Special Operations

Research Topics

2014

Joint Special Operations 

University

7701 Tampa Point Boulevard

MacDill AFB FL 33621

https://jsou.socom.mil

Special Operations Research Topics 2014
Joint Special Operations University

and the Strategic Studies Department

The Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) provides its publications 

to contribute toward expanding the body of knowledge about joint special 

operations. JSOU publications advance the insights and recommendations 

of national security professionals and the Special Operations Forces (SOF) 

students and leaders for consideration by the SOF community and defense 

leadership 

JSOU is the educational component of the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), MacDill Air Force Base, Florida. The JSOU 

mission is to educate SOF executive, senior, and intermediate leaders and 

selected other national and international security decision makers, both 

military and civilian, through teaching, outreach, and research in the science and art of joint special operations. JSOU provides education to the men 

and women of SOF and to those who enable the SOF mission in a joint and 

interagency environment. 

JSOU conducts research through its Strategic Studies Department where 

effort centers upon the USSOCOM and United States SOF missions: 

USSOCOM mission. Provide fully capable Special Operations Forces 

to defend the United States and its interests. Synchronize planning of 

global operations against terrorist networks.

USSOF mission. USSOF conduct special operations to prepare the 

operational environment, prevent crisis, and respond with speed, precision, and lethality to achieve tactical through strategic effect. 

The Strategic Studies Department also organizes and conducts strategic 

symposia, interagency curricula, international curricula, regional and cultural education senior level courses, and senior level professional military 

education. 

This publication is available on the JSOU public web page located at 

https://jsou.socom.mil.

Joint Special Operations University

Brian A. Maher, Ed.D., SES, President

Kenneth H. Poole, Ed.D., Strategic Studies Department Director

Robert Nalepa, Lt. Col., U.S. Air Force, Ret., Director of Research

William Knarr, Ed.D., Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret.; Mark Moyar, Ph.D., History; Richard Rubright, 

Ph.D., Strategic Studies; Jason Quirin, Ph.D., Chemical Engineering; Joanna Gutierrez Winters, 

M.A., International Relations and Diplomacy, M.A. Economics, Resident Senior Fellows

Anna-Marie Wyant, M.A., English, JSOU Press Editor

Editorial Advisory Board

Roby C. Barrett

Ph.D., Middle Eastern & South Asian History 

Public Policy Center Middle East Institute 

and JSOU Senior Fellow

Joseph D. Celeski

Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret.

JSOU Senior Fellow

Chuck Cunningham

Lieutenant General, U.S. Air Force, Ret. 

Professor of Strategy, Joint Advanced 

Warfighting School and 

JSOU Distinguished Senior Fellow

James J.F. Forest 

Ph.D., Higher Education Administration

Associate Professor, School of Criminology and 

Justice Studies, University of Massachusetts 

Lowell and JSOU Senior Fellow

Thomas H. Henriksen

Ph.D., History, Hoover Institution 

Stanford University and JSOU Senior Fellow

Bernd Horn

Colonel, Canadian Dept. of National Defence 

Ph.D., War Studies

Director, CANSOFCOM Professional 

Development Centre

Russell D. Howard

Brigadier General, U.S. Army, Ret.

JSOU Senior Fellow

John D. Jogerst

Colonel, U.S. Air Force, Ret.

James Kiras

Ph.D., History, School of Advanced Air and 

Space Studies, Air University and 

JSOU Associate Fellow 

William W. Mendel

Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret. 

JSOU Senior Fellow

Alvaro de Souza Pinheiro

Major General, Brazilian Army, Ret.

JSOU Associate Fellow

James F. Powers, Jr.

Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret.

JSOU Senior Fellow 

Thomas Sass

Ph.D., International Relations

Richard H. Shultz, Jr.

Ph.D., Political Science

Director, International Security 

Studies Program, The Fletcher School, 

Tufts University and JSOU Senior Fellow

Robert G. Spulak, Jr.

Ph.D., Physics/Nuclear Engineering

Sandia National Laboratories 

and JSOU Associate Fellow 

Jessica Glicken Turnley

Ph.D., Cultural Anthropology

Galisteo Consulting Group 

and JSOU Senior Fellow 

Francisco R. Wong-Diaz

J.D., Ph.D., Political Science

Professor of international affairs and law and 

JSOU Senior Fellow

Rich Yarger

Ph.D., History 

JSOU Senior Fellow
On the cover. Upper Left: A Critical Skills Operator stationed with 1st 

Marine Special Operations Battalion, Camp Pendleton, Calif., carries a 

Special Operations Forces Combat Assault Rifle during a training exercise. 

(Photo courtesy Marine Corps Forces, Special Operations Command)

Upper Right: Republic of Mali and U.S. Special Operations Forces troops 

stand in formation next to each other during the opening ceremony of the 

Flintlock 10 Exercise in Bamako, Mali. (Photo by U.S. Army Master Sergeant 

Donald Sparks)

Lower Left: Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Frazier of the 711th Special Operations Squadron receives a hug from his daughter in Duke Field, Florida, after 

returning from a deployment to Southwest Asia. (U.S. Air Force photo by 

Technical Sergeant Samuel King Jr.)

Lower Right: Members of Special Boat Team 12 navigate through San Diego 

Bay in rigid-hull inflatable boats. (U.S. Navy photo by Seaman Geneva G. 

Brier)

The JSOU Press

MacDill Air Force Base, Florida

2014

Special Operations

Research Topics

2014
This monograph and other JSOU publications can be found at https://jsou.

socom.mil. Click on Publications. Comments about this publication are 

invited and should be forwarded to the Director, Strategic Studies Department, Joint Special Operations University, 7701 Tampa Point Blvd., MacDill 

AFB FL 33621.

*******

The JSOU Strategic Studies Department is currently accepting written works relevant to special operations for potential publication. For more information please 

contact the JSOU Research Director at jsou_research@socom.mil. Thank you for 

your interest in the JSOU Press. 

*******

This work was cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.

ISBN 978-1-933749-76-1
Recent Publications of the JSOU Press

Hybrid Warfare, August 2013, Timothy McCulloh and Richard Johnson

Smart Power and U.S. National Strategy, August 2013, Francisco Wong-Diaz

Retooling for the Future, May 2013, Francisco Wong-Diaz 

21st Century SOF: Toward an American Theory of Special Operations, 

April 2013, Harry R. Yarger

Irregular Warfare: The Maoist Challenge to India’s Internal Security, 

December 2012, Prakash Singh 

Iran: Illusion, Reality, and Interests, September 2012, Roby Barrett 

Knowing Your Partner: The Evolution of Brazilian Special Operations Forces, 

August 2012, Alvaro de Souza Pinheiro

2012 JSOU and NDIA SO/LIC Division Essays, July 2012

Confronting the Terrorism of Boko Haram in Nigeria, May 2012, James J.F. Forest

Strategic Culture and Strategic Studies: An Alternative Framework for Assessing 

al-Qaeda and the Global Jihad Movement, May 2012, Richard Shultz

Understanding the Form, Function, and Logic of Clandestine Insurgent and 

Terrorist Networks: The First Step in Effective Counternetwork Operations, 

April 2012, Derek Jones

“We Will Find a Way”: Understanding the Legacy of Canadian Special 

Operations Forces, February 2012, Bernd Horn

Winning Hearts and Minds in Afghanistan and Elsewhere, February 2012, 

Thomas H. Henriksen

vii

Contents

Foreword.......................................................................................ix

Introduction...................................................................................xi

A. Priority Topics ........................................................................... 1

B. Line of Operation 1 - Winning the Current Fight........................ 7

C. Line of Operation 2 - The Global SOF Network....................... 15

D. Line of Operation 3 - Preservation of the Force and Families... 19

E. Line of Operation 4 - Responsive Resourcing........................... 25

F. Additional SOF Issues ............................................................. 31

Acronym List ............................................................................... 35
Topics Workshop 2014 participants at JSOU January 15, 2013.
ix

Foreword

The Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) Special Operations Research 

Topics 2014 publication highlights a wide range of topics collaboratively 

developed and prioritized by experts from across the Special Operations Forces 

(SOF) community. The topics in these pages are intended to guide research projects for professional military education (PME) students, JSOU faculty, fellows, 

and others writing about special operations during this academic year. As JSOU 

executes the joint education mission of United States Special Operations Command 

(USSOCOM), the university is focused on publication of hard-hitting, SOF-relevant 

research that contributes to better understanding of the policy and strategy issues 

affecting the operational and planning needs of SOF.

Our researchers, many of whom are world-renowned experts and authors, often 

find themselves lecturing in JSOU classrooms. This gives our students the unique 

opportunity to experience first-hand the author’s perspectives on their analysis 

and recommendations.

To develop this list, representatives from the USSOCOM headquarters, the 

theater special operations commands (TSOCs), SOF chairs from the war colleges, 

representatives from research centers and think tanks, and JSOU senior fellows meet 

annually to collaboratively develop a comprehensive list of issues and challenges of 

concern to the greater SOF community. 

The research that results from these topics directly supports JSOU’s evolution as 

a preeminent 21st century educational institution recognized as the intellectual and 

SOF-focused organization to conduct research in national security, military strategy, and global and regional studies. An exciting new development is the establishment of the Center for Special Operations Studies and Research (CSOSR) located at 

JSOU with initial operational capability forecast this year. CSOSR is the intellectual 

foundation for the USSOCOM Commander’s vision that SOF is the most educated 

force and will be the recognized center for solving SOF’s most complex problems.

I encourage SOF personnel to contribute their experiences and ideas to the SOF 

community by submitting your completed research on these topics to JSOU Press. 

If you have any questions about this document or ideas for future topics, contact 

the director of research via e-mail at jsou_research@socom.mil. I look forward to 

your participation in JSOU’s research and publication program.

Brian A. Maher, SES 

President 

xi

Introduction

The JSOU Research Topics 2014 list represents an effort to identify, categorize, and list SOF-related research topics for research by PME students, JSOU Senior Fellows, and other SOF researchers who desire to make 

timely and meaningful contributions to SOF issues and challenges. This list 

is tailored to address the USSOCOM Commander’s four lines of operation 

(LOOs):

•	 Winning the Current Fight

•	 The Global SOF Network

•	 Preservation of the Force and Families

•	 Responsive Resourcing

There is tremendous value and opportunity for personal growth when 

SOF PME students research and write on timely, relevant, SOF-related topics. 

Such activity develops the individual’s intellect and provides a professional 

and practical perspective that broadens and frames the insights of other analysts and researchers in regard to these topics. This list and the accompanying 

topic descriptions are a guide to stimulate interest and thinking; topics may 

be narrowed or otherwise modified as deemed necessary (e.g., to suit school 

writing requirements or maximize individual interests and experiences).

Section A (Priority Topics) identifies topics of particular importance as 

ranked by the research topics workshop participants. Sections B, C, D, and 

E each focus on one of the Commander’s LOOs. Section F contains topics 

of importance to SOF that do not fit into the other categories. All of the 

topics seek to expand SOF understanding of specific challenges and issues 

and promote thinking in regard to understanding them and identifying 

doctrine, capabilities, techniques, and procedures to increase SOF efficacy 

in addressing them. At the same time, the research is intended to inform 

policymakers, the larger military profession, and the public of the issues and 

challenges of concern to the SOF community and what might be undertaken 

in support of them. The topics reflect a consensus of those participating in 

the topics workshop and are vetted through TSOCs and components—that 

is, the topics are deemed particularly worthwhile in addressing immediate 

SOF needs and in building future capacity for emerging challenges. 
xii

Previous years’ research topics lists provide a repository of topics 

highlighted in the past. These topics lists may provide prospective 

researchers with additional ideas of relevant topics identified in this publication. The previous editions of the USSCOM Research Topics (2009 

through 2013 editions) are available on the JSOU public web site at: 

https://jsou.socom.mil/Pages/Publications.aspx. 

Limited travel funding may be available from JSOU to support travel for 

PME student research projects (e.g., to conduct interviews or visit USSOCOM 

or component headquarters). These research “grants” are subject to approval 

by the JSOU Strategic Studies Department director, contingent on the topic 

selected and the anticipated value of the research. All requests for research 

travel funding must be submitted to JSOU through your institution’s SOF 

Chair or senior SOF representative. Please share this reference with fellow 

researchers, thesis advisors, and other colleagues and feel free to submit 

additional topics for consideration. 

We encourage you to visit our publications page on JSOU’s public website 

to see whether JSOU has a publication that relates to your area of interest. 

We also encourage you to send us your completed research on these topics.
1

A. Priority Topics

A. Priority Topics

Topic Titles

A1. No time to think: Crisis management culture in SOF is inhibiting 

strategic thought

A2. SOF in under-governed spaces

A3. The next SOF fight: Emerging trends and mission consequences

A4. Women in SOF

A5. How do you “build” future SOF leaders?

A6. Advantages and disadvantages of a persistent SOF forward 

presence

A7. SOF 2030: The way SOF will look and operate in the future

A8. Cyber operations and SOF

A9. Using unconventional warfare against violent extremists

Topic Descriptions

A1. No time to think: Crisis management culture in SOF is inhibiting strategic thought 

From our most senior leaders down to the lowest level of leadership, Special Operations Forces (SOF) perpetuate a culture of crisis 

response and rapid problem solving. While this can be very beneficial 

in high-stress, time-sensitive situations, it may not be conducive to 

the development of far-reaching strategies and effective programs. A 

perceived lack of time to think and ponder consequences of actions 

can have the net result of strategic deficiency. What are some examples of this cultural impediment, and how can SOF adapt the culture 

to improve strategic decision making? Do our leaders spend sufficient 

time considering all the risks and benefits of particular decisions, 

or are they constrained by the next meeting or latest crisis? Even 

in U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) headquarters, 

away from the battlefield, a culture of crisis management has created a perception that everything is important and all problems must 

be quickly solved. Not only does this imply that slowing down to 

think is a waste of time, but it also increases the level of stress for 

all concerned. Without taking time to critically think about issues, 
2

Special Operations Research Topics 2014

Please send your completed research papers on these topics to the JSOU Strategic Studies Department.

do personnel have difficulty making sense of their situation leading 

to increased stress? How does this environment thwart any parallel 

efforts to manage stress? Does a culture of crisis management in SOF 

artificially impose stress even when service members and civilians 

are not actively deployed? Are there effective ways to overcome the 

crisis culture? Is the USSOCOM crisis management style driven by 

the direct action door kickers at the expense of thinkers? Could Sun 

Tzu or Clausewitz have done their foundational work at USSOCOM 

given the crisis management culture?

A2. SOF in under-governed spaces

Recent events in Mali, Libya, and Somalia have highlighted the difficulties of countering terrorism in areas lacking a viable national 

government. What roles should SOF play in these areas? Should SOF 

concentrate on long-term capacity building or short-term operations? 

Are there some lessons learned from previous SOF efforts? Are SOF 

prepared to advocate a form of government that is acceptable to 

locals yet at odds with the ideological desires of interagency partners? Does, or should, the legal framework for our actions in other 

countries apply to under-governed spaces? Is a revised definition of 

sovereignty needed? In irregular warfare (IW), what are the historical 

best practices and primary considerations for operations in remote 

areas, under-governed spaces, or denied areas?

A3. The next SOF fight: Emerging trends and mission consequences

Emerging trends warrant a reexamination of SOF missions and 

their consequences. The last decade has challenged and focused SOF 

resources in specific ways. However, the strategic environment and 

the potential actors within it have not been static. A key question is 

where, and for what reason, will SOF be in hostile environments? 

Where have SOF been, and what have these forces accomplished? 

What historical outcomes may be linked or associated with the presence of SOF? What were the metrics of success? Were these metrics 

effective or appropriate? What are some recommended metrics for 

future conflicts? Is there a link between SOF presence in a country 

and that country’s subsequent economic growth? Should we send SOF 

to areas where we wish to ‘reinforce success’ or areas we hope to ‘save 
3

A. Priority Topics

from total disaster’? What is the level of concern that those forces we 

train to a higher standard will become more capable adversaries in 

the future? Do SOF have sufficient capabilities and capacity for the 

next fight? 

A4. Women in SOF

In January 2013, the Secretary of Defense removed the ban on women 

in specialties and positions whose primary mission is direct ground 

combat. This was partially in response to the realities of the modern 

battlefield and recent experiences with female engagement teams 

and cultural support teams. With removal of these restrictions, the 

special operations community needs to determine how to best integrate women into SOF. In what missions would the incorporation of 

women in SOF be a distinct advantage or disadvantage? What are the 

relevant experiences of other armies in integrating women into SOF? 

How have women been incorporated into insurgent and terrorist 

operations? What lessons can be learned from women in the Office of 

Strategic Services during World War II? What distinct contributions 

can females make to U.S. special operations? How effective has female 

engagement been in Iraq and Afghanistan? To date, what has been the 

benefit versus the cost for U.S. forces? As women are integrated more 

deeply into SOF, how does this potentially affect recruiting? How will 

integration impact male and female social dynamics as a whole? Is 

there an impact on readiness, facilities, and training standards?

A5. How do you “build” future SOF leaders? 

Given parochial interests of the services, it is natural that their primary concern is service-oriented rather than SOF-oriented. Yet, SOF 

need to be highly specialized with skill sets that do not necessarily fit 

into service-oriented models. As USSOCOM looks to have high quality leadership, is it reasonable to expect the services to ensure future 

SOF leaders are prepared? Who in SOF should be “groomed”—operators, support personnel, or everyone assigned? How many people 

need to be “groomed” and for what leadership positions? Should 

USSOCOM be able to select component and other commanders? 

Which commander/office/leader is in the right position to make this 

work properly? What new authorities does USSOCOM need to do 
4

Special Operations Research Topics 2014

Please send your completed research papers on these topics to the JSOU Strategic Studies Department.

this? Does grooming these leaders create too many “clones” that lack 

the diversity to serve and examine SOF? Unconstrained from current 

models, given the conditions of the contemporary battle space, what 

skill sets would you want to foster? USSOCOM wants to develop 

SOF with doctorate degrees; how do you identify, manage, and retain 

these people? 

A6. Advantages and disadvantages of a persistent SOF forward 

presence

SOF are moving forward to help build a global SOF network and 

increase responsiveness. While there is no question of whether this 

effort is going to occur, there should be serious examination of the 

benefits and best practices of the forces. What advantages may be 

realized from posturing (or basing) SOF outside the U.S.? What are 

some of the disadvantages or even potential unintended consequences 

associated with posturing SOF forward? Language proficiency should 

be greatly enhanced, but only if risk aversion and a relaxed force protection posture allows for local interaction by SOF; is this realistic? 

In countries where SOF have a continuous presence, do they stay 

long enough in one place to accomplish their missions? Do personnel 

rotate too frequently to build adequate relationships with partnernation personnel?

A7. SOF 2030: The way SOF will look and operate in the future

What common vision of the individual operator, as well as collective SOF, will harmonize and align the efforts of the planners and 

acquisition personnel as they conduct long-range planning for the 

expenditure of resources and efforts? What future technology trends 

for requirements, training, and education are reasonably possible for 

equipping the force? What strategic contextualization is required to 

prevent irrelevance of a SOF 2030 vision? Is 2030 too far in the future 

to realistically deal with fiscal realities and uncertainty? Historically, 

how well have SOF and the services succeeded in achieving future 

visions? Based on ever-increasing regional complexity, technology 

advances, and global social responsibility concerns, is it time for the 

elevation of USSOCOM to a service-level equivalent? How will continued sensor development and fidelity provide SOF with increased 
5

A. Priority Topics

capability across core activities? Yet, technology is not a substitute for 

strategy; how will SOF tailor its approach to less technical partners 

to maximize capability? 

A8. Cyber operations and SOF

Cyber conflict is not the future; it is the present. Yet the complexity of the subject area is deep and the rules and tools unclear. How 

should USSOCOM prepare for environments in which cyber operations occur? How could USSOCOM ensure theater special operations commands (TSOCs) are equipped with minimal capabilities 

to conduct general analysis in their respective area of responsibility 

(AOR)? How could USSOCOM prepare for significant cyber threats 

to counter nefarious activities conducted in the TSOC geographical areas? Can SOF’s global presence be leveraged to actively defend 

friendly networks through interdiction of networks? Recent regime 

changes in Egypt and Libya exemplify the use of cyber tools, like 

social media, to successfully influence and organize resistance movements. How do cyber operations affect the conduct of UW? To what 

extent is it reasonable to reject legalistic constraints on cyber war as 

it is likely to hinder U.S. capability while failing to impact foreign 

state and non-state actors? Staying ahead of the adversary requires a 

clear understanding of the strategies, threats, capabilities, and tactics, 

techniques, and procedures (TTPs); what are the counters to these 

threats? 

A9. Using unconventional warfare against violent extremists

With profound change occurring in many countries, once wellknown regimes are being replaced. With such monumental changes 

occurring, the end-state is far from clear. It is possible that UW could 

become a more significant activity for SOF in the near future. What 

changes in U.S. legal authorities and restraints need to occur to prevent enemy exploitation? How would we have to modify existing 

UW policy and doctrine to use SOF in a force multiplier role for a 

cost-efficient containment strategy against violent extremism? In an 

era of constrained resources and a continued demand for low-density/

high-demand assets, can persistent engagement with surrogates provide an economical UW approach? What does the research and body 
6

Special Operations Research Topics 2014

Please send your completed research papers on these topics to the JSOU Strategic Studies Department.

of literature in the strategic logic of nonviolent conflict offer to U.S. 

UW paradigms? How can SOF illuminate networks to mitigate the 

inadvertent empowerment of malign actors? 
7

B. Winning the Current Fight

B. Line of Operation 1 - Winning the Current 

Fight

Topic Titles

B1. Service-provided capabilities for SOF in post-2014 Afghanistan

B2. Transitioning from a wartime posture in Afghanistan: A transfer 

of responsibilities

B3. Afghanistan 2014 and beyond: An evolving SOF mission

B4. Village stability operations: Lessons from the past and into the 

future

B5. Transnational organized crime and terrorism

B6. SOF’s role in influencing relevant populations’ behavior

B7. Regional allocation of SOF

B8. Transnational violent extremism

B9. Special warfare campaigning: Rising to the operational level of war

B10. How do SOF and conventional forces train, equip, man, and fight 

together?

B11. Relationships between North African tribes, al-Qaeda, and other 

violent extremist organizations

Topic Descriptions

B1. Service-provided capabilities for SOF in post-2014 Afghanistan

The post-2014 U.S. military presence in Afghanistan will see most but 

not all conventional forces (CF) withdrawn from Afghanistan. SOF 

presence will remain in Afghanistan and require service-provided 

capabilities to support continued operations. What challenges do 

the services face in providing support to SOF while trying to simultaneously reset their forces? How does the impending rebalance to 

the Asia/Pacific area impact sourcing requirements necessary for 

Afghanistan over the long term? Given the long “tail” of support 

required for special operations, what are the critical enabling elements provided by the services? Do these critical enablers need to 

be part of SOF (rather than the services) to ensure the continuity, 

C2, and common mindset needed as part of the SOF team? As an 

example, will the next explosive ordinance detachment (EOD) unit 
8

Special Operations Research Topics 2014

Please send your completed research papers on these topics to the JSOU Strategic Studies Department.

rotating in understand enough of SOF and the SOF “approach” to 

seamlessly and efficiently perform to standards? Considering that 

military support units are built to meet specific requirements and 

conventional support units are force-listed and resourced to satisfy 

conventional unit requirements, will any “excess capacity” exist to 

support SOF? Or, should USSOCOM support units be restructured/

grown to meet future demands in a self-sufficient model rather than 

a dependency model?

B2. Transitioning from a wartime posture in Afghanistan: 

A transfer of responsibilities

A post-International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) environment 

will require an adjustment of C2 relationships and interagency 

involvement. What are those ISAF-led tasks and responsibilities 

that will be transferred to the interagency, international community, 

Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, or simply will 

not be done? How will the U.S. consolidate successes while assisting 

Afghanistan’s government in maintaining legitimacy? How does the 

U.S. do this in such a way that it strengthens Afghanistan’s status as 

a sovereign nation, contributes to their relationships in the region as 

well as their status as an effective member in the international community, while remaining a responsible partner for the U.S.? How do 

SOF transition from a wartime posture in apportioned battle space, 

using Title 10 and 50 authorities, to a post-conflict posture supporting U.S. security assistance activities in a non-apportioned space or 

sovereign nation territory, under Titles 10, 22, and 50 authorities? 

What is the role of the TSOC during this period?

B3. Afghanistan 2014 and beyond: An evolving SOF mission

The drawdown in Afghanistan will necessarily change the security 

environment. The absence of a visibly large U.S. force to maintain 

stability will be replaced by small SOF units and Afghan security 

forces. A continued examination of the security environment in 

Afghanistan for 2014 is critical. As the U.S. military draws down in 

Afghanistan, what national security challenges will remain? What 

organizations will pose the greatest threat to U.S. interests as the 

drawdown is executed? What actions can SOF take now to prepare 
9

B. Winning the Current Fight

for success as the CF prepare to depart? What missions will SOF be 

required to do, and what do they look like in this specific environment? What are the implications for force structure and sustaining the force? “Drawdown” is not just about military numbers, the 

types of forces, and the primary military command structure. It 

is also about the Department of State and Department of Defense 

(DOD) enabling functions that SOF require in order to deal with a 

new security environment. What will that new security environment 

look like? How will those relationships develop, and how will those 

responsibilities be shared? What conditions must be set for Combined 

Forces Special Operations Component Command – Afghanistan to 

disengage from the Afghan Local Police program?

B4. Village stability operations: Lessons from the past and into the 

future

Village stability operations (VSO) are a major part of the coalition 

program in Afghanistan. Can we learn anything from the “Strategic 

Hamlet” program in Vietnam? Are there any similarities from the 

Vietnam experience that are relevant to Afghanistan, as an example, 

in the areas of technology or information sharing? To what degrees 

can technical means overcome some of the tactical challenges from 

the Vietnam era? And to what extent did technical “improvements” 

actually exacerbate the tactical through strategic challenges? What 

mechanisms can improve information sharing between Afghan 

National Police, Afghan National Army, and Afghan National 

Directorate of Security? This should include assessing the roles and 

effectiveness of the Operational Control Groups and the Regional 

Operational Control Groups that are conducting the coordination 

between these three elements on a daily basis. What potential assessment methodologies—to include both quantitative and qualitative 

measures—might be used to evaluate the effectiveness of VSO in a 

particular location as it applies to a particular command decision, 

mission, or end state? What things could be changed or identified 

internally or externally from VSO that could better support the way 

ahead? Is the VSO concept applicable to other theaters, and if so, how 

might it be adapted or generalized? 
10

Special Operations Research Topics 2014

Please send your completed research papers on these topics to the JSOU Strategic Studies Department.

B5. Transnational organized crime and terrorism

Transnational organized crime (TOC) networks are a world-wide 

issue and span across combatant commanders’ AORs. How do TOC 

networks interact with adversaries as not only facilitators, but smugglers, providers, and “fronts” as well? Connections go well beyond the 

drug cartels, to include terrorism, and the effects these organizations 

are having on the U.S. What are the successes, failures, constraints, 

authorities, operational, legal, and intelligence issues associated with 

supporting interagency TOC analysis and operations? How do the 

various TSOCs work together to address the issue? What benefit or 

detriment emerges from making a distinction between terrorist organizations and criminal organizations? Does this distinction enable or 

hinder interagency coordination? International coordination? International legitimacy?

B6. SOF’s role in influencing relevant populations’ behavior

IW strategy includes influencing the behavior of relevant populations, 

yet SOF are learning this through on-the-job training. What needs 

to be included in SOF training and education in order to increase the 

effectiveness of information operations? Is this a function of the Critical Task Review Board or Critical Task Site Selection Board within the 

school houses? Should this be part of the curriculum review process?

Considering the question of metrics in information operations, 

what is the appropriate balance between information operations conducted by outsiders to influence the local relevant population, and 

the information generated by the population itself? How is this balance measured? How does it change across different social-cultural 

settings, political regimes, and types of conflict? What is the TSOC’s 

responsibility in influencing relevant population behavior in its AOR? 

Is it properly resourced, permitted, and capable?

B7. Regional allocation of SOF

As SOF levels in Afghanistan are reduced, the allocation of SOF 

across regions is likely to change. Should Asia/Pacific receive most of 

the reallocated SOF as part of the general DOD pivot to Asia? Should 

Africa receive more SOF because of the newly emerging crises? 

Should the U.S. Northern Command AOR receive more SOF to deal 
11

B. Winning the Current Fight

with the Mexican TOC networks? With a change in priority regions, 

what are the toughest languages, greatest distances, and diminishing 

resources? Is Special Forces (SF) regional expertise even possible? On 

the other hand, with these changing priorities, is it prudent for SOF 

to be aligned with TSOC C2 structures, or should they align against 

enemy threats under a centralized command for resource efficiency 

and unity of command? Given the assumption that authorities for SF 

will not change, how could SF groups, indeed SOF as a whole, best 

engage and maintain engagement with key countries in their respective AORs? What would this look like?

B8. Transnational violent extremism

The threat of al-Qaeda and other groups remains an area of concern 

for the U.S. and its allies around the world. The reach of al-Qaeda 

and other terrorist networks can now be found not only in the U.S. 

Central Command AOR, but expanding into the U.S. Africa Command AOR as well. In particular, there is concern for militant groups 

operating in eastern Central African Republic, Northern Democratic 

Republic of the Congo, Mali, South Sudan, and Sudan, including 

their operating areas, membership, ideology, and smuggling routes. 

Additionally, research in the area should include those territories that 

are transitioning to Sharia Law. 

Research questions relevant to the topic include: What is the 

nature of terrorism as a tactic in the third decade of this cycle? Who 

will use terrorism, to what ends, and how? Procedurally, how do 

SOF coordinate intelligence, planning, and operations across U.S. 

organizational boundaries as compared to country teams, geographic 

combatant commanders (GCCs), State Department, U.S. Agency for 

International Development (USAID), and others? Are UW TTPs 

viable tools for containing these movements? What are the detailed 

cultural beliefs and standards derived from Sharia Law in areas where 

Sharia Law is not the known to be the governing law of the land? 

B9. Special warfare campaigning: Rising to the operational level of 

war

Despite 10 years’ experience in IW, CF’s ability to plan and execute 

operational level campaigns requiring an emphasis on special warfare 
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is lacking. There is no SOF headquarters designed to execute special 

warfare at the campaign level, nor is there comprehensive doctrine 

for special warfare/special operations campaign planning at the operational level. Should special warfare be the domain of SOF at the 

campaign level, or is it the responsibility of Joint Force Headquarters 

and specifically GCCs to develop integrated campaigns that include 

Special Warfare similar to traditional war-like campaign plans? In 

an era of persistent conflict, where persistent engagement will be the 

norm, consideration needs to be given to how the GCCs plan and 

conduct campaigns that are primarily SOF-relevant, but where the 

joint task force commander is likely to be a conventional commander. 

The crux of the issue is the GCC staff has the lead in developing 

the campaign plan and the ground force commander will generally be 

a conventional three-star commander. The TSOC supports the GCC 

and conventional commander, but the nature of the campaign would 

imply the inverse. Will the Afghanistan model, where the special 

operations joint task force (SOJTF) exercises command and control 

over all forces be the new norm? If so, can SOF support more than 

one SOJTF?

B10. How do SOF and conventional forces train, equip, man, and 

fight together?

As the transition of the war in Afghanistan continues and the downsizing of units meets minimal manning levels, it is imperative that 

SOF and CF combine efforts and resources to meet the requirements 

identified by the President and DOD. Command, control, and manning, to include type of manning, are critical ingredients in this process. In addition, the ability to advise and fight against an asymmetric 

enemy while planning with minimal force levels and enablers is critical. Objectives include: clear, defined processes for deployment and 

integration of SOF and CF to include pre-deployment, partnering 

and training; clearly established force modular formations; identification of minimal and optimal enablers and low-density military 

and interagency support; and exit strategies and measures of success 

against determined enemies capitalizing on asymmetric strategies. 

How can SOF and CF better integrate to conduct counterinsurgency and CT operations? Is it necessary for CF and SOF to train 
13

B. Winning the Current Fight

together before they deploy together? Does training together improve 

C2? As an example, for an EOD unit? A water purification unit? Do 

SOF need some conventional enablers assigned to USSOCOM, like 

EOD? What roles will the Army’s Regionally Aligned Brigades play? 

How will they affect SOF? What adjustments should SOF make in 

order to optimize the overall U.S. Government (USG) effort?

B11. Relationships between North African tribes, al-Qaeda, and 

other violent extremist organizations

Investigate tribal connections between al-Qaeda in the Maghreb 

(AQIM) and other violent extremist organizations (VEOs) of the 

region. Provide insight on how to address the threats and leverage 

tribal connections/seams against AQIM and VEOs. As an example, 

what are the lessons from Iraq? The success in Western Iraq was 

largely due to leveraging the Sunni population to reject and resist 

al-Qaeda. All transnational groups, tribes, and other organizations/affiliations that might be leveraged against the expansion 

of AQIM and other al-Qaeda associated groups should be examined. Therefore, what are the relationships between North African 

tribes, AQIM and VEOs? Where are the seams, and what are the 

common interests that unite the various organizations? How can 

those seams or common interests be used to influence the various 

populations?

15

C. The Global SOF Network

C. Line of Operation 2 - The Global SOF Network

Topic Titles

C1. Expanding the global SOF network: To what end?

C2. Joint service capabilities in support of SOF

C3. The next SOF fight: Capabilities and future adversaries

C4. Global SOF posture and access: Past, present, and future

C5. Leveraging networks for persistent presence

C6. Concepts for regional SOF coordination centers 

C7. Training partner nation forces

C8. Embedding full-time special operations liaison officers in select 

embassies

Topic Discussions

C1. Expanding the global SOF network: To what end?

Clearly establishing and defining the ends is important to maintaining U.S. relative superiority in an expanded SOF network. What capabilities will SOF require in the future in order to maintain relative 

superiority in an expanded global SOF network? What is the right 

balance of SOF capability and force structure across the range of missions assigned to SOF? What implications does expansion of a global 

SOF network have on UW or CT? Can the value or effectiveness of 

a SOF network be measured or quantified? If so, what metrics are 

appropriate to measure or gauge the effectiveness of a SOF network?

C2. Joint service capabilities in support of SOF

As the role of SOF increases to shape national security strategy missions abroad, how might the services support SOF using CF? Fiscal 

realities and national interests will compel the U.S. to reduce the 

conventional military force footprint abroad, leaving SOF as the globally predominant engagement force. Designed for light operations in 

austere environments, SOF require logistical and command, control, 

communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) capabilities typically organic to theater-aligned CF. 

How might the services and combatant commanders provide SOF 
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with logistical and C4ISR infrastructure after the larger more robust 

CF depart? Should SOF develop their support capability for those 

functions? What should joint and service strategies be for achieving 

national security objectives in a new era of reduced resources? 

C3. The next SOF fight: Capabilities and future adversaries

The SOF community is reexamining its purpose and relooking at 

activities and missions that have not received the attention in training 

and resourcing necessary to maintain proficiency. Can SOF capabilities required for the emerging trends and mission sets be identified 

and clearly delineated? Based on current SOF capabilities, do SOF 

have sufficient capabilities and capacity for the next fight? Can indicators that require SOF to modify, adjust, or change their operational 

capabilities and training be identified? How has the infusion of technological advances reshaped the way SOF operate and will be able to 

operate against future peer or technologically-superior adversaries 

in non-permissive or restrictive environments? What asymmetric 

TTPs will impact future SOF operations?

C4. Global SOF posture and access: Past, present, and future

How has past and current global SOF posture enabled or constrained 

the U.S.s’ ability to respond to crisis, or ability to leverage existing 

partner nation relationships to achieve security objectives? How have 

past or present USG policy decisions and partner nation constraints/

restraints impacted SOF posture and access to conduct operations, 

engagements, and exercises? How do SOF achieve the right balance 

of access and posture in each GCC’s theater as a critical component 

to both the USSOCOM 2020 vision and National Defense Strategy? 

What opportunities are there to gain synergy with SOF from key 

partner nations? 

C5. Leveraging networks for persistent presence

What is the real power in a network: standardization or shared vision? 

Should more effort be applied toward developing shared visions so 

the U.S. can minimize overall cost and obligations? Is the declared 

presence of U.S. SOF in a partner nation a hindrance to achieving 

U.S. or partner national goals? To what degree do partners in the 
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C. The Global SOF Network

SOF global network need to be totally interoperable? Is the intent 

of the planned regional SOF coordination centers, foreign internal 

defense, and security force assistance programs to develop capacities 

and capabilities in other countries that replicate the U.S. model or are 

non-standard, non-Western approaches satisfactory if the ultimate 

objective is achieved? 

C6. Concepts for regional SOF coordination centers

The USSOCOM commander has directed, where feasible, the establishment of regional SOF coordination centers (RSCCs) as vehicles 

for regional collaboration. RSCCs are considered integral to enabling 

the global SOF network and are envisioned to be regional, multilateral 

engagement hubs for facilitating communication and interoperability 

among global SOF partners. What are the different possibilities in 

creating these centers taking into account cultural, political, and 

social sensitivities? What should the roles and responsibilities of the 

regional centers be? How should the RSCCs be staffed? How can 

partner nations be encouraged to provide personnel? Do each of these 

centers need to be approached differently? If so, what are some examples? Should the RSCCs be aligned by GCC or some other means? 

Can RSCCs successfully exist where a U.S. presence is problematic? 

How can the effectiveness, efficiency, and quality of these centers be 

measured? What metrics should be considered? What should be the 

approach to information sharing in RSCCs?

C7. Training partner nation forces

Training partner nation forces is a traditional SOF mission and 

one that is aligned with U.S. national strategy of building partner 

nation capacity in all regions of the world. How much of USSOCOM 

allocated resources should be dedicated to training partner-nation 

forces? Do the GCCs have policies, programs, or similar interactions 

with partner nations in their region? Are these programs sufficient? 

Should SOF train only partner-nation SOF, or should it also train CF, 

constabularies, police, and civil administrations? Should SOF work 

with conventional trainers to ensure synergy? Do opportunities exist 

within other geographic regions that would enable the same kind of 

collaboration among SOF that currently exists within North Atlantic 
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Treaty Organization? What constitutes a strategic partnership in 

regards to SOF? How does partnership differ from capacity-building? 

How can training with partner nation forces be leveraged into a basis 

for a strategic partnership?

C8. Embedding full-time special operations liaison officers in select 

embassies

USSOCOM is developing special operations liaison officers (SOLOs) 

for assignment with partner nations’ SOF headquarters overseas. 

Should USSOCOM have full-time SOLOs embedded in the country 

teams at U.S. embassies in countries with critical SOF operations? 

What would be the purpose and role of such SOLOs? What conditions 

justify placement of a full-time SOLO at an embassy as opposed to 

what military attachés or security cooperation officers do currently? 

What would be the specific duties of a SOLO, and how would they 

differ from other U.S. military personnel assigned to an embassy? 

What are the diplomatic, legal, and bureaucratic requirements of 

embedding SOLOs in embassies? Are there professional development 

implications of deploying SOLOs? Should SOF heavily participate in 

respective service foreign area officer programs or develop a parallel 

SOF-specific career track? Should there be language, country experience, and rank requirements for SOLOs? Is a SOLO career track 

feasible? Does USSOCOM have the resources/manpower to execute 

this initiative?
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D. Preservation of the Force and Families

D. Line of Operation 3 - Preservation of the 

Force and Families

Topic Titles

D1. Show no weakness: The stigma associated with seeking medical 

and mental health care

D2. Balancing operational requirements with preserving the force and 

families

D3. Sustaining the SOF warrior and family during an era of persistent 

conflict

D4. The SOF mission and mental health: Career implications of mental 

health treatment

D5. Stress inoculation in SOF operators

D6. Partnering outside the Department of Defense for preservation of 

the force and family

Topic Discussions

D1. Show no weakness: The stigma associated with seeking medical 

and mental health care

It has been suggested that although today’s military leaders publically encourage forces to seek medical or behavioral health care, 

there remains a stigma associated with it. What can be done to “destigmatize” SOF operators and their families seeking medical and 

behavioral health care? Are there any adverse consequences to destigmatizing medical and behavioral health care treatment? What 

elements of military and SOF culture are present that challenge efforts 

to balance mental fitness with duty performance? Is a culture that 

rewards personnel based on how many hours they work, how many 

days they deploy and how many sacrifices they make counterproductive to establishing programs that support restoring and maintaining 

reduced levels of stress? How can a SOF operator take leave, reduce 

time away from family and/or seek measures to reduce stress when 

those efforts are possibly stigmatized as non-productive or perceived 

as a weakness? What are the implications of SOF personnel and families seeking outside health care under the exigencies of non-disclosure 
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agreements? What roles could a “SOF-for-Life” program play in 

assisting active and retired SOF to cope with stressors? Could an 

analysis of the retired SOF population coping mechanisms assist in 

improving current treatment protocols? Is the stigma associated with 

mental health treatment organizationally or culturally imposed? To 

what extent do SOF operators contribute to stigmas which prevent the 

seeking of health care or counseling for themselves and their families?

D2. Balancing operational requirements with preserving the force 

and families

SOF service members have identified the lack of predictability in 

their schedules as one of the principal causes of pressure on the force 

and families; however they perceive that their immediate leadership 

and commanders do not and will not turn down requests for additional deployments and other commitments, thus increasing operations tempo and decreasing predictability. Are mission requirements 

increasing and outpacing available manpower? Do SOF commanders effectively balance requests to support operational and training 

requirements with maintaining a healthy force? Can SOF maintain 

readiness levels and meet mission requirements while maintaining 

personnel tempo levels at a manageable level? How often do SOF 

commanders turn down requests for operational support without 

risking negative career implications? Should operations tempo and 

training for SOF at home station be reduced? What are reasonable 

work hours for SOF during the period of time when they are not 

deployed? How does “taking SOF global” conflict with preserving 

the force families? Will increasing accompanied permanent change 

of station assignments overseas alleviate the stressors of an overseas 

posture for SOF?

D3. Sustaining the SOF warrior and family during an era of persistent conflict

All indications point toward a continued high operations tempo 

and forward global engagement by SOF after the U.S. involvement 

in Afghanistan is decreased. What are the lessons learned from more 

than 12 years of increased operations tempo that can be carried forward to sustain SOF personnel and their families? USSOCOM has 
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D. Preservation of the Force and Families

administered an innovative and aggressive initiative named the Care 

Coalition and its Care Coalition Recovery Program since 2005 to 

assist the most severely injured SOF warriors and their families. What 

have been the impacts of the most recent programs to sustain SOF 

personnel and their families? How might these programs be impacted 

if forced to cope with more asynchronous deployment schedules (such 

as smaller numbers deployed simultaneously to the same location, 

greater dispersion in deployment offsets and locations)? What is 

the best way to address family issues and therapy? Are there fiscal, 

legal, or other constraints or obstacles that might limit the indefinite 

employment of these programs at current or increased levels? What 

metrics will articulate success and justify the value of these efforts to 

military members, policymakers, and Congress? How do SOF leaders 

improve access to family counseling and preventive family therapy? 

Are results consistent across the physical and emotional realms, or 

are there divergent impacts in these two areas? How is resiliency 

improving through preventative (pre-rehabilitative) and rehabilitative 

approaches? What additional measures should be taken? What indicators can be identified, and which are the best predictors of overall 

family stress? What has been the effect of such programs on recruiting and retention? What methods of measurement can be fielded in 

order to facilitate the collection of reliable data? 

D4. The SOF mission and mental health: career implications of 

mental health treatment 

Although there have been great efforts to encourage service members 

to seek mental health counseling and a declaration that this will not 

jeopardize their ability to continue their mission, there are realistically some problems that should remove an individual from direct 

service. Where is the balance between privacy and mission requirements? Is it different in SOF units? How are SOF personnel encouraged to seek counseling when there is a real perception that if their 

issues are severe enough, they will lose their ability to continue serving in a SOF unit? There are psychological norms published as part 

of the physical standards regulations in each service, and by civilian medicine. Does USSOCOM need to develop its own standards 

for SOF? In special operations, what are the anticipated acceptable 
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mental health issues, and what are the unacceptable issues? How do 

we educate leadership and operators on how to identify and address 

them? How does mental health treatment affect the career prospects 

for SOF? Should it disqualify individuals from obtaining certain jobs 

or from obtaining security clearances? To what extent does fear of 

adverse career consequences discourage individuals from reporting 

mental health problems? 

D5. Stress inoculation in SOF operators

What is human resiliency? What are the characteristics of human 

resiliency in SOF operators? Are current SOF selection and assessment programs efficient and effective in screening for stress-hardy 

individuals? Are there more efficient and faster ways to assess and 

select people who will succeed in SOF units? Can measuring stress 

resistance be a valid predictor in SOF selection? Can “stress resistance 

capability” be measured biochemically? Inoculation occurs to prevent 

certain conditions or ailments. What are the areas that need stress 

inoculation? What are current means of stress training? Are current 

training programs adequate?

D6. Partnering outside the Department of Defense for preservation 

of the force and family

Current laws and policies limit the circumstances under which service 

members and the DOD are able to accept gifts or assistance from the 

public and/or private organizations. Do these laws and policies need to 

be changed? In this time of constrained federal and state budgets, how 

can SOF leverage private organizations that desire to act in traditionally government-sponsored and funded roles such as post-traumatic 

stress/traumatic brain injury research and treatment, family/child 

counseling, other family services, physical therapy/rehab services, and 

nontraditional medical treatment? What laws/systems need to be put 

in place? Where can the SOF community leverage the private sector 

including industry and academia and other organizations outside of 

DOD for preservation of the force and family? Identify these organizations and how SOF could work with them. What issues, if any, are 

unique to the SOF community? Additionally, what about international 
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D. Preservation of the Force and Families

partners? Can preservation of the force and family lessons and programs be used as a partnership capacity building and access tool?

25

E. Responsive Resourcing

E. Line of Operation 4 - Responsive Resourcing

Topic Titles

E1. Developing capabilities to meet the 2020 challenges

E2. Service-like responsibility is not service-like authority

E3. Humans or hardware: Straying from a SOF truth?

E4. Building SOF programs: What else do SOF require for success?

E5. Resources and sustainment for conducting regional 

unconventional warfare campaigns

E6. The SOF funding wave has crested: What comes next?

E7. Shortening the acquisition cycle

E8. Does every theater special operations command need to be able to 

form its own special operations joint task force?

Topic Discussions

E1. Developing capabilities to meet the 2020 challenges

With uncertainty of funding comes uncertainty in operations, training, and development. However, USSOCOM must address challenges 

regardless of resource constraints. What are the emerging special 

operations challenges for 2020? What are the needed capabilities, and 

how and when should they be brought into the SOF enterprise? What 

are the challenges to SOF operations, and how should USSOCOM 

develop technologies to address them? How does the Joint Concept 

Technology Demonstration program help? Is strategic thinking 

trapped by the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) planning, 

programming, budgeting, and execution system processes? How 

could USSOCOM and SOF component commanders organize their 

staffs to develop strategic thought freed from the FYDP trap? What 

organizational processes inhibit a healthy, dynamic, living, changing organization, and what processes need to exists for checks and 

balances? Would partnering with the private sector or other USG 

agencies in new ways help USSOCOM better develop these capabilities while focusing and balancing resourcing? 
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E2. Service-like responsibility is not service-like authority

Although USSOCOM is provided Major Force Program 11 funding 

and reports to Congress on the success of SOF-peculiar manning, 

training, and equipment programs, the large majority of personnel and major item programs reside within the individual services. 

How does this prevent a joint organization like USSOCOM from 

adequately preparing its force? What are the financial and acquisition policies that inhibit effective development and resourcing of 

SOF? How might these processes be modified to support USSOCOM 

requirements? What are the costs/benefits to DOD budget with 

USSOCOM as a service component? How would this institutional 

structure impact readiness across the total force? How does this 

impact SOF capability, and what does this indicate for CF requirements? Given contemporary policy and strategic forecasts, what are 

the implications of USSOCOM as a service component on U.S. security and the defense budget?

E3. Humans or hardware: Straying from a SOF truth?

Although the SOF community continually expounds the importance 

of developing relationships, building partnerships, and focusing on 

the indirect approach, the majority of major procurement programs 

are focused on tools for direct action. For example, the special operations helicopter fleet was dramatically expanded over the last decade 

in response to a requirement in Afghanistan and Iraq for more assault 

platforms. The new helicopters and their increased technology provide little to no benefit to special operators conducting foreign internal defense, security force assistance, or other partnership missions. 

Which technological solutions have contributed most/least to providing the full spectrum of SOF capabilities? What additional training 

and education would be most beneficial for today’s SOF? In a more 

limited resource environment, how can education and indirect methods be given more support in times of transition between conflicts to 

better prepare the human element of SOF?

E4. Building SOF programs: What else do SOF require for success?

Title 10 and Title 22 funding is required to help many partner nations 

build their SOF, but no single program exists that provides a suitable 
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E. Responsive Resourcing

solution. Which present authorities can be combined with case studies to understand gaps and fissures? Most programs also have fiscal 

year limitations making the development of sustainment programs 

problematic. What authorities are needed to better support partner 

nations? Goldwater-Nicholls gave SOF “service-like” responsibilities for many things, including resourcing. Has the command fully 

exploited these authorities? Can an “overarching” pot of money be 

developed with more flexibility than the current system? How do you 

develop/enhance SOF authorities for future success? 

E5. Resources and sustainment for conducting regional unconventional warfare campaigns

The key condition of UW is effectively sustaining long-term (5 years 

or longer) shaping and influencing under regional engagement with 

partners. Many of our partners are under duress from more aggressive neighbors and larger nations seeking greater dominance in their 

regions. The USG has pledged to support/work with many of these 

partners. What are the best practices for resourcing UW in denied 

and/or restricted access areas? UW activities are executed mainly by 

the military (predominantly SOF); however the main objective is a 

political one which is sponsored or advocated by the civilian leadership (both USG and partner nation). How does the SOF community 

educate and inform those civilian leaders? Interagency support is 

also crucial to obtain assistance and authorities to operate in denied 

access or restricted areas. Yet how do SOF ensure that other partners 

contribute to the costs in the resource-constrained environment?

E6. The SOF funding wave may have crested: What comes next?

The funding realities in the current political and fiscal climate may 

mean an end to the year after year USSOCOM budget increases of the 

last 10 years. The new fiscal reality may dictate that USSOCOM will 

have to make even more difficult prioritization decisions in the future. 

Those decisions will have lasting implications for the SOF community. 

Has SOF become too reliant on high-ticket items? With less funding 

how do we keep effectiveness high while possibly not having advanced 

technology? How will USSOCOM’s strategic vision be affected should 

we enter an extended period of more limited funding? How do SOF 
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succeed in such an environment? What capabilities and/or equipment 

is eliminated or reduced? Sequestration reduces the top-line for DOD 

across FYDP; what are the potential short- and long-term effects of 

continuing resolutions and sequestrations on USSOCOM? What will 

SOF be capable of at 2007 funding levels without supplemental funding? What could be streamlined and reduced to maintain resource 

and operational flexibility?

E7. Shortening the acquisition cycle

With a reduction in funding comes a need for greater efficiency. 

While innovation to enhance efficiency should always be welcome, in 

a resource-constrained environment it becomes an imperative. How 

would a two-year operations and maintenance appropriation increase 

effective use of resources? The longer the cycle, the less “use it or lose 

it” spending will be required, leading to increased efficiencies. Is a 

two-year cycle optimal? Will existing programs suffer, and will a new 

two-year cycle be feasible? Through an abbreviated acquisition cycle, 

more bang for the buck is a possibility. What are the principal bottlenecks that increase acquisition time? How can they be mitigated? 

What areas of acquisition have the most urgent needs for reform? 

What command delegated signature authority levels for spending 

across the enterprise for best practices are winning the delayed 

staffing approval process fight? What are some recent examples of 

prolonged acquisition delays, and how have they impeded mission 

accomplishment? Can USSOCOM use its ability/authority to utilize 

PL 85.804 provisions (sole source contracting and other provisions 

allowing for rapid and special purpose contracting) in the interest of 

national security across all services? What are the downsides?

 E8. Does every theater special operations command need to be able 

to form its own special operations joint task force?

Headquarters USSOCOM is currently moving manpower to the 

TSOCs to optimize the TSOC’s capabilities to include the TSOC 

capability to develop and provide the foundation for its own SOJTF, 

if required in their AOR. What type of manpower (joint manning 

documents) is required to provide the foundation for the standup of a 

SOJTF? However, would the SOJTF be better served remaining in the 
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E. Responsive Resourcing

continental U.S. and training together, and even add predictability? 

Would this add stability?

31

F. Additional SOF Issues

F. Additional SOF Issues 

Topic Titles

F1. Future doctrinal and operational efforts for the SOF human 

domain

F2. Improving USSOCOM’s approach to interagency collaboration

F3. Future SOF involvement in governance and development

F4. Influencing target audiences through social media

F5. Vetting of partner nation forces

F6. What is regular about irregular warfare in the 21st century?

F7. SOF communication: Inside and out

F8. Special operations joint task force-type organizations to address 

regional problems

F9. SOF mobility in an anti-access/area denial environment

Topic Descriptions

F1. Future doctrinal and operational efforts for the SOF human 

domain

SOF do not have a coordinated, formalized, or codified process to 

maximize international, partner, and human domain engagement. 

This type of engagement is key to expanding the global SOF network. 

Often, SOF thrive on existing, informal relationships to great effect. 

However, the existing network is a patchwork of personal relationships, episodic opportunities across regional, functional, and operational equities. The relationships are at times not cultivated with 

any concerted effort to best identify, maintain, or enhance current 

engagement opportunities. What are the current joint and SOF definitions and understanding for “human domain efforts,” especially as 

they relate to integration with doctrinally recognized domains (e.g., 

air, maritime, land, space, cyber)? Should human domain become a 

doctrinal term? What are the expectations of the SOF enterprise for 

human domain as it relates to expanding the global SOF network and 

other DOD and interagency efforts?
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F2. Improving USSOCOM’s approach to interagency collaboration

The fifth “SOF truth” states most special operations require non-SOF 

support, and this concept extends to interagency partners. Given 

USSOCOM’s mission, what is the best approach to conducting effective interagency collaboration? Should there be a change in structure 

and/or process? What are some lessons learned from USSOCOM’s 

experience working with interagency partners and how can these lessons be used to improve the organization? How should USSOCOM – 

National Capitol Region be organized, and how should it interact with 

interagency organizations? What is the best model for USSOCOM 

to effectively collaborate with other agencies? How have USSOCOM 

interagency programs helped or hindered the DOD’s interagency 

objectives?

F3. Future SOF involvement in governance and development

SOF have acquired extensive experience in governance and development in Afghanistan, particularly through VSO. Should governance 

and development remain core competencies for some or all SOF in 

the future? Or should these belong only to CF such as civil affairs and 

USAID? Is there a need for SOF to have expertise and experience in 

governance above the village/VSO level? Ideally, which agency/organization is responsible for development at the district/regional level?

F4. Influencing target audiences through social media

A rapidly increasing portion of the world’s population is connected 

in some way to social media. This venue could provide superlative 

access to popular sentiment and opportunities to influence operations. Is there a need to widen interactive Internet activities authorities? What are the means and value of measuring sentiment on social 

media, and how does that vary for instance between connected young 

adults in their teens and twenties versus the old man in the coffee 

shop? Which social media venues are best suited to interfacing with 

particular audiences of interest? What are the future trends in social 

media, and how can SOF tap into this technology?
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F. Additional SOF Issues

F5. Vetting of partner-nation forces

Insider attacks in Afghanistan, security force collusion in drug trafficking in Latin America, and human rights abuses by foreign peacekeepers in Somalia demonstrate the importance of vetting partner 

nation forces. What are the current methods of vetting, and how 

effective are they? What are the advantages and disadvantages of the 

current vetting process? What new technologies and TTPs should be 

added to the vetting process? Does it make sense to exclude foreign 

forces for human rights violations instead of providing human rights 

training? Even the most thorough vetting process can be rendered 

irrelevant the moment it is completed unless the subjects are tracked 

and assessed. Humans are not static and are continually influenced 

by myriad factors. What is the relationship between vetting programs 

and other loyalty and confidence-building programs that will yield 

the most predictability and security?

F6. What is regular about irregular warfare in the 21st century?

As a result of CF superiority and the rise of non-state actors, many 

state and non-state actors have increasingly adopted irregular means 

of practicing warfare. Accepting doctrinal definitions of IW, which of 

these practices are so common and so well understood that primary 

responsibility could be migrated to CF? In those areas that could be 

migrated, which ones would be of benefit to SOF to divest or deemphasize? As high-demand/low-density assets, would this allow SOF 

to collectively shift focus to mission areas that are solely suitable to 

them?

F7. SOF communication: Inside and out

SOF are often referred to as a community. If so, it is a diverse one 

that can, at times, be isolated and secretive. This isolation can be due 

to operational necessity, but it is not always warranted. How can the 

SOF community better communicate within its confines and with 

outside elements? What are the legitimate concerns and rules, and 

what are merely impediments from history and force of habit? Some 

organizations are more secretive than others. As an example, SF soldiers have been called the silent professionals; however, recent news 
34

Special Operations Research Topics 2014

Please send your completed research papers on these topics to the JSOU Strategic Studies Department.

releases have indicated that might not be a SOF community attribute.

What are the cultural implications?

F8. Special operations joint task force-type organizations to address 

regional problems

The Special Operations Joint Task Force – Afghanistan (SOJTF-A) 

was stood up to deal with a synchronization of efforts of multiple SOF 

and CF from both the U.S. and coalition partners. Although successful, the standup did have its challenges to include manning, authorities, and synchronization of efforts across services, the coalition, and 

international treaties. SOJTF-A was established within a war zone with 

established partners and roles. A future challenge will be to establish a 

similar organization with limited time, involving partner nations in a 

time sensitive manner or in a less hospitable location. Can we define a 

clear process for utilization of SOJTF-type organizations to deal with 

contingencies across a broad spectrum of crisis? What is the basis for 

employing a SOJTF versus a Joint Special Operations Task Force for 

addressing a regional problem? What are options to man, equip, and 

train these organizations, as well as develop protocols to manage coalition and C2 authorities?

F9. SOF mobility in an anti-access/area denial environment

A great deal of press has been given to the air-sea battle operational 

concept, and its focus on ceding the initiative at the outset of an engagement to a country possessing the latest anti-access/area denial (A2AD) 

capabilities. Long-range mobility for SOF would be critical to an incremental deconstruction of the equipment and C4ISR network required 

to maintain an A2AD shield. Being able to engage on the margins of the 

denied area and slowly roll the shield back may require new capabilities, 

but it could potentially be accomplished with existing platforms available to SOF. What role could the capabilities of existing mobility platforms (submarines, littoral combat ships, C-130s, CH-53s, CV/MV-22s, 

et cetera) play when operating within specific threat weapons engagement zones? Could SOF get in, and if so, how far? What conditions must 

be set prior to entry? Research in this area would seek to expand on the 

available body of literature, contribute to the development of realistic 

timelines for mission execution, and help identify capability shortfalls.
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Acronym List

Acronym List

A2AD anti-access/area denial

AOR area of responsibility

AQIM al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb 

C2 command and control

C4ISR command, control, communications, computers, 

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

CF conventional forces

DOD Department of Defense

EOD explosive ordinance disposal

FYDP Future Years Defense Program

GCC geographic combatant commander

ISAF International Security Assistance Force

IW irregular warfare

JSOU Joint Special Operations University

LOO line of operation

PME professional military education

RSCC regional Special Operations Forces coordination center

SF Special Forces

SOF Special Operations Forces

SOJTF special operations joint task force

SOJTF-A Special Operations Joint Task Force - Afghanistan

SOLO special operations liaison officer

TOC transnational organized crime

TSOC theater special operations command

USAID United States Agency for International Development

USG United States Government

USSOCOM United States Special Operations Command

UW unconventional warfare

VEO violent extremist organization

VSO village stability operations