COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Elder, Clements and Agee 

Argued at Richmond, Virginia 

LEVON DENARD COOPER 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 0190-01-2 JUDGE JEAN HARRISON CLEMENTS 

 FEBRUARY 12, 2002 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND 

Thomas N. Nance, Judge 

 Craig W. Stallard, Assistant Public Defender 

(Patricia P. Nagel, Assistant Public 

Defender; Office of the Public Defender, on 

brief), for appellant. 

 Eugene Murphy, Assistant Attorney General 

(Randolph A. Beales, Attorney General, on 

brief), for appellee. 

 

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not 

designated for publication.

 Appellant Levon Denard Cooper was convicted in a bench trial 

of grand larceny of an automobile in violation of Code § 18.2-95. 

On appeal, he contends the evidence was not sufficient to sustain 

his conviction. We disagree and affirm the conviction. 

 As the parties are fully conversant with the record in this 

case and because this memorandum opinion carries no precedential 

value, this opinion recites only those facts and incidents of the 

proceedings as necessary to the parties' understanding of the 

disposition of this appeal. 
 Cooper contends the evidence was insufficient to support his 

larceny conviction because the Commonwealth failed to prove that 

he knew the car he was driving was stolen. The evidence, he 

argues, merely showed that he was driving a car that, unbeknownst 

to him, had been stolen six weeks earlier. Such evidence, he 

asserts, was insufficient to allow the trial court to infer that 

he was the one who had stolen the car. Moreover, he argues, even 

if such an inference of larceny was permitted, his evidence was 

sufficient to rebut it. 

 When the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged on appeal, 

we review the evidence "in the light most favorable to the 

Commonwealth, granting to it all reasonable inferences fairly 

deducible therefrom." Bright v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 248, 

250, 356 S.E.2d 443, 444 (1997). "In so doing, we must discard 

the evidence of the accused in conflict with that of the 

Commonwealth, and regard as true all the credible evidence 

favorable to the Commonwealth and all fair inferences that may be 

drawn therefrom." Watkins v. Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 335, 349, 

494 S.E.2d 859, 866 (1998). We are further mindful that the 

"credibility of a witness, the weight accorded the testimony, and 

the inferences to be drawn from proven facts are matters solely 

for the fact[ ]finder's determination." Keyes v. City of Virginia 

Beach, 16 Va. App. 198, 199, 428 S.E.2d 766, 767 (1993). We will 

not disturb the conviction unless it is plainly wrong or 

- 2 -
unsupported by the evidence. Sutphin v. Commonwealth, 1 Va. App. 

241, 243, 337 S.E.2d 897, 898 (1985). 

 "At common law, larceny is the taking and carrying away of 

the goods and chattels of another with intent to deprive the owner 

of the possession thereof permanently." Lund v. Commonwealth, 217 

Va. 688, 691, 232 S.E.2d 745, 748 (1977). Code § 18.2-95 provides 

that grand larceny includes "larceny not from the person of 

another of goods and chattels of the value of $200.00 or more." 

Furthermore, "the unexplained possession of recently stolen goods 

permits an inference of larceny by the possessor." Bright, 4 Va. 

App. at 251, 356 S.E.2d at 444. In other words, "'[p]ossession of 

goods recently stolen is prima facie evidence of guilt of the 

crime of larceny, and throws upon the accused the burden of 

accounting for that possession.'" Hope v. Commonwealth, 10 Va. 

App. 381, 385, 392 S.E.2d 830, 833 (1990) (en banc) (quoting Fout 

v. Commonwealth, 199 Va. 184, 190, 98 S.E.2d 817, 821 (1957)). 

 In this case, Cooper does not dispute that the Commonwealth's 

evidence was sufficient to establish that the victim's car was 

stolen on May 4, 2000. Likewise, he concedes that he, as the 

driver of the car, was in possession of it on June 19, 2000. He 

contends, however, that the Commonwealth failed to prove beyond a 

reasonable doubt that he knew the car was stolen. His mere use of 

a car that he does not know is stolen is insufficient, he argues, 

to prove he stole the car, especially since he was able to 

reasonably explain his possession of the car. Thus, the issue 

- 3 -
before us is whether it was proper, under the facts of this 

case, for the trial court to infer guilt from Cooper's 

possession of the stolen car. 

 There is no direct evidence linking Cooper to the theft of 

the car. The evidence establishes, however, that on the evening 

of May 4, 2000, Greg Walters parked his white 1991 Ford 

Thunderbird car in a restaurant parking lot at Glenside and Broad 

Streets. Walters left a spare set of car keys in the car's middle 

console. The car, according to Walters, was undamaged when he 

left it that evening. The following morning, the car was gone. 

Walters called the police and reported his car stolen. 

 The evidence further establishes that, on June 19, 2000, 

while on patrol, Richmond City Police Officer Steven Kuzniewski 

observed Cooper driving a white Ford Thunderbird car, which, when 

Kuzniewski first saw it, was stopped in the middle of the road. 

Kuzniewski saw a man on the side of the road approach the stopped 

car and get in. The car then started down the road. 

 Intending to stop the driver of the Thunderbird for improper 

stopping and taking on passengers in the street, Kuzniewski turned 

his vehicle around and got behind the other car. As Kuzniewski 

followed the Thunderbird down the block, his partner ran a DMV 

check on the car's license plates and discovered that the car 

had been reported stolen. Kuzniewski activated his vehicle's 

lights and siren, and Cooper pulled over. 

- 4 -
 However, before the officers could exit their car, Cooper 

looked back at them and then drove away. Kuzniewski pursued 

Cooper for approximately twelve blocks, at which point Cooper 

stopped the car and fled on foot, leaving two passengers in the 

car. Kuzniewski and his partner pursued him and were able to 

apprehend him a few blocks away. They placed him under arrest 

for driving a stolen vehicle. Cooper told the officers that he 

had run from them because his license was suspended, but he gave 

them no explanation for his possession of the stolen car. 

 Returning, approximately fifteen minutes later, to the 

stolen vehicle, Kuzniewski observed that the steering column had 

been "popped" on the left side. Approximately five inches of 

the plastic covering had been ripped off the steering column, 

exposing the inside of the ignition system, including "a little 

piece of metal that was sticking out." According to Kuzniewski, 

that metal piece was a "switch you move up and down [and] around 

to start" the car. There were no keys in the ignition itself, 

which was intact, but Kuzniewski did find keys in the car's 

middle console. Kuzniewski testified that the damage to the 

steering column was plainly visible to anyone driving the car. 

 Initially, we find that Cooper's admitted possession of the 

stolen car was sufficiently recent, as a matter of law, to 

establish a prima facie case of larceny and, thus, justify the 

inference that Cooper stole the car. See Sullivan v. 

Commonwealth, 210 Va. 201, 204, 169 S.E.2d 577, 579 (1969) 

- 5 -
(holding that possession of stolen goods two and a half months 

after they were stolen is not, as a matter of law, too long a 

time to consider goods recently stolen); Wilborne v. 

Commonwealth, 182 Va. 63, 68-69, 28 S.E.2d 1, 3-4 (1943) 

(holding that three months is not too long a time to permit the 

recent-possession inference). We turn, then, to Cooper's claims 

that he did not know the car was stolen and that the evidence he 

presented was sufficient to rebut the inference that he was the 

one who stole the car. 

 Testifying on his own behalf, Cooper denied knowing the car 

was stolen. He testified that Duke, a person he had known for 

five years but whose last name he did not know, picked him up in 

the morning and drove him to the "Temp agency." Duke got a job 

but Cooper did not, so Duke let him borrow the car for the day. 

Cooper had seen Duke driving the car several times before that 

day. Duke had told him that the car belonged to a friend of 

his. Cooper testified that he used a key to start the car and 

that he never noticed the damaged steering column. He further 

testified that, when he stopped the car to flee the police on 

foot, he left the key in the ignition. According to Cooper, he 

fled from the police because his license was suspended and he 

had already been convicted of driving on a suspended license 

twice before. Thus, he "panicked." Cooper also testified that, 

when apprehended by the police, he told them that Duke had lent 

him the car. 

- 6 -
 While Cooper's account of how he obtained possession of the 

recently stolen car would, if found credible by the trial court, 

overcome the inference that he stole the car, the trial court 

obviously did not believe Cooper's explanation. The trier of 

fact is not required to accept a party's evidence in its 

entirety, but is free to believe or disbelieve in part or in 

whole the testimony of any witness. Rollston v. Commonwealth, 

11 Va. App. 535, 547, 399 S.E.2d 823, 830 (1991). Furthermore, 

"[i]n its role of judging witness credibility, the fact finder 

is entitled to disbelieve the self-serving testimony of the 

accused and to conclude that the accused is lying to conceal his 

guilt." Marable v. Commonwealth, 27 Va. App. 505, 509-10, 500 

S.E.2d 233, 235 (1998). Thus, the trial court was not required 

to accept Cooper's testimony as to why he had possession of the 

recently stolen car. 

 Based on our review of the record, we cannot say that the 

trial court's decision to reject Cooper's explanation was 

plainly wrong or without evidence to support it. In the light 

most favorable to the Commonwealth, the evidence clearly showed 

that Cooper knew the car was stolen. He could plainly see the 

damaged steering wheel column, and he started and drove the car 

without a key in the ignition. Furthermore, after being pulled 

over by the police, he fled, and, when apprehended, he gave the 

officers no explanation for his possession of the recently 

stolen vehicle. He did not tell them that Duke had lent him the 

- 7 -
car for the day. This evidence supports the trial court's 

finding that Cooper's explanation of his possession of the 

stolen car was not credible. 

 Cooper having failed to credibly explain his possession of 

the recently stolen car, the trial court was entitled to 

conclude that Cooper stole the car. We hold, therefore, that 

the evidence was sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt 

that Cooper committed the larceny. 

 Accordingly, we affirm Cooper's conviction. 

 Affirmed.

- 8 -