For Release 

on Delivery 

Expected at 

9:00 a.m. EST 

Wednesday 

June 8, 1988 

Federal Drug Abuse Control Policy and the Role of 

the Military in Anti-Drug Efforts 

Statement of 

Charles A. Bowsher 

Comptroller General 

of the United States 

Before the 

Senate Committee on Armed Services 

0-Q 3Fs 

GAO/T-GGD-88-38 GAO Par 1m (U/87) 
FEDERAL DRUG ABUSE CONTROL POLICY 

AND THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY 

IN ANTI-DRUG EFFORTS 

SUMMARY OF STATEMENT BY 

CHARLES A. BOWSHER 

COMPTROLLER GENERAL 

OF THE UNITED STATES 

Drug abuse is a major national problem despite increasingly 

expensive federal anti-drug efforts. Federal expenditures for 

drug control were nearly $4 billion in fiscal year 1987. The 

drug problem persists because of the enormous demand for illegal 

drugs in the United States and the overwhelming supply of illegal 

drugs available to meet the demand. 

It is time to reassess federal drug abuse control policy and 

strategy. If we measure success by the number of drug users and 

the amounts of drugs being smuggled into the country, we must 

unfortunately conclude that our present strategy and policies are 

not working. Experts disagree and opinions vary about which 

anti-drug programs work best, and about which programs should 

receive a higher priority and increased resources. An increasing 

number of experts believe we should attack the root of our drug 

problem, America's demand for illegal drugs. This approach 

warrants strong consideration. 

We must also have better management and stronger leadership of 

federal drug control efforts. We lack a cohesive federal antidrug policy and strategy. Numerous organizational changes have 

been made over the past 20 years to reduce the fragmentation of 

federal anti-drug efforts, improve coordination, and strengthen 

leadership and oversight. Presently, the National Drug Policy 

Board is charged with this mission. The authority and 

responsibility for planning and coordinating federal anti-drug 

efforts needs to reside in a single official directly accountable 

to the President, To succeed, this individual must receive 

strong and sustained support from the President and the Congress. 

The military has become increasingly involved in supporting 

federal anti-drug efforts. The costs and benefits of having the 

military do more, however, require careful and thoughtful 

consideration. Increasing military support would probably result 

in more drug seizures and arrests, but it may not significantly 

reduce drug supplies. DOD officials also believe a substantial 

increase in military assistance could adversely affect military 

readiness. In addition, providing military personnel with 

search, seizure, and arrest authority would be a significant 

departure from this country's long-standing tradition of 

separating national defense and civilian law enforcement 

responsibilities. Whatever the Congress decides, the military's 

role must be part of a unified federal anti-drug policy and 

strategy. 
Chairman Nunn and Members of the Committee: 

We are pleased to be a part of your hearings examining the status 

of the United States drug situation and the federal government's 

anti-drug efforts, including the military's role in the "war on 

drugs." 

Drug abuse continues to be a major national problem despite 

increasingly expensive federal anti-drug efforts over the last 

twenty years. The problem persists because of the enormous 

demand for illegal drugs in the United States and the 

overwhelming supply of illegal drugs available to meet this 

demand. 

THE FEDERAL DRUG STRATEGY 

HAS NOT CURTAILED DRUG ABUSE 

The drug problem has been a matter of national concern since the 

early 1900s when the narcotics laws were first passed. Early 

efforts to deal with the problem primarily focused on reducing 

the supply of drugs, first with the 1914 Harrison Narcotic Act 

requiring manufacturers and distributors of opium, morphine, 

heroin, or coca products to register and pay taxes, then later by 

prohibition and strict legal control. 

1 
By the end of the 195Os, the public and legislators generally 

agreed that the strict supply reduction policy by itself was not 

enough. During the 1960s and 197Os, drug abuse increased 

dramatically and spread to new markets. The almost exclusive 

emphasis on supply reduction and stiff penalties was challenged 

with growing frequency, leading to increased research and 

experimentation with treatment for drug abusers. With the 

passage of the Drug Abuse Office and Treatment Act of 1972 

(Public Law 92-255), federal policy clearly called for a more 

balanced response to the drug abuse problem by adding a vigorous 

prevention and treatment component to the federal effort. From 

1970 to 1976, more federal drug control funding was devoted to 

such programs, which were designed to reduce the demand for 

drugs. 

Most of the early demand reduction activities were directed 

toward providing treatment for drug users, particularly heroin 

addicts. Heroin abuse had emerged in the mid-1960s as a problem 

of major significance, and heroin was essentially the number one 

drug priority throughout the 1970s. 

In the 198Os, the situation has become dramatically different. 

Cocaine is now the major problem. The smuggling of drugs, 

especially cocaine, from South America has escalated, and the 

federal government's drug strategy now places much greater 

emphasis on supply reduction, especially on interdicting drugs 

2 
being smuggled into the United States. As chart A shows, 

expenditures for federal anti-drug efforts have increased from 

$129.5 million in 1970 to nearly $4 billion in 1987. The 

budgetary emphasis shifted to supply reduction programs in 1977, 

and the spending gap between supply and demand reduction efforts 

has continually widened since. By 1987, the federal government 

was spending three times more on supply reduction than demand 

reduction, $3 billion and $1 billion, respectively. Our analysis 

shows that spending on drug interdiction activities increased by 

about 1,500 percent from 1977 to 1987. 

Despite the increased funding, there is a continuing heavy demand 

for drugs by U.S. consumers. Americans want drugs,‘and they are 

willing to pay a high price to get them. 

The latest National Survey on Drug Abuse in 1985 shows that the 

overall level of illicit drug use reported by households has 

remained high. About 70 million people (37 percent of the 

population over 12 years of age) had used an illegal drug at 

least once in their lifetime and about 23 million people (12 

percent) were current users (i.e., they reported using a drug at 

least once in the 30 days prior to being surveyed). 

There are a variety of new drug trends in the 1980s. But cocaine 

has emerged as the widely abused drug of greatest concern, and 

"crack," a potent and highly addictive form of cocaine, has 

3 
exploded in epidemic proportions in some cities. Chart B 

illustrates the increased cocaine consumption in this country 

from 1982 to 1985, and charts C and D show the resulting trends 

in cocaine-related hospital emergencies and deaths from 1983 

through 1987. In all cases, the trend is up. 

The heroin addict population has remained relatively stable since 

the 1970s at about 500,000. However, Mexican "black tar," a new 

and crudely processed form of heroin that is high in purity but 

low in price, has become more widely available. "Black tar" can 

be processed in a shorter time than traditional Mexican brown 

powder heroin, leaving several impurities in the drug and 

coloring it dark brown to black. Marijuana use has been 

declining, but it remains the most widely abused illegal drug in 

the country. The estimated U.S. marijuana consumption was 4.9 

thousand metric tons in 1982, compared to 4.7 thousand metric 

tons in 1985. Domestic marijuana production has increased as has 

the potency of the marijuana available on the market. Another 

problem reported by law enforcement officials is the increased 

violence associated with drug trafficking, including much greater 

use of automatic weapons by the traffickers. 

Drug production in foreign countries remains at high levels 

despite international drug control programs, and supplies 

available for export to the United States are plentiful. For 

example, there was an estimated 45 to 55 metric tons of opium 

4 
produced in Mexico in 1987, 735 to 1,360 metric tons produced in 

Southwest Asia in 1987, and 1,095 to 1,575 metric tons produced 

in Southeast Asia during the 1986-1987 growing season. The 

amount of cocaine produced in Colombia, Peru, Bolivia, and 

Ecuador in 1987 was estimated to be 322 to 418 metric tons. 

Countries involved are often not motivated to take strong action 

against drug cultivation, which, in many cases, has been an 

important part of their culture and economy for centuries. Major 

source countries, such as Iran, Afghanistan, and Laos, are 

outside U.S. influence, and other governments, such as Colombia 

and Bolivia, where cooperative efforts have been attempted, have 

been subjected to corruption and violence by drug traffickers. 

Contributing to the problem are the enormous profits of drug 

trafficking, which attract an endless stream of entrepreneurs who 

see opportunities far outweighing those offered by legitimate 

businesses. The President's Commission on Organized Crime 

reported in 1986 that drug trafficking generates an income 

estimated to be as high as $110 billion. 

Finally, it is still relatively easy to smuggle illegal drugs 

into the United States and sell them to willing customers once 

they are here. Only a small part of the drugs smuggled into the 

United States are interdicted before they reach the domestic drug 

trafficking networks. For example, Customs estimated that 27 

tons of cocaine were seized in fiscal year 1986 out of an 

5 
estimated 138 tons smuggled into the country, and 1,106 tons of 

marijuana were seized out of an estimated 11,000 tons smuggled in 

that same year. 

FEDERAL ANTI-DRUG POLICY AND 

STRATEGY MUST BE REASSESSED 

It is time to reassess federal drug abuse control policy and 

strategy. If we want to measure success by looking at the number 

of drug users and amounts of drugs entering the country, we must 

unfortunately conclude that our present strategy and policies are 

not working. The dilemma is that no one knows which drug control 

programs are the most effective. Opinions vary about what the 

federal government should do to control the drug problem. 

Experts disagree about which anti-drug programs work best, and 

about which programs should receive a higher priority and 

increased resources. 

An increasing number of drug experts believe that the root cause 

of our national drug problem is the demand for illegal drugs. 

Since our current approach is not working, it is time to consider 

devoting more emphasis and more resources to activities aimed at 

reducing demand: prevention, treatment, and research on the 

causes and extent of drug abuse. I do not suggest that efforts 

to control the supply of illegal drugs are useless and should be 

reduced. I do suggest, however, that the Congress and the 

6 
executive branch should exercise great caution before deciding to 

devote more resources and more emphasis to supply reduction 

programs. 

BETTER MANAGEMENT AND STRONGER 

LEADERSHIP ARE NEEDED 

We must also have better management and stronger leadership of 

federal drug abuse control efforts. In reports and testimonies 

dating back to the early 197Os, we have repeatedly pointed out 

problems caused by the fragmentation of federal anti-drug efforts 

among several cabinet departments and agencies and the resulting 

lack of coordination of federal drug control policies and 

programs. 

Numerous organizational changes have been made over the past 20 

years to reduce the fragmentation of federal anti-drug efforts, 

improve coordination, and strengthen leadership and oversight. 

At present, the National Drug Policy Board, chaired by the 

Attorney General, is charged with strengthening central direction 

and facilitating coordination of federal drug abuse control 

policy and programs. 

In February 1988, we reported that the Policy Board had made some 

progress in facilitating coordination among drug law enforcement 

agencies. The Policy Board had also made several policy 

7 
decisions, and issued the National and International Drug Law 

Enforcement Strategy--primarily a description of existing drug 

enforcement strategies and activities. However, the Board had 

not exercised its statutory authority and responsibility to 

develop budgetary priorities, on the grounds that it lacked the 

information needed to decide where resources should be allocated. 

Exercising budget authority effectively is a key to having a 

cohesive policy. 

The Board has been unable to make the hard choices affecting 

agency budgets and programs necessary to bring cohesion to 

federal drug control efforts. The Policy Board operates by 

consensus, and its members, who are heads of departments and 

agencies, each have vested interests in the programs of the 

organizations they represent. 

I believe that the time has come to assign the authority and 

responsibility for planning and coordinating federal anti-drug 

efforts to a single individual. This individual must be directly 

accountable to the President for developing and implementing a 

unified drug abuse control policy and a coordinated anti-drug 

strategy. But organizational changes by themselves are not 

sufficient to solve the problem. To succeed, this individual 

must receive strong and sustained support from the President and 

the Congress. 

8 
One of the first priorities of the President's drug policy 

coordinator should be to improve the quality and quantity of 

information that can be used to assess drug control programs and 

determine which are the most effective. Existing data systems 

portray general drug trends and help gauge the overall impact of 

the federal drug strategy, but they do not adequately measure the 

effectiveness of specific drug control efforts. 

EXPANDING THE MILITARY'S 

ANTI-DRUG ROLE REQUIRES 

CAREFUL CONSIDERATION 

The passage of the Posse Comitatus Act Amendment in 1981 

clarified the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD) can 

indirectly support civilian law enforcement efforts. Since then, 

the military has played an increasing role in anti-drug efforts 

that has concentrated almost exclusively on assisting 

interdiction efforts. The costs of DOD interdiction support have 

risen steadily-- from an estimated $5 million in fiscal year 1982 

to about $405 million in fiscal year 1987. 

DOD contributes support to civilian drug interdiction efforts in 

a variety of ways. For example, military surveillance aircraft 

provide radar coverage of areas determined by Customs and Coast 

Guard to be major air and marine smuggling routes; selected Navy 

ships patrolling the Caribbean have Coast Guard personnel aboard 

9 
to interdict suspected smugglers; Army helicopters transport 

Bahamian law enforcement teams on apprehension missions in the 

Bahamas; and Army helicopters and personnel were used to 

transport Bolivian strike teams in raids on cocaine labs. In 

addition, DOD supports anti-drug efforts by sharing intelligence; 

training law enforcement personnel; and loaning communications 

equipment, radars, weapons, motion sensors, night vision goggles, 

and other equipment. 

DOD is prohibited by statute from assisting drug law enforcement 

agencies if such assistance will adversely affect military 

readiness. According to DOD officials , providing support to drug 

law enforcement agencies affects readiness to some degree but the 

impact so far has been minimal. Thus, DOD infrequently turns 

down requests for assistance on the basis of readiness 

considerations, but it has, on occasion, provided a lower level 

of support than requested because of potential readiness 

degradation. DOD officials contend, however, that substantially 

increasing military assistance could adversely affect readiness. 

While greater involvement by the military would probably result 

in more drug seizures and arrests and create a greater deterrent 

effect, such increases may not significantly reduce drug 

supplies. Drug traffickers have numerous smuggling methods and 

routes available and can quickly counter interdiction strategies. 

10 
Drug producers also have such large quantities of raw materials 

available that they can overcome losses from interdiction. 

Furthermore, most DOD anti-drug assistance, like most civilian 

drug interdiction activities, is directed at trying to stop drugs 

being smuggled into the country on boats and airplanes between 

ports-of-entry. Such interdiction activities are very expensive 

and have produced few results. For example, the Air Force 

reported that in fiscal year 1987 it designated 591 AWACS flying 

hours to interdiction, and only 6 seizures and 10 arrests were 

attributed to this effort. The incremental cost to DOD 

associated with this assistance was $2.6 million. Similarly, the 

Navy and the Coast Guard reported that Coast Guard personnel were 

on board Navy ships for a total of 2,500 ship days in 1987 to 

conduct interdictions. According to the Navy and Coast Guard, 

these efforts resulted in 20 vessel seizures and 110 arrests at a 

total cost of about $40 million. 

Marijuana is the drug that is most frequently interdicted between 

ports-of-entry. But most heroin and a large percentage of 

cocaine entering the United States is thought to be smuggled 

through ports-of-entry (e.g., cargo containers, airline 

passengers, automotive vehicles). The law prohibits DOD 

personnel from conducting port-of-entry searches and seizures, 

and DOD officials believe that if this prohibition were lifted, 

the number of military personnel needed to make port-of-entry 

11 
inspection efforts more successful would be great and would 

directly detract from the Armed Services' primary mission. 

Perhaps the greatest need that drug law enforcement agencies have 

for interdiction efforts is drug intelligence, especially realtime intelligence concerning specific smuggling movements, such 

as aircraft and boat departures and commercial shipments known to 

contain contraband. Some experts believe that drug interdiction 

efforts can best be improved by developing more reliable and 

timely intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination so 

that law enforcement agencies can more effectively target their 

interdiction efforts. DOD has tasked some of its personnel 

outside the United States with collecting drug-related 

intelligence, th0ug.h DOD points out that the amount of drug 

intelligence these personnel can collect is limited, given their 

military missions. 

Both the Senate and House versions of the Defense authorization 

bill propose not only to increase the level of DOD involvement in 

the anti-drug effort but also to provide military personnel with 

search, seizure, and arrest authority under certain conditions. 

Before making decisions, there are several issues Congress should 

carefully consider. Providing military personnel with police 

authority would be a significant departure from this country's 

long-standing tradition of separating national defense and 

12 
civilian law enforcement responsibilities. However, if Congress 

decides to give the military that authority, it needs to be 

defined very carefully. DOD's role in collecting intelligence to 

support drug enforcement also raises questions--we must take 

every precaution to make sure that the military does not become 

involved in domestic intelligence operations like those it 

engaged in during the 1960s. Other considerations are the 

additional training that would be required if military personnel 

are to safely and effectively carry out searches, seizures, and 

arrests, and the impact on military readiness if more personnel 

are diverted to a nonmilitary mission. In addition, we question 

the advisability of the Navy routinely boarding U.S. and foreign 

registered vessels given the potential sensitivity of American 

citizens and foreign governments to such boardings; In summary, 

the military can play a key role in providing logistical and 

technical support to civilian drug law enforcement efforts, but 

going beyond such a role needs careful consideration. And even 

that role must be part of a unified federal anti-drug plan. 

That concludes my prepared remarks. We would be pleased to 

respond to questions. 

13 
Chart A: Federal Spending-Supply Versus Demand 

4.0 

2.1 

2.0 

2.5 

20 

1.1 

ll0 

1Om lS7l ls72 1072 lS74 1076 1076 lS77 1sn mm lmo 1Ml lQ82 lm2 1924 1sSS 1Bw 1% 

Source: Vaious Federal Drug Slrategy Documents 
Chart B: Estimated U.S. Cocalno 

Consumption, 1962 and 1995 

60 TonsconslJrnsd 

70 

60 

so 

40 

30 

20 

10 

0 

1662 1666 

Note: Metric ton=2,205 pounds. 

6ource: National lnstihm on Drug Abuse 
Chart C: Trends in Cocaine-Related 

Hospital Emergencies, 1983-1987 

wooo Enmgrncy Room Yontbns 

2sooO 

10000 

-da 

0 

1922 1284 192s lsm lw7 

Source: National Institute on Drug Abuse, unpublished DAWN data, May 1988. 
Chart D: Trends In Cocaine-Related 

Deaths, 1983-1987 I 

1400 Dmmthm 

1300 

1266 

1166 

1666 

a00 

wo 

700 

606 

so0 

4w 

300 

200 

100 

0 

Souroe: National institute on Dnrg Abuse. unpubtirhed DAWN dala, May 1999.