# United States Court of Appeals **For the Eighth Circuit**

___________________________ No. 17-1515

___________________________ United States of America

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee

v.
Kwame Ali Askia

lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant

____________ Appeal from United States District Court for the Western District of Arkansas - El Dorado

____________ Submitted: April 12, 2018 Filed: June 29, 2018

____________ Before GRUENDER, MELLOY, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.

____________ MELLOY, Circuit Judge.

Kwame Ali Askia managed an organization that received federal grant funds to subsidize an after-school program for children. After mi sappropriating over $5,000 of those funds for personal expenditures, Askia was charged on March 6, 2013, with theft concerning programs receiving fede ral funds, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(A). Askia moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that it violated the applicable statute of limitations. Specifically , Askia claimed that the five-year statuteof limitations barred his indictment for o ffenses committed before March 6, 2008, and that his crime was committed before that date. In fact, and complicating the issue, Askia’s alleged criminal conduct straddled this limitations bar; the indictment charged criminal conduct from August 23, 2007, to April 11, 2008. The district court 1 denied Askia’s motion, concluding that the offens e was a “continuing offense,” meaning the crime was not committed until the last date charged in the indictment, and thus the indictment was timely. The district court alternatively held that, even assuming the offense was not a continuing offense and As kia had committed an offense before the limitations bar, the indictment charged a separate § 666(a)(1)(A) offense within the limitations period. The case proceeded to tr ial, and a jury returned a guilty verdict.

On appeal, Askia raises several questi ons, including one of first impression in this circuit: When an offense prohibits unlawfully taking at least $5,000 from an organization receiving federal funds, is that crime “committed” once all elements are established or is the crime continually committed over time?

I.

The United States government, through a grant program known as the “21st Century Community Learning Centers,” provides grant money to subsidize community learning centers, typically for children attending high-poverty, lowperforming schools. The Arkansas Depart ment of Education received grant funds from the 21st Century program and then awarded grants to approved entities.

Askia, the owner of Askia Learning C oncepts, submitted an application on behalf of Askia Learning for a 21st Century grant. The application sought a grant in order to establish a community lear ning center in Arkansas during the 2007–2008

1 The Honorable Susan O. Hickey, United St ates District Judge for the Western District of Arkansas, adopting the report and recommendations of the Honorable Barry A. Bryant, United States Magistrate J udge for the Western District of Arkansas.
-2-school year. The application was approved, and Askia Learning received a grant for $149,280, the full amount requested in the application.

On November 1, 2007, Arkansas Departme nt officials visited Askia Learning’s location and discovered seve ral compliance issues. Bas ed on these issues, the Department ordered Askia Learning to ceas e spending grant funds and to send the Department a current expend iture report with supporting documentation. Department officials then held several meetings withAskia, repeatedly requested documentation, and continually ordered Askia to stop spe nding grant funds. Askia neither supplied the requested documentation nor stopped spending grant funds. On March 27, 2008, the Department sent Askia Learning a letter, terminating the 21st Century grant based on Askia Learning’s failure to comply with grant requireme nts and demanding repayment of most of the grant. After investigating Askia Learning and Askia, the Government identified numerous expenditures where he allegedly misappropriated grant funds for personal expenditures.

On March 6, 2013, more than five year s after Askia Learning received the 21st Century grant, a one-count indictment was returned, charging Askia with a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(A). The indictment specifically charged:

From on or about August 23, 2007, to on or about April 11, 2008, in the Western District of Arkansas, El Dorado Division, the defendant, KWAME ALI ASKIA , being an agent of, Askia Learning Concepts, a for profit organization, said organization receiving in the one year period beginning August 23, 2007, benefits in excess of $10,000 under a 21st Century Community Learning Centers Grant, embezzled, stole, without authority knowingly converted, obt ained by fraud, and intentionally misapplied property worth at leas t $5,000 and owned by and under the care, custody and control of Askia Learning Concepts, that is, grant funds provided for educational serv ices to Strong High School, Strong, Arkansas, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(A).

-3-Askia moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the applicable five-year statute of limitations barred his indictment for offenses committed before March 6, 2008. This date landed towardthe end of the timeline charged in the indictment (i.e., August 23, 2007, to April 11, 2008). At a hearing on the motion, the Government offered proof of seventeen supposedly pers onal expenditures, including at least four occurring after March 6, 2008. Thes e four expenditures totaled $5,503.36.

The district court denied Askia’s motion to dismiss, for two reasons. First, the court concluded that § 666(a)(1)(A) was a “continuing offense” and thus the statute of limitations did not begin to run until th e last date charged, i.e., April 11, 2008, placing the indictment within the limitations period. Second, even assuming § 666(a)(1)(A) was a completed offense and thus the statute of limitations began to run once all elements of the offense were es tablished, the court concluded that the four expenditures after March 6, 2008, established a separate offense within the limitations period.

The case proceeded to trial, where Askia represented himself pro se with standby counsel. Notwithstanding the district court’s earlier alternative ruling that the indictment charged an offense committed af ter March 6, 2008, Askia did not challenge the Government’s evidence of expenditure s before March 6. Askia also did not request a jury instruction or a special verd ict form as to the dates of his alleged misappropriations. A jury then returned a guilty verdict. The sentencing court sentenced Askia to twenty-four months of imprisonment, to be followed by thirty-six months of supervised release, and orde red $148,416 in restitution. Askia timely appealed.

-4-II.

On appeal, Askia raises four challenges regarding: (A) the statute of limitations, (B) evidentiary issues, (C) his due-proce ss rights, and (D) the sufficiency of the evidence.

A.

Askia first asserts that the applicable statute of limitations barred the indictment charging him with violating 18 U.S.C. § 666( a)(1)(A). “This c ourt reviews de novo the denial of a motion to dismiss the indictment.” United States v. Howell , 531 F.3d 621, 622 (8th Cir. 2008).

A statute of limitations for an offens e typically begins to run once it is complete—in other words, once all elements of the offense are established. See Toussie v. United States , 397 U.S. 112, 115 (1970); id. at 124 (White, J., dissenting). Larceny is an easy example. A larceny occurs when a person wrongfully or fraudulently takes another’s property without her permission or consent, and with the intent to permanently deprive the owner of that property. The crime is committed and complete once the last of thes e elements has occurred. That point in time thus starts the clock for a statute of limitations. See United States v. McGoff, 831 F.2d 1071, 1078 (D.C. Cir. 1987).

There is an exception to this general rule, however, for a “continuing offense.” A continuing offense is, simply put, a single crime that continues over time. See Toussie , 397 U.S. at 119; United States v. Yashar , 166 F.3d 873, 875 (7th Cir. 1999); McGoff, 831 F.2d at 1078. “[E]ven after the elements necessary to establish the crime have occurred,” Yashar , 166 F.3d at 875, the same crime is continuously or continually committed over time. Toussie , 397 U.S. at 119–20. A statute of

-5-limitations for a continuing offense thus does not start until the offense “expires.” Conspiracy is a classic continuing offense. The statute of limitations for a conspiracy does not start until the conspiracy expires—fo r example, when either the conspiracy’s unlawful purpose is accomplished or the relevant conspirator withdraws from the conspiracy. See Ashraf v. Lynch , 819 F.3d 1051, 1053 (8th Cir. 2016).

The Supreme Court in Toussie v. United States formulated two prongs for identifying a continuing offense. 397 U.S. at 115. An offense is continuous if either “the explicit language of the substantive criminal statute compels such a conclusion, or the nature of the crime involved is such that Congress must a ssuredly have intended that it be treated as a continuing one.” Id. The Government concedes that § 666(a)(1)(A) is not a continuing offense unde r the first prong, but contends that the offense is a continuing offense under the second prong. 2

The Supreme Court has cautioned courts to apply the continuing-offense doctrine infrequently. “The purpose of a st atute of limitations is to limit exposure to criminal prosecution to a certain fixed period of time following the occurrence of those acts the legislature has decided to punish by criminal sanctions.” Id. at 114. This “limitation is designed to protect i ndividuals from having to defend themselves against charges when the basic facts may have become obscured by the passage of time and to minimize the danger of offici al punishment because of acts in the far-distant past. Such a time limit may also have the salutary effect of encouraging law enforcement officials promptly to inve stigate suspected criminal activity.” Id. at 114–15. Based on these principles, “[t]he te nsion between the purpose of a statute of limitations and the continuing offense doctrine is apparent; the latter, for all practical

2 Yet the Government has conceded in other cases that § 666(a)(1)(A) is not a continuing offense under either prong. See, e.g. , Yashar , 166 F.3d at 876 (“[T]he government agree[s] that § 666 is not a ‘conti nuing offense’ as that term is defined in Toussie .”).

-6-purposes, extends the statute beyond its stated term.” Id. at 115 (alteration in original) (citation omitted). “[T]he doctrine of c ontinuing offenses [therefore] should be applied in only limited circumstances . . . .” Id.

To determine whether an offense is a c ontinuing offense, a court must analyze the language and elements of the offense, rather than the facts alleged or the charge itself. See id. at 116–20 (examining the te xt and legislative history of the offense); Yashar , 166 F.3d at 877 (“[T]he active or passive nature of a defendant’s actions has never been the benchmark of a continuing offense under Toussie . Instead, the focus is on the statutory language.”); United States v. Jaynes , 75 F.3d 1493, 1506 (10th Cir. 1996) (“[A] continuing offense is not the sa me as a scheme or pattern of illegal conduct.”); United States v. Niven , 952 F.2d 289, 293 (9th Cir. 1991) (per curiam) (“As [Toussie ] makes clear, the analysis turns on th e nature of the substantive offense, not on the specific characteristics of the conduct in the case at issue.”), overruled in part on other grounds by United States v. Scarano , 76 F.3d 1471, 1474–77 (9th Cir. 1996); McGoff, 831 F.2d at 1077–78. We thus start with the text of the offense.

Here, Askia was charged with viol ating 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(A), which prohibits unlawfully taking property from an organization receiving federal funds:

(a) Whoever, if the circumstance de scribed in subsection (b) of this section exists—(1) being an agent of an organization . . . (A) embezzles, steals, obtains by fraud, or otherwise without authority knowingly converts to the use of any person other than the rightful owner or intentionally misapplies, property that —(i) is valued at $5,000 or more, and (ii) is owned by, or is under the care, custody, or control of such organization . . . shall be fined unde r this title, imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both.
Subsection (b), in turn, limits the offense’ s scope to an agent of an organization (or of certain governmental bodies) that “recei ves, in any one yearperiod, benefits in

-7-excess of $10,000 under a Federal program involving a grant.” 18 U.S.C. § 666(b). The statute of limitations for this offense is five years. Id. § 3282(a) (“Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, no person shall be pros ecuted, tried, or punished for any offense, not capital, unless the indictment is found or the information is instituted within five years next after su ch offense shall have been committed.”).

The issue of whether § 666(a)(1)(A) is a c ontinuing offense is an issue of first impression in this circuit. Although lar ceny might be an easy example and although embezzlement is similar to larceny, there is a partial circuit split on the issue of whether an embezzlement-type offe nse is a continuing offense.

The Seventh Circuit in United States v. Yashar held that § 666(a)(1)(A) is not a continuing offense and “the offense is committed and the limitations period begins to run once all elements of the offense ar e established, regard less of whether the defendant continues to enga ge in criminal conduct.” 166 F.3d at 879–80. Several district courts have he ld similarly. See, e.g. , United States v. Sunia , 643 F. Supp. 2d 51, 72–75 (D.D.C. 2009); United States v. Donehue , No. C 07-00380 SI, 2008 WL 1900992, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 2008); cf. United States v. Johnson , 145 F. Supp. 3d 862, 871 (D.S.D. 2015) (holding that “e mbezzlement under 18 U.S.C. § 656 is not a continuing offense”); United States v. Jones , 676 F. Supp. 2d 500, 518 (W.D. Tex. 2009) (holding that bribery under 18 U.S.C . § 666(a)(1)(B) is not a continuing offense). But see United States v. Shoemaker , No. 2:11-CR-00038-NBB-DAS, 2012 WL 313620, at *1–2 (N.D. Miss. Feb. 1, 2012) (holding that § 666 is a continuing offense, despite the government concedi ng “that a Section 666 offense is not a continuing offense”).

-8-The Fourth Circuit in United States v. Smithanalyzed a similar embezzlementtype statute, 18 U.S.C. § 641, 3 and held that it was a continuing offense. 373 F.3d 561, 567–68 (4th Cir. 2004) (per curiam). Th ere, the defendant had arranged for his mother’s Social Security benefits to be automatically deposited in his and his mother’s joint account each month, and the defe ndant continued receiving and spending benefits after his mother died. Id. at 563. The Fourth Circuit held that § 641 was a continuing offense because the scheme i nvolved a “recurring, automatic scheme of embezzlement.” Id. at 567. In so holding, the court analyzed not only the language and elements of the offense, but also th e facts and circumstances alleged, which is contrary to our conclusion above that a c ourt must analyze the language and elements of the offense.

We agree with the Seventh Circuit and hold that 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(A) is not a continuing offense. We reach this conclusion for at least four reasons.

3 Section 641 is analogous in all relevant respects here to § 666(a)(1)(A). See Sunia , 643 F. Supp. 2d at 73. Each offense prohibits unlawfully taking property; the offenses differ merely based on the lawful owner or possessor of the property and the property’s value. Section 641 specifically provides: Whoever embezzles, steals, purloins, or knowingly converts to his use or the use of another, or without au thority, sells, conveys or disposes of any record, voucher, money, or thing of value of the United States or of any department or agency thereof, or any property made or being made under contract for the United States or any department or agency thereof; or Whoever receives, conceals, or retains the same with intent to convert it to his use or gain, knowing it to have been embezzled, stolen, purloined or converted—Shall be fi ned under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both; but if the value of such property in the aggregate, combining amounts from all the counts for which the defendant is convicted in a singl e case, does not exceed the sum of $1,000, he shall be fine d under this title or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.

-9-To start, a § 666(a)(1)(A) offense is co mpleted once each element of the offense has occurred. A defendant’s “i nstantaneous events,” Toussie , 397 U.S. at 122—embezzling or stealing property from anorganization receiving federal grant funds—complete the crime. As noted above, it is well established that offenses such as stealing, theft, and larce ny are completed offenses. See McGoff, 831 F.2d at 1078 (“[A] larceny is completed as soon as ther e has been an actual taking of the property of another without consent, with the intent permanently to deprive the owner of its use. The offense does not ‘continue’ ove r time.”). Section 666(a)(1)(A) proscribes those actions, in addition to embezzlement- type actions. But embezzlement is merely a larceny from a position of trust. Even the Fourth Circuit in Smithrecognized that embezzlement “differs from lar ceny [only] in the fact that the original taking of the property was lawful, or with the consen t of the owner.” 373 F.3d at 564. That distinction, however, does not transform emb ezzlement into an offe nse that continues over time. SeeToussie , 397 U.S. at 136 (“[T]he unlawful course of conduct [for a continuing offense] is ‘set on footby a single impulse and operated by an unintermittent force,’ until the ultimate illega l objective is finally attained.” (citation omitted)); United States v. Morales , 11 F.3d 915, 921 (9th Ci r. 1993) (O’Scannlain, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Embezzlement, like larceny, is completed with the unlawful taking.

Second, unlike well-established continui ng offenses—such as conspiracy and unlawful possession—a § 666(a)(1)(A) offe nse “does not ‘continue’ over time.” McGoff, 831 F.2d at 1078. Once the elements ar e established—i.e., an agent of an organization, which receives certain fede ral funds, unlawfully takes at least $5,000 from the organization—the crime is complete. It is not then continuously or continually committed over time, as is the case with conspiracy. SeeToussie , 397 U.S. at 122; Yashar , 166 F.3d at 875. Although the harm to the victim might continue, the crime does not.

-10-Our holding is supported also by the principle that continuing “offenses are not to be implied except in limite d circumstances.” Toussie , 397 U.S. at 121; id. at 115 (reaffirming “the principle that criminal limitations statutes are ‘to be liberally interpreted in favor of repose’” (quoting United States v. Scharton , 285 U.S. 518, 522 (1932))). The Supreme Court in Toussie declared that “the doctrine of continuing offenses should be applied in only limited circumstances since . . . ‘[t]he tension between the purpose of a statute of limitati ons and the continuing offense doctrine is apparent; the latter, for all practical pu rposes, extends the statute beyond its stated term.’” Id. at 115 (alteration in original) (citation omitted). That principle governs here where Congress neither expressly d eclared that § 666(a)(1)(A) is continuing offense, nor clearly implied as such when prescribing the nature of the offense. Congress’s inaction is particularly telling as larceny-type offenses long have been understood as generic, non-continuing offenses. See id. at 120.

Finally, the rationales unde rgirding the statute of limitations further support finding that § 666(a)(1)(A) is not a con tinuing offense. As noted above, this legislatively prescribed limitation not only encourages timely prosecutions when the facts are fresh and recollections collected, but also discourages prosecutions for “acts in the far-distant past.” Id. at 114–15. Those rationales militate against concluding that § 666(a)(1)(A) is a continuing offense, where the statute of limitations gave the Government five years to seek an indictment for the offense, yet the Government failed to obtain an indictment until more than five years after initially discovering Askia’s misconduct.

We therefore hold that 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(A) is not a continuing offense. As such, a defendant may not be char ged for a § 666(a)(1)(A ) offense committed outside the five-year statute of limitations. See 18 U.S.C. § 3282(a).

-11-The question remains, however, whethe r a defendant may be charged for a § 666(a)(1)(A) violation when the charged conduct falls both outsi de and within the limitations period. To prove a § 666(a)(1)(A) offense, th e government must show in part that the defendant stole at least $5,000. To establish this element, the government sometimes may aggregate multiple thefts to satisfy the $5,000 jurisdictional minimum. See United States v. Hines , 541 F.3d 833, 837 (8th Cir. 2008) (holding that § 666 “permits the government to aggregate multiple transactions in a single count to reach the $5,000 minimum as long as they were part of a single plan or scheme”). An issue thus arises—as it does here—when the aggreg ated thefts straddle the limitations bar.

The Seventh Circuit in Yasharimplied that a § 666(a)(1)(A) offense outside the limitations period absolves future § 666(a)(1)(A) offenses committed within the limitations period. See166 F.3d at 879–80 (“[W]e hold that for offenses that are not continuing offenses under Toussie , the offense is committed and the limitations period begins to run once all elements of the offense are established, regardless of whether the defendant continues to engage in criminal conduct .” (emphasis added)). The Yasharcourt thus remanded to the district court to determine whether “all elements of the crime were met [outside the limitati ons period], such that the government could have proceeded with criminal charges prior to that date”; if so, “then the indictment in th[e] case was not timely.” Id. at 880.

We disagree with that position. If, as we have decided, each § 666(a)(1)(A) violation is a separate criminal offense, and not a continuing violation, we see no reason why those violations that occurred within the statute of limitations cannot be prosecuted. We see nothing in criminal la w that would prevent the prosecution of an individual who commits a series of thefts or embezzlements (which, by their nature, are crimes of concealment) over a number of years from being prosecuted for those crimes that occurred withinthe limitations period, just because a few of the embezzlements or thefts occurred outside th e five years. The government is precluded

-12-from prosecuting the violations committed more th an five years prior to the date of the indictment, but, would be free to charge and prosecute any § 666(a)(1)(A) violations committed within the limitations period.

At the motion-to-dismiss hearing here, the Government introduced evidence of seventeen supposedly personal expenditures. The district court found that four of those expenditures occurred within the limitations period a nd equaled over $5,000. Those four expenditures independently s upported a separate § 666(a)(1)(A) offense, and nothing could bar the Government from charging those expenditures as a § 666(a)(1)(A) violation. SeeSmith , 373 F.3d at 570 (Michael, J., dissenting) (“The record indicates that some of [the de fendant]’s conduct [allege dly in violation of § 641] occurred within the applicable limitations period . . . . The government would be able to obtain a superseding indi ctment charging that conduct.”); Jaynes , 75 F.3d at 1507 (“[The defendant] could be convicted of the offenses charged in counts one and two if she forged or pa ssed any Treasury checks within five years of the date of the indictment, even if some of the alleged acts of forg ery and passing forged checks would be barred by the statut e of limitations.”); Morales , 11 F.3d at 922 (O’Scannlain, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part ) (“When an official engages in an ongoing pattern of seeking and receiving bribes fro m a single source . . . that does not mean that he is guilty of a ‘continuing’ violation . . . (or, for that matter, a series of such ‘continuing’ violations). Instead, [the defendant] could have been charged for each discrete, individual . . . violation he committe d . . . .”). The indictment did not specify the precise expenditures supporting the offense, and the four post-March 6 expenditures supported an offense committed within the limitations period. See United States v. Fleming , 8 F.3d 1264, 1265 (8th Cir. 1993) (“An indictment will ordinarily be held sufficient unless it is so defective that it cannot be said, by any reasonable construction, to charge th e offense for which the defendant was convicted.”). The district court therefore properly denied Askia’s motion to dismiss the indictment.

-13-Based on the district court’s errone ous ruling that § 666(a)(1)(A) was a continuing offense, the Government at trial introduced evidence of Askia’s personal expenditures outside the limitations peri od. The Government also introduced evidence of expenditures within the limitations period, tota ling over $5,000. As noted above, at trial Askia did not challenge th e evidence on the expenditures outside the limitations period through, for example, a motion in limine . Nor did he request a jury instruction or a special verdict form as to which expenditures (i.e., those pre- or postMarch 6) supported his conviction. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 30–31. Now, however, Askia appears to contest the jury’s consid eration of the outside-the-limitations-period expenditures. Because Askia did not challenge this evidence at trial, we review the evidentiary challenge fo r plain error. Seeid. 52(b) (standard of review); United States v. Olano , 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993). A court of appeals has the discretion to correct an error only if there is “an ‘error’ that is ‘p lain’ and that ‘affect[s] substantial rights.’” Olano , 507 U.S. at 732 (alteration in original). The court “should not exercise that discretion[, however,] unless the error seri ously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. (second alteration inoriginal) (citation omitted).

Here, even assuming the admission of the pre-March 6 evidence was plain error, Askia has not shown that the suppos ed error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. See id. As discussed above, the jury received evidence of numerous expe nditures within the limitations period that were allegedly for pe rsonal reasons and that these expenditures tota led over $5,000. Viewing the evidence in the light most fa vorable to the jury’s verdict, these transactions established that Askia unlaw fully took, for his ow n personal use, over $5,000 from Askia Learning. Because this evidence supports a finding that Askia

-14-violated § 666(a)(1)(A) within the statut e of limitations, the purported error did not seriously affect the judicial proceeding’ s fairness, integrity, or public reputation. 4

B.

Askia next complains that the Governme nt submitted, to the grand jury and at trial, a document falsely purporting to be Askia Learning’s application for the 21st Century grant. The application admitted into evidence was marked as “Exhibit 4,” and Askia contends that Exhibit 4 was not his true grant application.

Even assuming Askia properly objected to this evidence, he has not shown that the district court abused its discretion inadmitting Exhibit 4 into evidence. See United States v. Big Eagle , 702 F.3d 1125, 1130 (8th Cir. 2013) (standard of review). The purported differences between Exhibit 4 and the document that Askia claimed to be his “true” application include omitted pa ge numbers, date stamps, and an appendix, as well as different formatting. The most significant difference between the documents, it appears, is the documents’ budgetary allocations (allocating the amounts that Askia Learning could spend on certain e xpenses). Askia has not shown, however, how those purported differences were relevant to the questi on at trial, i.e., whether Askia misappropriated federal grant funds for his personal expenditures. Askia therefore has not demonstrated that the district court abused its discretion in admitting Exhibit 4 into evidence.

4 Askia also argues that the personal expe nditures were withdrawals of personal funds he had commingled with the gran t funds in Askia Learning’s bank account. This circuit, however, has rejected th e argument that the government must trace personal expenditures direc tly to federal grant funds when a defendant has commingled federal grant funds withhis own personal funds. Hines , 541 F.3d at 836.

-15-Moving on, Askia appears to argue that the Government violated his Sixth Amendment rights by not introducing into evid ence the document he claims to be the
true 21st Century grant application. He also suggests that the district court violated his rights by not sua sponte holding a hearing to determine which document was the real application. Askia nevertheless c oncedes there was no violation of Brady v. Maryland , 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (holding that “the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon re quest violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecuti on”). Although his arguments are not entirely clear, we conclude they are meritless. Askia had ample opportunities at trial to introduce his version of the application into evidence and to challenge the validity of Exhibit 4. His own failures did not create Sixth Amendmen t violations by the Government or the district court.

Finally, Askia contends that the district court should have dismissed the indictment because the Government gave th e grand jury a copy of Exhibit 4 (before being marked as such). As kia did not file a motion to dismiss the indictment based on this supposedly false application. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(3)(A)(v). Because Askia did not file such motion before trial, he must show good cause for this failure. See id. 12(c)(3); United States v. Green , 691 F.3d 960, 963 (8th Cir. 2012). He has not done so, and therefore his argument is untimely. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(c)(3).

C.

Askia next claims that his due-proce ss rights under the Fourteenth Amendment were violated at a pretrial hearing b ecause the Government presented hearsay evidence rather than giving Askia the opportun ity to confront an adverse witness who was the source of that evidence. Speci fically, after Askia allegedly violated conditions of his pretrial release, the Government petitioned to detain him pending

-16-trial. At a hearing on that petition, the Government elicited testimony from a probation officer about the alleged pretrial violations, detailed ina “violation report.” The testifying officer, however, had not prep ared the report. The Government did not call as a witness the officer who actually had prepared the report. Askia contends that the Government’s reliance on the hearsay testimony of the probation officer who had not prepared the violation report was a viol ation of Askia’s due-process rights. For this contention, Askia relies on Morrisey v. Brewer , 408 U.S. 471, 477 (1972).

Even assuming there was such a violation, however, this issue is moot. Federal courts may adjudicate only “ actual and concrete disputes , the resolutions of which have direct consequences on the partie s involved.” Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk , 569 U.S. 66, 71 (2013). “If an inte rvening circumstance deprives the plaintiff of a ‘personal stake in the outco me of the lawsuit,’ at any point during litigation, the action can no longer proceed and must be dismissed as moot.” Id. at 72 (citation omitted). The resolution of the i ssue in this appeal—whether there was a violation of Askia’s constitutional rights at the pretrial detention hearing—will have no direct consequence on Askia now. His pretrial detention has c oncluded (and he has already been released after serving his sentence). SeeUnited States v. Sanchez–Gomez , 138 S. Ct. 1532, 1540 (2018) (concluding that the defendants’ challenges to their pretrial detentions were moot because they were “no longer in pretrial custody”).

Relatedly, Askia argues that his pretrial detention hindered his and his stand-by counsel’s abilities to obtain evidence, lo cate witnesses, and prepare for trial. In support of this argument, Askia relies primarily on Barker v. Wingo , 407 U.S. 514 (1972), which deals with the Sixth Amendmen t right to a speedy trial. Under Barker , a defendant must show “serious prejudi ce” resulting from a constitutional violation. Id. at 534. But Askia has not shown how he suffered serious pr ejudice here, besides his conclusory claim that his trial prepar ation was hindered. Askia also fails to

-17-explain how his stand-by counsel—who claims to have met with Askia “daily”—was unable to pursue these possi ble sources of evidence.

D.

Askia’s last argument is that the eviden ce at trial was insufficient to support his conviction. “We review the sufficiency of the evidence de novo, viewing evidence in the light most favorable to the governme nt, resolving conflicts in the government’s favor, and accepting all reasonable inferences that support the verdict.” United States v. Washington , 318 F.3d 845, 852 (8th Cir. 2003). The evidence showed that Askia was an agent of Askia Learning; that, in a one-year period, Askia Learning received a federal grant valued over $10,000; that Askia deposited those grant funds into Askia Learning’s account; that he withdrew funds several times for personal expenditures; and that these expenditures totaled at leas t $5,000. These facts more than sufficiently support Askia’s conviction. See 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(A). 5

III.

The judgment of the district court is affirmed. 6

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5 Askia presents several other arguments on the above issues and others. We have reviewed these arguments and conclude they are meritless. See8th Cir. Rule 47B.

6 Askia’s and the Government’s motions to supplement the r ecord are denied. The Government’s motion to strike is dismissed as moot.

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