J-S08013-21

2021 PA Super 98

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT

OF PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

ARTHUR LEE BELLAMY

Appellant No. 281 MDA 2020

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered March 27, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County

Criminal Division at No.: CP-35-CR-0001336-2016

BEFORE: STABILE, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

OPINION BY STABILE, J.: FILED MAY 14, 2021

Appellant Arthur Lee Bellamy appeals the March 27, 2018 judgment of 

sentence entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County (“trial 

court”), following the nunc pro tunc reinstatement of his direct appeal rights. 

Upon review, we affirm. 

On April 6, 2016, Dunmore Borough Police Department charged 

Appellant with possession with intent to deliver (“PWID”) (heroin), conspiracy 

to commit PWID, possession of a controlled substance (heroin), and 

possession of drug paraphernalia.1 The affidavit of probable cause 

accompanying the complaint alleged:

On April 5, 2016 at approximately 2110 hours, members of the 

Dunmore Police Department, Lackawanna County District 

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30), 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 903(a)(1), and 35 P.S. § 780-

113(a)(16), and (32), respectively.
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Attorney’s Office Detectives and members of the Lackawanna 

County Drug Task Force executed a search warrant, approved by 

Deputy District Attorney Michael Ossont and out of the office of 

the District Judge Paul Ware, at the Econo Lodge 1175 Kane Street 

Scranton PA (Room # 229). As Drug Task Force members 

prepared to make entry to room # 229, they encountered a white 

male (later identified as John Bell) opening the door to the room. 

Detectives then made entry into the room and encountered 

[Appellant] and Avette [McNeil2] near the bed area. All suspects 

were taken into custody and made aware of their rights, which 

they verbally stated they understood.

Detectives then began a search of the room (# 229), where . . . 

Detective Corey Condrad recovered a plastic zip-lock bag 

containing 10 glassine bags of suspected heroin and $2,519.00 of 

US currency located in the dresser drawer near the beds. 

[Detective Condrad] then recovered a men’s black Nike sneaker 

on the floor near the bed. Inside the sneaker, [he] recovered a 

plastic zip-lock bag containing 400 glassine bags of suspected 

heroin. Officer Golden (SPD) recovered a womens [(sic)] purse 

on top of the bed. Inside the purse Officer Golden recovered 1 

glassine bag of heroin and a plastic bag containing rubber bands. 

[Detective Condrad] then recovered a Samsung cellular phone 

and two LG cellular phones, along with $21.00 of US currency on 

top of the bed. [Appellant] stated that the Samsung phone 

belonged to him. All items were photographed at their location. 

All suspects were then transported to the Dunmore Police 

Headquarters.

At Dunmore Police Headquarters, Detective [Harold] Zech 

recovered 5 bags of suspected heroin from inside Bell’s under 

ware [(sic)], during a further search incident to arrest. [Detective 

Condrad] field tested the heroin with positive results. The 

Samsung cellular phone was identified as the “target[”] cellular 

phone used by [Appellant] in this investigation. Also, a sum of US 

currency was identified as pre-recorded, serialized US currency 

also used during this investigation. [Appellant], Bell, and [McNeil]

were then transported to the Lackawanna County Processing 

Center on drug charges.

____________________________________________

2 Avette’s last name is spelled various different ways in the certified record. 

For instance, she is referred to as “Maneil” and “McNeal.” We, however, will 

refer to her as McNeil herein. 
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All items seized in the investigation were entered and secured into 

evidence and the heroin will be sent to PSP Wyoming Crime Lab 

for further testing.

Affidavit of Probable Cause, 4/6/16 (sic). The charges were held for court. 

On October 21, 2016, Appellant filed an “Omnibus Pretrial Motion,” seeking to 

suppress communication intercepted through the Wiretapping and Electronic 

Surveillance Control Act (the “Wiretap Act”), 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 5701-5782. 

Additionally, he sought to suppress evidence recovered in the room at the 

Econo Lodge because of the police officers’ alleged failure to comply with 

Pa.R.Crim.P. 207, which codifies the knock and announce rule.3 

The trial court conducted a hearing on the pretrial motion, which 

spanned two days. At the hearing, the Commonwealth presented the 

testimony of three police officers. First, the Commonwealth called to the stand 

Detective Condrad. N.T. Suppression, ,4/10/17, at 3. He testified that he had 

been employed by the Dunmore Police Department for approximately two 

years. Id. Describing his duties, Detective Condrad testified:

I’m assigned to the drug unit there. Some of my duties are 

meeting with confidential informants, interviewing those 

informants, finding out who is selling narcotics. Once we find out, 

we arrange controlled purchases either in an undercover capacity 

or have informants go and purchase those narcotics. We also 

execute search warrants prior to those operations.

____________________________________________

3 Appellant did not identify the officers’ alleged violation of Rule 207 as a 

separate basis for seeking suppression. We, however, overlook this omission, 

because the facts contained in his omnibus pretrial motion sufficiently 

subsumed this issue, and Appellant subsequently discussed it with specificity 

in his brief in support of the pretrial motion. 
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Id. at 3-4. Detective Condrad testified that he has been involved in over 500 

drug investigations. Id. at 4. He further testified that at 7:00 p.m., on April 

5, 2016, he, along with Detectives John Munley and Zech, met with a 

confidential informant (“CI”) about heroin sales in the City of Scranton.4 Id.

at 4, 19. The CI informed them that 

he or she could purchase heroin from a black male known to the 

informant by the street alias Bo. The informant gave a description 

of Bo as a black male, heavyset, approximately 6’2, in his 30s. 

Detectives were familiar with an Arthur Bellamy [(Appellant)] from 

prior investigations who goes by the street alias Bo. The 

informant later stated that Bo was selling heroin out of Room 229 

at the Econo Lodge. I then obtained a JNET photograph of 

Bellamy. I provided that photograph to the informant. The 

informant then positively identified Bellamy as Bo, the person 

selling heron from [Room] 229.

Id. at 4-5. According to Detective Condrad, the CI provided them with a 

cellular phone number for purposes of contacting [Appellant]. Id. at 5. 

Detective Condrad testified that he relayed the information to Deputy District 

Attorney Ossont, who consensualized the CI. Id. “After the consensualization 

was over, the [CI] placed an intercepted and recorded phone call to 

[Appellant]. During the phone call, [Appellant] agreed to meet with the [CI] 

at Room 229 to sell him or her a quantity of heroin.” Id. Detective Condrad 

recalled that after the phone call, the CI and his or her vehicle were 

“thoroughly searched for currency and contraband.” Id. at 6. Detective 

____________________________________________

4 Detective Condrad testified that Detectives Zech and Munley had worked 

previously with the CI. N.T. Suppression, 4/10/17, at 31.
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Condrad testified that he provided the CI with $100.00 of pre-recorded and 

serialized US currency to effectuate the heroin purchase from Appellant. Id. 

He further testified that, thereafter, he and Detective Zech established 

surveillance near Room 229 at the Econo Lodge. Id. “I then kept the [CI] 

under surveillance as he or she travelled from the District Attorney’s Office to 

the Econo Lodge.” Id. Detective Condrad recalled that “Detective Zech then 

kept the [CI] under surveillance as he or she entered the room of 229. Within 

a few minutes that [CI] was observed exiting that room where he or she then 

met with me and handed me ten glassine bags of suspected heroin,” which 

field tested positive. Id. at 6-7. According to Detective Condrad, the CI did 

not meet anyone else on his or her way to or from Room 229. Id. at 7. 

Detective Condrad recalled that, after the contraband that the CI 

purchased from Appellant field tested positive for heroin, Detective Munley 

prepared and applied for a search warrant for Room 229, which was signed 

by Magistrate Paul Ware and approved by Deputy District Attorney Ossont. 

Id. Detective Condrad testified that they executed the search warrant on the 

same day (April 5, 2016) at 9:10 p.m. Id. Describing the events leading up 

to the search, Detective Condrad recalled:

We observed a white male exit [Room 229]. That male was later 

identified as John Bell. Mr. Bell was detained. He was given his 

Miranda[5] warnings which he verbally stated he understood. We 

then made entry into that room where we encountered [Appellant] 

and [Ms. McNeil] inside the room near the bed.

____________________________________________

5 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
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Id. at 7-8. Detective Condrad clarified that, as they were approaching and 

the door opened, they “could see there was [(sic)] additional occupants beside 

Mr. Bell inside the room.” Id. at 8. He testified that the occupants inside 

were able to see him and he was wearing a tactical police vest, i.e., a “bullet 

proof vest that says Police on the front of it.” Id. 

Detective Condrad further testified that when they entered the room, 

the police officers said “search warrant.” Id. They, however, did not knock 

on the door, because it opened. Id. Detective Condrad stated that “[o]nce 

[Appellant] and Mr. Bell observed us, we were in fear that they might destroy 

evidence or for officer safety that they might have a weapon, therefore, we 

entered the room without knocking.” Id. at 8-9. The occupants, Appellant 

and Ms. McNeil, were detained. Id. at 9. Thereafter, according to Detective 

Condrad, Appellant and Ms. McNeil were Mirandized and the room was 

searched pursuant to the search warrant. Id. The police recovered narcotics, 

which later tested positive for heroin, U.S. currency, including the $100 in prerecorded and serialized U.S. currency provided to the CI, and three cell 

phones. Id. at 9-10. Detective Condrad testified that Appellant claimed 

ownership of the Samsung cell phone. Id. at 9. 

On cross-examination, Detective Condrad confirmed that he had known 

Mr. Bell prior to encountering him during the execution of the search warrant 

in this case. Id. at 12. Detective Condrad clarified that when Mr. Bell exited 

Room 229, he did not close the door and that the door was open. Id. He 

explained that Mr. Bell was detained and Mirandized in the “doorway portion” 
J-S08013-21

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of the room. Id. at 13. Detective Condrad stated that Mr. Bell “was brought 

out of the room and then to make way for the detectives to enter the room.” 

Id. According to Detective Condrad, Appellant and Ms. McNeil observed the 

police taking Mr. Bell and putting him in handcuffs. Id. When asked how 

much was the door open, Detective Condrad replied “[e]nough for me to see 

into the room.” Id. Detective Condrad explained:

This was all happening very quickly, if you can imagine, somebody 

coming out of the room. We were – we were ready to make entry 

into that room using a ramming device. Once that door opened, 

Mr. Bell walked out. He was immediately handcuffed, taken out 

of the way, given his Miranda warnings at the time we entered 

the room.

Id. at 13-14. 

The Commonwealth next presented the testimony of Detective John 

Munley. N.T. Suppression, 7/24/17, at 4. Detective Munley agreed with 

Detective Condrad’s account of what transpired at the Econo Lodge on April 

5, 2016. Id. at 7. Detective Munley recalled that “[a]s [Mr. Bell] was exiting 

the room, we were entering. It was happening simultaneously. We were 

approaching the room as he exited.” Id. Explaining the reason for the 

officers’ failure to knock, Detective Munley stated:

Well, here’s what happened. Again, we were about to go up, 

knock on the door, announce, but as we were approaching [Mr. 

Bell] exited. He saw us. We were right next to the door, so the 

occupants in the room also saw us. We yelled, “Police. Get on 

the ground.” And we took them into custody along with Mr. Bell.
J-S08013-21

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Id. at 7-8. Detective Munley recalled that Mr. Bell was not taken into custody 

and Mirandized prior to their entry into Room 229, because “[w]e wouldn’t 

have had time for that.” Id. at 8. He explained that “[i]t happened so fast. 

He’s coming out of the room. He’s grabbed, taken into custody as others 

enter.” Id. Detective Munley testified that he did not have any information 

indicating the presence of weapons in the room prior to entering it. Id. When 

asked whether he had any “specific facts to indicate” that Appellant was about 

to destroy narcotics, Detective Munley replied:

As far as the weapons and destruction of evidence, the only thing 

I have is my training, knowledge, education, and experience in 

over a thousand drug investigations where it’s common for drug 

dealers to both carry weapons and destroy evidence if they have 

a chance.

 . . . .

No, we were in so fast [Appellant] didn’t have a chance. The door 

was open.

Id. at 8-9. According to Detective Munley, Appellant did not have a chance 

to make any furtive movements. Id. 

Lastly, the Commonwealth called to the stand Detective Harold Zech. 

Id. at 11. Recalling the circumstances surrounding the execution of the 

search warrant, Detective Zech testified:

Our entry team arrived at the hotel, the Econo Lodge, exited our 

vehicles, formed a stack, which is basically a line of officers, given 

a specific duty. I had a ram with me in case we had to force entry 

into the hotel room. We proceeded to the second floor of the 

hotel, approached the door. And as we approached, we had a 

person exiting the room. I believe his name was Bell. He was 

detained, forced to the last person in the stack. And being that 
J-S08013-21

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the door was open, we could clearly see persons inside. We 

announced our presence and entered the room. We were 

compromised at that point.

Id. at 12-13. Upon entering Room 229, according to Detective Zech, they 

detained Appellant and Ms. McNeil. Id. at 13. Detective Zech recalled that, 

because he was one of the first officers approaching the door, he personally 

announced their presence. Id. When asked whether he indicated to any 

occupants his purpose for being there, Detective Zech replied that “[i]t was 

pretty obvious after they were placed in handcuffs and they were notified that 

this was a search warrant.” Id. at 13. He testified that he did not observe 

any attempts by the occupants of Room 229 to destroy evidence. Id. at 14. 

In response, Appellant testified on his own behalf. Id. at 15. Describing 

what happened that night, he stated:

As Mr. Bell was leaving, he was opening the door. And when he 

was opening the door, the officers was [(sic)] waiting outside the 

door. When they seen he was opening the door they busted in 

the door. They yelled, “Police”, and they ran straight to me. They 

took Mr. Bell. They ran straight to me, took me down, and put 

me in cuffs. And they did the same thing with Ms. McNeil.

Id. at 16. Appellant testified that the police did not give him any type of 

opportunity to surrender peacefully. Id. He further testified that the police 

did not knock and announce their presence. Id. 

Q. How much was the door opened?

A. Mr. Bell was – he was opening the door. The door wasn’t open. 

He was opening the door to leave and they was out there.

Q. And then what happened as he’s opening the door?
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A. As he’s opening the door they were squatted by the door.

[6]

And that’s when they seen him opening the door they seen me, 

they ran in. They bust right through the door and came in.

Q. And did they go directly to your location?

A. Pretty much. They did grab Mr. Bell, but they ran straight to 

me.

Q. And are you taken into custody at that point?

A. Yes. 

Q. Handcuffed?

A. Yes.

Id. at 17 (emphasis added). On cross-examination, Appellant acknowledged

that he could see the police and they could see him when they took Mr. Bell 

out. Id. at 18. 

Following the hearing, the trial court denied Appellant’s omnibus pretrial 

motion on October 27, 2017. On December 4, 2017, Appellant waived his 

right to a jury trial and proceeded to a stipulated bench trial.7 The trial court 

found Appellant guilty to PWID, conspiracy, possession of a controlled 

substance, and possession of drug paraphernalia. On March 27, 2018, the 

trial court sentenced Appellant to an aggregate sentence of 30 to 60 months’ 

____________________________________________

6 Appellant clarified that he saw the police prior to their entry into Room 229 

when they were squatted by the door as Mr. Bell was opening it. N.T. 

Suppression, 7/24/17, at 18. 

7 Appellant specifically requested and, the trial court agreed, that he be 

permitted to retain his appellate rights on the suppression issue. N.T. Trial, 

12/4/17, at 3. 
J-S08013-21

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imprisonment, followed by two years of state probation.8 Appellant did not 

file any post-sentence motion. Appellant, however, timely appealed. The trial 

court directed Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement of errors 

complained of on appeal. Appellant complied. On June 22, 2018, this Court 

dismissed Appellant’s appeal for failure to comply with Pa.R.A.P. 3517, relating 

to docketing statement. 

On December 31, 2018, Appellant pro se filed a petition under the Post 

Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-46. The PCRA court 

appointed counsel, who, on March 25, 2019, filed an amended petition, raising 

a claim for ineffective assistance of trial counsel. In specific, Appellant argued 

that but for counsel’s failure to file a docketing statement, his direct appeal 

would not have been dismissed. As a result, Appellant sought nunc pro tunc 

reinstatement of his direct appeal rights. The PCRA court granted relief on 

January 17, 2020. 

On February 10, 2020, Appellant filed a notice of appeal nunc pro tunc. 

The trial court directed Appellant to file a Rule 1925(b) statement. Appellant 

raised four assertions of error, challenging the denial of his omnibus pretrial 

motion. On November 20, 2020, the trial court issued a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) 

opinion, concluding that Appellant is not entitled to relief.

On appeal, Appellant presents two issues for our review.

____________________________________________

8 The trial court did not impose a sentence for conspiracy, possession of heroin 

or possession of drug paraphernalia. 
J-S08013-21

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[I.] Whether the trial court erred in denying Appellant’s motion to 

suppress evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant on the 

basis that law enforcement violated the knock [and announce 

rule] as required by Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure 207

and Article 1, § 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution?

[II.] Whether the trial court's denial of Appellant’s motion to 

suppress evidence on the basis that the intercept was not 

supported by reasonable grounds to suspect criminal activity was 

supported by the record and free from legal error?

Appellant’s Brief at 2 (unnecessary capitalizations omitted). 

In reviewing appeals from an order denying suppression, our standard 

of review is limited to determining 

whether [the trial court’s] factual findings are supported by the 

record and whether [its] legal conclusions drawn from those facts 

are correct. When reviewing the rulings of a [trial] court, the 

appellate court considers only the evidence of the prosecution and 

so much of the evidence for the defense as remains 

uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as a whole. 

When the record supports the findings of the [trial] court, we are 

bound by those facts and may reverse only if the legal conclusions 

drawn therefrom are in error.

Commonwealth v. Griffin, 116 A.3d 1139, 1142 (Pa. Super. 2015). Our 

scope of review is limited to the evidence presented at the suppression 

hearing. In re interests of L.J., 79 A.3d 1073, 1088-89 (Pa. 2013). 

Appellant first argues that the trial court erred in denying his 

suppression motion because the evidence adduced at the suppression hearing 

established that the police failed to comply with the knock and announce rule

when they entered Room 229 before, or simultaneous to, announcing their 

identity and failed to announce their authority or purpose. Appellant’s Brief 

at 6-7. Additionally, Appellant claims that the Commonwealth failed to satisfy 
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any of the four exigent circumstances to justify the officers’ noncompliance 

with the knock and announce rule. Id. at 7. 

The Commonwealth seemingly concedes that the police officers failed to 

comply with the knock and announce rule,9 but invokes an exception to justify 

the officers’ noncompliance. Commonwealth’s Brief at 10. Particularly, the 

Commonwealth claims that the officers “were virtually certain that the 

occupants of the motel room already knew their purpose when the officers 

entered the room without knocking and announcing their purpose.” Id.

(emphasis in original). 

We explained the knock and announce rule in Commonwealth v. 

Frederick, 124 A.3d 748 (Pa. Super. 2015), appeal denied, 138 A.3d 2 (Pa. 

2016):

Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 207 codifies the “knock 

and announce” rule:

(A) A law enforcement officer executing a search 

warrant shall, before entry, give, or make reasonable 

effort to give, notice of the officer’s identity, authority, 

and purpose to any occupant of the premises specified 

in the warrant, unless exigent circumstances require 

the officer’s immediate forcible entry.[10]

(B) Such officer shall await a response for a 

reasonable period of time after this announcement of 

____________________________________________

9 Given the Commonwealth’s concession, we decline to address separately 

Appellant’s argument that the police officers’ failed to comply with Rule 207 

(knock and announce rule). 

10 Forcible entry is “any unannounced entry, regardless of the actual force 

used.” Commonwealth v. Duncan, 390 A.2d 820, 824 (Pa. Super. 1978) 

(citing Sabbath v. United States, 391 U.S. 585 (1968)).
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identity, authority, and purpose, unless exigent 

circumstances require the officer’s immediate forcible 

entry.

(C) If the officer is not admitted after such reasonable 

period, the officer may forcibly enter the premises and 

may use as much physical force to effect entry therein 

as is necessary to execute the search.

Pa.R.Crim.P. 207.[11] “Although this rule is frequently referred to 

as ‘knock and announce,’ the rule actually imposes no specific 

obligation to knock.” Commonwealth v. Walker, 874 A.2d 667, 

671 (Pa. Super. 2005) (quoting Commonwealth v. Doyen, 848 

A.2d 1007, 1012 (Pa. Super. 2004)). Nonetheless, the rule 

requires that police officers announce their identity, purpose and 

authority and then wait a reasonable amount of time for the 

occupants to respond prior to entering any private premises.[12]

Commonwealth v. Crompton, 682 A.2d 286, 288 (Pa. 1996). 

This requirement, however, will be relaxed only in the presence of 

exigent circumstances. Carlton, 701 A.2d at 148. Our Supreme 

Court has recognized only four exigent circumstances: 

____________________________________________

11 Rule 207 came about in 2000 as a result of the renumbering of Rule 2007, 

its predecessor. Rule 207 was amended, effective April 1, 2001. The 

amendments to Rule 207 were minor and did not substantially change the 

import of the rule. 

12 Discussing the genesis of the rule, our Supreme Court explained:

The “knock and announce” rule’s origins pre-date the United 

States Constitution. It was born in English Common Law and was 

subsequently adopted in America. In recent times, the “knock 

and announce” rule has assumed a Constitutional dimension. 

Both our Supreme Court and United States Supreme Court have 

held that the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against 

unreasonable searches and seizures applies to the manner of a 

warrant’s execution. Even a valid warrant may not be executed 

in an unreasonable manner; unreasonableness is determined on 

a case-by-case basis. 

Commonwealth v. Carlton, 701 A.2d 143, 147 (Pa. 1997) (citations and 

some quotations marks omitted). 
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1. the occupants remain silent after repeated 

knocking and announcing;

2. the police are virtually certain that the 

occupants of the premises already know their 

purpose;

3. the police have reason to believe that an 

announcement prior to entry would imperil their 

safety; [or13]

4. the police have reason to believe that evidence is 

about to be destroyed.

Commonwealth v. Chambers, 598 A.2d 539, 541 (Pa. 1991); 

accord Commonwealth v. Means, 614 A.2d 220, 222 (Pa. 

1992); Crompton, 682 A.2d at 288; Carlton, 701 A.2d at 147. 

[ . . .]. [To invoke an exception, police must possess only “a 

reasonable suspicion that one of these grounds is present.” 

Commonwealth v. Kane, 940 A.2d 483, 489 (Pa. Super. 2007), 

appeal denied, 951 A.2d 1161 (Pa. 2008) (emphasis added).]

“The purpose of the ‘knock and announce’ rule is to prevent 

violence and physical injury to the police and occupants, to protect 

an occupant’s privacy expectation against the unauthorized entry 

of unknown persons, and to prevent property damage resulting 

from forced entry.” Chambers, 598 A.2d at 541. The purpose of 

the rule may be achieved only through police officers’ full 

compliance. See id. Indeed, our Supreme Court has held that 

“in the absence of exigent circumstances, forcible entry without 

announcement of [identity, authority and] purpose violates Article 

I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, which proscribes 

unreasonable searches and seizures.” Carlton, 701 A.2d at 148 

(“In a free society, the mere presence of police does not require 

an individual to throw open the doors to his house and cower 

submissively before the uniformed authority of the state.”). Our 

____________________________________________

13 Even though the exigencies are enumerated with the conjunctive “and,” 

courts have held that “any one of the instances justifies noncompliance with 

the knock and announce rule.” Commonwealth v. Piner, 767 A.2d 1057, 

1059 n.1 (Pa. Super. 2000) (holding that the second exigency applied because 

“a uniformed officer stood under a porch light and engaged the attention of at 

least several occupants with an announcement of his identity, authority, and 

purpose”). 
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Supreme Court has determined that “the remedy for 

noncompliance with the knock and announce rule is always 

suppression.” Crompton, 682 A.2d at 290 (emphasis added). 

During a suppression hearing, the Commonwealth bears the 

burden of proving that the police seized evidence without violating 

defendant’s constitutional rights. Id. at 288. “The 

Commonwealth can satisfy its burden by establishing either that 

the police complied with the knock and announce rule or that the 

circumstances satisfied an exception.” Id. (emphasis added). 

Frederick, 124 A.3d at 754 (emphasis added). 

Instantly, based upon our review of the record, as detailed above, we 

agree with the Commonwealth. The trial court did not err in denying 

Appellant’s suppression motion because the Commonwealth established an 

exception to the knock and announce rule. Under the totality of the

circumstances of this case, the Commonwealth demonstrated that the officers

possessed reasonable suspicion to believe that knock and announce would be 

futile. The officers were virtually certain that Appellant (and Ms. McNeal)

already knew their purpose when he (or they) observed them outside of Room 

229.14 As the trial court found, the officers executed the search warrant 

shortly after the CI engaged in a controlled buy of heroin from Appellant, and 

Appellant obviously knew he was in possession of a large quantity of illegal 

drugs. When the officers were approaching Room 229, they encountered Mr. 

Bell who was exiting that room. The trial court found that the “officers were 

____________________________________________

14 The Commonwealth correctly points out that the second exigency to justify 

the noncompliance with the knock and announce rule requires that the police 

and not Appellant be virtually certain that Appellant already knew the purpose

of the police presence. 
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not given the chance to knock” because of Mr. Bell’s opening the door and 

exiting the room. Trial Court Opinion, 11/30/17, at 13. Thus, as Mr. Bell was 

exiting the room, the door to Room 229 was sufficiently ajar for Appellant to 

observe the officers,15 who were attired in tactical vests displaying the word 

“police”, squatting outside the room. Appellant further observed the officers 

detain Mr. Bell, announce their presence by shouting police, and enter the 

room. Again, given the circumstances of this case, we cannot disagree with 

the trial court’s conclusion that the officers were virtually certain that 

Appellant already knew of the officers’ purpose when he observed them 

outside of Room 229. Appellant does not obtain relief.16 

We now turn to Appellant’s second argument that the trial court erred 

in denying his suppression motion because the interception was not supported 

by reasonable grounds to suspect criminal activity.17 Appellant’s Brief at 23. 

Specifically, Appellant claims that the information provided by the CI to the 

detectives prior to the interception “was not supported by reasonable grounds 

____________________________________________

15 Similarly, the officers observed Appellant and Ms. McNeil near the bed area. 

16 In light of the disposition of this case, we need not address whether the 

officers entered Room 229 in good faith. We note, however, that the good 

faith exception to the exclusionary rule does not exist under the Pennsylvania 

Constitution. Frederick, 124 A.3d at 756. 

17 Appellant concedes that he does not question that all procedures set forth 

in the Wiretap Act were followed to obtain the wiretap. Appellant’s Brief at 

24-25. 
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to suspect criminal activity.”18 Id. at 25. Appellant claims that Detective 

Condrad did not receive an abundance of information from the CI. In support, 

Appellant points out that Detective Condrad did not know whether the CI had 

any illicit dealings with Appellant. Id. at 27. Appellant also notes that the CI 

neither claimed to have purchased narcotics from Appellant prior to meeting 

with the detectives, nor explained how he learned that Appellant was selling 

drugs from the Econo Lodge. Id. Moreover, Appellant argues that the 

detectives did not conduct any independent investigation into Appellant prior 

to seeking a consensual wiretap. Id. 

We previously have explained that the Wiretap Act

is a pervasive scheme of legislation which suspends an individual’s 

constitutional rights to privacy only for the limited purpose of 

permitting law enforcement officials, upon a showing of probable 

cause, to gather evidence necessary to bring about a criminal 

prosecution and conviction. The statute sets forth clearly and 

unambiguously by whom and under what circumstances these 

otherwise illegal practices and their derivative fruits may be used.

Commonwealth v. Glass, 200 A.3d 477, 483 (Pa. Super. 2018), appeal 

denied, 216 A.3d 226 (Pa. 2019). The Wiretap Act, however, provides an 

exception, which allows law enforcement to utilize wiretaps without obtaining 

prior judicial approval when one of the parties to the conversation provides 

consent. Id. 

____________________________________________

18 Appellant did not challenge the CI’s reliability before the trial court. Any 

argument now presented on this issue is waived. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) 

(“Issues not raised in the lower court are waived and cannot be raised for the 

first time on appeal.”).
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Section 5704, relating to exceptions to prohibition of interception and 

disclosure of communications, provides in relevant part:

It shall not be unlawful and no prior court approval shall be 

required under this chapter for:

 . . . .

(2) Any investigative or law enforcement officer or any 

person acting at the direction or request of an investigative 

or law enforcement officer to intercept a wire, electronic or 

oral communication involving suspected criminal activities, 

including, but not limited to, the crimes enumerated in 

section 5708 (relating to order authorizing interception of 

wire, electronic or oral communications), where:

 . . . .

(ii) one of the parties to the communication has given 

prior consent to such interception. However, no 

interception under this paragraph shall be made 

unless the Attorney General or a deputy attorney 

general designated in writing by the Attorney General, 

or the district attorney, or an assistant district 

attorney designated in writing by the district attorney, 

of the county wherein the interception is to be 

initiated, has reviewed the facts and is satisfied that 

the consent is voluntary and has given prior approval 

for the interception; however, such interception shall 

be subject to the recording and record keeping 

requirements of section 5714(a) (relating to recording 

of intercepted communications) and that the Attorney 

General, deputy attorney general, district attorney or 

assistant district attorney authorizing the interception 

shall be the custodian of recorded evidence obtained 

therefrom[.]

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5704(2)(ii). 

“In determining whether the approval of a consensual wiretap was 

proper, this Court has determined that police officers must articulate 
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‘reasonable grounds’ for the monitoring and the Attorney General or the 

district attorney must verify that that these reasonable grounds exist.” 

Commonwealth v. McMillan, 13 A.3d 521, 525 (Pa. Super. 2011), appeal 

denied, 27 A.3d 244 (Pa. 2011); see also Commonwealth v. Taylor, 622 

A.2d 329, 333 (Pa. Super. 1993) (explaining that reasonable grounds existed 

to support a consensual wiretap when, prior to the interception, the informant 

provided police with abundant information about his illegal dealings with the 

defendant and the assistant attorney general interviewed the informant to 

verify the existence of the reasonable grounds). 

Here, given the totality of the circumstances present in this case, we 

conclude that the trial court did not err in denying Appellant’s suppression 

motion based upon his argument that the interception was unsupported by 

reasonable grounds. Here, the detectives articulated reasonable grounds for 

monitoring. The CI approached the detectives with specific information about 

an individual selling heroin from his motel room. Specifically, the CI informed 

the detectives that a heavyset black male, in his 30s and approximately 6 feet 

and 2 inches tall, was selling heroin from Room 229 at the Econo Lodge. Not 

only did the CI provide the detectives with the individual’s phone number, but 

also shared with them his street alias, Bo. The detectives determined that Bo 

was Appellant’s alias, with whom they were familiar from prior investigations. 

The detectives then printed out a picture of Appellant from JNET and the CI 

positively identified him as Bo. Thus, based on these facts, and the officers’ 

prior knowledge of Appellant, they possessed reasonable grounds for 
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monitoring.19 Moreover, Deputy District Attorney Ossont confirmed these 

facts and consensualized the CI prior to intercepting and recording the CI’s 

communication with Appellant. Under these circumstances, Appellant is not 

entitled to relief. 

For the foregoing reasons, we cannot conclude that the trial court erred 

in denying Appellant’s omnibus pretrial suppression motion.

Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 05/14/2021

____________________________________________

19 To the extent Appellant appears to challenge the suppression court’s weight 

and credibility determinations, we reject such challenge. As an appellate 

court, we cannot upset the credibility determinations of the suppression court, 

“within whose sole province it is to pass on the credibility of witnesses and the

weight to be given their testimony.” Commonwealth v. Poplawski, 130 

A.3d 697, 711 (Pa. 2015).