UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

CHRISTOPHER L. COVALT, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant, 

v. 

INMATE SERVICES CORPORATION; 

RANDY CAGLE, Owner of Inmate 

Services Corporation; JOHN DOE, a driver 

known as “Captain”; JANE DOE, a driver 

known as “Sarge”; LARAMIE COUNTY 

SHERIFF’S OFFICE; DANNY GLICK, 

Sheriff of Laramie County; ROCKWALL 

COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S 

OFFICE; ROCKWALL COUNTY 

DISTRICT ATTORNEY, 

 Defendants - Appellees. 

No. 15-1247 

(D.C. No. 1:15-CV-00685-LTB) 

(D. Colo.) 

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ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

_________________________________ 

Before HARTZ, HOLMES, and McHUGH, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

Christopher L. Covalt appeals from a district court order dismissing his 

42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against Inmate Services Corporation, two of its employees, 

 *

 After examining appellant’s brief and the appellate record, this panel has 

determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the 

determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The 

case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment 

is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, 

and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent 

with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit 

August 1, 2016

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court
2 

and various state officials whom he contends are collectively responsible for how he 

was treated during his transport by van as a pretrial detainee. Exercising jurisdiction 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm. 

In his pro se complaint, Mr. Covalt alleged that he was subjected to 

unconstitutional conditions of confinement during the seven-day journey from Texas 

to Wyoming, in violation of his rights to adequate sleep, water, food, exercise, 

sanitation, safety, and due process. Screening the complaint under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915A, the district court concluded that it failed to state a claim against any 

defendant. 

Having retained counsel for this appeal, Mr. Covalt argues the allegations in 

the complaint are sufficient to state a violation of his constitutional rights, and 

therefore the district court erred by dismissing his complaint. We disagree. 

We review de novo the dismissal of a complaint under 28 U.S.C. 

1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim. Kay v. Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214, 1217 

(10th Cir. 2007). Applying the same standard of review that we employ for 

dismissals under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), “we must accept the 

allegations of the complaint as true and construe those allegations and any reasonable 

inferences that might be drawn from them, in the light most favorable to the 

plaintiff.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). We then consider whether “the 

plaintiff has provided enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 

face.” Hogan v. Winder, 762 F.3d 1096, 1104 (10th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation 
3 

marks omitted). We construe liberally Mr. Covalt’s pro se complaint. Hall v. 

Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). 

Because Mr. Covalt was a pretrial detainee, the Due Process Clause governs 

his claims related to unconstitutional conditions of confinement. Craig v. Eberly, 

164 F.3d 490, 495 (10th Cir. 1998). The Eighth Amendment standard, which 

“provides the benchmark for such claims,” requires a plaintiff to satisfy both an 

objective component (a sufficiently serious deprivation) and a subjective component 

(deliberate indifference on the part of the official responsible). Id. We determine 

that Mr. Covalt failed to establish the objective component; therefore, we do not 

address the subjective component. 

To satisfy the objective component, a plaintiff must “produce objective 

evidence that the deprivation at issue was in fact sufficiently serious.” Mata v. Saiz, 

427 F.3d 745, 751 (10th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). A plaintiff 

“must show that conditions were more than uncomfortable, and instead rose to the 

level of ‘conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm’ to [his] health or 

safety.” DeSpain v. Uphoff, 264 F.3d 965, 973 (10th Cir. 2001) (quoting Farmer v. 

Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994)). “[O]nly those deprivations denying the 

minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities are sufficiently grave to form the basis 

of an Eighth Amendment violation.” Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991) 

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 

Mr. Covalt undoubtedly endured unpleasant conditions during the non-stop, 

circuitous, seven-day journey. According to the complaint, he was prevented from 
4 

sleeping for any significant period because he was handcuffed, sitting up, and 

surrounded by other passengers; he was given only three small cups of water each 

day, causing him headaches and other symptoms; the fast-food sandwiches he was 

fed three times a day were unhealthy and insufficient to sate his hunger; he was 

unable to exercise; bathroom breaks were five to six hours apart, causing him to 

urinate in his pants; his handcuffs prevented him from cleaning himself properly after 

defecating, causing him to develop a rash; he and the other passengers were not given 

the opportunity to shower or change their clothes, causing the van to smell bad; the 

drivers drove carelessly, without taking sufficient breaks, while he was sometimes 

made to sit on a crate without a seatbelt; he was exposed to secondhand smoke when 

the drivers and passengers smoked cigarettes after meals; and the drivers did not 

intervene when he was harassed repeatedly by another passenger. 

Although these conditions are understandably objectionable, we conclude they 

did not rise to a constitutional violation. Cases where this court has found conditions 

sufficiently serious to state an Eighth Amendment claim stand in stark contrast to 

those alleged here. See, e.g., Gee v. Pacheco, 627 F.3d 1178, 1189 (10th Cir. 2010) 

(concluding that allegations the plaintiff “had not had food or water for more than 

24 hours . . . and both Defendants restrained him with a stun belt, belly chains, 

handcuffs, and a black box covering the handcuffs, which prevented him from 

accessing the food and water provided to the other prisoners being transported” were 

sufficiently serious to satisfy objective component of an Eighth Amendment claim); 

Fogle v. Pierson, 435 F.3d 1252, 1259-60 (10th Cir. 2006) (concluding that denying 
5 

the plaintiff any outdoor exercise for three years constituted a sufficiently serious 

deprivation); McBride v. Deer, 240 F.3d 1287, 1291-92 (10th Cir. 2001) (concluding 

that forcing the plaintiff to live in a feces-covered cell for three days was a 

sufficiently serious condition of confinement). Even considered collectively, the 

alleged conditions here do not constitute a sufficiently serious deprivation. 

The judgment is affirmed. Mr. Covalt’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis 

on appeal is moot, as the filing fee has already been paid. 

Entered for the Court 

Jerome A. Holmes 

Circuit Judge