IN THE COURT OF CHANCERY OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

JEFFREY GOWER,

Plaintiff,

v.

TRUX, INC., VIKING VENTURE 

PARTNERS, LLC, MICHAEL 

SACCONE, SR., MICHAEL 

SACCONE, JR., MICHAEL 

WHOULEY, and RICHARD 

SACCONE,

Defendants.

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C.A. No. 2020-0996-PAF

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Date Submitted: November 8, 2021

Date Decided: February 23, 2022

Brandon W. McCune, BLANK ROME LLP, Wilmington, Delaware; Patrick J. 

Hannon, HARTLEY MICHON ROBB HANNON, LLP, Boston, Massachusetts; 

Attorneys for Plaintiff Jeffrey Gower.

Richard M. Beck, Sean M. Brennecke, KLEHR HARRISON HARVEY 

BRANZBURG LLP, Wilmington, Delaware; Lawrence P. Murray, Gregory 

Paonessa, BURNS & LEVINSON LLP, Boston, Massachusetts; Attorneys for 

Defendant Trux, Inc.

Kevin J. Mangan, WOMBLE BOND DICKINSON (US) LLP, Wilmington, 

Delaware; Hayden J. Silver, III, WOMBLE BOND DICKINSON (US) LLP, 

Raleigh, North Carolina; Attorneys for Defendant Viking Venture Partners, LLC. 

S. Michael Sirkin, R. Garrett Rice, ROSS ARONSTAM & MORITZ LLP, 

Wilmington, Delaware; Scott C. Ford MINTZ, LEVIN, COHN, FERRIS, 

GLOVSKY & POPEO, P.C., Boston, Massachusetts; Attorneys for Defendants 

Michael Saccone, Sr., Michael Saccone, Jr., and Michael Whouley.
Samuel T. Hirzel, Elizabeth A. DeFelice, HEYMAN ENERIO GATTUSO & 

HIRZEL LLP, Wilmington, Delaware; Kevin T. Peters, Michael D. Brier, GESMER 

UPDEGROVE LLP, Boston, Massachusetts; Attorneys for Defendant and 

Counterclaim Plaintiff Richard Saccone.

FIORAVANTI, Vice Chancellor
This action concerns alleged breaches of an agreement among stockholders of 

Trux, Inc. (“Trux” or the “Company”). The agreement, defined below as the ROFR 

Agreement, prescribes a detailed process governing any proposed transfer of shares

and provides rights of first refusal and co-sale rights. The plaintiff, Jeff Gower, 

alleges that three other Trux stockholders sold their shares to a fourth stockholder, 

Viking Venture Partners, LLC (“Viking”), in violation of the ROFR Agreement. 

His headline claim alleges the share sales were effected without providing Gower 

and other stockholders the requisite notice as required by the ROFR Agreement. 

Gower asserts claims for breach of contract and the implied covenant of good faith 

and fair dealing. Gower also seeks a declaratory judgment that the resulting 

breaches render the share transfers null and void under the express terms of the 

ROFR Agreement. All of the defendants, except one, have moved to dismiss the 

complaint in its entirety. This opinion denies the motions to dismiss the breach of 

contract and declaratory judgment claims, but grants the motions to dismiss the 

implied covenant claim. 
2

I. BACKGROUND

Unless otherwise specified, the facts recited in this Memorandum Opinion 

are drawn from the Amended Verified Complaint and documents integral thereto.1

A. The Parties

Trux is a privately held Delaware corporation based in Waltham, 

Massachusetts.2

 It is a technology company that “facilitates trucking services in the 

construction industry.”3

 The other parties are or were stockholders of Trux at the 

times relevant to the claims in this case.

Gower served as Trux’s Chief Executive Officer (“CEO”) from January 2018 

until he wasterminated in January 2020.4

 According to the Company, Gower owned 

809,994 shares at the time of the share transfers.

5

Defendants Michael Saccone, Sr.,

6 Michael Saccone, Jr., and Michael 

Whouley owned approximately 19%, 7.5%, and 6.3%, respectively, of Trux’s stock

1 Exhibits attached to the Amended Verified Complaint (“Compl.”) will be cited as “Ex.”

2 Compl. ¶ 9.

3 Id. ¶ 16.

4 Id. ¶¶ 17, 27. 

5 Ex. K. 

6 Michasel Saccone Sr. was also a member of Trux’s board of directors (the “Board”). 

Compl. ¶ 11. 
3

immediately prior to selling it to Viking.

7 Defendant Richard Saccone,8 who 

intervened as a defendant and has not moved to dismiss, owned approximately 

30.3% of Trux’s outstanding stock prior to selling his shares to Viking.9

 

Viking is a Delaware limited liability company and is based in Birmingham, 

Alabama.10 Viking is a wholly owned subsidiary of Vulcan Materials Company, 

LLC, one of Trux’s largest customers.11 Viking owned approximately 22.2% of 

Trux’s stock at the time of the events at issue.12 

Michael Sr., Michael Jr., Richard, and Whouley are referred to as the “Selling 

Stockholders.” Michael Sr., Michael Jr., and Whouley are referred to as the 

“Moving Sellers” and, together with Viking, the “Moving Defendants.” The Moving 

Defendants, Trux, and Richard are referred to as the “Defendants.”

B. The Right of First Refusal and Co-Sale Agreement

The claims in this case all arise from a contract to which all of the litigants 

here are parties. That agreement is the Trux, Inc. Right of Refusal and Co-Sale 

7 Compl. ¶¶ 11–13. The court calculates these figures to be 18.7%, 7.4%, and 6.2%. See

Ex. A, Scheds. A–B.

8 For ease of reference, this Memorandum Opinion refers to Michael Saccone, Sr. as 

“Michael Sr.,” Michael Saccone, Jr. as “Michael Jr.,” and Richard Saccone as “Richard.” 

No disrespect or familiarity is intended.

9 See Ex. A (Scheds. A–B).

10 Compl. ¶ 10.

11 Id. 

12 See Ex. A (Scheds. A–B).
4

Agreement (the aforementioned “ROFR Agreement”), dated as of April 6, 2018.13 

The ROFR Agreement has two categories of signatories—“Investors”14 and

“Stockholders.”15 Viking and three non-parties to this case are identified as

Investors.16 Gower and the Selling Stockholders are identified as being among the 

Stockholders.

17 The ROFR Agreement also confers rights upon Gower, Viking, and 

the Selling Stockholders as “Closing Stockholders”—the “holders of Common 

Stock as of the closing of the transactions” on April 6, 2018, when a separate share 

purchase agreement between Trux, Viking, and the other Investors became 

effective.

18

13 Ex. A. 

14 Id. § 1.11 (defining “Investors” as “the persons named on Schedule A” and any assignees 

pursuant to the terms of the ROFR Agreement). 

15 Id. (Sched. B) (identifying the “Stockholders” as of April 6, 2018); id. § 1.23 (defining

a “Stockholder” as “any holder of Capital Stock of the Company, each person to whom the 

rights of a Stockholder are assigned pursuant to Subsection 3.1, each person who hereafter 

becomes a signatory to this Agreement pursuant to Subsection 6.9 or 6.16 and any one of 

them, as the context may require”). 

16 Id. (Sched. A).

17 Id. (Sched. B).

18 See id. § 1.4 (defining “Closing Stockholders” as “the holders of Common Stock as of 

the closing of the transactions described in the Purchase Agreements”); id. (Recitals B–C) 

(defining the “Purchase Agreement” and identifying its effective date as the “even date 

herewith”); id. (Scheds. A–B) (identifying Gower, Viking, and the Selling Stockholders as 

holding shares as of April 6, 2018). 
5

1. The Process for Transferring Shares of Trux Stock 

The ROFR Agreement prescribes a process that a Stockholder must follow to 

sell or transfer its shares of Trux stock (the “Sales Process”). As summarized here 

and detailed below, in the event a Stockholder wishes to sell or transfer its shares to 

a third party, the Stockholder must provide 60 days’ notice of the transaction and its 

material terms to the Company and all Closing Stockholders. Delivery of the notice 

triggers a waterfall of rights of refusal and corresponding notice obligations. Viking 

has the highest priority right of first refusal (the “Special ROFR”), subject to certain 

limitations. The Investors have the second-highest priority right of refusal (“the 

Right of First Refusal”), and the Closing Stockholders have the third-highest priority 

right of refusal (the “Secondary Refusal Right”). If there are shares remaining after 

each Stockholder has exercised (or failed to exercise) its respective right of refusal, 

the Company may exercise a right to repurchase any of the offered shares (the 

“Tertiary Refusal Right”). If the Company declines to exercise that right, the 

Stockholders that have already exercised their right of refusal may purchase any 

remaining outstanding shares on offer. If any shares remain on offer once this 

process is complete, each Stockholder has a right to participate on a pro rata basis in 

the sale of shares to the third party, and the third party may not purchase any offered 

shares unless it negotiates to purchase the requisite pro rata share from each of the 

participating Stockholders. 
6

a. The Notice Requirement 

In the event of a “Proposed Transfer”—defined to include any “assignment, 

sale, offer to sell” and “transfer” of Trux shares by any Stockholder19—Section 

2.1(b) of the ROFR Agreement provides: 

Each Stockholder proposing to make [the] Proposed Transfer must 

deliver a Proposed Transfer Notice to the Company, [Viking], each 

Investor other than [Viking] and each Closing Stockholder not later 

than sixty (60) days prior to the consummation of such Proposed 

Transfer.20 

The Proposed Transfer Notice “shall contain the material terms and conditions 

(including price and form of consideration) of the Proposed Transfer, the identity of 

the Prospective Transferee and the intended date of the Proposed Transfer.”21

2.2(b) of the ROFR Agreement provides: 

Each Stockholder proposing to make a Proposed Transfer must deliver 

a Proposed Transfer Notice to the Company and each Investor not later 

than sixty (60) days prior to the consummation of such Proposed 

Transfer.22

The content of the Proposed Transfer Notice required by Section 2.2(b) is the same 

as that required by Section 2.1(b): “Such Proposed Transfer Notice shall contain the 

material terms and conditions (including price and form of consideration) of the 

19 Ex. A § 1.12.

20 Id. § 2.1(b). 

21 Id. § 2.1(b). 

22 Id. § 2.2(b). 
7

Proposed Transfer, the identity of the Prospective Transferee and the intended date 

of the Proposed Transfer.”23 

b. Viking’s Special ROFR 

Delivery of the Proposed Transfer Notice triggers the waterfall of rights of 

refusal (“Rights of Refusal”), starting with Viking’s Special ROFR. Upon receipt 

of the Proposed Transfer Notice, Viking has 15 days to exercise the Special ROFR.

24 

To exercise that right, Viking must “deliver written notice to the selling Stockholder, 

the Company, each Investor other than the Viking Investor and each Closing 

Stockholder . . . specifying the number of shares of Transfer Stock to be 

purchased.”25 The number of shares that Viking may purchase may not cause its 

ownership of Trux stock to exceed 49% on a fully diluted basis.26 

c. The Investors’ Right of First Refusal 

Following delivery of the Proposed Transfer Notice, Investors other than 

Viking likewise have 15 days to exercise their Right of First Refusal to purchase “all 

or any portion of” the Proposed Transfer shares subject to the Proposed Transfer 

Notice available for purchase after the exercise of any higher-priority Rights of 

23 Id.

24 Id.

25 Id.

26 Id. § 2.1(a). 
8

Refusal (such shares, the “Remaining Transfer Stock”).27 If “any Investor does not 

provide an Investor Notice exercising its . . . Right of First Refusal with respect to . 

. . its full pro rata portion of Remaining Transfer Stock subject to a Proposed 

Transfer, such Investor must deliver a Secondary Notice to the selling Stockholder, 

the Company and each Closing Stockholder” within that same 15-day time frame.28 

d. The Closing Stockholders’ Secondary Refusal Right

Each Closing Stockholder has 30 days from delivery of the Proposed Transfer 

Notice to provide notice to the Company and the selling Stockholder that it wishes

to exercise its Secondary Refusal Right to purchase any Remaining Transfer Stock.29 

If “any Closing Stockholder does not provide [notice] exercising its . . . Secondary 

Refusal Right . . . such Closing Stockholder must deliver a Tertiary Notice to the 

selling Stockholder and to the Company” within that 30-day timeframe.30

e. Rights of Refusal Regarding Any Unsubscribed Stock 

The Company possesses a Tertiary Refusal Right to repurchase “all or any 

portion of the Remaining Transfer Stock not purchased pursuant to Viking’s Special 

ROFR, the Investors’ Right of First Refusal or the Closing Stockholders’ Secondary 

27 Id. § 2.2(b). 

28 Id. § 2.2(c). 

29 Id.

30 Id. § 2.2(d). 
9

Refusal Right.”31 To exercise that right, the Company must provide notice to the 

selling Stockholder, the Investors, and the Closing Stockholders within ten days after 

the Closing Stockholders’ deadline for delivering the Tertiary Notice—that is, 40 

days after delivery of the Proposed Transfer Notice.32

In the event any shares of the Remaining Transfer Stock remain 

undersubscribed after the Company exercises its Tertiary Refusal Right, the 

Company must then deliver notice to any Stockholders that have exercised their 

Rights of Refusal (the “Exercising Rightsholders”) after an additional five days.

33 

The Exercising Rightsholders then have 15 days to “purchase all or any part of the 

balance of any such remaining unsubscribed shares of Remaining Transfer Stock on 

the terms and conditions set forth in the Proposed Transfer Notice.”34

f. The Co-Sale Process 

If any shares subject to the Proposed Transfer Notice are not purchased 

pursuant to the process outlined above and are “thereafter . . . to be sold” to a third 

party (a “Prospective Transferee”), the ROFR Agreement gives each Investor and 

Closing Stockholder the right to participate in the proposed sale of shares to the 

31 Id.

32 Id.

33 Id. ç 2.2(e). 

34 Id.
10

Prospective Transferee on a pro rata basis (the “Right of Co-Sale”).

35 Section 2.3 

governs the process for exercising this Right of Co-Sale (the “Co-Sale Process”). 

Section 2.3(a) requires each Investor or Closing Stockholder that wishes to exercise 

its Right of Co-Sale (such Stockholder, a “Participating Rightholder”) to give the 

selling Stockholder written notice “to that effect within fifteen (15) days after the 

deadline for delivery of the Tertiary Notice”—that is, 55 days after delivery of the 

Proposed Transfer Notice.36 

The “terms and conditions of any Proposed Transfer” pursuant to the exercise 

of the Right of Co-Sale “will be memorialized in, and governed by” a share purchase 

agreement with “customary terms and provisions for such a transaction” (such 

agreement, a “Purchase and Sale Agreement”).

37 If the Prospective Transferee 

refuses to purchase shares from any Participating Rightholder that has exercised its 

Co-Sale Right “or upon the failure to negotiate in good faith the Purchase and Sale 

Agreement satisfactory to the Participating Rightholders,” no other Stockholder may 

sell its shares to the Prospective Transferee unless “simultaneously with such sale, 

such Stockholder purchases all securities subject to the Right of Co-Sale from such 

Participating Rightholder or Rightholders on the same terms and conditions 

35 Id. § 2.3(a). 

36 Id.

37 Id. § 2.3(c). 
11

(including the proposed purchase price) as set forth in the Proposed Transfer 

Notice.”38

2. Other Pertinent Provisions in the ROFR Agreement

Among other remedies, the ROFR Agreement provides that “[a]ny Proposed 

Transfer not made in compliance with the requirements of this Agreement shall be 

null and void ab initio, shall not be recorded on the books of the Company or its 

transfer agent and shall not be recognized by the Company.”39 Any non-breaching 

party is “entitled to seek protective orders, injunctive relief and other remedies 

available at law or in equity (including, without limitation, seeking specific 

performance or the rescission of purchases, sales and other transfers of Transfer 

Stock not made in strict compliance with this Agreement).”40 If any Stockholder 

“purports to sell any Transfer Stock” in violation of the Right of Co-Sale of any 

Participating Rightholder, the Participating Rightholder may “require such 

Stockholder to purchase from such Participating Rightholder the type and number 

of shares of Capital Stock that such Participating Rightholder would have been 

entitled to sell to the Prospective Transferee had the Prohibited Transfer been 

effected in compliance” with the Co-Sale Process.41 

38 Id. § 2.3(e). 

39 Id. § 2.4(a).

40 Id.

41 Id. § 2.4(c).
12

The ROFR Agreement may be “amended, modified or terminated . . . and the 

observance of any term thereof may be waived (either generally or in a particular 

instance and either retroactively or prospectively) only by a written instrument” 

executed by the Company, Viking, and Stockholders holding a majority of Company

stock.

42 Any “amendment, modification, termination or waiver” will be binding 

“upon the Company, the Investors, the Stockholders” and any of their assignees or 

successors in interest.43 “The Company shall give prompt written notice of any 

amendment, modification or termination hereof or waiver hereunder to any party 

hereto that did not consent in writing to such amendment, modification, termination 

or waiver.”44

Separately, a non-breaching party may provide a “waiver, permit, consent or 

approval of any kind or character” (a “Waiver”) to a breaching party, but the Waiver 

“must be in writing.”45 Waiver “of any single breach or default” shall not operate 

as “a waiver of any other breach or default theretofore or thereafter occurring.”46

42 Id. § 6.8. 

43 Id.

44 Id.

45 Id. § 6.7.

46 Id.
13

C. The Transactions at Issue and Gower’s Objections 

In February 2020, Trux’s Board terminated Gower as Trux’s CEO—the 

result, Gower alleges, of a “coordinated campaign to push [him] out”47 by certain 

other stockholders that disagreed with his decision to seek venture capital funding 

and instead wanted a quick sale of the Company.

48 Gower alleges that he owned 

approximately 6.1% of Trux stock but that a portion of that equity was subject to

vesting.49 Trux asserted that Gower was terminated “for cause,” which “result[ed] 

in a purported redemption of Gower’s unvested equity for an amount far less than 

fair market value.”50 Gower maintains that he contested and intended to mount a 

legal challenge to his termination and the redemption of his unvested equity.

51

On March 13, 2020, Gower received an email from Bart Ronan, his successor 

as Trux’s CEO, informing Gower as a Trux Stockholder that the Board had approved 

an offer by Viking to acquire all the outstanding shares of Trux.52 The email 

included a form of a proposed written consent to be executed by Stockholders 

pursuant to Section 228 of the Delaware General Corporation Law (the “Written 

47 Compl. ¶ 2. 

48 Id. ¶¶ 21–26. 

49 Id. ¶ 18. 

50 Id. ¶ 27. 

51 Id. ¶ 28. 

52 Id. ¶ 30; see Ex. B.
14

Consent”).53 The email requested that Gower sign and return a copy of the signature 

page of the Written Consent by the close of business on March 17, 2020.54 Among 

other recitals, the Written Consent acknowledges:

Pursuant to Section 2.2 of the Right of First Refusal and Co-Sale 

Agreement . . . if any Stockholder (the “Transferring Stockholder”) 

proposes to transfer any of its shares of capital stock of the Company, 

such Transferring Stockholder shall first give notice and offer such 

shares of capital stock of the Company to the Investors and Closing 

Stockholders . . . .

55

The Written Consent defines this right as the “Right of First Refusal.”56 The Written 

Consent provides that the “Stockholders hereby ratify, waive and forever release all 

of the Stockholders’ rights to the Right of First Refusal in connection with the 

Transaction.”57 Gower’s counsel informed Trux’s counsel that Gower would not be 

executing the Written Consent and asked to review a definitive share purchase 

agreement “so that any issues relating to [Gower’s] potential claims can be dealt 

with in an appropriate and timely fashion.”58

On April 1, 2020, Gower received another email from Ronan informing him 

as a Trux Stockholder that “Viking has entered into agreements to acquire shares of 

53 Ex. B.

54 Id.

55 Id.

56 Id.

57 Id.

58 Compl. ¶ 33; Ex. C.
15

the Company’s capital stock” with each of the Moving Sellers (such transactions, 

together, the “Share Sales”).59 The email stated that the Moving Sellers’ shares, 

together with Viking’s existing stake, “represent a majority of the Company’s issued 

and outstanding shares of capital stock.”60 The email gave Gower 15 days—until 

April 16, 2020—to return a signed copy of an enclosed Purchase and Sale 

Agreement (the “Proposed PSA”) to sell 809,994 shares to Viking pursuant to

Section 2.3 of the ROFR Agreement.61 The Proposed PSA gave Gower a choice as 

to the form of consideration.62 Under “Option A,” Gower would receive a portion 

of the consideration in a cash payment at closing and the rest in the form of a 

promissory note maturing on July 1, 2021.

63 As described in Ronan’s April 1 email, 

under Option A Gower would receive “$1.18 per share, with $0.52 per share paid at 

the closing of such transaction (the ‘Closing’) and $0.66 per share payable no later 

than July 1, 2021.”64 Under “Option B,” Gower would receive the entire 

consideration up front in the form of a cash payment of $0.92 per share.65

59 Ex. F.

60 Id.

61 Id.

62 Id.

63 Id.

64 Id.

65 Id.
16

Gower maintains that the terms of the Proposed PSA were “problematic” for 

him given the legal issues arising from his termination.66 Gower cites to Section 

5(a) of the Proposed PSA, which required him to represent and warrant that he 

owned 809,994 shares of Trux stock rather than the 1,439,989 shares that Gower 

maintains he owned or to which he was otherwise entitled.

67 Gower also alleges that 

the Proposed PSA contained a release of claims that “would have extinguished 

Gower’s right to pursue any and all claims arising from his termination.”68 When 

Gower’s counsel asked for copies of the agreement executed by the Moving Sellers, 

Viking’s counsel did not provide the copies but responded that Gower “received the 

same offer” as the Moving Sellers and that the “only differences between those 

documents and Jeff Gower’s is the names, number of shares and the option A/option 

B choice that is in Jeff Gower’s (the other 3 just had option A).”69

Gower alleges that Viking’s original March 12 offer was “either withdrawn 

or rejected” and that Viking instead entered into direct negotiations with the Moving 

Sellers to acquire their shares.70 Gower also alleges that the ROFR Agreement was 

66 Compl. ¶ 45.

67 Id.

68 Id.

69 Ex. H. 

70 Compl. ¶ 35.
17

never “waived or otherwise amended in connection with the agreements referenced 

in Ronan’s April 1, 2020 email.”71

On April 16, 2020, Gower’s counsel informed the Moving Sellers and 

Viking’s counsel that Gower “wishes to exercise his rights under the [ROFR] 

Agreement” and that the Share Sales were “null and void” because: (1) “Gower was 

never provided with a Proposed Transfer Notice,” (2) the “proposed Purchase and 

Sale Agreement provided to Mr. Gower substantially understates his ownership 

interest,” and (3) “there has been a failure to ‘negotiate in good faith a Purchase and 

Sale Agreement satisfactory to [Mr. Gower].’”72 Viking’s counsel responded the 

next day that “Gower was offered the same deal that each other [Stockholder] was 

provided” and that the number of Gower’s shares to be sold under the Proposed PSA

reflected Trux’s official records.73 Viking’s counsel also extended Gower’s deadline 

to respond to Viking’s offer to the end of day on April 20, 2020.74 Gower never 

executed the Proposed PSA. 

71 Id. ¶ 41.

72 Ex. I; Ex J. 

73 Ex. K.

74 Id.
18

D. Procedural History

On November 19, 2020, Gower filed his Verified Complaint.75 Trux, Viking, 

and the Moving Sellers filed motions to dismiss the Verified Complaint.76 On April 

23, 2021, Gower filed an Amended Verified Complaint, which I refer to as the 

“Complaint.”77 On May 24, 2021, Trux, Viking, and the Moving Sellers separately

moved to dismiss the Complaint.78 On June 16, 2021, Richard filed a motion for 

leave to intervene as a Defendant.79 The court granted the motion on July 9, 2021.

80 

Richard has not moved to dismiss the Complaint.81 After briefing, the court heard 

oral argument via remote video on November 8, 2021.82

75 Dkt. 1.

76 Dkt. 19–20. 

77 Dkt. 22.

78 Dkt. 25–27.

79 Dkt. 31.

80 Dkt. 34. 

81 Instead, Richard has filed an answer and a “counterclaim.” Dkt. 39. In his counterclaim, 

Richard “requests that if the Court enters the judgment Gower requests declaring ‘the 

transfer of stock to Viking is ‘null and void ab initio,’ that the Court declare that [Richard]’s 

sale of 4,958,848 shares of Trux stock to Viking on April 7, 2020 is also ‘null and void.’” 

Id. at 21. On August 19, 2021, Viking filed an answer to the counterclaim, seeming to 

question whether it is appropriately styled as a counterclaim rather than as a cross-claim. 

Dkt. 52 at 1. The Moving Sellers, Viking, and Gower have not responded to Richard’s 

counterclaim. On August 19, 2021, Trux moved to dismiss Richard’s counterclaim on the 

same grounds it has sought to dismiss Gower’s claim for a declaratory judgment. Dkt. 51. 

On September 22, 2021, Richard and Trux filed a proposed order stipulating that Richard

had not brought any claims against Trux and withdrawing Trux’s motion to dismiss as 

moot. Dkt. 56. The court granted the proposed order on the same day. Dkt. 57. 

82 Dkt. 65. 
19

II. ANALYSIS

The Complaint contains three counts. Count I is a claim for declaratory 

judgment that the transfer of stock from the Moving Sellers to Viking is void. Count 

II is a breach of contract claim. Count III alleges that the Moving Sellers breached 

the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The Complaint alleges, and no 

party contests, that the court has subject matter jurisdiction over the claims under 8 

Del. C. 111.83

A. Standard of Review

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Court of Chancery 

Rule 12(b)(6), (a) all well-pleaded factual allegations are accepted as true; (b) even 

vague allegations are well-pleaded if they give the opposing party notice of the 

claim; and (c) the court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Savor, Inc. v. FMR Corp., 812 A.2d 894, 896-97 (Del. 2002). 

“[D]ismissal is inappropriate unless the plaintiff would not be entitled to recover 

under any reasonably conceivable set of circumstances susceptible to proof.” Id. 

(internal quotations omitted). To make this determination, the Court “is not required 

to accept every strained interpretation of the allegations” the plaintiff proposes, but 

“only those reasonable inferences that logically flow from the face of the complaint.” 

83 8 Del. C. § 111(a)(3) confers upon the court the authority to “interpret, apply, enforce or 

determine the validity of the provisions of . . . [a]ny written restrictions on the transfer, 

registration of transfer or ownership of securities under §202 of this title.” 
20

Roma Landmark Theaters v. Cohen Exhibition Co., 2020 WL 5816759, at *7 (Del. 

Ch. Sept. 30, 2020) (quoting In re Gen. Motors (Hughes) S’holder Litig., 897 A.2d 

162, 168 (Del. 2006)). “[A] claim may be dismissed if allegations in the complaint 

or in the exhibits incorporated into the complaint effectively negate the claim as a 

matter of law.” Malpiede v. Townson, 780 A.2d 1075, 1083 (Del. 2001). 

Plaintiff’s declaratory judgment claim is dependent upon the success of his 

claims for either breach of contract or breach of the implied covenant of good faith 

and fair dealing. Therefore, I first address the breach of contract and implied 

covenant claims. 

B. Gower Has Adequately Alleged that the Share Sales Were the 

Product of a Breach of Contract. 

Count II alleges that the Moving Sellers breached their obligations under the 

ROFR Agreement to provide Gower written notice of the terms and conditions of 

the Share Sales “not later than sixty (60) days prior to the consummation of such 

Proposed Transfer.”84 As a result, Gower maintains, the Share Sales were “not made 

in compliance” with the requirements of the ROFR Agreement.85 

Under Delaware law, “the elements of a breach of contract claim are: (1) a 

contractual obligation; (2) a breach of that obligation by the defendant; and (3) a 

84 Pl.’s Ans. Br. to Viking 11 (quoting Ex. A § 2.1). 

85 Id. at 10–11; Compl. ¶¶ 56–57 (quoting Ex. A § 2.4). 
21

resulting damage to the plaintiff.” Skye Min. Invs., LLC v. DXS Cap. (U.S.) Ltd., 

2020 WL 881544, at *14 (Del. Ch. Feb. 24, 2020). “When addressing whether a 

plaintiff has well pled the first two elements, the court must consider, and often 

construe, the proffered contract at the heart of the claim of breach.” Id.

In Delaware, the construction of contract language presents 

a question of law. Rhone-Poulenc Basic Chems. Co. v. Am. Motorists Ins. Co., 616

A.2d 1192, 1195 (Del. 1992). The court’s “task is to fulfill the parties’ shared 

expectations at the time they contracted.” Leaf Invenergy Co. v. Invenergy 

Renewables LLC, 2019 WL 1965888, at *6 (Del. May 2, 2019) (internal quotation 

marks and alterations omitted). The court starts with the text of the contract. Sunline 

Comm’l Carriers, Inc. v. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 206 A.3d 836, 846 (Del. 2019). 

When a contract’s language is clear and unambiguous, the court will give effect to 

the plain meaning of the contract’s terms and provisions. Osborn v. Kemp, 991 A.2d

1153, 1159-60 (Del. 2010). The contract is to be read as a whole, giving effect to 

each term and provision, so as not to render any part of the contract mere

surplusage. Id. at 1159. “If a contract is unambiguous, extrinsic evidence may not 

be used to interpret the intent of the parties, to vary the terms of the contract, or to 

create an ambiguity.” Eagle Indus., Inc. v. DeVilbiss Health Care, Inc., 702 A.2d 

1228, 1232 (Del. 1997). If, however, the contract is ambiguous, the court may 

consider extrinsic evidence to determine the parties’ intent. Sunline Comm’l 
22

Carriers, 206 A.3d at 847. But “[a] contract is not rendered ambiguous simply 

because the parties do not agree upon its proper construction.” Rhone-Poulenc, 616 

A.2d at 1196.

1. The Complaint Alleges the Moving Sellers Failed to Comply 

with the Notice Requirement of the ROFR Agreement. 

Section 2.1(b) of the ROFR Agreement plainly and unambiguously imposes

an obligation on “each Stockholder proposing to make a Proposed Transfer” to 

provide notice to “each Closing Stockholder not later than sixty (60) days prior to 

the consummation of such Proposed Transfer” (the “Notice Requirement”).86 There 

is no dispute that the Moving Sellers were Stockholders or that Gower was a Closing 

Stockholder. The definition of “Proposed Transfer” applies to any “transfer”87 of 

shares, and the definition of “Prospective Transferee” covers “any person” and thus 

also Viking.88 As this court has recognized, the plain meaning of the term 

“consummate” in the context of business transactions “refers to closing”—the time

when the transactions contemplated by the agreement have been “completed.” 

Airborne Health, Inc. v. Squid Soap, LP, 984 A.2d 126, 138–39 (Del. Ch. 2009). 

When the Moving Sellers agreed to sell their shares to Viking, they had “proposed” 

86 Ex. A § 2.1(b).

87 Id. § 1.12.

88 Id. § 1.14.
23

to make a “Proposed Transfer,” triggering an obligation to provide Gower with at 

least 60 days’ notice before the Share Sales closed.

The Moving Defendants concede that the ROFR Agreement required the 

Moving Sellers to provide Closing Stockholders with 60 days’ notice of the 

Proposed Transfer to Viking.89 The Moving Defendants argue, however, that notice 

was only required to be provided to those Closing Stockholders that were seeking to 

“exercise primary, secondary, and tertiary first-refusal rights” and that “there is no 

suggestion in the . . . Complaint that Gower wanted to exercise—or could have 

exercised—any of those first-refusal rights.”90 This position relies on the theory that

the ROFR Agreement conditions the Notice Requirement on a Closing 

Stockholder’s desire or ability to exercise its Right of Refusal. Because Gower was 

looking only to exercise a Co-Sale Right, this argument runs, he was entitled to only

15 days’ notice under Section 2.3. 

89 Although Section 2.2(b), unlike Section 2.1(b), does not expressly provide that Closing 

Stockholders are entitled to 60 days’ notice, the Moving Defendants have proceeded as 

though 60 days’ notice was required to be provided to Closing Stockholders under both 

provisions. See Viking Opening Br. 4 (“Subsections 2.1 and 2.2 of the ROFR Agreement 

require each ‘Stockholder proposing to make a Proposed Transfer’ to ‘deliver a Proposed 

Transfer Notice to [Trux], [Viking], each Investor other than [Viking] and each Closing 

Stockholder not later than sixty (60) days prior to the consummation of such Proposed 

Transfer.’”)(emphasis added); Moving Sellers’ Opening Br. at 4 (adopting and 

incorporating by reference “the arguments stated in the Viking Brief”). 

90 Viking Opening Br. 14. 
24

This proposed limitation on the scope of the Notice Requirement in Section 

2.1(b) is contrary to the plain meaning of the contract. When construing a contract, 

the court must give effect to all its provisions. Salamone v. Gorman, 106 A.3d 354, 

368 (Del. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). While “general terms of the 

contract must yield to more specific terms,” Sunline Com. Carriers, 206 A.3d at 

846, the “meaning inferred from a particular provision cannot control the meaning 

of the entire agreement if such an inference conflicts with the agreement’s overall 

scheme or plan.” Riverbend Cmty., LLC v. Green Stone Eng’g, LLC, 55 A.3d 330, 

335 (Del. 2012). The Moving Defendants’ sole textual basis for limiting the scope 

of the Notice Requirement is that the requirement “is found in the two subsections 

governing the right of first refusal.”91 The implication of this position is that even 

though Section 2.1(b) on its face requires 60 days’ notice “to the Company, [Viking], 

each Investor other than [Viking] and each Closing Stockholder,” the Notice 

Requirement only applies to Viking because Section 2.1 governs the Special ROFR 

right which only Viking possesses. That interpretation would render the bulk of the 

Notice Requirement in Section 2.1 mere surplusage and is not reasonable. Moving 

Defendants thus point to nothing in the text of ROFR Agreement that would justify

limiting the scope of the Notice Requirement in the manner they propose. 

91 Id.
25

Moving Defendants’ atextual limitation would also undermine the structure 

of the contract. The unequivocal language of the Notice Requirement reflects the 

intent of the parties to structure the Rights of Refusal around requirements that 

facilitate the flow of information downstream. See Union Oil Co. of California v. 

Mobil Pipeline Co., 2006 WL 3770834, at *13 (Del. Ch. Dec. 15, 2006) (observing 

that “communication is one of the primary concerns” of a stockholders’ agreement 

containing similar right of first refusal provisions, “as illustrated by the fact that it is 

structured around the ROFR Notice”). Gower’s ability to exercise his Co-Sale 

Right, moreover, was tethered to the exercise by other Stockholders of their Rights 

of Refusal because the Co-Sale Right only vests “if any Transfer Stock subject to a 

Proposed Transfer is not purchased pursuant to Subsections 2.1 and 2.2.”92 The 

Moving Defendants’ interpretation of these provisions would instead make notice 

conditional upon the downstream actions of the contract parties. That gets things 

backwards and would rewrite the core mechanism by which the contract initiates the

waterfall of Rights of Refusal and upon which the entire Sales Process hinges. 

The Moving Sellers also take an even more extreme position, arguing that

Gower was not entitled to even 15 days’ notice because he never provided notice of 

his interest in selling his shares under Section 2.3(a).93 Section 2.3(a) requires a 

92 Ex. A § 2.3(a). 

93 Moving Sellers’ Opening Br. 7.
26

Closing Stockholder to provide the requisite notice to exercise its Co-Sale Right; 

nothing in the provision conditions Gower’s right to receive notice on his taking any

affirmative actions. Moreover, for a Closing Stockholder to be able to provide 

requisite notice of its interest in a transaction, the Closing Stockholder must know 

about the transaction in the first place. Conditioning the Notice Requirement upon

a declaration of interest from Gower would not only contradict the Notice 

Requirement but would also undermine the contract’s basic structure. That is not a 

reasonable interpretation of Section 2.3(a). See Veloric v. J.G. Wentworth, Inc., 

2014 WL 4639217, at *9 (Del. Ch. Sept. 18, 2014) (observing that the court “should 

avoid interpreting a term in an unreasonable way that would yield an absurd result 

or that would render other contractual language superfluous”). 

2. The Complaint Adequately Pleads that the Moving Sellers

Failed to Provide Gower with Requisite Notice. 

Gower alleges that, when he received notice of the Share Sales on April 1, 

2020, the Moving Sellers “had . . . already purported to transfer their Trux stock to 

Viking.”94 The Moving Defendants do not argue otherwise. Gower is therefore

entitled to the pleadings-stage inference that the Share Sales had already closed or 

94 Compl. ¶ 5. 
27

would close sooner than 60 days from the announcement of the transactions on April 

1, 2020.95 

The Moving Defendants insist that even if Gower was not provided with the 

contractually mandated notice of the Proposed Transfer, the Notice Requirement

was waived pursuant to a written stockholder consent.96 This argument fails for 

several independent reasons. 

Waiver is an affirmative defense. Medek v. Medek, 2008 WL 4261017, at *10 

(Del. Ch. Sept. 10, 2008). “To prove waiver, Defendants must prove Plaintiff 

voluntarily and intentionally relinquished a known right.” Id. There is no executed 

waiver in the record. All that the Complaint shows is that Trux asked the

Stockholders to execute a form of Written Consent on March 12, 2020. The Written 

95 The stock purchase agreements governing the Share Sales between the Moving Sellers

and Viking are not in the record. Trux and Viking refused to provide copies of those 

agreements to Gower’s counsel. See Ex. G (Trux’s counsel informing Gower’s counsel 

that “the Company has instructed us not to do so”); Ex. H (Viking’s counsel describing but 

failing to provide the agreements). 

96 Viking Opening Br. 12 (“The Amended Complaint also shows that a majority of Trux’s 

Stockholders waived the notice provision Gower now claims was breached.”); see also id. 

at 15 (“a majority of the Stockholders ‘waive[d] and forever release[d] all of the 

Stockholders’ rights to the Right of First refusal in connection with the Transaction’—

including the right to ‘notice’ of the transaction”); id. (“That waiver forecloses any 

potential obligation to provide Gower with notice under subsections 2.1(b) or 2.2(b).”); id.

(“Gower tries to circumvent that waiver . . . .”); id. at 17 (“Gower could not prevail on his 

lack-of-notice claim because Trux, Viking, and a majority of the Stockholders approved 

the transaction. While the ROFR Agreement contemplates a 60-day notice period to allow 

for various first refusal rights, the parties to that ROFR Agreement later ‘authorize[d], 

approve[d], and consent[ed] to’ the ‘transactions contemplated by the Term Sheet.’”

(emphasis omitted)). 
28

Consent purports to “Resolve” that Stockholders “waive and forever release all of 

the Stockholders’ rights to the Right of First Refusal in connection with the 

Transaction.”97 The Transaction to which the Written Consent refers is reflected in 

an attached Term Sheet wherein Viking proposed to purchase all of the Company’s 

outstanding shares for “approximately $.9928 per share of common stock.”98 An 

unsigned Written Consent, which does not reflect that it was executed by 

stockholders owning a majority of the Company’s outstanding common stock, does 

not satisfy the Moving Defendants’ burden on a motion to dismiss. See Allen v. 

Prime Computer, Inc., 540 A.2d 417, 420 (Del. 1988) (“[F]or there to be valid 

stockholder action under § 228 written consents must be signed by holders of a 

majority of the outstanding voting shares.”). 

Even if the proposed Written Consent had been executed,

99 Gower’s 

allegations support a reasonable inference that the Written Consent’s waiver of the 

Notice Requirement did not extend to the Share Sales. Section 6.8 of the ROFR 

97 Ex. B.

98 Id.

99 The unsigned March 12, 2020 Written Consent states that it is a written consent pursuant 

to Section 228 of the Delaware General Corporation Law. Ex. B. The statute requires that 

action by less than unanimous written consent be provided to non-consenting stockholders. 

8 Del. C. § 228 (e) (“Prompt notice of the taking of the corporation action without a meeting 

by less than unanimous consent shall be given to those stockholders . . . who have not 

consented and who, if the action had been taken at a meeting, would have been entitled to 

notice of the meeting . . . .”). None of the Defendants has contended that any such notice 

was provided to Gower or any other non-consenting Stockholder.
29

Agreement provides that “[n]o waivers of or exceptions to any term, condition or 

provision of this Agreement, in any one or more instances, shall be deemed to be, or 

construed as, a further or continuing waiver of any such term, condition or

provision.”100 The well-pleaded allegations of the Complaint support a reasonable 

inference that the transaction proposed on March 12, 2020 to which the Written 

Consent applied was different from the actual Share Sales between Viking and the 

Moving Sellers.

101 Pursuant to the transaction proposed on March 12, 2020, Viking 

would purchase “all the outstanding shares . . . of capital stock held by all 

shareholders” for a price share of approximately $0.99 per share.

102 Viking’s 

proposal indicated that it would “expire” on March 18, 2020, and that Viking 

expected the “transaction can be closed on or before March 31, 2020.”103 Contrast 

100 Ex. A § 6.8(a) (emphasis added). 

101 Compl. ¶ 35. Viking’s argument that Gower understood that “there was already 

sufficient shareholder approval of the Stockholder Consent,” Viking Reply Br. 6, 

overstates an email exchange between Gower’s counsel and the Company’s counsel. In 

that email, Gower’s counsel recounts their call from the prior evening. Gower’s counsel 

stated: “To confirm, given your belief that there is no need for Mr. Gower to execute the 

Stockholder Consent (because there is already sufficient shareholder approval) and our 

concern with some of the language in the document, Mr. Gower will not be executing the 

Stockholder Consent.” Ex. C. The fact that Gower’s counsel was told that “there is already 

sufficient shareholder approval” does not establish the fact that there was sufficient 

approval, or that the Written Consent pertained to the transaction described in the April 1, 

2020 email. Id.

102 Ex. B. 

103 Id. 
30

that with Ronan’s representations in the April 1, 2020 email.104 That email, stating 

that Viking had entered into agreements to purchase the shares of the Moving 

Sellers, offered different terms than the March 12, 2020 proposal. The April 1, 2020 

proposal gave Gower two options: he could either sell his shares for $1.18 per 

share—with $0.66 of that amount payable over 15 months—or for $0.92 per share

in a single up-front cash payment.

105 It is reasonable to infer for pleadings-stage 

purposes that Viking’s initial proposal contemplated a different transaction and 

terms than that of April 1. When the Moving Sellers accepted Viking’s offer to 

purchase their shares, they thereby proposed a different transaction to which the

purported waiver did not apply. 

Moving Defendants also argue that, as a practical matter, Gower had enough 

time to evaluate Viking’s proposal and therefore received the benefit of the notice 

provisions. “When confronted with less than literal compliance with a notice 

provision, courts have required that a party substantially comply with the notice 

provision. The requirement of substantial compliance is an attempt to avoid harsh 

results . . . where the purpose of these [notice] requirements has been met.” Gildor,

2006 WL 4782348, at *7 (internal quotation marks omitted). But the Moving 

Defendants do not argue that the Moving Sellers attempted but failed to provide 

104 Ex. F. 

105 Id. 
31

Gower with 60 days’ notice. The facts alleged in the Complaint indicate that the 

Moving Sellers made no such effort. The Moving Defendants now maintain the 

Moving Sellers did not need to try because Gower was only entitled to, at most, 15 

days’ notice. That argument is entirely inconsistent with the terms of the ROFR 

Agreement. 

For these reasons, the Complaint contains well-pleaded allegations that the 

Moving Sellers breached the Notice Requirement in the ROFR Agreement. The 

motion to dismiss Count II is therefore denied. 

C. The Claim for Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and 

Fair Dealing Is Duplicative of the Breach of Contract Claim and Is

Dismissed. 

Count III alleges a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair 

dealing against the Moving Sellers for failure to provide notice consistent with the 

Notice Requirement of Section 2.1. The implied covenant of good faith and fair 

dealing inheres in every contract governed by Delaware law and requires “a party in 

a contractual relationship to refrain from arbitrary or unreasonable conduct which 

has the effect of preventing the other party to the contract from receiving the fruits 

of the bargain.” Dunlap v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 878 A.2d 434, 442 (Del. 

2005) (quoting Wilgus v. Salt Pond Inv. Co., 498 A.2d 151, 159 (Del. Ch. 1995)

(internal quotation marks omitted)). “[T]he implied covenant only applies where 

a contract lacks specific language governing an issue and the obligation the court is 
32

asked to imply advances, and does not contradict, the purposes reflected in the 

express language of the contract.” Alliance Data Sys. Corp. v. Blackstone Cap. P’rs 

V L.P., 963 A.2d 746, 770 (Del. Ch.), aff’d, 976 A.2d 170 (Del. 2009). “The doctrine 

thus operates only in that narrow band of cases where the contract as a whole speaks 

sufficiently to suggest an obligation and point to a result, but does not speak directly 

enough to provide an explicit answer.” Airborne Health, Inc. v. Squid Soap, LP, 984 

A.2d 126, 146 (Del. Ch. 2009). “[T]he covenant is a limited and extraordinary legal 

remedy. As such, the implied covenant does not apply when the contract addresses 

the conduct at issue, but only when the contract is truly silent concerning the matter 

at hand.” Oxbow Carbon & Minerals Hldgs., Inc. v. Crestview-Oxbow Acquisition, 

Inc., 202 A.3d 482, 507 (Del. 2019) (cleaned up). 

“Because express contractual provisions ‘always supersede’ the implied 

covenant, an implied covenant claim will not survive a motion to dismiss if it 

duplicates breach of contract claims.” Bandera Master Fund LP v. Boardwalk 

Pipeline P’rs, LP, 2019 WL 4927053, at *22 (Del. Ch. Oct. 7, 2019). In his 

answering brief, Gower clarifies that he asserts his breach of the implied covenant 

claim in the alternative, in the event the court were to determine that the Complaint 

failed to state a claim for breach of contract.

106 Because the court has determined 

106 Pl.’s Ans. Br. to Moving Sellers 11–12.
33

that Count II states a claim for breach of contract, the implied covenant claim is 

“duplicative and not viable.” Edinburgh Hldgs., Inc. v. Educ. Affiliates, Inc., 2018 

WL 2727542, at *9 (Del. Ch. June 6, 2018). As such, the claim “fails as a matter of 

law and must be dismissed.” Id.

D. Plaintiff Has Stated a Claim for Declaratory Relief. 

Count III seeks a declaratory judgment that the Share Sales are void. Gower 

argues that the failure to provide the contractually mandated notice under the ROFR 

Agreement renders any non-compliant transaction void under Section 2.4: “Any 

Proposed Transfer not made in compliance with the requirements of this Agreement 

shall be null and void ab initio, shall not be recorded on the books of the Company 

or its transfer agent and shall not be recognized by the Company.”107 Moving 

Defendants do not dispute that the notice requirements in the ROFR Agreement 

constitute “requirements” for purposes of Section 2.4. 

Defendants raise three arguments specific to Gower’s declaratory judgment

claim. First, the Moving Defendants argue that the court should dismiss the claim

on equitable grounds because Gower waited too long to seek a declaratory judgment. 

Second, the Moving Defendants argue that Gower is not entitled to declaratory relief

107 Ex. A § 2.4(a) (emphasis added). 
34

because he has not alleged harm to his stock. Third, Trux argues that it should be 

dismissed from this action because it is not a proper party. 

The Declaratory Judgment Act, 10 Del. C. § 6501 et seq., gives the court the 

power to issue declaratory judgments. A declaratory judgment is a creature of statute 

and “not a purely equitable remedy.” Kraft v. WisdomTree Invs., Inc., 145 A.3d 969, 

985 (Del. Ch. 2016). When “declaratory relief is sought, all persons shall be made 

parties who have or claim any interest which would be affected by the declaration, 

and no declaration shall prejudice the rights of persons not parties to the proceeding.” 

10 Del. C. § 6511. This court has found occasion not to dismiss a declaratory 

judgment claim where the defendant’s “interest in the controversy” was not “so 

attenuated that it could not properly have been named as a defendant.” Sprint Nextel 

Corp. v. iPCS, Inc., 2008 WL 2737409, at *14 (Del. Ch. July 14, 2008). 

The court’s power to issue declaratory judgments is limited by the well-settled 

principle that a declaratory judgment must “address an actual controversy between 

parties with affected rights.” Lynch v. Gonzalez, 2020 WL 5648567, at *6 (Del. Ch. 

Sept. 22, 2020). For the case or controversy requirement to be satisfied: 

(1) [The case] must be a controversy involving the rights or other legal 

relations of the party seeking declaratory relief; (2) it must be a 

controversy in which the claim of right or other legal interest is asserted 

against one who has an interest in contesting the claim; (3) the 

controversy must be between parties whose interests are real and 

adverse; [and] (4) the issue involved in the controversy must be ripe for 

judicial determination. 
35

Rollins Int’l, Inc. v. Int’l Hydronics Corp., 303 A.2d 660, 662–63 (Del. 1973). The 

case or controversy requirement serves to ensure that an “application for declaratory 

relief” does not turn into “a contingent, speculative venture that would require the 

Court to issue an advisory opinion.” K&K Screw Prod., L.L.C. v. Emerick Cap. 

Invs., Inc., 2011 WL 3505354, at *9 (Del. Ch. Aug. 9, 2011). Even when the 

requirement is met, the court may dismiss a defendant if it would be “inequitable for 

this Court to require [the defendant] to remain as a defendant in [the] action.” Sprint 

Nextel Corp., 2008 WL 2737409, at *14. 

1. Moving Defendants’ Thinly Veiled Laches Argument Cannot 

Be Decided at this Stage. 

Moving Defendants argue that the court should exercise its discretion to deny 

Gower a declaratory judgment on equitable grounds. Declaratory judgment would 

be inequitable, Moving Defendants aver, because Gower waited 232 days to file his 

lawsuit and unwinding the Share Sales would cause substantial prejudice to the 

Moving Defendants and Trux.108 Moving Defendants’ appeal to equity and the 

exercise of discretion is nothing short of a laches defense. “[D]ismissal of the 

complaint based upon an affirmative defense is inappropriate” under Delaware law 

“[u]nless it is clear from the face of the complaint that an affirmative defense exists 

and that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts to avoid it.” Reid v. Spazio, 970 A.2d 

108 Id. at 27–28.
36

176, 183–84 (Del. 2009). “[L]aches generally requires proof of three elements: first, 

knowledge by the claimant; second, unreasonable delay in bringing the claim; and 

third, resulting prejudice to the defendant.” Whittington v. Dragon Grp., L.L.C., 991 

A.2d 1, 8 (Del. 2009) (quoting Reid, 970 A.2d at 182–83) (cleaned up). Whether

Gower unreasonably delayed in filing his complaint and whether the Moving 

Defendants and Trux would suffer prejudice due to Gower’s inaction is a factual 

question to be resolved at a later stage in the proceedings. See Reid, 970 A.2d at 183 

(“In ruling on a motion to dismiss under Court of Chancery Rule 12(b)(6), the Court 

is generally limited to facts appearing on the face of the pleadings. Accordingly, 

affirmative defenses, such as laches, are not ordinarily well-suited for treatment on 

such a motion.”). In that regard, the Moving Defendants do not address Gower’s 

argument that any claim of unreasonable delay fails under the express terms of the 

contract. Section 6.7 provides that “no delay or omission to exercise any right, 

power or remedy accruing to any party under this Agreement, shall impair any such 

right, power or remedy of such non-breaching or non-defaulting party.”109 

“Delaware courts do not lightly trump the freedom to contract and, in the absence of 

some countervailing public policy interest, courts should respect the parties’

bargain.” Gildor, 2006 WL 4782348, at *11. I need not definitively decide the 

109 Ex. A § 6.7. 
37

applicability of that provision on this motion. The parties have not fully briefed it. 

For present purposes, it is not “clear from the face of the complaint that an 

affirmative defense exists and that the Plaintiff can prove no set of facts to avoid it.” 

Reid, 970 A.2d at 183. In any event, it is premature for me to deny the Plaintiff the 

discretionary remedy of declaratory relief based upon a thinly veiled laches defense 

on a motion to dismiss. 

2. Gower’s Request for an Alternative Remedy of Damages

Does Not Compel Dismissal of His Request for Relief.

Moving Defendants argue that Gower is not entitled to declaratory judgment 

because Gower has not alleged any “damage to the value of his holding resulting 

from the transaction.”110 The Moving Defendants confuse the arguments and the 

relief sought in the Complaint. Plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment that the Share 

Sales are void under the ROFR Agreement.111 Damages is sought “[i]n the 

alternative.”112 Moving Defendants, as parties to the ROFR Agreement, ignore that 

they have already stipulated that “any breach of this Agreement would result in 

substantial harm to the other parties hereto for which monetary damages alone could 

not adequately compensate.”113 Gower’s claim requires a “determination of rights 

110 Viking Opening Br. 11. 

111 Compl. ¶ 6.

112 Id. ¶ 7. 

113 Ex. A § 2.4(a) (emphasis added). 
38

as between the defendant and . . . other stockholders as to their respective interests 

in the corporation’s assets.” Highlights for Child., Inc. v. Crown, 193 A.2d 205, 207 

(Del. Ch. 1963). As a party to the ROFR Agreement, Gower has an interest in 

resolving the question of whether the Share Sales were invalid and to know from 

whom he has a right to purchase shares (and to whom he may sell his shares) under 

the agreement.114

3. Is Trux a Proper Defendant in this Action?

Trux argues that it is not a proper party to this action because it “has no stake 

in the outcome of this case and any declaratory relief that could be awarded does not 

relate in any way to Trux’s actions or interests.”115 

In support of that proposition, Trux cites two cases. In Lynch v. Gonzalez, the 

court held that a Delaware limited liability company lacked standing to prosecute a 

declaratory judgment claim as to the validity of a purported share transfer between 

two of its stockholders. 2020 WL 5648567, at *7. The court so held because the 

114 Moving Defendants also argue that Gower’s declaratory judgment claim should be 

dismissed because Gower’s dispute is “over Gower’s termination and the redemption of 

his unvested shares.” Viking Opening Br. 26–27. But Gower asserts no such claim and 

seeks no corresponding relief in this action. Pl.’s Ans. Br. to Viking 20. The mere fact 

that Gower may have legal rights related to his termination under a different agreement has 

no bearing on whether he may bring claims under the ROFR Agreement. As the “master 

of [his] complaint,” Gower “can choose what [he] wants to plead.” Amalgamated Bank v. 

Yahoo! Inc., 132 A.3d 752, 797 (Del. Ch. 2016), abrogated on other grounds, 214 A.3d 

933 (Del. 2019). 

115 Trux Opening Br. 3. 
39

plaintiff was not involved in the transfer and had not “suffered any cognizable harm 

from the purported private transfer.” Id. Lynch relied on SolarReserve CSP 

Holdings, LLC v. Tonopah Solar Energy, LLC, in which the court held that the 

plaintiff lacked standing to bring breach of contract claims under an LLC agreement 

because it had assigned its “right, title, and interest in and to all actions” against the 

defendant to a third party. 2020 WL 4251968, at *4 (Del. Ch. July 24, 2020), order 

vacated, appeal dismissed, 258 A.3d 806 (Del. 2021), vacated, (Del. Ch. 2021), 

order vacated, appeal dismissed, 258 A.3d 806 (Del. 2021). “As such,” the court

held, “SolarReserve would not be the beneficiary of any relief that might be achieved 

in this action.” Id.

Gower first argues that these cases are not applicable because, unlike the 

parties without standing in Lynch and SolarReserve, Trux is a defendant and not a 

plaintiff in this action.116 The court in Lynch made clear, however, that it was 

addressing the third prong of the case or controversy requirement—that “the 

controversy must be between parties whose interests are real and adverse.” Lynch, 

2020 WL 5648567, at *7 (emphasis in the original). That prong applies to plaintiffs 

and defendants alike. See K&K Screw Prod., 2011 WL 3505354, at *8 (discussing 

whether defendant had an interest that was “real and adverse” to the plaintiff “in 

116 Pl.’s Ans. Br. to Trux 4.
40

contesting this action”). Lynch therefore supports the proposition that a corporation 

has no real and adverse interest in a declaratory judgment action between its 

stockholders if it “does not hold any rights [or obligations] at issue in the dispute”

or does not stand to receive “the fruits of the purported bargain.” Lynch, 2020 WL 

5648567, at *6 n.52.

Gower’s other argument is more persuasive. Gower argues that Trux does

have a stake in this dispute because Trux is a party to the ROFR Agreement and 

because judgment for the Plaintiff would impose an obligation on Trux.117 The 

ROFR Agreement provides that “[a]ny Proposed Transfer not made in compliance 

with the requirements of this Agreement shall be null and void ab initio, shall not be 

recorded on the books of the Company or its transfer agent and shall not be 

recognized by the Company.”118 The Declaratory Judgment Act provides that, when 

“declaratory relief is sought, all persons shall be made parties who have or claim 

any interest which would be affected by the declaration, and no declaration shall 

prejudice the rights of persons not parties to the proceeding.” 10 Del. C. § 6511 

(emphasis added). The statute thus codifies 

[Equity]’s fundamental principle concerning parties . . . that all persons 

in whose favor or against whom there might be a recovery, however 

partial, and also all persons who are so interested, although indirectly, 

in the subject-matter and the relief granted, that their rights or duties 

117 Id. at 3–4. 

118 Ex. A § 2.4(a).
41

might be affected by the decree, although no substantial recovery can 

be obtained either for or against them, shall be made parties to the suit.

Sprint Nextel, 2008 WL 2737409, at *13 (emphasis omitted) (quoting 1 Pomeroy’s 

Equity Jurisprudence § 114 (5th ed. 1941). 119 It is not the case that Trux has no

interest in the outcome of this dispute.120

Trux argues that it is not named as merely a nominal defendant, and should 

not be subjected to discovery and other expenses as if it were an adversarial party.121 

That argument misses the mark. First, it is inevitable that Trux will be subjected to 

discovery in this case, either through discovery as a party or through a subpoena. 

Second, as a practical matter, it became apparent through the briefing and argument 

119 Trux argues that Gower’s dispute as to Trux is purely hypothetical, relying on 

Boilermakers Local 154 Retirement Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934 (Del. Ch. 2013). 

In Boilermakers, plaintiffs challenged forum selection clauses in corporate bylaws, 

presenting the court with “purely hypothetical situations in which they sa[id] that the 

bylaws of Chevron and FedEx might operate unreasonably.” Id. at 940. The court refused 

to consider the hypothetical scenarios, explaining “it would be imprudent and inappropriate 

to address these hypotheticals in the absence of a genuine controversy with concrete facts.” 

Id. Unlike in Boilermakers, Gower’s complaint presents a genuine controversy with 

concrete facts. 

120 When asked at oral argument whether Trux would void the Share Sales on the 

Company’s books if the court were to enter judgment in favor of Plaintiff, Trux’s counsel 

equivocated. Dkt. 65 (Hrg. Tr.) at 33:4–7 (“The only thing I can say at this point, Your 

Honor, is it is an extremely remote possibility that there would ever be a dispute about this 

if Mr. Gower prevails in this lawsuit.”).

121 Id. at 26:17–21 (“Trux is not named as a nominal party here. We are named as an actual 

party in the declaratory judgment case, claim. And, therefore, we would have to defend 

the case in some way.”); id. at 26:12–15 (“It would be unfair to require Trux to engage in 

this litigation, to engage in discovery, to take positions on matters that we really have no 

interest in.”). 
42

that Trux effectively is a nominal defendant, even though not denominated as such 

in the Complaint. Accordingly, the court does not anticipate that Trux will be a 

participant in these proceedings to the same extent as the remaining Defendants. In 

that respect, Trux “has not shown that it would suffer any additional mutual burden 

or difficulty in remaining a defendant in this action.” Sprint Nextel, 2008 WL 

2737409, at *14. 

Trux has staked its motion to dismiss solely on the theory that it has absolutely 

no interest in this action. For the reasons stated above, I am not persuaded that the 

Company is an improper party with no interest in the outcome of this action. Trux’s 

motion to dismiss is therefore denied. 

III. CONCLUSION

For these reasons, the motions to dismiss Count I and Count II are denied, and 

the motions to dismiss Count III are granted for failure to state a claim. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.