alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent *

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision **

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff - Appellee,

 v.

ALEJANDRO VANUELOS-FREGOSO,

aka Francisco Javier Leon-Calderon,

 Defendant - Appellant.

No. 09-50329

D.C. No. 5:09-cr-00032-VAP

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Virginia A. Phillips, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted August 23, 2010** 

Before: LEAVY, HAWKINS, and THOMAS, Circuit Judges. 

Alejandro Vanuelos-Fregoso appeals from his guilty-plea conviction and 30-

month sentence for illegal reentry by an alien following deportation, in violation of

8 U.S.C. § 1326. 

FILED

SEP 07 2010

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 09-50329

Pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), Vanuelos-Fregoso’s

counsel has filed a brief stating there are no grounds for relief, along with a motion

to withdraw as counsel of record. We have provided Vanuelos-Fregoso the

opportunity to file a pro se supplemental brief. No pro se supplemental brief or

answering brief has been filed.

Our independent review of the record pursuant to Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S.

75, 80-81 (1988), discloses no arguable grounds for relief as to VanuelosFregoso’s conviction. We dismiss the appeal of the sentence in light of the valid

appeal waiver. See United States v. Nguyen, 235 F.3d 1179, 1182 (9th Cir. 2000).

In accordance with United States v. Rivera-Sanchez, 222 F.3d 1057, 1062

(9th Cir. 2000), we remand the case to the district court with instructions that it

delete from the judgment the incorrect reference to § 1326(b)(2). See United States

v. Herrera-Blanco, 232 F.3d 715, 719 (9th Cir. 2000) (remanding sua sponte to

delete the reference to § 1326(b)).

Counsel’s motion to withdraw is GRANTED.

The conviction is AFFIRMED, the appeal of the sentence is DISMISSED,

and the case is REMANDED with instructions to correct the judgment.
NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Respondent,

v.

PETER JAMES LITTLE, Petitioner.

No. 1 CA-CR 16-0176 PRPC

Petition for Review from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CR2001-005401

The Honorable Mark H. Brain, Judge

REVIEW GRANTED; RELIEF DENIED 

COUNSEL

Maricopa County Attorney's Office, Phoenix

By Susan L. Luder

Counsel for Respondent

Peter James Little, Tucson

Petitioner

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Michael J. Brown, Judge Jennifer B. Campbell and Chief 

Judge Samuel A. Thumma delivered the decision of the Court.

FILED 11-7-2017
STATE v. LITTLE

Decision of the Court

2

PER CURIAM: 

¶1 Petitioner Peter James Little seeks review of the superior 

court's order denying his petitions for post-conviction relief, filed pursuant 

to Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1. These are petitioner's fifth and 

sixth successive petitions.

¶2 Absent an abuse of discretion or error of law, this court will 

not disturb a superior court's ruling on a petition for post-conviction relief. 

State v. Gutierrez, 229 Ariz. 573, 577, ¶ 19 (2012). It is petitioner's burden to 

show that the superior court abused its discretion by denying the petition 

for post-conviction relief. See State v. Poblete, 227 Ariz. 537, ¶ 1 (App. 2011) 

(petitioner has burden of establishing abuse of discretion on review).

¶3 We have reviewed the record in this matter, the superior 

court's order denying the petitions for post-conviction relief, and the 

petition for review. We find that petitioner has not established an abuse of 

discretion. 

¶4 For the foregoing reasons, we grant review and deny relief.
427 A.2d 1220

#### Commonwealth v. Ross, Appellant.

*623Argued September 12, 1979.

Louis B. Priluker, for appellant;

Suzanne McDonough, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.

Before PRICE, WIEAND and VAN der VOORT, JJ.*

*

 Judge Donald E. Wieand is sitting by special designation.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JAN-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                              FEB-2-1997
<PERIOD-END>                                NOV-1-1997
<CASH>                                          48,666
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   55,115
<ALLOWANCES>                                     8,786
<INVENTORY>                                      1,226
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               132,472
<PP&E>                                          21,973
<DEPRECIATION>                                  13,527
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 206,458
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           85,701
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                           471
<OTHER-SE>                                      90,421
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   206,458
<SALES>                                        471,843
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               471,843
<CGS>                                          406,647
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  406,647
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                65,758
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                 5,172
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               2,806
<INCOME-PRETAX>                               (34,927)
<INCOME-TAX>                                     4,277
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                           (39,882)
<DISCONTINUED>                                   5,220
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                  (45,459)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   (1.17)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (1.17)
        

</TABLE>
Editorial Note on Part 888
Editorial Note: Nomenclature changes to part 888 appear at 73 FR 35341, June 23, 2008.

§ 888.4210 Cement mixer for clinical use. ( a ) *Identification.* A cement mixer for clinical use is a device consisting of a container intended for use in mixing bone cement (§ 888.3027).
( b ) *Classification.* Class I (general controls). The device is exempt from the premarket notification procedures in subpart E of part 807 of this chapter, subject to the limitations in § 888.9.
[52 FR 33702, Sept. 4, 1987, as amended at 53 FR 52953, Dec. 29, 1988; 59 FR 63014, Dec. 7, 1994; 66 FR 38815, July 25, 2001]
Section 906 Certification- CEO



 
Exhibit 10.1

 
CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, 
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO 
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF
2002 
 
In connection with the Quarterly Report of Matrix
Service Company, Inc. (the “Company”) on form 10-Q for the period ended February 28, 2003 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I Bradley S. Vetal, Chief Executive Officer of the
Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that based on my knowledge: 
 

	1.	 	The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and 

 

	2.	 	The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.


 
This certification is deemed to accompany this
Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q, but is not deemed “filed” for purpose of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, or otherwise. 
 

	
	 



	
 Bradley S. Vetal

	 Chief Executive Officer

	 April 10, 2003
Editorial Note on Part 868
Editorial Note: Nomenclature changes to part 868 appear at 73 FR 35341, June 23, 2008.

§ 868.5720 Bronchial tube. ( a ) *Identification.* A bronchial tube is a device used to differentially intubate a patient's bronchus (one of the two main branches of the trachea leading directly to the lung) in order to isolate a portion of lung distal to the tube.
( b ) *Classification.* Class II (performance standards).
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                                    9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1998
<CASH>                                      20,053,030
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                3,173,055
<ALLOWANCES>                                     2,008
<INVENTORY>                                     65,523
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                            23,426,375
<PP&E>                                       3,418,851
<DEPRECIATION>                                 955,944
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              51,003,799
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                       32,532,483
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                 25,697,414
<COMMON>                                         5,859
<OTHER-SE>                                 (7,241,996)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                51,003,799
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             2,671,302
<CGS>                                           57,353
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                            39,532,312
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             973,537
<INCOME-PRETAX>                           (44,804,577)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                       (44,804,577)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                              (44,804,577)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   (0.94)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (0.94)
        

</TABLE>
§ 1.21-3 Special rules applicable to married taxpayers. ( a ) *Joint return requirement.* No credit is allowed under section 21 for taxpayers who are married (within the meaning of section 7703 and the regulations thereunder) at the close of the taxable year unless the taxpayer and spouse file a joint return for the taxable year. See section 6013 and the regulations thereunder relating to joint returns of income tax by husband and wife.
( b ) *Taxpayers treated as not married.* The requirements of paragraph (a) of this section do not apply to a taxpayer who is legally separated under a decree of divorce or separate maintenance or who is treated as not married under section 7703(b) and the regulations thereunder (relating to certain married taxpayers living apart). A taxpayer who is treated as not married under this paragraph (b) is not required to take into account the earned income of the taxpayer's spouse for purposes of applying the earned income limitation on the amount of employment-related expenses under § 1.21-2(b).
( c ) *Death of married taxpayer.* If a married taxpayer dies during the taxable year and the survivor may make a joint return with respect to the deceased spouse under section 6013(a)(3), the credit is allowed for the year only if a joint return is made. If, however, the surviving spouse remarries before the end of the taxable year in which the deceased spouse dies, a credit may be allowed on the decedent spouse's separate return.
[T.D. 9354, 72 FR 45341, Aug. 14, 2007]
#### Domin *v.*Brush *et al.*

Atkinson, J.

1. In accordance with the general equity rule (21 C. J. 397, § 418), one who asks for injunctive relief must clearly allege his title or interest in the subject-matter of the suit. 32 O. J. 325, § 539(b). *33As a general rule an allegation that a party is the owner of specified realty is an allegation of an ultimate fact and not a conclusion of law. 21 Enc. PL & Pr. 718, 719, note 1. In this State in a suit for injunction it will be sufficient to allege generally title in the plaintiff, without setting out the several steps by which the title was perfected. *Chancey*v. *Johnson,*148 *Ga.*87 (95 S. E. 975); 32 C. J. 326, § 539, note 6, and cit.

No. 8486.

December 21, 1931.

2. “In order for outstanding conveyances to be a cloud upon title, it is necessary that they of themselves, or in connection with alleged extrinsic facts, should constitute an apparent title; that is, one upon which a recovery could or might be had against the true owner were he in possession and relying upon possession alone. Anything which would force him to attack the adverse title, or to exhibit his own, would be a cloud; anything which would not have this effect would be no cloud.” *Thompson*v. *Etowah Iron Co.,*91 Ga. 538 (17 S. E. 663); *McMullen*v. *Cooper,*125 *Ga.*435 (54 S. E. 97); *Adams*v. *Johnson,*129 *Ga.*611 (59 S. E. 269); *Howell*v. *Wilson,*137 *Ga.*710 (74 S. E. 255). The allegations of the petition do not show that the alleged proposed sale if made would constitute a cloud upon title.

3. The judge did not err in dismissing the action on the ground that the petition failed to allege a cause of action for equitable relief.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*All the Justices concur.*

*34W. *V. Gusier &*Son, for plaintiff. *P. D. Rich,*for defendants.
Officer’s Certificate

 

Pursuant to the requirements of the applicable Servicing Agreement for the transactions listed on Schedule I hereto, for which Wells Fargo Bank, National Association, as Master Servicer, and Berkeley Point Capital LLC, as Servicer, the undersigned, Ellen D. Miller, as Managing Director and Head of Servicing of Berkeley Point Capital LLC, hereby certifies subject to any limitations listed on Schedule I hereto, as of the date hereof, solely in her capacity as an officer and not in her individual capacity, as follows:

 

1.       A review of the activities of the Servicer during the preceding calendar year (the “Reporting Period”) and of its performance under the Agreement has been made under my supervision; and

2.       To the best of my knowledge, based on such review, the Servicer has fulfilled all of its obligations under the Agreement in all material respects throughout the Reporting Period.

 

 

Dated:   March 1, 2016

 

 

Berkeley Point Capital LLC      

 

/s/ Ellen D. Miller

Ellen D. Miller

Managing Director, Head of Servicing

 

  

Schedule I

 

Multifamily Pass-Through Certificates, Berkeley Point Capital LLC as ***Sub-Servicer***:

Series 2009-K3     

Series 2010-K7

Series 2010-K8

Series 2010-K9

Series 2011-K11

Series 2011-K13

Series 2011-K15

Series 2011-K701

Series 2011-K702

Series 2011-K703

Series 2011-K704

Series 2012-K20

Series 2012-K706

Series 2012-K707

Series 2012-K711

Series 2013-K26

Series 2013-K713

Series 2013-K29

Series 2013-K30

Series 2013-K31

Series 2013-K33

Series 2013-K34

Series 2014-K714

Series 2014-K715

Series 2014-KF04

Series 2014-K716

Series 2014-K40

Series 2014-KF05

Series 2015-K42

Series 2015-K44

Series 2015-K47

Series 2015-K48

Series 2015-K720

Series 2015-KF11

Series 2015-KS03

Series 2015-K721

Series 2015-K51

 

Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates; Berkeley Point Capital LLC as ***Primary Servicer***

COMM 2014-CCRE20 Mortgage Trust

COMM 2015-CCRE24 Mortgage Trust

COMM 2015-CCRE26 Mortgage Trust

COMM 2015-LC23 Mortgage Trust

GS Mortgage Securities Trust 2015-GC28

GS Mortgage Securities Trust 2015-GC34

 

Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates; Berkeley Point Capital as ***Limited******Sub-Servicer***

COMM 2012-CCRE2 Mortgage Trust

COMM 2012-CCRE3 Mortgage Trust

COMM 2012-CCRE4 Mortgage Trust

COMM 2013-CCRE6 Mortgage Trust

COMM 2013-CCRE10 Mortgage Trust

COMM 2013-CCRE12 Mortgage Trust

COMM 2013-CCRE13 Mortgage Trust

COMM 2013-FL3

COMM 2014-CCRE14 Mortgage Trust

COMM 2014-CCRE20 Mortgage Trust

COMM 2014-LC17 Mortgage Trust

COMM 2014-UBS5 Mortgage Trust

DBCCRE 2014-ARCP

GSMS 2014-GC18

GSMS 2014-GC22

GSMS 2014-GC26

CGMCT 2014-GC19

CGMCT 2014-GC21

BBCCRE TRUST 2015-GTP

CFCRE 2015-RUM

COMM 2015-CCRE22 Mortgage Trust

COMM 2015-CCRE24 Mortgage Trust

COMM 2015-CCRE25 Mortgage Trust

COMM 2015-CCRE26 Mortgage Trust

COMM 2015-LC23 Mortgage Trust

GS Mortgage Securities Trust 2015-GC28

GS Mortgage Securities Trust 2015-GC34
#### § 1.336-5 Applicability dates.

Except as otherwise provided in this section, the provisions of §§ 1.336-1 through 1.336-4 apply to any qualified stock disposition for which the disposition date is on or after May 15, 2013. The provisions of § 1.336-1(b)(5)(i)(A) relating to section 1022 apply on and after January 19, 2017. The provisions of § 1.336-2(g)(3)(ii) and (iii) apply to foreign income taxes paid or accrued in taxable years beginning on or after December 28, 2021.

[T.D. 9959, 87 FR 324, Jan. 4, 2022]
Exhibit 32.1


CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO


18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350





In connection with the Annual Report on Form 10-K of Manitowoc Foodservice, Inc. (the “company”) for the year ended December 31, 2015, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Hubertus M. Muehlhaeuser, President and Chief Executive Officer of the company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of my knowledge:


|   |                                                                                                                      
|-- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

|   |                                                                                                                                                     
|-- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the company.




Date: March 30, 2016


/s/ Hubertus M. MuehlhaeuserHubertus M. MuehlhaeuserPresident and Chief Executive Officer
EXHIBIT
        32.2
 
 CERTIFICATION
        PURSUANT TO
 18
        U.S.C.
        SECTION 1350,
 AS
        ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
 SECTION
        906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
  In
        connection with the Quarterly Report of Fonix Corporation on Form 10-Q for
        the
        period ending March 31, 2007, as filed with the Securities and Exchange
        Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Roger D. Dudley, Chief
        Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section
        1350,
        as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
        that:
 
 (1) The
        Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of
        the
        Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
 
 (2) The
        information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
        the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
 
 
 
 **/s/
                  ROGER D. DUDLEY**Roger
                  D. DudleyChief
                  Financial Officer
 Dated
        May
        15, 2007
#### § 1.332-3 Liquidations completed within one taxable year.

If in a liquidation completed within one taxable year pursuant to a plan of complete liquidation, distributions in complete liquidation are received by a corporation which owns the specified amount of stock in the liquidating corporation and which continues qualified with respect to the ownership of such stock until the transfer of all the property within such year is completed (see paragraph (a) of § 1.332-2), then no gain or loss shall be recognized with respect to the distributions received by the recipient corporation. In such case no waiver or bond is required of the recipient corporation under section 332.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 00-7221

EDDIE HARRELL,

Petitioner - Appellant,

versus

CALVIN ANTHONY, Warden; CHARLES M. CONDON, Attorney General of the State of South Carolina,

Respondents - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of

South Carolina, at Charleston. G. Ross Anderson, Jr., District

Judge. (CA-00-510-9-13)

Submitted: November 9, 2000 Decided: November 15, 2000

Before WILKINS, WILLIAMS, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Eddie Harrell, Appellant Pro Se. Derrick K. McFarland, OFFICE OF

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF SOUTH CAROLINA, Columbia, South Carolina,

for Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
2

PER CURIAM:

Eddie Harrell appeals the district court’s order granting

summary judgment to the Respondents and denying relief on his

petition filed under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254 (West 1994 & Supp. 2000).

We have reviewed the record and the district court’s opinion accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and find no

reversible error. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal on the reasoning of the district

court. See Harrell v. Anthony, No. CA-00-510-9-13 (D.S.C. July 27,

2000). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the

court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
### IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 16

- 11825 Summary Calendar

JAMES DURHAM
,

Plaintiff

- Appellant

v.

DEE ANDERSON, Sheriff
,

Defendant

- Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas USDC No. 4:16

- CV

- 1027

Before DAVIS, CLEMENT and COSTA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: * James Durham appeals the district court’s dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint pursuant to the screening provisions of 2 8 U.S.C. § 1915A.

Durham alleged that the defendant was liable for injuries he received when he was beaten with a mop handle by another jail inmate.

As a threshold matt er, this court must determine whether it has jurisdiction to entertain the appeal. Mosley v. Cozby, 813 F.2d 659, 660 (5th

* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5 , the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set f orth in 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

### FILED October 25, 2017

Lyle W. Cayce Clerk Case: 16-11825 Document: 00514209686 Page: 1 Date Filed: 10/25/2017No. 16

- 11825

2 Cir. 1987). A timely notice of appeal is mandatory and jurisdictional in a civil

case. Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 214 (2007)

. Durham ’s notice of appeal, which we consider filed no ear lier than the date he signed it on December 18, 2016 , is untimely from the district court’s judgment, which was entered on November 7, 2016

. See F ED

. R. A PP

. P. 4(a)(1)(A) (a party must file a n otice of appeal in a civil case within 30 days of the order or judgment ). Th ere is no basis to construe his notice of appeal as a motion for extension of time under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(5). Accordingly, his appeal is dismissed for lac k of jurisdiction. See Bowles, 551

U.S. at 214. His motion for appointment of counsel is denied.
APPEAL DISMISSED; MOTION DENIED. Case: 16-11825 Document: 00514209686 Page: 2 Date Filed: 10/25/2017