NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

IN RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO C.F.

No. 1 CA-JV 23-0181 

FILED 3-12-2024

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. JS520513

The Honorable Sigmund G. Popko, Judge Pro Tempore

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Maricopa County Legal Defender's Office, Phoenix

By Jamie R. Heller

Counsel for Appellant

Stuart & Blackwell, PLLC, Chandler

By Cory A. Stuart

Counsel for Appellee

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge James B. Morse Jr. delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Angela K. Paton and Judge Michael S. Catlett joined.
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO C.F.

Decision of the Court

2

M O R S E, Judge:

¶1 Bryanna M. ("Mother") appeals from the juvenile court's order 

terminating her parental rights. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 Mother and Johnny F. ("Father") are the biological parents of 

C.F. ("Child"), born in May 2015. Mother and Father began living together 

in 2014. A couple of years later, Father and Mother stopped living together 

and ended their relationship. Father and Mother then agreed to an 

alternating-week parenting-time schedule for Child. 

¶3 In May 2016, Father petitioned the court to memorialize the 

parenting-time schedule. Mother continued to exercise her parenting time 

with Child. 

¶4 In March 2017, Father petitioned the court to modify legal 

decision-making, parenting time, and child support. The court awarded 

Father sole legal decision-making authority, modified Mother's parenting 

time, and established her child support obligation. The court explained that 

if Mother submitted to weekly random drug testing for three consecutive 

months, without missed or diluted tests, her parenting time would revert 

to the alternating-week schedule. Mother continued to exercise her 

parenting time with Child as modified by the court. 

¶5 In February 2020, Father again requested that the court 

modify Mother's parenting time. The court modified Mother's parenting 

time to supervised visitations. The court also provided that if Mother 

submitted to weekly random urinalysis testing for three consecutive 

months, without missed or diluted tests, her parenting time would revert 

to unsupervised visitation. Following this modification, Mother requested 

phone calls with Child, but Father refused and told her to arrange 

supervised visitations. Mother did not set up supervised visitations 

through an agency, and Father rejected Mother's requests for supervised 

visits with maternal grandmother or paternal grandmother. On other 

occasions, Mother asked for Child's school and medical information, but 

Father refused to provide it. During this time, Mother did not submit to 

weekly drug testing as required by the court's modification orders and was 

behind on child support payments. 

¶6 In November 2022, Father married. The following month, 

Father filed a termination petition, alleging Mother abandoned Child and 

was unable to parent Child due to chronic substance abuse. Mother 
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO C.F.

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contested Father's petition. The court set an adjudication hearing for June 

2023. 

¶7 After a three-day hearing, the court denied termination under 

the chronic-substance-abuse ground but granted it as to the abandonment 

ground and concluded Father had proven by clear and convincing evidence 

that Mother abandoned Child without just cause. The court based its 

finding on Mother's failure to pay child support, maintain regular contact 

with Child, and provide normal parental supervision over Child "for a 

period far more than the statutory six months." The court also concluded 

that Father's actions—which may have made it difficult for Mother to 

maintain regular contact with Child—or his failure to "comply with the 

family court order to keep Mother informed of certain details of Child's 

life," did "not amount to a defense under Calvin B. v. Brittany B., 232 Ariz. 

292 (App. 2013)." The court also found by a preponderance of the evidence 

that termination was in Child's best interests because Father's spouse 

("Stepmother") was willing to adopt Child.

¶8 Mother timely appealed, and we have jurisdiction under 

A.R.S. §§ 8-235(A), 12-120.21(A)(1), and 12-2101(A)(1). 

DISCUSSION

¶9 Parents have a fundamental right to the custody and control 

of their children, but that right is not absolute. Michael J. v. Ariz. Dep't of 

Econ. Sec., 196 Ariz. 246, 248, ¶¶ 11–12 (2000). To terminate a parent's rights, 

a court must (1) find a statutory ground for termination under A.R.S. § 8-533 

by clear and convincing evidence and (2) determine, by a preponderance of 

the evidence, that termination is in the child's best interests. Brionna J. v. 

Dep't of Child Safety, 255 Ariz. 471, 474, ¶ 1 (2023); see A.R.S. § 8-533(B) 

(requiring at least one statutory ground and a best-interests finding). 

Because the juvenile court "is in the best position to weigh the evidence, 

observe the parties, judge the credibility of witnesses, and resolve disputed 

facts," Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec. v. Oscar O., 209 Ariz. 332, 334, ¶ 4 (App. 2004), 

we accept the court's findings of fact if reasonable evidence supports them 

and will affirm the "court's legal conclusions" terminating parental rights 

unless they are clearly erroneous, Brionna J., 255 Ariz. at 478–79, ¶ 31. The 

court's findings are not clearly erroneous unless this Court determines "as 

a matter of law that no one could reasonably find the [supporting] 

evidence" meets the applicable burden of proof. Brionna J., 255 Ariz. at 478–

79, ¶ 31 (quoting Murillo v. Hernandez, 79 Ariz. 1, 9 (1955)).
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO C.F.

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I. Abandonment. 

¶10 Parental rights may be terminated when a parent abandons a 

child. A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(1). Abandonment is defined in A.R.S. § 8-531(1):

"Abandonment" means the failure of a parent to provide 

reasonable support and to maintain regular contact with the 

child, including providing normal supervision. 

Abandonment includes a judicial finding that a parent has 

made only minimal efforts to support and communicate with 

the child. Failure to maintain a normal parental relationship 

with the child without just cause for a period of six months 

constitutes prima facie evidence of abandonment.

Abandonment is assessed objectively based on the parent's conduct, not her

subjective intent. Michael J., 196 Ariz. at 249–50, ¶ 18; see Kenneth B. v. Tina 

B., 226 Ariz. 33, 36–38, ¶¶ 15–16, 22 (App. 2010) (concluding a court could 

find abandonment despite an absent parent's subjective intent not to 

abandon a child).

¶11 Mother argues that she "made more than minimal efforts to 

maintain a relationship with [Child] and Father's actions hindered the 

parent-child relationship." The court must consider "whether a parent has 

provided reasonable support, maintained regular contact, made more than 

minimal efforts to support and communicate with the child, and 

maintained a normal parental relationship." Michael J., 196 Ariz. at 249–50, 

¶ 18.

¶12 Mother specifically argues that she made more than minimal 

efforts to support and communicate with Child by having Child on her 

health insurance plan since birth, purchasing gifts for Child, providing 

items to her mother to give to Child, requesting phone calls with Child after 

the 2020 modification order, and contacting agencies and offering names of 

relatives to supervise visits. The court heard evidence that Mother claimed 

to have purchased thousands of dollars' worth of gifts for Child and 

provided gifts to Child through her mother but also heard evidence that 

Mother was in arrears of child support payments and noted that Mother 

offered "no explanation" as to "why that money could not have been used 

to make child support payments over time." Further, the court heard 

testimony from Mother and Father that he prohibited Mother from 

speaking with Child on the phone after the 2020 modification order, and

the record shows that Mother contacted Father "approximately 12 times" 

attempting to speak with Child during that time. But the court noted that 
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO C.F.

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aside from her testimony, "Mother offered no corroborating evidence and 

was unable to offer specific details of her attempts" to contact agencies and 

offer names of other individuals that could have supervised visits. The 

court also noted that Mother did not "offer any explanation of why she did 

not ask the family court to review Father's refusals" as unreasonable. The 

court "credit[ed]" Father's testimony and evidence that Mother did not have 

regular contact with Child nor provided normal parental supervision over 

Child. We do not reweigh the evidence considered by the juvenile court.

Oscar O., 209 Ariz. at 336, ¶ 14.

¶13 Mother also argues that Father hindered her from 

maintaining a normal parental relationship with Child. Mother specifically 

argues that the court's 2018 and 2020 modification orders indicated that 

Child had a good and positive relationship with Mother and that nothing 

in the record demonstrates that phone calls with Child would have been 

detrimental to Child. Mother argues that Father "was aware [Child] was in 

counseling because she missed" Mother and that he withheld information 

from Mother concerning Child's health and education. But the court 

concluded that Father's actions did not amount to a defense under Calvin B.

¶14 In Calvin B., the mother interfered with the father's ability to 

develop a normal relationship with their child by violating a court-ordered 

visitation plan, and the father "actively sought more involvement" and 

pursued legal remedies despite the mother's efforts to restrict his access to 

their child. 232 Ariz. at 295, 297–98, ¶¶ 11, 22, 29. In contrast, here the court 

found and the record shows that (1) Father "sought to enforce the existing 

family court order" by requiring Mother to submit to weekly drug tests to 

revert back to unsupervised visitations, (2) Father's requirement for Mother 

to provide clean drug tests "was nothing like the [mother's] contumacious 

conduct in Calvin B.," and (3) Mother failed to "vigorously and persistently" 

assert her legal rights by seeking court action. The record shows that 

Mother did not seek court action after Father refused her requests. Even 

though Mother claims that she could not afford supervised visitations, 

Mother did not vigorously attempt to arrange supervised visitation—she 

did not inform the court of her inability to pay for supervised visitation 

through an agency nor suggest any other supervision alternatives after 

Father declined to allow the grandmothers to supervise. More importantly, 

Mother could have unilaterally eliminated the requirement for supervised 

visitation by submitting to weekly drug tests, which she failed to do for 

over two years. Nor did she seek any relief from the court regarding weekly 

drug tests.
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO C.F.

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¶15 Although contested, reasonable evidence supports the court's 

factual findings that Mother abandoned Child, and we cannot conclude that 

the court clearly erred in terminating Mother's parental rights.

II. Best Interests. 

¶16 Termination is in a child's best interests "if either: (1) the child 

will benefit from severance; or (2) the child will be harmed if severance is 

denied." Alma S. v. Dep't of Child Safety, 245 Ariz. 146, 150, ¶¶ 12–13 (2018) 

("The 'child's interest in stability and security' must be the court's primary 

concern." (quoting Demetrius L. v. Joshlynn F., 239 Ariz. 1, 4, ¶ 15 (2016))). 

The best-interests finding "focuses primarily upon the interests of the child, 

as distinct from those of the parent." Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279, 287, 

¶ 37 (2005). In conducting the best-interests inquiry, "courts must consider 

the totality of the circumstances existing at the time of the severance 

determination, including the child's adoptability." Alma S., 245 Ariz. at 148, 

¶ 1.

¶17 Mother argues that the court did not consider the totality of 

the circumstances, including Mother's rehabilitation efforts, Child's need 

for counseling because she missed Mother, and Father's actions to prevent 

Child from having relationships with maternal relatives. In addition to 

Child's adoptability, the court noted that Mother had not "offered any 

substantial evidence of her rehabilitation," even though Mother testified 

that she "had engaged in drug treatment." The court gave "little weight to 

Mother's testimony in this regard" and was in the "best position" to weigh 

any other factors in conducting its best-interests inquiry, notwithstanding 

Child's need for counseling and Father's efforts to prevent Child from 

developing relationships with maternal relatives. Oscar O., 209 Ariz. at 334,

¶ 4.

¶18 As to adoptability, a "current adoptive plan is one 

well-recognized example" of a benefit of termination. Id. at 334, ¶ 6; see 

Audra T. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 194 Ariz. 376, 377, ¶ 5 (App. 1998) ("One 

factor the court may properly consider in favor of [termination] is the 

immediate availability of an adoptive placement."). The court found 

Stepmother is "ready, willing, and able to adopt Child" and "that Child is in 

a loving and supportive environment and all her needs are being met." The 

court also concluded that "Child has bonded with [Stepmother] and she 

parents [Child] as a natural mother would." The record supports these 

findings. Thus, based on Stepmother's desire to adopt Child, the court did 

not clearly err in finding that termination was in Child's best interests.
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO C.F.

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CONCLUSION

¶19 We affirm.