i

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iii

v

Strategic Studies Institute

and

U.S. Army War College Press

MILITARY CONTINGENCIES IN MEGACITIES 

AND SUB-MEGACITIES

Phil Williams

Werner Selle

December 2016

The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and 

do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the 

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public release; distribution is unlimited.

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This publication is subject to Title 17, United States Code, 

Sections 101 and 105. It is in the public domain and may not be 

copyrighted.
vi

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ISBN 1-58487-735-9
vii

FOREWORD

The U.S. Army has to adapt to a constantly changing environment. One of the most important changes 

in this environment is urbanization—a process that is 

occurring rapidly and globally and is resulting in the 

advent of much larger cities—of over 10 or in some 

cases even 20 million people—as well as the growth of 

many more smaller cities. It is also resulting in different kinds of cities, ranging from smart cities, in which 

technology is fully integrated, to feral cities characterized by violence and disorder. In between these extremes are fragile cities that can tip in either direction. 

This has led to some discussion about the appropriate 

focus for the Army, but the authors of this study argue 

that the best way forward is to consider both megacities and (what they term) sub-megacities. The authors 

also respond to questions that have been raised about 

the conditions that might draw the Army into a military operation in a megacity or sub-megacity, identifying six different kinds of strategic considerations 

that might lead civilian decision-makers to determine 

the need to use military force in response to events, 

trends, and developments in a massive urban agglomeration. The authors take the view that although such 

a contingency would be a formidable undertaking, a 

better understanding of the urban environment and 

more effective preparations can enhance the prospects for success. They emphasize the need to understand the city as a complex living organism with its 

own flows, networks, and rhythms, and recommend 

a multi-level approach to intelligence preparation for 

and on the battlefield, ranging from the subterranean 

dimension to the cyber- and data-overlay that hovers 

above the city. Phil Williams and Werner Selle also 
viii

argue that it is important to minimize the disruption 

to the natural flows and rhythms of a city. This is followed by a practical and helpful discussion of how 

more selective recruitment, enhanced training, better 

equipment, and more effective tactics could enhance 

the prospects for success. The authors conclude that 

the U.S. Army—through a conceptual understanding 

of megacities and sub-megacities; an institutionally 

embedded system of intelligence collection and analysis for the urban battlefield; innovations in doctrine, 

equipment, and training; and an appreciation of likely 

scenarios and adversary actions—can be more prepared for the dense urban battlefield than ever before. 

Inherent and unforeseen challenges will remain, but 

the prospects for overcoming these challenges will be 

significantly enhanced.

 

 DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

 Director

 Strategic Studies Institute and

 U.S. Army War College Press
ix

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

WERNER SELLE is a recent graduate of the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs (GSPIA) 

at the University of Pittsburgh, with particular interests in international security, strategic studies, and 

U.S. foreign policy. Before enrolling at the University 

of Pittsburgh, he worked for 2 years as a psychological operations specialist. Prior to that, he was a noncommissioned officer and infantryman with numerous combat deployments. He holds a master’s degree 

in security and intelligence studies from GSPIA, and 

a bachelor's degree in political science from the University of Pittsburgh. Additionally, he served as a 

security and logistics contractor in both Iraq and in 

the United States. His research interests include major and emerging powers in “marginal areas” and 

the effective use of military forces in broad-spectrum 

operations. He is currently pursuing research projects 

in non-traditional operations for military forces, such 

as combating transnational crime, disaster relief, and 

humanitarian aid.

PHIL WILLIAMS holds the Wesley W. Posvar Chair in 

International Security Studies at the Graduate School 

of Public and International Affairs at the University 

of Pittsburgh, and is the Director of the University’s 

Matthew B. Ridgway Center for International Security 

Studies. Dr. Williams has published extensively in the 

field of international security. During the last 22 years, 

his research has focused primarily on transnational 

organized crime, which he has written about in Survival, Washington Quarterly, The Bulletin on Narcotics, 

Scientific American, Crime Law and Social Change, and 

International Peacekeeping. In addition, Dr. Williams 
was a founding editor of the journal Transnational 

Organized Crime and has edited several volumes on 

combating organized crime, Russian organized crime, 

and the trafficking of women. He has been a consultant to both the United Nations Office of Drugs and 

Crime and U.S. Government agencies and has also 

given congressional testimony on organized crime. 

In 2001 and 2002, Dr. Williams spent a sabbatical at 

Carnegie Mellon University’s Computer Emergency 

Response Team, where he worked on intelligence 

analysis for cyberthreats and financial cybercrime. 

Dr. Williams has worked more recently on terrorist 

finances, ungoverned spaces, and drug trafficking 

throughout West Africa. In the academic years 2007-8 

and 2008-9, he was a visiting research professor at the 

Strategic Studies Institute (SSI), U.S. Army War College (USAWC), where he wrote a monograph on The 

New Dark Age: The Decline of the State and U.S. Strategy. 

Another one of his monographs, published in August 

2009, entitled Criminals, Militias, and Insurgents: Organized Crime in Iraq. Dr. Williams has contributed three 

chapters to Fighting Back, an edited volume on terrorism published by Stanford University Press; he has 

also published an article on Mexican drug violence in 

a special issue of Terrorism and Political Violence and 

a chapter on Nigerian organized crime in the Oxford 

Handbook of Organized Crime. He is currently working 

on the crisis of governance in the northern triangle of 

Central America.

x
xi

SUMMARY

Urbanization is one of the most important megatrends of the 21st century. Consequently, the possibility of U.S. military involvement in a megacity or 

sub-megacity is an eventuality that cannot be ignored. 

After elucidating the nature of urbanization and developing a typology in terms of smart, fragile, and 

feral cities, we give consideration to the kinds of contingencies that the U.S. military, especially the 

Army, needs to think about and prepare for. 

Six kinds of contingencies have since been identified: humanitarian disaster relief; military support for 

civilian authorities in a restoration of order; intervention—for whatever reason—in a strategic city (also 

termed a critical or alpha city); military involvement 

in a city in the context of counter-insurgency; use of 

military force in a city in an interstate conflict; and 

containment or quarantine of an urban pandemic. 

Many debates arise concerning whether the appropriate focus should be predominantly on megacities 

or on smaller, but possibly more important, cities or 

perhaps on both. If the U.S. Army has the capacity to 

intervene militarily in a megacity, then it is likely that 

it could do the same in a smaller city. Consequently, 

the authors of this monograph focus on megacities 

and sub-megacities. 

Whatever the contingency, understanding the 

city as a complex system or organism is critical and 

provides the basis for changes in intelligence, recruitment, training, equipment, operations, and tactics. In this monograph, we place emphasis on intelligence preparation for the battlefield in terms of 10 

interconnected layers: the subterranean dimension, 

topography, cityscape, service infrastructure, inhabit-
ants, networks, flows, governance, rhythms, and the 

cyber dimension. This is followed by a discussion of 

what needs to be done to prepare for operations in 

megacities with the “concrete canyons” of modern 

business areas and the “sheet metal forests” found in 

massive slum areas. Consideration is given to equipment, personnel recruitment and training, the lessons 

that can be derived from past military experience as 

well as more recent law enforcement practices, and 

the need to work with (instead of against) the flows 

and rhythms of a city. Without such an approach, the 

results of military involvement in such a formidable 

environment would likely be disastrous; with it, the 

prospects for success would at least be enhanced. 

The recommendations include the following:

• Megacities should become a distinct focus of 

analysis for intelligence. Cities have to be understood as a layered and interacting series 

of complex adaptive systems, outlined with a 

more refined intelligence of the battlefield. Operating in these cities requires an understanding of these systems and an ability to harness, 

rather than disrupt, their dynamics.

• The development of a repository of knowledge 

and understanding of cities is critical, and the 

U.S. Army should create both an Urban Analysis Center and a supporting network that provides a surge capability for crisis interventions. 

• Greater interagency cooperation that transcends the military services and incorporates 

civilian departments and agencies (such as the 

Department of State, the U.S. Agency for International Development, and other Federal law 

enforcement agencies) is essential. 

xii
xiii

• U.S. forces will have to interact effectively with 

both the formal and informal mechanisms of 

governance within megacities and sub-megacities. This may involve cooperating with nontraditional stakeholders, such as criminal elements or other alternative governance actors.

• Conducting operations in megacities, as well as 

other urban areas, will require highly trained, 

quality personnel. The armed services will 

have to increase incentives to draw talented individuals to serve. It will also be necessary to 

incorporate recruits and affiliates with broader 

skill sets, especially those required for urban 

management and urban law enforcement. 

These initiatives should be complemented 

by in-house training for professional soldiers 

to prepare them more effectively for the demands of operating in these complex urban 

environments. 

• Governments should recognize that there are 

synergies—and important economies of scale—

between the skill sets required for operating in 

dense urban areas and those appropriate for 

stabilization operations.

• Finally, this monograph proposes two broad 

checklist-based acronyms, URBAN and 

SMART, which encapsulate many of the arguments and themes articulated in the preceding 

analysis. To fight effectively in a dense urban 

environment, the U.S. Army will have to meet 

the following requirements and approaches:

• Understanding the megacity battlefield. 

• Responding appropriately to the stringent 

demands of the urban battlefield.

• Battle management that is accommodating 

to the city’s rhythms, flows, and networks. 
xiv

• Alliances that will go beyond government 

agencies and their usual partners.

• Novel approaches that are essential to creating the smart urban soldier.

Moreover, within this urban approach, the smart soldier would exhibit the following qualities: 

• Sophisticated understanding of the urban 

battlefield.

• Multimedia and social media awareness.

• Ability to act as intelligence collectors and 

receivers.

• Rapid responses both within the command 

system and in decentralized operations.

• Technological knowledge and expertise.

Ultimately, fighting smart in an urban environment 

is the only feasible approach. This monograph offers 

some preliminary considerations of what this might 

mean, but, raises more questions than it answers. It 

is no more than an early—but hopefully useful—contribution to a debate that needs to be both broadened 

and refined. Only after such a debate will the United 

States be ready for future contingencies that are likely 

to be as challenging as they are inescapable.
1

MILITARY CONTINGENCIES IN MEGACITIES 

AND SUB-MEGACITIES

INTRODUCTION

Contemporary military operations in large cities 

are fraught with risk, particularly for conventional 

military forces fighting unconventional enemies. Indeed, cities are in some ways a great leveler in warfare, 

negating many of the advantages of high technology, 

constricting opportunities for maneuver operations, 

slowing the tempo of battle, and limiting the application of “shock and awe.” Moreover, the United States 

does not have a particularly impressive record when 

it comes to urban combat. The path from the battle of 

Hue in 1968 to the second battle of Fallujah in 2004 

seemed all too short as the United States progressed 

from destroying one city in order to save it in Vietnam to achieving the kind of victory it could not really 

afford in Iraq. As one study observed:

cities possess great numbers of noncombatants, are 

dense with vital infrastructures and important sociopolitical institutions, and are usually cluttered threedimensional spaces that pose significant logistical and 

navigational challenges. It suffices to say that these 

and other characteristics conspire to create a daunting 

environment for U.S. forces.1

In spite of the complex, highly cautionary nature 

of the urban environment for military forces, however, cities are becoming ever more important politically and economically. Historians examining the 21st 

century are likely to look back upon it as a century of 

massive and unparalleled urbanization. Indeed, some 

of the cities that will rise to prominence in the 21st 

century will likely become as important and distinc-
2

tive in their own way as Athens, Rome, and Constantinople at the height of their grandeur. Moreover, connectivity among many cities is growing. Although not 

all cities deserve to be characterized as global cities, 

more cities are becoming more connected to the global 

economy. In many respects, cities act as the hubs of 

a globalized world, providing the transportation and 

communications linkages that facilitate global flows 

of finance, commodities, and people. Saskia Sassen 

has argued that much of the global economic activity moves through a growing network of global cities: 

although there is a “disproportionate concentration in 

cities of the global North,” such as New York, London, Tokyo, Frankfurt, Zurich, and Hong Kong, cities 

in the developing world, such as Sao Paulo, Mexico 

City, Johannesburg, and Shanghai, have also become 

a part of this network.2 Moreover, during the next 2 

decades, as the developing world becomes almost the 

sole engine of urbanization, its contribution to the network of global cities will grow significantly. To put it 

simply, global cities will increasingly become a global 

phenomenon. Therefore, it is also likely that cities will 

become more important strategically, and that the 

United States will find itself at some point in the nottoo-distant future engaged in military contingencies 

in large cities. 

Dimensions of Urbanization.

Unfortunately, the notion of an increasingly urban 

world is often repeated but rarely unpackaged beyond the observation that the majority of the world’s 

population now lives in cities. In reality, urbanization has multiple dimensions, each of which poses its 

own set of challenges to the forces of governance and 

order and to the hopes for successful military action 

in urban areas. 
3

• The advent of metacities. One of the most important developments in the trend toward 

urbanization is the emergence of a small but 

growing number of metacities, that is cities—or 

perhaps, more accurately, continuous urban agglomerations that often transcend the boundaries of any one city—with populations of over 20 

million people. Although Tokyo was for some 

years the only city officially in this category, the 

figures provided by the Demographia website 

in January 2015 suggest that it has been joined 

by Jakarta, Delhi, Manila, Seoul-Incheon, 

Shanghai, Karachi, Beijing, the greater New 

York area, Guangzhou-Foshan, Sao Paulo, and 

Mexico City.3 The sheer size of such cities will 

create major environmental hazards, generate 

immense law and order problems (especially 

in poorer areas), and strain infrastructures that 

are already over-stretched. In some cases, the 

stresses and strains could prove overwhelming. 

• An increase in the number of megacities, that is, 

cities with populations in excess of 10 million 

people. In 1950, the only city of this kind was 

New York; by 1995, there were 14 such cities—

most of which were in the developing world. It 

was anticipated that by 2015 there would be 23 

megacities, with 19 of them in the developing 

world. In actuality, in 2015 there were 34 urban 

agglomerations with over 10 million people. 

Twenty-one of them had between 10 and 20 

million inhabitants, and the other 13 had over 

20 million people.4 By 2016, two more cities 

had joined the ranks of megacities, bringing the 

total to 36.5

• A marked increase in the number of what 

might be termed emerging- or mini-megacities. 
4

According to one observer writing in 2002, it 

was anticipated that by 2015 “the number of 

urban areas with populations between five and 

ten million will shoot from 7 to 37.”6 This has 

proved to be a slight underestimation, with the 

Demographia report of January 2015 identifying 

41 cities in this category. The United Nations 

(UN) put the figure slightly higher, at 43, and 

noted that these cities have over 300 million 

inhabitants. It also noted that “the number of 

such cities is expected to grow to 63 by 2030 

and house more than 400 million people, representing close to 9 percent of the global urban 

population.”7

• The continued growth in the number of cities with populations between 1 and 5 million 

inhabitants. By 2015, there were 419 cities in 

this category.8 The importance of such cities is 

difficult to overestimate. If megacities are the 

heavyweights of urbanization, and mini-megacities are the light heavyweights, these cities are 

the middle weights—and there are lots of them. 

• A large increase in the number of smaller cities with populations less than 500,000 people. 

According to the UN in 2014, almost one-half 

of the world’s urban population lived in settlements with fewer than 500,000 inhabitants.9

“While this proportion is projected to shrink 

over time, by 2030 these small cities and towns 

will still be home to around 45 percent of urban 

dwellers.”10 Although such centers are a less 

compelling focus of attention compared to the 

larger cities, they cannot be ignored, because 

there are so many of them.
5

The most notable feature of this distribution is 

that it resembles a power law with a long tail: there 

are relatively few megacities, while there are many 

smaller—but still large—cities. As the population 

metric decreases, the number of cities in that category 

increases significantly. The implication of this for the 

U.S. Army is that, while the megacity scenario has to 

be factored into contingency planning as a worst case, 

the odds of U.S. involvement in the various subsets 

of smaller cities (5 to 10 million, 2 to 5 million, 1 to 

2 million, and 500,000 to 1 million) probably increase 

as the size goes down. Accordingly, the analysis here 

includes both megacities and what, for convenience, 

are termed sub-megacities. 

The issue of what size cities the U.S. military should 

focus upon has become a bone of contention among 

military scholars and analysts. The focus coming 

from the Army Chief of Staff has been on megacities, 

which was encapsulated in the U.S. Army’s June 2014 

publication of Megacities and the United States Army: 

Preparing for a Complex and Uncertain Future. This report was an explicit recognition that rapid and often 

uncontrolled urbanization has significantly changed 

the international security environment in which U.S. 

military forces have to operate. It was also a tacit acknowledgement that the U.S. Army is more likely to 

have to operate within dense urban environments in 

which tactical maneuvers are constrained and the superiority of firepower is more easily neutralized than 

on traditional large, open, and fluid battlefields—and 

that, therefore, it should prepare much more systematically than in the past for such contingencies. Yet, 

not all the responses to this have been favorable. Michael Evans, in particular, has argued that the focus 

on megacities is based on “a selective interpretation 
6

of the highly complex process of 21st century global 

urbanization.”11 A major component of his critique is 

that:

megacities are not necessarily the principal urban areas in which American forces may be called upon to 

fight in the future. Rather, middleweight and smaller 

cities remain just as likely to provide important operational environments in the years ahead.12

In some ways, this conclusion is reinforced by the 

trends discussed above and the relative number of 

cities in each of the categories. Given the power law 

distribution of a few extremely large (and many much 

smaller) cities, it is more likely that the United States 

will become involved in a sub-megacity than in a 

megacity or metacity. At the same time, this does not 

preclude a military contingency in a massive urban 

space. Indeed, the problem with Evan’s critique, as 

with many other discussions of strategy and security, 

is that it presents what is in effect a false dichotomy. It 

argues that the focus should be on smaller, rather than 

larger, cities, when, in fact, the United States needs to 

think about military contingencies both in megacities 

and in sub-megacities. 

A second component of Evans’ critique is that:

megacities are not sui generis; they do not represent a 

novel military phenomenon. The military processes of 

operating in any city are drawn from fundamentals of 

urban warfare tried and tested by land forces since at 

least the middle of the twentieth century. Future technological developments notwithstanding, most fundamentals of urban warfare are likely to remain relevant 

for general-purpose forces even in a conglomeration 

on the scale of a megacity.13
7

There is something to this argument, but it ignores 

the possibility that a difference in scale can at some 

point become a difference in kind. A megacity, for example, could swallow up a military division in a way 

that a city of a million people could not. Moreover, 

it can be argued that by preparing for the worst-case 

contingency in a megacity, the United States would 

be better able to deal with lesser contingencies in submegacities. The converse, however, is not necessarily 

true. While the principles of strategy and warfare apply in both small and large cities, and the challenges 

of operating in an urban environment remain very 

similar, scale cannot be dismissed. Preparing for a 

Category 5 hurricane while hoping that it will not 

happen is a much more sensible approach than basing 

contingency plans on wishful thinking about the low 

probability of such an event and preparing only for a 

Category 3 hurricane. Given the challenges that will 

face the U.S. Army in any urban environment, planning and training to operate in a megacity should provide capabilities and skills that could also be used for 

operations in smaller cities. 

At the same time, it has to be recognized that urbanization not only has multiple dimensions, but 

that it also takes on different forms in different countries and regions. Moreover, although urbanization 

is one of the most important megatrends of the 21st 

century, it cannot be seen in isolation. Urbanization 

interacts with other powerful drivers of change, such 

as globalization and neo-liberalism, continued population growth, global climate change, and technological advancement; the impact of these interactions can 

be as profound as the individual drivers themselves. 

Indeed, the nature of these interactions can be positive or negative and can intensify or ameliorate the 
8

adverse consequences of urbanization. This helps to 

explain the disconnect between the broad consensus 

about the growing importance of cities in the 21st 

century, and the starkly divergent assessments as to 

whether cities are likely to be positive or negative in 

their impact on global prosperity, global security, and 

global order. While there are often particular nuances 

in individual studies, it is possible to identify several 

distinct schools of thought regarding cities—what are 

termed here for convenience—urban optimists, urban 

pessimists, and urban pragmatists. Inevitably, this is a 

gross simplification of the debate, which in many respects is as diverse as the cities themselves. Comparing 

Moscow with Mogadishu, Tokyo with Tegucigalpa, or 

London with Lagos is not very helpful, except for the 

way it highlights the vast gulf between not only large 

and small, or developed and developing cities, but also 

between the orderly and the chaotic. In part, the empirical diversity helps to explain the highly divergent 

assessments, and yet, other factors are also at work. 

Many aid and development scholars, for example, 

see enormous potential in cities with their economies 

of scale in service provision, concentrations of labor, 

and opportunities for entrepreneurship and creativity. Equally appropriately, security specialists focus 

on urban violence, disorder, and the growing threats 

to national and global security that can emanate from 

cities. In effect, judgments about the costs and benefits 

of urbanization depend in large part on the analytic 

framework one starts from and the specific focus one 

adopts within it. 
9

Urbanization Optimists.

On the one hand, cities are widely and in many cases appropriately seen as engines of economic growth; 

repositories of wealth, power, and entrepreneurship; 

and centers of culture, scholarship, and innovation. 

They provide economies of scale in service delivery 

and a wide variety of many employment opportunities. They facilitate high levels of social and economic 

creativity.14 Cities also provide many of the key nodes 

in a globalized world, acting as major hubs and transmission belts for the flows of goods, people, and capital 

associated with globalization. This vision was encapsulated in the UN-Habitat Report, State of the World’s 

Cities 2012/13. Although the report acknowledged that 

prosperity was not always evenly distributed within 

cities, it described the city as:

the home of prosperity. It is the place where human 

beings find satisfaction of basic needs and essential 

public and private goods, where commodities can be 

found in sufficiency and their utility enjoyed. Cities 

are where material and immaterial aspects of life are 

realized, providing contentment and happiness and 

increasing the prospects of individual and collective 

well-being.15

The same report noted that urban areas are “becoming 

not just the dominant form of habitat for humankind, 

but also the engine-rooms of human development 

as a whole.”16 In effect, the report argued, cities are 

continuing to play—albeit on a larger scale than ever 

before—their time-honored role as centers of prosperity: “in the 21st as in much earlier centuries, people 

congregate in cities to realize aspirations and dreams, 

fulfill needs and turn ideas into realities.”17
10

Such observations reflect a tendency toward a form 

of urban triumphalism that is captured in the work of 

Edward Glaeser, who argued that cities have been:

engines of innovation since Plato and Socrates bickered in an Athenian marketplace. The streets of Florence gave us the Renaissance, and the streets of Birmingham gave us the Industrial Revolution. The great 

prosperity of contemporary London and Bangalore 

and Tokyo comes from their ability to produce new 

thinking. Wandering these cities . . . is to study nothing less than human progress.18

Moreover, Glaeser argues, cities in the developed 

world:

have survived the tumultuous end of the industrial 

age and are now wealthier, healthier, and more alluring than ever. In the world’s poorer places, cities are 

expanding enormously because urban density provides the clearest path from poverty to prosperity.19

Highlighting these arguments is not to suggest that 

Glaeser ignores either the problems brought about by 

rapid and unplanned urbanization or the challenges 

stemming from the marginalization and exclusion of 

large segments of the urban population. Nevertheless, 

there is an assumption that these problems and challenges will be met in the future as they were in the 

past: that in the same way that the London described 

by Charles Dickens was transformed into the vibrant 

cosmopolitan London of today, so will the Lagos of today be transformed into the vibrant well-functioning 

metropolis of tomorrow. In this view, the march of 

progress is inexorable. 
11

A subset of the urban optimists blends the promise 

of cities with the promise of technology. This has resulted in the emergence of the concept of smart cities—

that is, cities that are not only environmentally friendly, but also integrate and exploit high technology to 

control power, flows, and the delivery of services and 

goods. Closely linked to the notion of smart cities is 

the Internet of Things, which is also likely to be largely 

urban in character, or at the very least, most powerful and pervasive where there are large concentrations 

of people, homes, and businesses. There is, of course, 

the possibility that even smart cities might have their 

own dystopian underside where dense connectivity 

and transparency become intrusion, surveillance, and 

oppression. Yet, it is also clear that smart cities are 

most likely to be efficient, well-functioning, and, for 

the most part, able to provide high levels of security 

and safety to their citizens. The marriage of urbanization and technology offers multiple opportunities 

for synergy: scale and efficiency; social networks and 

technological networks; and concentrations of wealth, 

entrepreneurship, and innovation that are connected 

with similar concentrations elsewhere. The smart city 

of the near future will not have the Medici family, 

but will have an elite group of high-technology specialists sensitive to environmental needs and highly 

responsive to citizens adept in using social media to 

articulate concerns and aggregate policy preferences. 

If the image of the smart city feeds into a vision of 

utopian urbanization, however, this vision is not universally shared. At the opposite end of the spectrum 

are scholars who identify and elucidate the dark side 

of urbanization. 
12

Urbanization Pessimists.

Among those whose expectations about future cities contrast most dramatically with the urbanization 

optimists are R.H. Liotta and James Minkel, Richard 

Norton, and David Kilcullen. All of these authors present variations on the theme of dystopian urbanization 

that are powerful, haunting, and compelling. At the 

very least, these visions of current and future trends in 

urbanization capture an emerging, inescapable reality 

for large cohorts of people, particularly in the developing world. Perhaps for every smart city, there will 

be dozens of dysfunctional cities, with widespread 

slums; high levels of crime, violence, and instability; 

congestion, environmental degradation, and a large 

informal economy that serves as an indispensable 

coping mechanism. “Grinding poverty, environmental degradation, income inequalities, historical socioeconomic inequalities, marginalization and various 

forms of exclusion” are just some of the problems 

facing rapidly expanding cities in the 21st century.20

When they are interrelated with drugs, weapons, 

and the youth bulge, these problems and challenges 

become even more formidable.

There are several reasons urbanization in the developing world has a very significant downside.First 

is the sheer speed of population growth in many cities 

in the developing world. While it is clear that many 

large cities in the developed world also grew in a relatively short period, the growth was neither as large 

nor as dramatic and sustained as the way cities have 

grown—and are continuing to grow—in the developing world. Liotta and Miskel, for example, compare 

the 30-percent increase in the growth of New York between 1950 and 2015 with Dhaka’s population increase 
13

of more than 5,400 percent during the same period.21

The authors also note that although London grew by 

sevenfold in the 19th century, Kinshasa’s growth between 1950 and 2015 approached a factor of 50, and 

Lagos, a factor of 25.22

The speed of population growth in cities is related 

to what might be termed “sequencing.” Cities in the 

developed world generally had infrastructure and basic amenities in place prior to—or at least in tandem 

with—the expansion of their populations. In effect, 

the expansion of cities in the global north reflected the 

logic in a popular movie about a baseball stadium—

build it and they will come. The population surge into 

the cities of the global south, however, preceded the 

building, while also revealing that the aphorism cannot be easily reversed. Much of the surging population came before it was built, and in many cases, it 

has still not been built. The massive influx of population swamped the existing infrastructure and capacity for service provision—whether in terms of water, 

sanitation, power, or adequate road systems—and 

even where there have been efforts to extend infrastructure and services, these efforts have been wholly 

inadequate to the needs of the new urban migrants. A 

massive growth of slums and informal settlements has 

been the most obvious result. Moreover, as Liotta and 

Miskel point out:

first world megacities expanded at a more manageable 

pace and . . . did so after their parent nation-states—

and their governing structures—had been firmly established and the population had more or less settled 

on a common national identity. Further, past megacities took shape before the communications revolution 

raised their residents’ expectations and before globalization integrated them as deeply into the international economy as Cairo, Rio, and Lagos today.23
14

Closely linked to the sequencing is the fact that 

much of the urbanization in the developing world can 

be described as spontaneous rather than planned. The 

lack of planning is closely connected to issues of land 

and property ownership. Many of those who come to 

the expanding cities of the developing world live in 

homes within urban settlements, and neither the individual homes nor the community settlement has a legal basis, something that adds a degree of precariousness to lives that are already full of hardship. Irregular 

land occupation—and the vulnerability that goes with 

it—is a serious problem for many city dwellers in the 

developing world. Wherever they occur, these illegal 

settlements are also a problem for city planners and 

managers intent on ensuring the efficient functioning 

of the city. At the same time, they feed into the prospects for long-term instability in the event that either 

state or city authorities seek to reclaim land that, in 

their view, has been illegally occupied, or, those who 

have occupied land demand that their de facto ownership becomes de jure. This has important implications for stability and order in emerging and rapidly 

expanding cities. 

It is clear from all this that the challenges of urban management in the 21st century are formidable. 

Yet, in many cases, there appear to be little capacity to 

manage these challenges. As Liotta and Miskel note:

with the rise of massive urban centers in Africa and 

Asia, cities that will matter most in the twenty-first century are located in less-developed, struggling states. A 

number of these huge megalopolises—whether Lagos 

or Karachi, Dhaka or Kinshasa—reside in states often 

unable or simply unwilling to manage the challenges 

that their vast and growing urban populations pose. 

There are no signs that their governments will prove 

more capable in the future.24
15

Yet, the issue is not simply one of capacity, but also 

one of will. In this connection, Mike Davis famously 

noted that in much of the developing world: 

the idea of an interventionist state strongly committed 

to social housing and job development seems either a 

hallucination or a bad joke, because governments long 

ago abdicated any serious effort to combat slums and 

redress urban marginality.25

He also argued that the minimalist role of national 

government was reinforced by neoliberal economic 

orthodoxy and the structural adjustment policies 

imposed by the World Bank and the International 

Monetary Fund. If anything, however, the impact of 

neoliberalism has become even more pronounced as, 

in many countries, it has encouraged and legitimized 

state abdication of responsibility to its citizens.

Many of these problems have been most explicitly 

articulated by Norton, who coined the term “feral cities” to describe concentrated urban spaces that can 

be regarded either as “failed,” “collapsing,” or “collapsed.”26 Kilcullen has offered a similar assessment, 

arguing that: 

rapid urban growth in coastal, underdeveloped areas is overloading economic, social, and governance 

systems, straining city infrastructure, and overburdening the carrying capacity of cities designed for 

much smaller populations. This is likely to make the 

most vulnerable cities less and less able to meet the 

challenges of population growth, coastal urbanization, and connectedness. The implications for future 

conflict are profound, with more people competing 

for scarcer resources in crowded, underserviced, and 

under governed urban areas.27
16

From this perspective, cities are likely to be a major 

driver of instability and insecurity in the 21st century. 

Unfortunately, the traditional focus of attention on 

states in international relations has contributed to a 

neglect of cities. What makes this neglect all the more 

problematic is that in some cases, city failure could be 

a major contributor to state failure. This is particularly 

likely when the city in question is a capital city and 

has an inordinate share of the state’s population and 

wealth. In some developing countries, for example, 

the state does not have much of a presence outside the 

capital. In such cases, the failure of the city to continue 

functioning as a viable entity—because of the gradual 

accumulation of problems such as crime, environmental decay, and a growing gap between the need for 

services and governance on the one side and the provision of these on the other—could have a profound 

impact on the state as a whole. 

The difficulty, of course, is that city collapse is not 

easily predictable. One reason is that cities are highly 

complex entities, which almost invariably contain a 

mixture of functional and dysfunctional elements. As 

such, they can often continue to operate on the edge 

of chaos or collapse, without actually tipping over. 

In some cases, the tipping point could result from a 

natural disaster such as an earthquake—something to 

which Mexico City, for example, is particularly vulnerable. In other instances, small changes could have 

major effects, moving the city into failure or collapse. 

City collapse, in turn, could contribute to state collapse; sometimes the two could be synonymous. This 

is most likely in developing economies based on a hub 

and spoke model, in which commercial activities are 

directed from the capital. In these circumstances, any 

major disruption in the capital would have significant 
17

cascading effects through the national economy. In 

other words, the symbiosis of cities and states is something that will be increasingly difficult to ignore in the 

future. 

The difficulty is that both optimists and pessimists 

can find examples to bolster their argument and the 

cases that confound them. Moreover, the reality of 

many cities—with many if not most cities having both 

well-ordered localities and spaces, and poorly governed and dangerous spaces—is far messier than this 

neat and dichotomous typology suggests. The mixture 

of the smart and the dysfunctional described above is 

likely to exist within cities as much as between them. 

Observers who can most accurately be characterized 

as “urbanization pragmatists” best capture this. 

Urbanization Pragmatists. 

Robert Muggah, in a very astute analysis, has encapsulated these competing assessments in what he 

termed the “urban dilemma”—a dilemma that, in his 

view, is:

exemplified by the paradoxical effects of urbanization 

in the twenty first century: as a force for unparalleled 

development on the one hand, and as a risk for insecurity amongst the urban poor on the other.28

Muggah and John De Boer have played a major role 

in articulating the notion of “fragile cities,” contrasting the notion of fragility with that of resilience.29 De 

Boer and Muggah recognize that the notion of a fragile city is not easily and simply defined. Drawing on 

their pioneering work, however, a fragile city can best 

be understood as one where there is a mix of order 

and chaos; where both governance and service provi-
18

sion exist, but are patchy and uneven; where levels of 

violence range from high to low across different zones 

or localities within the city; and where there is both 

wealth and poverty, most often segregated and distant from one another, but sometimes juxtaposed in 

uncomfortable proximity. 

Urbanization pragmatists see both promise and 

peril in the growing importance of cities in global 

economics and politics. They see cities as economic 

dynamos and as having the potential to contribute 

significantly to development. At the same time, they 

recognize, in Muggah’s words, that: 

all cities are fragile. The intensity of their fragility, 

however, varies considerably across time and space. 

Some cities—Aleppo, Caracas, Kabul, or Mogadishu—are affected by acute fragility and are close to 

collapse. Others—Abuja, Baltimore, Dhaka, and San 

Salvador—are also at risk, albeit to a lesser degree. 

Even cities like Amsterdam, London, New York, Paris, 

and Tokyo are not immune.30

The key point about a fragile city, however, is that it 

can tip both positively and negatively. A fragile city, 

with the right leadership, some careful management, 

and some luck, can become a smart and resilient city. 

As Muggah acknowledges: 

city fragility is not permanent. There are remarkable 

examples of once dangerous cities turning things 

around. How do they do this? They start with enlightened leadership, especially successive mayors 

that make a plan and stick to it. The best cases involve 

evidence-based and targeted approaches to mitigating 

risks. Cities that purposefully build inclusive public 

spaces, support predictable transport, invest in hotspot policing, create meaningful opportunities for 
19

young people, and plan carefully to mitigate natural 

disasters are the most likely to shift from fragility to 

resilience.31

In this connection, London over 150 years has moved 

from a largely feral city toward becoming a smart city 

with global influence. Ironically, Dickens would not 

recognize the London of the early-21st century, but he 

would be fairly familiar with the deprivations of the 

favelas (shantytowns) of Rio de Janeiro or the slums 

of Lagos, in spite of their cultural contrasts with 19thcentury London. Similarly, the New York of 2015 is 

very different from the New York of the 1970s, when 

violence was much more pervasive and citizens far 

more fearful than they are today. Those cities that fail 

to do what London and New York have done, however, are likely to move from being fragile to feral, 

where areas of order, wealth, security and safety, and 

upward social and economic mobility are surrounded 

by and ultimately eclipsed by “red zones” of violence, 

disorder, poverty, and despair. 

In other words, cities are highly dynamic and can 

move from one of the categories identified in Table 1 

to another. Urban blight and urban gentrification can 

be understood as two sides of the dynamic nature of 

cities, simply representing movement in opposite directions. Indeed, when examining the notion of a fragile city, complexity and paradox come to the fore. Both 

smart cities and feral cities, in effect, are ideal types—

one of promise, one of peril—and are at opposite ends 

of a continuum, whereas fragile cities are located in 

the middle, with enormous potential for both advance 

and decay. The major characteristics of the three types 

of city are summarized in Table 1.
20

Smart Cities—

Townsend

Fragile Cities—Muggah 

and De Boer Feral Cities - Norton

Well ordered

Emphasis on both the 

positive and negative 

effects of urbanization 

as something that can 

promote economic 

development and create 

insecurity

Urban spaces that can 

be regarded either as 

“failed,” “collapsing,” 

or “collapsed” 

Low levels of 

violence 

Rapid urban population 

growth

Income inequalities result 

in higher levels of violence 

Zones of order and 

security plus zones of 

violence that sometimes 

spills over 

High levels of violence 

Dickensian-dystopian

Disorderly and chaotic

Technology 

integrated with 

infrastructure

Enclaves of technology 

and capital along with 

enclaves of exclusion and 

expulsion

Gated communities and 

slums 

Low levels of 

technology except 

for feature phones 

that give access to 

Internet

Effective and 

efficient service 

provision

Service provision uneven 

and patchy 

Absence of state or 

municipal services

Coping mechanisms, 

and informal and illicit 

economies 

Formal 

Governance 

Mechanisms

Mixed/Competing/ 

Collaborative Governance 

Mechanisms 

Governance varies from 

one part of the city to 

another

Alternative 

Governance 

Mechanisms 

dominate

The formal authorities 

(state and city) have 

lost control 

Table 1. Characteristics of Smart, Fragile, 

and Feral Cities.
21

The implication of the distinctions between smart, 

fragile, and feral cities for military contingencies in 

megacities and sub-megacities is that size is not the 

only important differentiator. The challenges that the 

U.S. Army would face in the event of some kind of 

intervention in a megacity or sub-megacity could differ considerably depending on whether the city was 

smart or feral, or where it stood and in which direction it was moving within the fragile category. The 

other consideration that could have massive implications for the probability of success or failure would be 

the way the strategic purpose for such involvement is 

designed.

THE RATIONALES FOR MILITARY 

CONTINGENCIES IN MEGACITIES 

AND SUB-MEGACITIES

The dangers associated with military operations 

in urban terrain are very well understood: military 

contingencies in megacities and sub-megacities are 

unlikely to be high on the U.S. Army’s list of things it 

would eagerly do. Indeed, in Megacities and the United 

States Army referred to above, the authors acknowledge that the question of relevance often arises. Their 

response is that this might be a matter of strategic 

necessity rather than strategic choice. They note that 

neither Pearl Harbor nor 9/11 were “predicted by decision makers of the time,” yet “led to unanticipated 

military commitments.”32 As well as the possibility of 

a military intervention in a megacity resulting from 

some kind of strategic shock, they also note an assessment of national interests that considers how megacities could become: 
22

magnets for international attention and demand military intervention will aid military planners in avoiding future strategic surprises. This is an important distinction; it is less of a question of why the U.S. Army 

would go than a question of what conditions would 

draw the Army into a megacity.33

This monograph seeks at least a preliminary answer to 

this question and identifies six different kinds of strategic considerations that might lead civilian decisionmakers to determine the need for the use of military 

force with regard to events, trends, and developments 

relating to a particular megacity. 

Humanitarian Disaster Relief.

The first is that the United States will provide some 

kind of humanitarian assistance in the aftermath of a 

natural disaster. Many of the world’s major cities are 

vulnerable to earthquakes or flooding, or in some cases to both. San Francisco, Los Angeles, Tokyo, Mexico 

City, Jakarta, Tehran, Istanbul, and Manila are among 

the world’s leading cities in earthquake zones. Many 

other cities are vulnerable to major flooding. Such 

risks have always been present, but as cities grow, 

the risks also grow. For example, a World Bank study 

noted that “in a rapidly urbanizing developing world, 

the growth of population and economic assets in cities will lead to a rapidly increasing concentration of 

hazard risk in urban areas.”34 It goes on to note that 

the “population in large cities exposed to cyclones is 

estimated to increase from 310 to 680 million between 

2000 and 2050,” while “urban population exposed in 

areas with a significant probability of a major earthquake increases from 370 million in 2000 to 870 million in 2050.”35 Other studies have observed that cities 
23

in the developed world typically have a high degree of 

resilience in the face of such disasters. In the cities in 

developing countries, however, resilience and the capacity to absorb the impact of a disaster will be much 

lower. Moreover, where urbanization is largely unplanned, building codes and standards are low, and 

overcrowding is the norm, those living in poor urban 

areas are particularly vulnerable. The probability of 

such disasters is likely to increase as global climate 

change makes extreme weather events more frequent. 

In the context of climate change, Kilcullen’s argument 

about the increasing importance of littoral cities becomes even more pertinent. Many large coastal cities 

are increasingly vulnerable in the medium and long 

term to rising sea levels resulting from global climate 

change. According to one study, which assessed the 

top 20 cities in terms of the number of people exposed 

to coastal flooding now and projected figures for 2070, 

the situation is likely to become increasingly dire. Nowhere is this more obvious than in South Asia. Kolkata currently has nearly 2 million people exposed, but 

this is expected to increase to over 14 million by 2070.36

Mumbai will jump from under 3 million currently 

to over 11.4 million.37 Other cities at risk include Ho 

Chi Minh City, Shanghai, Bangkok, Rangoon, Alexandria, Lagos, Tokyo, and Jakarta, while both Miami 

and New York are also on this list.38 Perhaps nowhere 

is as vulnerable as Bangladesh, which has three cities—Dhaka, Khulna, and Chittagong—on the list and 

is expected to have over 70 million people exposed to 

coastal flooding by 2070.39 Dhaka alone currently has 

under a million people vulnerable to coastal flooding, 

but will have over 11 million vulnerable people by 

2070.40 The irony is that Dhaka itself has become a refuge for Bangladeshi victims of monsoon flooding. As 

one commentary observed, the majority of migrants 

coming into Dhaka:
24

hail from coastal areas that are already experiencing 

rising sea levels, increased salinity, destructive floods 

and cyclones. At least 400,000 people move to Dhaka 

every year, according to the World Bank, while the 

International Organization for Migration (IOM) estimates that 70% of Dhaka’s slum-dwellers moved there 

fleeing some sort of environmental shock.41

The irony, as the author notes, is that the people seeking safety in the short term by moving to coastal cities 

might actually be putting themselves at greater risk in 

the long term, given the vulnerability of these cities to 

storm surges and rising sea levels. 

There is an added irony from the perspective of 

U.S. military planners: a major natural disaster could 

actually change the categorization of a particular city, 

rendering a smart city fragile, and precipitating the 

collapse of a fragile city into a feral one. One only has 

to look at the experience of New Orleans under the 

impact of Katrina to see how a city can rapidly degenerate into anomie and anarchy, with the normal 

rules and norms of urban life abruptly jettisoned. This 

has important implications. Insofar as the U.S. Army 

had made particular contingency plans for a specific 

city, these would be complicated if not attenuated by 

the disaster. At the very least, the restoration of order 

and stability would have to accompany if not precede 

major disaster relief operations. This effort could also 

create opposition. 

Under many circumstances, a United States-led 

humanitarian intervention for disaster mitigation and 

a vulnerable and exposed population, ready for any 

source of assistance, would welcome recovery. Yet, it 

is not inconceivable that, even in these circumstances, not everyone will be happy to see U.S. forces in 

their city, and pockets of protest and resistance could 
25

quickly develop. Even if they do not, the designation 

of the contingency as a humanitarian assistance mission does not mean that the forces would be immune 

to hostile action. It is conceivable that terrorist and 

rebel groups that are very hostile toward the United 

States would see U.S. forces in a megacity as a more 

convenient and easier target set than the continental 

United States. For those with limited capabilities who 

are intent on attacking the United States, attacks on 

U.S. forces involved in a humanitarian mission might 

be a very attractive alternative. Those engaging in 

such attacks might well see the chaos and complexity 

of the post-disaster environment as an opportunity to 

engage in asymmetric warfare, using the disaster-torn 

city to avoid direct confrontations with U.S. forces. 

Depending on the scale and scope of the attacks on 

U.S. forces, at best they could divert attention and resources away from rescue missions and efforts to provide basic provisions and restore services. Moreover, 

U.S. defensive measures could be portrayed as aggressive, undermining much of the goodwill that would 

otherwise be created. At worst, such attacks could 

transform the nature of the intervention, not through 

mission creep but through rapid mission transformation. Even the most innocuous involvement in a megacity or sub-megacity, therefore, has the potential for 

going badly wrong. 

Military Support for Civilian Authorities 

in a Restoration of Order.

One of the most striking aspects of the continued 

evolution of violence in recent years has been the 

growing overlap between high-level criminality and 

low-level warfare. Just to underline this, in 2010, more 
26

people (15,273) were victims of homicides in Mexico 

than were killed in Iraq and Afghanistan combined.42

The Iraq Body Count organization recorded 4,038 civilian deaths from violence in 2010, while in Afghanistan, in 2010, military and civilian deaths were around 

3,500.43 Moreover, even controlling for population 

differences, Mexican homicide rates in 2010 were not 

very different from—and were probably slightly higher than—those in the two war zones. Although drugrelated killings in Mexico appear to have declined in 

recent years, there has been a significant increase in 

homicides in the Northern Triangle countries of Central America—Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala. 

According to some observers, current and recent levels of violence in El Salvador and Guatemala exceed 

those of the brutal civil wars these countries fought 

into the 1990s. Much of the violence emanates from 

drug trafficking organizations competing for control 

of particular routes and from gang wars between and 

within the two major maras (gangs), Mara Salvatrucha 

13 and Barrio 18. Perhaps even more important for the 

analysis here, much of the violence is concentrated in 

cities. For several years, San Pedro Sula in Honduras 

had the unenviable distinction of the highest homicide 

rate of any city in the world, although it now appears 

to have been overtaken by San Salvador. 

The implication of all this is that many cities in 

the developing world, especially but not exclusively 

in Latin America and the Caribbean, have to confront 

levels of violence that could at some point become 

overwhelming. While concerns over sovereignty and 

some lingering distrust of the United States are likely 

to inhibit requests for assistance by governments in 

Latin America, the possibility that, at some point, such 

a request might be made cannot be excluded. The 
27

inhibitions on the part of the United States to responding with military support are likely to be as strong 

if not stronger. Nevertheless, if an allied country in 

Latin America were facing chaos and intense levels of 

violence in one of its major cities, some kind of intervention to restore order might be seen as preferable 

to another migrant crisis involving not only unaccompanied minors but also a much broader segment 

of the population fleeing from violence. Obviously 

much would depend on the circumstances, but to rule 

out such a contingency could be a mistake. Is it highly probable? Absolutely not. However, neither is it 

impossible. 

Military Intervention in a Strategic City.

One of the reasons a military intervention in Latin 

America is deemed so unlikely is that, despite proximity, it is rarely regarded by the United States as a region 

of primary geopolitical, strategic, or economic importance. Yet, there are other cities around the world—

some related to the continued conflict with extremist 

groups such as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) 

and the Taliban—that could be endowed with such 

importance, not in the least because they are related 

to ongoing military operations elsewhere. Karachi, for 

example, has been critical in resupplying U.S. forces 

in Afghanistan; if extremist elements were to initiate 

large-scale attacks on supply lines and the attendant 

support structures, it is not clear that the United States 

would accept the resulting disruption without some 

kind of response. Moreover, as the world becomes 

increasingly urbanized, the strategic significance of at 

least some cities is likely to grow considerably. The 

critique by Evans of Megacities and the United States 
28

Army did not question the growing strategic importance of cities as such; rather, it was about which cities 

fell into the category of high importance, something 

that, he argued, was not determined exclusively by 

size.44 For Evans, some smaller cities might have more 

strategic importance than some megacities and, therefore, might require U.S. military involvement. Liotta 

and Miskel use the term “alpha cities”—a term they 

recognize is not widely used—to describe cities like 

Mumbai, which are critical nodes in the global economic system.45 As they note, “with more cell phones 

per capita of any city on the subcontinent, Mumbai 

generates more than one-sixth of India’s GDP.”46

Mumbai also represents an important trend in which a 

growing number of cities in developing countries are 

developing a trajectory that will move them into the 

category of global cities (as defined by Sassen). Some 

cities are important, not only economically, but also in 

terms of their political significance. Liotta and Miskel, 

for example, describe Cairo as a “critical city.”47 They 

note that in spite of—and perhaps even because of—

the unrest in Egypt itself and in the Middle East writ 

large, Cairo: 

remains crucial to the United States in the Middle East. 

Second, Cairo is a city in which national governance 

heavily invests. The Egyptian government recognizes 

that disorder in Cairo threatens the stability of the entire state and, for that matter, the entire region.48

Recognizing the strategic significance of a city does 

not mean that the United States would necessarily be 

willing to deploy military forces to that city. Nevertheless, as strategic calculation catches up with the 

intrinsic importance of key cities in a globalized but 

highly fractious world, then the kind of considerations 
29

outlined in Megacities and the United States Army, and 

extended to a broader range of cities, could become 

even more compelling. Consequently, an intervention 

in an “alpha” or “critical” city with major strategic 

significance that is either intrinsically important (such 

as a global financial and communications hub) or has 

become important to the implementation of U.S. strategy in a particular region and the continued viability 

of a regional ally might well be on the list of policy 

options. 

Military Involvement in a City in the Context of 

Counterinsurgency.

Closely related to the idea of a strategic intervention in a city, but in a narrower context, is that the 

United States—when involved in another counterinsurgency campaign (and distasteful as this might be, 

it cannot be ruled out)—will find as it did in Iraq that 

a specific city becomes endowed with a great deal of 

symbolic and strategic significance. In the current conflict between ISIS on the one side and the Syrian and 

Iraqi governments with their respective patrons and 

supporters on the other, Mosul clearly falls into such 

a category. The city’s fall to ISIS was a massive victory 

for the extremist insurgency and provided unprecedented access to massive resources extracted through 

taxation and coercion. Indeed, the conquest of Mosul 

gave important impetus to the declaration of the Caliphate, while also providing credibility and a sense 

of empowerment to the declaration. Indeed, the seizure of the city was critical to the momentum that ISIS 

obtained in 2014, and that will not be fully reversed 

until Mosul is retaken, thereby depriving ISIS of both 

its highly symbolic victory and a vital component 

of its resource base. The extent to which the United 
30

States will go beyond air support to assist forces on 

the ground trying to retake Mosul remains uncertain. 

Part of that, however, is a result of the formal withdrawal from Iraq by the United States and continuing 

concerns about being dragged back into a quagmire 

with allies who are weak and unreliable. It is certainly 

conceivable that in a future counterinsurgency campaign, the United States will be less risk averse and 

less constrained. 

The Use of Military Force in a City in the 

Context of a Conflict between States.

The parallel to involvement in urban warfare as 

part of a counterinsurgency campaign is either defense 

of or an offense against a city that is an important strategic prize in a more traditional military conflict, albeit one that is in the so-called gray zone. In the event 

that geopolitical competition with Russia increases in 

intensity and that Russian President Vladimir Putin, 

either as a result of desperation (losing political support at home) or ambition (restoring some semblance 

of the Soviet empire), moves directly or indirectly 

against one or more of the Baltic states, the United 

States could find itself helping in the defense of Riga, 

Tallinn, or Vilnius. In a speech in Tallinn, Estonia, in 

September 2014, U.S. President Barack Obama reassured the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO’s) Baltic members that they would not again lose 

their independence to Moscow as they had done after 

World War II. As the President emphasized:

we will defend our NATO allies, and that means every 

ally. . . . In this alliance, there are no old members or 

new members, no junior partners or senior partners. 

They’re just allies, pure and simple.49
31

This commitment has been buttressed by the decision to spend more defense money in the region, to 

preposition more equipment stockpiles, and to deploy 

a combat brigade on a rotating basis at different locations in the region. There is always a danger with 

a commitment of this kind, that, although primarily 

symbolic, it does entangle the United States in a potential conflict. Symbols can have enormous strategic 

significance, as was evident with U.S. troops stationed 

in West Berlin during the Cold War. Given the location of West Berlin and the problems of resupply from 

a U.S. and NATO perspective, the city was indefensible in the event of a Soviet effort to capture it. As 

Thomas Schelling famously noted, the one thing U.S. 

troops could do there was to die.50 In other words, the 

forces were deployed as a tripwire, as a manifestation 

of the U.S. commitment to its European allies and as 

part of extended nuclear deterrence, which depended 

on what Bernard Brodie called the “marvelous clarity of choice between non war and destruction.”51 Yet, 

West Berlin also had a special status that dated back to 

the 1948 crisis and the Berlin Airlift. It is far from clear 

that the U.S. commitment to the Baltic States and their 

capital cities is as strong. Moreover, the current relationship between the United States and Russia is far 

less clear-cut than that between the two superpowers 

during the Cold War. In adversarial relationships in 

which lines and commitments are not clearly demarcated, the potential for mischief, misunderstanding, 

and miscalculation is much greater. The implication 

is that the United States could find itself having to defend one or more of the Baltic capital cities in an area 

where it has long supply lines and other geographic 

disadvantages. These are not megacities, but they 

have been endowed with some strategic significance. 
32

In addition, if the commitment is to be credible, then 

there has to be at least a readiness and some preparation to operate in these urban environments. 

Containment or Quarantine of an Urban Pandemic.

The other kind of urban contingency that could 

arise for the U.S. Army stems from the possibility of 

a megacity or sub-megacity becoming an incubator 

for some kind of infectious disease. In the event of an 

urban outbreak of some kind of contagion that could 

take on the qualities of a pandemic, it is not inconceivable that there might be an attempt to quarantine the 

city. Drastic as this might appear, if the mortality rate 

of the outbreak was sufficiently high, and there were 

no obvious countermeasures to the disease, then enforced isolation might be the only feasible response. 

The difficulty here, of course, is that people would 

want to escape from the city and, in some cases, 

would pay organized criminals to facilitate their exit. 

Consequently, a quarantine would require some kind 

of coercive power to back it up—and only military 

forces would be capable of imposing this, and even 

they would find it difficult. Obviously much would 

depend on the city and country involved, whether or 

not there was an indigenous capacity for enforcement, 

and if there was a willingness to invite external forces 

to assist in the containment process. Again, it is a lowprobability contingency; however, as Nassim Taleb 

has very persuasively shown, “black swan” events 

(that is, events with low probability but high impact) 

occur more frequently than we like to acknowledge.52
33

Implications.

All of these contingencies have a low probability. 

Yet, as discussed above, the events and decisions that 

might require some kind of military deployment to or 

around a city are neither particularly novel nor without either some kind of precedent or strategic logic. 

Yet, in some ways, the problems of urban military 

engagements are even more formidable than the preoccupation with megacities suggests. By using one 

category such as a megacity—formidable as it might 

be—there is a danger of oversimplifying the problem. 

The authors of Megacities and the United States Army

take pains to emphasize that megacities vary considerably from one another in so many different ways 

that there is no one-size-fits-all response. The analysis 

here, however, suggests that the problem is in some 

ways greater than that. Each kind of contingency has 

its own specific requirements, while the size of the 

city adds another important set of variables, as does 

its character—smart, fragile, or feral. In other words, 

there is a mix-and-match quality that gives a wide variety of permutations. 

Yet, the categories help both to bind and to think 

through the implications of different kinds of interventions in different size cities that are either smart, 

fragile, or feral. The purpose of any operation would 

do a great deal to determine its scale, scope, duration, 

and manageability. The size of the city would likely be 

an important determinant of the force level the United 

States would deploy. All cities would require a common core of competencies, skills, and capabilities. 

Yet, the character of the city (smart, fragile or feral) 

would also require particular subtleties of approach, 

distinctive operational techniques, and different 
34

levels of technology. In other words, the permutations 

are many, but the three components (mission, size of 

the city, and character of the city) provide important 

boundaries within which planners and policymakers 

could determine force levels, deployment strategies, 

intelligence requirements, and the like. 

More generally, as megacities and sub-megacities 

take on increasing salience and importance in the next 

few decades, they should become a distinct focus of 

attention and analysis not only for military planners 

but also for intelligence agencies. Understanding and 

anticipating developments and events in megacities 

and sub-megacities will need to become a central 

responsibility of the United States intelligence community, supplementing, and at times even surpassing, both the traditional focus on states and the more 

recent focus on transnational actors. An important 

prerequisite for enhanced performance at almost every level of intelligence, however, is better thinking 

about what a city is, how it works, and what kinds 

of constraints and opportunities it provides for the 

operations of military forces. Although the focus has 

to be on the strategic implications and requirements 

for military operations, it is essential nonetheless to 

ask fundamental questions about how cities can best 

be conceptualized. Accordingly, the next section deals 

initially with concepts for approaching and understanding cities, and then uses them as a basis for a 

holistic, multi-level approach to intelligence requirements for urban military contingencies. 
35

CONCEPTUAL THINKING AND LAYERED 

INTELLIGENCE FOR URBAN MILITARY 

CONTINGENCIES

In the preceding discussion, cities have been distinguished from one another in terms of size and character. Yet, there is a more fundamental question that 

has not yet been asked: what is a city? The question is 

much easier than the answer. Moreover, the answer 

has changed over time as conceptualizations of the 

city have become more utilitarian. As one study noted: 

the notion of urban remains fleeting, changing from 

time to time, differing across political boundaries, and 

being modified depending upon the purpose that the 

definition of urban would serve. At times, urban populations are defined in terms of administrative boundaries, at times in terms of functional boundaries, and 

at times they are defined in terms of ecological factors 

such as density and population size.53

In a sense, definitions have been politicized. They 

have also become increasingly sophisticated over 

time. Even the early answers, however, have captured 

important dimensions of the city.

One of the first notions of the city involves the city 

as a place with certain attributes in terms of population size, density, and heterogeneity. Sociologist Louis 

Wirth, for example, writing in the late-1930s, delineated a city in terms of four characteristics: a relative 

permanence; large population size; concentration of 

people in a limited space, i.e., high population density; and social heterogeneity.54 To this, one could add 

an agglomeration of physical structures that provide 

places of work, business, economic production, and 

often places of worship and leisure. 
36

The economic dimension of the city became the 

basis for what has been described as “the functional 

definition of urban,” a definition rooted in economic 

geography.55 This approach emphasizes that the city 

has become a retail market center for broader regional 

distribution. Other scholars have developed this argument, highlighting: 

the variety of economic functions that take place in an 

urban center includes various types of production, but 

also educational, political, administrative and socially 

related economic activities which tend to employ a 

diversely orientated labor force. An important related 

concept is that of ‘agglomerative economies,’ which 

are a concentration of economic functions that operate 

external to a particular firm but make it advantageous 

for a firm to locate there. For instance, other firms, 

banking, credit, transportation and storage facilities 

tend to exist in and around urban centers.56

This concentration of economic functions in turn attracts more people, increasing population density.57

The city, as both a place and a set of economic 

functions, conveys important elements of its reality. 

A very different conception of the city has been that it 

resembles a living organism. Within this, some have 

even discussed the metabolism of cities. Drawn from 

biology, the concept of metabolism:

refers to physiological processes within living things 

that provide the energy and nutrients required by an 

organism as the conditions of life itself. These processes can be described in terms of the transformation 

of inputs (sunlight, chemical energy, nutrients, water, 

and air) into biomass and waste products. . . . Just as 

living things require the inputs mentioned above, so 

do cities. That is, cities cannot exist without those inputs—urbanites require clean air, water, food, fuel, 
37

and construction goods to subsist while urban industries need materials for production purposes.58

While this is particularly useful in terms of assessing 

the relationship between the city and the environment, the broader notion of any city as a living organism is particularly compelling. It is also particularly 

useful in delineating intelligence needs for military 

contingencies in megacities and sub-megacities. This 

is evident in Table 2, which highlights the parallels between humans and the city as as an organism.

Table 2. Comparison of a Human to a City 

as an Organism.

There are, of course, limits to such an analogy. 

Kevin Lynch, one of the doyens of urban planning, 

has noted that:

cities are not organisms, any more than they are machines, and perhaps even less so. They do not grow 

or change of themselves, or reproduce or repair themselves. They are not autonomous entities, nor do they 

run through life cycles, or become infected.59

Human Entity City as an Organism 

Skeleton Physical infrastructure

Core and Periphery Center and peri-urban

Neural networks Social networks

Metabolism Flows

Blood flow Pulse or rhythm 

Brain functions Governance

Survival instincts: fight-or-flight mechanisms Coping mechanisms: informal or illegal economies 

Immune system: antibodies Resistance to external intervention
38

Such criticisms and caveats notwithstanding, treating 

the city as an organism helps to bound the intelligence 

process and identify key elements, such as social networks, flows, governance, the rhythm of cities, and the 

likely response to external intervention, even when it 

might be benign. The idea of the city as an organism 

has also become important in understanding some of 

the results of the increased size of cities. The work of 

Geoffrey B. West, Luís M. A. Bettencourt, and their 

colleagues has shown that there are:

systematic scaling laws which explicitly show that 

cities are more than the linear sum of their individual components. For example, economic productivity 

(value-added in manufacturing, GDP, wages, personal income, etc.) increases systematically on a per capita 

basis by 15% with every doubling of a city’s population, regardless of a city’s initial size (whether from, 

say, 50,000 to 100,000, or from 5,000,000 to 10,000,000). 

Remarkably, these general increasing returns to population size manifest, on average, the same statistical 

relationship (the 15% rule) across an extraordinarily 

broad range of metrics, regardless of nation or time. 

Similar increases apply to almost every socioeconomic 

quantity, from innovation rates and rhythms of human behavior to incidence of crime and infectious diseases. They express a continuous and systematic acceleration of socioeconomic processes with increasing 

numbers of people, so that larger cities produce and 

spend wealth faster, create new ideas more frequently 

and suffer from greater incidence of crime all approximately to the same degree.60

The work done by these authors at the Santa Fe Institute also uses the idea of cities as complex emergent 

systems. Bettincourt, for example, has emphasized the 

importance of networks, arguing that:
39

cities are first and foremost large social networks. In 

this sense, cities are not just large collections of people, 

they are agglomerations of social links. Space, time 

and infrastructure play a fundamental role in enabling 

social interactions to form and persist, and in allowing them to become open-ended in terms of increased 

connectivity and sustainable from the point of view of 

energy use and human effort.61

Networks are also an important part of what Michael 

Batty has described as “the new science of cities.”62

One of:

the central ideas of this new science is that locations are 

really the nodes that define the points where processes 

of interaction begin and end . . . instead of thinking 

of cities as sets of spaces, places, [and] locations, we 

need to think of them as sets of actions, interactions, 

and transactions that define their rationale and relate 

to the way scale economies generate wealth in social 

and economic terms.63

Cities have to be understood as a layered and interacting series of complex adaptive systems involving 

actions, interactions, and transactions. This also requires multiple streams of intelligence: information 

on network and power structures could be obtained 

and updated from the intelligence community; infrastructure mapping, breakdowns from satellite data, 

and considerable social, economic, and political intelligence could be obtained from non-governmental 

organizations. All of this would lead to an enhanced 

understanding of urban dynamics, including patterns 

of flows and networks of relationships.64 Operating 

effectively in megacities and sub-megacities requires 

an understanding of these flows and networks and 

an ability to determine when to exploit rather than 
40

disrupt their dynamics. This focus and approach can 

be extended to facilitate the understanding of governance patterns and governance processes in urban 

areas. Indeed, the following discussion of intelligence 

preparation of and on the urban battlefield looks at 10 

different layers of the city, recognizing that these are 

not independent from one another, but are constantly 

interacting. In complex systems, all variables are interdependent. Indeed, there are clearly multiple sets 

of vertical connectors between the various layers, both 

direct and indirect. Some of these connectors will have 

readily predictable consequences, while others will be 

much harder to assess. Nevertheless, by treating these 

as a series of layers, it should be possible to elucidate 

the need for a comprehensive (if daunting) approach 

to intelligence in megacities and sub-megacities. The 

key point, however, is that there are multiple connections among and across the layers that also need to 

be considered, even though they make the intelligence 

task even more formidable. 

In thinking about intelligence for military contingencies in urban areas, it is important to consider it 

as a dynamic interactive process. Intelligence preparation of the battlefield will be vital prior to action; intelligence preparation on the battlefield will be a continued and even more stringent requirement throughout 

the duration of the contingency. As Chad Serena and 

Colin P. Clarke noted: 

the U.S. military will have to be able to effectively 

piece together a comprehensive and actionable intelligence picture, and under enormously challenging circumstances. This will require, at a minimum, an ability to persistently monitor, collect, and interpret—in 

near real-time—the millions of bits of data associated 

with cellphone communications, social media post-
41

ings, financial transactions, and the operational movements of these actors. The challenges associated with 

doing so—exposed in Grozny, Sadr City and now 

Raqqa—will likely require the U.S. military to increase 

the number of intelligence platforms it employs and to 

develop the ability to manage and interpret in a timely 

fashion the unending stream of data. Failure to do so 

will exacerbate the difficulties associated with operating in megacities, prolong conflicts therein, and create circumstances in which hostile groups can exploit 

physical and virtual sanctuaries largely unobserved 

by U.S. forces.65

Against this requirement, the levels or slices of the 

intelligence challenge are identified in Table 3.

Level 1 Subterranean

Level 2 Topography—roads, chokepoints, etc.

Level 3 The Cityscape—the buildings

Level 4 The Service Infrastructure 

Level 5 The People—human terrain 

Level 6 The Networks—social or criminal capital

Level 7 The Flows—people and things 

Level 8 Forms and Spaces of Governance

Level 9 The Rhythm of the City

Level 10 The Cyber and Electronic Layer 

Table 3. Levels of Intelligence Challenges.

Inevitably, there are elements of artificiality in 

such a framework, in that none of the categories is 

hermetically sealed. Indeed, the problem—as the writings of Batty noted above have emphasized—is that 

the city is an emerging complex system, and it is the 

key interactions among the people, places, flows, and 
42

networks that make the city function the way it does. 

Cities—like all complex systems—are much more 

than the sum of their parts. Consequently, an additive 

approach is wholly inadequate. Kilcullen’s colleagues 

at Caerus have made a very similar point, noting that 

cities are:

complex, adaptive systems due to their connectedness; their unique terrain; and the diversity of territorial controllers. These qualities lead to a high density 

of interaction between the population, infrastructure, 

and the physical terrain, which overwhelms traditional reductive analysis.66

The implication for the intelligence preparation for 

the urban battlefield (IPB) approach articulated here 

is that the notion of distinct levels of analysis or slices 

of the intelligence challenge is a starting point, but 

that there are important connections and interactions 

among these levels that are complex and that sometimes create not only unexpected consequences but 

also, on occasion, surprising developments that can 

have strategic significance. 

For the sake of clarity of presentation, the dimensions of IPB are presented separately. They will be followed, however, by a discussion of how the various 

levels might intersect and interact with one another, 

thereby adding a more holistic approach to the intelligence enterprise. It is also worth emphasizing that 

the primary focus in what follows is on understanding 

the city as organism. Understanding the enemy is also 

vitally important; but that is something U.S. military 

forces do all the time and is not discussed at length 

in what follows. The emphasis here is on understanding the city as a dynamic emergent organism with 

various characteristics—some of which are universal, 
43

while others are idiosyncratic. The deeper the understanding of the city, the more likely it is that military 

units can act in ways that are copacetic with the dynamics of the city. Under some circumstances, U.S. 

forces that act in this way will have a competitive 

advantage over adversary forces that lack a similar 

depth of understanding. 

IPB Level 1: The Subterranean Dimension of Cities.

The subterranean parts of cities generally receive 

little attention. Yet, some cities such as Toronto, Beijing, Rome, and London have extensive subterranean 

passages and pathways. Toronto, in large part because 

of the climate, has a system known as PATH, which 

has been described as “a network of underground 

pedestrian tunnels, elevated walkways, and at-grade 

walkways connecting the office towers of Downtown 

Toronto.”67 The PATH system is reportedly about 19 

miles long and encompasses a massive underground 

shopping complex. Rome not only has its catacombs, 

but the contemporary above-ground structures typically sit on earlier structures as successive generations 

simply built on the buildings beneath. London has a 

massive underground system that goes well beyond 

its subway system; much the same seems to be true 

in Moscow. Beijing also has an underground city that 

might have been used by government forces during 

the Tiananmen Square massacre. Moreover, even those 

cities that have grown up more recently have some 

kind of underground complex of drainage and sewage systems, pipelines, and infrastructure that could 

be exploited against U.S. forces in a military contingency in a megacity or sub-megacity. As the Marine 

Corps student handout on fighting in cities noted:
44

subterranean systems are easily overlooked but can be 

important to the outcome of operations. These areas 

may be substantial and include subways, sewers, cellars, and utility systems. . . . The city of Los Angeles 

alone has more than 200 miles of storm sewers located 

under the city streets. Both attacker and defender can 

use subterranean avenues to maneuver to the rear or 

the flanks of an enemy. These avenues also facilitate 

the conduct of ambushes, counterattacks, and infiltrations.68

Although the Marine Corps focus is largely operational and tactical, it is only necessary to think about the 

tunnel system in Vietnam to recognize that the subterranean dimension of a conflict can sometimes take 

on strategic significance. This was equally true in the 

very different context of the Balkan wars of the early1990s. During the Serbian siege of Sarajevo in 1993, 

the tunnel under the airport took on enormous strategic significance. The tunnel linked two Bosnian communities and enabled the besieged Bosnians to maintain their resistance, with “an average of 4,000 people 

and 20 tons of material” moving through the tunnel 

daily.69 Without the continued flow of supplies, the 

outcome would have been very different. In this instance, it helped the population and forces defending 

the city. Movement underground, however, can also 

be used offensively. It is likely to be less vulnerable to 

detection and, therefore, might enhance the capacity 

for surprise, at least at the tactical level.70

The implication of all this is that if the U.S. military, for one reason or another, has to intervene in a 

megacity or sub-megacity, it needs to know the extent 

of the subterranean networks, the extent to which 

they could be exploited by either an adversary or the 
45

intervening forces themselves, and the ways these 

networks might be blocked or countered. One study 

by military officers at the Naval Postgraduate School 

even suggested that “subterranean” be regarded as an 

operational environment.71 The same study noted that 

“subterranean infrastructure includes: ventilation, 

power supply, water supply, waste discharge, transportation, and communications,” and that these can 

have multiple entry and exit points.72

It is important, therefore, to identify access points 

to this subterranean infrastructure as well as to assess 

the capacity to move people and things through the 

underground systems. Here again, the authors noted:

mobility within a subterranean passage typically coincides with the largest item that can be conveyed 

through or housed within the functional workspace. 

Mobility within the subterranean environment in 

terms of the maneuverability of ground forces will 

ultimately determine the tactics employed. The specific assessment of mobility refers to the dimensions 

of the access portal or entrance, as well as that of the 

entrance tunnel. . . . The mobility attributes are defined as restricted, semi-restricted, permissive, and 

unrestricted.73

The challenge is that such systems do not readily 

show up on Google maps or even more sophisticated 

satellite reconnaissance. Moreover, prior knowledge 

might be difficult to obtain, particularly if the city is 

in a country where the United States is unable to deploy more than very limited intelligence assets. This 

could put U.S. forces at a significant disadvantage. 

In this connection, it is worth noting a point made by 

Lirio Gutierrez about the gangs in Honduras. She argued that one reason the government forces had little 
46

impact on the maras was that the gang members had 

a much higher level of territorial knowledge than did 

the government.74 For an outside intervention force in 

a city that it has never been in before, the lack of local knowledge is an enormous disadvantage. As the 

forces seek to mobilize and exploit friendly residents 

with such local knowledge, finding people who can be 

trusted and who are knowledgeable about the urban 

subterranean world is vital. 

IPB Level 2: The Topography of Cities.

Topography is typically defined as “the arrangement of the natural and artificial physical features of 

an area.”75 In a city, the most important of these physical features are man-made. As Michael Desch noted:

urbanization changes the physical geography of an 

area by increasing the density of settlement and producing built-up areas of closely spaced buildings and 

tight networks of roads and rail lines.76

Yet, the underlying natural features provide both opportunities and constraints for these buildings and 

transportation systems. Moreover, as Max Neiman 

pointed out:

the topography and natural surroundings (rivers, 

mountains, or beaches, for example) are included in 

the built form of individual cities and urban settings 

since they establish the contours on which and within 

which structural forms occur.77

This emphasizes once again the enormous variations in 

cities and raises important questions: Are the cities on 

flat terrain where the built elements can be construct-
47

ed easily and widely? Is the city nestled within mountains and hills, where the natural topography can be 

an important differentiator among different communities with different socio-economic attributes? Certain 

kinds of ridge and ravine formations within cities in 

Latin America, for example, have provided spaces for 

shantytowns or informal settlements that have grown 

up spontaneously as economic migrants moved to the 

cities because of network opportunities, or as political 

refugees fled into the cities to escape rural violence. 

One example is the settlement known as La Limonada 

within Guatemala City, where an estimated 60,000 

people have settled on land that most would consider 

uninhabitable.78 This has become the largest slum in 

Central America. Even more striking are the favelas of 

Rio de Janeiro; many are built on mountainsides that 

are so steep they can be accessed only on foot, through 

narrow alleys that are the perfect places for traffickers 

and gangs to ambush the incoming forces. This has 

imposed serious limitations on security forces as they 

have sought to pacify the favelas and contain the drug 

trafficking and gang violence within them. 

Similarly, if a city is littoral, what are the advantages and risks of that? Is it generally good for trade, 

both licit and illicit? At the same time, there are risks 

of extreme weather events that can create a humanitarian disaster. Some coastal cities might also offer attractive targets for terrorists because of the easy access 

by sea. In 2008, for example, the Lashkar-e-Taiba terrorists came into Mumbai by sea—and were ignored 

as they came ashore because they were believed to be 

contraband smugglers.79 From the U.S. perspective 

too, it is worth considering both the benefits and the 

risks stemming from the coastal nature of a city. The 

coastal component would likely be an asset for U.S. 
48

forces in terms of the initial entry into the city as well 

facilitating a relatively easy exit strategy. At the same 

time, once U.S. forces are securely in place, would it 

make efforts to control and manage the city, in accordance with the overall mission, more or less difficult? 

If the previous discussion emphasizes some of the 

major differences among cities, some scholars have 

developed a narrow but systematic approach to urban 

spatial structures that could be useful if integrated into 

IPB as part of a macro-level understanding of the city. 

Shlomo Angel in particular has identified five discrete 

attributes of every urban spatial structure that he argued could be measured and analyzed systematically 

in all cities and countries. First:

urban land cover, or urban extent, is typically measured by the total built-up area (or impervious surface) of cities, sometimes including the open spaces 

captured by their built-up areas and the open spaces 

on the urban fringe affected by urban development.80

Second:

average urban population density is typically measured as the ratio of the total population of the city 

and the total built-up area it occupies.81

Third: 

centrality concerns the relative proportion of the city 

population that lives in close proximity to its center 

rather than in its suburban periphery.82

Fourth: 

fragmentation, or scattered development, is typically 

measured by the relative amount and the spatial structure of the open spaces that are fragmented by the 
49

noncontiguous expansion of cities into the surrounding countryside.

A fifth attribute in Angel’s typology is “compactness, 

or the degree to which the city footprint approximates 

a circle rather than a tentacle-like shape.” This is important because it impacts on “accessibility—the more 

circular the city, the closer its locations are to its center 

and to one another.”83 This notion of spatial structure 

is an important dimension of urban topography.

A broad understanding of urban spatial structures 

of this kind has to be supplemented by knowledge that 

is more detailed at what might be termed the district 

level. As suggested in the introduction of this monograph, there are massive variations in density, with 

the highest density of people to spaces in areas that 

are deprived socially and economically, and the lowest density among the social elites. In other words, the 

average urban density can be a useful first approximation, but can also be misleading. One way to approach 

this—at least as a first approximation—is to consider 

the city in terms of concentric rings radiating outward 

from the city center, to the peri-urban zones that mix 

urban and rural elements while sometimes acting as 

a focal point where new entrants to the city congregate—often in informal settlements. Operations in 

areas of low density might differ in important ways 

from operations in high-density urban areas. 

Another approach to urban spatial structures has 

been enunciated in a research paper by several scholars steeped in a complexity science approach to cities. 

In their view: 

the complexity of human movements has redefined 

the usage of urban space and the arrangement of 

resources. People, as physical carriers, motivate the 
50

transfer of materials, money, people, and information 

between areas in urban space.84

This approach leads to an emphasis on three elements of urban spatial structure: hubs, centers, and 

borders. Hubs refer to the most significant areas that 

connect spaces between which urban stocks are transferred. These act within the urban structure as spatial 

bridges between different neighborhoods. Centers refer to the most relevant areas that accumulate urban 

stocks, which can differ from hubs but are very often 

the same.85 Borders refer to socioeconomic boundaries that are generated by aggregated travel location 

choices, which subdivide a city into small neighborhoods or communities.86

Using a quantitative approach with data drawn 

from the use of public transport systems in Singapore, 

the authors identified important trends and changes 

in the city, including the move toward a “more polycentric urban form.”87

Singapore, of course, is a relatively smart city with 

lots of readily available data. It also has highly efficient 

transportation systems that facilitate easy movement. 

In other cities, however, conditions might be different, with the topography and transportation systems 

imposing constraints rather than facilitating mobility. 

In considering roads in cities in the developing world, 

for example, it is reasonable to expect that many of 

them are narrow, with low-quality construction and 

limited carrying capacity. After the 2015 earthquake 

in Nepal, for example, the flow of aid and assistance 

was stifled by both the limited capacity of Kathmandu 

Airport and by the poor transportation into the city, 

let alone to the rest of the country. Poor roads might 

also be a hindrance to military operations, especially 
51

when there is a need for rapid response to requests 

for assistance either from the civilian population or 

from military units. In addition, it is critical that U.S. 

forces operating in a city have a clear understanding 

of the major chokepoints and how they can be avoided when operations require mobility, and how they 

might be exploited when the United States is seeking 

to constrain the mobility of adversaries. 

IPB Level 3: Cityscapes.

Closely related to the topography, and often 

considered part of it, is what might be termed the 

“cityscape”—the buildings that are created as places 

to live, learn, work, play, engage in commerce, or 

govern. These have their own distinctive features that 

have to be identified by intelligence and taken into 

account in operations. As one study noted:

urban terrain, being a man-made environment, is composed of angular forms, the like of which occurs only 

rarely in non-urban terrain. Not only are these forms 

angular in planimetric pattern (as a grid street pattern), 

but in the third dimension as well. Verticality becomes 

of great importance, for this not only creates extremely 

difficult barriers to assault, but provides the defense 

with a man-made form of ‘high-ground.’ A large city 

provides several planes of ‘urban high ground’ and, in 

many instances, a subterranean level.88

Before U.S. forces move into a city, therefore, they 

need to identify particular buildings that would provide good defensive positions as well as high buildings that would provide advantageous “terrain” for 

sniping, ambushes, or other forms of attack on U.S. 

forces. Commanders will need to know where to 
52

locate the “high ground” in the city, and how easy this 

location will be to access, take, and maintain control 

over.

The other elements of the cityscape to consider are 

whether particular buildings are endowed with political, religious, or symbolic significance. After this has 

been determined, it is important to develop a policy 

and strategy for dealing with significant buildings. 

Are certain kinds of buildings, for example, to be 

regarded as no-go areas for U.S. forces? However, if 

they are treated as such, and then exploited for offensive operations by an adversary or adversaries, what 

does this do to the initial determination? Does U.S. occupation of certain buildings or operations in certain 

parts of the city alienate the population? Conversely, 

if a troop presence provides a degree of order and stability for the local population, is it then welcomed? 

IPB might also consider the possibility that buildings that are contiguous will be used as a form of 

manufactured tunnels, with forces operating through 

them to maintain cover and avoid surveillance. During the Battle of Nablus in 2002, the Israeli Defense 

Forces (IDF) used this approach to target high-value 

Palestinian military leaders. The commander of the 

Paratrooper Brigade articulated the approach in 

terms of multiple perspectives on urban space and 

architecture: 

We interpreted the alley as a place forbidden to 

walk through and the door as a place forbidden to 

pass through, and the window as a place forbidden 

to look through, because a weapon awaits us in the 

alley, and a booby trap awaits us behind the doors. 

This is because the enemy interprets space in a traditional, classical manner, and I do not want to obey this 

interpretation and fall into his traps. . . . I want to 
53

surprise him! This is the essence of war. . . . This is why

that we opted for the methodology of moving through 

walls. . . . Like a worm that eats its way forward, 

emerging at points and then disappearing.89

The result was that:

during the battle soldiers moved within the city across 

hundreds of meters of ‘over ground tunnels’ carved 

out through a dense and contiguous urban structure

. . . . Furthermore, they used none of the city’s streets, 

roads, alleys or courtyards, or any of the external 

doors, internal stairwells and windows, but moved 

horizontally through walls and vertically through 

holes blasted in ceilings and floors. This form of movement, described by the military as ‘infestation,’ seeks 

to redefine inside as outside, and domestic interiors as 

thoroughfares. The IDF’s strategy of ‘walking through 

walls’ involves a conception of the city as not just the 

site but also the very medium of warfare—a flexible, 

almost liquid medium that is forever contingent and 

in flux.90

It is not coincidental that Israeli military training and 

thinking is influenced by philosophy and architecture 

as well as more traditional military texts. 

IPB Level 4: The Service Infrastructure.

Conceiving the city as an organism suggests that, 

like human beings, cities have certain needs or requirements in order to function effectively. As one 

scholar noted, “Cities require fresh water to exist. 

These supplies fill a number of functions, such as human and domestic needs, commercial and industrial 

purposes, street flushing, and firefighting.”91 In cities 

in many developing countries, however, clean water 

is not readily available:
54

The lack of adequate water and sanitation facilities 

leads to health issues such as diarrhea, malaria and 

cholera outbreaks. Though water supply and sanitation coverage increased between 1990 and 2008, the 

growth of the world’s urban populations jeopardizes 

those results. While between 1990 and 2008 1052 million urban dwellers gained access to improved drinking water and 813 million to improved sanitation, the 

urban population in that period grew by 1089 million 

people.92

Depending on the contingency, one of the most urgent challenges for U.S. forces in a megacity might 

be to provide enough uncontaminated water to keep 

people alive. 

Before U.S. forces engage in any kind of contingency in a megacity or sub-megacity it is essential that they 

understand the infrastructure, defined broadly rather 

than narrowly. Infrastructure tends to be seen in terms 

of abstract forms such as power lines, water pipes, 

and sewerage systems, but these have to be managed 

and maintained. Indeed, services themselves require 

servicing and support or they break down, or at the 

very least are subject to interruption. In other words, 

the conception of infrastructure in traditional terms is 

not only overly narrow—it is dangerously misleading. 

Services—and they can differ significantly in scope 

and scale between cities in the developed world and 

those in the developing world—ultimately have to 

be provided by organizations and people. Knowing 

where these organizations are located and how they 

operate, as well as where and when they operate, is as 

important as tracing the underlying physical means of 

delivery. 
55

The implication of all this is that:

the information demands . . . will be staggering. There 

are certain areas you will always need to understand 

when entering an urban area—with the purpose of 

then controlling it and the population. These are the 

building layout and composition, transportation, electrical, sewage and water, and natural gas systems and 

the locations/status of key subcomponents—bridges, 

gas stations, power stations, high tension power 

lines, neighborhood substations/transformers, underground sewage canals, water purification plants, 

gas lines and their depth under roads (so they aren’t 

crushed by your tanks).93

The more that is known prior to deployment, the 

better. 

If the U.S. military is dealing with the aftermath 

of a natural disaster (hurricane or earthquake), then 

many services will be degraded, destroyed, or disrupted, and the priority task, along with the provision 

of relief supplies, will be to get them working again. 

If the military is involved in a combat role, then it 

should at least know where the key centers of power 

and service provision are located so that it can try to 

avoid collateral destruction and damage. Disruptions 

of power, if they are frequent or sustained, significantly erode political legitimacy—as the United States 

found to its cost in Iraq. Maintaining, protecting, or 

restoring a functioning infrastructure, therefore, will 

be essential in any intervention in a megacity or submegacity. In short, military forces need to know what 

services are provided: by whom and to whom, the 

points of origin and the places of distribution, and via 

what routes and methods. 
56

IPB Level 5: The Inhabitants of Cities.

So far, the emphasis has been on the city as sets of 

structures and services. Focusing on these, however, 

does not mean that the inhabitants can be ignored. In 

effect, cities are concentrated forms of human interaction as well as interactions between people and places. 

Max Neiman has highlighted the importance of both 

dimensions: 

The social meaning of urban places refers to those cultural features of cities and urban places that reflect the 

values, social perceptions, and interactions of inhabitants with regard both to the city and to one another. 

Urban places that hold special religious or historical 

meaning are likely to affect combatants in ways that 

cities without such intensely held symbolic or nationalistic implications are not. Additionally, the levels of 

social harmony or discord with respect to class conflict, ethnic antagonisms, or religious strife can affect 

the unity and capacity of inhabitants to work together 

effectively. Just as importantly, these characteristics 

might greatly complicate the post-combat, pacification, and occupation periods. Beirut, Belfast, and the 

cities in Bosnia or Kosovo are examples of how these 

issues can affect combat missions in unique ways.94

Indeed, when it comes to the inhabitants of the 

city, it is critical to have an understanding of the extent to which the city is cosmopolitan and integrated 

on the one hand, and factionalized and segregated 

on the other. Generally, a city will have very obvious 

class and socio-economic differentiations that are easy 

to determine. The elites live in less crowded areas, often in gated and secure communities, where violence 

is low; there are neighborhoods that are not wealthy 

but are a reflection of economic achievement and 
57

social status; there are mixed neighborhoods that are 

home to lower-middle and working-class segments 

of the population; there are poor neighborhoods; and 

there are areas inhabited by those who have been marginalized and excluded or expelled from the formal 

economy. People in the last two groups often have 

little choice but to work in the informal economy and 

live in informal settlements where they have no legal 

title to their houses. Any intervention in a megacity 

or sub-megacity in the developing world will have to 

deal with the challenge of large slums with appalling 

living conditions. Indeed, it is worth noting that the 

UN-Habitat Report, State of the World’s Cities, 2006/7,

noted that slums could be the “emerging human settlements of the 21st century.”95 The report also noted 

that “urbanization has become virtually synonymous 

with slum growth, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, 

Western Asia, and Southern Asia.”96 Characterized 

by the lack of durable housing, sufficient living area, 

access to water and sanitation, and security against 

eviction, slums can be understood best in terms of 

Castell’s notion of social exclusion.97 They are generally areas where the state, at best, is minimalist in the 

provision of services; more often than not it is completely absent. Many of the people coming from rural 

areas in search of economic opportunity will find that 

they have merely traded a life of rural poverty for one 

of urban destitution.

In addition to the class divisions there can be divisions based on identity politics. These divisions sometimes spillover into what is described as communal 

conflict or civic conflict.98 As Stephen Graham has noted, “like other facets of global social change, political 

violence is, in a sense, being urbanized.”99 There are 

several dimensions of this urbanization of violence, 
58

one of which is the growing way in which “insurgent 

and guerilla groups, rather than seeking shelter within rural proletarian groups, are colonizing the world’s 

burgeoning urban spaces.”100 Another dimension concerns the tendency of clashes between rival sectarian 

or religious groups to erupt or magnify in cities. In 

1992, for example, an attack by Hindu militants on a 

mosque in a small town called Ayodhya sparked off 

inter-communal violence in many of India’s biggest 

cities. “Rather than spreading through the nearby 

countryside, the hatred exploded hundreds of kilometers away in Mumbai, Calcutta, Ahmedabad, and 

New Delhi,” with the result that 95% of all those killed 

were city dwellers.101 Similarly in Nigeria, in February 

2006, the protests against the Danish cartoons of the 

Prophet Mohammed sparked riots and violent clashes 

between Muslim and Christian mobs in several Nigerian cities.102 In January 2007, Hezbollah supporters 

brought Beirut to a halt with strikes and protests that 

sparked violent clashes not only between Muslim and 

Muslim, but also between Christian groups that supported rival political factions. In other words, cities 

provide a concentration of everything, including animosities, rivalries, and tensions among political and 

ethnic groups and factions. 

Sectarian divisions between Shia and Sunni, or between Protestants and Catholics, can also create tensions and conflicts. A key dimension is the extent to 

which such communities are intermingled. In some 

cities, tensions are latent rather than overt, although 

there is always a potential for some kind of spark to 

intensify these antagonisms in ways that result in violence. The danger is that military intervention is rarely 

neutral. As became evident in Iraq, when external intervention changes the internal power structure, those 

who have suddenly become disadvantaged seek to 
59

restore the status quo ante, while those who have gone 

from a position of subordination to primacy want to 

exploit their newfound power for retribution against 

those who previously held power. The result was a 

period of sectarian cleansing in Baghdad that resulted 

in the number of residential quarters that mixed Sunni 

and Shia residents dropping from 56 in 2006 to 21 in 

2007.103 During the same period, 14 Sunni neighborhoods increased to 23, and the number of Shia residential quarters—reflecting the effectiveness of the 

Mahdi Army operations—went from 17 to 41.104

 In other words, U.S. military involvement in a 

megacity or sub-megacity almost invariably has the 

potential for sparking a tinderbox. Prior to intervention, therefore, it is important to understand what the 

cleavages or potential cleavages might be, as well as 

how different factions or groups might perceive the 

intervention. It is also critical to send in soldiers and 

support workers with appropriate language skills; 

the complexity of the language challenge should not 

be underestimated. As Jeff Watson noted, “megacities are largely multilingual. While this can be said of 

large cities in general, the scale of multilingualism in 

megacities magnifies its effects.”105 In New York City:

nine foreign languages are spoken by communities of 

one hundred thousand or larger. Language also plays 

a role in determining one’s identity and the larger language community in which one decides to live.106

The problem is intensified by local dialects and regional languages within countries. In India—a country of 

ethnolinguistic states—Hindi and English are accompanied by many ethno-regional languages that people 

bring from the countryside into the major cities. It is 

vital to understand such nuances prior to deployment 

to a megacity or sub-megacity:
60

Understanding the regional languages within a megacity will have practical implications for creating appropriate pre-deployment language and culture familiarization training, identifying reach-back capabilities, 

and building an effective military and host-nation 

interpreter cadre.107

Such skills will also be important during the deployment: 

A clear understanding of the multilingual information 

flows within a megacity will help military decision 

makers better understand how language communities 

prefer to receive and share information. These data 

will provide insight into how to most effectively communicate with friendly forces or interrupt and manipulate the communication of enemy forces.108

By adding both depth and subtlety of understanding, 

an enhanced linguistic capability will greatly enhance 

all aspects of intelligence and operations in megacities 

and sub-megacities, including the understanding of 

governance. 

IPB Level 6: Networks.

Language skills are indispensable in a military contingency in a megacity or sub-megacity because they 

facilitate the identification of all kinds of social, political, economic, family, tribal, or ethnic networks. Indeed, networks come in all varieties, differing in size, 

shape, membership, cohesion, and purpose. They can 

vary from small-truncated localized networks that can 

be important only within the confines of a small district within the city, to some with citywide reach and 

importance, to those with a national and even transna-
61

tional reach. Networks can also be centrally directed 

or highly decentralized, they can have amorphous or 

specific objectives, and they can be restricted or open 

in their membership. They can operate through faceto-face meetings or—because of technology—can be 

much more dispersed, but still effective. Networks 

facilitate flows of information, knowledge, and communication as well as more tangible commodities.

Consequently, it is important for U.S. forces coming into a megacity or sub-megacity to have some idea 

about the most important networks and the underlying affiliations that give them a high degree of trust 

and cohesion. Who are the most important policymakers in the city? How much of their influence depends 

on social and business connections? How are the policymakers integrated in the broader political and economic elite? Are they part of larger family, kinship, 

tribal, or ethnic networks? How do these networks 

overlap and intersect? If there are distinct networks, to 

what extent do these networks cooperate or compete 

with one another? How powerful are these networks, 

and what is their ability to mobilize forces either to 

work with or against the U.S. military forces that have 

been deployed to the city? 

A second level of questions about networks moves 

from the general understanding of the network size, 

shape, structure, and influence to more specific and 

focused questions about the key nodes and connections within the network. Nodes that are highly trusted and, therefore, particularly influential in shaping 

opinion will need to be co-opted where possible by 

U.S. forces. In addition, the contingency force will 

need to be particularly sensitive to and careful in 

dealing with networks that have a particular historical, cultural, or religious significance. Failure by the 
62

Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) to appreciate 

the status of the al-Sadr family in Baghdad and to 

treat Muqtada al-Sadr as an important network node 

in the Shia community in the city and, therefore, as an 

important stakeholder in post-invasion Iraq, proved 

to be very costly. By marginalizing al-Sadr, the CPA 

needlessly created an additional adversary. In effect, 

al-Sadr and his movement became an illicit power 

structure, albeit one that continued to be an important 

social movement and welfare provider. 

In addition to the formal networks, there are also 

likely to be a series of shadow networks in the city: the 

fixers, the arms dealers, the smugglers, the organized 

crime figures, as well as political extremists. Indeed, 

the underworld networks might be as important as 

those that operate in the open. It is important, therefore, to identify those nodes within the network that 

are particularly important—either because they provide leadership, they offer particular skills that are 

indispensable to the organization, or they are boundary spanners and key connectors with the licit world. 

Moreover, it is necessary to determine the extent to 

which the continued operation of these networks is 

compatible with the mission of U.S. military forces in 

the city. If there is broad compatibility, then a strategy 

of co-option might be more effective than a strategy of 

confrontation. Attempting to disrupt and degrade a 

criminal network could prove to be highly disruptive 

for the city and, therefore, counterproductive to the 

attainment of the mission objectives. 

The other kinds of networks that are important in 

cities are spatial networks, and recent scholarship on 

cities has given these networks a far more prominent 

place than in the past. Batty, for example, one of the 

most prominent scholars in the uses of complexity sci-
63

ence as a way to understand cities, treats networks as 

a core element in his work. As one assessment noted:

Complexity theory . . . rejects the top-down, comprehensive, and structural approaches of traditional planning practice. Instead, there is a focus on bottom-up, 

organically structured activities that shape and influence urban systems. Complexity theory also rejects 

steady state assumptions about cities in place of a nonequilibrium perspective.109

Building on these premises, Batty regards networks 

as the “physical containers whose capacity constrains 

flows of energy and information, manifested as materials, people, or ideas.”110 Moreover, those energy 

flows provide another, closely interlinked, focus for 

IPB. 

IPB Level 7: The Flows.

Scholars such as David Held, one of the major theorists of globalization, have emphasized that one of the 

most salient features of globalization is the vast flow of 

people, money, commodities, information, messages, 

digital signals, and services around the world.111 What 

Manuel Castells termed the “space of flows” has become a global space.112 Cities too have become spaces 

of flows. Global cities in particular are often defined by 

the flows of money and information to other cities. Yet, 

even cities that do not have this status have all sorts of 

flows. Some of the flows differ in intensity at different 

times, but such things as food, water, commodities, 

people, money, vehicles, information, and services all 

flow constantly. There are flows into the city, flows 

around the city, flows through the city, and flows out 

of the city. Moreover, there are licit and highly benefi-
64

cial flows that are important to maintain and protect, 

but there are also illicit flows of guns, drugs, contraband, and even trafficked people that it is important 

to block or interdict. One of the priorities for the IPB 

in relation to military contingencies in megacities and 

sub-megacities is to map and understand these flows. 

This includes points of origin, length, duration, intensity, direction, and route, as well as pulses within the 

flows. Those attributes of the city that facilitate flows 

and those that constrict or inhibit them must also be 

considered. 

At a very mundane level, one of the most important of these flows is transportation. Movement of 

people through the city is often very congested, especially during certain peak hours. As one study noted:

the streets of the city serve a wide variety of interrelated purposes: as axes for the movement of people, 

goods, and vehicles; as public areas separating enclosed private spaces and providing the essential 

spatial frame of reference for the city as a whole; as 

areas for recreation, social interaction, the diffusion of 

information, waiting, resting . . . and as locations for 

economic activities. . . . Within the functional complexity of the street environment, the street occupations 

are both strongly influenced by changes in other environmental factors, and also contributors to general 

environmental conditions. Thus, for example, streettraders and small-scale transporters depend upon the 

direction, density, velocity, and flexibility of potential 

customers’ movements, and are immediately affected 

by changes in traffic flows and consumer behavior. At 

the same time, they influence patterns of movement 

and overall levels of congestion . . .113

This description highlights two interrelated aspects of 

flows: the first is their complexity and their interaction with both people and places; the second is that 
65

disruption or even abrupt changes in flows can have 

significant consequences in terms of businesses and 

livelihoods. The second aspect in particular needs to 

be factored into any intelligence products about any 

megacity or sub-megacity that the United States might 

find itself operating within. Even if the United States 

goes in with a high degree of legitimacy, actions that 

are poorly thought out in relation to flows can rapidly 

create disaffection and disillusion among the populace 

in ways that could make the operational environment 

much more difficult for the United States.

There is a conundrum here—although the extent 

of it depends in large part on the nature of the contingency. One of the challenges of dealing with illicit 

flows is that they are often deeply embedded within 

licit flows. The issue, therefore, is how to detect and 

interdict flows such as arms or drugs without seriously disrupting the normal legitimate flows. There 

is an inescapable tradeoff here. Nevertheless, it is important that the costs and benefits be weighed prior 

to any major action that might interrupt normal flows 

that are a natural part of the functioning of the city. 

One way to think about the issue is that the military 

force in the city should operate, if not as an “invisible 

hand,” then at least as a facilitator of city flows and 

functions, rather than as an inhibitor of or impediment to these flows. 

The other important element in relation to flows 

is the need to maintain and protect them. This is true 

whether it is flows of services and power, of people, 

or of goods and vehicles. It is important, therefore, 

to identify points of vulnerability in flows. One clear 

point of vulnerability—and a very attractive target 

for attack—is a transportation hub, particularly one 

in which different kinds of flows converge; another is 
66

at the final distribution point. The number of terrorist 

attacks in Baghdad that occur at markets is indicative 

of the importance of the distribution point. Not only 

are such attacks relatively easy to mount, but they also 

kill innocent civilians and strike at the flows of daily 

necessities. 

If the intervention in the city is an effort at disaster 

management, then the issue will be one of restoring 

the flows. Once the immediate search and rescue operations are complete and a degree of order restored, 

priority has to be given to the restoration of flows. 

Even if these are initially partial, incomplete, and at 

significantly lower levels than prior to the disaster, 

getting them reignited will be an important step on 

the road back to recovery and normality. 

IPB Level 8: Governance in Cities. 

Governance in cities is responsible for maintaining flows and networks of goods, services, people, 

traffic, information, and communication that are indispensable for the continued health and well-being 

of the city—as poor as these might be. Governance 

provides a superstructure that in effect facilitates the 

natural functions and flows of the city. It is also concerned about the control of violence and maintenance 

of order. Unfortunately, much of the literature on urban governance is really about governance in a select 

set of cities in North America, Europe, and Japan that 

are increasingly likely to fall into the smart city category. One scholar, for example, identified four different ideal types of approaches to urban governance: 

the managerial, corporatist, pro-growth, and welfare 

models.114 Yet, for both fragile and feral states, the 

issue is less likely to be about the type of governance 
67

and more about the paucity of governance. In many 

cities in the developing world, there are both capacity gaps and functional holes, with the state and the 

city government failing to provide either social control mechanisms or even basic services. Moreover, city 

governance, like state governance, is often corrupt, ineffective, and patchy at best. It is not surprising, therefore, that bottom-up or organic governance mechanisms emerge as a substitute for state governance.115

This is both positive and negative. It is positive in that 

it provides some degree of order, limited but real economic opportunities, and some rudimentary services; 

it is negative in that the providers are often criminal 

organizations, which use paternalism as a means of 

enhancing their own security and aggrandizement. 

This phenomenon is visible in the Cape Flats in South 

Africa, where, as André Standing has noted, “the 

criminal economy delivers employment and goods to 

thousands of individuals who are socially excluded,” 

while the “criminal elite provides . . . ‘governance 

from below’ . . . by performing functions traditionally 

associated with the state.”116 These functions include 

dispute settlement, a degree of social protection, and 

even private philanthropy, which is at least a partial 

substitute for the state provision of welfare.117 If anything, the phenomenon is equally if not more striking 

in the slums of Kingston, Jamaica, where the “dons” 

provide employment, services, and protection. The 

provision of these collective goods, of course, results 

not from altruism but self-interest as criminals seek 

to mobilize public support and thereby enhance their 

own legitimacy and security. Even so, criminal paternalism has provided benefits to communities long 

ignored by the state, and at times this informal governance has become more important than formal gov-
68

ernance. Sometimes there might even be tacit agreement whereby the state provides some services while 

criminals or other violent armed groups provide other 

services. This results in a form of mixed or hybrid governance, well described by Enrique Desmond Arias in 

his study of the favelas of Rio de Janeiro.118

Even though violent armed groups—militias, 

criminals, insurgents, terrorists, revolutionaries—

might provide alternative forms of governance, they 

also tend to be in competition with one another for 

territorial control, and for the control of markets, both 

licit and illicit. At times spaces within the city are bitterly contested as rival groups vie for supremacy; at 

other times or in other parts of the city the struggle is 

between the forces of the state and these violent armed 

groups, resulting in confrontational spaces. Given this 

diversity, one way to think about spaces within the 

city is in terms of governance and conflict. Prior to 

U.S. military involvement in a megacity or sub-megacity, it would be extremely useful to identify differing 

elements of both governance and conflict. This could 

actually be done in terms as indicated in the following matrix using the dimensions of governance and its 

providers, and conflict and who the belligerents are. 

Table 4 yields the following typology of spaces within 

cities.
69

Table 4. Types of Spaces within Cities.

Although this might appear rather abstract—and 

certainly has qualities of an ideal type—it does facilitate an understanding of the variety of urban (and for 

that matter non-urban) spaces that the United States is 

likely to encounter in any operation in a megacity or 

sub-megacity. Some areas of major cities in the Northern Triangle of Central America, for example, are under the control of government forces (i.e., the police 

and military); some are under the control of a particular gang (such as MS-13 or Barrio 18); some “enjoy” 

the benefits of a mixed form of governance, in which a 

gang and government forces tacitly share responsibility; some are the scene of direct confrontation between 

the state and gangs over control; others are the venue 

for contests between MS-13 and Barrio 18, each of 

whom seeks exclusive control; and some are the subject of a three-way (or more) conflict in which gangs 

are fighting one another while also fighting the state. 

There is an added twist to all this. If urban areas 

have a range of actors vying for limited resources and 

providing varying levels of governance, military operations in such areas become, de facto, an additional 

and novel level of governance. At a minimum, therefore, understanding the existing patterns of governance and the networks that provide them is essential 

Formally Governed 

Spaces—where the 

state is dominant 

Hybrid Governed 

Spaces—by mix of both 

state and armed groups

 Alternatively Governed 

Spaces—where an armed 

group dominates

Confrontational 

Spaces—between the 

state and violent armed 

groups 

Multilayered Conflict 

Spaces—that are both 

confrontational and 

contested 

Contested Spaces—

among violent armed 

groups 
70

to the success of contingency operations in megacities 

and sub-megacities. It is equally important to develop 

procedures for intersecting smoothly and effectively 

with these networks, both formal and informal, thereby supplementing rather than superseding or disrupting them. There will be occasions, however, when the 

external military force will be seen as a threat and an 

additional player in an already multilayered conflict. 

In these circumstances, it will have no choice but to 

resort to violence. 

IPB Level 9: The Rhythms of Cities. 

One dimension that has been given little attention 

with regard to the possibility of a military intervention in a megacity is the relationship between space 

and time. Almost every movie or television series set 

within a large city gives attention to what is sometimes described as the “pulse of the city,” a recognition that the city is constantly transforming and reconstituting itself each day with inward and outward 

flows of traffic, people, commodities, etc. However, 

the notion goes beyond this: time is related to business interactions and social engagements in the city, 

and even has a bearing on safety. The question of who 

controls the city at night, for example, is a manifestation of the time-space relationship, and the imposition 

of a curfew is no more than an emphatic, if occasionally overly dramatic, acknowledgement of the critical 

interplay between time, space, and certain kinds of activities. The Swedish scholar Torsten Hägestrand even 

developed a concept of time geography that sought 

to link place and time in terms of the interweaving 

of people’s lives. Although some urban scholars see 

Hägestrand’s work as an early attempt to link place 
71

and time, the pioneer of rhythm analysis is widely regarded as Henri Lefebvre, who enunciated ideas related to the rhythm of life—including the rhythm of the 

city. While some of the concepts and language of the 

time-space relationship take on an abstract or metaphysical quality, the notion is ultimately very simple: 

it is necessary to think about time and space together 

rather than in isolation from one another. As Lefebvre 

noted:

concrete times have rhythms, or rather are rhythms—

and all rhythms imply the relation of a time to a space, 

a localized time, or, if one prefers, a temporalized 

space. Rhythm is always linked to such and such a 

place, to its place, be that the heart, the fluttering of 

the eyelids, the movement of a street or the tempo of 

a waltz.119

As one scholar noted, the great strength of this perspective is to avoid “the conception of place as static, 

for rhythms are essentially dynamic, part of the multiplicity of flows that emanate from, pass through and 

center upon place, and contribute to its situated dynamics.”120 Instead, it offers a “temporal understanding of place and space.”121 One aspect of these rhythms 

is that there is often repetition in both time and space—

daily rush hours, for example—but not identical repetition. As Lefebvre acknowledged, “there is always 

something new and unforeseen that introduces itself 

into the repetitive.”122 This recognizes that cities are 

complex emergent systems, constantly changing and 

adapting. Indeed, as one scholar observed:

rhythm analysis can help explore notions that places 

are always in a process of becoming, seething with 

emergent properties, but usually stabilized by regu-
72

lar patterns of flow that possess particular rhythmic 

qualities whether steady, intermittent, volatile or 

surging.123

Rhythms are in large part about the timing of 

flows, the speed with which they pass through particular locations. Yet, they are also about routines and 

intersections. As one scholar noted:

familiar places are the unquestioned settings for 

daily tasks, pleasures and rhythmically apprehended 

routines, with regular patterns of walking, driving, 

shopping and other routinized practices as part of 

familiar spatio-temporal experience. These patterns 

are marked by regular paths and points of spatial and 

temporal intersection which routinize action in space 

and collectively constitute the time-geographies . . . 

within which people’s trajectories separate and cross 

in regular ways. Shops, bars, cafes, garages and so 

forth are meeting points at which individual paths 

congregate, providing geographies of communality 

and continuity within which social activities are cocoordinated and synchronized. This ongoing mapping 

of space through repetitive, collective choreographies 

of congregation, interaction, rest and relaxation produce situated rhythms through which time and space 

are stitched together to produce what Seamon (1980) 

calls ‘place ballets.’124

One task of IPB is to understand these “choreographies of congregation,” especially when they might 

represent or produce not communality and continuity 

but violence and dislocation. Another is to consider 

how accepted rhythms might be disrupted, either deliberately by those who want to bring about change 

or inadvertently by actions of U.S. forces that are 

based on an inadequate understanding of the dominant rhythms of the city they are operating in. Indeed, 
73

Lefebvre discussed the creation of arrhythmia. To go 

back to commuting, minor cases of arrhythmia could 

result from minor accidents that block traffic and extend the length of rush hour far beyond the norm. 

More serious cases could result from deliberate sabotage or blocking of transportation arteries, especially 

bridges or roads, or from military operations by an 

intervening force that are badly timed and block the 

normal flows. Moreover, within megacities there will 

almost certainly be groups and individuals “who are 

often spatially segregated, and marginal to the life and 

dominant rhythms of the city.”125 Sometimes they simply want to opt out. There are also instances that they 

become so alienated that they seek revenge or recompense. Some of the maras in the major cities of Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala have sought to make 

money and exert power by extorting transportation 

companies and drivers, and at times by violent attacks 

on buses. In effect, they are seeking to exercise power 

through the creation of arrhythmia. 

The other dimension of rhythm that has particular relevance to military contingencies in megacities 

is the difference between the rhythms of the day and 

those of the night. For any contingency force, controlling the rhythms of the night (at least in key areas) 

will be highly desirable, if somewhat difficult. U.S. 

military forces, however, can also seek to exploit the 

different rhythms of the night, taking actions with 

impunity that, in daytime, might create arrhythmia. 

Understanding the rhythms of the city, synchronizing 

with these rhythms and moving in the direction of the 

prevailing flows rather than against them, limits the 

footprint of the contingency force, minimizes disruption, and reduces the prospects of alienating large segments of the urban population. 
74

IPB Layer 10: The Cyber Dimension.

Treating cyberspace as an additional target of intelligence is relatively novel; yet, cyberspace has to 

be included in a comprehensive approach to IPB for 

megacities and sub-megacities. Cyberspace and what 

Jeff Boleng and Colin Clarke term the “New ‘Net” 

have become both an extension of the battlefield and 

a window on the battlefield. Nowhere is this more relevant than in urban military contingencies. Although 

cyberspace is sometimes regarded as a fifth operational domain of warfare, it is more. It permeates society, 

economics, politics, culture, and increasingly, warfare. 

It is part of the context within which military operations have to be conducted, yet also provides insights 

into both conditions in a megacity and the adversaries operating there. As one study noted, “megacities 

function at the intersection of the physical, social and 

cyber spaces”126 and, therefore, should be treated as 

information hubs. 

Other research that has been done completely outside the military context makes a very similar point, 

focusing on what is termed the “data city” and developing “methods and tools to collect, analyze, and 

represent time-based geo-located social media data at 

the urban scale.”127

This concept of the data city builds on the earlier 

work of scholars who developed concepts such as 

“mediascape” or “informational landscape,” and “offered descriptions that combine traditional city representations with new informational membranes hovering above urban fabrics.”128 Indeed:
75

the underlying idea of these approaches is to view the 

urban experience as tied to the multiple, fragmented, 

and temporary layers of data and information generated by human-place interactions. This is what we 

define as the data city. These data can be produced 

either collectively or by the individual; they can be 

aggregated or discrete, open or protected. They constitute observation points that allow the interpretation 

and description of behavioral patterns within specific 

temporal and spatial coordinates.129

The data city “presents itself with an unprecedented 

quantity of information in the form of geo-located 

comments from Twitter” and other social media.130

This fragmented proliferation of information generated by urban inhabitants offers potential benefits 

both for the research community and urban decisionmakers, who can use the data to generate broad and 

analytical visions of the uses of urban space.131

The basic notion is that citizens with smartphones 

have become mobile sensors, reporting on events in 

the city with tweets, photos, messages, and the like. 

This transforms human beings into potential ‘sensors’ 

that not only have the ability to process and interpret 

what they feel and think but also to geographically localize the information (sometimes involuntarily) and 

spread it globally through the Internet, thus drawing 

people-generated landscapes.132

This notion of “the informational membrane hovering 

above urban fabrics”133 is particularly useful and emphasizes how the data city can feed directly into IPB.

There are, of course, differences between smart cities of the developed world and fragile or feral cities 
76

in the global south. In cities in the developed world, 

much of the reporting includes geolocation and timestamps, thereby providing unprecedented opportunities for time geography. Even without analyzing the 

content, the volume and intensity of tweets and messages can provide insights on the “choreographies of 

congregation” described above in the discussion of the 

rhythm of cities. Moreover, Paolo Ciuccarelli, Giorgia 

Lupi, and Luca Simeone also provide a series of: 

spatial aggregations based on social media. Areas 

were defined and colored according to the time period 

of the day with the highest level of contributions from 

the users. We compared weekdays, weekends, and a 

special week [with a major event].134

The results were striking examples of time geography, 

highlighting the rhythm of the city at different times 

and on different days of the week. 

Cities in the developing world are also very rich 

information environments, although sometimes with 

less geolocation data, since the predominant mobile 

phones are feature phones rather than smartphones. 

This might change in the future as developers seek to 

give feature phones at least some of the capabilities of 

smartphones. Even without this, however, the “information membrane” hovering above cities in the developing world offers both challenges and opportunities. 

The challenges, according to Boleng and Clarke, stem 

in part from the fact that:

the data content produced, consumed, and exchanged 

in this new network will be largely voice, images, and 

video. Significant content will also be exchanged as 

traditional text via SMS, but it will be multi-lingual 

slang and leetspeak.135
77

The sheer volume of unstructured data adds further 

complications, as does:

the transient nature of the network itself, both in 

terms of connectivity and participation. Reliance on 

battery power and the difficulty of recharging phones 

in slums where infrastructure is fragile, expensive, 

and often non-existent have created an environment 

where users power off phones when not in use. This 

creates a highly dynamic network with mobile devices 

disappearing from one location and reappearing in 

another.136

Such problems notwithstanding, this remains a rich 

environment that provides opportunities for understanding cities and their dynamics. 

This point has been emphasized by Robert Dixon, 

who sees the urban environment as extremely rich for 

intelligence gathering and analysis, by new as well 

as traditional means. Dixon has argued, though, that 

“the Army’s current approach to learning about this 

environment is to seek the diamonds scattered amidst 

this clutter,” when in fact:

the clutter itself is the jewel. Enormous amounts of 

readily available data can reveal more about a city, 

its population, and the nefarious actors residing there 

than we could have imagined before. To truly understand this environment the Army must fundamentally 

change its approach to understanding the environment: It must adopt a holistic approach enabled by big 

data analytics.137

This would offer an opportunity to do a deep analysis 

of correlated and anomalous data, and discover what 

people actually do, thereby developing “previously 
78

unimaginable insight into modern urban ecology.”138

Dixon has also noted, “the Army currently lacks the 

resources, expertise, approaches, or seemingly even 

the desire to investigate and exploit the reservoir of 

information available in modern cities. This must 

change.”139 Certainly, the use of big data needs to 

be fully integrated into institutional learning. This 

should go hand in hand with a complexity approach 

that avoids “one-dimensional thinking and reductive 

hypotheses.”140 Such approaches are indispensable. 

Nevertheless, it is important not to oversell them and 

ignore the possibility that there might still be problems with noise and clutter, as well as adversary denial and deception. 

The other problem when dealing with cyberspace 

in relation to megacity contingencies is that adversaries can exploit the almost automatic transparency that 

it creates—both to show U.S. forces in a bad light and 

their own actions very positively. Consequently, part 

of IPB prior to any action in a megacity or sub-megacity must be to identify the service providers for both 

telecommunications and the Internet. It is also important to identify online opinion-makers who could have 

a major impact in any controversy over U.S. military 

intervention.

Implications.

These 10 layers have been presented here in linear 

fashion and as separate and distinct categories. In reality, however, they are interdependent, characterized 

by all sorts of interactions and intersections, many of 

which are difficult to predict or prepare for. The idea 

of a city as an evolving and emerging complex system 

that is far more than the sum of its parts encapsulates 
79

the notion of these interactions. Change in one area, 

for example, can create all sorts of feedback loops, 

some of which act as amplifiers and others as dampeners. The problem with amplifiers in particular is that 

they can create consequences that cascade through the 

system, often with a highly disruptive impact. This is 

why small changes in complex systems can have large 

consequences, which sometimes create unexpected 

tipping points.

Given all this, it is critical that the U.S. Army create 

some kind of center or institutional forum for urban 

intelligence and analysis. For the sake of convenience, 

it is described here as an Urban Analysis Center. The 

exact form will depend on available resources and the 

depth and endurance of the commitment to prepare 

for contingencies in megacities and sub-megacities. 

Nevertheless, the center should be guided by several 

principles. 

The first is that a carefully selected and relatively 

small core of military officers, urban scholars, and 

intelligence analysts should be designated with the 

responsibility to provide a sense of vision, central 

leadership, continuity, and an ever-expanding repository of knowledge about urbanization in general, and 

specific megacities and sub-megacities in particular. 

An inter-disciplinary mix is critical; it should include 

urban planners, architects, and structural engineers as 

well as military officers and intelligence specialists. 

Second, rather than the Urban Analysis Center 

having a large permanent staff, it should be run as a 

network designed to have a powerful surge capability when required. In other words, the core leadership 

could identify scholars, urban planners, and journalists with particular specialties and country and city 

expertise to become part of a constantly adapting and 
80

pulsating network with a high degree of adaptation 

and agility. There is a reasonably good model for this. 

Over the last decade or so, the intelligence community has created an outreach program in which people 

outside the community were designated originally as 

National Intelligence Council Associates, and more 

recently as Intelligence Community Associates. The 

intelligence community could then call on the associates for conference participation, analytic papers, and 

the like. The scheme did not require security clearances, because most of the work could be completed with 

open-source analysis. Since most of the information 

about cities would also be in the unclassified domain, 

this could operate on the same principle. The Urban 

Analysis Center, by bringing the associates together 

in periodic conferences with specific goals—ranging 

from enhanced understanding of urban dynamics to 

accumulating in-depth knowledge about a specific 

city—could create over time a sense of community 

and trust that would greatly strengthen the network 

and increase its value to the Center and to the Army.

The third principle is that provision be made for 

crisis management and direct communications with 

military units in the event of a military contingency in 

a megacity. Not only should the Urban Analysis Center have a communications capability allowing direct 

support for operations in any urban environment, but 

also a capacity for increased staffing and support in a 

crisis. Indeed, the Center could bring in particular outside experts with specific expertise related to the target 

city or particular elements within it, such as terrain, 

flows, and networks. There would then be a capacity 

for the operating units to reach back to the Center for 

technical expertise (on such matters as infrastructure), 

political analysis (relating to the networks of influence 
81

within the city), or criminological assessments (dealing, for example, with the major criminal organizations and criminal markets). The request could also go 

the other way, with Center personnel requesting information—that could be in multi-media form—that 

could assist in sense making and result in feedback 

to units in the city that would enhance situational 

awareness. 

The fourth principle is that the Center becomes 

a focus of institutional learning and adaptation. It 

would take the lead in compiling the lessons learned 

after any contingency and turn these into a set of best 

practices. Moreover, this could be done as a living 

document constantly being updated and refined. In 

fact, there could be both a formal version and one that 

is treated as a “Wiki” and open to contributions from 

military personnel with experience in urban combat 

as well as academics and urban planners. An opensource approach of this kind would offer some exciting new possibilities and could prove to be extremely 

creative and rewarding.

In other words, the Center would have a wide 

range of tasks and responsibilities, ranging from longterm strategic assessments of particular cities, to shortterm operational and tactical support to the battlefield 

level. It would be engaged in IPB and intelligence 

provision on the battlefield; it would also make great 

use of Google Earth and particular software packages 

that allow systematic monitoring of geolocated social 

media. The information membrane discussed above 

as part of the cyber-layer could be a particularly rich 

source of information not simply for mining, but also 

for informing decision-making at all levels—from the 

battlefield to the highest political and military leadership. In short, the Urban Analysis Center would be 
82

an invaluable asset in any military contingency in a 

megacity or sub-megacity. Indeed, to engage in such 

a contingency without this kind of support center 

would be reckless. 

PREPARING FOR MEGACITY OPERATIONS

The U.S. military has had a variety of experiences 

in various urban environments, some successful, some 

not. These have ranged from full-intensity conflicts 

such as World War II or, more recently, Fallujah and 

Sadr City, all the way to operations other than conflict, 

such as the Los Angeles riots of 1992 or the deployment of National Guard troops to Ferguson, Missouri, 

in August 2014. In addition, military forces have been 

deployed in response to hurricanes in New Orleans 

in 2005 and New York City in 2012. The lessons from 

these experiences have been invaluable, and they 

provide a solid foundation for future contingencies. 

Nevertheless, military involvement in megacities and 

sub-megacities will present new and extremely formidable challenges and problems. Success will require 

unique and innovative solutions, rather than simply 

scaled-up versions of traditional tactics and methods. 

Consequently, equipment, personnel, tactics, and doctrine must be developed in ways that provide the U.S. 

Army with effective military capabilities and with discrete options that are tailored to the environment and 

can be executed with minimal damage and disruption 

(see Figure 1).
Figure 1. Developments Needed for Military 

Involvement in Megacities and Sub-Megacities.

Military operations in dense urban terrain require 

new mindsets. While the Army has already highlighted the role of the individual infantryman in an urban 

environment, and his or her ability as a front-line 

intelligence gatherer or as an extension of American 

diplomacy, more will be required. Not only are the 

unique difficulties of urban terrain likely to increase 

dramatically in a megacity, but also they will require 

significant changes in the organizational structure 

and operating doctrines of the Army. Moreover, they 

necessitate going beyond rules of engagement for the 

use of force, to the development and understanding of 

rules of interaction. Winning respect will be achieved 

as much through friendly encounters with the civilian population as through hostile encounters with 

83

Network of 

Systems, i.e., 

"The Flow"
enemy combatants. Against this background, Figure 

2 outlines the framework for operating in a megacity 

environment. The pre-kinetic mindset includes understanding the battlefield, doctrinal changes, and the 

overall mission scope. The kinetic battlefield is covered later within the tactical considerations. Finally, 

the post-kinetic is essentially the re-establishment of 

effective governance and the prevention of a regression to the kinetic phase of combat. Figure 2 illustrates 

this mindset.

Figure 2. The Pre-Kinetic, Kinetic, 

and Post-Kinetic Battlefield.

Highlighting the Network of Systems.

It is clear from the preceding discussion that cities 

are highly variegated entities that almost invariably 

contain a mixture of functional and dysfunctional elements; formal, informal, and mixed governance mechanisms; and areas of low and high violence. Moreover, 

each city has its own unique fingerprint or genetic 

coding that needs to be identified and understood. 

A military intervention in a city—for whatever rea84

Post-Kinetic

• Governance

• Prevent a return to 

the Kinetic

Kinetic

• Traditional Urban 

Concerns

• Megacity-Centric 

Concerns

• IPB Concerns

• Changing Battlefield 

Pre-Kinetic

• IPB

• Training & Equipment

• Doctrinal Changes

• Mission
85

son—adds an additional layer of turbulence and complexity. At the same time, military operations in such 

areas become, de facto, an additional and novel level 

of governance. At a minimum, therefore, understanding the existing patterns of governance and the networks that provide them is essential to the success of 

contingency operations in megacities and sub-megacities. Just as it is essential to understand networks of 

influence, it is equally important to understand networks of governance and develop procedures to intersect smoothly and effectively with these networks, in 

effect, supplementing rather than superseding them. 

One way to think about this is the notion of a military force in the city operating, if not as an “invisible 

hand,” then at least as a facilitator of city functions 

rather than as an inhibitor or impediment to these 

functions. If the intervention in the city is an effort at 

disaster management then the role will be much more 

active and visible, but will still need to display some 

of the same sensitivities. 

Other governance concerns during both the prekinetic and the kinetic phase include the complex nature of operating in an urban area in which a myriad 

of actors and agents with overlapping responsibilities 

compete for limited resources. As Russell Glenn concisely stated:

A coalition operating in such a region would find itself 

coordinating with hundreds of administrative jurisdictions: political, fire, law enforcement, transportation, and health to touch on a few, this regardless of 

whether the mission at hand involves armed force or 

not. Nor would opposing force’s evacuation of an urban area guarantee relief. Removal of what might well 

have been coercive authorities too typical of the Third 

World removes the lid from a simmering pot; looting, 
86

surging criminality, and latent sectarianism could be 

only three of the . . . rewards for assuming responsibility.141

In other words, the military forces have to be prepared 

for surprises of all kinds and, in response, have to be 

highly adaptive in developing effective mitigation 

strategies. 

Understanding the Battlefield.

Urban Terrain as an Operational Minefield. 

Operating in dense urban terrain is similar to operating in an extensive minefield. A minefield is of 

concern to a battlefield commander because it slows 

operational tempo and funnels forces, thereby increasing vulnerability to an adversary exploiting such 

developments. Yet, a minefield also affects not only local commerce and governance but also the surrounding populace. Operating in or near a minefield is rife 

with hazards, and the solutions to clearing a minefield range from the very destructive—with attendant 

drawbacks, such as making the land unusable for 

commerce or agriculture—to a methodical approach 

using specialized equipment and personnel with an 

understanding of both the dynamics and the impact 

of the action. Similarly, a megacity or sub-megacity is 

an inhospitable environment that not only reduces operational tempo, but also is rife with the possibility of 

unintended consequences and catastrophic mistakes. 

As such, it requires specialized equipment, highly 

trained soldiers and specialists, flexible doctrines, and 

adaptive operations. Just as military formations and 

other institutions must adapt to operating in a minefield, so must the Army and civilian institutions adapt 

for expeditionary urban operations.
87

Throughout the last century, military forces frequently engaged in urban combat, albeit often reluctantly, viewing it as an unwelcome deviation from 

more critical maneuver-orientated missions. Yet, 

armies maneuvering in the field cannot overcome the 

fact that urban areas are often the center of gravity for 

enemy forces, whether standing armies or sophisticated terrorist networks. Of greater concern is the acceleration of urbanization, especially in the developing world, which not only increases the likelihood of 

military operations being conducted in urban terrain, 

but also ensures that the battlefield will be densely 

populated. Civilians will no longer be mere bystanders able to be circumvented or avoided, but an integral 

component of the battlefield. Consequently, whether 

facing sophisticated armies and air forces or smaller, 

highly-mobile, non-traditional enemies, urban terrain 

dictates not only a shift in traditional utilization of 

military resources but also a greater understanding of 

those factors likely to impact military operations. In 

this connection, the urban environment has physical, 

social, and political attributes that impact military operations and, therefore, need to be examined.

Physical.

Urban terrain reduces the advantage for the attackers while providing significant benefits for the 

defenders. As the Russians discovered in Grozny, maneuvering in urban terrain—even with massive firepower superiority and modern equipment—can lead 

to ambushes that inflict considerable losses.142 Cover 

and concealment is readily available to the defender, 

negating the advantages of long-range weaponry by 

precluding the use of many ground-based line-of-sight 
88

systems. In addition, most modern cities, including 

some megacities and sub-megacities, have extensive 

sewer systems or subway systems that can be utilized 

in conjunction with travel within buildings to maneuver out of sight of the attacker or occupying forces.143

Consequently, most battles take place at close 

range, rendering air power and artillery far less relevant. Moreover, some opponents will intentionally 

“hug” friendly units or civilians to prevent or inhibit 

the utilization of heavier firepower.144 Traditional 

reliance on air power is also difficult, as low-flying 

aircraft are highly vulnerable to man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS), which can be easily concealed within a large urban environment. In light of 

this, many of the advantages usually enjoyed by the 

U.S. military, such as high-tech long-range weaponry, 

are likely to be negated in dense urban environments.

The physical geography of urban terrain necessitates centralized planning but decentralized execution.145 Lower-level noncommissioned officers and 

lower enlisted troops play a critical role in relaying the 

senior commander’s intent and objectives, especially 

in military operations on urban terrain (MOUT)—operations in which units are widely scattered and require devolved leadership.146 However, having such 

decentralized command structures inhibits the concentration of forces when needed, and can also lead to 

a loss of discipline. This in turn increases the chance 

of actions that might be counterproductive to the operation. The Mahmudiyah killings in Iraq—in which 

American soldiers from the 502nd regiment of the U.S. 

Army gang-raped and killed a 14-year-old girl and 

murdered her family—are a case in point.147

In the final analysis, the physical layout of urban 

terrain, in conjunction with its benefits to the enemy, 
89

has far-reaching implications for contingency forces. 

Securing lines of communication and maintaining 

supply routes can be particularly difficult in urban 

terrain, requiring careful planning by personnel familiar not only with military considerations but also with 

the subtleties of urban planning and the management 

of systems ranging from transportation to sewerage. 

The combat potential and operational tempo of a maneuver force can be constrained by simple traffic jams, 

markets, and other day-to-day activities of an urban 

area. Enemy interdiction of supply lines is to be expected and, as recent combat experience in Iraq and 

Afghanistan suggests, can be quite effective in determining battlefield initiative and success.

Megacities are often Slum Cities. 

In a megacity, physical factors often become physical barriers. Most megacities have a significant number of large slums. Such areas, sometimes termed 

sheet metal forests, are feral, squalid, underserviced, 

and incredibly difficult both to traverse and to penetrate for information. As depicted by Davis in Planet 

of Slums, life within these slums is often nasty, brutish, 

and short. Potable water is nearly nonexistent, communicable diseases are often rampant, and raw sewage as well as garbage is not only strewn about but 

accumulates at a dramatic rate.148 Indeed, slums such 

as Kibera in Kenya, only three miles from the center 

of Nairobi, or Madanpur Khadar, on the outskirts of 

Delhi, have effectively been abandoned by governments. The result is a surplus of unemployed males 

with little to do but join gangs or engage in crime as a 

source of income. Joining extremist or terrorist organizations might also appear attractive as a way out. 
90

At the very least, in the event of some kind of conflict, 

these young men would provide a pool of potential 

recruits for those opposing the United States. In short, 

slums would be an inordinately difficult battlefield.149

They would add an additional constraint, challenging 

many of the traditional techniques of urban combat. 

The use of heavy firepower and of tactical air support—already difficult in cities—would be reduced 

even further due to population density and the flimsy 

nature of slum dwellings. Ironically, given that slums 

provide few of the defenses of more robust and traditional urban buildings, they could give an adversary 

an even greater defensive edge.

Yet, they are also Digital Cities. 

The traditional focus on urban combat has been 

primarily on the terrain, with some focus on the population. However, most modern urban areas, even 

those in the least developed countries, are “information rich” in terms of open-source data about the 

movement of goods, people, and the infrastructure. 

In a megacity, such information is drastically greater, 

due to the size and density of the population and the 

extent of the urban area. The sheer size and volume of 

this data-rich environment could become overwhelming, leading to data overload or potential “stove piping” of information as the only way to manage it.150

Furthermore, the implications of social media and 

the rapid spread of information (and disinformation) 

in a highly digital city can be profound. For example, 

in June 2009, a woman was shot while attempting to 

peacefully demonstrate against the outcome of the Iranian presidential elections in Tehran.151 A video surfaced of the incident in which she was allegedly shot 
91

by a member of the pro-regime Basij militia.152 Within 

hours, this video became viral, inflaming tensions and 

spurring 10 days of violent protests.153 Similarly, here 

in the United States, the release of videos showing 

killings by police has led to significant protests and 

political movements. When the battle of Mogadishu 

occurred, the American public was aghast as American casualties were publicly paraded; yet, the video 

quality was poor and the dissemination of the footage was rather limited. With the rapid proliferation of 

mobile technology, dwellers of even the most underdeveloped megacity would be broadcasting a similar 

scenario in high definition and this would be globally 

disseminated within hours, if not minutes. Consequently, any mission within a megacity environment 

must consider the potential benefits and pitfalls of a 

digital environment that gives military activities an 

unprecedented degree of transparency.

The Human Terrain. 

In thinking about military contingencies in megacities and sub-megacities, the most obvious issue is the 

terrain; yet, it is equally important to understand the 

people—not least because they are densely packed into 

a massive but still finite space.154 Operating in a hostile city is enormously difficult, as the opportunities 

for ambushes, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), 

sabotage, the exploitation of “flash mobs,” riots and 

demonstrations, and media events are infinite. If the 

support of the population is a key element in insurgency and counterinsurgency, it is even more critical 

in urban operations. To some extent this will depend 

on the extent to which economic and social life are 

respected and facilitated or disrupted and hindered. 
92

In this connection, one aim of the contingency force 

(and this will obviously depend on the circumstances 

that have led to the insertion of military forces into the 

city) must be to minimize disruption on the functioning of the social and economic life of the city. Thinking 

systematically beforehand about how this can best be 

done is essential.

The “Mega Minefield.” 

Not only do megacities compound the familiar 

problems with conducting MOUT, but they also have 

a higher potential for instability than smaller cities. 

Therefore, problems such as civil unrest, basic infrastructure corrosion, and disease transmission will 

plague the governance of such cities and play significant roles in the military operations conducted within 

them. Furthermore, the extensive civilian population 

can significantly bolster adversary manpower reserves, and be quickly mobilized by nonstate actors to 

challenge governance of the city.155

The usual decentralization of MOUT operations 

would increase dramatically in a megacity. Large geographical distances and a teeming population would 

require a higher degree of decentralization in the case 

of stability operations. Moreover, difficulties in traditional MOUT would be compounded by the sheer 

distance and increased demands on a force attempting 

military operations within a megacity or large submegacity. Maintaining secure lines of communication 

and supply would be enormously difficult: not only 

would underdeveloped infrastructure slow resupply 

or casualty evacuation, but also the immense congestion experienced in these cities could bring such efforts 

to a crawl. Enemy interdiction of supply lines would 
93

not only create the need for specialized equipment 

and dedicated combat power, but might also cause 

significant panic and spontaneous efforts at evacuation by the citizens.

Governance as a Nightmare as Well as Potential 

Savior. 

The sheer scale and density of megacities and submegacities ensure that such urban environments are 

highly dependent on both effective governance and 

access to resources not found within the confines of 

the city. This has led some to compare the megacity 

to the un-consumable elephant, in which addressing 

the needs of the population and providing effective 

governance are beyond the means of any coalition 

or intervention force, at least for any protracted intervention.156 The past decade has been replete with 

examples of the U.S. Army and its partners failing to 

provide the necessary resources for effective governance. These have ranged from New Orleans during 

Katrina, to Kandahar, Falluja, and Baghdad in Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM. 

Consequently, additional urban and megacity-specific doctrine plans should be articulated, in which 

greater thought is given to the logistical and governance nightmares presented by large dense urban 

environments.

However, even in the least developed of megacities, 

there is a glimmer of hope for a savior. The population 

and host government themselves can often mitigate if 

not prevent greater calamities. A perfect example is 

during the Ebola crisis, when an Ebola-infected Liberian man named Patrick Sawyer collapsed upon 

arrival in Lagos, Nigeria.157 Lagos, one of the world’s 
94

largest megacities and often characterized as underdeveloped, fragile, and borderline feral was able to not 

only get in touch with all 891 individuals potentially 

exposed, but also, with aid from the Bill and Melinda 

Gates Foundation, was able react quickly.158 This was 

accomplished despite the fact that the doctors of the 

city were on strike. It was only possible because of the 

unique nature of a megacity. As the primary economic, political, and cultural driver of a region, a megacity 

is also the epicenter of many resources. Even in Nigeria, a doctor (not on strike) was able to recognize the 

patient’s symptoms, impose a quarantine, and apply 

proper medical precautions.159 The response reduced 

the infected to only 20 individuals, with only eight 

deaths in a city of 30.6 million.160

Thus, while megacities are often portrayed as significant hurdles to any military contingency operations, they also have invaluable assets that could assist in making what appears to be an overwhelming 

problem seem far more manageable.161

Increased Cooperation (Inter-Service and 

Inter-Agency).

More focus should also be given to operating in 

megacities and sub-megacities in a “whole of government” manner. At the very least, this requires greater 

cooperation with other military services and agencies. 

Considering that many megacities and sub-megacities 

are littoral, greater cooperation between the Army, 

Navy, and Marine Corps will become increasingly 

important. Understanding the capabilities, needs, and 

doctrine of naval operations will be crucial, therefore, 

in any future operations in megacities. The inter-agency process, however, will need to go well beyond this 
95

and include a multitude of civilian agencies, which can 

bring to bear complementary expertise and a broader 

set of competences than the military acting alone. 

Intelligence. 

Megacities and sub-megacities should become 

a distinct focus of analysis for intelligence agencies. 

Understanding and anticipating developments and 

events in megacities and sub-megacities will need 

to become a central responsibility of the U.S. intelligence community, supplementing and at times even 

surpassing both the traditional focus on states and 

the more recent focus on transnational actors. At the 

same time, a comprehensive picture will require multiple streams of information going beyond formal 

intelligence sources. While information on network 

and power structures could be obtained and updated 

by the intelligence community, with infrastructure 

mapping and breakdowns provided by satellite data, 

much social, economic, and political insight, understanding, and even situational awareness could be obtained from non-governmental organizations. All of 

this would lead to an enhanced appreciation of urban 

dynamics, including patterns of flows and networks 

of relationships.162 Operating effectively in megacities and sub-megacities requires an understanding of 

these flows and networks and an ability to determine 

when to exploit rather than disrupt their dynamics. 

As discussed in the previous section, such a repository of knowledge and understanding will be essential for intelligence preparation of the battlefield 

in megacity and sub-megacity military contingencies. 

Moreover, this is not something that can be improvised for particular contingencies without a depth of 
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background knowledge and constant monitoring. At 

the same time, once the United States is involved in a 

megacity or sub-megacity contingency, then it should 

make extensive use of drones, sensors (including those 

inadvertently provided by citizens and adversaries), 

human intelligence, and big data to provide a more 

comprehensive understanding of the battle space. Given the ubiquity of cell phones even throughout much 

of the developing world, as well as the growing potential for exploiting drones and sensors, most megacities 

are likely to be target rich environments for technical 

intelligence. Indeed, intelligence could be collected at 

such a high volume that big-data processing would be 

both appropriate and necessary to determine hidden 

patterns and anomalies. Big data, however, would 

still need to be supplemented by human intelligence. 

Drones, no matter how technically complex and full 

of sensors, will have great difficulty gathering intelligence within a vast urban area in which adversaries 

will most certainly meet indoors. Human intelligence 

assets will be able to offer far greater insight on adversaries because of their ability to capture emotions and 

relationships—things that will long remain outside 

the purview of even the most sophisticated drones.

Private and Public Partnerships. 

Numerous private organizations already conduct 

business within megacities. Many of these private 

firms conduct threat assessments and intelligence 

gathering. Furthermore, the necessities of conducting 

business force these organizations to evaluate topics 

relevant to military operations, such as crime, infrastructure, and local governance, as well as the potential for political and social unrest. In a similar fashion, 
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utilizing the large American academic community, 

and to some extent the global one, could assist in obtaining data concerning key megacities. Many academics already focus on issues such as urban planning and management, human security, and economic 

development—all of which are relevant to megacities 

and sub-megacities. Tapping into this vast pool of research could not only reduce costs by requiring fewer 

government employees, but would also increase efficiency by preventing public entities from spending 

limited resources to explore topics already thoroughly 

researched by academics.

Consequently, in light of the increasing constrained funding environment for the Armed Forces, 

more fully developed partnerships between private 

organizations and the Army can usefully be fostered. 

Such partnerships, however, should be clearly defined 

and structured so as to ensure that national interests 

as well as the Army’s mission prevail over private 

interests. These partnerships will also need to include—at least tacitly and under careful guidelines—

what might be described as non-traditional partners, 

such as the criminal organizations that have enormous knowledge of cities and how they function and 

would be better to have working with U.S. forces than 

against them. 

Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF) and Partnerships. 

RAF should become a cornerstone of both the 

Armed Forces and the foreign policy community. In 

an era of limited resources tasked with a multitude of 

missions and threats, prudence would dictate an emphasis on enhanced cooperation with regional partners. In this regard, the current focus on RAF could be 
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quite beneficial. Additionally, efforts should be made 

to highlight such cooperation among the media, academics, and other policymakers. Doing so would both 

create a greater understanding of cooperation among 

the U.S. Army and allied forces, as well as foster creative and novel ideas from a broad spectrum of contributors. Increased integration and cooperation with 

regional partners and collective security organizations 

should also be prioritized. Whether through existing 

arrangements or organizations, or through the advent 

of a new organization, the U.S. military should push 

for greater integration with regional partners whose 

interests are convergent with those of the United 

States.163

The “Equipment.”

Enhancing the combat power and intelligence 

capabilities of smaller squad elements should be a 

key focus for conducting operations within megacities and sub-megacities. Not only would this reduce 

dependence on fire support or air power, but also it 

would aid the centralized command in creating a coherent picture of the battlefield. In a similar fashion, 

increased and self-contained combat power and reduced logistical needs should be pursued. If smaller 

elements are able to operate independently with greater potency and little reliance on a logistical system, 

then operating within megacities becomes a lot more 

feasible. In the same way, larger maneuver elements 

should develop capacities to deal with the myriad 

of problems associated with operating in a megacity 

and sub-megacity environment. Consequently, either 

new equipment must be procured or current equipment should be modified for use in megacities. This 
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equipment is divided into five sections: Command, 

Control, Communication, and Computers (C4); Force 

Protection and Projection; Intelligence, Surveillance 

and Reconnaissance (ISR); Logistics; and Maneuver 

equipment.164

Command, Control, Communication, and Computers (C4).

Overcoming the difficulties in operating in a megacity or sub-megacity will require significant command 

and control communicated in real time through highly 

integrated computerized networks. Therefore, highly 

reliable and secure access to communications and the 

global network will be a large factor in determining 

success. Equipment should be designed to ensure 

intra-unit and inter-echelon communication under 

all conditions, with the focus on real-time access to 

needed information such as tactical intelligence and 

position location. Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan 

demonstrated that reliable C4 is a combat multiplier, 

but that much equipment is outdated or requires significant maintenance. Accordingly, any future procured equipment or modifications of current equipment should focus on decreasing the weight, ensuring 

reliability, and reducing the logistical requirements, 

whether through longer battery life or lower dependence on other power supplies. Miniaturization of 

sensors and drones, and, indeed, combinations of 

these, could be particularly important here. Additionally, such command and control equipment should be 

protected against disruption by increasingly technologically capable foes.
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Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR).

Successful operations within megacities and submegacities will require real-time tactical information 

and intelligence. Soldiers and battle commanders will 

not only require information, but also equipment to 

detect and track events and entities of interest. In conjunction with equipment that allows for actionable 

intelligence, soldiers and battle commanders will not 

only have a greater understanding of the battlefield, 

but will be able to impact events decisively on the 

ground. Increased focus on biometric technology to 

identify personnel and combine that information with 

actionable intelligence could pay great dividends. 

Similarly, investments in language translation equipment will most certainly pay large dividends, allowing for not only enhanced ISR but also greater C4. Finally, equipment creating an enhanced battle picture 

through multi-variable mapping of the political and 

socio-economic planes and levels of infrastructure 

will greatly enhance the capabilities and sustainability 

of smaller elements and provide for the best allocation 

of limited assets.

Reaching Forward and Backward.

As emphasized above, operations within megacities will require accurate, timely, and actionable intelligence. The military has previously attempted programs such as the land warrior system and instilling 

a sense of each individual soldier as an intelligence 

asset (so called “eyes and ears”). The benefits of such 

systems create both a “reach forward” and a “reach 

backward” capability. This reaching is only possible 

with greater integration and synergy between both 
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different command elements and numerous megacity-centric actors. Reaching forward means that individual soldiers and their accompanying equipment 

(drones, GoPro cameras, land warrior-like systems) 

allow battlefield commanders, urban planners, and 

intelligence analysts a first-hand look onto the battlefield. For example, a soldier might not realize the significance of graffiti located on a wall, but an analyst 

seeing such footage in real time will be able not only 

to notify the soldier of its significance but also to compile a more accurate assessment of the situation on the 

ground. Similarly, an example of reaching backward 

would be a soldier requesting the services of a structural engineer to assess the structural weakness of a 

building in the kinetic phase of combat, or to help find 

a structural entry during a natural disaster scenario. A 

shortage of interpreters, to at least some degree, could 

also be overcome via reach-back sessions employing 

Skype or Facetime connections with remote language 

speakers.165 While some of these technologies are 

readily available, at this time they are costly and cumbersome. Further research on the utility of such technology is likely to have substantial benefits.

Force Protection and Projection.

Equipment that provides protection from a range 

of enemy attacks, whether in an asymmetric or a conventional urban battlefield, is critical. Defeating the 

hazards of explosives should be a major focus, with 

increased attention on the detection of buried objects 

at standoff, out of direct line-of-sight, and over-thehorizon distances. Continued improvements in counter-rocket, artillery, and mortar (C-RAM), as well as 

personal protective equipment with an emphasis on 
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lightweight designs are vital. Counter sniper technology should also be pursued, as sniping might be 

a preferred tactic amongst adversaries across a broad 

spectrum of operations.

Technology enhancing the reliability of munitions 

as well as the capabilities for close fire support such as 

mortars should be pursued. Direct line-of-fire weaponry as well as Counter Defilade Target Engagement 

(CDTE) systems such as the XM25166 should continue 

to be procured. The advantages of such weapons systems in denying adversaries the use of cover while 

minimizing collateral damage will be key in large 

complex environments such as megacities or submegacities. 

Additionally, as the battle of Sadr City in 2008 

demonstrated, heavy armored units have utility in urban operations.167 Surprisingly, such heavily armored 

units cause less collateral damage than other means of 

fire support.168 Additionally, such vehicles are survivable and lethal, and greatly enhance the combat power 

of units.169 Therefore, innovation in armored vehicles 

should continue not only for maneuver warfare, but 

also with urban warfare in mind. Recent modifications to existing vehicles and newer armored vehicles 

such the Russian tank support combat vehicle Object 

199 “Ramka”170 and the IDF armored personnel carrier 

“Achzarit,”171 were designed from first-hand combat 

experience in urban terrain. The U.S. Army should 

also modify existing vehicles or design an armored 

vehicle for the express purpose of operating in megacities and sub-megacities. 
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Logistics.

Operational sustainment in a megacity or submegacity will be intensive, requiring significant investment in technology and equipment that will enable the Army to outpace rapidly changing operational 

scenarios.172 Munitions that increase combat capabilities but reduce the logistical weight of the maneuver 

elements should be a major technological investment 

area.173 Considering the limited infrastructure in many 

megacities, bridging solutions (such as modular lightweight bridges) and the trade-offs between tracked 

and wheeled must be taken into consideration. Finally, 

greater priority should be given to water purification, 

fuel supply, and maintenance. This is critical, because 

any mission within a megacity or sub-megacity will 

have significant logistical requirements, whether due 

to scale, terrain, or enemy action.

Maneuver.

Equipment and technological innovation should 

also focus on increasing survivability and enhancing 

maneuverability of key systems and units in a megacity environment. Emphasis should be placed on increasing the capabilities and reliability of autonomous 

systems, thus reducing the exposure of personnel to 

enemy action. Additionally, considering both lack of 

infrastructure and high levels of congestion, fuel-efficiency-enabling technologies for Army tactical and 

off-road vehicles should be explored. 

Furthermore, the density of many megacity environments means that vertical insertion may be the 

most efficient means of entry and egress.174 As Dawn 

Morrison and Collin Wood argue, the vertical nature 
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of many cities offers man-made high ground.175 Benefits of such high ground include much needed standoff distance, overwatch, greater potential access to 

clear communication channels, and the potential for 

rapid insertion and egress, all with minimal impact 

on the population.176 Therefore, investing or examining technology to maximize the benefits of such manmade high ground will prove quite beneficial and 

might even restore some semblance of maneuver in 

usually very constricted environments.

The “Personnel.”

Megacity and urban operations require intelligent 

and talented personnel capable not only of comprehending and complying with senior leaders’ objectives, but also of gathering intelligence and understanding the dynamic relationships at play within an 

urban environment. Recruiting and retaining such 

quality infantrymen might be more expensive and 

increasingly difficult in light of the general lack of interest in military service by many talented individuals—especially given the attractions of more lucrative, 

yet safer, professions. Lawmakers and policymakers 

should understand that conducting effective military 

operations in urban areas requires high-quality personnel, and as such will require increased incentives 

for recruitment. With many private firms offering college tuition in addition to higher wages than the military, a new incentive structure must be created and 

maintained if the military is to train and sustain the 

high-quality personnel needed on 21st-century urban 

battlefields. 

Attaining such a high-quality level of personnel 

will not only require more intensive use of traditional 

recruiting methods, but will also demand a revision in 
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recruitment, training, and retention practices. However, as the “Pentathlete” concept and the Special Forces 

Assessment and Selection system have demonstrated, 

recruiting and retaining higher-quality soldiers is feasible. Furthermore, by utilizing the accrued knowledge of numerous law enforcement agencies (domestically and internationally), the U.S. Army can greatly 

enhance its success in the non-kinetic battlefield environment. Although there might be criticism of such a 

proposal, especially in the face of increased costs and 

training duration, the benefits will be significant. 

Selection and Training of Soldiers.

Former Chief of Staff of the Army General Peter 

Schoomaker frequently championed the concept of the 

“pentathlete leader,” in which an officer is equipped 

with problem-solving capabilities and confidence to 

respond to any situation on the battlefield.177 Similarly, former Secretary of the Army Dr. Francis J. Harvey 

identified the pentathlete as “a multi-skilled leader 

that personifies the warrior ethos in all aspects, from 

warfighting to statesmanship to enterprise management.”178 Consequently, the concept of a pentathlete leader has been incorporated into formal Army 

leadership instruction at numerous levels.179 Such a 

concept should not only continue to be fostered, but 

megacity-centric skills should be explicitly taught 

at both the officer and enlisted levels (at least of the 

non-commissioned officers), so as to meet the exceptional challenges faced within the megacity and submegacity environments.

At first, such a task might seem incredibly difficult; 

yet a foundation already exists in current programs. 

The first is within the Special Forces Qualification 

Course (SFQC). In order to be given the opportunity to 
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try the course, candidates must have already achieved 

high scores on both the general technical and combat 

operations sections of the Armed Services Vocational 

Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) test.180 Consequently, even 

before training, soldiers with a higher potential (insofar as the testing can indicate) are selected. Furthermore, in conjunction with comprehensive training and 

language instruction, Army Special Forces are able to 

develop formidable soldiers with multiple skills.

Given the complex nature of future conflicts, especially those within megacities, similar requirements 

should be imposed on most other soldiers. All military occupation specialties (MOS) would potentially 

gain from this initial pentathlete training and the more 

stringent requirements it imposes. If the Army were to 

choose to limit the program due to fiscal or other restraints, however, the emphasis should be on combat 

MOS. They would benefit most and would be better 

prepared, not only for current stabilization operations, but also for the even-more-demanding conditions likely to prevail in future megacity operations.181

Despite technological innovations, urban combat 

is ultimately the domain of the infantry.182 Therefore, it requires highly trained and capable infantrymen, who are able to operate in an environment that 

is not only multi-dimensional, but one in which the 

opponent might have numerous advantages in cover, 

concealment, and intelligence. In at least some megacities, the adversary will have far larger manpower 

reserves than Army forces.183 Yet, recruiting and 

maintaining a large infantry force is expensive, especially given legacy costs such as health and medical 

benefits. However, as the special forces community 

has demonstrated, smaller, better trained units with 

greater access to resources are just as effective as—if 
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not more effective than—larger forces with regard to 

post-kinetic missions, such as winning the hearts and 

minds of populations.

Law Enforcement Influences.

For many, the mention of megacity combat and 

law enforcement conjures up the dystopian image of 

the fictional character Judge Dredd.184 While lacking 

the fictional power of such a figure, many law enforcement officials already tackle difficult problems facing 

megacities, such as the aftermath of an earthquake in 

Tokyo, or the search and seizure of a terrorist cell in 

London or more recently in Paris. Many of the military contingencies outlined in this monograph have 

been similar to contingencies confronting law enforcement agencies. However, while there might be some 

convergence within some of the roles and operations 

conducted by both, the two professions are significantly different, especially with regard to the battlefield. Yet, soldiers might find themselves in situations 

in which law enforcement personnel have had a great 

deal more experience and training. Joint training, with 

its opportunities for insight into the types of coercion 

and compliance that work at the community level, 

as well as other techniques used by law enforcement 

agencies, could be enormously beneficial.185

Furthermore, numerous studies have shown that 

law enforcement officers with a greater education 

(such as college degrees) are better at handling a large 

array of different situations than their counterparts 

without such qualifications.186 The implication is that 

as the modern battlefield becomes more complex, especially in a potential megacity, there are significant 

benefits to imposing higher educational standards on 
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those specialized soldiers who will play increasingly 

complex roles. 

Megacity-Centric Training and Inclusion.

In addition to infantry, other personnel, such as 

low-density but high-demand specialized units like 

civil affairs, military police, and transportation units 

should be involved in the conduct of MOUT operations. Such personnel should have backgrounds in 

engineering, infrastructure reconstruction, medicine, 

urban planning and design, law enforcement, and 

working with big data. These personnel will be able 

to tackle the less understood aspects of MOUT operations, providing basic needs and reconstruction efforts for the civilian population. A successful MOUT 

operation most certainly requires security, but having 

significant development and human security related 

operations, in conjunction with military security, increases the likelihood of a successful outcome. As the 

battle for Sadr City in 2008 demonstrated, the expertise of such personnel can have a major impact on 

the battlefield by easing the hold on the population 

of adversaries or by creating conditions for enhanced 

governance and subsequent civilian support.187

Additionally, megacity-centric training areas will 

be critical. As Kevin Felix and Frederick Wong noted, 

the U.S. Army simply does not possess the live-training areas that replicate the scale required to train for a 

megacity.188 They argue that while the Joint Readiness 

Center’s Shughart-Gordon complex is quite useful for 

squad level training, it lacks the multi-dimensional 

requirements for training in a megacity.189 Given the 

tough budgetary constraints it faces, the Army should 

consider funding appropriate facilities through vari-
109

ous other means, whether those are from public or 

private ventures, or from collaboration with other interested parties.190 Such a training area would enhance 

the capabilities of not only the Army but also other 

federal, state, and local agencies that would provide 

potential partners. Finally, other actors, primarily 

those concerned with governance and stabilization 

efforts, could also use such training facilities. Such actors could include law enforcement, urban planners, 

aid-delivery agencies, or even potential foreign partners or host nations. Conducting training in such an 

environment would greatly enhance the cooperation 

and potential lessons to be learned before conducting 

a mission within a megacity.

As Evans argued, “[the military planners conducting such training must in effect] assume much of the 

mindset of an urban planning executive.”191 Consequently, the training conducted on such a site should 

reflect the difficulties faced by many megacities and 

sub-megacities. Army forces conducting stabilization 

efforts have actually faced such difficulties numerous 

times. These difficulties include but are not limited to: 

providing electricity, sanitation, infrastructure maintenance, and other facets of everyday city governance. 

As Evans observed, “if city operations are to be a 

common future environment for American and allied 

forces, then an urban strategic lens must be developed 

. . .”192 The discussion in this monograph is intended 

to contribute toward the development of such a lens. 

OPERATING ON THE MEGACITY BATTLEFIELD

U.S. Armed Forces and their coalition partners, 

engaged in urban combat in a dense urban area, face 

far greater challenges today than in previous interven-
110

tions in already complicated and dense urban environments. As emphasized throughout this analysis, 

the megacity environment is highly complex and networked, and will require the Armed Forces to adapt 

and operate in ways that have a high degree of accord 

with the urban environment. Congruence rather than 

dissonance is essential. 

The urban battlefield—like all terrain in which 

military operations occur—is not static, uniform, or 

monolithic. Moreover, as noted above, the occupants 

of a dense urban area are a major part of the terrain. 

Yet, this population and any opposition combatants 

will almost certainly attempt to leverage the complex 

characteristics of urban areas. This section first summarizes the characteristics of urban combat, drawing 

on past experiences and lessons learned from historical 

cases. Then we elaborate on what is termed the “contradiction of security.” This is followed by a discussion 

of potential enemy actions, as well as of the unforeseen consequences and surprising developments that 

are an inevitable concomitant of military operations in 

a dense and massive urban environment. This section 

concludes with some future considerations.

Urban warfare has been a facet of war since humanity started to congregate into larger settlements. 

Consequently, throughout most of human history, 

urban combat has actually been more the rule rather 

than the exception.193 From the ancient siege of Tyre 

(332 BC) by Alexander the Great, to the battle of Hue 

(1968) during the Vietnam War, urban conflict has 

not only provided significant challenges, but has at 

times also been a key to successful outcomes of many 

military operations. Consequently, the dense urban 

battlefield already has basic characteristics that define and constrain the combatants. These include ter-
111

rain, which highly favors the defense by restricting 

movement and creating funneled approaches for any 

would-be attacker. This terrain, as previously noted, 

is 360 degrees in scope, with subterranean, street level, and elevated buildings. Furthermore, the persistent 

threat of ambushes, in conjunction with the high potential for casualties and the high expenditure of ammunition, creates significant command and logistical 

difficulties. A brief look at past and potential urban 

operations will help bring understanding to the inherent difficulties of operating in such a complex battle 

environment.

Traditional State-on-State War.

The battles of Stalingrad (1942) and Berlin (1945) 

provide vivid examples of state-on-state warfare for 

major dense urban areas, both of which lead to extremely high casualties for all combatants. In the case 

of Stalingrad, the defensive phase lasted 126 days and 

resulted in 644,000 total Russian casualties and over 

600,000 Russian refugees.194 Both of these battles ultimately resulted in the utter destruction of the dense 

urban areas. A more modern scenario, which although 

unlikely is by no means inconceivable, could involve a 

battle in Seoul, in the Republic of Korea. In some ways, 

such a scenario exemplifies the potential for a contemporary Battle of Stalingrad. The greater Seoul metropolitan area contains over 23 million people, provides an incredibly dense metropolitan environment 

that has many elements of a smart city, and is critical 

to the economy of South Korea. This megacity, which 

faces an aggressive and unpredictable North Korea, 

is only 30 miles from the demilitarized zone and, in 

the event of hostilities on the peninsula, would likely 
112

be an immediate target of North Korean conventional 

forces. The United States, bound by the Treaty to the 

Republic of Korea, would be obligated to come to its 

assistance. One of the advantages the United States 

would have in such a contingency would be access to 

detailed local knowledge of the city, its transportation 

routes and networks, its flows, and its rhythms. In this 

kind of traditional military conflict, such advantages 

might be less important than in other contingencies 

involving megacities. Whether they would be enough 

to offset North Korea’s advantages in conventional 

forces, therefore, remains uncertain. The more U.S. 

military forces are educated, trained, and equipped 

for a dense urban conflict, the more likely the numerical advantage of North Korea would not prove nearly 

as decisive as Pyongyang might anticipate. 

State vs. Nontraditional Actors.

In Mogadishu (1993) and Grozny (1995), the U.S. 

Army and Russian Federation Army respectively underestimated non-traditional actors.195 In the case of 

Mogadishu, what was intended as a quick high-value 

target-capture mission instead resulted in a 17-hour 

firefight, in which a large city militia attacked American forces.196 In the case of Grozny, the Russian forces 

utilized deep urban penetration tactics in the hope of 

seizing key infrastructure targets, but they were cutoff and destroyed. Both instances show how things 

can go awry and how those entities with deeply embedded knowledge of the city and an ability to mobilize their members can offset forces that possess conventional superiority.
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The Contradictions of Security.

Any military force embroiled within a dense urban area must take into account the complexity of 

networks, flows, and rhythms. The population typically works within the familiar framework these 

create, establishing everyday norms and routines. If 

the framework is seriously disrupted, over the longterm it can adapt, creating new, if perhaps more constrained, rhythms. In the short term, however, serious 

disruptions of networks, flows, and rhythms—especially if man-made rather than the result of a natural 

disaster—will create considerable antipathy in the 

population toward those deemed responsible. 

This creates an inevitable tension—what is described here as the contradictions of security— in that 

efforts to enhance security through measures such as 

erecting barriers or restricting movement would actually disrupt the flows, networks, and rhythms within 

the city. In effect, the defensive measures could create forms of arrhythmia so disruptive that significant 

segments of the population would be deeply alienated 

and even hostile. Far from making the urban landscape safer, such efforts could actually increase the 

hostility toward the intervention forces, whatever the 

initial mission. Glenn noted how this might occur:

The commander drawing militarily-typical unit 

boundaries along physical features such as roads, rivers, and the like will find those boundaries become 

self-inflicted wounds should they not be realigned 

once combat operations recede. Savvy leaders can instead minimize liaison, communications equipment, 

and other demands by realigning boundaries with 

existing administrative jurisdictions. It is a lesson unfortunately repeatedly learned and forgotten, two of 
114

the most recent instances being during the Los Angeles 1992 riots and in 2003 Baghdad. Recognizing the 

importance of identifying administrative delineations, 

then providing them to operational planners could 

preclude yet another recurrence.197

The implication of Glenn’s analysis is that even 

if military necessity requires actions that create dissonance and disruption in the city in the short term, 

these impediments to the normal flows and rhythm—

whether control points or administrative hassles—

should be eliminated as soon as possible. 

In addition to inadvertent arrhythmia, however, 

it is also possible to conceive of the creation of arrhythmia as a deliberate strategy. Enemy forces might 

well decide that causing arrhythmia in the city could 

actually provide numerous tactical and strategic benefits—especially if the disruption could be specifically targeted against intervening forces—and even 

more if it can be somehow blamed on these forces or 

even their very presence. It is not hard to conceive, 

for example, of an armed group developing a blocking 

strategy that uses a coordinated approach of blocking 

roads through abandoning large numbers of vehicles 

in the streets that prevents access to and exits from 

the U.S. military headquarters in the city. A well-coordinated initiative of this type would create enormous 

difficulties for U.S. forces, especially if some of the 

vehicles contained booby traps or IEDs. Even if only 

a few of the vehicles contained IEDs, as long as they 

were located among the first to be cleared, this would 

ensure the whole clearance operation becomes much 

more painstaking—and far more protracted. If such 

a scenario seems far-fetched, it is worth noting that 

in 2011, the Zetas Organization, a Mexican criminal 

organization, attacked an Army base in Monterrey, 
115

and they also blocked roads to ensure that reinforcements could not quickly come to assist the soldiers in 

the base. There is a risk, however, for armed groups in 

such a strategy, as they could be held responsible for 

disrupting the city—thereby losing considerable support. Nevertheless, this might be a risk worth taking. 

Much the same is true for U.S. Armed Forces. The 

worst case for the U.S. military, of course, is the imposition of strict security measures that fail to increase 

security while also proving highly disruptive. Other 

attempts at enhancing security might succeed in this 

objective but simultaneously inhibit flows of commerce and people, thereby creating offsetting negative consequences. Such an outcome, however, is not 

preordained. When implemented in conjunction with 

other measures, enhanced security efforts can work, 

in spite of creating short-term dislocation. An example of this was the campaign in Sadr City in 2008. U.S. 

and Iraqi forces conducted an operation in which they 

reduced enemy activity within the Sadr City segment 

of Baghdad. The operation was a success because, 

while significant forces were directed toward building physical barriers to restrict enemy movement, additional resources were directed toward some very 

effective supporting operations.198 These included 

a buyback program that increased the market value 

of arms and ammunition beyond the capacity of the 

enemy to compete, as well as measures designed to 

meet the essential needs of the population behind the 

walled areas.199 Some critics have argued that providing for basic needs in fact might actually spur some 

people to become combatants. If young men, for example, are focused on getting their next meal or finding shelter, they will be too preoccupied to take up 

arms. However, if their needs are being met, then they 
116

are potentially able to play a more significant role in 

the conflict. There might be something to this, but it 

ignores the fact that the provision of services and even 

more, employment opportunities, tends to create a 

degree of political support. Although not related to a 

megacity, the Anbar Awakening was an excellent example of how the United States was able to outbid the 

insurgents and, in that case, create its own militia. 

A recognition of the dangers of a narrow approach 

to security is also critical in relation to competing narratives. While the Vietnam War and the battle of Mogadishu (1993) clearly displayed the power of the traditional media, the rise of social media has added a new 

and much more immediate dimension. In the digital 

age, facts will often be distorted, as events are broadcast minutes after occurring, often without a context or 

full picture. Such reports tend to become part of what 

John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt termed “the battle 

of the story.”200 Presenting compelling narratives can 

enhance legitimacy and authority in the eyes of many 

stakeholders (such as the urban population). Understanding the utility and power of digital media, therefore, allows for enormous reach and breadth that can 

indirectly alter the battlefield. The user-friendliness of 

mass media and mobile technology allows adversaries to manipulate and garner favorable public opinion 

and recruit support. For these reasons and more, civilian and military leaders cannot afford to ignore the 

requirement for compelling narratives. 

A military commander should understand, therefore, that his or her decisions and the actions of subordinates could have far larger political impact than 

in the past because of digital media. This “information wake” will often be incomplete or inaccurate, but 

that will not prevent it from having serious conse-
117

quences. It is critical, therefore, that commanders not 

only enforce strict rules of engagement, interaction, 

and conduct, but also educate the lower echelons 

on the impact of the digital battlefield. Furthermore, 

higher echelons should comprehend that failing to 

understand and engage in this battle of the narrative 

might erode public support among not only those in 

the dense urban area in which military operations are 

being conducted, but also domestic publics and other 

stakeholders globally.

In the final analysis, the battle of narratives and the 

contradictions of security are likely to be at the forefront, especially as the most likely contingencies will 

be humanitarian or stabilization operations. Moreover, such operations could even take place within the 

continental United States, as demonstrated by the Los 

Angeles riots and the responses to Hurricane Katrina 

and Superstorm Sandy. Presenting a positive image of 

the military to the American public is indispensable 

for continued support.

Likely Enemy Actions and Potential Tactical Solutions.

In any military contingency, adversaries react 

and adapt to the tactical situation on the battlefield. 

Within a dense urban area such as megacity or submegacity, such reactions can be highly diverse—and 

have varying degrees of success. Adversaries might 

seek to minimize or reduce the benefits of U.S. technological or firepower supremacy by changing where 

they operate. Alternatively, they might seek to leverage technology to their own benefit. In many developing world megacities (such as Mumbai or Cairo), the 

high level of penetration of feature phones facilitates 

the creation of flash mobs. The Arab Spring, especially 
118

in Egypt, highlighted the use of this tactic. During a 

military contingency in a megacity or sub-megacity, 

flash mobs could be used to hinder the maneuver of 

forces, to provide distractions, and to offer cover and 

concealment for an opposition group.

Choosing the place and time of battle is often critical 

for military success. The dense urban battlefield is no 

different. Enemy forces might exploit underserviced 

and underdeveloped feral areas, go underground, or 

use their knowledge of terrain to maneuver and engage on their own terms. Traditionally, adversaries 

have utilized the benefits of dense urban areas. These 

man-made “concrete canyons” restrict movement and 

funnel attackers, thereby providing significant advantages to defensive forces. The battle of Grozny (1995) 

clearly highlighted these benefits, as experienced by 

the Russians when they suffered significant casualties 

in their attempts at occupying the city. A traditional 

solution has been simply to increase offensive firepower and essentially raze the city to the ground, thus 

attempting to deny the enemy the advantages of cover 

and concealment. Even in World War II, however, this 

approach was flawed. The battles of Stalingrad (1942) 

and Berlin (1945), in which both cities were largely destroyed, proved that even the rubble of a city is still a 

significant source of cover and concealment and thus 

a combat multiplier. The more modern example of 

the battle of Grozny (1995) demonstrated that a much 

smaller defensive force could simply melt away as the 

attacker accumulated and brought to bear greater firepower. The Chechens simply relocated and, without 

adequate intelligence, the Russians then inadvertently 

caused civilian casualties and destroyed the infrastructure of the city.
119

The IDF utilized a novel conceptual approach during the battle of Nablus in 2002; “concrete canyons” 

such as streets, courtyards, and alleys were simply 

circumnavigated by moving horizontally through 

structures. By using explosives and other breaching 

tools, the IDF was able to maintain an operational 

tempo and deny the enemy the usual advantages of 

urban terrain. The U.S. military also enjoyed some 

success during the battle of Sadr City (2008) by utilizing heavy armored units in effective support for 

sustained street fighting.201 On the other hand, during 

recent operations against the IDF in dense urban areas, Hamas utilized extensive underground networks 

to deny targeting and observation opportunities to 

the Israelis.202 The resistance groups used an underground infrastructure to move around and maintain 

its operational capacity. Such underground structures—sewer and subway systems or underground 

tunnels built by illicit actors—are already part of the 

fabric of many dense urban areas. Furthermore, creating such structures near critical civilian infrastructure or population centers could further add to their 

utility. While numerous technological advances and 

weaponry make it possible to engage and destroy such 

underground networks, their continued utility and resilience will ensure their appearance in a dense urban 

environment.

Many megacities and dense urban areas also contain numerous slums or “sheet metal forests,” which 

are very different from “concrete canyons.” These 

areas cannot be traversed easily, if at all, with heavy 

armored units. Moreover, the use of heavy firepower 

will be restricted because of the density of civilians, 

and the inherently weak structures that are unable to 

provide any effective protection. At the same time, 
120

these areas can provide significant concealment to adversaries, and even become strong operational bases. 

Apart from moving the population out and bulldozing the slum, there is very little that can be done. In 

addition, expulsion and relocation can prove difficult 

even in peacetime. In September 2014, the Indian city 

of Mumbai bulldozed 309 acres of slums to protect 

the airport region. The displacement of 90,000 slum 

dwellers, however, imposed additional resource demands on city authorities.203 Attempting something 

similar during a military contingency would probably 

be regarded as politically unacceptable. An alternative 

would be to deal with alternate governance stakeholders, such as criminal entities, that often reside and operate in such slums and engage in both predatory and 

paternalistic behavior. A tacit or explicit agreement 

with the forces of alternative governance might make 

it possible to prevent adversaries from utilizing these 

“sheet metal forests.” Of course, there would have to 

be something in return, even if only an implicit understanding that U.S. military forces would not interfere 

with the illicit business of the criminal organizations. 

The proliferation and democratization of drones or 

unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) present both challenges and advantages within megacity combat zones. 

While much has been written about the benefits and 

drawbacks of drones, their utility in a dense urban area 

is hard to dispute. Their over-the-horizon capabilities 

as surveillance or weapons platforms, as well as their 

capacity to loiter over the battlefield, are significant 

assets. Yet, there are numerous anti-UAV defense systems (AUD) that reduce the effectiveness of drones. 

One of these AUD methods includes using cyber and 

technological means to hack or hijack the drone, either 

seizing it or rendering it inoperable. Other techniques 
121

include counter-drone weaponry such as freezing 

rays or radio jamming, which are being developed by 

United Kingdom-based firms.204 Another AUD low 

technology technique is using Dutch-trained eagles to 

hunt and destroy UAVs.205 Moreover, it is only a matter of time until other states and non-traditional actors invest significantly in AUD technology. Similarly, 

while micro-UAVs and unmanned ground vehicles 

(UGVs) will provide added benefits on the battlefield, 

countermeasures will also rapidly be devised. 

Finally, the use of smaller camera systems (whether micro-drones or the GoPro variety) and global positioning system (GPS) programs will provide real-time 

battlefield intelligence that could be a combat multiplier. Yet, there are limits inherent in the technology 

itself. Moreover, some useful technologies have not 

yet been widely adopted. For example, the Waze application provides navigation assistance and real-time 

traffic updates, but is community based and has not 

yet spread to the developing world. Consequently, 

there is no Waze map of slums within megacities. 

There are also some dangers; user-submitted data, for 

example, might be subject to deliberate manipulation. 

Perhaps even more important, the data flow would 

likely be reduced at the very time it is most needed. 

Military action would lead many of the users to flee 

the area, or forget about posting data as they try to 

keep themselves safe. Nevertheless, the long-term potential for such technology is considerable, as it would 

offer constant updating to existing maps.

Unforeseen Actions and Unanticipated Consequences.

Unfortunately, there are always unforeseen actions and inadvertent consequences in any military 

contingency. In the context of a dense urban area, 
122

these include human crushes, inadvertent alienation 

of population segments, and a constant knowledge 

gap. Human crushes often occur when large groups 

of people are funneled through inadequate flow systems, and people are simply trampled to death. This 

occurred on August 31, 2005, when hundreds of thousands of people converged on a pilgrimage across the 

Al-Aaimmah Bridge in Baghdad.206 A mortar attack 

earlier in the day hit part of the crowd, and many 

of the pilgrims suspected another attack was imminent. Consequently, a man claiming he saw someone 

wearing explosives triggered a panic. This caused a 

rush to the bridge, which had been closed for security reasons. As security forces opened a gate, people 

rushed the bridge, trampling and crushing those who 

fell. At least 953 people attempting to flee across the 

bridge were killed.207 Unfortunately, such events are 

relatively frequent in dense urban areas in the developing world—even without military activities. They 

are even more likely in combat zones and cities targeted by terrorists. Consequently, commanders and 

their subordinates should be sensitive to the contradictions of security and recognize that, under some 

circumstances, heightened security measures could 

prove deadly—with significant media and political 

repercussions.

Another dilemma arises in relation to local knowledge. It is clear that there is no substitute for local 

knowledge and expertise, and unless this can somehow be co-opted by the contingency force, commanders will be operating at a major disadvantage. Consequently, attempts should be made to co-opt this 

knowledge, whether through better relationships 

with host governments and forces, building ties and 

relationships with criminal enterprises, or utilizing 
123

private-public relationships. The difficulty is that such 

relationships can become too exclusive and thereby 

alienate other stakeholders, with both unforeseen and 

unfortunate consequences in the short term and long 

term.

Future Considerations.

Anticipating future combat scenarios is a formidable undertaking; there will always be knowledge 

gaps, major uncertainties, and unpleasant surprises. 

Sometimes there will also be indeterminate outcomes. 

Nevertheless, with increasing urbanization, the likelihood of combat or at least some kind of contingency 

in a megacity or sub-megacity increases. Given the 

trends in urbanization, especially in the global south 

and the concomitant problems of instability and fragility, it is more likely that the U.S. Army will find 

itself in a fragile or feral megacity than in a smart 

city. Consequently, it will have to display an unprecedented degree of sensitivity toward issues such as 

alternative governance, social and political networks, 

and the flows and rhythms of the city. Indeed, a willingness to make tradeoffs between enhanced security 

and maintaining the mobility inherent in cities will 

also be essential. Nor can the United States count on 

unchallenged technological superiority, as it will have 

to contend with both traditional and nontraditional 

forces engaging in both imitative and offset reactions. 

Moreover, the prospect of a “black swan” event or innovation that could dramatically change the dynamics 

of megacity combat cannot be ruled out. Such events 

or innovations play a disproportionate role, and are 

hard to predict. Nevertheless, by understanding the 

dynamics of a megacity and by engaging in appropriate doctrinal and technological innovation, the U.S. 
124

Army can develop a robust capability for operating 

effectively in a megacity environment.

The impact of focusing on dense urban areas will 

obviously have an impact on the U.S. military and 

on the U.S. Army in particular. Through greater integration with non-kinetic stakeholders, the Army 

will become more adept at tackling humanitarian and 

governance issues. This will be of even broader relevance and importance—such issues have been critical in recent stabilization interventions such as in Iraq 

and Afghanistan. Therefore, the focus on governance 

in dense urban areas will indirectly increase Army 

expertise in stabilization efforts. Another significant 

benefit for the Army will be the integration of nontraditional technologies and tactics, such as the use 

of social media and law enforcement techniques as 

additional mechanisms of political leverage. 

CONCLUSION

Urbanization will most certainly continue at a significant pace, resulting in cities becoming ever more 

important politically and economically. The likelihood, therefore, is that cities will become more important strategically, and that the United States will 

find itself, at some point in the not-too-distant future, 

engaged in military contingencies in large cities. It is 

imperative, therefore, that political and military leaders in the United States understand the intricacies of 

the interlinked systems that compose dense urban 

areas and are able to leverage that understanding 

into battlefield success. The U.S. Army can be better 

prepared for the dense urban battlefield than ever before through: a conceptual understanding of megacities and sub-megacities; an institutionally embedded 

system of intelligence collection and analysis for the 
125

urban battlefield; innovations in doctrine, equipment, 

and training; and an appreciation of likely scenarios 

and adversary actions. Inherent and unforeseen challenges will remain. Indeed, it is important to keep in 

mind the cautionary note articulated by Barry Posen, 

who observed that:

combat of any kind in an urban environment is very 

difficult. A skilled, reasonably well armed, adversary 

with a few thousand good and committed infantry can 

probably impose very significant costs on even a very 

competent Western military force. Military operations 

in urban areas should thus be avoided to the extent 

possible.208

Such cautions notwithstanding, an inhibition cannot 

be allowed to become a prohibition. If there is a highly 

compelling strategic rationale for action, the United 

States might not have the luxury of avoiding the dangers of an urban contingency. Consequently, it needs 

to be as prepared as possible, in terms of knowledge, 

equipment, training, and tactics. This is reflected in 

the following recommendations. 

Key Findings and Recommendations:

• As megacities and sub-megacities take on increasing salience and importance in the next 

few decades, they should become a distinct focus of analysis for intelligence. Understanding 

and anticipating developments and events in 

dense urban areas will need to become a central responsibility of the U.S. intelligence community, supplementing and at times even surpassing both the traditional focus on states and 

the more recent focus on transnational actors. 

Cities have to be understood as a layered and 
126

interacting series of complex adaptive systems, 

outlined with a more refined intelligence of and 

for the battlefield. Operating in these cities requires an understanding of these systems and 

an ability to harness rather than disrupt their 

dynamics.

• Developing a repository of knowledge and 

understanding of these cities is a critical component of IPB in megacity and sub-megacity 

military contingencies. Moreover, this is not 

something that can be improvised for particular contingencies without a depth of background knowledge and understanding. Given 

all this, it is critical that the U.S. Army create an 

Urban Analysis Center and a supporting network that provides a surge capability for crisis 

interventions. 

• Greater cooperation among the armed services 

themselves is essential for any operations in 

megacities or sub-megacities. This requirement will be quite demanding and could all 

too easily lead to inter-service turf wars, particularly if the Army envisages combat operations in littoral urban areas, traditionally the 

preserve of the Marine Corps. Not only is cooperation among the armed services essential, 

but civilian government agencies (including 

the Department of State and the U.S. Agency 

for International Development) as well as law 

enforcement agencies will also have key roles 

to play. Their involvement is essential for 

success. 

• It will also be necessary to interact with both 

the formal and informal mechanisms of governance within megacities and sub-megacities. 

This may involve cooperating with non-tradi-
127

tional stakeholders such as criminal elements 

or other alternative governance actors. 

• Once the United States is involved in a dense 

urban contingency, then it should make extensive use of equipment and tactics that leverage 

American as well as coalition advantages and 

that reduce the capabilities of likely adversaries. This equipment should include drones, 

reach-back and reach-forward technologies 

(Skype, GoPro cameras, and components of a 

land-warrior type system), and appropriate logistics and maneuver technology. 

• Conducting operations in megacities, as well as 

other urban areas, will require highly trained, 

quality personnel. The armed services will 

have to increase incentives to draw talented individuals to serve. It will also be necessary to 

incorporate recruits and affiliates with broader 

skill sets, especially those required for urban 

management and urban law enforcement. 

These initiatives will need to be complemented 

by in-house training for professional soldiers to 

prepare them more effectively for the demands 

of operating in complex urban environments. 

• Recognize that there are synergies—and important economies of scale—between the skill sets 

required for operating in dense urban areas and 

those appropriate for stabilization operations.

Finally, this monograph proposes two broad checklist-based acronyms defined below—URBAN and 

SMART—that encapsulate many of the arguments 

and themes articulated in the preceding analysis. To 

fight effectively in a dense urban environment, the 

U.S. Army will have to meet the following requirements and approaches:
128

• Understanding the megacity battlefield; 

• Responding appropriately to the stringent 

demands of the urban battlefield;

• Battle management that is accommodating to 

the city’s rhythms, flows, and networks; 

• Alliances that go beyond government agencies 

and the usual partners; and,

• Novel approaches that are essential to creating 

the smart urban soldier.

Moreover, within this urban approach the smart soldier would exhibit the following qualities: 

• Sophisticated understanding of the urban 

battlefield;

• Multimedia and social media awareness;

• Ability to act as intelligence collectors and 

receivers;

• Rapid responses both within the command 

system and in decentralized operations; and,

• Technological knowledge and expertise.

Ultimately, fighting smart in an urban environment is the only feasible approach. This monograph 

has offered some preliminary considerations of what 

this might mean. Yet, it has obviously raised more 

questions than it has answered and can be no more 

than an early contribution to a debate that needs to 

be broadened and refined. Only after such a debate 

will the United States be ready for future contingencies that are likely to be as challenging as they are 

inescapable. 
129

ENDNOTES

1. Scott Gerwehr and Russell W. Glenn, The Art of Darkness: 

Deception and Urban Operations, MR-1132-A, Santa Monica, CA: 

Rand Corporation, 2000, p. 1.

2. Saskia Sassen, “Global City: Introducing a Concept,” Brown 

Journal of World Affairs, Vol. 11, 2004, p. 33.

3. Wendell Cox, World Urban Areas 11th Annual Edition, Belleville, IL: Demographia, January 2015.

4. Ibid.

5. Cox, World Urban Areas 12th Annual Edition, Belleville, IL: 

Demographia, April 2016, available from demographia.com/dbworldua.pdf.

6. Erla Zwingle, “Megacities: The Coming Urban World,” National Geographic, Vol. 202, No. 5, November 2002, p. 77.

7. United Nations (UN), World Urbanization Prospects: The 2014 

Revision, Highlights, (ST/ESA/SER.A/352), New York: United 

Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population 

Division, 2014, p. 13.

8. Cox, World Urban Areas 11th Annual Edition.

9. UN, World Urbanization Prospects, p. 2.

10. Ibid., p. 15.

11. Michael Evans, “The Case against Megacities,” Parameters,

Vol. 45, No. 1, Spring 2015, p. 33.

12. Ibid., p. 37.

13. Ibid., p. 34.

14. Jonathan Kalan, “Think Again: 10 Million Sardines in a 

Sea of Skyscrapers: How sprawling megacities—from Lagos to 

Mumbai—might just save the world,” Foreign Policy, May 8, 2014. 
130

15. UN, State of the World’s Cities 2012/2013: Prosperity of Cities, UN-Habitat State of the World’s Cities Report, New York: 

Routledge, 2013, p. 4.

16. Ibid., p. x.

17. Ibid., p. v.

18. Edward Glaeser, Triumph of the City, New York: Penguin 

Press, 2011, p. 1.

19. Ibid.

20. See Anna K. Tibaijuka, “Introduction,” in UN, State of the 

World’s Cities 2010/11: Bridging the Urban Divide, UN-Habitat State 

of the World’s Cities Report, London, UK: Earthscan, 2008. 

21. P. H. Liotta and James F. Miskel, The Real Population Bomb: 

Megacities, Global Security and The Map of the Future, Kindle Ed., 

Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, Incorporated, 2012, p. 144.

22. Ibid., p. 147.

23. Ibid., p. 438.

24. Ibid., p. 87.

25. Mike Davis, Planet of Slums, London, UK: Verso, 2006, 

p. 62.

26. Richard J. Norton, “Feral Cities,” Naval War College Review,

Vol. 65, No. 4, Autumn 2003, pp. 97-106, available from www.nwc.

navy.mil/press/Review/2003/Autumn/pdfs/art6-a03.pdf.

27. David Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains: The Coming Age of 

the Urban Guerrilla, New York: Oxford University Press, 2013, 

pp. 35-36.

28. Robert Muggah, Researching the Urban Dilemma: Urbanization, Poverty and Violence, Ottawa, CA: International Development 

Research Centre, May 2012, p. vi.
131

29. Robert Muggah, “Deconstructing the Fragile City: Exploring Insecurity, Violence and Resilience,” Environment and Urbanization, Vol. 26, No. 2, May 2014, pp. 345-358; and John de Boer, 

Resilience and the Fragile City, Tokyo, JP: United Nations University, Centre for Policy Research, August 25, 2015, available from 

i.unu.edu/media/cpr.unu.edu/attachment/1489/UNU-CPR-Resilienceand-the-Fragile-City-Article.pdf.

30. Robert Muggah, “How Fragile Are Our Cities?” World 

Economic Forum, available from https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/02/how-fragile-are-our-cities/, accessed April 28, 2016.

31. Ibid.

32. Chief of Staff of the Army, Strategic Studies Group, Megacities and the United States Army: Preparing for a Complex and Uncertain Future, Arlington, VA: Chief of Staff of the Army, Strategic 

Studies Group, Megacities Concept Team, June 2014, p. 4.

33. Ibid.

34. Somik V. Lall and Uwe Deichmann, “Density and Disasters: Economics of Urban Hazard Risk,” The World Bank Research 

Observer, Vol. 27, No. 1, 2012, p. 3.

35. Ibid., p. 6.

36. Susan Hanson et al., “A global ranking of port cities with 

high exposure to climate extremes,” Climatic Change, Vol. 104, 

2011, p. 100.

37. Ibid.

38. Ibid.

39. Ibid.

40. Ibid.

41. Poppy McPherson, “Dhaka: the city where climate refugees are already a reality,” The Guardian, December 1, 2015.
132

42. The following analysis draws from Phil Williams, “The 

Terrorism Debate Over Mexican Drug Trafficking Violence,” Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 24, No. 2, p. 28.

43. Ibid., p. 28.

44. Evans.

45. Liotta and Miskel, p. 517.

46. Ibid., p. 1238.

47. Ibid., p. 74. 

48. Ibid., p. 74. 

49. Luis Ramirez, “Obama Stresses NATO Commitment

to Baltics,” Voice of America, September 3, 2014, available from 

www.voanews.com/content/president-obama-baltic-nationsukraine/2436881.html, accessed on April 28, 2016.

50. Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence: With a New 

Preface and Afterword, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 

2008, p. 47.

51. Bernard Brodie, Escalation and the Nuclear Option,

Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1966.

52. Nassim Nicholas Taleb, The Black Swan: The Impact of the 

Highly Improbable, New York: Random House, 2007.

53. William H. Frey and Zachary Zimmer, “Defining the 

City,” in Ronan Paddison, ed., Handbook of Urban Studies, London, 

UK: Sage Publications, Limited, 2001.

54. Louis Wirth, “Urbanism as a Way of Life,” American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 44, No. 1, 1938, pp. 1-24.

55. Michael E. Smith, “What is a city? Definitions of the urban,” available from wideurbanworld.blogspot.com/2011/02/what-iscity-definitions-of-urban.html.
133

56. Frey and Zimmer, p. 26.

57. Ibid.

58. Joel A. Tarr, “The Metabolism of the Industrial City: 

The Case of Pittsburgh,” Journal of Urban History, Vol. 28, No. 5, 

2002, p. 511.

59. Kevin Lynch, Good City Form, Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1984, p. 95.

60. Luís M. A. Bettencourt, José Lobo, Deborah Strumsky, and 

Geoffrey B. West, “Urban Scaling and Its Deviations: Revealing 

the Structure of Wealth, Innovation and Crime across Cities,” PloS 

one, Vol. 5, No. 11, 2010, pp. 1-2.

61. Luís M. A. Bettencourt, “The Kind of Problem a City Is,” 

Santa Fe Institute (SFI) Working Paper, Santa Fe, NM: Santa Fe 

Institute, 2013, pp. 175-187.

62. Michael Batty, The New Science of Cities, Cambridge, MA: 

Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 2013.

63. Ibid. pp. 8-9.

64. Ibid. p. 9.

65. Chad C. Serena and Colin P. Clarke, “A New Kind of Battlefield Awaits the U.S. Military—Megacities,” The RAND Blog, 

posted April 6, 2016, available from www.rand.org/blog/2016/04/

a-new-kind-of-battlefield-awaits-the-us-military-megacities.html, 

accessed on April 28, 2016.

66. Mark Lomedico and Elizabeth M. Bartels, “City as a System Analytical Framework: A Structured Analytical Approach 

to Understanding and Acting in Urban Environments,” Small 

Wars Journal, August 4, 2015, available from smallwarsjournal.com/

print/26087, accessed on April 29, 2016.

67. Wikipedia, “PATH (Toronto),” available from https://

en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PATH_(Toronto).
134

68. United States Marine Corps, Urban Operations I: Introduction, Basic Officer Course Student Handout B4R5359, 

Camp Barrett, VA: The Basic School, Marine Corps Training 

Command, p. 6. 

69. Peter Andreas, “The Clandestine Political Economy of 

War and Peace in Bosnia,” in Michael A. Innes, ed., Bosnian Security after Dayton: New Perspectives, New York: Routledge, 2006, p. 79.

70. See Joshua S. Bowes, Mark T. Newdigate, Pedro J. Rosario, 

and Davis D. Tindoll, The Enemy Below: Preparing Ground Forces for 

Subterranean Warfare, Dissertation, Monterey, California: Naval 

Postgraduate School, 2013, for a fuller analysis of subterranean 

operations.

71. Ibid., p. v.

72. Ibid., p. 11.

73. Ibid., p. 12.

74. Lirio Gutiérrez Rivera, “Violence, Crime, and the Maras in 

Honduras: Assessing a Decade of Security Policies,” The Chronicle 

of International Association of Youth and Family Judges and Magistrates, January 2013.

75. See Oxford Dictionaries online, “Topography,” Oxford 

University Press, available from www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/

definition/american_english/topography.

76. Michael C. Desch, “Why MOUT Now?” in Desch ed., Soldiers in Cities: Military Operations on Urban Terrain, Carlisle, PA: 

Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2001, p. 5.

77. Max Neiman, “Urban Operations: Social Meaning, the Urban Built Form, and Economic Function,” in Desch, ed., Soldiers 

in Cities, p. 14.

78. See Mark Volkers, dir., The Fourth World, streaming documentary film trailer, available from https://www.facebook.com/TheFourthWorld/videos/105658435282/.
135

79. Evans, p. 37.

80. Shlomo Angel, Making Room for a Planet of Cities, Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, 2011, p. 7.

81. Ibid., pp. 7-8.

82. Ibid., p. 8.

83. Ibid.

84. Chen Zhong et al., “Detecting the Dynamics of Urban 

Structure through Spatial Network Analysis,” International Journal 

of Geographical Information Science, Vol. 28, No. 11, 2014, p. 2179.

85. Ibid.

86. Ibid.

87. Ibid., p. 2178.

88. Richard A. Ellefsen, Urban Terrain Zone Characteristics, 

San Jose, CA: Aberdeen Proving Ground, U.S. Army Human 

Engineering Laboratories, 1987, p. 12.

89. Eyal Weizman, “The Art of War,” Frieze Magazine, May 

6, 2006, available from www.frieze.com/article/art-war, accessed on 

April 28, 2016.

90. Ibid.

91. Tarr, p. 513.

92. UN, Water Decade Programme on Advocacy and Communication (UNW-DPAC), “Water and Cities Facts and Figures,” 

available from www.un.org/waterforlifedecade/swm_cities_zaragoza_2010/pdf/facts_and_figures_long_final_eng.pdf, accessed on April 

28, 2016.

93. James Howcroft, “Intelligence Challenges in Urban Operations,” Small Wars Journal, July 20, 2014, available from smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/intelligence-challenges-in-urban-operations, 

accessed on April 28, 2016.
136

94. Neiman, p. 143.

95. UN, State of the World’s Cities 2006/7: 30 Years of Shaping 

the Habitat Agenda, UN-Habitat State of the World’s Cities Report, 

London, UK: Earthscan, 2006, pp. 58-59.

96. Ibid., p. 12.

97. Manuel Castells, End of Millennium: The Information Age: 

Economy, Society and Culture, Volume III, New York: Blackwell, 

1998.

98. Jo Beall, Tom Goodfellow, and Dennis Rodgers, Cities, 

Conflict and State Fragility, Crisis States Working Papers Series 

No.2, Paper No. 85, London, UK: London School of Economics, 

January 2011, p. 7.

99. Stephen Graham, “The Urbanization of Political Violence,” in UN, State of the World’s Cities 2006/7, p. 150.

100. Ibid.

101. Lisa Mastny and Richard P. Cincotta, “Examining the 

Connections Between Population and Security,” in Michael 

Renner, Hilary French, and Erik Assadourian, eds., State of the 

World 2005: Redefining Global Security, New York: W. W. Norton & 

Company, Limited, 2005, p. 30.

102. Craig Timberg, “Christians Turn on Muslims in Nigeria; 

More Than 30 Die,” The Washington Post Foreign Service, February 23, 2006, available from www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/02/22/AR2006022200876.html; and Michelle Vu, 

“Churches Burned in Nigeria Riots; Death Toll Passes 127,” Christian Today, February 27, 2006, available from www.christiantoday.

com/article/churches.burned.in.nigeria.riots.death.toll.passes.127/5481.

htm.

103. Mahbub Rashid and Dhirgham Alobaydi, “Territory, Politics of Power, and Physical Spatial Networks: The 

Case of Baghdad, Iraq,” Habitat International, Vol. 50, December 

2015, p. 189.
137

104. Ibid. 

105. Jeff R. Watson, “Military Operations in Megacities: A 

Linguistic Perspective,” Military Review, Vol. 96, No. 1, JanuaryFebruary 2016, p. 108.

106. Ibid.

107. Ibid., p. 110.

108. Ibid., p. 113.

109. Andrew Karvonen, “Book Review: The New Science of 

Cities by Michael Batty,” The London School of Economics and 

Political Science, January 4, 2014, available from http://blogs.lse.

ac.uk/lsereviewofbooks/2014/01/04/book-review-the-new-science-ofcities-by-michael-batty/.

110. Batty, p. 48.

111. David Held, ed., A Globalizing World? Culture, Economics, 

Politics, London, UK: Routledge, 2004.

112. Manuel Castells, “An Introduction to the Information 

Age,” in Frank Webster et al., eds., The Information Society Reader, 

London, UK: Routledge, 2004, pp. 138–149.

113. Steve Pile, Christopher Brook, and Gerry Mooney, eds., 

Unruly Cities? London, UK: Routledge, 1999, p. 88.

114. Jon Pierre, “Models of Urban Governance: The Institutional Dimension of Urban Politics,” Urban Affairs Review, Vol. 34, 

No. 3, 1999, pp. 372-396. 

115. The author is grateful to Matthew Hoffman for suggesting this notion of bottom-up governance. 

116. André Standing, The social contradictions of organised crime 

on the Cape Flats, ISS Paper 74, Pretoria, ZA: Institute for Security 

Studies, June 2003, available from www.issafrica.org/uploads/74.

PDF, accessed April 28, 2016.
138

117. Ibid.

118. Enrique Desmond Arias, Drugs and Democracy in Rio de 

Janeiro, Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2006.

119. Henri Lefebvre, Rhythmanalysis: Space, time and everyday 

life, London, UK: Continuum, 2004, p. 89.

120. Tim Edensor, “Introduction: Thinking about Rhythm 

and Space,” in Edensor, ed., Geographies of Rhythm: Nature, Place, 

Mobilities and Bodies, Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2012, p. 3.

121. Ibid., p. 1.

122. Lefebvre, p. 16.

123. Edensor, p. 3. 

124. Ibid., p. 8.

125. Gerry Mooney, “Urban ‘disorders’,” in Pile, Brook, and 

Mooney, p. 75.

126. Anthony Stefanidis, Andrew Jenkins, Arie Croitoru, and 

Andrew Crooks, “Megacities Through the Lens of Social Media,” 

Journal of the Homeland Defense & Security Information Analysis Center (HDIAC), Vol. 3, No. 1, 2016, p. 25.

127. Paolo Ciuccarelli, Giorgia Lupi, and Luca Simeone, 

Visualizing the data city: social media as a source of knowledge for urban planning and management, London, UK: Springer Science & 

Business Media, 2014, p. ix.

128. Ibid., p. 5.

129. Ibid., p. 6.

130. Ibid., p. ix.

131. Ibid.

132. Ibid., p. 7.
139

133. Ibid., p. 5.

134. Ibid., p. 44.

135. Jeff Boleng and Colin Clarke, “Big Data Challenges, 

Failed Cities, and the Rise of the New ‘Net,” in Phil Williams and 

Dighton Fiddner, eds., Cyberspace: Malevolent Actors, Criminal Opportunities and Strategic Competition, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies 

Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2016.

136. Ibid.

137. Robert Dixon, “Bringing Big Data to War in Mega-Cities,” War on the Rocks, January 19, 2016, available from warontherocks.com/2016/01/bringing-big-data-to-operations-in-mega-cities/, 

accessed on April 28, 2016.

138. Ibid.

139. Ibid.

140. Ibid.

141. Russell W. Glenn, “Megacities: The Good, the Bad, and 

the Ugly,” Small Wars Journal, February 2016.

142. Olga Oliker, “Grozny Summary,” Russia’s Chechen Wars 

1994 – 2000, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001.

143. Barry R. Posen, “Urban Operations: Tactical Realities and 

Strategic Ambiguities,” in Desch, ed., Soldiers in Cities, p. 151.

144. Carlotta Gall and Thomas de Waal, Chechnya: Calamity in 

the Caucasus, New York: NewYork University Press, 1998.

145. James D. Delk, Fires and Furies: The L.A. Riots - What Really Happened, Palm Springs, CA: Education, Technology, Communication (ETC) Publications, 1995.

146. Ibid.
140

147. Shannon E. French and Anthony I. Jack, “Dehumanizing 

the Enemy: The Intersection of Neuroethics and Military Ethics,” 

in David Whetham and Bradley J. Strawser, eds., Responsibilities to 

Protect: Perspectives in Theory and Practice, Leiden, NL: Koninklijke 

Brill, 2015.

148. Major Christopher O. Bowers, “Future Megacity Operations-Lessons from Sadr City,” Military Review, May-June 

2015, pp. 8-16.

149. Davis, p. 19.

150. Glenn, “Megacities.”

151. Thomas D. Mayfield III, “A Commander’s Strategy for 

Social Media,” Joint Force Quarterly, Iss. 60, 1st Qtr. 2011, pp. 79-83, 

available from ndupress.ndu.edu/portals/68/Documents/jfq/jfq-60.pdf.

152. Ibid.

153. Ibid.

154. Erik A. Claessen, “The Urban Individual: Unassailable 

Source of Power in Twenty-First Century Armed Conflicts,” 

Military Review, Vol. 95, No. 6, November-December 2015.

155. Posen, pp. 149-165; and Liotta and Miskel. 

156. Glenn, “Megacities.”

157. Ibid.

158. Ibid.

159. Ibid.

160. Ibid.

161. Ibid.

162. Ibid. p. 9.
141

163. U.S. Department of the Army, Army Support to Security 

Cooperation, Army Field Manual 3-22, Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, January 2013.

164. Office of Naval Research website, Code 30: Expeditionary 

Maneuver Warfare and Combating Terrorism Department information page, available from www.onr.navy.mil/Science-Technology/

Departments/Code-30.aspx.

165. Glenn, “Megacities.”

166. C. Todd Lopaz, “XM25 Counter Defilade Target 

Engagement System May Lose ‘X’ by Next August,” U.S. Army 

News Service, August 9, 2013, available from www.army.mil/article/109049/XM25_Counter_Defilade_Target_Engagement_system_

may_lose__X__by_next_August/.

167. David E. Johnson et al., The 2008 Battle of Sadr City: Reimagining Urban Combat, Santa Monica: RAND, 2013, pp. 108-109.

168. Ibid.

169. Ibid.

170. Warfare.be website, BMP-T, available from https://web.

archive.org/web/20130930181607/http://warfare.be/db/linkid/1785/

catid/245/.

171. Global Security.org website, Achzarit, available from 

www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/israel/achzarit.htm.

172. Office of Naval Research website, Code 30: Logistics 

Thrust Area information page, available from www.onr.navy.mil/

en/Science-Technology/Departments/Code-30/All-Programs/Logistics.

aspx.

173. Ibid.

174. Stephen Graham, “Vertical Geopolitics: Baghdad and 

After,” Antipode Journal, Vol. 36, Iss. 1, January 2004, pp. 12-23.

175. Dawn Morrison and Colin Wood, “Megacities and Dense 

Urban Environments: Obstacle or Opportunity?” Small Wars Jour-
142

nal, February 23, 2016, available from smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/

art/megacities-and-dense-urban-environments-obstacle-or-opportunity.

176. Ibid.

177. Major Kareem Montague, Building the Pentathlete Mind: 

Army Leadership in the Contemporary Operating Environment, General Douglas MacArthur Military Leadership Writing Competition Submission, February 23, 2007, p. 1.

178. Francis J. Harvey, “Building the Future Force While Continuing to Fight the Global War on Terrorism,” Army Magazine, 

October 1, 2005, p. 19.

179. Montague, p. 1.

180. U.S. Army website, “Special Forces, Qualifications and 

Benefits,” available from www.goarmy.com/special-forces/qualifications-and-benefits.html.

181. Kevin McElroy, Developing the Army Pentathlete, Strategy 

Research Project, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 

2007, endnote 47, “[Colonel Peggy] Combs interview, 11 Dec, 

2006. Colonel Combs indicated that all specialties needed to experience the suggested training, but agreed that the immediate 

needs of stabilization and reconstruction operations suggested 

that some [military occupation specialties] MOS were more suited 

than others in the initial phases.”

182. Posen, pp. 149-165; and Liotta and Miskel. 

183. Posen, pp. 149-165; and Liotta and Miskel. 

184. Chad Serena and Colin Clarke, “A new kind of battlefield awaits the U.S. military—megacities,” Reuters, posted April 

6, 2016, available from blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2016/04/06/isthe-u-s-military-prepared-to-fight-in-megacities/.

185. Evans, p. 42.
143

186. B. E. Sanderson, “Police Officers—The Relationship of 

College Education to Job Performance,” National Criminal Justice 

Reference Service, 1976, pp 1-72; Jason Rydberg and William Terrill, “The Effect of Higher Education on Police Behavior,” Police 

Quarterly, Vol. 13, No. 1, March 2010, pp. 92-120, first published 

online January 3, 2010; Rebecca Paynich, “The Impact of a CollegeEducated Police Force: A review of the literature,” February 2009.

187. Johnson et al., p. 95.

188. Kevin Felix and Frederick Wong, “Megacities: Pros and 

Cons: The Case for Megacities,” Parameters, Vol. 45, No. 1, Spring 

2015, pp. 19-33.

189. Felix and Wong, p. 30.

190. Ibid.

191. Evans, p. 41.

192. Ibid.

193. Felix and Wong, p. 19.

194. S. J. Lewis, “The Battle of Stalingrad,” in William G. Robertson, gen. ed., and Lawrence A. Yates, man. ed., Block by Block: 

The Challenges of Urban Operations, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: U.S. 

Army Command and General Staff College Press, 2003, pp. 30, 35.

195. Colonel John Antal and Major Bradley Gericke, eds., City 

Fights: Selected Histories of Urban Combat from World War II to Vietnam, New York: Random House, 2003.

196. David Shunk, “Mega Cities, Ungoverned Areas, and 

the Challenge of Army Urban Combat Operations in 2030-2040,” 

Small Wars Journal, January 2014.

197. Glenn, “Megacities.”

198. Bowers, pp. 8-16.

199. Bowers, pp. 8-16.
144

200. John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, “Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy,” Monograph 

Reports, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2001, p. 3, available from www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1382.html.

201. Bowers, p. 15.

202. Glenn, “Megacities.”

203. Morrison and Wood. 

204. Chris Baraniuk, “UK firms develop drone-freezing ray,” 

BBC News, October 8, 2015 available from www.bbc.com/news/

technology-34475158, accessed April 5, 2016.

205. Peter Holley, “Watch this trained eagle destroy a drone 

in a Dutch police video,” The Washington Post, February 2, 

2016, available from www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/

wp/2016/02/01/trained-eagle-destroys-drone-in-dutch-police-video/,

 accessed April 2016.

206. Patrick Weidinger, “10 Tragic Human Panics and Stampedes,” Listverse, available from listverse.com/2010/11/26/10-

tragic-human-panics-and-stampedes/, accessed February 2016.

207. Ibid.

208. Posen, p. 162.
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