SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

1160 

CA 11-01106 

PRESENT: PERADOTTO, J.P., CARNI, LINDLEY, AND SCONIERS, JJ.

 

 

ROSS T. RUNFOLA, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, 

V MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

SIEGEL, KELLEHER & KAHN, HERBERT M. SIEGEL, AND 

DENNIS A. KAHN, DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS. 

 

PHILLIPS LYTLE LLP, BUFFALO (CHRISTOPHER L. HAYES OF COUNSEL), FOR

DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS.

CHIACCHIA & FLEMING, LLP, HAMBURG (ANDREW P. FLEMING OF COUNSEL), FOR

PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT. 

 

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Erie County (Diane Y.

Devlin, J.), entered July 26, 2010. The order, insofar as appealed

from, denied in part the motion of defendants for summary judgment. 

It is hereby ORDERED that the order insofar as appealed from is

unanimously reversed on the law without costs, defendants’ motion is

granted in its entirety and the complaint is dismissed. 

Memorandum: Plaintiff, a former partner in defendant Siegel,

Kelleher & Kahn (SKK), commenced this action against that law firm and

defendants Herbert M. Siegel and Dennis A. Kahn alleging, inter alia,

breach of contract, fraud, and promissory estoppel. In 1992, Siegel

and Kahn, the law firm’s managing partners, purchased a group longterm disability insurance policy for the benefit of the firm’s

partners. An internal letter circulated in the law firm announced the

existence of the disability policy and outlined the coverage

provisions. Over the next several years, plaintiff suffered several

physical and medical ailments and, although he continued to work, his

ability to practice law was impaired. In December 1997, the group

disability policy lapsed based on the nonpayment of premiums. 

According to plaintiff, he was not notified when the policy was

allowed to lapse, nor did he learn that the policy had been cancelled

until a few years thereafter, when he was inquiring about the

coverage. Plaintiff continued working at SKK until May 2001 and

thereafter commenced this action.

Supreme Court properly granted those parts of defendants’ motion

for summary judgment dismissing the first through third causes of

action, but should have granted the motion for summary judgment

dismissing the complaint in its entirety. The causes of action left

intact by the court are preempted by the Employee Retirement Income
-2- 1160 

CA 11-01106 

Security Act of 1974 ([ERISA] 29 USC § 1001 et seq.). Specifically,

ERISA “shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now

or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan” covered by ERISA (29

USC § 1144 [a]). In accordance with that expansive preemption

provision (see e.g. California Div. of Labor Stds. Enforcement v

Dillingham Constr., N.A., Inc., 519 US 316, 324; Ingersoll-Rand Co. v

McClendon, 498 US 133, 138; Shaw v Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 US 85,

98; see also Matter of Council of City of N.Y. v Bloomberg, 6 NY3d

380, 394), ERISA provides that “[a] law ‘relates to’ an employee

benefit plan . . . if it has a connection with or reference to such a

plan” (Shaw, 463 US at 96-97). ERISA also imposes, inter alia, notice

and disclosure requirements in relation to employee benefit plans (see

29 USC §§ 1021-1024; see also Peralta v Hispanic Business, Inc., 419

F3d 1064, 1070; see generally Veilleux v Atochem N. Am., Inc., 929 F2d

74, 75-76). Thus, ERISA mandates dismissal of plaintiff’s remaining

causes of action. In light of our determination, we do not reach

defendants’ remaining contentions.

Entered: November 18, 2011 Patricia L. Morgan

Clerk of the Court