United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

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No. 04-2162

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Lori A. Mosby, *

*

Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the 

* Eastern District of Arkansas. 

Stark Ligon, in his individual capacity *

and in his official capacity as Executive *

Director of the Supreme Court *

Committee on Professional Conduct; *

W. H. Arnold, Chief Justice, in his *

official capacity, Arkansas Supreme *

Court; sued as W. H. "Dub" Arnold; *

Ray Thornton, Justice, in his official *

capacity, Arkansas Supreme Court; *

Robert Brown, Justice, in his official *

capacity, Arkansas Supreme Court; *

Tom Glaze, Justice, in his official *

capacity, Arkansas Supreme Court; *

Donald L. Corbin, Justice, in his official *

capacity, Arkansas Supreme Court; *

Annabelle Clinton Imber, Justice, in *

her official capacity, Arkansas Supreme *

Court; Jim Hannah, Justice, in his *

official capacity, Arkansas Supreme *

Court, *

*

Appellees. * 
1

The Honorable Garnett Thomas Eisele, United States District Judge for the

Eastern District of Arkansas.

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Submitted: January 12, 2005

Filed: August 17, 2005 

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Before MELLOY, SMITH, and COLLOTON, Circuit Judges.

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COLLOTON, Circuit Judge.

Lori A. Mosby, an African-American attorney from Arkansas, appeals from the

dismissal of her complaint against Stark Ligon, Executive Director of the Arkansas

Supreme Court Committee on Professional Conduct, and seven Justices of the

Arkansas Supreme Court. Mosby alleged violations of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983

relating to the disciplinary processes of the Arkansas bar. The district court1

 granted

the motion to dismiss brought by Ligon and the seven Justices, and we affirm.

I.

The events precipitating Mosby’s lawsuit began in July 2001. Ligon, in his

capacity as Executive Director of the Supreme Court Committee on Professional

Conduct (“Committee”), received a complaint on July 10, 2001, from one of Mosby’s

clients regarding a personal injury claim that Mosby was handling. The client alleged

that Mosby had been dilatory in reaching a settlement with the opposing party, had

been insufficiently accessible during the settlement process, and had failed to provide

the client with requested copies of documents. Mosby settled the client’s personal

injury suit in mid-July 2001, and the settlement amount was paid on July 19. In

response to the client’s complaint, Ligon contacted Mosby and, after ascertaining that
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the matter had settled, requested a copy of the settlement check and a release form

executed by the client.

Mosby sent Ligon a copy of the release and a copy of her check to her client

for the net settlement proceeds, in the amount of $5,940. Ligon then requested a copy

of Mosby’s “settlement sheet” accounting for the entire amount of the $11,000

settlement. Mosby admitted that she did not have a settlement sheet, so Ligon

requested that she reconstruct one and provide him with copies of all checks drawn

on Mosby’s trust account against the settlement proceeds. During this process,

Mosby discovered that $1,310 of the settlement proceeds owed to her client had not

yet been paid. The $1,310 had been retained by Mosby, apparently on the

understanding that she would use it to pay her client’s medical bills. On learning of

this, Ligon requested and received records proving that there had been $1,310 in

Mosby’s trust account at all times after the receipt of her client’s settlement. At this

time, Mosby accused Ligon of expanding his investigation beyond the scope of her

client’s initial complaint.

After completing its investigation in January 2003, the Committee filed a

formal complaint against Mosby, alleging that Mosby had failed to (1) provide her

client with all of the settlement funds to which the client was entitled until almost

eighteen months after receipt of the funds, (2) reasonably respond to her client’s

inquiries regarding her case, (3) provide her client with a written statement

accounting for the proceeds of the settlement, and (4) timely reconcile her client

accounts in her trust account. These acts, it was alleged, amounted to violations of

several Arkansas Model Rules of Professional Conduct (“Rules”).

A panel of the Committee found Mosby guilty of violating the Rules, cautioned

her, and ordered her to pay $50 in costs. The Committee’s findings and order were

accompanied by a cover letter informing Mosby of her right to a public hearing before
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a different panel of the Committee. Mosby did not request a public hearing, and the

Committee’s decision became final.

Mosby later filed this action, alleging that Ligon had acted and was likely to

act in the future “in bad faith and with deliberate indifference” toward Mosby’s

rights. Mosby also asserted that Ligon had applied the Rules to her in a manner that

violated the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment

and was likely to do so in the future. Finally, Mosby accused the Justices of the

Arkansas Supreme Court of discriminatory application of the Rules, and of deliberate

indifference toward such application of the Rules by others. All of the above acts

were said to “implicate” 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983.

In her complaint, Mosby sought six types of relief. First, she sought injunctive

and declaratory relief directing the Arkansas Supreme Court to review its procedures

governing the powers of the Committee’s executive director, and to “specify

directives by which the Executive Director is authorized to act.” Second, Mosby

requested the formulation of “objective standards” to “guide and define each assertion

of misconduct identified by” the Rules. Third, she requested the establishment of

“standards and guidelines” for applying the Rules. Fourth, Mosby sought an

injunction against Ligon from further enforcement of the Rules until the Justices had

formulated guidelines and standards. Fifth, she requested a declaration that the past

practices of the Committee discriminated against black attorneys (including herself).

Finally, Mosby sought an injunction against retaliatory action by Ligon.

The district court dismissed Mosby’s complaint, noting that the RookerFeldman doctrine, which interprets 28 U.S.C. § 1257 to deprive lower federal courts

of jurisdiction to hear challenges to state court judgments except in habeas corpus

proceedings, applies to state proceedings that are “essentially judicial in nature.”

(Mem. Op. and Order of Dismissal at 7). See D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460

U.S. 462, 476 (1983); Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415, 416 (1923). The
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court held that the doctrine barred its review of a decision of the Committee, and that

Mosby’s constitutional claims were “inextricably intertwined” with the Committee’s

decision in her case so that review of these claims was also prohibited. (Id. at 6, 9).

The district court also concluded that it was obliged to abstain under the doctrine

announced in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), because the Committee’s

decision constituted an “ongoing state court proceeding.” (Id.).

II.

On de novo review, we agree with the district court that it lacked subject matter

jurisdiction over Mosby’s claims. That portion of her complaint that seeks a

declaration concerning the Committee’s disciplinary proceedings against her

constitutes a challenge to the result of a state judicial proceeding, and the RookerFeldman doctrine bars its consideration in the district court. To the extent that her

complaint states only a facial challenge to the Rules, or a declaration with respect to

past disciplinary actions involving other attorneys, Mosby lacks standing because she

has failed to allege an Article III case or controversy.

A.

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine provides that, “with the exception of habeas

corpus petitions, lower federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over challenges

to state court judgments.” Ballinger v. Culotta, 322 F.3d 546, 548 (8th Cir. 2003)

(internal quotation omitted). The doctrine bars federal courts from hearing cases

brought by the losing parties in state court proceedings alleging “injury caused by the

state-court judgment and seeking review and rejection of that judgment.” Exxon

Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 125 S. Ct. 1517, 1526 (2005).

Mosby does not dispute that the Committee’s disciplinary proceedings against

her were judicial in nature. See Feldman, 460 U.S. at 479. Because the Committee
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is created and appointed by the Arkansas Supreme Court, operates pursuant to rules

promulgated by that court, and is subject to review by that court, the Committee’s

decision to discipline Mosby is the functional equivalent of a state-court judgment.

Thomas v. Kadish, 748 F.2d 276, 281-82 (5th Cir. 1984); Muhammed v. Ark. Supreme

Court Comm. on Prof’l Conduct, 655 F. Supp. 584, 586 (E.D. Ark. 1986). Mosby

argues, however, that the district court erred in concluding that it lacked jurisdiction

over her complaint, because she does “not factually challenge[] the Committee’s

ruling pertaining to her,” but “makes a general challenge to the constitutionality of

how the Committee executes the rules,” and “facially challenge[s] the administration

of the rules.” (Br. of Appellant at 7).

Despite these assertions, we agree with the district court that at least some of

the substance of Mosby’s complaint is a challenge to the Committee’s disciplinary

action against her. Mosby alleges that the Rules were applied to her in a

discriminatory manner in violation of the United States Constitution. She seeks a

declaratory judgment to this effect, perhaps because the sanction has damaged her

permanent record. While Mosby undoubtedly has standing to pursue this challenge,

we think this claim seeks to undo the Committee’s decision in Mosby’s case, for the

only practical reason to seek a declaration that the discipline was meted out in

violation of the Fourteenth Amendment would be to set aside the sanction.

Although Mosby failed to raise her constitutional claims before the Committee

or the Arkansas Supreme Court, that circumstance does not give the district court

jurisdiction to consider them. That Mosby could have raised these claims in the statecourt proceedings means that in this case the district court “is in essence being called

upon to review a state court decision.” Feldman, 460 U.S. at 482 n.16. Therefore,

that portion of Mosby’s complaint challenging the Committee’s previous disciplinary

action against her is barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
2

This reading of Feldman is consistent with the Supreme Court’s own

admonition that “when questions of jurisdiction have been passed on in prior

decisions sub silentio, this Court has never considered itself bound when a

subsequent case finally brings the jurisdictional issue before us.” Hagans v. Lavine,

415 U.S. 528, 533 n.5 (1974). 

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B.

Mosby also asserts that Rooker-Feldman should not apply because she mounts

only a “facial” challenge to the administration of the Rules. We agree that the

Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not bar the district court from exercising jurisdiction

over general challenges to the constitutionality of a State’s disciplinary rules and

processes. The Supreme Court’s decision in Feldman drew a distinction for purposes

of 28 U.S.C. § 1257 between actions seeking review of a state court’s disposition of

a specific claim and actions “mount[ing] a general challenge to the constitutionality”

of state legislation. Feldman, 460 U.S. at 482-83. Only the Supreme Court has

jurisdiction over the former, while the latter can be heard by federal district courts in

which jurisdiction is otherwise proper. Id.

But Feldman does not relieve Mosby of the requirement that she demonstrate

Article III standing, and we conclude that Mosby does not have standing to bring

what she describes as her facial challenge. Because Feldman dealt primarily with the

definition of judicial proceedings for the purposes of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine,

the opinion “should not be read as implicating the standing of a litigant seeking

declaratory or injunctive relief.” Grendell v. Ohio Supreme Court, 252 F.3d 828, 837

(6th Cir. 2001).2

 Such litigants still must satisfy the normal requirements of Article

III standing. See id. at 836-38; Landers Seed Co. v. Champaign Nat’l Bank, 15 F.3d

729, 732 (7th Cir. 1994); Facio v. Jones, 929 F.2d 541, 543-45 (10th Cir. 1991).

Article III of the United States Constitution confines the jurisdiction of federal

courts to justiciable cases and controversies. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2; Lujan v.
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Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559-60 (1992). Such cases and controversies

include only those claims that allege some “injury in fact” redressable by a favorable

judgment. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 124 S. Ct. 2301, 2308 (2004).

To satisfy this “injury in fact” requirement, a plaintiff seeking prospective relief

against future conduct of defendants who caused injury in the past must show that she

faces “a real and immediate threat that she would again suffer similar injury in the

future.” Park v. Forest Serv. of the United States, 205 F.3d 1034, 1037 (8th Cir.

2000) (internal quotations and brackets omitted); see O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S.

488, 496 (1974). In addition to satisfying Article III standing requirements, litigants

must stay within “prudential limitations” on the exercise of federal-court jurisdiction.

Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975). One such limitation is a rule that parties

“generally must assert [their] own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest [their]

claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties.” Id. at 499.

To the extent Mosby’s complaint asserts only a facial challenge to the

administration of the Rules without “challeng[ing] the Committee’s ruling pertaining

to her,” (Brief of Appellant at 7), it fails to allege the requisite standing. Mosby lacks

Article III standing to seek prospective injunctive relief against future actions of the

Committee and the Justices, because her complaint does not sufficiently allege a “real

and immediate threat of repeated injury.” O’Shea, 414 U.S. at 496. Instead, it dwells

almost exclusively on Mosby’s past interactions with Ligon. While earlier sanctions

can be “evidence bearing on whether there is a real and immediate threat of repeated

injury,” City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983) (internal quotation

omitted), Mosby does not allege any facts suggesting the existence of such a threat.

Because “[t]he rules of standing . . . are threshold determinants of the propriety of

judicial intervention,” the plaintiff has a responsibility “clearly to allege facts

demonstrating that [s]he is a proper party to invoke judicial resolution of the dispute

and the exercise of the court’s remedial powers.” Warth, 422 U.S. at 517-18.
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In her appellate brief and at oral argument, Mosby suggested cryptically that

she has unrelated matters pending before the Committee. Such assertions were not

part of the record before the district court, and we do not consider them in

determining whether Mosby has standing to challenge future applications of the

Rules. If Mosby had sought an injunction against application of the Rules in an

ongoing Arkansas disciplinary matter, then it would be necessary to consider the

applicability of the abstention doctrine of Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).

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The record here does not demonstrate that Mosby is likely to suffer from

alleged discrimination by Ligon or the Justices of the Arkansas Supreme Court in the

future. Her only likely opportunity for interactions with Ligon or the Committee in

the future would be in the case of another alleged violation of the Rules. We deem

apropos the Supreme Court’s observation in O’Shea, that “attempting to anticipate

whether and when respondents will be charged with crime . . . takes us into the area

of speculation and conjecture,” 414 U.S. at 497, because we have the same inability

to foresee whether Mosby will face future disciplinary proceedings. The speculative

nature of making this prediction leads us to conclude that the record does not

establish a real or immediate threat of repeated injury. Mosby thus lacks standing to

pursue the injunctive relief that she seeks.3

Mosby also requests a declaration that the past practices of the Committee

discriminated against black attorneys other than herself. She fails to allege, however,

that discipline imposed on other attorneys has caused Mosby herself to suffer an

injury-in-fact that would satisfy the Article III standing requirement. In this respect,

moreover, it is clear that Mosby attempts to “rest [her] claim to relief on the legal

rights or interests of third parties,” Warth, 422 U.S. at 499, and we conclude that she

cannot overcome the prudential limitation on the exercise of federal jurisdiction.

Mosby plainly does not fit within the limited exception to the prudential proscription

against asserting the rights of third parties, for she presents no evidence of a “‘close’

relationship” with these attorneys or “a ‘hindrance’” to the attorneys’ ability to

protect their own interests. See Kowalski v. Tesmer, 125 S. Ct. 564, 567 (2004)
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(quoting Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 411 (1991)). We therefore conclude that

Mosby lacks standing to assert the interests of other black attorneys.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

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