UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR VE TER AN S CL AI M S

N O . 99-2229
G AR Y M. J ANSS EN , A PP EL L ANT ,

V
. ANTHONY J. P RI NCI PI , S EC RE T A RY O F V ET ER A N S A FF A I RS , A PPEL L EE
.

On Ap pe a l f ro m th e B oa

rd of Ve te ra ns ' Ap pe a ls
(De cided De cembe r 27, 2001 )

J oh n S te v e ns Be rry , o f L inc oln , N e br a sk a , w a s o n th e ple a din g s f or the a pp e lla nt.
Tim S. Mc Cla in , G e ne ra l Co un se l; R. Ra nd all Cam pb e ll , Ac tin g As sis tant G e ne ra l Co un se l; Carolyn F. W

as hington , Deputy

Assistant Gener al Counsel; and Richard May erick , all of Washington, D.C., wer e on the plea dings f or the a ppellee.
Be fore KRAMER, Chief Judge , and HOL DAWAY and STEI NB ERG, Judges

. PER C URI AM: The appe llant, Gary M. J anss e n , a

p p e a ls , th r o u gh c o unsel, a Nove mber 1999 de c isi on of the B oa rd of Ve te ra ns ' Ap pe a ls ( B oa

rd or B VA ) t hat, i nte r a lia , d e nie d a s n ot w e ll g rounded, unde r the then-curr ent version of 38 U.S.C. § 5107(a) , claims for D epar tment of Vete rans Affa irs (VA) service connec tion for hea ring loss, tinni tus, a low-bac k disorder, a n d re s i d uals of a le ft -l e g inj ur

y ; de nie d a

ratin g in e xce ss o f 3 0% fo r h is s e rv ic e -c onnect ed post- tr a umatic str e ss dis or de r ( PTS D); and

de nie d a c omp e ns a

ble ratin g fo r h is s e rv ic e -c onne c te d r e sid ua ls o f a sh e llfra g ment wound to his left hand and r ight temple. Re cord ( R.) at 13. The a p p el l ant filed a brief contesting only

th e i s s u e of his PTSD rating a nd expressly

waivingall of the other

issues raised be fo re the B oa

rd . The Se c re tary

fi le d a mot ion to d ism iss in p art

and to s umm ari ly

a ff ir m in pa rt

. Subsequent to those filings, the V eter ans Claims Assistance A ct of 2000, Pub. L . No. 106-475, 11 4 Stat . 20 9 6 ( N o v
. 9 , 2 0 0 0 ) ( V C A A ) , w a s e n a c t e d

. T h e V C A A , i n t e r a l i a , am e n d e d

3 8 U

. S

. C. § 5103 (" Notice to claimants of required inf ormation and e vidence ") and adde d 38 U.S.C. § 5103A2

(" Duty to assist claimants") . VCAA § 3(a ), 114 S tat. at 2096-98. On November 13, 2000, the Court i s s u e d a m i s c e l l an e o u s o r d e r

o f g e n e r a l a p p l i c a b i l i t y, In Re: Veterans Claims Assistance Ac t of 2000 , 15 Vet.App. 27 ( 2000) (e n banc or der) , inviting par ties who had a

ppeals pe nding be fore this Court

a t th e tim e of

or fi le d af

te r the e na c tme nt o f t

he VC AAto a dd

re ss t he VC AA ' s a

pp lic a bil ity to t he ir

c la ims

. I n a

re sp on se to t

he mis c e lla

ne ou s o rd e r, the a

pp e lla nt i nd ic a te d h is d e sir e to a ba nd on a ll of the c laims presente d to the BV A except for h i s cl ai m fo r a highe r initial rating for PTSD. As deter mined by the Court in an April 23, 2001, order , the Court will not review the B oard' s decision with r espec t to any claims other than the one for PTSD, be cause those claims ar e c onsidered abandone d. See F

ord v. Gobe r , 10 Vet.App. 531 ( 1997) (issues a nd claims prese nted to BV A and not pursued on appe al ar e conside red a bandoned)

. I n his r esponse, the appe llant also made what the Court construed to be a

n attempt to waive a

pplication of the VCAA to his PTSD claim. Finally , as to h is r e ma ini ngPTSD c la im, the a pp e lla nt r e qu e ste d o ra l argume nt. I n the April 2001 orde r, t h e C o urt direc ted the appe llant to submi t additional briefing clar ifying his position as to what the Court construe d to be an attempted waiver of the a pplication of the VCAA to h i s P T S D claim. The appellant filed a response that expressly

proposes that he waive this Court' s consideration of the duty -to-assist and notice provisions of the VCAA a s part of this appeal. The Court has jurisdiction over the c ase unde r 38 U.S.C. §§ 7252( a) a nd 7266(a) , and, for the r easons se t forth belo w, wi l l d eny the appe llant's r equest for oral a rgument, g rant the Secre tary ' s motion, affirm t he Board' s decision as to the appellant's rating for PTSD, and dismiss as to t he oth e r i ssu e s o n a

pp e a l.

I. F acts The a ppellant serve d on active duty in the U.S. Army

from September 1968 until April 1970, including se rvice in V ietnam. R. at 16. His service rec ords indicate that he was w ounded in combat and was awa

rded both the Combat Infantry Ba dg e and the Purple Hea rt. Id. I n September 1997, he fi le d a c la im f or VAdis a bil ity c ompens ati on

fo r s e rv ic e -c onne c te d r e sid ua ls o f a n a rt ill e ry sh e ll explos ion while in service ; he stated that the f orce of the artillery explos ion threw him about "30 or 40" f eet. R. at 46-47. H e cla imed to ha ve suffe red shrapne l wounds to his left arm and f orehe ad,

as we ll as tinnitus , PTSD, a nd injuries to his head, bac k, and lef t leg . R. at 46. A VA re g ional office3

(RO) subseque ntly

provided him a phy sical examination (R. at 51-52) as well as an examination for PTSD in Ja

nu ary 19 98 (R . at 53 ), the latte r b e ingc on du c te d b y Dr . D a vid

D. Parr ish . In h is r e po rt , Dr. Parr ish, refe rringto the appellant, state d: Subsequent to his discharg e, he beg an to ha ve nightmar es that persist up t o t he prese nt time with the freque ncy o f 2 to 3 times a wee k with a content pr imarily of c omb a t and

he a lso ha s f

la shba c ks 2 o r 3 tim e s a we e k, a lso wi th a sim ila r c on te nt. He make s a conc erte d eff ort to avoid any

incidence o r t h o u gh t s that would trigg er tr a umatic me mor ie s. He ha s avo ide d mo vie s, bo ok s a nd art ic le s o n V ie tna

m. Subsequent to discharg e, he ha d some difficu lty with maintaining a

loving, c aring attitude and had a definite g ener al loss of interest in life which has pe rsisted up to the pr e se nt t ime . M r. Jans se n a lso has expe ri e nc e d mo de rate moo d s hif ts w ith occa sional irritability and has had mild to moderate episodic depre s s i o n s s ince dis c h ar g e w i t h n o r e p o rt e d an xi e t y o r d e p r e s s i v e s y mp t o m a t o l o g y p r i o r t o h is induction. He does e x perie nce some psy choamne sia conc erningVietnam. He has persistent fe eling [s] o f a foreshortened f uture a nd has had ong oing sle ep patter n p ro blems with intermittent awakeningand aw akeningabout 4 in the morning and being unabl e to return to sleep. He has exag g erated startle r esponse a nd hy pervig ilence. H e has e x perie nced problems with c oncentr ation and has a tendenc y to p re fe r t o b e by

[him se lf ] an d h a s a lso ke pt his fe e lin g s a bo ut V ie tna

m to him se lf wi th o nly oc c a sio na l disc us sio ns c on c e rn ing his wa rt ime e xpe ri e nc e s. Th is m an is self employ ed. As wa s stated ea rlier, he pref

ers to be by himself and has me ntioned that this has affe cted his re lationships to at least a mild to m oderate deg ree
. ME NT AL

STA TU S EX AM : Th is ve te ra n ap pe are d for his a

pp oin tme nt in a

tim e ly manner
. He was a

ppropriate ly

dresse d and wa s friendly

and coope rative throughout the int e rv ie w. He wa s w e ll o ri e nte d a s to tim e , p la c e and pe rs on . H e was able to fo llo w a g oa l id e a and his a bil ity to [pe rf

or m] a bs tr a c t c on c e ptu a lizatio ns wa s in ta c t. He manif ested a mild amount of tension during the evaluation. He did not show any marke d depre ssion nor was ther e evide nce of mood shifting d u ri n g the eva luation. His rec ent and remote memory was intact. His intelligenc e was ju d ged as ab ove aver ag e. He denied a

ny delusions, hallucinati ons or suicidal ideation. There is no evidenc e of a

ny underlying thinkingdisorder. H e said that he has made conce rted eff orts to avoid stressful situations since he is s t re s s s en sitive. His judgment wa s int a c t and he is c a pa ble of mana g ing his ow n fi na

nc ia l a ff a ir s wi tho ut a ssi sta

nc e . H is insight is partially

impaired. R. at 53 -5 4. Dr . Pa

rrish c on c lud e d th a t th e a pp e lla nt s uf fe re d f ro m c hr on ic PTSD of

mod e rate

sever ity (R. at 54) and deter

mined his G lobal Assessment of F unctioning ( GAF ) to be be tween 65 and 70 at that time (R. at 55)

. I n Marc h 1998, the RO g rante d service connec tion for the appe llant's PTSD and a ssigne d a 30% disability

rating

. R. at 70. The RO also g rante d service connec tion for a she ll-fra g ment wound4

to his right hand, a ssigninga noncompe nsable rating. Id

. T h e RO denied a s not well g rounded, under the then current 38 U.S.C. § 5107(a) , a number of other c laims made by the appe llant except

on e fo r s e rv ic e con nect io n f or a sh e ll- fr a g me nt w ound

to t he ri g ht t e mpl e , w hic h w a s d e fe rr e d in order to pr ovide the appellant with f urther e x aminations. Id

. The appellant then fil ed a Notice of Di sa g re e me nt. I n Jun e 19 98 , th e a

pp e lla nt w a s e xami ne d ag a in by Dr . Pa rr ish , w ho e sse nti a lly

re pe a te d h is

e arl ie r as se ssm e nt ( R. at 89 -9 1) and fu rt he r n ote d th a t th e a

pp e lla nt h a d b e e n ta

kin g me dic a tio n to tr e a t hi s n ig htm are s and

sle e p d iso rd e rs , b ut t

hat he ha d d isc on tin

ue d ta kin g the me dic a tio n b e c a

us e it left him feeling sedate d even a fter a wake ning ( R. at 90). Dr. Par rish incre ased his asse ssment of the se ve ri ty

of the a pp e lla nt' s im pa irment in e mpl oy

me nt a nd so c ia l r e latio ns hip s f

ro m " mil d to mod e rate " to " mod e rate to s e ve re ," and a g a in c on c lud e d th a t th e a pp e lla nt s uf fe re d f ro m c hr on ic PTSD of mod e rate se ve ri ty , w itha GA F sc or e of 65

. R. a t 90 -9 1. A de c isi on by the RO in Augus t 1998 g rante d service connec tion for re siduals of a shell-f ra g ment wound to the hea d, ratingthat disability as noncompensa ble, and continued the 30% rating for PTSD. R. at 116. I n April 1999, the appe llant filed an a

ppeal to the B oard se ekingan incr ease d ratin g for each of his service

c onne c te d d isa

bil iti e s. I n the Novembe r 1999 B VA dec ision on appeal, the B oard, a fter r eviewingthe evidenc e, made a fac tual deter

mination that a disability

ratingin excess of 30% for the appe llant's PTS D was not warr anted be cause his sy mptoms m ore c losely

approximated sy

mp to ma to lo gy r e q u ir e d f o r a 30% disability ratingas opposed to that re quired for a 50% r ating . Specifica lly , the B oard f ound: De sp ite the ve te ra

n' s c onte nti on s r e g ard ingoc c up a tio na l im pa i rm e nt a s a

re su lt o f h is p o s t -t rau m at i c s t re s s d i s o rd er , t h e B o ar d o b s erv es t h at h i s p ri m ary s y mp t o m at o l o gy is depression, chr onic sleep impairme nt, an d anxiety . These sy mptoms are contemplated in the c urre nt p ro v i s i o ns for a 30 perc ent disability

rating , as is the i mp a i r m e n tr e f l e c t e d b y t h e G A F s c o r e s t h a th e h a s b e e na s s i g n e d r e c e n t l y. Conversely , the veter an' s lack of f ormal thou gh t d isturbance , and g rossly intact memory , as well as his a bility to unde rstand and communicate, demons t ra t e t he absenc e of the sy

mptomatology require d for a 50 perc ent di sability evaluation under t h e schedula

r cr iteria. As suc h, the B oard must conc lude that the vete ran's p o s t -t rau m at i c s t re s s d i s o rd er d o es n o tm o re n early

approxi m at e t h e s y

mp t o m at o l o gy require d for a

ratingin excess of the 30 per cent c urre ntly assig ned, and ha s not done so since September

1997.5

R. at 11 -1 2. Ad dit ion a lly , the B oa rd de nie d th e c la ims fo r i nc re a se d r a tin g s f or re sid ua ls o f a sh e llfr agm ent wound to t he hand a nd head, f

inding that e ach disa

bility failed to mee t the minimum criter ia nece ssary to r ece ive a compensa ble rating

. Finally , as to those claims that had be en denie d by the RO for be ing not we ll gr ounded, the B oard c oncluded t h at t he appe llant had not offe red evidenc e suff

icient to justify

a belief by a fa ir and impartial individual that any of those claims wer e plausible and that the appellant had failed to r eport for a VA me dical examination that could have

su bs tanti a te d h is c la ims , a

nd , th e re fo re , th e B oa

rd c on tin ue d th e RO ' s d e c isi on s.

II. Ana lys is A. W aiv e r o f C ons ide ra tio n of

V CAA o n PT

SD c lai m Although the appea l before the Court challeng es a B VA d en i al of a n incre ased sc hedular

ra t i n g fo r P T S D, t h e p re l i m i n ary i s s u e t o b e ad dre s s ed i s wh et h er an ap p el l an t ca n wa i v e th i s C o u rt 's

c on sid e ratio n on ap pe a l of rig hts g ua ra nte e d to him by an ac t of Congre ss (i .e ., the VC AA ). We h old that in case s such as this, wher e the a ppellant is r epre sented by counsel, whom the Court pre sumes to b e ve rs e d in

the fa c ts o f t

he c a se and to kn ow and to un de rs tand the law a s it

re late s to tho se fa c ts, the a pp e lla nt c an w a ive thi s Co ur

t' s c on sid e ratio n o f s uc h r ig hts on a pp e a l. Ho we v er , i n o rd er t o d o s o , t h e ap p el l an t m u s t fi rs tp o s s es s a r i gh t , h e m u s th av e kn o wl ed ge of that r ig ht, and he mu st in tend, v olu nta ri ly and fr e e ly , to re lin qu ish

or surr e nd e r t

hat r ig ht. See United States v. Olano , 507 U.S. 725, 732-33 (1993) ( holding wa iver is the " ' i n t en t i o nal

re l i n qu i s h m en to r ab an d o n m en to f a kn o wn ri gh t '" ( qu o t i n g J oh ns on v . Ze rb st , 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1 93 8) )) ; McCall v. U.S. Postal Serv ice , 8 3 9 F. 2 d 6 6 4 , 6 6 8 (F ed

. C i r. 1 9 8 8 ) ( u p h o l d i n g em p l o y ee 's waiver of appe al of disciplinary action, U.S. Court of Appe als for the Fe dera l Circuit (Fe dera l Circuit) ac knowledg ed that Mer it Sy stems Protection Boa rd had de emed suc h "r ight to appea l

. . . susceptible to waive r if the a ction was the informed, intentional a bandonment of a known r ight, f ree
o f an y c o e r c i o no r

d u re ss" ); Ca l l icotte v. Carlucci , 698 F. Supp. 944, 946 (D. D .C. 1988) (re cog nizi ng that whether "pa rticular w aiver

is enforc eable . . . [depends on] whether it was made kn ow ing ly , v olu

nta ri ly and fr e e ly " ). Al tho ug h th e iss ue of wh e the r a

statutor y ri g ht i s w a iva

ble depends upon, inter

alia, the r ight at stake, Olano , 507 U.S. at 733, "a bsent some af

firmative indication o f C o n gre s s ' intent to preclude waiver , . . . [t he Court must] presume[ ] that st atutory6

pro vi si on s are subj ectto wai ver .
. . ." United States v. Me zzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 201 (1995) ( citing Evans v. J

eff D. 475 U.S. 717, 730- 32 (1986))

. I n other wor ds, unless there is spec ific pre clusion to d oin g so , p art ie s are g e ne ra lly pe rm itt e d to wai ve the a pp lic a tio n o f s tatut e s in te nd e d f or the ir benef it. See Peretz v . United States , 50 1 U. S. 92 3, 93 6 ( 19 91 ); Shutte v. Thompson, 82 U. S. ( Wal l) 151, 159 (1873). A s s t a t e d a b o v e , t h e a

p p e l l an t s e e k s t o w a i v e t h i s C o u rt ' s c o n s i d e r a t i o n o na p p e a l o f t h e d u t yto-assist and notice pr ovisions of the VCAA. This Court held in Karnas v. Derwinski , 1 Vet.App. 30 8, 31 3 ( 19 91 ), that w he n a law o r r e g ulatio n a

pp lic a ble to a cla im chang e s w hil e the c la im i s pending a fina l decision, an a ppellant is entitled to have the claim rea djudicated under both ve rsions of the lawor re g ulation so that the appellant may rec eive the benef

it of t he more favor able ve rsion. That beingsaid, the Court un d er s t an d s that there may be compe lling re asons why a par ticular appellant would not wish to have their cla im r ea d j udicated unde r the duty -to-assist and notice require ments. Despite the g ener ally procla imant atmosphere i n which vete rans' law oper ates, the Court fi nd s n o le g a l r e a so n to pr e ve nt suc h a re pr e se nte d ap pe lla nt f ro m de pr ivi nghim se lf

or he rs e lf of thi s Co ur

t' s c on sid e ratio n o n a

ppeal of su c h a dd iti on a l pr ote c tio ns , if tha t is his or he r c le arl y stated, informe d, and voluntary d es i re . Such a cla imant-appe llant is in a unique position t o make

a de te rm inatio n a s to wh e the r t his Cou rt ' s c on sid e ra

ti on on app e a l of

any e xpand e d d

uty -t o- a ssi st or notice r equire ments would be bene ficial to the a ppeal. See VCAA § 3 (e nactingrevised se ction 5103 and new

section 5103A). F or example, a c laimant may rea ch an informed conc lusion, from the uniq u e p o s i t ion he or she oc cupies, that fur ther de velopment of the c laim may not only be unhelpful, bu t t h at i t may be har mful to that claim. The same may be true as to a phy sical examination or medic al o p i n i o n provided by VA. F urthermor e, an a

ppellant, in the intere st of an

ex p ed i t i o u s re s o l u t i o no f h i s o r h er cl ai m , m ay r e ac han i n fo rm edd ec i s i o nt o fo re go t h i s C o u rt 's consideration on appeal of any such rights arising from new law or r egulation and may , in fac t, prefe r an immediate r esolution of that claim. I t is also important that a remand f or the B oard to determine under Karnas whether

the VCAA duty -to-assist and noti ce amendments are more favor able than the pre- VCAA provisions they supplant would appea

r t o be a pointless exerc ise, bec ause V A' s Gene ral Coun s e l h a s a lr e a dy

d e te r mi n e d , in a p r e c e d e n ti a l d e c is io nth a t t h e B V A is b o u n d

to f o ll ow, see 38 U. S.C. § 7 10 4( c ); 38 C.F .R. §§ 14 .5 07 , 2 0. 10 1( a ) ( 20 01 ); Colay on g v . W est , 12 Vet.App. 524,7

53 6- 37 (1 99 9) ; Sa bo nis v . B ro wn , 6 Ve t.A pp . 426 , 429 (1 99 4) , that the VC AA is mor e fa vo ra ble to claimants than the law in effe ct prior to its enac tment, see VA Ge n. Coun. Prec. 11-2000 ( Nov. 27, 2000). Today ' s holding is not contra ry to the previous d ec i s i ons of this Court in Ba k e r v . W est , 11 Vet.App. 163 (1998), and Kin gs ton v . W est , 11 Vet.App. 272 ( 1998) (pe r cur iam order ), ea ch of which re fused to allow a

ppellants to waive r eadjudication pursuant to Karnas , su pra , as a r esult of chang es in schedula

r rating sc hemes pre scribed a fter e ach a ppeal wa s filed. Ba k

e r and K ingston

e a c h inv olv e d a

pp e a ls of de nie d c la ims fo r inc re a se d ratin g s fo r PTSD

. Duri ng th e appe a ls, amendments to the disabi l i t y -r at ing c riteria a pplicable to the a

ppeale d claims wer e adopte d that mig ht h a ve a ff

e c te d th e ratin g s u lti mate ly awa rd e d. Ho we ve r, the re , un lik e he re , the e xten t of tho se
c ha ng e s w a s n ot k

no wa ble ins of ar a s th e pa

rt ic ula r c la im i nv olv e d w a s c on c e rn e d unti l su c h ti me
a s a fa c t f ind e r a pp lie d th e fa c ts o f t

he ind ivi du a l c a se to t

he ne w r e g ulatio ns
. Mo re ov e r, wh a t th e a

pp e lla nt a tte mpt s to wa ive a s p art of thi s Co ur t' s c on sid e ratio n in

thi s appea l may

be per ceive d as not a subst antive right but , rathe r, several proc edura l rig hts – rights a s to which he is in the unique position to judge wh et h er t h ei r consideration in this appeal would be benef icial t o his appea l. To the ex tent that the VC AA duty -to-assist and noti ce pr ovisions at issue he r e ar e p r o c e d

u r a l i nn a tu

r e , th e n , a t i s s u e w o u ld

b e n o t c h an g e s in

s u b s ta n ti v e la w th a t m ig ht ultimately

aff ord the a ppellan t a g reater leve l of VA be nefits but, rathe r, enha nced pr ocedur al protec tions de signe d to e nsure full and complete development of the claim. I f he makes a n informed deter mination that he has alre ady rec eived suc h pro ce d u ral prote ction under the law prior to the VCAA' s enac tment, then he should be permitted to waive this Court's consider ation on appea l of the new, more string ent proc edura l protections af forde d by the VCAA. See P eretz, supra. This conce pt of an appellant' s rig ht to make a knowing and voluntary waiver of considerat i o n o f p roce dural protec tions is neither fore ign to nor prohibited by this Court. To the contra ry , this Court has long

a c c e pte d th e a

bil ity of a pp e lla nts to w a ive c e rt a in p ro c e dura l r ig hts , in c lud ingthe fo llo wi ng : th e ir rig ht to appea l cer

tain claims denied by the B VA, as ha ppened he re (se e Fo rd

, s up ra ); the ir

ri g ht t o a per sonal hea

ring prior to a B oard de cision ( see 38 U.S.C. § 7107(b); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.103(c) , 20.700 ( 2001); Ande rso n v . B ro wn , 9 Vet.App. 542, 547 ( 1996)); and re quirements that a Supplementa l State me nt o f t

he Ca se be iss ue d whe n pe rt ine nt ev ide nc e is sub mitte d b y the a pp e lla nt (see 38 C.F .R.8

§ 2 0. 13 04 (c ) ( 20 01 ); Su tto n v. Br own , 9 Ve t.A pp . 5 53 , 5 67 -6 9 ( 19 96 )) ; se e als o Holliday v. Principi , 14 Vet.App. 280, 292-93 (2001) (Steinberg , J ., concur ring ). In Bowling v. Principi, 15 Vet.App. 1, 17 (2001), we rec og nized that an "a ppellant[] can 'e x pressly waive .

. . due process rights [before the BV A]

. . . i f

. . . h e [ o r s h e] wi s h es t o d o s o '" ( qu o t i n g Al lda yv . B ro wn , 7 Vet.App. 517, 533 ( 1995));

se e als o V

e le z v . W est , 11 Vet.App. 148, 155 ( 1998). To the e xten t th a t th e wa ive r o f the duty -t o- a ssi st an d n oti c e re qu ir e me nts a tte mpt e d h e re is essentially

no differ ent from the waiver of those proc edura l and due pr ocess r ights noted a bove, the

a pp e lla nt h a s k no wl e dg e of

c e rt a in p ro c e dura l r ig ht s th at he po sse sse s and ha s e xpre sse d h is int e nti on c le arl y a nd un e qu ivo c a lly , a

nd on the a dvice of com pe te nt c ouns e l, t o r e lin qu ish thi s Court's c onsiderat i o n o f t hem in this appeal. Nothingfurther is require d. See O lano , 507 U.S. at 73 2- 33 ; Mc Cal l , su

pra . He h as m ad e cle ar that he believe s that the claim under revie w has be en de ve lop e d a s fu lly and c omp le te ly a s is ne c e ssa ry (o r a s muc h a s he wi sh e s it t o b e ) f or the Court to

car ry out judicial reviewas to the denia l of that claim, and that he consider s further development of the fa cts and a dditional notices to be of no benef it to him. I f he believes that he ca n obtain nothing more fr om a re mand for c onsideration of ne w protec tions afforde d by the VCAA i n terms of de ve lop me nt o f o r n oti c e s a s to his c la im, the Court fi nd s n o le g a l r e a so n o n th e fa c ts o f t his c a se not to perm it him t o make that c hoice, e specia lly in the absenc e of some a ffirmative indication of Congr ess' intent to preclude his abi l i t y t o d o so. See M ezzanatto, 513 U.S. at 201. I ndeed, the dis tin c tio n b e tween wa ive r o f p ro c e dura l ve rs us su bs tanti ve statut or

y ri g hts ha s b e e n e xpre ssl y
rec og nized by

the Fe dera l Circuit as a factor in dete rmining whether a F eder al employ ee c ould waive

" procedure

s by which civil serva

nts a re hired and fired" (there a rig ht to a ppeal disciplinary

action purs ua nt to 5 U. S.C. § 7 70 1( a )) , w hic h h e c ou ld w a ive , a nd " min imum substantive g uara ntees for ind ivi du a l e mpl oy e e s" in the c on du c t of a c oll e c tiv e ba rg a ini ng a g re e me nt e nte re d int o p ur su ant t o the Fair L abor Standa

rds Act ( FL SA), 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq. , which he c ould not waive. Mc Cal l , su pra ; se e Cal lic otte , 6 9 8 F. S u p p
. at 9 4 6 -4 7 (d i s t i n gu i s h i n g Mc Cal l from situation where Fe dera l employ ee ha d signe d settlement ag ree ment purporting to waive he r rig ht to file discrimination complain t b as ed o n asser ted status as handic apped pe rson; court struc k down waive r as " contra ry to p u b li c p o li c y " b e c a

u s e it c o n s ti tute d

" w a iv e r [o f ] h e r s tatuto r y r igh t" n o t t o b e d is c r im in a ted ag ainst based on ha

ndicap, a rig ht gua rante ed by

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 791,9

et seq. , in purs uit of " the pu bli c int e re st i n e ra dic a tin g dis c ri min a tio n in the fe de ra l w or

kp la c e " ); see als o A tc his on , To

pe k a a nd Sa nta FeRa ilwa

yCo. v . B ue ll , 480 U.S. 557, 565 (1987) (holding that employ ee ma

y not waive minimum subs ta nti v e g u a r a nte e s p rovided to individual worker s by Fe dera l Em plo y e rs ' L ia

bil ity Ac t) ; Barrentine v. Ark

ansas-Best Freight System , 450 U.S. 728, 745 (1981) (hol ding that rig hts provided in FL SA were not waivable in c ontext of collec tive barg aining

a g re e me nt) ; Lynn's Food Stor es, Inc

. v. United States, Etc. , 679 F.2d 1350, 1352- 53 (11th Cir. 1982) (to same e ffe ct). I f it is as s u med that the VCAA is not proc edura l in nature, Kingston and Bake r are a lso d is ti n g u is h a

b le f r o m t h is c a s e o nan o th e r

b a s is

. I n Ba k

e r and Kingston , th e Cou rt , in or de r t o addre ss t h e merits of the c laim, would have ha d to ignor e Karnas be c a us e the a pp e lla nts in t ho se
case s arg u e d

f o r th e a p p li c a ti o no f

th e o ld v e r s io no f

th e PT SD r e g u lati o n s th a t h a d c h ang ed, wher eas he re we ne ed not be c oncer ned with Karnas beca

use the a ppellant ar g ues that the statutory provisions added or a

mended by

the VCAA (ne w law) and the releva nt pree x isting law ( old law) a re
no t im pli c a te d b y

his c a se ; he ar g ue s her e that the B VA e rr or wa s in its fa ilure to ap ply 38 C.F .R. § 4.126(a) , which wa s not affe cted by the new la

w, the VCAA. We also believe it hig hly

signific ant that in W

illiams v. Principi , 15 Vet.App. 189 ( 2001) (e n banc) , Tellex v. Principi , 15 Vet.App. 233, 240 (2001), a nd Maxson v . Principi , 15Vet.App. 241, 242 (2001) ( per curiam order), this Court, in eff ect, permitted waiver s of our consideration of the VCAA

on appea l. I n W

illiams , Tellex , and Maxson , we declined to a ddress the V CAA issue, in the latter two case s citing a

failure on the par

t of the par

ties to raise it. Surely an express wa iver, such a s we have in the instant c ase, is simply an emphatic way

of say ing " I choose not to raise this issue." The Court's decisions in W

illiams , Tellex , and Maxson not to addre ss the potential applicability of a pie ce of leg islation that appear s to be ca pable of as fa r-r eac hing r amifications as is the V CAA amounted to a fi nd ingof

an im pli e d w a ive r o f the a

pp e lla nt' s ri g ht to have his or

he r c la im c on sid e re d b y

thi s Court on appea l in light of the new protec tions a ffor ded under the new law, espec ially g iven that the pa rt ie s in tho se c a se s we re re pr e se nte d b y c ouns e l. T he log ic a l c on c lus ion ste mmi ngfr om t

his re su lt is that i f i nformed implied wa ivers ar e per missibl e as to this Court's c onsideration of V CAA protec tions on appeal, then so must be e x presse d waiver s. To permit otherwise would be bizarre

. Thus, beca

use the e n banc W

illiams Court was cog nizant of Ba k e r and Kingston , as we ll as of the10

fac t that the VCAA wa s potentially applicable ( see H olliday , 14 Vet.App. at 286 (holding V CAA potentially

applicable to all claims that were nonfinal)) but yet still chose not to addre ss the issue,

we r ead W

illiams to l imi t Bake r

and Kingston narr owly to situations wher e the Court determines that the attempted wa iver did not ref lect a f ull understandingof its conseque nces
. There fore , under the circu m s t an ces present he re, the Court will permit the repre sented

a pp e lla nt t o w a ive thi s Co ur

t' s c on sid e ratio n o f any

duty -t o- a ssi st a

nd no tic e ri g hts po te nti a lly aff orded to him under the VCAA, as they may apply in this appeal to his claim for PTS D. The Court expresses no opinion as to the applica bility of the VCAA to the PTSD cla im, nor do we e x press at this ti me any

view as to a

pro se a ppellant' s abili t y t o wa i v e our consider ation of the VCAA on appea l. See ge nerally Best v . Principi , 15 Vet.App. 18 ( 2001) (pe r cur iam order ). B. I nc re as e d D isa bil

ity Rat ing fo r P TSD The B oard' s decision re g ardingthe deg ree of disability under the ratingschedule is a finding of fac t subje ct to r eview in this Court unde r the " clea rly err oneous" standard of

revie w. See J

ohnston

v . B ro wn , 1 0 V e t.A

pp
. 80 , 84 (1 99 7) . T he Court may no t r e je c t th e B oa

rd ' s c on c lus ion

if it i s supported by

a plausible ba sis in the recor d. See Sande rs v. Derwinski , 1 Vet.App. 88, 90 ( 1990); Gilbert v. De rwinski , 1 Vet.App. 49, 53 ( 1990). The Court is not p er m i t t ed to s ubstitut e its own jud g me nt f

or a fa c tua l de te rm inatio n ma de by the B oa rd , e ve n if we mig ht no t have re a c he d th e same conclusion. Se e id

. F or PTSD , a 30 % d isa bil ity ratin g is w arr ante d w he n th e re is: Occ upational and soc ial impairment with occa sional decr ease in work ef ficienc y and int e rm itt ent perio ds of

ina bil ity to p e rf or m oc c up a tio na l ta sk s ( a lth ou g h g e ne ra lly functioning satisfac torily , with routine behavior, self-c a r e , a n d c o nv e r s a tion normal), due to such sy

mp t o m s as: depre ssed mood, anxiety , suspiciousness, panic attacks (we ekly or less often) , chro n i c s l ee p impairment, mild memory loss (such as forg etting na

mes, direc tions, rece nt events). 38 C.F.R. § 4.130, Diag nostic Code (DC) 9411 (2001)

. A 50% disability ratingis warr anted whe n the re is: Occ upation al

and so c ia l impai

rment with re duc e d re lia bil

ity and pr od uc tiv ity due to such sy mptoms as: flattened af

fec t; circumstantial, circ umlocutory , or stere oty ped speec h; pa

nic attacks more than once a wee k; dif ficulty in unde rstanding co m p l ex c omm and s; i mpa ir

me nt o f s ho rt - a

nd lon g -t e rm

memo ry (e .g ., re te nti on

of on ly highly lear ned mater ial, forg etting to complete tasks); impaired judg ment; impaired11

abstrac t thinking; disturbance s of motivation a n d mo od; difficulty

in establishing a

nd ma int a ini nge ff

e c tiv e wo rk

and so c ia l r e latio ns hip s. Id. (empha sis added). After a re view of the rec ord on appea l, the Court c annot hold that the Boa rd' s findings w ere clea rly err oneous. The B oard' s findings of fac t a re plausible and wer e base d upon the re ports of the appellant' s two psy chiatric examinations (R. at 53-55, 89-91), which the Boa rd found ha d indicated that th e va st m a

jor ity of his sy mpt oms fe ll und e r the 30 % ratin g c ri te ri a and that fe w, if any , o f h is sy mptoms fell under the 50% rating criteria (R. at 11-12). For example, Dr. Parr ish indicated that the appe llant had nig htmares a nd ong oing sl ee p p robl ems with intermittent awake ning a nd an i n ab i l i t y to return to slee p. R. at 53, 90. Dr. Parr ish stated that the appe llant had moderate mood shifts with irritabilit y , but that during the examinations he was fr iendly and coope rative, a

nd that he failed to show a

ny signs of marke d depre ssion. R. at 53-54. Dr. P arr ish reporte d that the appe llant

arr ived for his a

ppointment in a timely

manner , was a

ppropriate ly

dresse d, oriented to time, space , and pe rs on , and de mon str a te d int a c t jud g me nt. R. at 54 , 9 0. Th e B oa rd no t on ly highli g hte d th e se sy mptoms (R. at 10-11), but corr ectly found that in order

for the a ppellant to war

rant a 50% rating he mus t ha

ve de mon st rat ed sy

mpt oms su c h a s d if

fi c ult y in u nd e rs tand ingc omp le x co mma nd s, impairment of short- a

nd long- term memory , impaired judg ment, disturbance o f m o o d and motivations, and impairment of abstra ct t hinking (R. at 11-12). Although the Boa rd i s not corre ct insofar a s mood disturbances a re c oncer ned (D r. Parr i s h re p o rt ed mood shifts, R. at 53), such sy mptomatology

could support either

a 30% or a 50% rating , and the Boa rd was corre ct that none of t he other sy

mptoms nece ssary for a 50% rating were repor ted by the ex aminer. Thus, the Court h o l d s t h a tt h e B o ar d ' s f

a c tu a l f i n d i n g s a s t o t h e d e g r e e o f i mp a i r m e n tar e p l a

u s i b l e an d , a c c o r d i n g l y, must affirm the B oard' s decision. I n his brief, the a

ppellant ar g ues that the B oard f ailed to prov i d e an ad eq uate state ment of

rea sons or bases f

or its decision as re quired unde r 38 U.S.C. § 7104(d)( 1). Se e Gi lbe rt , 1 Vet.App. at 56-57. He avers th at t h e Bo ar d focuse d its discussion onl y upon the appe llant's subjec tive sy mptomato l o gy and not on the examiner' s assessment of the a ppellant' s occupational and social impairment, as is require d by 38 C.F.R. § 4.126(a) (2001), which provides in pertinent part: "The ratingag ency

shall assig n an eva luation based on a ll the evidence of reco rd t hat bea rs on12

occupational and social impairment r ather than solely

on the examiner' s assessment of the le vel of disability at the moment of the e x amination." A rea ding of the B oard' s entire de cision indicates that it did consider the appe llant's oc cupational a nd social i mpairment. The B oard spe cifica lly descr ibed

a ll the a pp e lla nt' s G AF ra

tin g s and c on c lud e d th a t th e se sc or e s we re ind ic ativ e of a 30 % d isa bil ity

ra t i n g. R

. at 1 0 -1 2

. T h e Bo ar d s et fo rt hfu l l y

a r ec i t at i o no f t h e e v i d en ce d es cr i b i n g t h e ap p el l an t 's le ve l of dis a bil ity , in c lud inghis se lf

-r e po rt e d p a tie nt his tor

y (R . at 1 1- 12 ), thr ou g ho ut t he pe ri od to be c on sid e re d in

a ssi g nin g an in iti a l r a tin g and fo un d im pli c itl y that th e e vid e nc e did

no t de mon str a te that the appellant had the "r educe d reliability and productivity " that is the hallm ark require ment for a 50% r ating for PTSD. 38 C.F.R. § 4.130, DC 9411. Although the Boa rd' s statement of re asons
or ba se s in thi s r e sp e c t c ou ld h ave be e n mo re c omp le te , w e c on c lud e that the deci si on , ta ke n a s a whole, showe d adequa

te consider ation of all of the material e vidence "that bear s on occupational and

s o ci al i mp ai rm en t " an d d i d n o t , as p ro h i b i t edb y § 4

. 1 2 6 (a ), fo cu s "s o l el y o nt h e e x am i n er 's

ass ess men t o f t he l evel of d is abi li ty at t he m om ent of t he ex ami nat io n. " Id

. Additionally , the appe llant argues that the B oard e rre d by not providing him with stag ed d i s a b i l i t y r a t i n g s a s r e q

u i r e d b y Fe nd e rso n v . W

est , 12 Vet.App. 119, 126- 27 (1999). Althoug h the

a pp e lla nt i s c or re c t in a sse rt ingthat th e B oa

rd is r e qu ir e d to de te rm ine dis a bil ity ratin g s fo r the fu ll applicable period covere d by an initial rating , in this case the B oard spe cifica lly ref err ed to stag ed rating s under Fende rson (R. at 10) a nd there afte r found that the a ppellant' s deg ree of disability had

rema ined constant at a 30% level from the time he filed his cla im; the Boar d thus impl icitly found that stag ed disability

rating s would be inappropr iate. R. at 10. The B oard' s position i s bolstered by the fa ct that the appe llant, in his J anuar y 1998 and J une 1998 psy chiatric examinations, presented virtually identical sy

mptomatology , which in turn re sulted in ne arly identical diag noses. Ther efor e, the Cou rt mus t c on c lud e that th e B oa rd's de c isi on

no t to awa

rd sta g e d r a tin g wa s n ot c le arl y
err oneous.

III. Conclusi on On consider ation of the fore g oing, the pleading s, and a r eview of the re cord on a

ppeal, the

a pp e lla nt' s r e qu e st f

or or a l argume nt i s d e nie d b e c a us e the Court

does no t belie ve it w ou ld materia lly

assist in the disposi tion of this appeal. Se e Ma so n ( Sa nge rn e tta

) v. Brow n , 8 Vet.App.13

44, 59 (1995). The S ecr etar y ' s motion is g rante d. On t he is sue of an increase d disability ratingfor PTSD, the Court holds that the appellant has not demonstrated that the B oard c ommitt ed either leg al

or fa c tua l e rr or

that w ou ld w arr ant r e ve rs a l or re mand , a

nd ha s w a ive d this Court ' s c on sid e ratio n in this appeal of a

rema nd for the B oard to de termine c ompliance with a ny applicable new pr otections fo un d in the VC AA . T he Court

is s a tis fi e d t hat th e B oa

rd de c isi on fu lf ill s th e " re a so ns or

ba se s" requirement of 38 U.S.C. § 7104(d)( 1), se e Gi lbe rt , su pra , an d t h e d e c i s i o n o f t h e B o ard is AFF I RMED on this matter. As for the other claims denied by the B oard, he has expressly withdrawn those claims from this appe al; thus, any appea ls as to those claims are DI SMI SSED. AFF I RMED I

N PART; DI SMI SSED I

N PART.