In the United States Court of Federal Claims

No. 19-400L

(Filed: June 24, 2022)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

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ELIZABETH G. BRADLEY et al., *

*

Plaintiffs, * Notice of Attorney’s Lien; Antiassignment

* Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3727; District of Columbia

v. * Law Regarding Attorney’s Liens; Sovereign

* Immunity

THE UNITED STATES, *

*

Defendant. *

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ORDER STRIKING NOTICE OF ATTORNEY’S LIEN

On May 9, 2022, James H. Hulme, on behalf of ArentFox Schiff LLP (“ArentFox

Schiff”), filed a notice of attorney’s lien in the above-captioned case. Mr. Hulme avers that the 

purpose of the filing is to 

assert[] an attorney’s lien against any recovery by Plaintiffs, or any award of fees 

and costs to the Plaintiffs[,] . . . based upon legal services performed and costs 

incurred by ArentFox Schiff in connection with the representation of [some of 

the] Plaintiffs in this action, from inception of the matter through January 31, 

2019.

Notice of Attorney’s Lien 1. The filing of such a lien is authorized, he contends, by United 

States Court of Claims (“Court of Claims”) precedent and District of Columbia law. The court 

disagrees.1

1

 Neither plaintiffs nor defendant moved to strike Mr. Hulme’s filing. However, in a 

footnote in its response to ArentFox Schiff’s motion to intervene, defendant argues that the 

“notice of attorney lien should be stricken as improper, as there is no waiver of sovereign 

immunity supporting such a lien and it conflicts with the Anti-Assignment Act.” Def.’s Resp. 4 

n.3. ArentFox Schiff responds that defendant “misreads the language and spirit of the Notice of 

Lien . . . in asserting that ArentFox Schiff is seeking a claim against the United States” because 

“the lien exists upon the right of Plaintiffs and [their] current counsel to receive the proceeds in 

this case.” ArentFox Schiff Reply 7. Notwithstanding ArentFox Schiff’s characterization, its 

purported lien would give it an interest in any award payable to plaintiffs by defendant. See

Pittman v. United States, 116 F. Supp. 576, 579-80 (Ct. Cl. 1953) (remarking that a contingency 

fee agreement “did attempt to create in [the attorney] an interest in the proceeds of the claim 

asserted on behalf of the client against the United States, as security for the payment of [the 

attorney’s] fee” and that the attorney was seeking “to hold the Government liable” for his fee); 
-2-

As Mr. Hulme observes, the Court of Claims stated in Carver v. United States that when 

a claimant seeks to substitute a new attorney to appear on his behalf, and the original attorney 

was proceeding on a contingency fee basis, “courts will assure [the original attorney] of a lien 

upon the ultimate judgment, and secure his immediate re-imbursement of the expenses that have 

been incurred.” 7 Ct. Cl. 499, 500 (1871). However, thirty-five years later, the United States 

Supreme Court (“Supreme Court”) held in Nutt v. Knut that a contractual provision deeming the 

payment of attorney’s fees to be a lien on the client’s claim against the federal government was 

contrary to statute. 200 U.S. 12, 19-21 (1906). The statute at issue generally prohibited the 

assignment of claims against the United States:

All transfers and assignments made of any claim upon the United States, or of any 

part or share thereof, or interest therein, whether absolute or conditional, and 

whatever may be the consideration therefor . . . shall be absolutely null and void 

unless they are freely made and executed in the presence of at least two attesting 

witnesses, after the allowance of such a claim, the ascertainment of the amount 

due, and the issuing of a warrant for the payment thereof. 

Id. at 19 n.† (quoting 36 Rev. Stat. § 3477 (1878)2

). The Supreme Court explained that one of 

the purposes of this statute, commonly referred to as the Antiassignment Act, 

was to forbid anyone who was a stranger to the original transaction to come 

between the claimant and the government, prior to the allowance of a claim, and 

who, in asserting his own interest or share in the claim, pending its examination, 

might embarrass the conduct of the business on the part of the officers of the 

government.

Id. at 20. 

Subsequently, in Pittman, the Court of Claims applied the holding in Nutt to a situation in 

which an attorney, who was working pursuant to a contingency fee agreement, asserted an 

attorney’s lien against the amount recovered by his client from the federal government. 116 F. 

Supp. at 576. Recognizing that Nutt “stands for the broad principle that any attempt to impress a 

lien upon the proceeds of a claim against the United States as security for the payment of an 

attorney’s fee is within the ends to which the prohibition of [the Antiassignment Act] was 

aimed,” id. at 580, the court held that that the lien asserted by the attorney “was a nullity,” id. at 

578. See generally id. at 580 (“The Anti-Assignment statute was enacted for the purpose of 

preventing third parties, with whom the Government was not in privity, from acquiring an 

enforceable interest in a claim against it.”). The Court of Claims reached this same conclusion in 

Lien, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (defining the type of attorney’s lien asserted by 

ArentFox Schiff––a charging lien––as “[t]he right of an attorney . . . to encumber money payable 

to the client . . . until the attorney’s fees have been properly determined and paid”). 

2

 This version of the statute was enacted in 1853. See Act of Feb. 26, 1853, § 1, 10 Stat. 

170, 170. The current version of the statute, enacted in 1982, is substantively similar. See 31 

U.S.C. § 3727(a)-(b). 
-3-

other cases. See Kearney v. United States, 285 F.2d 797, 800 (Ct. Cl. 1961) (concluding that “a 

contract between an attorney and a client which gives the attorney an interest in the client’s claim 

against the Government is exactly what the anti-assignment statute forbids”); Empire Ordinance 

Corp. v. United States, 128 F. Supp. 744, 744-45 (Ct. Cl. 1955) (holding that an attorney’s lien 

authorized by the plaintiff’s board of directors was “ineffectual because of the Anti-Assignment 

Act”). 

In light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Nutt and the Court of Claims precedent 

applying the holding of Nutt––all of which is binding on this court––Mr. Hulme’s reliance on 

Carver is not well taken. Furthermore, Mr. Hulme has not alleged that the requirements of the 

current version of the Antiassignment Act have been satisfied. See 31 U.S.C. § 3727(a)-(b) 

(reflecting that an assignment of a claim, or an interest in a claim, against the United States “may 

be made only after a claim is allowed, the amount of the claim is decided, and a warrant for 

payment of the claim has been issued”). Consequently, the notice of attorney’s lien filed by Mr. 

Hulme violates the Antiassignment Act. 

Case law from the District of Columbia supporting the use of attorney’s liens in 

contingent fee cases does not alter this conclusion. As an initial matter, the decisions relied upon 

by Mr. Hulme did not involve a claim against the federal government and, therefore, did not

implicate the Antiassignment Act. Moreover, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal 

Circuit (“Federal Circuit”) has expressly concluded that the application of a state’s attorney’s 

lien statute against the United States is barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. See

Knight v. United States, 982 F.2d 1573, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (holding that “unless the United 

States has submitted itself to such state law, an attorney lien statute . . . has no force or effect 

against it and places no restraints on the government’s payment of its obligations to another”); 

accord Tucker v. United States, 7 Cl. Ct. 374, 376 (1985). Notably, Mr. Hulme was made aware 

of this binding Federal Circuit precedent by the Honorable Armando O. Bonilla during a March 

31, 2022 status conference in another case in which ArentFox Schiff filed a notice of attorney’s 

lien. See Transcript of Status Conference at 10, Arnold v. United States, No. 15-1252L (Fed. Cl. 

Mar. 31, 2022) (citing Knight and Tucker for the proposition that the notice of attorney’s lien

filed in a consolidated case was “contrary to the law of this Circuit”). Thereafter, on April 8, 

2022, ArentFox Schiff withdrew the notice of attorney’s lien. See Praecipe, Dawson v. United 

States, No. 15-1268L (Fed. Cl. Apr. 8, 2022). Given these events, it is difficult to understand 

why Mr. Hulme––only six days later––chose to file a notice of attorney’s lien in this case, and 

did so without attempting to establish that the United States has subjected itself to District of 

Columbia law regarding attorney’s liens so as to waive its sovereign immunity. 

In short, the notice of attorney’s lien filed by Mr. Hulme violates the Antiassignment Act 

and is barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Accordingly, the court directs the clerk to 

STRIKE the notice of attorney’s lien (ECF No. 83) from the docket. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

s/ Margaret M. Sweeney 

MARGARET M. SWEENEY

Senior Judge