The Honor able B rian M. Cog an, United States District Court for the Easter

n District of Ne w * York, sitting by

desig nation. 1 06- 5614- cv Dur a n v . Be a um ont

1 U N IT E D S T A T E S C O U R T O F A P P E A LS 2 3 F OR THE S EC OND C IR C U IT 4 5 6 7 August Term, 2007 8 9 (Argued: Marc h 4, 2008 Dec ided: J uly 18, 2008) 10 11 Docke t No. 06-5614-c v 12 13 14 H UGO A L EJ ANDR O V I LLEG A S D UR AN , 15 16 Petitioner-Appellant , 17 18 –v.– 19 20 J OHANA I VETT E A R R I B ADA B EA UMONT , 21 22 Respondent- Appellee . 23 24 25 26 Be fore : 27 28 W I NT ER and W ES L EY , Circuit Judges , and C OGAN , District Judge . * 29 30 Appea l from a f inal judgme nt of the United States District Court for the Southern District 31 of Ne w York ( Robinson, J .) dismissing for la ck of jurisdiction petitioner’ s motion for return of 32 his da

ughte r t o Ch ile . We a ff

ir m and ho ld t hat pe tit ion e r d id n ot a c tua lly po sse ss c us tod

y ri g hts 33 at the time of his daughter’s r emoval to the United States, such a s to allow him to seek return of 34 her, unde r the Ha gue Convention, implemented by the International Chil d Abduction Remedies 35 Ac t. 36 37 J udg e Wesley dissents in a separ ate opinion. 382

1 J OS HUA A. B R OOK (Roderic k L . Arz, on the brief ), Arnold & Porter, L L P, New 2 York, N.Y ., for Appellant , 1 R OB E R T D. A R E N ST E IN , New Y ork, N.Y., for Appellee. 2 3 COGAN, District J udg e: 4 Appellant, Hug o Alejandr o Villeg as Dura n, seeks a n order compellingAppellee , J ohana 5 Ive tte Ar

ri ba da B e a umo nt, to r e tur

n th e ir da ughte r, Va le nti na

Al me nd ra Vi lle g a s A rr iba da , to 6 Chile under the Ha gue Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Chil d Abduction, done 7 at the Ha gue on Oc t. 25, 1980, T.I .A.S. No. 22,670, 1343 U.N.T.S. 89, re pr inte d in 5 1 Fe d . R eg. 8 10,494 (1986) ( the “Ha gue Convention”), implemente d by the International Chil d Abduction 9 Remedies Ac t (“I CARA”), 42 U.S.C. § 11601 et seq. (2000). The United States District Court 10 for the Souther

n District of Ne w York ( Robinson, J .) denie d Appellant’s pe tition for an orde r of 11 return, f

inding that Appe llant does not have r ights of c ustody under the Hague Convention. 12 We hold that Appellant’s rig hts do not constitut e rights of custody within the meaningof 13 the Ha gue Conve nti on . B e c a us e a dis tr ic t c ourt

ha s juri sd ic tio n to or de r t he re tur n o f a c hil d 14 under the Hague Convention only if the child has be en re moved in brea ch of a petitioning 15 pare nt’s custodial rig hts, the district court lacke d jurisdiction to order the r eturn of the child and 16 proper ly

dismiss ed the pe tition. 17 BACK GR OUND 18 Appellant and A ppellee, both Chilean c itiz ens, we re involved r omantically but never 19 marr ie d. Th e ir

da ug hte r w a s b or

n o n Apr il 2 2, 20 01 , in

Chi le and

liv e d w ithbo th p are nts until 20 they

separ ated in 2004. While the separ ated c ouple lived in Chile, the child lived with Appellee, 21 and Appe llant had visitation rights.La w N ° 16, 618 – M I NO RS L AW , TI TL E II I, J U V E N I L E C O U R T S Y S T E M

– ORGANI Z AT I ON AND POW E RS , A rt. 4 9 , p ro vid es: 1 Shoul d t he cus t od y of

a c hi l d hav e n ot been gr ant ed by t he j udge t o ei t her par ent or t o a t hi r d part y , t he mi nor may not ex i t t he count r y wi t hout t he aut hor i zat i on of bot h par ent s , or f

r om t he one wh o had r ecogn i zed h i m ... . I f s uch au t h or i za t i on c an n ot be g r an t ed or i f , w i t h ou t r ea s on abl e g r ou n ds , i s r ef u s ed by t h e per s on f

r om wh om i t i s r equ i r ed, i t m ay b e grant ed by t he juveni l e judge having juri sdi ct i o n ove r t he p l ace o f res i d ence o f

t he m i no r. 3 1 Under

Chilean law, Appellee could not remove the child from Chile without Appellant’s

1 2 pe rm iss ion , a

nd Ap pe lla nt r e fu se d to c on se nt. Th e re fo re , App e lle e pe tit ion e d th e Ei g hth Min or s’ 3 Court of Santiag o, and the c ourt issued an orde r authorizing he r to trave l to the United States 4 with the child for thre e months. Appellee and the c hild departe d Chile on Aug ust 3, 2005. The 5 trave l period expired on Novembe r 3, 2005, but Appellee rema ined with the child in the United 6 State s, in v iol atio n o f t he Chi le an c ourt ’s or de r. Ac c or din gto a c e rt if ic atio n is su e d b y

the Ei g hth 7 Min or s’ Court

of Santi a g o o n Augus t 28 , 2 00 6, a fi na l de te rm inatio n o f s ole c us tod y fo r t he c hil d 8 has not y et bee n deter mined. 9 On J uly

25, 2006, Appellant filed a Petition for the Return of Child and an Or der to Show 10 Cause in the Southern District of N ew Yor k. The district cour

t held evidentiar

y hear ings on the 11 Petition and found that it lacked jurisdiction to order the re turn of the c hild because Appellant 12 did not have rig hts of custody under Chilean la

w. The c ourt then denie d Appellant’s motion for 13 rec onsideration. This appe al followed. 14 DI SCU SSIO N 15 The issue be fore this Court i s whether under the Hague Convention Appellant ha s 16 custody

rig hts as opposed to rig hts of acc ess. I f Appe llant has custody rig hts, United States 17 courts would have jurisdiction to order the r eturn of the child. Howeve r, if Appe llant merely has 18 acc ess rig hts, as the district court found that he did, then United States cour ts are w ithout 19 j ur i s d i c t i o nt o o r d e r th i s r e m e dy.4

1 In a ca se brought under the H ague Convention, we r eview the district court’s c onclusions 2 of law de novo. Cro ll v . Croll , 229 F.3d 133, 136 ( 2d Cir. 2000). “In case s arisingunder the 3 Convention, a district court' s fac tual deter minations are r eviewe d for c lear err or.” Blondin v. 4 Du bo is , 238 F.3d 153, 158 ( 2d Cir. 2001). In addition, “[t] he [d] istrict [ c]ourt's a pplication of 5 the Convention to the fac ts it has found, like the interpre tation of the Convention, is subject to de 6 novo revie w.” Id. 7 “ In c on str

uin ga tr e aty , a s in

c on str uin ga statut e , w e fi rs t lo ok

to i ts t e rm s to de te rm ine its 8 meaning .” Un ite d S tates v . A lv ar e

z- Ma c ha in , 5 04 U. S. 6 55 , 6 63 (1 99 2) . A lth ou g h w e be g in 9 with the text , we may also “look beyond the written wor ds” to other f actor s, such as the “ history 10 of the tre aty , the neg otiations, and the prac tical construc tion adopted by the par ties,” for 11 guidance . Eastern Airlines, Inc. v . Floyd , 499 U.S. 530, 534-35 (1991) ( internal quotations 12 omitted). 13 The Ha gue Convention was e ntere d into force for the United States on J uly 1, 1988, for 14 the purpose of

“prote ct[ing] children internationally from the ha

rmful ef fec ts of their wrong ful 15 re mov a l or

re te nti on and to e sta bli shpr oc e dure s to e ns ur e the ir pr omp t r e tur

n to the State of

the ir 16 habitual re sidence , as we ll as to secure protec tion for rig hts of acc ess.” Ha gue Convention, 17 Preamble, 51 F ed.Reg . at 10,498. The H ague Convention is specifica lly desig ned to pre vent the 18 remova l or rete ntion of children by close fa mily members. “ To deter

family members f

rom 19 removingchildren to jurisdictions more fa vorable to their custody

claims in order

to obtain a 20 rig ht of custody

from the a

uthorities of the country

to which the child has be en take n, the Hague 21 Convention attempts to deprive [their] actions of any prac tical or juridica l conseque nces.” Gitter 22 v. Gitter , 396 F.3d 124, 129- 30 (2d Cir. 2005) (inter nal quotations omitt ed). The Hague 23 Conve nti on

a do pts the pr inc ipl e that th e c hil d’ s c ountr y of “ ha bit ua l r e sid e nc e ” is “ be st p la c e d toE lisa P é re z -V e ra w a s “th e o ff ic ia l H a g u e C o n fer e n c e re p o rte r fo r th e C o n v e n tio n .” H a g u e In te rn a tio n a l C h ild 2 Abduc t i on Conv en t i on ; T ex t a n d Le g al An al y s i s , 51 Fe d. Reg . a t 10, 503. “ H er e x pl an at or y r epor t i s r ec og n i ze d by t he C onf er enc e a s t he of

f i ci al hi s t ory an d com ment ar y on t he C onven t i on, ” i d. , an d w e ha v e p re v io u sly sa id tha t “it i s an au t hor i t at i ve s our ce f or i nt er pret i ng t he C onven t i on' s provi s i ons , ” C ro ll , 229 F. 3d a t 137 n . 3. 5 1 decide upon questions of custody and ac cess.” Cro ll , 229 F.3d at 137 (quoting Elisa Pér ez-Ver a, 2 Explanatory Re

port: Hague Conferenc e on Private I nternational L aw , in

3 A c ts a nd Do c ume nts 3 of the F ourtee nth Session (Chil d Abduction) 426, 434-35, ¶ 34 (1980)) . Both the United States

2 4 and Chile are signatories to the Hague Convention. 5 “ A p e tit ion e r c ann ot i nv ok e the pr ote c tio n o f t he Ha gue Conve nti on

un le ss t he c hil d to 6 whom the petition relate s is ‘habitually resident’ in a State sig natory to the Convention and has 7 been r emoved to or r etained in a differ ent State.” Gitter , 396 F.3d at 130. Since the Hague 8 Convention disti nguishes betwee n two ty pes of pa renta l rig hts – rights of c ustody and rights of 9 acc ess, g rantingdiffer ent protec tions to parents with reg ard to e ach ty pe of r ights – a

remova l or 10 rete ntion is considered “ wrong ful” for the purpose of

return of the child under

the Hague 11 Convention where : (a) it is in brea ch of r ights of c ustody attributed to a pe rson under the law of 12 the State in which the c hild was habitually resident immediately

befor e the r emoval or r etention; 13 and (b) at the time of re moval or re tention those rig hts were actua lly exercised, e ither jointly

or 14 a lon e , o r w ou ld h ave be e n s o e xer c ise d b ut f or the re mov a l or

re te nti on . H a gue Conve nti on , a rt . 15 3, 51 Fe d.Reg . at 10,498. 16 This Court has rec og nized that rights of c ustody may arise “ by operation of law or by 17 rea son of a judicial or administrative dec ision, or by rea son of an a g ree ment havingleg al ef fec t 18 under the law of that State.” Gitter , 396 F.3d at 130. Thus, in order to pre vail on a cla im under 19 the Hague Convention, a pe titioner must establish by a pre pondera

nce of the evidenc e that (1) the 20 child was ha

bitually resident in one State a

nd then re moved to or re tained in a diff ere nt State; (2) 21 the re moval or re tention was in brea ch of the petitioner’s c ustody rig hts under the law

of the6

1 place of habitual re sidence ; and (3) the petitioner wa s exercisingcustody rig hts at the time of the 2 remova l or rete ntion. See42 U. S.C. § 1 16 03 (e )( 1) (A ); Gitter , 396 F.3d at 130-31. 3 T h e H a gu e C o n v e n t i o nd i s t i n gu i s h e s b e tw e e nr i g h t s o f c u s t o dy an d r i g h t s o f a c c e s s . It 4 define s the latter a s “the right to take a c hild for a limited period of time to a pla ce othe r than the 5 child’s habitual re sidence .” Ha gue Convention, art. 5, 51 F ed.Reg . at 10,498. Althoug h reme dies 6 exis t in the event that a c hild is removed in brea ch of a cce ss rig hts, recour se for such re moval 7 does not include a

n order of re turn to the child’s plac e of ha bitual residenc e. See id. art. 21, 51 8 Fe d.Reg . at 10,500. In such situations, district courts may fashion a r emedy

order ing the 9 custodial pare nt who has re moved the child to allow and f inancially provide for

periodic visits by 10 the no n- c us tod ia l pa re nt. 11 Neither

the Hague Convention nor its implementing leg islation defines “ha bitual 12 residenc e.” H oweve r, we have pr eviously articulated the standa

rd used to dete rmine a c hild’s 13 habitual re sidence . 14 Fi rs t , th e c o urts h o u l d i n qu i re i n t o th e s h ar edi n t en to f t h o s e en t i t l ed t o fi x th e c h i l d 's 15 r e s i d e n c e ( u s u a l l y th e p ar e n t s ) atth e l at e s tt i m e t h atth e i r i n t e n tw a s s h ar e d . In 16 makingthis determination the court should look, as alwa y s in determiningintent, at 17 a c tio ns a s w e ll a s d e c laratio ns . N or ma lly the sh are d inte nt o f t

he pa re nts sh ou ld 18 control t he habitual residenc e of the child. Second, the court should i nquire whe ther 19 the evidenc e unequivoc ally points to t he conclusion that the child has a cclimatized 20 to [a] new location and thus has ac quired a new ha bitual residenc e, notwithstanding 21 any

conflict with the pa

rents' latest share d intent. 22 23 Gitter , 396 F.3d at 134. 24 Ap ply

ingthe se pr inc ipl e s to the fa c ts o f t his c a se , w e ho ld t

hat th e dis tr ic t c ourt

pr op e rl y 25 fo un d Ch ile to b e the c hil d’ s p la c e of ha bit ua l r e sid e nc e . A s b oth

pa re nts are Chi le an c iti zen s, 26 their child wa s born in Chile and lived in Chile until August 2005 when Appe llee took her to the 27 Un ite d St ate s, a

se ttl e d mutua l inte nt t o ma ke Chi le the c hil d’ s p e rm ane nt h ome c an b e e a sil y7

1 c on c lud e d. Th e re is n o e vid e nc e to t he c ontr ary

and c e rt a inl y no joi nt s e ttl e d inte nti on to 2 abandon Chile a s the habitual re sidence . Fur thermore , Appellee repr esente d to the Chilean court 3 that th e c hil d’ s r e mov a l w a s o nly te mpo ra ry and that sh e int e nd e d to re tur n th e c hil d to Chi le 4 afte r a pe riod of thre e months. There fore , Chile, and not the United States, is the habitual plac e 5 of the c hild’s residenc e. 6 We now turn to the primary issue of this case , that is, whether A ppellant has rights of 7 custody . Under

Chilean law, whe n pare nts live separately , the re sponsibili ty for the pe rsonal ca

re 8 of their c hild rests with the mother. See CODE CI VI LSection 225 (Chile). Howe ver, the other 9 pare nt stil l has a ne ex eat rig ht: the rig ht to determine whe ther the c hild will l eave the country . 10 SeeMI

NORS L AW 16,618 art. 49. Althoug h Appellee was grante d permission by order of the 11 Chilean court to leave the c ountry with the child for thre e months, violation of the conditions of 12 that or de r c an b e a

vio latio n o f A

pp e lla nt’ s ne ex eat

rig ht. 13 In interpre ting the H ague Convention, this Court has held that violating a ne ex eat ri g ht i s 14 insufficient to qualify as a violation of c ustodial rights. See Cro ll , 229 F.3d at 138-140. In 15 Cro ll , we f

ound that a ne ex eat

clause does not cre ate r ights of c ustody within the meaningof the 16 Hague Convention. 229 F.3d at 135. We ex plained that “c ustody of a c hild entails the primary 17 duty

and ability

to choose a

nd g ive sustenanc e, shelter , clothing, mor al and spiritual guidance , 18 me dic a l atte nti on , e du c atio n, e tc ., or the (r e vo c a

ble ) s e le c tio n o f o the r p e op le or ins tit uti on s to 19 g ive these thing s.” Id. at 138. We have r easone d that custody under the Hague Convention 20 “re fer ence s a bundle of r ights ... a nd is in some tension with t he idea ... that one ca

n have 21 custody

by holding a singlepower

such as the ve to confe rre d by a ne ex eat

clause .” Id. at 139. 22 Fur thermore , we ha

ve said that a lthough a ne ex eat ri g ht l imi ts a

c us tod ia l pa

re nt’ s p ow e r t o8

1 expatriate a c hild, it does not amount t o a powe r to deter mine wher e the c hild will l ive. Id. at 2 139. To hold otherwise w ould be “unwor kable” beca

use the Ha gue Convention assumes that 3 “the r emedy

of re turn will deliver the c hild to a custodial pare nt who (by definition) will rec eive 4 and care for

the c hil d. I t do e s n ot c onte mpl ate re tur n o f a c hil d to a pa re nt who se so le ri g ht- to 5 visit or veto-imposes no duty to give car e.” Id. at 140. 6 We ag ree with the district court that Appe llant did not establish the custody require ment 7 by a pre pondera

nce of the evidenc e. Appe llant primarily relies on a

n aff idavit from the Chilean 8 Corporation of Judicial Assistance of the Reg ion Metropolitana (the “Centra l Authority ”) a s 9 support for his ar gument that he has c ustodial rights unde r Chilean law. A ppellant maintains that 10 the dis tr ic t c ourt

fa ile d to a ff

or d th e Chi le an Auth or ity ’s int e rp re tatio n o f C hil e an la w a pp ro pr iate 11 weig ht. The issue of whe ther the Centr al Authority ’s af fidavit constitutes an authoritative 12 int e rp re tatio n f

or the purp os e s o f t

he Ha gue Conve nti on

is i nc on c lus ive fo r a

numbe r o f r e a so ns , 13 inc lud ingthe fa c t th at th e Chi le an Auth or ity may no t ha ve ha d a ll i nf

or matio n o n th is c a se 14 ava ila

ble to i t at th e tim e that it ma de its a sse ssm e nt. Ho we ve r, it i s r e a dil y a pp are nt t hat e ve n if 15 it i s a

uth or itativ e , th e dis tr ic t c ourt wa s n ot b ound

to f oll owit. As thi s Co ur

t ha s p re vio us ly 16 stated, “a

fore ign sove reign' s views re g ardingits own laws merit – althoug h they do not 17 command – some de g ree of def ere nce.” Karaha Bodas Co., L .L.C. v. Perusahaan 18 Pe rta mb anga n M

iny ak Da n G as Bu miNe

ga ra , 313 F.3d 70, 92 ( 2d Cir. 2002). Reasons existed 19 f o r th e d i s tr i c tc o urtt o r e f

r a i nf r o mg i v i n gth e a f

f i d av i ta b s o l u t e d e f

e r e n c e . M o s ti mp o rt an t l y, 20 the Ce ntr a l Auth or ity ’s c on c lus ion that jo int c us tod y e xists un de r C hil e an la

w a s a de fa ult re sts 21 almost ex clusively

on the ne ex eat

rig ht. We have alr eady

stated that as we interpre t the Hague 22 Convention, this veto power does not conf er r ights of c ustody .C o m p are t hese r i ght s wi t h t he ri ght s d et ai l ed i n N o rden-P o wers v. B everi d ge, 12 5 F.Sup p . 2 d 63 4 (E . D . N . Y . 20 0 0 ), 3 whe r e t he di s t r i ct cour t f ound r i gh t s of

cu s t od y . I n t hat ca s e, one pet i t i oner pre s ent ed a c ons ent approved by an A us t r al i an cour t af

f ordi ng hi m joi nt gu ar di ans hi p. H e a l s o t es t i f i ed as t o how he par t i ci pat ed i n e ducat i onal d eci si o ns, s t ud i ed wi t h hi s chi l d ren and aided i n f i l l i ng out f

o rms f o r course s el ect i o n, dis cuss ed de nt al care ar r ang ement s wi t h r es po ndent , “ r ecomm ended an d of f er ed t o f aci l i t at e des i gn at i ng a g ene r al pra ct i t i oner f or medi cal n e e d s” , t a u g h t his c h ild re n ho w to su rf a n d m a inta ine d re g u la r c o m m u n ic a tio n . I d. a t 639. 9 1 Appellant misinterpre ts the weig ht the district court g ave to the opinion of A ppellee’ s 2 wi tne ss. Th e dis tr ic t c ourt e xplic itl y

fo un d th at th is i nd ivi du a l w a s not an expert, and the re is no 3 rea son to conclude that it afforde d his testimony substantial weig ht. Instead, the district c ourt 4 looked to the rig hts Appellant claimed to possess in orde r to deter mine whether

he, in fa ct, had 5 custody

rig hts. 6 Ap pe lla

nt a lso re lie s o n th e fa c t th at he ha d v isi tatio n r ig hts and that he pa id f

or c e rt a in 7 me dic a l e xpe ns e s. He po int s to Ar tic le 22 9 o f t

he Chi le an Ci vil Cod e wh ic h p ro vid e s th at a 8 pare nt “who is not persona lly responsible for

the ca re of a child will not be depr ived of the r ight 9 ... to maintain a direc t and re gular re lationship with t he child.” H oweve r, this article a ddresse s 10 visitation rights only and not rig hts to care for the c hild under a c ustodial relationship. 11 At oral a

rgument, the district court attempted on a number of occ asions to elicit what 12 ri g hts Ap pe lla

nt h a s th at he c la ims wo uld amou nt t o c us tod

y . H ow e ve r, Ap pe lla

nt w a s una

ble to 13 of fe r a ny thi ngmor e tha

n th e langua g e of

Ar tic le 22 9, vis itatio n r ig hts , p ay me nt o f s ome 14 expenses and possibly reg isteringthe child for sc hool. As the district court state d: 3 15 Ido n’ t se e wh e re he ha d r ig hts . T he on e do c ume nt t hat you sh ow e d me g ave him 16 a ver

y specific rig ht .... I t said one ver y specific thing. On Sunday s, from 10 to 8 or 17 1 0 t o 1 0 , d e p e n d i n go n s e a s o n , h e g o t t o s e e th e c h i l d . Itd i dn ’ ts ay, an d b y th e w ay, 18 the se are a

lis t of the oth e r t

hings y ou get to de c ide in t he c hil d’ s li fe . Y ou

g e t to 19 decide , as I

said, what school the child g oes to. You g et to bringthe child to school 20 ever

y day or pick the c hild up from school eve ry day or make deter

minations about 21 what cla sses the child will take or what extracur ricular activities the child will be in. 22 Th os e are the kin ds of thi ng s that wou ld le a d me to say he wa s g ive n c us tod ia l r ig hts 23 ve rs us he wa s g ive n a c c e ss. Ido n’ t se e any of that. 2410

1 On the other

hand, Appe llee has the authority to make all these cruc ial decisions for the 2 child. The only

restric tions on Appellee’s de cision-makingpower under Chilean la

w ar e 3 that she has to allow Appe llant his scheduled visitations and she ca nnot take the c hild out 4 of the c ountry

without either Appe llee’s pe rmission or a cour t order. 5 The bundle of rig hts Appellant lay s claim to does not cre ate r ights of c ustody under the 6 Hague Convention and I CARA; they cumulatively

amount mere ly

to a rig ht of ac cess. We find, 7 as the district cour

t concluded, that Appellant has no right to make deter minations about the 8 wellbeingand conduc t of the child. These rig hts belongto Appellee. 9 CO NC LU SION 10 For

the fore g oing r easons, we hold that, under the H ague Convention, the rig hts confer red 11 o nAp p el l an td o n o tam o un tt o ri gh t s o f c u s t o dy . T h e r em o v al o f t h e c h i l d fr o mC h i l e, al th o u gh 12 in violation of a lawful or der f rom a Chilean c ourt, did not breac h rig hts of custody and wa s 13 there fore not “wrong ful” unde r the Ha gue Convention. The district cour t’s order dismiss ing the 14 pe tit ion

fo r l a c k o f j ur isd ic tio n a

nd or de ri ngpe ri od ic vis itatio n o f t he c hil d f or Ap pe lla nt i s 15 AFF I RMED.This provision is reprinted in footnote 1 of the majority ’s opinion. 1 11 1 W ES L EY , Circuit Judge , d i s s en t i n g: 2 The majority has cor rec tly identified the c entra l question in thi s case : Whether Appellant 3 has the “ rig hts of custody” over his daug hter ne cessa

ry to invoke the Hague Convention’s 4 r e m e dy

o f r e tur no f th e c h i l d ? See Ha gue Conve nti on on the Civ il A sp e c ts o f I

nte rn atio na l Ch ild 5 Ab du c tio n a

rt . 3 , O c t. 2 5, 19 80 , T .I .A .S. No . 2 2, 67 0, 13 43 U. N. T. S. 8 9. Un de r t he fa c ts o f t

his 6 case , wher e ther e has be en no judicial dete rmination of custody , the answe r to that question 7 depends on whether , under Chilean la w, the def ault rule whe n the unmarr ied par ents of a minor 8 se pa rate is that th e y

sh are joi nt c us tod

y or that th e mot

he r h a s so le c us tod

y . T he ma

jor ity 9 deter mined that, notwithstanding the a ffidavit fr om the Chilean Central Authority asser ting that 10 separ ated unmar

ried pa rents shar e joint custody

by operation of Chilean law, this Circuit’s 11 decision in Cro ll require s the conc lusion that Appellant had only rig hts of acc ess. I

disag ree and 12 wo uld

va c ate the de c isi on

be low and re mand thi s c a se fo r p ro c e e din g s c on sis te nt w iththi s 13 Circuit’s prac tice of g iving some de fer ence to a fore ign sove reign’s view of its own law. 14 DI SCU SSIO N 15 In Cro ll , we he ld that a custody decr ee that gr anted a

fathe r ac cess r ights a

nd contained a 16 nee x e at clause , while explicitl y g rantingsole custody

of the minor to her

mother, did not bestow 17 the sort of c ustodial rights on the f ather nece ssary

for him to invoke the right of retur n under the 18 Hague Convention. Cro ll v . Croll , 229 F.3d 133, 134- 35 (2d Cir. 2000). The majority finds that 19 thi s f

or e c los e s App e lla

nt’ s argume nt t

hat A rt ic le 49 of

the Min or

L aw’ s nee

x e at clause and

1Book I of the Civil Code of the Republic of Chile, Title IX: Rights and duties be tween 2 pare nts and children, Sec tion 229, provides in releva nt part (in tra

nslation): The father or mother

who does not have the per sonal ca re of a child shall not be exempted from the duty

to sep [si c] a direc t, permane nt relationship with he/she, and to contac t it as freque ntly and fr eely

as agree d with its guar dian or, other wise, as dete rmined by

the judg e as be ing in the be st interest of the c hild. Appellant does not c ontest that Appellee , the minor’s mother, a lso has rig hts of custody 3 purs ua nt t o Se c tio n 2 25 of

the Chi le an Ci vil Cod e , whic h a ssi g ns “ pe rs on a l c are ” of a min or to her mother

“if the pa rents live sepa

rate ly ” in the abse nce of

any mutual ag ree ment or judicial d e c i s i o nt o th e c o n tr ar

y. I t is sim ilarly

unclea r on what gr ounds the district court re jected A ppellant’s 4 int e rp re tatio n o f S e c tio n 2 29 . Ca rl os B ianc hi t e sti fi e d in

the dis tr ic t c ourt as a la

ywitn ess on be ha lf of Ap pe lle e re g ard ingthe pr op e r i nte rp re tatio n o f t he re le va nt p ro vis ion s o f C hil e an la w: Ar tic le 49 of

the Min or

L aw, and Se c tio ns 22 5 a

nd 22 9 o f t he Civ il Co de . H e a sse rt e d, in rele vant par

t, that Section 229 gr ants only rig hts of acc ess under

Chilean law, not rig hts of 12 1 Section 229 of the Civil Code’s mandate that the pare nt without “personal c are ” of the child has 2 2 the “r ight” and “duty” to maintain a “ direc t permane nt relationship” with the child ar e indicative 3 of the fa ct that, under Chilean law, pa

rents shar e custody

of a minor in the a

bsence of any

judicial 4 d e c r e e t o th e c o n tr ar y. 3 5 Ibe lie ve that th e ma jor ity ov e r- re a ds Cro ll. Cro ll undoubtedly holds that a

ne ex eat 6 c la us e c ann ot c on v e rt rig hts of acc ess into rig hts of custody in the context of an expli cit judicial 7 deter mination of the respe ctive rig hts of the par ents. Howe ver, in my mind, this does not 8 fore close Appe llant’s argument that a statutorily enshrined nee

x e at clause may

be evide nce of a 9 leg al re g ime’s re cog nition of shared “ rig hts of custody” in the abse nce of any judicial 10 de te rm inatio n. Th is i s p art ic ula rl y tr ue in l ig ht o f t

he fa c t th at th e Ap pe lla

nt d oe s n ot s ole ly

re ly 11 on Ar tic le 49 ’s nee

x e at clause , but also points to S ection 229’s spe cific de leg ation of rig hts and 12 duties to the pare nt without “personal c are ” of the minor. The majority dismiss es Section 229 as 13 “ a dd

re ss[i ng ] vis itatio n r ig hts on ly ,” but c ite s n o a uth or ity fo r t hat pr op os iti on . Thus , whil e thi s 4c us tod

y . T he ma

jor ity wr ite s th at: “ Th e dis tr ic t c ourt e xplic itl y

fo un d th at [B ianc hi] w a s no t an expert, and there is no reason to c onclude that it af forde d his testimony

substantial weig ht. Instead, the district c ourt looked to the rig hts Appellant claimed to possess in orde r to deter mine wh e the r h e , in

fa c t, h a d c us tod

y ri g hts .” De sp ite the ma

jor ity ’s a sse rt ion , h ow e ve r, it i s h ard to tell on what g rounds the district cour t might have reje cted Sec tion 229 as a potential sourc e of custodial rig hts other than B ianchi’s testimony to that effe ct. Of c ourse, this Court has held that lay testimony

on a question re quiringexpertise is of no probative va lue. See P feiffer v. Silver , 712 F.2d 799, 804 ( 2d Cir. 1983). Th e Ap pe lla

nt a lso pr ov ide d a

n unp ub lis he d a

rt ic le by Chi le an Pr of

e sso r B e rn ard ita 5 Br iones Maira

that supports his interpretation of Chilean la w, as we ll as a copy

of Profe ssor Maira’ s impressive re sume. J udg e Robinson did not mention t he ar ticle duringhis oral dec ision and denie d Appellant’s motion for r econside ration base d on an off er of Professor Ma ira’s testimony on his behalf. 13 1 Court’s case law cle arly does not compel Appe llant’s pref err ed interpr etation of Chilean law , I 2 a lso do no t be lie ve that it re qu ir e s u s to re

je c t it . 3 The primar

y evidenc e that Appe llant offer s in support of his prefe rre d interpre tation of 4 Chilean law is an a ffidavit fr om the Chilean Corporation of Judicial Assistance of the Reg ion 5 Me tr op oli tana

(t he “ Ce ntr a l Auth or ity” ). Th e Chi le an Auth or ity wr ite s th at: 5 6 The “ rig ht of custody” alluded [to] by the [Hague] Convention, in [ Chilean] 7 leg islation . . . is l inked [to] and includes the followingrig hts: the “custody ,” the 8 “ pe rs on a l c are of the min or ,” the “ gua

rd [,]” the “ pa

tr ia po te sta s, ” and

the “ ri g ht t o 9 authorize the minor[’s] exitof the c ountry ,” which a re r egulated in diffe rent 10 art ic le s c onta ine d in dif fe re nt L aws . 11 12 Emphasizing the nee x e at clause contained in Ar ticle 49 as “ rele vant, espe cially” in the instant 13 case , the Chilean Authority conclude s that “the ‘r ight of custody ,’ to which the [Hague] 14 Convention . . . refe r[s] . . . is shared by [Appellant] Villeg as and [Appellee ] Arribada.” The 15 Chilean Authority

also notes that “both par ents have the guard a nd custody

of their da

ug hter” and 16 that “‘the decisions of major importa nce’ must be adopted by

both pare nts” under Chilea n law. 17 The majority conclude s that even if the Central Authority ’s af fidavit is “authoritative” 18 with respec t to Chi lean law , “the district cour t was not bound to follow it.” They explain thatThe Ha gue Convention specif ically desig nates the Centr al Authority of a c ontrac ting 6 State a s th at State ’s a

uth or itativ e vo ic e re g ard ing its vie w o f i ts o wn

c us tod y laws a s r e le va

nt t o Article 3 of

the Convention: The judicial or a dminist rative a uthorities of a Contrac ting State may , prior to the makin gof

an o rd e r f

or the re tur n o f t he c hil d, re qu e st t

hat th e a pp lic ant o bta in from the a

uthorities of the State of the ha bitual residenc e of the child a dec ision or other de termination that the re moval or re tention was wrong ful within the meaningof Article 3 of the Convention, wher e such a decision or de termination may be obtained in that State. The Central Authorities of the ContractingStates shall so far a s prac ticable a ssist applicants to obtain such a dec ision or deter mination. Hague Convention art. 15. 14 1 even though “a f

oreign sovere ign’ s views re g ardingits own laws merit – althoug h they do not 2 command – some de g ree of def ere nce,” “[r]easons exi sted for the district court to ref rain fr om 3 g iving the a ffidavit absolute de fer ence .” The only such re ason cited by

the majority

is that “the 4 Chi le an Auth or ity ’s c on c lus ion that jo int c us tod y e xists un de r C hil e an la

w a s a de fa ult re sts 5 almost ex clusively

on the nee

x e at rig ht” – re asoningwhich they contend c onflicts with Cro ll . 6 Irespe ctfully disag ree with the majority for two r easons. F irst, it is not clear from the 7 district court’s de cision whether it gave anydefe renc e at a ll to the Central Authority ’s 8 int e rp re tatio n o f C hil e an la w. Ind e e d, the dis tr ic t c ourt did no t e ve n me nti on

the a ff ida vit in 6 9 jus tif yinghis de te rm inatio n th at App e lla nt h a d n o c us tod

y ri g hts . T his ru

ns c ounte r n ot o nly

to 10 pr e c e de nt i n th is c ir c uit ho ldi ngthat a

fo re ig n g ov e rnme nt’ s inte rp re tatio n o f i ts o wn law m e ri ts 11 considera

ble def ere nce, see, e .g. , Karaha Bodas Co. , L.L.C. v. Pe rusahaan Pertambangan 12 Mi ny ak

Da n G as Bu miNe

ga ra , 313 F.3d 70, 92 ( 2d Cir. 2002), but also to prec edent of sister 13 circ uits sugg estingthat such def ere nce is pa

rticularly favor ed in the conte x t of deter mining 14 custody

rig hts under the Ha gue Convention, see, e .g. , Navani v. Shahani , 496 F.3d 1121, 1128 15 (10th Cir. 2007). 16 Second, it is not at all clear from the Chilean Authority ’s languag e that its custodyI t would also have a ided this Court’s review of the district court’s de cision if, on 7 rema nd, the cour

t clarifie d its treatment of B ianchi’s testimony and Profe ssor Maira ’s ar ticle, as we ll a s it s g ro un ds fo r r e

je c tin gthe Ap pe lla

nt’ s inte rp re tatio n o f S e c tio n 2 29 of the Chi le an Ci vil code. 15 1 de te rm inatio n r e sts solely on Ar tic le 49 ’s nee

x e at clause , which would be ne cessa ry for the 2 district court to dismiss t he af fidavit entirely

even unde r the majority ’s re adingof Cro ll . For 3 ins tanc e , th e a ff

ida vit sp e c if ic a lly dis tin guis he s th e “ gua

rd ” e le me nt o f c us tod

y fr om t he “ ri g ht t o 4 authorize the minor[’s] exitof the c ountry ,” and the n notes that separ ated pa rents shar e the 5 former

as we ll as the latter. More over, the re is languag e in the af fidavit – such as, “ ‘the 6 decisions of major importa nce’ must be adopted by

both pare nts” – which would see m to favor a 7 findingof joint custody under this Court’s pre cede nt. Se e Cro ll , 229 F.3d at 138 (“[C] ustody of 8 a child enta ils the primary duty and ability

to choose a

nd g ive sustenanc e, shelter , clothing, mor al 9 and spiritual guidance , medical attention, education, etc ., or the (r evoca ble) sele ction of other 10 people or

institutions to give these things.” ). 11 CO NC LU SION 12 Isee no ne ed to re ach a conclusion on the ultimate merits of Appe llant’s pref err ed 13 interpre tation of Chilean law. I would vacate the district cour t’s decision and r emand the c ase f or 14 fu rt h er

p ro ce ed i n gs co n s i s t en twi thth i s C o urt ’s p ra ct i ce o f gi v i n g s o m e d ef er en ce t o a f

o re i gn 15 sovere ign’ s view of its own law. The majority notes that “[t] he issue of whether the Central 7 16 Authority ’s af

fidavit constitutes an authoritative inter pretation for the purpose s of the Ha gue 17 Conve nti on

is i nc on c lus ive fo r a

numbe r o f r e a so ns , in c lud ingthe fa c t th at th e Chi le an Auth or ity 18 may no t ha ve ha d a ll i nf

or matio n o n th is c a se ava ila ble to i t at th e tim e that it ma de its 19 a sse ssm e nt. ” Ia g re e . O n r e mand , th e dis tr ic t c ourt c ou ld b oth

e ns ur e that th e Chi le an Auth or ity 20 had ac cess to all of the rele vant mater ials and dete rmine the pre cise leg al basis for theSee supra note 6. 8 16 1 Authority ’s asser

tion of joint custody

(assumingit stands) by

followingthe proc edure specifie d 2 i nArt i cl e 1 5 o f t h e H agu e C o n v en t i o nfo r h o w aj u d i ci al au th o ri ty m ay o b t ai na f

o re i gn 3 so ve re ig n’ s a

uth or itativ e int e rp re tatio n o f i ts o wn c us tod y laws . 8 4 The bottom line here is that a child has traveled to the United States w ith her mother a nd 5 has not retur

ned to Chile as ea

rlier pr omised. Thousands of miles and two distant and diff ere nt 6 leg al sy stem separ ate the c hild from her f ather . An international acc ord provides the substantive 7 and proc edura l mechanisms to resolve the dispute. Adhere nce to its provisions and ca ref ul 8 attention to rig hts give n a par ent under Chilean law a

re c entra l to a fair a

nd just resolution of the 9 dispute. We would ex pect the sa me of a Chilean court if a

child from the United States w ere 10 taken ther e by

her mother

and fa iled to return. I

would ask for

that same c are ful attention here 11 and the re fo re Ire sp e c tf

ull y dis se nt.