NOTES FROM OUR ATTIC

A CURATOR’S POCKET HISTORY OF THE CIA

NOTES FROM OUR ATTIC: 

A CURATOR’S POCKET 

HISTORY OF THE CIA

Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, DC
The Center for the Study of Intelligence (CSI) was founded in 1974 in response to Director of 

Central Intelligence James Schlesinger’s desire to create within CIA an organization that could “think 

through the functions of intelligence and bring the best intellects available to bear on intelligence 

problems.” The Center, comprising both professional historians and experienced practitioners, 

attempts to document lessons learned from past activities, explore the needs and expectations of 

intelligence consumers, and stimulate serious debate on current and future intelligence challenges.

To support these efforts, CSI publishes books and monographs addressing historical, operational, 

doctrinal, and theoretical aspects of the intelligence profession, to include this publication. It also 

administers the CIA Museum.

Comments and questions may be addressed to: 

Center for the Study of Intelligence 

Central Intelligence Agency 

Washington, DC 20505 

Notes From Our Attic contains some material created by individuals other than US Government 

employees or contractors and, accordingly, such works are appropriately attributed and protected 

by United States copyright law. Such items should not be reproduced or disseminated without the 

express permission of the copyright holder. Any potential liability associated with the unauthorized 

use of copyrighted material from Notes From Our Attic rests with the third-party infringer.

Notes From Our Attic is available on the Internet at: 

https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/ 

© 2014 Central Intelligence Agency 

ISBN 978-1-929667-24-6

Produced by:

The CIA Museum Staff with exceptional contributions by 

CIA Museum Staff Historian Samuel J. Cooper-Wall and 

Museum Contract Historian Nicholas E. Reynolds. 

The CIA Museum gives special thanks to its generous artifact donors, 

who made this publication possible.

Photography by Peter Garfield, Garfield Studio

Design by Andrea Hemmann, GHI Design
Preface

Foreword

1 OSS: America’s First Centralized Intelligence Agency

2 From OSS to CIA

3 Formative Years and Early Successes

4 The Not-So-Cold War

5 Threats from New Quarters

6 9/11 and After

Index

5

7

9

27

35

47

63

81

96

To the men and women of the Central Intelligence Agency, 

who for nearly 70 years have served as the nation’s 

first line of defense.

5

Preface

history can be studied in more than one way. You can learn about facts 

and ideas from books. You can search for the documents that the books are 

based on. You can take the material approach: go to the places where history 

was made, perhaps join a group of re-enactors, and absorb the atmosphere. Or 

you can go to a museum. Museums are where you discover history by studying 

things, that is, artifacts, in context. What we do here is tell the story of the 

Central Intelligence Agency through a selection of the artifacts collected by the 

CIA Museum, often called “The Best Museum You’ve Never Seen” because we 

display our artifacts in their true CIA context—but only staff and official visitors 

to the CIA Headquarters compound can see them. This is part of an initiative to 

share our treasures with a wider audience. Because we are interpreting history 

through artifacts, our catalog is a little different from other forms of history 

that start with a narrative and may or may not use photographs and maps to 

illustrate a story. We start with what we have in the collection and use artifacts 

to reconstruct the history of the Agency. The result is more impressionistic 

and less linear than other histories, but we hope it will be just as memorable 

and informative.

7

Foreword

since the american revolution, various groups in the US Government 

have collected and disseminated intelligence. Beginning in the 1880s, military 

and naval attachés at American embassies overseas were often spies in 

uniform, collecting information about the host country. In the 1920s, the State 

Department and the Army ran a successful “Cipher Bureau,” but Secretary of 

State Henry Stimson shut it down, famously declaring that it was wrong for 

“gentlemen” to “read each other’s mail.” 

In the months before Pearl Harbor, both the Navy and the Army were reading 

various Japanese coded messages. Their failure to work together was one 

of the reasons the Japanese achieved surprise and destroyed much of the Pacific 

fleet in December 1941, thereby thrusting the United States into World War 

II. Pearl Harbor became the iconic intelligence failure of the 20th century and 

one of the driving forces for more and better strategic intelligence. The wartime 

Office of Strategic Services (OSS) grew out of this failure, and the post-war CIA 

grew out of OSS. Allen Dulles, who served both as an OSS station chief and later 

as CIA Director in the 1950s, captured an important change in the atmosphere 

in Washington by declaring, “When the fate of a nation and the lives of its 

soldiers are at stake, gentlemen do read each other’s mail.”

“The necessity of procuring good intelligence is 

apparent and need not be further urged.”

— GEORGE WASHINGTON, 1777

9

OSS: America’s First Centralized 

Intelligence Agency

1

“[A] novel attempt in American history to organize 

research, intelligence, propaganda, subversion, and 

commando operations as a unified and essential feature 

of modern warfare.”

 — THOMAS TROY DESCRIBING THE OSS

General Donovan always preferred working in the field as opposed to behind a desk. As OSS Director 

he traveled the world to meet with his officers and gain perspective from being on the front lines. 

Here he holds an impromptu conference in Southeast Asia.
10

“Wild Bill” Donovan 

In July 1941, President Franklin D. Roosevelt brought William J. Donovan, the 

World War I hero and powerful New York lawyer, into the Executive Branch as 

the Coordinator of Information, a first step toward the creation of a national 

intelligence agency.

On 13 June 1942, some six months after the United States entered the war, 

Roosevelt turned the Office of the Coordinator of Information into the Office of 

Strategic Services (OSS), subordinating it to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Wartime 

imperatives meant that Donovan’s limitless imagination, drive, and willingness to 

take risks were now unleashed, and he proceeded to build an intelligence service 

by energetic fits and starts. OSS grew quickly, taking on responsibilities for 

espionage and unconventional warfare in addition to research and analysis. No 

holds were barred; few Americans worried that there might be any gentlemen on 

the other side. The war already looked like it would be a bitter fight to the finish.

DONOVAN’S MEDAL OF HONOR, DISTINGUISHED SERVICE CROSS, 

NATIONAL SECURITY MEDAL, AND DISTINGUISHED SERVICE MEDAL

In the course of his service in World Wars I and II, General Donovan became the only person in 

American history to receive all four of these honors. When the Medal of Honor was draped around 

his neck in 1923, Donovan remembered the sacrifice of the men in his regiment by quietly saying, 

“It doesn’t belong to me. It belongs to the boys who are not here...also to the boys who were lucky 

enough to come through.” 



14

The Glorious Amateurs 

You would expect an agency... [like] the Office of Strategic Services to attract many 

unorthodox and rugged individuals—and you would be absolutely right. I never 

distinguished a common denominator... [for] OSS personnel. Love of high adventure 

would...approach it, yet, on the other hand, many a timid man or woman, motivated by 

deep patriotism or...hatred of the enemy, outperformed the boys of derring-do.

— STANLEY LOVELL

OSS was a more or less independent intelligence agency with a strategic charter 

and a number of in-house functions. It was to a large extent self-contained. It 

hired, trained, equipped, and deployed its own personnel. It could both collect 

and analyze information to produce useful intelligence. It conducted paramilitary, 

espionage, and counterespionage operations that often complemented each 

other. It even had a research and development branch that produced novel spy 

equipment. The organization’s logistics, security, medical, finance, and training 

offices provided the necessary support. 

Many of the original members of OSS were Director Donovan’s friends and 

colleagues. Among them were well-to-do New York lawyers and socialites—

hence the joke that OSS really stood for “Oh So Social.”

But OSS was far more than a group of gentlemen spies. Along with a few misfits, 

OSS attracted talented and adventuresome souls from many walks of life. 

Two-thirds of OSS members came out of the military, many of them daredevils 

who volunteered for risky missions that no one explained to them until they had 

signed up—and sometimes not even then. The rest of the workforce was civilian 

and, especially in the Research & Analysis Branch, included some of the best 

minds in America.

While not a champion of diversity for its own sake, Donovan was ahead of his 

time in offering opportunities to anyone with the right qualifications. Some 

4,500 OSS employees were women. At least one prominent OSS analyst, 

Ralph Bunche, was African American. 
15

A PERSONAL NOTE FROM RICHARD HELMS

As Americans celebrated victory in Europe on 7 May 1945, OSS officer and future CIA Director 

Richard Helms wrote this eloquent note to his young son on a sheet of Adolf Hitler’s personal 

stationery. Helms’s words captured the meaning of the war, not only for OSS but also for America and 

most of its allies. 
16

A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF ADOLPH HITLER BY WALTER C. LANGER*

William Langer headed OSS Research & Analysis. His younger brother, the psychoanalyst Walter, was 

a consultant to OSS. Walter achieved a measure of fame in 1943 for his classified 249-page analysis 

of Hitler’s character. The book addressed how the dictator viewed himself and how the German public 

and his own close associates saw him; it also featured a reconstruction of Hitler’s life to explain his 

behavior during World War II. In the book’s conclusion, Langer accurately predicted that the dictator 

would commit suicide just before the German surrender. 

*Langer used an English spelling of Hitler’s first name instead of the German spelling “Adolf.”

ENIGMA

The Allies enjoyed great success in the realm of signals intelligence, arguably much more than in 

other kinds of intelligence operations. The German armed forces used Enigma cipher 

machines to create what they thought were unbreakable messages. The Enigma could offer 

150,000,000,000,000,000,000 possible solutions to an enciphered message. Yet Allied code 

breakers were often able to find the right solution and read German secrets, some of 

which found their way to OSS’s counterintelligence staff. The intercepts are said to have 

shortened the war by two years. 
17

19

COUNTERFEIT NAZI STAMPS

Within OSS, Morale Operations was responsible for the design and printing of counterfeit 

postage stamps that featured a skeletal version of Hitler’s face. The idea was to put them on letters 

and insert the letters into the German postal system.

21

OSS ID BADGE

This small badge for overt employees identified Technical Sergeant Spiros H. Kaleyias of 

Special Operations while he worked at OSS facilities like the E Street Compound in Washington.

MARK IV RADIO

In 1942, René Joyeuse escaped from France and joined the Free French Forces, eventually serving 

with OSS. Sent to London for training, he parachuted back into France in 1944 before D-Day and used 

this radio to transmit intelligence as part of Operation Sussex. He received the French Legion of Honor 

and the American Distinguished Service Cross for his service.
22

BLOOD CHIT

OSS issued this silk blood chit for use in the China-Burma-India Theater in case the bearer became 

lost in unfamiliar territory. It reads “This foreign person (American) has come to China to help the war 

effort. Soldiers and civilians, one and all, should save and protect him.” 

HI-STANDARD .22-CALIBER PISTOL

This short-range, automatic pistol was ideal for use in close spaces or for eliminating sentries. 

Its silencer suppressed all the flash and 90 percent of the sound when discharged.
23

FREE THAI PATCH

OSS provided critical support to the Free Thai movement, essentially a patriotic resistance 

led by a cadre of anti-Japanese Thai officials in key government positions. By early 1945, OSS had 

even managed to set up a covert base in Japanese-occupied Bangkok. The bonds and contacts formed 

between these Americans and the Free Thai would reap significant benefits for the United States 

during the Vietnam war more than two decades later. 

THE FAIRBAIRN-SYKES FIGHTING KNIFE

Developed in 1940, this specialized fighting knife was standard issue for many OSS officers and 

their British counterparts. Capt. William H. Pietsch, Jr., carried this one when he parachuted into 

Nazi-occupied France on his first mission as a member of an OSS Jedburgh team.

27

From OSS to CIA

2

“[After the war,] this agency...should be authorized, 

in the foreign field only, to carry on...espionage, 

counter-espionage, and...special operations...to anticipate 

and counter...enemy action.”

— WILLIAM J. DONOVAN

DCI Walter Bedell Smith (left) and President Harry S. Truman look over a globe on Smith’s first 

day in office. Over the course of his tenure, Smith oversaw a broad re-organization of the Agency, 

much of which is still in place today.
28

At War’s End 

OSS did not win World War II for the Allies but did make important 

contributions to the war effort. Donovan argued that OSS, or something like it, 

should survive the war. He foresaw a centralized organization that would report 

directly to the President. Donovan’s many bureaucratic enemies objected to 

his proposals, arguing that the OSS was a wartime expedient that should be 

dissolved at the end of the war. The issue was still unresolved when President 

Roosevelt died in April 1945.

Donovan tried his best to garner the support of the new President, Harry S. 

Truman, but Donovan’s rivals gained and held the upper ground. In the end, 

Truman signed an executive order for the “Termination of the Office of Strategic 

Services and Disposition of its Functions” along with a lukewarm personal letter 

to Donovan thanking him for his “capable leadership.”

At this point, Donovan had to focus on dissolving his organization in the space of 

less than two weeks and preserving the record of its accomplishments.

STELLA UZDAWINIS’S PENDANT

Upon the dissolution of the OSS on 1 October 1945, Donovan arranged for members of the 

organization to buy a commemorative pin or pendant for a dollar. Stella Uzdawinis, a civilian 

assigned to the Research & Analysis and Secret Intelligence (SI) Branches, purchased this pendant. 

While assigned to SI, Uzdawinis worked in France as a communicator.

CIA SEAL AUTOGRAPHED BY PRESIDENT HARRY S. TRUMAN

The US Army Institute of Heraldry, which supports both the military and other branches of the 

Federal Government, designed the seal of the Central Intelligence Agency in 1950. President Truman 

signed several prints of the new seal, some of which are in the Museum’s collection.
29

New Requirements

Donovan was not long gone from Washington before the need for some sort of 

centralized intelligence agency reasserted itself. As the US digested the lessons 

of World War II, the Cold War with the Soviet Union intensified. The Soviets 

were threatening American interests worldwide, especially in fragile Western 

European countries still recovering from the war. Clearly, the US Government 

needed to strengthen its intelligence function and generally streamline the 

relationships between the Army and Navy. The result was the National Security 

Act of 1947, which created the US Air Force, the Office of the Secretary of 

Defense, and, not least, the Central Intelligence Agency. Many of the plans that 

Donovan had advocated found their way into CIA’s enabling act.
30

A New Agency

Like OSS, the new Central Intelligence Agency housed a number of functions; it 

too would become a one-stop intelligence shop. CIA took over an organization 

that had grown out of the OSS, the Office of Special Operations, which was 

mainly responsible for running spies. In 1948, the National Security Council 

created the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC) to conduct paramilitary and 

psychological warfare, two more OSS functions. OPC first operated under joint 

CIA-State Department supervision before becoming an integral part of CIA 

in 1950. Rounding out the picture were analysts such as those in the Office of 

Reports and Estimates, originally charged with briefing the President. To do all of 

this work, CIA hired a number of OSS veterans, three of whom would eventually 

become Directors of Central Intelligence and all of whom would leave their 

imprint on the new agency.

EDITOR’S COPY OF INTELLIGENCE SUMMARIES FOR THE PRESIDENT

Annoyed by the amount of uncoordinated and contradictory intelligence reports he was seeing in 

the wake of World War II, President Truman tasked CIA and its immediate predecessor, the Central 

Intelligence Group (CIG), to provide him with a synthesized daily briefing on the latest foreign 

intelligence. The “Daily Summary,” a two- to three-page publication written for Truman and his 

designees, débuted on 15 February 1946 and established a tradition. Daily briefings have continued 

during the terms of every president since Truman. 


33

CORNERSTONE TROWEL

President Dwight D. Eisenhower joined Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles to lay the 

cornerstone for the Original Headquarters Building of CIA on 3 November 1959. Just over 12 years 

old at the time, CIA was now one step closer to having a permanent headquarters facility. 

Agency employees began occupying the Langley facility in 1962. 

EARLY CIA SIGN

After accommodating OSS Headquarters from 1942 to 1945, the compound at 2430 E Street, NW, 

in Washington, DC, was CIA’s headquarters from 1947 to 1961. Legend has it that the only signage at 

that site read “Government Printing Office” until one of President Eisenhower’s staff members could 

not find the place. The annoyed President is said to have ordered CIA to put up an accurate sign. 

The Agency complied immediately, producing this sign, which remained at the entry gate until the 

front fence was demolished to make room for the present-day E Street Expressway.

35

Formative Years and Early Successes

3

“To discover the exact dimensions of communist 

activity in all countries of the world and to counter and 

negate communist political gains were [the] two main 

tasks entrusted to...CIA.” 

— RAY CLINE

Colonel Oleg Penkovskiy, a Soviet military intelligence (GRU) officer, had grown disaffected with the 

Soviet regime and spied for CIA and British intelligence from 1960 until his arrest in 1962. One of 

the most productive assets in Agency history, he provided extensive documentary material on Soviet 

missile capabilities that would ultimately help President Kennedy defuse the Cuban Missile Crisis.
36

THE U-2 MODEL

Although the Soviets tracked each U-2 overflight on radar, they lacked the technology to shoot one 

down—until 1 May 1960. On that day, U-2 pilot Francis Gary Powers flew the final USSR mission, 

which ended when a Soviet missile downed his plane near Sverdlovsk. Powers survived, and the 

Soviets held a show trial, convicting him of spying. Eventually freed in exchange for a Soviet spy 

in prison in the United States, Powers used this CIA-produced model when he testified before the 

Senate Armed Services Committee in 1962. Several portions of the model were detachable so Powers 

could demonstrate how his plane broke apart after the missile exploded near the rear of the aircraft.

High Altitude Success

C’est formidable! — FRENCH PRESIDENT CHARLES DE GAULLE, WHEN TOLD 

U-2 PICTURES WERE TAKEN AT AN ALTITUDE OF 14 MILES 

Especially after the Soviet Union tested its first atomic bomb in 1949, 

understanding the capabilities of the USSR, the main enemy of the United 

States, became vitally important to the US Government. This was no easy task, 

as the USSR was a closed society dominated by the Soviet state security service 

that had many names but is remembered as the KGB. The US Government 

came to realize that overhead photoreconnaissance could fill the intelligence 

gap, and President Dwight D. Eisenhower approved ambitious programs for 

CIA to develop three technological marvels: the high-flying U-2 aircraft, the 

supersonic A-12 aircraft, and the Corona satellites. The resulting intelligence 

products, starting with photographs taken by the U-2, made an enormous 

difference to the US, enabling it to progress from sophisticated guesswork about 

Soviet capabilities to evidence-based analysis. That the U-2 program against the 

USSR ended when the Soviets were finally able to bring down a CIA aircraft in 

May 1960 should not detract from the many contributions the program made 

between 1956 and 1960, in 1962 during the Cuban Missile Crisis, and in other 

parts of the world through the present day.

38

U-2 PARTIAL PRESSURE SUIT AND HELMET

CIA developed the U-2 to fly at altitudes well above 63,000 feet, where human blood starts to bubble 

without artificial air pressure. U-2 pilots wore a special helmet and form-fitting, insulated pressure 

suit to protect them from depressurization and low temperatures during flight. If the suit looks 

something like an old-fashioned girdle, there is a reason for that: CIA contracted with the David Clark 

Corset and Brassiere Manufacturer for its construction.


41

Espionage 

While overhead photoreconnaissance was able to fill many intelligence gaps, a 

photograph can tell you only so much, and CIA never stopped looking for ground 

truth in other ways. CIA conducted unconventional paramilitary operations, 

arranging for brave men and women to parachute into communist territory in 

much the same way that the Jedburgh teams had jumped into occupied France 

in 1944. Only a few of these missions yielded useful information; most of 

them ended in failure. At the same time, CIA continued to conduct traditional 

espionage operations against the Soviet Union, trying to spot, develop, and 

recruit Soviet officials with access to significant information and who were 

willing to spy for the free world. The work was difficult and frustrating. Perfectly 

competent and diligent CIA officers could spend a career working against a 

Soviet target, doing everything right, and still have little to show for their efforts; 

recruiting a Soviet was never easy. Then, from time to time, a remarkable 

opportunity would present itself—more than once in the form of a walk-in or 

write-in—and CIA would reap the benefits.

KISEVALTER CUFFLINKS

Case Officer George Kisevalter was a CIA Trailblazer who helped perfect the art of running 

secret operations. In 1953, he was assigned to handle Pyotr Popov, the first GRU (Soviet military 

intelligence) officer to spy for America. The CIA made two sets of these unusual cufflinks to enable 

Popov to recognize any CIA officer who approached him. West Point graduate and CIA officer 

Peer de Silva designed each cufflink to resemble his alma mater’s “Duty, Honor, Country” crest 

with the Pallas Athena helmet over a Greek sword. When Kisevalter retired, DCI Richard Helms 

presented this pair to him.
42

Warfare by Other Means 

The US Government had to learn how to conduct secret operations in the Cold 

War. Few precedents existed. The primary mission was relatively straightforward: 

predict if/how/when the Cold War could become a hot war—to prevent another 

Pearl Harbor. Paramilitary initiatives also followed from World War II experience. 

But what about political warfare, that is, influencing political outcomes without 

showing the hand of the US Government? The threat was relatively easy to 

grasp, but the possible American responses took some time to develop. As the 

eminent diplomat George Kennan put it, “We were alarmed at the inroads of...

Russian influence in Western Europe...particularly over the situation in France 

and Italy. We felt that the communists were using...very extensive funds...to gain 

control of key elements of [political] life in France and Italy, particularly the...

press, the labor unions, [and] student organizations.” To counter the threat, 

in 1948 the Truman Administration decided to use the CIA to provide secret 

campaign funds to Italy’s pro-western Christian Democratic Party. The Christian 

Democrats won the election, averting a possible communist takeover and 

establishing a precedent. The CIA proceeded with operations in Iran—in concert 

with the British—and in Guatemala to install pro-Western governments. 

DOCTOR ZHIVAGO IN RUSSIAN

Renowned Russian author Boris Pasternak won the 1958 Nobel Prize in Literature for his “lyrical 

poetry and...epic” writing, particularly in his masterpiece Doctor Zhivago, a love story set against the 

backdrop of the Russian Revolution. Soviet authorities suppressed the book as “a malicious libel of 

the USSR.” In 2008, a broadcaster and literary historian named Ivan Tolstoy, himself the scion of a 

famous Russian literary family, published a book alleging that the CIA had secretly arranged for the 

publication of a limited-run, Russian-language edition of Doctor Zhivago. According to The Washington 

Post, Tolstoy concluded that “Pasternak’s novel became a tool that was used by the United States to 

teach the Soviet Union a lesson.” He argued that it was part of an ongoing US campaign to promote 

authors who told the truth about the harsh realities of life in the Soviet Union. CIA declassified its 

activities related to Doctor Zhivago in 2014. 

44

We Didn’t Walk There 

Most forms of covert action cannot occur without a hidden infrastructure for 

support. Someone must hire and train the people, procure the equipment, rent 

the property, and get the people and equipment where they need to be. In its 

first few decades, CIA relied on proprietary companies to do much of the work. 

Among them was an airline, known first as Civil Air Transport (CAT), which flew 

commercial routes throughout Asia. CAT seemed like just another airline to the 

average passenger who did not need to know that a CAT subsidiary provided 

airplanes and crews for secret CIA missions. The Agency eventually gave CAT a 

new name, Air America, under which it flew into history as one of the mainstays 

of CIA’s covert war in Laos. As one of the largest paramilitary operations ever 

undertaken by the Agency, this covert effort is credited with blocking communist 

initiatives in Laos for some 13 years. Anyone on one of Air America’s hair-raising 

operational flights in Laos appreciated the fact that they were not flying on 

an ordinary airline. 
45

AIR AMERICA IRONWORK

This ironwork was once part of the gate at an Air America facility within the Royal Thai 

Air Force base at Udorn, Thailand. Udorn was a critical center for training Air America crew 

and home for a flight operations department that provided ground support to more than 

70 Air America aircraft.

CIVIL AIR TRANSPORT CARRY-ON BAG

This black vinyl bag was one of many different types of CAT premiums given to passengers 

on the airline. 

47

The Not-So-Cold War

4

“Mr. President, I am as sure of this as a photointerpreter 

can be sure of anything.”

— ARTHUR LUNDAHL, DIRECTOR OF CIA’S NATIONAL PHOTOGRAPHIC

INTERPRETATION CENTER, ABOUT SOVIET MISSILES IN CUBA

Overhead reconnaissance photo from a U-2 flown by the Strategic Air Command on 14 October 1962 

proved that offensive surface-to-surface missiles, capable of striking the United States, were being 

installed in Cuba, triggering the 13-day Cuban Missile Crisis. 
48

COMMEMORATIVE EMBLEMS

Patches and insignia designed for Brigade 2506 in the Bay of Pigs invasion. 

Bay of Pigs 

On 17 April 1961, some 1,500 “Brigade 2056” Cuban fighters, trained and 

equipped by CIA, waded ashore at a place in Cuba called the Bay of Pigs. It 

was an ill-fated attempt at regime change. For reasons that are still debated, 

the operation was a catastrophic failure for CIA and the United States, to 

say nothing of the members of the brigade. The consequences on both sides 

were far reaching. For Fidel Castro, the operation had the ultimate effect of 

cementing his hold on power. His ragtag army had marched into Havana two 

years earlier, and he was only too happy to use the opportunity to dispose of 

counter-revolutionary threats. For the months-old Kennedy Administration, it 

was a major foreign policy embarrassment that helped to set the stage for the 

Cuban Missile Crisis 18 months later. For the CIA, it was an historical turning 

point. Until April 1961, the Agency had enjoyed a fair degree of success in its 

covert-action initiatives. After the Bay of Pigs, the long-serving DCI, Allen Dulles, 

and his operations director, Richard Bissell, both lost their jobs, and the Agency 

was on track to become the object of often-hostile scrutiny that peaked during 

the directorship of William E. Colby in the mid-1970s. Colby later remembered 

the Bay of the Pigs as “the start of the CIA’s slide from being one of the 

most prestigious and admired agencies of the government toward one of its 

most denounced and condemned.”

50

The Cuban Missile Crisis 

The most straightforward way in which the Cuban Missile Crisis was a sequel to 

the Bay of Pigs was that it gave the Soviet leader, Nikita Khrushchev, an excuse 

to bolster the island’s defenses against the United States. In the summer of 

1962, CIA noted an upsurge of Soviet arms shipments to Cuba. The issue that 

soon presented itself was: just what did those shipments include—nuclear 

missiles capable of striking US cities? CIA’s job was to answer that question. 

Initially, CIA’s answer was in the negative but changed in relatively short order 

to reflect the true picture. In the end, CIA provided information, analysis, and 

estimates from human sources as well as aerial reconnaissance showing just 

what the Soviets were up to. The world now stood closer to the brink of nuclear 

war than it had at any other time in the Cold War. CIA intelligence enabled the 

President to take a step back from the brink. 

MESSAGE FROM MOSCOW

Following tense negotiations with the United States, the Soviets eventually agreed to remove their 

missiles from Cuba and sent confirmation of that agreement to the White House via diplomatic 

channels. Sensing the urgency of this message and knowing the possible delay in diplomatic 

communications, the Soviets also broadcast the same message in Russian over Radio Moscow, 

hoping that someone in the US would hear it and relay it to President Kennedy more quickly. In 

cooperation with British partners, the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (CIA’s unclassified print 

and broadcast media center) monitored the radio transmission, translated the message, and flashed 

it to the White House before the official diplomatic version arrived.


53

 

DOCUMENT SIGNED BY PRESIDENT KENNEDY

President Kennedy signed this letter of commendation to DCI John McCone after the crisis was over. 

It went far beyond the conventional bureaucratic thank-you note. It was a well-deserved tribute not 

only to McCone, who was one of the first in Washington to understand Soviet intentions, but also to 

the men and women of the CIA and the Intelligence Community who worked to provide the President 

with intelligence as he faced this Soviet threat.

PRESIDENT’S INTELLIGENCE CHECKLIST

In the summer of 1961, not far removed from the Bay of Pigs fiasco, CIA’s Office of Current Intelligence 

reformatted the daily briefing material for the President to better suit John F. Kennedy’s reading 

preferences and renamed the briefing as the President’s Intelligence Checklist (PICL). CIA produced 

a commemorative issue of the PICL following Kennedy’s assassination on 22 November 1963. The 

lone content inside was a poetic verse Kennedy had used to reassure the public during the tense days 

of the Cuban Missile Crisis: Bullfight critics ranked in rows, Crowd the enormous plaza full; But only one is 

there who knows, And he’s the man who fights the bull. 
54

The 30-Year War in Southeast Asia 

[Y]our [CIA] analysts are the only honest guys in town, and we need to know the truth.

— MCGEORGE BUNDY, NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR TO PRESIDENT LYNDON JOHNSON

The struggle between communist and non-communist forces in Vietnam 

lasted some 30 years. From 1944 on, the OSS and later the CIA operated there, 

and from 1965 to 1973, the US military committed hundreds of thousands of 

servicemen and servicewomen to the conflict. Vietnam became the signature 

foreign-policy issue for the Johnson Administration and, not coincidentally, 

the subject of superheated controversy. Should the United States be involved 

in the conflict? Should CIA be conducting counterinsurgency paramilitary 

operations in Vietnam? What were the communists’ strengths and intentions? 

The Intelligence Community, especially CIA, met the resulting demand for 

information and intelligence about the war. In doing so, CIA leadership found 

itself plunged into controversy more than once, as it did when CIA and US 

military estimates of the enemy’s strength differed significantly. (In retrospect, 

the CIA estimates were much higher and more accurate.) In 1975, when the 

war ended in a communist victory, CIA air assets played an important role in 

evacuating American and Vietnamese officials from the country.

ELEPHANT COUNTER

During the Vietnam war, the CIA recruited Laotian trail watchers to count enemy troops and supplies 

moving down the Ho Chi Minh Trail from North Vietnam to South Vietnam along the border of 

Laos. As many of the recruits could not read or write, CIA technical wizards developed this unusual 

counting mechanism. Instead of words, it features pictograms representing troops, weapons, vehicles, 

and—in some models—elephants, common beasts of burden in Laos. The data could be transmitted 

to an airplane overhead by activating a toggle switch.

56

AN-2 “COLT” THROTTLE

On 12 January 1968, four North Vietnamese AN-2 Colt biplanes, painted dark green and modified 

to drop bombs, flew into Laos headed for a US radar facility that was providing critical all-weather 

guidance to American warplanes flying strike missions against targets in North Vietnam. By chance, 

an unarmed CIA UH-1D “Huey” helicopter approached the site at the same time and gave chase, 

with the on-board flight mechanic firing his AK-47 at one of the Colts. After a 20-minute pursuit, the 

Colt crashed, thus earning the Huey’s two-man crew the distinction of having shot down an enemy 

fixed-wing aircraft from a helicopter—a one-of-a-kind victory. This throttle was recovered from 

the wreckage.

INFRARED LANTERN BEACON

Modifications by Agency technicians transformed this commercial Coleman lantern into an infrared 

beacon that could be seen from as far away as 250 feet. Gasoline-powered and painted dull black, 

the beacon emitted a narrow vertical infrared beam as well as some visible light, making it useful for 

marking air-drop and landing-field locations during the Vietnam war.
57
58
59

EVACUATION MAP AND INSTRUCTIONS FOR SAIGON

By early 1975, the US had prepared for a possible evacuation from Saigon, the capital of South 

Vietnam, then under threat from the North Vietnamese Army. The plan that emerged, FREQUENT 

WIND, was the last gasp of American involvement in the war. Not widely known was that the CIA 

was fully integrated into the plan and that Air America played a pivotal role in the evacuation. In 

April 1975, the CIA designated 14 assembly points in Saigon for the emergency evacuation of key 

personnel. This map identifies the locations of those points and the accompanying documents give 

instructions for the evacuation.

HOMEMADE VIET CONG PISTOL

A counterintelligence team in South Vietnam collected this homemade Viet Cong pistol. The 

primitive weapon was symbolic of the grassroots communist insurgency. 
60

Reform 

In most fields of human endeavor, allowances are made for difficulties and 

obstacles, failure may be counted as a step on the way to success. ... Intelligence 

cannot count on this kind of sympathy. — WALTER LAQUEUR 

The Vietnam war was a watershed in American political history. As the war 

dragged on, many Americans came to challenge the underlying assumptions 

of the Cold War, leading to a reassessment of CIA’s role. What exactly 

had the CIA been doing in the name of the American people? Had it gone 

beyond its original charter by running front organizations at home, spying on 

anti-war protesters or experimenting with mind-altering drugs? And what 

should its future role be? The Director of Central Intelligence, William E. Colby, 

established a policy of full disclosure of any past actions that, in hindsight, 

might appear to have overstepped the bounds of legality or propriety, thus 

sharing the Agency’s so-called “family jewels” with Congress. The result was 

a new regime of executive orders and Congressional oversight for the 

Intelligence Community. 

DEAR PISTOL 

The CIA DEnied ARea pistol is a 9-mm parabellum, single-shot, reloadable pistol designed for 

distribution to foreign fighters willing to operate behind enemy lines. The receiver is made of 

cast aluminum, and the barrel of blue steel. It came with spare cartridges in the grip and a small 

instruction sheet. Like the OSS Liberator pistol of WWII, the Vietnam-era close-range DEAR pistol 

could, in theory at least, be used to take a more powerful weapon from an enemy, although 

existing records suggest few were ever issued or used. Most of these pistols, along with other 

unconventional weapons, were destroyed following the Pike and Church Congressional Committees’ 

investigations into the Agency. Only a few DEAR pistols—this being one—survived. 


63

Threats from New Quarters

5

“There are no facts about the future.”

— DIA DIRECTOR VICE ADMIRAL THOMAS WILSON, 1999

On 4 November 1979, militant Islamic students seized the US Embassy in Tehran. 

This was the scene near the embassy shortly after the seizure. 
64

444 Days 

Ok, so what? — CIA OFFICER AND AMERICAN HOSTAGE WILLIAM DAUGHERTY, UPON BEING

CONFRONTED BY IRANIAN INTERROGATORS WITH EVIDENCE OF HIS AGENCY AFFILIATION

The years between 1945 and 1985 sometimes seemed monochromatic, 

dominated by the struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union. The 

palette clearly began to change in 1979 when the threat from a new quarter took 

shape. In a move that CIA did not predict, Islamic fundamentalists overthrew 

the Shah of Iran. Seen as a bulwark against Soviet influence, he had been a longtime American ally. Believing that the friend of your enemy is also your enemy, 

the fundamentalists turned into staunch enemies of the United States. That 

same year, militants aligned with the emerging fundamentalist regime overran 

the US Embassy in Tehran and took an original total of 63 Americans hostage; 

another six embassy personnel escaped and hid with Canadian Embassy 

officials. CIA successfully exfiltrated the so-called “Canadian Six” in an elaborate 

covert operation—a story dramatized in the award-winning Hollywood movie 

Argo in 2012. CIA also played a significant role in supporting the US military in 

an attempt to free the hostages by force in Operation Eagle Claw. The operation 

famously failed after the dramatic collision between a tanker plane and rescue 

helicopter at a makeshift airstrip deep in the Iranian desert. 

ARGO PANOPLY

To exfiltrate the six American diplomats sheltered in the homes of Canadian Embassy officials, CIA 

Directorate of Science & Technology officers created an elaborate ruse—Studio 6, a fake Hollywood 

production company, and Argo, a fake movie based on an actual science-fiction script. The six were 

able to leave Iran under the pretense of being Canadian filmmakers scouting for filming locations. 

Creating materials such as movie posters and press releases helped establish the operation’s cover. 


67

INFRARED RUNWAY MARKER USED AT DESERT ONE AIRSTRIP 

In Operation EAGLE CLAW, the US military needed to safely land fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft under 

cover of darkness for refueling at a remote desert site in Iran known as “Desert One.” This is one of the 

concealable landing lights developed by CIA to mark the desert landing strip. It was a modified marine 

buoy light coated with an infrared-filtering lacquer and controlled by a radio-receiver switch used in 

audio surveillance. Although the operation ended in disaster after a fiery collision between a plane and 

helicopter, the markers worked perfectly and became the forerunners of standard runway markers 

for today’s special operations forces.

TAR-224 RADIO

A compact, high-frequency, paramilitary transceiver, the TAR-224 enabled communications with field 

agents operating behind enemy lines. It saw service in Vietnam as well as during Operation EAGLE CLAW. 
68

Afghanistan

[The CIA was]...conducting in Afghanistan what became one of the most 

successful covert operations since the Second World War. — CHRISTOPHER ANDREW

During the Cold War, the rugged, deeply traditional Islamic country of 

Afghanistan sat in a strategic position between two Islamic republics, Iran and 

Pakistan, and the Soviet Union. Committed to expanding their influence in the 

region, the Soviets invaded Afghanistan in 1979 to protect a relatively new, 

pro-Soviet government from overthrow by traditionalists. President Jimmy 

Carter directed CIA to assist the various Islamic rebel groups, generally known 

as Mujahideen, with money, weapons, medical supplies, and other equipment. 

The initial goal was simply to bog the Soviets down, not unlike the way that 

the US had been bogged down in Vietnam. In 1985, on orders from the Reagan 

Administration, the goal became more ambitious: help the rebels win. To that 

end, the US Government stepped up its aid to the Mujahideen, supplying them 

with Stinger missiles to shoot down Soviet helicopter gunships and establishing 

a network of contacts with rebel commanders. The strategy contributed to 

the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989. 
69

STINGER MISSILE LAUNCHER 

The Stinger missiles supplied by the United States gave Afghan guerrillas the ability to destroy the 

dreaded Soviet Mi-24D helicopter gunships. Three of the first four Stingers fired each took down a 

gunship. The guerrillas were now able to challenge Soviet control of the airspace above the battlefield. 

Mujahideen morale soared as Soviet losses mounted. By 1989, the Soviet Union had concluded 

that the fight was not worth the cost and withdrew from the country.

71

AFGHANISTAN ANTI-COMMUNIST POSTER

This poster, proclaiming “The Permanent Embrace,” decries the prolonged Soviet invasion. 

Such Spanish-language posters may have been intended for Central America, where the Soviets 

were supporting another communist regime in Nicaragua.

SOVIET HELICOPTER PILOT’S HELMET

Texas Congressman Charlie Wilson was a devoted supporter of the Mujahideen. On one of his trips 

to the troubled region, Wilson received this helmet. It was once worn by a Soviet helicopter gunship 

pilot and was given to Wilson by one of the first Mujahideen fighters to successfully shoot down 

that type of aircraft.
72

Year of the Spy

No intelligence service can be more effective than its counterintelligence 

component for very long. — RICHARD HELMS

In the US, 1985 became known as the “Year of the Spy” because that was the 

year when 14 Americans were arrested or convicted of spying against their 

country. It was also the year when the mid-level CIA officer Aldrich Ames 

became a Soviet mole and when the FBI Special Agent Robert Hanssen resumed 

his career of espionage on behalf of the Soviets. Both working for the KGB, 

Ames and Hanssen would not be caught for a number of years, giving them 

ample time to betray many American secrets, including the identities of Soviets 

(and Russians after 1991) who were spying for the United States. Most of those 

identified were subsequently executed. No one has been able to explain the 

remarkable convergence of espionage in this year; “Year of the Spy” was hardly 

a distinction that the American Intelligence Community wanted. The lesson 

learned was the need for better counterintelligence strategies, even after the end 

of the Cold War.

KW-7 AND KW-26 CRYPTO MACHINES

The United States and other NATO countries used these cryptographic communication machines 

as recently as the mid-1980s. The KW-26 (the larger unit on the bottom) encrypted and decrypted 

teletype between large sites in bulk and at fast rates. Widely used with over 14,000 units produced, 

the KW-26 superseded the crypto machines of World War II by using electronic shift registers instead 

of mechanical rotors. The KW-7 (the smaller unit on top) provided station-to-station communications 

and featured solid-state circuitry, a rugged housing, and a sealed lid to prevent electro-magnetic 

emanations. Convicted spy John A. Walker compromised the KW-7 by selling its key cards to the 

Soviets from 1967 to 1985. 


75

Central America

One of the last frontiers of the Cold War was Central America, where the Reagan 

and George H. W. Bush Administrations fought two proxy wars. Both wars 

originated in clashes between left-wing insurgents and right-wing regimes, and 

both soon attracted international attention as the Soviet Union, Cuba, and the 

United States took sides. In the case of Nicaragua, insurgents seized power in 

1979 and eventually established the communist Sandinista regime modeled on 

Castro’s Cuba. The CIA’s role in Nicaragua was to support the anti-communist 

fighters known as the Contras. By 1985, the US Congress had cut off aid to 

the Contras, and in 1990 the Sandinistas were voted out of office, only to return 

in 2011. In El Salvador, the insurgents challenged an army and government 

still dominated by traditional oligarchs. The CIA supported the US Government 

policy of simultaneously strengthening the Salvadoran armed forces and 

moderating the influence of extremists. The Salvadoran Government and the 

rebels eventually negotiated a cease-fire that took effect on 1 January 1992 and 

evolved into a durable peace agreement. 

“ATTITUDE” HAT

An Agency officer wore this simple Guatemalan hat while monitoring the Salvadoran Civil War, 

marked by heavy fighting between leftist insurgents and government forces supported by the 

United States. He wore the hat on days when things were not going well, as a kind of bellwether. 

When he left his position, he literally passed the hat to another Agency officer. As the situation 

began improving, that officer wore it less and less.
76

The End of History?

For more than 50 years, the CIA devoted most of its time and energy to spying 

on the Soviets, writing reports and estimates about them, and fighting them or 

their surrogates on distant battlefields. Starting in 1989, the cracks in the Soviet 

façade were growing and the infrastructure was buckling. The Berlin Wall came 

down late in the year, and the Soviet Union itself came apart in 1991. Senator 

Daniel Patrick Moynihan famously declared that the defining failure of the CIA 

was that it did not predict the collapse of the Soviet Union. But a closer look 

at CIA performance reveals that, while the Agency did not know everything 

about the Soviets, it did know a lot and had for the most part accurately analyzed 

the problems of communism and the strains under which it had labored.

BERLIN WALL

Removed from the Berlin Wall in November 1989, these three sections of reinforced concrete form 

a monument, dedicated at CIA Headquarters in 1992. Oriented just as the wall was in Berlin, 

the monument bears painted graffiti on its west side—in stark contrast to its whitewashed east side. 


79

The First Gulf War

It was all such fun during the Cold War. But now, I wonder, what the hell is the point of it all?

— BRITISH INTELLIGENCE OFFICER AFTER THE BERLIN WALL CAME DOWN 

For the CIA, whose raison d’être for many years was to fight communism, the question 

above made sense. Some at CIA talked of paying a kind of peace dividend by, for example, 

letting some of its Russian speakers go. But soon the Agency’s plate started filling up 

again. The world was still a dangerous place, perhaps even more dangerous, now that 

the threats were harder to categorize. CIA certainly did not lack for crises and issues to 

scrutinize. In 1990, Iraqi dictator Saddam Husayn invaded Kuwait, compelling the United 

States to put together a coalition to eject his forces from the oil-rich sheikdom. In 1993, 

the attack by Islamic fundamentalists on the World Trade Center was the first in a series 

of such attacks that would continue into the next decade. Troubling outbreaks of terrorism 

began in Europe, and, for much of the 1990s, the successor states of the former Republic 

of Yugoslavia were at war. The collapse of the Soviet Union led to harrowing questions 

about the whereabouts of its nuclear arsenal; CIA found itself devoting more time to 

counterproliferation than ever before. 

DESERT STORM LEAFLETS 

The Agency produced leaflets like these to be dropped over locations in Iraq, subject to US military 

air strikes during Operation DESERT STORM. The leaflet translates as “Your equipment is subject to 

bombardment! Warning! This site will be bombed soon. Leave your equipment and save yourselves.”

81

9/11 and After

6

“Every day is 9/12.”

 — UNOFFICIAL MOTTO IN THE CIA COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER

CIA’s Team ALPHA rode on horseback with the Afghan Northern Alliance forces in an expedition 

that took the city of Mazar-e Sharif from the Taliban on 9 November 2001. CIA officers, like 

Team ALPHA’s leader (pictured here), sometimes spent 10 hours or more a day in uncomfortable, 

wood-framed, Uzbek saddles from Afghanistan.
82

9/11 

Sixty years earlier, the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor led to the creation of 

the OSS. Similarly, the surprise attacks by the Islamic terrorist group known 

as al-Qa’ida on 11 September 2001 brought about profound changes in the 

American Intelligence Community. In general terms, the intent of the changes 

was to prevent another such attack from occurring. CIA had established the 

Counterterrorism Center in 1986, but its work did not become an all-consuming 

priority for the Agency as a whole until 2001. CIA now had a focus to replace 

the Soviet threat. The attacks also led to a reorganization of the Intelligence 

Community, with legislation creating a senior coordinating organization—the 

Director of National Intelligence—to replace the Office of the Director of Central 

Intelligence at CIA, created by the National Security Act of 1947. Under the new 

legislation, CIA became primarily responsible for operations to collect human 

intelligence and produce all-source intelligence anaylsis. 

WORLD TRADE CENTER SAFE DRAWER

This safe drawer came from the rubble of one of the World Trade Center buildings. Luckily, the 

occupants escaped safely before the building collapsed late in the afternoon on 11 September 2001. 

An eyewitness described the recovery of the drawer: 

When you think about breaking a steel safe...the force that crushed those buildings’ floors just must 

have been incredible...the drawer part was melted to the body part of the safe. The temperature had 

been so hot [inside the building that] it literally melted the safe into one piece...they estimated that 

the temperature was something like 1,600° to 1,800°or 1,900°....They found a little bit of paper, some 

identification badges, some hard drives, a few components of electronic equipment, some twisted 

pieces of safe, but they didn’t find very much....Not when you considered how much was there.





88

SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES LASER ACQUISITION MARKER (SOFLAM)

US forces in Afghanistan used the AN/PEQ-1A SOFLAM to mark targets with laser light for the 

precise delivery of laser-guided ordnance. The SOFLAM was critical in the battle for Tora Bora where a 

joint CIA-Special Forces team directed 72 hours of unrelenting air strikes—sometimes perilously 

close to its own position. 

RAW LAPIS LAZULI ORE

Al-Qa’ida uses lapis lazuli, a semi-precious royal-blue gemstone, in its financial network to bypass the 

traceability of cash transactions within the world’s standard monetary system. This trunk of raw ore—

possibly used as currency to pay fighters—came from a captured Taliban stronghold in Afghanistan.

 

 
91

JAWBREAKER KNIFE

CIA officer Gary Schroen was starting his transition to retirement, but after 9/11 he volunteered 

to return to active service and lead Operation JAWBREAKER into Afghanistan. He carried this 

knife with him in the war zone.

LIFESAVER

A CIA medic carried this multipurpose Schrade tool in Afghanistan. He used it to perform 

numerous surgical procedures on Afghan partners, including three lower-leg amputations.
92

The 2003 Iraq War

CIA was intimately involved in US Government operations in Iraq. After 9/11, 

the Bush Administration was concerned about possible support to terrorism 

by Iraqi dictator Saddam Husayn, whose regime had used weapons of mass 

destruction (WMD) against Iran in the 1980s. In 2002-2003, CIA participated 

in the intense discussions about the continued existence of any such weapons. 

CIA did much to support the military operations that followed to overthrow 

Saddam. A US-led coalition seized Baghdad in April 2003, and in the ensuing 

occupation, CIA established a presence in the country to monitor years of 

difficult—and often dangerous—political developments. 

THURAYA SATELLITE PHONE

Intelligence officers relied heavily on Thuraya phones in 2003 to communicate on the ground during 

the launch of Operation Iraqi Freedom after most other communication lines were destroyed or 

interrupted during the invasion. 
93

The War on Terrorism, Continued 

The terrorist threat continued while American forces operated in Afghanistan 

and Iraq. In both countries, a delicate balance existed between the US presence 

and terrorist activity. Counterterrorist operations brought terrorist responses, 

but as time went on, a number of terrorist leaders were killed or captured, to 

include Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, killed in Iraq, and 9/11 mastermind Khalid Sheikh 

Mohammed, captured and incarcerated at Guantanamo Bay since 2006. 

The highest priority target, Usama Bin Ladin, remained elusive until intelligence 

analysts and targeters located him in Pakistan and a special operations team 

killed him in May 2011. Most of these counterterrorist operations were joint 

in the sense that CIA, the US military, and other parts of the Intelligence 

Community worked together more closely than they ever had in the past. 

ABBOTTABAD COMPOUND MODEL

In support of the raid that resulted in the death of Usama Bin Ladin, National Geospatial-Intelligence 

Agency (NGA) model makers built this exact copy of the Abbottabad Compound 1 Model. The NGA 

Director presented it to the CIA’s Associate Deputy Director on 22 January 2013. 


96

Index

Abbottabad Compound 1 Model, 94, 95

Adversaries of the United States,

al-Qai’da, 82, 84, 88

al-Zarqawi, Abu Musab, 93

Bin Laden, Usama, 84, 93

Castro, Fidel, 48

Hitler, Adolf, 16

Psychological analysis of, 16

German and OSS stamps portraying, 18-19

Husayn, Saddam, 79, 92 

Khrushchev, Nikita, 50

Message of, 51

Mohammed, Khalid Skeikh, 93

North Vietnam, 58

Sandinista National Liberation Front, 

“Sandinistas,” 75

Taliban, 81, 84, 87, 88

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 

Soviet Union (USSR), 29, 35, 36, 41, 42, 50, 

53, 64, 68, 69, 71, 72, 75, 76, 79, 82, 84

Vietcong, 59

Homemade pistol used by, 59

Aerial Photo Reconnaissance, 36, 46, 47 

Afghanistan, 68, 69, 70, 71, 84, 87, 88, 91, 93

Saddle used in, 87

Soviet Helicopter Pilot’s Helmet used in, 71

Air America, 44, 45

Ironwork, Ornamental logo of, 44

Aircraft and airlines affiliated with CIA,

Air America, 44, 45

Ironwork, Ornamental logo of, 44 

Bell UH-1 “Huey” helicopter, 56

Civil Air Transport, 44, 45

Carry-on bag, 45

Mi-17 Helicopter, 84

Cockpit instrument used in, 85

U-2 aircraft, 36, 38

Helmet for pilot of, 38

Model of, 37

Photo from, 46

Suit worn by pilot of, 39

al-Qai’da, 82, 84, 88

al-Zarqawi, Abu Musab, 93

Ames, Aldrich, 72

AN-2 throttle, 56

Anti-Communist poster, 70

Argo, 64, 65

Baghdad, Iraq, 92

Bay of Pigs, 48, 50, 53

Brigade 2506 in, 48

Commemorative emblems of, 49

Bell UH-1 “Huey” helicopter, 56

Berlin Wall, 76

Three sections removed from, 77

Bin Laden, Usama, 84, 93
97

Bissell, Richard, 48

Blood Chit, 22

Brigade 2506, 48

Bunche, Ralph, 14

Bush, George H.W., administration of, 75

Bush, George W., 84

Administration of, 92

“Canadian Six,” 64 

Carter, Jimmy, 68 

Castro, Fidel, 48

Central American “Attitude” Hat, 74 

Central Intelligence Group, 30

China-Burma-India Theater, 22

Christian Democratic Party, of Italy, 42

Church, United States Senator Frank, 60 

Civil Air Transport, 44, 45

Carry-on bag, 45

Colby, William E., 48, 60

Coleman lantern, 58

Communications and encryption equipment,

Enigma Machine, 16-17

KW-7, 73

KW-26, 73

Mark IV Radio, 21

TAR-224 radio, 67

Thuraya Satellite Phone, 92

Congressional Oversight of CIA, 60

“Contras” (Nicaraguan fighters), 75

Coordinator of Information, 10

Cornerstone Trowel, 33

Counterterrorism Center (CTC), 82

Covert Action, 42, 44, 48

Cuban Missile Crisis, 35, 36, 47, 48, 50, 53

Daily Summary, The, 30

Editor’s Copy of first product for Truman, 31

David Clark Corset and Brassiere Manufacturer, 38

De Silva, Peer, 41

Denied Area (DEAR) pistol, 61

Director of National Intelligence (DNI), 82

Directors of Central Intelligence,

Colby, William E., 48, 60

Dulles, Allen W., 7, 33, 48

Helms, Richard M., 15

Personal note from, 15

McCone, John A., 52, 53

Smith, Walter Bedell, 27

Doctor Zhivago, 42-43

Donovan, Major General William J., 9, 10, 

14, 28, 29

Distinguished Service Cross of, 11

Distinguished Service Medal of, 13

Medal of Honor of, 11

National Security Medal of, 12

Dulles, Allen W., 7, 33, 48

E Street Complex, OSS and early CIA 

Headquarters at, 21, 33

Early CIA Sign, 32

Eisenhower, Dwight D., 33, 36 

El Salvador, 75

Elephant Counter, 55

Evacuation map and instructions for Saigon, 58

Fairbairn, William, 25

Fairbairn-Sykes fighting knife, 24-25

Firearms,

Denied Area (DEAR) pistol, 61

Hi-Standard .22-caliber pistol, 23

Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 50

Free Thai Movement, 23

Patch of, 23

Enigma Machine, 16-17

Great Espionage Cases of the Central 

Intelligence Agency

Penkovskiy, Oleg, 34, 35

Popov, Pyotr, 41

GRU, Soviet military intelligence, 35

Guantanamo Bay Prison, 93 

Hanssen, Robert, 72

Helms, Richard M., 15

Personal note from, 15

Hitler, Adolf, 16

Psychological analysis of, 16

German and OSS stamps portraying, 18-19

Husayn, Saddam, 79, 92 

Infrared Lantern Beacon, 58-59

Infrared Runway Marker, 66

Iran, 42, 64, 67, 68, 92

Iranian Hostage Crisis, 64

Rescue attempt of the hostages in 

(Operation EAGLE CLAW), 64, 67 

Iraq, 79, 92, 93,

Investigations of CIA, see “Congressional 

Oversight”

Jedburgh (World War II codeword) 

paratroopers, 25, 41

Johnson, Lyndon B., administration of, 54

Joyeuse, René, 21

Kaleyias, Spiros, 21

OSS identification badge belonging to, 20 

Kennan, George, 42

Kennedy, John F., 35, 48, 52, 53

Letter from, 53

Khrushchev, Nikita, 50

Message of, 51

Kisevalter, George, 41

Cufflinks (regonition symbols) of, 40 

Knives,

Fairbairn-Sykes fighting knife, 24-25

Knife used by Gary Schroen, 90

Schrade Tool, 91

Kuwait, 79

KW-7, 73

KW-26, 73

Langer, Walter, 16

Langer, William, 16

Laos, 44, 54, 56

Lapis Lazuli ore, raw, 89

Mark IV Radio, 21

Mazar-e Sharif, Afghanistan, 81

McCone, John A., 52, 53

Mi-17 Helicopter, 84

Cockpit instrument used in, 85

Mine probing tool, 84

Mohammed, Khalid Skeikh, 93

Moynihan, Daniel Patrick, 76 

Mujahideen (Afghan Freedom Fighters), 

68, 69, 71

National Geospatial-Intelligence 

Agency (NGA), 93

National Security Act of 1947, 29, 82

Nicaragua, 71, 75

North Vietnam, 58

Northern Alliance Afghan Coalition, 81

Office of Policy Coordination, 30

Office of Reports and Estimates, 30
98

Office of Strategic Services (OSS), 7,30, 54, 82

Counterintelligence staff of, 16

Dissolution of, 28 

Morale Operations Branch of, 19

Personnel of, 14

Secret Intelligence Branch of, 28

Research & Analysis Branch of, 14, 16, 28

Operation DESERT STORM, 79

Leaflets dropped during, 78

Operation EAGLE CLAW, 64,67

Operation FREQUENT WIND, 59

Operation Iraqi Freedom, 92

Operation JAWBREAKER, 84, 91

Operational field equipment 

Blood Chit, 22

Elephant Counter, 55

Evacuation map and instructions 

for Saigon, 58

Infrared Lantern Beacon, 58-59

Infrared Runway Marker, 66

Mine probing tool, 84

Pointy-talky chart, 86

Special Operations Forces Laser 

Acquisition Marker (SOFLAM), 88

Pakistan, 68, 84, 93

Pasternak, Boris, 42, 43

Pearl Harbor,

Intelligence failure at, 7, 42, 82

Japanese attack on, 7

Penkovskiy, Oleg, 34, 35

Pietsch, Jr., William H., 25

Pike, United States Representative Otis, 60 

Pointy-talky chart, 86

Popov, Pyotr, 41

Powers, Francis Gary, 36

President’s Intelligence Checklist (PICL), 53

Presidents of the United States 

Bush, George H.W., administration of, 75

Bush, George W., 84

Administration of, 92

Carter, Jimmy, 68 

Eisenhower, Dwight D., 33, 36 

Johnson, Lyndon B., administration of, 54

Kennedy, John F., 35, 48, 52, 53

Letter from, 53

Reagan, Ronald, administration of, 68, 75

Roosevelt, Franklin D., 10, 28 

Truman, Harry S., 27, 28, 29, 30

Administration of, 42

CIA Seal autographed by, 29

Reagan, Ronald, administration of, 68, 75

Reform, 

of CIA, 60

of the Intelligence Community, 60

Roosevelt, Franklin D., 10, 28 

Saigon, South Vietnam, 58, 59

Sandinista National Liberation Front, 

“Sandinistas,” 75

Schrade Tool, 91

Schroen, Gary, 91

Knife used by, 90

September 11 (9/11), terror attacks of, 82, 91, 92

Smith, Walter Bedell, 27

Special Operations Forces Laser Acquisition 

Marker (SOFLAM), 88

Support functions of the CIA, 44

Stimson, Henry, 7

Stinger Missile, 68, 69

Launcher of, 69

Taliban, 81, 84, 87, 88

TAR-224 radio, 67

Tehran, Iran, 64

Terrorism, 79, 82, 92, 93

Thuraya Satellite Phone, 92

Traitors to the United States,

Ames, Aldrich, 72

Hanson, Robert, 72

Walker, John A., 72

Truman, Harry S., 27, 28, 29, 30

Administration of, 42

CIA Seal autographed by, 29

U-2 aircraft, 36, 38

Helmet for pilot of, 38

Model of, 37

Photo from, 46

Suit worn by pilot of, 39

Udorn, Thailand, Royal Thai Air Base in, 45

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 

Soviet Union (USSR), 29, 35, 36, 41, 42, 50, 53, 

64, 68, 69, 71, 72, 75, 76, 79, 82, 84

United States Army Institute of Heraldry, 28

United States Military Academy 

(West Point), 41

Uzdawinis, Stella, 28

Pendant belonging to, 28

Vietcong, 59

Homemade pistol used by, 59

Vietnam, United States war in, 23, 54, 

56-60, 67, 68

Walker, John A., 72

Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), 93

Wilson, Charles “Charlie,” 71

World Trade Center, 79, 82

Safe drawer recovered from, 83

Yugoslavia, former Republic of, 79



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

“Honest history is the weapon of freedom.” 

— ARTHUR SCHLESINGER, JR., HISTORIAN AND OSS VETERAN
NOTES FROM OUR ATTIC

A CURATOR’S POCKET HISTORY OF THE CIA