Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-1931 | March 31, 2020 Page 1 of 35

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT FATHER

Cara Schaefer Wieneke

Wieneke Law Office, LLC

Brooklyn, Indiana

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT MOTHER

Amy Karozos

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Abigail R. Recker

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

In the Matter of the Termination 

of the Parent-Child Relationship 

of M.F. & P.F. (Children) and 

C.B. (Mother) & J.F. (Father);

C.B. (Mother) and J.F. (Father),

Appellants-Respondents,

v.

The Indiana Department of 

Child Services,

Appellee-Petitioners

March 31, 2020

Court of Appeals Case No.

19A-JT-1931

Appeal from the Vigo Circuit 

Court

The Honorable Sarah K. Mullican, 

Judge

The Honorable Daniel Kelly, 

Magistrate

Trial Court Cause No.

84C01-1903-JT-340

84C01-1903-JT-341

May, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-1931 | March 31, 2020 Page 2 of 35

[1] C.B. (“Mother”) and J.F. (“Father”) (collectively, “Parents”) appeal the 

involuntary termination of their parental rights to M.F. and P.F. (collectively, 

“Children”). We consider four issues raised by the parties:

1. Whether the Department of Child Services presented 

sufficient evidence to support some of the trial court’s 

findings; 

2. Whether the trial court’s findings support its conclusions that 

the conditions under which Children were removed from 

Parents’ care would not be remedied or the continuation of 

the parent-children relationships poses a threat to Children’s 

well-being;

3. Whether the involuntary termination of Father’s parental 

rights to Children was in Children’s best interests; and

4. Whether the trial court erred when it took judicial notice of 

the contents of the records in previous CHINS and 

termination of parental rights cases involving Children and 

their older siblings.

We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Parents are the biological parents of M.F. and P.F., born September 7, 2016, 

and September 29, 2017, respectively. Parents’ rights to their six other children, 

Je.F. Jr., Jay.F., Jar.F., C.F., Ky.F., and Ke.F. (collectively, “Older Siblings”) 

were involuntary terminated in prior proceedings. Parents have a lengthy 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-1931 | March 31, 2020 Page 3 of 35

history with the Department of Child Services (“DCS”) that stretches back to 

1999 and includes at least fourteen substantiations of neglect or abuse.

[3] In October 2015, Older Siblings were adjudicated as Children in Need of 

Services (CHINS) based on abuse and neglect in the home. Older Siblings 

remained in the home until they were placed in foster care on January 11, 2016, 

when Mother’s adult child, B.F., reported that one of the Older Siblings had 

“sustained suspicious injuries.” (DCS App. Vol. II at 19.) Older Siblings were 

returned to Parents for a trial home visit on January 26, 2017, where they 

joined M.F., who had recently been born. 

[4] On May 2, 2017, DCS received a report that Father had hit Older Sibling Ja.F.

and the child had a cut under his eye. On May 9, 2017, DCS received a report 

that Older Sibling C.F. had two black eyes and swelling on her face. On May 

12, 2017, DCS received a report that C.F. also had a boil on her buttocks that 

was determined to be MRSA and a handprint mark on top of it. Based thereon, 

on May 12, 2017, DCS removed Older Siblings and M.F. from the home based 

on physical abuse allegedly perpetrated by Father.

[5] On May 16, 2017, DCS filed a petition alleging M.F. was a CHINS based on 

the physical abuse of his siblings. On September 12, 2017, the trial court held a 

factfinding hearing and adjudicated M.F. as a CHINS based on the multiple 

incidents of physical abuse involving Older Siblings, Parents’ significant history 

with DCS, and Parents’ lack of participation in services in the CHINS case 

involving Older Siblings. On October 10, 2017, the trial court held a 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-1931 | March 31, 2020 Page 4 of 35

dispositional hearing regarding M.F. and on October 25, 2017, issued its 

dispositional order requiring Parents to engage in services including parenting 

assessments, random drug screens, psychological evaluations and counseling, 

domestic violence assessments, and visits with M.F.

[6] On September 29, 2017, P.F. was born. On October 2, 2017, P.F. was removed 

from Parents’ care based on the earlier incidents of abuse involving Older 

Siblings and the hospital staff’s report of a lack of interaction between Parents 

and P.F. DCS filed a petition alleging P.F. was a CHINS on October 3, 2017. 

The trial court held a factfinding hearing regarding P.F. on April 24, 2018, and 

adjudicated P.F. as a CHINS on April 28, 2018, based on the earlier incidents 

of abuse involving Older Siblings and Parents’ lack of participation in services 

in the CHINS cases involving Older Siblings. The trial court held a 

dispositional hearing on May 22, 2018, and entered its dispositional decree on 

June 1, 2018, which ordered Parents to participate in the same services ordered 

in the dispositional decree concerning M.F., as well as meeting with medical 

and psychiatric personnel and taking all medications as prescribed.1

[7] Parents completed psychological evaluations, but neither followed through with 

the recommended treatment. Mother was diagnosed with major depressive 

disorder and mild intellectual disability. Father was diagnosed with adjustment 

1 On August 8, 2018, the trial court terminated Parents’ parental rights to Older Siblings. Parents appealed, 

and we affirmed on May 15, 2019. B.F. v. Ind. Dept. of Child Servs., 18A-JT-1967, 2019 WL 1217791 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2019), trans. denied.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-1931 | March 31, 2020 Page 5 of 35

disorder, ADHD, and social anxiety disorder. Home-based counseling and 

supervised visitation were provided by the same service provider who had 

interacted with Parents in the Older Siblings CHINS proceedings. Parents had 

weekly supervised visits with Children and were provided extended visits with 

P.F. due to her young age. Parents asked that the extended visits with P.F. be 

reduced because the extra time with P.F. was “entirely too long.” (TPR2 Tr. 

Vol. II at 13.)

[8] Parents did not progress past supervised visits with Children. Parents were 

offered the opportunity for unsupervised visits contingent on Father’s increased 

engagement and interaction with Children, but Father refused to engage with 

Children, especially P.F. Mother interacted well with the Children, but her 

progress with parenting skills was not consistent. Parents attended most visits, 

however, starting in November 2018, Mother missed nineteen visits and Father 

missed seventeen visits. Children’s foster mother reported that P.F. would get 

“really anxious” after visits with Parents. (Id. at 73.) Foster mother also 

reported that M.F. would always need “more prompting” to engage in potty 

training following visits with Parents. (Id.)

[9] Parents’ involvement in case management was “sparse.” (Id. at 35.) Parents 

attended only one case management meeting after August 2018, when their 

parental rights to Older Siblings were terminated. Parents refused further case 

2

 The Court Reporter filed two transcripts, one for the initial hearing in this case (“Initial Hearing Tr.”) and 

one for the factfinding hearing in this case (“TPR Tr.”).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-1931 | March 31, 2020 Page 6 of 35

management meetings and told the service provider “they felt like they didn’t 

need any further help[.]” (Id.) The service provider attempted to provide the 

case management during visitation.

[10] From September 2018 to January 2019, Parents attended therapy to help them 

process the grief associated with losing their parental rights to Older Siblings 

and to assist with other coping skills. Parents attended eleven out of fifteen 

sessions. The therapist reported that Parents’ “[p]rogress was very limited . . . 

[and] they did not really learn a lot of new coping skills but they did a lot of 

venting of frustrations.” (Id. at 39.) The therapist testified that “most of the 

sessions focused on [Parents’] complaints about providers, DCS, the case in 

general and not a lot of focus on what they could do different. [sic] How they 

could make some changes.” (Id. at 41.) Therapy was terminated in January 

2019 because Parents “did not feel they needed therapy at the time” but DCS 

left the referral open “if they felt they wanted to pursue it later[.]” (Id. at 42.)

[11] The DCS Family Case Manager held regular team meetings. Father stopped 

attending team meetings in November 2018. Mother told the Family Case 

Manager that 

she was not real interested in the two little ones because she did 

not really know them that well and that really she wanted the 

bigger kids and not the little ones because she was around them 

more and had made some reference to that they were, the 

children in general, were, were like puppies and if she couldn’t 

have one of them she didn’t want any of them.
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(Id. at 14.) On March 19, 2019, DCS filed petitions for the involuntary 

termination of Parents’ parental rights to Children. The trial court held a 

factfinding hearing on the petitions on July 15, 2019, and issued an order 

terminating Parents’ parental rights to Children on July 22, 2019.

Discussion and Decision

[12] We review termination of parental rights with great deference. In re K.S., 750 

N.E.2d 832, 836 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). We will not reweigh evidence or judge 

the credibility of witnesses. In re D.D., 804 N.E.2d 258, 265 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2004), trans. denied. Instead, we consider only the evidence and reasonable 

inferences most favorable to the judgment. Id. In deference to the juvenile 

court’s unique position to assess the evidence, we will set aside a judgment 

terminating a parent-child relationship only if it is clearly erroneous. In re L.S., 

717 N.E.2d 204, 208 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied, cert. denied 534 U.S. 

1161 (2002).

[13] “The traditional right of parents to establish a home and raise their children is 

protected by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.” In 

re M.B., 666 N.E.2d 73, 76 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996), trans. denied. A juvenile court 

must subordinate the interests of the parents to those of the child, however, 

when evaluating the circumstances surrounding a termination. In re K.S., 750 

N.E.2d at 837. The right to raise one’s own child should not be terminated 

solely because there is a better home available for the child, id., but parental 
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rights may be terminated when a parent is unable or unwilling to meet his or 

her parental responsibilities. Id. at 836. 

[14] To terminate a parent-child relationship in Indiana, DCS must allege and 

prove:

(A) that one (1) of the following is true:

(i) The child has been removed from the parent for at 

least six (6) months under a dispositional decree.

(ii) A court has entered a finding under IC 31-34-21-5.6 

that reasonable efforts for family preservation or 

reunification are not required, including a 

description of the court’s finding, the date of the 

finding, and the manner in which the finding was 

made.

(iii) The child has been removed from the parent and 

has been under the supervision of a county office of 

family and children or probation department for at 

least fifteen (15) months of the most recent twentytwo (22) months, beginning with the date the child 

is removed from the home as a result of the child 

being alleged to be a child in need of services or a 

delinquent child;

(B) that one (1) of the following is true:

(i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions 

that resulted in the child’s removal or the reasons 

for placement outside the home of the parents will 

not be remedied.

(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the 

continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a 

threat to the well-being of the child.

(iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been 

adjudicated a child in need of services; 

(C) that termination is in the best interests of the child; and

(D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment 

of the child.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-1931 | March 31, 2020 Page 9 of 35

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2). DCS must provide clear and convincing proof of 

these allegations. In re G.Y., 904 N.E.2d 1257, 1260-61 (Ind. 2009), reh’g denied. 

“[I]f the State fails to prove any one of these statutory elements, then it is not 

entitled to a judgment terminating parental rights.” Id. at 1261. Because 

parents have a constitutionally protected right to establish a home and raise 

their children, the State “must strictly comply with the statute terminating 

parental rights.” Platz v. Elkhart Cty. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 631 N.E.2d 16, 18 

(Ind. Ct. App. 1994).

1. Challenged Findings

[15] When, as here, a judgment contains specific findings of fact and conclusions 

thereon, we apply a two-tiered standard of review. Bester v. Lake Cty. Office of 

Family & Children, 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005). We determine whether the 

evidence supports the findings and whether the findings support the judgment. 

Id. “Findings are clearly erroneous only when the record contains no facts to 

support them either directly or by inference.” Quillen v. Quillen, 671 N.E.2d 98, 

102 (Ind. 1996). If the evidence and inferences support the juvenile court’s 

decision, we must affirm. In re L.S., 717 N.E.2d at 208.

a. Finding 2(f)(1) and 2(f)(21) Regarding Money Spent on Reunification

[16] Parents challenge Finding 2(f)(1), which states, in part: “To-date, DCS has 

spent over Four Hundred Thousand Dollars ($400,000) in reunification 

services.” (Appellants’ Joint App. Vol. II at 65.) Mother also challenges a 

portion of Finding 2(f)(21), which relatedly states in part: “At the termination 
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hearing, the DCS attorney asked the current FCM about the extensive services 

that have been provided to this family, totaling in excess of Four Hundred 

Thousand Dollars ($400,000.00).” (Id. at 73.) Parents argue the findings 

referencing the amount allegedly spent to reunify the family is clearly 

erroneous, as it seems to “fault [P]arents for the amount of money spent by the 

[S]tate on a family when an affluent family would not be facing the same 

consequence.” (Mother’s Br. at 21.)

[17] In In re Br.L.P., 91 N.E.3d 625 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), our court spoke 

unfavorably of DCS’s assertion that a father, who was on probation and 

attempting to secure stable employment in Georgia, should easily be able to 

afford a plane ticket from Georgia to Indiana to participate in visitation with his 

child. Id. at 632. In that case, the father “ha[d] done everything within his 

power to remedy the mistakes of the past and forge a bond with [his child].” Id. 

at 633. Based on that and other factors, our court reversed the termination of 

father’s parental rights to his child. Id. at 634.

[18] While we agree that, like in In re Br.L.P., the trial court’s statement regarding 

the amount of money DCS has spent on reunification of this family is in poor 

taste and is not relevant to the factors for the involuntary termination of 

parental rights, the finding does not necessitate reversal in this case. Here, 

unlike in In re Br.L.P., Parents have made very little progress in services and 

have done virtually nothing to remedy the situation that precipitated Children’s 

removal. Thus, we conclude the finding was superfluous, and, again, while 

malapropos, not a reason for reversal. See Lasater v. Lasater, 809 N.E.2d 380, 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-1931 | March 31, 2020 Page 11 of 35

397 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (“To the extent that the judgment is based on 

erroneous findings, those findings are superfluous and are not fatal to the 

judgment if the remaining valid findings and conclusions support the 

judgment.”).

b. Finding 2(f)(6)

[19] Parents challenge a portion of Finding 2(f)(6), which states: “The CHINS case 

on [M.F.] was dismissed on March 3, 2017[.]” (Appellants’ Joint App. Vol. II 

at 71.) Parents argue the record is devoid of any information regarding a 

CHINS case involving M.F. prior to the CHINS adjudication which ultimately 

led to the termination proceedings we review here. The State agreed. 

However, this error is not a reason for reversal, because Parents do not 

challenge the rest of the finding, which outlines the events which led up to 

M.F.’s adjudication as a CHINS in this proceeding. Thus, the erroneous 

portion of this finding which states, “CHINS case on [M.F.] was dismissed on 

March 3, 2017” is superfluous and not reason for reversal. See S.M. v. Elkhart 

Cty. Ofc. of Family & Children, 706 N.E.2d 596, 598 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (“When 

a trial judge makes an erroneous fact finding that is superfluous to the 

judgement the error does not warrant reversal.”).

c. Finding 2(f)(9)

[20] Mother challenges Finding 2(f)(9), which states:

Father generally came to supervised visits and case management 

sessions, which Mother missed a number of both, citing 
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employment conflicts, though DCS worked around Mother’s 

schedule whenever she informed them of it. Between July 3, 

2018 and the end of November of that year, Mother worked at 

least six different jobs, requiring DCS to constantly change visit 

times and disrupt the [C]hildren’s schedules.

(Appellants’ Joint App. Vol. II at 72.) Mother argues the evidence presented 

does not support this finding because she claims the evidence “showed that 

DCS worked about Mother’s schedule only minimally.” (Mother’s Br. at 25.) 

[21] However, Family Case Manager William Welch testified at the factfinding 

hearing:

[Welch]: . . . There were, she did miss more visits due to the 

fact that she had claimed she was frequently working. There 

were frequent job changes. So, there were a lot of times when 

she was unable or would not be able to attend. That went along 

with the case management. Typically, if [Mother] couldn’t 

attend case management or therapy, [Father] would not attend 

those sessions either. So, there was [sic] a lot more misses for 

[Mother].

[State]: Did the department try to accommodate her work 

schedule?

[Welch]: They did. The visitations [sic] schedules were 

changed a couple of different times to the point that eventually it 

got to where it was just not productive to continue to change the 

routine for the [C]hildren because of the constant job changes. I 

believe during my extent [sic] on the case there were five different 

jobs. Correction, six different jobs that [Mother] had been 

involved with from July 3rd through the end of November.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-1931 | March 31, 2020 Page 13 of 35

(TPR Tr. Vol. II at 11-12.) Mother’s argument is an invitation for us to 

reweigh the evidence and judge the credibility of witnesses, which we cannot 

do. See In re D.D., 804 N.E.2d at 265 (appellate court cannot reweigh evidence 

or judge the credibility of witnesses).

2. Reasonable Probability Conditions Not Remedied

[22] The juvenile court must judge parents’ fitness to care for their children at the 

time of the termination hearing. In re A.B., 924 N.E.2d 666, 670 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2010). Evidence of a parent’s pattern of unwillingness or lack of commitment 

to address parenting issues and to cooperate with services “demonstrates the 

requisite reasonable probability” that the conditions will not change. Lang v. 

Starke Cty. OFC, 861 N.E.2d 366, 372 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied. 

[23] The trial court made several unchallenged findings regarding Parents’ lack of 

progress to remedy the conditions under which Children were removed from 

their care, including:

f. There is a reasonable probability that the conditions which 

resulted in the removal of the [C]hildren from their [P]arents will 

not be remedied . . .

1. The family has a lengthy history of substantiations, 

including more than twenty separate substantiations, and a 

number of prior involuntary terminations. . . . 

Unfortunately, the evidence indicates that the 

circumstances that prevent reunification have only been 

marginally ameliorated and that the [P]arents are still 

unable to provide a safe home and to meet their 

[C]hildren’s basic needs.
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2. The prior substantiations and issues included physical 

abuse of [Older Siblings], sexual molestation by a parent of 

[Mother’s] other children, medical neglect, lack of verbal 

stimulation by [Father], resulting in the [C]hildren failing 

to develop speech skills, poor hygiene, lack of supervision, 

domestic violence in front of the [C]children, lack of 

intellectual capacity to parent, and on and on.

* * * * *

6. . . . DCS quickly received the following succession of 

reports of physical abuse:

• On May 2, 2017, DCS received a report alleged that 

[Ja.F.], age six, was a victim of physical abuse, with 

the perpetrator being [Father]. [Ja.F.] had a cut 

under his eye.

• On May 9, 2017, DCS received a report alleging 

that [C.F.], age 5, was the victim of physical abuse. 

She reportedly had two black eyes and swelling on 

her face which was confirmed by DCS.

• On May 12, 207 [sic], DCS received a report 

alleging that [C.F], age five, was the victim of 

physical abuse. The child had a boil on her buttocks 

that appeared to have a handprint mark on top of it.

At this time, all of the children who were in the home were 

removed, including [M.F.], and new CHINS proceedings 

were initiated. While those cases were pending with all 

children removed from the home, [P.F.] was born on 

September 29, 2017. DCS received a report on October 1, 

2017, alleging [P.F.] to be a victim of neglect. There were 
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nine other children that had been removed due to concerns 

of domestic violence, medical neglect of the children and 

physical abuse. The report stated that the older children 

had special needs which were being neglected by the 

parents.

7. The [Family Case Manager, herein after “FCM”] went 

to the hospital to investigate this report. She observed that 

the baby, [P.F.], was in the crib in the hospital room and 

that neither parent interacted with her while the FCM was 

present, even when the baby began to make noises and 

move around in the crib.

8. Father initially showed up for most court-ordered 

services, but was not usually engaged in the services. He 

stopped attending team meetings. The parties have had 

numerous ups and downs in their relationship, including a 

series of break-ups and reconciliations. DCS instituted 

couples therapy, but those typically degenerated into the 

parties venting about the termination proceedings that 

were filed, and eventually granted, with regard to [Older 

Siblings].

* * * * *

10. Father would rarely speak or engage with the 

[C]hildren. He would occasionally interact minimally 

with [M.F.], while ignoring [P.F.] altogether.

11. A team meeting was held on July 30, 2018, with 

regard to [Children]. Despite termination proceedings 

involving [Older Siblings], [P]arents were insistent upon 

decreasing visits with [P.F.] from 3 1⁄2 hours to 2 hours 

each. The FCM noted that the [P]arents seemed less 

invested in these [C]hildren than the ones for whom 
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termination was granted. When DCS met with Mother 

about a goodbye visit with [Older Siblings], she mentioned 

that she wasn’t really interested in the two little children -

[Children], because she didn’t know them as well. She 

remarked that if she could not have all of her children, she 

didn’t want any of them.

12. Mother advised DCS that she was unable to keep the 

visits scheduled for Friday because of a lack of 

transportation. The FCM pointed out that they had given 

her bus passes and the visits only required a walk of two 

blocks.

13. When Father visited [Children] in supervised visits, 

the supervisors typically described the visits as 

“destructive/limited,” with no affection or verbal 

interaction displayed.

14. During the time that DCS was providing reunification 

services for [Children], [P]arents frequently commented 

that they did not need services and that the services were 

“worthless.”

* * * * *

16. The evidence indicated that if the [C]hildren were 

returned to their [P]arents’ home, they would likely be 

exposed to the dangers of physical abuse, neglect, ongoing 

domestic violence, and [P]arents with mental and 

psychological issues that prevent them from meeting their 

basic needs.

17. A service provider has been providing home-based 

case management to teach parenting skills, childhood 
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development, bonding, discipline, budgeting and 

organization. She also supervises visits. Although there 

was some progress noted by Mother, there was no progress 

with [Father], who would generally not even speak to the 

[C]hildren when prompted. [Mother] would show some 

progress in areas that were being addressed in case 

management sessions, but would rarely carry out those 

skills beyond the next couple of visits before regressing 

again. She struggled with consistency in discipline and 

redirection and in implementing basic parenting skills. 

The case manager would try to convey lessons in a variety 

of ways, including by writing down instructions, 

discussing them, drawing pictures and modeling.

18. Therapy was set up for the [P]arents to learn coping 

skills and to deal with the grief of the termination of their 

rights to [Older Siblings]. The [P]arents only attended 

about 75% of their therapy sessions, which were closed out 

when the [P]arents told the therapist they didn’t need 

therapy. The therapist testified that she made “very 

minimal, if any progress” in getting the [P]arents to focus 

on [Children] rather than obsessing on the ones for which 

termination had already been granted.

19. A case manager from Raintree Consulting took over 

supervision of visits beginning in November 2018. During 

those twice per week visits, Mother missed 19 visits. She 

interacted with the [C]hildren reasonably well during the 

visits she attended. Father was observed interacting 

slightly with [M.F.], while ignoring [P.F.], refusing to even 

greet her at the beginning and end of visits. This 

consultant saw no improvement in parenting skills during 

her time on the case.

20. A family team meeting was held on January 14, 2019, 

at which the [P]arents informed DCS that they saw no 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-1931 | March 31, 2020 Page 18 of 35

need to engage in services, and since that time have 

engaged in no services other than supervised visits.

21. At the termination hearing, the DCS attorney asked 

the current FCM about the extensive services that have 

been provided to this family . . . . Despite the 

Department’s diligent efforts to afford reunification 

services following involuntary terminations, each of the 

“CHINS circumstance” set forth in the court’s order of 

October 5, 2017, finding the [C]hildren to be CHINS were 

still present, nearly two years later, including the 

following:

a. Mother and Father have participated in, but not 

engaged or implemented the skills learned in these 

services.

b. Mother and Father display a lack of parenting 

skills that is accentuated by Father’s lack of 

engagement.

c. This lack of parenting skills creates safety and 

behavioral concerns in the [C]hildren, and 

specifically, [contributes] to the developmental 

issues.

d. The [Children’s] physical and mental condition 

is impaired by Mother and Father failing to supply 

adequate supervision stemming from overall 

neglect.

(Appellants’ Joint App. Vol. II at 65-74.) Parents do not challenge these 

findings, and thus they stand proven. See Madlem v. Arko, 592 N.E.2d 686, 687 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-1931 | March 31, 2020 Page 19 of 35

(Ind. 1992) (“Because Madlem does not challenge the findings of the trial court, 

they must be accepted as correct.”). 

[24] Mother argues simply that the trial court’s findings do not support its 

conclusion that the conditions under which Children were removed from her 

care would not be remedied. As indicated in the unchallenged findings supra, 

there is an overwhelming amount of evidence that Mother did not engage in 

services; when she did engage in services, she did not implement any of the 

skills taught; and eventually declined services. Mother would not address 

Father’s treatment of Children and the couple did not progress in couples’ 

therapy. Thus, we conclude that the trial court’s unchallenged findings support 

its conclusion that the conditions under which Children were removed from 

Parents’ care would not be remedied. See Lang, 861 N.E.2d at 373 (affirming 

termination of father’s parental rights to his children based on father’s lack of 

cooperation in services ordered to address his unreasonable corporal 

punishment of children).

[25] Father argues DCS did not present evidence regarding his ability to parent at 

the time of the termination hearing, however, there are a plethora of findings 

that illustrate the Father’s pattern of behavior and unwillingness to properly 

parent Children or engage in services to assist him in doing so. Father contends 

that, had he been given an opportunity to parent Children, he would have done 

so appropriately. There is no evidence to support his statement, and the “trial 

court need not wait until a child is irreversibly harmed such that his physical, 

mental, and social development is permanently impaired before terminating the 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-1931 | March 31, 2020 Page 20 of 35

parent-child relationship.” McBride v. Monroe Cty. Ofc. of Family & Children, 798 

NE.2d 185, 199 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003).3

3. Children’s Best Interests 

[26] In determining what is in Children’s best interests, a trial court is required to 

look beyond the factors identified by DCS and consider the totality of the 

evidence. In re A.K., 924 N.E.2d 212, 223 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. dismissed. 

A parent’s historical inability to provide a suitable environment, along with the 

parent’s current inability to do so, supports finding termination of parental 

rights is in the best interests of the child. In re A.L.H., 774 N.E.2d 896, 900 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2002). The recommendations of a DCS case manager and courtappointed advocate to terminate parental rights, in addition to evidence that 

conditions resulting in removal will not be remedied, are sufficient to show by 

clear and convincing evidence that termination is in Children’s best interests. In 

re J.S., 906 N.E.2d 226, 236 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). 

[27] Mother does not make an argument regarding Children’s best interests. Father 

argues termination of his parental rights is not in Children’s best interests 

3 Parents also allege the trial court’s findings do not support its conclusion that the continuation of the parentchildren relationships posed a threat to Children’s well-being. Because we hold the trial court’s findings 

supported its conclusion that the conditions under which Children were removed from Parents’ care would 

not be remedied, we need not consider Parents’ argument regarding whether the continuation of the parentchildren relationships poses a risk to the Children’s well-being. See In re L.S., 717 N.E.2d 204, 209 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 1999) (because Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B) is written in the disjunctive, the court need find 

only one requirement to terminate parental rights), reh’g denied, trans. denied, cert. denied 534 U.S. 1161 (2002). 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-1931 | March 31, 2020 Page 21 of 35

because the limitations in DCS services did not give him an opportunity to 

properly bond with his Children, specifically because “Father was only 

permitted to visit with P.F. twice per week in a small office while being 

supervised. The conditions were less than ideal to establish a bond.” (Father’s 

Br. at 24.) However, any deficiencies in services as part of the CHINS 

proceedings is not a basis to attack a termination order. In re J.W., Jr., 27 

N.E.3d 1185, 1190 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied. Furthermore, when the 

findings indicate Father did not even acknowledge P.F.’s existence when 

provided with an opportunity to establish a bond with her, we find his 

argument about needing additional opportunities to be disingenuous. 

[28] The FCM testified she believed that placement with Children’s foster parents 

should continue and answered in the affirmative when asked if Parents’ 

parental rights should be terminated. In a report from February 21, 2019, the 

CASA stated that “[i]t would be in the [C]hildren’s best interest[s] for the DCS 

to start the termination of parental rights process.” (Ex. Vol. I at 218.) These 

statements and the findings discussed in this opinion support the trial court’s 

conclusion that termination of Father’s parental rights would be in Children’s 

best interest. See In re T.F., 743 N.E.2d 766, 776 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) 

(testimony of guardian ad litem and caseworker sufficient to support trial 

court’s findings and conclusion that termination was in child’s best interests), 

trans. denied.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-1931 | March 31, 2020 Page 22 of 35

4. Due Process – Judicial Notice

[29] In a termination of parental rights proceeding, parents have certain due process 

rights:

When a State seeks to terminate the parent-child relationship, it 

must do so in a manner that meets the requirements of the due 

process clause. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 102 S. Ct. 1388, 

71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982). Although due process has never been 

precisely defined, the phrase embodies a requirement of 

“fundamental fairness.” E.P. v. Marion County Office of Family & 

Children, 653 N.E.2d 1026, 1031 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (quoting 

Lassiter v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 26, 101 S. Ct. 2153, 

68 L.Ed.2d 640 (1981).

J.T. v. Marion Cty. Office of Family & Children, 740 N.E.2d 1261, 1264 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2000), reh’g denied, trans. denied, abrogated on other grounds by Baker v. Marion 

Cty. Office of Family & Children, 810 N.E.2d 1035, 1041 (Ind. 2004) (abrogation 

based on underperformance of counsel). Parents argue the trial court violated 

their due process rights by taking judicial notice of the contents of the records in 

CHINS and termination cases involving Older Siblings.

a. Standard of Review

[30] We review the trial court’s decision to take judicial notice of information for an 

abuse of discretion. Horton v. State, 51 N.E.3d 1154, 1157 (Ind. 2016). The 

conditions under which a trial court can take judicial notice is governed by 

Indiana Evidence Rule 201 which states, in relevant part:

(a) Kinds of Facts That May Be Judicially Noticed. The court 

may judicially notice:
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-1931 | March 31, 2020 Page 23 of 35

(1) a fact that:

(A) is not subject to reasonable dispute because it is 

generally known within the trial court’s territorial 

jurisdiction, or

(B) can be accurately and readily determined from 

sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be 

questioned.

(2) the existence of:

(A) published regulations of governmental agencies;

(B) ordinances of municipalities; or

(C) records of a court of this state.

* * * * *

(c) Taking Notice. The court:

(1) may take judicial notice on its own; or

(2) must take judicial notice if a party requests it and the 

court is supplied with the necessary information.

(d) Timing. The court may take judicial notice at any stage of 

the proceeding.

(emphasis in original).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-1931 | March 31, 2020 Page 24 of 35

[31] “For years, [Evidence] Rule 201 did not permit a trial court to take judicial 

notice of court records, even if they were ‘its own records in another case 

previously before the court on a related subject with related parties.’” Horton, 

51 N.E.3d at 1157 (quoting Gray v. State, 871 N.E.2d 408, 413 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2007), trans. denied.) However, in 2010, our Indiana Supreme Court amended 

Indiana Evidence Rule 201 to the version active during the time period relevant 

to this case, which permits courts to take judicial notice of the records of a court 

of this state. Id. at 1160. Parents do not dispute that the trial court could take 

judicial notice of the existence of records in the involuntary termination of 

parental rights cases involving Older Siblings; instead, Parents argue the trial 

court was not permitted to take judicial notice of the facts in those records.

b. Findings from Prior CHINS and Termination Adjudications

[32] During the termination fact-finding hearing, the State asked the trial court to 

take judicial notice of the CHINS and termination orders involving Older 

Siblings. Parents did not object to the court taking judicial notice of these 

items. These challenged findings encompass Finding 2(f)(3):

3. The court was asked in these proceedings to take judicial 

notice of the CHINS and TPR cases of the [P]arents’ older 

children.

Among the findings in those prior involuntary terminations were 

the following:

a. Mother’s intellectual functioning is very low . . . 

Mother’s longtime boyfriend ([Father]) and father of the 
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younger children . . . has evidently established a pattern of 

extremely inadequate verbal communication, both with 

Mother, the children, service providers and the world. 

This results in far too little verbal stimulation by the 

numerous children’s primary caregiver, who generally 

cares for all of the kids when Mother works to support the 

family. In addition, the evidence unmistakably points to 

[Father] having serious and persistent anger control issues. 

[Mother’s] adult daughter testified credibly that all of the 

children were subjected to physical abuse by [Father] and 

that physical abuse of the children and domestic violence 

occurred in the home on a virtually daily basis over a 

period of years.

[TPR order of 8-7-2018 in Cause No. 84C01-1710-JT1441].

b. Further complicating the anger control, physical abuse 

and domestic violence problems is the fact that, even after 

working with service providers inside the home and out for 

three years, Mother, [Father], [and] [Father’s] 

grandmother all remain in complete denial about these 

obvious and serious issues, rendering a remediation of 

those problems all but impossible.

[TPR order of 8-7-2018 in Cause No. 84C01-1710-JT1441].

c. Finally, the condition of all of the children before 

removal compared to their present levels of functioning 

presents an almost unbelievable contrast.

[TPR order of 8-7-2018 in Cause No. 84C01-1710-JT1441].

d. Despite a number of services being in place following 

the dispositional order, the Department continued to 

receive a number of reports of physical abuse and domestic 

violence in the home. In one such report, [Je.F. Jr.] was 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-1931 | March 31, 2020 Page 26 of 35

observed to have a large “goose egg” bump on his head. 

While Mother claimed that the injury occurred when 

[Je.F. Jr.] and a brother were “roughhousing,” the other 

children reported to DCS that they saw [Father] throw 

[Je.F. Jr.] into a dresser.

[TPR order of 8-8-2018 in Cause Nos. 84C01-1710-JT1442 through 1447].

e. On May 12, 2017, all children were again removed 

when new reports were received. [C.F.], who previously 

had a suspicious black eye that was already being 

investigated, now had marks on her buttocks consistent 

with physical abuse. At this time, the children disclosed 

that [Father] beats the younger children “because they will 

not listen.”

[TPR order of 8-8-2017 in Cause Nos. 84C01-1710-JT1442 through 1447].

f. Throughout the life of the Child In Need of Services 

proceedings, there has been a pattern whereby Mother 

engages in services and is largely compliant, but fails to 

implement that which she has been taught through 

services. Through testing that was done as part of a 

psychological evaluation, DCS determined that Mother’s 

intellectual functioning is extremely limited. Her IQ score 

of 63 on the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale, Fourth 

Edition (WAIS-IV) places [Mother] in the “extremely low 

range” of intellectual functioning for her age. Psychologist 

Dr. Leah Powell found these results to be an accurate 

reflection of Mother’s current level of cognitive 

functioning. Dr. Powell also found that Mother appeared 

to be sad most of the time. She reported feeling generally 

unlucky. She also felt a need to “protect” her children, 

rather than allowing them the independence necessary to 

become autonomous.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-1931 | March 31, 2020 Page 27 of 35

[TPR order of 8-8-2018 in Cause Nos. 84C01-1710-JT1442 through 1447].

g. When DCS became involved with the family in 2015, 

all of the children six years old and under were still in 

diapers and were non-verbal. The court concludes from 

the evidence that the children’s inability to speak was the 

result of a combination of untreated hearing loss, cognitive 

impairment and lack of verbal and intellectual stimulation 

in the home. When Mother worked outside of the home, 

[Father] was a primary caregiver for all of the children. 

He was described by virtually every witness who interacted 

with him as extremely quiet and frequently sullen. Poor 

anger management also appears to be a strong aspect of his 

personality, as he would frequently abuse Mother and 

various children in the home. Whether it was due to 

Mother’s own limited intellectual functioning, a 

consequence of being a victim of abuse, her dependence 

upon his help with the children or a combination of these 

factors, Mother refused to leave [Father], and by the time 

of the termination hearing was denying that he was 

abusive to her or the children, claiming that DCS put the 

notion of abuse in the children’s heads. Therefore, in 

addition to concerns about her cognitive functioning 

making it difficult to parent a large number of children in 

the home and to deal effectively with the children’s 

numerous medical and educational needs, the evidence 

indicates that Mother cannot keep the children safe from 

physical abuse and domestic violence.

[TPR order of 8-8-2018 in Cause Nos. 84D01-1710-JT1442 through 1447].

h. Despite the continuing threat that [Father’s] presence in 

the home posed to all of the children, [Father] was 

generally non-communicative, non-participatory in 

services, and quick to angry outbursts. [Father] refused to 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-1931 | March 31, 2020 Page 28 of 35

talk to DCS case managers, telling at least one of them 

that they needed to communicate to him through 

[Mother]. In family team meetings, both parents would 

often get so angry that DCS was unable to conduct the 

meeting.

[TPR order of 8-8-2018 in Cause Nos. 84C01-1710-[JT]-

1442 through 1447].

11. [sic4

] Mother would often show up to supervised visits 

crying, having been in a fight with [Father]. Their poor 

relationship, characterized by frequent arguing and 

physical altercations, remained a significant obstacle to 

reunification throughout the duration of the case. When 

the kids were home on a trial home visit, the children saw 

[Father] grab Mother by the shirt and throw her against a 

wall. [Mother] rationalized [Father’s] abuse, saying that 

he hits her because she doesn’t give him enough breaks 

with the kids and he takes his frustration out on her.

[TPR order of 8-8-2018 in Cause Nos. 84C01-1710-JT1442 through 1447].

12. [sic] Although service providers pushed [Father] to 

obtain a driver’s license so that he could help [Mother] 

transport the children to their many doctor and therapy 

appointments, he has still never obtained a driver’s license. 

His intellectual functioning is in the low-average range. 

Although he would feed the children and change their 

diapers during supervised visits, he rarely displayed 

affection toward the children.

4 It seems there was a numbering error within these findings, as there exists a Finding 11 and 12 in the midst 

of lettered findings.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-1931 | March 31, 2020 Page 29 of 35

[TPR order of 8-8-2018 in Cause Nos. 84C01-1710-JT1442 through 1447].

i. Eighteen-year-old [As.F.] credibly testified to daily 

abuse of the children by her stepfather [Father]. She also 

frequently saw him abuse her mother. When the children 

were in the care of [Father], they would sometimes miss 

meals and she generally felt unsafe. She strongly believes 

that parental rights should be terminated.

[TPR order of 8-8-2018 in Cause Nos. 84C01-1710-JT1442 through 1447].

j. As a consequence of their educational and medical 

needs, all of the children at issue require more care than 

typical children, but due to parents’ limitations and the 

sheer number of children involved, as well as 

transportation issues, the parents simply cannot meet those 

needs for the children. During a trial home visits [of the 

older children], regression in a number of areas was noted 

for the children, after progress had been made in foster 

care. The children gradually became more out-of-control. 

[A service provider] had to frequently prompt [Father] to 

intervene in the children’s fighting. During one supervised 

visit, some of the children ran outside in the parking lot in 

the rain. At the present time, [Mother] and [Father] are 

still just receiving visits of one hour, once a week. When 

the visits have been extended beyond that, the parents 

became overwhelmed. The pattern of progress upon their 

subsequent removal to the present time has been clearly 

established, similarly to that which occurred from initial 

removal to the failed trial home visit.

[TPR order of 8-8-2018 in Cause Nos. 84C01-1710-JT1442 through 1447].

k. After extensive services for nearly three years, the inhome caseworker from Raintree Consulting, who worked 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-1931 | March 31, 2020 Page 30 of 35

on parenting, tutoring, supervised visitation, home 

organization and linked the family to resources, felt that 

no progress had been made with [Mother] and [Father]. 

She testified that the children made progress following 

removal on their ability to speak, using the bathroom, etc.

[TPR order of 8-8-2018 in Cause Nos. 84C01-1710-JT1442 through 1447].

(Appellants’ Joint App. Vol. II at 65-70) (footnote added). Parents argue the 

trial court abused its discretion when it took judicial notice of the findings from 

the orders in the termination cases involving Older Siblings. 

[33] In support of their individual arguments, Mother and Father both cite cases that 

were decided prior to the 2010 amendment to Indiana Evidence Rule 201. See 

Brown v. Jones, 804 N.E.2d 1197, 1202 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied, 

superseded by statute as noted in Matter of D.P., 72 N.E.3d 973, 983 n.3 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2017) (holding court could not take judicial notice of its order dissolving 

the relevant corporation, as it included finding regarding alleged conversion);

see also Patterson v. State, 659 N.E.2d 220, 223 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (trial court 

could not take judicial notice of statements of a doctor who treated Patterson 

filed in an underlying criminal case to determine Patterson’s mental condition). 

[34] In Matter of D.P., our court examined the amended version of Indiana Evidence 

Rule 201. 72 N.E.3d 976, 982 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). In that case, DCS alleged 

D.P. was a CHINS based, in part, on D.P.’s father’s alleged substance abuse. 

D.P.’s father did not attend the CHINS fact finding hearing because allegedly 

he was incarcerated. During that hearing, DCS sought admission of evidence 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-1931 | March 31, 2020 Page 31 of 35

of the father’s drug use, but the trial court sustained proper objections to their 

admission. Id.

[35] In its order adjudicating D.P. as a CHINS, the trial court stated it was taking 

judicial notice of preliminary “reports and other filings during the course of the 

proceedings” and some of those reports “referenced Father’s drug use.” Id. 

Absent other evidence to support the trial court’s finding that D.P.’s father 

abused illegal substances, we concluded 

it would stretch the concept of judicial notice too far to allow the 

contents of the previous filings in this case to be accepted as 

substantive evidence. . . . [I]f a trial court hearing a CHINS 

matter could simply rely upon the facts alleged in such 

preliminary filings, it would seem to obviate the need for a factfinding hearing.

Id. at 982-3.

[36] Here, however, the trial court took judicial notice of the entire record in the 

prior CHINS and termination proceedings, but only used the findings in the 

trial court’s own termination order to support its termination of Parents’ 

parental rights to Children. The trial court’s own order is a not pleading or 

filing, but a final judgment set forth by the trial court to address all issues before 

it. Thus, our court’s holding in Matter of D.P. is distinguishable because the 

documents judicially noticed in that case were preliminary reports by a party to 

the litigation.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-1931 | March 31, 2020 Page 32 of 35

[37] Under Indiana Evidence Rule 201(b)(5), the trial court may judicially notice 

“records of the court of this state.” Judicial notice “‘encompasses facts 

ascertainable from sources that cannot reasonably be questioned, and 

presumably court records are such sources,’ in the absence of evidence tending 

to rebut that presumption.” Horton, 51 N.E.3d at 1161 (quoting Brown, 804 

N.E.2d at 1202). Here, the court took judicial notice of its own previous orders

after those orders had been affirmed on appeal by this court. See B.F., 18A-JT1967, slip op. at *6 (affirming involuntary termination of Parents’ parental 

rights to Older Siblings; holding the trial court’s findings supported its 

conclusions that there was a reasonable probability that the conditions that 

resulted in Older Siblings’ removal would not be remedied and termination was 

in Older Siblings’ best interests). Based thereon, we conclude the findings 

included in the order “cannot be reasonably questioned.”5

5 Parents also argue their due process rights were violated because the trial court relied primarily on findings 

from Older Siblings’ termination cases, and thus the court subjected them to an irrebuttable presumption of 

parental unfitness. We disagree. The termination order was eleven pages long, with approximately four 

pages of history, which included findings from the Older Siblings’ termination order. As we have concluded 

the trial court was permitted to take judicial notice of the facts in those orders, and the findings show a 

habitual pattern of conduct by Parents, which the trial court supplemented with multiple pages of findings 

regarding the events leading up to the current termination and Parents’ lack of participation in services, we 

reject Parents’ argument. See Bester v. Lake Cty. Ofc. of Family and Children, 839 N.E.2d 143, 152 (Ind. 2005) 

(trial court “must evaluate parent’s habitual patterns of conduct to determine the probability of future neglect 

or deprivation of the child”); see also Matter of Eq.W., 124 N.E.3d 1201, 1210-11 (Ind. 2019) (evidence of 

parents’ prior experiences with DCS, including CHINS adjudications, is relevant “to all potential future 

CHINS proceedings involving the parents and children”).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-1931 | March 31, 2020 Page 33 of 35

c. Report from Prior Court-Appointed State Advocate

[38] In its order, the trial court also referenced a report made as part of a previous 

CHINS case involving M.F. by a prior Court-Appointed Special Advocate 

(CASA) which was judicially noticed by the trial court at the State’s request. 

The trial court’s finding stated:

5. Although the instant termination proceedings with respect to 

[M.F.] have arisen from a CHINS case with the Cause 

No.84C01-1705-JC-690 [sic], [M.F.] was previously the 

subject of a CHINS action under Cause NO. 84C01-1609-JC104. The CASA wrote the following in a report filed in that 

case on February 20, 2018:

We encourage the court to follow the permanency plan 

DCS has in place for [Older Siblings] ([termination of 

parental rights] and adoption). The environment being 

created by both parents is volatile at this present time. 

[T]hey continue to make very bad decisions regarding the 

ability to provide any kind of safe and nurturing 

environment. Neither parent has completed their 

psychological evaluation as requested by DCS. [Mother] 

continues to make poor choices that will affect the children 

if the children were ever allowed to return home. We have 

observed several family visitations and read reports 

following other visitations we did not attend. These visits 

are chaotic and sometimes disruptive to the children’s 

daily routines. What the children do on a day-to-day basis 

oftentimes needs to be changed to accommodate the 

parents’ schedules. Neither parent has complied with 

DCS’s request for psychological evaluations and based 

upon social media, [Mother] has absolutely no respect for 

this court system or the process to comply in order to ever 

have any hope of reconciliation with her children. Foster 

care is the most nurturing and loving environment for all 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-1931 | March 31, 2020 Page 34 of 35

these children. Going forward, we encourage Termination 

of Parental Rights and Adoption for all the children

(exception – A.F. [Mother’s older child] who is going into 

collaborative care).

(Appellants’ Joint App. Vol. II at 70) (emphasis in original omitted). Parents 

do not challenge the trial court’s judicial notice of the existence of the CASA 

report from M.F.’s earlier CHINS case; instead they challenge the trial court’s 

use of the contents of the CASA’s report in the order terminating Parents’ 

parental rights to Children.

[39] The trial court here did not use the CASA’s statement as a substantial part of 

the evidence to support its decision, as the trial court did in Matter of D.P., 72 

N.E.3d at 983. Thus, as we have affirmed the trial court’s other findings and 

conclusions, we conclude the trial court did not err when it took judicial notice 

of the statements within the CASA’s report because there existed substantial 

independent evidence to support the trial court’s decision to involuntarily 

terminate Parents’ parental rights to Children. 

Conclusion

[40] DCS presented sufficient evidence to support challenged Finding 2(f)(9). The 

parties agreed a portion of Finding 2(f)(6) was not supported by the evidence 

and we concluded it was inappropriate for the trial court to, in Findings 2(f)(1) 

and 2(f)(21), cite the amount of money DCS had expended on services for 

reunification of this family over the years. However, the erroneous portions of 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-1931 | March 31, 2020 Page 35 of 35

Findings 2(f)(6), 2(f)(1), and 2(f)(21) are superfluous and not a basis for reversal. 

Further, the trial court’s unchallenged findings support its conclusion that the 

conditions under which Children were removed from Parents’ care would not 

be remedied and that termination of Father’s parental rights were in Children’s 

best interests. Finally, the trial court did not violate Parents’ due process rights 

when it took judicial notice of its own records and included portions of those 

records in the findings of the termination order before us now. Accordingly, we 

affirm.

[41] Affirmed.

Crone, J., and Pyle, J., concur.