F OR P UBLICATION



### UNIT E D ST AT E S CO URT O F APPE AL S FO R T H E NINT H CIRCUIT

H E C T O R N A

V A R R O ; M I K E S H I R I N I A N ; A N T H O N Y P I N K I N S ; K E V I N M A L O N E ; R E U B E

N C A S T R

O , Plaintiffs-Appellants
,

v

.

E N C I N O M O T O R

C A R S , L L C, erroneously

sued as Mercedes B enz of Encino, Defendant-Appellee. N o. 13-55323

D.C. No. 2:12-cv-08051- RGK-MRW

OPI NI ON

On Remand from the Supreme Court of the Uni ted States

F iled J a nuary 9, 2017

B efore: Susan P. Graber and Kim McL ane W ardlaw, Circuit J udg es, and J ames C. Mahan, * District J udg e.

Opinion by

J udg e Graber

* T h e Ho n orab le J am es C. Mah an , Un ited States District Ju dg e f o r th e District o f

Nev ad a, sittin g b y

d esig n atio n

.N A V A R R O V

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SUMMARY * *

Labor Law

On remand from the Supreme Court, the panel affirmed in p art and reversed in part the district court’s dismissal of an action broug ht under the F air L abor Standards Act a g ainst an automobile dealership.

Reversing t h e d ismissal of a federal claim for overtime compensation, a n d d isag reeing with the F ourth and F ifth Circuits, the panel held that service advisors do not fall within

an ex e mption from the F L SA’s overtime-compensation requirement for “any sales m an , partsman, or mechanic primarily eng ag ed in . . . servicing automobiles.” Assuming without deciding that it must g ive no weig ht to the Secretary of L abor’s interpretation, the panel interprete d 2 9 U .S.C. § 213(b)(10)(A) in the first instance.

F or the reason s gi v en in an earlier opinion, the panel affirmed the dismissal of plaintiffs’ other federal claims and reversed the dismissal of st at e

- law c laims. The panel remanded the case to the district court.

** T h is su m m ary co n stitu

t es n o p art o f th e o p in io n o f th e co u rt. It h as b een p rep ared b y

co u rt staf

f f o r th e co n v en i en ce o f

th e read er.N A V A R R O V

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COUNSEL

S. Keven Steinberg (arg

ued), Thompson Coe & O’M e ara, L os Ang eles, California; Nancy B reg stein Gordon, J ames A

. F eldman, and Stephanos B ibas, University of Pennsy lva nia La w S c h o o l S u p r e m e C o u r t C l i n i c , P h i l ad e l p h i a , Pennsy lvania; for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Todd B

. Scherwin ( arg ued), Karl R. L indeg r en, and Colin P. Calvert, F isher & Phillips L L P
, I rvine, California; W endy McGuire Coats, F isher & Phi llips L L P, San F rancisco, California; for Defendant-Appellee.

F elicia R. Reid, H i r s chfeld Kraemer L L P, San F rancisco, California; Doug la s I

. Greenhaus, National Automobile Dealers Association, McL ean, Virg inia; for Amici Curiae National Automobile D ealers A ssociation and State A utomobile Dealers Associations for Alaska, Ariz ona, California, Hawaii, I daho, Montana, Nevada
, Oreg on, a nd W a shing ton State.

Melissa A. Murphy and L aura M. Moskowitz
, Senior Attorney s; Paul L

. F rieden, Counsel for Appellate L itig ation; J ennifer S. B rand, Associate Solic i t o r; M. Patricia Smith, Solicitor of L abor; Office of the Solicitor, U nited States Department o f L abor, W ashing ton, D.C.; for Amicus Curiae Secretary of L abor.N A V A R R O V

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OP INION

GRAB ER, Circuit J udg e:

On remand from the Supreme Court, Encino Motorcars, L L C v

. Navarro
, 136 S. Ct. 2117 (2016), we must consider

anew whether the F air L abor Standards Act ( “F L SA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219, requires automobile d e a l e rships to pay overtime compensation to service advisors. The district court held that service advisors fall within the ex emption from the overtime-compensation requi r e ment for “ any salesman, partsman, or mechanic primarily eng ag ed in s el l i ng o r servicing automobiles,” id. § 213(b)(10)(A), on the g r ound that a service advisor is a “salesman

. . . primarily eng ag ed in

. . . servicing automo b i l e s.” B ecause we conclude that Cong r ess d id not intend fo r the ex emption to encompass service advisors, w e reverse and remand for furt h er proceeding s.

F ACTUAL

AND PROCEDURAL

HI STORY

De f e n d a n t Encino Motorcars, L L C, sells and services new and used Mercedes-B enz automobiles. 1 D efendant employ ed

or employ s Plaintiffs H ector Navarro, Mike Shi r i n i an, A n thony Pinkins, Kevin Malone, and Reuben Castro a s “service advisors.” Plaintiffs g reet Mercedes-B enz o wners a s they ar r i v e in the service area of the dealership; listen to customers’ concerns about their c a rs; e valuate the repair a

nd maintenance n eeds of the cars; sug g est s e r vices to be performed to remedy the cust o m e r s’ concerns; sug g e st

1 B ecau se th e d istrict co u rt dism issed th is case u n d er Fed eral Ru le of Civ il P ro ced u re 1 2 ( b )(6 ), w e tak e th e f acts alleg ed i n th e co m

p lain t as tru e. Bro wn v. Elec. Arts, In c. , 7 2 4 F.3 d 1 2 3 5 , 1 2 4 7 (9 th Cir. 2 0 1 3 ).N A V A R R O V

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supplem e n t a l services bey o n d those that will remedy the customers’ concerns; write up e s t i m ates; and, often, follow up with the customer while the r epair work is u n d erway to sug g est further repairs and maintenance.

Plaintiffs alleg e that Defendant has violated the F L SA b y failing to pay them overtime wag es. T h e district court dismissed the claim, and Plaintiffs timely appealed.

W e reversed. Navarro v. Encino Motorcars, LLC
, 780 F .3d 1267 (9th Cir. 2015). W e held that a reg ulation promulg a ted by the D epartment o f L abor in 2011 reasonably interpreted the statutory e x emption n ot to encompass service advisors. Id. at 1271–77. A pply ing the principles of ag ency deference described in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc.
, 467 U.S. 8 3 7 ( 1 9 84), we deferred to the
ag ency ’s interpretation. Navarro
, 780 F .3d at 1277.

T h e Supreme Court g r anted certiorari and held that we erred by apply ing the Chevron framework. E n c ino Motorcars
, 136 S. Ct. a t 2 124–27. The Court concluded that

§ 213(b)(10)(A) m ust be construed without
p l a c i n g c o n t r o l l i n g w e i g h t o n t h e Department’s 2011 reg ulation. B ecause the decision below relied on Ch e vron deference to this reg ulation, it is appropriate to remand for the Court of Appeals to interpret the statute in
t h e f irst instance. Cf. United States v. Mea d Corp , 533 U.S. 218, 238–39 (2001).

Id. at 2127 (citation format altered).N A V A R R O V

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D I SCUSSI ON

Cong r ess enacted the F L SA i n 1938 to “protect all covered workers from subs t a n d ard wag es and oppressive working hours.” Barrentine v. Ark.-Best Freight Sys., In c. , 450 U .S. 728, 739 (1981). To that end, 29 U.S.C. § 206 imposes a minimum wag e requirement, and § 207 requires the pa y m en t of overtime compensation for hours ex ceeding

a standard workweek. B u t not all workers are covered by the Act’s provis i o ns. Subsection 213(a) lists categ ories o f

em p loy ees who are ex empt from both the minimum-wag e a nd overtime-compensation r e q u i r e m e n t s

. S u b s e c t i o n 2 1 3 ( b ) l i sts categ ories of employ e e s who are e x empt from the overtimecompensation requirement only

.

I n 1961, Cong ress amended § 213(a) to ex empt from both the minimum-wag e and overtime-co m p e n s a t i o n r e q u i r e m e n t s

a l l e mploy ees of automobile dealerships. F air L abor S tandards Amendments of 1961, Pub. L

. No. 87-30, § 9, 75 Stat. 6 5
, 71. New parag raph (a)(19) ex empted “any employ ee of a retail or service establishment which is primarily eng ag ed in the business of sell i n g automobiles, trucks, or farm implements.” 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(19) ( 1 961); 75 Stat. at 71.

I n 1966, Cong ress repeale d § 2 13(a)(19) but added
parag raph (b)(10). F a ir L abor Standards Amendmen t s o f 1966, Pub. L

. No. 89-601, § 2 08, 80 Stat. 830, 836. The new provision e x e m p t e d only the following employ ees f r om the overtime-compensation requirement:

any salesman, partsman, or mechanic primarily eng ag ed in selling or s e rvicing

a u t o m o b i l e s , t r a i l e r s , t r u c k s , f a r mN A V A R R O V

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implements, or aircraft if employ ed b y a nonmanufacturing establishment primarily
eng ag ed in the business o f sell i n g such vehicles to ultimate purchasers.

29 U.S.C. § 213(b)(10) (1966). I n effect, unless a s e p a rate

ex e mption a

pplied, the 1966 a mendments narrowed the 1961

ex e mption a

nd required d ealerships to pay a minimum w ag e to all em p l o y ees a

n d to pay overtime compensation to all employ e es ex cept those listed in § 213(b)(10).

I n 1970, the Department of L abor issue d a r eg ulation defining the terms of § 213(b)(10). 29 C.F .R. § 779.372. The
ag ency defined “salesman” to encompass only t h o s e salesmen who sold vehicles. Id. § 779.372(c)(1). Under the ag e ncy ’s interpretation, the ex e mpti o n did not encompass service advisors. Id. ; see also id. § 779.372(c)(4) (1970).

I n 1974, Cong ress amended § 213(b)(10) to its p r e s e n tda y form to ex clude from the overtime-compensation requirement the following employ ees:

(A) any salesman, partsman, or mechanic primarily eng ag ed in s e l ling or servicing automobiles, trucks, or farm implements, if he i s e m p l o y e d b y a n o n m a n u f a c t u r i n g establishment primarily e n g ag ed in the business of se l l i n g s u c h v e h i c l e s o r implements to ultimate purchasers; or

(B ) a n y salesman primarily eng ag ed in selling trailers, b oat s, or aircraft, if he is

e m p l o y e d b y a n o n m a n u f a c t u r i n g establishment primarily eng ag e d in theN A V A R R O V

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business of selling trailers, boats, or aircraft to ultimate purchasers[ .]

29 U.S.C. § 213(b)(10) (2016); Fa ir L abor Standards Amendments o f 1974, Pub. L

. No. 93-259, § 14, 88 Stat. 55, 61. The 1 974 amendments had no effect on the tex t pertinent
t o car dealerships—the same ex emptions as in 1 9 6 6 continued to apply

.

I n 1 978, the Department o f L abor issued an opinion letter stating that, c ontrary to the ag ency ’ s reg ulati o n , service advisors were ex empt under 2 9 U.S.C. § 213(b )(10)(A). Dep’t of L abor, W a g e & H our Div., Opinion L etter No. 1520 (W H–467), 19 7 8 W L 5 1 403 (J uly 28, 1978). I n 1987, the
ag ency amended its Fi e l d Operations Handbook along the

same lines, stating in an I nsert that the a ge ncy would “ no long er deny the [ overtime] ex e mption” for servic e a d visors. Dep’t of L abor, W ag e & Hour Div., F ield Operations Handbook, I nsert No. 1757, 24L 04–4(k) (Oct. 20, 1987).

I n 2008, the Department of L abor proposed to amend its formal reg ulation—which had remained the same since 1970 despite the ag ency ’s shift in position—to conform t o its practice of allowing the ex emption for service advisor s

. Updating Reg ulations I ssued Under the F air L abor Standards Act, 73 F ed. Reg

. 4 3,654-01 (J uly 28, 2008). After r eceiving public comments, h o w ever, the ag ency issued a final rule in 2011 that reaffirmed the ag ency ’s orig inal position: s e r v ice advisors are not ex empt under 29 U.S.C. § 2 13(b)(10)(A). 76 F ed. Reg . 18,832-01 (Apr. 5, 2011). 2

2 T h e Secretary o f L ab o r h as i n f o rm ed u s th at, also in 2 0 1 1
, t h e ag en cy am en d e d i t s Field Op eratio n s Han d b o o k b y rem o v in g t h e 1 9 8 7N A V A R R O V

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The parties dispute whether w e owe deference t o t h e Secretary of L abor’s interpretation that the statut e d o e s not

ex e mpt service advisor s

. P laintiffs arg ue that deference

u n d e r Skidmore v. Swift & Co.
, 323 U .S. 134 (1944)
, i s appropriate. Defendant u rg es us to g ive no weig ht to the
ag ency ’s interpretation. W e decline to resolve this d i spute because, as we ex plain below, the answer does not affect the
outcome. I nstead, we assume without deciding that we must g ive no weig ht to the ag ency ’s interpretation and the
reg ulation, a

nd we “interpret the statute in the first instance.” 3 Encino Motorcars , 136 S. Ct. at 2127.

The F L SA ex empts from the overtime-compensation requirement “any salesman, partsman, or mechanic p rimarily
eng ag ed in selling o r servicing automobiles, trucks, or farm implements, if he is employ ed by a n o nmanufacturing establishment primarily eng ag ed in the bu s i n ess of selling such vehicles or implements to u ltimate p urchasers.” 29 U.S.C. § 213(b)(10)(A). Defendant is a n a ut o m o b i l e dealership w ithin the meaning of the ex e m p t i o n

. W e limit

our discussion to the ex emption’s coverag e of employ ees o f

an automobile dealership. Thus, the relevant statutory passag e is: “any salesman, p artsman, or mechanic primarily
eng ag ed in selling or servicing automobiles.”

In sert, th u s rev ertin g to its o rig i n al en f o rcem en t p ractice. B rief f o r Sec’ y

o f L ab o r as A m i cu s Cu

riae Su p p o rtin g P lain tif

f s- A p p ellan ts at 5 n .1

.

3 W e d o so o u t o f an ab u n dan ce o f cau tio n

. If w e h av e m isu n d ersto o d th e Co u rt’ s i n stru ctio n s an d a r e p e rm i tted o r req u ired to co n sid er S kid mo r e d ef eren ce, th en w e co n clu d e th at su ch d ef eren ce is ap p ro p riate. A lth o u g h th e ag en cy h eld a co n trary p o s itio n i n in t erv en in g y ears, w e f in d th e ag en cy ’ s p resen t reaso n i n g persu asiv e an d t h o ro u g h

. Mo reo v er, th e ag en cy ’ s cu

rren t p o s i t i o n is id en tical t o th e po sitio n th at it to o k in 1 9 7 0 —sh o rtly

af ter en actm en t

o f th e 1 9 6 6 am en d m en ts.N A V A R R O V

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Unless d efined by the F L SA, w e co n sider the “ordinary
, contemporary , common meaning ” o f the terms a t the time that Cong ress added the relevant clause—1966. P e r r i n v

. U n ited States
, 444 U .S. 37, 42 (1979). To determi n e t h e

common meaning
, w e consult dictionaries and other sources in use in 1 966. Tanig u ch i v

. K an P ac. Saipan, Ltd.
, 132 S. Ct. 1997, 2002–04 (2012). F or an understanding of job descript ions, we look to the 1966–1967 edition of the Department of L abor, B ureau of Statistics, Occu p ational Outlook Handbook (“OOH”). See, e.g. , Un i t ed States v

. Charles
, 722 F .3d 1319, 1324 (11th Cir. 2013) (consulting the Occupational Outlook Handbook).

W e proceed a s follows. F irst, we conclude that, under the
most natural reading of the statute, Cong ress did not intend to

ex e mpt service advisors. S e c o n d
, even if the tex t were ambig uous, the leg islative h istory c o nfirms that Cong ress intended to ex empt only salesmen sell i n g cars, partsmen servicing cars, and mechanics servicing ca r s

. Cong r ess did not intend to ex empt service advisors.

A. Statutory Text

1. “Any Salesman, Partsman, or Mechanic”

I n 1 966, Cong ress repealed the ex emption for all employees of an automobile deal ership and replaced it with

a l i mited ex emption f

or only three specific v ocations : salesmen, par t s m en, and mechanics. Then, as today
, many different ty

p es of employ ees—including service advisors— worked a t a u t o m o b i l e d e alerships. The Occupational Outlook Handbook listed many common vocations. Among those categ ories of workers that one mig ht have ex pected to find at automobile dealerships in 1966, three job titles—emphasiz edN A V A R R O V

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below—clearly alig n w ith the three job titles ex empted b y Cong r ess:

• Automobile body

repairmen

• Autom obile m echanics

• Automobile painters

• Autom obile parts counterm en

• Autom obile salesm en

• Automobile service advisors

• Automobile upholsterers

• B o okkeeping workers

• Cashiers

• J anitors

• Purchasing ag ents

• Shipping and receiving clerks

OOH at XI I I

–XVI I I (Table of Contents).

Hence, looking o nly at the statutory ex emption’s list o f job titles, service advisors were e x cluded. Cong ress’ choice
to ex empt three—not four—job titles sug g ests that s e r v ice

a dvisors are n ot ex empt. I f, as Defendant posits, Cong ress intended to ex empt service advisors, it could have inclu d edN A V A R R O V

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“service a dvisors” in the statutory l i st. I n sum, the most

n a tural reading of the ex emption is that Cong ress ex empt e d only three commonly understood job titles—a u t o mobile salesmen, p artsmen, and mechanics—and Cong ress therefore

ex c luded service advisors.

I t is possible to r ead the ex emption’s list of job titles more broadl y , to encompass all persons whose functional roles
meet the d i ct ionary definitions of the terms “salesman,” “partsman,” or “mechanic.” 4 A service advisor can be considered to sell services. According ly
, if we read the

ex e mption’s list of job titles b r o adly
, a service a dvisor qualifies, in a g eneric sense, as a “salesman.” 5

But even assuming that Cong ress intended a b r o a d interpretation of the term “ salesman,” n o t every “s a l e s m an”

4 W e g iv e th e term “ an y ” n o sig n i f ican ce. T h e term “ an y ” “ d o [es] n o t b ro ad en th e o rd in ary m ean in g ” o f t h e w o rd i t m o d if

ies. BP Am. Pro d. Co

. v. Bu rto n , 5 4 9 U.S. 8 4
, 9 3 (2 0 0 6 ). T h at p rin ci p l e a p p lies w ith sp ecial f o rce h ere. B o t

h b ef o re an d af ter th e 19 6 6 am en d m en ts to th e FL SA
, each

o f th e 3 3 ex em

p tio n s in § 2 1 3 (a) an d § 2 1 3 (b ) b eg an w ith th e term “ an y .” S ee 2 9 U.S.C. § 21 3 (a)(1 )– (2 2 ) (1 9 6 5 ) (b eg in n in g w ith “ an y ”); id

. § 2 1 3 (b )(1 )– (1 1 ) (1 96 5 ) (sam e); id

. § 2 1 3 (a)(1 )– (1 4 ) (1 96 7) (sam e); id

. § 2 1 3 (b )(1 )– (1 9 ) (1 9 6 7 ) (sam e). T h e w ord “ an y ” w as p lain ly a d raf tin g

co n v en tio n , n o t an ex

p ressio n o f co n g ressio n al in ten t th at w e in terp ret a p articu lar ex em

p tio n ex p an s i v ely

.

5 S ee Ran d o m Ho u se Dictio n ary o f th e En g lish L an g u ag e (“ Ran d o m Ho u se”) 1 26 2 (1 9 6 6 ) (d ef in in g “ salesm an ” as “ a m an w h o sell s g o o d s,

serv ices, etc.”); W eb s ter’ s T h ird New In tern atio n al Dictio n ary (“ W eb s ter’ s T h ird ”) 2 0 0 3 (1 9 65 ) (“ o n e em p lo y ed to sell g o o d s o r serv ices eith er w i th in a g iv en territo ry o r in a sto re”); 9 Ox f o rd En g lish Dictio n ary (“ OED”) 5 0 (1 93 3 ) (“ A m an w h o se bu sin ess it is to sell g o o d s o r co n d u ct sales”); s ee a lso A m erican Heritag e Dictio n ary o f th e En g lish L an g u ag e (“ A m erican Heritag e”) 1 1 44 (1 st ed

. 1 9 6 9 ) (“ A m an em p lo y ed to sell

m erch an d i se in

a sto re o r in

a d esig n ated

territo ry ”).N A V A R R O V

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is ex empt; the statute covers only th o s e who are “primarily
eng ag ed in selling or servicing automobiles. ” 2 9 U .S.C. § 213(b)(10)(A). W e therefore consider nex t whether service advisors primarily eng ag e in selling or servicing cars.

2. “Primarily E

n gaged in Sellin g or Servicing Automobiles”

A service advisor clearly is not a “salesman

. . . p rimarily
eng ag ed in selling

. . . a u t o mobiles.” That categ ory encompasses sal e s m e n selling a p articular g ood—cars. I t does not cover salesmen selling other g oods a nd, critically
, it d o es n ot cover salesmen selling services. Service advisors
may be sa l e s m e n o f a sort, b ut they do n ot qualify a s salesmen primarily eng ag ed in selling c ars b e c a u s e they do not sell cars.

W e turn, then, to whether service advisors a re “primarily
eng ag ed in

. . . servicing automobiles.” W e beg in with the contemporary meaning
, in 1 9 66, of the statute’s terms. “Primar i l y

” m e a n s “ e s sentially ; mostly ; chiefly ; principally .” 6 “To be eng ag e d in” an activity means “to occupy o n es elf; become involved” in the activity

. 7 I n t h e contex t o f an automobile dealership, to “ s e rv ice” means to “supply [ ]

6 Ran d o m Ho u se at 1 1 4 2 ; a cco rd 8 OED at 1 3 5 8 (“ In th e f i rst p lace, f irst o f a ll, pre- em in en t ly
, ch ief ly
, p rin cip ally ; essen tially .”); see a l so A m erican Heritag e at 1 0 3 9 (“ Ch ief ly ; p rin cip ally ”).

7 Ran d o m Ho u s e at 4 73 ; a cco rd 8 O ED at 1 7 4 ( “t o en ter u p o n or

e m p lo y o n eself in an actio n ”); W eb ster’ s T h ird at 7 5 1 (“ t o em p lo y o r in v o lv e o n eself

”; “ to tak e p art”); see a lso A m erican Heritag e at 4 3 3 (“ T o in v o lv e o n eself

o r b eco m e o ccu

p ied ; p articip ate”).N A V A R R O V

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maintenance and repair.” 8 Thus, to be “primarily eng ag e d in

. . . s er v i cing automobiles” means to “occupy oneself principally

in maintaining and repairing cars.”

W h ether w e look to the contemporaneous dictionary definitions or to the terms of the p hrase itself, the phrase most naturally encompasses only

those who are actually

occupied in the repair and mainte nance of cars—the partsmen a nd mechanics w ho, for ex a mple, repair defective brakes or flush the transmission. A service a dvisor neither performs any repairs nor provides a

ny maint e n ance. I nstead, a service advisor “wait[ s] on customers who bring their automobiles in for maintena n c e a nd repairs.” OOH at 314. The service

a dvisor “confers with the c ustomer to determine his servi c e needs, a nd a rrang es for a m e c h anic to do the work.” Id. According ly
, service advisors are not prim arily eng ag ed in servicing automobiles. 9

Defe n d a nt sug g e sts that we adopt a more ex pansive d e f inition, one that encompasses all employ ees who are “integ ral” to the customer’s overall e x p e r ience of having a

car serviced. Supp. B rief for Defendant-Appellee at 14 (filed Aug

. 16, 2016). The statutory tex t is arg uably flex ible
enoug h to accommodate Defendant’s sug g estion. Using the dictionary defini t i o n s most favorable to Defendant, the

ex e mption en c o mpasses those principally “involved” in

8 Ran d om Ho u se at 1 30 4 ; a cco rd W eb ster’ s T h ird at 2 0 7 5 (“ to rep air

o r p ro v id e m ain ten an ce f o r”); see a lso A m erican Heritag e at 1 1 8 5 (“ T o

m ak e f it f or u se; ad j u s t; rep air; m ain tain ”).

9 Serv i ce ad v i so rs m ay o ccasio n ally p e rf o rm s im p le rep airs or

m ain ten an ce task s b ef

ore th e m ech an ic t ak es o v er. B u t Def en d a n t d oes

n o t co n ten d th at P l a i nt i f

f s sp en d a sig n i f

ican t am o u n t o f tim e o n th ose

m in o r task s.N A V A R R O V

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“supply ing maintenance and re p a i r.” I f one interprets “supply ing ” to mean “the overall process of supply ing ,” then service advisors can b e said, in a g eneral sense, to be “primarily eng ag ed in . . . servicingautomobiles.”

B u t the fact “ [t] hat a d ef i n i t ion is broad enoug h to encompass one sense of a wo r d d o es not establish that the word is ordinarily understo o d i n that sense.” Taniguchi
, 132 S. Ct. at 2003. Defendant’s interpretation represents a considerable stretch of the ordinary meaning of the stat ute’s words. W e usually do n ot say that we primarily e ng ag e in an acti v i ty that we do not perform p ersonally (and that we may lack t h e skills to perform). W e ty pically say that we primarily eng ag e in an activity

only if we actually

undertake the activity
, a t leas t i n p a rt. F or ex ample, a receptionistscheduler at a dental office f i e lds calls from p atients, matching their needs ( e.g ., a broken tooth or jaw pain) w ith the appropriate provider, appointment time, and leng th o f anticipated service. That work is inte gr a l t o a patient’s obtaining dental services, b ut we would no t s ay that the receptionist-scheduler is “primarily eng ag ed in” cleaning teeth or installing crowns. Similarly
, an automobile salesman who sells custom-made cars is integ r al to a purchaser’s receiving a specializ e d car, but we ordinarily would not say that the salesman is primarily eng ag ed in manufacturing cars.

Defendant neverthele s s asserts that we must a dopt its broad definition because a narrower interpretation would read “partsman” ou t o f the statute. Defendant contends that, because partsmen do n ot actually perform the repairs a nd maintenance, Cong ress must have intended to include all employ e es involved in the overall p rocess of providing repair and maintenance services. W e are unpersuaded.N A V A R R O V

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The Occupational Outlook Handbook described the positi o n of an “automobile p arts counterman” who is employ e d by a

utomobile dealers. OOH at 312–14. Parts
countermen may spend some time selling parts to customers. Id. at 312. B ut parts c o u ntermen “employ ed by automobile and truck dealers

. . . may spend most of their time supply ing parts to mechanics employ ed by the dealer.” Id. ; s ee a lso B rief for I nt’l Ass’n of Ma ch i n i s ts and Aerospace W orkers

as Amicus Curiae Supporting Re s p o ndents in Encino Motorcars
, 2016 W L 1388060, at *28 (“A partsman g enerally works at one o f two counters: the back c ounter, which o pens to the shop w here the mechanics work o r the fr o n t c o unter, which opens into the dealership to an area w h e r e cu stomers may p urchase accessories or p arts that will not be installed b y the dealership.”). “B y knowing how to use parts catalog s a nd by knowing the lay o ut of the stockroom, he can read i l y find
any one of several thousand items.” OOH at 312. A parts counterman also uses specializ ed equipment to test parts, to determine interchang eability of parts, and to repair p arts. Id. at 312–13.

According ly
, Defendant’s premise is wrong : P artsmen “may repair parts, using equipment such as b ra ke riveting machines, brake drum lathes, valve r e f acers, and eng ine head
g rinders.” OOH a t 3 1 3. U nder any definition, fix ing a defective part qualif

i e s as servicing a car. Partsmen also “may use micrometers, c a lipers, fan-belt measurers, and other devices to measure parts for i n t e rchang eability

. They may also u se coil-condenser testers, sp ark plug testers, and other ty pes of testing equipment to determine whether p a rt s a re def e c t i v e

. ” Id. at 312–13. Those hands-on tasks a re qualitatively indisting uishable from—if n ot identical to—the work of a mechanic. Similarly
, partsmen use their e x pert knowledg e of parts, parts ca t a l o gs, and the stockroom toN A V A R R O V

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determine an appropriate replacement part and locate it for a mechanic—tas k s that contribute directly to the actual repair of a car. B ecause mos t o f the common tasks of a partsman easily meet the ordinar y meaning o f primarily eng ag ing in servicing
, w e are not compelled to accept Defendant’s broad interpretation of the ex emption. 1 0

I n sum, we conclude that the phrase “primarily eng ag ed in selling . . . automobiles” encompasses only those who are actually a

nd p rimarily occupied in selling cars, and we conclude that the phrase “primarily eng ag ed in

. . . servicing automobiles” e ncompasses o nly those who are actually a nd primarily occupied in the repair a nd maintenance o f cars. B ecause service advisors meet neither defini t ion, the F L SA does not ex empt service advisors.

Our interpretive task could end h e r e, with the words o f the statute as commonly understood in 1966. B ut, to ensure t hat we have not overlooked a relevant w ay of r eading § 213(b)(10)(A), we will ex amine that p r ovision in lig ht o f applicable principles of statutory construction.

3. Principles of Statutory Interpretation

Our interpretation comports with a holistic reading of the statutory ex emption. S

ee, e .g. , Graham Cty. S

o i l & W ater Conservation Dist. v. U.S. ex rel. W ilson , 559 U.S. 280, 290

10 It i s tru e, o f co u rse, t

h at p artsm en m ay sp en d so m e t i m e on task s

u n related to th e serv icin g o f a n a u t o m o b ile: T h ey m ay clean th e sto ck ro om , o r th ey m ay s ell p arts t o th e p u b l ic, f or ex am p le. B u t th at f act p o ses n o in terp retiv e p ro b l em b ecau se th e ex em p tio n co v ers o n l y t h ose

w h o “ prim arily ” s erv ice cars. If an in d iv id u al p artsm an sp en d s little tim e

serv icin g cars, th e ex em

p tio n d oes n o t ap p l y

.N A V A R R O V

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(2010) (“Courts have a duty to construe statutes, not isolated provisions.” ( internal quotation marks omitted)); see al s o Sturgeon v. Frost
, 136 S

. C t

. 1 061, 1070 (2016) (“I t is a fundamental c anon of statutory construction that the w ords o f

a statute must be read in their contex t

. . . “ (internal quotation marks omitted)). Read literally
, the ex emption encompasses six categ ories of employ e es:

Salesman primarily
eng ag ed in selling Partsman

primarily
eng ag ed in selling Mechanic

primarily
eng a g ed in selling

Salesman primarily
eng ag ed in servicing Partsman

primarily
eng ag ed in servicing Mechanic

primarily
eng a g ed in servicing

Three of the literal categ orie s describe common employ e es at a d e a l ership: salesmen selling cars, partsmen servicing ca r s , and mechanics servicing cars. A “salesman

. . . p rimarily eng ag e d in selling

. . . automobiles” neatly describes a car sa l e s m a n

. 1 1 As noted above, many parts countermen likely qualify as “p a rtsm[ e] n

. . . p rimarily
eng ag ed in

. . . servicing a utomobiles.” And it is unassailable

11 “ A u to m o bile salesm en ” w ere “ im p o rtan t lin k s b etw een th e m ak ers

an d bu y ers o f n ew cars, an d b etw een u sed car d ealers an d bu y ers.” OOH
at 3 0 9

. “ T h e au t o m o bil e s alesm an sp en d s m u ch o f h is tim e w aitin g on

cu sto m ers,” try in g to m ak e a sale. Id

. at 3 1 0

.N A V A R R O V

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t h a t most (if not all) automobile mechanics service cars. 1 2 The remaining three literal c a t e go r i e s are: a “salesman

. . . primarily eng ag ed in

. . . servicing automobiles,” a “partsman

. . . primarily eng ag ed in selling

. . . a utomobiles,” and a “mechanic primarily eng ag ed in selling

. . . automobi l es.” Reading the ex emption as a whole, we concl u d e that Cong r ess d id not intend to g ive meaning to those categ o ries.

A salesman is naturally u n derstood to be someone primarily e n ga g ed in selling

. After all, he is a sales man, defined a t the relevant time as “a man who sell s

. ” R a n d om House at 1262 (emphasis added). I t makes litt l e s ense, in ordinary speech, to describe a salesman w ho primarily
eng ag es in work activities other than selling

.
Moreover, we k

now that Cong ress did not intend for u s to g ive effect to all six literal ca t e go r ies. Read literally
, the
statute ex empts p artsmen and mechani cs primarily eng ag ed i n s e l l i n g cars, but those categ ories do not ex ist in the real world. Neither partsmen nor mechanics occ u p y themselves
reg ularly
, let alone most of the time, w i t h selling cars. B y definition, they spend most of their time r epairing

car s , maintaining cars, repairing parts, d etermining interchang e ability o f parts, finding suitable replacement parts in the stockroom, a

nd so o n

. Cong ress indisputably did not intend to connect “partsman” and “mechanic” with “selling ” automob i les; Cong r ess intended to connect “partsman” a nd “mechanic” o n ly with “servicing ” automobiles.

12 “ A u to m o b ile m ech an ics k eep th e Natio n ’ s risin g n u m b er of

au to m o b iles

. . . in g o o d ru n n in g o rd er. T h ey d o p rev en tativ e

m ain ten an ce, d iag n o se b reak d o w n s, an d m ak e rep airs.” OOH at 4 7 7

.N A V A R R O V

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Putting it all tog ether, the most natural r e a d ing of the
statute is that Cong r ess intended the g erunds—selling a nd servicing —to be distributed to their appropriate subjects— salesman, partsman, and mechanic. A salesman sell s ; a partsman services; and a mechanic services.

At first blush, i t m a y seem odd for Cong ress to choose phrasing that, read literally
, joins nouns w i t h inapplicable verbs. B u t Cong r ess sometimes makes that choice. See, e.g. , 16 U.S.C. § 742c(e) (referring to “ the construction or repair of vessels lost, destroy ed, or d amag ed” by an earthquake); see also B r ief for Respondents in Encino Motorcars
, 2016 W L 1298032, app. D (listing scores of statutory phrases using this distribut i v e construction). Scholars and courts have
recog niz ed this method of distributive p hra s i n g: “W here a

s e n t e n ce c o n t a i n s s e v e r a l a n t e c e d e n t s a n d s e v e ra l consequents, courts read them distributiv e l y a nd apply the words to the subjects which, by conte x t, they seem most properly to relate.” 2A Norman Sing er e t a l., Sutherland Statutes and Statutory Construction § 4 7 : 2 6 (7th e d. Supp. Nov. 2 016); see id. at n.1 (collecting cases); see also Antonin Scalia & B ry an A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 214 (2012) ( “Distributive p h r a s i ng applies each ex pression to its a

p propriate referent.”); id. at 214–16 (describing cases that applied the principle).

The most natural reading of these statutes is not t h at Cong r ess w anted to g ive leg al effect to each literal categ ory

. Rather, Cong ress merely used ex pedien t wording to avoid tedious repetition of surrounding tex t, with the ex p e ctation that c o u rt s would read the statutes sensibly

. This statute provides a g ood ex ample. Cong r ess could have separated out the treatment of salesmen from the treatment of partsmen a nd mechanics. B ut that would have required rep e a t i n g theN A V A R R O V

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“primarily eng ag e d in” tex t, the list of vehicles— “automobiles, trailers, trucks
, f a r m i m p l e m e nts, or aircraft”— and the c lause concerning employ ment at a deale r s h i p—“if employ e d by a nonmanufacturing establishment prima r i ly

e n g ag ed in the business of selling such vehicles to ultim a t e purchasers

. ” 29 U.S.C. § 213(b)(10) (1966). I nstead, Cong r ess trusted co u rts to recog niz e the obvious: Cong ress meant to ex empt salesmen selling
, not repairing
, ca rs; a nd Cong r ess meant to ex e mpt partsmen and mechanics r e p a i r i n g , n o t selling
, cars. Thus, the statute leaves only th r e e categ ories of ex empt employ ees: 1 3

Salesman primarily
eng ag ed in selling Partsman

primarily
eng ag ed in selling Mechanic

primarily
eng a g ed in selling

Salesman primarily
eng ag ed in servicing Partsman

primarily
eng ag ed in servicing Mechanic

primarily
eng a g ed in servicing

4. Narrow Construction of the FLSA’s Exemptions

W e f ind Defendant’s e xp a

n s i ve interpretation p a

rticularly implausible in lig ht o f t he long standing r ule that the

ex e mpti o n s i n § 213 of the F L SA “are to be narrowly construed ag ainst the employ ers seeking to a ssert them.”

13 W e ad d ress h ere o n ly au to m o bile d ealersh ip s. T he r e is so m e

su g g estio n in th e leg i slativ e h i sto r y t h a t p artsm en em p lo y ed b y f

arm

im p lem en t dealers w ere u n dersto o d to sell f arm i m p lem en ts. B u

t w e h av e fo u n d n o su g g estio n

—in th e leg islativ e h isto ry o r o th erw ise

— t h a t

au to m o b ile p artsm en

sell cars.N A V A R R O V

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C A R S 22

Arnold v

. B en Kanowsky, Inc.
, 361 U.S. 388, 392 ( 1 960); accord Mitchell v. Ky

. F i n. Co.
, 359 U.S. 290, 295 (1959) (holding that the prin c i ple of narrow construction of the F L SA’s ex emptions is “well settled”). W e must a pply

ex e mptions o n ly to “ those [ e mploy ees] plainly a nd unmistakably within [the F L SA’s] terms.” A

. H. Phillips, Inc.

v. W alling
, 324 U.S

. 4 9 0
, 4 9 3 ( 1945). I n order to conclude that § 213(b)(10 ) (A) encompasses service advisors, we would be required to do the o pposite—construe the ex emption broadly

. W e are b o und by Supreme Court precedent to construe the ex emption narrowly

.

I n r ecent y ears, the Supreme Court has acknowledg ed the rule o f n arrow construction with respect to the ex emptions listed in § 213, but the Court has he l d t h a t the r ule does not apply to interpretations of other provisions of the F L SA, such

as the g eneral definitions codified in § 203. Sandifer v. U .S. Steel Corp.
, 134 S. Ct. 870, 879 n.7 (2014); C hristopher v

. SmithKline B e e c h a m Corp.
, 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2172 n.21 (2012). B ecause this case involves interpretation of terms appearing in § 213 and not defined in § 203, t h e Supreme Court’s long standing principle o f n arrow construction applies her e

. W e recog niz e that some members o f the Supreme Court have questioned the soundness of the r u l e o f narrow construction. E.g.
, E

ncino M otorcars , 136 S. Ct. at 2131 (Thomas, J
., dissentin g)

. B ut we may not disreg a rd the Court’s ex isting
, binding precedent. See, e.g

. , B o s se v

. Oklahoma
, 137 S. Ct. 1, 1 ( 201 6 ) (per curiam) ( “ I t is this Court’s prerog ative alone to overrule one of its precedents.” (internal q u o tation marks and brackets omitted)); id. (“Our decisions remain b indin g precedent until we see fit to reconsider them, reg ardless o f w hether subsequent cases haveN A V A R R O V

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raised doubts about t h eir continuing vitality .” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 1 4

I n sum, we a re convinced that Cong ress intended to

ex e mpt only salesmen sell ing c a rs, p artsmen servicing cars, and mechanics servicing cars. W e ag ree with Defendant that, under an e x pansive interpretation of the litera l categ ory of a

“ s alesman

. . . primarily e ng a g ed in

. . . ser v i c i n g automobiles,” the statute c o u l d be construed as ex empting service advisors. B ut in lig ht of the ordinary meaning of the

ex e mption’s words and the rule that we must interpret

ex e mptions narrowly
, we find that interpretation implausible. W e ne v e r theless assume that Defendant’s interpretation
creates an ambig uity

. According ly
, we ex ami ne leg islative history below.

B

. Legislative History

A s we h ave noted, in 1966, Cong ress enacted n e w § 213(b)(10), ex empting from the overtime-compensation requirement “any salesman, partsman, or mechanic p rimarily
eng ag ed in selling or servicing automobiles” at a dealership. During hearing s before subcommittees of the House and the Senate, the National Automobile Dealership Association h ad
soug h t an overtime ex emption for two specific categ ories of

14 Fo r th e sak e of j u d icial eco n o m y , w e n ote th at w e w o u ld reach th e

sam e u ltim ate h o l d in g —th at t h e ex em p tio n d o es n o t en co m

p ass serv i ce ad v iso rs—ev en if th e ru le o f n arro w co n s t r u ctio n d id n ot ap p ly

. Def en d an t’ s i n terp retatio n creates, at m o st, an am b ig u ity

. B ecau s e leg i slativ e h isto ry stro n g ly s u g g ests t h at Co n g ress d id n o t in t e n d to

ex em p t serv ice ad v iso rs, ou r u ltim ate h o ld in g is th e sam e, w h eth er or n o t

w e ap ply th e p rin cip le o f

n arro w co n stru ctio n

.N A V A R R O V

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employ e es: autom o bile salesmen and mechanics. 1 5 Accordi n g t o the Association, a utomobile salesmen a

nd mechanics were we ll paid, a nd they often w orked unusual hours; according ly
, ov e r t ime compensation would be both
unnecessary and challeng ing to cal c u l ate. 1965 House Hearings at 368–69; 1965 Senate Hearings at 1237–38. The testimony was not new. Th e Association had g iven similar testimony in 196 1
, 1 9 60, 1959, and 1957, 1 6 in response to

15 Min imu m W

a ge-Ho u r Amen d

men ts: H ea rin g s o n H. R

. 8 2 5 9 B e

f o r e th e Gen

. S

u b co mm. o n La b o r o

f t h e H

. Co m m. o n Ed

u c. & La bo r , 89 th Co n g

. 36 6

– 7 7 (1 9 6 5 ) (“ 1 9 6 5 Ho use He a rin g s ”) (statem en t o f Sam H. W h ite, Ch airm an , Go v t’ l Relatio n s Co m m ., Nat’ l A u to

. Dealers A ss’ n ); Amen d men ts to t h e Fa ir La b o r S ta n d

a rd s Act: H ea rin g s o n S

. 7 6 3 et a l. Befo re th e S

u b co m m. o n La b or o

f t h e S

. Co mm. o n La bo r & Pu b

. W elfa re , 8 9 th Co n g

. 1 2 3 6

– 3 8 (1 9 65 ) (“ 1 9 6 5 S en a te Hea r in g

s ”) (statem en t o f Sam H. W h ite, Ch airm an , Go v t’ l R elatio n s Co m m ., Nat’ l A u t o

. Dealers A ss’ n ).

16 Amen d m en ts t o th e Fa i r La b o r S ta n d a rd s Act: Hea rin g

s o n S

. 2 5 6
et a l. Befo r e th e S

u bco mm. o n La bo r o

f t h e S

. Co mm. o n La b o r & Pu b

. W elfa re , 8 7 th Co n g

. 1 7 5 –8 2 (1 9 6 1 ) (statem en t o f S.E. Ko ssm an , Ch airm an , N at’ l A f

f a i r s C o m m ., Nat’ l A u t o

. Dealers A ss’ n ); Min imu m W a g e-Ho u r Leg isla tio n : Hea rin g s Befo re th e S

u b co mm. o n La b o r S t a n d ard s o f th e H. Co mm. o n Ed

u c. & La b o r , 8 6 th Co n g

. 1 3 9 1

– 9 4 (1 9 6 0) (“ 19 6 0 Ho u se H

ea rin g s ”) (statem en t o f W i l liam J

. Clev elan d
, Directo r, Nat’ l A u to

. Dealers A ss’ n ); To Amen d th e Fa ir L a b o r S ta n d ard s Act: H ea rin g s o n S

. 25 et al. Befo re th e S

u bco mm. o n L a b o r o

f t h e S

. Co m m

. o n L a bo r & Pu b. W elfa re , 8 6 th Co n g

. 2 0 5

– 1 4 (1 9 5 9 ) (“ 1 9 5 9 S en a te Hea rin g s”) (statem en t o f W i l l iam J

. Clev elan d
, Nat’ l A u to

. Dealers A ss’ n ); Fa ir La b o r S ta n d ard s Act: Hea rin g

s Befo re a Su b co mm.

o f th e H. C

o mm. o n Ed

u c. & L a b o r , 8 5th Co n g

. 2 5 1

– 7 7 (1 9 5 7 ) (“ 1 9 5 7 Ho u se Hea rin gs ”) (statem en t o f F red erick M. Su tte r, P resid en t , Nat’ l A u to . Dealers A ss’ n ); Pro p o sa l s t o Exten d

Co vera g e o

f Min imu m W

ag e Pro tectio n : H

ea rin g s o n S

. 1 13 5 et a l. Befo re th e S

u b co mm. on La b o r o

f th e S

. Co mm. on La b o r & Pu b

. W elfa re , 8 5 th Co n g

. 1 1 3

– 3 3 (1 9 5 7 ) (“ 1 9 5 7 S en a te H ea rin g s ”) (statem en t o f F r ed erick J

. B ell, Rear A d m iral USN (Ret.), Ex ecu tiv e Vice P resid en t , Nat’ l A u to

. Dealers A s s’ n ); s ee a lso id

.N A V A R R O V

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earlier proposals for t h e F L SA to cover d ealerships’ employ e es. I n sum, w hen the full Cong ress took up the proposal, the automobile-dealership industry had made clear its concerns about apply i n g the overtime-compensation requirement t o t wo specific categ ories of employ ees: automobile salesmen and mechanics.

The leg islative history contains o n ly one probative discussion by members of Cong r ess: a debate in t h e S e n a te about w hether to ex empt partsmen in addition to automobile salesmen and mechanics. 112 Cong

. Rec. 20,502–06 (1966). Every one ag reed that automobile salesmen 1 7 a n d mechanics work irreg ular hours, sometimes a w a y from the dealership. See, e.g.
, id. at 20,504 ( “Salesmen are a little different breed of cats, because they g o out at unusual hours

. . . .” (statement

at 1 1 6 0

– 6 1 (letter d ated Mar. 2 9
, 19 5 7, f ro m th e So u t

h Caro lin a A u to m o bile Dealers A sso ciatio n , ex p ressin g sim ilar sen tim en ts).

17 No tab ly
, th e Sen ato rs im plicitly assu

m ed th at “ salesm an ” ref

erred
to so m eo n e w

h o sells cars. S

ee 1 1 2 Co n g

. Rec. 2 0,5 0 4 (“ [A n am en d m en t]

w o u ld n o t af

f ect th e salesm an

. H e c a n g o ou t an d sell an Old sm ob ile, a P o n tia c , o r a B u ick all d ay lo n g an d all n i g h t. He is n o t u n d er an y

o v ertim e

. ” (statem en t o f S en

. Yarb o ro u g h )); id

. (“ T h e salesm an tries to g et p eo p l e m ain ly af

ter th eir h ou rs o f w o rk

. In so m e cases a m an w i l l leav e h is j ob
, g et h is w if

e, an d g o to lo o k at au to m o b iles.” (statem en t of Sen . Yarb o ro u g h )); id

. (“ Salesm en

. . . g o o u t at u n

u su al h o u rs, try in g to

e a r n co m m issio n s.” (statem en t o f Sen

. Bay h )). On e co m

m en t ato r h a s i n t erp reted a p assag e b y Sen ato r J av its as i m p licitly m en t io n in g serv ic e ad v iso rs as a f

o rm o f salesm an

. No te, S h o w Me th e Mo n ey: On W h eth er Ca r Dea lersh ip S

ervice Ad

viso rs Are En titled t o o r Exemp t Fro m Overtime Pa

y Un d er th e FLS

A
, 9 1 No tre D am e L

. Rev

. 17 0 7
, 1 7 3 1 (A p r. 2 0 1 6 ). We d raw th e o p po site in f eren ce f ro m t h e tran scrip t. S en ato r J av its

n o ted th at “ th e m ech an ic an d th e salesm an [are] su b j ect to call at an y tim e th at a f ello w ’ s car b ro k e d o w

n .” 1 1 2 Co n g

. R ec. 2 0 ,5 0 6

. W e r e a d th at

c o m m en t to m ean sim

p ly th at, w

h en o n e’ s car f

ails, th ere ar e t w o

o p tio n s—f

ix it (v ia a m ech an i c) o r rep l ace it (v i a a car salesm an ).N A V A R R O V

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of Sen. B ay

h)); id. (“My ex perience with a u t o mobiles has been that the mechanic g oes o ut and answers calls in the rural areas.” (statement o f Sen. Yarboroug h)). The debate centered

on whether the same was true of p artsmen. Some Se n a t o rs tho u ght that partsmen had to work irreg ular hours and, according ly
, should als o b e ex empt. See, e.g. , id. at 20,502 (“In many instances it is essential that partsmen work long er hours or at other than reg ular times. This is especially true in the farm equipment business

. . . . B ecause of these factors, it would not be easy to place partsmen on a time-clock basis and to c ompute overtime com pensation in an equitable

manner. ” ( s t a tement of Sen. B ay h ) ); id. at 20,503 (“The partsman does occupy a sig n ificant and unusua l p o sition in the ag ricult u r a l e c onomy

. He has to be available during the harvesting season—and b e fore and after, to a lesser

ex tent—at a ll h o urs o f the day

. ” (s t a t e ment of Sen. Mansfield)). Other Senators thoug h t t hat partsmen worked inside only and, according ly
, like all other o r dinary employ e es of a dealership, should not be ex empt

. S e e id. at 20,504 (“The mechanics a nd the salesmen

. . . d o n ot g et overtime because their w ork is o utsi d e.

. . . The partsman works inside.” (statement of Sen. Y arboro u g h )) ; id. (“[ A] partsman is an inside man. The reason for ex emptin g the salesmen a

nd the mechanics wa s the difficulty of their keeping r eg ular hours.” (statement of Sen. Yarboroug h ) ); id.
at 20,505 ( “[ T] here is n o ex cuse whatever for including partsmen in the o vertime ex emption, because the partsman, like the stenog rapher, would be w orking inside.” (statement

o f Sen. Clark)). Nothing in the leg islative record sug g e s t s that Cong ress thoug ht that service advisors worked a ny thing but ordinary b usiness hours—to the ex tent that C ong ress thoug ht a bout service a dvisors at all. See OOH at 3 1 4

– 17 ( describing the work of service advisors without any wh e r e sug g esting that they

worked unusual hours).N A V A R R O V

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The leg islative history thus contains rep e a t ed, detailed

concerns a b o u t a p p l y i ng the overtime-compensation requirement to automobile s al esmen, partsmen, a nd mechanics. B y contrast, Defendant does not d irect us to any portion of the leg islative h istory that reveals a similar concern for apply ing the overtime-compensation requ i r ement to service advisors, a n d we have found none. To the contrary , the only r eferences to service a dvisors that w e have f ound
sug g est that dealerships h ad no c oncern about overtime compensation for service advisors. 1 8

Viewed in lig ht of the clear concerns a b o u t overtime compensation for automobile salesmen, partsmen, and mechanics, the leg islati ve history ’s apparent silence on

concerns about overtime pay for service advisors strong ly
sug g ests that Cong ress did n o t intend to ex empt service advisors. I f Cong ress meant for the ex e mption to encompass service advisors, we would ex pect that c o n ce r n to be plain from—or at least mentioned in—the leg islative record of the 1966 amendments.

I n 1974, Cong ress amended parag r a p h ( b)(10) to its present-day form. 29 U.S.C. § 213(b)(10) (2016); 8 8 Stat. at 61. The law created new subparag raph (b)(10)(A), which

ex e mpted “any salesman, partsman, o r mechanic p rimarily

18 S ee 1 9 6 0 Ho u se H

ea rin g s at 1 3 9 3 (testim o n y b y a Fo rd d ealer f ro m

ru ral L o u isian a, m erely co m p arin g t h e av erag e p ay at h is d ealersh ip w i th th e av erag e p ay at d ealersh ip s in N ew Orlean s f o r m ech an ics, pain ters, b o d y rep airm en , u

p h o lsterers, p arts- d ep artm en t m en , an d “ serv i c e salesm en [serv ice ad v iso rs]”); 1 9 5 9 S en a t e H ea rin g s at 2 08 (sam e); 1 9 5 7 Ho u se Hea r in g

s at 1 1 8 8 (sam e); 1 9 5 7 S

en a t e Hea rin g

s at 11 6 0

– 61 (letter fr o m th e So u t

h C aro lin a A u to

. Dealersh i p A ss’ n ex p ressin g n o co n c e r n ab o u t p ay in g o v erti m e t o its em p l o y ees o th er th an au to m o b ile salesm en

an d m ech an ics).N A V A R R O V

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eng ag ed in selling o r s e r v icing automobiles, trucks, farm implements” and new subparag raph (b)(10)(B ), which

ex e mpted “any salesman p rimarily eng ag ed in selling trailers, boats, or aircraft.”

B o th the H ouse an d t he Senate were provided with

w ritten summaries of the r evised ex emption. I n the H o u s e, Representative Dent’s report described the o verall effect o f the new § 213(b)(10)(A) & (B ):

Provides an o vertime ex emption for a ny salesme n primarily engaged in selling

a u t o m o b i l e s , t r a i l e r s , t r u c k s , f a r m implements, boats, or aircraft if employ ed b y

a n onmanufacturing establishment primarily
eng age d in the business of selling such vehicles to u l timate p urchasers. Also provides an overtime ex emption for partsmen and mechanics o f automobile, truck, and farm implement dealerships.

120 Cong

. Rec. 8602 (1974) ( e mph a s i s a dded). That
summary makes clear that “ s a lesman” applies only to “selling ” g oods. There is n o mention of salesmen p rimarily
eng ag ed in servicing a

u tomobiles, even though t h e literal
terms of th e e x emption could encompass that categ ory

. I nstead, the summa r y ap plied only the verb “selling ” to the subject “salesman.”

I n the Senate, Senator W illiams’ report described the chang es between the then-ex isting ex emption and t h e new § 213(b)(10)(A) & (B ):N A V A R R O V

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[ A] mends section 13(b)(10) relating to salesmen, partsmen, and mechanics b y repealing the overt i m e e x e m p t i o n for partsmen and mechanics in nonmanufacturing establishments primarily eng ag e d in selling trailers; by r epealing the overtime ex emption f o r p a r t s m e n a n d m e c h a n i c s i n nonmanufacturing establishments eng ag e d in selling aircraft; and by p roviding an overtime

ex e mption for salesmen eng ag e d in the sale o f boats.

120 Cong

. Rec. 8763 (1974). That summary a lso makes clear
t h a t “salesman” applies o nly to “ selling ” g oods. Reviewi n g the words of the statute literally
, as Defendant u rg es us to do, the amendment also repealed the ex e mption for salesmen primarily eng ag ed i n s e r v icing trailers and aircraft. B ut the
summary does not mention such a n eff ect, strong ly
sug g esting that Cong r ess did not think that “ sa l e sman” connected to “servicing .” Thus, the s u m maries of the 1974 amendments before the House and the Sen a te both understood the ex emption to encompass only salesmen “selling ,” not salesmen “servicing .”

So, too, did the National Automobile Dealers A s s o c i a t i o n

. During hearing s before subcommittees of the House and the Senate, the Associ a t i o n submitted a p r epared statement that
urg ed Cong ress not to chang e § 2 13(b)(10) a s it applied to

s a l esmen, partsmen, a n d m e c h a n i c s a t a u t o m o b i l e dealerships. 1 9 The statement ex p lai n e d that Cong ress’ 1966

19 T o Amen d th e Fa ir La b o r S ta nd a rd s Act: Hea rin gs o n H.R. 1 0 9 4 8

a n d H.R. 1 7 5 9 6 Befo re th e Gen

. S u b co mm. on La b o r o

f th e H. Co mm. o n Ed u c. & La b or , 9 1 st C o n g

. 1 0 9

– 11
, 2 5 9– 6 1 (1 9 7 0 ) (“ 1 9 7 0 Ho useN A V A R R O V

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creation of the ex emption in § 213(b) (1) “was a recog nition of the fact that these categ ories of employ ees work long hours during peak perio d s, but receive h ig h commissions, and, according ly should not be subject to overtime requirements.” 1970 House H

earings at 109, 259. To prove the hig h-pay assertion, the statement then detailed the averag e earning s o f

“ all car and truck salesmen,” “mechanics,” and “partsmen.” Id. (emphasis added). To p r ove that salesmen, mechanics, and partsmen work long hours, the statement described e ach position. The p arag raph d escribing salesmen plainly r efers to persons who sell cars, not to s e r v i ce advisors. Id. The statement summariz ed:

The primary purpose o f m inimum wag e a nd overtime leg islation is to take care of peopl e who receive substandard salaries. As already noted, automobile salesmen averag e $10,036
per y ear, automobile mechanics a verag e $5.00
p er hour and partsmen averag e $3.42 pe r hour.

Id. (emphasis added).

As with the 1966 amendments, Defendant has n ot pointed

us to any p assag e o f the leg islative history sug g esting that Cong r ess intended to e x empt service advisors, and w e have found none. T o th e c o ntrary , the only reference to service

Hea r in g s ”); Fa ir La b o r S ta nd

a r d s Amen d men ts o f 1 9 7 1 : Hea rin g

s o n S

. 1 8 6 1 a n d S

. 2 2 5 9 Befo re th e Su b co mm. o n La b or o f th e S en a te Co mm. o n La b o r & Pu b. W

elfa re , 92 n d Co n g

. 7 8 9– 9 4 (1 9 7 1 ) (“ 1 9 7 1 Sen a te Hea r in g s ”).N A V A R R O V

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advisors that we hav e f

o u n d sug g e sts that Cong ress had no

concern a bout overtime compensation for service advisors. 2 0

I n sum, the leg islative history o f the 1966 amendm e n t s and of the 1974 amendments reveal c lear concerns with apply ing the overtime-com p e nsation requirement to ex actly three categ ories of a dealership’s employ ees: automobile salesmen, par t s men, and mechanics. The ex tensive leg islati v e r e cord—tens of thousands of pag es spanning a decade a nd a half—contains hardly a me n t i o n of service advisors, and the few references that ex ist display n o concern about overtime compensation for s ervice advisors. W e a re firmly persu a d e d that Cong ress did not intend to e x empt service advisors.

C. Conclusion

After a thoroug h, de novo review of cong ressional intent,

we hold that the ex emption in § 213(b)(10)(A) d o e s n ot encompass service a dvi s o rs. W e acknowledg e that our holding conflicts with p ublished decisions by the F ourth a nd F ifth Circuits and by the Supreme Court of Montana. W alton

v. Gree n b rier Ford, Inc.
, 370 F .3d 446 (4th Cir. 2 004); Brennan v. D eel Motors, Inc.
, 475 F .2d 1095 (5th Cir. 1 973); Thompson v. J.C. B illion, Inc.
, 2 9 4 P.3d 397 (Mont. 2013). W e are unpersuaded by the analy sis of those decisions for the reasons stated above and for the reasons stated in our earlier opinion (ex cept those reasons concerning defere n c e to the
ag ency ). Navarro , 780 F .3d at 1274–77.

20 We f o u n d o n ly o n e p o rtio n

o f th e leg islativ e reco rd th at m en tio n s

a “ serv ice ad v iser.” 1 9 7 1 S en a te Hea rin g

s at 7 8 0

– 8 1

. T h at te st i m o n y

m erely d escrib ed w

h at a serv ice ad v i so r d o es; it d o es n o t su g g est th at th e

ex em p tio n ap p lied to serv ice ad v iso rs. Id

.N A V A R R O V

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This opinion address e s o n ly Plaintiffs’ federal claim for overtime c ompensation. F or the reasons g iven in our earlier opinion, id. at 1270 n

. 2
, w e a f f irm the dismissal of all other federal claims, and we reverse the dismissal of the state-law claims.

AF F IRMED in part, REVERSED in part, a nd REMANDED. Co s t s on appeal awarded to PlaintiffsAppellants.