Filed 8/10/23 P. v. Reeves CA4/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

JOHN K. REEVES,

Defendant and Appellant.

D080704

(Super. Ct. Nos. 289485 & 

294234)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, 

Polly H. Shamoon, Judge. Affirmed.

Pauline E. Villanueva, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for 

Defendant and Appellant. 

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant 

Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Collette 

C. Cavalier and Kathryn Kirschbaum, Deputy Attorneys General for Plaintiff 

and Respondent. 

John K. Reeves appeals from a condition of his probation which ordered 

him to stay away from the Pacific Beach neighborhood of San Diego. After 

filing his notice of appeal in this matter, his probation was revoked for 
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reasons unrelated to that condition of probation. The primary issue on 

appeal therefore is moot and we decline to reach it. We remand to address a 

technical issue with the abstract of judgment.

BACKGROUND

Relevant to this appeal, Reeves pled guilty to offenses in two different 

cases. In case number SCD289485 (case 485), on August 23, 2021 Reeves

pled guilty to possession for sale of a controlled substance. On October 21, 

2021 the trial court sentenced him to a two-year term of probation for that 

offense. 

In case number SCD294234 (case 234), on May 18, 2022 Reeves pled 

guilty to being a felon in possession of ammunition. He also admitted that he 

violated his probation in case 485.

At a sentencing hearing on June 23, 2022 the trial court considered 

both the probation revocation on case 485 as well as the sentence for case

234. The court continued the two-year term of probation for case 485, and 

sentenced Reeves to a two-year period of probation for case 234, to be served 

concurrently.

In doing so, the trial court also considered a proposed condition of 

probation that Reeves “[s]tay away from Pacific Beach, 92109 zip code.”

Reeves objected to this condition, arguing that there was no nexus between 

the crime and the Pacific Beach stay-away order. The court disagreed, noting 

that case 485 involved drug sales and that there was “an absolute nexus” 

between the stay-away order and the offense. The court referred to dozens of 

convictions outlined in the probation report, many of them for drug offenses 

and other crimes that occurred in the Pacific Beach area. The court 

concluded that “[b]ased on not just the conviction alone, but also his past 

record and his activities, past convictions, past failed probation grants, it is 
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an appropriate nexus to, frankly, both cases, given the activity and where 

they took place in both cases,” and therefore included the condition in the 

terms of Reeves’s probation.

Reeves timely appealed that judgment of June 23, 2022. Shortly 

thereafter, Reeves was rearrested for an unrelated offense, and on July 29, 

2022 the trial court revoked his probation in case 485 and case 234. On

August 26, 2022 the trial court sentenced Reeves to two years in prison on 

case 485 and sixteen months in prison on case 234. Accordingly, Reeves is no 

longer on probation.

DISCUSSION

I. The Probation Condition Issue is Moot

On appeal, Reeves challenges the imposition of the condition of 

probation that he stay away from Pacific Beach, 92109 zip code. Because his 

probation was revoked, he is no longer on probation and therefore the issue is 

moot. 

“ ‘ “[W]hen, pending an appeal from the judgment of a lower court, and 

without any fault of the [opposing party], an event occurs which renders it 

impossible for this court, if it should decide the case in favor of [defendant], to 

grant him any effectual relief whatever, the court will not proceed to a formal 

judgment, but will dismiss the appeal” ’ as moot.” (People v. DeLeon (2017) 

3 Cal.5th 640, 645.) 

A probation condition challenge becomes moot after probation is 

terminated or revoked. (See People v. Carbajal (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1114, 1120, 

fn. 5; In re Charles G. (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 608, 611.) A ruling on the 

validity of the challenged probation condition would have no practical effect 

and would not provide any effective relief to Reeves.
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Reeves concedes that his probation condition challenge is moot, but 

asks us to consider the issue because, he argues, it is an issue of broad public 

interest that is likely to recur and the issue may recur between the parties

here. (See Harris v. Stampolis (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 484, 495.)

As to the issue of broad public interest, we fail to discern how a 

probation term for Reeves has “broad public interest.” Reeves argues that 

the claimed restrictions on his constitutional rights “should be reviewed as a 

matter of public interest,” but provides no support for the assumption that 

there is public interest in whether or not Reeves should be ordered to stay 

away from Pacific Beach. Nor does he suggest that similar provisions are 

commonly imposed or that the issue is likely to recur outside his own 

individual case. Regardless, even if such provisions were commonly imposed, 

the validity provision could be easily tested in another case in which the 

defendant remains on probation and subject to the condition during the 

pendency of the appeal. 

Reeves’s citation to In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875 is not helpful. 

The constitutional analysis there focused on whether a probationer had 

forfeited her right to raise a constitutional challenge to a probation term 

because she had failed to raise it below, which is not an issue in this case.

(Id. at p. 878.) Relevant to us, the Supreme Court noted that the appeal in 

Sheena K. was moot, because the defendant had died during the pendency of 

the appeal, but it chose to “exercise[] [its] inherent authority to retain this 

case for argument and opinion,” in order to resolve a pending conflict among 

the courts of appeal as to whether the forfeiture doctrine applied to 

constitutional challenges to probation conditions. (Id. at p. 879.) To our 

knowledge, no such conflict exists here. Without more, we cannot conclude 
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that a broad public interest underlies the now-moot condition of Reeves’s

probation.

In arguing that the issue “may recur between the parties,” Reeves 

further contends that we should consider the issue because it is “likely that 

Mr. Reeves will be subject to a similar parole condition upon his release from 

custody.” We disagree. First, we decline to speculate what parole conditions 

will be imposed upon Reeves when the time comes for him to be released from 

custody. Second, absent some unusual circumstance, the sentencing court 

will not be involved in fashioning parole conditions, which will be determined 

by the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation prior to Reeves’s release 

from prison (Pen. Code § 3000, subd. (b)(7)), so the issue will not recur 

“between the parties” involved in the probation condition before us. And 

third, Reeves will have the ability to challenge the exact language of any 

provision that may be imposed in any future proceeding. (See, e.g., In re 

Stevens (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1234 [stating that “[c]onditions of 

parole must be reasonably related to the compelling state interest of fostering 

a law-abiding lifestyle in the parolee”].)

Accordingly, we decline to consider the merits of Reeves’s arguments 

regarding the now-moot condition of probation.

II. The Judgment Should Be Corrected to Clarify the Imposition of Only 

One Restitution Fine

The parties agree that the abstract of judgment dated August 26, 2022 

should be corrected so that it cannot be misinterpreted as imposing a 

duplicative restitution fine under Penal Code section1202.4(b).

When probation is revoked, the original restitution fine remains in 

place, and the trial court cannot impose an additional restitution fine. 

(People v. Preston (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 415, 423.) Here, the trial court 
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stated, “[t]he 300 that was suspended is now imposed with 300 stayed unless 

parole is revoked.” But, as the People concede, the August 26 abstract of 

judgment could be read to impose an additional restitution fine. Therefore,

the abstract of judgment should be corrected to avoid future 

misinterpretation.

DISPOSITION

The matter is remanded to the Superior Court with instructions to 

correct the abstract of judgment dated August 26, 2022 to reflect that the 

Penal Code section 1202.4(b) restitution fine was previously imposed. In all 

other respects, the appeal is dismissed as moot.

KELETY, J.

WE CONCUR:

O’ROURKE, Acting P. J.

DATO, J.