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ORDERED PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY APPELLATE PANEL

OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT

In re: ) BAP No. CC-13-1145-TaDKi

)

H GRANADOS COMMUNICATIONS, ) Bk. No. 1:12-bk-10197-AA

INC., )

)

Debtor. )

______________________________)

)

REDIGER INVESTMENT )

CORPORATION; DURINGER LAW )

GROUP, PLC, )

)

Appellants, )

)

v. ) O P I N I O N

)

H GRANADOS COMMUNICATIONS, )

INC. )

)

Appellee. )

 )

Argued and Submitted on November 21, 2013 

at Pasadena, California

Filed – December 24, 2013

Appeal from the United States Bankruptcy Court

for the Central District of California

Honorable Alan M. Ahart, Bankruptcy Judge, Presiding

 

Appearances: Edward L. Laird, II of Duringer Law Group, PLC

argued for appellants Rediger Investment

Corporation and Duringer Law Group, PLC; Elaine

V. Nguyen of Weintraub & Selth, APC argued for

appellee H. Granados Communications, Inc.

 

Before: TAYLOR, DUNN, and KIRSCHER, Bankruptcy Judges.

FILED

DEC 24 2013

SUSAN M. SPRAUL, CLERK

U.S. BKCY. APP. PANEL

OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT
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 Unless otherwise indicated, all chapter and section 1

references are to the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1532. 

All “Rule” references are to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy

Procedure and all “Civil Rule” references are to the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure.

 We exercise our discretion to take judicial notice of 2

documents filed in the bankruptcy case. See O’Rourke v.

Seaboard Sur. Co. (In re E.R. Fegert, Inc.), 887 F.2d 955,

957-58 (9th Cir. 1989).

2

TAYLOR, Bankruptcy Judge:

The bankruptcy court held appellants Rediger Investment

Corporation (“Rediger”) and its counsel, the Duringer Law Group,

PLC (“Duringer Firm” and, jointly, the “Appellants”) in civil

contempt under 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) for violation of the 1

automatic stay. As a result, it awarded sanctions against the

Appellants, jointly and severally, in the amount of $23,072.09. 

Rediger and the Duringer Firm appeal. We AFFIRM.

FACTS

The Duringer Firm, representing Rediger, commenced an

unlawful detainer action in state court (“State Court Action”)

against H Granados Communications, Inc. (“Debtor”) and its

president, Henry Granados. Four months later, the Debtor filed

for bankruptcy relief under chapter 11. It listed Rediger on

its Schedule F, its List of Creditors Holding 20 Largest

Unsecured Claims, and its creditor mailing matrix. As a 2

result, Rediger promptly received notice (“Notice of

Bankruptcy”) of the bankruptcy case (the “Bankruptcy”). At an

early point in the Bankruptcy, the Debtor obtained an order

limiting notice of most events in the chapter 11 case to, among
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 It is unclear from the record who represented the Debtor 3

in the State Court Action.

3

others, the 20 largest unsecured creditors; this included

Rediger. Thus, Rediger received notices throughout the

Bankruptcy.

It also appears that the Debtor filed the Notice of

Bankruptcy in the State Court Action on or about the petition

date of January 8, 2012. The record includes a copy of the

Notice of Bankruptcy bearing a stamp of the Executive

Officer/Clerk for the Superior Court of California, County of

Los Angeles, dated January 8, 2012. ECF No. 226, Ex. G at 29. 

The record also contains a copy of the case summary in the State

Court Action as of January 23, 2013, which includes an entry

dated January 8, 2012 and states “Notice of Bankruptcy Filed.” 

ECF No. 242, Ex. J at 70. Debtor’s counsel submitted these

documents, and there is no evidence that the Duringer Firm

objected to submission of the documents as evidence. In fact,

and as discussed further below, the Duringer Firm conceded the

veracity of these documents at oral argument.

Despite this notice, the Duringer Firm (on behalf of

Rediger) continued to prosecute the State Court Action against

the Debtor during the first three-quarters of 2012: it obtained

a default judgment against the Debtor and Mr. Granados, filed a

declaration of accrued interest, and eventually obtained a writ

of execution.

Debtor’s bankruptcy counsel apparently was oblivious to the

events occurring in the State Court Action; but eventually, on 3
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November 1, 2012, she personally filed a notice of stay of

proceedings (“Notice of Stay”) in the State Court Action and

served the same on both Rediger and the Duringer Firm. As a

result, there is no dispute that as of November 2, 2012, both

Rediger and the Duringer Firm knew that the Bankruptcy existed.

One month later, the Los Angeles County Sheriff levied on

the Debtor’s DIP bank account at City National Bank (“Bank”),

which deprived the Debtor of the use of $27,941.26. In

response, Debtor’s counsel wrote to the Sheriff and the Bank,

advising of the pending Bankruptcy and demanding a release of

the levy. Debtor’s counsel also sent this letter to the

Duringer Firm, underscoring the bankruptcy notices previously

provided to the Appellants.

This letter initiated a series of communications between

Debtor’s counsel and the Duringer Firm. It appears, in

particular, that the latter was attempting to obtain

verification of the exact party in bankruptcy; that is, whether

it was the Debtor or Mr. Granados or both. The volley of

communications went on for over a month.

At the end of December 2012, the Debtor moved for an order

to show cause why the Appellants should not be found in contempt

for willfully violating the automatic stay. The bankruptcy

court issued an order to show cause and identified five events

as possible stay violations: (1) filing a request for entry of

default judgment and supporting declaration in the State Court

Action; (2) obtaining entry of default judgment; (3) filing a

declaration of accrued interest and obtaining a writ of

execution; (4) causing the Los Angeles County Sheriff to serve a
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levy on the Debtor’s DIP bank account at the Bank; and

(5) refusing to release the levied funds despite repeated

requests by Debtor’s counsel.

During this time, the Debtor also actively worked to remedy

(or limit the effects of) the stay violations with respect to

both the State Court Action and levied funds. On January 15,

2013, the levy of funds finally was released and credited to the

Debtor’s DIP bank account. One week later, the state court

vacated the previously entered default judgment.

The bankruptcy court heard the OSC and found that both

Rediger and the Duringer Firm willfully violated the stay. It,

therefore, held them in civil contempt under § 105(a), awarded

compensatory damages, and instructed the Debtor to file

declaratory evidence of the fees and costs incurred as a result

of the stay violations. The Debtor submitted a memorandum

(“Damages Memorandum”), along with the declarations of its

counsel and an employee, detailing the costs and expenses

incurred by counsel and employees in connection with the stay

violations. The bankruptcy court entered its order holding the

Appellants in civil contempt (“Contempt Order”) on February 19,

2013.

At a continued hearing on the sanctions issue, the

bankruptcy court, relying on its tentative ruling, awarded the

compensatory sanctions for costs incurred as a result of the

stay violations. These included attorneys’ fees for review of

the Appellants’ opposition to the Damages Memorandum and

appearance at the sanctions hearing. The bankruptcy court

thereafter entered an order awarding sanctions against the
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Appellants, jointly and severally, in the amount of $23,072.09

(“Sanctions Award”).

The Appellants timely appealed.

JURISDICTION

The bankruptcy court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1334 and 157(b). We have jurisdiction over this appeal

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158.

ISSUES

Did the bankruptcy court abuse its discretion in:

(1) finding that the Appellants wilfully violated the automatic

stay and, thus, holding them in civil contempt; or (2) awarding

sanctions against them in connection with the civil contempt

determination?

STANDARDS OF REVIEW

We review the decision to impose contempt and an award of

sanctions for an abuse of discretion. See Knupfer v. Lindblade

(In re Dyer), 322 F.3d 1178, 1191 (9th Cir. 2003) (civil

contempt); Rosales v. Wallace (In re Wallace), 490 B.R. 898,

904-05 (9th Cir. BAP 2013) (sanctions award for civil contempt). 

The underlying factual findings are reviewed for clear error. 

In re Dyer, 322 F.3d at 1191.

Abuse of discretion is a two-prong test; first, we

determine de novo whether the bankruptcy court identified the

correct legal rule for application. See United States v.

Hinkson, 585 F.3d 1247, 1261-62 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc). If

not, then the bankruptcy court necessarily abused its

discretion. See id. at 1262. Otherwise, we next review whether

the bankruptcy court’s application of the correct legal rule was
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clearly erroneous; we will affirm unless its findings were

illogical, implausible, or without support in inferences that

may be drawn from the facts in the record. See id.

DISCUSSION

A. Preliminary Issues

1. The Appellants’ request for judicial notice is denied.

The Appellants move for this Panel’s judicial notice,

pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 201, of the following

documents in the State Court Action: (1) the state court

complaint; and (2) a judgment and writ of possession entered on

September 22, 2011. We reviewed the documents and deny the

motion for judicial notice as the documents do not enhance our

review or otherwise lend assistance in the present appeal.

2. The scope of appeal includes the Contempt Order.

The Debtor argues that appeal of the Contempt Order is

untimely. It contends that Appellants filed the Notice of

Appeal more than 14 days after entry of the Contempt Order and

also failed to designate the Contempt Order therein.

The Contempt Order was an interlocutory order that became

final and appealable once the bankruptcy court awarded

sanctions. See Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Int’l Longshoremen’s &

Warehousemen’s Union, 733 F.2d 645, 645 (9th Cir. 1984); see

also Donovan v. Mazzola, 761 F.2d 1411, 1417 (9th Cir. 1985). 

Upon entry of the Sanctions Award, the Contempt Order merged

into the earlier order. Thus, the Contempt Order is also

subject to this appeal. See Am. Ironworks & Erectors, Inc. v.

N. Am. Const. Corp., 248 F.3d 892, 897-98 (9th Cir. 2001).

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B. The Bankruptcy Court Did Not Err in Entering the Contempt

Order.

1. The record is sufficient to review the issues on

appeal.

A motion for contempt is a contested matter and,

consequently, subject to Rule 9014. In turn, in a contested

matter, the bankruptcy court must render findings of fact and

conclusions of law as required by Civil Rule 52(a) (incorporated

by Rules 7052 and 9014(c)).

Here, the bankruptcy court made no express findings in

connection with the Contempt Order, but did adopt a tentative

ruling. The tentative, however, merely states that the

bankruptcy court intended to grant the Debtor’s request for

civil contempt; it contains no factual discussion or legal

analysis. Thus, the tentative is not a substitute for the

findings required by Rule 9014(c).

Where the bankruptcy court rules without articulating its

findings, however, there is no reversible error where the record

provides the reviewing court with a full, complete, and clear

view of the issues on appeal. First Yorkshire Holdings, Inc. v.

Pacifica L 22, LLC (In re First Yorkshire Holdings, Inc.), 470

B.R. 864, 871 (9th Cir. BAP 2012) (citation omitted). Review of

the record suffices when it contains clear references to the

factual basis supporting the bankruptcy court’s ultimate

conclusions. Id. Here, the record as a whole provides us with

a full, complete, and clear view of the issues on appeal. 

Therefore, we turn to review of the Contempt Order.

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2. The Appellants wilfully violated the automatic stay.

Section 362(k) permits the recovery of damages resulting

from a stay violation. This subsection, however, applies only

to individuals, which, as relevant here, excludes corporations. 

See Johnston Envtl. Corp. v. Knight (In re Goodman), 991 F.2d

613, 619 (9th Cir. 1993) (discussing former § 362(h)). 

Nonetheless, a corporation may be entitled to recovery for a

stay violation under § 105(a) as a sanction for civil contempt. 

See id. at 620; In re Dyer, 322 F.3d at 1191 (for civil contempt

purposes, the automatic stay under § 362 “qualifies as a

specific and definite court order.”).

To find a party in civil contempt for a stay violation, the

threshold inquiry turns on a finding of “willfulness.” Id. at

1191. The bankruptcy court must find that: (1) the party knew

of the automatic stay; and (2) the party’s actions that violated

the stay were intentional. Id. Thus, it is irrelevant whether

the party exhibited bad faith or had a subjective intent to

violate the stay. Id. The movant bears the burden of showing

by clear and convincing evidence that the party violated the

stay. See id.

In its opening brief, the Duringer Firm contends that it

was unaware of the Bankruptcy until Debtor’s counsel served it

with the Notice of Stay on November 2, 2012. The law firm does

not expressly contest that Rediger, its client, was aware of the

Bankruptcy; in fact, the law firm conceded as much at the

sanctions hearing.

At oral argument, however, the Appellants expressly

conceded a willful violation of the automatic stay. In
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particular, the Duringer Firm, in substance, conceded that the

Notice of Bankruptcy was filed in the State Court Action at the

commencement of the Bankruptcy. The law firm subsequently

conceded that the stay was willfully violated. This is

sufficient to affirm a “willfulness” finding under § 105(a), and

our review of the bankruptcy court’s finding of civil contempt

for a stay violation need not go any farther.

Even so, the record supports the bankruptcy court’s

determination of “wilfulness.” First, as previously stated, the

record contains two documents showing that the Notice of

Bankruptcy was filed in the State Court Action on or about the

date of the bankruptcy petition. The Appellants neither

contested this below or on appeal; the Duringer Firm, instead,

conceded the veracity of the documents at oral argument. This

establishes that the Appellants were cognizant of the Bankruptcy

– and, more importantly, aware of the automatic stay – in

January of 2012.

In addition, the record further supports that the

Appellants were otherwise made aware of the Bankruptcy and the

automatic stay long before the OSC issued. As to Rediger, the

record shows that it was served with the Notice of Bankruptcy at

the end of January 2012. And, as one of the Debtor’s largest 20

creditors, Rediger continued thereafter to receive notices of

the Debtor’s filings. Rediger, thus, was, charged with notice

of the stay shortly after the case was filed.

As to the Duringer Firm, even if we accept that it was

unaware of the Bankruptcy until November 2012 – which we do not

– the record is clear that Debtor’s counsel served the law firm
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with the Notice of Stay on November 2, 2012. The law firm,

thus, clearly had notice of the Bankruptcy as of that date.

In sum, the record provides alternative evidence supporting

that the Appellants were aware of the Bankruptcy and, thus,

charged with knowledge of the automatic stay at various points

during the Bankruptcy; this satisfies the first prong of the

“willfulness” standard under Dyer.

The second prong requires that the actions taken in

violation of the stay were intentional. The record affirms that

the Duringer Firm, on behalf of its client Rediger, pursued

relief in the State Court Action that violated the stay: namely,

moving for and then obtaining a default judgment; filing a

declaration of accrued interest; obtaining a writ of execution;

and causing the Los Angeles County Sheriff to levy on the

Debtor’s DIP bank account. The Duringer Firm also failed to

take affirmative action to undo the effects of stay violative

action after receiving the November 2, 2012 notice; it did not

vacate, and it did not cancel, the default judgment. True,

there was limited confusion as Debtor’s counsel initially

checked a box indicating that both defendants, not just the

Debtor, were in bankruptcy. But this over-inclusion of parties,

if anything, required a cessation of the entire State Court

Action until further clarification - instead, it stopped

nothing.

These instances are each and independently an intentional

stay violation. These were not accidental or inadvertent

actions by the Duringer Firm. Thus, the second prong of the

Dyer standard is satisfied.
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This record clearly supported a determination of

“willfulness.” The Duringer Firm’s admission at oral argument

further supports that the bankruptcy court did not abuse its

discretion in holding the Appellants in civil contempt for

violation of the automatic stay.

C. The Bankruptcy Court Did Not Err in Entering the Sanctions

Award.

It appears that the Appellants advance three main arguments

against the Sanctions Award: (1) that under Sternberg v.

Johnston, 595 F.3d 937 (9th Cir. 2010), damages for a stay

violation under § 105(a) are limited to efforts to enforce the

stay or remedy a violation, but do not include costs incurred in

pursuing sanctions; (2) that in order for Debtor to recover

damages, the Appellants’ actions must have interfered with the

Debtor’s reorganization efforts; and (3) that the charges

awarded are beyond the scope authorized by Ninth Circuit and

U.S. Supreme Court authority and otherwise are unreasonable. We

address these arguments in turn.

1. Stay violation damages appropriately include

attorneys’ fees incurred after the Appellants remedied

the stay violations.

In the Ninth Circuit, a debtor’s recovery of attorneys’

fees under § 362(k) is limited to fees and costs incurred in

enforcing and remedying the stay violation; it does not include

fees and costs incurred in pursuing damages for the stay

violation. Sternberg, 595 F.3d at 947. Sternberg, however,

does not control here because the Debtor is not an individual

and, thus, as a matter of law, § 362(k) is inapplicable.
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Moreover, Sternberg does not limit the recovery of fees and

costs to § 362(k); instead, a debtor’s recovery of damages is

also available under § 105(a). This is confirmed in the

decision itself, which provides that the basis for the decision

was the statutory language of § 362(k), not the bankruptcy

court’s civil contempt authority under § 105(a). See id. at 946

n.3 (“As this opinion does not consider the civil contempt

authority of the court, it does not limit the availability of

contempt sanctions, including attorney fees, for violation of

the automatic stay, where otherwise appropriate.”).

There is no clear authority in our circuit that expressly

limits the recovery of fees under § 105(a) solely to those

incurred in enforcing and remedying a stay violation. Indeed,

analogous case authority involving § 105(a) sanctions suggests a

result to the contrary. In the context of a willful violation

of the discharge injunction, the bankruptcy court may award

actual damages and attorneys’ fees to the debtor as a civil

contempt sanction. See Walls v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 276

F.3d 502, 507 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[C]ompensatory civil contempt

allows an aggrieved debtor to obtain compensatory damages,

attorneys fees, and the offending creditor’s compliance with the

discharge injunction.”); Nash v. Clark Cnty. Dist. Attorney’s

Office (In re Nash), 464 B.R. 874, 880 (9th Cir. BAP 2012)

(bankruptcy court may award actual damages, punitive damages,

and attorneys’ fees as a civil contempt sanction for a willful

violation of the discharge injunction); see also Espinosa v.

United Student Aid Funds, Inc., 553 F.3d 1193, 1205 n.7 (9th

Cir. 2008), aff’d, 559 U.S. 260 (2010) (same). While not
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identical transgressions, a stay violation under § 105(a) is

analogous to a discharge injunction violation; both implicate

offenses to prophylactic injunctions exclusively available under

the Bankruptcy Code.

Further, unlike a damages award under § 362(k), an award of

attorneys’ fees and costs under § 105(a) does not arise in “an

ordinary damages action.” See Sternberg, 595 F.3d at 948. The

text of § 105(a) does not provide for or otherwise reference the

term “damages.” Instead, civil contempt under § 105(a) enables

the bankruptcy court to remedy a violation of a specific order. 

See In re Dyer, 322 F.3d at 1196. Thus, the “American Rule” on

attorneys’ fees is inapplicable in a § 105(a) context. See In

re Bluetooth Headset Prods. Liab. Litig., 654 F.3d 935, 941 (9th

Cir. 2011) (exception to the American Rule exists where a party

violates a court order).

Based on the foregoing, we hold that a damages award under

§ 105(a) for a willful stay violation may appropriately include

attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in pursuing damages for the

violation.

2. Whether a creditor’s stay violation interferes with a

chapter 11 debtor’s reorganization efforts is

irrelevant to calculating damages.

The Appellants next argue that in order to recover damages

for a stay violation, a debtor must show that the creditor’s

actions interfered with the debtor’s reorganization efforts. In

support of this proposition, they cite In re Orient River Invs.,

Inc., 105 B.R. 790 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1989); Matter of Lehan

Bros., Inc., 29 B.R. 553 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1983); and In re
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Augustino Enters., Inc., 13 B.R. 210 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1981).

We reject this argument. The case authority cited in

support of this proposition is inapposite. None of these cases

involved sanctions under § 105(a); instead, they predominantly

address damages under the predecessor of § 362(k), which, as

previously discussed, does not apply here. The relevant inquiry

in calculating damages is whether the Debtor sustained injury as

a result of the Appellants’ violative actions; the manner in

which it sustained injury is not, in and of itself, dispositive

of the inquiry.

3. The bankruptcy court did not err in awarding the

attorneys’ fees based on the Appellants’ civil

contempt.

Further, the Appellants contend that certain charges

awarded (as designated in an exhibit to their opposition to the

Debtor’s Damages Memorandum) exceed the scope of fees permitted

under pertinent authority and are otherwise unreasonable. They

assert that, at most, Debtor’s counsel may claim $4,534.50 and

that, under federal law, this amount is subject to further

reduction under the lodestar method. Additionally, they assert

that other considerations require further reduction, including

Debtor’s counsel’s request for attorneys’ fees for clerical

tasks and online research. In conclusion, Appellants argue that

$2,500 is a reasonable amount for sanctions based on these

considerations, as well as the experience of Debtor’s counsel,

the limited skill required to file a motion for a contempt

order, and the fact that Debtor could have avoided the whole

encounter had its counsel promptly communicated with the
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Duringer Firm.

Sanctions for civil contempt must either be compensatory or

designed to coerce compliance. See In re Dyer, 322 F.3d at

1192. Attorneys’ fees are an appropriate component of civil

contempt sanctions. Id. at 1195. This includes reasonable

attorneys’ fees incurred in the process of voiding the stay

violation. Id. An award of fees incurred in litigating an

issue that does not flow from the stay violation, however, is

improper. Id. at 1195 & n.19.

The record shows that Debtor’s counsel submitted a detailed

time summary of fees incurred. These entries reflect legal

tasks performed by counsel in connection with the stay violation

issues and within the appropriate time frame.

The bankruptcy court approved these costs. In doing so, it

implicitly determined that the costs were reasonable and

supported by evidence. This, in turn, is supported by the

bankruptcy court’s statement at the sanctions hearing, providing

that it awarded almost but not all of the requested fees and

costs. As reflected in the Sanctions Award, it subtracted

messenger fees and costs to copy the pleadings filed in the

State Court Action. Nor is there anything in the record showing

that the Appellants objected to any particular cost or expense

with any level of detail or specificity. It, thus, is clear

that the bankruptcy court not only reviewed the pertinent

documents, but determined that the costs were reasonable and

adequately supported.

With the exception of application of the lodestar method,

the Appellants fail to support any of these arguments with any
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authority. They fail to adequately explain, for example, how

this Panel may reduce the amount of fees awarded by substituting

its own calculation based on the lodestar method. The

Appellants also fail to expressly identify which time entries

relate to clerical tasks or other inappropriate functions. 

Ultimately, they paint with broad strokes, but fail to properly

support their arguments within the framework of appellate

review. We are not in the business of substituting our own

factual determinations for those of the bankruptcy court.

At oral argument, the Appellants also argued that the

bankruptcy court should have employed a comparative fault system

in assessing damages. They argued that the bankruptcy court

failed to take into account the Appellants’ actions – and the

Debtor’s alleged inaction – in mitigating the damages resulting

from the stay violation. First, we need not consider these

arguments inasmuch as it does not appear that the Appellants

expressly raised these points before the bankruptcy court.

Second, this is simply not the standard under § 105(a). 

The Duringer Firm makes much of its efforts to contact Debtor’s

counsel during the final months of 2012 to confirm whether the

Debtor filed bankruptcy. Whatever its motive or belief, the law

firm’s excuse is irrelevant. Once the Appellants were made

aware of the Bankruptcy, the onus was on them to cease all

efforts related to the Debtor in the State Court Action without

further order from the bankruptcy court and to remedy the impact

of existing stay violative actions. See In re Dyer, 322 F.3d at

1192 (creditor has an affirmative duty to remedy a stay

violation).
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 In fact, our independent review of the website for the 4

Central District of California, see Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(2) and

(c)(1), confirms that links for PACER and CM/ECF exist directly

on the actual homepage. See United States Bankruptcy Court for

the Central District of California, http://www.cacb.uscourts.gov

(last visited on Dec. 24, 2013).

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It was not the responsibility of Debtor’s counsel to

further confirm the existence of the Bankruptcy with the

Duringer Firm. To the extent that the law firm was truly

confused, a search in PACER or the bankruptcy court’s CM/ECF

system would have provided a simple and swift answer. Nothing 4

precluded the law firm from accessing PACER or CM/ECF – like

numerous other creditors and law firms do on a daily basis. It

is unclear why the law firm insisted on obtaining this

information directly from Debtor’s counsel. Instead, it

inappropriately disclaimed responsibility for its stay

violations, and it failed to take affirmative action to remedy

the various stay violations for nearly two months – a violation

of the stay in and of itself. Thus, the arguments as to

mitigation are largely (or completely) inapposite under these

circumstances.

In sum, on this record, the bankruptcy court did not err in

awarding the fees as compensatory damages.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, we AFFIRM the bankruptcy

court.