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AFGHANISTAN’S TERRORIST RESURGENCE:

AL-QAEDA, ISIS, AND BEYOND

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, 

NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

APRIL 27, 2017

Serial No. 115–20

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

PAUL COOK, California 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

DANIEL M. DONOVAN, JR., New York 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., 

Wisconsin 

ANN WAGNER, Missouri 

BRIAN J. MAST, Florida 

FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida 

BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania 

THOMAS A. GARRETT, JR., Virginia 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID N. CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

AMI BERA, California 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania 

DINA TITUS, Nevada 

NORMA J. TORRES, California 

BRADLEY SCOTT SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

THOMAS R. SUOZZI, New York 

ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York 

TED LIEU, California

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE

TED POE, Texas, Chairman 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

PAUL COOK, California 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

BRIAN J. MAST, Florida 

THOMAS A. GARRETT, JR., Virginia 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania 

DINA TITUS, Nevada 

NORMA J. TORRES, California 

BRADLEY SCOTT SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Mr. Bill Roggio, editor, Long War Journal, Foundation for Defense of Democracies ..................................................................................................................... 4

Seth G. Jones, Ph.D., director, International Security and Defense Policy 

Center, RAND Corporation ................................................................................. 14

Vanda Felbab-Brown, Ph.D., senior fellow, Center for 21st Century Security 

and Intelligence, Foreign Policy Program, The Brookings Institution ............ 29

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

Mr. Bill Roggio: Prepared statement ..................................................................... 7

Seth G. Jones, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ............................................................ 16

Vanda Felbab-Brown, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ................................................ 31

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 56

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 57

The Honorable Ted Poe, a Representative in Congress from the State of 

Texas, and chairman, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and 

Trade: Statement by H.E. Mahmoud Saikal, Ambassador, Permanent 

Respresentative of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan to the United Nations ....................................................................................................................... 58

(1)

AFGHANISTAN’S TERRORIST RESURGENCE:

AL-QAEDA, ISIS, AND BEYOND 

THURSDAY, APRIL 27, 2017

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:00 p.m., in room 

2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ted Poe (chairman of 

the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. POE. The subcommittee will come to order. Without objection, all members may have 5 days to submit statements, questions, and extraneous materials for the record subject to the length 

limitation and the rules. At this time, I am going to make my opening statement. 

When our forces invaded Afghanistan in 2001, the goal was simple: Remove the Taliban government that sheltered the plotters of 

the 9/11 attacks and destroy al-Qaeda. It has been 16 years that 

the United States has been at war, and Afghanistan is still a haven 

for terrorists who seek to attack and kill Americans. Just today, 

two Americans were killed in the eastern province of Afghanistan. 

Our military quickly toppled the Taliban government in 2001, 

and the Taliban/al-Qaeda forces fled to Pakistan where they regrouped and launched more attacks against our troops. Since then, 

the Taliban has waged insurgency in Afghanistan, destabilizing the 

country and creating perfect conditions for terrorists to exploit. 

The Taliban insurgency today is stronger than any other point 

since 2001. The Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction said in January, 171 Afghan districts are controlled, influenced, or contested by the Taliban. As long as the Taliban is successful this means good news for al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda has a long 

history of loyalty to the Taliban, or Osama bin Laden swore allegiance to the Taliban’s leader, Mullah Omar, even before 9/11. And 

when bin Laden was killed, Ayman al-Zawahiri renewed his oath 

that cemented ties between al-Qaeda and the Taliban. Wherever 

the Taliban has influenced, al-Qaeda is not behind. 

Since 2010, United States’ officials have claimed that al-Qaeda 

had a small presence in the country limited to only 50 to 100 fighters. That is absolutely incorrect. The United States has killed and 

captured more Afghan, more terrorists, since that time than was 

claimed to be in the entire country. 

Alongside al-Qaeda and Afghanistan we have another terrorist 

group, the Haqqani Network. This group is directly linked to both 

2

al-Qaeda and the Taliban and is based, guess where, Pakistan. The 

Haqqani Network is responsible for more American deaths in the 

region than any other terrorist group. The Haqqani Network attacks inside Afghanistan have been directly traced back to Pakistan. In fact, in 2011, Admiral Mike Mullen, the chairman of the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff, testified before the Senate, ‘‘The Haqqani Network acts as a veritable arm of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence agency.’’

It seems that Pakistan has ties to about every terrorist group 

that is in Afghanistan. Pakistan openly supported the Afghan 

Taliban both before and after the extremists took control of Kabul 

in 1996. We know the Taliban is still based in Pakistan, and it 

came to no surprise that when a U.S. drone strike killed the leader 

of the Taliban in May 2016, he was in southwestern Pakistan. 

The laundry list of evidence of Pakistan support for terrorists 

goes on and on. We remember that when the al-Qaeda leader and 

America’s most wanted terrorist, Osama bin Laden, was killed he 

was found in Pakistan. Afghan’s representative to the U.N. recently told the Security Council that Pakistan retains ties with 

more than 20 terrorist groups. And I ask unanimous consent to introduce into the record the full statement made by Afghan’s representative to the U.N. and it is admitted. 

I believe Pakistan is playing us. They launched what they called 

counterterrorism operations in the tribal areas bordering Afghanistan, but it quickly became clear they were only targeting the Pakistani Taliban and not the Afghan Taliban. 

ISIS announced the establishment of an Afghan affiliate in January 2013 and has entrenched itself in the eastern part of the country. ISIS presence in Afghan further complicates the country’s terrorist landscape. These fighters ended up becoming the leaders of 

the ISIS affiliate in Afghanistan known as ISIS-Khorasan Province. 

It is no surprise that Afghanistan is a mess. In the war on terror 

it is crystal clear to me that Pakistan is not on our side. It is time 

that we consider, one, listing Pakistanas a state sponsor of terrorism; two, stop sending them U.S. aid; three, remove and revoke 

their status as a major non-NATO U.S. ally. Our Pakistan policy 

should match Pakistan’s behavior. And I will yield to the ranking 

member for his comments. 

Mr. KEATING. Thank you, Chairman Poe. Two U.S. service members were killed in Afghanistan overnight. Reports indicate that 

they were killed in operations against Islamic State fighters in 

Nangarhar Province in eastern Afghanistan. Words are truly inadequate to express our country’s gratitude at the extraordinary sacrifice of these individuals and heroes, and our prayers are with 

their families. 

As the continued threat of insurgent groups and instability in the 

country poses a direct challenge to the United States, this year 

marks 16 years of military presence in Afghanistan following the 

September 11th attacks. Our own security is linked to Afghanistan’s security, putting the elimination of terrorism there and putting them squarely within our interests, as well, as a country. 

If we are to be successful in eradicating this threat, we must be 

sure that the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan is addressing the drivers 

of terrorism head on. Unfortunately, in Afghanistan, there are mulVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:14 May 25, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_TNT\042717\25262 SHIRL
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tiple drivers, and our prolonged military presence in the country 

underscores this complex reality. 

Internally, Afghanistan’s National Unity Government is still 

struggling to effectively address the many systemic problems facing 

their country. Organized crime, illicit economies, rampant corruption at all levels of the Afghan society require a coordinated and 

a robust approach from the government if Afghanistan is to achieve 

security from the national level all the way down to the community 

level. 

Taliban control in Afghan communities impedes the government’s ability to limit recruitment and the threat of terrorism 

throughout the country. Strengthening the role of a democratic Afghan Government at all levels is absolutely necessary in order to 

eradicate terrorism in the long term. Additionally, the Afghan military continues to encounter issues of internal accountability and 

operational effectiveness in combating terrorist groups. 

I have witnessed U.S. military, along with our allied forces, 

training and advising Afghan forces for years and the significant 

progress they have made. However, there seem to be ongoing institutional challenges within the Afghan military that require further 

attention if their military is going to be sufficiently prepared to 

take on the long term responsibility of managing the terrorist 

threat in Afghanistan. 

There is a role for the United States to play in ensuring that Afghanistan can achieve their own security and independently and 

internationally deal with the support necessary to do so. However, 

we also need to be clear on what form our role should take. 

The security situation in Afghanistan, and by extension the 

United States, is multidimensional and not solely comprised of 

military objectives. The governance issues in Afghanistan that are 

stymied and that have stymied the progress in the fight against 

terrorism cannot be resolved solely through the use of force and integration of military expertise. 

The whole of the government approach is what is necessary. That 

whole of the government approach that Afghanistan must take to 

combat this threat of terrorism should be complemented by the diverse expertise that the United States can offer in order to make 

sure the Afghan Government is most efficiently and effectively 

moving toward greater security within its own borders. This means 

ensuring that our State Department and other key government 

agencies have the capacity to engage meaningfully with their counterparts and partners in Afghanistan. 

A whole of government approach here in the U.S. keeps our 

troops and allies safer. It also promotes longer stability in the 

country, a stability that will bring about a more rapid resolution 

to this conflict. 

I, therefore, join many of my Democratic and Republican colleagues on and off the Foreign Affairs Committee who are deeply 

concerned about the proposed budget cuts to the State Department 

and the impact they would have on our objectives in the long term. 

This is not only because of the complex situation within Afghanistan, but because of the role that other countries play in exacerbating the terrorist threat inside the country. 

4

We know that Iran and Russia have both provided assistance to 

the Taliban in an effort to counter the threat of the Islamic State 

groups in Afghanistan. Pakistan has had a long and complicated 

history and have long and complicated efforts to combat terrorism 

in Afghanistan through its acquiescence in providing safe haven to 

terrorists, particularly the Haqqanis. 

So, we need a balanced approach to tackling the terrorist threat 

in Afghanistan that reflects the complex and dynamic reality on 

the ground and in the region. Why should we tie one hand behind 

our back when we have the experts ready and waiting to make this 

difficult process of eliminating terrorist threat, a process that 

should move forward more effectively and quickly, if we take this 

approach? 

Today I am eager to hear from our witnesses about the lessons 

learned about what is working, what is not working, and why. This 

is important as the White House reassesses the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan and as Congress looks forward to an appropriations process which gives us the opportunity to make sure that the most effective strategies to bring peace and stability for Afghanistan and 

the United States are appropriately funded. 

Thank you, Chairman Poe. I yield back. 

Mr. POE. I thank the gentleman. So, without objection, all the 

witness’ prepared statements will be made part of the record. I ask 

that each of the witnesses please keep your presentation to no 

more than 5 minutes, and when the red light comes on you need 

to stop or I will encourage you to stop. I will introduce each witness 

and then give them time for opening statements. 

Mr. Bill Roggio—is it Roggio—is a Foundation for Defense of Democracies Senior Fellow and editor of the Long War Journal. Mr. 

Roggio was embedded with the U.S. Marines, the United States 

Army, and Iraqi forces in Iraq between 2005 and 2008, and with 

the Canadian Army in Afghanistan in 2006. 

Dr. Seth Jones is director of the International Security and Defense Policy Center at the RAND Corporation. He previously served 

as the representative for the commander, U.S. Special Operations 

Command, to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations. 

And Dr. Vanda Felbab-Brown is a senior fellow in the Center for 

the 21st Century Security and Intelligence at the Brookings Institution. She is an expert on international and internal conflicts and 

nontraditional security threats. 

Mr. Roggio, we will start with you. You have 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF MR. BILL ROGGIO, EDITOR, LONG WAR 

JOURNAL, FOUNDATION FOR DEFENSE OF DEMOCRACIES 

Mr. ROGGIO. Thank you, Chairman Poe and Ranking Member 

Keating, and the rest of the distinguished members of this committee. This is a timely discussion. 

Last week the Taliban launched a major attack on an Afghan 

army base. Ten fighters launched what I call a suicide assault 

where the fighters penetrate security at the base, and they are not 

coming back. They are going to fight to the death. They killed at 

least 140 Afghan soldiers. This was an attack on an army corps 

base in northern Afghanistan, not in the south where everyone asVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:14 May 25, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_TNT\042717\25262 SHIRL
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sumes the Taliban to be strong. I have seen reports of upwards of 

250 Afghan troops killed in this attack. 

The Taliban is using tactics that have been honed and perfected 

by al-Qaeda and now the Islamic State, which is the child of alQaeda. We are losing in Afghanistan. The U.S. military will tell 

you at best we are at a stalemate, but in a stalemate, in that situation, the tie goes to the insurgent and the Taliban controls or contests at least half of Afghanistan. 

The Taliban issued a report in late March saying they control or 

contest 211 of Afghanistan’s more than 400 districts. That is very 

close to the SIGAR report that you had mentioned where it was, 

I believe, 177. That assessment was given by SIGAR in the fall of 

2016. In addition to—and the reason the Taliban matters is the 

Taliban and al-Qaeda, they remain tied at the hip. The Taliban refused to surrender al-Qaeda members and Osama bin Laden after 

the 9/11 attacks. They continue to fight side by side. 

Al-Qaeda serves as a force multiplier. Multiple designations from 

the U.S. Treasury Department talk about how al-Qaeda and the 

Taliban fundraise for each other in the Gulf States. This includes 

the Haqqani Network by the way. And we continue to see al-Qaeda 

fighters killed on the battlefield. As a matter of fact, the U.S. military killed a senior al-Qaeda leader just last month inside Afghanistan. 

So a lot has been made in the U.S. intelligence circles about the 

strength of al-Qaeda. Under the Obama administration, we were 

told there were 50 to 100 al-Qaeda fighters inside the country, and 

we were consistently given this estimate for more than 6 years. 

This all came crashing down in October 2015 when U.S. military 

raided two al-Qaeda camps; one of them described by a U.S. commander as possibly the largest al-Qaeda facility taken down since 

9/11. This is in Afghanistan; not in Syria, not in Iraq, not in Somalia or Yemen. More than 150 al-Qaeda fighters were killed in this 

one raid alone. So, we basically took 150 percent of al-Qaeda’s estimated strength by the U.S. military that was given in intelligence 

circles for more than 6 years. 

We have an intelligence problem in Afghanistan. We have a 

problem recognizing what the threat is. Until we determine where 

al-Qaeda is inside Afghanistan and how they are working closely 

with the Taliban, we will continue to have a problem, and we will 

fail to properly deal with this threat. Today, a lot of the threat in 

Afghanistan is looked at as being the Islamic State’s Khorasan 

Province. We dropped the mother of all bombs there, and as you 

both had mentioned, we lost two soldiers in Nangarhar Province 

last night. 

The Islamic State is on the fringe. It is a small problem in Afghanistan compared to al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and other Pakistani 

jihadists groups that operate there. They operate primarily in four 

districts in Nangarhar Province and have a minimal presence in 

the north. It certainly is a problem. Our efforts seem to be focused 

on the Islamic State at this point in time while largely ignoring 

what the Taliban is doing throughout the country, and that is directly challenging the Afghan military. They are going toe to toe, 

they are raiding their bases, they are taking control of territory, 

6

and the U.S. military, frankly, has downplayed this problem with 

the Taliban. 

When the Taliban overran the Sangin District, hundreds of U.S. 

Marines and British troops died trying to liberate it during the 

surge between 2010 and 2012. When the Taliban overran that district, the military put out—what I will say is—a ridiculous press 

release stating, no, no, the district wasn’t overrun. We merely 

moved the district center, and the Taliban took control of rubble. 

And if that is the attitude of the U.S. military toward the Taliban 

inside Afghanistan, we will continue to lose this war. 

We need to reassess Afghanistan. We need to—our policy in Afghanistan is a mess, frankly, and the Trump administration needs 

to decide what to do and how to do it, quickly. Thank you very 

much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Roggio follows:]

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Mr. POE. The Chair recognizes Dr. Jones for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF SETH G. JONES, PH.D., DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY CENTER, RAND 

CORPORATION 

Mr. JONES. Thank you, Chairman Poe, Ranking Member 

Keating, and other distinguished members of the subcommittee. 

Thanks for holding this hearing. It is a reminder that Afghanistan 

is and should be still important. 

At over a decade and a half after the 9/11 attacks, many Americans may not realize how deeply engaged the U.S. remains in Afghanistan. Most of the media coverage, up until very recently, has 

been on counterterrorism operations in Syria, Iraq, North Korea, 

and a range of other locations, but Afghanistan is a front line state. 

Many may also forget that the number of U.S. military forces 

there, which is in the neighborhood of 8,400, is larger than any 

other active combat zone deployment. It is larger than what the 

U.S. has in Syria, Iraq, or other combat zones. As Bill mentioned 

earlier, some Americans finally began to realize and remember that 

we still have forces there after the U.S. dropped its most powerful, 

or one of its most powerful non-nuclear bombs. 

My comments are going to focus on three questions. First, what 

are U.S. national security interests in Afghanistan today? That is 

one. Two, what is the terrorist and insurgent landscape? And then 

three, what, at least briefly, steps can the U.S. do to help mitigate 

the threat from Afghanistan and more broadly in the region? 

So, let me turn to U.S. interests. I mean, I think there is no 

question that the U.S. has a range of interests overseas. I mentioned earlier Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran, but I do think 

the U.S. has several interests that remain in Afghanistan. One is 

that there are a number of extremist groups, Islamic extremist 

groups, that continue to operate on both sides of the Afghan-Pakistan border. Bill mentioned them earlier. They range from alQaeda, the Taliban, Haqqani Network to the Islamic State, but 

also a range of other ones that have operations in Central Asia. 

Second, I think an expanding war, if the U.S. were to leave, 

would also increase regional instability particularly with countries 

like India, Pakistan, Iran, Russia, and even China. A particular 

concern to me would be what it does to the Pakistan-India competition. Those are both nuclear armed states and have gone to war 

and are essentially fighting a proxy war in Afghanistan right now. 

Let me then move to the landscape, because I think this is important to remember. It is part of U.S. interests. The Taliban does 

continue to operate. It is the largest group that operates in Afghanistan. It does have its sanctuary, its command and control nodes, 

in Pakistan not in Afghanistan. Its three major regional surahs are 

also on the Pakistan side of the border. And I would just emphasize 

again the chairman’s remarks about the increase in Russian contacts and, at least, limited support to the Taliban. It is not a positive step in developments in the region. 

But I would point out with the Taliban, the Taliban does not control yet—I mean I would certainly argue that it has increased its 

rural presence. It does not control yet a major urban area, which 

15

makes it a little different from what we have seen in 2014, 2015 

in Iraq in cities like Mosul or other cities within Anbar. 

AQIS, al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent, my estimate is probably larger and more expansive than it was 5 to 10 years ago. It 

has a presence that is larger than just what some Americans have 

talked about up in the northeast; but down in the south in 

Kandahar as Bill mentioned, in Helmand, along the Baramcha 

area, in Zabul, in Ghazni, in Paktika, those are likely small cell 

structures. 

In addition, the Islamic State-Khorasan Province does have a 

presence. It looks to me like it has probably come down a little bit 

from a year or 2 ago—down to between 1,000 and 2,000 fighters—

but I would say that it has conducted a number of attacks both in 

Afghanistan and Pakistan as well as in Bangladesh. So, in my view 

it has been pretty active in conducting attacks. There are other 

groups, the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, Lashkar-e-Taiba, and 

Jamaat-ul-Ahrar that also have a presence in the region, and I 

think—in that sense—there are a milieu of groups. 

Just briefly, I would note there are a range of things. I would 

support the ranking member’s comments about focusing on governance and development. I would add electoral reform. I would also 

add, I think there are opportunities at the moment for reconciliation. I certainly would support at least opening up discussions. I 

think they are probably unlikely in the near term, but I think they 

are worth talking about. 

The range of things, and we can certainly get into this that—I 

would suggest pushing U.S. trainers down to the tactical level. I 

would support probably slightly increasing the U.S. presence in Afghanistan but more on the trade, advise, and assist efforts. And I 

am happy to talk more later about the steps toward Pakistan, but 

let me just briefly conclude by noting that the Afghan Government 

and generally these people want the U.S. to stay, so I think we 

should take that seriously. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Jones follows:]

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Mr. POE. I thank the gentleman. 

Dr. Felbab-Brown, 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF VANDA FELBAB-BROWN, PH.D., SENIOR FELLOW, CENTER FOR 21ST CENTURY SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE, FOREIGN POLICY PROGRAM, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION 

Ms. FELBAB-BROWN. Thank you very much, Chairman Poe, 

Ranking Member Keating, and distinguished members of the subcommittee. It is an honor for me to address you today. 

I want to give away my punch line right at the beginning. Improving governance, not merely beefing up military efforts or attempting to counter external sponsor of terrorism in Afghanistan, 

is critical for the success of U.S. counterterrorism efforts. It is also 

critical for the broader interests the United States has in Afghanistan and the region. Yes, denying safe havens to anti-American 

global and regional terrorist groups is crucial, and it is the number 

one primary objective. 

But, U.S. interests in Afghanistan go beyond that. As Seth also 

mentioned, an unstable Afghanistan risks destabilizing Pakistan. 

The relationship is not merely the reverse that a problematic Pakistan destabilizes Afghanistan, but also that an unstable Afghanistan destabilizes Pakistan and, as result, Pakistan-India relationship and the entire region of Central and South Asia. 

Moreover, this integration of the Afghan State or an outbreak of 

an outright civil war would be a great boost to Salafi groups 

around the world. Once again, a great power will have been seen 

as being defeated in Afghanistan. That is from a strategic perspective, few places from a counterterrorism point of view matter as 

much as Afghanistan does. Moreover, U.S. reputation and self-regard are also at stake as a country that can be relied upon to honor 

its commitments, including commitments to the Afghan people. 

The Taliban remains by far the most potent terrorist group in Afghanistan. It has not targeted U.S. assets or people outside of Afghanistan, but certainly makes it a good point to target them in 

Afghanistan and defines as its primary objective to drive U.S. 

forces out of the country. It is a major threat to the Afghan State, 

the Afghan Government, and, frankly, the very political dispensation that has been in the country since 9/11. 

Afghanistan remains in a highly precarious position. As the 

chairman said, the Taliban today is at its strongest point at any 

point since 9/11. That does not mean that the Taliban does not 

have problems, does not have shortcomings, or suffer from deficiency and constraints; it does. But nonetheless, its military energy 

is showing no signs of fizzling out yet. 

More significantly, the Taliban is often seen as a less pernicious 

form of governance than even some of the power brokers associated 

with the Afghan Government and the post-9/11 dispensation in Afghanistan. And, this is indeed the fundamental problem in the 

country and the reason why the Taliban still today has so much capacity to regenerate and weather the military pressure from the 

United States, allies, and even the Afghan security forces. Unless 

major progress is made in improving governance in Afghanistan 

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stan, even with beefed-up U.S. forces, we can be exactly in the 

same predicament 5 or 10 years from now. 

The government of National Unity has made some important efforts to improve governance. It has taken on some corruption and 

criminality but these efforts are hardly sufficient. Much more needs 

to take place, and the United States must make it a crucial point 

of its engagement with Afghanistan to insist, facilitate, and help 

with improving governance. 

The priority in improving anti-corruption and anti-crime measures clearly are in the Afghan security and defense forces. Indeed, 

one of the reasons they have been struggling so much on the battlefield and are taking such large casualties is because of the ethnic 

and patronage rifts, the corruption that plagues the services that 

results in poor leadership, poor morale, and a whole host of other 

enable problems. Clearly, the system of corruption and the system 

of criminality are an enormous challenge in Afghanistan, defining 

the very political arrangements of the country. 

It is not realistic to expect that everything can be tackled, but 

even just taking on some steps, particularly before the next Presidential election in Afghanistan, would be very important, once 

again, starting with the most deleterious forms of corruption and 

criminality such as rooting out discrimination of entire ethnic 

groups. 

One of the reasons why we saw the fall of Kunduz, the most significant, tactical, and in fact strategic victory of the Taliban so far, 

is number one along with that—and very much correlated with focusing on the corruption and criminality in the Afghan National 

Security Forces. There are other measures beyond that that I am 

glad to answer or speak about during your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Felbab-Brown follows:]

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Mr. POE. I thank all three of the witnesses. The Chair will reserve its time until the close of all the questions by the other members, so therefore, I will recognize the ranking member for his 5 

minutes. 

Mr. KEATING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. A couple of things, and 

based on your testimony, I would like to just give you the opportunity to comment on more. Can you give us some of the examples, 

Doctor, on the criminality and the corruption activities more specifically within the National Security Forces? 

Ms. FELBAB-BROWN. The most fundamental problem—I would 

say—is that positions of leadership at all levels, from unit down to 

higher-up levels have for years been allotted on the basis of ethnic 

patronage, very much with mind of rivalries amongst specific commanders, and also related to tribal and ethnic rivalries, but also 

have been sold out to those who can pay most for the positions. 

And similar issues, such as getting leave to go to family, has often 

been associated with those who can pay at the level of individual 

soldiers. Related to that, with perhaps most significant progress 

achieved so far, is simply on getting pay down to soldiers as well 

as getting equipment to soldiers. 

Mr. KEATING. Right. Now when I was there a few years ago, they 

were implementing electronic payments directly, and that was a 

way to try and ameliorate that. Has that been utilized, first, and 

has it been successful? 

Ms. FELBAB-BROWN. Yes. The process is underway, and it is more 

linked to biometric systems, one of the primary of sort of focus for 

the U.S. military and allied military as well as President Ghani. 

So, progress has been achieved. It is hardly complete; the process 

is not full. I want to very much compliment the U.S. military in 

Afghanistan for insisting that only soldiers that are part of the biometric system are paid, because an immense problem has been 

ghost soldiers that have been receiving payment. 

Mr. KEATING. Thank you, Doctor. You gave me some more specifics that I appreciate. 

Dr. Jones, you wanted some more time to talk about Pakistan 

and the regional instability, but also you mentioned Bangladesh. If 

you could, really comment on Pakistan and Bangladesh and what 

the effects regionally are there from your vantage point? 

Mr. JONES. Sure. My comments on Bangladesh were actually 

twofold if I had had a little more time. One is that we have seen 

an increase in Islamic State-Khorasan Province activity, including 

strikes in and around Bangladesh. We have also seen a growth of 

al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent of Bangladesh as well. 

So we often focus a lot on Afghanistan. The terrorist problem is 

a regional one, and we often focus also on Pakistan, but Bangladesh has seen a major increase in jihadist activity over the past 

several years. So, you know, part of the answer here is a much better regional counterterrorism and governance issue than just focusing on Afghanistan or——

Mr. KEATING. Yeah. Would you say in Bangladesh too—with 

some of the things I have witnessed there in terms of the way their 

government is running right now—do you think that has been an 

incubator for this kind of activity or do you think it is just because 

of geography? 

42

Mr. JONES. Well, I think it is a combination both of geography 

and also strategy. When Ayman Al-Zawahiri announced the creation of al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent, he specifically asked 

for Bangladesh to be included in that. So, it was a strategic decision. There is also—and you can see the World Bank or Transparency International data—it is a weak state. It has allowed 

groups like the ones I mentioned to establish sanctuary there, so 

again very serious concerns, I think, in Bangladesh. 

Mr. KEATING. And do any of the witnesses want to talk about 

what we could do with the Iranian and Russian influence in that 

area, any suggestions you might have? 

Ms. FELBAB-BROWN. I think it is very important, significant, and 

laudatory that General Nicholson highlighted the pernicious role of 

Russia. It is not new. It has been in the making for a number of 

years even during Russia’s nominal cooperation with the United 

States and Afghanistan. It has been halting and sporadic, and it 

has clearly disintegrated as part of the difficult U.S.-Russia relationship. 

There are no easy fixes, but exposure is an important first step, 

and there are other ways to engage diplomatically with Russia. 

Hence, Ranking Member, I emphasize your crucial statements in 

the beginning about the role of the State Department and the fact 

that wars cannot simply be won on the military battlefield. The 

diplomatic effort as well as the——

Mr. KEATING. Briefly, on the issue of the Russians supplying 

arms to the Taliban, is some of that just part of the way they act 

criminally for their own revenues, criminal syndicates, and things, 

or do you think it is strategic or both? 

Ms. FELBAB-BROWN. I do believe it is strategic. There is no doubt 

that the Russian military has dealt with issues of criminal involvement and criminal perpetration, including in the narcotics trade. 

But I do believe that in the case of supplying weapons to the 

Taliban it is a very controlled strategic decision and likely indicates 

rogue members of the Afghan military selling weapons and equipment to the Taliban as well. 

I do want to emphasize, however, that support for the Taliban, 

such as from Iran, in my view, no more than the support that Russia provides, is also very much a function of the regional disbelief, 

at this point, that a stable, successful government in Afghanistan, 

as envisioned after 9/11, can be achieved. And it is the tremendous 

insecurity and uncertainty about what will happen with the government, including as a result of the lack of clarity of U.S. position 

that encourages——

Mr. KEATING. So, we get back to governance too. I know my time 

is over so I want to yield that back, but we go back to governance 

again. Thank you. 

Mr. POE. I thank the gentleman. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California, Colonel Cook, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. COOK. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Continuing the conversation, I wanted to ask how the Chinese 

view the disturbing role of Russia there, particularly being an ally 

of—well, China being an ally of Pakistan, and of course, they border Afghanistan. Is that viewed as a major threat any time the 

43

Russians do something along a border that is close to China? And 

that is up to anyone to address that if they could. 

Mr. ROGGIO. Sure, I will address that. I can’t speak to what 

China has or hasn’t done with respect to Russian arming of the 

Taliban, but the Chinese certainly have an interest in stability in 

Afghanistan. They have economic interests and, obviously, security 

interests there as well. And there is a group that is based—it is 

called the Turkistan Islamic Party. It is made up of primarily ethnic Uyghurs from western China and they conduct attacks. They 

primarily are based in Afghanistan and are closely allied with alQaeda as well as the Taliban. They fight inside Afghanistan alongside those groups. 

And so you have that bleed-back problem where fighters that 

come from China to fight inside of Afghanistan come back, and that 

is a major security issue and security concern for the Chinese Government. 

Mr. JONES. If I could just add—I mean—I would say broadly 

speaking the Chinese have several interests. One is, historically, 

the economic interest—what I would call soft power. They do have 

access to a range of mines although they have been slow to develop 

them because of the security situation. Two, they have been involved in peace negotiations, so trying to bring the Taliban to the 

peace table, that have not been particularly successful. And three, 

they have had terrorism concerns. I suspect that anything that 

would exacerbate their concerns about terrorist activity in the region, including Russian support, would make China somewhat 

nervous. 

Mr. COOK. Doctor? 

Ms. FELBAB-BROWN. I agree with those comments, perhaps only 

to add there is rivalry between China and Russia. It is taking place 

in Central Asia. The rivalry is, perhaps, not without restraint, but 

nonetheless that is clearly taking place. So, this is yet another element of the rivalry, the threats, and the interests of China that 

serve, and Bill articulated also, then implied, that China cannot be 

happy with Russia’s maneuvers toward the Taliban. 

Mr. COOK. I want to address the poppy and the drugs that finance the Taliban. And it almost seems counterproductive for the 

Russians to be supporting the Taliban if you are worried about 

some of these drugs that would go up through Uzbekistan into Russia, which has had some concerns about growing drug problems of 

its own. Could you address that drug situation, because it is as I 

said—it doesn’t seem logical. 

Ms. FELBAB-BROWN. Sure. I will be very glad to do that. A lot 

of my expertise is on the issues of drugs, including in Afghanistan. 

So you are right, Representative Cook, about the poppy being often 

emphasized as a key interest and problem of Russia. Russia has 

long blamed the United States for poppy cultivation in Afghanistan, accusing the U.S. of being at best incompetent and often purposeful in allowing poppy cultivation as a tool of poisoning the Russian nation. Obviously, those are outrageous and incorrect claims. 

The larger issue, of course, is that it is enormously difficult to suppress poppy cultivation, as the Russian Government is well aware, 

and in fact, any aggressive eradication measures will only feed the 

Taliban insurgency. The Taliban derives a great deal of support by 

44

being able to protect itself—offer itself as a protector of the poppy 

farmers. 

And in fact, one of the reasons why the Islamic State in 

Nangarhar is so particularly challenged is because it has prohibited poppy cultivation there and essentially mobilized the populations in Achin, Shinwari, Khogyani against itself. However, Russia’s interest in countering the drug trade is offset by its other interests, and I would say that Russia’s driving interest these days 

is to be as challenging to the United States across the world as possible. 

Mr. COOK. Thank you, I yield back. 

Mr. POE. I thank the gentleman. We are in the process of votes. 

We do have time for one more series of questions from Ms. Frankel 

from Florida. That is right. 

Ms. FRANKEL. Thank you. Thank you very much to the panel for 

being here. So, I guess probably myself, like most Americans, are 

just very frustrated. My own son has served in the military in Afghanistan as well as USAID, and so I have heard a lot of war stories. 

I want to ask you this. Compared to pre-9/11, which obviously led 

to the catastrophe of the towers, how would you compare Afghanistan and the dangers currently? 

Mr. ROGGIO. Sure; I will tackle that. Well, prior to 9/11, al-Qaeda 

was operating training camps with no threat of—really, little 

threat other than maybe an occasional cruise missile strike or 

something like that, and they were doing it with the support of the 

Taliban. So, you had the state sponsorship side; as such the 

Taliban was a state, and they were operating unfettered. 

Today, Afghanistan is a war zone. We have American forces 

there, and they are engaging, targeting, and killing al-Qaeda leaders and trying to prevent them from maintaining safe haven. However, that camp that I mentioned in Shorabak and Kandahar Province that was operating for some time before American—Americans 

only found out about it when they conducted a raid in Paktika 

Province several months prior and killed a senior al-Qaeda leader 

there. Then, they discovered evidence of that camp, and that is 

when they—and then they spent several months planning the attack. 

So, and also I would add that this continuous fighting really 

serves as a recruiting machine for jihadist groups. That doesn’t 

mean we shouldn’t be fighting them there, but the longer we are 

there fighting the more they are going out and selling their wares. 

They are getting jihadists to join their cause, be it the Taliban, alQaeda, or the myriad of Pakistani jihadist groups operating there. 

Thank you. 

Mr. JONES. If I can add to that, I mean—I think pre-9/11, with 

al-Qaeda’s sanctuary and external plotting and with assistance 

from the Taliban regime, the threat level to the U.S. was obviously 

extremely high. Over the next couple of years, it varied somewhat. 

I mean—I would point to the period of 2009 and 2010 where we 

had several active plots that went back to that area, Faisal 

Shahzad in New York City as well as Najibullah Zazi, also New 

York City plots. 

45

I think today the threat level is serious. I don’t see the same 

number today of external plotting by AQIS, al-Qaeda in the Indian 

Subcontinent, or core al-Qaeda, but I would say that as we look at 

future trends, particularly with the return of foreign fighters from 

Iraq and Syria to the region, it is a serious danger of becoming 

something like that in the future. 

Ms. FRANKEL. So I guess that leads to my next question, which 

is, does that call for keeping the troops there, more troops? Obviously, I guess the—you have talked about, Doctor, about USAID 

type efforts, and with the governance and the corruption, I would 

be curious as to whether you have seen any progress at all in terms 

of the governance and the corruption issue? But if you could answer both those questions. 

Ms. FELBAB-BROWN. I definitely see progress. Clearly, President 

Ghani is motivated to take on corruption and criminality. He has 

been constrained, and much more than has been done needs to be 

done. Unfortunately, more broadly the Afghan political elite continues to be constantly preoccupied and distracted, as mentioned, 

with politicking and not sufficiently focused on governance, and 

here is a crucial element of where U.S. policy needs to engage. 

If the United States decided to withdraw from Afghanistan, we 

would be in a situation of full-blown civil war with the Taliban controlling significant territories. No doubt the situation would be dire 

in the country with serious repercussions for the United States. I 

do believe that there is good reason to have more troops in Afghanistan, simply because the current force posture does not allow, really, for any meaningful U.S. presence outside of Kabul or even in 

terms of assistance and eyes on the ground, such as in economic 

efforts. 

However, I also believe that the continuing U.S. engagement—

military engagement needs to be coupled with a very explicit political strategy, and I don’t mean by the negotiations with the Taliban 

simply or predominantly, but rather very explicit engagement with 

the Afghan Government about improving governance. So yes; there 

is some progress but hardly sufficient, and that needs to be the 

core of U.S. engagement in the country. 

Ms. FRANKEL. Thank you. I think my time, Mr. Chairman. Mr. 

Roggio, I just want to understand something that you said. You 

said that fighting begets fighting, and yet I think you are all advocating that we maintain our troops. So, is the theory to try to 

maintain the troops without fighting or let just as advisers and 

trainers? 

Mr. ROGGIO. Yes. Afghanistan certainly is a catch-22 situation at 

this time given the length of time we have been there, and I think 

we have lost the trust of a lot of Afghans. However, I don’t see any 

other option, and I agree with Dr. Brown. If we pull our forces out 

of there—if we disengage from Afghanistan, it will be largely run 

by the Taliban, large Taliban pockets in the south, east, north. You 

will have al-Qaeda back in strength. 

So, we have to continue fighting them, and we have to work hard 

at the governance side as well. We really need to find the right—

it is amazing to me that in almost 16 years, we haven’t found the 

right incentives to get the Afghans to do what they need to do to 

take this fight to the Taliban—to defeat them. 

46

I also agree—negotiations, we have been down this path numerous times. We have been fooled by the Taliban. The Taliban are 

motivated. Yes; they have their problems militarily and politically, 

but there is no incentive for them at this point in time. They believe they are winning. They are winning in some areas, and we 

are not going to get them off the battlefield by negotiating with 

them. They need to be defeated militarily. We never have done 

that, and that is going to be extremely difficult until we solve the 

Pakistan angle, which we have all discussed multiple times here. 

Thank you. 

Mr. POE. I thank the gentlewoman from Florida. The subcommittee will be in recess until 10 minutes after the final vote. 

There are three votes. Mr. Rohrabacher from California will be the 

next questioner of the panel. 

[Recess.] 

Mr. POE. The subcommittee will come to order. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California, Surfin’ Rohrabacher. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, Mr. Chairman, I will have to amend 

your introduction. It is not the surfing Rohrabacher; it is the suffering Rohrabacher now. 

Well, listen, I have enjoyed your testimony today. I am going to 

have some challenges about some of the positions that you have 

been advocating. It doesn’t mean I don’t respect you. I do, because 

you seem like you are smart and you have done your homework, 

but I do disagree with you on some things. Also, perhaps, there 

would be some alternatives that you need to think about that 

maybe you haven’t and, maybe, we haven’t as a country. But first 

let me ask some specific questions on issues. How much heroin and 

opium is now being produced in Afghanistan? 

Ms. FELBAB-BROWN. I do not remember the exact number from 

last year, but it is a very high number. It is believed to supply at 

least 90 percent of the world’s opiate production. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Talking about billions of dollars? 

Ms. FELBAB-BROWN. Yes, and a significant portion of the country’s GDP. So the United Nations Drugs and Crime Office estimates, or used to put out a number—they stopped putting out a 

number—that only about 4 percent of Afghanistan’s GDP is linked 

to opium poppy. That is a very significant underestimate. They 

only measured the farm-gate production. I think it is a——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay, so we are talking about billions of dollars that we know is floating around Afghanistan, and is it fair to 

say that a significant amount of that money gets into the hands of 

Islamic terrorists including the Taliban? Okay, nobody disagrees 

with that? 

Ms. FELBAB-BROWN. Certainly the Taliban. There has been no 

evidence that the money has been going to other terrorist groups. 

It is a significant number of that money that gets to the hands of 

power brokers linked with the Afghan Government. 

Mr. JONES. But the Taliban, which does have relationships with 

other groups, the Taliban does get a fair amount of money 

from——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay, so the Taliban gets a fair amount of 

money and, of course, the Afghan Government, who we put into 

place—corrupt officials in that group including the family of Mr. 

47

Karzai maybe. We are talking about billions of dollars of wealth. 

Well, with billions of dollars going like that—coming out like that, 

I can imagine that would buy a lot of AK-47 bullets, and people 

wonder where people get the money now. 

Do you think we would have the ability—I don’t know; are any 

of you aware that we now have the ability to drop—to spray an 

area and that within a short period of time, in a way that will not 

hurt other crops, would eliminate the poppy production in Afghanistan and, basically, would not permit it to grow in that area again 

for 10 years? Are you aware of that government program? 

Okay. Well, let me note for the record, Mr. Chairman, that we 

have had that capability for at least 20 years and have not touched 

it and not done it. We didn’t do it after 9/11. We had that capability, and we didn’t do it. After 9/11, there were storehouses of 

opium where the Taliban had stored billions of dollars of opium 

and heroin in special locations in Afghanistan. And I would just go 

on the record for the first time on this. I notified our Government 

at the very highest level exactly where those were and that they 

needed to be bombed because the Taliban needed to be denied that 

money, and our Government never did that. Our Government never 

did it. The excuse was always, well, we think it might be too close 

to a mosque. 

All right. In terms of our alternatives now, okay, we ended up 

bringing Karzai in. We have already heard an assessment of the 

level of corruption associated with the Karzai regime and the 

Karzai family. We created that. Those of us who were engaged with 

this effort before that time wanted the king to return the king. He 

was the one guy, Pashtun and the rest of them, who everybody respected. Instead, we brought in Karzai, who it appears as being 

said today oversaw massive corruption. 

But now, back to how we now are in. So now, we are in a bad 

spot. We didn’t do what was right then, and now we are in a bad 

spot. And let me just say for the record, Mr. Chairman, that the 

alternative is not just putting more U.S. troops into Afghanistan. 

And let me ask the question of our panel, do you know how many 

U.S. troops were in Afghanistan after 9/11 at the time when the 

Taliban were driven out of Kabul? Do we know? Two hundred. Two 

hundred. So, obviously, 200 Americans weren’t the ones who drove 

them out, it was the Northern Alliance. And instead of having a 

government in which we respected these individual leaders and a 

decentralist approach—have any of you read the Afghan Constitution? Have you read the—okay. 

Who in the Afghan Constitution, who appoints the local police? 

Kabul. Who appoints the local educators? Kabul. We gave them, 

Mr. Chairman, the most centralized government plan for the people 

who are the most decentralized culture in the world, and now they 

are upset, and they are willing to go along with any number of 

groups. 

And I am going to leave it with this one thought, because I am 

sorry if I am taking too much time, Mr. Chairman. The Flying Tigers came in, and really, they were private people, and they were 

saving Chiang Kai-shek from this onslaught of the Japanese before 

Pearl Harbor. They were actually on the way there. Their first misVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:14 May 25, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00051 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_TNT\042717\25262 SHIRL
48

sion actually happened a couple days after Pearl Harbor, but they 

were on their way over to create an air force. 

We need air cover; do we not, sir? Do not our friends in Afghanistan need the air cover? It is now being proposed by a private sector of folks, who are not dissimilar from the Flying Tigers, that 

they would go to Afghanistan and provide this service. And I would 

hope that anybody reading this testimony understands that we 

don’t need to send massive troops in when private sector people 

will get the job done or if people in their own country would get 

it done. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. POE. I thank the gentleman. The Chair recognizes the 

gentlelady from California, Ms. Torres. 

Ms. TORRES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to the 

panel for taking time to be here today. 

Based on recent statements by General Nicholson and Secretary 

Mattis, it appears increasingly clear that Russia has been arming 

the Taliban. What is your assessment of Russian intentions in Afghanistan? And I would like to hear an opinion from maybe the 

three of you. How do you think the United States should respond 

to Russia’s intervention in Afghanistan? 

Mr. ROGGIO. Sure. I believe Russia’s intentions are primarily focused on targeting the growing threat of the Islamic State. What 

used to be al-Qaeda’s branch in the Caucasus has now become part 

of the Islamic State, and there is a threat also that emanates from 

the region from the Islamic State. They are concerned about that 

in the Central Asian countries, which are in Russian sphere of influence as well as attacks in their country. 

So, I think part of that is an attempt. Because the Taliban and 

the Islamic State are enemies, they do fight each other. Although 

this was more common a year or 2 ago, they have sort of, kind of 

come to some uneasy truce. I believe that they are also—I think 

this is also a ploy by the Russians to gain influence with the 

Taliban as well as, you know, as possibly a little payback for 

United States efforts in Afghanistan in the 1980s. 

As far as what the United States can do about this, I think there 

is only really political pressure that can be applied. As far as Russian support for the Taliban, it is pretty low on the chain. When 

you look at it, you know, you have the primary state sponsor for 

the Taliban and jihadist groups in Pakistan is—or in Afghanistan 

is Pakistan, and I would even say Iran poses a bigger threat with 

its support for the Taliban as well. 

Russia; they are providing light arms as far as I could tell at this 

point in time. We haven’t had a lot of specifics of what that Russian support is, but really the only solution is diplomatic here. We 

are not going to go to war with the Russians for providing a small 

amount of arms to the Taliban. 

Ms. TORRES. Thank you. 

Mr. JONES. I would say, based on my look at this, there are at 

least three potential motivations for Russia right now. One, I think 

if we look broadly at Russian operations in Syria, even Russian 

presence in Libya as well as in Afghanistan and other locations, 

they are expanding and attempting to expand their influence as 

part of a resurgence effort. Second, I think they are concerned 

about the Islamic State and other groups operating in Afghanistan, 

49

particularly ones that may come back from Iraq and Syria into 

Central Asia, the Caucasus, and South Asia. And third, they have 

had some concerns about the U.S. withdrawal from the regions and 

what gets left on their southern flank. 

I mean, I think there are a few things that the U.S. can do. One 

is—I mean—to continue to target, as the U.S. has, the Islamic 

State in the region including in Afghanistan. I mean, it is a threat 

so I think there is some reason for the Russians to be concerned 

about ISIS there. I think the U.S. should stop saying, as it has 

done at various points over the last couple of years, that it is going 

to leave. I think that may be helpful so the Russians realize we are 

not leaving for the foreseeable future; it is a conditions based effort. 

And I think, and Vanda said this earlier, that we should be as 

transparent as possible on what they are doing so we have evidence to show it publicly. 

Ms. TORRES. Thank you. Dr. Brown? 

Ms. FELBAB-BROWN. I agree with the three stated motivations. 

Russia’s official justification for its engagement and not denial of 

support for the Taliban has been that the Islamic State is a bigger 

threat for them. I think that is the calculation. I don’t think that 

is the sole calculation, however. I do believe that Russia, like other 

regional actors, are uncertain about the outcome and are hedging 

and cultivating proxies. It is not simply the Taliban that Russia is 

engaging, but also other proxies that have been not violently, but 

in political opposition to Kabul. 

So, it is a wide range of actors that Russia is engaging just as 

Iran is engaging, and clearly, they have now moved to directly military cultivating the Taliban. And I do believe that Russia defines 

its primary strategic objective as challenging the United States 

across the world. They waited in Afghanistan to challenge the 

United States, but they never wholeheartedly supported U.S. efforts in Afghanistan, and now they determined that this is yet another theater where they can engage. 

I do believe that the primary response is one of diplomatic exposure and diplomatic engagement and, perhaps, diplomatic isolation 

of Russia. However, there are other interdiction options also not of 

Russian agents in the Taliban, but certainly of some of the proxies 

that Russia is engaging with, that does not necessarily mean military eliminating them; but perhaps, blowing up the heroin stockpiles that the representative mentioned that belong to proxies and 

favored power brokers of Russia in Afghanistan as a tool, as a signal. 

Ms. TORRES. Thank you, and my time is up. I yield back. 

Mr. POE. I thank the gentlelady. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Illinois Mr. Schneider. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Thank you, Chairman Poe. Thank you to you 

and the ranking member for calling this hearing, and I want to 

thank the witnesses for sharing with us your perspectives. This is 

obviously, as you have stated, a very complex issue. Before I continue, I also want to join with my colleagues in extending my personal and our condolences to the families of the fallen fighters in 

Afghanistan. Our thoughts and prayers are with them. 

So Mr. Roggio, and I mentioned this to you on the break. You 

mentioned something called the Long War and that could be lookVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:14 May 25, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00053 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_TNT\042717\25262 SHIRL
50

ing backward. We have been in Afghanistan now approaching its 

16th year, or it could be looking forward. From your perspective 

what are we looking at going forward as far as the time of our involvement here? 

Mr. ROGGIO. Yes, this long war has expanded greatly since 9/11. 

If we look at just the threat of al-Qaeda, it was operating in Afghanistan alongside the Taliban fighting the Northern Alliance, 

running training camps, and then it had a small presence in a couple of countries throughout the world operating on a cellular level. 

Since particularly with the Arab Spring, the jihadist threat has 

expanded greatly. We now have active war zones in Syria, Iraq, 

Yemen, Somalia, Mali, Libya, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Southeast Asia. We could go on listing the countries where we have active jihadist insurgencies. We have had attacks here in the homeland, attacks in Europe. The reality is we are fighting this enemy 

militarily, but we are not tackling their ideology, which to me is 

the prime driver of these Islamist militant groups. 

Until we and our allies come up with a way to discredit them, 

to discredit their ideology, we are just not killing them fast enough. 

We have great success in killing terrorist leaders, in killing fighters 

in drone strikes, and that has been fine. But they have shown a 

remarkable capability to replace their leadership and that is the 

way they have been expanding their operations. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. And I am sorry just because of time—and they 

are resilient. But if I can turn to Dr. Jones, I think it was you that 

said this. If not, I apologize. I may have lost it while we had 

stepped away. But you indicated that our policy across administrations has been, I think the term you used was, a mess. And my——

Mr. JONES. Bill may have used that. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. All right. That is just—I may have gotten it 

right. But my question, this is for the whole panel, is as we look 

at the policy as it is today with the challenges—and Mr. Roggio you 

talked about how quickly, how resilient they are and how quickly 

they have expanded and can pop up with new members, new resources—as we try to put a policy into place that has a sense of 

order, what does that order look like? What specific goals would 

you apply? What would be the timelines we should be considering 

as we look at policy here from our position? 

Mr. JONES. Sure, I have a couple of comments on that. I mean, 

I think as I have looked at this and I have been involved myself 

in this as a civilian and in the military in Afghanistan, I think our 

objectives at this point should be fairly limited. We are dealing 

with a government that has challenges and is relatively weak, but 

I would set up several objectives. One is to prevent the Taliban 

from overthrowing the government and from holding urban terrain, 

you know, major urban terrain, and I think that is potentially doable. 

I think we should continue to target groups that are plotting attacks against the U.S. both here and overseas, and I think we 

should continue to support the government and local actors as well 

on the ground. I don’t know the timelines there. I think those are 

in American interests. I think one can do those with a limited presence on the ground with both diplomatic, development, and military. 

51

But I think that is a condition based approach rather than a 

timeline, and I think as long as we are moving in those directions 

and the government is relatively competent, I would personally 

support that. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Dr. Felbab-Brown, your perspective? You bring 

experience beyond just this region; across the globe. What do you 

see as some of the objectives, challenges, and metrics that we can 

measure progress by? 

Ms. FELBAB-BROWN. Beyond the unfortunate position of not having a good alternative to persevering, we can decide to liquidate the 

mission in Afghanistan, and indeed, to quote a prominent U.S. 

strategist or paraphrase, the hallmark of a wise power is to know 

when to liquidate unwise commitments. 

I don’t believe we have reached that stage in Afghanistan. Our 

perseverance still keeps the country from outright civil war and the 

Taliban from toppling the regime and holding significant territories. Those are very important means to achieving or to maintaining U.S. objectives. 

I would think about the conditions under which the U.S. support 

would no longer be maintaining those objectives such as if the Afghan military turned on itself, if there were massive defections, if 

in fact political infighting started in advance of the Presidential 

2019 elections. Those would be markers for me to reconsider liquidating despite the terrible cost to U.S. counterterrorism objectives. 

Until then, I do believe that we need to persevere, perhaps, with 

a boosted military presence as well. However, the perseverance and 

the military presence cannot be decoupled from strong focus and 

governance. We need to change the perceptions of the Afghan people where the Taliban is really not so much worse than the predatory rule of local power brokers or even Afghan officials associated 

with the government. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Thank you. My time is up. As with all complex 

issues but especially here, the answers to a question leads to so 

many more questions. I wish we had more time, but thank you for 

being here. 

Mr. POE. And the gentleman can submit those questions for the 

record and we will make sure that the witnesses invite those, or 

answer those questions in a timely manner; not take 16 years to 

answer them for us. I will recognize myself, as I mentioned, as last 

to ask questions. I want to read a statement made by the Ambassador from Afghanistan to the United Nations—only portions of it. 

In recent months, dozens of terrorist attacks across Afghanistan 

have claimed scores of innocent lives. The Taliban has claimed responsibility for most of these attacks, but regardless of whose 

names are being labeled on these attacks, our own investigations 

have clearly established that they were generally plotted beyond 

our frontiers on the other side of the Durand line, mainly Pakistan. 

Mr. President, it is a fundamental factor which needs to be addressed. 

So I want to address that with the remaining time that we have. 

Dr. Jones, I will ask you first. Explain, as you can concisely, what 

Pakistan’s mischief is regarding terrorist groups that are related to 

Pakistan, hide in Pakistan, and they go to Afghanistan. Explain 

that relationship if you can. 

52

Mr. JONES. Sure. I think this in part comes down to what I 

would call the great power of politics, meaning Afghanistan sits—

and Pakistan is a major border with Afghanistan. Afghanistan’s 

strongest regional ally is India. That is unacceptable to Pakistan; 

India is an enemy. So while the Afghan Government has an ally 

in the Indian Government, Pakistan has resorted to proxy organizations to further its foreign policy goals both in places like Jammu 

and Kashmir against the Indians and in Afghanistan and that 

means support to organizations like the Haqqani Network and the 

Taliban. So it is a proxy war. 

Mr. POE. Either one of our other witnesses want to weigh in on 

this? 

Mr. ROGGIO. I would agree with Dr. Jones. The Pakistani Government is, you know, continuing with its policy or its strategy of 

strategic depth. It views everything through the lens of fighting 

India. And unfortunately, some of these jihadist groups that have 

spawned from the Pakistani efforts to fight India to establish strategic depth in Afghanistan. It has come back to bite them with 

groups like the movement of the Taliban in Pakistan and other 

groups which have attacked the Pakistani State. And unfortunately, Pakistan seems unwilling to recognize this. 

It is still—while it fights the movement of the Taliban in Pakistan, it continues to support other groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba and 

host of other groups, because they are willing to serve as Pakistan’s 

strategic depth. Until the Pakistani Government, leaders and military intelligence—until they come to grips with this, this problem 

is going to exist for decades. 

Mr. POE. Would you agree that with the statement of Admiral 

Mullen in 2011 that the Haqqani Network acts as a veritable arm 

of Pakistan’s Inter-Service Intelligence agency? 

Mr. ROGGIO. Yes, I absolutely would agree. And keep in mind the 

operational leader of the Haqqani Network, Siraj Haqqani. He is 

also one of two deputy emirs for the Taliban. The Haqqani Network, they will tell you—their propaganda has said look, we don’t 

exist, there is no Haqqani Network. We are the Taliban. That is 

both true and untrue. It is a subset of the Taliban. Its leaders are 

integrated with the Taliban, so it is a major; it is receiving major 

support from the Pakistani Government and, you know, they are 

killing Americans. And we have to—we really need to figure out a 

way to get Pakistan to stop supporting the Taliban. 

Mr. POE. And in recent years, the United States has given over 

$33 billion in some form of aid to Pakistan. Pakistan directly or indirectly supports the Haqqani Network in theory. That network, as 

we mentioned earlier, has killed more Americans in the region 

than any other terrorist group. To me that is something that we 

should not accept. We should not accept sending money to a country that supports a terrorist group that kills Americans. I think 

there is a real problem with that. 

Dr. Jones, do you want to weigh in on that? 

Mr. JONES. No. I think it is a serious problem. I mean, I have 

been on the receiving end of it myself. I have lost friends and colleagues because of Haqqani Network attacks. I think it is a very, 

very serious problem. I would support, as the U.S. did last year, 

when it has a strike against a Taliban leader as it did with Mullah 

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Mansour to take that strike. I mean, I think it is worth considering 

the costs and benefits, but I would applaud the administration for 

targeting the Taliban leader last year. 

Mr. POE. All right, I will yield back the remainder of my time. 

I want to thank all of our witnesses for being here. I certainly want 

to thank the members of the committee. This has not been an encouraging hearing about the 16-year war that is taking place, but 

I appreciate you being here. Maybe we can figure out some solutions for what Congress’ role should be and advise the administration as well. This subcommittee is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:14 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

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MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY THE HONORABLE TED POE, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF TEXAS, AND CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON

TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE


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