Analysis of Severe

Roadway Accidents 

Involving Long Duration 

Fires

Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards 

NUREG/CR-7035
Analysis of Severe

Roadway Accidents

Involving Long Duration 

Fires

Prepared by:

G. Adams, T. Mintz

Center for Nuclear Waste Regulatory Analyses 

6220 Culebra Road

San Antonio, TX 78228

Manuscript Completed: December 2010 

Date Published: February 2011 

C. Bajwa, NRC Project Manager

NRC Job Code J5639

Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards

NUREG/CR-7035
iii

ABSTRACT

10 CFR Part 71 provides the regulatory requirements for the certification of transportation 

packages for spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and radioactive material. SNF packages are expected to 

be designed to endure a fully engulfing fire, as prescribed in 10 CFR Part 71. As a regulatory 

authority for transportation of radioactive materials, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

(NRC) ensures that packages designed to transport SNF meet the regulations prescribed in 

10 CFR Part 71. The purpose of the study described in this report was to support NRC in 

determining the different types and frequency of roadway accidents involving severe, long 

duration fires that could impact roadway transport of SNF. Roadway accident data were 

examined from the U.S. Department of Transportation—Pipeline and Hazardous Materials 

Safety Administration. This study focused on those in-transit hazardous material (HAZMAT)

accidents resulting in a fire that involved more than one vehicle. Such fires were analyzed to 

identify those that could have been severe enough to potentially affect an SNF package 

being transported on a roadway where the source of fuel for the fire would be from a 

vehicle not carrying the SNF package. From this study, the frequency of a severe fire 

occurring was estimated as roughly 4.90 × 10−5 accidents per million HAZMAT vehicle-km 

[7.89 × 10−5 accidents per million HAZMAT vehicle-mi]. This frequency represents 23 severe 

fire accidents occurring over the last 12 years (i.e., 1997 to 2008). None of the severe fire 

accidents involved the release of radioactive material. In general, severe fires are characterized 

by the release of flammable liquid (i.e., Class 3 HAZMAT), and in about 40 percent of the 

severe fires, more than 22,710 L [6,000 gal] of flammable liquid was released. Also, about half 

of the severe fires occurred on interstate highways with a median or divider and two of the 

severe fires occurred on interstate ramps. One of these accidents, occurring on a ramp, was 

likely in an enclosed area and as a result had the potential to generate a fire with higher 

average temperatures.
v

CONTENTS

Section Page

ABSTRACT................................................................................................................................ iii

FIGURES...................................................................................................................................vi

TABLES.................................................................................................................................... vii

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ...........................................................................................................ix

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS.............................................................................................................xi

ACRONYMS/ABBREVIATIONS............................................................................................... xiii

1 INTRODUCTION................................................................................................................1-1

1.1 Historical Review of Roadway Accident Data ............................................................1-1

1.2 Objective ...................................................................................................................1-3

1.3 Scope and Organization of the Report.......................................................................1-4

2 DATA ANALYSIS...............................................................................................................2-1

2.1 Data Sources.............................................................................................................2-1

2.2 Data Screening..........................................................................................................2-1

2.3 Overall Frequency of Hazardous Material Roadway Accidents..................................2-2

2.4 Data Classification for In-Transit Fires .......................................................................2-3

2.4.1 Hazardous Material Class ..............................................................................2-4

2.4.1.1 Radioactive Material Accidents........................................................2-5

2.4.1.2 Flammable Liquid Released ............................................................2-8

2.4.2 Estimated Speed............................................................................................2-9

3 IDENTIFICATION OF SEVERE FIRE ACCIDENTS...........................................................3-1

3.1 Roadway Accidents Involved in Potential Severe Fires..............................................3-2

3.2 Brief Description of Roadway Accidents ....................................................................3-3

3.2.1 Accidents With No Severe Fires.....................................................................3-3

3.2.2 Accidents With Severe Fires ..........................................................................3-9

3.2.3 Other Noteworthy Events .............................................................................3-12

3.3 Frequency of Severe Roadway Accidents ...............................................................3-13

3.4 Severe Fire Accident Parameter Trends..................................................................3-13

3.4.1 Hazardous Material Type and Quantity ........................................................3-14

3.4.2 Speed and Time of Accident ........................................................................3-16

3.4.3 Cause and Location of Severe Accident.......................................................3-18

3.4.4 Summary of Severe Fire Accident Parameter Trends ..................................3-19

4 CONCLUSIONS.................................................................................................................4-1

5 REFERENCES...................................................................................................................5-1

APPENDIX A .....................................................................................................................A-1

APPENDIX B .....................................................................................................................B-1
vi

FIGURES

Figure Page

2-1 Hazardous Material In-Transit Fires..............................................................................2-3

2-2 In-Transit Fires Separated by Hazardous Material Class..............................................2-4

2-3 Radioactive Material Accidents.....................................................................................2-5

2-4 Amount of Flammable Liquid Released for In-Transit Fires Involving

More Than One Vehicle................................................................................................2-8

2-5 Estimated Speed for In-Transit Fires ............................................................................2-9

3-1 Severe Accidents Separated by Hazardous Material Class ........................................3-14

3-2 Amount of Flammable Liquid Released During Severe Accidents ..............................3-15

3-3 Estimated Speed for Severe Accidents.......................................................................3-16

3-4 Time of Occurrence for Severe Accidents ..................................................................3-17

3-5 Cause of Severe Accidents ........................................................................................3-18

3-6 Location of Severe Accidents .....................................................................................3-19
vii

TABLES

Table Page

1-1 Comparison of Roadway Accident Frequencies ...........................................................1-3

2-1 Frequency of In-Transit HAZMAT Roadway Accidents .................................................2-2

2-2 Frequency of In-Transit Radioactive Material Roadway Accidents................................2-6

2-3 In-Transit Fires Involving More Than One Vehicle and a Flammable 

Liquid Release..............................................................................................................2-9

3-1 Roadway Accidents Involving a Collision With a Train..................................................3-3

3-2 Roadway Accidents Involving Material That Could Not Pool.........................................3-4

3-3 Roadway Accidents With Insufficient Material Release to Be Severe ...........................3-5

3-4 Roadway Accidents With Fires Involving a Single Vehicle............................................3-6

3-5 Roadway Severe Accidents..........................................................................................3-9

3-6 Roadway Accidents in Enclosed Space......................................................................3-12

3-7 Summary of Severe Roadway Accidents From 1997 to 2008.....................................3-13
ix

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

As a regulatory authority for transportation of radioactive materials in the United States, the 

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) ensures that packages designed to transport 

radioactive material, including spent nuclear fuel (SNF), meet the regulations prescribed in 

10 CFR Part 71. In 2003, the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) formed a committee to 

evaluate risks associated with transportation of SNF and high-level radioactive waste in the 

United States. The principal findings from this evaluation indicated that there are no technical 

barriers to safe transport. However, NAS recommended that NRC conduct additional analyses 

of very long duration fires that may exceed the current regulations. The purpose of the study 

described in this report was to support NRC in determining the different types and frequency 

of roadway accidents involving severe, long duration fires that could impact SNF transport 

on roadways.

To perform this study, roadway accidents from the past 12 years (i.e., 1997 to 2008) were 

analyzed to estimate the accident frequency involving hazardous material (HAZMAT) releases. 

Roadway accident data were obtained from the U.S. Department of Transportation—Pipeline 

and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration with vehicle mileage data obtained from the 

U.S. Census Bureau and the Bureau of Transportation Statistics. Based on this 

information, more than 23,000 in-transit HAZMAT accidents occurred in the past 12 years, 

resulting in a frequency of approximately 4.92 × 10−2 accidents per million HAZMAT vehicle-km 

[7.92 × 10−2 accidents per million HAZMAT vehicle-mi].

Most of the report focuses on the review of in-transit fires involving more than one vehicle 

because these types of accidents would most likely result in a transportation package being 

exposed to a fire. This assumes that a transportation package would not provide fuel to a fire 

and that it would be unlikely for fuel from the truck transporting the SNF to leak from a ruptured 

fuel tank, leak under the package, and fully engulf it in a fire. For in-transit fires, the frequency 

was approximately 1.02 × 10−3 accidents per million HAZMAT vehicle-km [1.64 × 10−3 accidents 

per million HAZMAT vehicle-mi], and for those fires involving more than one vehicle, the 

frequency was approximately 2.98 × 10−4 accidents per million HAZMAT vehicle-km [4.8 × 10−4

accidents per million HAZMAT vehicle-mi]. In addition, roadway accidents for the past 12 years 

were analyzed in more detail to identify those accidents involving a severe fire and to estimate 

the severe accident frequency.

During the last 12 years, 477 in-transit roadway accidents resulted in a fire and 140 of them 

involved more than 1 vehicle. Out of these 140 fires, only 23 were identified as severe. The 

identification of a severe fire was based on the following criteria: (i) the principal source of fuel 

for the engulfing fire was from another vehicle, (ii) fuel was flammable liquid that could pool 

under another vehicle, (iii) the accident involved more than one vehicle but not collisions of a 

vehicle with a train, and (iv) the fire persisted for an extended period of time. Using these four 

criteria, on average, two severe fire accidents occurred per year resulting in a frequency of 

approximately 4.90 × 10−5 accidents per million HAZMAT vehicle-km [7.89 × 10−5 accidents per 

million HAZMAT vehicle-mi].

In addition to calculating the frequency, severe fire accidents were analyzed to identify trends in 

the data. In general, severe fires are characterized by the release of flammable liquid 

(i.e., Class 3 HAZMAT), and in about 40 percent of the severe fires, more than 22,710 L 

[6,000 gal] of flammable liquid were released. Also, about half of the severe fires occurred on 

interstate highways with a median or divider and 2 out of the 23 severe fires occurred on 

interstate ramps. Accident descriptions are brief, so it is difficult to determine with certainty,

however, one of these accidents on a ramp was likely in an enclosed area because of its 

location on the highway ramp and as such potentially led to a hotter fire. Consistent with their 
x

occurrence about half the time on interstate highways, typically more in-transit severe fires 

occurred in the speed range from 66 to 97 km/h [41 to 60 mph].

Based on the analysis of roadway accident data involving in-transit HAZMAT fires, there is a 

very small frequency of severe fires and therefore a very small frequency that an SNF package 

being transported on the roadway would be affected in a severe fire. Out of the 23,106 in-transit 

HAZMAT accidents, only about 2 percent (i.e., 477 out of 23,106) involved a fire and only about 

0.1 percent (i.e., 23 out of 23,106) resulted in a severe fire.
xi 

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 

This report was prepared to document work performed by the Center for Nuclear Waste 

Regulatory Analyses (CNWRA®) for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) under 

Contract No. NRC–02–07–006. The activities reported here were performed on behalf of the 

NRC Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, Division of Spent Fuel Storage and 

Transportation. The report is an independent product of CNWRA and does not necessarily 

reflect the views or regulatory position of NRC. 

The authors would like to thank C. Bajwa and E. Easton for guidance during this study. In 

addition, the authors would like to thank M. Necsoiu for data retrieval, A. Ghosh for technical 

review, S. Mohanty for programmatic review, and L. Mulverhill for editorial review. The authors 

also appreciate A. Ramos for providing word processing support in preparation of 

this document. 

QUALITY OF DATA, ANALYSES, AND CODE DEVELOPMENT 

DATA: All CNWRA-generated data contained in this report meet quality assurance 

requirements described in the Geosciences and Engineering Division Quality Assurance 

Manual. Data used in this report are derived from publicly available sources. Each data source 

is cited in this report and should be consulted for determining the level of quality of those 

cited data. 

ANALYSES AND CODES: Microsoft® Office Excel® 2003 (Microsoft, 2003) was used to 

organize the data, and macros were written within this software to analyze the data. 

REFERENCE 

Microsoft. “Microsoft Office Excel 2003.” Redmond, Washington: Microsoft Corporation. 2003. 

 
xiii

ACRONYMS/ABBREVIATIONS

ANL Argonne National Laboratory

CNWRA Center for Nuclear Waste Regulatory Analyses

BTS Bureau of Transportation Statistics

DOE U.S. Department of Energy

HAC Hypothetical Accident Condition

HAZMAT Hazardous Material

NAS National Academy of Sciences

NRC U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

NTSB National Transportation Safety Board

PHMSA Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration

SFST Spent Fuel Storage and Transportation

SNF Spent Nuclear Fuel

WIPP Waste Isolation Pilot Plant
1-1

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Historical Review of Roadway Accident Data

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) currently shares regulatory authority for the 

packaging and transportation of high-level radioactive materials with the U.S. Department of 

Transportation. Under the NRC regulations in 10 CFR Part 71, a spent nuclear fuel (SNF) 

transportation package must be designed to withstand hypothetical accident conditions (HACs), 

including dropping, crushing, puncturing, engulfing fire, and immersing in water. The current 

regulations state that an SNF transportation package must be designed to survive a fully 

engulfing fire with an average flame temperature of at least 800°C [1,475°F] for a period of not 

less than 30 minutes. Once subjected to this HAC fire, the transportation package must 

maintain containment, shielding, and criticality functions throughout and after the fire exposure.

In 2003, the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) formed a committee on transportation of 

radioactive waste. The original purpose of this committee was to evaluate the risks and identify 

key current and future technical and societal concerns with the transportation of SNF and 

high-level radioactive waste in the United States. After the study began, the scope of the 

committee expanded to include the examination of procedures the U.S. Department of Energy 

(DOE) used for selecting routes to transport DOE research reactor SNF. The review 

(National Academies Press, 2006) included but was not limited to examination of previous 

technical studies on package performance, transportation procedures, transportation risk, 

transportation corridors, and presentations during public meetings.

The principal finding from the NAS committee was that there were no fundamental technical 

barriers for the safe transport of SNF or high-level radioactive waste. However, the NAS 

committee indicated that social and institutional challenges must be resolved to successfully 

implement a large quantity shipping program. In addition to this principal finding, the NAS 

committee indicated that the current international standards and U.S. regulations, at the time of 

writing the report, are adequate to ensure that the transportation package would provide 

adequate protection over various transportation conditions. However, the NAS committee did 

note that various technical reports indicated a very small number of severe accident conditions 

involving long duration fires could potentially compromise the containment integrity of the SNF 

package. The committee further recommended that NRC conduct additional analyses of very 

long duration fire scenarios that bound accident conditions expected to occur under 

realistic accidents.

Based upon the NAS committee recommendation, NRC has continued to evaluate accidents 

that involve severe, long duration fires. This includes the evaluation of the MacArthur Maze fire 

in April 2007 near the San Francisco–Oakland Bay Bridge in California and the Newhall Pass 

Tunnel fire that occurred in October 2007 north of Los Angeles, California. Both of these 

accidents are included in Section 3.2.3 of this report. In addition to these two roadway 

accidents, NRC had evaluated long duration fire events (i.e., longer than 30 minutes exposure) 

before the NAS committee’s report was published. These include the Baltimore (rail) tunnel fire 

that occurred in July 2001 and the Caldecott Tunnel fire that happened in April 1982 near 

Oakland, California. Neither of these two accidents is included in this report because one of 

them was a railway accident and the other one occurred more than 12 years ago. However, all 

four accidents are noteworthy because accident analyses indicated that the peak temperatures 

in these fires could have exceeded the 800 °C [1,475 °F] stipulated in 10 CFR Part 71. Note, 

however, the regulatory temperature is an average temperature (not a peak) and the 

temperature of the fire is not the only important feature in understanding the implication of these 

events for transportation of SNF. The likelihood that one of these severe accidents could occur 

must also be taken into consideration.
1-2

Various studies have reviewed the frequency of accidents involving SNF. NUREG–0170, 

“Final Environmental Statement on the Transportation of Radioactive Material by Air and 

Other Modes,” (NRC, 1977) considered two factors in evaluating the impact of accidents 

involving vehicles carrying radioactive shipments: the frequency of an accident to occur and the 

consequence of this accident. This report examined the accident rates for aircraft, truck, rail, 

helicopter, and ship. For truck accidents, the severity was based upon the crush force and fire 

duration at a temperature of 1,027 °C [1,880 °F]. The crush force ranged from 0 to 2.22 × 106

newtons and was divided into 7 classes of severity. As indicated, the classification of the 

accident severity was also dependent upon the fire duration. The classification based on fire 

duration was evenly distributed roughly every 30 minutes. The NRC study based its accident 

frequency on “Quantitative Characterization of the Environment Experienced by Cargo in Motor 

Carrier Accidents” (Foley, et al., 1974), which calculated accident frequencies based upon 

accident rates reported for intercity shipments of property by Class I and II Interstate Motor 

Carriers. Based upon the data Foley, et al. (1974) developed; the overall frequency used was 

1.1 × 10−6 accidents per vehicle-km [1.7 × 10−6 accidents per vehicle-mi].

Additionally, NUREG/CR–4829, “Shipping Container Response to Severe Highway and Railway 

Accident Conditions,” (Fischer, et al., 1988) evaluated the response of spent fuel packages 

exposed to severe highway and railway accident conditions if a severe accident occurred during 

the shipment of SNF. In this evaluation, roadway accident rates are highly variable and depend 

upon many elements including road type, vehicle type, regulations, and driving practices. The 

analyses in the Fischer, et al. (1988) report derived two accident rates from different sources. 

The first source was the U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Motor Carrier Safety 

Administration for all roadways. The data analyzed from this source spanned the time between 

1960 and 1972. The calculated frequency for this time range was 1.6 × 10−6 accidents per 

vehicle-km [2.5 × 10−6 accidents per vehicle-mi]. The U.S. Department of Transportation, 

Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration data included all truck and carrier types of 

accidents. The analyses in the same NRC (1988) report included a second source: American 

Petroleum Institute data from 1968 through 1981 for all roadways. The accident frequency from 

this second data source was calculated to be 4.0 × 10−6 accidents per vehicle-km [6.4 × 10−6

accidents per vehicle-mi]. For the Fischer, et al. (1988) report, the American Petroleum Institute 

accident rate was used as the estimate for spent fuel truck accident rates, because it was 

assumed that these data were more reliable and the transportation would be more consistent 

with that used to transport SNF packages. 

NRC decided to reexamine the risks associated with the shipment of SNF in NUREG/CR–6672, 

“Reexamination of Spent Fuel Shipment Risk Estimates,” (Sprung, et al., 2000). This report 

evaluated various reports that had reviewed frequencies of past roadway accident rates. 

Sprung, et al. (2000) indicated that the most comprehensive data set available at the time was 

from the U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration. Also, 

Sprung, et al. (2000) indicated that Argonne National Laboratory (ANL) had reviewed accident 

data between the years 1984 and 1986 through 1988 using the U.S. Department of 

Transportation data in ANL/ASD/TN–150, “State-Level Accident Rates of Surface Freight 

Transportation: A Reexamination” (Saricks and Tompkins, 1999). The resulting accident 

frequency from the ANL review was 3.6 × 10−7 accidents per vehicle-km [5.8 × 10−7 accidents 

per vehicle-mi].

In addition, DOE examined the risk associated with transport of SNF in DOE/EIS–0250, “Final 

Environmental Impact Statement for a Geologic Repository for the Disposal of Spent Nuclear 

Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste at Yucca Mountain, Nye County, Nevada” (DOE, 2002). 

DOE evaluated its roadway freight accidents based upon ANL/ASD/TN–150 (Saricks and 

Tompkins, 1999). The roadway accident rates were based on statistics the U.S. Department of 
1-3

Transportation, Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration compiled from 1994 through 1996. 

From the data, the composite mean frequency was calculated as 3.2 × 10−7 accidents per 

vehicle-km [5.2 × 10−7 accidents per vehicle-mi].

These previous reports are compared in Table 1-1, which indicates that the earlier studies had a 

slightly higher accident frequency per vehicle mile than the later studies. This may have been 

the result of the changes in the regulations or automotive advancements that have

increased the safety of roadway travel over the past 30 years. As Table 1-1 shows, the

main source of information for accident frequency was data from the U.S. Department of 

Transportation, Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration. However, some studies, 

including Fischer, et al. (1998), used other sources of information, such as the American 

Petroleum Institute.

Table 1-1. Comparison of Roadway Accident Frequencies

Source Document Source of Data

Reported Accident 

Frequency 

(Accidents/Vehicle-mi)*

NUREG–0170† SAN074–0001‡ 1.7 × 10−6

NUREG/CR–4829§

U.S. Department of Transportation, 

Federal Motor Carrier Safety 

Administration,

1960–1972

2.5 × 10−6

NUREG/CR–4829§ American Petroleum Institute,

1968–1981 4.0 × 10−6

NUREG/CR–6672║

U.S. Department of Transportation 

Office of Motor Carriers,

1984 and 1986–1988

5.8 × 10−7

DOE/EIS–0250¶ U.S. Department of Transportation 

Office of Motor Carriers, 1994–1996 5.2 × 10−7

*To convert to accidents/vehicle-km divide by 1.609

†NRC. NUREG–0170, “Final Environmental Statement on the Transportation of Radioactive Material by Air 

and Other Modes.” Washington, DC: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. December 1977.

‡Clarke, R.K., J.T. Folwy, W.F. Hartman, and D.W. Larson. “Severities of Transportation Accidents, Volume I: 

Summary.” SAND74–0001. Albuquerque, New Mexico: Sandia Laboratories. 1975.

§Fischer, L.E., C.K. Chou, M.A. Gerhard, C.Y. Kimura, R.W. Martin, R.W. Mensing, M.E. Mount, and M.C. 

Witte. NUREG/CR–4829, “Shipping Container Response to Severe Highway and Railway Accidents 

Conditions.” Washington, DC: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 1988.

║Sprung, J.L., D.J. Ammerman, J.A. Koski, and F.R. Weiner. NUREG/CR–6672, “Reexamination of Spent 

Fuel Shipment Risk Estimates.” Washington, DC: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 2000.

¶DOE. DOE/EIS–0250, “Final Environmental Impact Statement for a Geologic Repository for the Disposal 

of Spent Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste at Yucca Mountain, Nye County, Nevada.” 

Las Vegas, Nevada: DOE, Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management. February 2002.

1.2 Objective

The objective of this study is to support the NRC Division of Spent Fuel Storage and 

Transportation (SFST) in its review of severe roadway transportation accidents involving long 

duration fires. SFST develops and implements NRC programs governing storage and 

transportation of SNF. To support the SFST mission, the Center for Nuclear Waste Regulatory 

Analyses (CNWRA®) was tasked to review available data on roadway accidents carrying 

flammable hazardous material (HAZMAT) that resulted in a long duration fire and assess 

possible trends associated with roadway accidents involving long duration fires. 
1-4

1.3 Scope and Organization of the Report

As will be described in Chapter 2 of this report, more than 23,000 reported in-transit1

This report focuses on the statistics and trends of historical roadway accident data. The 

document is organized into four chapters, including this chapter (Chapter 1, Introduction). 

Historical roadway accident data are reviewed in Chapter 2. Chapter 2 also evaluates accident 

frequency from the U.S. Department of Transportation, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety 

Administration (PHMSA) accident data and examines the trends associated with these data. 

Chapter 3 narrows down this accident list to focus on the evaluation and trends of accidents 

involving severe fire. Chapter 4 presents conclusions from this study.

accidents 

occurred between 1997 and 2008 that involved HAZMAT. Many of these were minor releases

or there was not a release, and only 59 involved radioactive materials. Analyzing the roadway 

accident statistics and determining whether there are any trends in the data can support NRC 

evaluations of current and future regulations associated with transportation of SNF.

____________

1

As stated in PHMSA (2004), in-transit means the incident occurred or was first discovered while the package was in 

the process of being transported.
2-1

2 DATA ANALYSIS

The regulations at 49 CFR 171.15 and 49 CFR 171.16 govern the reporting of HAZMAT 

incidents. Using information primarily from PHMSA, the data analysis in this chapter focuses on 

roadway in-transit HAZMAT incidents involving a fire. Those in-transit fires involving more than 

one vehicle were further analyzed in Chapter 3 to identify which accidents would include severe 

fires. Although the regulations and the information obtained from PHMSA are in terms of 

HAZMAT incidents, the term “accident” is used instead of “incident” in the remainder of this 

chapter for consistency with the rest of this report and the studies described in Chapter 1. 

In-transit fires involving more than one vehicle were reviewed to understand how a truck 

carrying an SNF package could be involved in a fully engulfing fire. As will be later described in 

Chapter 3, for the fire to be a severe fire and provide sufficient fuel for a fully engulfing fire, the 

source of fuel needs to come from another vehicle such as a truck loaded with Class 3 HAZMAT 

(i.e., flammable liquid). In-transit fires involving more than one vehicle included collisions 

between a truck carrying HAZMAT and a train, a truck carrying HAZMAT and another truck, and 

a truck carrying HAZMAT and a car. However, in-transit fires involving more than one vehicle 

were not just limited to collisions but also included another vehicle swerving in front of a truck 

carrying HAZMAT. Noncollision accidents were considered because in some cases, it was not 

clear from the accident description whether a collision actually occurred when a vehicle swerved 

in front of the truck carrying HAZMAT and it was important to consider another vehicle being 

involved in the fire whether or not a collision actually occurred. Instead of more narrowly 

defining the data set, the individual in-transit fires involving more than one vehicle were 

analyzed further using the criteria described in Chapter 3 and then narrowed down to identify 

the ones that were severe fires.

2.1 Data Sources

PHMSA compiles information on HAZMAT accidents in summary reports (PHMSA, 2010a) and 

in an online searchable database (PHMSA, 2010b). The number of in-transit HAZMAT 

accidents and the number of in-transit fires from 1998 to 2008 were obtained using the PHMSA 

summary reports and online database. However, 1997 data were requested directly from 

PHMSA because they could not be downloaded from the website.

Data for number of vehicle miles were used to calculate the frequency for in-transit HAZMAT 

accidents. Data for vehicle miles were obtained from the Bureau of Transportation Statistics

(BTS, 2010), and HAZMAT vehicle miles were obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau (2004). 

2.2 Data Screening

The data analysis focused on in-transit HAZMAT highway accidents obtained from PHMSA

(2010b). In-transit highway accidents were downloaded from PHMSA for 1998 to 2008 in a 

comma-separated value file and then analyzed in Microsoft® Excel®. Duplicate records for an 

individual accident were identified by matching the record numbers and also by using a field in 

the database that identified these multiple records. Those in-transit accidents involving fires 

were then separated from the larger data set, placed in a separate Excel file, and analyzed to 

determine the type and amount of HAZMAT released.
2-2

2.3 Overall Frequency of Hazardous Material Roadway Accidents

Table 2-1 shows the overall frequency of in-transit HAZMAT roadway accidents for the past 

12 years (i.e., 1997 to 2008). The last row in the table summarizes total vehicle miles, total 

accidents, and average frequencies of these accidents. As shown in this table, for the 12 years 

from 1997 to 2008, the frequency of a HAZMAT accident was approximately 4.92 × 10−2

accidents per million HAZMAT vehicle-km [7.92 × 10−2 accidents per million HAZMAT 

vehicle-mi]. For in-transit fires, the frequency was approximately 1.02 × 10−3 accidents per 

million HAZMAT vehicle-km [1.64 × 10−3 accidents per million HAZMAT vehicle-mi], and for 

those fires involving more than 1 vehicle, the frequency was approximately 2.98 × 10−4

accidents per million HAZMAT vehicle-km [4.8 × 10−4 accidents per million HAZMAT vehicle-mi]. 

As shown in Table 2-1, the number of in-transit HAZMAT accidents appears to have increased 

over time, with the number of in-transit accidents in 2008 (i.e., 2,513) about 70 percent greater 

than the number for 1997 (i.e., 1,494).

Table 2-1. Frequency of In-Transit HAZMAT Roadway Accidents

Year

Million 

HAZMAT 

Vehicle 

Miles*

In-Transit HAZMAT 

Accidents In-Transit Fires

In-Transit Fires 

Involving More Than 

One Vehicle

Number Frequency† Number Frequency† Number Frequency†

2008 24,707 2,513 1.02 × 10−1 40 1.62 × 10−3 9 3.64 × 10−4

2007 24,707 2,636 1.07 × 10−1 38 1.54 × 10−3 11 4.45 × 10−4

2006 24,223 2,741 1.13 × 10−1 32 1.32 × 10−3 9 3.72 × 10−4

2005 24,224 2,132 8.80 × 10−2 39 1.61 × 10−3 10 4.13 × 10−4

2004 24,038 1,468 6.11 × 10−2 46 1.91 × 10−3 16 6.66 × 10−4

2003 23,723 1,505 6.34 × 10−2 43 1.81 × 10−3 11 4.64 × 10−4

2002 23,362 1,352 5.79 × 10−2 34 1.46 × 10−3 9 3.85 × 10−4

2001 24,908 1,482 5.95 × 10−2 45 1.81 × 10−3 15 6.02 × 10−4

2000 24,489 1,970 8.04 × 10−2 56 2.29 × 10−3 20 8.17 × 10−4

1999 24,152 1,874 7.76 × 10−2 38 1.57 × 10−3 12 4.97 × 10−4

1998 23,400 1,939 8.29 × 10−2 29 1.24 × 10−3 9 3.85 × 10−4

1997 24,788 1,494 6.03 × 10−2 37 1.49 × 10−3 9 3.63 × 10−4

Summary 291,566 23,106 7.92 × 10−2 477 1.64 × 10−3 140 4.80 × 10−4

*To convert from mi to km, multiply by 1.609.

†Frequency in accidents per million HAZMAT vehicle-mi. To convert to accidents per million HAZMAT vehiclekm, divide by 1.609.

To develop the frequencies in Table 2-1, the number of in-transit accidents was obtained 

directly from PHMSA; however, HAZMAT vehicle miles had to be estimated because data were 

available for only 1997 and 2002 from the U.S. Census Bureau (2004). For 1997, the number of 

HAZMAT vehicle miles was approximately 13 percent of total vehicle miles, and for 2002, the 

number of HAZMAT vehicle miles was approximately 11 percent of total vehicle miles. Based 

on this information, the HAZMAT vehicle miles were estimated to be 11 to 12 percent of total 

vehicle miles for the remaining years. Between 1997 and 2002, the average of 12 percent was 

used. After 2002, the same percentage for 2002 (i.e., 11 percent) was used. Note that total 

vehicle miles were not available for 2008; therefore, 2007 data were used. These estimated 

HAZMAT vehicle miles are shown in Table 2-1.
2-3

About 2 percent of the HAZMAT accidents listed in Table 2-1 resulted in an in-transit fire 

(i.e., 477 out of 23,106). Additionally, about 30 percent of the in-transit fires involved more than 

1 vehicle (i.e., 140 out of 477), and in 9 of these fires, the other vehicle was a train. Figure 2-1 

shows the number of HAZMAT in-transit fires for the last 12 years. As shown in this figure, in 

contrast to what appears to be an increasing trend in HAZMAT accidents (Table 2-1), the 

number of in-transit fires (including those involving more than one vehicle) does not appear to 

increase or decrease significantly over time. On average, 40 in-transit fires occurred per year,

and approximately 30 percent of them (i.e., 12 per year), on average, involved more than 

1 vehicle. The number of in-transit fires was the highest in 2000; 56 in-transit fires occurred with 

approximately 36 percent of them (i.e., 20) involving more than 1 vehicle.

Figure 2-1. Hazardous Material In-Transit Fires

2.4 Data Classification for In-Transit Fires

In-transit fires were analyzed to determine the type and amount of HAZMAT released and the 

estimated speed of the vehicle carrying the HAZMAT. This data classification was used to help 

identify trends that may impact the severity of a fire.

40 38

32

39

46

43

34

45

56

38

29

37

9 11 9 10

16

11 9

15

20

12

9 9

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

Year

Number of Accidents

In-Transit Fires

In-Transit Fires Involving More than One Vehicle
2-4

2.4.1 Hazardous Material Class

Figure 2-2 shows in-transit fires for HAZMAT classes involving explosives, flammable material, 

oxidizer, and radioactive material. As determined from this figure and Table 2-1, flammable 

liquid was involved in about 69 percent (i.e., 329 out of 477) of the in-transit fires; flammable gas 

was involved in about 8 percent (i.e., 40 out of 477) of the in-transit fires; and oxidizer was 

involved in about 5 percent (i.e., 22 out of 477) of the in-transit fires. Although only 1 percent of 

the in-transit fires involved radioactive material (i.e., 5 out of 477), in 1 of these fires, flammable 

liquid and radioactive material were released.1 As shown in Figure 2-2, more than 1 vehicle was 

involved in about 33 percent of the in-transit fires involving flammable gas (i.e., 13 out of 40) or 

liquid (i.e., 108 out of 329). Additionally, more than 1 vehicle was involved in about 20 percent 

of the in-transit fires involving explosives (i.e., 1 out of 6), an oxidizer (i.e., 4 out of 22), or 

radioactive material (i.e., 1 out of 5).

Figure 2-2. In-Transit Fires Separated by Hazardous Material Class. Some Fires Involved 

More Than One Hazardous Material Class.

1

For more information on this accident, refer to PHMSA (2010b, Report Number I–2003041380).

6

40

329

13 22

1 5 13

108

3 4 1

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

1 2.1 3 4 5.1 7

HAZMAT Class

Number of Accidents

In-Transit Fires

In-Transit Fires

Involving More than

One Vehicle

Class 1: Explosives

Class 2.1: Flammable Gas

Class 3: Flammable Liquid

Class 4: Flammable Solid

Class 5.1: Oxidizer

Class 7: Radioactive Material
2-5 

2.4.1.1 Radioactive Material Accidents 

Figure 2-3 shows the number of radioactive material (i.e., Class 7 HAZMAT) in-transit accidents 

(with and without a fire) and radioactive material in-transit fires for the past 12 years (i.e., 1997 

to 2008). In these 12 years, on average, about 5 in-transit accidents involving radioactive 

material occurred per year. However, as shown in this figure, the number of in-transit accidents 

varied greatly from year to year. For example, the number of accidents in 2005 was more than 

twice the average and just 3 years later in 2008, the number of accidents was less than half the 

average. From 1997 to 2008, only five in-transit accidents resulted in fires with four of them 

occurring from 2003 to 2005. The accident occurring in 2003 involved more than one vehicle. 

Figure 2-3. Radioactive Material Accidents 

2

3

6

11

88

2

1

4

5

1

8

000

1

2

1

00

1

0 000

5

10

15

1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

Year

Radioactive Material Accidents

In-Transit Accidents

In-Transit Fires
2-6

Table 2-2 shows the frequency of in-transit radioactive material (i.e., Class 7 HAZMAT)

accidents for the past 12 years (i.e., 1997 to 2008). The last row in the table summarizes total 

vehicles miles, total accidents, and average frequencies of those accidents. As shown in this 

table, for the 12 years from 1997 to 2008, the frequency of an in-transit radioactive material 

accident was approximately 7.27 × 10−2 accidents per million Class 7 HAZMAT vehicle-km

[1.17 × 10−1 accidents per million Class 7 HAZMAT vehicle-mi]. With 5 in-transit fires 

occurring over the 12 years, the frequency for an in-transit radioactive material fire accident

was approximately 6.18 × 10−3 accidents per million Class 7 HAZMAT vehicle-km [9.95 × 10−3

accidents per million Class 7 HAZMAT vehicle-mi]. Only 1 of these fires involved another 

vehicle for a frequency of 1.24 × 10−3 accidents per million Class 7 HAZMAT vehicle-km

[1.99 × 10−3 accidents per million Class 7 HAZMAT vehicle-mi]. To develop the frequencies in 

Table 2-2, the number of in-transit radioactive material accidents was obtained directly from 

PHMSA; however, the number of Class 7 HAZMAT (i.e., radioactive material) vehicle miles had 

to be estimated because data were available for only 1997 and 2002 from the U.S. Census 

Bureau (2004, 1999). For 1997, the number of radioactive material vehicle miles was 

approximately 0.04 percent of total vehicle miles, and for 2002, the number of radioactive 

material vehicle miles was approximately 0.01 percent of total vehicle miles.

Table 2-2. Frequency of In-Transit Radioactive Material Roadway Accidents

Year

Million 

Class 7 

HAZMAT 

Vehicle 

Miles*

In-Transit Radioactive 

Material Accidents In-Transit Fires

In-Transit Fires 

Involving More Than 

One Vehicle

Number Frequency† Number Frequency† Number

Frequency

†

2008 29.7 2 6.73 × 10−2 0 0.00 × 100 0 0.00

2007 29.7 3 1.01 × 10−1 0 0.00 × 100 0 0.00

2006 29.1 6 2.06 × 10−1 0 0.00 × 100 0 0.00

2005 29.1 11 3.78 × 10−1 1 3.43 × 10−2 0 0.00

2004 28.9 8 2.77 × 10−1 2 6.92 × 10−2 0 0.00

2003 28.5 8 2.80 × 10−1 1 3.50 × 10−2 1 3.50 ×

10−2

2002 28.1 2 7.12 × 10−2 0 0.00 × 100 0 0.00

2001 56.6 1 1.77 × 10−2 0 0.00 × 100 0 0.00

2000 55.7 4 7.18 × 10−2 1 1.80 × 10−2 0 0.00

1999 54.9 5 9.10 × 10−2 0 0.00 × 100 0 0.00

1998 53.2 1 1.88 × 10−2 0 0.00 × 100 0 0.00

1997 78.7 8 1.02 × 10−1 0 0.00 × 100 0 0.00

Summary

502.4 59 1.17 × 10−1 5 9.95 × 10−3 1 1.99 ×

10−3

*To convert from mi to km, multiply by 1.609.

†Frequency in accidents per million Class 7 HAZMAT vehicle-mi. To convert to accidents per million Class 7 

HAZMAT vehicle-km divide by 1.609.

Based on this information, the radioactive material vehicle miles were estimated to be 0.01 

to 0.03 percent of total vehicle miles for the remaining years. Between 1997 and 2002, 

the average of 0.03 percent was used. After 2002, the same percentage for 2002 

(i.e., 0.01 percent) was used. Note that total vehicle miles were not available for 2008; 

therefore, 2007 data were used. These estimated Class 7 HAZMAT (i.e., radioactive material)

vehicle miles are shown in Table 2-2.
2-7

The estimated average frequency of in-transit radioactive material accidents shown in Table 2-2

is comparable within an order of magnitude to the frequency Battelle (2001) estimated. 

Battelle (2001) calculated an accident rate for Class 7 HAZMAT (i.e., radioactive material) of 

2.45 × 10−1 accidents per million Class 7 HAZMAT vehicle-km [3.95 × 10−1 accidents per million 

Class 7 HAZMAT vehicle-mi] using data from 1990 through 1999. It estimated 12 accidents in

48.9 million km [30.4 million mi], which is comparable to the data for in-transit radioactive 

material accidents for 2005 shown in Table 2-2. However, the average frequency over 12 years 

of data in Table 2-2 {7.27 × 10−2 accidents per million Class 7 HAZMAT vehicle-km [1.17 × 10−1

accidents per million Class 7 HAZMAT vehicle-mi]} is smaller by more than a factor of three. At 

least some of this difference is due to the uncertainty in estimating radioactive material miles. 

From Table 2-2, on average, radioactive material is estimated to have been transported

67.4 million km [41.9 million mi] annually compared to 48.9 million km [30.4 million mi] estimated 

by Battelle, an increase of about 38 percent. The larger difference, however, involves the 

number of in-transit radioactive material accidents. As shown in Table 2-2, on average about 

5 in-transit radioactive material accidents were identified from PHMSA per year, which is less 

than half of the approximately 12 accidents estimated in Battelle (2001).

In addition, based on information from the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), DOE (2009a)

identified 8 traffic accidents involving WIPP trucks in the first 10 years of operation. Using

shipment information from November 30, 2009 (DOE, 2009b), totaling approximately 

15.4 million km [9.6 million loaded mi] and assuming 8 or fewer accidents involving a loaded 

WIPP truck, the frequency for an accident would be approximately 6.46 × 10−2 to 5.18 × 10−1

accidents per million loaded vehicle-km [1.04 × 10−1 to 8.33 × 10−1 accidents per million loaded

vehicle-mi], which is also comparable within an order of magnitude to the average frequency for 

in-transit radioactive material accidents estimated in Table 2-2.
2-8 

2.4.1.2 Flammable Liquid Released 

As determined from Figure 2-2 and Table 2-1, flammable liquid was involved in about 

77 percent (i.e., 108 out of 140) of the in-transit fires involving more than 1 vehicle. Figure 2-4 

shows a subset of these 108 in-transit fires because the amount of flammable liquid released 

was identified in only 98 of the 108 fires. In this figure, the amount of flammable liquid released 

was arbitrarily separated into 7,570-L [2,000-gal] bins. 

As shown in Figure 2-4, in about half of the fires (i.e., 52 out of 98), more than 22,710 L 

[6,000 gal] of flammable liquid were released. As shown to the far right in this figure, in 1 of 

these fires, 50,719 L [13,400 gal] were released. Although not shown in this figure, for the 

lowest bin {i.e., 3.8 to 7,570 L [1 to 2,000 gal]}, about 70 percent of the fires (i.e., 23 out of 33) 

involved the release of fewer than 1,893 L [500 gal] of flammable liquid. 

Figure 2-4. Amount of Flammable Liquid Released for In-Transit Fires Involving More 

Than One Vehicle. To Convert From Gallons to Liters, Multiply by 3.785. 

33

8

5

17

34

0 1

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

 1 -

2000

2001 -

4000

4001 -

6000

6001 -

8000

8001 -

10000

10001 -

12000

12001 -

14000

Flammable Liquid Released (gal)

Number of In-Transit Fires
2-9

2.4.2 Estimated Speed

Figure 2-5 displays the number of in-transit fires in terms of estimated speed for the vehicle 

carrying HAZMAT. This figure shows a subset of the in-transit fires because speed information 

was available for only 330 of the 477 in-transit fires and for only 122 of the 140 in-transit fires 

involving more than 1 vehicle. The estimated speed was arbitrarily separated into 32-km/h

[20-mph] bins. As shown in this figure, most of the in-transit fires occurred in the range from

66 to 97 km/h [41 to 60 mph]. In this range, 37 percent (i.e., 68 out of 182) of the in-transit fires 

involved more than 1 vehicle. Out of these 68 fires involving more than 1 vehicle, 72 percent of 

them (i.e., 49 out of 68) involved the release of flammable liquid (Table 2-3). One of these 

49 in-transit fires also involved the release of radioactive material. Similarly, in the higher speed 

range from 98 to 129 km/h [61 to 80 mph], 33 percent (i.e., 15 out of 46) of the in-transit fires 

involved more than 1 vehicle. Out of these 15 fires involving more than 1 vehicle, 67 percent of 

them (i.e., 10 out of 15) involved the release of flammable liquid (Table 2-3).

Figure 2-5. Estimated Speed for In-Transit Fires. To Convert mph to km/h, 

Multiply by 1.609.

Table 2-3. In-Transit Fires Involving More Than One Vehicle and a Flammable 

Liquid Release

Speed Range

(mph)*

Number of InTransit Fires

Average Amount of 

Flammable Liquid 

Released

(gal)†

Maximum Amount 

of Flammable 

Liquid Released 

(gal)†

1 to 20 9 3,653 10,000

21 to 40 19 5,225 8,803

41 to 60 49 4,918 13,400

61 to 80 10 5,038 8,900

*To convert mph to km/h, multiply by 1.609.

†To convert gal to L, multiply by 3.785.

33

69

182

46

16

23

68

15

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

180

200

1 - 20 21 - 40 41 - 60 61 - 80

Estimated Speed (mph)

Number of Accidents

In-Transit Fires

In-Transit Fires

Involving More than

One Vehicle
2-10

Although not shown in Figure 2-5, 6 of the 330 in-transit fires occurred at estimated speeds 

greater than 113 km/h [70 mph] with 3 of these accidents involving more than 1 vehicle. The 

description for one accident occurring on April 24, 2006, in Spanish Fork, Utah, identified that 

the vehicle was traveling too fast. It was traveling at an estimated speed of 121 km/h [75 mph].2

 

However, in other cases such as those involving single-vehicle rollovers, accident descriptions 

referred to the vehicle entering a curve too fast or traveling too fast for the road conditions. For 

example, the recommendations involving one accident occurring on April 20, 2005, in Golconda, 

Nevada, identified that the driver entered the curve too fast. The estimated speed for this 

accident was 56 km/h [35 mph].3

Table 2-3 summarizes in-transit fires involving more than one vehicle where flammable liquid 

was also released. This table shows the average amount of flammable liquid released in these 

fires in terms of the estimated speed for the vehicle carrying HAZMAT. As shown in this table, 

87 in-transit fires were identified over the 4 speed ranges from 1.6 to 129 km/h [1 to 80 mph]

with a release of flammable liquid. For the higher 3 speed ranges, the average amount of 

flammable liquid released was just above or just below 18,925 L [5,000 gal]. At the lower speed 

range from 1.6 to 32 km/h [1 to 20 mph], fewer than 15,140 L [4,000 gal] of flammable liquid, on 

average, were released. Although not shown in the table, for the speed range from 66 to 

97 km/h [41 to 60 mph], about half of the fires (i.e., 26 out of 49) involved a release of more than 

22,710 L [6,000 gal] of flammable liquid. Similarly, in the highest speed range from 98 to 

129 km/h [61 to 80 mph], half of the fires (i.e., 5 out of 10) involved a release of more than 

22,710 L [6,000 gal] of flammable liquid.

Table 2-3 also shows the maximum amount of flammable liquid released for each of the four 

speed ranges. As shown in this table, the maximum amount of flammable liquid released 

exceeded 22,710 L [6,000 gal] in all 4 speed ranges with the highest release occurring in the 

speed range from 66–97 km/h [41–60 mph]. This speed range also showed the greatest 

number of in-transit fires.

____________

2

For more information on this accident, refer to PHMSA (2010b, Report Number E–2006100009). 3

For more information on this accident, refer to PHMSA (2010b, Report Number E–2005040296).
3-1

3 IDENTIFICATION OF SEVERE FIRE ACCIDENTS

This section identifies roadway fires that had the greatest potential to exceed the bounds of the 

HAC fire described in 10 CFR 71.73(4). These criteria are established in 10 CFR 71.73(4) and,

in essence, require a transportation package to be designed to survive a fully engulfing fire with 

an average flame temperature of not less than 800°C [1,475°F] for a period of not less than 

30 minutes. When subjected to the HAC fire, the transportation package must maintain 

containment, shielding, and criticality functions through and after the fire exposure. However, 

when evaluating actual historical roadway accidents, as reported in the PHMSA database, a 

quantitative identification of a fully engulfing fire, with similar characteristics as the one 

described in 10 CFR 71.73(4), can present some difficulties. Accident data for roadways are 

often in summary form, and the records are not focused on the exact fire durations, 

temperatures experienced, and magnitudes for these accidents. This makes it challenging to 

characterize a fire resulting from a roadway accident as having the potential to (i) fully engulf a 

transportation package or (ii) produce a thermal environment similar to the one described in 

10 CFR 71.73.

In lieu of quantitative identification of fully engulfing fires, this chapter attempts to identify 

historic roadway fires that had a reasonable potential to approach or exceed the bounds of the 

HAC fire described in 10 CFR 71.73(4). These fires are herein referred to as severe fires. 

Because of the lack and inconsistency of data for each roadway fire, various criteria were used 

to define a severe fire, but not all could be applied to each accident identified in Chapter 2. 

• The first criterion was that the principal source of fuel for the substantially engulfing 

fire must have been derived from another vehicle. The purpose of this first criterion 

was to (i) restrict the term “severe fires” to those fires that could have affected an SNF 

package (implicitly assuming the SNF package does not provide fuel to the fire) and 

(ii) exclude roadway accidents where the fire only involved the one vehicle (i.e., the 

vehicle where the fire originated). This first criterion was partially evaluated in Chapter 2 

by examining only those accidents involving a collision or potential collision with multiple 

vehicles. If a collision did not occur, then there is very little chance of the fire involving 

multiple vehicles. 

• The second criterion was that the flammable material involved had to be a liquid, which 

could potentially pool underneath an SNF transportation package. 

• The third criterion was that the accident was between two or more automobiles and did 

not include an accident between a train and an automobile. This criterion is similar to 

the first because it assumes that the conveyance on which the SNF package is being 

transported does not provide fuel to the fire, and an accident between a transportation 

package and train would not be expected to lead to a severe fire fully engulfing the 

package. This also assumes that the train’s flammable material would not lead to a 

pooling fire below the material package. This assumption seems reasonable because a 

review of the accidents involving trains indicates that most of the fires initiated from the 

truck carrying HAZMAT. 

• The final criterion that was used to evaluate the severity of these fires is that the fire 

must persist for a considerable time to effectively transfer the heat to the 

canister/container carrying nuclear materials. Thus, under the constraints of this 

definition, a roadway accident that can be considered a severe fire is one that lasted for 

an extended period of time and could have engulfed an SNF transportation package.

These criteria defining a severe fire contain some subjective elements (criterion one: 

“substantially engulfing” and “principal source of fuel”; criterion four: “extended period of time”). 
3-2

These subjective elements are a result of the information or descriptions provided in many of 

the accident reports. Most of the information provided in the PHMSA data or National 

Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) reports focuses on identifying the causes and determining 

preventative actions to reduce these types of accidents from occurring in the future. While this 

reporting is highly beneficial to society, the reports often do not provide much, if any, specific 

information about the ensuing fires. Damages are assessed in terms of the lost freight, 

equipment, and life. Additionally, if emergency response information is included, it is often with 

regard to how the fires were contained and does not necessarily detail the efforts used to 

contain the fires. Without these detailed assessments, the evaluation of roadway accidents

often relies on the interpretation of sparse information and details contained in accident 

photographs. These photographs, in conjunction with the accident description 

(where available), provide information on the number of vehicles involved in the fire. However, 

the evaluation of an event could have been altered by the timing or angle of the photograph. 

Because of the minimal amount of information, the use of the PHMSA roadway report 

descriptions as a basis to classify roadway accidents often requires the use of inference, 

which potentially could be interpreted as subjective. A general guideline used in this 

analysis follows:

• “Substantially engulfed” was interpreted as a fire that could have pooled below and 

engulfed at least 30 percent of the surface area of a transportation package.

• “Extended period of time” was interpreted as a duration that appeared to have lasted at 

least 30 minutes or that was documented as lasting longer than 30 minutes. Most of the 

accident descriptions did not provide information on the fire duration. As such, 

assumptions were made based on the amount of fuel that was burned in the fire. 

A study by Blinov and Khudiakov (1961) determined that for diesel pool fires, the 

regression rate reaches a steady state of roughly 4 mm [0.2 in] per minute when the 

diesel pool fire has a surface area larger than 1.76 m2 [19 ft2

]. Assuming that a 

transportation package for nuclear materials is roughly 5 m [16 ft] long with a 1-m [3-ft]

diameter {based on LWT package in NUREG–0383, “Directory of Certificates of 

Compliance for Radioactive Materials Packages” (NRC, 2009)} and the fire is on one

side of the package, 30 percent of the surface area would be engulfed by a fire 

having a footprint of roughly 1.6 m2 [17 ft2

] {i.e., a rectangular area of 1.6 m × 1 m

[5.2 ft × 3 ft]}. Therefore, to have a fire last longer than 30 minutes, the fuel would need 

to have a minimum depth of 0.12 m [0.39 ft], which leads to a minimum volume of liquid 

of 212 L [56 gal]. Consequently, we can reasonably assume that if the volume of liquid 

was less than roughly 212 L [56 gal], it would not lead to an extended fire. However the 

physics of an unconfined spill are such that fuel depths and constrained area 

assumptions in this analysis are conservative. A pool fire condition typically requires 

several hundreds of gallons of diesel fuel to complete a 30-minute fire exposure 

(e.g., based on requirements from 10 CFR Part 71.73). The volume of 56 gallons 

was selected to establish a minimum fuel quantity for the purpose of classifications in 

this study.

3.1 Roadway Accidents Involved in Potential Severe Fires

During the last 12 years (i.e., 1997 to 2008), more than 23,000 reportable in-transit roadway 

accidents occurred involving HAZMAT (Table 2-1), and of all these accidents, only a small 

percentage has been indentified as having potentially severe fires. The process of identifying 

those accidents with severe fires began by identifying and focusing on those accidents involving 

a fire. As described in Section 2.3, this criterion reduced the number of candidate accidents to 

just 477 in-transit accidents involving HAZMAT and a fire. The next criterion used was to 
3-3

examine only those accidents that involved a collision or potential for collision. This criterion 

reduced the number of accidents to 140 as shown in Table 2-1. 

This section (i) identifies those events that involved severe fires and (ii) identifies trends that 

could help identify severe fire accidents. These results can then be used to focus attention on 

those historic events that were more likely to have challenged the thermal safety criteria for 

shipping SNF transportation packages and to identify any trends in these accidents that could 

be used to better understand the risks involved in SNF roadway transport.

The 140 roadway accidents identified as having the potential for a severe fire were initially 

identified through a search of the PHMSA accident database of roadway accidents involving 

HAZMAT for the period between 1997 and 2008. After these accidents were identified, details 

about these accidents were then derived from the PHMSA accident data summary information, 

NTSB reports, and online news outlets. However, of the 140 accidents initially identified, 

49 accidents did not have enough information to determine their severity. Consequently, these 

events were not evaluated to determine the fire severity, nor were they included in the severe 

accident parameter trend analysis in Section 3.4. These excluded roadway accidents are 

included in Appendix A.

Of the 140 initially identified accidents, enough information was provided in the PHMSA report, 

NTSB reports, and/or new agency information for 91 accidents to determine whether the 

accidents led to severe fires. These 91 accidents with their location and dates are listed in 

Appendix B.

3.2 Brief Description of Roadway Accidents

The evaluated accidents are briefly described next. These accidents have been grouped 

according to their classification as including or not including a severe fire. Those determined 

not to be a severe fire have been grouped by how their severity was determined. Most of the 

data, as indicated earlier, were obtained from the PHMSA database; however, for some 

accidents, information was available from other sources. These sources are referenced along 

with the data. Where there are no additional references, the PHMSA database was the only 

source of information.

3.2.1 Accidents With No Severe Fire

As previously discussed, the accidents identified in Appendix B had enough information to 

determine the severity of the fire. One of the first screening mechanisms used was the 

elimination of any accidents that were between vehicles and a train (if the vehicle was a 

transportation package and it was struck by a train, this would not be expected to lead to a 

severe fire, as discussed previously). Of all the 91 accidents in Appendix B, 9 accidents 

involved a collision between a HAZMAT vehicle and a train. These accidents are described in 

Table 3-1. 

Table 3-1. Roadway Accidents Involving a Collision With a Train

Date Location Material Released

February 19, 2007 Falkville, Alabama 6.8 m3 [240 ft3] of propane

March 26, 1007 Glendora, Mississippi 23,204 L [6,130 gal] of diesel fuel

January 20, 2006 Lagrange, Texas 25,915 L [6,846 gal] of natural gas

June 25, 2004 Chalmette, Louisiana 31,801 L [8,401 gal] of gasoline

August 1, 2002 Clear Lake, Iowa Fuel oil

December 13, 2001 Gary, Indiana 1,066 kg [2,350 lb] of calcium carbide

February 21, 2000 Henderson, Kentucky 0.37854 m3 [13.368 ft3] of acetylene

September 12, 2000 Sandersville, Georgia 568 L [150 gal] of fuel oil

October 26, 2000 Aguilares, Texas 28,936 L [7,644 gal] of crude oil
3-4

Another previously discussed criterion to determine whether an accident could have been a 

severe fire was based on the type of fuel released. For a fire to have been considered severe, it 

was assumed that the fuel released would have been able to pool under the transportation 

package. While most of the materials involved in the fire occurred in a liquid state, 10 accidents 

involved flammable gases and 2 accidents involved flammable material being burnt while 

released from a tank’s pressure relief valve. These events are highlighted in Table 3-2. 

Table 3-2. Roadway Accidents Involving Material That Could Not Pool

Date Location Material Released

December 23, 

2004 San Antonio, Texas 35,159 L [9,288 gal] of propane

August 6, 2004 Maybell, Colorado Propane vapors

September 16, 

2002 Massey, Maryland 63 m3 [2,230 ft3

] of hydrogen

May 18, 2001 Detroit, Michigan Only nitrogen refrigerant was lost from venting

May 1, 2001 Ramona, Oklahoma 4,078 m3 [144,000 ft3] of hydrogen*

December 28, 

2000 Fort Lauderdale, Florida

3,028 L [800 gal] of gasoline was burned while 

venting from pressure relief value (not enough 

material to pool)

February 17, 2000 Rolla, Missouri Propane

June 28,1999 Bruceville, Texas Propane

November 2, 1998 Government Camp, Oregon 5,300 L [1,400 gal] of petroleum gas

October 5, 1998 Woburn, Massachusetts Methane

August 11, 1997 Painter, Virginia 3,407 L [900 gal] of propane

June 26, 1997 Columbus, Ohio Carbon dioxide

*NTSB. “Animations Simulating the Collision and Fire of Tractor/Cargo Tank Semitrailer and Passenger Vehicle, 

Yonkers, New York, October 9, 1997.” 2010. <http://www.ntsb.gov/Events/yonders/anim_desc.htm> (April 

2010).
3-5

The third criterion used for screening was the amount of material released during the accident. 

As indicated previously in this chapter, 212 L [56 gal] of liquid fuel were calculated as the 

minimum amount of material that would need to be released to engulf one-third of a 

transportation package for longer than 30 minutes. Based on this information, 20 of the 

accidents did not have enough material to result in a long duration fire. This was determined by 

examining the amount of material reported released in the PHMSA accident report. A list of 

these accidents and the basis for not considering the accidents severe is provided in Table 3-3. 

For all of the accidents in Table 3-3, the maximum amount of HAZMAT that was released was 

208 L [55 gal] of gasoline.

Table 3-3. Roadway Accidents With Insufficient Material Release To Be Severe

Date Location Material Released

June 30, 2008 Princeton, Minnesota 76 L [20 gal] of gasoline

July 18, 2008 Prairie City, Iowa No release

October 18, 2006 Macon, Georgia 11.8 L [3.125 gal] of butane

November 3, 2004 Snow Hill, Maryland 30 L [8 gal] of methyl ethyl ketone

August 13, 2004 Berrien, Michigan No release indicated in description

August 3, 2004 Defiance, Ohio No release

May 14, 2004 Cranbury, New Jersey 0.95 L [0.25 gal] of medical waste

October 1, 2003 Mission Viejo, California 76 L [20 gal] of gasoline

February 17, 2002 Santa Rosa, California No release indicated in description

December 4, 2001 Bakersfield, California 57 L [15 gal] of crude oil

November 29, 2001 Canton, Michigan 38 L [10 gal] of gasoline

November 23, 2001 Honea Path, South Carolina 16.0 L [4.23 gal] of fuel oil

October 23, 2001 Braselton, Georgia 167 L [44 gal] of paint

July 11, 2001 Detroit, Michigan 208 L [55 gal] of gasoline

February 26, 2001 Springfield, Massachusetts 15 L [4 gal] of gasoline

August 2, 2000 Altoona, Pennsylvania 189 L [50 gal] of gasoline

November 22, 1999 Hammond, Indiana No release indicated in description

November 12, 1999 Hammond, Indiana 76 L [20 gal] of gasoline

February 15, 1998 Wilmington, Delaware 76 L [20 gal] of gasoline

April 25, 1997 Jacksonville, Florida

14.20 L [3.75 gal] of acetone, 6.151 L

[1.625 gal] of alcohol, and 18.45 L [4.875 gal] 

of turpentine
3-6

The final method to screen the accidents as not severe was by examining the number of 

vehicles involved in the fire. The accident descriptions were reviewed to determine whether, 

after the collision, multiple vehicles were engulfed in the fire. If only a single vehicle was 

engulfed in the fire, the accident was deemed to be not severe (if a transportation package had 

been involved, it was assumed not to be the source of the fire, and would have had to be 

engulfed by a fire that originated from another vehicle). Accidents screened as having only a 

single vehicle involved in the fire are listed in Table 3-4. In Table 3-4, there are 27 accidents 

where the fire only involved the vehicle releasing the HAZMAT.

Table 3-4. Roadway Accidents With Fires Involving a Single Vehicle

Date Location Description of Fire

April 26, 2008 High Springs, Florida

A tractor-trailer was hit head-on by another 

tractor-trailer, which led to the fire. The 

second truck overturned but did not catch 

fire.

May 10, 2007 Howell Township, New 

Jersey

A tanker truck was hit broadside by 

another vehicle. The second vehicle 

careened across the grassy median but 

was not burnt in the fire.*

December 15, 

2006 Pittsburg, Kansas

A vehicle crossed the center lane and hit a 

vehicle containing HAZMAT but was not 

involved in the fire.

August 12, 2006 Lawton, Oklahoma

A tanker truck failed to clear a vehicle while 

passing, which caused the tanker to end up in 

the middle of the roadway and the other 

vehicle on side of the road in a ditch.

April 15, 2006 Purchase, New York

A tractor-trailer swerved to avoid a disabled 

vehicle, which made it hit the cement barrier, 

igniting the trailer.

July 12, 2005 Ridgefield, Connecticut

A tanker truck was cut off by another vehicle. 

In the process of avoiding the vehicle, the 

tanker jackknifed and ignited, while the other 

vehicle left the scene.†

June 29, 2005 Kern, Colorado

A tanker truck going downhill lost use of its 

brakes, hitting another tractor-trailer from 

behind. The tanker safely pulled to side of the 

road, and the tractor-trailer was discovered to 

be on fire.

April 5, 2005 London, Kentucky

A tractor-trailer hit another vehicle that had lost 

control. This led to the tractor-trailer 

overturning and continuing over an earth 

embankment where only it was engulfed in 

a fire.

April 17, 2004 Greenville, North Carolina

A passenger vehicle collided with a tanker 

truck and resulted in the tanker burning in 

the fire.

March 25, 2004 Bridgeport, Connecticut

A passenger vehicle struck a tanker truck that 

caught on fire. The passenger vehicle was not 

involved in the fire.‡ 

March 20, 2004 Waco, Texas

A tow truck was towing a tanker truck when it 

was hit by another vehicle. Both the tow truck 

and the tanker being towed were burned in the 

gasoline fire. 
3-7

Table 3-4. Roadway Accidents With Fires Involving a Single Vehicle (continued)

Date Location Description of Fire

October 19, 2003 Phoenix, Arizona

A tanker truck was hit by another vehicle, 

which led to the overturn and fire on the tanker 

truck. The other vehicle went through a fence 

off the freeway. 

September 23, 

2003 Bell Gardens, California

A tanker truck swerved to avoid an abandoned 

vehicle left in the freeway lane, which caused 

the tanker to roll over, leading to a fire that did 

not involve the second vehicle.§

July 24, 2003 Birmingham, Alabama

A tanker truck entering an intersection avoided 

hitting a vehicle that turned in front of the 

tanker, which resulted in the tanker turning 

over.

June 9, 2001 Atlanta, Georgia

A tanker truck hit a disabled vehicle that was 

left in the roadway. This lead to the tanker 

truck rolling over and down the highway 

and igniting.

May 20, 2001 Carson, California

A tractor-trailer was hit by passenger vehicles, 

sending it into the shoulder of the roadway and 

rolling over an embankment onto an on-ramp 

to the freeway.

November 4, 2000 Centerville, Utah

A tanker truck was cut off leading to the tank 

igniting. The tanker truck was able to avoid 

other vehicles.

June 8, 2000 Alvwood, Minnesota

A tanker truck hit a boat trailer coming onto the 

highway, which led to the trailer going off the 

road and down an embankment.

June 6, 2000 Carnesville, Georgia

A tanker truck swerved to miss another vehicle 

that had crossed the center line. There was no 

contact between the two vehicles.

March 15, 2000 Ellsworth, Wisconsin

A tanker truck pulled off the road to avoid a 

vehicle that had crossed the center lane. 

While coming back onto the road, the tanker 

truck overturned, causing the fire.

October 23, 1999 Irving, Texas

A tanker truck was struck by a vehicle that had 

crossed the center median. After the impact, 

the tanker continued down the road, hitting a 

guardrail and then a bridge abutment. The 

cargo tank was punctured, which led to the fire.

September 20, 

1999 Pleasant View, Tennessee

A tanker truck was hit by a personal vehicle, 

which led to a fire and loss of the tanker truck 

and trailer.

August 11, 1999 Dawson Springs, Kentucky

A tractor truck rear-ended another vehicle. 

The tractor truck veered off the road into the 

median and overturned, causing the fire. The 

fire only consumed the tractor.

August 3, 1999 Mitchell, South Dakota

A tanker truck hit another vehicle, causing 

damage to the tanker’s front right tire. The 

tanker pulled to the side of the road, and it was 

then noticed that the tanker was on fire. 
3-8

Table 3-4. Roadway Accidents With Fires Involving a Single Vehicle (continued)

Date Location Description of Fire

September 5, 

1997 Brownsburg, Indiana

A tanker truck swerved to avoid another 

vehicle that had crossed the center line. The 

tanker truck dropped off the edge of the 

pavement, and the vehicle rolled onto its side 

and caught fire.

July 25, 1997 Bloomington, Illinois

A tanker truck was cut off and hit a passenger 

vehicle from behind, which made the tanker 

jackknife. The tanker rolled onto its side 

and down into a ditch where it caught fire 

and burned.

February 21, 1997 Marshall, Illinois

A tanker truck was struck from behind by 

another truck. This accident led to the rupture 

of the tanker’s vehicle, which caught fire. The 

fire department arrived on the scene quickly 

enough to prevent the other truck’s cargo 

from igniting.

*Appezzato, J. “Driver of Tanker Truck Killed in Fiery Route 195 Crash.” 2007. 

<http://blog.nj.com/ledgerupdates/2007/05/driver_of_tanker_truck_killed.html> (7 April 2010).

†NRWA. “Devastating Truck Accident Kills Driver and Impacts Bridge and Norwalk River in Ridgefield, 

Connecticut.” 2010. <http://www.norwalkriver.org/accident.htm> (7 April 2010).

‡Associated Press. “Fiery Crash Shuts I-95 Section in Conn.” 2004. 

<http://www.urbanplanet.org/forums/index.php?/topic/3161-i-95-crash-and-aftermath/> (7 April 2010).

§Los Angeles Times. “Tanker Truck Blast Kills Driver, Forces Evacuations.” 2003.

<http://articles.latimes.com/2003/sep/24/local/me-explode24> (7 April 2010).
3-9

3.2.2 Accidents With Severe Fires

Twenty-three accidents out of the original 140 were considered to be severe. These accidents 

and their descriptions are listed in Table 3-5. 

Table 3-5. Roadway Severe Accidents

Date Location Description of Fire

October 5, 2008 Chattanooga, Tennessee

An empty tanker truck rear-ended another 

tractor-trailer, which led to the tractor 

catching on fire.

July 5, 2008 Kingman, Arizona

A tractor-trailer collided with the rear of a 

tanker truck, resulting in the release of 

gasoline and subsequent fire. Multiple 

vehicles were involved in this accident.*

March 28, 2008 Chicopee, Massachusetts

A tanker truck was struck by a passenger 

vehicle resulting in the tanker rolling over 

and igniting. The diesel fuel consumed at 

least three vehicles in the fire.†

March 24, 2008 Lower Makefield, Pennsylvania

A dump truck collided with a tanker releasing 

4,542 L [1,200 gal] of fuel oil. The dump 

truck and a passenger vehicle were engulfed 

in the fire.‡

November, 7, 

2007 Tallulah, Louisiana

A tractor-trailer lost control after hitting 

another vehicle. The tractor-trailer crossed 

the median and struck another vehicle, 

which resulted in a fire consuming both 

vehicles.

June 23, 2007 Harrisburg, Pennsylvania

A tractor-trailer hit a stopped vehicle on the 

highway, causing a fire that engulfed five 

vehicles including the tractor cab.§

March 14, 2007 Picacho, Arizona

A passenger vehicle became wedged below 

a tractor-trailer and was dragged, which 

initiated a fire engulfing both vehicles.

April 21, 2006 Dahlonega, Georgia

A tanker truck was turning into a gas station 

when a passenger vehicle struck the tanker. 

Both the vehicle and tanker were caught in 

the fire.

July 28, 2005 Kingsport, Tennessee

A tractor-trailer moved into oncoming traffic 

from the emergency lane. A second 

tractor-trailer hit the vehicle coming into the 

moving lanes. The second tractor-trailer 

overturned onto a pickup truck, which led to 

a fire engulfing both the tractor-trailer and 

pickup truck.║

May 11, 2005 Berks, Pennsylvania

A tractor-trailer rear-ended a tanker truck, 

which ripped open both units. Explosive 

dust from the tractor-trailer exploded, 

catching both units on fire.

September 13, 

2004 Carlos, Texas

A tanker truck collided with another vehicle 

that had crossed the centerline of the road. 

The tanker truck rolled off the road. A third 

vehicle was forced off the road near the 

tanker truck. Though not in the fire, the third 

vehicle sustained extensive body damage 

due to the heat from the fire.
3-10

Table 3-5. Roadway Severe Accidents (continued)

Date Location Description of Fire

March 13, 2004 Taylor, Michigan

A tanker truck was struck by another vehicle 

going through a red light, which resulted in a 

fire. The fire engulfed the tractor and the 

other vehicle. 

January 13, 2004 Elk Ridge, Maryland

A tanker truck lost control and went over an 

overpass, landing across lanes of the 

highway and causing a fire. Other than the 

tanker truck, three trucks and two passenger 

vehicles were involved in the fire.

December 14, 

2003 Greenville, Tennessee

A vehicle traveling the wrong direction hit the 

tanker truck, causing a fire that consumed 

both vehicles.

May 18, 2003 Ovilla, Texas A multivehicle accident led to a fire, which 

involved four vehicles.

November 29, 

2001 Canton, Michigan

A tanker truck was hit by a passenger 

vehicle that crossed into the wrong lanes of 

traffic. The vehicle caught on fire, which 

ignited the tanker truck. Both vehicles were 

engulfed in the fire.

April 2, 2001 Green Bay, Wisconsin

A tanker truck was making a turn at an 

intersection when another vehicle failed to 

stop at the stop sign and struck the tanker. 

The accident caused an immediate fire, 

which engulfed both the passenger vehicle 

and tanker.

October 25, 2000 Mill Creek, Ohio

A tanker truck, trying to avoid collision with 

stopped vehicles, moved into an oncoming 

lane where another tractor-trailer was 

located. The second tractor-trailer 

attempted to avoid the tanker and lost its 

cargo, which punctured the tanker. The 

second trailer hit the tanker, and both were 

consumed in the subsequent fire.

January 25, 1999 Davie, Florida

A tanker truck was entering a highway when 

it lost control and pulled two other vehicles 

into the median. The tanker ruptured and 

burst into flames, engulfing all three 

vehicles.

December 18, 

1998 Raleigh, North Carolina

A tanker truck struck an abandoned pickup 

truck that was in the travel lanes. This led to 

the fire that engulfed both vehicles.

October 17, 1998 Huntsville, Alabama

A tanker truck struck an abandoned pickup 

truck and traveled down a steep 

embankment. Upon striking the bottom of 

the embankment, the vehicle caught fire. 

Two parked vehicles located near the fire 

were affected by the fire. 

July 7, 1998 Mustang, Oklahoma

A tanker truck entering an intersection was 

hit by a passenger vehicle that ran a red 

light. Both the passenger vehicle and tanker 

truck caught on fire immediately.
3-11

Table 3-5. Roadway Severe Accidents (continued)

Date Location Description of Fire

October 9, 1997 Yonkers, New York

A tanker truck turning onto a road was 

broadsided by a passenger vehicle, which 

led to a fire that engulfed both vehicles.¶

*CNN. “Dispatch Audio from Major Tanker Fire on US 68 Near Kingman LIVE.” 2008. 

<http://www.ireport.com/docs/DOC-42978> (7 April 2010).

†Buckley, M.R.F. “Fuel Tanker Crash Sparks Explosion, Fire.” 2008. 

<http://www.thebostonchannel.com/news/15731400/detail.html> (7 April 2010).

‡Rawlins, J. “Oil Tanker Explodes in Collision.” 2008. 

<http://abclocal.go.com/wpvi/story?section=news/local&id=6038282> (7 April 2010).

§Monek, B. “Pa. Turnpike Accident Kills 3 People.” 2007. 

<http://abclocal.go.com/wpvi/story?section=news/local&id=5415318> (7 April 2010).

║Breeding, K. “Driver Convicted of Criminally Negligent Homicide in I-81 Crash.” 2009. 

<http://www.timesnews.net/article.php?id=9015658> (7 April 2010).

¶NTSB. “Animations Simulating the Collision and Fire of Tractor/Cargo Tank Semitrailer and Passenger Vehicle, 

Yonkers, New York, October 9, 1997.” 2010. <http://www.ntsb.gov/Events/yonkers/anim_desc.htm > (7 April 

2010).
3-12

3.2.3 Other Noteworthy Events

In addition to those accidents that released HAZMAT and where the fire involved two or more 

vehicles, special attention was given to those accidents located in an enclosed space 

(e.g., overpass or tunnel). Studies have shown that fires in an enclosed space can lead to 

higher temperatures (Lönnermark and Ingason, 2005). An example is an enclosed accident that

occurred in an Oakland, California, tunnel in 1982 between a bus and a tanker truck. The fire 

that occurred in the Caldecott Tunnel achieved temperatures as high as 1,025 °C [1,877 °F] as 

evidenced by the incinerated materials (Larson, et al., 1983). As such, some accidents where 

only single vehicles were exposed to the fire were also examined to determine whether these 

accidents occurred in an enclosed environment because the temperatures in an enclosed 

environment could still potentially affect a transportation package even if the package was not 

fully engulfed in the fire. For this report, an enclosed location was taken as either under a 

bridge or overpass, or in a tunnel. Accidents determined to be in an enclosed area are listed in 

Table 3-6. Note that the first six accidents listed in Table 3-6 under, “Accidents Where Multiple 

Vehicles Were Involved in the Fire” were accidents included in the evaluation described in 

Sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2. Out of these six accidents, only the Elk Ridge accident was 

determined to be a severe fire. The other accidents in this table listed under “Other Accidents” 

were accidents identified as being in an enclosed space, but these did not involve either 

HAZMAT or multiple vehicles.

Table 3-6. Roadway Accidents in Enclosed Space

Accidents Where Multiple Vehicles Were Involved in the Fire

Date Location

May 28, 2005 Irving, Texas

January 13, 2004 Elk Ridge, Maryland

January 5, 2002 Birmingham, Alabama

June 9, 2001 Atlanta, Georgia

October 23, 1999 Irving, Texas

Other Accidents

Date Location

September 28, 2008 New Virginia, Iowa

June 10, 2008 Baltimore, Maryland

October 12, 2007 Santa Clarita, California

April 29, 2007 Oakland, California

June 9, 2005 Chicago, Illinois

January 1, 2002 Birmingham, Alabama

December 28, 2001 Tampa, Florida

Other Accidents

Date Location

October 24, 2000 Forth Worth, Texas

July 20, 2000 Warwick Rhode Island

May 27, 2000 Detroit, Michigan

October 7, 1997 Sacramento, California
3-13

3.3 Frequency of Severe Roadway Accidents 

Table 3-7 includes the roadway accidents releasing HAZMAT that occurred in the last 12 years 

involving a severe fire as described in Section 3.2. For the 140 roadway accidents that could 

have or did include a collision, the fire was severe in roughly 17 percent (i.e., 23 out of 

140 accidents). As shown in Table 3-7, on average for the last 12 years, there were 2 severe 

fires accidents per year with an overall frequency of roughly 4.90 × 10−5 accidents per million 

HAZMAT vehicle-km [7.89 × 10−5 accidents per million HAZMAT vehicle-mi].

Table 3-7. Summary of Severe Roadway Accidents From 1997 to 2008

Year Million HAZMAT Miles* Severe Fire Incidents Frequency†

1997 24,788 1 4.03 × 10−5

1998 23,400 3 1.28 × 10−4

1999 24,152 1 4.14 × 10−5

2000 24,489 1 4.08 × 10−5

2001 24,908 2 8.03 × 10−5

2002 23,362 0 0

2003 23,723 2 8.43 × 10−5

2004 24,038 3 1.25 × 10−4

2005 24,224 2 8.26 × 10−5

2006 24,223 1 4.13 × 10−5

2007 24,707 3 1.21 × 10−4

2008 24,707 4 1.62 × 10−4

Total 291,566 23 7.89 × 10−5‡

*To convert to kilometers, multiply miles by 1.609.

†Frequency in accidents per million HAZMAT vehicle-mi. To convert to accidents per million HAZMAT vehiclekm divide by 1.609.

‡Assuming a Poisson distribution based on severe fires being independent rare events and assuming the 

accident rate is approximately constant over the 12 years, for a 95 percent confidence interval, the lower limit is 

5.00 × 10−5 accidents per million HAZMAT vehicle-mi and the upper limit is 1.18 × 10−4 accidents per million 

HAZMAT vehicle-mi.

3.4 Severe Fire Accident Parameter Trends

Roadway accidents involving severe fires were analyzed to determine the trends associated 

with these accidents. The results of these analyses are shown in the following sections.
3-14

3.4.1 Hazardous Material Type and Quantity

Figure 3-1 shows roadway severe accident fires involving HAZMAT classes for flammable 

material, organic peroxide, poisons, corrosives, and miscellaneous materials. As shown in this 

figure, the majority of accidents determined to be severe contain flammable liquids. This is a 

reasonable conclusion because flammable liquid is the most likely material to create a pool that 

could potentially engulf a transportation package in the ensuing fire. 

Figure 3-1. Severe Accidents Separated by Hazardous Material Class. Some Fires 

Involved More Than One Hazardous Material Class.

0

5

10

15

20

25

Class

2.1

Class 3 Class

5.2

Class

6.1

Class 8 Class 9

HAZMAT Class

Number of Severe Accidents

1 1 1 1

20 Class 2.1: Flammable Gas

Class 3: Flammable Liquid

Class 5.2: Organic 

Peroxide

Class 6.1: Poisons

Class 8: Corrosives

Class 9: Miscellaneous

1
3-15

Figure 3-2 shows the amount of material that was released for the severe accidents containing 

liquid HAZMAT. In Figure 3-2, there appear to be two ranges of fuel release where severe fires 

occurred. The number of accidents that released fuel in the quantity range of 310 to 7,570 L 

[82 to 2,000 gal] is the same as accidents that released fuel in the range of 30,283 to 37,850 L 

[8,001 to 10,000 gal]. For the lower range, half of the accidents released 969 L [250 gal] or 

less, while the other half of the accidents released more than 3,100 L [800 gal] of fuel. For the 

upper range, the majority of the accidents released 33,713 L [8,700 gal] or more fuel. This 

result is interesting as it indicates that a severe fire does not have to be associated with a truck

that has a complete load. Because any semi truck will typically contain two 757-L [200-gal] fuel 

saddle tanks, there is a potential for any large tractor-trailer to contain enough HAZMAT to 

engulf one-third of a transportation package for longer than the 30 minutes as discussed 

previously. However, as discussed previously, the physics of an unconfined spill are such that 

the fuel depths and constrained area assumptions are unknown and would affect the required 

amount of fuel necessary to maintain a fire for longer than 30 minutes.

Figure 3-2. Amount of Flammable Liquid Released During Severe Accidents. To Convert 

From Gallons to Liters, Multiply by 3.785.

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

82-2000 2001-

4000

4001-

6000

6001-

8000

8001-

10000

Flammable Liquid Released (Gal)

Number of Severe Accidents

1

9 9
3-16

3.4.2 Speed and Time of Accident

Figure 3-3 shows the estimated speed of the vehicle containing HAZMAT when the severe 

accident occurred. The maximum number of severe accidents occurred during the 66–97 km/h

[41–60 mph] speed, which is consistent with the maximum number of in-transit accidents with 

fires as shown in Figure 2-5. The number of accidents tapered off on either side of this range;

another higher number of accidents occurred in the low speed range of 0 to 32 km/hr 

[0 to 20 mph]. These results show that the severe accidents appear to occur at high speeds 

(i.e., highway travel) or at lower speeds (e.g., turning in an intersection or while stopping on 

the highway).

Figure 3-3. Estimated Speed for Severe Accidents. To Convert mph to km/h, 

Multiply by 1.609.

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

0-20 21-40 41-60 61-80

Estimated Speed (mph)

Number of Severe Accidents

6

9

3

5
3-17

The times for the severe accidents are presented in Figure 3-4. This figure indicates that the 

severe accidents seemed to be dispersed evenly throughout the day. The more severe 

accidents occurred during the 6:00 a.m. to 12:00 p.m. time period, but there are only 

two additional accidents during this time period compared to the other periods.

Figure 3-4. Time of Occurrence for Severe Accidents

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

12:00am6:00am6:00am12:00pm12:00pm6:00pm6:00pm12:00am

Time of Accident

Number of Severe Accidents

5 5 5

7
3-18

3.4.3 Cause and Location of Severe Accident

The cause of the severe accidents was also examined to determine whether a trend could be 

identified. Various types of accidents appeared to occur more than once. This included a 

vehicle crossing the centerline of a road or median, a vehicle going through an intersection and

hitting the HAZMAT vehicle, and the HAZMAT vehicle rear-ending or running into a stopped 

(e.g., stopped in traffic or abandoned on the highway) vehicle. Using these three categories 

and “other” for all the other types of accidents that occurred, the results have been presented in 

Figure 3-5. As can be seen, only 13 percent (3 out of the 23) of the severe accidents were from 

vehicles crossing the centerline of a road or median. Twenty-two percent (5 out of 23) of the 

severe accidents occurred in an intersection, while 26 percent (6 out of 23) of the severe 

accidents happened from the HAZMAT vehicle rear-ending a stopped vehicle. The remaining 

severe accidents were classified as “other.” From these results, there does not appear to be an 

overwhelming cause for most of the severe accidents that occurred. 

Figure 3-5. Cause of Severe Accidents

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

Vehicle

Crossed Center

Line/Median

Intersection

Accident

RearEnd/Stopped

Vehicle

Other

Cause of Accident

Number of Severe Accidents

3

3

5

6

9
3-19

The location of severe accidents was also examined using the information provided in the 

PHMSA data reports. Figure 3-6 shows the locations of severe accidents separated into four 

classes. The first is interstates with a median or separated by a central dividing barrier. 

Forty nine percent (11 of the 23) of the severe accidents were located on this type of road. 

This seems a reasonable result because most HAZMAT travel would likely comprise interstate 

travel. Following interstates with a divide were accidents that occurred in an intersection, which 

comprised 26 percent of the locations (6 out of 23) for severe accidents. These were followed 

by roads with no dividers at 13 percent (3 out of 23) and interstate ramps at 9 percent (2 out 

of 23).

Figure 3-6. Location of Severe Accidents

As mentioned earlier, some special attention was given to those accidents located in or near an 

enclosed space. This is because a fire in an enclosed space will have a large heat contribution 

from radiation heat transfer. Therefore, a package in a fire near or in an enclosed space has 

the potential for achieving a higher temperature than one that is exposed to a fire in an open 

environment. Out of all the severe accidents, the accident that occurred at Elk Ridge, Maryland,

on January 13, 2004, was likely in an enclosed space because of its location near a highway 

ramp. During this severe accident, the HAZMAT vehicle, which released 33,319 L [8,803 gal] of 

gasoline, lost control and went over an overpass onto another interstate, damaging multiple 

vehicles. While the ramp location represents a small fraction of the total number of severe 

accidents, an enclosed area such as this could lead to a more severe fire exposure.

3.4.4 Summary of Severe Fire Accident Parameter Trends

Four criteria were used to evaluate the 140 multicar accidents that were screened from the 

Chapter 2 analysis: (i) the principal source of fuel for the substantially engulfing fire must have 

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

Interstate

With Median

Or Central

Divider

Road With

No Divider

Highway

Ramp

Intersection

Location of Severe Accident

Number of Severe Accidents

11

2

6

3

6
3-20

been derived from another vehicle; (ii) the flammable material involved had to be a liquid, which 

could potentially pool underneath an SNF transportation package; (iii) the accident had to 

involve two vehicles and not a train; and (iv) the fire had to persist for an extended period of 

time. Using these 4 criteria, 23 accidents were identified as being severe.

The characteristics for these 23 accidents were examined to determine any important trends. 

From the data it was determined that severe roadway fire accidents are generally characterized 

by collisions between 2 or more vehicles in which HAZMAT was released with a quantity of 

more than 310 L [82 gal]. There did not seem to be many trends associated with these severe 

accidents, except that they mainly involved Class 3 HAZMAT. The amount of HAZMAT 

released varied from 568 to 35,961 L [150 to 9,500 gal]. The amount of fuel released in the 

severe accidents showed a bimodal histogram, with the majority of accidents releasing either 

310 to 7,570 L [82 to 2,000 gal] or 30,283 to 37,850 L [8,001 to 10,000 gal] of fuel.

The vehicle speeds when the severe accident occurred were also examined. The severe 

accident speeds showed a slightly higher number of accidents occurring in the range from 

66-97 km/h [41–60 mph]. However, this may be due to the number of vehicles that typically 

travel in this speed range. The number of accidents decreased moving away from this speed 

range, but then increased at the lower speed range of 0 to 32 km/h [0 to 20 mph].

The time and cause of the accidents were also investigated. The number of accidents was

evenly distributed throughout the day, with a slightly higher rate between the 6:00 a.m. and 

12:00 p.m. timeframe. Examining the cause of the accident, no singular accident type appears 

to occur more often. Finally, most accidents occurred on main interstates where there is a 

divider or median. However, this is likely due to the higher percentage of travel on these types 

of roads. 
4-1

4 CONCLUSIONS 

Based on the NAS recommendations, NRC is interested in determining the types and frequency 

of roadway accidents involving severe, long duration fires that could impact SNF transport on 

roadways. The results of this study suggest that in the previous 12 years (i.e., 1997 to 2008), 

more than 23,000 in-transit HAZMAT accidents occurred, resulting in a frequency of 

approximately 4.92 × 10−2 accidents per million HAZMAT vehicle-km [7.92 × 10−2 accidents per 

million HAZMAT vehicle-mi]. In addition, the number of in-transit HAZMAT accidents appears to 

have increased in the last 12 years from about 1,494 in 1997 to about 2,513 in 2008.

This study further examined the accident frequency associated with in-transit HAZMAT 

accidents resulting in a fire: 1.02 × 10−3 accidents per million HAZMAT vehicle-km [1.64 × 10−3

accidents per million HAZMAT vehicle-mi] and for those fires involving more than one vehicle, a

frequency of approximately 2.98 × 10−4 accidents per million HAZMAT vehicle-km [4.8 × 10−4

accidents per million HAZMAT vehicle-mi]. 

The evaluation of fire-related accidents further identified those that were considered severe. 

Out of the 140 in-transit fires involving more than 1 vehicle, 23 were identified as severe based 

on the following criteria: (i) the principal source of fuel for the engulfing fire was from another 

vehicle, (ii) the fuel was flammable liquid that could pool under another vehicle, (iii) the accident 

involved more than one vehicle but not collisions of a vehicle with a train, and (iv) the fire 

persisted for an extended period of time. Based on these 4 criteria, about 2 severe fire 

accidents occurred per year resulting in a frequency of roughly 4.90 × 10−5 accidents per million 

HAZMAT vehicle-km [7.89 × 10−5 accidents per million HAZMAT vehicle-mi]. One of the 23 

severe fires occurred on a freeway entrance/exit ramp, likely in an enclosed area. None of the 

23 severe fires involved a release of radioactive material. 

The accident frequencies estimated in this study are lower than the previous NRC and DOE 

studies of accident frequencies. because this report focuses on a much narrower data set : 

roadway accidents that involved a HAZMAT release, more than one vehicle, and resulted in a 

fire. The range of accident frequencies the previous NRC and DOE reports calculated was 

between 0.32 and 2.5 accidents per million vehicle-km [0.52 and 4.0 accidents per million 

vehicle-mi]. These values are orders of magnitude higher than the frequency calculated in this 

report for HAZMAT accidents involving a fire and more than 1 vehicle {i.e., 3.0 × 10-4 accidents 

per million HAZMAT vehicle-km [4.8 × 10-4 accidents per million HAZMAT vehicle-mi]} and the 

frequency calculated in this report for severe accidents {i.e., 4.90 × 10-5 accidents per million

HAZMAT vehicle-km [7.89 × 10-5 accidents per million HAZMAT vehicle-mi]}. 

In addition to calculating a frequencyfor severe accidents involving fire, accidents were analyzed 

to identify trends in the data. In general, severe fires are characterized by the release of 

flammable liquid (i.e., Class 3 HAZMAT), and in about 40 percent of the severe fires, more than 

22,710 L [6,000 gal] of flammable liquid were released. Also, about half of the severe fires 

occurred on interstate highways with a median or divider and two of the severe fires occurred on 

interstate ramps. One of these accidents on a ramp was likely in an enclosed area and 

potentially led to a hotter fire. Consistent with their occurrence about half the time on interstate 

highways, typically more in-transit severe fires occurred in the range from 66 to 97 km/h [41 to 

60 mph]. 

Out of more than 23,106 in-transit HAZMAT accidents, only about 2 percent (i.e., 477 out of 

23,106) involved a fire and only about 0.1 percent (i.e., 23 out of 23,106) of the in-transit 

HAZMAT accidents resulted in a severe fire. In addition, only one of these in-transit severe fires 

likely occurred in a constrained environment. In summary, based on the analysis of roadway 

accident data involving in-transit HAZMAT fires, there is a very small frequency of a severe fire 
4-2

and therefore the likelihood that an SNF transportation package being transported on the 

roadway would be involved in a severe fire is also very small. 
5-1

5 REFERENCES

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_____. DOE/EIS–0250, “Final Environmental Impact Statement for a Geologic Repository for 

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Management. February 2002. 

Fischer, L.E., C.K. Chou, M.A. Gerhard, C.Y. Kimura, R.W. Martin, R.W. Mensing, M.E. Mount, 

and M.C. Witte. NUREG/CR–4829, “Shipping Container Response to Severe Highway and 

Railway Accident Conditions.” Washington, DC: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 1988.

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Environment Experienced by Cargo in Motor Carrier Accidents.” Proceedings of the 4th

International Symposium on Packaging and Transportation of Radioactive Materials, Miami 

Beach, Florida, September 22–27, 1974.

Larson, D.W., R.T. Reese, and E.L. Wilmot. “The Caldecott Tunnel Fire Thermal Environments, 

Regulatory Considerations, and Probabilities.” Proceedings of the 7th International Symposium 

on Packaging and Transportation of Radioactive Materials, New Orleans, Louisiana, 

May 15–20, 1983.

Lönnermark, A. and H Ingason. “Gas Temperatures in Heavy Goods Vehicle Fires in Tunnels.” 

Fire Safety Journal. Vol. 40. pp. 506–527. 2005.

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and High-Level Radioactive Waste in the United States.” Washington, DC: National Academies 

Press. February 2006.

NRC. NUREG–0383, “Directory of Certificates of Compliance for Radioactive Materials 

Packages.” Washington, DC: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 2009.

_____. NUREG–0170, “Final Environmental Statement on the Transportation of Radioactive 

Material by Air and Other Modes.” Washington, DC: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 

December 1977.

PHMSA. “Incident Statistics.” 2010a. <http://www.phmsa.dot.gov/hazmat/library/datastats/incidents> (1 April 2010).
5-2

_____. “Incident Reports Database Search.” 2010b. 

<https://hazmatonline.phmsa.dot.gov/IncidentReportsSearch/> (1 April 2010).

–––––. “Guide for Preparing Hazardous Materials Incidents Reports.” Washington, DC: U.S. 

Department of Transportation. 2004.

Saricks, C.L. and M.M. Tompkins. “State-Level Accident Rates of Surface Freight 

Transportation: A Reexamination.” ANL/ESD/TM–150. Argonne, Illinois: Argonne National 

Laboratory Transportation Technology R&D Center. 1999.

Sprung, J.L., D.J. Ammerman, J.A. Koski, and R.F. Weiner. NUREG/CR–6672, “Reexamination 

of Spent Fuel Shipment Risk Estimates.” Washington, DC: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission. 2000.

U.S. Census Bureau. “2002 Economic Census, Vehicle Inventory and Use Survey, Geographic 

Area Series.” Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Commerce. 2004.

_____. “1997 Economic Census, Vehicle Inventory and Use Survey, Geographic Area Series.” 

Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Commerce. 1999.
APPENDIX A

This appendix lists and describes the roadway accidents that involved a fire and a collision that 

did not have sufficient information to determine whether a severe fire occurred.
A–1

Table A. Roadway Accidents With Insufficient Information To Determine Severity

Date Location Summary

December 16, 2008 Ada, Oklahoma

A collision of a tractor truck with another 

vehicle punctures the tractor’s fuel tanks, 

leading to a fire that consumed 787 L 

[200 gal] of diesel fuel.

December 4, 2008 North Little Rock, Arkansas A tanker truck overturned and caught fire,

releasing 33,327 L [8,804 gal] of gasoline.

August 23, 2007 West Point, Alabama

A tanker truck was hit at an intersection,

leading to release of 17,034 L [4,500 gal] of 

gasoline and fire.

August 11, 2007 Junction, Texas

A tanker truck hit a parked construction 

truck, leading to release of 33,312 L 

[8,800 gal] of gasoline and fire.

August 1, 2007 Wheeler, Illinois

A tanker truck struck a tractor-trailer that 

caused the tanker to overturn and release

1,514 L [4,000 gal] of diesel fuel, which led 

to a fire.

July 29, 2007 Carryville, Tennessee

A tanker truck was hit by another vehicle 

that crossed the center lane, causing the 

tanker to overturn and release 32,206 L 

[8,508 gal] of gasoline, which led to a fire.

June 26, 2007 Strafford, Missouri

A tractor-trailer was involved in a multiple 

vehicle accident where 81 kg [180 lbs] of 

calcium hypochlorite was released.

July 19, 2006 Gowers Corner, Florida

A tanker truck was hit by another truck as it 

crossed the centerline of the road, releasing 

30,283 L [8,000 gal] of gasoline, which led to 

a fire.

April 7, 2006 Walla Walla, Washington

A tractor-trailer was hit head on leading to a 

fire, which released 833 L [220 gal] of 

phosphoric acid.

March 30, 2006 London, Kentucky

A tanker truck struck another vehicle when it 

turned in front of the truck, which led to the 

release of 26,498 L [7,000 gal] of diesel fuel.

November 6, 2005 Stratford, Texas

A rear-end crash caused a tractor-trailer to 

burn to the ground releasing 799 L [211 gal]

of isopropyl alcohol and 799 L [211 gal] of 

acetic acid.

October 3, 2005 Marathon, Florida

A tanker truck was struck head-on by a 

vehicle going the wrong direction, releasing

32,176 L [8,500 gal] of gasoline, which led to 

a fire.

August 16, 2005 Louisville, Kentucky

An accident between two passenger cars led 

to one passenger vehicle being sent into 

opposite traffic where it struck a 

tractor-trailer. The fuel tanks of the trailer 

exploded, which ignited the 313 kg [690 lbs] 

of dichloroisocyanuric acid.

May 28, 2005 Irving, Texas

A tanker truck involved in an accident fell off 

a bridge and resulted in a fire involving 

18,927 L [5,000 gal] of gasoline.
A–2

Table A. Roadway Accidents With Insufficient Information To Determine Severity 

(continued)

Date Location Summary

May 25, 2005 Bloomington, Minnesota

A tractor-trailer was exiting a construction 

zone, and the driver got confused, leading 

to the accident, which overturned the 

vehicle releasing 2,873 L [759 gal] 

of herbicide.

November 17, 2004 Briarcliff Manor, New York

A tanker truck collided with another vehicle 

leading to the release of 29,147 L 

[7,700 gal] of gasoline and a fire.

July 17, 2004 Why, Arizona

A tanker truck swerved to avoid an 

oncoming vehicle causing the tanker to 

overturn and releasing 33,690 L [8,900 gal] 

of gasoline, which led to a fire.

July 3, 2004 Amity, Oregon

A tanker truck was in an accident where 

another vehicle pulled in front of the tanker 

leading to the release of 23,470 L 

[6,200 gal] of gasoline.

December 10, 2003 Montverde, Florida

A vehicle crossed over the center lanes 

hitting a Federal Express vehicle releasing 

13 kg [29 lbs] of detonating fuses, which 

led to a fire.

September 27, 2003 Newtown, Connecticut

A tanker truck was hit head on as a vehicle 

crossed over the center lane, which 

released 31,040 L [8,200 gal] of gasoline

and led to a fire.

September 16, 2003 Detroit, Michigan

A tanker truck was cut off leading to loss of 

control of the tanker and subsequent fire 

consuming 50,725 L [13,400 gal] 

of gasoline.

July 19, 2003 Breckenridge, Texas

A tanker truck and tractor-trailer hit head

on, leading to the release of 25,438 L 

[6,720 gal] of crude oil and a fire.

April 5, 2003 Yeehaw Junction, Florida

A tractor-trailer hit a parked vehicle on the 

roadside, leading to the release of various 

combustible liquids totaling roughly 1,022 L 

[270 gal] and a fire.

September 14, 2002 MacClenny, Florida

A tanker truck was hit by a vehicle that 

crossed the median, leading to the 

gasoline fire.

May 23, 2002 Forrest Park, Georgia

A highway accident involving multiple 

vehicles led to the puncture of the tractor 

fuel tanks, which released 16,080 L

[4,248 gal] of paint and started a fire.

May 18, 2002 Moca, Puerto Rico

An accident at a gas station led to the 

puncture of a tanker truck cargo tank, 

which released 37,854 L [10,000 gal] of 

gasoline and started a fire.

April 15, 2002 Highland, Indiana

An intersection accident led to the release 

of 946 L [250 gal] of gasoline and started 

a fire.
A–3

Table A. Roadway Accidents With Insufficient Information To Determine Severity 

(continued)

Date Location Summary

January 5, 2002 Birmingham, Alabama

A tanker truck hit a bridge when a vehicle 

pulled in front of the truck, releasing 

37,476 L [9,900 gal] of gasoline and 

started a fire.

February 23, 2001 Mendenhal, Mississippi

A tractor truck struck a vehicle stopped in 

the right-hand lane, which led to the 

release of 757 L [200 gal] of gasoline and 

started a fire.

January 29, 2001 Barnesville, Minnesota

A tanker truck was hit by another 

tractor-trailer that did not stop at an 

intersection, releasing 33,323 L 

[8,803 gal] of gasoline and started a fire.

January 27, 2001 Roswell, Georgia

A tractor-trailer was hit by another vehicle

changing lanes leading to the overturn of 

the trailer, released 757 L [200 gal] of 

diesel fuel, and started a fire.

September 25, 2000 East Islip, New York

A tanker truck was hit exiting a business 

leading to the release of 18,359 L 

[4,850 gal] of gasoline and starting a fire.

September 24, 2000 Meriden, Connecticut

A tanker truck was hit by another vehicle 

that crossed the center of the median,

leading to the release of 32,577 L 

[8,606 gal] of gasoline, and started a fire.

September 14, 2000 Bainbridge, Indiana

A tanker truck was involved in an 

intersection accident that released 

15,142 L [4,000 gal] of alcohol and 

started a fire. 

August 12, 2000 Jacksonville, Florida

A tanker truck avoiding a spun-out vehicle 

lost control and overturned, leading to the 

release of 32,933 L [8,700 gal] 

of gasoline and starting a fire.

August 7, 2000 Macon, Georgia

A tanker truck attempted to avoid a 

collision leading to the release of 3,785 L 

[1,000 gal] of gasoline and starting a fire.

August 2, 2000 Las Vegas, Nevada

A tanker truck was hit by another tractor 

truck, which led to the release of 32,115 L 

[8,484 gal] of gasoline and started a fire.

June 16, 2000 Selah, Washington

A tanker truck was rear-ended, rupturing 

the tank, releasing 3,785 L [1,000 gal] of 

aviation fuel, and starting a fire.

May 1, 2000 El Reno, Oklahoma A traffic accident released 757 L [200 gal] 

of gasoline and led to a fire.

April 21, 2000 Albany, Georgia

A passenger vehicle veered in front of a 

tanker truck, which tried to avoid the car. 

An oncoming tractor-trailer hit the tanker 

carrying 31,419 L [8,300 gal] of gasoline.

October 8, 1999 Indianapolis, Indiana

A tanker truck was hit broadside by 

another vehicle going through a red light. 

The tanker rolled, and its compartments 

ruptured, leading to the fire.

September 6, 1999 La Veta, Colorado A multicar accident led to a fire and 

release of various hazardous materials.
A–4

Table A. Roadway Accidents With Insufficient Information To Determine Severity 

(continued)

Date Location Summary

March 12, 1999 Buena Park, California

An accident with a tanker truck released 

15,142 L [4,000 gal] of diesel fuel and 

11,356 L [3,000 gal] of gasoline and led to 

a fire.

February 16, 1999 Columbus, Ohio

An accident between a tractor-trailer and 

another vehicle resulted in a fire and 

release of gasoline.

December 19, 1998 Westlake Village, California

An accident between a tanker truck and 

another vehicle released 33,312 L 

[8,800 gal] of gasoline and led to a fire.

May 23, 19998 Chester, Pennsylvania

A tanker truck attempted to avoid a vehicle 

that cut it off, leading to the overturn of the 

tanker, and releasing 33,690 L [8,900 gal] 

of gasoline, and leading to a fire.

January 15, 1998 Louis, Texas

An accident between two tractor-trailers 

led to the fire and release of anhydrous 

chromium trioxide. 

October 31, 1997 Coraopolis, Pennsylvania

A vehicle ran into the trailer of an empty 

tanker truck leading to the fire and release 

of gasoline.

June 25, 1997 Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

A tractor-trailer attempting to avoid a 

vehicle that had cut it off led to the vehicle 

overturning and to a fire that released 

hydrated calcium hypochlorite.
APPENDIX B

This appendix lists all of the roadway accidents involving a fire and a collision that had sufficient 

information to determine whether they were a severe fire.
B–1

Table B. Roadway Accidents With Sufficient Information To Determine Severity

Date Location Date Location

October 5, 2008 Chattanooga, Tennessee March 14, 2007 Picacho, Arizona

July 18, 2008 Prairie City, Iowa February 19, 2007 Falkville, Alabama

July 5, 2008 Kingman, Arizona December 15, 2006 Pittsburg, Kansas

June 30, 2008 Princeton, Minnesota October 18, 2006 Macon, Georgia

April 26, 2008 High Springs, Florida August 12, 2006 Lawton, Oklahoma

March 28, 2008 Chicopee, Massachusetts April 21, 2006 Dahlonega, Georgia

March 24, 2008 Lower Makefield, 

Pennsylvania April 15, 2006 Purchase, New York

November 7, 2007 Tallulah, Louisiana January 20, 2006 Lagrange, Texas

June 23, 2007 Harrisburg, Pennsylvania July 28, 2005 Kingsport, Tennessee

May 10, 2007 Howell Township, New 

Jersey July 12, 2005 Ridgefield, Connecticut

March 26, 2007 Glendora, Mississippi June 29, 2005 Kern, Colorado

May 11, 2005 Berks, Pennsylvania April 2, 2001 Green Bay, Wisconsin

April 5, 2005 London, Kentucky February 26, 2001 Springfield, Massachusetts

December 23, 2004 San Antonio, Texas December 28, 2000 Fort Lauderdale, Florida

November 3, 2004 Snow Hill, Maryland November 4, 2000 Centerville, Utah

September 13, 2004 Carlos, Texas October 26, 2000 Aguilares, Texas

August 13, 2004 Berrien, Michigan October 25, 2000 Mill Creek, Ohio

August 6, 2004 Maybell, Colorado September 12, 2000 Sandersville, Georgia

August 3, 2004 Defiance, Ohio August 2, 2000 Altoona, Pennsylvania

June 25, 2004 Chalmette, Louisiana June 8, 2000 Alvwood, Minnesota

May 14, 2004 Cranbury, New Jersey June 6, 2000 Carnesville Georgia

April 17, 2004 Greenville, North Carolina March 15, 2000 Ellsworth, Wisconsin

March 25, 2004 Bridgeport, Connecticut February 21, 2000 Henderson, Kentucky

March 20, 2004 Waco, Texas February 17, 2000 Rolla, Missouri

March 13, 2004 Taylor, Michigan November 22, 1999 Hammond, Indiana

January 13, 2004 Elk Ridge, Maryland November 12, 1999 Hammond, Indiana

December 14, 2003 Greenville, Tennessee October 23, 1999 Irving, Texas

October 19, 2003 Phoenix, Arizona September 20, 1999 Pleasant View, Tennessee

October 1, 2003 Mission Viejo, California August 11, 1999 Dawson Springs, Kentucky

September 23, 2003 Bell Gardens, California August 3, 1999 Mitchell, South Dakota

July 24, 2003 Birmingham, Alabama June 28,1999 Bruceville, Texas

May 18, 2003 Ovilla, Texas January 25, 1999 Davie, Florida

November 29, 2002 Meeker, Colorado December 18, 1998 Raleigh, North Carolina

September 16, 2002 Massey, Maryland November 2, 1998 Government Camp, Oregon

August 1, 2002 Clear Lake, Iowa October 17, 1998 Huntsville, Alabama

February 17, 2002 Santa Rosa, California October 5, 1998 Woburn, Massachusetts

December 13, 2001 Gary, Indiana July 7, 1998 Mustang, Oklahoma

December 4, 2001 Bakersfield, California February 15, 1998 Wilmington, Delaware

November 29, 2001 Canton, Michigan October 9, 1997 Yonkers, New York

November 23, 2001 Honea Path, South Carolina September 5, 1997 Brownsburg, Indiana

October 23, 2001 Braselton, Georgia August 11, 1997 Painter, Virginia

July 11, 2001 Detroit, Michigan July 25, 1997 Bloomington, Illinois

June 9, 2001 Atlanta, Georgia June 26, 1997 Columbus, Ohio

May 20, 2001 Carson, California April 25, 1997 Jacksonville, Florida

May 18, 2001 Detroit, Michigan February 21, 1997 Marshall, Illinois

May 1, 2001 Ramona, Oklahoma