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TESTING THE LIMITS: IRAN’S BALLISTIC MISSILE

PROGRAM, SANCTIONS, AND THE ISLAMIC

REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

MARCH 29, 2017

Serial No. 115–14

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

PAUL COOK, California 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

DANIEL M. DONOVAN, JR., New York 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., 

Wisconsin 

ANN WAGNER, Missouri 

BRIAN J. MAST, Florida 

FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida 

BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania 

THOMAS A. GARRETT, JR., Virginia 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID N. CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

AMI BERA, California 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania 

DINA TITUS, Nevada 

NORMA J. TORRES, California 

BRADLEY SCOTT SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

THOMAS R. SUOZZI, New York 

ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York 

TED LIEU, California

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

PAUL COOK, California 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

DANIEL M. DONOVAN, JR., New York 

ANN WAGNER, Missouri 

BRIAN J. MAST, Florida 

BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

DAVID N. CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

BRADLEY SCOTT SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

THOMAS R. SUOZZI, New York 

TED LIEU, California 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Kenneth Katzman, Ph.D., specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs, Congressional 

Research Service .................................................................................................. 8

Mr. Michael Eisenstadt, Kahn Fellow, director of Military and Security Studies Program, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy .......................... 24

Ms. Elizabeth Rosenberg, senior fellow and director, Energy, Economics and 

Security Program, Center for a New American Security .................................. 42

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

Kenneth Katzman, Ph.D.: Prepared statement .................................................... 10

Mr. Michael Eisenstadt: Prepared statement ....................................................... 27

Ms. Elizabeth Rosenberg: Prepared statement ..................................................... 44

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 70

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 71

The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress from the 

Commonwealth of Virginia: Prepared statement .............................................. 72

(1)

TESTING THE LIMITS: IRAN’S BALLISTIC 

MISSILE PROGRAM, SANCTIONS, AND THE 

ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS 

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 29, 2017

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:05 p.m., in room 

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. The subcommittee will come to order. After 

recognizing myself and Ranking Member Deutch for 5 minutes 

each for our opening statements, I will then recognize other members seeking recognition for 1 minute or longer. We will then hear 

from our witnesses. 

Without objection, witnesses, your prepared statements will be 

made a part of the record. Members may have 5 days in which to 

insert statements and questions for the record subject to the length 

limitation in the rules. 

The Chair now recognizes herself for 5 minutes. 

In the nearly 2 years since the United Nations Security Council 

adopted Resolution 2231, approving the Joint Comprehensive Plan 

of Action, JCPOA, and lifting sanctions on Iran, one thing has been 

abundantly clear: The notion that Iran would now modify its behavior and become a responsible member of the international community has proven to be completely and utterly false. 

Many of us knew that the Iranian regime would not moderate its 

behavior, but that it would amplify its illicit activity using the nuclear deal as leverage. Sure enough, since the JCPOA was signed, 

we have seen an Iran that has taken U.S. citizens hostages and demanded, and unfortunately, received ransom for their return. As a 

result, Iran has since held additional U.S. citizens and permanent 

U.S. residents with the expectation of receiving more ransom payments. 

The regime continues to support the Assad regime with money, 

supplies, weapons, fighters, and is doing the same in Yemen with 

the Houthis. Iran’s ships have made dozens of provocative actions 

toward U.S. ships in the Strait of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf, 

with the regime playing a dangerous game and harassing our vessels. 

2

Iran continues to support terror around the world, most notably 

through its support of the terror group Hezbollah. This has allowed 

Hezbollah to increase its stockpiled rockets and missiles to 150,000 

or more and add more sophisticated missiles to its arsenal, putting 

our friend and ally, the democratic Jewish state of Israel, under 

greater threat. 

All of these activities have seen an uptick since the JCPOA and 

all are indeed very troubling, but perhaps the most egregious and 

troubling is Iran’s continued pursuit of a viable ballistic missile 

program. Why? Because history has shown us, and as one witness 

before this panel previously stated, that nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs go hand in glove. 

Over time, the correlation between a country’s nuclear program 

and a corresponding ballistic missile program has proved to be absolute: That countries that sustain indigenous medium and longrange ballistic missiles always aspire to possess nuclear weapons. 

Since the signing of the JCPOA, Iran has tested, according to 

some sources, at least 15 ballistic missiles, and it has done so in 

open defiance of Resolution 2231. 

It came as a shock to so many of us that a final concession to 

Iran was given when the U.S. agreed to lift the arms embargo as 

part of the nuclear deal, especially when we were told repeatedly 

that the deal was only on the nuclear program. That is why the 

Trump administration needs to follow through on some of its promises and reevaluate the JCPOA and the 2231 resolution. 

We are seeing an uptick in these ballistic missile tests and Iran’s 

aspiration for an ICBM program, precisely because the regime 

wants to be ready to be able to deliver a nuclear payload when the 

terms of the JCPOA expire and we will have walked them right 

into it. 

We simply cannot allow the regime to continue with these provocations. We need to go back to the Security Council and find a way 

to make sure that there can be no ambiguity. Any ballistic missile 

testing, any attempt to acquire ballistic missile technology or expertise, and any attempt to proliferate from the regime must be 

stopped and sanctioned. 

The original intent of the nuclear sanctions was to put so much 

pressure on the regime that it would be forced to end all enrichment and completely dismantle its nuclear program and infrastructure. That needs to be our approach on the regime’s missile program, while also revisiting the JCPOA and all of its flaws. 

We already have important tools for the President to use now, 

like the Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act. Sadly 

as this subcommittee learned last Congress, the State Department 

and the previous administration sat on these important reports and 

sanctions, oftentimes for years, in order to not upset the regime 

during these sensitive negotiations. The latest round of sanctions, 

on March 21, is a good step, but this report came 9 months after 

the previous report and only covered activities that took place in 

the year 2014. So we still have a very serious backlog. 

The new administration needs to step up its Iran, North Korea, 

and Syria nonproliferation activities and it needs to use the other 

tools available to it. One tool should be Chairman Royce and RankVerDate 0ct 09 2002 12:33 May 02, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_MENA\032917\24834 SHIRL
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ing Member Engel’s new bill, of which I am proud to be a cosponsor, that specifically targets Iran’s ballistic missiles. 

We need Iran and those that seek to supply it with the technology or know-how to know that we will bring down sanctions so 

crippling on them that they will have to think twice about developing its ballistic missile program. We need to fully and vigorously 

enforce our current sanctions and then strengthen and expand 

them to ensure maximum pressure is exerted because Iran only responds to strength and pressure. 

With that, I am pleased to yield to the ranking member, Mr. 

Deutch, for his opening statement. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you, Madam Chairman. Thanks for calling 

today’s very timely hearing. 

Iran is not a new subject for the subcommittee. We have explored 

its nuclear program, the threat it poses to Israel, its relationships 

with North Korea and Hezbollah, and the realities that it hopes to 

exploit under the JCPOA. 

Today we will focus on Iran’s nonnuclear behavior, its ballistic 

missile program and its dangerous Revolutionary Guard Corps. I 

know that you and I share the belief that this Congress can still 

move resolutely against Iran’s continued pursuit of ballistic missiles. I want to thank our witnesses for being here to answer our 

questions and help us frame our conversation, and I look forward 

to what I know will be a healthy exchanges of ideas. 

Despite the nuclear deal, Iran’s behavior has not changed. Now 

freed from many of the sanctions that once isolated it, Iran is looking to integrate itself into the global economy and to normalize its 

relations with the Western countries. Unsurprisingly, this hope has 

been undermined by Iran’s continued support for the murderous 

Assad regime in Syria, funding of Hezbollah in Lebanon, calls for 

the destruction of Israel, and insistence on sowing instability beyond its borders. 

In many areas of conventional military power, Iran lags far behind its neighbors. To make up for these deficiencies, Iran now has 

the Middle East’s largest arsenal of ballistic missiles and is developing the know-how to produce increasingly complex missile components on its own. Thanks to the Russians, Iran now has the S300 missile defense system. And in a matter of a few years, the Iranian space program claims it will be able to create rockets that can 

drop a warhead anywhere in the world. 

It is clear that left unhindered, the scale and the sophistication 

of the Iranian missile program will only grow, and it is incumbent 

on this Congress to act decisively to halt its progress. However 

Members may have felt about the nuclear deal, we can all agree 

that the JCPOA does not prevent us from responding to reckless 

behavior from Iran and that U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231 

forbids the Iranians from testing or developing ballistic missiles. 

Despite that resolution, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, 

which oversees the missile program, has conducted test after test 

of these weapons in defiance of the will of the international community. The fact that an organization like the IRGC, which supports terrorist organizations like Hamas and Hezbollah, is also in 

charge of dangerous missile technologies should send a chill down 

4

the spine of anyone working for peace and stability in the Middle 

East. 

The United States has an obligation to stand against the IRGC’s 

repeated provocations by raising the issue of missile tests in the 

Security Council at every opportunity. We also need to use our influence at the U.N. to encourage allies to do the same, even at a 

time when our new President seems intent on abdicating America’s 

role as a leader in international diplomacy. 

In addition to robust engagement at the Security Council, we can 

take a number of concrete steps to box in the Iranians. 

First, we need to pass the bipartisan H.R. 1698, which I am 

proud to cosponsor. The bill would sanction countries like Russia 

that sell missile technology to Iran, the financial institutions that 

make those sales possible, and the Iranian entities that contribute 

to the country’s domestic missile industry. 

Second, we have to support full and vigorous enforcement of the 

JCPOA, which means ensuring that the IAEA has the resources 

that it needs to carry out its monitoring, and, importantly, embracing Europe’s renewed interest in tightening implementation of the 

deal. 

Finally, we should encourage GCC states to adopt a coordinated 

missile defense system that will act as a deterrent to Iranian aggression in the Gulf. 

I don’t pretend that this list is exhaustive, and I am glad we 

have the opportunity today to discuss all of our options. Whatever 

path we take, it is clear that we must act together and that we 

must act quickly. The danger that Iran continues to pose through 

its funding of terrorist organizations, its meddling in regional affairs, and its pursuit of ever more deadly ballistic technologies demands continued engagement from the United States and our allies. 

We have seen that international coordination against the threat 

from Iran is possible, and we know that there is strong bipartisan 

support in Congress for decisive action of this kind. I welcome a 

thoughtful discussion today about the tools we have at our disposal, and I encourage my colleagues to remain united against 

Iran’s violations of international law and its clear refusal to live in 

peace with its neighbors. 

And I will yield back the balance of my time. Thank you, Madam 

Chairman. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Deutch. 

And now we will turn to our members for their opening statements, starting with Mr. DeSantis of Florida. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

We have been on this committee years talking about Iran, talking about the Iran deal. We were told at the time this deal would 

help bring Iran into the community of nations, it would improve 

their behavior if we just let our boot off their neck and released all 

these sanctions. That hasn’t happened here. We are talking about 

now their belligerence, what they are doing with ballistic missiles. 

Go back to this deal. The Obama administration conceded at the 

outset on the ballistic missile issue, which was a major mistake to 

begin with. We see Iran has been emboldened by this deal, their 

belligerent conduct throughout the Middle East in places like 

5

Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, has demonstrated that they are very much 

a malevolent force. 

And I think I join both my colleagues in supporting the need for 

us to move very swiftly on tough sanctions, both again Iran’s ballistic missile program and against the Revolutionary Guard Corps. 

And I yield back the balance of my time. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Mr. DeSantis. 

Mr. Boyle of Pennsylvania. 

Mr. BOYLE. Thank you, and I will be brief. Some of this will be 

a little bit repetitive from what Mr. Deutch was saying. 

Essentially the intelligence community has assessed that Iran 

has the largest inventory of ballistic missiles in the Middle East. 

U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231 calls upon Iran—and let me 

quote it specifically, because I think this is sometimes confused by 

some, ‘‘not to undertake any activity related to ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons, including 

launches using ballistic missiles technology.’’

Despite that, we know now there have been some 15 illegal tests 

since 2231 came into force. So I look forward to this hearing and 

specifically discussing ways we can move forward on this matter 

that do not in any way conflict with the JCPOA, but live up to the 

letter of the law of 2231. 

Thank you. I yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you Mr. Boyle. 

Mr. Mast of Florida. 

Mr. MAST. Thank you, Chairman. 

You know, as we speak about this issue, I just ask that we always keep into perspective what we have allowed to become very 

cliche, in that we constantly point to Iran using the phrase ‘‘the 

largest state sponsor of terror,’’ and ask ourselves, what does that 

really mean? 

For those of us that have spent time on our Nation’s battlefields 

in modern history, we know exactly that that looks like. It was Iranian hands that produced improvised explosive devices that literally killed thousands of our servicemembers in Iraq. It was Iranian hands that packed improvised explosive devises with nuts and 

screws and bolts and other pieces of shrapnel so that they would 

put so many holes in our servicemembers that we couldn’t plug 

each and every one of them before they would hemorrhage out. 

That’s the enemy that we are dealing with. As my colleague, Mr. 

Deutch, put it, the group that is sowing instability. That is how 

they sow that instability. And I ask that we keep that in perspective as we move forward in this dialogue. 

Thank you. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, sir, for your service. 

Mr. Schneider of Illinois. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Thank you, Madam Chairman. I want to thank 

you and the ranking member for calling this very important hearing. I thank the witnesses for sharing their perspectives and insights. 

Iran obviously remains a significant threat in the region, around 

the world, to our allies and to our interests. And while a nuclear 

Iran is without question one of the greatest threats we could face, 

Iran continues to, through its ballistic missile development, 

6

through its shipment of conventional arms, through its nefarious 

activities in the region, in the world, and as well as its violations 

of human rights, to remain a very bad actor. 

As the ranking member said, the JCPOA does not preclude us 

from taking actions to thwart Iran’s ballistic missile program or to 

address their other nefarious actions around the world and in the 

region. I would take it a step further in fact: I believe we have a 

moral obligation to do just that. And I look forward to have this 

hearing to talk about how we can push back on Iran’s behavior. 

Thank you, and I yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. Fitzpatrick of Pennsylvania. 

Mr. FITZPATRICK. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

As a former FBI agent dealing with counterterrorism matters, it 

was often our job to find the nexus between terrorists and their 

state sponsors. And since the 1980s, the largest and most adept 

state sponsor of terrorism has been the Islamic Republic of Iran. 

Americans first became aware of this somber fact back in 1983 

when an Iranian-sponsored terrorist group, Hezbollah, bombed the 

Marine barracks in Beirut, Lebanon. 

Since then, Iran has continued to support groups that target 

Americans abroad. From 1982 to 1992, Iranian-backed Hezbollah 

kidnapped and held captive some 104 hostages in Lebanon, including the CIA’s Beirut station chief, William Buckley. After the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, Iranian intelligence and Revolutionary Guard Corps operatives provided training, arms, IED materials to insurgents. 

In recent years, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, specifically the shadowy Quds Force group, has attempted to sow continued instability throughout the Middle East. In Syria, the IRGC advisers have fought and died alongside of the forces of Bashar alAssad. 

In Iraq, the commander of the Quds Force has been seen advising and assisting local Iraqi Shiite militias. Some of these militias, 

such as the Badr organization, have been accused of heinous 

human rights abuses. These militias have worsened the already 

heightened sectarianism between the Sunnis and Shiites in Iraq. 

Unfortunately, Iran’s treachery has not been met with any increased sanctions or diplomatic pressure. Rather in recent years 

they have been awarded over $1 billion in frozen assets to Iran as 

part of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, otherwise known 

as the JCPOA. 

The JCPOA has not only upset America’s Sunni Arab allies, it 

has also emboldened Iran. Iran still continues to test ballistic missiles and continues to sow discord and sectarianism throughout the 

region. While it is important to continue the fight against ISIS in 

Iraq and Syria, we must remain vigilant and prevent Iran from establishing a crescent of influence throughout the region. 

I yield back, Madam Chairman. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. Cicilline. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you, Chairman Ros-Lehtinen and Ranking 

Member Deutch, for holding this important hearing on Iran’s ballistic missile program. 

7

Without question, Iran’s continued efforts to develop short-range 

and medium-range ballistic missiles and its ambition to develop 

intercontinental ballistic missiles pose a significant challenge to the 

United States and our allies. Development of these capabilities 

pose significant risks to U.S. forces and interests in the region, and 

it is also places Israel and our allies in the Persian Gulf in danger. 

Iran cannot be allowed to define international agreements and 

create increased uncertainty and disorder in the Middle East. At 

the same time, I believe it is essential that our response to Iran’s 

defiance of international agreements not undermine the progress 

made under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action to curb Iran’s 

nuclear program. 

It is my hope that the Trump administration will continue to 

work closely with our partners and allies to address the mutual 

challenges posed by Iran. I look forward to hearing from today’s 

witnesses and hearing their insights on how to best respond to 

Iran’s continued development of its ballistic missile program while 

ensuring that we do not move backwards in the international effort 

to prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons. 

And with that, I thank the gentlelady and yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank Mr. Cicilline. 

And now we turn to Mrs. Wagner of Missouri. 

Mrs. WAGNER. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Last month a senior member of the Iranian Parliament’s National Security and Foreign Policy Commission warned us that had 

the U.S. Army’s Fifth Fleet in Bahrain will be, and I quote, ‘‘razed 

to the ground if the enemy,’’ the United States, ‘‘makes a mistake.’’ 

These comments are particularly threatening in light of Iranian’s 

denial of confrontations between its fast attack boats and U.S. 

ships in the Gulf last week. 

It is clear that Iran interprets reality, their own reality, however, 

as it chooses, and future incidents could easily end in shots fired. 

Iran is one of the United States’ most severe security threats and 

the JCPOA—or, as we would call it, the Iran deal—has done little 

to mitigate dangerous conflict. 

I look forward to discussing this afternoon how we can best reduce tensions in the region and hold Iran accountable for its actions. 

And I thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you for an excellent statement. 

And now I am pleased to introduce our witnesses this afternoon. 

First, we are delighted to welcome back Dr. Kenneth Katzman, 

who serves as the senior Middle East analyst for the Congressional 

Research Service. He is a specialist on Iran, on the Persian Gulf 

states, and Afghanistan. Dr. Katzman is also an expert on Iran’s 

Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the IRGC, and he has written 

one of the preeminent books on the subject and is an expert on Iranian-backed groups operating in the Middle East. Prior to this, he 

was an analyst at the CIA. He is a foremost expert on Iran’s Revolutionary Guard. 

We look forward once again to your testimony, Dr. Katzman. 

Welcome back. 

Next, we want to also welcome back Mr. Michael Eisenstadt. He 

is the director of the Military and Securities Study Program at the 

8

Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Prior to joining the institute, he served for 26 years as an officer in the U.S. Army Reserve. 

Thank you for your service, sir, and we look forward to your testimony, Mr. Eisenstadt. 

Finally, we would like to welcome Elizabeth Rosenberg, director 

of the Energy, Economics and Security Program at the Center for 

a New American Security. She served as a senior adviser to the 

U.S. Department of the Treasury, to the assistant secretary for terrorist financing and financial crimes, and then to the under secretary for terrorism financial intelligence. In these roles she has 

worked on tightening global sanctions on Iran. 

Welcome to our subcommittee, Ms. Rosenberg. 

And as I stated in my opening statement, your full statements 

will be made a part of the record. Please feel free to synthesize. 

Thank you. 

Dr. Katzman, we will begin with you while I clean up here. 

STATEMENT OF KENNETH KATZMAN, PH.D., SPECIALIST IN 

MIDDLE EASTERN AFFAIRS, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH 

SERVICE 

Mr. KATZMAN. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. And thank you, 

Mr. Deutch, for inviting CRS to testify today. I will summarize my 

statement. I ask that my full statement, which was cleared by the 

CRS review process, be included in the record. 

First, I will talk a little about what are Iran’s objectives in its 

ballistic missile program. We think it is multifaceted: Iran’s longstanding national identity, Iran’s ideology, a response to perceived 

threats, and domestic political dynamics in Iran. 

In terms of national prestige and pride, developing a large sophisticated missile arsenal enhances Iran’s prestige and international reputation. 

Ideologically, the transfer by the Quds Force, as was mentioned, 

the IRGC Quds Force, of shorter-range missiles and rockets to 

forces in the region, such as Hezbollah, Hamas, the Houthis in 

Yemen, appears to be aimed at boosting movements that share 

Iran’s ideology, which is ultimately to overturn a power structure 

in the region that Iran’s leaders feel was established by and serves 

the United States, Israel, and Saudi Arabia. 

Strategically, Iran’s missile program can be interpreted as an 

equalizer to address Iran’s conventional military weaknesses relative to the United States or any other regional power. Iran’s supply of short-range missiles to Hezbollah, for example, gives Iran 

and Hezbollah the option to attack Israel. Iran’s shipments to the 

Houthis in Yemen, which they have used on several occasions, position Iran to project power not only in the Gulf, where it traditionally projects power, but also now on the southern coast of the Arabian Peninsula. 

In terms of Iranian politics, Iran’s President Hassan Rouhani 

might perceive that because he was the architect on the Iranian 

side of the JCPOA, he might be vulnerable to hardline elements 

who might ask him, ‘‘Well, you have given up Iran’s nuclear deterrent potential, how do you plan to defend the country?’’ And missiles could be seen as his answer to that challenge. 

9

On the IRGC, the ballistic missile program, as was noted, is run 

by the IRGC Air Force. The IRGC Air Force originally was designed to become an air force, but Iran quickly learned that it was 

too expensive and too time consuming to develop another air force 

alongside the regular air force, so they assigned the IRGC Air 

Force to handle Iran’s ballistic missile program. 

The Quds Force, as was noted, is a key instrument in Iran’s attempts to reshape regional politics to its advantage through these 

weapons transfers of cruise short-range missiles. 

The IRGC also, because its charter is to defend the revolution, 

it interprets its mission as justifying its involvement in Iranian politics, which is really unique to militaries around the world. It is 

one of the only—I haven’t studied all of the militaries in the 

world—but it is one of the only militaries that says its mission is 

to involve itself in politics. 

The IRGC Navy is amply supplied with cruise and coastal defense missiles, mostly purchased from outside suppliers. The IRGC 

Navy and the regular navy, again two navies, IRGC Navy and a 

regular navy, use these missiles to try to control Iran’s territorial 

waters. 

Sanctions and others options. The JCPOA imposes no restrictions 

on Iran’s missile program. U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231 

calls upon Iran to refrain for a maximum of 8 years from developing ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear 

weapons. And that is 8 years from October 2015, so we are now 

really 61⁄2 years until that restriction expires. 

There are a number of options available to the Trump administration to counter Iran’s ballistic missile program. One option is additional sanctions. At their height in 2012-2013, sanctions had significant effect on Iran’s economy and clearly contributed to its acceptance of the JCPOA. Yet, Iran continued to expand its nuclear 

and missile programs. 

One problem is the JCPOA essentially walls off Iran’s main economic sectors from new sanctions, because there is language that 

Iran would consider it a breach if sanctions are reimposed, the ones 

that were lifted are reimposed, which makes it difficult, we think, 

to impose new proliferation-related sanctions, which would not 

touch the main economic sectors. If you don’t touch Iran’s main economic sectors, it might be hard to be effective in changing Iran’s 

calculations. 

Another option would be to designate the IRGC as a foreign terrorist organization. It is difficult, however, to see how much additional actual pressure this would add on the IRGC that is not already imposed under existing sanctions, which are extensive on the 

IRGC. 

Other options could be enhancing U.S. and regional missile defense. And as far as military options, President Trump has said 

that all options are on the table, but he has not specified criteria 

or circumstances that could trigger potential U.S. military action 

on Iran. 

I look forward to your questions. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Katzman follows:]

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Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Excellent testimony. Thank you, Mr. 

Katzman. 

We have been joined by Mr. Chabot and Ms. Gabbard. So before 

we move to the witnesses, I wanted to see if they had an opening 

statement or anything that is on their mind. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you for offering, but I think I will pass at 

this time. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. And I know you are on Judiciary 

that has a markup right now. 

Ms. Gabbard? Okay, thank you. 

So, Mr. Eisenstadt, you are up. It is still going on. Thank you, 

sir. 

STATEMENT OF MR. MICHAEL EISENSTADT, KAHN FELLOW, 

DIRECTOR OF MILITARY AND SECURITY STUDIES PROGRAM, 

THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY 

Mr. EISENSTADT. Chairperson Ros-Lehtinen, Ranking Member 

Deutch, committee members, thank you for inviting me to address 

your committee today. 

As stated by several committee members in their opening statements, Iran has the largest missile force in the Middle East, consisting of thousands of short- and medium-range ballistic missiles 

and possibly land-attack cruise missiles. Although its missiles are 

conventionally armed, many could deliver a nuclear weapon if Iran 

were ever to acquire such a capability in violation of its NPT obligations and JCPOA commitments. 

While the recent nuclear accord with Iran will likely defer such 

a possibility, it did not impose new constraints on Iran’s missile 

program. On the contrary, Security Council Resolution 2231, which 

gave international legal force to the nuclear accord, loosened them 

and included provisions for the lifting of these constraints in 8 

years, if not sooner. 

Missiles and rockets are central to Iran’s way of war and that of 

its proxies. Missiles permit quick, flexible responses during rapidly 

moving crises. Missile salvos can generate greater cumulative effects on enemy morale and staying power in a shorter period of 

time than can terrorist attacks. For these reasons, Iran’s missile 

forces are the backbone of its deterrent and warfighting capabilities. 

The United States and its regional partners have been investing 

significant resources in missile defenses in recent decades. However, the continued growth in size and accuracy of Iran’s missile 

force raise concerns that it could saturate and overwhelm missile 

defenses in the Gulf and Israel. 

This problem will only increase with the passage of time. At current production rates, Iran’s missile force could more than double 

in size by the time the major limits imposed by the JCPOA are lifted in the year 2030. 

Iran’s growing missile force, in tandem with its growing offensive 

cyber capabilities, will enable it to target the critical infrastructure 

and missile defenses of our partners with a powerful one-two punch 

in the physical and virtual domains, while putting American military bases and forces in the region, including our carrier strike 

groups, at risk. 

25

An Iranian nuclear missile force would be highly destabilizing. 

Short missile flight times between Iran and Israel, the lack of reliable crisis communication channels, and the impossibility of knowing whether incoming Iranian missiles are conventional or nuclear 

could spur Israel and any other regional nuclear states that might 

emerge in the interim to adopt a launch-on-warning posture, undermining the prospect for a stable nuclear deterrent balance in 

the region. 

So what can be done to deal with this threat? Sanctions, to the 

degree that they complicate Tehran’s ability to procure equipment 

and special materials for its missile program, to include cruise missiles, are helpful and underscore Washington’s commitment to addressing the threat. They are an important element of U.S. policy. 

Washington should also continue to press allies, partners, and 

others, especially states that are members of the Missile Technology Control Regime, to tighten enforcement of export controls to 

prevent Iran from acquiring technology, equipment, and special 

materials that are essential to its missile program. 

The U.S. also needs to further strengthen its deterrent posture. 

To this end, it should continue to build up coalition missile defenses in the Middle East. After all, Iran’s missile force is a problem to which there is a viable solution, albeit an extremely costly 

one. And it should continue to strengthen the ability of U.S. and 

partner nations to deliver long-range precision fires and conduct 

aerial strikes against Iranian missile bases and launchers to attrite 

Iran’s missile forces ‘‘left of launch.’’

These capabilities also ensure that the U.S. and its partners 

have the ability to respond in kind to Iranian missile strikes. 

But the U.S. response must go beyond missiles. The United 

States needs a comprehensive strategy toward Iran that pushes 

back against destabilizing Iranian regional activities, strengthens 

the JCPOA, and deters Iran from building an industrial-scale nuclear infrastructure or attempting a nuclear breakout down the 

road. 

To this end, the United States should respond in a more assertive fashion to Iranian naval harassment in the Gulf, increase efforts to interdict Iranian arms transfers to regional proxies and 

partners, ramp up support for non-Salafist opposition groups in 

Syria, and commit to a long term defense partnership with Iraq. 

The intent of these steps would be to restore Washington’s credibility in Tehran and alter Iran’s cost-benefit calculus vis—vis the 

United States, inducing it to greater caution in areas where the 

possibility of a conflict with the United States exists. 

As for the nuclear deal, it would be a mistake to tear it up. This 

would isolate the United States, further complicate the reimposition of sanctions should it prove necessary, and provide Iran with 

a pretext to resume formerly proscribed nuclear activities. 

Rather, the U.S. should strictly enforce the JCPOA, try to address its shortcomings, and maximize the productive use of the decade-plus bought by the agreement. 

One of the main flaws of U.S. policy toward Iran is that it pursued a time-buying approach, the JCPOA, without a strategy for 

how to use the time gained. The United States needs to put together such a strategy now by, first, addressing loopholes and 

26

shortcomings in the existing nonproliferation and safeguards regime; assembling a broad coalition to persuade Iran to forgo its option to build an industrial-scale nuclear infrastructure once 

JCPOA-mandated restrictions are lifted after 15 years; and perhaps most importantly, leveraging the credibility conferred by its 

pushback against destabilizing Iranian regional policies to alter 

Tehran’s nuclear risk calculus, thereby bolstering America’s ability 

to deter a future Iranian nuclear breakout. 

I look forward to discussing these matters with you. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Eisenstadt follows:]

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Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, sir. 

Ms. Rosenberg. 

STATEMENT OF MS. ELIZABETH ROSENBERG, SENIOR FELLOW 

AND DIRECTOR, ENERGY, ECONOMICS AND SECURITY PROGRAM, CENTER FOR A NEW AMERICAN SECURITY 

Ms. ROSENBERG. Thank you, Chair Ros-Lehtinen, Ranking Member Deutch, distinguished members of the committee. I appreciate 

the opportunity to testify today on the topic of Iran ballistic missile 

and IRGC sanctions. 

International sanctions on Iran’s ballistic missile activities and 

the IRGC are an integral component to the broad-ranging and powerful financial measures that target and isolate Iran for its nefarious activities. They are at the heart of U.S. sanctions on Iran and 

set an appropriately aggressive tone for Washington to pursue its 

interests with this destabilizing regime. 

Congress has provided critical leadership in this effort to target 

Iran’s missile activity and the IRGC, and I applaud this important 

work. I encourage you to continue this attention to make it clear 

to Iran that while the international community has entered into a 

strong agreement with Iran over its nuclear program, U.S. policy 

leaders will aggressively hold Iran accountable for its threatening 

nonnuclear activities. 

The United States has imposed sanctions on the IRGC and Iran’s 

ballistic missile activities specifically to highlight Iran’s weapons 

proliferation, human rights abuses, including through cyber-enabled means, and in the case of the IRGC Quds Force, its support 

for terrorism. 

Even after the nuclear deal, of course, many sanctions on Iran’s 

ballistic missiles development and the IRGC remain firmly in 

place. U.S. sanctions on Iran’s ballistic missile activity seek to expose and counter the agencies and the entities that develop and deploy Iran’s missile program. Along with regional missile defense capabilities and the U.S. military’s significant presence in the Middle 

East, as has been mentioned, they are an integral part of the 

United States effort to deter Iran from using missiles to threaten 

its neighbors and to protect U.S. interests in the region. 

The Iranian missile arsenal is the largest and most lethal in the 

Middle East, and it is fundamental to the Iranian strategy to 

project power and influence. 

Iran continues its dangerous and provocative missile tests, as 

you mentioned in your statement, in a show of force. However, the 

greatest threat that this arsenal presents is the potential for missiles to serve as delivery systems for nuclear weapons, of course. 

Financial sanctions imposed by the United States on the IRGC 

more broadly than just on its missile program target this proliferation activity and its human rights abuse, and in the case of the 

Quds Force, as I mentioned, its support for terrorism. These various sanctions are important, given the political prominence of the 

IRGC in Iran and in the Middle East, and its extensive role in a 

host of Iranian commercial sectors. 

However, they have a limited financial impact given the relatively limited links between the U.S. and the Iranian economies 

and the broad avoidance by Iranians of the U.S. dollar as a means 

43

to limit their sanctions exposure. Indeed, the IRGC has been able 

to function during the last several years of most severe international sanctions pressure on Iran before and leading up to implementation day for the nuclear deal. 

The United States has a variety of options to expand sanctions 

pressure on Iran’s ballistic missile activities and the destabilizing 

and threatening role of the IRGC. 

First, the administration should aggressively go after implementing existing sanctions authorities, targeting Iran’s ballistic 

missile procurement networks and the agencies responsible for development and deployment of the missile program. 

Second, the administration should immediately embark on a concerted and broad-ranging sanctions campaign to expose and target 

the dangerous and insidious activities of the IRGC within and beyond the borders of Iran, including exposing the financial activity 

and holdings of the IRGC, its agents, and instrumentalities and regional terrorist proxies wherever feasible. 

The strongest and most successful approach to countering Iranian threats is through continued multilateral action. Where European sanctions on Iranian ballistic missiles and the IRGC do not 

match those of the United States, U.S. policymakers should strongly urge EU counterparts to align their financial measures. 

U.S. leaders should also work with U.N. member states to add 

new arms or missile proliferators to sanctions lists where there is 

sufficient information. 

Congressional leaders are well placed to outline the contours of 

such a strategy and to urge aggressive administration implementation. And congressional members can also set the right expectations for successful multilateral engagement, including renewed 

sanctions pressure, and also a fresh look at force posture arrangements and intelligence and covert activities. 

Thank you very much for the opportunity to speak with you 

today, and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Rosenberg follows:]

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Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you to the three of you. Excellent testimony. 

Dr. Katzman, I will begin with you. You stated in your written 

testimony that some are interpreting the JCPOA as essentially 

walling off core economic sectors in Iran, like energy, banking, 

manufacturing, from new sanctions. I believe that Iran’s core economic sectors are absolutely eligible for impact by nonnuclear-related sanctions under the JCPOA because the IRGC is in control 

of Iran’s ballistic missile programs, as well as so much of Iran’s 

economy. Any effective sanctions targeting the missile program will 

by necessity impact these core economic sectors. 

So do you believe that these economic sectors are walled off from 

nonnuclear sanctions? 

Mr. KATZMAN. Thank you, Congresswoman. 

The sanctions that were lifted basically were secondary U.S. 

sanctions that force major foreign corporations to choose between 

doing business in Iran with its major economic sectors or doing 

business in the United States. Those sanctions were lifted in concert with the JCPOA, and we have seen foreign corporations now 

return. 

Some of the big energy majors have returned and are talking 

about drilling for oil again. Iran’s ships are patrolling the seas 

again, delivering oil. Iran’s oil exports are back to where we were 

in 2011. Iran is back into the international banking system. It has 

been relinked to the SWIFT electronic payment system. So the Iranian economy has grown, possibly as high as 6 percent in the 1 

year since the sanctions were lifted. 

So if those sanctions cannot be reimposed like that, it may be difficult to cause Iran to make the calculations on missiles or human 

rights or terrorism like was made when they accepted the JCPOA. 

Their economy was hurting so badly that they felt they had to accept the JCPOA. If you cannot reimpose those sanctions at that extensive level, they might not think twice about some of these other 

activities, yeah. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, sir. 

And, Mr. Eisenstadt, can you please outline for us the IRGC’s involvement in Iran’s economy? Which sectors does it have a stake 

in? And how are they connected to Iran’s ballistic missile program? 

And how can our sanctions against the IRGC and Iran’s missile 

program be more effective? 

Mr. EISENSTADT. Madam Chairperson, this is not an area that I 

am really a specialist in, so I will defer for the most part, except 

to say my understanding is that the IRGC has involvement 

throughout just about every sector of the economy. They either 

have full ownership or partial ownership of firms throughout the 

economy. Many of them are in sectors that are important, that 

have a potential contribution to make to the missile program, 

whether it be related to heavy industry, mining, production of materials that are important potentially for the missile program. 

But showing the connection between those industries and the 

missile program, I think at least in the public domain, is the missing link. And I think therefore any new sanctions regarding the 

missile program that mandates reporting that exposes these connections would be very helpful. 

52

So let me just say, my approach to sanctions on the missiles, 

Iran’s missile program, is to look at how we can disrupt their ability to acquire special materials, technology, and the like from overseas. And we see in pictures that they continue to publish of missile production facilities that they are getting production technology that they should not be getting under the MTCR, Missile 

Technology Control Regime. So clearly some of our allies have more 

work to do in terms of tightening their export controls. So there is 

more work to be done in that area. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. 

I don’t know if Ms. Rosenberg or Dr. Katzman wanted——

Ms. ROSENBERG. I would be happy to speak to this question, as 

well as to the question you posed to Mr. Katzman. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Yes, please. 

Ms. ROSENBERG. I would like to affirm your interpretation of the 

JCPOA, which I also agree does not preclude the United States 

from pursuing sanctions pursuant to nonnuclear areas of its concern with regard to Iranian behavior. So should there be an entity 

that is engaged in significant acts of support for terrorism or regional destabilization, the United States can and should pursue 

sanctions against such an entity. That is different from going after 

sectors of the Iranian economy which were broadly delisted in the 

nuclear agreement. 

Speaking to the areas of the economy in which the IRGC is involved, they are reported to be quite extensive: Heavy industry, engineering, construction, energy, and shipping. However, as was 

mentioned, it is difficult to trace the beneficial ownership link between the IRGC and many of its entities in the Iranian economy 

for various reasons, but such legal requirements for disclosure of 

this corporate information are not very good in Iran. In fact, that 

has been pointed out by professional institutions in the financial 

services sector. 

One of the most effective ways that the United States can go 

after the IRGC for its concerns relating to the IRGC have to do 

with identifying further agents, entities, companies, fronts, commanders, and business executives in these companies in the economy that work on behalf of the IRGC. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Ms. Rosenberg. 

Dr. Katzman, you wanted to comment on that? 

Mr. KATZMAN. I would just comment, one of the biggest construction companies in Iran is called Khatam al-Anbiya, which means 

seal of the prophet. It is called GHORB. It is a designated sanctioned entity. It is very large, thousands of employees. It was started by the IRGC. In fact, it grew out of the IRGC’s—like their Army 

Corps of Engineers. It was the IRGC’s construction wing during the 

Iran-Iraq war, and then it was spun off as essentially a construction company. It is very large and it is a designated entity and it 

is sanctioned, yes. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Deutch. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thanks, Madam Chairman. 

Dr. Katzman, do you want to just continue with that? So it is already sanctioned and so what more can be done with a huge entity 

like that. 

53

Mr. KATZMAN. Well, I mean, I think the point is, when the 

JCPOA was implemented last January, 2016, hundreds of entities 

were delisted from U.S. sanctions. In other words, they were no 

longer subject to U.S. sanctions. But these were mainly, again, as 

I mentioned, energy companies, shipping, shipping insurance, 

banks, the Central Bank, Iran Air—Iran’s civilian economy, 

delisted. 

The IRGC-related companies, like GHORB, other IRGC affiliates, 

missile entities, anything to do with terrorism, IRGC commanders, 

I mean, hundreds of entities remain designated for sanctions, and 

it is in these areas, proliferation, terrorism, human rights. But the 

civilian economy, Iran’s civilian economy, the energy sector, banking, what I mentioned, transportation, sanctions were lifted. 

And under the JCPOA, Iran has said that if the sanctions that 

were lifted are reimposed, Iran would consider that a breach and 

it would cease implementing its commitment. So, for example, if 

Iran’s Central Bank were again sanctioned to the extent that it 

was cut off from the international banking system, I think I have 

a lot of confidence in saying Iran would say the deal is finished. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Even if the sanctions had nothing to do with proliferation activity? 

Mr. KATZMAN. Correct. The language in the JCPOA is sanctions 

that were lifted cannot be reimposed for other justifications, nonnuclear. In other words, terrorism, human rights, these other 

things, cannot be reimposed under other justifications, right. 

Mr. DEUTCH. I wanted to just follow up on the concept of multilateral sanctions, which are still I think the best approach, and the 

frustration of the Security Council to act against the ballistic missile tests. This has now gone on in two administrations. And we 

raised the tests at the Council and Russia and China played lawyer 

for Iran and argued that the tests aren’t prohibited under 2231. 

So if U.N. sanctions aren’t an option, what about the EU? And 

what is the best argument for our EU allies that adopting strong 

sanctions, ballistic missile sanctions, aren’t just of paramount importance to international security, but that they also don’t violate 

the deal—at a time, we should point out, when the EU is interested 

in vigorously enforcing the deal at least to ensure that the deal remains in place? 

Ms. Rosenberg. 

Ms. ROSENBERG. Thank you for the question. 

I think there is a lot of running room for the United States to 

work with the EU on sanctions and on further sanctions concerning 

the IRGC, for example. The EU targets the IRGC under its own 

sanctions and some of those remain in place still. 

It is difficult for the U.N. Security Council, for a number of reasons mentioned already this afternoon, to go after these Iranian 

missile tests and call them a violation. It doesn’t meet the test of 

the language in the U.N. Security Council resolution and furthermore to the extent that Iran has——

Mr. DEUTCH. They argue that it doesn’t meet the test, that is the 

role they play. 

Ms. ROSENBERG. Correct. So if it is difficult to find a violation at 

that level, then surely the United States and Europe can move forward further here. 

54

I think for the United States offering leadership by designating 

additional fronts in the network, the procurement network related 

to the ballistic missile program and working with the EU to share 

information and asking them to match the sanctions in the EU, by 

the EU Commission, is a perfectly viable, reasonable, and important strategy for the U.S. to take. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you. 

Mr. Eisenstadt. 

Mr. EISENSTADT. If I could just add, the Islamic Republic has 

itself said that the U.N. Security Council resolution is something 

separate than the nuclear deal and they don’t consider it binding. 

We should say, well, if we are trying to argue for our allies to 

join us on sanctions related to the missiles, we should say that, 

look, the Islamic Republic itself says that this is not part of the 

deal and, therefore, there should not be consideration with regard 

to our allies. And also we share concern with regard to freedom of 

navigation in the Gulf and the security of the Gulf and this impinges on that. So I think we have a good argument to make with 

regard to our European partners. 

Mr. DEUTCH. And, Madam Chairman, if I could ask just one 

other question, and that is in order to weaken the IRGC’s involvement in terrorism we have to cut off their access to Hezbollah. And 

the concern that I know we all share is that as long as Russia continues to turn a blind eye to what Iran is doing in Syria, it makes 

that really difficult. 

Rouhani was just in Moscow this week. Russia, it seems, has accomplished its goal in Syria, being firmly entrenched now in the 

Middle East. It continues to aid Iran, not just in Syria, but in the 

uranium sale, the S-300 sale, for reasons that appear to be only to 

serve their own self-interest or being bulwarks against the United 

States. 

The question I would just put out to you is, if the United States, 

as the President has now told us repeatedly, wants closer cooperation with Russia, how do we get tough with Iran at the same time? 

I didn’t mean to stump you. 

Yes, Ms. Rosenberg. 

Ms. ROSENBERG. I don’t think that these necessarily must be inconsistent. And whether you appreciate or not the example of the 

previous administration, there was a demonstration of, on the one 

hand, working in coordination with Russia and the U.N. process 

around the nuclear deal, and working aggressively with Russia 

when it came to application of new sanctions with regard to its activities in Ukraine. 

There is no reason why there cannot similarly be a variegated 

strategy under this administration which could seek to coordinate 

with Russia as appropriate, perhaps on Syria-related issues, and 

push back more firmly in this case with regard to support for Iran’s 

ballistic missile program. 

Mr. DEUTCH. And Iran’s support of Hezbollah and Syria. 

Ms. ROSENBERG. Absolutely. 

Mr. EISENSTADT. If I could just add to that. I mean, we have 

worked productively in the past with regard to, say, for instance, 

the S-300 missiles, delaying the delivery of those for quite some 

time. 

55

The problem is, I think, given the current trajectory of U.S.-Russian relations—and the fact that there is probably some daylight 

between Russia’s position toward the conflict in Syria and Iran’s 

position—but given the general trajectory of U.S.-Russian relations, 

I think it will be increasingly difficult in the future because of all 

of the stuff that is going on with regard to hacking and Ukraine 

and the like, it will be increasingly difficult to find areas to cooperate on. But in principle it is a possibility. 

Mr. KATZMAN. If I can just add. In my assessment, it is going to 

be extremely difficult to get Iran and Hezbollah to be separated. 

Iran sees Hezbollah as the most prominent outgrowth of the Islamic revolution of 1979. Iran will do anything to defend Hezbollah. 

I would argue Iran is in Syria in a big way because it wants to 

protect that weapons channel to Hezbollah. The IRGC created 

Hezbollah’s military wing. The Quds Force grew out of the IRGC’s 

contingent that went to Lebanon to create Hezbollah’s military 

wing. 

The connection between Iran and Hezbollah is organic. It would 

take a tremendous heavy lift to separate these two entities, in my 

estimation. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Great questions. Thank you so much, Mr. 

Deutch. 

Mr. Mast of Florida. 

Mr. MAST. Mr. Eisenstadt, you spoke in your written testimony 

about the way Hamas and Hezbollah use their rockets against 

Israel and that is a useful template for what could happen in the 

future. And I wanted to start with something backing up a little 

bit before that. 

To what would you attribute this? You know, the United States 

of America mastered this ballistic technology in the 1950s, 1960s, 

China did as well, you know, Russia, 1950s, 1960s, 1970s. What 

would you provide the greatest attribution to, to say this far in the 

future, 2017, Iran still hasn’t mastered that? Why would you say 

they still haven’t mastered that? 

Mr. EISENSTADT. One thing that we, I think, often underestimate 

is exactly how hard it is to even create technologies that we developed in the 1940s and the 1950s for many developing countries 

today. And so, many proliferators are in some ways along the—if 

you look at it in terms of proliferation timeline in terms of their 

capabilities, they are still in the 1940s in many ways. 

But you know what, to use a term that my friend Peter Zimmerman coined, while pursuing ‘‘bronze medal technology,’’ from their 

point of view and in terms of their needs it is good enough, because 

we have seen time and again that even Hamas, with rockets made 

in home, kind of garage workshops, until the Israelis deployed the 

Iron Dome, were able to terrorize populations in southern Israel 

and to harass these people and cause casualties. 

So now with the development of Israeli missile defenses, they 

have developed the ability, at least in—well, in theory and in practice, to intercept these capabilities, but the Iranians are producing 

them in such numbers and they are cheap relative to the price of 

defenses, that they have the ability to saturate defenses. 

And the Israelis are developing a layered approach, that they 

have the low end capabilities now with Iron Dome, they have high 

56

end with the Arrow, in the middle range they are developing David’s Sling and deploying it this year. But most of——

Mr. MAST. To pause you. Are you saying that it was basically 

pure dumb luck or a lack of intelligence on their part that didn’t 

get them to this point? What about what we have done in modern 

history, prior to the JCPOA, has prevented them to getting to this 

point? Prior to that, what prevented them from getting this? 

Or even talking about proliferation. You know, the first nuclear 

weapon, we didn’t even have to test Trinity. We knew if you fire 

one piece of fissile material into another, you are going to get a 

critical mass. We didn’t have to test it. 

What has prevented them, previous to the JCPOA, to getting to 

that point? 

Mr. EISENSTADT. It is a combination of efforts to disrupt what 

they were doing by us, arms control, export control regimes, efforts 

to try to prevent the spread of this information, although now this 

stuff is pretty much out there. But it is one thing to know it. It 

is another thing to actually be able to apply in practice. And you 

need to have a very large human manpower base, human capital 

base that is capable of handling complex projects and integrating 

all the different aspects of it. 

We often under-estimate how difficult it. How many countries in 

the world produce fighter jets or even cars? Iran does produce cars 

now, but for many years it was kind of knock-down kits that they 

imported from Peugeot or whatever. 

So we often underestimate how difficult it is, these kind of complex industrial tasks. So a lot of it is just that it is extremely hard. 

We have been doing it for so long—we have what people call tacit 

knowledge—because we have a lot of people who have learned how 

to do this kind of thing. But if you are starting from scratch, it is 

very difficult to be able to master the full range of capabilities 

needed for a robust ballistic missile program. 

Mr. MAST. Where would you say access to the world market puts 

them in terms of advancing toward what they have yet been able 

to master? That is China, Russia, U.S., a number of other countries. 

Mr. EISENSTADT. Yes, it is very important, because in the 1990s 

they benefited from Russian help in terms of individuals who were 

formally associated with Russia’s missile programs. Their Shahab3 missile was based on the North Korean Nodong. So they have 

gotten help from the North Koreans, the Russians, and also China 

was involved in their solid fuel rocket program. 

So they have benefited from foreign assistance and they probably 

still do. Every program around the world has benefited from foreign assistance. But they have reached a point now where they 

have in some ways surpassed their former teachers in North Korea 

and they are generally considered to be more capable in this area 

than the North Koreans in most areas in the missile realm. 

But getting know-how and materials from abroad is still very important for their program, and there are some areas where I think 

they will continue to benefit. For instance, penetration aids and 

countermeasures, which as far as we know they don’t really put on 

their missiles yet. That is the next step and that will make missile 

57

defense much harder if they are able to jam and put out countermeasures to the missile defenses. 

Mr. MAST. We didn’t get into MIRV or anything else, but my 

time has expired. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Mast. 

I will follow up with some of your questions. Mr.——

Mr. SUOZZI. Suozzi. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Suozzi. 

Mr. SUOZZI. You have got it. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. I have got a really difficult name. So I hope 

you don’t get insulted by Suozzi. 

Mr. SUOZZI. Suozzi, in Italian. 

Madam Chair, I want to thank you very much for your leadership here, as well as the ranking member. 

I want to thank the witnesses for their thoughtful insight and 

analysis. It really is a great education that you are giving us here 

today. 

I think there is broad agreement in this room that there is a serious problem with Iran’s ballistic missile program and that something has to be done. It is a question of, what is the proper authority, and how are we going to do it, and who are our partners going 

to be in that process? But I think that there is broad agreement. 

I want to ask a question about timing. The elections are coming 

up in Iran in May. I would like to just hear the benefit of your 

analysis regarding the politics of Iran and how the President, 

Rouhani, and the Supreme Leader and the IRGC and all the different players that are involved here—the regular military—just 

tell me a little bit about the intersection of all them and then how 

what we do could or could not affect that outcome. 

Mr. KATZMAN. I will start with that. The regular military that 

existed under the Shah, it is still there. It does not interfere in politics at all. In fact, during the uprising of 2009, the regular military 

issued a letter saying, ‘‘Do not ask us to go repress these demonstrators.’’ So they are not a factor. 

Now the IRGC, as I said in my statement, is a factor. 

Mr. SUOZZI. Does the regular military report to the civilian President? 

Mr. KATZMAN. It reports up to the general headquarters that reports to the Supreme Leader, actually. 

Mr. SUOZZI. To the Supreme Leader. Okay. 

Mr. KATZMAN. Yes. The Supreme Leader is technically the commander in chief of the whole Armed Forces, right. 

The IRGC does interfere in politics, and they have done so on 

several occasions. In fact, it was widely reported, and there seems 

to be agreement, that it did put Mr. Ahmadinejad over the top in 

2005. He came out of nowhere. But the IRGC deployed the Basij. 

They leafleted for him. They drove people to the polls. And they 

view it as their mission to interfere in politics to defend the revolution. 

Now, I think most experts—and I would say I am in this camp 

too—think if it is a free and fair election, Mr. Rouhani is the favorite. He ran on a platform of delivering Iran from its international 

isolation. He negotiated the JCPOA. He did bring them, to some 

58

extent, out of their isolation. So the people that voted for him in 

2013 seem to probably vote for him again. 

Now, the issue is the hardliners. There was some thinking earlier on that the hardliners would maybe just not even contest it so 

much. But no. They seem to be organizing. They are trying to unify 

around one conservative hardline candidate to oppose him. 

Mr. SUOZZI. Who is that? 

Mr. KATZMAN. Well, they are having some caucuses, for the first 

time, they are actually having some meetings to try to vote on one 

unified candidate. The issue is there is one particular figure who 

the Supreme Leader favors a lot who they might choose. And that 

would be significant because, if this individual runs, the regime 

might be tempted to try to, let’s say, interfere on his behalf, to put 

it mildly. He is the leader of the Quds Razavi Foundation in 

Mashhad. Khamenei appointed him last summer. And Khamenei 

appears to favor him as the next Supreme Leader. So engineering 

him to the Presidency would give him an advantage to be the next 

Supreme Leader. 

Mr. EISENSTADT. If I could take a——

Mr. SUOZZI. I am sorry. Does it help or hurt for us to do something before May? 

Mr. KATZMAN. You mean in terms of sanctions? Well, probably 

the hardliners, the Supreme Leader, they have been criticizing 

Rouhani to some extent that he—they are saying he has not delivered all the promises of sanctions relief. It is possible that new action——

Mr. SUOZZI. I am running out of time. 

Mr. Eisenstadt, go ahead. 

Mr. EISENSTADT. I will just be quick. Iran’s domestic politics has 

its own internal logic. And our ability to influence it in ways that 

redounds to the benefit of American policy has generally worked 

out, you know, just the opposite that we had hoped. And I would 

just say we could probably do a lot to hurt things. But there is not 

a lot we can do to help the people that we want to help. 

You know, President Khatami, when he was elected in 1997, we 

had hopes that this would herald a change. He was undercut by 

his domestic opponents. President Bush wanted regime change, but 

the people didn’t rise up. They rose up in 2009, when we had a 

President who wanted to engage the regime there. 

And with the JCPOA, we were hoping that the nuclear agreement would lead to a broadened—you know, a general improvement in the relations between the two countries. But what we have 

seen is in fact it has probably emboldened those who are against 

the improvement of relations. So our ability to game this in a way 

to achieve—to advance our goals has been shown to be very limited, if nonexistent. 

But there are things we can do that could harm things if we act 

in a heavy-handed way sometimes. But often we can’t really help 

the people we want to help usually. 

Ms. ROSENBERG. I will just be very brief in responding to this. 

I would like to agree with the comments just made by my colleague, Dr. Eisenstadt, that in fact it is very difficult for U.S. policymakers to specifically engineer particular political outcomes in 

Iran. We should be very humble about that. 

59

I don’t think that undertaking sanctions enforcement using existing authorities will meaningfully sway Iranian politics. It doesn’t 

actually change the broader U.S. posture or the set of authorities 

that are in place. Nevertheless, there is no specific need to do 

something now versus 60 or 90 days from now, absent a particular 

provocation against which the U.S. should push back. 

There are plenty of opportunities. The United States has an ability to use them whenever it wants. 

Mr. SUOZZI. Thank you very much. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, sir. Excellent questions and answers. 

Now we turn to Mrs. Wagner—Ambassador Wagner. 

Mrs. WAGNER. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Mr. Eisenstadt, the rules of Iranian cyber warfare seem to deviate I think from the codes that guide the world’s five cyber powers: 

The U.S., U.K., Russia, China, and Israel. Iranian hackers do not 

just engage in espionage and gather intelligence; they try to do 

harm. There were some reports last spring that there had been a 

lull in Iranian cyber activities since the nuclear deal. Can you discuss, to the best of your ability, how Iranian cyber strategy has 

shifted in the wake of the nuclear deal and how Iran will use destructive cyber capabilities in the future? 

Mr. EISENSTADT. Yeah. A lot of this will be necessarily speculative. My understanding is that, during the negotiation of the 

JCPOA, they actually held in abeyance a lot of their offensive cyber 

activities. After its conclusion, my understanding is that there 

was—they resumed a lot of their net reconnaissance activities. In 

other words, they were kind of snooping around to try to gather information about critical infrastructure in the United States and 

elsewhere, both probably to send the signal that they have the capability to harm us in this domain in the future should relations 

deteriorate and also to build up their cyber target folders. 

And a lot of this also involved spear-phishing activities against 

personnel involved in American Iran policy and the like. 

There were also some attacks directed against Saudi Arabia over 

the winter, which probably are related to the worsening or the 

downturn in relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran. 

So, from Iran’s point of view, a lot of their activities are in response to aggressive action either by the United States and Israel, 

for instance, with regard to Stuxnet, or other activities that were 

done, for instance the sanctions against their financial sector; so 

they attacked our financial sector with denials of service activities, 

and, likewise, they engaged in attacks on Saudi Aramco and 

Qatar’s RasGas in response to our sanctions on their oil industry 

a few years ago. 

So, from their point of view, a lot of it has been defensive thus 

far, but I have no doubt that if there was a kind of deterioration 

in relations with Iran—from their point of view, we live in a cyber 

glass house. We have massive critical infrastructure which, right 

now, we don’t have the ability to protect. Their capabilities are not 

advanced; they are kind of a third-tier cyber power. But I think 

they have great potential in this area. But this is an area which, 

in the future, I think will be much more important for them. Right 

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now, there is not probably—they could do some—they could be a 

nuisance at this time, and perhaps more. 

Mrs. WAGNER. I have great concerns about our future and where 

we may be going with this. 

Moving on, it seems that Erdogan has long been loath to criticize 

Iranian ballistic missile and nuclear programs. The complicated relationship between Turkey and Iran has become more concerning 

with the Moscow Declaration and the trial of Turkish-Iranian sanctions-buster Reza Zarrab in New York. 

Ms. Rosenberg, given the arrest of Turkish sanctions-busters in 

the U.S. and the information that courts may uncover, do you think 

we will find that the Turkish elite have extensive Iranian ties? 

Ms. ROSENBERG. Ties to Iran or ties to sanctions evasion? 

Mrs. WAGNER. Yes. 

Ms. ROSENBERG. That is a subject that has been of great concern 

and focus for U.S. policy leaders and for the U.S. intelligence community. There has been quite a lot of investigation into this, appropriately so, given economic linkages and also political ties. I should 

say that Turkey is not singled out in this category. There are other 

jurisdictions where linkages between high-level officials and economic linkages put——

Mrs. WAGNER. But you would say there are ties there? 

Ms. ROSENBERG. There are links, and the concern is they may be 

more insidious than merely political or commercial ties could suggest. 

Mrs. WAGNER. Interesting. Okay. 

So, Mr. Eisenstadt, in my short time here—or others on the 

panel—to what extent does Iranian money fund terror groups operating inside of Turkey? 

Mr. EISENSTADT. I will defer to my colleagues. I don’t follow Turkey very closely. So I will defer to others on this. 

Mr. KATZMAN. You are talking about Kurdish groups? 

Mrs. WAGNER. Yes. 

Mr. KATZMAN. The IRGC has some relation with the Iraqi Kurds. 

PKK—not sure—not really a close connection there. 

Mrs. WAGNER. Ms. Rosenberg? I know my time is up. 

Ms. ROSENBERG. I have nothing further to add. 

Mrs. WAGNER. Thank you very much, Madam Chair. I yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Mrs. Wagner. You 

make a valuable contribution to our subcommittee. 

Mr. Kinzinger, thank you for your service also on our subcommittee and to our Nation. 

Mr. KINZINGER. It is good to be back. Thanks. 

Thank you all for being here. Obviously, I think it comes as no 

surprise I thought the JCPOA was a pretty bad deal. I think it 

really just provides, as we look at it, a roadmap for a timeline on 

how to acquire nuclear weapons eventually. And when it comes to 

playing the long game, I think Iran is okay with saying, ‘‘We can 

have weapons in 10 or 15 years,’’ or the threat of weapons is almost, in many cases, as good as having them. 

But I also think now, obviously, we are in a situation where to 

redevelop, despite the discussion of snapback provisions and sanctions, which we knew would never happen, being able to develop 

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ficult. But I think we have to watch this JCPOA like a hawk and 

be ready to fight back against any violations and push back against 

ballistic missile technology. 

I also think, when you look at Iran—and it is not just what is 

happening in Yemen—I think what is extremely important is what 

is happening in Syria. And you look at Bashar al-Assad, who I actually believe created ISIS, not necessarily by signing on the dotted 

line somewhere, but by creating an environment where it is easy 

to recruit into Daesh or ISIS from. So I believe that Iran bears 

some responsibility for the existence of ISIS. 

Now, I also want to say—I am co-chair of the Iraq Caucus and, 

you know, obviously, an Iraq veteran myself. And when I was in 

Iraq, we saw the role of Iran and Iraq very closely. We know that 

hundreds of Americans died as a result of Iran’s involvement in 

Iraq. And we know that, in fact, the incoming Iranian Ambassador 

is a senior IRGC official. So we can only estimate what that means. 

We cannot allow Iran to continue to destabilize Iraq. 

So, in addition to sanctions, Mr. Eisenstadt, how would you advise the administration to counter Tehran’s influence in Iraq? 

Mr. EISENSTADT. First of all, the first thing I would recommend 

is that we commit to make it clear to the Iraqis—let me just say 

that the Iraqi Government, both the current government and even 

the previous government under Nouri al-Maliki, has always wanted 

to maintain a balance between the United States and Iran. And indicating to them that we want to maintain a long-term security relationship with them as well as a relationship in other areas will 

make it clear to them that they will have the ability to continue 

with that policy. 

We have to recognize, because of proximity, they have to make 

their peace with the Iranians and live with a certain degree of influence that many Iraqis feel uncomfortable with. Making it clear 

that we want a long-term security relationship with them is the 

first part of that. I think committing to a long-term training relationship with the Iraqi Armed Forces—I mean, one of the things 

that has come through with this campaign in Mosul is that it 

was—basically, while, in the early days after June 2014, the Popular Mobilization Forces were very important for breaking the advance of ISIL, the conventional military forces have been key to 

pushing them back in most places. And I think we can make a very 

convincing case to the Iraqi Government that you need to continue 

building up your conventional security forces, and we are really the 

ideal partner to do that. Iran can’t help you there. 

So, basically, there are things we can do, I think, in this regard 

to continue to ensure that Iraq knows that we want this relationship, and they will be able to push back. 

Mr. KINZINGER. That is important to know, too, is the Iraqi military can be fully capable, but they need the American military to 

stiffen their spine at least for now. And we see, obviously, that was 

important in the fight against Daesh. 

Ms. Rosenberg, I want to ask you about Syria. Again, 500,000 

dead Syrians almost, 50,000 of which are children. You are watching Iran use, I think, money from sanctions relief to prop up that 

regime. And, unfortunately, around the world, there is kind of this 

belief now that it is either Bashar al-Assad or it is terrorism, and 

62

I don’t think people recognize that, in fact, Assad is creating the 

next generation of terrorists right now—that we will end up having 

to fight—by taking away opportunity and freedom for people. 

But, specifically, when I talk about the sanctions relief and the 

money, do you know if there is any way we can track how much 

that money is being used in Iran? And if they are using that to 

fund genocides, what kind of action can we take to punish them? 

Ms. ROSENBERG. Thank you for the question. It is difficult, as I 

think you are indicating, to track exactly where Iran’s money that 

was unfrozen after the nuclear deal is going or is flowing specifically. That is true for a number of reasons. Two key ones are that, 

if we are talking about state revenues, it goes into a state budget 

and can be allocated under the design of the state. So there is not 

a transaction chain to follow if it were going through independent 

institutions that must use private banking channels, et cetera. 

Another significant reason that it is difficult to understand exactly where it is flowing is because Iran has ample reason to keep 

that money outside of its own jurisdiction and not to repatriate it 

and then to hand it over, in this instance, to President Assad in 

terms of cash or material support, using this to defend its currency, 

using it to balance international trade. Iran still struggles for access to hard currency. So there is quite ample reason for it to use 

this for what is essentially the civilian economy. There are great 

needs there in order to deliver economic relief to the population, 

which was a mandate, of course, of President Rouhani as part of 

this deal and following on. 

Mr. KINZINGER. Thank you. 

With that, I will yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Kinzinger. 

And Mr. Schneider of Illinois. Thank you. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Thank you. 

And, again, thank you to the witnesses for your testimony. 

Dr. Katzman, in your opening statement, you talked a bit about 

Iran’s calculus and trying to change their calculus. If I think about 

math briefly, on the right-hand side of the equation are goals and 

objectives for Iran. Broadly speaking, that is preserving the regime 

and maintaining their influence. On the left-hand side of that 

equation are factors they control and factors they don’t control—

hopefully we can. Now, ultimately, it is up to everybody. What are 

the factors post or within the context of the JCPOA, within the 

context of what is happening in Syria, in Yemen, and around the 

region, with broad context of what is happening in our country and 

around the world—what can we do to change that calculus? And 

what do we have to understand about Iran’s thinking to know 

which levers to pull or which buttons to push? 

Mr. KATZMAN. I would just start by saying Iran’s calculus is 

multifaceted in the region. As I said in my statement, Iran views 

the Middle East as controlled basically by the United States, Israel, 

and Saudi Arabia. That is how they think, which is a power structure, in Iran’s view, that is weighted against Shia, against Islamist 

parties, against anyone that is not part of the dominant elite. So 

they have chosen to intervene in a number of places to protect national interests, to protect their allies, to protect favored parties. 

And what is really needed is a multifaceted approach. 

63

Obviously, I think if all the conflicts we see going in Syria, in 

Yemen, in Iraq were ended, then Iran might not have rationale to 

be intervening as it is. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. I suspect they would find other rationales. 

Mr. Eisenstadt, your thoughts? 

Mr. EISENSTADT. I just want to build on Ken’s comments before 

about Iran and Hezbollah. I agree that we probably can’t separate 

Iran from Hezbollah, but we haven’t increased costs for Iran for its 

involvement in Syria. Our train-and-equip program with the Syrian 

opposition in the past was really not a serious effort. It may be too 

late now for us to mount a serious effort. But I would argue that 

we need to find people among the non-Salafist opposition to arm, 

both in order to ensure that areas where there are ceasefires remain ceasefires—because if the regime is able to build up its 

strength, it won’t keep these ceasefires over time—and in areas 

where there aren’t ceasefires and the regime continues to fight, we 

increase the costs for them and their allies, which includes the Iranians. And if this becomes a long-term quagmire for Iran, which 

this may be something which we don’t have the ability to do now, 

but if we were able to do that, we might also be able to drive a 

wedge between Iran and Russia because I don’t think—Russia has, 

I think, different interests in Syria than the Iranians do. 

But we need to have a cost-imposing strategy in Syria, which we 

have not really tried until now. And I would hope this current administration might consider that going forward. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. I will come to you, Ms. Rosenberg, in a second. 

But, Mr. Eisenstadt, I need you to talk about Hezbollah. Is it fair 

to say that HIFPA, the Hezbollah International Financing Prevention Act, has had an impact on Hezbollah’s ability to act in the region, or are there more things we can do around that as well? 

Mr. EISENSTADT. My understanding is it has had a major impact 

but perhaps not on their ability to act in the region, because I 

think, in terms of prioritizing moneys, from their point of view, 

their activities in Syria and elsewhere is existential, from their 

point of view, and if they have less money for social services and 

to provide for their base, well, in terms of guns and butter, the 

money goes to the guns and not the butter at this point. But in the 

long term, that could have an impact in terms of how their domestic support base looks at them if they can’t benefit from this in the 

future. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Ms. Rosenberg. 

Ms. ROSENBERG. I would just add briefly to that, in addition to 

raising the costs, I think that creating greater leverage for the 

United States and other international allies can be cultivated by 

exposing—further exposing—Iran’s dangerous activities or naked 

violations of arms restrictions, for example. What I am talking 

about here is using sanctions as a means to expose particular violations or circumvention activities, doing more public interdiction of 

weapons for Houthis or to proxies, terrorist proxies, in the Middle 

East, and again through possibly use U.S. force posture and protection in the Middle East by identifying instances where Iran is engaged in threatening behavior, saber rattling in the Gulf and in the 

straits. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Thank you. 

64

With that, my time is all but expired. I will yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Schneider. 

Now, Mr. Connolly of Virginia. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Madam Chairman, and thank you so 

much for pulling this together. 

Wonderful panel. I wish we had lots of time with each one of you 

because I have enjoyed listening to the testimony and watching it. 

I am going to go kind of rapid fire. Bear with me because I only 

have got 5 minutes, and this chairman is tight. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. No, no, no. Take all the time you want. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Ms. Rosenberg, you answered Mr. Deutch’s question about the apparent incompatibility of the Trump administration’s desire for a rapprochement with Russia with Iranian threats. 

You said these don’t need to be inconsistent. And I want to give 

you a chance to explain that because, to me, there is prima facie 

evidence they are inherently inconsistent. I mean, their support for 

Houthis, their support for Hezbollah, their support for Assad: 

These are all goals antithetical to U.S. policy that has not changed 

with the new administration—that I am aware of. 

And what did you mean they don’t need to be inconsistent? How 

could they be otherwise? I am not trying to challenge you. I want 

to give you an opportunity to clarify. 

Ms. ROSENBERG. Sure. What I meant was that on U.S. posture 

toward Russia there could be both cooperation in certain domains 

and a tough pushback in others. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Even where we disagree. 

Ms. ROSENBERG. Correct. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Got it. That is what you meant. 

Ms. ROSENBERG. Yes. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you. 

Dr. Katzman, how important do you believe, in resolving all of 

these issues ultimately—what is going on in Yemen, the civil war 

in Syria, and other tensions in the region; I could go down the 

laundry list—how important, at the end of the day, will diplomacy 

be as part of the solution? 

Mr. KATZMAN. Well, actually——

Mr. CONNOLLY. Could you speak up? 

Mr. KATZMAN. It was tried. After the JCPOA, there was in fact 

an effort to enlist Iran to try to get——

Mr. CONNOLLY. No. I am talking about our diplomacy. 

Mr. KATZMAN. Well, the U.S. tried to—we were talking with the 

Iranians after the JCPOA was finalized to get them to be helpful 

on Syria. It did not succeed. The JCPOA still went forward, but 

that did not succeed because Iran’s interests were just completely 

different. They need Assad there because he is allowing this channel for Iran to support Hezbollah, which is their most cherished 

goal. So the Iranians did not cooperate. We tried diplomacy, and it 

did not succeed in that particular example. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Fair enough. But although that kind of goes back 

to Ms. Rosenberg’s point—we agree on some things; we are going 

to disagree on others—it really depends on what is in—perceived 

national interest. Apparently Iran perceived that a nuclear agreement was in its interests. 

Mr. KATZMAN. They absolutely did. 

65

Mr. CONNOLLY. As did we and the other world powers. 

Mr. KATZMAN. The sanctions drove them into what we here, if it 

had done that much damage to our economy, it was on the line of 

the Great Depression here. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you. Very good point. 

And that allows me to segue to Mr. Eisenstadt, and you can comment as well. How efficacious will sanctions be, can they be, on the 

issue of ballistic missiles and other unacceptable behavior by Iran? 

It seemed to work on the nuclear front. Can it, will it work here? 

Mr. EISENSTADT. I think the case of the nuclear sanctions are 

kind of sui generis at this point. And I think the best we could 

hope for is kind of incremental benefits, disrupting their efforts to 

acquire technology, know-how, and the like, small wins, if you will. 

The JCPOA gave us, if it works as intended, perhaps 15 years of 

respite in which we could use the time to perhaps change Iran’s 

nuclear calculus. With the missiles, it is going to be an ongoing 

kind of thing with small victories at best. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. When you said ‘‘sui generis,’’ part of that is we 

actually had, mirabile dictu, the cooperation of Russia and China 

and France. On ballistic missiles and other behavior, we clearly 

will not. 

Mr. EISENSTADT. Yes. I agree, yes. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Very good point. Either one of you, Ms. Rosenberg or Dr. Katzman, want to comment on that? This is very relevant to us, as the chairman knows, because we are, as we speak, 

looking at additional sanctions legislation. 

Ms. ROSENBERG. Sure. I would add that——

Mr. CONNOLLY. If you can speak into that microphone like Dr. 

Katzman did. 

Ms. ROSENBERG. In addition to sanctions that can and should be 

part of the strategy, I certainly agree that, as a kind of creation 

of leverage or means to cultivate U.S.—for deterrence for Iran, 

these are small by comparison to a conventional deterrence force, 

which underscores the point that sanctions must be part of a 

broader, more holistic strategy of alliance, politics, and operational 

activities, as well as conventional defenses, not to mention cyber 

activity, covert activity. 

And this body, Congress, is well positioned to oversee not just 

sanctions, of course, but other—these other realms as well, particularly force structure and appropriations. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Madam Chairman, if you would just allow Dr. 

Katzman to respond, and then I will yield back. I thank the chair. 

Mr. KATZMAN. I would say that——

Mr. CONNOLLY. You have got to speak into the microphone again, 

Dr. Katzman. 

Mr. KATZMAN. I sort of lost my train of thought. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Sorry. ‘‘I would say,’’ you started to say. 

Mr. KATZMAN. What was the question again? I am sorry. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I think were you about to say, ‘‘I would say that 

was a brilliant question, Congressman Connolly, and God, I wish 

this hearing had been having more like that,’’ something like that. 

No? That wasn’t it. I was trying to help you here. 

Mr. KATZMAN. I mean, I would say sanctions were effective in 

getting the JCPOA because they affected Iran’s core economic—its 

66

economy, its entire civilian economy. To work at the margins, to 

have other sanctions that are only going to nibble at the margins 

of Iran’s economy are not likely to affect Iran’s calculations. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Would you agree with Mr. Eisenstadt that in 

some ways the sanctions with respect to the nuclear development 

program were sui generis? 

Mr. KATZMAN. Yes. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. And, therefore, unlikely to be replicated for anything else? 

Mr. KATZMAN. Well, if the new administration decides that it is 

going to implement the JCPOA, Iran is very clear that if the sanctions that were lifted are reimposed under other justifications, Iran 

is going to walk away from the deal. Iran is very clear on that. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Well, let me just say: There are many of us up 

here who support the JCPOA, who believe fervently the JCPOA is 

working, that, as a matter of fact, the existential threat to Israel 

was denial of JCPOA, not approval, and will not support sanctions 

that encroach on—that we won’t do. I am more than willing to look 

at sanctions in the other venues. But I always worry with respect 

to sanctions about efficacy. And that is why I take what Mr. 

Eisenstadt said seriously. It doesn’t mean don’t do it, but if we are 

going to do it, it can’t just be a feel-good, symbolic kind of thing. 

It has to be toward some end, a change in behavior. And that was 

the nature of my question. 

Mr. KATZMAN. Let me just give you—Iran was exporting 2.6 million barrels a day of oil. When the sanctions kicked in, Iran was 

reduced to 1 million barrels a day, 60 percent decrease. That is 

what caused, that type of diminishment is what caused Iran to 

make a new calculation. Unless you can replicate that, it is going 

to be very difficult to get Iran to make a new calculus. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Excellent point. And we even got nations like 

India to agree—think about this—to reduce Iran as a supplier of 

something they don’t really produce. That is a big hardship. And 

to get that level of cooperation takes a lot of diplomatic and other 

skills. And I take Mr. Eisenstadt’s point: Not so easy to replicate 

that for other things. We can try, but that is going to be a bigger 

challenge. 

Mr. Eisenstadt? 

Mr. EISENSTADT. Can I make just one more point? Also, depending upon how U.S. relations with Russia and China evolve, even if 

Iran was to violate its JCPOA commitments, I am not sure we 

would even be able to snap back sanctions a few years from now. 

The stars all aligned in the last couple years to enable JCPOA and 

the sanctions. And politics might evolve in a certain way that it 

may not be possible in the future even for nuclear violations. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Good point. 

Madam Chairman, you have been very indulgent. And I really 

appreciate it, but I think this is a really important discussion. 

Thank you for putting this together. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. You are right, especially in terms of new legislation that is building up in Congress. 

Thank you, Mr. Connolly, as always. 

And thank you to our witnesses. 

With that, our subcommittee is adjourned. Thank you. 

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[Whereupon, at 3:37 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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