Michael Moodie, Cheryl Loeb, Robert Armstrong, and Helen Purkitt 

 

 

 

 

 

Center for Technology and National Security Policy 

National Defense University

September 2008 

Good Bugs, Bad Bugs:

A Modern Approach for Detecting

Offensive Biological Weapons Research
ii

The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not reflect the official 

policy or position of the National Defense University, the Department of Defense or the 

U.S. Government. All information and sources for this paper were drawn from 

unclassified materials. 

Robert Armstrong (1948–2008) was a Senior Research Fellow with the Center for 

Technology and National Security Policy (CTNSP) at the National Defense University. 

He held a B.A. degree in psychology from Wabash College and an M.A. in experimental 

psychology from Oxford University, as well as an M.S. in biology and a Ph.D. in plant 

breeding and genetics, both from Purdue University. Dr. Armstrong retired as a chemical 

corps colonel in the U.S. Army Reserve. He held a variety of positions in both the 

National Guard and Army Reserve and was a graduate of numerous Army schools, 

including the Army War College. His last military assignment was as the commander of a 

separate chemical brigade. Prior to joining CTNSP, Dr. Armstrong served as a life 

sciences intelligence officer with the Central Intelligence Agency, where his work 

included analytical projects involving biological and chemical warfare. 

Cheryl Loeb is a Research Associate at CTNSP and a Ph.D. candidate in the Biodefense 

Program at George Mason University. Prior to joining CTNSP, she was a Research 

Associate in the D.C. office of the Monterey Institute of International Studies, Center for 

Nonproliferation Studies. Ms. Loeb may be contacted via e-mail at loebc@ndu.edu or by 

phone at (202) 685-2397. 

Michael Moodie is a consultant to CTNSP who has worked for more than 15 years on 

chemical and biological weapons issues in government and the policy research 

community. He headed the Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute and served as 

assistant director for multilateral affairs at the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament 

Agency. 

Helen Purkitt is a Professor of Political Science at the U.S. Naval Academy. After 

earning a Ph.D. at the University of Southern California, she joined the Political Science 

faculty at Texas Tech University, where she was the Director of the International 

Relations Graduate Program. She has also worked as an analyst for the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense-African Affairs and served as a co-principal investigator for an 

experimental study of political decisionmaking funded by the National Science 

Foundation. She has served as editor for fifteen volumes of Dushkin/McGraw-Hill's 

Annual Editions: World Politics and has published several articles in social science 

journals. 

Defense & Technology Papers are published by the National Defense University Center for Technology 

and National Security Policy, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, DC. CTNSP publications are available 

online at http://www.ndu.edu/ctnsp/publications.html. 
iii

Contents 

Executive Summary.........................................................................................................................v 

Introduction......................................................................................................................................1 

A New Environment ........................................................................................................................4 

Implications of a Changing Environment......................................................................................11 

Indicators to Monitor BW Trends Worldwide...............................................................................17 

 Known Chemical and Nuclear Weapons Programs..............................................................18 

 Number and Level of BSL 3-4 Facilities..............................................................................20

 Sophistication of Civilian Domestic Biotechnology Capabilities ........................................22 

 Known Manufacture of Rare or Unusual Biological Compounds........................................24 

 Mismatch Between Number of Trained Scientists and Positions Available ........................25 

 Level of Business Transparency ...........................................................................................27 

 Number of Publications Compared to Number of Scientists................................................27 

 Complexity of Social Networking Among Scientists...........................................................28 

 

Conclusion .....................................................................................................................................29 
iv
v

Executive Summary 

Monitoring covert offensive biological weapons research from afar has always been a 

daunting task. The problems facing analysts today are even more difficult, as advances in 

life sciences and dual-use biotechnology are rapidly spreading the knowledge, equipment, 

and materials needed to produce crude and sophisticated biological weapons around the 

world. Unlike nuclear programs, a well-defined and limited set of equipment and material 

that can be controlled through various import/export controls does not exist. Future 

monitoring will become more challenging as the distinctions among military, civilian and 

dual-use research and applications continue to blur. Managing proliferation risks in this 

environment will constitute the greatest challenge to policymakers in the biological 

weapons arena over the next two decades. 

One of the factors that make this new type of analysis challenging is that nearly every 

nation-state in the world today has some level of biodefense and biotechnology 

capability. Most government decisionmakers and planners view the life sciences as 

promising drivers fueling future economic growth. These common trends serve to create 

a lot of “noise” that makes it much more difficult than even a few years ago to identify 

signs of covert biological weapons research and development. 

The major requirements for dealing successfully with biological challenges today, 

therefore, are to shape a new conceptual framework and analytical approach sophisticated 

and rich enough to capture current complexities and dynamics, and to create new policy 

tools that, taken together, improve the international community’s ability to drive 

biological risks to the lowest possible levels. The search for good indicators of malicious 

intent, destructive capabilities, or a combination of the two, therefore, must continue. 

Such indicators need not provide evidence of a “smoking gun.” Rather, they should be 

used to generate sufficient concern so that policymakers and analysts can pay closer 

attention to a given situation, intensify their scrutiny, attempt to prevent surprises, and 

mobilize the international community to address a gathering problem. 

This report outlines a new framework to monitor countries in terms of their potential to 

engage in covert biological weapons research. This is an effort to develop an indirect 

approach to measuring a nation's capability to conduct offensive weapons research in 

both civilian and government or military settings. This report discusses eight possible 

indicators of illicit biological weapons activities. Through analyzing these indicators, one 

can indirectly identify areas of possible illicit BW activity. These indicators include: 

• Known chemical or nuclear programs, 

• Number and level of BSL 3-4 facilities in a country, 

• Sophistication of civilian domestic biotechnology capabilities, 

• Known manufacture of rare or unusual biological compounds, 

• Mismatch between number of trained scientists and positions available, 

• Level of business transparency, 

• Number of publications compared to number of scientists, and 
vi

• Complexity of social networking among scientists (both domestically and with 

scientists from other countries). 

While not a panacea for monitoring all types of biological proliferation threats, the 

framework may serve as a guide for government and industry analysts for the type of 

information that needs to be collected and assessed to make more informed judgments 

about the likelihood that a particular state is engaging in illicit biological weapons 

research. 
1

Introduction 

At the 2006 Sixth Review Conference of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention 

(BWC), Assistant Secretary of State for International Security and Nonproliferation John 

Rood argued that, 

[f]undamental to the success of the BWC and its goal of ridding the world of 

biological weapons is full and effective compliance by all States Parties. 

Noncompliance with the central obligation of the BWC poses a direct threat to 

international peace and security, and compliance concerns must be pursued 

vigorously...Noncompliance with the fundamental requirement not to develop 

biological weapons is of paramount concern. It would be irresponsible to 

strengthen the superstructure of the Convention and yet turn a blind eye to 

problems with the foundation itself. 

He then went on to state publicly that the United States believed that Iran and North 

Korea probably had illegal offensive biological weapons programs (a charge immediately 

and vehemently denied by Iran), and to raise concerns about Syria’s research and 

development for an offensive program as well. Secretary Rood concluded his 

observations on compliance by noting that the United States understands that the problem 

of noncompliance with the BWC is difficult, but that it must be faced head-on: “The 

international community must remain vigilant and steadfast, and root out violators that 

undermine the integrity of the Convention.”1

The issue of identifying illicit efforts to pursue biological weapons has bedeviled the 

international community since it first began to worry about such capabilities almost a 

century ago. The problem has taken its most concrete form in the inability to verify 

compliance with the BWC, which was negotiated in the early 1970s and entered into 

force in 1975. From the beginning of the negotiations of the BWC, the United States 

argued that the agreement was not verifiable and that it knew of no way to make it so at 

an acceptable political, economic, or security cost. Although the Clinton administration 

took a somewhat different view, that position has largely characterized U.S. policy for 

most of the last three decades. 

The challenge of verifying compliance has been a contentious issue among BWC States 

Parties, and it has been the object of often intense debate over the last thirty years. The 

most recent attempt to address the problem—the seven-year effort of the Ad Hoc Group 

(AHG) to negotiate a legally binding verification protocol to the BWC—collapsed in 

2001 with the U.S. rejection of the draft protocol tabled by the AHG chairman. The 

process ended with hard feelings and bruised sensitivities, and no mechanism to ensure 

compliance with treaty obligations or identify noncompliant behavior. 

 

1

 John C. Rood, Assistant Secretary of State for International Security and Nonproliferation, “United States 

of America Address to the Sixth Biological Weapons Convention Review Conference,” Geneva, 

Switzerland, November 20, 2006. 
2

The problem of verifying compliance with the BWC and identifying BW-related activity 

has been further complicated by two developments that, while ongoing for some time, 

have been thrown into sharper relief in recent years. First, the underlying life sciences 

and associated technologies are advancing at an incredible pace, propelled by strong 

legitimate scientific, health, and commercial interests. At the same time, this knowledge 

and related technology is diffusing widely around the world. 

Second, the emergence of non-state actors, especially terrorists, with interest in biological 

weapons capabilities (among others) presents a new dimension to the challenge. The 

identification of large, military-oriented, state-sponsored BW programs has been difficult 

enough. Terrorists bring to their cost/benefit calculations regarding potential biological 

weapons capabilities different motivations and objectives, non-military standards of 

desired or needed operational effectiveness, and a wider range of possible options and 

targets for BW attacks. All of these factors mean that terrorists are likely to take a 

different approach to development and use of biological weapons, providing a 

significantly altered profile from that of possible state programs that is even harder to 

identify with any degree of certainty. 

While the task is enormously difficult, it would nevertheless be irresponsible for 

policymakers or analysts to abandon efforts to find ways to detect illicit BW-related 

activity, whether by states or terrorists. After all, such behavior at times has been 

identified. The United States, for example, charged the Soviet Union with noncompliance 

with the BWC for over a decade, charges that were acknowledged in 1992 by then 

Russian President Boris Yeltsin to be correct (although the United States was surprised 

by how right it was in terms of the size and scope of the program). The United States did 

not use treaty-designated means to make its determination because there were none, and 

most other BWC States Parties were reluctant to support Washington’s contentions (one 

exception was Britain which had access to the same defector sources as the United 

States), demonstrating that dealing with issues of noncompliance are as much about 

politics as they are about evidentiary and technical issues. 

More importantly, meeting the challenge of biological capabilities in the hands of states 

or terrorists cannot be successful through preparedness alone. Prevention is also 

necessary, and prevention entails doing everything possible to identify potentially 

harmful activities before any harm occurs. 

The search for good indicators of malicious intent, destructive capabilities, or a 

combination of the two, therefore, must continue. Such indicators need not provide a 

smoking gun, which is highly unlikely to be found in any case. Rather, they should 

generate sufficient concern so that policymakers and analysts can pay closer attention to a 

situation, intensify their scrutiny, attempt to prevent surprises, and mobilize the 

international community to address a gathering problem. 

Meeting the challenge of identifying and dealing effectively with an illicit biological 

weapons program, however, demands an appreciation of how much the world has been 

transformed. Changes since the BWC was negotiated have altered the contours of the 
3

problem, and old paradigms and templates are no longer adequate to capture either the 

dynamics or complexity of the current situation. Change has also thrown into question the 

continuing utility and relevance of several of the traditional tools on which policymakers 

have depended to address the biological weapons issue. The major requirements for 

dealing successfully with biological challenges today, therefore, are to shape a new 

conceptual framework and analytical approach sophisticated and rich enough to capture 

current complexities and dynamics, and to create new policy tools which, taken together, 

improve the international community’s ability to drive biological risks to their lowest 

possible levels. 

This report will first discuss the complexities and issues surrounding biological weapons 

proliferation and then will discuss eight indicators of biological weapons development 

activities. These indicators are part of a new framework to monitor countries in terms of 

their potential to engage in covert biological weapons research. In the life sciences in 

particular, a legitimate business may mask prohibited research, be exploited to advance 

illegitimate efforts, or be integrated with other activities, which, seemingly innocent in 

isolation, when combined move an actor closer to a dangerous capability. 
4

A New Environment 

New thinking about the biological warfare challenge begins with understanding the 

evolving environment in which that challenge emerges and the changes that have 

occurred. Several characteristics of that new environment should be highlighted. 

First is the rapid advance of the life sciences and associated technologies. What is known 

about life today—especially at the molecular level—is vastly greater than it was even ten 

years ago, and substantially less than what will be known a decade hence. Not only is it 

the nature of the discoveries that are remarkable, but the speed at which they are 

occurring. Many areas of the life sciences are moving forward at a rate faster than the 

frequently cited Moore’s Law in information technology.2 This explosion in knowledge is 

prompting significant growth in the number of legitimate applications in health, 

agriculture, the environment, and many other areas. These rapid advances are, in the eyes 

of many commentators, so profound that they are producing a “revolution” in the life 

sciences, so much so that they are hailing the 21st century as the “century of biology.” 

This development is important for security as it relates to the process of scientific 

innovation and discovery. A recent study by the National Academy of Sciences Institute 

of Medicine and National Research Council stresses that progress in science is rarely a 

linear process but is marked by serendipitous discoveries and developments. These 

innovations and unexpected discoveries yield sudden and occasionally dramatic changes 

with important impacts. Sometimes those implications are to combine progressive 

increases in performance and continually declining costs to push rapid technological 

growth. At other times, they result in a fundamental paradigm shift that alters the 

fundamental outlook of the entire scientific enterprise. The impact is to produce results 

that are unanticipated, unexpected, and even unknowable.3 If such developments were to 

occur in areas with security implications, the results could be unwelcome surprises for 

which policymakers are unprepared. 

Innovation beyond the scientific process is also important, particularly innovation in the 

use of technology in which scientific knowledge is embedded. Technology innovation 

can also yield surprise, that is, employment of technology in new ways or according to 

new concepts of operation. That technology need not be at the cutting edge, but could 

also be “sidewise technology,” or older technology whose use is innovative with respect 

to processes, areas of application, or in hitherto unforeseen combinations.4 The important 

point is that devastating harm need not come only from state-of-the-art biotechnology or 

 

2

 Robert Carlson, “The Pace and Proliferation of Biological Technologies,” Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: 

Biodefense Strategy, Practice, and Science, 1, no. 3, 2003, 7. 3

 Institute of Medicine/National Research Council, Globalization, Biosecurity, and the Future of the Life 

Sciences (Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 2006). 4

 The term is Paul Bracken’s. See Paul Bracken, “Sidewise Technologies: National Security and Global 

Power Implications,” in Technology Futures, and Global Power, Wealth, and Conflict, edited by Anne 

G.K. Solomon, A Report of the Project on Technology Futures and Global Power, Wealth, and Conflict, 

Center for Strategic and International Studies, May 2005, 91–100. 
5

techniques, but that even modest levels of capability can, especially if used in unexpected 

ways, foster considerable damage. 

In the current environment, key scientific advances are rarely reported by individual 

scientists or companies, but by teams of collaborators. At the level of the firm, one of the 

key characteristics to have emerged is increasing specialization; it is hard to be successful 

if a company seeks to go it alone and do everything on its own. The same is true for 

research scientists. Therefore, alliances, partnerships, and other forms of collaboration are 

increasingly important. The number of technical cooperation agreements in 

biotechnology, for example, grew from near zero in 1970 to almost 700 in 1985 to 1989.5

More and more of those cooperative relationships, whether they are among companies or 

scientists, are occurring across international borders. Myriad examples could be cited: 

Cuba has technical agreements with fourteen countries, including Algeria, Brazil, China, 

India, Iran, Malaysia, Mexico, and Tunisia; a trilateral forum with Brazil, India, and 

South Africa fosters dialogue on critical biotechnology issues;6 the Economic 

Cooperation Organization, created initially by Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan, and extended 

to a number of other central Asian states, is creating an Agricultural Biotechnology 

Network hosted by Iran;7

 and the South African Bioinformatics Initiative not only seeks 

to connect researchers at national universities, government facilities, and startup private 

biotechnology firms, but to provide access to state-of-the-art bioinformatics throughout 

the African continent.8

This development reflects the second major trend shaping the new global security 

environment—the global diffusion of life sciences knowledge and technology. Many 

countries around the world see the life sciences and their commercialization as a key 

driver of future economic growth. As a result, they are investing heavily both in 

promoting indigenous development of such capabilities and attracting foreign life 

sciences research and commercial enterprises. China and India in particular have been 

identified as likely biotechnology leaders in the years to come, but many other countries 

outside the developed world, including Singapore, Malaysia, South Korea, Cuba, Brazil, 

and South Africa, are also committed to promoting commercial life sciences enterprises. 

The impact of this trend was summarized by Robert Erwin, CEO of the Large-Scale 

Biology Corporation, who argues that in this new environment, “Everything will be 

cheaper, faster, and in the hands of a vastly larger number of people who are competent 

to use it.”9

 The result is that a breakthrough in the life sciences or related technology—

 

5

 NAS, Globalization, 82. 6

 “Science and Technology Minister Discusses Nuclear, Space, and Other Priorities,” Open Source Center, 

original published in Brasilia InfoReal in Portuguese, April 6, 2006. 7

 “Experts Meet in Tehran for Establishment of ECO Agricultural Biotechnology Network,” Islamic 

Republic News Agency, April 25, 2006. 

8

 Helen E. Purkitt, Biowarfare Lessons, Emerging Biosecurity Issues, and Ways to Monitor Dual-Use 

Biotechnology Trends in the Future, U.S. Air Force Institute for National Security Studies, INSS 

Occasional Paper 61, September 2005, 40–41. 9

 Quoted in Gerald Epstein, Global Evolution of Dual-Use Biotechnology, A Report of the Project on 

Technology Futures and Global Power, Wealth, and Conflict, Center for Strategic and International 

Studies, April 2005. 
6

possibly one with important security implications—could come from virtually anywhere 

in the world. 

This expansion of life sciences and biotechnology capabilities around the world is the 

product of many factors: national decisions to make biotechnology an important driver of 

future economic development; relatively low costs of materials, equipment, facilities, and 

labor; growing use of cooperative agreements and other forms of international 

cooperation; and long- and short-term exchanges of life scientists. The important impact 

of these trends is that they contribute to a “deterritorialization” of life sciences 

technology development, application, and dissemination, making it almost impossible for 

any single government to exert control over commercial operations and activities. 

The third key factor influencing the security environment in which the biological 

challenge must now be addressed is the decreasing significance of material and 

equipment and the increasing importance of knowledge. In this regard, the biological 

challenge stands in stark contrast to its nuclear counterpart. For nuclear proliferation to be 

successful, a proliferator—whether a state or non-state actor—must acquire weapons 

grade nuclear material. Hence, preventing such acquisition and securing access to nuclear 

materials remains a cornerstone of nuclear nonproliferation efforts. In the biological 

realm, however, access to materials and equipment is not a problem. Some traditional 

BW agents, such as anthrax and plague, are still found in nature. Increasingly, biological 

agents can also by synthesized from scratch in a laboratory as their genomes are 

identified. Moreover, the prospect has been widely reported that, as science continues to 

advance, new pathogens and other kinds of biological weapons, e.g., those affecting the 

body’s natural bioregulators and thereby influencing human behavior, could be 

developed in the future. 

At the same time, the spread of the relevant science and technology and its 

commoditization through biotechnology make available most of the equipment needed to 

formulate a biological agent. Even technology related to delivery of the agent—generally 

considered the most difficult aspect of developing an effective biological weapon—is 

increasingly widespread, as, for example, commercial efforts move forward to improve 

the aerosolization of agents for better drug delivery. 

In an environment of virtually ubiquitous material and equipment, then, the key factors 

for proliferation become knowledge, the people who have that knowledge, and what they 

choose to do with it. From a scientific point of view, knowledge may be important for its 

own sake, but in the security realm its broader utility depends on how it is used. It is 

applied knowledge that is the source of leverage and influence. As more is known about 

the life sciences and the more that knowledge can be applied, the greater its potential 

impact. Indeed, biotechnology is one of the most knowledge-intensive activities in the 

contemporary global economy. A paper by the Organization for Economic Cooperation 

and Development (OECD), for example, argues that “knowledge churn” has become the 

motor for advances in the biosciences.10

 

10 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, “The Bioeconomy to 2030: Designing a 

Policy Agenda,” (Paris: OECD Futures Program, 2006), 5. 
7

But science and technology are neutral; they can be used for beneficial or malevolent 

ends. The key is what the user chooses to do. If one opts for proliferation, greater 

knowledge will allow entry higher on the proliferation learning curve, make that curve 

less steep, and reduce the costs of making further advances. 

Social network analysis has identified tacit knowledge—knowledge that can be gained 

only by doing, by trial and error—as especially important. In the context of BW 

proliferation, this insight has been reinforced by work done with BW scientists in the 

former Soviet Union. In the short-term, this reality may relieve some anxiety regarding 

biological proliferation, because the number of biological weaponeers—whether from the 

former Soviet Union, South Africa, or Iraq—is relatively small. Over the longer-term, 

however, it provides little comfort in the face of the declining scientific and technical 

barriers to proliferation made possible by advancing science and related technology, and 

by the number of life scientists, biotechnologists, and other experts in related work (even 

if not for proliferation purposes) around the globe. 

This leads to the fourth factor making the security landscape related to biological 

proliferation more complex: the growth in the number and variety of potential players in 

the proliferation arena. Reflecting its global diffusion, the work force involved in the life 

sciences and biotechnology is growing both in terms of highly trained scientists and 

increasingly important, but less well trained, technicians.11 Moreover, those workers are 

ever more mobile. A growing, increasingly capable, and highly mobile work force with 

elements of the critical knowledge needed for BW proliferation is a prospect that must 

cause severe headaches for nonproliferation officials, especially those seeking to discover 

noncompliance with treaty-based obligations. This is not to argue that members of this 

life sciences work force are likely proliferators. Far from it; the vast majority certainly 

are committed to the beneficent use of the life sciences to improve the human condition. 

But if knowledge is now the core of a BW proliferation program, it is the people with that 

knowledge who are key, and the statistical reality is that as the number of people with the 

necessary knowledge grows, the risk also goes up that someone will decide to use that 

knowledge for malevolent purposes. Moreover, managing the risks associated with this 

“people dimension” of the challenge is something with which policymakers have very 

little experience. 

A further complication related to the issue of potential proliferation players is the fact that 

proliferation is not just the province of governments and terrorists or the scientists and 

technologists they might recruit. The problem now encompasses many more potential 

kinds of actors, as was well demonstrated in the nuclear realm by the activities of A.Q. 

Khan and his cohorts. Those who might now be involved in proliferation as providers, 

users, or facilitators include proliferation “entrepreneurs,” rogue scientists, organized 

 

11 In the United States alone, industrial demand for skilled biotechnology workers has increased 14 to 17 

percent per year for the last decade, with many workers coming from overseas. See, E.D. Sevier and A.S. 

Dahms, “The Role of Foreign Worker Scientists in the U.S. Biotechnology Sector,” Nature Biotechnology, 

20, no. 9, 2002, 955–956. 
8

criminal groups, financiers, logisticians, ethnic separatists, tribes or other entities engaged 

in communal conflict, front companies, and multinational corporations. 

It is not just the number and variety of possible participants in the proliferation process 

that is important to understand, but also the nature of their interactions. Traditionally, 

proliferation has been a top-down process initiated by a government interested in 

acquiring a specific capability. Today, the process is much more free-form. The operation 

of formal or informal networks is particularly important in this regard. The emergence of 

networks is one of the key factors empowering the wide array of potential proliferation 

players, and it has facilitated the flow and exchange of materials, equipment, and 

knowledge. In the past, because they existed at different levels or were geographically 

disparate, the nodes in many of these networks were isolated from one another. 

Moreover, they were without access or influence. 

New technology has now made possible a mode of operation supported by a global 

infrastructure that changes all that. The impact of the growth and diversity of networks is 

to increase the number of channels within and among society through which action can 

be taken and influence exerted. More and more, these new and increasingly empowered 

networked non-state actors are able to express their singular interests through the tools 

and channels globalization provides. The point has been made with respect to business, 

but it is applicable to many other non-state actors, as well, that globalization is allowing 

them to operate beyond the control of any single government.12 The result is that even 

relatively weak actors can have disproportionate impact. 

Networks are decentralized and distributed, and their hallmarks are flexibility, 

adaptability, and resilience, the same factors that are likely to exacerbate the difficulties 

confronting those responsible for countering proliferation. The challenge of identifying 

illicit, noncompliant behavior in the face of networked activity among proliferation actors 

is especially difficult. The existence of increasingly complex global networks 

complicates management of the security challenge, because the significant and growing 

numbers of transactions among an increasingly diverse set of actors make it more 

difficult to identify transactions of concern. This is a problem in which, as bioterrorism 

expert Randy Murch has elaborated, the signs that would portend such a development are 

small, often unrecognizable, imperceptible and evolving signals in a vastly greater, more 

complex dynamic of naturally occurring and man-made noise which represents the 

advance of legitimate biology-related science and commerce. 

A final factor defining the current environment relates to industrial processes that are 

being significantly revised by globalization. Globalization is changing the way individual 

facilities and broad industries do business. At the facility level, technology has increased 

the level of automation, thereby reducing the personnel needed for efficient operation. 

Practices such as just-in-time delivery have altered the extent to which stockpiles of 

 

12 Ronald F. Lehman and Eileen S. Vergino, “Unclear and Present Danger: Understanding and 

Responding to WMD Latency,” presentation to the 2005/2006 CGSR Futures Roundtable, Center for 

Global Security Research, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, January 19–20, 2006. 
9

materials and other former requirements are now necessary. An important aspect of these 

changing industrial processes is the eroding distinction between technology development 

and application. Today, rather than a process that leads from one to another in distinct 

stages, development and application are now both phases of a process that is ongoing 

simultaneously.13 

Another key aspect of these new ways of organizing the conduct of business at the 

industry level is the practice of outsourcing. The reality of a global biological 

infrastructure for both science and commercialization drives outsourcing in the face of 

largely commercial desires to share business risk, take advantage of distributed expertise 

around the world, and get into new markets. This trend has led to what one assessment 

has described as “deinfrastructuralization,”14 or a diminished reliance on an indigenous 

infrastructure, but instead on one that is more geographically decentralized and 

distributed. Those interested in exploiting biotechnology will be reliant on neither wholly 

indigenous nor wholly external resources. 

Changes in industrial practices, such as decentralization and outsourcing, put a premium 

on the ability to integrate. The elements of a successful endeavor that have to be brought 

together will likely come from many different places. Advanced technology will be 

available not just to those who invent it. Those who will be successful will be those who 

are best able to put disparate pieces together. As the National Intelligence Councils 

projection of the world in 2020 argues, “benefits of globalization will accrue to countries 

and groups than can access and adopt new technologies. Indeed, a nation’s level of 

technological achievement will be defined in terms of its investment in integrating and 

applying the new, globally available technologies” (emphasis added).15

What is true in the broad economic arena is also true for any attempt to apply 

biotechnology in the security sphere. Because the security sector now relies on the 

application of technologies emerging largely from the commercial sector, the advantage 

here also rests with those who can rapidly adapt, exploit, and integrate evolving 

technology.16 With the global spread of biotechnology, the United States should be under 

no illusion that it or its friends and allies are the only places where innovation in the 

application of the technology to the security arena can occur. 

A second important implication of this development is the prospect of pursuing multiple 

routes to the same end point. It is vital for those responsible for managing the security 

risks related to biology to recognize that future efforts to exploit the life sciences and 

biotechnology for malicious purposes could bear no resemblance to past efforts in terms 

of the pathways traveled to achieve success. Comparing past BW programs, such as those 

of the Soviet Union, Iraq, and South Africa, one can see that those efforts began at 

different points on the learning curve and took distinct forms. This difference is likely to 

 

13 J.D. Kenneth Boutin, “Technological Globalization and Regional Security in East Asia,” Institute for 

Defence and Security Studies, Singapore, no. 65, May 2004, 5. 

14 Lehman and Vergino, “Unclear and Present Danger: Understanding and Responding to WMD Latency.” 15 NIC, Mapping the Global Future, 11. 16 Ibid., 13. 
10

become more pronounced with respect to security-related programs that might emerge in 

the years ahead. U.S. assessments, particularly those that focus on potential 

noncompliance, must guard against adopting the notion that the future will be like the 

past. 
11

Implications of a Changing Environment 

From the perspective of proliferation, why do such developments matter? The reason is 

obvious: these developments can have a profound effect on the potential for the misuse of 

the life sciences and biotechnology by those people who would wish to do harm to others. 

As one journalist put it, “the age of weaponeering is just dawning; almost all of the fields 

potential lies ahead.”17 The potential impact of these trends and patterns is likely to be 

felt in a number of ways: 

• They will increase the range of options and possibilities for those who might seek 

to exploit them for malicious purposes; 

• They will make it easier to acquire capabilities and to do so at a more rapid pace; 

• Untoward activities will be harder to detect; and 

• Those responsible for countering proliferation will have a diminished capacity to 

manage risks and respond to problems. 

The accelerating pace of scientific and technological change and the surprise inherent in 

scientific discovery and technological innovation require addressing phenomena that are 

both unanticipated and, in a sense, unknowable. Current trends and patterns make it 

extremely difficult to predict or even identify the threat. David Relman of Stanford 

University’s Department of Medicine and chair of several important National Academy 

of Science studies makes the point that history does not provide a particularly good guide 

in this regard for several reasons. First, the notion of only a few agents posing a plausible 

threat is largely an artifact of weapons programs that predated the current knowledge of 

molecular biology; moreover, it reflected the identification of agents on the basis of 

natural properties and limited technical expertise. Second, large-scale industrial processes 

are no longer necessary for development of potent biological weapons, because the 

means for propagating agents under controlled conditions are now more easily accessible. 

Third, the traditional concept of weaponization is misleading, given that nature provides 

mechanisms for packaging infectious agents that are increasingly understood and more 

and more subject to manipulation through genetic engineering. Moreover, scientific 

advances will yield new ways to package such agents. Relman’s conclusion is that the 

full potential of programs of the past was never unleashed and the use of biological 

weapons by small groups historically was relatively unsophisticated (even the relatively 

well educated and well funded Aum Shinrikyo). They are “far from representative of 

what moderately well informed groups might do today.”18 

In such an environment, the proliferation dynamic is moving further and further away 

from the classic model of a government making a commitment to achieving a biological 

weapons capability and then moving through a series of steps to the eventual deployment 

of a full military system. This trend argues not only for an assessment of whether the 

 

17 Mark Williams, “The Knowledge,” Technology Review, March/April 2006, 50. 18 David A. Relman, “Bioterrorism – Preparing to Fight the Next War,” The New England Journal of 

Medicine, 354, no. 2, January 12, 2006, 113–115. 
12

current definition of “proliferation” appropriately captures the nature of the problem, but 

also whether efforts to identify proliferation—including noncompliance with 

nonproliferation obligations—are adequate. Do we have an effective analytical 

framework for making such determinations? 

What Indicators?

A recent background paper prepared for the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission, 

chaired by Swedish diplomat Hans Blix, argues that, “there is no single outstanding 

critical indicator of a state-funded chemical or biological weapons programme, rather 

multiple indicators or specific ‘signatures’ of indicators common for chemical and 

biological programmes have to be used.”19 Any weapons capability, including biological 

weapons, is the product of the desire for such a capability and the ability to produce it. 

This much is true whether the actor is a state or a terrorist. At the state level, a wide array 

of elements will shape any government decision to pursue a biological weapons 

capability, including policy (both foreign and national security) as well as bureaucratic 

and organization, economic, psychological, and cultural factors. Fewer factors may be 

involved in the choice by terrorists, but some of the same forces are in play. In terms of 

capability, for both states and terrorists, an understanding of the underlying science and 

an ability to translate that scientific knowledge into usable technology are needed. 

The factors that might provide some indication of illicit efforts, then, are numerous. For 

analysts, such abundance is both positive and negative. On one hand, there are many 

places to look. On the other hand, because there are so many factors, much of the 

information relating to them inevitably will be partial and incomplete, yielding significant 

uncertainties. The critical element is to identify and understand how those different 

factors come together. 

Policy and Leadership Factors 

The Swedish researchers referenced above concluded that, “the most decisive signature 

components were found to be state leadership and political will.”20 While they may be the 

most important, they are also the most difficult to assess. This is the case in part because 

leadership and political will are the product of many factors. Among the most critical are, 

obviously, perceptions of national security interests, the perceived nature of the threats to 

those interests, and the national leadership’s objectives with respect to those interests. 

The Swedish analysts noted as key indicators expansionistic ambitions, pursuit of 

regional hegemony, and what they called a “negative asymmetric position towards the 

[perceived] threat.”21 Few countries, however, are likely to be blatant about these kinds of 

ambitions. They are much more likely to cast the issue in terms of defense needs and cite 

an existential threat to their security—whether one exists or not—as a justification for 

considering actions of which the international community is likely to disapprove. They 

 

19 Ingrid Faengmark and Lena Norlander, “Indicators of State and Non-State Offensive Chemical and 

Biological Programmes,” WMD Commission Paper 30, August 2005, 3, available at 

<www.wmdcommission.org>. 

20 Ibid., 9. 

21 Ibid., 6. 
13

can make their case stronger if they convince the international community that a major 

gap exists between the threat and their ability to deter or respond effectively to it. 

Similarly, few if any states will be open about their perception of the utility of “weapons 

of mass destruction,” including biological weapons, in addressing their security deficit. 

Although some critical holdouts remain, most countries today are party to the major 

international arms control and nonproliferation agreements (the Nuclear Nonproliferation 

Treaty [NPT], the Chemical Weapons Convention [CWC], and the BWC). Given the 

importance that most of the world attaches to these agreements, a country interested in 

capabilities those treaties prohibit is unlikely to suggest it does not take its treaty 

obligations seriously, or that it is engaged in a cynical maneuver to cover illicit behavior. 

States do get reputations regarding their willingness to abide by international treaty 

obligations. These reputations are earned not by what governments say, but by what they 

do. It is a reputation based on a pattern of behavior extending well beyond arms control 

and nonproliferation agreements to their observance of international norms, rules, and 

expectations embodied in treaty-based global commitments they assume, such as 

membership in the United Nations or the World Trade Organization (WTO). Suspicions 

may exist with respect to a country such as China, for example, not only because it has 

abetted proliferation through nuclear assistance to Pakistan, or because the United States 

has had to sanction Chinese companies for violations of export control norms, but also 

because China has been notorious in disregarding its obligations to protect intellectual 

property rights as a member of the WTO. The current view is that China is doing better in 

this regard, a view that is shaped less by the rhetoric of China’s leadership and more by 

the actions the Chinese are seen to be taking to demonstrate the seriousness with which 

they view their international obligations. 

A government’s decision to pursue biological weapons, of course, is a product of much 

more than national security and foreign policy incentives. Analysts have discussed many 

other factors that contribute to such policy choices. These include the political 

psychology of the leadership on such questions as the extent to which it feels integrated 

with or isolated from those in the international community with whom they most want to 

associate. Another important factor is the influence of particular segments or 

organizations that are part of the domestic political dynamic, not least of which are the 

military and the scientific communities. Yet another cluster of factors is cultural 

influences, such as the extent to which the society values secrecy. 

Complicating the assessment still further is the fact that none of these factors works in 

isolation; they interact with one another. Nor do they all necessarily work in the same 

direction (i.e., either promoting or impeding a decision to pursue BW); they can be 

reinforcing in some cases but cancel each other out in others. No methodology has yet 

been developed that establishes an analytical framework defining the nature of the 

relationships among these factors, weighs their respective values in influencing a 

decision, or accommodates the variability in their dynamics that will inevitably emerge as 

an analyst moves from one specific case to the next. 
14

The best that can be done in evaluating intent in relation to the proliferation of biological 

weapons capabilities is for country, regional, nonproliferation, and scientific experts to 

work together to construct a convincing narrative regarding a particular country’s 

perspective. The eight indicators proposed in this report can provide the basis for this 

narrative. 

During the Cold War, the United States expended extraordinary resources—time, 

treasure, and talent—on understanding its adversaries in the Kremlin. By and large, it 

developed a reasonably sophisticated and thorough understanding of how the Soviet 

leadership operated and what made it tick. Even so, intense debates abounded within the 

U.S. policy, intelligence, and analytical circles about a range of Soviet-related issues. 

Moreover, some issues, such as the extent of the illicit Soviet BW program, were never 

fully grasped. No comparable security challenge today commands such assets. Analytic 

and policymaking resources must be spread more thinly across a wider variety of 

consequential but existential challenges. 

Science and Technology 

As the earlier discussion of the changing security landscape underlines, the challenges of 

finding useful indicators of a biological weapons capability is getting more difficult. It is 

certainly true that some combinations of capability, if seen in some contexts, would raise 

suspicions. One example is a capacity for large-scale cultivation, preparation of 

pathogenic materials for aerosol dissemination, and animal testing facilities (especially 

aerosol chambers). In general, however, it has been the traditional view that it was not 

until the later stages of a BW program—production, storage, deployment, and training—

that more recognizable indicators emerge. In part this was the case because the BWC 

allows for biological defense activities that in some cases are virtually the same as those 

of an offensive program. The suspicious combination mentioned above, for example, 

could be explained away as part of a defensive program to enhance protection against 

airborne agents. 

Thinking about capability indicators has its origins in concern about the original 

proliferation dynamic, that is, military programs aimed at producing biological weapons 

for use on the battlefield. Such thinking is increasingly outmoded for several reasons. 

First, the nature of conflict is changing, and how biological weapons could be used is 

changing with it. Large, set-piece battles, while they cannot be totally dismissed, are 

increasingly rare. Military forces now find themselves engaged in other forms of conflict, 

both military engagements of an unconventional character and “operations other than 

war.” In such an environment, the perceived uses of biological weapons may change. One 

group of analysts, for example, suggests that biological agents could be used in situations 

in which the armed forces of the international community find themselves in an internal 

conflict.22 In almost every case of community conflict in the world today, one side or the 

other, and often both, have accused the other side of using chemical weapons. Most of 

these charges have been made for political reasons or have mistaken other materials 

 

22 Ake Sellstronm and Anders Norqvist, “Comparison of States and Non-State Actors in the Development 

of a BTW Capability,” WMD Commission Paper Number 16, 5, available at 

<http://www.wmdcommission.org/files/no16.pdf >. 
15

(smoke, tear gas) for chemical weapons. Looking to the future, however, in light of 

current trends it would not be a big jump for them to consider the actual use of chemical 

or biological weapons. 

The second reason for the questionable relevance of looking for traditional capability 

indicators is that advancing science and technology are changing the biological weapon 

model insofar as they are making some program elements that in the past might have 

provided indicators less necessary. It would be foolish in the extreme, for example, for 

any state to produce and store large stockpiles of biological weapons. Such stockpiles are 

not needed in the face of a growing just-in-time production capability. This would be 

especially the case if the concept of operation for BW use shifts away from its 

employment on the battlefield to other purposes. 

Third, traditional capability indicators may become less relevant because a state might 

decide to proceed with a limited biological weapons program without necessarily 

committing to its ultimate implementation. The leadership might be intrigued, for 

example, by what advancing science and technology make possible, even if they have no 

clear vision at the outset of how capabilities can be exploited or commitment to carrying 

a program forward. This might be called the “Mount Everest syndrome” (that is, when 

asked why they climb mountains, climbers respond, “Because it’s there”). In this variant, 

the question is why someone would push for the creation of a dangerous capability, and 

the response would be: “Because we could.”23

The combination of what is interesting and what is doable could yield worrisome results. 

It could, in particular, make “dabbling” much more frequent. Such a decision could 

produce a program that focuses on research and development without scaling up to 

production or even significant testing. At the same time, it would provide a “warm 

capabilities base” or a latent or virtual capability on which the actor could build rapidly. 

In some ways, this situation may be the most difficult for the international community, 

because it suggests the creation of a capability that allows for rapid breakout if and when 

a leadership makes the decision that such a capability is worth having. 

Some people may argue that such a latent biological capability is of little or no use 

without the training, doctrine, and equipment needed to exploit it. In a military context, 

this is true. Armed forces need to be trained in BW uses and protected against its effects. 

The argument here, however, is that such classical military applications need not be the 

sole or perhaps even the most likely use scenarios in the future. Limiting the applicable 

 

23 A mid-1990s scientific experiment involving the recovery of frozen tissues containing the agent that 

caused the 1918–1919 Spanish influenza pandemic that killed at least 40 million people provides an 

interesting example. In that case, the research team had recently developed a new technique to analyze 

DNA in preserved tissue. Looking for new applications, they decided on the Spanish flu. According to one 

description of the effort, “this work was not triggered by a search for flu treatments or the search for new 

biowarfare agents, but by a rather simple motivation: [the] team could just do it.” According to the team 

leader, “the 1918 flu was by far and away the most interesting thing we could think of.” In short, the work 

went ahead because the team was curious, the issue was interesting, and they could do it. See the Sunshine 

Project, “Emerging Technologies: Genetic Engineering and Biological Weapons,” Background Paper 

Number 12, November 2003, 7, available at <http://www.sunshineproject.org/publications/ bk/bk12/html>.
16

use template leads to thinking that may be too narrow to identify the real problems that 

will arise. 

The final reason that indicators related to military programs may be less germane now 

relates to the foregoing point. In today’s world, it makes little sense for a determined BW 

proliferator to have its illicit program reside in its military sector. The non-military arena 

provides innumerable opportunities for activities that could contribute to an illegal 

offensive capability. Since many of the questions relating to the development and 

performance of agents and delivery systems are the same for civilian and military 

applications, significant understanding of fundamentals can be achieved in the 

commercial arena that would not likely be seen to be violations of international treaty 

obligations. Given the sensitivity of such a program, the leadership might want to put 

control of the critical function of integrating the dispersed efforts that are likely to 

characterize a modern program into hands other than the military’s to achieve an 

additional layer of protection against discovery. 

The Need for Innovative Thinking 

The empowerment of individuals underlines an important shift that must be made in 

thinking about the problem of BW proliferation, whether pursued by state or non-state 

actors. More and more, the problem in the biological realm is one of potential misuses of 

knowledge. The focus of concern, therefore, should shift to the people who hold such 

knowledge. But almost no work—conceptual or policy-related—has explored the means 

by which this dimension of the risk can be managed. 

Clearly, the policy and analytical communities need innovative thinking regarding both 

the nature of future biological proliferation and the tools needed to address them. That 

thinking must begin with the recognition that no single tool will be decisive, and no 

single indicator will be definitive. It is likely to be the quality of integrated assessment 

and analysis of information gathered from a growing number of sources that will provide 

the key to understanding what is happening. Such thinking will also require the 

contribution of a wider range of expertise than has traditionally been the case, which will, 

in turn, require the allocation of more resources to this task. It is well worth the 

investment, and it is time to begin. 
17

Indicators to Monitor BW Trends Worldwide 

Monitoring covert offensive biological weapons research in the future will be a difficult 

task for nonproliferation experts. Advances in life sciences and dual-use biotechnology 

are rapidly diffusing the knowledge, equipment, and materials needed to produce crude 

and sophisticated biological weapons around the world. Due to the dual-use nature of 

many of the products and materials associated with biological weapons development, it 

will grow increasingly difficult to distinguish an offensive weapons program from 

legitimate civilian research until the weapons program is in advanced stages, if at all. 

Unlike nuclear programs, there is not a well-defined set of equipment and material that 

can be controlled through import/export controls, further complicating the monitoring 

process and the ability to identify illicit activity (see table 1). 

Table 1. Characteristics of Fissile Materials and Pathogens24

Fissile Materials Biological Pathogens 

Do not exist in nature Generally found in nature 

Nonliving, synthetic Living, replicative 

Difficult and costly to produce Easy and cheap to produce 

Not diverse; plutonium and highly enriched 

uranium are the only fissile materials used in 

nuclear weapons 

Highly diverse; more than 20 pathogens are 

suitable for biological warfare 

Can be inventoried and tracked in a 

quantitative manner 

Because pathogens reproduce, inventory 

control is unreliable 

Can be detected at a distance from the emission 

of ionizing radiation 

Cannot be detected at a distance with available 

technologies 

Weapons-grade fissile materials are stored at a 

limited number of military nuclear sites 

Pathogens are present in many types of 

facilities and at multiple locations within a 

facility 

Few nonmilitary applications (such as research 

reactors, thermo-electric generators, and 

production of radioisotopes) 

Many legitimate applications in biomedical 

research and the pharmaceutical/biotechnology 

industry 

The changing threat environment since the end of the Cold War, coupled with revolutions 

in the life sciences and the increasing impotence of international arms control 

agreements, begs that novel approaches to detecting illicit offensive biological weapons 

programs be developed. 

This section discusses eight possible indicators of illicit biological weapons activities. 

Through analyzing these indicators as they relate to a specific country, an analyst can 

develop a narrative of a country’s potential capability to engage in illicit bioweapons 

 

24 Jonathan Tucker, “Preventing the Misuse of Pathogens: The Need for Global Biosecurity Standards.” 

Arms Control Today, 33, no. 5, June 2003, available at <http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2003_06/ 

tucker_june03.asp>. 
18

research. The indicators selected for this study are just a small sampling of indicators that 

can be chosen, depending on the nature and goals of the study being undertaken. These 

indicators were chosen because they provide a broad overview of the different types of 

indicators that can be used. Together, these indicators will not provide “smoking gun” 

evidence of a country’s illegal biological weapons activities, but rather, a narrative of the 

potential or likelihood for a country to engage in illegal activity. These indicators are: 

• Known chemical or nuclear programs, 

• Number and level of BSL 3-4 facilities in a country, 

• Sophistication of civilian domestic biotechnology capabilities, 

• Known manufacture of rare or unusual biological compounds, 

• Mismatch between number of trained scientists and positions available, 

• Level of business transparency, 

• Number of publications compared to number of scientists, and 

• Complexity of social networking among scientists (both domestically and with 

scientists from other countries). 

Other possible indicators not profiled in this study that could highlight potential offensive 

research include: the type or nature of state leadership (i.e., undemocratic state with 

limited transparency and no public insight into internal affairs), regional dynamics (i.e., 

one country may choose to pursue offensive BW program based on the perceived state of 

another country’s unconventional and conventional weapons arsenal), membership and 

compliance with nonproliferation agreements, and mismatch between production 

capacity and stated production output in both civilian biotechnology facilities and known 

biodefense facilities. 

Known Chemical and Nuclear Weapons Programs 

While it may not be true in all cases, evidence indicates that countries that have pursued 

chemical and/or nuclear weapons programs have also pursued, or are likely to pursue, 

some level of biological weapons capacity. Historically, Germany, France, Japan, the 

United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and the United States all pursued offensive biological 

weapons capabilities in parallel with development of their chemical and nuclear weapons 

arsenals. While these countries have publicly renounced their chemical and biological 

weapons programs, a number of other countries are suspected of pursuing illicit WMD 

programs, including Iran, North Korea, and Syria. One indicator of potential illicit BW 

activity would be to analyze which countries have had or are pursuing nuclear weapons 

capabilities and/or illegal chemical weapons programs, or are suspected of having such 

programs. 

Iran, which has been accused by both the United States and the international community 

of illegally pursuing a nuclear weapons program, is also suspected of seeking production 

technology, dual-use materials, training, and expertise from foreign entities to develop 

indigenous biological and chemical weapons capabilities, even though it has ratified both 

the biological and chemical weapons conventions. Some analysts suspect Iran has small 
19

stockpiles of both mustard and cyanide, and, potentially the nerve agent sarin.25 Of 

particular interest is the growing sophistication of Iran’s biotechnology and 

pharmaceutical industries, and the potential to divert dual-use agents and materials for 

illicit weapons purposes. At a minimum, based on its biotechnology infrastructure, Iran 

has the capability to produce at least small quantities of offensive biological weapons. 

Some of the most common agents associated with the Iranian research in the open 

literature are anthrax, botulinum toxin, ricin toxin, T-2 mycotoxin, and Variola virus, the 

causative agent of smallpox.26 

North Korea performed an underground nuclear weapons test on October 9, 2006, 

confirming long-held suspicions that the country was pursing a nuclear weapons 

capability. According to analysis done by the Nuclear Threat Initiative, North Korea is 

suspected of stockpiling, or has the capability of stockpiling, a number of chemical 

weapons, including phosgene, lewisite, mustard blister agents, and possibly sarin, as well 

as related delivery vehicles.27 In regard to biological weapons, the country is believed to 

have the capability to produce traditional infectious biological warfare agents or toxins. 

In 2002, General Thomas A. Schwartz stated in testimony before the U.S. Senate that 

“... North Korea has the capability to develop, produce and weaponize biological warfare 

agents. They can deploy missiles with chemical warheads and potentially have the ability 

to weaponize biological agents for missile delivery.”28 Russian intelligence sources have 

also stated that North Korea has an offensive biological weapons program and may be 

conducting research on anthrax, cholera, bubonic plague, and smallpox.29 North Korea 

also possesses a conventional munitions production infrastructure that could be used to 

weaponize BW agents, and is believed to be actively seek to acquire dual-use equipment, 

materials, and expertise that could be used to support an offensive BW program.30

Both India and Pakistan have detonated nuclear weapons and are capable of developing 

chemical and biological weapons. India, for example, has an advanced domestic 

biotechnology infrastructure, as well as a known defensive biological weapons program. 

Other countries that are believed to be pursuing nuclear and/or chemical programs and 

have the potential to pursue biological weapons capabilities include China, Egypt 

 

25 Nuclear Threat Initiative, “Iran Profile: Chemical Chronology 1998–1992,” October 2003, accessed at 

<http://www.nuclearthreatinitiative.org/e_research/profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2960.html>. 26 Nuclear Threat Initiative, “Iran Profile: Biological Overview,” June 2007, available at 

<http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Iran/Biological/index_2300.html>. 27 Nuclear Threat Initiative, “North Korea Profile: Chemical Overview,” February 2006, available at 

<http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/NK/index_1549.html>. 

28 Statement of General Thomas A. Schwartz, Commander in Chief United Nations Command/Combined 

Forces Command; and Commander, United States Forces Korea, before the 107th Congress, Senate Armed 

Forces Committee, March 5, 2002, available at <http://armedservices.senate.gov/statemnt/ 2002 / 

Schwartz.pdf>. 

29 Russian Federation Foreign Intelligence Service, “A New Challenge After the Cold War: Proliferation of 

Weapons of Mass Destruction,” 99. 30 Deputy Director of National Intelligence, “Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of 

Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 January31 December 2004,” available at <ttp://www.dni.gov/reports/2004_unclass_ report_to_ NIC_DO_ 

16Nov04.pdf>. 
20

(chemical program, no nuclear program), Israel, Syria, and Taiwan (past, and foregone 

interest in nuclear weapons as well as chemical suspected).31 

Number and Level of BSL 3-4 Facilities 

Most countries operate a defensive biological weapons program, which is permitted 

under the Biological Weapons Convention. A potential indicator, however, lies in the size 

and sophistication of a country’s defensive biological research and development program 

and the number of high containment biological safety level (BSL) facilities a country 

operates (both civilian and military). It is particularly important to look at how many of 

the identified facilities are run by the defense establishment, the biosecurity level at these 

sites (we recommend an analysis focus only on those facilities that are classed as BSL 3 

and above, and the level of security at the facilities, such as armed guards, restricted 

access, fences, and cameras). A large number of BSL 3-4 facilities will increase a 

country’s capability to quickly divert defensive research into offensive research. 

While BSL guidelines are not universal, laboratories can typically be classed through 

levels 1-4, based on the type of agents researched on or stored in the laboratory, as well 

as the risk posed to personnel, environment, and surrounding community by research 

done at the lab (table 2).32 BSL 4 labs, the highest classification in regard to risk, contain 

pathogens such as hemorrhagic fever viruses Ebola and Marburg, lassa fever, and 

smallpox. Agents located in BSL 4 labs are typically dangerous and/or exotic agents that 

pose a high risk of life-threatening disease, high individual risk of aerosol-transmitted lab 

infections, and for which vaccines or other treatments are usually not available. 

As with the other indicators, determining a country’s number and level of BSL 3-4 

facilities alone will not provide a “smoking gun” of illegal activity. Rather, it gives more 

countries the capability to pursue offensive weapons research masked as benign 

defensive research or civilian vaccine or therapeutic research. Analyzed together with 

other selected indicators, the number and level of a country’s BSL 3-4 facilities will 

provide a narrative of the capability and/or likelihood to engage in illegal activities. 

Table 2 provides a general guideline on the differences between BSL levels 1-4. As 

noted, while BSL guidelines are not universal, similar requirements for laboratory safety 

exist throughout the international community, and even illegal programs must protect 

their workers from biohazards. 

 

31 Nuclear Threat Initiative, “Country Profiles,” available at <http://www.nti.org/e_research/ profiles/ 

index.html>. 

32 For examples of existing BSL4 facilities, please see Interpol’s “Biocontainment Laboratories,” accessed 

at <http://www.interpol.int/public/BioTerrorism/links/biocontainmentLab.asp>. 
21

Table 2. Biosafety Levels33

BSL Agents Practices Safety Equipment 

(Primary barriers) 

Facilities 

(Secondary 

barriers) 

1 Not known to consistently cause 

disease in healthy adults 

Standard 

Microbiological 

Practices 

None required Open bench top 

sink required 

2 Associated with human disease, 

hazard = percutaneous injury, 

ingestion, mucous membrane 

exposure 

BSL-1 practice 

plus: 

Limited access 

Biohazard warning 

signs 

"Sharps" 

precautions 

Biosafety manual 

defining any needed 

waste 

decontamination or 

medical 

surveillance 

policies 

Primary barriers = 

Class I or II BSCs 

or other physical 

containment 

devices used for all 

manipulations of 

agents that cause 

splashes or aerosols 

of infectious 

materials; PPEs: 

laboratory coats; 

gloves; face 

protection as 

needed 

BSL-1 plus: 

Autoclave available 

3 Indigenous or exotic agents with 

potential for aerosol 

transmission; disease may have 

serious or lethal consequences 

BSL-2 practice 

plus: 

Controlled access 

Decontamination of 

all waste 

Decontamination of 

lab clothing before 

laundering 

Baseline serum 

Primary barriers = 

Class I or II BCSs 

or other physical 

containment 

devices used for all 

open manipulations 

of agents; PPEs: 

protective lab 

clothing; gloves; 

respiratory 

protection as 

needed 

BSL-2 plus: 

Physical separation 

from access 

corridors 

Self-closing, 

double-door access 

Exhausted air not 

recirculated 

Negative airflow 

into laboratory 

4 Dangerous/exotic agents which 

pose high risk of life-threatening 

disease, aerosol-transmitted lab 

infections; or related agents with 

unknown risk of transmission 

BSL-3 practices 

plus: 

Clothing change 

before entering 

Shower on exit 

All material 

decontaminated on 

exit from facility 

Primary barriers = 

All procedures 

conducted in Class 

III BSCs or Class I 

or II BSCs in 

combination with 

full-body, airsupplied, positive 

pressure personnel 

suit 

BSL-3 plus: 

Separate building or 

isolated zone 

Dedicated supply 

and exhaust, 

vacuum, and decon 

systems 

Other requirements 

 

33 Centers for Disease Control and National Institutes of Health, “Biosafety in Microbiological and 

Biomedical Laboratories, 4th Edition,” May 1999, available at 

<http://www.cdc.gov/od/ohs/biosfty/bmbl4/bmbl4toc.htm>.
22

Sophistication of Civilian Domestic Biotechnology Capabilities 

Nearly every country has some level of biotechnology capability. Rising science and 

technology powers, such as India and China, have made it a high priority to become 

leaders in biotechnology research, development, and commercialization. At the same 

time, other fields not traditionally viewed as biotechnologies, such as materials science, 

agricultural science, information technology, and nanotechnology, are becoming 

increasingly integrated with traditional biotechnologies. As a result, the capabilities to 

develop and produce BW are becoming available in both civilian industrial sectors and 

academic settings. Widespread access to the Internet has expanded the availability of the 

supplies, equipment, and specialized data bases, such as gene and protein libraries, 

needed to produce biological weapons to people beyond scientific and technical 

communities.34 

The equipment needed to develop biological weapons is also decreasing in cost and size. 

Small fermenters capable of cultivation of pathogenic microorganisms, viruses, or toxins, 

protective and containment equipment, and other materials are available for purchase 

from hundreds of distributors around the world. Large-scale industrial processes are no 

longer necessary for development of potent biological weapons, because the means for 

propagating agents under controlled conditions are now easily accessible. This shift 

means that the research and development phase of a BW program does not need to be 

conducted through an offensive military program. 

Australia, Brazil, China, India, Israel, Russia, Singapore, and South Korea are all 

expected to become “stronger economic, political, scientific, and technological global 

players in the future.”35 India and China, for example, which are signatories to the BWC, 

have well-developed domestic biotechnology infrastructures that include numerous 

pharmaceutical production facilities and biocontainment laboratories (including BSL3) 

for working with lethal pathogens.36 An industry analysis by Frost & Sullivan estimated 

India’s pharmaceutical market to be about $5.1 billion in 2004, ranking it 13th globally by 

value and 4th by volume.37 

As mentioned above, China has also made strides in biotechnology in the past decade due 

to numerous reforms in science and technology. Over 500 biotechnology companies 

operate in China, employing over 5,000 people. China was the only developing country 

to participate in the Human Genome Project, is currently the world’s leading producer of 

genetically modified cotton, and, in 2003, became the first country to obtain a drug 

license for a recombinant gene therapy. Further, China has more than 150 health 

 

34 Author Helen Purkitt discovered a mobile, module field BL 3 laboratory for sale on the Internet. While 

this product had only been used by such agencies as the CDC in emergency situations as of 2005, the 

manufacturers indicated they were prepared to sell to any legitimate user via the Internet. 35 National Academies of Science, “Globalization, Biosecurity and the Future of Life Sciences,” available 

at <http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=11567>. 

36 Nuclear Threat Initiative, “India: Biological Overview,” October 2006, available at 

<http://nti.org/e_research/profiles/India/Biological/index.html>. 37 National Academies of Science, “Globalization, Biosecurity and the Future of Life Sciences,” available 

at <http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=11567>. 
23

biotechnology products in clinical trial and has received approval to market a number of 

Chinese-produced vaccines, diagnostics, and therapeutics.38 

Egypt also has begun to emerge as a biotechnology power. Among Arab states, Egypt is a 

scientific leader, with a strong biotech base in agricultural and health biotechnology. 

Because Egypt’s biotechnology sector is largely dependent on foreign rather than 

indigenous innovation, the government has been channeling funds toward the building of 

multipurpose biotechnology pilot manufacturing plants (i.e., the Mubarak City for 

Scientific Research and Technology Applications, the National Research Centre, and El 

Monoufiya University). They have also begun introducing biotechnology educational 

programs into Egypt’s higher education system.

39

Within this indicator, one could also look at large quantities of dual-use materials and 

technology within the civilian biotechnology and defensive research fields and any 

discrepancy in declared activities and/or production at a site and the types of technologies 

known to be located at the site. The Australia Group, an informal forum of countries 

which, through the harmonization of export controls, seeks to ensure that exports do not 

contribute to the development of chemical or biological weapons,40 has identified 

equipment and materials that have dual-use potential. Such equipment includes: 

• Fermenters capable of cultivation of pathogenic micro-organisms, viruses, or toxin 

production, without the propagation of aerosols, having a capacity of 20 liters or 

greater. 

• Cross (tangential) flow filtration equipment capable of separation of pathogenic 

micro-organisms, viruses, toxins, or cell cultures, without the propagation of 

aerosols, having a total filtration area equal to or greater than 1 square meter and 

capable of being sterilized or disinfected in-situ. 

• Chambers designed for aerosol challenge testing with micro-organisms, viruses, or 

toxins and having a capacity of 1 cubic meter or greater. 

• Steam-sterilizable, freeze-drying equipment with a condenser capacity of 10 kg of 

ice or greater in 24 hours and less than 1,000 kg of ice in 24 hours. 

• Complete spraying or fogging systems, specially designed or modified for fitting 

to aircraft, lighter than air vehicles, or UAVs, capable of delivering, from a liquid 

suspension, an initial droplet of less than 50 microns at a flow rate of greater than 

two liters per minute.41

Even though the existence of large amounts of such equipment and materials alone is not 

an indicator of illicit activity, it allows the analyst to identify and determine the 

capabilities of production. 

 

38 Ibid. 

39 Ibid. 

40 Australia Group, “The Australia Group,” 2007, available at <http://www.australiagroupnet 

/en/index.html>. 

41 The Australia Group, “Control List of Dual-Use Biological Equipment and Related Technology,” 

September 2007, available at <http://www.australiagroup.net/en/dual_biological.html>. 
24

As mentioned, however, the challenge in examining the implications of the global spread 

of biotechnology is that it presents a high noise-to-signal ratio. With many countries 

around the world investing heavily in biotechnology on the bet that it will be a future 

economic driver, it is very difficult indeed to distinguish developments that have little or 

no bearing on BW prospects (noise) from those that do (signals). As biotechnology 

continues to advance, a country will come ever closer to the line that separates legal from 

illegal activities. The critical factor then becomes whether that country chooses to exploit 

that capability for weapons purposes. We have come full circle back to intent. 

Known Manufacture of Rare or Unusual Biological Compounds 

If traditional capability indicators are less useful today, a sense of a country’s biological 

weapons capability—or at least its potential—can still be achieved by examining its life 

sciences activities and its ability to translate its scientific knowledge into useful products 

and technologies. 

As described earlier, the basic level of the life sciences around the world is improving 

significantly. While much of this scientific knowledge is applicable to biological 

weapons, analysts have identified research in the life sciences that has particular 

relevance and could trigger greater attention if identified. A report of the National 

Academy of Sciences, for example, lists seven classes of experiments that illustrate the 

types of endeavors or discoveries that should require review and discussion because of 

their potential implications for biological weapons development. These include 

experiments that would: 

• Demonstrate how to render a vaccine ineffective, 

• Counter resistance to therapeutically useful antibiotics or antiviral agents, 

• Enhance the virulence of a pathogen or render a non-pathogen virulent, 

• Increase transmissibility of a pathogen, 

• Alter the host range of a pathogen, 

• Enable the evasion of diagnostic/detection modalities, and 

• Enable the weaponization of a biological agent or toxin.42

A second NAS committee took a different approach. It identified four major categories of 

advances in the life sciences that will have high-impact, near-term consequences for the 

life sciences and could enhance or alter the nature of future biological threats. These 

categories of activities include: 

• Acquisition of novel biological or molecular diversity (e.g., DNA synthesis, DNA 

shuffling, bioprospecting, and high-throughput screening), 

• Direct design (e.g., rational drug design, synthetic biology, or genetic engineering 

of viruses), 

 

42 National Research Council, Biotechnology Research in an Age of Terrorism (Washington, DC: National 

Academies Press, 2004), also known as the “Fink Report,” after Dr. Gerald Fink, who chaired the 

committee that produced it. 
25

• Understanding and manipulation of biological systems (e.g., RNA interference, 

computational biology and bioinformatics, systems biology, and genomic 

medicine), and 

• Production, delivery, and packaging (biopharming, mirofluidics and 

mircrofabrication, bionanotechnology, mircroencapsulation technology, aerosol 

technology, and gene therapy technology).43

Sponsorship of work in these areas—especially related to the first set of seven 

experiments—would certainly raise a warning flag about a country’s possible BW plans, 

especially if it is less than transparent about such work. 

A second area at which to look to achieve some sense of a country’s biological weapons 

potential is its ability to exploit scientific advances. This is largely the province of life 

sciences industry, a large and expanding economic sector. Key applications of life 

science discoveries that take the form of new technology potentially relevant in the 

military area will come from the civilian sector. A country with a strong biotechnology 

base would be able to begin a BW program much higher on the learning curve than was 

the case for past programs. Advances in aerosolization technology, for example, driven 

by non-military factors, such as potential for drug delivery, would assist in overcoming 

what had been a major technical barrier in past BW programs. 

Mismatch Between Number of Trained Scientists and Positions Available 

Analyzing the number of trained scientists working for a defense establishment and the 

number of positions available/required for a defensive only program is a useful guide to 

possible illicit activity. Within this indicator, analysts should also look at foreign-trained 

scientists located within the establishment. 

A historical example of a large mismatch between the number of trained scientists 

working for a defense establishment and the number of positions available/required for a 

defensive only program is the Soviet biological weapons program. From 1972 to 1992, 

Biopreparat, an ostensibly state-owned Soviet pharmaceutical organization was, in 

reality, carrying out an extensive illicit offensive biological weapons program. By the 

early 1990s, more than 60,000 people were estimated as involved in the research, 

development, and production of biological weapons, making it the largest offensive 

biological weapons program ever created.44 

Another related factor is the number of indigenous foreign-trained scientists participating 

in a domestic BW program. Scientists who train or study in countries with significantly 

advanced life sciences capabilities and return to work in domestic programs could 

provide the knowledge or expertise needed to develop offensive biological weapons. This 

is particularly relevant for countries that do not have advanced life sciences capabilities. 

In its Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to 

 

43 NAS, Globalization. 44 National Research Council, Committee on Advances in Technology and the Prevention of Their 

Application to Next Generation Biowarfare Threats, Globalization, Biosecurity, and the Future of the Life 

Sciences (Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 2006).
26

Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 January-31 

December 2006, the CIA stated it believed that Syria continued to seek dual-use 

technology and expertise from foreign sources and had a basic capability of biological 

agent development. In regard to Iran, they stated that their assessment of Iran’s 

biotechnology infrastructure: 

indicates that Iran probably has the capability to produce large quantities of some 

Biological Warfare (BW) agents for offensive purposes, if it made the decision to 

do so. Iran continues to seek dual-use biotechnology materials, equipment, and 

expertise consistent with its growing legitimate biotechnology industry but these 

components could also advance Tehran's BW capability.

45

The report also stated that countries of concern continued to contact Russian entities as a 

source of dual-use biotechnology equipment and related expertise. Russia’s well-known 

biological expertise may make it an attractive target for countries seeking assistance that 

could be applied to biological warfare programs.46

Finally, one must be concerned with the phenomenon known as “brain drain,” whereby 

weapons experts provide biological related materials and expertise to a suspected 

proliferant country or terrorist organization. This is particularly relevant in the case of 

former weapons scientists from South Africa and the Soviet Union. From 1981—1993, 

South Africa’s apartheid chemical and biological weapons program known as “Project 

Coast,” collected hundreds of strains of microbes, including forty-five types of anthrax, 

and strains of cholera, brucellosis, and plague. Dr. Wouter Basson, the former head of the 

project, is known to have traveled to China, Iraq, and Libya under the guise of business, 

and is believed to have sold cultures of these deadly pathogens, including genetically 

engineered varieties, on the black market for profit.47 

Another serious risk of brain drain stems from scientists of the former Soviet Union’s 

vast BW program. Since the breakup of the USSR, it is unknown how many Soviet 

weapons scientists have attempted to sell WMD-related technologies, materials, and 

knowledge to countries or terrorists suspected of pursuing offensive programs. While 

programs such as the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program have attempted 

to find alternate employment for former weapons scientists to limit this threat, cases exist 

of weapons scientists either emigrating to suspected proliferant countries or attempting to 

sell their knowledge and expertise on the black market. The Government of Iran, for 

example, has been reported to have attempted to recruit Russian scientists to help it 

develop its biological weapons program, and has hired several scientists once associated 

with institutes that were part of the Soviet Union's germ warfare program.48 

 

45 CIA, “Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass 

Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 January-31 December 2006,” available at 

<http://www.dni.gov/reports/Acquisition_Technology_Report_030308.pdf> 46 Ibid. 

47 Jonathan Tucker, “Preventing the Misuse of Pathogens: The Need for Global Biosecurity Standards,” 

Arms Control Today, available at <http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2003_06/tucker_ 

june03.asp#notes> 

48 Judith Miller, “Russian Biologist Denies Work in Iran on Germ Weapons,” The New York Times, January 

19, 1999, available at <http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res= 

9D00E7D91430F93AA25752C0A96F958260>. 
27

Through analyzing the number of trained scientists working for a defense establishment, 

the number of positions available/required for a defensive only program, and the number 

of foreign-trained scientists within the establishment, one might develop a realistic 

indicator of potential illegal bioweapons activity. 

Business Transparency 

A variable that could indicate potential illicit dual-use BW activity is the relative 

transparency of a country’s business practices. The United States, for example, has a very 

transparent business culture, where information on research, sales, and other activities are 

easily accessible to the public, both inside and outside the United States. The 

biotechnology, pharmaceutical, health, medical, and other industries are subject to not 

only licensing, importation, and exportation rules, but also Federal regulatory standards 

and government oversight. 

A high level of transparency in a nation’s business culture provides a window through 

which one can gain insight into potential illicit or dual-use BW related activities. A 

transparent business culture makes possible the identification and tracking of purchases 

of dual-use materials and equipment, cutting edge research, allocation of government 

resources in the private sector, and other types of important information. 

The opposite is true for countries characterized by opaque business practices—weak 

business regulations, impenetrable business cultures, and limited controls on the 

importation and exportation of dual-use materials. This lack of transparency raises the 

risk that illegal activity will go undetected. Analysts looking for potential BW activity 

should look at business transparency of a country and ask questions such as: What kind 

of information is made public regarding relevant commercial activity? In what quantities? 

Of what quality? How frequently? By whom? Based on such information, what kind of 

research are they undertaking? To whom are they selling their products? What safeguards 

are being used? Could terrorists could gain access to the materials?

Number of Publications Compared to Number of Scientists 

Scientists, for the most part, need to publish their work to be recognized for their 

achievements by the scientific community. Analyzing the type of research being 

published as well as the number of publications, or lack thereof, coming from a country 

could provide indicators of illicit activity. One facet is to look at the number of 

publications in a country’s academic community and compare them against the number 

and types of publications coming out of a military or defense establishment. A key 

indicator is if a large number of employed scientists working for a government or military 

biodefense program are publishing their scientific research in limited quantities only. A 

country that is capable of performing “red flag” research but produces no record of it, 

therefore, should be the subject of concern; it may be trying to hide ongoing work by its 

scientists, whom they refuse to let publish. If a government does not allow them to 

publish their research, it may be because it does not want the rest of the world to know its 

current priorities. Such was the case in the early 1990s with Iraq’s burgeoning biological 

weapons program. In March 1990, the Defense Intelligence Agency stated in a memo: 
28

The Nuclear Research Center (NRC) at Tuwaitha has not only continued, but 

increased the procurement of media for cell cultures and material for molecular 

biology and genetic engineering. The Center is also procuring a centrifuge 

suitable for viruses, bacteriophage cell nuclei...Even though the NRC has been 

procuring materials associated with genetic engineering and virology, there have 

been no publications in these areas from this facility. For that reason it is 

speculated that the facility is affiliated with BW.49 

Another indicator is to look at the type of research, regardless of quantity, published in 

scientific journals. Research that could raise red flags and indicate capabilities to produce 

offensive biological weapons, or hidden offensive research already being undertaken, 

include those kinds of efforts identified in the National Academy study previously 

mentioned, such as research on how to render a vaccine ineffective; countering resistance 

to therapeutically useful antibiotics or antiviral agents; and enhancing the virulence of a 

pathogen or rendering a non-pathogen virulent. 

Complexity of Social Networking Among Scientists 

Monitoring the social networking of scientists could provide signs of potential intent. 

Questions to be asked include: Are the scientists attending international meetings and 

conferences? What type of meetings and events do they attend? What are the topics of the 

meetings? With whom are they meeting? Are they actively seeking out specialists in 

areas they are not experts in? 

Through analyzing social exposure and networking, one can identify a variety of 

potential patterns that might be indicative of dual-use or offensive weapons research. In 

particular, analysts could identify scientists interested in specific cutting edge or “gray 

area” research. Noticeable interest in topics relating to increasing transmissibility of a 

pathogen or altering the host range of a pathogen can act as a red flag, especially if the 

scientists’ home country does not have particular expertise in these or other related dualuse areas. 

Analysts also need to monitor patterns of inactivity, where gaps show that groups of 

scientists are not interacting but should be. Similar to a citation index, such a pattern 

poses the question of whether they might be hiding illicit activities and are not attending 

international scientific symposia in order to keep their illicit research secret. 

 

49 GulfLink, “The Nuclear Research Center,” March 1990, available at <http://www.gulflink.osd.mil/ 

declassdocs/dia/19961031/961031_950719_22010629_90a.html>. 
29

Conclusion 

A global revolution is underway in the life sciences, transforming the way the 

international community must deal with biological weapons proliferation. Traditional 

tools of arms control and nonproliferation are no longer adequate in an ever-changing 

security environment of increasingly complexity and uncertainty. Accelerating advances 

in life sciences and the availability of materials, equipment, and technical know-how, 

have vastly increased the number of actors who are capable of producing biological 

weapons and significantly increased the playing field in which they can operate. 

The framework identified in this paper is the first step in an effort to develop an 

analytical approach to identify possible proliferation in an era in which the risks turn 

increasingly on the proliferator’s intent, smoking guns to demonstrate maleficent designs 

will be few and far between, ambiguities will prevail, and the line between legal and 

illegal activities will become ever harder to draw with any brightness. These indicators 

are offered in the hope that when they are examined, not individually, but in terms of how 

they might interact, we can indirectly measure a country’s capability to engage in illicit 

BW activity. Armed with those insights, more attention and resources can be directed 

toward an uneasy situation with the goal that more intensive efforts and the brighter glare 

of continuing analyses will reveal more of the true nature of a disturbing confluence of 

developments.