alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
```

[Congressional Bills 118th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 8045 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

118th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 8045

   To limit the closure or consolidation of any United States Postal 
  Service processing and distribution center in States, and for other 
                               purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             April 17, 2024

Ms. Hageman (for herself and Mr. Pappas) introduced the following bill; 
  which was referred to the Committee on Oversight and Accountability

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
   To limit the closure or consolidation of any United States Postal 
  Service processing and distribution center in States, and for other 
                               purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Postal Operations Stay Timely And 
Local Act'' or the ``POSTAL Act''.

SEC. 2. LIMITATION ON CLOSING OR CONSOLIDATING POSTAL SERVICE 
              PROCESSING AND DISTRIBUTION CENTERS IN STATES.

    (a) In General.--The United States Postal Service may not close, 
consolidate, downgrade, or take any other similar action with respect 
to any processing and distribution center in a State if such action 
would result in no such center being located in that State or 
negatively impact mail delivery.
    (b) Definitions.--In this section--
            (1) the term ``processing and distribution center'' means a 
        central mail facility that--
                    (A) distributes and dispatches part or all of both 
                incoming mail and outgoing mail for a designated 
                service area;
                    (B) provides instructions on the preparation of 
                collection mail, dispatch schedules, and sorting plan 
                requirements to mailers; and
                    (C) is a sectional center facility, a general mail 
                facility, or a dedicated mail processing facility 
                without a station or branch; and
            (2) the term ``State'' means the 50 States and the District 
        of Columbia.
                                 <all>
```
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 01-50723

Conference Calendar

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

JORGE SANCHEZ-CALDERON,

also known as Jorge Sanchez-Rodriguez,

Defendant-Appellant.

--------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. EP-01-CR-732-ALL-DB

--------------------

February 21, 2002

Before JOLLY, JONES, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Jorge Sanchez-Calderon appeals the 46-month term of

imprisonment imposed following his guilty plea conviction of

attempting to illegally reenter the United States after removal

in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. He contends that the sentence

is invalid because it exceeds the two-year maximum term of

imprisonment prescribed in 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a). 

Sanchez-Calderon complains that his sentence was improperly

enhanced pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2) based on his prior
No. 01-50723 

-2-

removal following an aggravated felony conviction. He argues

that the sentencing provision violates the Due Process Clause. 

Alternatively, Sanchez-Calderon contends that 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a)

and 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2) define separate offenses. He argues

that the aggravated felony conviction that resulted in his

increased sentence was an element of the offense under 8 U.S.C.

§ 1326(b)(2) that should have been alleged in his indictment. 

Sanchez-Calderon acknowledges that his arguments are foreclosed

by the Supreme Court’s decision in Almendarez-Torres v. United

States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998), but seeks to preserve the issues for

Supreme Court review in light of the decision in Apprendi v. New

Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). 

Apprendi did not overrule Almendarez-Torres. See Apprendi,

530 U.S. at 489-90; United States v. Dabeit, 231 F.3d 979, 984

(5th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1202 (2001). SanchezCalderon’s arguments are foreclosed. The judgment of the

district court is AFFIRMED.

The Government has moved for a summary affirmance in lieu of

filing an appellee’s brief. In its motion, the Government asks

that the judgment of the district court be affirmed and that an

appellee’s brief not be required. The motion is GRANTED. 

 AFFIRMED; MOTION GRANTED.
#### Slater *v.*Davis, superintendent of banks, *et al.*

Gilbert, J.

1. In *Davidson*v. *Citizens Bank of Fort Valley,*171 *Ga.*81 (154 S. E. 775), it was held: “A stockholder in an insolvent bank can not set off the amount of his individual deposits against his statutory liability to depositors of the bank. The request to review and overrule the decision in *Swicord*v. *Crawford,*148 *Ga.*719 (98 S. E. 343), is refused.” That ruling controls in this case. Counsel for the plaintiff in error formally request that both of the decisions just mentioned, and that of *Reed*v. *Mobley,*172 *Ga.*116 (157 S. E. 321), be reviewed and overruled. The request is denied.

2. With reference to the constitutional questions raised in the petition, the only discussion in the brief of counsel for plaintiff in error is, viz.: “Plaintiff in error respectfully urges that the allegations in her bill in *634paragraphs 16, 17, and 18,” in which the constitutional questions are raised, “present proper questions for determination in this cause, and that said section should be held, as we verily believe to be, violative” of the sections of the constitution as stated in the petition. No authorities are cited and no elaboration of the reasons stated in the petition by way of argument are set forth in the brief. *Held,*that the statute is not unconstitutional for any reason assigned.

No. 8780.

March 18, 1932.

3. The court did not err in sustaining the general demurrer to the petition.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*All the Justices concur.*

*636Moore, *Oberry & Wheless,*for plaintiff.

*Kelley & Dickerson,*for defendants.-
§ 1.457-12 Effective dates. ( a ) *General effective date.* Except as otherwise provided in this section, §§ 1.457-1 through 1.457-11 apply for taxable years beginning after December 31, 2001.
( b ) *Transition period for eligible plans to comply with EGTRRA.* For taxable years beginning after December 31, 2001, and before January 1, 2004, a plan does not fail to be an eligible plan as a result of requirements imposed by the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 (115 Stat. 385) (EGTRRA) (Public Law 107-16) June 7, 2001, if it is operated in accordance with a reasonable, good faith interpretation of EGTRRA.
( c ) *Special rule for distributions from rollover accounts.* The last sentence of § 1.457-6(a) (relating to distributions of amounts held in a separate account for eligible rollover distributions) applies for taxable years beginning after December 31, 2003.
( d ) *Special rule for options.* Section 1.457-11(d) does not apply with respect to an option without a readily ascertainable fair market value (within the meaning of section 83(e)(3)) that was granted on or before May 8, 2002.
( e ) *Special rule for qualified domestic relations orders.* Section 1.457-10(c) (relating to qualified domestic relations orders) applies for transfers, distributions, and payments made after December 31, 2001.
[T.D. 9075, 68 FR 41240, July 11, 2003]
exv10w6



 




Exhibit 10.6


FIRST AMENDMENT

TO

PRODUCTION PARTICIPATION PLAN

OF

WHITING PETROLEUM CORPORATION



     This First Amendment (this “Amendment”) to the Production Participation Plan (as amended and
restated February 23, 2006, the “Plan”) of Whiting Petroleum Corporation, a Delaware corporation
(the “Company”), is adopted by the Company by action of its Board of Directors on February 23, 2007
and executed to be effective March 1, 2007. Capitalized terms used herein without definition shall
have the meaning ascribed to such terms in the Plan.




	 	1.	 	Amendments.





	 	a.	 	The second sentence of Section 4.2 of the Plan is hereby amended
by adding the following to the end of the sentence:






	 
	 	“; provided, however, that, with respect to any Partial Plan Year or
a Plan Year, the last day of which is the date of a Change in Control
(as defined in Section 1.5) or a voluntary termination of the Plan,
the Committee shall not allocate a percentage less than the average
of the percentages set by the Committee for the three (3) previous
Plan Years as to proven undeveloped reserves allocated pursuant to
Section 7.1.”






	 
	 	b.	 	The first sentence of Section 5.1(b) of the Plan is
hereby amended by deleting and replacing such sentence in its entirety
with the following:






	 
	 	“(b) Up to sixty-six and two-thirds percent (66-2/3%) of the Net
Income attributable to each Plan Year’s or Partial Plan Year’s
accounting pool shall be available for allocation among eligible
Participants on the basis of performance or any other basis
determined in the discretion of the Committee.”






	 	2.	 	Force and Effect. Except as amended by this Amendment, the terms and
conditions of the Plan shall remain in full force and effect.





	 	 	 	 	 
	 	WHITING PETROLEUM CORPORATION

 	 
	 	By:  	/s/ James J. Volker
 	 
	 	 	James J. Volker 	 
	 	 	President and Chief Executive Officer
Editorial Note on Part 886
Editorial Note: Nomenclature changes to part 886 appear at 73 FR 35341, June 23, 2008.

§ 886.5200 Eyelid thermal pulsation system. ( a ) *Identification.* An eyelid thermal pulsation system is an electrically-powered device intended for use in the application of localized heat and pressure therapy to the eyelids. The device is used in adult patients with chronic cystic conditions of the eyelids, including meibomian gland dysfunction (MGD), also known as evaporative dry eye or lipid deficiency dry eye. The system consists of a component that is inserted around the eyelids and a component to control the application of heat and pressure to the eyelids.
( b ) *Classification.* Class II (special controls). The special controls for this device are: ( 1 ) Appropriate analysis/testing should validate electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) and safety of exposure to non-ionizing radiation;
( 2 ) Design, description, and performance data should validate safeguards related to the temperature and pressure aspects of the device, including during fault conditions;
( 3 ) Performance data should demonstrate the sterility of patient-contacting components and the shelf-life of these components;
( 4 ) The device should be demonstrated to be biocompatible; and
( 5 ) Performance data should demonstrate that any technological changes do not adversely effect safety and effectiveness.
[76 FR 51878, Aug. 19, 2011]
# United States Court of Appeals For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 19-3467

___________________________ United States of America, lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee ,

v. Taquan Laquise Johnson, (originally named Taquan Laguise Johnson), also known as MooMoo, lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellant
.

____________ Appeal from United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas - Little Rock

____________ Submitted: October 1, 2020 Filed: October 6, 2020 [Unpublished]

____________ Before COLLOTON, BENTON, and KOBES, Circuit Judges.

____________ PER CURIAM.Taquan Johnson appeals after the district court 1 revoked his supervised release

and imposed sentence. The court sentenced Johnson to twelve months in prison and one year of supervised release, with a special condition that the first 180 days of his supervised release be spent in a residential reentry center. His counsel has moved for leave to withdraw, and has filed a brief challenging the treatment of the period in the reentry center as part of Johnson’s term of supervised release rather than his term of imprisonment. After careful review of the record, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by requiring Johnson to spend the first 180 days of his supervised release in a reentry center. The district court has broad discretion to impose special conditions that are reasonably related to 18 U.S.C. § 3553 factors, involve no greater deprivation of liberty than reasonably necessary, and are consistent with any pertinent Sentencing Commission policy statements. See 18 U.S.C. § 3563(b)(11) (court may require probationer to reside at a community corrections facility for all or part of the term of probation); U.S.S.G. § 5B1.3(e)(1) (residence in a community treatment center, halfway house or similar facility may be imposed as a condition of probation); United States v. Melton , 666 F.3d 513, 517-18 (8th Cir. 2012). Accordingly, we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw, and affirm.

______________________________

1 The Honorable James M. Moody, Jr., United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Arkansas. -2-
427 A.2d 1233

#### Lincoln Bank v. High Sky, Inc., Appellant.

Submitted June 29, 1979.

Sidney Bernstein, for appellant;

Robert Maris, for appellee.

Before CERCONE, P. J., and WIEAND and LOUIK, JJ.*

*

Judge Donald E. Wieand is sitting by special designation. Judge Maurice Louik of the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, is sitting by designation.

Order affirmed.
UASolutions Group, Inc. www.uasolutionsgroup.com

2518 Auburn Drive, Cocoa, FL 32926 (321)-261-2547 

uasolutionsgroup@uasolutionsgroup.com

July 29, 2015

U. S. Department of Transportation

Federal Aviation Administration

Office of Rulemaking, Bldg. 10A

800 Independence Avenue, SW

Washington, DC 20591

RE: Summary Grant for Stampede Presentation Products, Inc. Exemption 

Request Under Section 333 of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) 

Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, 49 U.S.C. § 44701(f), and 14 C.F.R. Part 

11

Dear Sir or Madam:

Pursuant to Section 333 of the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 (FMRA), 49 

U.S.C. § 44701(f), and 14 C.F.R. Part 11, Stampede Presentation Products, Inc. an 

operator of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems (“sUAS”) equipped to conduct full service 

photography and videography, seeks exemption from the following listed Code of Federal 

Regulations (CFR) to allow commercial operation of the DJI Phantom Series and DJI 

Inspire within the National Airspace System (NAS) for controlled, low-risk, product 

demonstration and training, over certain areas of the United States, conducted within and 

under the conditions outlined herein, or as may be established by the FAA, as required 

by Section 333 requirements. 

Stampede Presentation Products, Inc. in the accompanying petition, seeks exemption 

from the requirements of 14 C.F.R. §§ 45.27(a), 61.113(a) and (b), 91.7(a), 91.105, 

91.119(c), 91.121, 91.151(b), 91.405(a), 91.407(a)(1), 91.409(a)(1) and (2),and 91.417(a) 

and (b). 

Stampede Presentation Products, Inc. has requested that the FAA not request public 

comment on its petition because it would not set any precedent and because the relief 

requested is identical to numerous exemptions granted previously by the FAA. 14 C.F.R. 

§ 11.87. 

In addition, Stampede Presentation Products, Inc. will be utilizing the same DJI Phantom 

Series and DJI Inspire proven technologies the FAA has already accepted and approved 

in over 75 percent of approved exemptions. All of the appropriate documentation to 
UASolutions Group, Inc. www.uasolutionsgroup.com

2518 Auburn Drive, Cocoa, FL 32926 (321)-261-2547 

uasolutionsgroup@uasolutionsgroup.com

accompany Stampede Presentation Products, Inc. Section 333 Petition is included. 

Combined, their comprehensive Section 333 Exemption and the approvals the FAA has 

already given to their chosen products and the technology, should provide the support 

necessary to the FAA for a Summary Grant of XFLY’s Section 333 Petition and expedite 

the process. 

Kelly J. Neubecker

CEO

UASolutions Group, Inc.

CC:

Bill Crozier

Joe Morra

Jake Troutman

Dean Griffith, Esq.

Robert Papas
427 A.2d 1231

#### In re Roy P. Appeal of Louis C. and Dora C.

*641Argued November 13, 1979.

John 0. Gunn, for appellants;

Joseph A. Jaffe, for Roy P., appellee;

James Culp, for Children and Youth Services, participating party.

Before SPAETH, HOFFMAN and VAN der VOORT, JJ.

The order of the lower court is hereby affirmed.
39310.

#### O’QUINN v. O’QUINN.

Frankum, Judge.

Lillian Lorraine O’Quinn, the former wife, of Robert Harris O’Quinn, now divorced, brought a proceeding under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (Ga. L. 1958, pp. 34, 47; *Code Ann. Ch.*99-9A), against said Robert Harris O’Quinn, hereinafter referred to as respondent, for support of their two minor children, and the court ordered the respondent to pay $80 per month, for support. The respondent appealed to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court transferred the case to this court. See *O’Quinn v. O’Quinn,*217 Ga. 431 (122 SE2d 925). ' The only contention raised by respondent is that, under the facts' of the case, there was an abuse of judicial discretion by the court in rendering the judgment in the amount aforesaid. *Held:*

The uncontradicted evidence in this case shows that the respondent received $217 per month as a disability compensation from the United States Government. The respondent has a chronic heart condition which prevents him from expending much exertion. All evidence concerning the respondent’s physical handicap goes to show that the respondent is finable to earn more than his disability pension. The court found that the respondent could eam only $217 per month.

He testified that his expenses per month were $45 for rent, $10.50 for utilities, $78 for groceries, medicines, etc., $8.28 for clothing, and $40 automobile expenses, totaling $179.78. While he testified that his physical condition required the maintenance of an automobile 'as transportation to and from Hunter Air Force Base where he received medical treatment, he also testified that he could ride a bus to. Hunter Air Force Base, and that if he moved1 nearer to the Hunter Air Force Base, he could do without a car with less inconvenience. These facts were addressed to the discretion of the trial judge,' but the facts do not demand a finding that the respondent must have the use of an automobile.

We are of the opinion that his case is one where an award in any amount works a hardship on the parties because .of insufficient earning capacity of the respondent to allow adequate support for respondent and his minor children. The facts presented a question for judicial, discretion, and we *242cannot say that, as a matter of law, the trial court abused such discretion in awarding $80 out of a monthly income of $217. The effect of this order leaves a balance of $137 per month to the respondent which is the approximate amount of the respondent’s living expenses excluding the expense of operating his automobile.

Decided January 25, 1962.

*Josephine M. Plunkett, Gilbert E. Johnson,*for plaintiff in error.

*Andrew J. Ryan, Solicitor-General, Sylvan A. Garfunkel,*contra.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*Nichols, P. J., and Jordan, J., concur.*
```

[Congressional Bills 118th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 8096 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

118th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 8096

 To amend the Commodity Exchange Act to prohibit trading of water and 
       water rights for future delivery, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             April 19, 2024

 Mr. Khanna (for himself, Ms. Tlaib, Ms. Bush, Mr. Carson, Ms. Ocasio-
   Cortez, Ms. Adams, Ms. Omar, Mr. Garcia of Illinois, Mrs. Watson 
   Coleman, Ms. Schakowsky, Mrs. Ramirez, Ms. Lee of California, Ms. 
Norton, Mr. Bowman, Mrs. Hayes, and Mr. Pocan) introduced the following 
        bill; which was referred to the Committee on Agriculture

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To amend the Commodity Exchange Act to prohibit trading of water and 
       water rights for future delivery, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Future of Water Act of 2024''.

SEC. 2. PROHIBITION OF TRADING IN WATER AND WATER RIGHTS FOR FUTURE 
              DELIVERY.

    (a) Commodity Exchange Act.--Section 1a(9) of the Commodity 
Exchange Act (7 U.S.C. 1a(9)) is amended--
            (1) by striking ``(7 U.S.C. 13-1)) and'' and inserting ``(7 
        U.S.C. 13-1)),'';
            (2) by inserting ``water or water rights (or any index, 
        measure, value, or data related to water or water rights), 
        and'' after ``receipts), and''; and
            (3) by striking ``receipts) in which'' and inserting 
        ``receipts, and water or water rights, or any index, measure, 
        value, or data related to water or water rights) in which''.
    (b) Public Law 85-839.--The first section of Public Law 85-839 (7 
U.S.C. 13-1) is amended in the first sentence of subsection (a)--
            (1) by inserting ``water or water rights (or any index, 
        measure, value, or data related to water or water rights),'' 
        after ``sale of''; and
            (2) by striking ``receipts)'' and inserting ``receipts),''.
                                 <all>
```
#### § 1.1402(c)-1 Trade or business.

In order for an individual to have net earnings from self-employment, he must carry on a trade or business, either as an individual or as a member of a partnership. Except for the exclusions discussed in §§ 1.1402(c)-2 to 1.1402(c)-7, inclusive, the term “trade or business”, for the purpose of the tax on self-employment income, shall have the same meaning as when used in section 162. An individual engaged in one of the excluded activities specified in such sections of the regulations may also be engaged in carrying on activities which constitute a trade or business for purposes of the tax on self-employment income. Whether or not he is also engaged in carrying on a trade or business will be dependent upon all of the facts and circumstances in the particular case. An individual who is a crew leader, as defined in section 3121(o) (see such section and the regulations thereunder in part 31 of this chapter (Employment Tax Regulations)), is considered to be engaged in carrying on a trade or business with respect to services performed by him after 1956 in furnishing individuals to perform agricultural labor for another person or services performed by him after 1956 as a member of the crew.

[T.D. 6978, 33 FR 15937, Oct. 30, 1968]