IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

 November 19, 2008 Session

MATTIE PIANA, ET AL. v. OLD TOWN OF JACKSON, ET AL.

Direct Appeal from the Circuit Court for Madison County

No. C-03-225 Roger A. Page, Judge 

No. W2007-02832-COA-R3-CV - Filed February 6, 2009

This is an wrongful death action arising under a theory of premises liability. Plaintiff’s husband died

as a result of injuries he sustained after tripping over a piece of concrete embedded in a dirt path.

Plaintiff alleged that two of the defendants, who were under a separate maintenance contract with

the owner of the property, failed to exercise the required due care in the maintance, inspection, and

repairs of the path. The trial court granted directed verdicts for both defendants after finding that

neither owed a duty to Plaintiff’s husband. We agree that defendant Brooks Shaw did not have a

duty to maintain the path. However, we have determined that defendant Town and Country did owe

a duty to Plaintiff’s husband. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, we

find that there are genuine issues of material fact for the jury to decide. We therefore reverse and

remand for further proceedings. 

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed in Part and

Reversed in Part

J. STEVEN STAFFORD,J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which ALAN E. HIGHERS, P.J., W.S.,

and DAVID R. FARMER, J., joined.

David W. Camp, Jackson, TN, for Appellant, Mattie Piana, et al.

David I. Feigelson, Memphis, TN, for Appellee, Brooks Shaw & Son Old Country Store Inc.

Kyle C. Atkins and Terri Smith Crider, Humboldt, TN, for Appellee, Town and Country Property

Management 

OPINION

Facts and Procedural History
In addition to owning Old Town, Mr. Smith has a fifty percent ownership interest in Town and Country.

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In 1978, Defendants Old Town ofJackson, Inc. (“Old Town”) and Brooks Shaw & Son Old

Country Store, Inc. (“Brooks Shaw”) began constructing the commercial development known as

Casey Jones Village in Jackson, Tennessee. Casey Jones Village consists of four acres. Old Town

owns one acre, and Brooks Shaw owns the other three. Old Town’s one acre lot lies directly north

of property owned by Defendants Donald G. Taylor and Brenda Taylor d/b/a Days Inn of Jackson

(“Days Inn”).

Prior to 1999, there was a thirty-five foot ditch on the southern part of Old Town’s property.

Then, the City of Jackson installed an eight foot culvert and partially filled the ditch. Afterwards,

customers walked over a dirt path, created by foot traffic, on the ditch to approach Casey Jones

Village from the Days Inn hotel. The path is located on Old Town’s property.

In 1984, J. Reginald Smith, on behalf of Old Town, and Clark Shaw, on behalf of Brooks

Shaw, orally entered into a maintenance agreement. Under the agreement, each party would take

care of its own buildings. Brooks Shaw also agreed to maintain the common grounds of Casey Jones

Village. Mr. Smith testified that the common grounds consisted of “the parking lot, the flower beds,

and the grassy areas on the edge of the buildings.” When the agreement was reached, the dirt path

did not exist. After 1999, Brooks Shaw did not inspect or perform maintenance on either the ditch

or the path, and Mr. Smith did not ask Brooks Shaw to do so. 

In 1993, Old Town entered into a written agreement with Defendant Town and Country

Property Management, Inc. (“Town and Country”). Under the contract, Town and Country agreed

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to maintain and manage all of Old Town’s property at Casey Jones Village. The agreement

specifically authorized Town and Country to make “all ordinary repairs and replacements reasonably

necessary to preserve the Premises in its present condition and for the operation efficiency of the

Premises.” Because Brooks Shaw also had maintenance obligations, the agreement did not require

Town and Country to maintain the parking lot. Town and Country’s primary obligation under the

agreement was to maintain Old Town’s building and to collect rent from tenants. Mr. Smith did not

specifically discuss the maintenance of the ditch with Town and Country. 

Frank Piana, Sr., his wife, Mattie, and their grandson were guests at Days Inn in July 2002.

On July 13, 2002, Mr. Piana wanted to take his grandson to play miniature golf at Casey Jones

Village. They left the hotel and began crossing the dirt path between the hotel and the Village.

While crossing the path, Mr. Piana tripped over a small piece of concrete that was covered by grass.

He suffered severe injuries and ultimately died from those injuries on April 25, 2003.

On July 3, 2003, Mattie Piana, individually and as Mr. Piana’s personal representative, filed

a Complaint in the Madison Country Circuit Court. The Complaint alleged negligence on the part

of several Defendants: Old Town, Brooks Shaw, the City of Jackson, Days Inn, and Town and

Country. With respect to Brooks Shaw and Town and Country, Ms. Piana alleged that they failed

to exercise the required due care in the maintenance, inspection, and repair of the dirt path and/or
Because Days Inn had not yet presented its proof, the trial court should have waited, pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ.

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P. 50.01, to rule on the motions for directed verdict. None of the parties, however, raised an objection at trial or raises

the issue on appeal. We simply note the procedural misstep but find any error waived. See Yeubanks v. Methodist

Healthcare-Memphis Hosps., No. W2001-02051-COA-R3-CV, 2003 WL 21392411, at *7-8 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 10,

2003).

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to properly warn Mr. Piana of the dangers existing on that path. The City of Jackson and several

other defendants were granted summary judgment and are not parties to this appeal. Likewise, Ms.

Piana reached a settlement with Old Town prior to trial

At trial, three defendants remained: Days Inn, Brooks Shaw, and Town and Country. At the

close of Plaintiff’s proof, all three defendants moved for directed verdicts. The trial court took the

motions under advisement, and Town and Country presented its proof. When Town and Country

concluded, the trial court granted directed verdicts for both Town and Country and Brooks Shaw.2

The trial court found that Brooks Shaw did not owe a duty to the Plaintiff because it neither owned

nor maintained the premises where Mr. Piana fell. Similarly, the trial court found that Town and

Country did not owe a duty to Mr. Piana. The trial court stated that any duty owed by Town and

Country must stem from the terms of its maintenance agreement with Old Town. After examining

those terms, the trial court concluded that Town and Country was not obligated to inspect or repair

the dirt path on Old Town’s property.

As the sole remaining Defendant, Days Inn presented its proof, and the case was submitted

to the jury. The jury only considered the fault of Mr. Piana, Old Town, the City of Jackson, and

Days Inn. The jury attributed 70% of the fault to Old Town and 30% to Mr. Piana. The jury also

found $3,000,000 in damages. The plaintiff, however, had already settled with Old Town, and

therefore, could not recover additional damages based upon the jury verdict. 

Ms. Piana now appeals the trial court’s decision to grant directed verdicts for Brooks Shaw

and Town and Country

Standard of Review 

A trial court’s decision to grant a motion for directed verdict involves a question of law.

Underwood v. HCA Health Servs. of Tennessee, Inc., 892 S.W.2d 423, 425 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994).

On appeal, we apply the same standard used by the trial court when ruling on the motion initially.

United Brake Sys., Inc. v. Am. Envtl. Prot., Inc., 963 S.W.2d 749, 754 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997).

Accordingly, we do not weigh the evidence or evaluate the credibility of witnesses. Id. (citing

Underwood, 892 S.W.2d at 425). Rather, we consider all of the evidence, taking the strongest

legitimate view of it in the non-moving party’s favor. Eaton v. McLain, 891 S.W.2d 587, 590

(Tenn. 1994). The court should grant the motion, “only if, after assessing the evidence according to

the foregoing standards, it determines that reasonable minds could not differ as to the conclusions

to be drawn from the evidence.” Id.

Law and Analysis
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A negligence claim requires proof of the following elements: (1) a duty of care owed by the

defendant to the plaintiff; (2) conduct by the defendant falling below the standard of care amounting

to a breach of that duty; (3) an injury or loss; (4) causation in fact; and (5) proximate or legal cause.

Hale v. Ostrow, 166 S.W.3d 713, 716 (Tenn. 2005); Coln v. City of Savannah, 966 S.W.2d 34, 39

(Tenn. 1998). 

The focus in the present case is on the first element of negligence, the duty of care. The

existence of a duty is a question of law. Hale, 166 S.W.3d at 716; Coln, 966 S.W.2d at 39. Legal

duty has been defined as the legal obligation owed by a defendant to a plaintiff to conform to a

reasonable person standard of care for the protection against unreasonable risks of harm. West v.

East Tennessee Pioneer Oil Co., 172 S.W.3d 545, 551 (Tenn. 2005). A “risk is unreasonable and

gives rise to a duty to act with due care if the forseeable probability and gravity of harm posed by

defendant's conduct outweigh the burden upon defendant to engage in alternative conduct that would

have prevented the harm.” McCall v. Wilder, 913 S.W.2d 150, 153 (Tenn. 1995). When deciding

whether a duty is owed in a specific case, “courts apply a balancing approach, based upon principles

of fairness, to identify whether the risk to the plaintiff was unreasonable.” Burroughs v. Magee, 118

S.W.3d 323, 328-29 (Tenn. 2003). When balancing the relevant factors, the “forseeability prong

is paramount because ‘forseeability is the test of negligence.’” Hale, 166 S.W.3d at 716-17 (quoting

Biscan v. Brown, 160 S.W.3d 462, 480 (Tenn. 2005). 

A. Brooks Shaw

The trial court found that Brooks Shaw did not owe a duty to Mr. Piana because the common

maintenance agreement between Brooks Shaw and Old Town did not require Brooks Shaw to

maintain the ditch area or the path. Brooks Shaw did not own the property on which Mr. Piana fell.

Accordingly, Brooks Shaw could not owe a duty to Mr. Piana as the owner of the premises. See

Hale, 166 S.W.3d at 717-18; Benson v. H.G. Hill Stores, Inc., 699 S.W.2d 560, 562 (Tenn. Ct.

App. 1985). Therefore, the trial court correctly concluded that any duty Brooks Shaw might owe to

Mr. Piana must stem from its common maintenance agreement with Old Town. 

The oral agreement between Brooks Shaw and Old Town was reached in 1984. The

agreement required Brooks Shaw to maintain its building and the “common grounds.” The path

along the ditch, however, did not exist in 1984; it was created by pedestrians after the ditch was filled

in by the City of Jackson in 1989. In 1984, neither Brooks Shaw nor Old Town could have possibly

contemplated the maintenance of a path that did not yet exist. 

Ms. Piana insists that Brooks Shaw undertook a duty to maintain the path because Brooks

Shaw occasionally performed maintenance on areas owned by Old Town. When it did so, Brooks

Shaw could seek reimbursement from Town and Country for twenty five percent of the cost of the

repairs. Accordingly, Brooks Shaw could have inspected and repaired the path. Because of this

possibility, Ms. Piana argues that Brooks Shaw undertook a duty to do so. 
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This Court, however, rejected a similar argument in Thompson v. Ruby Tuesday, Inc., No.

M2004-01869-COA-R3-CV, 2006 WL 468724 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 27, 2006). In Thompson, the

defendant was bound to a lease agreement under which it had the right to repair a common area

owned by its lessor. Id., at *6. This Court found that a contractual right to repair is not synonymous

with a legal duty. Id. Here, Brooks Shaw also had the right to enter Old Town’s property and

maintain the dirt path. This right, however, did not place a duty upon Brooks Shaw to protect guests

on Old Town’s property. Instead, we find that Old Town retained this duty as the owner of the

premises.

Next, Ms. Piana contends that Brooks Shaw was a “possessor” of the property and thus liable

to the same extent as the owner. To support this contention, Ms. Piana relies on this Court’s decision

in Smith v. Inman Realty Co., 846 S.W.2d 819 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992). In Smith, we held that a

realtor, who showed a house under a listing agreement with the owner, had the same duty of care to

an invitee as would the owner. Id. at 823. To reach this conclusion, the Court found that the realtor

was a “possessor” of the property as defined by the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 328(E) (1965).

Section 328(E) provides:

A possessor of land is

(a) a person who is in occupation of the land with intent to control it or

(b) a person who has been in occupation of land with intent to control it, if no other

person has subsequently occupied it with intent to control it, or

(c) a person who is entitled to immediate occupation of the land, if no other person

is in possession under Clauses (a) and (b).

Ms. Piana, however, did not present evidence showing that Brooks Shaw is a “possessor” of the

relevant property under this definition. The realtor, in Smith, had the right to enter the property and

actually took an invitee onto the property. Smith, 846 S.W.2d at 823. Brooks Shaw, on the other

hand, did not have any relationship with Mr. Piana. Furthermore, the maintenance agreement

between Brooks Shaw and Old Town did not give Brooks Shaw the exclusive right to maintain any

property other than its own building and the parking lot. Accordingly, Brooks Shaw is not a

“possessor” under Section 328(E), and Smith is inapplicable.

Having reviewed the facts in the light most favorable to Ms. Piana, we find that the trial court

did not err when granting a directed verdict in favor of Brooks Shaw. Brooks Shaw did not own the

property where the injury occurred or where the alleged defective condition existed. Nor did Brooks

Shaw undertake a duty, under its maintenance agreement with Old Town, to inspect or repair the dirt

path. Therefore, the trial court properly granted Brooks Shaw’s motion for directed verdict.

B. Town and Country

The trial court found that Town and Country did not owe a duty to Mr. Piana. To reach this

conclusion, the trial court considered the Management Agreement between Old Town and Town and

Country. The agreement described the property to be managed as “40 Casey Jones Village, Old
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Town,” which is simply the address for Old Town. Town and Country’s authority, with respect to

inspections and repairs, comes from section 6(b) of the agreement:

Agent is authorized to make or cause to be made, through contracted services or

otherwise, all ordinary repairs and replacements reasonably necessary to preserve the

Premises in its present condition and for the operation efficiency of the Premises; and

all alterations required to comply with lease requirements, governmental materials,

supplies and other items necessary for the management, maintenance or operation of

the Premises.

The trial court analyzed this paragraph and concluded that it “does not contemplate inspecting the

dirt path to see if there is a one-and-a-half inch piece of concrete in it covered by grass.”

Accordingly, the trial court granted a directed verdict in favor of Town and Country.

Liability in cases like this one follows the right to control the premises. Because Old Town

is the sole owner of the property, the trial court correctly found that the terms of the Management

Agreement define Town and Country’s right to control the property. The trial court then implicitly

found that Town and Country had the right to control the dirt path. However, Town and Country did

not owe a duty to Mr. Piana because the danger and potential harm was not forseeable. On appeal,

Town and Country first argues that it did not owe a duty to Mr. Piana because it was not required

to perform any maintenance on the ditch 

Accordingly, our first task is to determine the extent of Town and Country’s obligations

under the Management Agreement. Tennessee courts have examined similar written agreements to

determine whether a party has a duty to inspect or maintain a piece of property. Thompson, 2006

WL 468724, at *5); Denton v. Hahn, No. M2003-00342-COA-R3-CV, 2004 WL 2083711, at *8

(Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 16, 2004). The interpretation of a written agreement–here, the Management

Agreement–is a matter of law. Guiliano v. CLEO, Inc., 995 S.W.2d 88, 95 (Tenn. 1999). When

interpreting the written agreement, our primary task is to ascertain the intention of the parties. Jaffe

v. Bolton, 817 S.W.2d 19, 25 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991). We must consider the words of the instrument

in the context of the instrument as a whole and give those words their usual, natural, and ordinary

meaning. Ballard v. North Am. Life & Cas. Co., 667 S.W.2d 79, 82 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983); Barber

v. Westmoreland, 601 S.W.2d 712, 714 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980). 

The premises described in the Management Agreement is Old Town’s address at Casey Jones

Village. The description itself does not limit Town and Country’s obligations to Old Town’s

building. Town and Country argues that the Agreement excluded the ditch and path because Mr.

Smith, the owner of Old Town, did not specifically request Town and Country to maintain this area.

Furthermore, Town and Country did not inspect, nor was it requested to inspect, the ditch or the path

when performing its annual inspections. Instead, Town and Country insists that its maintenance

obligations were limited to the structural integrity of Old Town’s buildings on the property. 
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The first question then is whether the description of the premises, “40 Casey Jones Village,

Old Town,” in the Management Agreement encompasses the dirt path. At trial, Mr. Smith offered

contradictory statements about his understanding of the contract. At first, Mr. Smith testified that

the Agreement defines the premises as the “full one acre of Old Town’s property.” On crossexamination, however, Mr. Smith testified that he never expected Town and Country to perform

maintenance on the ditch or dirt path. Patricia Fox, the property manager for Town and Country,

also testified that the terms of the agreement did not exclude any part of Old Town’s property at the

Casey Jones Village. Like Mr. Smith, Ms. Fox testified that Town and Country’s primary obligation

was to maintain the buildings on Old Town’s property. Ms. Fox did not believe that Town and

Country was required under the Management Agreement to maintain the dirt path behind the

buildings. Finally, both Mr. Smith and Ms. Fox testified that they did not know that the dirt path was

located on Old Town’s property.

After examining the entire record, we conclude that the language of the Management

Agreement required Town and Country to maintain the entire premises, including the dirt path on

Old Town’s property. Both parties to the Agreement testified that the premises described as “40

Casey Jones Village, Old Town” did not exclude the dirt path. Because the parties admit that the

description is unambiguous, we must disregard their attempts at trial to limit the agreement’s scope.

Town and Country cannot avoid a clear contractual duty by simply claiming ignorance of the

obligation. Were we to hold otherwise, other property managers could avoid liability to invitees by

ignoring the unambiguous terms of their maintenance contracts. Accordingly, we agree with the trial

court’s implicit finding that Town and Country had an obligation under the Management Agreement

to maintain all of Old Town’s property at Casey Jones Village, including the path. 

Next, we must determine the extent of Town and Country’s authority under the Management

Agreement. In Lawrence v. HCA Health Servs. of Tennessee, Inc., No.

M2007-01128-COA-R3-CV, 2008 WL 3451799 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 12, 2008), we found that a

property manager, acting under a similar contractual agreement, became the “operator” of the

property that it managed. Lawrence, 2008 WL 3451799, at *5. Like the manager in Lawrence,

Town and Country was authorized, in addition to its maintenance obligations, to find tenants, collect

rent, and hire staff. Therefore, we conclude that Town and Country was the operator of Old Town’s

property at Casey Jones Village.

Like an owner, the operator of a place of business has a duty “to exercise reasonable care

with regard to social guests or business invitees on the premises.” Rice v. Sabir, 979 S.W.2d 305,

308 (Tenn. 1998). The operator’s duty “includes maintaining the premises in a reasonably safe

condition either by removing or repairing potentially dangerous conditions or by helping customers

and guests avoid injury by warning them of the existence of dangerous conditions that cannot, as a

practical matter, be removed or repaired.” Psillas v. Home Depot, U.S.A., Inc., 66 S.W.3d 860, 864

(Tenn. Ct. App. 2001). The operator of a premises, however, does not have a duty to “remove or

warn against ‘conditions from which no unreasonable risk was to be anticipated, or from those which

the occupier neither knew about nor could have discovered with reasonable care.’” Rice v. Sabir,

979 S.W.2d 305, 309 (Tenn. 1998) (quoting W. Page Keaton, Prosser and Keaton on Torts, § 61 at
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426 (5 ed. 1984)). In this regard, “the mere existence of a defect or danger is generally insufficient th

to establish liability, unless it is shown to be of such a character or of such duration that the jury may

reasonably conclude that due care would have discovered it.” Id. (citation omitted).

The trial court apparently found that the piece of concrete on the path was not a condition that

presented an unreasonable risk to guests. In Nee v. Big Creek Partners, 106 S.W.3d 650 (Tenn. Ct.

App. 2002), we described a plaintiff’s evidentiary burden on this issue:

[F]or an owner or occupier to be found negligent, there must be some evidence that

there was a dangerous or defective condition on the premises. A jury cannot conclude

that an owner or occupier failed to exercise reasonable care to prevent injury to

persons on their property if there is no evidence of a dangerous or defective

condition. If no dangerous or defective condition exists, an owner or occupier cannot

be held liable for failing to take action in order to remedy the supposed condition.

Id. at 653-54. Like the present case, the Court in Nee considered the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s

evidence after the trial court granted the defendant/owner’s motion for directed verdict. Id. at 651.

In Nee, the plaintiff, who tripped while going down stairs on the defendant’s property, simply

described the accident at trial and introduced photographs of the stairs. Id. at 654. The photographs

were an accurate representation of the stairs, but standing alone, did not show that there was anything

wrong with the stairs. Id. Accordingly, we affirmed the verdict because “[a] finding that the steps

were defective or dangerous based on the photographs would require the jury to engage in

speculation, conjecture, and guesswork.” Id. 

The evidence presented by Ms. Piana is similar to the plaintiff’s evidence in Nee. Ms. Piana

testified about the condition of the path and introduced photographs showing the piece of concrete.

Considering this evidence in the light most favorable to Ms. Piana, we find that there was sufficient

evidence for a jury to decide if the condition was dangerous or defective. Unlike the plaintiff’s

photographs in Nee, Ms. Piana showed that the piece of concrete itself could be a dangerous

condition. Accordingly, a reasonable person could find that the condition was dangerous without

engaging in speculation or guesswork. Because reasonable persons could draw conflicting

conclusions from this evidence, the issue should have been submitted to the jury rather than being

settled by directed verdict. 

Finally, we must address whether Ms. Piana presented sufficient evidence showing that Town

and Country had notice of the condition. If the plaintiff alleges that an owner or operator of the

premises allowed a dangerous or defective condition to exist on the premises, the plaintiff must

prove, in addition to the elements of negligence, that: “1) the condition was caused or created by the

owner, operator, or his agent, or 2) if the condition was created by someone other than the owner,

operator, or his agent, that the owner or operator had actual or constructive notice that the condition

existed prior to the accident.” Blair v. West Town Mall, 130 S.W.3d 761, 764 (Tenn. 2004). Ms.

Piana has not alleged that Town and Country created the condition. Likewise, she has not alleged

that Town and Country had actual notice that the condition existed prior to the accident. Therefore,
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she was required to present evidence showing that Town and Country had constructive notice of the

condition.

 A plaintiff may prove constructive notice by showing that “the dangerous or defective

condition existed for such a length of time that the defendant, in the exercise of reasonable care,

should have become aware of the condition.” Blair, 130 S.W.3d at 764 (citing Simmons v. Sears,

Roebuck & Co., 713 S.W.2d 640, 641 (Tenn. 1986). Alternatively, the plaintiff may prove

constructive notice by showing “a pattern of conduct, a recurring incident, or a general or continuing

condition indicating the dangerous condition’s existence.” Blair, 130 S.W.3d at 765-66. If notice

is proven, the owner takes on a duty “to take reasonable steps to remedy this commonly occurring

dangerous condition.” Id. at 766. Ms. Piana only presented evidence that the condition had existed

for such a length of time that Town and Country should have been aware of it. 

Although the issue of duty is a question of law for the court to decide, “it is generally for the

jury to say whether the condition causing the injury...had existed long enough that a reasonable man

exercising reasonable care would have discovered it.” Allison v. Blount Nat. Bank, 390 S.W.2d

716, 719 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1965). Before the question can go to the jury, however, the plaintiff must

present “some material competent evidence from which it can be logically inferred [that] the

proprietor, by the exercise of ordinary care, would have or should have discovered the dangerous

condition.” Paradiso v. Kroger, 499 S.W.2d 78, 80 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1973); see also Chambliss v.

Shoney’s Inc., 742 S.W.2d 271, 273 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987) (“When there is a complete absence of

proof as to when and how the dangerous condition came about, it would be improper to permit the

jury to speculate on these vital elements.”).

At trial, Ms. Piana testified that she had seen the piece of concrete on the path several times

prior to the accident. She did not specify any precise dates, but she stated that the piece of concrete

had been on the path for at least a few years. During her previous visits, the concrete was clearly

visible, but at the time of the accident, it had been covered by grass. Reviewing this evidence in the

light most favorable to the plaintiff, we find that the question of notice should have been submitted

to the jury. Ms. Piana presented uncontradicted testimony that the defect had existed for several

years prior to the accident. While her testimony lacked specificity, it is for the jury to evaluate the

quality and reliability of her statements. By preempting the jury’s review of this question, the trial

court erred. When considering a motion for directed verdict, the trial court is not permitted to weigh,

let alone disregard, material evidence presented by the non-moving party. 

For these reasons, we remand this matter to the trial court. We have determined, as a matter

of law, that Town and Country owed a duty to Mr. Piana. We have not determined that the concrete

constituted a dangerous condition or that Town and Country had notice of the condition. We have

only determined that Ms. Piana presented sufficient evidence for a jury to consider these questions.

Conclusion
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Based upon the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s grant of directed verdict in favor

of Brooks Shaw. However, we reverse the trial court’s grant of directed verdict in favor of Town

and Country. This case is hereby remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Costs of this appeal are assessed equally to Ms. Piana and Town and Country, for which execution

may issue if necessary.

______________________________ 

J. STEVEN STAFFORD, J.