JSOU Report 13-6 The Nexus of Extremism and Trafficking Howard/Traughber

The Nexus of Extremism 

and Trafficking:

Scourge of the World or So 

Much Hype?

Russell D. Howard

Colleen Traughber

JSOU Report 13-6

October 2013

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Robert Nalepa, Lt. Col., U.S. Air Force, Ret., Director of Research

William Knarr, Ed.D., Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret.; Mark Moyar, Ph.D., History; Richard Rubright, 

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Editorial Advisory Board

Roby C. Barrett

Ph.D., Middle Eastern & South Asian History 

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and JSOU Senior Fellow

Joseph D. Celeski

Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret.

JSOU Senior Fellow

Chuck Cunningham

Lieutenant General, U.S. Air Force, Ret. 

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Warfighting School and 

JSOU Distinguished Senior Fellow

James J.F. Forest 

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Lowell and JSOU Senior Fellow

Thomas H. Henriksen

Ph.D., History, Hoover Institution 

Stanford University and JSOU Senior Fellow

Bernd Horn

Colonel, Canadian Dept. of National Defence 

Ph.D., War Studies

Director, CANSOFCOM Professional 

Development Centre

Russell D. Howard

Brigadier General, U.S. Army, Ret.

JSOU Senior Fellow

John D. Jogerst

Colonel, U.S. Air Force, Ret.

James Kiras

Ph.D., History, School of Advanced Air and 

Space Studies, Air University and 

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William W. Mendel

Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret. 

JSOU Senior Fellow

Alvaro de Souza Pinheiro

Major General, Brazilian Army, Ret.

JSOU Associate Fellow

James F. Powers, Jr.

Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret.

JSOU Senior Fellow 

Thomas Sass

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Richard H. Shultz, Jr.

Ph.D., Political Science

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Studies Program, The Fletcher School, 

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Robert G. Spulak, Jr.

Ph.D., Physics/Nuclear Engineering

Sandia National Laboratories 

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Jessica Glicken Turnley

Ph.D., Cultural Anthropology

Galisteo Consulting Group 

and JSOU Senior Fellow 

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J.D., Ph.D., Political Science

Professor of international affairs and law and 

JSOU Senior Fellow

Rich Yarger

Ph.D., History 

JSOU Senior Fellow
On the cover. Top Left: A Coast Guard crew seizes cocaine being smuggled 

on a boat in the Eastern Pacific Ocean. U.S. Coast Guard photo. 

Top Right: Archive photo of Osama bin Laden from the Homeland Security 

Digital Library. 

Bottom Left: Drug money confiscated by the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) is stacked on a table at an FBI office near the Mexican border. 

FBI photo. 

Bottom Right: AK-47s seized by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) are lined up in an El Paso, Texas police department. ICE photo.

JSOU Report 13-6

The JSOU Press

MacDill Air Force Base, Florida

2013

The Nexus of Extremism 

and Trafficking:

Scourge of the World or 

So Much Hype?

Russell D. Howard

Colleen Traughber
This monograph and other JSOU publications can be found at https://jsou.

socom.mil. Click on Publications. Comments about this publication are 

invited and should be forwarded to Director, Strategic Studies Department, 

Joint Special Operations University, 7701 Tampa Point Blvd., MacDill AFB 

FL 33621.

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The JSOU Strategic Studies Department is currently accepting written works relevant to special operations for potential publication. For more information please 

contact the JSOU Research Director at jsou_research@socom.mil. Thank you for 

your interest in the JSOU Press. 

*******

This work was cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.

ISBN 978-1-933749-81-5
The views expressed in this publication are entirely those of 

the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views, policy 

or position of the United States Government, Department of 

Defense, United States Special Operations Command, or the 

Joint Special Operations University. 
Recent Publications of the JSOU Press

SOF Interagency Counterterrorism Reference Manual, September 2013

Security Force Assistance and Security Sector Reform, September 2013, 

Richard Shultz

Special Operations Research Topics 2014

Hybrid Warfare, August 2013, Timothy McCulloh and Richard Johnson

Smart Power and U.S. National Strategy, August 2013, Francisco Wong-Diaz

Retooling for the Future, May 2013, Francisco Wong-Diaz

21st Century SOF: Toward an American Theory of Special Operations, 

April 2013, Harry R. Yarger

Irregular Warfare: The Maoist Challenge to India’s Internal Security, 

December 2012, Prakash Singh 

Iran: Illusion, Reality, and Interests, September 2012, Roby Barrett 

Knowing Your Partner: The Evolution of Brazilian Special Operations Forces, 

August 2012, Alvaro de Souza Pinheiro

2012 JSOU and NDIA SO/LIC Division Essays, July 2012

Confronting the Terrorism of Boko Haram in Nigeria, May 2012, James J.F. Forest

Strategic Culture and Strategic Studies: An Alternative Framework for Assessing 

al-Qaeda and the Global Jihad Movement, May 2012, Richard Shultz

Understanding the Form, Function, and Logic of Clandestine Insurgent and 

Terrorist Networks: The First Step in Effective Counternetwork Operations, 

April 2012, Derek Jones

“We Will Find a Way”: Understanding the Legacy of Canadian Special 

Operations Forces, February 2012, Bernd Horn

Winning Hearts and Minds in Afghanistan and Elsewhere, 

February 2012, Thomas H. Henriksen
vii

Contents

Foreword.......................................................................................ix

About the Authors..........................................................................xi

Introduction................................................................................... 1

1. The Big Four of Trafficking: Human, Weapons, Drugs, and 

Contraband ................................................................................. 11

2. Challenges and Opportunities ................................................. 39

3. The Terrorist-Trafficking Nexus and Special Operations 

Forces.......................................................................................... 49

Endnotes...................................................................................... 61

ix

Foreword

In a globalized and increasingly interconnected world, the transfer of 

information, expertise, and relationships are becoming more complex and 

more commonplace. The interconnectedness of criminal organizations that 

span not only countries but across regions of the globe is troubling. However, 

more troubling is the possibility of the linking of transnational criminal 

organizations with insurgent and terrorist organizations as addressed in this 

work by Brigadier General (retired) Russ Howard and Ms. Colleen Traughber. The radical ideologies propagating politically motivated violence now 

have the opportunity to leverage and participate in traditionally criminal 

enterprises. This melding of form and function provides criminals with new 

networks and violent extremists with new funding sources and potential 

smuggling opportunities.

General Howard and Ms. Traughber delve into the nexus between violent 

extremist elements and transnational criminal elements by first clarifying 

whether a real problem exists, and if so, what is the appropriate role for Special Operations Forces (SOF) in confronting it. The authors bring rigor to 

the subject matter by dissecting the issue of intention and opportunities of 

criminal organization and violent extremists. The question is confounded by 

the authors who note the wide variance in the motivations and opportunities 

of both different criminal organizations and extremist organizations. What 

the authors do make clear is that the trafficking of humans, weapons, drugs, 

and contraband (HWDC) is a natural way for the criminals and extremists 

to cooperate.

To bring the issue into focus, the authors systematically examine case 

studies dealing with the nexus between specific organizations and HWDC 

trafficking opportunities. Human trafficking in Europe and the former 

Soviet Union; weapons trafficking in the Far East, Asia, and South America 

for money; the narcotics trade by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia; Hezbollah and Kurdistan Workers’ Party, as well as contraband smuggling of cigarettes, are all used to examine the extremist/criminal nexus. 

The connections become clear as the authors discuss each of the HWDC 

issues within the nexus; what is also clear is that often the nexus is a simple 

marriage of convenience.
x

General Howard and Ms. Traughber transition from the vignettes to how 

this nexus will impact SOF and interagency partners. Most importantly, the 

authors recognized a need for SOF to expand their mission set, and authorities to more appropriately address criminality in support of extremist groups. 

The authors identify issues for SOF including the traditional delineation 

between law enforcement activities and military activities. The findings, 

therefore, make a case that as SOF move into the future and are required to 

confront the nexus between extremists and criminals, a new definition and 

some deep thought need to be given to expanding SOF roles and authorities.

Kenneth H. Poole, Ed.D.

Director, JSOU Strategic Studies Department 
xi

About the Authors

Brigadier General (retired) Russ Howard is an Adjunct Professor of Terrorism Studies and Senior Research Fellow at the Monterey Institute 

of International Studies. He is also a Senior Fellow 

at JSOU and a Senior Adviser to Singapore’s Home 

Team Academy. Previously, General Howard was the 

founding Director of The Jebsen Center for Counter-Terrorism Studies at The Fletcher School, Tufts 

University, the Head of the Department of Social Sciences and the founding director of the Combating 

Terrorism Center at West Point. 

His previous Army positions include chief of staff 

fellow at the Center for International Affairs, Harvard University and commander of the 1st Special Forces Group (Airborne), Fort Lewis, Washington. 

Other recent assignments include assistant to the Special Representative 

to the Secretary General during United Nations Operations in Somalia II, 

deputy chief of staff for I Corps, and chief of staff and deputy commander for 

the Combined Joint Task Force, Haiti/Haitian Advisory Group. Previously, 

he was commander of 3rd Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group 

(Airborne) at Fort Bragg. He also served as the administrative assistant to 

Admiral Stansfield Turner and as a special assistant to the commander of 

U.S. Southern Command.

As a newly commissioned officer, he served as an “A” team commander in 

the 7th Special Forces Group from 1970 to 1972. He left the active component 

and then served in the U.S. Army Reserve from 1972 to 1980. During this 

period he served as an overseas manager, American International Underwriters, Melbourne, Australia and China tour manager for Canadian Pacific 

Airlines. He was recalled to active duty in 1980 and served initially in Korea 

as an infantry company commander. Subsequent assignments included classified project officer, U.S. Army 1st Special Operations Command at Fort 

Bragg, and operations officer and company commander, 1st Battalion, 1st 

Special Forces Group in Okinawa, Japan. 

General Howard has a Bachelor of Science in Industrial Management 

from San Jose State University and a Bachelor of Arts in Asian Studies from 
xii

the University of Maryland. He also has a Master of Arts in International 

Management from the Monterey Institute of International Studies and a 

Master of Public Administration from Harvard University. He was an assistant professor of Social Sciences at the U.S. Military Academy and a senior 

service college fellow at The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts 

University. His previous JSOU Press publications are Intelligence in Denied 

Spaces: New Concepts for a Changing Security Environment (2007), Educating Special Forces Junior Leaders for a Complex Security Environment (2009), 

and Cultural and Linguistic Skills Acquisition for Special Forces: Necessity, 

Acceleration, and Potential Alternatives (2011).

Ms. Colleen Traughber is a Foreign Service Officer at the U.S. Department of State with overseas assignments in Copenhagen, Denmark 

and Sana’a, Yemen. Prior to joining the State Department, Colleen was a Boren Fellow in Amman, Jordan 

and a graduate research assistant at the Jebsen Center 

for Counter-Terrorism Studies, where she investigated 

the links between terrorism and organized crime and 

participated in the Combating Terrorism Working 

Group of the Partnership for Peace Consortium. Previously, as a Fulbright Scholar at the Otto-Suhr Institute for Political Science at the Free University Berlin, 

she researched European foreign policy, including the European response 

to terrorism. Ms. Traughber has work experience with the German Council 

on Foreign Relations, the German Parliament, and the Concordia Language 

Villages. She holds a Master of Arts in Law and Diplomacy from the Fletcher 

School, Tufts University, and a Bachelor of Arts from Carleton College. 
1

Howard/Traughber: The Nexus of Extremism and Trafficking

Introduction

The word nexus, with origins from the Latin word for “to bind,” signifies 

a connection, tie, or link. Since the mid-1990s, nexus has been used to 

describe various connections, ties, or linkages between terrorist and criminal 

trafficking groups, but these relationships have been a topic of increasing 

national and international security interest since the terrorist attacks of 11 

September 2001. Separately, both terrorists and traffickers have concerned 

law enforcement, security personnel, and policymakers for decades. However, 

the notion that the different types of criminal organizations possess working relationships or have even joined forces with terrorist groups has moved 

some to contend that the nexus between the two types of criminal groups is 

a clear and present danger.1

 

There are more than a hundred recognized definitions of terrorism—some 

are short, some are long, some make sense, and others do not. In the United 

States, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Department of Defense 

(DOD), and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) each define terrorism differently, and the United Nations (UN) has been unable to define terrorism at all. 

There is no definition for illicit trafficking per se. However, there are separate 

definitions for the illicit trafficking of humans, weapons, drugs, and contraband. For the purposes of this monograph, terrorism is defined as violence 

or the threat of violence conducted against civilians for political or ideological purposes.2 Also for this monograph, the definition of illicit trafficking is 

an amalgamation of several definitions and “is the receipt, possession, use, 

sale, transfer, or disposal of any persons or material without permission or 

authorization.”3

The four most resilient sectors of organized international crime affecting state security are human, weapons, drug, and contraband trafficking 

(HWDC-trafficking). Often interconnected and sometimes mutually supporting, HWDC-trafficking is pervasive throughout the world. HWDC-trafficking 

is responsible for billions of dollars in profit earned by criminal organizations 

worldwide, and has been progressively more linked to the activities of violent 

extremist organizations including al-Qaeda and like-minded groups. Illicit 

trafficking also undermines democratic institutions and economic growth, 

directly impacting trade, transportation, and transactional systems.
2

JSOU Report 13-6

Certainly, the line between criminal trafficking and terrorist organizations is often blurred. By definition, both HWDC-traffickers and terrorists 

engage in criminal activity. Also by definition, and as their name implies, terrorists use terrorist tactics to achieve their objectives. By contrast, HWDCtraffickers use extortion, bribery, and other intimidation activities to achieve 

their objectives; they may also employ terrorist tactics, but not exclusively. 

While there are similarities in their use of certain tactics, the motives of terrorists and HWDC-traffickers are different. Terrorists are generally driven 

by idealistic motives, however misguided; by contrast, a trafficking organization’s focus is on money and profit, clear and simple.4

 

The destabilizing effects of both terrorist and trafficking organizations 

are indisputable. However, experts debate the importance of the so-called 

nexus between HWDC-trafficking and terrorist organizations, and HWDCtrafficking’s effects on international security. For example, some contend 

that al-Qaeda must now resort to drug trafficking because effective law 

enforcement and interdiction campaigns have reduced its other sources of 

operational funding.5 Others, such as researchers John Rollins and Liana Sun 

Wyler, have contended that there is no proven connection between al-Qaeda 

and drug trafficking at all.6 Dr. Jeffrey M. Bale, noted terrorism expert and 

professor at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, believes the 

nexus between criminal cartels and terrorist organizations is more “much 

ado about nothing” than a clear and present danger.7 According to Bale, 

states have often exaggerated, and sometimes fabricated, the nexus between 

criminal cartels and terrorist organizations in order to justify the adoption of 

more aggressive security or “anti-drug” policies, and that in turn has encouraged a multitude of overly alarmist analyses concerning this hypothesized 

criminal-terrorist nexus (e.g., in the case of “narco-terrorism”). There is no 

doubt, he says, that various extremist milieus and organizations—left-wing, 

right-wing, ethno-nationalist, and religious—have collaborated periodically with criminal organizations and actively engaged in criminal activities 

like arms trafficking and drug production and smuggling. There has been 

an even more extensive history of collaboration between criminal organizations and corrupt government officials and intelligence operatives, not 

to mention components of “respectable” financial institutions, which have 

extensive dealings with the world’s “underground economy.” Among the 

numerous well-documented examples of the “government-criminal nexus,” 

Bates cites the collaborations between elements of French intelligence and 
3

Howard/Traughber: The Nexus of Extremism and Trafficking

the Corsican Mafia; between elements of the Italian political establishment 

and security services with the Sicilian Mafia, the Neapolitan Camorra, or 

the Calabrian Indrangheta; between components of the Turkish military 

and intelligence services and the Turkish 

Mafia; between both the Guomindang and 

the Chinese communists and various triads; 

between the Pakistani military and intelligence service and Pakistani and Afghan 

criminal networks, including opium growers; and between U.S. intelligence agencies 

and the Cosa Nostra (against Castro), Burmese opium growers, and other drug traffickers in their Cold War struggle against 

communism.8 According to Bale, the grim 

reality is that almost any entity, official or unofficial, that operates covertly or 

clandestinely is eventually bound to encounter and interact in some way with 

criminal networks that also operate in the shadows. Therefore, it is hardly 

surprising that collaborative agreements will sometimes develop between 

them on either a temporary or longer-term basis. 

In short, Bates believes that claims concerning the nexus between terrorists and criminals should be viewed with appropriate skepticism, especially 

in the absence of verifiable evidence. He emphasizes two crucial points in 

this context. First, members of violent extremist groups do not trust outsiders who do not share their own ideologies and agendas, especially criminals 

who are primarily motivated by crass materialistic motives (and who are 

thus potentially capable of being bought off by the highest bidder). Second, 

criminal organizations would be likely to endanger their own survival and 

impede their ability to continue profiting from illicit activities by collaborating with high-profile terrorist groups, since they would then be targeted 

even more aggressively by the world’s security forces. One recent example 

should serve to illustrate the whole problem with the widespread allegations concerning the nexus between terrorists and criminals. Since 9/11, 

commentators and analysts have repeatedly made alarmist claims about 

the hypothesized or potential collaboration between Latin American drug 

cartels and al-Qaeda, but there is as yet little evidence in the public domain 

to support such claims.9

... the grim reality is that 

almost any entity, official 

or unofficial, that operates 

covertly or clandestinely 

is eventually bound to 

encounter and interact in 

some way with criminal 

networks that also operate 

in the shadows.
4

JSOU Report 13-6

However, there are at least two U.S. government organizations that do 

not agree with Bale’s assessment regarding the importance of the criminalterrorist relationship. For example, in its 2010 Consolidated Priority Organization Targets list, the Department of Justice reported that 29 of 63 different 

illicit organizations demonstrated collaboration or other close relationships 

with terrorist groups.10 Also, in an October 2010 meeting with representatives 

from 44 countries, then U.S. National Security Advisor General James L. 

Jones spoke of similarities between transnational organized criminal and 

terrorist organizations, stating:

Much like major terrorist organizations, criminal syndicates compartmentalize their activities so that no single person knows the 

details of the entire operation. Apprehending even a key figure may 

have little to no effect. Enterprises that once focused on particular 

illicit activities are increasingly diversifying their operations. If we 

do not act together to prevent them, these trends will only continue 

to intensify in the years to come. And that is something that should 

concern all our nations. In a world full of transnational threats, 

transnational crime is in an ascendant phase.11

While some believe the nexus may be a nonexistent or mere opportunistic 

“marriage of convenience,” others, such as General Jones, believe that it is 

a significant security threat—one that could involve the successful transfer 

of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) material to terrorists, or present 

opportunities for terrorists to enter the United States via human trafficking 

networks.12 

This paper sorts through the “terrorist-trafficking nexus” debate by first 

detailing the similarities and differences between the two groups, as mentioned in this introduction. It then explains what trafficking and terrorist 

groups have learned from each other and what motivates them to cooperate. 

Next, the paper analyzes individual HWDC-trafficking organizations and 

their linkages to terrorism and terrorists. Case studies detailing the relationships between and among HWDC-traffickers and terrorist organizations are 

provided to help put the nexus debate in perspective. Finally, the “so what” of 

this work is explained by highlighting the challenges and opportunities associated with prosecuting traffickers and terrorists when they work in tandem. 
5

Howard/Traughber: The Nexus of Extremism and Trafficking

Similarities

HWDC-trafficking groups and terrorist organizations have much in 

common. They are both engaged in illicit activity and use violence, fear, 

and corruption in pursuit of their objectives. Traffickers and terrorist groups 

of all stripes prosper in failing states and denied areas where governmental 

controls are weak, trafficking laws are not enforced, officials are corruptible, and open or porous borders make control difficult.13 Both groups have 

learned to use modern technology to communicate, train, and control their 

subordinates.14 For example, international drug traffickers and terrorists are 

among the most prolific users of encrypted messages and computers.15 For 

decades, decentralized operations have been a hallmark of major criminal 

organizations like HWDC-traffickers. However, since 9/11 many international terrorist organizations have decided to operate similarly, forgoing 

familiar hierarchical and bureaucratic structures for those that are flat, more 

efficient, and less vulnerable to detection.16 After suffering a major defeat, 

both HWDC-traffickers and transnational terrorist groups have a capacity 

to regenerate themselves, often reemerging in new or unrecognizable forms.17

In addition to strategic similarities, HWDC-traffickers and terrorist 

groups use the same tactics, including money laundering techniques to process illicit profits18 and transportation of bulk cash shipments, valuables, 

and personnel across the same vulnerable borders.19 Traffickers and terrorists have the same favored currency—and it is the euro, not the U.S. dollar. 

Because of its rarity, the 500 euro bill is referred to as the “bin Laden,”20 

which stands preferred over the U.S. 

$100 “Ben Franklin” due to its higher 

face value, which is more efficient and 

space-saving.21 Furthermore, “Traffickers and terrorists both are clandestine; 

they both corrupt officials at the highest levels and they both rely on shadow 

facilitators.”22 For example, terrorists 

and drug traffickers hire the same document forgers, use the same routes 

and bribe the same border guards while executing their illicit activities.23 

Both types of organizations are also similar in their territorial ambition 

and scope. Many of the most powerful traffickers—particularly drug traffickers—and terrorist organizations now have multinational operations. In 

... terrorists and drug traffickers 

hire the same document forgers, 

use the same routes and bribe 

the same border guards while 

executing their illicit activities.
6

JSOU Report 13-6

the past, criminal organizations and terrorist groups were generally substate actors with local interests and objectives; now, however, both types of 

organizations operate internationally. Organized crime has diversified, says 

a former Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) agent: “it has gone global and 

reached macro-economic proportions.”24 Indeed, according to a UN report, 

“the criminal world spans the planet: illicit goods are sourced from one 

continent, trafficked across another, and marketed in a third.”25 Al-Qaeda is 

also an international phenomenon, considered by some to be the world’s first 

truly global terrorist organization.26 For example, al-Qaeda operatives from 

more than 100 different countries—including the U.S.—have been arrested in 

57 countries in the world.27 Finally, HWDC-traffickers and terrorist groups, 

both of which are manned and led by transnational non-state actors, owe 

allegiance to no state and thus are beholden to no one but themselves.28 

Another similarity between HWDC-traffickers and terrorists involves 

their ability to diversify their activities. In order to evade law enforcement, 

both groups have become increasingly innovative with their operations, 

expanding activities to include contraband trafficking.

Criminal and terrorist groups have also both exploited the tactic of 

hostage taking to generate funds. According to one major news outlet, alQaeda in the Islamic Maghreb “has sustained itself since 2003 primarily on 

revenues derived from the business of hostage taking, mostly Westerners 

... [the] group’s kidnap-for-ransom business, especially in North Africa, 

generates many millions of dollars.”29 This tactic has even been discussed 

by the UN Security Council; in September 2010, British Foreign Secretary 

William Hague told the body that the British government “believes that 

we must act to prevent kidnap ransoms becoming a significant source of 

terrorist finance.”30 Indeed, organized criminal groups have been profiting 

from kidnapping for ransom for decades. Conservative estimates place the 

“market value” of this industry at well over $500 million each year31—a figure 

not lost on terrorist groups.

Differences

Despite their many similarities, criminal drug traffickers and transnational 

terrorists also differ in several important ways. Terrorists—at least in their 

own minds—are idealists: they believe they are serving a cause to achieve 

greater benefit for a certain constituency.32 A criminal organization generally 
7

Howard/Traughber: The Nexus of Extremism and Trafficking

serves no cause other than creating wealth for itself. Terrorists seek publicity, while criminals do not; “the media collectively constitute terrorism’s 

oxygen.”33 Terrorists often give interviews to journalists, post videos to claim 

responsibility for attacks, and celebrate mass media coverage of their terrorism. Conversely, organized criminals target elements of the media. In fact, 

Reporters Without Borders has called organized crime the media’s leading 

predator, claiming that in the 2000s, “141 journalists have been killed for 

reporting on organized crime.”34 Terrorist groups are overall less likely to 

pursue this kind of systematic targeting of the media.

There are other differences in what terrorists and traffickers target. By 

definition, civilians are the terrorists’ primary target, while for drug traffickers, they are customers. Terrorist victimization tends to be less discriminate 

than the violence used by organized criminals.35 That is not to say that the 

perpetrators of organized crime would weep at the victimization of an innocent bystander; however, they are slightly more concerned than a terrorist 

might be with such an outcome. By contrast, traffickers—particularly drug 

traffickers—target other traffickers as a way of eliminating competition; they 

also target police and military to instill fear against arrest and prosecution. 

Finally, criminal traffickers such as the drug cartels in Mexico fight each 

other in turf wars, which is less common with rival terrorist groups.36 

Scholar Bruce Hoffman sums it up best: most fundamentally, he says, the 

criminal is not concerned with influencing or affecting public opinion: he 

simply wants to abscond with money the easiest way possible. “By contrast,” 

he says, “the aim of terrorists’ violence is ultimately to change ‘the system’—

about which the ordinary criminal could care less.”37

Learning from Each Other

While the differences are fundamental and are not meant to be dismissed as 

“minor,” the similarities between terrorist and organized criminal groups 

highlighted in paragraphs above showcase these entities’ ability to adapt, 

strengthen, and often learn from each other’s successes and failures. As 

illustrated by one quintessential example, this phenomenon is not new: 

The traditional Mafia has learned to use the magnifying glass of 

symbolic violence to reach a wider audience: in 1993, the Sicilian 

Mafia carried out a series of car bomb attacks in the Italian mainland 

... plans were laid to blow up the Leaning Tower of Pisa. The aim 
8

JSOU Report 13-6

was not to eliminate an enemy, but to intimidate public opinion and 

Parliament into abrogating recently passed anti-mafia legislation.38

In this instance, the Italian Mafia clearly adopted “terrorist” tactics to 

achieve an objective. Criminal groups in Brazil have also realized the potential 

effectiveness of using terror tactics to force political demands on the government, especially when the state threatens their illicit operations.39 For example, 

following the inauguration of a new Brazilian government administration in 

2002, the increasing power of Brazilian drug traffickers prompted the new 

administration to clamp down on them—particularly those operating out of 

Rio de Janeiro. The tougher restrictions provoked these criminal groups into 

“launching a campaign of political violence.”40 This strategy resulted in group 

members who “bombed buses, fired shots at government buildings, and targeted police officers,” with the violence ending “only after the state appeared 

to grant the criminal group leaders immunity in order to continue conducting their criminal operations with limited obstacles.”41 Two ominous tactics 

recently adopted by Mexican drug cartels point to the cross-fertilization of 

ideas and perhaps training from terrorist organizations such as al-Qaeda. A 

relatively new tactic used by drug traffickers in Mexico, and evidenced now 

in the United States, is beheading.42 At least 40 people were decapitated in 

Mexico in 2008, two years after the method emerged in the country. According to Jorge Chabat, a criminal justice expert at the Center for Research and 

Teaching of Economics in Mexico City, drug trafficking bosses “saw internet 

video of beheadings of hostages captured by Muslim extremists in Iraq and 

Pakistan, and adopted the tactic themselves, down to the posting of video 

on the internet” and violent display of the victims’ dismembered heads.43

Beheadings also now appear to have reached U.S. territory; the first known 

beheading conducted by drug criminals in the United States occurred in 

Phoenix, Arizona in March 2011.44

Another terrorist tactic copied by traffickers is the use of improvised 

explosive devices (IEDs), particularly car bombs. Presently, Mexican drug 

traffickers fighting security forces use the same kind of IEDs that insurgents 

and terrorists employ against coalition forces in Afghanistan and Iraq.45 

During the last three months of 2010, Mexico witnessed “at least three vehicleborne explosive devices against [its] security forces, which look very similar to 

the model that we saw in Iraq and continue to see,” said Lieutenant General 

Michael Oates, former director of the Joint IED Defeat Organization.46
9

Howard/Traughber: The Nexus of Extremism and Trafficking

In July 2010, an IED car bomb attack in Juarez, Mexico was the first 

example of a suicide attack used by a trafficking organization. Responding 

to what they thought was an “officer down” emergency call, a nearby policeman and paramedic worked frantically to save what they thought was another 

policeman’s life. Unfortunately, the “wounded officer down” was a decoy who 

himself was killed with the responding police officer and paramedic when a 

nearby car bomb exploded.47 

Terrorists also learn from criminal cartels. Many analysts believe that 

transnational terrorist organizations, including al-Qaeda, adopted their 

decentralized cell-and-network-based structure from drug cartels.48 Terrorists have also copied techniques used by criminal organizations to hide, 

transfer, and launder their money and other assets. Common methods for 

both criminal and terrorist groups include the use of alternative remittance 

systems, such as the hawala system in the Middle East and South Asia and 

the Asia/Oriental system used by Chinese Triads in Asia and around the 

world.49 Trade-based money laundering, bulk cash smuggling, and the smuggling of high-value goods, including precious metals and stones, are also 

examples of “value transfer” methodology learned by terrorists from traffickers.50 More recently, there is evidence that al-Qaeda has copied “drug mule” 

techniques used by traffickers who cross frontiers with up to several pounds of illicit drugs 

packed in their body cavities. However, instead 

of ingesting drugs, al-Qaeda’s technique is to 

ingest explosives. Weapons experts explain the 

“ingested explosive” technique could be effective for assassinations or possibly as a weapon 

on a commercial airliner.51 A video taken by 

al-Qaeda documents the “ingested explosive” 

attack conducted by 23-year-old Abdullah Hassan al-Asiri on a Saudi antiterrorism official, which resulted in only slight injuries to the target and the 

death of the detonator.52 

The examples provided illustrate knowledge transfers between trafficking 

groups and terrorists, and how each entity can benefit from sharing tactics. 

While there is no hard evidence of formal exchange programs between these 

trafficking groups and terrorist organizations, there are clear indications that 

the two are observing each other and adopting techniques that might benefit 

their groups and further the achievement of their organizational goals.

The examples provided 

illustrate knowledge 

transfers between 

trafficking groups and 

terrorists, and how each 

entity can benefit from 

sharing tactics.

11

Howard/Traughber: The Nexus of Extremism and Trafficking

1. The Big Four of Trafficking: Human, 

Weapons, Drugs, and Contraband

Human Trafficking

Human trafficking is often described as the process of recruitment and 

transportation of people by means of deception or force for the purpose of exploitation.53 The exploitation can include forced labor, prostitution, 

or other involuntary activities. Because prostitution or domestic servitude 

are the most common uses for trafficked persons, the victims of human 

trafficking are often assumed to be mainly women and children. In reality, 

the victims can be men, women, children, or anyone who is transported 

against his or her will. Human trafficking is thus differentiated from human 

smuggling, in which illegal immigrants cross borders as a matter of choice. 

Of the four major types of trafficking, human trafficking statistics are 

the least defined with any accuracy. For example, estimated profits from 

human trafficking range from a low of $9.5 billion a year to $42.5 billion a 

year.54 The numbers of people trafficked are similarly startling—two to four 

million people are trafficked against their will every year, including those 

forcefully moved across borders and within borders.55 

Current evidence suggests that human trafficking continues to benefit 

from an increasingly globalized world. Even with heightened awareness of the 

problem among both academics and policymakers,56 the number of human 

trafficking cases increases annually as the ability of traffickers and trafficked 

victims to move around the globe also grows,57 and policymakers have been 

unable to stem the tide of the crime. As human trafficking levels increase, 

so do opportunities for collusion with other forms of organized crime and 

violent groups. Human traffickers have been known to adopt the tactics and 

strategies of drug traffickers, learning from the lucrative business of the narcotics trade.58 These tactics include moving goods (i.e. the trafficking victims) 

in a low-cost and high-volume manner, forming a trafficking ring with high 

consumption and small savings, depleting natural resources, enabling violent 

entrepreneurship, using trade and development strategies, and employing the 

methods of traditional slavery. They have shown great ingenuity in adapting 

their business tactics to the trafficking operating environment.59 
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JSOU Report 13-6

Human Trafficking and Terrorism

Just as the profits from human trafficking are less than those from arms 

and drug trafficking, the links between this form of organized crime and 

terrorism are less pronounced. Nevertheless, evidence suggests that the 

nexus between human trafficking and terrorism is growing and, where it 

has taken hold, is also thriving, particularly in ungoverned spaces.60 Specifically, human traffickers and terrorists appear to benefit from using the same 

routes and similar illicit financing sources.61 In areas where both terrorism 

and human trafficking have thrived, the likelihood of a symbiotic relationship between human trafficking and terrorism greatly increases. 

Select cases show that supporters and facilitators have actually used 

human trafficking to support terrorist efforts. Three Pakistani citizens—who 

were tried in a U.S. court—pleaded guilty to provide material support to the 

Tehrik-e-Taliban in Pakistan (TTP), a designated foreign terrorist organization (FTO) often referred to as the “Pakistani Taliban.”62 The three men

... admitted that between January 3, 2011 and March 10, 2011 they 

conspired to provide material support to the TTP in the form of false 

documentation and identification, knowing that the TTP engages in 

terrorist activity and terrorism. According to court documents ...

[they] conducted a human smuggling operation in Quito, Ecuador 

that attempted to smuggle an individual they believed to be a member 

of the TTP from Pakistan into the United States.63

According to Assistant Attorney General for National Security Lisa 

Monaco, the case “underscores the threat posed by human smuggling networks that facilitate terrorist travel.”64 

A similar case was reported in Europe in late 2011, when a Helsinki 

man supporting the Somali Islamist al-Shabaab movement was arrested 

by Finland’s National Bureau of Investigation for participating in aggravated human trafficking with a terrorist intent. The lead investigator stated 

that “plans were under preparation for taking people abroad without their 

knowledge of the real purpose of their travel. There is reason to believe that 

they would have been taken to a training camp.”65 This case is reportedly the 

country’s first-ever terrorism case, showing the expansion and pervasiveness 

of the nexus.
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Howard/Traughber: The Nexus of Extremism and Trafficking

In 2011, the European Police Office (Europol) reported a growing connection between human trafficking and terrorism. Its European Union (EU) Terrorism Situation and Trend Report summarized member states’ intelligence 

and analysis that the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and the Liberation 

Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE) were actively involved in human trafficking. 

The Canadian government further reported that LTTE entered the human 

cargo business when its arms smuggling profits dried up after the war in Sri 

Lanka ended.66 In August 2011, the Criminal Investigation Department of 

Sri Lanka arrested a leading member of the LTTE named “Uganda Bala.” The 

human trafficker had been transiting between Malaysia, Singapore, India, 

Thailand, and several other countries, earning millions of rupees for LTTE 

by sending people to European countries via illegal means.67 These reports 

not only highlight the linkages between human trafficking and terrorism, 

but they also show the resiliency and adaptability of these criminal nexus 

organizations. 

Human traffickers and terrorists benefit from disruptions in an increasingly globalized world characterized by enclaves that provide space for illicit 

activities.68 These spaces can be juridical, social, virtual, or territorial, and 

may be the result of the vacuum in power left by weak or failing states.69 

Like other forms of organized crime, human trafficking is pervasive, and 

there is hardly a location in the world that is not affected, whether as an 

origin, transit, or recipient country.70 As a result, the opportunity for linkages 

and alliances between human trafficking and terrorist groups is great and 

widespread. The following case studies provide a sampling of this growing 

phenomenon.

Human Trafficking Case Study: Europe

Human trafficking in Europe ranges from human smuggling to terrorists 

who profit from human trafficking. In the first case, voluntary migrants, 

such as those in the Mediterranean and North Africa, benefit from being 

trafficked or smuggled to the EU southern borders. As a result of European 

integration and globalization in recent years, the removal of national borders has been accompanied by an increase in migration, both legally and 

illegally, to the EU.71 Separated from North Africa by the Mediterranean, the 

southern EU countries are a natural destination point for illegal immigrants 

from North Africa. Due in part to its economic prosperity, the EU, in fact, is 
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JSOU Report 13-6

a leading net recipient of trafficking victims worldwide.72 Increasingly, those 

migrants are associated with organized crime and, in some cases, terrorism.73

With porous borders and a relatively secure environment, Europe serves 

as a natural nexus for human trafficking and terrorism—a fact that is only 

slowly being recognized. The threat from Islamic extremists, however, is 

real. Foreign fighters from Morocco, for example, played an essential role in 

the Madrid bombings of 11 March 2004. Illegal migrants from North Africa 

acting as terrorists are not the only source of the threat, as another example 

shows; police apprehended a network of 13 would-be terrorists from Pakistan, 

India, and Nigeria in Barcelona on 3 February 2009.74 The group not only 

forged passports, but also trafficked in human beings across Europe, including in Belgium, Britain, France, Germany, Switzerland, and even Thailand.75

In the second case, traffickers actually profit from human trafficking. For 

example, the PKK in Turkey has used human trafficking as a means of both 

recruitment and funding.76 Amongst other means, the PKK has financed its 

operations through human trafficking.77 The PKK also uses human trafficking networks to move clandestinely within Europe.78 Finally, the terrorist 

organization has recruited members from the ranks of those trafficked.79 

Whether smuggling or trafficking, illegal migration has increasingly become 

a concern in Europe, due to its links to international terrorism.80 EU security 

forces are shifting their focus from external threats to internal or “transnational” threats from non-state groups, including organized crime syndicates 

and terrorist organizations, partially as a result of human trafficking.81 As 

the Europe case study suggests, however, transnational threats like human 

trafficking and terrorism should not be addressed unilaterally; they should 

be addressed in collaboration with other states and with international and 

nongovernmental organizations.82

Human Trafficking Case Study: Former Soviet Union 

Russia and other parts of the former Soviet Union are well known as major 

transit hubs for victims of human trafficking from across the globe, including 

Asia, Africa, Afghanistan, Iraq, Kurdistan, and Somalia.83 Human trafficking 

activities in the region are not only well established, they are growing. Yet, 

just as the extent of the involvement of the former Soviet Union’s organized 

crime organizations (such as the Russian Mafia) in human trafficking is 

unclear,84 the connections between human trafficking and armed extremist 
15

Howard/Traughber: The Nexus of Extremism and Trafficking

groups are also less distinct. There is, however, growing evidence that the two 

share nodes of operation, relying on the same or similar local contacts for 

clandestine movements and operations, whether it be for the sex trade—the 

most blatant form of human trafficking in post-Soviet spaces—or armed 

movement.85 

In areas of the former Soviet Union, terrorists and criminals are taking 

advantage of the same “gray areas” in which to create an operational space. 

For example, in Central Asia and the Caucasus, human trafficking is growing.86 According to the International Organization for Migration, thousands of women have been trafficked from Central Asia during the past 

two decades;87 Meanwhile in the Caucasus, the estimates are even higher; 

each year, thousands are trafficked from and through the region.88 At the 

same time, armed factions such as Chechen extremists and others in the 

Caucasus, Central Asia, and Russia have made use of the ungoverned areas 

for their own designs.89 Where ungoverned spaces exist in these areas, both 

traffickers and terrorists benefit from similar nodes of operation, even if 

collusion is not direct. 

As suggested, the connection between human trafficking and terrorism 

is less entrenched in Russia. While there are examples of groups, such as the 

Russian Mafia, engaged with both violent extremist activities and crime, 

including human trafficking, the relationships tend to be linkages of convenience rather than direct collusion. At the very least, human traffickers 

and terrorists in the Russian context tend to follow the same routes, taking 

advantage of the same gaps and “gray areas” of the world. For example, traffickers in both Central Asia and the Caucasus travel the same routes that are 

used by terrorists.90 Employing human trafficking as a profitable, criminal 

enterprise appears to be one of a number of options, and is often displaced 

by its more lucrative alternatives, arms or drug trafficking.

Weapons Trafficking

The trafficking of weapons is commonly defined as the illegal trade of conventional arms as well as the materials necessary to construct biological, 

chemical, and radiological weapons. Sometimes described as “gun-running,” weapons trafficking often involves small arms and light weapons. 

Weapons trafficking tends to have a natural affinity with armed conflict; the 

illegitimate purchasers are often affiliates of armed groups with nefarious 
16

JSOU Report 13-6

intentions. As a result, the links between weapons trafficking and terrorism 

are entrenched. 

In comparison to human trafficking, the profits from the illicit trade in 

weapons are more fixed, with estimates of $10 billion per year.91 Arms trafficking, however, creates more of a “bang for the buck” than human trafficking by having the capacity to fuel transnational conflict, including terrorism. 

According to the Small Arms Survey, the illicit trade in small arms and light 

weapons involves 875 million arms around the world.92 Small arms are often 

sold for money or valuable goods like diamonds, drugs, or other smuggled 

goods. In addition to being a profitable criminal activity, arms trafficking 

also has the capacity to fuel conflict, providing tangible support to hundreds 

of wars and insurgencies over the past two decades. 

Worldwide attention to weapons trafficking, particularly concerning 

WMD, has risen in recent years. Despite the increased resources allocated 

to the problem, evidence suggests that arms trafficking levels are only rising, 

particularly in the small arms and light weapons market.93 In addition, the 

natural affinity between arms trafficking and terrorism is often overlooked. 

The U.S. Government Accountability Office review of the State Department’s 

annual Country Reports on Terrorism showed that, while the U.S. government is aware of terrorism safe havens around the world, it is not reporting on the actions of host governments to combat the trafficking of WMD 

though those safe havens, effectively ignoring the links between WMD trafficking and terrorism in areas of critical interest to national security.94 

Weapons Trafficking and Terrorism

In contrast to human trafficking, weapons trafficking is clearly linked to 

terrorism, with reports of collaboration between human traffickers and terrorists on every continent.95 The reports are both clear and far-reaching; there 

are not only links from insurgent groups to small arms and light weapons, 

but also to biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons.96 While the links 

between weapons traffickers and terrorists are not as profit-motivated as 

other trafficking methods, the natural affinity between the two activities 

indicates that where one exists, the other is likely to be found. 

Arms traffickers and terrorists benefit from many of the same “gaps” 

created by an increasingly globalized world, as do other trafficking groups. 

A decline in state sponsorship for terrorists at the end of the Cold War is 
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Howard/Traughber: The Nexus of Extremism and Trafficking

generally considered to be a driver behind terrorist organizations’ development of “in-house” criminal activities such as arms trafficking to fund 

operations.97 As a result, alliances tend to be one of several types: mutual 

benefit between traffickers and terrorists; direct involvement of terrorists in 

trafficking; or replacement of the terrorists’ ideological goals with the traffickers’ profit motivations.98 The relationships therefore tend to vary widely 

in both the extent of the collusion and the nature of the collaboration. 

Arms Trafficking Case Study: Thailand 

Arms trafficking, which has a natural affinity to terrorism, can be quite 

lucrative if the arms trafficker has the links to the right extremist organizations. Unlike human trafficking, arms trafficking is more than just a means 

to generate income for criminal organizations; it is also a direct source of 

armaments in conflict. In a globalized economy, arms recipients do not need 

to be in the vicinity of the arms trafficker, who can find a location that is 

conducive for illicit activity. Arms can be trafficked over long distances to 

reach their ultimate destination, given the right price. 

In a Thailand-based case, notorious weapons trafficker Viktor Bout was 

able to sell arms to almost any organization that could pay him. He reportedly sold weapons to the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia (FARC) 

and the Taliban, as well as warring factions in Angola, the Democratic 

Republic of Congo, Liberia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, and Sudan.99 Arrested 

by Thai authorities on 6 March 2008, this “merchant of death” had built 

a private air fleet to transport weapons 

from ex-Soviet stocks to the major conflicts of the world.100

While not directly related to an 

armed conflict, the case of weapons trafficker Viktor Bout shows the symbiotic 

relationship that can emerge between 

crime and terror. In this case, the terror 

and criminal elements developed into a 

nexus,101 relying on one another for support and depending on the other 

for expertise. The relationship moved past the point at which the two types 

of groups adopted similar methods without working together, but did not 

progress to the sharing of methods or motives.

In this case, the terror and 

criminal elements developed 

into a nexus, relying on one 

another for support and 

depending on the other for 

expertise.
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Arms Trafficking Case Study: Osama bin Laden 

In other cases, the link between arms trafficking and terrorism is better 

documented. A terrorist organization may be directly involved in trafficking activities, possibly acting as a bridge between terrorism and organized 

crime or linking organizations that engage in each type of activity. Osama 

bin Laden’s attempt to purchase nuclear-grade weapons material through 

other terrorist organizations illustrates a case of direct links between arms 

trafficking and terrorism. Although ultimately thwarted, the case demonstrates the extent of collusion that can develop between organizations with 

drastically different directives. 

Bin Laden’s first attempt to acquire uranium was in Sudan in 1993, prior 

to the bombings of the embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.102 Reportedly 

unable to acquire the weapons-grade uranium in Sudan,103 bin Laden tried 

again in 2000 to make a purchase, this time of “ready-made” Russian nuclear 

weapons from Chechen weapons traffickers.104 Bin Laden was duped to the 

tune of $2 million in Sudan and possibly as much as $30 million in Chechnya for his attempt to purchase weapons-grade plutonium and/or nuclear 

weapons.105 

Bin Laden’s foiled plot to attain nuclear materials further demonstrates 

the links between crime and terror groups. In colluding with extremists in 

Sudan and Chechnya, bin Laden and his organization demonstrated their 

willingness to work with criminal syndicates for their own purposes—as 

well as the shrewdness of criminal groups to take advantage of a demand 

without delivering. Collusion like this suggests elements of a mutually beneficial symbiotic relationship with or dependence on groups that are themselves hybrid terror-crime organizations, expressing methods and motives 

of both.106 Although in this case unsuccessful, such terrorist organizations 

have the capacity to be just as much terrorist as criminal, and should be 

recognized and approached by counterterrorism and law enforcement officials as such. 

Arms Trafficking Case Study: Moldova

A recent example of potential coordinated cooperation between criminal 

syndicates and terrorists was uncovered during a June 2011 sting operation by 

Moldovan authorities in which police were able to pre-empt North African 

buyers from purchasing uranium oxide. Moldovan authorities arrested the 
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Howard/Traughber: The Nexus of Extremism and Trafficking

suspects, traced the uranium to Russian facilities, and discovered data indicating the group had been actively seeking contacts in North Africa. Little is 

known about the North African buyer(s), but Senator Richard Lugar of the 

Senate Foreign Relations Committee has reported his concerns regarding the 

smuggling operations and their links to a region where confirmed terrorist 

activity is on the rise.107 The uranium was moved through Transnistria, a 

breakaway republic located between the Dniester River and the eastern Moldovan border to Ukraine. It has been an ideal operating ground for smugglers, as flights into the area cannot be monitored, borders are porous, and 

security is weak.108 The case not only underscores the prevalence of nuclear 

or radiological materials originating in former Soviet states, but also highlights the link with North Africa. This particular interdiction highlights the 

need to strengthen monitoring of bomb-making materials and stockpiles. 

Heightened security would aid in deterring future relationships between 

European smugglers and buyers from a region that hosts known terror cells. 

However, it also provides an example of successful international collaboration: Moldovan law enforcement, trained by U.S. specialists, undoubtedly 

enhanced the sting operation.

Arms Trafficking Case Study: Tamil Tigers

In several cases, the LTTE, or “Tamil Tigers,” have been involved in arms 

trafficking, illustrating a clear case of a designated terrorist organization 

forging close relationships with criminal groups. In 2010, Balraj Naidu was 

convicted of providing material support to a terrorist organization. The 

Singapore arms broker was said to have equipped a terrorist organization 

with advanced weapons. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s 

(ICE) Homeland Security Investigations successfully investigated the case 

to prove that Naidu attempted to purchase weapons from China, Thailand, 

North Korea, the Philippines, and Indonesia for the LTTE to use against 

Sri Lankan government forces.109 According to the report, Naidu’s weapons 

source introduced him to a Maryland based undercover agent with whom 

he negotiated the acquisition of American-made weaponry, which were to be 

delivered to the Sea Tigers, the naval branch of the Tamil Tigers. Members of 

the terrorist organization purchased 28 tons of weapons for $900,000. Upon 

payment and inspection of the weapons, co-conspirators Bin Osman, Haji 

Subandi, Erick Wotulo, and Thirunavukarasu Varatharasa were arrested. 
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These arrests led to the indictment of Naidu, who was sentenced to four years 

and nine months in prison.110 The acquisition of advanced weapons for the 

Tamil Tigers—a designated foreign terrorist organization—was found to be 

illegal. The case highlighted the relationship between the arms merchants 

and terrorist-supporting group and showed the importance of continued 

enforcement and vigilance of export laws.

In 2009, three members of a transnational gang were charged with brokering human trafficking, forging and selling fake passports, and transporting illegal migrants to Thailand. The arrest of Mohammad Ali Hussein, 

Mohammad Mudbahem, and Chubri Awae revealed that the gang was not 

only involved in human trafficking, earning around 200,000 baht (approximately $6,500) for each individual, but also had close ties with the LTTE in 

Sri Lanka and insurgents in the far south of Thailand, where terrorists were 

reportedly trained by Jemaah Islamiyah and al-Qaeda. The operation—

carried out collaboratively between the Department of Special Investigation, armed forces, and immigration police—found that the three suspects 

helped terrorists and the southern insurgency movement, funding activities 

through their involvement with war weapons and the drug trade. According 

to intelligence units, the group had supplied fake passports to people who 

possibly included al-Qaeda members traveling to the U.S. to carry out the 

9/11 terrorist attacks. Hussein is alleged to be involved in the trafficking of 

weapons.111 The successful arrest therefore prevented sophisticated weaponry 

from getting into the hands of terrorists.

Drug Trafficking

Drug trafficking is an illegal system—a global black market consisting of 

the cultivation, manufacture, distribution, and sale of illegal drugs. It is a 

commercial exchange of illegal drugs for profit. Varying estimates of the 

annual income from worldwide drug trafficking range between $400 billion 

and $1 trillion a year.112 

Some analysis suggests that terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda increasingly 

rely on drug trafficking proceeds for operational funding.113 In any case, the 

sheer dollar volume generated by the illicit drug market makes rich and poor 

countries alike vulnerable to the money’s corruptible influences. Michael 

Shifter, vice-president for policy at Inter-American Dialogue, a Washington, 

DC-based research center, said drug trafficking is “devastating” and a “major 

threat” to democratic governance and peace for nations around the world.114
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Howard/Traughber: The Nexus of Extremism and Trafficking

Drug Trafficking and Terrorism

Experts disagree about the so-called nexus between drug traffickers and 

terrorist organizations. Michael Braun, former assistant administrator and 

chief of operations at the DEA, believes the nexus is a serious, long-term 

threat which increases the complexity and challenges of taking on both drug 

traffickers and terrorists.115 According to Braun, the nexus between traffickers 

and terrorists is not a new trend, but now is growing at “light speed.”116 Braun 

cites DEA statistics suggesting that 19 of the 43 officially designated foreign 

terrorist organizations (FTOs) have links to some aspect of the global drug 

trade. He also believes that approximately 60 percent of terror organizations 

are in some way connected with the illicit narcotics trade.117 

 Others disagree and instead characterize drug trafficker-terrorist relationships as marriages of convenience that serve primarily logistical and 

financial purposes. According to those who support the “marriages of convenience” argument, the two groups only operate together in those relatively 

rare instances where there is also some ideological or political relationship.118

Certainly, there is disagreement with regards to al-Qaeda’s participation 

in the drug trade. Some contend that, due to the global crackdown on alQaeda’s funding sources, the terrorist group has increasingly turned to drugs 

to finance its operations.119 Congressional Research Service researchers John 

Rollins and Liana Sun Wyler disagree; instead, they contend that there is no 

proven connection between al-Qaeda and drug trafficking at all.120 

So who is correct? While the answer probably lies somewhere within the 

spectrum of differing opinions, there is recent evidence indicating Braun’s 

scenario may be more likely—that there is a serious trend toward increased 

cooperation between drug traffickers and certain terrorist groups. Why? 

In the simplest terms: money. Terrorist organizations have chosen to participate in the illicit drug trade for several financial reasons. First, according to Michael Braun, “state sponsorship of terrorism is declining, and the 

Department of Treasury, CIA, ICE, and FBI have done a very good job at 

identifying private donors and disrupting the flows of terror financing.”121 As 

a result, terrorist groups “are increasingly in need of new sources of funds 

and the drug business fills this need perfectly.”122 Drugs provide many different revenue streams, including funds derived from taxing farmers and 

local cartels, and the provision of security for all aspects of production, trade, 

and distribution.123 What do drug cartels get out of the relationship? One 
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benefit is protection; another is shared intelligence, including knowledge of 

safe routes of passage and bribable border guards; and a third is access to 

an expanded market.

Drug Trafficking Case Study: the FARC

The FARC is an organization operating as both a terrorist and drug trafficking organization and has the dubious distinction of being the first to be 

identified as a “narco-terrorist” group. Established in the early 1960s as a 

Marxist group with a leftist agenda, the FARC has both pursued a political 

agenda within Colombia and created a viable regional and international 

drug trafficking network based from its Colombian stronghold.124 In fact, 

the FARC has increased its influence almost entirely through the drug trade. 

In the 1970s, the FARC taxed marijuana growers in the rural areas it controlled. In the 1980s, the FARC moved into the cocaine business by taxing 

coca plantations in areas under its control. By 2010, the FARC had replaced 

the defeated Cali and Medellin drug cartels to the extent that General Cesar 

Pinson, head of the Colombian police force’s anti-narcotics section, now 

calls the FARC “the big cartel.”125 The FARC nets an estimated $300 million 

a year126 from the drug trade and is actively working with Mexican traffickers 

who import drugs from Colombia.127 

In November 2011, Alfonso Cano, head of the FARC, was killed by the 

Colombian army, marking a major turning point for the organization. However, questions remain pertaining to what the death of the leader will mean 

for the terrorist group and the war against it.128 The FARC has suffered losses 

of leadership in the past—most notably the killing of founder Manuel Marulanda in 2008 and the death of top commanders Raul Reyes in 2008 and 

Jorge “el Mono Joy Joy” Briceno in 2010—but has survived as others have 

stepped up to take control.129 For the present, all available evidence suggests 

that the FARC continues to use its drug profits to support terrorist operations in Colombia.130 

Drug Trafficking Case Study: Hezbollah

Hezbollah directly benefits from drug trafficking. Indeed, Hezbollah is not 

new to the drug trafficking business, having moved opiates out of Lebanon’s Bekaa Valley for decades.131 Despite the fact that poppy cultivation has 

declined in the Bekaa Valley,132 the organization still benefits from selling 
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Howard/Traughber: The Nexus of Extremism and Trafficking

illicit drugs in the Middle East, particularly to Israeli Arabs, in exchange 

for money or information. For example, in 2002, a lieutenant colonel in the 

Israeli Army was charged with spying for Hezbollah in exchange for hashish and heroin.133

Hezbollah is currently increasing its involvement in the drug trade 

because of a shortfall in operational funds. The estimated $120-200 million 

annual stipend from Iran has not met Hezbollah’s operational requirements. 

Moreover, there is some evidence that Hezbollah will need to generate even 

more revenue from drug trafficking, as Iran is hard-pressed to maintain 

funding at past levels.134 Indeed, much of Hezbollah’s additional support 

comes from drug trafficking, a major moneymaker surprisingly endorsed by 

Iranian Mullahs through a particular fatwa.135 In addition to long-standing 

Bekaa Valley drug trafficking, Hezbollah is now trafficking cocaine from 

Latin America for the FARC from Colombia, through Venezuela, and on to 

West Africa, where it is shipped to Europe and the Middle East. 

According to reports from Interpol and the United Nations, cocaine 

transported from Venezuela and traded through West Africa 

accounts for a considerable portion of terrorist group Hezbollah’s 

income. Hezbollah takes advantage of the Lebanese Shiite expatriate Diasporas in South America and West Africa to guarantee an 

efficient connection between the two continents.136

According to Rudy Atallah, a former Africa counterterrorism director 

for the U.S. DOD, Hezbollah’s tentacles have spread across West Africa. 

Starting from Senegal, says Atallah,137 “they have a vast array of connections with the drug dealers, so it’s a natural flow where you have facilitations by Hezbollah in Africa to move drugs coming from Latin America to 

West Africa and up into Europe.”138 Once the drugs hit Europe, Hezbollah 

continues its trafficking operations. For example, German police arrested 

two Lebanese citizens living in Germany in October 2009 after they transferred large sums of money to a family in Lebanon with connections to 

Hezbollah’s leadership, including known Hezbollah terrorist and the group’s 

Secretary General, Hassan Nasrallah. Officials suspected that the duo was 

selling cocaine in Europe and sending the profits to Lebanon, ostensibly to 

support Hezbollah.139

Unfortunately, proving Hezbollah complicity in drug trafficking is often 

difficult. On 28 April 2009, 17 people were arrested in Curaçao for alleged 
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involvement in a drug trafficking ring that had connections to Hezbollah. 

The suspects included four from Lebanon and others from Curaçao, Cuba, 

Venezuela, and Colombia. According to police reports at the time, some 

of the drug trafficking proceeds were funneled through informal Middle 

Eastern banks to Hezbollah.140 According to Curaçao prosecutor Ludmila 

Vicento, “We have been able to establish that this group has relations with 

international criminal organizations that have connections with the Hezbollah.”141 Additional details later emerged:

The suspects are reported to have specialized in exporting Colombian cocaine that they obtained from smugglers who transported 

the drugs to Curaçao using speedboats and ocean-going cargo ships 

that embarked from Venezuela. The drug ring is also reported to have 

imported arms, ammunition, and hashish from the Netherlands to 

Curaçao. Sources in Curaçao reported that the suspects established 

an elaborate scheme to launder their illicit profits. Among other 

things, the smugglers purchased property in Curaçao, Colombia, 

Venezuela, the Dominican Republic, and Lebanon. The Curaçaobased contingent of the drug ring, for instance, operated legitimate 

businesses on the island that served as front companies for their 

illicit activities.142

Hezbollah has denied any wrongdoing in the Curaçao affair, which is to 

be expected. In fact, Hezbollah categorically denies involvement in any type 

of drag trafficking activity. Unfortunately for counterterror and counterdrug 

authorities, and in spite of several reports allegedly linking Hezbollah to the 

Curaçao drug trafficking crime ring, no details regarding the exact nature 

of Hezbollah’s involvement have been provided by Curaçao authorities or 

by the other parties involved in the investigation.143 

This is not the first time allegations regarding Hezbollah involvement in 

drug trafficking have failed to be confirmed. In a similar 2008 incident in 

Colombia, U.S. authorities took down a major drug trafficking ring headed 

by Lebanese nationals. The suspects were alleged to have channeled part of 

their funds back to Hezbollah’s coffers. However, details explaining the precise Hezbollah link never materialized. In another case in 2005, Colombian 

and Ecuadorian officials collaborated to expose a Hezbollah-linked global 

drug trafficking ring. In addition, “According to Ecuadorian officials, the suspects, who included Lebanese, Syrians, Ecuadorians, Colombians, Algerians, 
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Howard/Traughber: The Nexus of Extremism and Trafficking

Nigerians, and Turks, are reported to have transferred 70 percent of their 

profits to Hezbollah.”144 However, as in the previous cases, no concrete details 

explaining the exact Hezbollah link ever emerged.145 The authors’ best guess 

for the lack of evidence had more to do with the protection of intelligence 

assets and confidential sources than claims that Hezbollah was innocent in 

the affair.146

Drug Trafficking Case Study: Saudi-Iranian Plot

In October 2011, the U.S. Justice Department accused Iran of orchestrating 

a plot to assassinate Abdel al-Jubeir, the Saudi Ambassador to the United 

States, with a bomb and to also bomb the Saudi and Israeli embassies in 

Washington, DC. A criminal complaint charged Gholam Shakuri, an officer 

of the Quds Force, the foreign operations arm of Iran Revolutionary Guard 

Corps, and Mansour J. Arbabsiar, an Iranian-American and former usedcar dealer, with conspiracy to murder a foreign official, to use a weapon of 

mass destruction, and to commit an act of terrorism. Through intercepted 

phone calls and bank transfers, officials were able to conclude reports on the 

alleged terrorist plot pointed to a connection with the Mujahadeen Khalq 

Organization, a militant group based in Iraq. Shakuri is believed to be an 

active member of the Iranian opposition group, still designated as a foreign 

terrorist organization by the U.S. Department of State.147 

The case began in May, when Arabsiar sought help from a Mexican drug 

cartel to assassinate the ambassador. The Iranian-American thought he was 

engaging with a member of the feared Zetas Mexican drug organization, 

but had unknowingly approached a DEA informant, according to agents. 

The unwitting Arbabsiar apparently tried to hire the cartel to carry out the 

assassination in exchange for $1.5 million. Down payments were wired to an 

undercover bank account, which led to the arrest.148 The plot demonstrated 

the threats posed by collaboration between foreign terrorist groups and powerful drug trafficking organizations.

Former Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has said he was unaware 

of any plot, and his spokesman, Ali Akbar Javanfekr, accused the U.S. of fabricating the entire event. U.S. Representative Mike Rogers, chairman of the 

House Intelligence Committee, was confident the plan was sponsored by top 

Iranian officials, constituting a clear violation of U.S. and international law, 

and because of the incident the U.S. Treasury Department imposed further 

sanctions on Iran.
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JSOU Report 13-6

Drug Trafficking Case Study: Iranians, Turks, and Hezbollah

In a recent case that charged an Iranian and a Turk for supplying weapons 

and drugs to Hezbollah, prosecutors underscored the growing link between 

drug trafficking and terrorism. DEA Special Agent Derek Maltz stated, “Drug 

traffickers and terrorists are joined at the hip in many parts of the world in 

mutually profitable relationships, and this is one of many examples of that 

dangerous connection.”149 He announced that Siavosh Henareh and Cetin 

Aksu were extradited for providing massive amounts of heroin and material 

support to Hezbollah. The case was uncovered when they attempted to carry 

out the deal through a DEA agent they believed to be an associate of Hezbollah. The United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, Preet 

Bharara, echoed Maltz’s position, stating, “This case provides fresh evidence 

of the growing nexus between drug trafficking, weapons trafficking, and 

terrorists, a nexus with the potential to threaten our national security.”150

In June 2010, Henareh began meeting with DEA confidential sources 

posing as Hezbollah associates in Turkey, Romania, and Greece. During 

meetings and telephone calls, Henareh agreed to arrange the sale of hundreds 

of kilograms of high-quality heroin in the U.S. to the DEA undercover operative and was under the assumption that profits would be used to purchase 

weapons for Hezbollah. Another individual working with Henareh brought 

a sample of the drug to the DEA operative in Bucharest, Romania, which 

was to be followed by a multi-hundred kilogram load. Through Henareh, 

the agent met Aksu and Bachar Wehbe, who agreed to purchase militarygrade weaponry on behalf of Hezbollah in Romania, Cyprus, Malaysia, and 

elsewhere. On 13 June 2011, in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, “Aksu and Wehbe 

signed a written agreement for the purchase of 48 American-made Stinger 

surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), 100 Igla SAMs, 5,000 AK-47 assault rifles, 

1,000 M4 rifles, and 1,000 Glock handguns,” for $9.5 million.151 Wehbe made 

a $100,000 down payment and indicated that he was purchasing the weapons 

following requests of Hezbollah. Henareh and Akso were arrested in Bucharest, Romania on 25 July 2011 and Wehbe was arrested in the Republic of the 

Maldives, and eventually faced the same charges.152

This case is a recent example of how terrorist and criminal collusion was 

successfully identified, investigated, and prosecuted. The undercover operators were able to penetrate trafficking networks that led them to uncover 

important financial resources for Hezbollah.
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Howard/Traughber: The Nexus of Extremism and Trafficking

Drug Trafficking Case Study: PKK

The Kurdish Communities Union (KCK) and its armed wing, the PKK, have 

been known to use profits from drug trafficking to fund their extremist 

activities. Given the widespread dealings with both arms and drug trafficking, as well as arson, blackmail, and extortion, the PKK provides a good 

nexus case study. Founded as an insurgent group and composed mostly of 

Kurds living in Turkey, the PKK was launched in 1974 with a goal of establishing an autonomous Kurdish state in southeastern Turkey. The group’s 

objective and activities, however, have shifted, as has its categorization as 

a major terrorist threat,153 due to its increased use of terrorism tactics and 

threats of violence against civilian and military targets. 

The magnitude of narcotics operations run by the PKK has grown into 

what many describe as a monopoly on the drug trade.154 Turkey is a geographically ideal transshipment point linking Asia and Europe. The PKK 

dominates the routes through Turkey and Europe and is largely responsible 

for bringing buyers and sellers together. Germany’s chief prosecutor asserted 

that 80 percent of narcotics seized in Europe have links to the PKK or “other 

Turkish groups,” which often use the profits from illegal narcotics for the 

purchase of weapons.155 After experiencing trouble financing its activities, 

the organization increased production at plantations. For example, there are 

known opium and cannabis plantations in Osmaniye and Hatay, in mountain villages, and in Lice (Diyarbakır) and other rural areas of Hakkari and 

Van in Turkey.156

In November 2011, a seizure of 28 million Turkish Lira worth of drugs 

illustrates the tight association and organizational structure of the PKK. 

Drug production and trafficking are clearly a major financial resource for 

the organization. In the largest known operation of the PKK/KCK drug 

business, 44 tons of marijuana was seized in early November.157

The PKK works closely with various Kurdish clans and relies heavily on 

individual couriers in narcotics trafficking to mask its direct involvement. 

Since those captured generally testify that they are independent businessmen 

acting alone, it becomes difficult to trace the connection to other criminal or 

terrorist organizations. Recent arrests, however, have provided information 

that many are, in fact, KCK/PKK members or militants.158
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JSOU Report 13-6

Drug Trafficking Case Study: al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb

While al-Qaeda “central” may not be involved directly in the illicit drug 

business, increasing evidence links its “well-armed, well-connected” surrogate, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), to drug trafficking operations in North and West Africa.159 Some contend that AQIM does not use 

narcotics due to religious reasons and only provides “security” for traffickers 

as they move product through West and North Africa to lucrative markets 

in Europe.160 Others contend that AQIM is aggressively pursuing the drug 

trade.161 According to those sources, not only does AQIM offer security for 

traffickers in the region, it also taxes the shipments and provides geographical guidance and transport protection. Recent evidence affirms that AQIM 

takes advantage of its local knowledge and connections to move illicit drug 

products: “The lack of strong state authority and the importance of personal, 

tribal and ethnic loyalties make it easier to corrupt officials, a fundamental 

step to guaranteeing the passage of cocaine.”162 Indeed, AQIM operators, 

along with local, small, affiliated groups—not necessarily Islamists—use 

their knowledge of the harsh Sahel/Sahara region to guide shipments of 

drugs. AQIM protects the drug shipments and provides vehicles to transport 

them to Morocco, then on to Spain, the main entry and distribution point for 

cocaine in Europe.163 In the past, AQIM was mainly focused on Algeria, but 

it is now actively recruiting from other North and West African countries, 

which makes it easier for the organization to conduct criminal activities in 

the entire Sahel region.164

In a sting operation on 18 December 2010, the DEA arrested three AQIM 

members from Mali on drug trafficking charges. It was the first time the DEA 

uncovered an apparently solid connection between Latin American drug 

smugglers and a well-established terrorist organization with connections 

to al-Qaeda.165 During the successful operation, DEA confidential sources 

posing as FARC agents uncovered a Latin America-Africa nexus between 

drug trafficking organizations and al-Qaeda that a former DEA official called 

the “tip of the iceberg.”166

This operation marked the third time the DEA used confidential sources 

posing as FARC operators to lure suspected transnational criminals. The first 

time this tactic had been used, it led to the “capture, arrest and conviction 

of Syrian arms trafficker Monzer al-Kassar, who was arrested in Spain in 

2007.”167 In 2008, a second FARC sting captured arms trafficker Viktor Bout.
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Howard/Traughber: The Nexus of Extremism and Trafficking

Contraband Trafficking

Contraband crimes involve illegally obtained items that evade regulation 

or taxation, as well as legitimate products that are restricted or taxed differently in the target market than in the home market. High-tax markets have 

bred the diversion of goods by organized criminal groups.168 According to 

ICE, contraband smuggling methods “include the use of high-speed vessels, 

cargo containers, aircraft, commercial trucking, commercial vessel, and 

human carriers.”169 Large-scale contraband crimes could include product 

piracy, cargo crime, smuggling, hijacking, or tax evasion. The most commonly smuggled goods involved in tax evasion crimes are rare stones and 

cigarettes. 

U.S. lawmakers have made attempts to strengthen legislation deterring 

cigarette trafficking, such as the Prevent All Cigarette Trafficking Act (H.R. 

1676), which was passed by the U.S. House of Representatives on 21 May 

2009. The Senate Judiciary Committee amended and submitted a similar 

bill, which was passed by the Senate on 11 March 2010 and by the House 

a week later.170 The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives 

(ATF) has primary jurisdiction over criminal provisions related to tobacco 

in the Contraband Cigarette Trafficking Act of 1978. H.R. 1676 would allow 

ATF to establish tobacco trafficking teams, an intelligence center, a covert 

national warehouse for undercover operations, and a computer database to 

track the illegal transactions involving tobacco products.171 Contraband is 

often accorded relatively low priority from law enforcement, and it is viewed 

as a less violent crime than possession of firearms. That said, the ATF has 

determined that terrorist groups do engage in tobacco diversion and ally 

with tobacco traffickers to fund their activities.172

The varying levels of taxation create incentives for illicit trade and profit 

in goods such as cigarettes. Because taxes and fees make up a significant 

portion of final prices (averaging 53 percent), this type of transaction has 

become a new cash cow for many criminal organizations. According to law 

enforcement officials, another incentive in the cigarette industry is that illicit 

tobacco penalties are less severe than those for other forms of illicit trade.173

Tax increases, display bans, or plain packaging initiatives may in fact benefit 

the black market.
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JSOU Report 13-6

Contraband and Terrorism

The illicit use of a legitimately produced commodity provides an often overlooked means of terrorist funding. This type of financing activity receives 

less attention because so little is known about how criminals and terrorists 

operate in tandem to profit from contraband transactions. It is commonly 

agreed that natural resources such as diamonds and oil have exacerbated 

conflict and are exploited for terrorism funding. The trade in manufactured 

commodities, such as cigarettes or electronic equipment, could be a useful 

area to further assess.174 The UN has estimated that 25 percent of the worldwide cigarette trade profits go toward the illicit market, and in 2003 the ATF 

issued a statement that terrorist organizations increasingly profit from the 

cigarette black market, which provides a steady flow of income.175 According 

to the U.S. Government Accountability Office, the cigarette trade is among 

the top methods of terrorist fundraising. Participant groups include Hezbollah, Hamas, al-Qaeda, Irish Republican Army, PKK, and both the Egyptian 

and Palestinian Islamic Jihad.176 According to Louise Shelley, a transnational 

crime expert at George Mason University and an illicit trade adviser to the 

World Economic Forum, “terrorist financing through cigarette smuggling is 

huge,” but “no one thinks cigarette smuggling is too serious, so law enforcement doesn’t spend resources to go after it.”177

From data gathered on weapons trafficking and explosives accountability, 

investigators have determined that terrorist organizations may be shifting to 

tobacco and alcohol commodities to fund their activities.178 The most trafficked contraband items in the world are cigarettes. They are a legal product 

but are priced or taxed at a level that enables traffickers to make sizable profits 

by undercutting state-regulated taxes. As state and the federal governments 

have raised excise taxes on cigarettes, smuggling has become more lucrative 

and therefore a more attractive activity for terrorists.179 Transporting 10 cases 

of contraband cigarettes from low-tax states to high-tax states, for example, 

can bring in from $18,000 to $23,000 in profits.180 The illegal diversion and 

smuggling of cigarettes in the United States results in significant loss in tax 

revenue to governments. It is difficult to quantify the precise amount, but 

estimates point to a loss of roughly $1.75 billion for the U.S. government 

alone.181 By undercutting retail and wholesale prices, cigarette smugglers 

also cause legitimate enterprises to lose lucrative business by flooding the 

market with cheap cigarettes.182
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Howard/Traughber: The Nexus of Extremism and Trafficking

There is evidence that terrorist organizations have indeed formed alliances with tobacco traffickers.183 Since the President’s Executive Order on 

Terrorism Financing in 2001, the ATF has increased efforts to stem the illegal 

diversion of alcohol and tobacco products that finance criminal and terrorist operations. Since 9/11, 223 cigarette smuggling cases were investigated to 

locate associations with terrorist groups and their supporters.184 

Contraband should be viewed as another potential dimension of the 

nexus, as it provides the same benefits to terrorists as human, weapons, 

and drug trafficking. Authorities should expand their scope by tracing the 

intersection between terrorist groups and contraband trafficking in the 

same way they have with other illicit activity. While it has been difficult to 

identify direct links between terrorist financing and contraband trafficking profits, law enforcement can make 

many inferences using the same methods as in other criminal areas. As with 

human, weapons, and drug trafficking, 

the approach to identifying the potential 

overlap between contraband trafficking 

and terrorist groups is by first cutting off 

financing sources through the prosecution of individual cases. Of course, individuals engaging in contraband 

smuggling will likely be found guilty of a range of other criminal violations. Although effective prosecution is impeded by the compartmentalized 

nature of the investigations (each crime is treated separately), at a minimum, 

identifying terrorists’ involvement in this area of crime will help to further 

uncover the nexus between criminals and terrorists.

Contraband Case Study: Charlotte Hezbollah Cell

One way a terrorist organization can benefit from illicit activities such as 

contraband smuggling is to maintain contacts who have already mastered 

the black market in a region far from its base. These relationships can serve 

as a buffer from law enforcement while simultaneously reinforcing sources 

of funding. Diaspora communities interested in profit for themselves may 

sympathize with the political motivations of terrorist organizations and 

send proceeds back to the home country. Hezbollah possesses a vast network of criminal enterprises throughout the world. In 2002, one such North 

Contraband should be 

viewed as another potential 

dimension of the nexus, as it 

provides the same benefits to 

terrorists as human, weapons, 

and drug trafficking.
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JSOU Report 13-6

Carolina-based cell was convicted of providing material support to Hezbollah through contraband profits earned in the U.S.185 The case of Mohamad 

Youssef Hammoud illustrates how such a remittance system is carried out 

and how illicit profits are laundered and set aside to benefit a designated 

terrorist organization.

After illegally obtaining residency status in the U.S., several aliases, and 

multiple forms of credit (to facilitate purchasing and transferring of profits), a group based in Charlotte, North Carolina succeeded in transporting 

cigarettes from the low-tax state of North Carolina to the high-tax state of 

Michigan.186 In 2002, the price differential in taxes per carton increased from 

$7 to $12—translating into a $10,000 profit for the transfer of 1,500 cartons 

of cigarettes.187 Investigations uncovered that Mohamad and his brother, 

Chawki Hammoud, led a group of 12 members in purchasing nearly $8 

million worth of cigarettes, earning upwards of $1.5 million. They carried 

out the operations through complex financial transactions. Purchases were 

primarily made in cash from the wholesaler J.R. Tobacco. If credit cards 

were needed for other expenses, the various identities of each member were 

to be utilized. Once in Michigan, the cigarettes were generally purchased 

using cash as well. “Shell businesses” or “front” stores were also created to 

facilitate the smuggling activities.188 

The FBI confirmed that Mohamad Hammoud was the leader of a group 

of Lebanese Shia Muslims in Charlotte. He reportedly discussed Hezbollah operations during group gatherings and regularly screened propaganda 

videos related to the terrorist organization’s activities. During such meetings, 

Hammoud collected donations for Hezbollah to supplement the cigarette 

smuggling proceeds.189 Finally, in 2000 police found Hezbollah military 

operation propaganda and anti-American speeches, books, and pamphlets 

in the leader’s home. Wiretaps used at trial revealed that Hammoud communicated with Lebanon on near-daily basis and would frequently discuss 

Hezbollah’s military operations and counter-intelligence.190 Hammoud was 

found guilty of providing material support to a terrorist organization and 

was sentenced to 155 years in prison.191

In addition to convicting the criminals of cigarette smuggling and providing material support to Hezbollah,192 the investigation helped clarify 

how terrorist organizations operate and finance their activities in the U.S. 

The case not only highlighted illicit trade within a legitimate economy, but 

also how terrorist cells operate within the corporate world.193 Twenty-six 
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Howard/Traughber: The Nexus of Extremism and Trafficking

individuals were arrested and prosecuted for immigration fraud, visa fraud, 

interstate transportation of stolen property, bank fraud, bribery, money laundering, and racketeering, which successfully disrupted the illegal activity and 

effectively cut terror-crime links.194 Tracing their complex financial transactions and operations may help to reveal how other cases of contraband 

trafficking operate and succeed in cooperating with terrorist organizations. 

Nearly $1.5 million worth of assets were seized in this case.195

Contraband trafficking became an integral structural element to the 

Charlotte cell operations. The material support the group provided for 

Hezbollah depended on these criminal proceeds. Other criminal activities 

carried out by the cell, such as fraud, money laundering, and petty crimes, 

blurred the lines between traditional crime and terrorism but helped in 

providing additional paths to prosecution. Finally, the Hammoud case demonstrated increased domestic security threats as the geographic reach of 

terrorist financing activities spanned several regions within the U.S. 

As a footnote to the case, in 2003, Hassan Makki and Mohamad Akhdar, 

operating out of Dearborn, Michigan, pleaded guilty to trafficking contraband, funneling profits to Hezbollah, and conspiring to violate the Racketeer 

Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. Mohamad Hammoud of the 

Charlotte cell was the primary supplier of cigarettes for the Michigan-based 

enterprise. Hassan Nashar, a Lebanese native who later testified against the 

Hammoud brothers, Makki, and Akhdar, provided support to the group via 

additional cigarette shipments and counterfeit tax stamps.196

Contraband Case Study: R.J .Reynolds Cigarette Smuggling—

Iraq and PKK 

European governments and officials began investigating American manufacturers suspected of selling cigarettes to traders who resold them into 

black markets designed to evade taxes. In November 2000 in New York, the 

European Community (EC) filed a civil action accusing conglomerates Phillip Morris and R.J. Reynolds (RJR) of “an ongoing global scheme to smuggle 

cigarettes, launder the proceeds of narcotics trafficking, obstruct government 

oversight of the tobacco industry, fix prices, bribe foreign public officials, 

and conduct illegal trade with terrorist groups and state sponsors of terrorism.”197 The RJR case revealed the practice of corporate malfeasance and 

highlighted an intricate cooperation between the legitimate corporate world 
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JSOU Report 13-6

and terrorists. In 2002, RJR was brought to court for using established smuggling routes, shell corporations, fraudulent documentation, and laundering 

schemes to move cigarettes over the course of a 10-year period. The lawsuit 

focused on the company’s relationship with the PKK and the smuggling of 

cigarettes into Iraq, which violated a UN embargo. RJR provided assistance 

to the PKK and other terrorist groups, profiting from a complicated and 

mutually beneficial scheme involving cigarette sales. 

The trade embargo of 1990 Iraq banned most imports to and exports from 

Iraq.198 American tobacco products were among the prohibited items for sale 

in Iraq. RJR devised mechanisms to sell its product in Iraq, circumventing the 

embargo via a complex and layered scheme, including false documentation 

and packaging. The cigarettes were moved into Iraq through Turkey, with 

the PKK receiving a fee for each container transferred through the Kurdish 

region. According to EC legal filings against RJR, the cigarette proceeds 

went to the PKK and terrorist organizations based in Northern Iraq. These 

funds allegedly supported terrorist activities carried out in Europe. In addition to bolstering the operations of the PKK, this “legitimate” multinational 

corporation helped to establish smuggling routes in the region, violated a 

U.S. prohibition against trade with Iraq, and violated a UN embargo.199 Big 

tobacco companies boosted sales and gain market share by colluding with 

organized crime syndicates and terrorists. 

The PKK holds a unique position when defending its illegal operations. 

Members of the terrorist organization often claim that financing benefits 

the Kurdish cause and is therefore not illegal.200 

Contraband Case Study: Tri-Border Zone

The tri-border area of South America, where Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay 

meet has been notorious for the smuggling of drugs, arms, and humans, 

as well as a haven for money laundering. It has been a breeding ground for 

contraband items, from CDs and DVDs to fake designer clothing, accessories, sports shoes, games, and electronics. However, cigarettes mark the 

world’s biggest money maker in the contraband category. Paraguay is a top 

producer of contraband cigarettes, and activities involving the movement of 

the goods, particularly through the trade hub in Paraguay, have been difficult 

to thwart. Pat Heneghan, global head of anti-illicit trade for British American 

Tobacco (BAT), describes the porous borders that make cigarettes fairly easy 
35

Howard/Traughber: The Nexus of Extremism and Trafficking

to smuggle from low-duty Paraguay to high-duty Argentina and Brazil. The 

significant source of dirty money from cigarettes is a huge problem, and the 

multinational found that that 6.3 percent of cigarettes worldwide are illicit 

products (counterfeit, smuggled or sold on a country’s black market).201 Figures from BAT indicate that around 150 billion cigarettes are manufactured 

in Paraguay annually. However, the country’s citizens only consume around 

three billion cigarettes per year, and only another estimated three billion 

leave the country legally. This discrepancy suggests that a large portion of the 

cigarette production is exported to illicit markets. BAT believes that about 

8 percent of all illicit cigarettes smoked in the world originate in Paraguay 

and are smuggled abroad, initially through the tri-border route.202 

The tri-border area’s significant Arab diaspora, largely Lebanese, has a 

reputation for illicit activity, which is facilitated by unregulated business 

practices. The region presents another likely scenario of terrorist-trafficking 

connections. In recent years, U.S. officials began working with local officials 

on new programs that would uncover money-laundering rings they believed 

to be funding Hezbollah and other radical groups. The deputy assistant 

treasury secretary for terrorist financing and financial crimes believed there 

was strong evidence of the links.203 Smuggling and money laundering in the 

region has undoubtedly been on the rise, but according to federal agents in 

Paraguay, a lack of resources and technology make it extremely difficult to 

pursue the network of financial crime and illicit trade. One such Paraguayan 

agent, Maria Adelaida Vasquez, stated, “The criminals are on the vanguard 

of technology, and we don’t even have access to the Internet in our offices. 

If we have cellphones, it’s because we buy them with our own money.”204 In 

addition, gathering evidence for investigations is exceedingly difficult, as the 

community remains isolated and few or no local prosecutors speak Arabic.205

In 2004, Assad Ahmad Barakat was charged for sending proceeds to 

Hezbollah. The prominent businessman is of Lebanese descent but holds 

Paraguayan citizenship. He was running an import-export company as a 

front, enabling him to send proceeds from smuggling and counterfeiting 

operations back to Hezbollah. Investigators estimated that Barakat sent about 

$6 million to the terrorist organization annually from 1999 to 2003.206 

The area has been closely monitored by intelligence agencies during the 

last decade, especially following the 9/11 terrorist attacks. However, the triborder zone is one of the many regions where cigarette smuggling is difficult 

to investigate and prosecute. Weak controls, corruption, and geography make 
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JSOU Report 13-6

this area conducive to illicit activity. Combined with the already strong 

presence of human, weapon, and drug smuggling and the proven link to 

terrorist organizations such as Hezbollah, the tri-border zone remains a 

place of concern. 

Contraband Case Study: The “Marlboro Connection”

The 2,000-mile stretch across the Sahara and through the Mediterranean is 

a route for the most lucrative contraband. Cigarette smugglers move product from the West African coast across North Africa, and further north to 

Europe, where demand fuels this illegal trade. AQIM is largely in control 

of the trafficking network. With a strong presence in Europe, the Islamic 

terrorist group relies heavily on cigarette smuggling to these markets.207

Officials and scholars have even claimed that the cigarette smuggling activities constitute the number one source of financing. In collaboration with 

Tuareg nomads, AQIM charges protection fees to those moving this favored 

commodity across the unpoliced desert region.208 Cigarettes are moved in 

shipping containers across the north of Mauritania, often through the town 

of Zerouate, to Kidal in Mali. They are then loaded into smaller trucks for 

transport to Algeria and eventually Europe. The product enters untaxed 

through Italy. Journalist Kate Willson claims that cigarette smuggling “has 

provided the bulk of financing for AQIM. Lead smuggler in the Sahara 

Mokhtar Belmokhtar was nicknamed ‘Mister Marlboro’ for his involvement 

using cigarette smuggling profits to buy weapons.”209 AQIM has weakened 

governance in this region through its illegal activity. The wave of protests 

and political upheaval in neighboring countries will create an opportunity 

for the organization to gain a foothold.210

Cultural Property: The Clandestine Art World

The trade in works of art and cultural property is a dimension of illicit trafficking networks worth mentioning.211 When examined in a broad context, 

the evidence for the significance of cultural property to security has indeed 

been mounting in recent years. While there is much literature on theft of cultural property, particularly by so-called subsistence diggers who are driven 

by poverty and unemployment, there is little scholarly documentation on 

terrorist group participation in the illicit antiquities trade. However, the 

value of economic losses related to activities involving stolen art and cultural 
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Howard/Traughber: The Nexus of Extremism and Trafficking

property follows closely behind the trafficking in illicit narcotics and arms 

and has thus warranted some investigation. The illegal trade in antiquities 

alone—which represents just one component of cultural property—has been 

valued between $300 million to $6 billion per year.212 This has led many to 

believe that local trafficking should not be overlooked as a major security 

threat and method to fund terrorism.213 Along with the trade in arms, drugs, 

and human trafficking, some claim the trade in cultural property ranks as 

one of the most profitable branches of international organized crime and that 

it also finances international terror organizations.214 According to the U.S. 

National Central Bureau of INTERPOL, “the criminal networks trafficking 

in the illicit sale of works of art and cultural property are often times the 

same circles that deal in illegal drugs, arms, and other transactions. It has 

also been recently confirmed that many insurgent and terrorist groups fund 

their operations through the sale and trade of stolen works of art and cultural 

property.”215 Despite these assertions, conclusive connections between terrorism and the illicit trade in cultural property are yet to be substantiated 

through concrete evidence.

Cultural Property Case Study: Iraq

Following the invasion of Baghdad by American and Coalition forces in 

2003, the Iraq Museum was devastatingly plundered in a highly publicized 

looting. The Iraq case provides an example of how chaotic circumstances 

permitted looting to occur, and suggests that resulting profits fell into the 

hands of terrorists. It also serves as a reminder to the international community that increased monitoring and protection during vulnerable moments 

of lawlessness is imperative. 

Iraq shares borders with Turkey, Iran, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Syria. It 

is relatively easy to transport materials from Turkey directly to Europe, and 

from Saudi Arabia to the Gulf States and Europe. There is no precise proof 

of how or where looted material moves out of Iraq, but it is well known that 

the recent wars in the country were followed by the establishment of illicit 

trade networks, which identified key transport routes and mastered effective 

smuggling techniques.216 

While serving in counterterrorism operations in Iraq in 2003, Colonel 

Matthew Bogdanos volunteered to investigate the looting of Iraq’s National 

Museum with a multi-agency task force. Initial investigations estimated that 
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JSOU Report 13-6

170,000 artifacts were carried away by looters within 48 hours of the invasion.217 Approximately 15,000 artifacts were later confirmed stolen and 6,000 

priceless objects were recovered following months of raids, seizures, and 

amnesty programs by the time the museum reopened in 2009. The government has also been buying back artifacts from smugglers.218 UN Secretary 

General Kofi Annan issued a statement “deploring the catastrophic losses.”219

Roughly 695 artifacts from the museum were seized in the United States and 

United Kingdom, and approximately 700 were found by Jordanian, Syrian, 

Kuwaiti, and Saudi border officials.220 Other treasures were seized from international antiquities markets in Lebanon and Saudi Arabia.221 

After conducting an in-depth investigation, Bogdanos explained, “the 

illegal antiquities trade has become a revenue stream for terrorist activity 

in the region.”222 He justified this statement through his discoveries that 

each weapons shipment seized from terrorists or insurgents also contained 

antiquities. In a December 2005 raid of a terrorist bunker, the team uncovered automatic weapons, ammunition stockpiles, infrared goggles, and uniforms accompanied by “30 vases, cylinder seals and statuettes that had been 

stolen from the Iraq Museum.”223 The same routes and infrastructure (which 

were likely established following the 1991 Gulf War) were used to move the 

items, whether weapons or artifacts. Bogdanos points out that a place like 

Iraq, unlike other unstable regions, does not have a huge drug market, so 

smugglers turn to other markets. He adds, “When you consider the routes 

out of Iraq and on to the rest of the world ... via Lebanon, it should come 

as no surprise that Hezbollah saw this movement as a source of financial 

gain. We began to see Hezbollah taxing the movement of antiquities.”224 

Other observers claimed that Sunnis, Shiite militia, and possibly al-Qaeda 

in Iraq were taking advantage of this lucrative trade in looted antiquities as 

a funding source. The revenue flowed from a seemingly endless supply of 

antiquities also helped finance civilian and military attacks.225 While the 

information is largely anecdotal, the case does provide useful information 

for criminal investigations.226
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2. Challenges and Opportunities

Challenges

Fighting terrorism is difficult; so is battling HWDC-trafficking. Fighting 

terrorists and traffickers when they are working in tandem is doubly 

difficult due to a number of operational and legal considerations. Operationally, domestic and international efforts for countering both drug trafficking and terrorist activities are difficult to synergize. Domestically, U.S. 

counterterror activities are the responsibility of the Department of Justice 

and its lead agency, the FBI; the Department of Homeland Security; and 

87,000 different policing jurisdictions.227 Internationally, U.S. counterterror 

responsibilities rest with the Department of State and the DOD. Domestically, counter-drug activities are also the responsibility of the Department 

of Justice—but the lead agency is the DEA, not the FBI—and 87,000 different 

policing jurisdictions. The Department of Homeland Security and several 

of its agencies—ICE,228 the Coast Guard,229 and the Department of Customs 

and Border Protection230—have supporting counterdrug responsibilities that 

mostly entail keeping drug traffickers out of the country. Internationally, 

drug trafficking is the responsibility of the Department of State, with the 

DOD in a supporting role.231 

Therefore, a disparate number of federal, state, county, and local organizations and law enforcement agencies are responsible for countering terrorist 

and/or drug trafficking organizations that operate in a broad geographical 

area. Unfortunately, neither terrorists nor traffickers recognize borders or 

boundaries—international or domestic—which exacerbates the ability of 

the myriad of agencies bound by jurisdiction requirements to “connect the 

dots.” 

Legally, terrorism is handled as a national security issue, while drug trafficking is not—which makes little sense, considering that illicit drug activity 

kills more Americans every year than terrorism. According to testimony 

given before the U.S. House of Representatives, “More than 31,000 Americans—or approximately ten times the number of people killed by terrorists 

on 11 September 2001—die each year as a direct result of drug abuse.”232

Some are trying to “elevate” illicit drug activity to the same national security status as terrorism. For example, Texas congressman Michael McCaul, 
40

JSOU Report 13-6

a Republican from Austin, is seeking to designate seven of the top Mexican 

cartels as “foreign terrorist organizations” (FTOs), a move he says would 

give law enforcement in the United States enhanced tools to combat the drug 

cartels. Currently, leaders of drug cartels reside in what they consider to be 

safe havens—areas where they cannot be pursued by the criminal justice 

system.233 Phil Jordan, the former El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC) director 

who also led the inter-agency anti-drug cartel task force EPIC and ran the 

Dallas Drug Enforcement Agency office, explained that drug cartel members 

break the law on the Mexican side of the border because they know they get 

away with it; solving the cases then becomes extremely difficult for American 

authorities. Jordan advocates labeling some cartels meeting specific criteria 

as terrorist organizations to be a potential way to improve security.234 

Why not broaden the reach of law enforcement so that violent crime 

can be appropriately prosecuted? Legislation proposed by McCaul in H.R. 

1270 (March 2011) would permit the government to freeze money tied to 

the trafficking organizations and enhance the criminal penalties for those 

found aiding the cartels, much in the same manner as the law is used against 

al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups.235 Penalties, including large fines and 

prison sentences, would apply to the entire organization, not only the leaders. Placing the Mexican drug cartels—and perhaps other cartels as well—

on FTO list would also give law enforcement officers the authority to limit 

travel operations and deport any cartel member involved.236 In a letter dated 

27 April 2011, representatives Mike Rogers, Jeff Duncan, Dan Burton, Sue 

Myrick, and Brian Bilbray urged Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to support 

the designation of certain Mexican drug cartels as terrorist organizations 

and to “develop a comprehensive strategy to assist the Mexican government win the war against the cartels.”237 McCaul explains that the violence 

toward the Mexican government, legal system, and media threatens the 

very foundation of that nation and that the Obama administration requires 

tools to ensure security at the border. The new strategy is intended to create 

communication channels among involved agencies and to implement new 

technologies and plans to coordinate efforts between the Justice Department 

and Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control.238 By labeling the cartels as terrorist organizations, the task of targeting the criminal 

activities will be simplified and prosecution will be made more effective. 

The money trail left behind by both criminal and terrorist organizations will be one of the most promising ways to identify the growing nexus 
41

Howard/Traughber: The Nexus of Extremism and Trafficking

between them and will be an effective means of deterring activity. Several 

of the case studies outlined in this paper demonstrate how following transactions between bank accounts helped investigators to pinpoint the associations and make appropriate arrests. A powerful way to topple the nexus 

would be to dry up its financial sources. U.S. Treasury officials have worked 

with the Department of Homeland Security’s immigration office to help 

local officials in high-risk regions, such as the South American tri-border 

zone. Involvement in the banking sector is encouraged to reduce money 

laundering. The United States is equipping foreign governments with the 

means to implement “trade-transparency units.”239 This is a way to collect 

and analyze trade data in an effort to uncover irregularities that could help 

destabilize terrorist-trafficking activity. These tactics are less-cited examples 

of how to stem the trafficking that finances terrorists, but are undoubtedly 

an important means of controlling the illicit flow of goods, particularly 

weapons or weapons technology.

Opportunities

While targeting and disrupting the trafficking-terrorist nexus is replete with 

challenges, the nexus also creates several opportunities for its exploitation. 

First, tracking terrorists for their illicit activities, rather than their terrorismbased endeavors, is less complicated. One of the reasons law enforcement 

agencies were successful against terrorist groups such as the Baader Meinhof 

Gang and the Red Army Faction (RAF) in 

the 1960s was because law enforcement agencies and the legal system adapted to more 

easily target these “criminal activities.” In 

1976, West Germany increased police powers 

to deal with terrorism and made it a crime to 

establish a terrorist organization.240 Further, 

the establishment of an anti-terrorism paramilitary unit proved invaluable. 

The Federal Republic of Germany’s “formidable computerised [sic] bank of 

counterterrorism data,” and establishment of Grenzschutzgruppe 9—Border 

Protection Group 9 “helped the West German police capture some of the 

key members of the RAF who were on the run.”241 These centralized police 

responses to the criminality of the terrorist activities enabled them to be 

“successful overall in the quelling of the RAF.”242

... tracking terrorists for 

their illicit activities, rather 

than their terrorism-based 

endeavors, is less complicated.
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JSOU Report 13-6

Second, while some nations might not be willing to acknowledge a terrorism problem within their borders, they are more likely to acknowledge a 

criminal problem. This example is highlighted by the case of Hezbollah in the 

tri-border area of Argentina, Paraguay, and Brazil. In December 2006, the 

U.S. Treasury Department’s designation of certain Lebanese expatriates in 

the area as having ties to Hezbollah spurred the governments of Argentina, 

Brazil, and Paraguay to issue a “joint statement exculpating the suspects and 

rejecting U.S. claims about terrorist activity in the region.”243 However, the 

State Department’s 2007 annual report on terrorism “reveals that these three 

governments take a markedly more aggressive approach to other criminal 

activities.”244 The report states that the three nations “have long been concerned with arms and drugs smuggling, document fraud, money laundering, and the manufacture and movement of contraband goods through this 

region.”245 While these governments might not be willing to publicly support U.S. counterterrorism policy, their enforcement of existing laws is both 

internationally and domestically acceptable and would still further shared 

goals of targeting the nexus. 

Third, the counter-criminal approach is appealing because it can leverage 

existing resources and procedures. The approach:

... requires neither changes to domestic legal structures nor a reorganization of government bodies or legal, administrative, and regulatory authorities. Drug laws are comprehensive and ubiquitous; 

governments must simply enforce existing laws and hold terrorists 

accountable for their criminal transgressions. Enforcing domestic 

laws is not a political statement, but merely a function of law and 

order and of national sovereignty.246

This relates not only to the ease of operations within a legal framework, 

but also to the second point about some nations’ reluctance to openly discuss 

or act against terrorism. While “some countries use the rhetoric of counterterrorist cooperation but are unwilling to shoulder their responsibilities in 

practice, such as restricting the travel of terrorists through their territory 

or ratifying United Nations conventions on terrorism,”247 many nations are 

more willing to act against crimes codified in their own legal codes.

Fourth, it is easier to prosecute terrorists for criminal activity than for 

crimes of terrorism.248 Indeed, collecting solid evidence about terrorism 

may be more difficult than collecting evidence for many drug, immigration, 
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Howard/Traughber: The Nexus of Extremism and Trafficking

and white collar crimes.249 In terrorism-related procedures, evidence often 

comes from intelligence sources, which can pose significant evidentiary challenges in court. In fact, the evidence may be inadmissible because its use 

may compromise valuable sources or methods, “or the evidence may have 

been supplied by a foreign government unwilling to publicly acknowledge its 

cooperation with the United States.”250 Evidence in criminal prosecution faces 

far fewer constraints. For example, many criminal charges actually brought 

under the international and domestic terrorism programs do not involve 

violent acts or even the threat of violence. The most frequent, in fact, appear 

to reflect technical violations including false statements on visas, identification records such as drivers’ licenses, or other documents.251

Fifth, disclosing terrorists’ criminal activities has positive public relations implications. Exposing terrorists for what they are—criminals—sullies 

their “freedom fighter” or pious religious images and inhibits their opportunity to raise funds and recruit. The Federal Narco-Terrorism statute of 2006 

has already been used in several cases and will likely play an increasingly 

important role in terms of enforcement and highlighting “terrorist groups’ 

hypocritical involvement in criminal activity.”252 This type of public relations 

campaign can help support grassroots movements to discredit terrorist and 

criminal causes and provide much-needed assistance to governmental efforts 

to disrupt these types of activities. There may well be other silver linings to 

the nexus challenge as well. For instance, penetrating terrorist organizations, 

particularly Islamist extremist organizations such as al-Qaeda, is difficult—if 

not impossible. Indeed, religious extremists are more difficult to infiltrate 

than terrorists of previous generations. The networked, cellular structure used 

by al-Qaeda and like-minded groups is particularly difficult to navigate for a 

hierarchical security apparatus like that of the United States. While bribery 

and other traps could yield information and prosecutions for traditional 

criminal groups in the past, the $50 million reward on Osama bin Laden was 

never collected. And, despite bin Laden’s recent killing, it is still unclear how 

successful other methods have been in getting bin Laden’s followers to talk.253

Therefore, one potentially successful strategy would be to employ undercover 

operators to actively penetrate trafficking organizations known to be linked to 

terrorist entities, with the goal of getting close enough to the group to collect 

actionable intelligence. Alternatively, arrested traffickers with known terrorist 

associations should be convinced to share their knowledge of those terrorist 

organizations with intelligence and law enforcement officials.254 
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JSOU Report 13-6

Seeking the cooperation of unsavory criminal elements during conflict is 

not new. Many credit Mafia kingpin Lucky Luciano for aiding Naval Intelligence during World War II: “In return for reduction in his prison sentence in 1942, it is often speculated that Luciano made a deal with the U.S. 

government to secure New York’s docks from Nazi or Fascist sabotage and 

to provide human intelligence that would be used during the invasion of 

Sicily.”255 Interestingly, during the invasion of Sicily in July 1943—possibly 

because of Luciano’s connections and influence—Italian troops did not fire 

a single shot at the invading Americans.256 How might a “Lucky Luciano” 

arrangement work today? Consider weapons trafficker Viktor Bout, who is 

presently languishing in a U.S. prison on weapons trafficking and terrorism 

charges. Bout purportedly had dealings with al-Qaeda,257 Hezbollah,258 and 

Abu Sayyaf,259 among other terrorist groups. Someone like Bout would be 

a prime candidate to take the offer of a reduced sentence in exchange for 

valuable information about his former associates.260

As discussed, one way to anticipate areas of converging criminal and 

terrorist interest is to identify ungoverned or loosely governed geographical 

locations where both terrorist and criminal activity are likely to proliferate. 

This “failed states” approach may be effective in some cases by providing 

an approximation of a country’s stability or likelihood of collapse. However, 

by focusing on the “failed states” approach, places like Abbottabad, Pakistan, where Osama Bin Laden was killed, can go unnoticed by international 

analysts.261 The Global Black Spots-Mapping Global Insecurity (GBS-MGI) 

Program is currently developing a way to target terrorists through what 

has been called the “Black Spots” approach, which has three dimensions. A 

“Black Spot” will be outside of governmental control; it will be dominated by 

illicit organizations; and it will be able to produce and export insecurity (i.e., the organizations possess explosives, illicit drugs, and other 

instructions within terrorist networks).262 Not 

only does Pakistan have a strong military and 

considerable nuclear weapons, it has a strong 

intelligence apparatus. Here, the GBS-MGI 

approach allows for a more intricate analysis of 

provinces, cities, and districts and the presence 

of warlords, crime organizations, insurgent groups, and terrorist networks.263

A causal model for identifying these critical nodes in terrorist and other 

A “Black Spot” will be 

outside of governmental control; it will be 

dominated by illicit organizations; and it will 

be able to produce and 

export insecurity ...
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Howard/Traughber: The Nexus of Extremism and Trafficking

extremist networks can link Black Spots to capture the likelihood of collaboration through the use of technology and other investigative techniques 

targeted and exploited by law enforcement and technology. To date, GBSMGI has identified 600 Black Spots worldwide.264

While there are certainly challenges presented by the collusion and outright collaboration of terrorist and criminal groups, these relationships have 

the potential to provide openings for governments to infiltrate, intercept, and 

prosecute traditionally hard-to-access terrorist groups. In fact, the terrorcrime nexus presents interesting opportunities—perhaps even advantages—

for counterterrorism and anticrime officials to consider.

Conclusion

Recent evidence suggests increasing and deepening connections between 

HWDC-trafficking and terrorism, thought the two were previously considered mutually exclusive. The lines between criminal trafficking and terrorist organizations are increasingly blurred—in large part as a result of the 

similarities between the two phenomena. Trafficking and terrorist groups 

have a natural affinity with one another due to their engagement in illicit 

activities and their use of violence, fear, and corruption to attain their goals. 

They operate clandestinely in denied areas that stretch across the globe, 

where governmental controls are weak. Still, there are differences between 

trafficking organizations and terrorist groups. While criminal organizations 

focus on creating profits through illicit means, terrorist groups have goals 

that stretch beyond pure wealth creation. Terrorists, altruists in their own 

eyes, have ideological goals, serve a specific constituency, and use terrorist 

tactics to attain their objectives. While differences persist, criminal and terrorist groups have learned from one another, selecting activities to further 

their objectives such as using IEDs or laundering money. 

The “big four”—human, weapons, drug, and contraband trafficking—are 

connected to terrorism in a variety of ways. Although the links between 

human traffickers and terrorist groups are the least established among the 

big four, suggested relationships in Africa and the former Soviet Union States 

are becoming more frequent. Weapons traffickers, in contrast, are much 

more connected to terrorism and terrorist groups. Having a natural affinity 

to armed conflict, weapons traffickers are often connected to armed groups 

and harbor nefarious intentions. Weapons traffickers rely on terrorists for 
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JSOU Report 13-6

protection, and terrorists rely on weapons traffickers for weapons—it is a 

naturally symbiotic relationship, particularly when both can profit from 

the enterprise. 

Drug profits are important, particularly for terrorists such as al-Qaeda 

and Hezbollah, whose other funding sources are drying up. Therefore, the 

links between drug traffickers and terrorists are primarily focused on generating income, and to a lesser extent on creating or fueling violence and 

conflict. Yet the links between drug trafficking and terrorism are the most 

entrenched and fastest-growing of all three forms of trafficking illustrated 

here. The relationship varies across a spectrum, from straightforward “marriages of convenience” between drug traffickers and Islamist extremists to 

a true “nexus,” as in the case of the FARC, the world’s first narco-terrorist 

group. 

Recognizing that there is a nexus between certain trafficking and terrorist 

organizations is an important first step in successfully addressing and combating each type of group. Recognizing that law enforcement and counterterrorist officials might have an opportunity to use their abilities to penetrate 

criminal organizations in order to gain access to terrorist groups is perhaps 

even more important. Since it is easier to infiltrate criminal organizations, 

it may therefore be easier to gain access to terrorist organizations that have 

criminal associations. Nevertheless, challenges to counter-trafficking and 

counterterrorist operations persist. From a legal standpoint, counterterrorist laws are more comprehensive than their counter-drug counterparts. The 

ongoing effort to raise drug trafficking to the same national security level 

as terrorism is a positive sign. We have much to learn from the collusion of 

trafficking and terror. Recognizing the similarities, differences, and areas of 

cooperation between these two dangerous types of organizations will ensure 

that counter-trafficking and counterterrorist activities are more focused and 

ultimately more successful. 

Finally, the policy challenges to combating a crime-terror nexus are 

numerous, and affect a wide variety of governmental institutions with 

responsibilities to combat either crime or terror.265 Many of the institutions involved in the fight against the crime-terror nexus, including the 

departments of State, Treasury, Defense, Justice, and Homeland Security, 

as well as the intelligence community, suffer from separation of the offices 

that handle crime and terror. The U.S. Department of State, for example, 

has separate units that handle counterterrorism efforts (the Office of the 
47

Howard/Traughber: The Nexus of Extremism and Trafficking

Coordinator for Counterterrorism) and combat international organized 

crime (the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs). 

Since 9/11, however, these units have 

learned to work together, creating 

complementary programming that 

often has the same end goals. Unfortunately, the examples of such cooperation across government are not 

as prevalent. Therefore, to address 

terrorist-trafficker nexus challenges 

in the future, officials must foster 

better “policy nexus” connections between offices with responsibilities for 

countering terrorism and combating international crime. What is required 

is a nimble organizational structure that would combat terror-crime nexus 

challenges with a “policy nexus” that works.

... to address terrorist-trafficker 

nexus challenges in the future, 

officials must foster better policy 

nexus connections between 

offices with responsibilities for 

countering terrorism and combating international crime.

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Howard/Traughber: The Nexus of Extremism and Trafficking

3. The Terrorist-Trafficking Nexus and 

Special Operations Forces

Introduction

Special Operations Forces (SOF) have been engaged in counterterror 

operations and counter-drug trafficking, or counter-narcotics operations, for decades. Operation Snow Cap in South America in the late 1980s 

partnered United States Special Operations Forces (USSOF) and DEA teams 

to conduct counter-narcotics operations. The joint teams “provided paramilitary training, law enforcement planning, intelligence and advisory support for 

counterdrug raids on cocaine processing labs and airstrips in Bolivia, Peru 

and Ecuador.”266 In what was the normal method of operation for decades, 

U.S. military personnel were in a support role and confined to their bases, 

where they trained host country forces to conduct joint operations with 

DEA agents.267 

Presently, SOF continue to support counter-drug operations in South 

America and are often touted as a positive factor in turning the tide against 

drug traffickers in all of Latin America.268 SOF also support counter-drug 

operations in other combatant commands, particularly in Central Command, as part of the ongoing counterterror and counterinsurgency efforts 

in Afghanistan. When one of this monograph’s authors commanded the 1st 

Special Forces Group between 1994 and 1996, detachments from his command conducted counter-drug operations in Thailand, supported Joint Task 

Force Six counter-drug operations on the border of Mexico and, for a brief 

period, helped monitor drug crossing points on the U.S.-Canada border. 

These operations were either training or support missions, but they were 

still integral to the overall U.S. counter-drug strategy.

Specific authorities for investigating and countering terrorism and criminal activities are laid out in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (as amended), 

Title 10 of the U.S. Code, and various National Defense Authorization Acts.269

Under Title 10 and authorized missions, SOF clearly have authority to participate in counterterror operations, as do several other federal agencies. However, unlike other federal agencies, SOF’s authority to conduct counter-drug 

trafficking and other counter-trafficking operations is less clear. Agencies 
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JSOU Report 13-6

that are legally authorized to conduct both counterterror and anti-crime 

(counter-trafficking) operations include the FBI, DEA, ICE, and the International Organized Crime Intelligence and Operations Center.270

FBI

The FBI receives its authority to investigate all federal crime not assigned 

exclusively to another agency in Title 28, Section 533 of the U.S. Code. It is 

also authorized to investigate

... threats to national security pursuant to presidential executive 

orders, attorney general authorities, and various statutory sources. 

Title II of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 

2004, Public Law 108-458, 118 Stat. 3638, outlines FBI intelligence 

authorities, as does Executive Order 12333; 50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.; 50 

U.S.C. 1801 et seq. On foreign soil, FBI special agents generally do 

not have the authority to make arrests except in certain cases where, 

with the consent of the host country, Congress has granted the FBI 

extraterritorial jurisdiction.271

DEA

The DEA receives its authority from Title 21, Chapter 5A of the U.S. Code, 

which creates the DEA as the one comprehensive agency for the enforcement 

of drug laws and gives it the authority to enforce the Controlled Substances 

Act. More importantly, Section 122 of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and 

Reauthorization Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-177) prohibits narco-terrorism, with 

provisions for enhanced criminal penalties. Codified in Title 21, Section 960a 

of the U.S. Code, this language makes it “a violation of U.S. law to engage in 

narcotics-related crimes anywhere in the world while knowing, conspiring 

or intending to provide support, directly or indirectly, for a terrorist act or 

to a terrorist organization.”272 In order to enforce counter-narco-terrorism 

provisions, the DEA has established the Counter-Narco-Terrorism Operations 

Center under the umbrella of its Special Operations Division. In cases such 

as Afghanistan, the DEA carries out operations through Foreign-Deployed 

Advisory and Support Teams (FAST) that partner with the host country on 

joint investigations,273 much the same way that military special operations 

forces collaborate with their host’s counterpoints to carry out similar missions.
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Howard/Traughber: The Nexus of Extremism and Trafficking

ICE

ICE is authorized to investigate smuggling cases under Title 18 – General 

Smuggling; Title 19 – Customs Duties; and Title 21 – Narcotics Violations.274

Within ICE, the National Security Investigations Division is responsible for 

leading the effort to “identify, disrupt and dismantle transnational criminal enterprises and terrorist organizations that threaten the security of the 

United States.”275 

SOF

As mentioned previously, counterterrorism is a SOF “core operation” as 

noted in USSOCOM Publication 1, “Doctrine for Special Operations”276 and 

as a special activity in Title 10 U.S. Code Chapter 6.277 However, SOF have 

no counter-trafficking law enforcement authority under existing statutes. 

U.S. law enforcement bodies are clearly authorized to conduct international 

counter-trafficking operations, particularly counter-drug trafficking. But 

not granting SOF these authorities in an international environment may be 

short-sighted. For example, the security environment of a host nation may 

be non-permissive to the investigatory and prosecutorial missions of these 

agencies. When a host nation’s forces are ill equipped to conduct counterterrorism and/or anti-trafficking operations, or the security environment 

prevents U.S. law enforcement agencies from operating effectively, the U.S. 

military, specifically SOF, is ideal for contributing to “joint counternarcotics 

and counterterrorism or counterinsurgency activities.”278 

In fact, until recently, SOF support for countering human, weapons, and 

contraband trafficking has been limited. Other than support for counterdrug operations, SOF involvement in these efforts has been mostly coincidental—a side effect of other counterterror or counter-drug operations.279

While counterterror is a SOF core operation, as previously noted, there is 

little specificity regarding SOF and counter-drug operations. Interestingly, 

counter-drug operations—once listed as a collateral mission in SOF doctrine280 —are not mentioned as a mission, operation or activity in USSOCOM 

Publication 1.281 However, in an April 2011 joint publication, SOF are able to 

“perform other activities of a collateral nature such as counterdrug operations and noncombatant evacuation operations.”282 On the official U.S. Army 

Special Operations Command website, counter-drug operations are listed as 

a collateral activity for Special Forces.283 SOF’s participation in counter-drug/
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counter-narcotics operations is authorized under Title 10 of the United States 

Code. For example, Counter Nacro-Terrorism funding was approved to 

augment already existing Counter Drug/Counter Narcotics authorities to 

train and advise host nation security forces. This DOD (Title 10) exception 

enables SOF teams to train and provide direct assistance to friendly foreign 

forces, and it specifically addresses the nexus of terror and narco-crime 

organizations.

Other counter-trafficking activities—such as weapons, human, and contraband trafficking—are not listed in SOF-related doctrine or directives as 

missions, activities or collateral activities. However, if the nexus between 

terrorists and traffickers becomes more pronounced and threatening to the 

United States (a clear and present danger), look for policymakers to suggest 

SOF become more involved in counter-nexus type operations—whether 

willingly or unwillingly.284 

Counter-Drug Trafficking

In truth, SOF are presently engaged in counter-nexus-type operations—and 

have been for decades. For example, operations against the FARC by definition have both counterterror and counter-drug implications. The FARC is as 

much engaged in trafficking cocaine today as it is in leftist terrorist activities to affect regime change in Colombia.285 Similarly, SOF are engaged in 

operations against the Taliban, another narco-trafficking organization. In 

fact, Mario Costa, the former UN Drug Czar, described the Taliban’s heroin 

trade in Afghanistan and Pakistan as the “new clear and present danger.”286

As in role in South American counter-drug operations, SOF generally plays 

a support role in Afghanistan. Ideally, Afghan units, including the Afghan 

Ministry of Interior’s Air Interdiction Unit (AIU), will take full responsibility 

for the counter-drug mission in the near future. The AIU met a major milestone in August 2011 by conducting an integrated counter-drug operation 

with the Afghan National Intelligence Unit, Afghan commando forces and 

allied coalition advisers. According to AIU officials, the mission originated 

“from the Afghan Air Force compound in Kabul, was flown by Afghan AIU 

Special Forces pilots” and destroyed illegal drugs and drug-making equipment in Achin District in Nangahar province.287 

The extent to which SOF are committed to counter-drug operations in 

Afghanistan is beyond the scope of this work. However, a comment made 
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Howard/Traughber: The Nexus of Extremism and Trafficking

by Michael Braun, former Chief of Operations for the DEA, perhaps best 

sums up SOF participation in counter-drug operations and telegraphs a 

recommendation forthcoming in this monograph. According to Braun, as of 

October 2009, almost all counter-narcotics operations in Afghanistan were 

executed with “U.S. Military Special Forces operators working shoulder-toshoulder with law enforcement agents.”288 He added, “When you fuse the 

unparalleled tradecraft that seasoned DEA agents bring to the fight with 

the exclusive war fighting techniques of highly experienced Special Forces 

operators, you create a counter-insurgency capability that is second-to-none. 

More of this blend would definitely be better, and would be a wise investment 

of taxpayer dollars.”289

Since drug money is used to finance terrorist operations, recruiting, and 

training, SOF are logically able to assist in counter narco-terrorist operations. 

This logic was made clear in a 2004 speech delivered by Thomas O’Connell, 

then the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low 

Intensity Conflict, before a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing. 

According to Secretary O’Connell:

Global and regional terrorists threatening United States interests 

can finance their activities with the proceeds from narcotics trafficking. Terrorist groups such as the FARC in Colombia, Al Qaida 

in Afghanistan, and groups around the world partially finance key 

operations with drug money. The DOD, with our counterparts in 

the Department of State and other government agencies, seeks to 

systematically dismantle drug trafficking networks, both to halt 

the flow of drugs into the United States, and to bolster the broader 

war on terrorism effort.290

Other counter-trafficking operations

In Africa, the Pan Sahel Initiative (PSI) was a 2002 U.S. State Departmentfunded initiative in designed to enhance the border capabilities of Mali, 

Mauritania, Niger, and Chad in order to prevent arms smuggling, drug trafficking, and the movement of trans-national terrorists. U.S. Army Special 

Forces, assigned to U.S. European Command’s Special Operations Command, Europe, trained selected military units from the four countries on 

mobility, communications, land navigation, and small unit tactics.291 Another 

objective of the PSI was to bring military and civilian officials together to 
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JSOU Report 13-6

encourage more cooperation and information sharing within and among the 

governments of the region on counterterrorism and border security issues. 

Under the PSI, Special Forces soldiers helped train and equip one rapidreaction company—about 150 soldiers—in each of the four sub-Saharan 

states.292 Critics contend that the PSI was both significantly underfunded 

and lacking focus.293 

A follow-on program, initially referred to as the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative and eventually established under U.S. Africa Command 

(AFRICOM) as the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP), 

is better funded and has a wider scope, with several countries added to the 

program. From a SOF perspective, the overall goals of the TSCTP “are to 

enhance the indigenous capacities of governments in the Pan-Sahel (Mauritania, Mali, Chad, and Niger, as well as Nigeria and Senegal) to confront 

the challenge posed by terrorist organizations in the region. Additionally, 

TSCTP facilitates cooperation between the Pan-Sahel countries and Maghreb 

partners (Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia) in combating terrorism.”294 The 

U.S. Department of State’s TSCTP goals and objectives are more robust in 

that they include counter-criminal trafficking operations as well; its primary 

TSCTP objective is to create an environment in the Maghreb and Trans Sahel 

that is inhospitable to terrorist and trafficking operations. Commensurate 

with host country need and political will, the TSCTP program’s intent is to 

place law enforcement experts in requesting countries capable of lending 

assistance to local law enforcement personnel on a day-to-day basis.295 

Counter-Human Trafficking

Special Forces soldiers are presently attempting to capture a notorious human 

trafficker in Central Africa—terrorist Joseph Kony. Deployed by President 

Barack Obama at the end of 2011, the 100 U.S. Special Forces soldiers dedicated to this mission operate out of four bases and are split up about 15 to 30 

per base. Their purpose is to provide American technology and experience to 

Central African and Ugandan forces in pursuit of Kony and his Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) followers.296 The Kony-led LRA promotes a radical form 

of Christianity and African animism, which it claims should be the basis for 

the Ugandan government.297 In attempting to achieve its objective, the LRA’s 

tactics have included unbridled brutality, rape, torture, and murder against 

civilians.298 Approximately 80 percent of Kony’s ranks—or 3,000 human 
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Howard/Traughber: The Nexus of Extremism and Trafficking

beings—are trafficked children, who were kidnapped and brainwashed into 

service with the LRA.299 LRA members also kidnap children, particularly 

girls, to serve as sex slaves; some have even been trafficked as “gifts” to arms 

dealers in Sudan.300

Counter-Weapons Trafficking

Presently, SOF do not have any particular weapons trafficking authority 

under Title 10 or in SOF doctrine, nor do they have any dedicated missions 

or collateral activities. Perhaps they should. According to Special Operations 

researcher John B. Alexander, the resources of criminal organizations are 

increasingly posing direct threats to stability, and studies have proven that 

illegal drug trafficking is the leading funding source for terrorism. However, 

rather than concentrating on a single vice, transnational organized crime 

elements span many different facets of activities. Of particular concern is the 

relationship between trafficking and terrorist organizations.301 

Case Studies

Beyond the central theatres of war in Iraq and Afghanistan, SOF has conducted similar missions across the globe, denying sanctuary to terrorist/

trafficking groups from the Philippines to Honduras.

Africa

According to Colonel George Bristol, commander, Joint Special Operations Task Force-Trans Sahara, Africa is the “next true horizon.”302 It is an 

expansive and often poorly governed territory where the full spectrum of 

international powers, African states, and local actors are fighting for scarce 

natural resources. Such fierce competition for survival perpetuates instability 

in a region characterized by strong tribal traditions and frequent turnover 

in governance, allowing trafficking and terrorism to flourish. According to 

Janice Burton, the nexus where these factors converge is in the exchange of 

goods, echoing Bristol’s observation that “smuggling is considered an honest 

profession and illicit goods, drugs and weapons are coin of the realm.”303 

SOF have been working with African countries to try and stem the flow 

of illicit materials and violent ideology through a combination of counterviolent extremist operations and partner-nation capacity building. By taking 
56

JSOU Report 13-6

this two-pronged approach, SOF are able to provide stability in some areas 

while helping countries spread that stability to their neighbors. 

Operation Observant Compass is the deployment of Special Operations 

Command and Control Element - Horn of Africa, the special operations 

forces component of AFRICOM’s Combined Joint Task Force - Horn of 

Africa, to counter the Kony-led LRA. A Specially Designated Global Terrorist 

according to the U.S. Treasury Department, the group has wrought havoc in 

the countries of Uganda, South Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo and 

Central African Republic for nearly three decades. The LRA Disarmament 

and Northern Uganda Recovery Act was signed into law in May 2010, and 

in October 2011 President Obama “authorized the deployment of 100 Special 

Forces advisers to the region, not to engage the LRA, but rather to train the 

military forces in the region.”304 And according to James Scott Rawlinson, 

a spokesman for Special Operations Command Africa, American SOF are 

successfully helping their African partners to pursue the LRA. While he 

acknowledges that LRA attacks increased slightly in early 2012, he sees that 

as a sign that the group is feeling pressured and is backed into survival mode. 

In fact, Ugandan officials believe that the group has split into multiple factions, all of which are constantly on the run and without adequate food.305 

Meanwhile, AQIM poses the greatest threat in North Africa. According to 

James Kitfield, AQIM has made $90 million over the last decade by kidnapping for ransom and facilitating drug smuggling.306 AQIM has also been 

implicated in the 11 September 2012 attack on the American consulate in 

Benghazi, the January 2013 raid on a natural-gas facility in Algeria, and the 

seizure of Northern Mali by multiple Islamist groups and Tuareg separatists. 

In an area also threatened by Boko Haram of Nigeria and al-Qaeda affiliates 

in Libya, Civil Military Support Elements, Regional Information Support 

Teams and Special Forces operational detachments have worked closely with 

partner nations to advise counterterrorism units and limit the territorial 

control of these groups. 

Southeast Asia 

In 2002 U.S. Pacific Command initiated Operation Enduring Freedom – 

Philippines (OEF-P) to counter the growing threat of the al-Qaeda-affiliated 

Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) and the Islamist insurgent group Moro Islamic 

Liberation Front (MILF), both of which operated out of the southern islands 

of the Philippines. Unlike typical counterterrorism missions, OEF-P: 
57

Howard/Traughber: The Nexus of Extremism and Trafficking

... focused on assisting the Philippine government to protect its citizens, defeat the Islamist insurgency that had taken hold around the 

island of Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago, and deny sanctuary 

to VENs. OEF-P’s success has demonstrated the value of the special 

warfare approach of working “by, with, and through” partners to 

achieve common security goals.307

While it vacillates between ideological and criminal motivations, ASG 

has become notorious for its success in kidnappings for ransom, maritime 

piracy and arms trafficking.308 With USSOF assistance, Philippine forces 

won support of the local population and drove ASG from its safe haven on 

Basilan Island. SOF have continued to train, assist and advise the Armed 

Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police in counterterrorism and counterinsurgency. Renamed Joint Special Operations Task 

Force-Philippines (JSOTF-P), the SOF presence now consists of 500 to 600 

men whose activities are closely coordinated with the ambassador’s country 

team by a full-time SOF liaison officer assigned to the U.S. embassy. This 

ensures that OEF-P is synchronized with the objectives and activities of U.S. 

foreign policy toward the Philippines.309 

JSOTF-P’s support for AFP counterterrorism operations is complemented 

by its civil-military operations which, according to Colonel Bill Coultrup 

(U.S. Army), a former JSOTF-P commander, “change the conditions that 

allow those high-value targets to have a safe haven. We do that through helping give a better life to the citizens: good governance, better health care, a 

higher standard of living ... that’s how we prevent the bad guys from getting 

a grip on the local population.”310

USSOF and Philippine forces have also driven back the MILF insurgency 

and disrupted connections between local insurgencies such as MILF and 

criminal-terrorist groups such as ASG.311 Moreover, JSOTF-P’s supportive 

role has earned the respect and appreciation of the Philippine government, 

which recently offered to reopen its bases to conventional U.S. forces.312 The 

Philippine government appears eager to cooperate on an expanding set of 

security challenges, due in no small part to the relationships and trust established by U.S. SOF.313 
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JSOU Report 13-6

Central America

Members of Naval Special Warfare Task Element-Alpha (NSWTE-A), a 

deployed maneuver element attached to Naval Special Warfare Unit-FOUR 

in support of Special Operations Command South, recently trained their 

Honduran counterparts during a six-month deployment to enhance the 

abilities of the newly established Honduran Fuerza Especial Naval (FEN). 

FEN is a Honduran maritime Special Forces unit tasked with combating 

transnational organized crime in and around Honduras shores. According 

to the NSWTE-A officer in charge, the partnership has prepared FEN to 

continue training and operating on its own to protect Honduras borders 

from transnational organized crime and illicit trafficking.314

Conclusion

As previously noted, SOF have been engaged in counter-drug nexus operations for decades in several different regions of the world. Ongoing special 

operations, such as those in Africa against Joseph Kony and the LRA, may 

prove successful from a human trafficking perspective. Therefore SOF, at 

least to a degree, have been and continue to be in counter-trafficking activities in a training and support role—or in a more direct role if the trafficking 

is specifically related to terrorism activity.

Should SOF have more law enforcement (counter-trafficking) authorities 

than it does now? The authors believe the answer is yes, particularly in an 

international environment where transnational, non-state actors operate in 

denied areas, failed and failing states and along the so-called “arc of instability.” John Alexander writes that several emerging factors increase the 

likelihood that SOF forces and law enforcement agencies will be forced to 

work together in the future because of the transnational nature of the threat. 

According to Alexander, the transnational “expansion of international gangs, 

organized crime organizations and terrorism that has no boundaries and is 

relegated to criminal status require a coordinated response.”315 He continues,

Leaving these actions to federal LEAs—such as the FBI, DEA, Secret 

Service, Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, and others—to solve is 

insufficient. Rather, area fusion centers that incorporate investigative and response entities at the federal, state, and local levels are 

already emerging. These amorphous threats have no regard for 
59

Howard/Traughber: The Nexus of Extremism and Trafficking

geographic limitations. Therefore, our defense mechanisms call for 

agile, cooperative, and capable confederations that are not hampered 

by self-imposed limitations.316

Military leaders and government officials in the Obama administration 

have both alluded to the critical role that SOF will play in a U.S. defense strategy increasingly focused on capacity-building and preventative measures. 

This “light footprint” approach requires a revision of the multiple authorities 

under which SOF operate in order to effectively address the flexible, amorphous and transnational threat of the terror-trafficking nexus. Specifically, 

authorities need to support persistent, multi-year engagements rather than 

episodic training missions. Additionally, existing authorities that restrict 

U.S. efforts to build partner capacity to the training, advising, and equipping 

of partner forces that are involved in counterterrorism operations, must be 

revised or expanded to authorize SOF to engage in a wider mission set.317

61

Howard/Traughber: The Nexus of Extremism and Trafficking

Endnotes

1. Raven Clabough, “More Drug Arrests Connect Drugs to Terrorism,” The New American, July 28, 2011. Available at: http://thenewamerican.com/usnews/crime/8385-

more-drug-arrests-connect-narcotics-to-terrorism (accessed February 18, 2012). 

2. This definition was “coined” by author Russell D. Howard after examining more 

three dozen terrorism definitions. The Howard definition takes liberties with 

definitions from Richard Betts and Bruce Hoffman. It is meant to be succinct and 

useful in analysis. The Howard definition contains three of the most common 

words or terms in most all recognized definitions: “violence,” “civilian,” and “for 

political purposes.”

3. Taken from and changes made to: “Prevention of the inadvertent movement and 

illicit trafficking of radioactive materials,” International Atomic Energy Agency 

Technical Document 1311, September 2002, 1. Available at: www-pub.iaea.org/

MTCD/publications/PDF/te_1311_web.pdf (accessed February 25, 2012).

4. Multiple conversations with Bruce Hoffman over the past decade. 

5. Erick Stakelbeck, “Drug Money Funding Chavez, Islamic Terrorist Groups,” 

Christian Broadcasting Network, November 16, 2010. Available at: www.cbn.

com/cbnnews/world/2010/October/Chavez-Drug-Cartels-and-Terrorism-Funding/ (accessed January 11, 2011).

6. John Rollins and Liana Sun Wyler, “International Terrorism and Transnational 

Crime: Security Threats, U.S. Policy and Considerations for Congress,” Congressional Research Service Report for Congress R41004 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, March 18, 2010, 11. Available at: www.fas.org/sgp/crs/

terror/R41004.pdf (accessed April 6, 2012).

7. Multiple conversations and written correspondence between author Howard 

and Dr. Jeffrey M. Bale over a period of three months, 2011-2012. 

8. Ibid.

9. Ibid. 

10. “Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime: Addressing Converging 

Threats to National Security,” National Security Council, Office of the President 

of the United States, July 2011, 6. Available at: www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/

files/Strategy_to_Combat_Transnational_Organized_Crime_July_2011.pdf 

(accessed October 17, 2011).

11. “Remarks for Gen. James L. Jones, National Security Advisor at the Sochi Security 

Council Gathering, Sochi, Russia,” The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 

October 5, 2010. Available at: www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/10/05/

remarks-gen-james-l-jones-national-security-advisor-sochi-security-counc 

(accessed February 26, 2012).

12. Ibid.
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JSOU Report 13-6

13. Two areas where the nexus is highly prevalent are the tri-border area in South 

America and West Africa. See Horacio Calderon, “Organized Crime and Terrorism in the Triple Border Area,” Argentine Center for International Studies, 

August 24, 2007. Available at: www.horaciocalderon.com/Articulos/HC_TBA_

Organised_Crime_and_Terrorism.doc (accessed April 6, 2012). See also Juan 

Morote Sarion and Thomas Baumert, “Terrorism and Organized Crime: The 

Economic Nexus,” Universidad Católica de Valencia Documento de Trabajo No. 

8, December 2008, 2. Available at: www.ucv.es/jovellanos/documentos/DT_Jovellanos_8.pdf (accessed April 18, 2011).

14. Louise I. Shelley, “Organized Crime, Terrorism, and Cybercrime.” Security Sector 

Reform: Institutions, Society and Good Governance, Alan Bryden and Philipp 

Fluri, eds. (Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft: Baden-Baden, 2003), 302. See also Frank 

Shanty, Organized Crime from Trafficking to Terrorism, Volume I. September 30, 

2007, (ABC-Clio: Santa Barbara) 368. 

15. Shelley, “Organized Crime, Terrorism, and Cybercrime,” 303.

16. Russell D. Howard, “The Nexus between and among Internationally-Focused 

Terrorist Groups and Multinational Criminal Cartels” forthcoming.

17. Michael Braun, “Drug Trafficking and Middes East Terrorist Groups, A Growing 

Nexus,” PolicyWatch #1392 : Special Forum Report, Washington Institute, July 

25, 2008. Available at: http://www.eisf.eu/resources/library/DrugTraffickingMiddleeastTerrorGroups.pdf (accessed March 2009). See also: Michael Braun, 

“Regarding The Growing Confluence of Drugs and Terror And the Face of 21st 

Century Global Organized Crime,” Testimony -- Committee on Foreign Affairs, 

U.S. House of Representatives, October 12, 2011. Available at: http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/112/bra101211.pdf (accessed November 12, 2011).

18. “Anti-Money Laundering/ Combating the Financing of Terrorism: The Fund’s 

Involvement in AML/CFT,” International Monetary Fund. Available at: www.

imf.org/external/np/leg/amlcft/eng/aml1.htm (accessed April 6, 2012). 

19. “Money Laundering and Financial Crimes,” International Narcotics Control 

Strategy Report Volume II, US Department of State, March 2010, 56. Available at: 

http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/137429.pdf (accessed September 

12, 2011).

20. Like the rare 500 euro bill, bin Laden was never seen by most people, hence the 

nickname. 

21. Jonathan Lipow, “Turn in Your bin Ladens,” The New York Times, December 17, 

2010. Available at: www.nytimes.com/2010/12/18/opinion/18lipow.html (accessed 

April 6, 2012). 

22. Samuel Logan, “DEA Uncovers Drug-Terror Nexus,” International Relations and 

Security Network Security Watch, January 21, 2010. Available at: http://www.isn.

ethz.ch/isn/Current-Affairs/Security-Watch-Archive/Detail/?id=111599&lng=en 

(accessed April 6, 2012). 
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Howard/Traughber: The Nexus of Extremism and Trafficking

23. “Tracking Narco-Terrorist Networks,” Security News Center, undated. Available 

at: http://securityandintelligence.wordpress.com/s-america/ (accessed January 

26, 2012). 

24. Logan, “DEA Uncovers Drug-Terror Nexus.”

25. “Organized Crime Has Globalized and Turned into a Security Threat,” United 

Nations Information Service UNIS/CP/618, June 10, 2010. Available at: www.

unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/tocta/GlobalizationofCrime-PR-FinalEnglish.pdf (accessed May 8, 2011).

26. Bruce Reidel, “Al-Qaeda’s tentacles,” The Los Angeles Times, January 14, 2011. 

Available at: http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jan/14/opinion/la-oe-0114-riedelal-qaeda-20110114 (accessed April 24, 2011).

27. Multiple conversations with Dr. Rohan Gunaratna, who keeps tabs on these 

statistics, as quoted in Russell D. Howard and Margaret J. Nencheck, “The New 

Terrorism,” in Russell D. Howard and Bruce Hoffman, eds., Terrorism and 

Counterterrorism: Understanding the New Security Environment, 4th Edition 

(Dushkin/McGraw-Hill, 2011).

28. Alex Schmid, “Links between Terrorism and Drug Trafficking: A Case of ‘NarcoTerrorism’?” Working Group on Causes of Terrorism, International Summit on 

Democracy, Terrorism and Security (Madrid, Spain), March 6-11, 2005. Available 

at: http://english.safe-democracy.org/causes/links-between-terrorism-and-drugtrafficking-a-case-of-narcoterrorism.html (accessed November 1, 2010).

29. Rachel Ehrenfeld, “Drug trafficking, kidnapping fund al-Qaeda,” CNN.com, 

May 3, 2011. Available at: http://articles.cnn.com/2011-05-03/opinion/ehrenfeld.al.qaeda.funding_1_islamic-maghreb-drug-trafficking-al-qaeda-central?_

s=PM:OPINION (accessed January 7, 2012).

30. “Britain condemns paying ransom to militant groups,” Reuters, September 27, 2010. 

Available at: http://af.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idAFTRE68Q4XE20100927 

(accessed January 8, 2012).

31. Joe Kelly, “The business of kidnapping,” The Australian, February 17, 2010. Available at: www.theaustralian.com.au/news/features/the-business-of-kidnapping/

story-e6frg6z6-1225831111501 (accessed January 8, 2012).

32. Dipak K. Gupta, “Accounting for the Waves of International Terrorism,” Perspectives on Terrorism, Vol. 2, No. 11 (November 2008). Available at: www.

terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/55/html (accessed April 

6, 2012). 

33. Philip Seib and Dana M. Janbek, Global Terrorism and the New Media: The 

Post-al-Qaeda Generation (New York: Routledge, 2010), 1.

34. Benoit Hervieu, “Organized Crime Muscling in on the Media,” Reporters Without Borders Inquiry Report, February 24, 2011. Available at: http://en.rsf.org/

IMG/pdf/organized_crime.pdf (accessed January 9, 2012).

35. Alex P. Schmid, “The Links between Transnational Organized Crime and Terrorist Crimes,” Transnational Organized Crime, Vol.2, No. 4 (Winter 1996): 66-67. 
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JSOU Report 13-6

36. Ibid.

37. Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism revised and expanded edition (New York: 

Columbia University Press, 2006), 62. 

38. Alison Jamison, “Transitional Organized Crime: A European Perspective,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Volume 24, Issue 5 (September-October 2001), 

377-387.

39. Tamara Makarenko, “The Crime-Terror Continuum: Tracing the Interplay between 

Transnational Organised Crime and Terrorism,” Global Crime, Vol. 6, No. 1 

(February 2004), 134. Available at: www.silkroadstudies.org/new/docs/publications/Makarenko_GlobalCrime.pdf (accessed January 8, 2012).

40. Ibid.

41. Ibid.

42. Robert Ackerman, “Terrorists and Organized Crime Increase Teaming Efforts, 

Signal Online, March 29, 2012. Available at: http://www.afcea.org/signal/articles/

templates/Signal_Article_Template.asp?articleid=2933&zoneid=342 Accessed 

April 8, 2012. See also: Michael Webster, “Mexican Drug Cartels Using Terrorist 

Beheading Tactics,” Articles Base, April 21, 2008. Available at: www.articlesbase.

com/news-and-society-articles/mexican-drug-cartels-using-terrorist-beheadingtactics-392642.html (accessed April 6, 2012). 

43. Tim Johnson, “Why are beheadings so popular with Mexico’s drug gangs?” McClatchy 

Newspapers, April 1, 2010. Available at www.mcclatchydc.com/2010/04/01/91481/

beheadings-become-signature-of.html (accessed December 31, 2010).

44. David Schwartz and Alex Dobuzinskis, “Police link Arizona beheading to Mexican drug cartel,” Reuters, March 3, 2011. Available at: www.reuters.com/article/2011/03/04/us-beheading-arizona-idUSTRE7230L320110304 (accessed April 

24, 2011).

45. “Mexican Cartels Using IEDs in Drug Wars,” Newsmax.com, December 19, 2010. 

Available at: www.newsmax.com/InsiderReport/Rubio-Rated-Top-Communicator/2010/12/19/id/380409 (accessed December 13, 2010).

46. Ibid.

47. Ibid. 

48. Michael Braun, “Drug Trafficking and Middle Eastern Terrorist Groups: A Growing Nexus?” Washington Institute for Near East Studies Policy Watch No.1392: 

Special Forum Report (July 25, 2008). Available at: www.washingtoninstitute.

org/templateC05.php?CID=2914 (accessed January 5, 2011).

49. Lisa C. Carroll, “Alternative Remittance Systems Distinguishing Sub-systems 

of Ethnic Money Laundering in Interpol Member Countries on the Asian Continent,” Interpol, January 1, 2011. Available at: https://www.interpol.int/Public/

FinancialCrime/MoneyLaundering/EthnicMoney/default.asp (accessed April 6, 

2012). 

50. Rollins and Sun Wyler, “International Terrorism and Transnational Crime: Security Threats, U.S. Policy and Considerations for Congress,” 11. 
65

Howard/Traughber: The Nexus of Extremism and Trafficking

51. Charles Bremner and Marie Tourres, “New Threat from al-Qaeda ‘Keister Bomb,” 

The Times Online, October 6, 2009.

52. Ibid.

53. As defined by: Stop Trafficking of People (STOP). Available at: http://stoptraffickingofpeople.wordpress.com/ (accessed April 15, 2011). 

54. “Trafficking in Persons Report 2004,” U.S. Department of State Office to Monitor 

and Combat Trafficking in Persons, June 14, 2004, 14. Available at: www.state.

gov/g/tip/rls/tiprpt/2004/34021.htm (accessed April 15, 2011). See also United 

Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, “Human Trafficking: An Overview,” United 

Nations Global Initiative to Fight Human Trafficking (UNGift), 2008, 7. Available 

at: www.ungift.org/docs/ungift/pdf/knowledge/ebook.pdf (accessed January 27, 

2012). 

55. Liana Sun Wyler and Alison Siskin, “Trafficking in Persons: U.S. Policy and 

Issues for Congress,”, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress RL34317 

(Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2010), 2. Available at: http://

fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/139278.pdf (accessed April 6, 2012). See 

also United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, “Human Trafficking: An Overview,” 7. The UN overview lists the number at 2.5 million.

56. Yuliya Tverdoya, “Human Trafficking in Western Europe: A Comparative Public 

Opinion Study of Fifteen Nations,” University of California at Irvine, August 30, 

2011. Available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1919410 

accessed April 6, 2012). 

57. Beth Simmons and Paulette Lloyd, “Subjective Frames and Rational Choice: 

Transnational Crime and the Case of Human Trafficking,” July 17, 2010. Available 

at: http://government.arts.cornell.edu/assets/psac/fa10/Simmons_PSAC_Sep10.

pdf (accessed January 4, 2012). 

58. Justin Bailey, “A Global Survey of International Criminal Entities and International Law Enforcement Organizations’ Interdiction Again Human Trafficking,” thesis presented to the Graduate Council of Texas State University-San 

Marcos, December 2011, 18-21. Available at: http://repositories.tdl.org/txstateir/bitstream/handle/10529/ETD-TXSTATE-2011-12-299/BAILEY-THESIS.

pdf?sequence=1 (accessed January 4, 2011). 

59. Ibid., 18. 

60. Russell D. Howard and Colleen M. Traughber, “The ‘New Silk Road’ of Terrorism and Organized Crime: The Key to Countering the Terror-Crime Nexus,” in 

Armed Groups: Studies in National Security, Counterterrorism, and Counter 

Insurgency, Jeffrey H. Norwitz, ed. (Newport, RI: U.S. Naval War College, 2008), 

373. 

61. Sandra L. Keefer, “Human Trafficking and the Impact on National Security for 

the United States,” Strategy Research Project (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army 

War College, 2006), 3. 

62. “Three Plead Guilty to Conspiracy to Provide Material Support to the Pakistani Taliban,” Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Department of Justice, Office 
66

JSOU Report 13-6

of Public Affairs Press Release, September 12, 2011. Available at www.fbi.gov/

miami/press-releases/2011/three-plead-guilty-to-conspiracy-to-provide-material-support-to-the-pakistani-taliban (accessed January 8, 2012).

63. Ibid.

64. Ibid.

65. “Somali Muslim Terrorist in Finland Human Trafficking for Terror Training,” 

Helsingin Snomat, November 10, 2011. Available at www.hs.fi/english/article/

Police+uncover+suspected+human+trafficking+plan+during+terrorism+inves

tigation/1135269833686 (accessed January 8, 2012).

66. “LTTE arms dealers turn to human trafficking,” Daily News(Sri Lanka), February 

15, 2011. Available at: www.dailynews.lk/2011/02/15/sec00.asp (accessed January 

7, 2012).

67. “LTTE Human trafficker arrested at the Katunayake Airport,” Read Sri Lanka, 

August 20, 2011. Available at: http://english.readsrilanka.com/2011/08/20/lttehuman-trafficker-arrested-at-the-katunayake-airport/ (accessed January 7, 2012).

68. Raimo Väyrynen, “Illegal Immigration Human Trafficking and Organized 

Crime,” Discussion Paper No. 2003/72 (Helsinki, Finland: United Nations University/World Institute for Development Economics Research, 2003), 13. 

69. Ibid., 13. 

70. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, “Global human trafficking patterns,” 

July 17, 2003. Available at: www.unodc.org/pdf/speech_2003-07-17_1_slide5.pdf 

(accessed April 16, 2011). 

71. Väyrynen, 1.

72. Yuliya, Tverdova, “Human Trafficking in Western Europe: A Comparative Public 

Opinion Study of Fifteen Nations.” 

73. Derek Lutterbeck, “Policing Migration in the Mediterranean,” Mediterranean 

Politics, Vol. 11, No. 1 (March 2006): 63. Available at: http://studium.unict.it/

dokeos/2012/courses/1001283C1/document/Lutterbeck-Med_Politics-March06.

pdf (accessed April 6, 2012).

74. “13 Arrested in Spain Linked to Terror,” Global Jihad, February 4, 2009. Available 

at: www.globaljihad.net/view_news.asp?id=750 (accessed April 17, 2011). 

75. Ibid. 

76. Bekir Cinar, “Human Trafficking is used for Recruiting Terrorists,” Second 

Annual Interdisciplinary Conference on Human Trafficking, University of 

Nebraska-Lincoln, October 1, 2010, 9. Available at: http://digitalcommons.unl.

edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1023&context=humtrafconf2 (accessed February 

12, 2012). 

77. Ibid., 9-10. 

78. Ibid., 11. 

79. Ibid., 11-13. 

80. Lutterbeck, “ Policing Migration in the Mediterranean,” 59-82. 
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Howard/Traughber: The Nexus of Extremism and Trafficking

81. Ibid., 79. 

82. Sinikukka Saari, “Balancing between inclusion and exclusion: The EU’s fight 

against irregular migration and human trafficking from Ukraine, Moldova and 

Russia,” Working Paper (London: London School of Economics, 2006), 5. Available at: www2.lse.ac.uk/internationalRelations/centresandunits/EFPU/EFPUpdfs/EFPUchallengewp3.pdf (accessed April 6, 2012).

83. James O Finckenauer, “Russian Transnational Organized Crime and Human 

Trafficking,” Global Human Smuggling: Comparative Perspectives, David Kyle 

and Ray Koslowski, eds. (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), 

175. 

84. Ibid., 172-175. 

85. Ibid., 167. 

86. James H. Anderson and Stephen R. Bowers, “Terrorism and Crime: Critical 

Linkages,” Liberty University Faculty Publications and Presentations: Paper 19, 

2000. Available at: http://digitalcommons.liberty.edu/gov_fac_pubs/19/ (accessed 

April 6, 2012). 

87. LaVerle Berry et al., “Nations Hospitable to Organized Crime and Terrorism,” 

Report Prepared by the Federal Research Division, U.S. Library of Congress 

(Washington, DC: 2003), 61. Available at: www.loc.gov/rr/frd/pdf-files/Nats_

Hospitable.pdf (accessed April 6, 2012). 

88. Georgi Glonti, “Trafficking in Human Beings in Georgia and the CIS,” Demokratizatsiya, Vol. 9, No. 3 (Summer 2001): 382. 

89. Russell D. Howard and Colleen M. Traughber, “The “New Silk Road” of Terrorism and Organized Crime: The Key to Countering the Terror-Crime Nexus,” 

378. 

90. Ibid., 379-380. 

91. Derek Lutterbeck, “The New Security Agenda: Transnational Organized Crime 

and International Security,” PowerPoint Presentation, undated. Available at: 

www.docstoc.com/docs/46379133/Transnational-Organised-Crime-an (accessed 

April 15, 2011). 

92. United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, “Small Arms and Light Weapons,” undated. Available at: www.un.org/disarmament/convarms/SALW (accessed 

April 1, 2012).

93. Small Arms Survey 2010: Gangs, Groups, and Guns, A Project of the Graduate 

Institute of International and Development Studies (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 

University Press, 2010), 22. Available at: www.smallarmssurvey.org/publications/

by-type/yearbook/small-arms-survey-2010.html (accessed April 7, 2012). 

94. U.S. General Accountability Office, “Combating Terrorism: U.S. Government 

Should Improve Its Reporting on Terrorist Safe Havens,” GAO-11-561 (June 

2011). Available at: www.ncjrs.gov/App/Publications/abstract.aspx?ID=258469 

(accessed January 5, 2011). 
68

JSOU Report 13-6

95. Yvon Dandurand and Vivienne Chin, Links between Terrorism and Other Forms 

of Crime (Canada: International Centre for Criminal Law Reform and Criminal 

Justice Policy, 2004), 13. 

96. Ibid., 13, 20. 

97. Glenn E. Curtis and Tara Karacan, The Nexus Among Terrorists, Narcotics 

Traffickers, Weapons Proliferators, and Organized Crime Networks in Western 

Europe (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, 2004), 22. 

98. Ibid. 

99. Seth Mydans and Ray Bonner, “Major Russian arms dealer arrested in Thailand,” 

The New York Times, March 6, 2008. Available at: www.nytimes.com/2008/03/06/

world/europe/06iht-07dealer.10775231.html (accessed April 17, 2011). 

100. Ibid. 

101. Louise I. Shelley, et al., Methods and Motives: Exploring Links between Transnational Organized Crime and International Terrorism (Rockville, MD: National 

Criminal Justice Reference Service, 2005), 35-39. 

102. Kimberly Mc Cloud and Matthew Osborne, “WMD Terrorism and Usama bin 

Laden,” Center for Nonproliferation Studies Report, March 7, 2001. Available 

at: http://cns.miis.edu/reports/binladen.htm (accessed April 17, 2011). 

103. Ibid. 

104. Elizabeth Neuffer, “Bin Laden sought nuclear matter,” The Boston Globe, September 16, 2001. Available at: www.boston.com/news/packages/underattack/

globe_stories/0916/Bin_Laden_sought_nuclear_matter+.shtml (accessed April 

25, 2011).

105. “Report Links Bin-Ladin, Nuclear Weapons,” Al-Watan Al-Arabi, November 13, 

1998. See also Jack Boureston, “Assessing al-Qaeda’s WMD Capabilities,” Center 

for Contemporary Conflict Strategic Insights, Vol. 1, Issue 7 (September 2, 2002). 

Available at: www.einiras.org/pub/details.cfm?lng=en&id=34612 (accessed April 

7, 2012). 

106. Shelley, et al., Methods and Motives: Exploring Links between Transnational 

Organized Crime and International Terrorism, 35-39. 

107. Desmond Butler, “AP Exclusive: Officials say crime ring has uranium,” The Associated Press via The Guardian (UK), September 27, 2011. Available at: www.

guardian.co.uk/world/feedarticle/9866962 (accessed April 7, 2012).

108. Ibid.

109. “Singapore Man Convicted of Conspiracy to Provide Material Support to a Foreign Terrorist Organization,” United States Department of Justice Press Release, 

October 18, 2010. Available at: www.justice.gov/usao/md/Public-Affairs/press_

releases/press08/SingaporeManConvictedofConspiracytoProvideMaterialSupporttoaForeignTerroristOrganization.html (accessed December 1, 2011).

110. “Singapore man sentenced to 4 years in prison for conspiracy to provide material 

support to a foreign terrorist organization,” U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Immigration and Customs Enforcement Press Release, December 16, 2010. 
69

Howard/Traughber: The Nexus of Extremism and Trafficking

Available at: www.ice.gov/news/releases/1012/101216baltimore.htm (accessed 

December 2, 2011).

111. “Rohingya Terrorist Suspects Captured,” Bangkok Post, June 17, 2009.

112. “Legalizing Drugs: Will it Improve or Collapse the Economy?” Foreclosure Fish.

com, February 16, 2009. Available at: www.foreclosurefish.com/blog/index.

php?id=708 (accessed April 7, 2012). 

113. “Terrorist Groups Increasingly Linked to Drugs, Officials Say,” Washington File, 

March 13, 2002. Available at: www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/state/epf304.htm 

(accessed May 8, 2011). 

114. “Trinidad and Tobago affected by flourishing Venezuela drug trade,” Newsday.

com, March 11, 2007. Available at: www.newsday.co.tt/news/print,0,53636.html 

(accessed April 7, 2012).

115. “Narco-Terrorism: International Drug Trafficking and Terrorism—A Dangerous Mix,” Hearing before the Committee of the Judiciary, United States Senate, 

May 20, 2003. Available at: www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/congress/narco_

terror_20may03.pdf (accessed December 22, 2010. See also Shelley, “Organized 

Crime, Terrorism, and Cybercrime,” 203.

116. Braun, “Drug Trafficking and Middle Eastern Terrorist Groups: A Growing 

Nexus?”

117. Ibid.

118. Schmid, “Links between Terrorism and Drug Trafficking: A case of ‘NarcoTerrorism’?” The original quote is by Frank G. Shanty, 334.

119. Stakelbeck, “Drug Money Funding Chavez, Islamic Terrorist Groups.” 

120. Rollins and Sun Wyler, “International Terrorism and Transnational Crime: Security Threats, U.S. Policy and Considerations for Congress,” 11.

121. Michael Braun.

122. Ibid.

123. Ibid.

124. Stephanie Hanson, “FARC, ELN: Colombia’s Left-Wing Guerillas,” Council on 

Foreign Relations Backgrounder, August 19, 2009. Available at: www.cfr.org/

publication/9272/farc_eln.html (accessed April 7, 2012).

125. “‘FARC y bandas se prestan coca para cumplir con narcos de Mexico’: Director 

Antinarcóticos,” (interview with General Cesar Pinson), El Tiempo, September 

12, 2010. Available at www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/CMS-7902854 

(accessed April 7, 2012). 

126. Ray Walser, “State Sponsors of Terrorism: Time to Add Venezuela to the List,” 

The Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 2362, January 20, 2010. Available at 

www.heritage.org/research/reports/2010/01/state-sponsors-of-terrorism-timeto-add-venezuela-to-the-list (accessed April 7, 2012). 

127. “‘FARC y bandas se prestan coca para cumplir con narcos de Mexico’: Director 

Antinarcóticos.”
70

JSOU Report 13-6

128. Kristian Herbolzheimer, “After Alfonso Cano’s death, Colombia must rethink its 

path to peace,” The Guardian (UK), November 8, 2011, Available at: www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/nov/08/alfonso-cano-colombia-farc (accessed 

November 19, 2011).

129. Peter Canby, “Latin America’s Longest War,” The Nation, August 16, 2004. Available at www.thenation.com/article/latin-americas-longestwar (accessed April 7, 

2012). 

130. Herbolzheimer, “After Alfonso Cano’s death, Colombia must rethink its path to 

peace.”

131. Geoffrey Clarfield, “What Does Hezbollah do for a Living?” New English Review, 

December 2010. Available at: www.newenglishreview.org/custpage.cfm/frm/77084/

sec_id/77084 (accessed May 12, 2011).

132. “Terrorist Groups Increasingly Linked to Drugs, Officials Say.”

133. Chris Zambelis, “Mystery Surrounds Alleged Hezbollah Links to Drug Arrests in 

Curacao,” Terrorism Monitor, Vol. 7, Issue 18 (June 25, 2009). Available at: www.

jamestown.org/programs/gta/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=35183&tx_ttne

ws%5BbackPid%5D=26&cHash=189f5df0cf (accessed April 22, 2011).

134. “Iran heavily cuts funding to Hezbollah, report says,” M & C News, December 

16, 2010. Available at: www.monstersandcritics.com/news/middleeast/news/article_1606160.php/Iran-heavily-cuts-funding-to-Hezbollah-report-says (accessed 

April 22, 2011).

135. Marco Vernaschi, “The Cocaine Coast,” Virginia Quarterly Review, Vol. 86, No. 1 

(Winter 2010). Available at: www.vqronline.org/articles/2010/winter/vernaschicocaine-coast (accessed April 22, 2011).

136. J. Peter Pham, “Emerging West African Terror-Drug Nexus Poses Major Security 

Threat,” World Defense Review, January 28, 2010. Available at: http://worlddefensereview.com/pham012810.shtml (accessed April 7, 2012).

137. Stakelbeck, “Drug Money Funding Chavez, Islamic Terrorist Groups.”

138. Ibid.

139. Assaf Uni, “Hezbollah funded by drug trade in Europe,” Haaretz.com, January 

9, 2010. Available at: www.haaretz.com/news/report-hezbollah-funded-by-drugtrade-in-europe-1.261091 (accessed January 17, 2010). 

140. “Seventeen arrested on Curacao for involvement in Hezbollah-linked drug ring,” 

Associated Press, via Guardian.co.uk, April 29, 2009. Available at: www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/apr/29/curacao-caribbean-drug-ring-hezbollah (accessed 

April 7, 2012).

141. Ibid.

142. Zambelis, “Mystery Surrounds Alleged Hezbollah Links to Drug Arrests in 

Curacao.”

143. Ibid.

144. Ibid.
71

Howard/Traughber: The Nexus of Extremism and Trafficking

145. Ibid.

146. The Hezbollah case study presented in this paper is paraphrased from an earlier 

case study written by the author and appearing in: “Illegal Drugs: A Global 

Crisis Degrading Security, Economics, Human Potential and the Environment,” 

Directed Study, U.S. Special Operations Command, May 2011.

147. Scott Shane, “U.S. Denies Iran Claims That Saudi Plot Defendant Belongs to 

Exile Group,” The New York Times, October 19, 2011. Available at: www.nytimes.

com/2011/10/20/world/middleeast/obama-administration-denies-iran-claimsthat-saudi-plot-defendant-gholam-shakuri-belongs-to-exile-group.html 

(accessed October 19, 2011).

148. Ibid.

149. Mark Rockwell, “Two Men Charged with Selling Heroin to Fund Hezbollah 

Weapons,” Government Security News, November 21, 2011. Available at: www.

gsnmagazine.com/node/25046?c=law_enforcement_first_responders (accessed 

November 22, 2011).

150. “Manhattan U.S. Attorney Announces Extraditions of Two Defendants Charged 

with Conspiring to Provide support to Hizballah,” United States Attorney’s 

Office, Southern District of New York, Press Release, November 17, 2011. Available at: www.justice.gov/usao/nys/pressreleases/November11/henarehsiavoshandaksucetinextraditionspr.pdf (accessed November 24, 2011).

151. Ibid.

152. Ibid.

153. Glenn E. Curtis and Tara Karacan, “The Nexus Among Terrorists, Narcotics 

Traffickers, Weapons Proliferators, and Organized Crime Networks in Western 

Europe,” Library of Congress Federal Research Division Report, December 2002. 

Available at: www.loc.gov/rr/frd/pdf-files/WestEurope_NEXUS.pdf (accessed 

on November 19, 2011).

154. Hasim Soylemez, “PKK finances terrorism through drug trafficking,” Sunday’s 

Zaman, November 13, 2011. Availabe at: www.todayszaman.com/newsDetail_

getNewsById.action?newsId=262462 (accessed March 1, 2012).

155. Curtis and Karacan, “The Nexus Among Terrorists, Narcotics Traffickers, Weapons Proliferators, and Organized Crime Networks in Western Europe.”

156. Soylemez, “PKK Finances Terrorism through Drug Trafficking.”

157. Ibid.

158. Ibid.

159. “Analysts: North African Qaeda helps drug trade,” Middle East Online, June 15, 

2010. Available at: www.middle-east-online.com/english/?id=39555 (accessed 

January 5, 2011). 

160. Ibid.

161. Dario Cristiani, “Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and the Africa-to-Europe NarcoTrafficking Connection,” Terrorism Monitor, Vol. 8, Issue 43 (November 24, 
72

JSOU Report 13-6

2010). Available at: www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_

news%5D=37207&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=13&cHash=b9fb8c5a5e (accessed 

January 7, 2010).

162. Cristiani, “Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and the Africa-to-Europe NarcoTrafficking Connection.”

163. Ibid.

164. Ibid.

165. Logan, “DEA Uncovers Drug-Terror Nexus.”

166. Ibid.

167. Ibid.

168. Donald E. Dekieffer, “Trade Diversion as a fund raising and money laundering 

technique of terrorist organizations,” Thomas J. Biersteker and Sue E. Eckert, 

eds., Countering the Financing of Terrorism (London: Routledge, 2008), 156.

169. “Narcotics Enforcement,” U.S. Department of Homeland Security Immigration and Customs Enforcement, undated. Available at: www.ice.gov/narcotics 

(accessed February 5, 2012).

170. William J. Krouse, “The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives 

(ATF): Budget and Operations for FY2011,” Congressional Research Service 

Report for Congress R41206, January 6, 2011, 22. Available at: http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/R41206_20110106.pdf (accessed April 7, 2012).

171. Ibid., 23.

172. Ibid.

173. “Illicit Tobacco: Various Schemes Are Used to Evade Taxes and Fees,” United 

States Government Accountability Office Report to Congressional Committees 

GAO-11-318, March 2011. Available at: www.gao.gov/new.items/d11313.pdf 

(accessed Oct. 14, 2011).

174. Louise I. Shelley and Sharon A. Melzer, “The Nexus of Organized Crime and 

Terrorism: Two Case Studies in Cigarette Smuggling,” International Journal of 

Comparative and Applied Criminal Justice, Vol. 32, No. 1 (Spring 2008): 43-64. 

Available at: www.publicintegrity.org/investigations/tobacco/assets/pdf/Nexus_

of_Organized_Crime.pdf (accessed October 21, 2011).

175. Maarten van Dijck, “The Link between the Financing of Terrorism and Cigarette Smuggling: What Evidence is There?” HUMSEC Journal Issue 1 (2007), 

6. Available at: www.humsec.eu/cms/fileadmin/user_upload/humsec/Journal/

van_Dijck_Cigarette_Smuggling.pdf (accessed February 5, 2012).

176. Ibid., 10.

177. Kate Willson, “Terrorism and Tobacco: Extremists, insurgents turn to cigarette 

smuggling,” Center for Public Integrity iWatch News, June 29, 2009. Available at: 

www.iwatchnews.org/2009/06/29/6338/terrorism-and-tobacco (accessed November 23, 2011).
73

Howard/Traughber: The Nexus of Extremism and Trafficking

178. Martin A. Weiss, “Terrorist Financing: U.S. Agency Efforts and Inter-Agency 

Coordination,” Congressional Research Service Report for Congress RL-33020, 

August 3, 2005. Available at: www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RL33020.pdf (accessed 

April 7, 2012).

179. Krouse, “The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF): Budget 

and Operations for FY2011,” 21-22.

180. Ibid., 22.

181. “Contraband, Organized Crime and the Threat to the Transportation and Supply 

Chain Function,” Fia International Research Ltd., September 2001, 29. Available 

at: www.icde.org.br/artigos/contraband+and+transports.pdf (accessed February 

5, 2012).

182. Ibid., 40.

183. Omer Elagab and Jeehaan Elagab, International Law Documents Relating to 

Terrorism (London: Routledge-Cavendish, 2007), 164.

184. Ibid.

185. Rollins and Sun Wyler, “International Terrorism and Transnational Crime: Security Threats, U.S. Policy and Considerations for Congress,” 25.

186. D. Scott Broyles and Martha Rubio. “A Smokescreen for Terrorism,” United States 

Department of Justice United States Attorneys’ Bulletin, Vol. 52, No.4 (January 2004), 31,33. Available at: www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/

usab5201.pdf (accessed April 7, 2012).

187. Ibid., 33.

188. Ibid.

189. Ibid.

190. Ibid., 34.

191. Donald E. Dekieffer, “Trade Diversion as a fund raising and money laundering 

technique of terrorist organizations,” Thomas J. Biersteker and Sue E. Eckert, 

eds., Countering the Financing of Terrorism (London: Routledge, 2008), 157. 

192. See Broyles and Rubio, “A Smokescreen for Terrorism,” 21. Congress had just 

enacted a law making it illegal to provide “material support or resources” to a 

designated terrorist group.

193. Louise E. Shelly and Sharon Melzer, “The Nexus of Organized Crime and Terrorism: Two Case Studies in Cigarette Smuggling.” International Journal of Comparative and Applied Criminal Justice, Spring 2008, Vol. 32. No. 1, 2.

194. Broyles and Rubio. “A Smokescreen for Terrorism.”

195. Elagab and Elagab, International Law Documents Relating to Terrorism, 164.

196. United States v. Elias Mohamad Akhdar, Ali Mohamad Akhdar, Hassan Moussa 

Makki, United States District Court Eastern District of Michigan Southern Division. Available at: Findlaw.com.

197. Luk Joossens and M. Raw, “Progress in combating cigarette smuggling: controlling the supply chain,” Tobacco Control Vol. 17, Issue 6 (December 2008), 
74

JSOU Report 13-6

399. Available at: http://tobaccocontrol.bmj.com/content/17/6/399.full (accessed 

October 14, 2011).

198. Shelley and Melzer, “The Nexus of Organized Crime and Terrorism: Two Case 

Studies in Cigarette Smuggling,” 8-9.

199. Ibid., 9-10.

200. Soylemez, “PKK Finances Terrorism through Drug Trafficking.”

201. Pacifica Goddard and Keith Nuthall, “Tri-border zone fuels illicit tobacco trade,” 

International News Services, January 1, 2009. Available at: www.internationalnewsservices.com/articles/36-archive/17234-tri-border-zone-fuels-illicittobacco-trade (accessed December 2, 2011).

202. Ibid.

203. Ibid.

204. Monte Reel, “Paraguayan Smuggling Crossroads Scrutinized,” The Washington 

Post, August 3, 2006. Available at: www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/

article/2006/08/02/AR2006080201729.html (accessed February 5, 2012).

205. Goddard and Nuthall, “Tri-border zone fuels illicit tobacco trade.”

206. Rollins and Sun Wyler, “International Terrorism and Transnational Crime: Security Threats, U.S. Policy and Considerations for Congress,” 26.

207. Willson, “Terrorism and Tobacco: Extremists, insurgents turn to cigarette 

smuggling.” 

208. Ibid.

209. Stephen Harmon, “From GSPC to AQIM: The evolution of an Algerian Islamist 

terrorist group into an Al-Qa’ida Affiliate and its implications for the SaharaSahel region,” Concerned Africa Scholars Bulletin No. 85(Spring 2010), 19. Available at: http://concernedafricascholars.org/docs/bulletin85harmon.pdf (accessed 

December 2, 2011).

210. Laurent Bossard, “Insecurity in the Sahel, the Arab Spring and trans-Saharan cooperation,” Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Sahel and 

West Africa Club, September 15, 2011. Available at: www.oecd.org/document/31/0

,3746,en_38233741_38242551_48815839_1_1_1_1,00.html (accessed November 

15, 2011).

211. The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) 

has defined cultural property as “movable or immovable property of great importance to the cultural heritage of every people, such as monuments of architecture, 

art or history, whether religious or secular; archaeological sites; groups of buildings which, as a whole, are of historical or artistic interest; works of art; manuscripts, books and other objects of artistic, historical or archaeological interest; 

as well as scientific collections and important collections of books or archives or 

of reproductions of the property defined above.” See “Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict with Regulations for 

the Execution of the Convention 1954,” United Nations Educational, Scientific 

and Cultural Organization, May 14, 1954. Available at: http://portal.unesco.org/
75

Howard/Traughber: The Nexus of Extremism and Trafficking

en/ev.php-URL_ID=13637&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html 

(accessed January 4, 2012).

212. Raymond Fisman and Shang-Jin Wei, “The Smuggling of Art, and the Art of 

Smuggling: Uncovering the Illicit Trade in Cultural Property,” National Bureau 

of Economic Research Working Paper Series, No. 13446 (September 2007). Available at: www.nber.org/papers/w13446 (accessed April 7, 2012).

213. Kimberly Alderman, “Honor Amongst Thieves: Organized Crime and the 

Illicit Antiquities Trade,” 4, JD Supra, December 5, 2011, Available at:http://

www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=eb5644ac-3046-4e9c-b84bbed1fe660379 (accessed January 5, 2012).

214. Friedrich T. Schipper and Magnus T. Bernhardsson, “Archaeology in Conflict: 

Setting the Agenda,” Forum Archaeologiae, Vol. 55, No. 4 (2010). Available at: 

http://homepage.univie.ac.at/elisabeth.trinkl/forum/forum0610/forum55schipper.pdf (accessed January 5, 2012).

215. “Cultural Property Crimes Program,” U.S. Department of Justice, U.S. National 

Central Bureau of INTERPOL, undated. Available at:www.justice.gov/usncb/

programs/cultural_property_program.php (accessed January 3, 2012).

216. Neil Brodie, “Focus on Iraq: Spoils of War,” Archaeology, Vol. 56, No. 4 (July/

August 2003). Available at: www.archaeology.org/0307/etc/war.html (accessed 

January 6, 2012).

217. Matthew Bogdanos, “Casualties of War: The Looting of the Iraq Museum,” 

American Association of Museums Museum News, March/April 2006. Available 

at: www.aam-us.org/pubs/mn/MN_MA06_casualties.cfm (accessed January 4, 

2012).

218. Arwa Damon, “Iraq museum pays smugglers for looted treasures,” CNN.com, 

December 13, 2011. Available at: www.cnn.com/2011/12/13/world/meast/iraqmuseum-paying-smugglers/index.html (accessed April 2, 2012).

219. Bogdanos, “Casualties of War.”

220. Ibid.

221. Robert M. Poole, “Looting Iraq,” Smithsonian Magazine, February 2008. Available at: www.smithsonianmag.com/specialsections/making-a-difference/monument-sidebar.html (accessed January 7, 2012).

222. Matthew Bogdanos, “Opinion: Illegal antiquities trade funds terrorism,” CNN.

com July 7, 2011. Available at: http://articles.cnn.com/2011-07-07/world/iraq.

looting.bogdanos_1_antiquities-trade-iraq-s-national-museum-looting?_

s=PM:WORLD (accessed February 5, 2012).

223. Alderman, 14.

224. Bogdanos, “Opinion: Illegal antiquities trade funds terrorism.”

225. Roger Atwood, “The Loot Route,” Art News, June 2008, 86-88. Available at: http://

harrisschool.uchicago.edu/news/inthenews/cultpol-6-08.pdf (accessed January 

6, 2012).

226. Ibid.
76

JSOU Report 13-6

227. Charles Duecy, “Intelligence and Information Sharing in Counterterrorism,” in 

D.G. Kamien, ed., The McGraw-Hill Homeland Security Handbook (New York: 

McGraw-Hill, 2006), 391-412.

228. “ICE Investigations: Mission Roles in Multi-Agency Areas of Responsibility,” 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security Immigration and Customs Enforcement, August 2007, 2. Available at: www.fbiic.gov/public/2008/may/ICE_Mission_Roles.pdf (accessed April 3, 2011).

229. “Drug Interdiction,” United States Coast Guard, August 1, 2010. Available at: 

www.uscg.mil/hq/cg5/cg531/drug_interdiction.asp (accessed March 25, 2011). 

230. U.S. Customs and Border Protection Website. Available at::/www.cbp.gov/xp/

cgov/about (accessed March 25, 2011).

231. See Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Instruction 3710.01 B January 26, 2007 Available at: http://www.dtic.mil/cjcs_directives/cdata/unlimit/3710_01.pdf (accessed 

March 12, 2012).

232. Thomas Harrigan, “The U.S. Security Homeland Security Role in the Mexican 

War Against Drug Cartels,” Statement for the Record before the Subcommittee 

on Oversight, Investigations and Management, Committee on Homeland Security, United States House of Representatives, March 31, 2011, 1-5. Available at: 

www.justice.gov/dea/speeches/110331_testimony.pdf (accessed April 26, 2011).

233. Ibid., 2.

234. “Border safety concerns linger after Project Gunrunner revelations,” The Patriot 

Update, April 6, 2011. Available at:http://patriotupdate.com/5187/border-safetyconcerns-linger-after-project-gunrunner-revelations (accessed April 30, 2011).

235. Julian Aguilar, “Bill Seeks to Designate Drug Cartels as Terrorists,” The New York 

Times, April 21, 2011. Available at: www.nytimes.com/2011/04/22/us/22ttcartels.

html (accessed April 26, 2011).

236. Peter T. King and Michael T. McCaul, et al. “King, McCaul Letter to Secretary 

Clinton on Mexican Drug Cartels,” U.S. House of Representatives Committee 

on Homeland Security, April 27, 2011. Available at: http://homeland.house.gov/

letter/mccaul-king-letter-secretary-clinton-mexican-drug-cartels (accessed April 

29, 2011).

237. King and McCaul, “King, McCaul Letter to Secretary Clinton on Mexican Drug 

Cartels.”

238. Ben Buchanan, “U.S. Announces New Efforts to Combat Mexican Drug Trafficking Trade,” ABC News, June 9, 2009. Available at: http://abcnews.go.com/

Blotter/story?id=7786583 (accessed April 29, 2011).

239. Reel, “Paraguayan Smuggling Crossroads Scrutinized.”

240. “Terrorism: How Have Other Countries Handled It? How Should We?” Constitutional Rights Foundation, undated. Available at: www.crf-usa.org/americaresponds-to-terrorism/terrorism-how-have-other-countries-handled-it.html 

(accessed February 7, 2012).
77

Howard/Traughber: The Nexus of Extremism and Trafficking

241. Paul Wilkinson, Terrorism Versus Democracy: The Liberal State Response, 2nd 

Edition (New York: Routledge, 2006), 66-67.

242. Ibid., 67.

243. Matthew Levitt, “Hezbollah: Party of Fraud,” Foreign Affairs, July 27, 2011. Available at: www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67997/matthew-levitt/hezbollah-partyof-fraud?page=3 (accessed February 7, 2012).

244. Ibid.

245. “Country Reports on Terrorism 2007,” United States Department of State Office 

of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, April 2008. Available at: www.nauss.

edu.sa/Reports/WTR_2007.pdf (accessed February 7, 2012). 

246. “Tracking Narco-Terrorist Networks.”

247. “Countering the Changing Threat of International Terrorism,” Report from the 

National Commission on Terrorism, June 2000. Available at: www.fas.org/irp/

threat/commission.html (accessed February 7, 2012).

248. Tom O’Connor, “Terror Financing.” MegaLinks in Criminal Justice, January 

3, 2012. Available at: www.drtomoconnor.com/3440/3440lect03asecure.htm 

(accessed April 7, 2012). 

249. “Criminal Enforcement Against Terrorists,” Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse Report Supplement, June 17, 2002. Available at: http://trac.syr.edu/

tracreports/terrorism/supp.html (accessed April 7, 2012). 

250. Ibid.

251. Ibid.

252. “Tracking Narco-Terrorist Networks.”

253. Howard and Nencheck, “The New Terrorism,” . As this article is going to press, 

the debate is swirling around the notion that “torture” had a positive effect on 

turning evidence on bin Laden’s whereabouts. 

254. Russell D. Howard, “Intelligence in Denied Areas: New Concepts for a Changing Security Environment,” JSOU Report 07-10 (December 2007), 7. Available at: 

www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2007/0712_jsou-report-07-10.

pdf (accessed April 26, 2011).

255. Ibid.

256. Tim Newark, “Pact With the Devil?” History Today, Vol. 57, Issue 4 (2007). Available at: www.historytoday.com/tim-newark/pact-devil (accessed April 7, 2012).

257. Stephen Braun, Judy Pasternak, andSebastian Rotella, “Al-Qaeda Linked to Russian Arms Dealer,” The Los Angeles Times, February 16, 2002. Available at: http://

articles.latimes.com/2002/feb/16/news/mn-28372 (accessed April 7, 2012). 

258. Richard Galpin, “‘Kremlin Links’ of Alleged Arms Dealer Viktor Bout,” BBC 

News, January 20, 2011. Available at: www.bbc.co.uk/news/mobile/worldeurope-12208961 (accessed April 26, 2011).
78

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259. Douglas Farah, “Arrest Aids Pursuit of Weapons Network; Dealer Supplied Taliban, al-Qaeda, Officials Say,” The Washington Post, February 26, 2002. Available 

at: www.highbeam.com/doc/1P2-324886.html (accessed April 7, 2012). 

260. See Howard, “Intelligence in Denied Areas,” 11. The author makes a similar 

argument concerning International arms dealer Monzer Kassar of Marbella of 

Spain (actually, he is Syrian), who was arrested on June 9, 2007 in Madrid for 

conspiring to sell millions of dollars’ worth of weapons to the FARC. 

261. Bartosz Hieronim Stanisławski, “Global Black Spots: Threats from Governance 

without Governments,” The National Strategy Forum Review, Vol. 20, No. 3 

(Summer 2011), 1-5, Available at: http://nationalstrategy.com/Portals/0/documents/Summer 2011 NSFR/Global Black Spots.pdf (accessed October 18, 2011).

262. Ibid.

263. Ibid.

264. Ibid., 2-3.

265. Rollins and Sun Wyler, “International Terrorism and Transnational Crime: Security Threats, U.S. Policy and Considerations for Congress.” 

266. Michael Evans, “War in Colombia,: Guerillas, Drugs and Human Rights in U.S. 

Colombia Policy,” National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book, No. 69 (May 

3, 2002). Available at: www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB69/part1.html 

(accessed April 23, 2013).

267. Ibid.

268. Mackenzie Eaglen, “Green Berets Value is Proven in War on Drugs,” The New York 

Times, May 8, 2012. Available at: www.aei.org/article/foreign-and-defense-policy/

defense/green-berets-value-is-proven-in-war-on-drugs (accessed April 23, 2013).

269. John Rollins and Liana Sun Wyler, “Terrorism and Transnational Crime: Foreign 

Policy Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service Report for Congress 

R41004 (October 19, 2012). Available at: www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R41004.pdf 

(accessed April 30, 2013).

270. Ibid.

271. Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Frequently Asked Questions.” Available at: 

www.fbi.gov/about-us/faqs (accessed April 30, 2013).

272. John Rollin and Liana Sun Wyler, “Terrorism and Transnational Crime: Foreign 

Policy Issues for Congress.”

273. Ibid.

274. “ICE Investigations: Mission Roles in Multi-Agency Areas of Responsibility,” U.S. 

Immigration and Customs Enforcement, U.S. Department of Homeland Security 

(August 2007). Available at: www.fbiic.gov/public/2008/may/ice_mission_roles.

pdf (accessed April 30, 2013).

275. “National Security Investigations Division,” U.S. Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement, U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Available at: www.ice.

gov/national-security-investigations-division (accessed April 30, 2013).

276. U.S. Special Operations Command Publication 1 (2011), 21.
79

Howard/Traughber: The Nexus of Extremism and Trafficking

277. U.S. Code Title 10, Chapter 6, 167. Available at: www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/

uscprint.html (accessed April 23, 2013).

278. John Rollins and Liana Sun Wyler, “Terrorism and Transnational Crime: Foreign 

Policy Issues for Congress.”

279. For a very good review of SOF counter-trafficking operations, see Major Philip 

Brown, “USSOCOM’s Role in Human Trafficking, paper from the U.S. Army 

Command and Staff College, School of Advanced Military Studies, December 2, 2010. Available at: http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cdm/singleitem/collection/

p4013coll3/id/2669/rec/5 (accessed April 23, 2013).

280. See U.S. Army Field Manual 31-20, 1990, 3-6. Available at: www.jezail.org/03_

archive/manuals_monogrms/01_FM_31-20.pdf (accessed April 23, 2013).

281. “U.S. Army Special Forces Command (Airborne),” U.S. Army Special Operations 

Command. Available at: www.soc.mil/USASFC/USASFC.html (accessed April 

30, 2013).

282. U.S. Special Operations, Joint Publication 3-05 (April 2011), II-5. Available at: 

www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_05.pdf (accessed April 30, 2013).

283. “U.S. Army Special Forces Command (Airborne),” U.S. Army Special Operations 

Command. Available at: www.soc.mil/USASFC/USASFC.html (accessed April 

30, 2013).

284. Christina Wong, “Special Operations Forces to do More with Less,” Washington 

Times, February 28, 2012. Available at: www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/

feb/28/special-operations-to-do-more-with-less (accessed April 23, 2013).

285. Lisa Wustholz, “FARC Weakened but Far From Dead,” Geopolitical Monitor, 

November 24, 2011. Available at: www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/farc-is-weakened-but-far-from-dead-4543 (accessed April 23, 2013). See also: Dan Kubiske, 

“Forget Politics, FARC is Just Another Narco Gang,” Journalism, Journalists, 

and the World, May 2, 2012. Available at: http://worldjournalism.wordpress.

com/2012/05/02/forget-politics-farc-is-just-another-narco-gang (accessed April 

23, 2013).

286. Carlotta Gall, “UN: Afghanistan Hooked on Drug Trade,” Chicago Tribune, 

November 19, 2004. Available at: http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2004-11-19/

news/0411190294_1_opium-drug-lords-poppy (accessed April 23, 2013).

287. Jamie Humphries, “Afghan Air Interdiction Unit Conducts First Integrated 

Counternarcotics Operation,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, August 10, 

2011. Available at: a,www.aco.nato.int/afghan-air-interdiction-unit-conductsfirst-integrated-counter-narcotics-operation.aspx (accessed April 23, 2013).

288. “U.S. Counter-Narcotics Strategy in Afghanistan,” Security Debrief, October 22, 

2009. Available at: http://securitydebrief.com/2009/10/22/us-counternarcoticsstrategy-in-afghanistan (accessed April 30, 2013).

289. Ibid.

290. Thomas O’Connell, “Department of Defense Counternarcotics Budget,” Statement before the U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on 
80

JSOU Report 13-6

Emerging Threats and Capabilities, 108th Congress, April 2, 2004. Available at: 

www.dod.mil/dodgc/olc/docs/test04-04-02OConnell.doc (accessed April 30, 

2013).

291. “The Pan Sahel Initiative,” Global Security.org. Available at: www.globalsecurity.

org/military/ops/pan-sahel.htm (accessed April 23, 2013).

292. “The Trans Sahara Counter-terrorism Partnership,” AFRICOM Command Website. Available at: www.africom.mil/tsctp.asp (accessed April 23, 2013). 

293. “Pan Sahel Initiative,” Global Security.org.

294. “The Trans Sahara Counter-terrorism Partnership,” AFRICOM Command 

Website.

295. U.S. Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development, 

“Trans-Sahara Counter-terrorism Partnership,” TSCTP U.S. Foreign Assistance 

Performance Publication (FY 2009). Available at: www.state.gov/documents/

organization/159220.pdf (accessed April 23, 2013).

296. “U.S. Special Forces Help in Hunt for Kony,” Fox News, April 30, 2012. Available at: www.foxnews.com/world/2012/04/29/us-special-forces-help-in-huntfor-warlord-kony303902 (accessed April 23, 2013).

297. Xan Rice, “Background: The Lord’s Resistance Army,” The Guardian (UK), October 20, 2007. Available at: www.guardian.co.uk/katine/2007/oct/20/about.uganda 

(accessed December 19, 2011).

298 “Lord’s Resistance Army,” Global Security. Available at: www.globalsecurity.org/

military/world/para/lra.htm (accessed December 19, 2011).

299. “Lord’s Resistance Army,” National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and 

the Responses to Terrorism (START). Available at: www.start.umd.edu/start/

data_collections/tops/terrorist_organization_profile.asp?id=3513 (accessed 

December 19, 2011).

300. Ibid.

301. John Alexander, Convergence of Special Operations and Civilian Law Enforcement, 

Joint Special Operations University Report 10-6, July 2010, available at: citeseerx.

ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.171.56 (accessed March 26, 2013).

302. Janice Burton, “Special Operations in Africa,” Special Warfare, January-March 

2013. Available at: www.soc.mil/swcs/SWmag/archive/SW2601/SW2601SpecialOperationsInAfrica.html (accessed April 23, 2013).

303. Ibid.

304. Ibid.

305. John Ryan. “Troops making progress in hunt for Kony.” USA Today, May 29, 

2012. Available at: http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/world/story/2012-05-

29/joseph-kony-hunt/55260364/1 (accessed April 23, 2013).

306. James Kitfield, “Leading From The Shadows: The United States is using local 

soldiers to fight al-Qaida allies in East Africa,” National Journal, March 9, 2013.
81

Howard/Traughber: The Nexus of Extremism and Trafficking

307. “Expanding the Nation’s Option Set: The Future of Special Operations Forces,” 

Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, February 2013.

308. McKenzie O’Brien, “Fluctuations Between Crime and Terror: The Case of Abu 

Sayyaf’s Kidnapping Activities,” Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 24, No. 2 

(2012), 320-336. See also Angel Rabasa et al., “Chapter Seven: The Convergence 

of Terrorism, Insurgency, and Crime,” Beyond al-Qaeda, Part 2: The Outer Rings 

of the Terrorist Universe, (RAND Corporation, 2006), 101-160.

309. Beaudette, “JSOTF-P Uses Whole-Of-Nation Approach to Bring Stability to the 

Philippines, Special Warfare, July-September 2012. Available at: http://www.soc.

mil/swcs/SWmag/archive/SW2503/SW2503BringStabilityToThePhilippines.html.

310. As quoted in Eric Schmitt and Thom Shanker, Counterstrike: the Untold Story 

of America’s Secret Campaign Against al-Qaeda (New York: Times Books, 2011), 

195-196.

311. Ibid.

312. Craig Whitlock, “Philippine President Aquino seeks U.S. military aid,” Washington 

Post, June 8, 2012. Available at: http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-06-08/

world/35462555_1_president-benigno-aquino-iii-clark-air-base-philippine-leaders (accessed April 23, 2013).

313. “Expanding the Nation’s Option Set: The Future of Special Operations Forces.”

314. Brian Bird and Gino Rullo, “U.S. Navy Special Forces help Honduras form elite 

counter trafficking force,” United States Southern Command, February 3, 2013. 

Available at: www.southcom.mil/newsroom/Pages/US-Navy-Special-Forceshelp-Honduras-form-elite-counter-trafficking-force.aspx (accessed April 30, 

2013).

315. John Alexander, Convergence of Special Operations and Civilian Law Enforcement, Joint Special Operations University Report 10-6, July 2010, 65. Available 

at: citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.171.56 (accessed March 

26, 2013).

316. Ibid.

317. “Expanding the Nation’s Option Set: The Future of Special Operations Forces.”