alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
# C_2014303EN.01004401.xml

| 8.9.2014 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 303/44 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

8.9.2014

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 303/44

---

Action brought on 24 June 2014 — Österreichische Post v Commission

(Case T-463/14)

2014/C 303/52

Language of the case: German

Parties

Parties

Applicant: Österreichische Post AG (Vienna, Austria) (represented by: H. Schatzmann, J. Bleckmann, lawyers)

Applicant:

Defendant: European Commission

Defendant:

Form of order sought

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | annul the Commission’s implementing decision in Case C(2014) 2093 in so far as Directive 2004/17/EC continues to apply to the award of contracts for postal services which are not mentioned in Article 1 of the implementing decision, exemption from which the applicant has requested under Article 30(6) of Directive 2004/17/EC; |
| --- | --- |

—

annul the Commission’s implementing decision in Case C(2014) 2093 in so far as Directive 2004/17/EC continues to apply to the award of contracts for postal services which are not mentioned in Article 1 of the implementing decision, exemption from which the applicant has requested under Article 30(6) of Directive 2004/17/EC;

| — | in the alternative, in so far as partial annulment of the contested decision is, according to the Court, not admissible or possible, to annul the implementing decision in its entirety; |
| --- | --- |

—

in the alternative, in so far as partial annulment of the contested decision is, according to the Court, not admissible or possible, to annul the implementing decision in its entirety;

| — | order the defendant to pay the costs of the proceedings. |
| --- | --- |

—

order the defendant to pay the costs of the proceedings.

Pleas in law and main arguments

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the applicant claims that the contested decision, as regards the postal services not covered by Article 1 thereof, is unlawful under Article 263(2) TFEU because the Commission has infringed EU law by misapplying and misinterpreting Directive 2004/17/EC. The applicant claims, in essence, that the postal services which it provides are exposed to sufficient direct competition, so that the conditions for an exemption under Article 30(1) of Directive 2004/17 are met. The applicant also claims that the Commission misapplied the criteria and methods on market definition laid down by EU law and case-law.

Furthermore, the applicant alleges infringement of essential procedural requirements, as the Commission failed to give sufficient reasons for its decision.

Finally, the applicant submits that the Commission infringed general fundamental procedural rights, in that by failing to adequately address the applicant’s claims and evidence, it infringed the applicant’s right to be heard.

---
Editorial Note on Part 880
Editorial Note: Nomenclature changes to part 880 appear at 73 FR 35341, June 23, 2008.

§ 880.5045 Medical recirculating air cleaner. ( a ) *Identification.* A medical recirculating air cleaner is a device used to remove particles from the air for medical purposes. The device may function by electrostatic precipitation or filtration.
( b ) *Classification.* Class II (performance standards).
Editorial Note on Part 862
Editorial Note: Nomenclature changes to part 862 appear at 73 FR 35341, June 23, 2008.

§ 862.1310 Galactose test system. ( a ) *Identification.* A galactose test system is a device intended to measure galactose in blood and urine. Galactose measurements are used in the diagnosis and treatment of the hereditary disease galactosemia (a disorder of galactose metabolism) in infants.
( b ) *Classification.* Class I.
```

[Congressional Bills 118th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 7956 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

118th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 7956

            To require mandatory minimums for sexual abuse.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             April 11, 2024

   Mrs. Luna (for herself, Mr. Tiffany, and Mrs. Miller of Illinois) 
 introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on 
                             the Judiciary

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
            To require mandatory minimums for sexual abuse.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Justice for Rape Survivors Act''.

SEC. 2. MANDATORY MINIMUMS FOR SEXUAL ABUSE.

    (a) Aggravated Sexual Abuse.--Section 2241 of title 18, United 
States Code, is amended--
            (1) in subsection (a), by striking ``imprisoned for any 
        term of years or life,'' and inserting ``imprisoned for not 
        less than 30 years or for life,''; and
            (2) in subsection (b), by striking ``imprisoned for any 
        term of years or life,'' and inserting ``imprisoned for not 
        less than 30 years or for life,''.
    (b) Sexual Abuse.--Section 2242 of title 18, United States Code, is 
amended by striking ``imprisoned for any term of years or for life'' 
and inserting ``imprisoned for not less than 30 years or for life''.
                                 <all>
```
§ 1.24-1 Partial credit allowed for certain other dependents. ( a ) *In general.* For purposes of section 24(h)(4)(A), a taxpayer may be eligible to increase the credit determined under section 24(a) by $500 for a dependent of the taxpayer, as defined in section 152, other than a qualifying child described in section 24(c).
( b ) *Applicability date.* This section applies to taxable years beginning on or after October 13, 2020.
[T.D. 9913, 85 FR 64385, Oct. 13, 2020]
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA No. DA 23
- 0740 STATE OF MONTANA,

Plaintiff and Appellee, vs. CHARLES MICHAEL COVEY,

Defendant and Appellant
.

**ORDER** Upon consideration of Appellant’s motion for extension of time, and good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Appellant is granted an extension of time to and including September 2 3, 2024, within which to prepare, file, and serve Appellant’s opening brief on appeal.

Electronically signed by: Mike McGrath Chief Justice, Montana Supreme Court

August 16 2024

08/16/2024

Case Number: DA 23-0740
```

[Congressional Bills 118th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 7911 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

118th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 7911

To amend title 13, United States Code, to prohibit the use of questions 
  on citizenship, nationality, or immigration status in any decennial 
                    census, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             April 9, 2024

  Ms. Norton introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
               Committee on Oversight and Accountability

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To amend title 13, United States Code, to prohibit the use of questions 
  on citizenship, nationality, or immigration status in any decennial 
                    census, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Ensuring Full Participation in the 
Census Act of 2024''.

SEC. 2. PROHIBITING CENSUS QUESTIONS ON CITIZENSHIP, NATIONALITY, OR 
              IMMIGRATION STATUS.

    Section 141 of title 13, United States Code, is amended--
            (1) by redesignating subsection (g) as subsection (h); and
            (2) by inserting after subsection (f) the following:
    ``(g)(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), a questionnaire or 
survey used to carry out, or in connection with, any decennial census 
of population may not include any question regarding citizenship, 
nationality, or immigration status of the respondent, any family member 
of the respondent, or any individual living in the respondent's 
household.
    ``(2) Paragraph (1) shall not apply to the survey, conducted by the 
Secretary, commonly referred to as the `American Community Survey'.''.
                                 <all>
```
#### § 1.175-3 Definition of “the business of farming.”

The method described in section 175 is available only to a taxpayer engaged in “the business of farming”. A taxpayer is engaged in the business of farming if he cultivates, operates, or manages a farm for gain or profit, either as owner or tenant. For the purpose of section 175, a taxpayer who receives a rental (either in cash or in kind) which is based upon farm production is engaged in the business of farming. However, a taxpayer who receives a fixed rental (without reference to production) is engaged in the business of farming only if he participates to a material extent in the operation or management of the farm. A taxpayer engaged in forestry or the growing of timber is not thereby engaged in the business of farming. A person cultivating or operating a farm for recreation or pleasure rather than a profit is not engaged in the business of farming. For the purpose of this section, the term *farm* is used in its ordinary, accepted sense and includes stock, dairy, poultry, fish, fruit, and truck farms, and also plantations, ranches, ranges, and orchards. A fish farm is an area where fish are grown or raised, as opposed to merely caught or harvested; that is, an area where they are artificially fed, protected, cared for, etc. A taxpayer is engaged in “the business of farming” if he is a member of a partnership engaged in the business of farming. See paragraphs (a)(8)(i) and (c)(1)(iv) of § 1.702-1.

[T.D. 6649, 28 FR 3762, Apr. 18, 1963]
#### Regency Clothes, Inc., v. Progressive Clothes, Inc.

Before MacNeille, P. J.; Milner and Mawhinney, JJ.

*451
      *Wexler & Weisman,*for plaintiff.

*George T. Steeley,*for defendant.

December 19, 1951.

Mawhinney, J.,

— We are considering defendant’s petition for approval of certain interrogatories. In accordance with the policy of this court declared by President Judge MacNeille in Klosterman et ux. v. Clark et al., 78 D. *&*C. 263, we shall confine our remarks in such situation to a bare minimum.

Plaintiff contends that Rule 4011(c) (4) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure limits discovery where the facts sought are not necessary to prepare pleadings or to prove a prima facie claim or defense. A prima facie case is one in which the evidence presented is sufficiently strong to compel one’s opponent to go forward in answer. A preliminary determination of what is or is not necessary to the proof of a prima facie claim or defense is, at best, an educated guess in legal definition. The boundaries of a prima facie claim or defense are not clear. As in questions of relevancy, we must resolve doubts in favor of liberal allowance of revelation of factual questions. See Klosterman v. Clark, supra.

In this case defendant is certainly entitled to know the basis of and the particulars, to the extent known or recorded, of the breach of contract alleged by plaintiff. Defendant is also entitled to know the facts relative to the damages claimed by plaintiff. The existence or nonexistence of damages is always part of a prima facie claim or defense.

Plaintiff’s objection that the interrogatories require detailed investigation of plaintiff’s records and memoranda cannot bar defendant’s interrogatories. Such detail arises from the nature of plaintiff’s claim.

Insofar as defendant requests that *plaintiff supply him*with copies of records and statements, we have denied such request. See rule 4006.

*452
      *Order*

And now, December 19, 1951, upon consideration of the petition of defendant in the above-entitled action for the approval of written interrogatories directed to plaintiff, attached thereto, it is hereby ordered and decreed that plaintiff file a verified answer to interrogatories 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, first sentence of 10, 11, and 13, within 20 days after service of a copy of the interrogatories and of this order upon it or its counsel of record.
```

[Congressional Bills 118th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 8089 Referred in Senate (RFS)]

<DOC>
118th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 8089

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                           September 18, 2024

     Received; read twice and referred to the Committee on Finance

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 AN ACT

 
   To amend title XIX of the Social Security Act to require certain 
       additional provider screening under the Medicaid program.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Medicare and Medicaid Fraud 
Prevention Act of 2024''.

SEC. 2. MEDICAID PROVIDER SCREENING REQUIREMENTS.

    Section 1902(kk)(1) of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 
1396a(kk)(1)) is amended--
            (1) by striking ``The State'' and inserting:
                    ``(A) In general.--The State''; and
            (2) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:
                    ``(B) Additional provider screening.--Beginning 
                January 1, 2027, as part of the enrollment (or 
                reenrollment or revalidation of enrollment) of a 
                provider or supplier under this title, and not less 
                frequently than quarterly during the period that such 
                provider or supplier is so enrolled, the State conducts 
                a check of the Death Master File (as such term is 
                defined in section 203(d) of the Bipartisan Budget Act 
                of

              

                 2013) to determine whether such provider or supplier 
                is deceased.''.

            Passed the House of Representatives September 17, 2024.

            Attest:

                                             KEVIN F. MCCUMBER,

                                                                 Clerk.
```
Exhibit 32.2





CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO


18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,


AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY


ACT OF 2002





In
connection with the Annual Report on Form 10-K/A of
Eco Energy Tech Asia, Ltd. (the “Company”) for the
fiscal year ended December 31, 2016 as filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
“Report”), I, Philip K.H. Chan, Chief Financial Officer
of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as
adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
that:





1.
The
Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





2.
The
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of
operations of the Company.





Date:
April 5, 2017


/s/
Philip K.H. ChanPhilip K.H. ChanChief Financial Officer(Principal Financial Officer)
Editorial Note on Part 882
Editorial Note: Nomenclature changes to part 882 appear at 73 FR 35341, June 23, 2008.

§ 882.4545 Shunt system implantation instrument. ( a ) *Identification.* A shunt system implantation instrument is an instrument used in the implantation of cerebrospinal fluid shunts, and includes tunneling instruments for passing shunt components under the skin.
( b ) *Classification.* Class I (general controls). The device is exempt from the premarket notification procedures in subpart E of part 807 of this chapter subject to the limitations in § 882.9.
[44 FR 51730, Sept. 4, 1979, as amended at 65 FR 2319, Jan. 14, 2000; 84 FR 71815, Dec. 30, 2019]
Editorial Note on Part 874
Editorial Note: Nomenclature changes to part 874 appear at 73 FR 35341, June 23, 2008.

§ 874.3 Effective dates of requirement for premarket approval. A device included in this part that is classified into class III (premarket approval) shall not be commercially distributed after the date shown in the regulation classifying the device unless the manufacturer has an approval under section 515 of the act (unless an exemption has been granted under section 520(g)(2) of the act). An approval under section 515 of the act consists of FDA's issuance of an order approving an application for premarket approval (PMA) for the device or declaring completed a product development protocol (PDP) for the device. ( a ) Before FDA requires that a device commercially distributed before the enactment date of the amendments, or a device that has been found substantially equivalent to such a device, has an approval under section 515 of the act FDA must promulgate a regulation under section 515(b) of the act requiring such approval, except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section. Such a regulation under section 515(b) of the act shall not be effective during the grace period ending on the 90th day after its promulgation or on the last day of the 30th full calendar month after the regulation that classifies the device into class III is effective, whichever is later. See section 501(f)(2)(B) of the act. Accordingly, unless an effective date of the requirement for premarket approval is shown in the regulation for a device classified into class III in this part, the device may be commercially distributed without FDA's issuance of an order approving a PMA declaring completed a PDP for the device. If FDA promulgates a regulation under section 515(b) of the act requiring premarket approval for a device, section 501(f)(1)(A) of the act applies to the device.
( b ) Any new, not substantially equivalent, device introduced into commercial distribution on or after May 28, 1976, including a device formerly marketed that has been substantially altered, is classified by statute (section 513(f) of the act) into class III without any grace period and FDA must have issued an order approving a PMA or declaring completed a PDP for the device before the device is commercially distributed unless it is reclassified. If FDA knows that a device being commercially distributed may be a “new” device as defined in this section because of any new intended use or other reasons, FDA may codify the statutory classification of the device into class III for such new use. Accordingly, the regulation for such a class III device states that as of the enactment date of the amendments, May 28, 1976, the device must have an approval under section 515 of the act before commercial distribution.
#### RICHARDS *v.*SCHOEN INVESTMENT COMPANY *et al.*

No. 8673.

June 17, 1932.

*A. G. Corbett,*for plaintiff in error.

*G. S. Peck, W. B. Cody, J. L. Mayson, C. S. Winn,*and *J. O. Savage,*contra.

Beck, P. J.

G. A. Eichards, transferee of a city tax fi. fa. against Mrs. Anne Sue Sharp, which was a lien against several parcels of real estate, had the same levied upon one of the parcels, which had been conveyed by defendant in fi. fa. by warranty deed to a mortgage company, and, after foreclosure, to Schoen Investment Company, and by the latter to *W.*E. Thompson by warranty deed, Schoen Investment Company taking back at the same time a purchase-money security deed. Thompson failing to file a claim to the land, Schoen Investment Company filed an equitable petition seeking an injunction against the enforcement of the fi. fa. by levy against the lot of land in question, and praying that the levy of the tax execution be dismissed. The petitioner’s right to the relief sought depended upon whether or not the lot of land levied upon was sold and alienated after the other parcels of land referred to had been sold, so as to bring it within the rule contained in the Code, § 6029, which provides that “If the property subject to *910such lien is sold in several parcels at different times, the parcels should be charged in the inverse order of their alienation.”

The case was heard by the judge without the intervention of a jury, on an agreed statement of facts; and the judgment and decree of the court was, in part, that “the property levied on at No. 598 Seminole Avenue N. E. [this being the parcel of land in question here], described in the petition, was not the last parcel of property alienated by Mrs. Anne Sue Sharp from among several parcels of land which were returned by her and were subject to the lien of 1927 City of Atlanta taxes.” We are of the opinion that this finding of the court was authorized under the agreed statement of facts. And that being true, the court did not err in decreeing that the levy of the tax execution against the property be dismissed. See *Felton*v. *Grier,*109 *Ga.*320 (35 S. E. 175).

*Judgment affirmed.*

*Bussell, O. J., and Atkinson, Ilill, and Gilbert, JJ., concur.*
QRIGINAL 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

OP 22-0443 

RAMES, INC. FORMERLY d/b/a CENTRAL 

INS. AGENCY, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

MONTANA ELEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 

COURT, FLATHEAD COUNTY HONORABLE 

ROBERT B. ALLISON, Presiding, 

Respondent. 

AUG 1 6 2022 

Bowen Greenwooa 

Clerk of Supreme Court 

State. rlf RtInntarla 

ORDER 

Petitioner Rames, Inc., seeks a writ of supervisory control over the Eleventh Judicial 

District Court, Flathead County, in its Cause No. DV-15-2020-521. Rames, Inc., alleges 

that the court erred in its rulings in the court's February 28, 2022 Order Re: Summary 

Judgment, April 26, 2022 Order Re: Rernaining Issues, and August 9, 2022 Order 

Regarding Witnesses and New Defense. 

Supervisory control is an extraordinary remedy that is sometimes justified when 

urgency or ernergency factors exist making the normal appeal process inadequate, when 

the case involves purely legal questions, and when the other court is proceeding under a 

mistake of law and is causing a gross injustice, constitutional issues of state-wide 

importance are involved, or, in a criminal case, the other court has granted or denied a 

motion to substitute a judge. M. R. App. P. 14(3). Consistent with Rule 14(3), it is the 

Court's practice to refrain from exercising supervisory control when the petitioner has an 

adequate rernedy of appeal. E.g., Buckles v. Seventh Judicial Dist. Court, No. OP 16-0517, 

386 Mont. 393, 386 P.3d 545 (table) (Oct. 18, 2016); Lichte v. Mont. Eighteenth Judicial 

Dist. Court, No. OP 16-0482, 385 Mont. 540, 382 P.3d 868 (table) (Aug. 24, 2016). 

08/16/2022

Case Number: OP 22-0443
Rames, Inc., offers no argument as to why the normal appeal process would be 

inadequate in this case. It thus has not met the threshold requirements for consideration of 

a petition for writ of supervisory control under M. R. App. P. 14(3). 

Therefore, 

IT IS ORDERED that the Petition for Writ of Supervisory Control is DENIED and 

DISMISSED. 

The Clerk is directed to provide immediate notice of this Order to counsel for 

Petitioner, all counsel of record in the Eleventh Judicial District Court, Flathead County, 

Cause No. DV-15-2020-521, and the Honorable Robert B. Allison, presiding. 

„41--• 

DATED this I-40. day of August, 2022. 

Chief Justice 

194 AI J ut_ 

Justices 

2