. Ct. at 1967. That is all 

that the law requires.

Accordingly, we hold that the district court adequately 

explained its denial of Wright’s motion for compassionate 
UNITED STATES V. WRIGHT 25

release. Accepting that the court was obligated to discuss 

Wright’s home confinement request absent any affirmative 

argument or supporting evidence would require us to hold 

that a judge must explain his rejection of every form of relief 

mentioned in passing in a motion for sentence reduction. 

Both the facts and the reasoning of Chavez-Meza foreclose 

this proposition.14 Although a sentencing judge has an 

obligation to explain his or her decision, he or she is not 

required to “invariably acknowledge and address” every 

form of relief the petitioner requests when the request is 

slight and unsupported. High, 997 F.3d at 188–89. Rather, 

the sentencing judge is only obligated to address the 

petitioner’s “specific, nonfrivolous argument[s] tethered to a 

relevant § 3553(a) factor in support of a requested sentence.”

Carty, 520 F.3d at 992–93. The district court has done so 

here.

CONCLUSION

We AFFIRM the district court’s denial of Wright’s 

motion for compassionate release.

14 As noted above, the holding of a court encompasses “the facts 

giving rise to the dispute, other rules considered and rejected[,] and the 

views expressed in response to any dissent or concurrence.” Hart, 

266 F.3d at 1170. As “a sentence modification is ‘not a plenary 

resentencing proceeding,’” the Chavez-Meza Court rejected the dissent’s 

argument that a judge must articulate all of his reasoning on the record 

at resentencing—and declined to compel the judge to explain his 

rejection of the 108-month sentence the petitioner had proposed. See

138 S. Ct. at 1967 (quoting Dillon, 560 U.S. at 826). Absent nonfrivolous 

arguments in favor of Wright’s home confinement request, we likewise 

decline to do so here.