JSOU Report 13-5 Security Force Assistance and Security Sector Reform Shultz

Security Force Assistance

and Security Sector 

Reform

Richard H. Shultz, Jr. 

JSOU Report 13-5

September 2013

Joint Special Operations University

7701 Tampa Point Boulevard

MacDill AFB FL 33621

https://jsou.socom.mil
Joint Special Operations University

and the Strategic Studies Department

The Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) provides its publications 

to contribute toward expanding the body of knowledge about joint special 

operations. JSOU publications advance the insights and recommendations 

of national security professionals and the Special Operations Forces (SOF) 

students and leaders for consideration by the SOF community and defense 

leadership. 

JSOU is the educational component of the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), MacDill Air Force Base, Florida. The JSOU 

mission is to educate SOF executive, senior, and intermediate leaders and 

selected other national and international security decision makers, both 

military and civilian, through teaching, outreach, and research in the 

science and art of joint special operations. JSOU provides education to the 

men and women of SOF and to those who enable the SOF mission in a joint 

and interagency environment. 

JSOU conducts research through its Strategic Studies Department where 

effort centers upon the USSOCOM and United States SOF missions: 

USSOCOM mission. Provide fully capable Special Operations Forces to 

defend the United States and its interests. Synchronize planning of global 

operations against terrorist networks.

USSOF mission. USSOF conducts special operations to prepare the operational environment, prevent crisis, and respond with speed, precision, and 

lethality to achieve tactical through strategic effect. 

The Strategic Studies Department also organizes and conducts strategic symposia, interagency curricula, international curricula, regional and 

cultural education senior level courses, and senior level professional military education.

This publication is available on the JSOU public web page located at

https://jsou.socom.mil.

Joint Special Operations University

Brian A. Maher, Ed.D., SES, President

Kenneth H. Poole, Ed.D., Strategic Studies Department Director

Robert Nalepa, Lt. Col., U.S. Air Force, Ret., Director of Research

William Knarr, Ed.D., Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret.; Richard Rubright, Ph.D., Strategic 

Studies; Jason Quirin, Ph.D., Chemical Engineering; Joanna Gutierrez Winters, M.A., 

International Relations and Diplomacy, M.A., Economics, Resident Senior Fellows

Anna-Marie Wyant, M.A., English, JSOU Press Editor

Editorial Advisory Board

Roby C. Barrett

Ph.D., Middle Eastern & South Asian History 

Public Policy Center Middle East Institute 

and JSOU Senior Fellow

Joseph D. Celeski

Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret.

JSOU Senior Fellow

Chuck Cunningham

Lieutenant General, U.S. Air Force, Ret. 

Professor of Strategy, Joint Advanced 

Warfighting School and 

JSOU Distinguished Senior Fellow

James J.F. Forest 

Ph.D., Higher Education Administration

Associate Professor, School of Criminology and 

Justice Studies, University of Massachusetts 

Lowell and JSOU Senior Fellow

Thomas H. Henriksen

Ph.D., History, Hoover Institution 

Stanford University and JSOU Senior Fellow

Bernd Horn

Colonel, Canadian Dept. of National Defence 

Ph.D., War Studies

Director, CANSOFCOM Professional 

Development Centre

Russell D. Howard

Brigadier General, U.S. Army, Ret.

JSOU Senior Fellow

John D. Jogerst

Colonel, U.S. Air Force, Ret.

James Kiras

Ph.D., History, School of Advanced Air and 

Space Studies, Air University and 

JSOU Associate Fellow 

William W. Mendel

Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret. 

JSOU Senior Fellow

Alvaro de Souza Pinheiro

Major General, Brazilian Army, Ret.

JSOU Associate Fellow

James F. Powers, Jr.

Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret.

JSOU Senior Fellow 

Thomas Sass

Ph.D., International Relations

Richard H. Shultz, Jr.

Ph.D., Political Science

Director, International Security 

Studies Program, The Fletcher School, 

Tufts University and JSOU Senior Fellow

Robert G. Spulak, Jr.

Ph.D., Physics/Nuclear Engineering

Sandia National Laboratories 

and JSOU Associate Fellow 

Jessica Glicken Turnley

Ph.D., Cultural Anthropology

Galisteo Consulting Group 

and JSOU Senior Fellow 

Francisco R. Wong-Diaz

J.D., Ph.D., Political Science

Professor of international affairs and law and 

JSOU Senior Fellow

Rich Yarger

Ph.D., History 

JSOU Senior Fellow
On the cover. A U.S. Special Operations Forces service member along with 

3rd Bataillon d’Intervention Rapide or Rapid Intervention Battalion soldiers 

demonstrate the proper way to pass hallways and intersections during Close 

Quarter Battle training during Exercise Silent Warrior 2013 in Bamenda, 

Cameroon. Photo by Air Force Master Sgt. Larry W. Carpenter, Jr.

JSOU Report 13-5

The JSOU Press

MacDill Air Force Base, Florida

2013

Security Force

Assistance and 

Security Sector Reform

Richard H. Shultz
This monograph and other JSOU publications can be found at https://jsou.

socom.mil. Click on Publications. Comments about this publication are 

invited andshould be forwarded to Director, Strategic Studies Department, 

Joint Special Operations University, 7701 Tampa Point Blvd., MacDill AFB 

FL 33621.

*******

The JSOU Strategic Studies Department is currently accepting written works relevant to special operations for potential publication. For more information please 

contact the JSOU Research Director at jsou_research@socom.mil. Thank you for 

your interest in the JSOU Press. 

*******

This work was cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.

ISBN 978-1-933749-79-2
The views expressed in this publication are entirely those of 

the author and do not necessarily reflect the views, policy or 

position of the United States Government, Department of 

Defense, United States Special Operations Command, or the 

Joint Special Operations University. 
Recent Publications of the JSOU Press

Special Operations Research Topics 2014 

Hybrid Warfare, August 2013, Timothy McCulloh and Richard Johnson

Smart Power and U.S. National Strategy, August 2013, Francisco Wong-Diaz

Retooling for the Future, May 2013, Francisco Wong-Diaz

21st Century SOF: Toward an American Theory of Special Operations, 

April 2013, Harry R. Yarger

Irregular Warfare: The Maoist Challenge to India’s Internal Security, 

December 2012, Prakash Singh 

Iran: Illusion, Reality, and Interests, September 2012, Roby Barrett 

Knowing Your Partner: The Evolution of Brazilian Special Operations Forces, 

August 2012, Alvaro de Souza Pinheiro

2012 JSOU and NDIA SO/LIC Division Essays, July 2012

Confronting the Terrorism of Boko Haram in Nigeria, May 2012, James J.F. Forest

Strategic Culture and Strategic Studies: An Alternative Framework for Assessing 

al-Qaeda and the Global Jihad Movement, May 2012, Richard Shultz

Understanding the Form, Function, and Logic of Clandestine Insurgent and 

Terrorist Networks: The First Step in Effective Counternetwork Operations, 

April 2012, Derek Jones

“We Will Find a Way”: Understanding the Legacy of Canadian Special 

Operations Forces, February 2012, Bernd Horn

Winning Hearts and Minds in Afghanistan and Elsewhere, 

February 2012, Thomas H. Henriksen
vii

Contents

Foreword.......................................................................................ix

About the Author...........................................................................xi

Introduction................................................................................... 1

1. Dimensions of State Weakness: A 

Persistent 21st Century Security Challenge..................................... 5

2. Ungoverned/Alternatively Governed Territory .......................... 15

3. Changing Patterns of Conflicts ................................................. 29

4. A Strategy for Early Engagement............................................... 45

5. Security Force Assistance and Defense Institution Building ...... 49

6. Conclusion.............................................................................. 65

Endnotes ..................................................................................... 71

ix

Foreword

In this monograph, Dr. Richard Shultz conducts a study of the coming 

requirements and likely contexts in confronting future security challenges. Specifically, he argues that weak and failing states will play a central 

role in coming conflicts. More importantly, the ungoverned/alternatively 

governed spaces within weak and failing states will provide the opportunity 

for violent extremist organizations (VEOs) to grow and extend their influence. Even more challenging, some states face threats from multiple VEOs 

operating from ungoverned/alternatively governed areas. As such, Dr. Shultz 

argues that the failing states represent a challenge not only locally, but as a 

threat to international security. How this challenge will be overcome is first 

by recognizing that future threats, generally, will not be state centric, but 

rather irregular in nature.

Dr. Shultz advocates for not only engagement in these failing states, but 

to engage as early as possible to prevent the growth and festering of violent 

extremist organizations which will require larger more costly intervention 

later. He specifically recognizes the need for an irregular warfare tool to 

engage early through security sector reform to prevent just such growth. 

Dr. Shultz systematically addresses five issues in making the case for early 

engagement in weak and failing states: 1) What are the dimensions of weak 

and failing states? In what regions are these states clustered? 2) What is the 

relationship between weak and failing states and ungoverned or undergoverned territory where violent extremist groups may flourish? To what extent 

do these irregular conflicts coincide with weak and failing states? 3) Are 

there discernible patterns to post Cold-War and 9/11 irregular conflict? Will 

intrastate conflicts persist into the 21st century? 4) Which weak and failing 

states will have an impact on U.S. national security interests? On what basis 

should the United States determine it is in U.S. national interest to provide 

security force assistance and security sector reform? 5) What are the tools 

and capabilities which the Department of Defense needs to assist weak and 

failing states to be successful against irregular challenges? What does it need 

to add or develop to that inventory of capabilities?

Dr. Shultz delves into each of the questions to find common logic to support early engagement. Importantly, he identifies the contributions Special 
x

Operations Forces (SOF) can make to a new U.S. security force assistance and 

security sector reform strategy. While Dr. Shultz recognizes that the future 

is always a bit uncertain, and the U.S. may again be drawn into a large and 

costly confrontation against VEOs, he makes a compelling argument that 

the appropriate tool is SOF through irregular warfare with the intention of 

early engagement.

Kenneth H. Poole, Ed.D.

Director, JSOU Strategic Studies Department 
xi

About the Author

Dr. Richard H. Shultz, Jr., is a professor of international politics at the 

Fletcher School, Tufts University, where he teaches graduate-level 

courses in various aspects of international security 

affairs, internal/transnational conflict and war studies, and intelligence and armed groups. He is also 

the director of the Fletcher School’s International 

Security Studies Program. The program is dedicated 

to graduate-level teaching and research on a broad 

range of conflict, defense, and strategic issues. 

In Washington he has served as director of 

research at the National Strategy Information Center 

(NSIC) where in 2010 he completed, with NSIC President Roy Godson, a 

major study focused on Adapting America’s Security Paradigm and Security 

Agenda for 21st century security challenges. 

With the assistance from the U.S. Marine Corps, he recently completed 

an in-depth study analyzing one of what he believes is illustrative of the 

types of conflicts that will characterize the 21st century security environment—the U.S. Marine Corps’ 2004-2008 campaign in Al Anbar Province 

in Iraq. To complete the research he had access to the records and Iraq oral 

history collection at the U.S. Marine Corps History Division. The study has 

been published under the title The Marines Take Anbar: The Four-Year Fight 

against Al Qaeda (Annapolis, MD: The Naval Institute Press, 2013). Recently, 

the book was reviewed in The Wall Street Journal. 

His new research project is focused on developing “A U.S. Blueprint for 

Security Sector Reform (SSR) for the 21st Century.” The project focuses on 

developing a framework for the U.S. that adapts security sector reform (SSR) 

theory and practice for addressing dysfunctional security sectors of fragile states; examines the state of capabilities across the U.S. government for 

addressing these challenges; and identifies gaps in those capabilities that 

need to be filled if the U.S. is to employ SSR as an effective policy tool. The 

project is a joint effort with Dr. Querine Hanlon of United States Institute of 

Peace. Support for the project comes from the Smith Richardson Foundation.
xii

He has held three chairs: the Olin Distinguished Professorship of National 

Security Studies at the U.S. Military Academy, Secretary of the Navy Senior 

Research Fellow at the U.S. Naval War College, and Brigadier General H. L. 

Oppenheimer Chair of War-fighting Strategy, U.S. Marine Corps. Since the 

mid-1980s he has served as a security consultant to various U.S. government 

departments and agencies concerned with national security affairs. Currently he is Senior Fellow at the Joint Special Operations University and a 

consultant to the U.S. Special Operations Command and U.S. Marine Corps.

His other recent books include Insurgents, Terrorists, and Militias: The 

Warriors of Contemporary Combat (Columbia University Press, 2006; 2009 

Paperback Edition) and The Secret War against Hanoi: Kennedy’s and Johnson’s Use of Spies, Saboteurs, and Covert Warriors in North Vietnam (New 

York: Harper Collins, 1999; 2000 Paperback Edition). His recent articles 

include: “States in the 21st Century,” Geopolitics, History and International 

Relations 4:1 (2012); “A QDR for all Seasons,” Joint Forces Quarterly (Sept. 

2010); and “The Sources of Instability in the Twenty-First Century Weak 

States, Armed Groups, and Irregular Conflict,” Strategic Studies Quarterly 

(Summer 2011). He authored two recent monographs: Strategic Culture and 

Strategic Studies: An Alternative Framework for Assessing Al Qaeda and the 

Global Jihadi Movement (JSOU Press, 2012) and Armed Groups and Irregular Warfare: Adapting Professional Military Education (National Strategy 

Information Center, 2009). 
1

Shultz: Security Force Assistance and Security Sector Reform

Introduction

Over the last several years, notes Stewart Patrick in his recent volume 

Weak Links: Fragile States, Global Threats, and International Security, weak, failing, and failed states have increasingly come to be seen as 

significant security challenges by the senior leadership of the U.S. Department of State (DOS) and Department of Defense (DOD). Those officials 

contend that several fragile states are confronted by an array of fractious and 

intractable problems that can have important implications for the interests 

and security of the United States. Some are threatened by violent extremist groups with political agendas, others by potent criminal syndicates. 

Yet others confront multiple armed groups. These violent non-state actors 

emerge and mature in weak and failing states. 

In 2008, then Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice asserted that “One of 

the defining challenges in our world, now and for many years to come, will 

be to deal with weak and poorly governed states—states that are on the verge 

of failure, or indeed, states that have already failed.” These conditions “create 

anarchy, and conflict, and ungoverned space ... where arms traffickers and 

other transnational actors can operate with impunity, and where terrorists 

and extremists can gather, plot, and train.”1

 

One year later, her successor, Secretary Hillary Clinton, concurred, stating that weak and failing states are “Breeding grounds, not only for the worst 

abuses of human beings, from mass murder to rapes to indifference toward 

disease and other terrible calamities, but they are invitations to terrorists to 

find refuge amidst the chaos.”2

For former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, the challenges posed 

by weak and failing states were part of a transforming international security environment in which non-state armed groups were mushrooming in 

number and in their capacity to cause major geopolitical damage in their 

own territory and beyond through the use of irregular and unconventional 

means. Secretary Gates advanced this appraisal through his own public 

discourse, as well as through two Quadrennial Defense Reviews (QDR) and 

other notable DOD directives and initiatives. 

For example, in 2008 the secretary described the future conflict environment as one in which “overall, looking ahead, I believe the most persistent 
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JSOU Report 13-5

and potentially dangerous threats will come less from ambitious states, than 

from failing ones that cannot meet the basic needs—much less the aspirations—of their people.”3

 In his 2009 Foreign Affairs article, he expanded on 

this theme asserting:

The recent past vividly demonstrated the consequences of failing to 

address adequately the dangers posed by insurgencies and failing 

states. Terrorist networks can find sanctuary within the borders of a 

weak nation and strength within the chaos of social breakdown. The 

most likely catastrophic threats to the U.S. homeland, for example, 

that of a U.S. city being poisoned or reduced to rubble by a terrorist attack, are more likely to emanate from failing states than from 

aggressor states.4 

Within the Pentagon, the initial recognition of the ascendancy of weak 

and failing states and irregular conflicts as important security challenges 

appeared in the 2006 QDR. It was the first step in this diagnosis by the DOD. 

It stipulated that irregular warfare (IW) was now a vital mission area for the 

U.S. military, and stressed the need to prepare for it. War in the aftermath 

of 9/11 was characterized as “irregular in its nature.” Enemies in those fights 

were depicted as “not traditional conventional military forces.” IW involved 

indirect and asymmetric forms of attack by non-state actors, and is inherently a protracted struggle, according to the QDR.5

On the heels of the 2006 QDR, several manuals, directives, and related 

activities followed including Pentagon Directive 3000.07–Irregular Warfare. 

Defining IW as “a violent struggle among state and non-state actors” taking 

place “in fragile states,” the directive asserted that “IW is as strategically 

important as traditional warfare,” and was essential to “maintain capabilities and capacity so that the Department of Defense is as effective in IW as 

it is in traditional warfare.”6

Finally, the 2010 QDR highlights weak states as one part of a complex and 

uncertain 21st century international security environment that will include 

threats from states and from violent non-state actors. In the case of the latter, 

armed groups will “continue to gain influence and capabilities that, during 

the previous century, remained largely the purview of states.” Moreover, a 

“shifting operational landscape” and “changing international environment 

will continue to put pressure on the modern state system [by] increasing the 

frequency and severity of the challenges associated with chronically fragile 
3

Shultz: Security Force Assistance and Security Sector Reform

states.” These weak and failing states will provide sanctuaries or safe havens 

in ungoverned territory within their borders for empowered non-state actors 

who will have a growing impact on world affairs. The 2010 QDR gives particular attention to “al-Qaeda’s terrorist network.”7

To meet the challenges of weak states and the terrorist, insurgent, and 

criminal challenges that they can foster, the 2010 QDR noted that while there 

may be cases in the future in which the U.S. will have to engage in “large 

scale counterinsurgency, stability, and counterterrorism operations,” a more 

judicious approach is to assist “weak states facing insurgencies, transnational 

terrorists, or criminal networks” in their early stages when these challenges 

are emerging. To do so, the 2010 QDR highlights a “range of security cooperation activities [of which] the most dynamic in the coming years will be 

security force assistance,” but will also include “ministerial-level training 

missions” to strengthen those security institutions that manage military 

and police forces.8 The latter falls under the rubric of security sector reform 

(SSR), a capability the U.S. has only recently begun to consider developing.

For then Secretary Gates, the need for an “early intervention” approach 

was essential, given that he believed “The United States is unlikely to repeat 

another Iraq or Afghanistan—that is, forced regime change followed by 

nation building under fire—anytime soon. But that does not mean it may not 

face similar challenges in a variety of locales.” To head these situations off, 

Secretary Gates proposed that the U.S. employ “indirect approaches—primarily through building the institutional capacity of partner governments 

and their security forces—to prevent festering problems from turning into 

crises that require costly and controversial direct military intervention.” This 

approach, the secretary concluded, “is arguably as important as, if not more 

so than, the fighting the United States does itself.”9

The objective of this study will be to examine the security predicaments 

faced by fragile and weak states, the extent to which these situations affect 

U.S. interests, and the contributions Special Operations Forces (SOF) can 

make to a new U.S. security force assistance (SFA) and SSR strategy. If the 

U.S. is to adhere to Secretary Gates’ call to focus on strengthening the capacity and accountability of the security forces and defense ministries of weak 

governments before incipient irregular threats escalate into “crises that 

require costly and controversial direct military intervention,” a new policy 

and strategy is needed. This study begins by presenting the case or rationale 

for a new policy of early engagement. Chapters 1-3 make the case for why 
4

JSOU Report 13-5

the U.S. should adopt this policy course of action given today’s scare defense 

dollars. Having made the policy argument, Chapters 4-5 discuss the dimensions of the strategy for supporting this policy.
5

Shultz: Security Force Assistance and Security Sector Reform

1. Dimensions of State Weakness: A 

Persistent 21st Century Security Challenge

The starting point for determining the extent of SOF involvement in 

and contribution to future U.S. SFA and defense institution building 

missions, and the capabilities SOF will need to retain to do so, is an assessment of the weak and fragile state context. Are the above observations by the 

senior leadership of the DOS and DOD well-founded or overstated? Without 

that understanding, SOF mission planning at best would be problematic.

Weak states have been the subject of considerable recent academic and 

public policy attention with several major projects attempting to calculate 

the factors that contribute to state weakness and incapacity, and the impact 

this can have on local, regional, and international stability. To gain a better 

understanding of the extent to which weak states constitute a burgeoning international problem, a review of the findings from one of the most 

prominent of these analytic assessments will be undertaken. This project has 

sought over the last number of years to categorize states along a continuum 

from strong to weak, failing, and failed states, and to identify the principle 

sources of their strength or weakness. In the 21st century, the world now 

comprises nearly 200 states. How many of those can be characterized as 

weak, failing, or failed? 

Since 2005, The Failed State Index has sought to answer this question. To 

do so, it has assessed and categorized states along a strong to weak, failing 

and failed continuum. Produced annually by The Fund for Peace, the index 

is globally recognized and utilized. The architects of the index have designed 

a sophisticated content analysis-based methodology for ranking 177 nations 

based on their measured levels of stability and institutional capacity.10 They 

have also produced in-depth assessments of key countries based on data 

derived from the index, which is then supplemented by qualitative analysis.

To address the questions posed earlier concerning 1) the dimensions of 

state weakness, 2) the number of states that can be classified as weak, failing 

or failed, and 3) the regions in which these states are clustered, the findings 

from the 2011 Failed States Index are highlighted. The index measures the 

strength or weakness of a state based on data that provides insight into 

those “social, economic, and political pressures” that affect stability and 
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JSOU Report 13-5

institutional capacity. Twelve “conflict risk indicators” are assessed to measure the degree of a state’s stability and institutional capacity during a given 

year and how susceptible it may be to organized resistance, political violence, 

and armed conflict.11

Each indicator measures an important social, economic, or political/

security dimension of state strength or weakness. The following list contains 

a brief summation of the parameters of each indicator. Scores from each 

are summarized into an overall or aggregate rating “on a 1 to 10 scale with 1 

being a most stable [state] and 10 being [a state] most at-risk of collapse and 

violence.” In the annual Failed State Index report, each country receives an 

aggregate score assessing its overall strength or weakness based on these 12 

indicators.

An examination of these indicators suggests that while each is an important source of state strength or weakness, certain indicators focus more 

directly on those precipitating conditions that make a state vulnerable to 

civil resistance, political violence, or armed insurrection. This is important 

to note because not every state ranked as weak, failing, or failed is likely to 

foster a political crisis that generates civil or violent irregular conflict. An 

understanding of these distinctions would be important in shaping the kinds 

of assistance programs third parties provide to weak states. To be sure, weak 

and corrupt institutions contribute to poverty, human suffering, and abysmal 

development in all weak states. But these conditions of state weakness, in 

and of themselves, do not generate internal resistance and armed conflict.

Of those indicators that are most likely to foster intrastate conflict, the 

following appear most relevant. First is that social indicator that measures 

the degree to which ethnic, religious, or other political/social group grievance is high due to state organized and perpetrated repression of particular 

societal groups. These conditions, as a review of the patterns of intrastate 

conflict during the last 25 years discloses, frequently result in prolonged 

struggles in which violent or non-violent groups challenge the legitimacy 

and authority of a state’s ruling elites.

CONFLICT ASSESSMENT INDICATORS

Social Indicators

1. Mounting Demographic Pressures. Due to high population density relative 

to life-sustaining resources, group settlement patterns that affect freedom to 
7

Shultz: Security Force Assistance and Security Sector Reform

participate in common forms of activity, high growth rates, and impact natural 

disasters, epidemics, and environmental hazards.

2. Massive Movement of Refugees or Internally-Displaced Persons. Due to 

forced uprooting of large communities as a result of random or targeted violence 

and/or repression that spiral into larger humanitarian and security problems.

3. Vengeance-Seeking Group Grievance. Due to specific groups singled out 

for institutionalized political exclusion, persecution, or repression which may 

include atrocities committed with impunity.

4. Chronic and Sustained Human Flight. Voluntary emigration of “the middle 

class,” particularly economically productive segments of the population. “Brain 

drain” of professionals, intellectuals, and political dissidents fearing persecution or repression.

Economic Indicators

5. Uneven Economic Development. Group-based inequality, or perceived 

inequality, in education and economic status. Group-based impoverishment 

as measured by poverty levels.

6. Poverty and Sharp Economic Decline. Pattern of economic decline as a 

whole as measured by per capita income, gross national product, debt, poverty 

levels, business failures, and growth of illicit activities.

Political/Security Indicators

7. Legitimacy of the State. Massive and endemic corruption or profiteering by 

ruling elites who resist transparency and accountability. Widespread loss of 

popular confidence in state institutions. 

8. Progressive Deterioration of Public Services. Disappearance of basic state 

functions including failure to protect citizens from violence and to provide 

essential services. State functions narrows to those agencies that serve the ruling 

elites, such as the security apparatus.

9. Violation of Human Rights and Rule of Law. Outbreak of politically inspired 

violence against innocent civilians. Rising number of political prisoners or dissidents who are denied due process. Widespread abuse of legal, political, and 

social rights, including those of individuals, groups, and institutions.

10. Security Apparatus. Emergence of praetorian guards, secret intelligence 

units, or other irregular security forces loyal to a leader that operate with impunity. Emergence of state-supported private militias that terrorize political 

opponents. Armed resistance to the governing authority, violent uprisings and 

insurgencies, proliferation of armed groups that challenge the state’s monopoly 

of the use of force.
8

JSOU Report 13-5

11. Rise of Factionalized Elites. Fragmentation of ruling elites and state institutions along identity lines. Absence of legitimate leadership widely accepted as 

representing the entire citizenry.

12. Intervention of External Actor. Military or paramilitary engagement in 

the internal affairs of the state by outside armies or other entities that affect the 

internal balance of power or the resolution of conflict. Economic intervention 

by outside powers, including multilateral organizations.

Other political/security indicators likewise contribute to the context in 

which intrastate instability takes place. These include state security forces 

that on behalf of unaccountable elites operate with impunity, violate human 

rights, and foster violent uprisings and the proliferation of armed groups. 

Massive and endemic corruption by ruling elites also contributes to the conditions in which other kinds of intrastate challenges emerge. These include 

those from organized criminal syndicates who establish a nexus with the 

ruling elites of corrupt regimes. Alternatively, these conditions may also 

spawn non-violent civil resistance movements like those that emerged in 

Egypt, Tunisia, and initially in Syria during the Arab Spring.

The 2011 Failed States Index highlights this context, providing an analytic 

lens through which to gain an understanding of the conditions and sources 

of instability in weak, failing, and failed states. What the report finds is that 

of the 177 states evaluated, 108 can be classified as weak, very weak, failing, or 

failed. These states, to varying degrees, are not able to maintain control over 

the territory within their official borders, do not retain a monopoly over the 

use of force within that territory, are unable to perform core governmental 

functions beginning with the security of their citizens, and are plagued by 

corrupt and moribund institutions, poverty, the violation of human rights, 

and disregard for the rule of law. These are chronic problems that are not 

easily reversed.

Of the states assessed, 13 were classified as failing or failed. And of these, 

seven—Somalia, Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Afghanistan, 

Iraq, Pakistan, and Yemen—have been plagued by prolonged irregular conflict. This was generated by widespread internal repression carried out by 

state security services or state-supported private militias, violent armed 

groups challenging state authority and/or one another, and other illicit actors 

including criminal syndicates and radical Islamists vying for local control. 

These developments often contribute to regional instability because of the 

spillover of violence and illicit activities. 
9

Shultz: Security Force Assistance and Security Sector Reform

The other six failing states—Chad, Haiti, Zimbabwe, the Central African 

Republic, Cote d’Ivoire, and Guinea—while beset by grave humanitarian 

crises due to weak and corrupt government institutions and practices, are 

not presently immersed in violent internal wars like their seven counterparts. 

Therefore, they pose a different set of security challenges. However, in the 

case of the Central African Republic this has recently changed with the outbreak of violence in December 2012 between the government and a coalition 

of rebel forces that by March 2013 took control of the presidential palace. In 

April, a transitional council was established. But the events since December 

have seriously exacerbated the humanitarian situation in the Central African Republic, and insecurity is rife as a direct consequence of the violence.

The 2011 index classifies another 22 states as very weak. These states likewise suffer from governments with little legitimacy. Several factors contribute to this including a chronic lack of representativeness; massive corruption 

and illicit activities; unaccountable security services; and severe population 

and demographic challenges due to an inability or unwillingness on the part 

of government to revive near non-existent public services (health, sanitation, education). 

Several of these very weak states are also either directly or indirectly 

affected by irregular conflict challenges which can have implications for 

regional and international security. Here three examples are highlighted—

Nigeria, Guinea Bissau, and Kenya. Of these, Nigeria, situated at number 14 

on the 2011 index, faces the most serious intrastate threats from an array of 

violent armed groups. 

Of the 12 indicators of state weakness, Nigeria scores highest on group 

grievance and related political/security factors due to serious inter-faith challenges between north and south, which are made worse by poverty, unemployment, and the unequal distribution of oil revenues. This has led to the 

escalation of violence by Boko Haram, which in 2010 began launching bloody 

attacks in the south as well in the north. Over the last three years the group 

has killed over 1,000 Nigerians, mostly civilians. A self-proclaimed Salafi 

Jihad group, it poses a major terrorist threat to Nigeria and possibility to 

the region because some of its factions have embraced and aligned with the 

global jihadist ideology of al-Qaeda. Several other armed groups are active 

in the southern oil producing region of Nigeria, most notably the Movement 

for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND). It has carried out attacks 

on petroleum operations both on and off shore, engaging in sabotage, theft, 
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JSOU Report 13-5

guerrilla operations, and kidnapping. A major oil producer, instability in 

Nigeria has regional and international implications. 

A second very weak state whose internal challenges have implications for 

security and stability in the region in which it is located is Guinea Bissau, 

ranked number 19 in the 2011 index. Located in West Africa, it is a gateway 

for illicit actors that operate north into the Maghreb states of Morocco, 

Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Mauritania, and the disputed area of the Western 

Sahara. Since it gained independence in 1974, Guinea Bissau has been racked 

by military coups, most recently one in April 2012 that prevented the second 

round of presidential elections from taking place. One of the poorest countries in Africa, with high levels of corruption and little institutional capacity outside repressive security services, it has become an important port of 

entry for Latin American drug cartels that traffic cocaine north to Europe. 

The nexus between criminal syndicates and local elites is very strong. With 

a large archipelago and maritime space but no navy to control it, anemic 

police and judicial institutions, a near-total absence of the rule of law, and 

armed forces benefiting from engagement in the drug trade, Guinea Bissau 

has become a major security challenge for the region. This is due to linkages 

that are being forged between drug traffickers and extremist groups in the 

north, most importantly al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). 

Finally, in East Africa, in addition to the failed state of Somalia, the 

2011 index ranks Kenya at number 16 as a very weak state. A key factor 

contributing to Kenya’s high ranking is a long standing history of ethnic 

divisions that have long been a source of internal violence and instability, 

most recently manifesting itself in the disputed presidential election of 2007. 

More than 1,500 died as a result of that violence and over one quarter of a 

million were displaced. Also fostering state weakness in Kenya is uneven 

development and corruption, which are reflected in the economic indicators 

of the index. Finally, undermining Kenya’s stability is the border it shares 

with Somalia and the increasing number of refugees who cross that border. 

There are now large Somali enclaves in Kenya to include one in the Eastleigh 

district of Nairobi. This is now seen as a security threat by the Kenyan army 

and police because many of these refugees are armed. Kenya has different 

illicit actors operating across its territory as well to include those involved in 

international drug smuggling and money laundering. Consequently, Kenya, 

which was for a long time considered an anchor of stability in East Africa, 
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has over the last several years faced serious internal and regional security 

challenges. However, the recent elections, which were not marred by the 

violence of 2007, and a growing economy which has generated rising foreign 

direct investment, among related indicators, suggest that the situation inside 

Kenya is improving. 

Beyond these 13 failing and 22 very weak states, the 2011 index identified 

another 73 states as weak. These include both democratic and authoritarian variations. Of the former, weak democracies generally tend to be new 

democracies that are in varying stages of transition.12 They are part of what 

Sam Huntington called the third wave of democracy.13 This began in Latin 

America in the 1980s and went global with the fall of the Soviet Union in 

1991. By the end of the 20th century there were, according to Larry Diamond, 

over 100 strong and weak democracies.14 

Weak democracies may aspire to become liberal democracies, ones that 

“protect the civil rights and political liberties of their citizens and have a 

high degree of the rule of law.” But most have not reached this position. 

“Some do not uphold high standards of the rule of law or apply it inconsistently for only a portion of their populations. Others fail to protect civil 

liberties” and therefore “do not yet enjoy the full consent of all sectors of 

their populations.”15 As a result, they may be challenged by armed groups 

who undermine fundamental security and even jeopardize the continued 

existence of the regime. Examples include Colombia, Mexico, Lebanon, and 

the Philippines.

These examples withstanding, the majority of the 73 weak states in 2010 

did not face internal or cross-border security challenges from violent armed 

groups that rose to this level. That said, several of them, due to unrepresentative and authoritarian elites, serious levels of corruption, the presence of 

illicit actors, unaccountable security institutions and weak public services, 

suffered from acute capacity gaps that have the potential to generate violent 

and/or nonviolent opposition groups and movements. 

And this is precisely what happened in six states that are part of the Arab 

Spring uprising. Only one of those six—Yemen—was in the very weak or 

failing state category with armed groups already operating. Egypt, Tunisia, 

and Syria, ranked among the 73 weak states identified in the 2011 index, had 

no such instability. The same was true of the other two—Libya and Bahrain. 
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Nevertheless, three of these six states experienced regime change—Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya. And two others—Syria and Yemen—remain embroiled in violent 

internal wars. Only Bahrain managed to suppress—at least temporarily—the 

challenge to its authority. 

An unpacking of the aggregate scores for these states, as the 2011 index report 

notes, “does put the events in these countries into context” and sheds light on the 

preconditions or underlying sources of instability that helped trigger the Arab 

Spring uprising.16 In the cases of Egypt, Syria, Libya and Tunisia, their highest 

scores were those individual indicators that measure corruption and lack of representativeness, violation of human rights and the rule of law, and elite fragmentation. And in the case of Egypt and Syria, these were coupled with equally high 

scores on group grievances, making these two countries, in particular, potential 

candidates for the outbreak of instability. 

However, in the case of Libya and Tunisia, the scores on group grievance were 

lower. But insurrection still happened. In the case of Libya, this low score on group 

grievance may be explained by the effectiveness of the security services which 

kept those who had considerable grievances with the regime, as the subsequent 

revolt revealed, muted in 2010. The same appears to have been the case in Tunisia.

Among these states, Bahrain would appear to be the outlier, with a ranking 129 

on the 2011 index. In other words, it was not considered a weak state. But on the 

indicators of state legitimacy and representativeness, as well as group grievance, 

Bahrain scored fairly high. What this suggests is that it likewise was a potential 

candidate for the outbreak of instability. 

In sum, Egypt, Syria, Libya, Tunisia, and to a lesser extent Bahrain, all had 

political areas of weakness, as measured by the Failed State Index, that made these 

states vulnerable to political challenges by violent and nonviolent groups and 

movements. But it took the actions of a Tunisian fruit vendor who set himself on 

fire on 17 December 2010, protesting his mistreatment by unaccountable municipal officials, to kindle the Arab Spring. This event served at a precipitant or catalyst that led to the Tunisian revolt which quickly toppled the 23-year autocratic 

rule of Zine El Abidine Ben Ali. It also incited demonstrations and resistance in 

Egypt, Libya, Syria, and Bahrain.

The Arab Spring turned the Middle East and North Africa upside down, and 

the final outcome is far from in view. In addition to Yemen, Egypt, Syria, Libya, 

Tunisia, and Bahrain, several other states in the region, have similar internal areas 

of weakness that could make then vulnerable to similar violent or nonviolent civil 

resistance challenges.
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Beyond the Middle East and North Africa, several other regions are likewise 

composed of states that rank very high on the 2011 Failed States Index, making 

those regions susceptible to the outbreak of civil resistance, political violence, or 

armed insurrection. Of these, two regions in particular stand out: South Asia 

and East Africa. Based on the 2011 index, each has several states in the very weak 

and failing categories. 

In the case of South Asia, in 2010 it had the single highest aggregate regional 

index score. Six of its states—Afghanistan, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri 

Lanka, and Iran—were in the very weak and failing categories. In East Africa 

five states—Somalia, Sudan, Kenya, Ethiopia, and Uganda—likewise were ranked 

as very weak or failing. 

Finally, three other regions to include West, Southern, and Central Africa, 

Central Asia, and the Caucasus, all are populated by weak and very weak states, 

according to the 2011 Failed State Index. Ironically, the Middle East and North 

Africa, which because of the Arab Spring is seen by pundits as the cockpit of 

insurrection and instability, actually was ranked lower than these five regions in 

terms of state weakness.

The Failed State Index provides a macro level assessment of the strengths and 

weaknesses of 21st century states. What the 2011 appraisal finds, as reported above, 

is that weak, very weak, and failing states constitute a serious global challenge for 

the international community today and into the future. The following passage 

from that report highlights why this is seen to be the case: the “pressures on one 

fragile state can have serious repercussions not only for that state itself and its 

people, but also for its neighbors and other states halfway across the globe.”17 This 

is particularly the case when a weak state’s performance gaps, political tensions, 

and dysfunctional policies deteriorate into internal conflict and violence. This 

violence can spill over and spread outside the weak state, especially if internal 

conflict fosters transnational security threats that bring instability to the region 

in which it is located and beyond. 

The Failed State Index is not alone in such an assessment. Rather, it is illustrative of a considerable amount of research and analysis over the last decade that 

has resulted in similar findings.18 Moreover, these assessments generally agree 

that this environment, characterized by a large number of weak, very weak, and 

failing states will not wane any time soon. A decade into the 21st century, a pattern of irregular conflict can be clearly discerned. Understanding these trends is 

critical for the U.S. as these new security challenges are likely to persist well into 

the next decade of the 21st century. 

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2. Ungoverned/Alternatively Governed 

Territory

Following 9/11, an important factor frequently posited as both facilitating intrastate conflict within weak, very weak, and failing states, 

as well causing its regional spillover, was the access by armed groups to 

ungoverned territory within weak states’ borders. Such territory could be 

exploited as a safe haven in which indigenous armed groups evolve and 

mature. It could also be exploited by transnational extremists and international criminal enterprises who from these bases pose threats to regional 

stability and beyond. 

Geographical areas within the borders of weak states where government 

has diminished presence and where insurgents or other armed groups establish operational bases are not new. The starting point that Mao Zedong designated to initiate his classic strategy of protracted guerrilla warfare was to 

exploit remote territory as a base for organizing insurgent forces. Likewise, 

guerrillas in Latin America in the 1960s, following the strategy of the Cuban 

revolution, all dashed off to the mountains in hopes of emulating it. But few 

found success, and in the 1970s, Latin American revolutionaries refocused 

on urban terrain as an alternative, seeking to exploit the anonymity of cities.

In the 1990s, weak and failing states sparked growing international concern, especially when they devolved into humanitarian crises, ethnic cleansing, and genocide. But little attention was paid to assessing the bases from 

which armed groups involved in those calamities operated. 

Sanctuaries and Safe Havens

Concern over sanctuaries and safe havens changed in the aftermath of 9/11 for 

U.S. policymakers. Consider the Bush administration’s 2002 National Security 

Strategy. It warned that the U.S. would not “allow terrorists to develop new 

home bases ... We will seek to deny them sanctuary at every turn ... The 

events of September 11, 2001 taught us that weak states, like Afghanistan, can 

pose as great a danger to our national interests as strong states ... [because] 

poverty, weak institutions, and corruption make weak states vulnerable to terrorist networks and drug cartels within their borders.”19 Subsequent National 

Security Strategy documents in 2006 and 2010 concurred.
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In an assessment of national security threats facing the U.S. in 2003 and 

those on the horizon in 2004, Defense Intelligence Agency director Vice 

Admiral Lowell Jacoby expressed similar apprehension: “We are increasingly 

concerned over ‘Ungoverned Spaces,’ defined as geographic areas where 

governments do not exercise control. Terrorist groups and narco-traffickers 

use these areas as sanctuaries to train, plan and organize, relatively free from 

interference ... I believe these areas will play an increasingly important role 

in the War on Terrorism as al-Qaeda, its associated groups, and other terrorist organizations use these areas as bases for operations.”20 The Director 

of Central Intelligence, George Tenet, in his 2003 assessment of worldwide 

threats, likewise cautioned that in “the world’s vast stretches of ungoverned 

areas—lawless zones, veritable ‘no man’s lands’ like some areas along the 

Afghan-Pakistani border—extremist movements find shelter and can win 

the breathing space to grow.”21 Other senior officials from the administration 

concurred with these estimates, including Richard Haas, director of Policy 

Planning at the DOS.22

In 2003, initial analytic efforts from within the U.S. government attempted 

to delineate the features of ungoverned territory and to identify where it was 

located. For example, the National Intelligence Council produced “Possible 

Remote Havens for Terrorist and other Illicit Activity.” These potential sanctuaries were said to be in the world’s most desolate areas and to be “characterized by rugged terrain, thick vegetation cover, and suitable distance” 

from the security forces of government. International terrorists and other 

illicit actors were said to be “running rampant in many of these areas.” The 

study asserted that “international terrorist groups occupied chunks of remote 

territory in more than 20 countries,” while “more than 40 insurgencies were 

under way in remote parts of at least 20 countries.” And criminal enterprises 

“used such territory to skirt government authority.”23 

Employing geospatial modeling, a number of topographical maps were 

included to highlight states and regions with such territory. What was clear 

from these and other early descriptions, however, was the fact that understanding of ungoverned territory and safe havens was in its embryonic 

stage and lacked analytic nuance. While the areas assessed covered considerable remote territory and in some of those locations, various kinds of 

armed groups were exploiting governance and security gaps, missing were 

the details of what each had in common and how they differed. Moreover, 

there was little recognition that ungoverned territory could take more than 
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one form and present different kinds of security challenges. There was little 

consideration given to the possibility that urban terrain likewise could contain areas within it where governance and security were in sharp decline or 

nonexistent. That these areas could provide opportunities for illicit actors 

was not discerned. 

It soon became apparent that ungoverned territory was proving to be a 

more complicated and nuanced matter than initially portrayed in the public 

comments of government officials as well as in early analytic assessments. 

There was no single prototype of ungoverned territory but different variations of it. Likewise, the kinds of safe havens that ungoverned territory provided within weak states for both licit and illicit groups to exploit also varied 

considerably. 

Variations in Ungoverned Territory

Recognition of this complexity and its security implications began to be 

addressed in DOD-sponsored assessments appearing in 2007, followed by 

subsequent academic research efforts. With respect to the former, the Final 

Report of the Ungoverned Areas Project (hereafter the Lamb Report), prepared for the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, and the 

Rand Corporation’s Ungoverned Territories project, are illustrative of how 

analytic inquiry and more nuanced understanding evolved. Each found that 

“where the state’s presence is limited or largely absent, other non-state actors, 

both licit and illicit, will often seek to fill the void.” This was not uncommon 

in today’s world, each study noted, in light of the number of weak states that 

could “enable illicit actors to operate with impunity or evade detection or 

capture.”24 However, whether this was the case depended on the “circumstances that give rise to absent or ineffective governance.”25

Both assessments and subsequent ones sought to more concisely define 

the dimensions of ungoverned territory and to identify its different subtypes. 

While the focus of each was on ungoverned territory within fragile states, it 

should be noted that each also found that ungoverned spaces could also exist 

in developed countries as well. This included “Western liberal democracies, 

where illicit actors sometimes take advantage of ‘blind spots’ in governance 

capacity and political will, pockets of social discontent, geographical remoteness, or overcrowding” within large cities.26 Within the United States, for 

example, ungoverned space can be found in several major cities where illicit 
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gangs, some of which are part of trafficking networks extending through 

Mexico into Central America, take advantage of such blind spots. 

However, it was within weak and failing states that a larger number 

of non-state armed groups could be found taking advantage of declining 

government presence to establish safe havens to carry out illicit activities. 

Within these states, the Rand study identified three categories or subtypes of 

ungoverned territory—abdicated, incomplete, and contested—based on the 

extent to which state control was receding. The Lamb Report proposed a fivecategory typology—ungoverned, under-governed, misgoverned, contested, 

and exploitable areas. Other specialists devised yet other categorizations.27 

These delineations represented important efforts to distinguish various types 

of ungoverned territory within fragile states by specifying their distinctive 

characteristics.

As highlighted below, what differentiates each subtype from one another 

is the extent to which “the central government is unable or unwilling to 

extend control, effectively govern, or exert influence over the local population,” and where other actors, both licit or illicit, likewise do not have effective control, “due to inadequate capacity, insufficient political will, gaps in 

legitimacy, [or] the presence of political competition and conflict.”28 For 

the purposes of this study, ungoverned territory in fragile states is divided 

into four subtypes—abdicated, incomplete or under-governed, contested, 

and exploitable areas. 

Abdicated areas are present in weak or failing states when government 

has either given up or lost its capacity and political will to execute “governance functions.” The state’s institutions have either collapsed or withdrawn, 

and with them has gone the provision of security and other core public 

goods for the population. “All such ungoverned areas have the potential 

to become comprehensive safe havens,” according to the Lamb study, and 

many are exploited by indigenous and transnational non-state armed actors. 

For example, of the 13 states classified at the apex of the 2011 Failed State 

Index, each contains significant swathes of abdicated or ungoverned territory, 

with Somalia leading the way and Yemen not far behind. Moreover, of the 

13 states, ungoverned areas in 7 of them—Somalia, Sudan, the Democratic 

Republic of Congo, Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, and Yemen—have been 

exploited by indigenous armed groups, as well as by illicit transnational 

actors including criminal syndicates and radical Islamists.
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Incomplete or under-governed areas are regions where a state has some 

hold over its territory, but is deficient in ability to maintain strong and fully 

competent authority because of a lack of the “resources and capacity to do 

so.”29 While such governments have a degree of presence, competing nonstate actors challenge their reach, taking advantage of the situation to exploit 

governance and authority gaps. All such areas “have the potential to become 

partial safe havens,” notes the Lamb report, adding that at the present time, 

many of the safe havens of concern to the U.S. government “are in undergoverned areas that have been exploited by transnational illicit extremists.” But not all under-governed areas are exploited as safe havens by illicit 

non-state actors.30 Rather, indigenous 

groups to include tribes and clans may 

seek to fill the governance gap. In the 

Afghan-Pakistan border region, both 

types of non-state actors—indigenous 

and transnational—are attempting 

to do so. In other areas such as the 

600-mile border between Mexico and 

Guatemala, criminal cartels and gangs control considerable portions of the 

territory and the contraband that passes through it. The presence of border 

security forces is very limited with little capacity to stop the smuggling of 

people, drugs, and weapons that transit through illegal networks on the way 

to Mexico and the United States. And where they are present, border police 

often have either been corrupted or coerced by powerful criminal organizations. A porous border likewise exists between Venezuela and Colombia, 

and various armed groups have vied for control of the smuggling networks 

and illicit economy that dominates that region.

Contested areas are those places where indigenous groups “refuse to 

acknowledge the legitimacy of the government’s rule and pledge loyalty to 

some other form of social organization, such as an insurgent movement, 

a tribe or clan, or other identity group.”31 These non-state actors seek to 

facilitate arrangements with the local population by “performing some of 

the missing governance functions.” For example, “extremists may become 

the primary providers of education or social services as a way to spread their 

ideology and win popular support,” while other types of armed groups seek 

“to become the primary providers of security in an area.”32 The former does 

so to realize aspirations of independence such as insurgent and secessionist 

While such governments have a 

degree of presence, competing 

non-state actors challenge their 

reach, taking advantage of the 

situation to exploit governance 

and authority gaps.
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JSOU Report 13-5

movements. Examples include Islamists in the Mindanao region of the Philippines and separatists in Chechnya. Criminal organizations, on the other 

hand, seek to profit from illegal activities but do not have political aspirations. They only want to keep the state from interfering. Criminal syndicates 

in Mexico and Colombia are illustrative, as are criminal militias in several 

of the very weak states of Central and West Africa. 

Whereas abdicated, under-governed and contested territory all involves 

physical spaces within fragile states, this final category—exploitable areas—

does not. It constitutes the virtual area of the Internet and cyberspace. As 

with its three counterparts, it can “enable illicit actors to operate while evading detection or capture,” but it “exists not as a physically contiguous space 

... but as a network.”33 Non-state armed groups can exploit virtual space for 

operational, financial, or informational purposes. For example, operationally 

it has allowed actors like al-Qaeda to transform how they organize and fight. 

In Iraq, their underground apparatus was not a hierarchical but a horizontal 

collection of sometimes connected but often autonomous nodes that were 

joined together by information technologies. At that time, off-the-shelf information technology utilized by al-Qaeda to take advantage of virtual space 

included cellular phones and Internet communications through email and 

websites. These facilitated their deadly operations in ways different from 

those hierarchical armed groups that challenged states during the Cold War. 

International criminal syndicates likewise have taken advantage of virtual 

space to establish illicit financial networks.

While delineating the different variations of ungoverned space was an 

important step forward in advancing understanding of this emerging security challenge, two additional issues remained to be clarified: What are the 

different kinds of geographical space within ungoverned territory that can 

provide armed groups with the opportunity to establish a safe haven? What 

makes these different geographical spaces attractive or conducive for nonstate actors to exploit?

Rural, Urban and Maritime Sanctuaries

With respect to the different kinds of geographical space, attention to urban 

and maritime environments was added to the initial focus on remote rural 

and mountainous terrain. In the past, as noted above, regions that had little 

government presence were secluded territory characterized by rugged and 
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dense vegetation. These areas were considered ideal locations for armed 

groups’ sanctuary. And if that remote territory was near “undefined, illdefined, undefended, or disputed borders,” then it was even more attractive. 

But it could not be so remote that serviceable transportation and communication systems were completely unavailable to armed groups “for the simple 

reason that such infrastructure enables them to operate, even if it provides 

the central government access to such areas as well.”34 

The Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan are an 

archetypal example of a remote, rural safe haven where the central government has abdicated control and where licit and illicit actors vie for influence 

with local tribal populations. There is high tribal resistance to the Pakistani 

government and a set of social principles or tribal norms that have made 

the area attractive to a host of extremist groups to include the Afghan and 

Pakistan Taliban, the Haqqani Network, al-Qaeda, Islamist groups focused 

on Kashmir like Lashkar-e-Taibi, and criminal syndicates. 

While remote rural areas remain important, during the latter half of the 

20th century the world experienced a dramatic shift in population from the 

countryside to the urban milieu of cities and their surrounding environs. 

And, as one specialist has noted, “What makes this particularly important 

is that in the next few decades there will be more cities, more large cities, 

and more globally connected cities.”35 The number of cities with more than 

ten million inhabitants is projected to increase to “twenty-three by 2015 with 

nineteen of them in the developing world.”36 And cities with populations 

under ten but above one million will number over three hundred, with many 

also in the developing world.

Within a considerable number of these cities, many of which are located 

in weak states, there are “large slums that are often controlled by illicit actors 

and which are ‘no go’ areas for police.” Additionally, many have “shanty 

towns, refugee camps, and squatters’ villages” on their peripheries that 

likewise lack the presence of the government’s security forces.37 Consider 

Karachi; it is estimated that 40 percent of its population now live in slums, 

and those areas play host to various illicit groups like the Dawood Ibrahim 

criminal syndicate and Lashkar-e-Taibi, the Islamist organization responsible for terrorist attacks against targets in India including most notably 

that in Mumbai in 2008. Al-Qaeda has likewise taken advantage of Karachi.

These developments have turned Karachi, as well as Lagos, Johannesburg, 

Mexico City, and San Paulo, among others, into ideal locations for political 
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extremists, criminal syndicates, gangs, and other illicit actors. According 

to one specialist, given the high rate of unemployment and absence of government services, the populations of these cities “represent a ready source 

of recruits and a built-in intelligence network.”38 Finally, thanks to modern 

communications, non-state actors within these urban safe havens can network to coordinate their activities with counterparts in other parts of the 

weak state and beyond. 

Managing the irregular threats these armed groups pose has proven to 

be beyond the capacity of the police and security forces of many weak states. 

Richard Norton has observed that for fragile states “facing massive development challenges, even the military would be unequal to imposing legal 

order ... And while in other, more developed states it might be possible to 

use military force ... the cost would be extremely high, and the operation 

would be more likely to leave behind a field of rubble than a reclaimed and 

functioning population center.”39 Once armed groups gain control of urban 

territory, if they have the resources, they can acquire weapons and set up 

systems of control and defense that are very difficult for the security forces 

of the state to dislodge. 

A case in point was the situation the U.S. faced in Fallujah in 2004. In 

April of that year, the Marine command in Anbar province—I MEF—was 

told to take control of that city from the armed resistance. But part way into 

the assault, Washington issued a halt order and instructed the Marines to 

withdraw. Over the next six months, al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) was given a free 

hand in the city. Exploiting that opportunity, AQI moved with alacrity to 

take control of and build up its operational apparatus in Fallujah. To take 

charge, it eliminated any opposition to its authority through a brutal murder 

and intimidation campaign. During the next six months, AQI prepared 

Fallujah for the next Marine assault. They concentrated forces, built defenses, 

stockpiled weapons, and set up elaborate improvised explosive devices. 

To regain control of Fallujah required a major ground combat operation 

by Marine-Army forces with plenty of air support. While successful, the city 

suffered extensive damage and required considerable rebuilding. In Brazil, 

violent criminal gangs involved in the drug trade have taken control of large 

shanty towns that are a part of Sao Palo and Rio. The Brazilian government 

has adopted a containment policy which frequently involves pitched battles 

between police, traffickers, and criminal gangs.
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Over the last decade, the maritime environment has emerged as another 

location in which the inability of governments to monitor activities in their 

littorals and coastal areas has provided opportunities for criminal syndicates 

and autonomous pirate gangs to exploit. To do so, these illicit actors must 

take control of a portion of territory adjacent to a maritime area that can 

serve as a base from which to operate. That area must provide access to their 

targets—commercial shipping and maritime commerce. 

For example, pirates have emerged along the Somalia coast and Horn of 

Africa region where they threaten international shipping. According to one 

report, “at least 219 attacks occurred in this region in 2010, with 49 successful hijackings. Somali pirates have attacked ships in the Gulf of Aden, along 

Somalia’s eastern coastline, and outward into the Indian Ocean. Pirates 

now operate as far east as the Maldives in good weather, and as far south as 

the Mozambique Channel.”40 As a result of these developments, NATO has 

implemented several measures to address the piracy challenge in the Horn, 

resulting in a significant downturn in incidents.41 Some specialists believe 

there are links between Somali pirates and the al-Qaeda associated jihad 

group al-Shabaab. While those linkages are murky, what is clear is that 

attacks by pirates in this region are linked to Somalia’s lack of a functioning government. This provides them with freedom of action and bases from 

which to operate. 

Pirates likewise have emerged off the coast of West Africa in the region 

that encompasses the Gulf of Guinea. This area is second only to the Horn 

in terms of attacks on commercial shipping. Since 2009, attacks on tankers, 

barges, oil-industry vessels, and even oil platforms have involved robberies, 

kidnapping of crews, and hijacking of vessels. It appears that those carrying 

out these actions are more diverse when compared to their Horn of Africa 

counterparts. They include insurgents, crime cartels, and pirate gangs, all 

of which have the capacity to operate at sea. One example of the former is 

the MEND, which claims to be fighting on behalf of the people of the Delta. 

It steals crude oil and sells it to vessels at sea. Oil and other illicit economic 

opportunities have spawned other actors in the region to include autonomous pirate gangs who operate across the region from bases in the Delta. 

The direct and secondary cost of piracy to international commerce in the 

region includes rising “insurance rates, ransoms, self-protection measures, 

ship rerouting, naval operations, and piracy prosecutions,” as well as the 
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“macroeconomic impact on regional trade, on the region’s tourism and fishing industries, and on food prices.”42

Other ungoverned maritime territory attractive to illicit actors can be 

found north of the Gulf of Guinea in the Bijagos Archipelago of GuineaBissau. Consisting of over 80 islands (many of which are not populated), 

islets, and coastal inlets, little governmental control exists over this large 

maritime area. As noted earlier, the archipelago is attractive as an entry 

point for the trans-shipment of Latin American drugs bound for Europe. 

Guinea-Bissau is part of a trafficking network that includes Cape Verde, Mali, 

Benin, Togo, and Ghana. Drugs from Colombia and Peru, which often transit 

through Brazil, are shipped across the Atlantic and enter Africa through 

these countries. According to the African Economic Development Institute, 

nearly two thirds of all cocaine on the way from South America to Europe 

passes through this region. These are all weak states, the report notes, “where 

government laws [and authority] are easily evaded. The areas’ high level of 

corruption makes effective law enforcement difficult to occur ... Drug traffickers are able to pay for their safety by recruiting policemen, army officers 

and cabinet ministers.”43 

Conduciveness of Ungoverned Territory

The inability or unwillingness of a weak state’s political authorities to effectively perform the core functions of governance beginning with providing 

security to its population, while necessary, may not be sufficient for that 

territory to be exploited as a safe haven by a terrorist, insurgent, or criminal group. Additional conditions have to be present to make it favorable for 

exploitation. The Rand study on ungoverned territory describes these conditions as conducive “environmental factors [that] allow terrorists and insurgent groups to flourish” in abdicated, under-governed or contested areas.44 

These include the extent to which armed groups are able to gain either the 

support of or coercive control over the local population. Intrastate conflict in 

weak states is population-centric “war amongst the people,” as Rupert Smith 

explains, in that it “can take place ... in the presence of civilians, against 

civilians, in defense of civilians.”45 Consequently, armed groups may seek 

to gain the support or loyalty of the local population by engaging in a range 

of activities including provision of social programs and information operations. In these cases, support of the local population is gained through the 

achievement of legitimacy. 
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In the past, this approach has been taken by both ideological and identitybased insurgent movements. Their strategy has sought to undermine the 

legitimacy of the regime or intervening power, while simultaneously seeking 

to increase their own legitimacy with and support of the local population. 

The extent to which insurgents are able to address the local populations’ 

political, economic, and social grievances, the more likely they are to have 

the opportunity to establish a safe haven. In other words, if they can take 

advantage of areas “where there are grievances against the regime and/or 

a preexisting state of communal conflict,” then that territory will be more 

receptive to penetration and establishment of a safe haven.46 And it will 

provide an opportunity to recruit personnel that can carry out the insurgent 

organization’s different operational and administrative activities.

Other armed groups establish safe havens within abdicated, under-governed, or contested territory by enforcing coercive control over the local 

authorities and population. For example, criminal organizations typically 

seek to maintain dominance over local public officials through the use of 

violence, corruption, graft, or extortion. As for the indigenous population, 

in addition to the threat of force, their acquiescence can also be gained by 

providing illicit employment opportunities as an alternative to privation. 

This is the pattern followed by the drug cartels in Colombia and the Andean 

Ridge region since the late 1980s. 

Extremist organizations also use force to gain coercive control over populations in territories in which they seek to establish sanctuary. For example, 

notes the Lamb report, “classic terrorism strategy” employs intimidation 

and violence “to attack civilians, not only to demonstrate that the state is too 

weak to protect them, but also to provoke the state into overreacting in a way 

that creates further civilian casualties; this tends to generate a sense among 

the population that the state is not merely weak but malicious as well.”47

For abdicated, under-governed, or contested territory to be conducive 

as a safe haven requires that it provide access to financial resources either 

from internal or external sources. All armed groups need funds to support 

their activities. Consequently, if an area contains a high value commodity 

like drugs, oil, precious stones, or other mineral resources that the armed 

group can exploit, then that territory will be seen as conducive for establishing a base. In such situations, an illicit actor directly exploits the indigenous 

commodity by controlling its export distribution. For example, the Taliban 

have been able to profit from poppy production in Afghanistan by doing so. 
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They have the power to insert themselves into the process. According to the 

RAND study, “groups can trade these commodities themselves, as in the case 

of the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone and ‘conflict diamonds,’ 

or they can protect and tax them, which is the preferred approach of the 

Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia with the cocaine industry.”48

If an ungoverned area serves as a transit point through which illicit goods 

pass, it can also become a source of financial largesse that an illicit group 

exploits, making it a favorable location for a sanctuary. In return for providing “security” to the trafficker to insure safe passage through the territory, 

the armed group receives remuneration. For example, Hezbollah has over 

the years benefited financially from drug traffickers transiting through the 

Bekaa Valley to Israel and Arab countries. They pay a transit fee to Hezbollah to access these markets.

An ungoverned area is also conducive to serving as a safe haven if financial 

resources flow into it from an external actor including Diasporas, immigrant 

communities in third countries that retain identity ties to their homeland. It 

is not uncommon for ethnic and communal communities that have migrated 

to another country to hold onto a strong sense of identity with the land 

of their origins. When kinship back home is engaged in violent conflict, 

the Diaspora, or elements within it, become committed to providing support to their brethren fighting to defend the homeland. A synergy develops between the armed element fighting in the homeland and the Diaspora 

located abroad. The relationship between Tamil communities in Canada, 

Great Britain, France, and Australia, and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil 

Eelam (LTTE) insurgents fighting in Sri Lanka until recently was illustrative. The Tamil Diaspora became a financier of the LTTE. Another external 

source, although a politically contentious one, is that of various charities 

and particularly religious ones. Nevertheless, since 9/11 a recurring theme 

with respect to the issue of extremist group financing has been the role of 

charitable organizations.49

Wealthy individuals likewise can funnel funds to the safe havens of 

armed groups, making the area attractive as a sanctuary. For example, the 

Rand study notes that in the 1990s, a “prominent medical practitioner living 

in California is known to have pledged $4 million to the LTTE ... making 

him the single most important contributor to the group.” According to one 

LTTE official, “We ask and he gives. [He] is our financial God.”50 Likewise, 

the bipartisan National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United 
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States highlights the fact that al-Qaeda established an informal financial network of wealthy Saudi and other Gulf individuals who in the 1990s provided 

funds to establish an infrastructure of bases and capabilities in Afghanistan. 

It was from that safe haven that al-Qaeda planned and executed global strikes 

against the United States.51

Finally, for an abdicated, under-governed, or contested territory to function as a safe haven, “the existence of adequate infrastructure” is needed 

that permits an armed group to “perform basic functions. The elements of 

such an infrastructure include (1) communications facilities, (2) an official 

or unofficial banking system that allows for the transfer of funds, and (3) 

a transportation network that provides access to urban centers and potential external targets.”52 All armed groups require some minimal access to 

each of these, beginning with the capacity to communicate for operational, 

informational, and networking purposes. This can be accomplished through 

traditional telephone systems, cell phone service, or Internet connectivity. 

Illicit groups likewise not only need to be able to generate revenue, as was 

noted above, but require the ability to move those funds. Finally, the safe 

haven must provide some capacity to travel in and out of the sanctuary to 

reach targets, move supplies, and transport personnel. 

To summarize, weak, very weak, and failing states, to varying degrees, 

are unable to control all their territory within their borders. This lack of a 

security presence and authority can take various forms and involves both 

physical space—abdicated, under-governed, and contested territory—as 

well as the virtual space of the Internet. As illustrated above, each of these 

areas in fragile states has been exploited as sanctuaries and safe havens for 

operational, financial, or informational purposes by various indigenous and 

transnational illicit actors. 

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3. Changing Patterns of Conflicts

To what extent do post-Cold War and post-9/11 intrastate conflict patterns correlate with state weakness and ungovernability? Do these conflict trends foster optimism or pessimism about the extent to which intrastate 

violence and instability will occur over the next decade? And how will the 

answer to these questions affect the decision by the U.S. government to “of 

necessity rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region,” as stated in the new 

Defense Strategic Guidance document that then Secretary of Defense Leon 

Panetta released in January 2012? 

That decision is premised on the assumption that the area stretching 

from Middle East and North Africa through South and Central Asia will 

no longer constitute a cockpit of instability threatening vital U.S. interests 

as it has since the end of the Cold War and in the shadow of 9/11. According 

to the logic of the pivot to the Pacific, the end of the Afghan engagement 

in 2014 will be accompanied by a reduction of the U.S. presence across this 

area where Washington has been heavily engaged managing irregular and 

transnational threats to its interests for more than two decades. But is it a 

prudent supposition that an area that will surely remain in violent turmoil 

will no longer necessitate considerable U.S. attention? Or will the U.S. find 

that fragile states across an area stretching from Mali through Pakistan and 

north into Central Asia will inevitably draw it back in? 

If the latter is the case, would it not make sense to follow the advice of 

former Secretary Gates and prepare to focus on small advisory missions that 

are mainly preventative in scope and have as their objective building local 

security force capacity and accountability in fragile states? These missions 

aim to address the origins of weakness before it generates violent instability 

that might spread from local to regional levels. There may also be a need for 

larger missions to address situations where instability and armed conflict is 

taking place. In these circumstances a limited U.S. force deploys to assist a 

host nation to establish security, stability, and law and order. Should these 

contingencies receive a high priority? Before answering these questions, it 

is necessary to examine the patterns of intrastate conflict during the period 

since the end of the Cold War and to consider what those trends proffer for 

the next decade. 
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Starting in the 1990s scholars began observing that a detectable shift 

in the patterns of conflict and war were taking place. Interstate wars were 

sharply declining while intrastate conflicts were burgeoning. Consider the 

findings of K.J. Holsti for the period 1946-1995. He divided war into three 

categories based on the type of actors involved. The first was “standard state 

versus state wars and major armed intervention.” The former included the 

1962 war between China and India and the 1973 battle pitting Israel against 

several of its Arab neighbors, while the U.S. intervention in Vietnam and 

the Soviet attack into Afghanistan were cited as illustrative of the later. The 

second category consisted of intrastate clashes and involved “state-nation 

wars including armed resistance by ethnic and religious groups, often with 

the purpose of separation.” The Balkans secessionist movements of the 1990s, 

the Tamils in Sri Lanka, and Kurdish factions in northern Iraq were all cited 

as examples. Each sought to break away from the state in which they were 

located. Finally, the third category included yet other intrastate struggles 

that pitted ideological movements against regimes they sought to change. 

These included Sendero Luminoso in Peru, the Farabundo Martí National 

Liberation Front in El Salvador, and the Armed Islamic Group (later the 

Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat) in Algeria.53

For the period 1946-1995, Holsti found that “77 percent of the 164 wars 

[that took place] were internal,” pitting non-state actors in “armed combat 

... against the authorities within the state.”54 Accounting for this shift away 

from interstate warfare, he explained, was the fact that “in many areas of 

the world, the state is not the same as the community it encompasses.” In 

such situations, the state lacks legitimacy, resulting in clashes “over different 

conceptions of community and how those conceptions should be reflected in 

political arrangements and organizations.”55 These differences, which were 

increasingly being played out by force and violence, were “not about foreign 

policy, security, honor or status,” but were “about statehood, governance, 

and the role and status of nations and [identity] communities within them.” 

In sum, the main causes of war, Holsti concluded, were no longer due to 

disagreements between states but the result of “domestic politics” and the 

dysfunctional nature of political community within the state.56

This escalation in the number of intrastate conflicts during 1946-1995 was 

also characterized by a proliferation in the types of non-state actors challenging the state. Theodor Winkler, reflecting on those developments, observed 

that sub-state actors were becoming more diverse and multifarious: “If in the 
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past guerrilla groups and national liberation movements largely dominated 

the picture” during the Cold War. In its aftermath, he found many “different 

sub-state actors” including “ethnically-based militias, guerrilla or terrorist organizations, clans, tribes, warlords, organized communal groups and 

criminal gangs,” the latter of which could traffic in “human beings as easily 

as in small arms, drugs, blood diamonds, tropical woods, and any other commodity that sells.”57 Others adopted the term “armed groups” to describe an 

array of post-Cold War non-state actors who employed IW tactics to attack 

states as well as one another. They proposed an “armed groups taxonomy 

consisting of four sub-types: insurgents, terrorists, militias, and criminal 

organizations,” but cautioned that in “the real world these distinctions are 

not so static or long lasting.” Rather, they found: 

... the opposite is more likely. For example, at one point an armed 

group may be classified as a terrorist organization based on its 

operational and organizational profile, while at another point it 

morphs into a militia or criminal enterprise. In other instances, an 

armed group can simultaneously be described as fitting into more 

than one of the four subtypes. In other words, at the same time it 

can correspond to a terrorist organization and a criminal enterprise 

or some other combination.58

Based on these findings, Holsti concluded that armed conflict in “the 

early years of the next millennium will not be war between states, but wars 

about and within states.”59 Other academic specialists concurred,60 but scholars were not alone in drawing such conclusions about the contemporary 

conditions and future course of conflict. 

In 1997, the commandant of the Marine Corps, General Charles Krulak, 

in a speech at the National Press Club in Washington, warned that conflict 

and war in the future would be different from the conventional contingencies the Pentagon was preparing to fight at that time. Titling his speech 

“Not like Yesterday,” he counseled that this conventional mind-set could 

lead to military misfortunes: “Our enemies will not allow us to fight the son 

of Desert Storm, but they will try to draw us into the stepchild of Chechnya ... Our most dangerous enemies will challenge us asymmetrically [and 

unconventionally] in ways against which we are least able to bring strength 

to bear—as we witnessed in the slums of Mogadishu.”61 At the time, General 

Krulak was considered way out of step with his Pentagon counterparts. Those 
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irregular fights were considered at best tertiary security matters—internal 

disturbances, criminal enterprises, or ethnic group rivalries—of little consequence for those U.S. security institutions responsible for the conduct of 

warfare, diplomacy, and intelligence.62

The conflicts Krulak saw emerging in the 1990s burgeoned in the years 

following 9/11. As they did, other former general officers began drawing 

similar conclusions. Consider General Rupert Smith, Deputy Supreme Allied 

Commander Europe from 1998 to 2001. During his career in the British 

Army, he was trained to fight 20th-century “interstate industrialized war.” 

But in the Cold War’s aftermath, General Smith had to deal with conflicts 

that diverged considerably from that standard in Northern Ireland, Bosnia, 

and Kosovo. Then he witnessed the 9/11 attacks, the wars in Afghanistan and 

Iraq, and al-Qaeda’s transnational operations. In his 2006 book, The Utility 

of Force: The Art of War in the Modern Age, he contended that important 

changes had “undoubtedly occurred: from armies with comparable forces 

doing battle to a strategic confrontation between a range of combatants 

... using different types of weapons, often improvised.” “War amongst the 

people” replaced 20th-century conventional war. Critical to making sense 

of this new state of affairs was realization that wars between nation-states, 

all too common in the 20th century, were becoming anomalies.63 

At the policy level, the Bush administration came to endorse a version 

of this assessment in the aftermath of 9/11 as it believed itself engaged with 

rising levels of Islamist political violence in what came to term a “global war 

on terror.” In the decade that followed this resulted in major interventions in 

Afghanistan and Iraq, operations against extremist sanctuaries in Pakistan, 

Yemen, Somalia, and elsewhere, and a significant increase in SFA to nations 

seen as threatened by al-Qaeda and its associated movements. Within this 

evolving conflict environment, new or reignited armed conflicts associated 

with Islamist political violence, in conjunction with the major fights in Iraq 

and Afghanistan, and the operations against the previously identified sanctuaries painted a picture of long-term protracted irregular conflict with no 

early end state in sight.

But there was no unanimity over these conclusions. In the late 1990s 

and immediate years following 9/11 analysts utilizing macro-level quantitative research measures of global conflict trends raised questions about the 

pessimism that was implicit in the above assessments of post-Cold War 

and post-9/11 conflict trends and of the U.S. government’s security policies 
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upon which they were based. These specialists, who generally were from 

the development community and associated with international and nongovernmental organizations found in their analysis that those conflicts that 

were taking place were less deadly and in terms of the number taking place 

were not on the rise. In terms of early 21st century instability and intrastate 

conflict trends they found cause for optimism. 

For example, a 2003 a study by Eriksson, Wallensteen, and Sollenberg—

Armed Conflict, 1989-2002—found that based on a statistical dataset compiled under auspices of the International Peace Research Institute in Oslo 

and Uppsala University that overall the numbers of armed conflicts taking 

place globally had been decreasing significantly between 1989 and 2002. They 

divided conflict during that period into the following categories:

•	 Interstate Armed Conflict - Occurs between two or more states

•	 Internationalized Intrastate Armed Conflict - Occurs between the 

government of a state and internal armed opposition groups with 

outside intervention from other states

•	 Intrastate Armed Conflict - Occurs between the government of a State 

and internal armed opposition groups without intervention from other 

states

While the data in Table 1 (following page) illustrates that “most of the 

conflicts in 2002 were internal,” which is consistent with the findings above, 

it also reveals a decline in their occurrence during the period. According to 

the authors: “During the 1989-2002 period, there were 116 armed conflicts 

in 79 locations around the world. In 2002, there were 31 conflicts active in 

24 places, both figures being lower than in 2001.”64 In fact, 2002 was the 

lowest year for the occurrence of intrastate conflict since the collapse of 

communism.

Additionally, Eriksson, Wallensteen, and Sollenberg found that the lethality of those conflicts that took place during the period 1989-2002 was also 

declining when they were broken down and categorized in terms of the 

number of battle-related deaths. To categorize lethality the following three 

subsets were used:

•	 Minor Armed Conflict - At least 25 battle-related deaths per year and 

fewer than 1,000 battle-related deaths during the course of the conflict
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•	 Intermediate Armed Conflict - At least 25 battle-related deaths per 

year and an accumulated total of at least 1,000 deaths, but fewer than 

1,000 in any given year

•	 War - At least 1,000 battle-related deaths per year

As Table 2 depicts, conflicts in which 1,000 or more died per year 

“decreased significantly from 11 to 5 in 2002.” Moreover, this decline was 

even more noteworthy when compared with the initial post-Cold War years 

when as many as 20 took place. As for intermediate and minor armed conflicts, from the latter 1990s through 2001 they remained less than 15 each 

annually with the former consisting of one to four more than the latter. Only 

in 2002 did intermediate conflicts exceed 15.

These findings generated a significant controversy over whether the 

post-9/11 international security environment was characterized by rising or 

declining intrastate conflict and transnational terrorism. Earlier this study 

highlighted how senior U.S. officials asserted that the former was the case. 

However, other specialists, like those just cited, who approach the analysis of 

global and regional trends in armed conflict from human security and development perspectives, did not concur. Subsequently, independent research 

centers and organizations that initiated major efforts to assess global and 

regional trends in organized violence, their causes and consequences, drew 

similar conclusions.

An illustrative example is the Human Security Report Project which since 

2005 has produced four major studies analyzing global and regional conflict 

trends through the support of the foreign and development ministries of 

the governments of Great Britain, Canada, Sweden, Norway, and Switzerland. Beginning in 2005, these studies claimed to document “a dramatic, but 

largely unknown, decline in the number of wars, genocides and human rights 

abuse over the previous decade.” Moreover, they found that wars were “not 

only far less frequent today, but are also far less deadly.” These trends were 

said to “confound conventional wisdom” and to “explode a number of widely 

believed myths about contemporary political violence” including the “claims 

that terrorism is currently the gravest threat to international security.”65 

So striking were these findings that former United Nations SecretaryGeneral Kofi Annan declared in the forward to the Human Security Report 

2009/2010 that “while global media reporting continues to create the 

impression that we live in an ever-more violent world, the reality behind 
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JSOU Report 13-5

the headlines is quite different. The world has become much less insecure 

over the past 20 years. This study provides the first comprehensive analysis 

of this remarkable change.”66 In addition to international media accounts, 

these findings were also at odds with much of U.S. national security policy 

during the timeframe in which these reports were released. 

Recall that during this period both the public discourse of senior U.S. officials and assessments contained in two QDRs, the Quadrennial Diplomacy 

and Development Review (QDDR) and several other notable directives and 

initiatives drew very different conclusions about global and regional armed 

conflict trends. They saw the challenges posed by weak and failing states as 

part of a transforming international security environment in which non-state 

armed groups were mushrooming in number and in the capacity to cause 

major geopolitical damage in their own territory and beyond through the 

use of irregular and unconventional means. Moreover, these intrastate and 

transnational conflicts were not seen as declining but persisting. 

If in fact the findings of the Human Security Reports accurately capture 

the patterns of 21st century conflict and instability, then this would have 

important implications for U.S. security policy in general, as well as for 

SOF requirements as they relate to SFA and SSR initiatives. However, before 

addressing those issues, an examination and evaluation of the key findings 

and conclusions of the Human Security Report 2009/2010 are warranted.

With respect to conflict trends, the report concurs with the findings first 

documented by Holsti in the 1990s. “The overwhelming majority of armed 

conflicts today are now fought within states” and involve “the government 

of a state and one or more non-state armed group.” On occasion, these intrastate or civil conflicts may take on an international dimension in that “the 

armed forces of another state may support one of the warring parties.”67 This 

trend can be seen in Figure 1. 

However, the findings depicted in the graph also challenge “the commonly held assumption that [intrastate] armed conflict around the world 

has become more widespread.” To the contrary, what the data reveals is that 

the number of intrastate conflicts—those between the government of a state 

and internal armed opposition groups—has declined sharply since the end 

of the Cold War. Even though “that decline stopped in 2003, and ... by 2008 

had gone up by nearly 25 percent ... there are too few years of data to determine whether we are seeing a sustained reversal of the dramatic downward 

trend since the end of the Cold War.” They attribute this increase between 
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2004 and 2008 to “conflicts associated with Islamist political violence and 

the so-called War on Terror.”68

However, even with this increase, the report finds that intrastate conflicts 

as a whole “have become dramatically less deadly,” corresponding with the 

trend reported above by Eriksson, Wallensteen, and Sollenberg.69 This is 

because the number of intrastate conflicts with at least 25 but fewer than 

1,000 battle-related deaths during the course of a year had continued to 

increase beyond 2002, when their findings ended. Consider Figure 2 below.
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JSOU Report 13-5

“The core message that emerges from more than six decades of battledeath data,” note the authors of the Human Security Report 2009/2010, is 

that “warfare has become progressively less deadly.” While it is the case 

that conflict numbers have increased between 2004 and 2008, “the striking, though very uneven, long-term decline in the deadliness of state-based 

conflict has not been reversed.”70 As can be seen in the graph, from the late 

1980s to the latter 1990s, battle deaths declined significantly, spiked back up 

around 1998-1999, and then again dropped precipitously. As a result, by 2008 

there was “less than one-fifth of the toll in 1999.”71 Since 2001, the regions 

that have been “largely responsible for the increase in conflict numbers” are 

Central and South Asia due to “new or resurgent conflicts in Afghanistan, 

Pakistan, and Sri Lanka, as well as in India and Georgia.” This was followed 

by the Middle East and North Africa, where the “number of conflicts doubled 

between 2002 and 2005—going from three to six.”72

Based on these findings, the report’s authors were optimistic given that 

the long term decline in intrastate conflict and the decrease in the risk and 

the lethality of war. “The trend to smaller wars, which has meant fewer battle 

deaths per conflict, shows few signs of being reversed ... While the future 

remains impossible to predict, and will surely deliver some unpleasant surprises as it has in the past, there are no obvious countervailing system-level 

forces that appear powerful enough to reverse the positive effects of the 

trends we have identified.”73

But not all those who study the causes, sources, and nature of conflict 

agreed with these conclusions. They do not deem that intrastate discord 

among state and non-state actors is declining for several reasons. For example, Jack Snyder argues that the data employed to draw these deductions is 

too short term to generalize at this level, contending that “it is inappropriate to extrapolate from short-term trends.” Moreover, the data on battledeaths “used to demonstrate that the deadliness of war is declining ignores 

one-sided violence—the intentional killing of civilians by governments and 

non-state armed groups.” That data discounts “indirect deaths—i.e., fatalities 

from war-exacerbated disease and malnutrition.”74

Other specialists doubt the assessments found in studies like the Human 

Security Report 2009/2010 based on their analyses of the causes and underlying conditions that foster irregular conflict. From this perspective, conflict 

is viewed as more complex, and predictions based on the ebb and flow in the 

number of cases in conjunction with battle deaths is misleading. According 
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to Hewitt, for example, intrastate conflicts is said to encompass a “myriad of 

factors, many of which are difficult to measure” and “depends on the type 

of conflict we analyze, the particular attributes of conflict, and whether our 

focus relates to global patterns or regional breakdowns.”75 

Consider those failing, very weak, and weak states found in the 2011 Failed 

State Index noted earlier. Of the top 13 failing, 22 very weak, and 73 weak 

states, less than a third would find their way into those studies counting 

the number of annual intrastate conflicts determined on the basis of battle 

deaths. This kind of appraisal fails to take into consideration the underlying 

nature of population-centric irregular conflict. To varying degrees, based 

on the political and social conditions fostering weakness in those states, 

their indigenous populations will hold deep-seated grievances with those 

ruling elites in power. Indeed, in many of these fragile states, whether democratic, authoritarian, or somewhere in between, there is a protracted struggle 

going on over political, social, and cultural values and visions. On one side 

are those who embrace human rights, democratic values, and the need for 

change. On the other side are leaders and groups with very different perspectives that seek to maintain the status quo. In effect, there is a competitive 

political contest taking place—a struggle over values and visions—in which 

one side seeks legitimacy through the promotion of democratic principles 

and other actors that seek control through the antithesis of those principles. 

Internal cleavages based on deep seated grievances found in failing, very 

weak, and weak states are not easily resolved. These are psychological factors 

that also are not easily measured in quantitative studies like those above. 

Consider the Human Security Report 2009/2010 assessment of the Middle 

East and North Africa. It concluded that “notwithstanding the much-publicized invasion of Lebanon by Israel in 2006, and the ongoing war in Iraq, 

conflict numbers have declined ... since the early 1980s.”76 As noted above, 

such data trends could lead to the conclusion that not only has there been a 

decline in intrastate conflict in the Middle East and North Africa, but that 

this trend is not likely to be reversed. Consequently, concludes the 2009/2010 

report, “No obvious countervailing system-level forces appear powerful 

enough to reverse the positive effects of the trends identified.”77

But just a few years later, the Middle East and North Africa was turned 

upside down by violent and nonviolent movements that caused change in 

several regimes that were seen as invulnerable. What happened there can 

be explained by the internal dynamics of those states. Unrepresentative and 
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authoritarian elites, serious levels of corruption, unaccountable and repressive security institutions, and weak public services caused acute legitimacy 

and capacity gaps that had the potential to generate such challenges to state 

authority for many years. This is precisely what happened in six states that 

are part of the Arab Spring. For decades, a political struggle was taking place 

beneath the surface over values and visions, but those states maintained 

coercive control through powerful security agencies.

What this suggests is that a range of political, religious, and cultural differences exists in fragile states, which can result in violent and nonviolent 

challenges to state authority without clear indicators of early warning. These 

population-centric conflicts frequently involve an array of different nonstate actors who challenge the legitimacy and authority of the state. Some 

of these actors embrace rule of law, human rights, and democratic values, 

while others hold very different and often extremist or criminal perspectives. 

The former can take the form of movements that seek legitimacy and change 

through the promotion of democratic principles, while the latter groups seek 

control through the antithesis of those principles. 

In such cases, human agency factors are at play. Individuals and groups 

exercise their capacity for acting freely and challenge the authority of the 

larger political system. Individuals take part in a range of activities that 

may cause a potentially high risk situation that has been dormant for a 

long period of time to burgeon into a violent 

or nonviolent challenge to state authority. Thus, 

human agency trumps the political structures 

of regimes that have been seen as impervious 

to such challenges.

In the above assessments of how to estimate the vulnerability of fragile states to internal instability and conflict, we see the classic 

debate between structure and agency. In the 

case of the former, illustrated in the discussion 

of the findings of studies like the Human Security Report 2009/2010, conclusions are drawn from statistical data collected by national or international 

organizations. Those statistics are said to reveal identifiable trends in intrastate conflict as described above. But what those findings do not assess are 

agency factors, the capacity of internal challenges to state authority, and 

legitimacy generated by people. 

But what those findings 

do not assess are agency factors, the capacity 

of internal challenges 

to state authority, and 

legitimacy generated by 

people.
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If we take the Arab Spring states as a case in point, there appears to have 

been an implicit assumption that the downturn in internal instability in the 

region was due to the decades-long capacity of state security institutions to 

maintain coercive control in these states. As in the 1990s when dictatorships 

gave way to reform and democratic change across the developing world, the 

authoritarian regimes of the greater Middle East remained impervious to 

such change or reform. Indeed, as late as 2009, this was explained by specialists of the region as due to the fact that “the security sector constitutes the 

backbone of Arab political systems. Any discussion on reforming this sector 

exposes the systems’ inner vulnerability as well as their self-defense mechanisms.”78 Studies by Mehran Kamrava, Eva Bellin, Barry Rubin, and Risa 

Brooks all concluded that powerful security machineries provided the means 

for these robust authoritarian regimes to maintain power for decades.79 But 

the events beginning in early 2011 proved this not to be the case. 

Likewise, the Human Security Report 2009/2010 found that the end of 

the Cold War brought about “a dramatic decline in the number of armed 

conflicts in the Americas, many of which had been exacerbated by the East/

West tensions.”80 However, in the territory extending from Mexico into 

the Andes, criminal syndicates and gangs are challenging the authority of 

national governments through violence and corruption not captured in the 

estimates of intrastate conflict. This is because these illicit actors do not seek 

to overthrow the state and take power. Rather, their goal is to keep it weak so 

that they can carry out their criminal activities unimpeded. In doing so, they 

undermine the promotion of good governance and rule of law in these states. 

In sum, such assessments do not take into consideration the fact that 

many of the fragile states that exists today—both democratic and authoritarian—are vulnerable to internal instability and the outbreak of conflict. This 

is because highly contentious politics are at play within their borders. As 

noted above, there are many political struggles taking place today in fragile 

states over competing values and visions. An alternative was to understand 

the significance of this political context and its implications for U.S. regional 

interests and security is to assess contemporary states by their type of government and level of performance.81 

According to Freedom House, of the nearly 200 states included in its 

2009 survey, more than half can be classified as democracies.82 But only a 

minority constitute stable liberal democracies that “protect the civil rights 

and political liberties of their citizens and have a high degree of the rule of 
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JSOU Report 13-5

law.”83 Numbering less than 40, these include the states of Western Europe, 

the United States, Canada, Australia, and Japan. Liberal democracies are also 

described as strong states in terms of their ability to maintain a monopoly 

over the legitimate use of force, to control their territory, and to provide the 

core functions of good governance to their citizens.

What this means is that over 50 of the rest of the world’s democratic states 

are weak or very weak. Many of them face internal and external challenges 

to their territorial integrity and struggle to perform core functions for all 

their citizens. These states are vulnerable to political challenges to their 

legitimacy. Weak democracies are diverse as can be seen in the following 

examples selected from the 2009 Freedom House survey—Botswana, Brazil, 

Colombia, El Salvador, Georgia, Guatemala, Indonesia, Mexico, Peru, Senegal, and South Africa. Weak democracies also include those in the process 

of political transition such as the states of Eastern Europe and the former 

Soviet Union. 

While some weak democracies may aspire to become liberal democracies, 

many of them do not uphold the rule of law or apply it consistently to all of 

their populations. Others may have nascent institutions and processes that 

do not protect civil liberties and therefore do not receive the full consent of 

all sectors of their population. Still others suffer from considerable degrees 

of official corruption. Weak democracies are often unable to maintain a 

monopoly of the legitimate use of force, control their territory, or perform 

the core function of the provision of human security. In weak democracies, 

human security is frequently at risk. Consequently, many weak democracies are vulnerable to political challenges to their legitimacy by groups and 

movements who may use either violence or civil resistance to do so.

There are approximately 70 states in the world with authoritarian governments according to Freedom House.84 Some of these states, notably China, 

Russia, and Iran, are strong not because they have high degrees of legitimacy 

with their populations, but because they retain powerful internal security 

institutions that are not constrained by the rule of law. These authoritarian states derive their power to rule from strong institutions of coercion, 

and maintenance of a monopoly of force within their borders. Less than 20 

authoritarian states worldwide meet these criteria. 

Therefore, the majority of the authoritarian states today are weak, very 

weak, and in some cases failing. Both their coercive internal security institutions and competence to perform core functions of government are severely 
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limited. Moreover, corruption runs deep. Not only do these states lack legitimacy, they are also vulnerable to challenges from armed groups and civil 

resistance movements who may be perceived as being more legitimate than 

the state. 

By definition, these weak states have limited resources to counter political 

challenges to their regimes. And when their weakness in basic governance 

intensifies, instead of reform they more often than not resort to more repression and the use of force against their citizens. As a result, armed groups 

often proliferate, challenging the fundamental security of the regime and 

even jeopardizing the continued existence of it. “Some weak authoritarian 

regimes engage in opportunistic alliances with other authoritarian states 

and non-state actors to compensate for poor performance and to buttress 

their ability to stay in power.”85

In sum, there are a large number of weak and very weak states today—both 

democratic and authoritarian—in which protracted struggles are taking place 

over political, social, and cultural values and visions. Often what one finds is 

on one side are those who embrace human rights, democratic values, and the 

need for reform and change. On the other side are leaders and groups with very 

different perspectives that seek to maintain the status quo. In effect, there is a 

competitive political contest taking place—a struggle over values and visions—

in which one side seeks legitimacy through the promotion of democratic principles and other actors that seek control often through the antithesis of those 

principles.

This assessment is quite different from the optimistic view of the post-Cold 

War patterns of internal instability and conflict. The proliferation of state actors 

has significantly altered the contemporary security environment. There are more 

weak, very weak, and failing states than there are strong ones, and “more weak 

democracies than there are strong democracies.”86 Moreover, many of these 

weak states are vulnerable to internal challenges and the instability and conflict 

that can arise from it. These fragile states, whether democratic or authoritarian, 

“are also the most likely target for exploitation by opportunistic armed groups 

operating alone or in coalitions or loose networks with other state and nonstate actors... Through their exploitation of the territorial, performance and 

legitimacy vulnerabilities of fragile states, an array of new actors—and new 

networks or coalitions of actors—have transformed the peripheral theaters of 

the 20th century into the likely battlegrounds of the 21st century.”87 
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JSOU Report 13-5

These developments will have important implications for U.S. interests and 

foreign policy in the decade ahead. It is improbable that Washington will be able 

to avoid being drawn into the security challenges that weak states and armed 

groups will generate because they will affect those interests and policies. However, it will be much more cost effective for the U.S. to address these challenges, 

as Secretary Gates proposed, by developing an “early intervention” strategy. By 

doing so, Washington can assist those weak states that are located in key areas 

where it has interests at stake to “prevent festering problems from turning into 

crises that require costly and controversial direct military intervention.” But 

to do so, the U.S. will have to develop a strategy that takes this approach. The 

final two sections of the study will briefly outline the architecture for what 

such a strategy would entail and discuss the role of SOF in contributing to the 

execution of that strategy through its role of assisting in building the capacity 

and accountability of the security forces of partner governments.
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4. A Strategy for Early Engagement

The principal objective of a U.S. strategy for early engagement is to avoid 

the high costs of responding to violent conflict once it has broken out 

and begun to escalate. Early action, as former Secretary Gates proposed, will 

aim to contain and deescalate such situations before they turn into catastrophes. Early engagement will likewise impede the spillover of violence and 

instability into surrounding regions through the flow of refugees, transport 

of weapons and illicit goods, and cross border movement of various armed 

groups. It is a reality that intrastate conflict is rarely confined within the 

borders of the country where it begins. 

Consider the internal conflict taking place in Yemen. It has not remained 

localized as a result of the safe haven Yemen has provided for al-Qaeda’s 

regional affiliate—al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. Rather, it has served 

as a launching pad for transnational terrorist operations. Likewise, the conflict in Somalia has spilled across its borders bringing with it instability 

and violence to Kenya and other states in that region. An assessment of 

the region that encompasses Libya and Mali reveals how conflict in those 

states is having a destabilizing impact on the countries that surround them. 

Moreover, what Libya and the other states that are part of the ongoing Arab 

Spring uprising denote is that authoritarian regimes which appear to be 

outwardly stable have just below the surface those activating precipitants 

that cause violence and civil resistance to break out on short notice. Given 

today’s transnational and interconnected world, such regional developments 

often have an impact on the security and interests of the United States and 

its allies.

As noted in this study, ineffective, corrupt, and repressive governing 

institutions are among the key precipitants igniting these and other intrastate 

conflicts. In many of the weak, very weak, and failing states identified earlier, 

the institutions that are supposed to provide social, economic, and security 

necessities to their populations do not do so either because of the corrupt 

and authoritarian nature of those regimes or because their political system 

lacks the capacity to do so. Institutions are too weak to cope with demands. 

This may be the case, for example, in weak democracies. The resulting lack of 

trust and confidence in key institutions, and especially those responsible for 
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JSOU Report 13-5

security and justice, provide the conditions for civil resistance and violence 

which, in turn, can provide milieus that different illicit actors can exploit.

Consequently, when, as a result of these weak state conditions, intrastate 

instability appears imminent, the capacity to respond rapidly could stave off 

its outbreak or contain its escalation. Of course, the nature of the response 

will depend on the situation within the weak state. In other words, countries 

in the aftermath of an internal conflict will necessitate a response that will 

differ from that required for countries engaged in a political transition. In 

either case, a U.S. strategy of early engagement can have a stabilizing impact 

on the course of events.

As the U.S. withdraws from Afghanistan, it will be important for it to 

develop a strategy to respond early to weak and conflict-prone states where it 

has significant interests at stake. The decision as to which states fall into this 

category and how to prioritize them is beyond the scope of this study. However, it is a fundamental assumption of the study that there are several such 

countries in which a decent into crisis, instability, and conflict will impact 

U.S. regional concerns. This will require a mechanism for identifying states 

that are at risk of the kinds of political, economic, or social shocks that trigger instability. A periodic review process for doing so should be established 

that can provide at minimum a biannual assessment of those states at risk. 

An early warning mechanism would provide the U.S. with the ability to set 

the necessary actions in motion to take proactive steps. 

To respond with suitable and effective action, the U.S. will likewise require 

a range of appropriate skills and capabilities drawn from across the U.S. government to act on early warning that can be tailored to respond to specific 

conflict and transition scenarios. A broad range of capabilities is needed to 

conduct these missions. They can be divided into the following categories:

•	 Civil capabilities to strengthen indigenous government institutions to 

include those concerned with meeting material needs and political/

societal expectations

•	 Capabilities to build indigenous civil security forces and the institutions that oversee them; these include police, constabulary, and 

intelligence agencies

•	 Military and defense capabilities that provide local military forces 

and the defense institutions that oversee them with the capacity to 

establish security and stability
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Among this array of capabilities, those devoted to security force capacity 

building and security sector reform will play a key role. As the next section describes, security sector reform involves both civilian and military 

forces and institutions. Of those, military and defense engagement will play 

a critical role in supporting and fostering the development of capable and 

accountable military forces in weak states that can protect and win the support of their population and which are supervised by professional defense 

ministries. It is to the issue of the role of SOF, other U.S. military forces, 

and civilian defense constituents in security force assistance and defense 

institution building missions that we now turn.

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5. Security Force Assistance and Defense 

Institution Building

The role of the DOD in an early engagement strategy for weak and/or 

transitioning states focuses on the twin missions of military-centric 

security sector stabilization (SSS) and SSR. However, before discussing the 

capabilities and skill sets needed for these interrelated missions, it is necessary to briefly describe what each concept involves and to highlight where 

the military services and defense ministries that manage them fit into stabilization and reform missions. We will begin with SSR and work our way 

back to stabilization.

Security Sector Reform

Security sector reform provides a framework for identifying which actors are 

relevant to improving security in a given weak state context. While SSR was 

developed as a holistic process, carrying out all of its various activities at the 

same time rarely, if ever, takes place. Specialists at the Geneva Centre for the 

Democratic Control of the Armed Forces (DCAF) note that “SSR does not 

imply doing everything simultaneously. Instead, it promotes planning the 

next specific activity in full awareness of the complex interdependencies that 

characterize SSR, fitting it within the broader SSR framework and regarding 

[each] activity as one step within the overall SSR process. The holistic nature 

of SSR also underscores the need for coordination among all key actors.”88

According to DCAF specialists, “the security sector of a state is traditionally understood to include those agencies responsible for internal and 

external security” including “military forces, police and other law enforcement agencies, gendarmerie and paramilitary forces, intelligence and secret 

services, border guards and customs authorities, among others.” Each is 

“empowered with the legal right to bear arms on behalf of the state.” However, beyond these operating forces, specialists in SSR have broadened the 

security sector to include “non-state security and justice actors.”89 Following is a listing of those institutions and groups they include as part of the 

security sector of a state:
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JSOU Report 13-5

•	 Statutory Security Services include those that provide security and 

have a mandate to do so from a state authority. They include at minimum the military services, police, gendarmerie, and intelligence agencies, as well as other security services that are concerned with borders, 

prisons, and customs.

•	 Executive and Civil Ministries manage and give direction to the 

security services. This can include defense, interior and foreign affairs.

•	 Legislature and the Legislative Committees develop security sector 

legislation, authorize expenditures, and oversee the statutory security 

services, as well as the executive and civil ministries that supervise 

them.

•	 Justice Institutions interpret the laws under which the security services operate.

•	 Independent Oversight Agencies are financed by the government but 

usually only report to the legislative branch, such as ombudspersons, 

human rights commissions, and anti-corruption agencies.

•	 Civil Society Organizations, including the media and nongovernmental political, religious, and social organizations can have a role in 

monitoring security sector performance, informing and educating the 

public about security and providing policy advice to the government. 

•	 Non-Statutory Armed Formations include private military and security companies and community self-defense groups that operate in 

traditional societies, as well as actors such as organized armed groups 

that seek to undermine or destroy the state.

•	 External Actors include national donors, international and intergovernmental organizations supporting SSR or are otherwise involved in 

security affairs, criminal and terrorist groups, and the security forces 

of foreign countries.

The security sector is seen as a critical capability that weak states must 

improve to address both traditional security requirements—protecting the 

state—as well as the human security requirements of ensuring the wellbeing 

of the states’ citizens. Depending on the context, it may first be necessary to 

carry out security force stabilization and only after that is achieved to undertake reform of the security and justice sectors of weak states. Put another 
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way, SSS may be needed to serve as a table setter before undertaking SSR, 

which seeks to “transform the [security and justice] sector into an instrument 

of conflict prevention and management,” contributing to “development and 

paving the way for development activities.”90 Building on this understanding, 

specialists at DCAF conceptualized the SSR process in Figure 3:

This illustration characterizes the SSR process as consisting of one general 

approach, two primary objectives, and three essential dimensions. Local 

ownership stipulates that the impetus for reform has to come from within 

the state itself and cannot be orchestrated by an external actor or third party. 

In other words, writes Laurie Nathan, “The reform of security [and justice] 

policies, institutions and activities in a given country must be designed, managed and implemented by local actors rather than external actors.”91 While 

there may be one generalized approach, the local milieu will determine on 

which institutions to focus. External actors cannot direct this process. The 

approach has to be contextualized by local actors and focused on local conditions and requirements.

With respect to the twin objectives of effectiveness and accountability, 

they go hand in hand. However, there is a propensity among SSR specialists 

to focus more on the accountability of the security services. This is understandable given the fact that in many weak states the security forces constitute a major source of insecurity and authoritarian control. Focusing on 

improving their effectiveness can result in the enhancing of these repressive 

Figure 3. Security Sector Reform model
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JSOU Report 13-5

skills. “An effective and well-equipped army could ... be an obstacle to longterm peace and development if it were to use its skills and capacity to oppress 

citizens or violate their fundamental rights. Ensuring effective accountability” through formal management and governance mechanisms serve as 

checks against this from happening.92 Accountability establishes formal institutional mechanisms at the executive and parliamentary levels for management and oversight of the security services. With respect to military forces, 

these include a clear chain of command, civilian oversight and control, a 

professional code of conduct, and rules of engagement that respect human 

rights and adhere to rule of law. Similar procedures are established for the 

other civilian security services.93 

While accountability is critical, effectiveness cannot be overlooked or 

downplayed. Weak states can and often do face challenges from illicit armed 

groups. With respect to military forces, effectiveness is accomplished by 

enhanced training for the most likely contingences they will face, upgrading 

equipment and infrastructure for those contingencies, and strengthening the 

military chain of command and civilian institutions that have responsibility 

for managing them. 

Finally, the three dimensions of the SSR process highlight its political 

and technical complexity and the degree to which those third parties that 

intercede in this process through aid and assistance must understand each. 

The political nature of SSR is reflected in the fact that it seeks to affect power 

relations within the state and how the state regulates its monopoly over the 

use of force as it relates to security, rule of law, and human rights. All of this 

makes the SSR process highly political both domestically and for international actors that seek to foster it through assistance. Therefore, this requires 

that third parties have a “high level of political understanding and sensitivity,” and employ “analytical, research and negotiation skills,” in conjunction 

with diplomacy when seeking to engage in SSR support programs. In other 

words, before the DOD provides SFA and defense institution building assistance, arrangements must be established with the host country that provide 

entry points for assistance and establish a commitment to reform.

Security Sector Stabilization

Depending on the local security context a weak state may not satisfy the conditions necessary to initiate the security sector reform process. This is due to 

the fact that in weak states experiencing conflict the capacity of the security 
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forces is low, particularly in terms of their ability to respond to a contested 

environment. That environment is likely to be characterized by varying 

degrees of active violence, the failure of security institutions to respond to 

it, and the absence of a political settlement. Such situations are in need of 

stabilization and to achieve it the security forces have to be strengthened in 

terms of their capacity and effectiveness. In these situations basic security 

must come first before reform can be fully addressed.

According to Danish specialist Peter Dahl Thruelsen, security sector 

stabilization takes place in “non-permissive environments” which can range 

from “general war fighting to low-risk military engagement.”94 Stabilization 

is focused on “stability generation.” By this he means building security forces 

that can address tactical level requirements. This becomes the highest priority because the “overwhelming security concern” is with “the need to create 

a minimum level of stability.”95 There will be no progress toward reform of 

the security sector without it. In non-permissive contexts preventing further 

state breakdown has to come first or little else will be accomplished. What 

the implementation of a successful stabilization program achieves is that it 

enables key security providers including the military services, police, gendarmerie, and intelligence agencies to mitigate the violence being orchestrated 

by armed groups.

The initial role of third parties in these situations is to provide SFA in the 

form of “train and equip” programs that aim to improve the capacity and 

effectiveness of a weak state’s statutory security forces to manage internal 

instability. Engagement by external actors in the non-permissive environment of weak states helps those security forces address basic security challenges. However, in providing SFA, the third power should do so with the 

view that this in an interim or initial step that responds to the immediate 

security challenges but also establishes the foundation for reform. In many 

ways this can be thought of as a two-step process in which stabilization lessens the violence and instability in the short term, while setting the conditions 

for long term reform of the security sector. 

According to Thruelsen, it is important to introduce basic concepts of SSR 

within train and equip programs: “when implementing programs in the SSS 

phase, plans for reforming the trained units ... must be made ready early in 

the process. This is especially important if one wants to avoid initiatives in 

the SSS phase that will ultimately undermine the program of SSR.”96 What 

Thurelsen is referring to is the danger that in addressing the need to build 
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JSOU Report 13-5

security force capacity and effectiveness to address violence and instability, 

programs that encourage accountability by those forces are sidetracked.

To circumvent this outcome, he proposes that third party train and equip 

missions for a weak state’s security forces engage at “all stages of development, from basic training to participating in combat operations and eventually in the transition process.” The members of these missions “will have 

to follow the national units on the job, mentoring them and monitoring 

their progress” encouraging them “to avoid abuse, looting, corruption and 

other activities that will undermine the local perception of the new forces 

as legitimate security providers.”97 Thus, when stabilization is the priority, 

there is danger if it does not introduce and begin to embed the foundation 

elements of security sector reform. The experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan 

did not follow this course of action. The urgency for executing SFA operations led to a focus on building up the capacity of the force being generated. 

In those cases, those foundation elements of reform that could contribute to 

longer term security force development and accountability were only belatedly embedded in the stabilization process. 

Capabilities and Skill Sets for Early Engagement

Former Secretary of Defense Gates, as noted earlier, asserted that “the most 

important military component” for today’s persistent and irregular conflicts 

“is not the fighting we do ourselves, but how well we enable and empower our 

partners to defend and govern their own countries.” To this end, he challenged 

the military to prepare for partner capacity building, stability operations, SFA, 

and defense institution building missions.98 

As this study has illustrated, most weak states have limited capabilities to 

counter the complex array of security challenges that armed groups and other 

non-state actors can pose. Because of this, the former Secretary of Defense 

steadfastly advocated that the U.S. make a significant commitment to enhancing 

its SFA and defense institution building capabilities for assisting, training, and 

mentoring indigenous military forces and the institutions that manage them in 

weak states. To do so would entail maintaining sufficient U.S. capabilities with 

the appropriate skill sets. While SFA missions can take place in both permissive 

and contested environments, Gates stressed that special attention should be 

given to how SFA could be employed as a preemptive/preventive tool to assist 

weak states before the challenges posed by armed groups became robust.
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SFA can span the spectrum of conflict. It is focused on organizing, training, 

equipping, rebuilding, and assisting host nation security forces to address 

challenges in their operating environment. However, since 9/11 the priority 

aim of SFA is to improve the capability and capacity of host-nation security 

forces to manage irregular challenges. In late 2010, this was affirmed in 

DOD Instruction 5000.68, which asserted “SFA activities shall be conducted 

primarily to assist host countries 

to defend against internal and 

transnational threats to stability.” 

While other missions were noted, 

“SFA oriented towards supporting 

a host country’s efforts to counter 

internal threats from subversion, 

lawlessness, and insurgency” was 

emphasized.99

In post-9/11 SFA doctrine, host-nation foreign security forces include 

“Duly constituted military, paramilitary, police, and constabulary forces of 

a government.”100 To manage irregular conflicts, each is said to require attention as part of U.S. assistance missions. But not all of these statutory forces 

fall under the authority of the DOD. Its primary role in SFA is to “organize, 

train, equip, and advise foreign military forces, foreign paramilitary security 

forces such as border and coastal control forces, and counterterrorist forces,” 

and to “support the development of host-country defense institutions and 

ministries.”101 It has been the case that since 9/11 the authority of DOD was 

expanded by the Congress beyond these SFA missions to include training 

the police forces of Iraq and Afghanistan. But it seems unlikely that this 

authority will be extended beyond these cases, and therefore in the future 

DOD efforts will remain centered on host nation military, paramilitary, and 

counterterrorist forces.

Within the U.S. military, SOF have been designated as the most appropriate for executing SFA missions. This is because they are organized, trained, 

and equipped to conduct small-unit operations against irregular enemies 

and possess both regionally focused language and cultural skills. Especially 

since 9/11, SOF have been seen as well suited for employment in the most 

frequently initiated SFA missions, those that involve indigenous force capacity building to meet irregular threats. 

SFA can span the spectrum of 

conflict. It is focused on organizing, 

training, equipping, rebuilding, and 

assisting host nation security forces 

to address challenges in their operating environment.
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JSOU Report 13-5

However, if SFA policy is to move in the direction proposed by former 

Secretary Gates, then the number of SFA missions will expand. In the post9/11 period, the major focus of SFA has been on states that are facing serious 

internal threats from extremist groups or on weak and vulnerable states in 

regions that are deemed critical to U.S. interests. In these cases, the provision 

of SFA was driven by the war on terror. SFA went to militaries in countries 

that met these criteria. The major recipients included Afghanistan, Iraq, 

Pakistan, Yemen, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Djibouti, Jordan, Kenya, Ethiopia, 

Nigeria, Georgia, and Azerbaijan. A recent regional example is the SFA-type 

operations to several nations in the Trans Sahel. SFA in these cases consisted 

of weapons and equipment, training in counterterrorism and irregular warfare techniques, and instruction in intelligence gathering and analysis. Some 

of these militaries, due to their lack of elementary capabilities, also required 

basic necessities to include uniforms, vehicles, communications equipment, 

ammunition, and even salary support. In other cases, assistance took the 

form of sophisticated and high-priced items such as helicopters and small 

boats. 

Because effectiveness was the goal of these SFA programs, attention to 

accountability and reform tended to be overlooked. Improving capacity was 

the priority because of the need to achieve a meaningful level of stability. 

In such non-permissive contexts attaining this was seen as having to come 

first, or little else would be accomplished. However, as Thruelsen observed 

earlier, “when implementing programs in the SSS phase, plans for reforming the trained units ... must be made ready early in the process. This is 

especially important if one wants to avoid initiatives in the SSS phase that 

will ultimately undermine the program of SSR.”102 

Under the Gates proposal, SFA would be elevated to a core mission for 

the DOD. In an era of persistent irregular conflict and the need for persistent 

engagement, SFA would be approached as a strategic tool for managing challenges to U.S. interests. SFA missions would include weak states where the 

armed group threat is in its incipient stage. If adopted, this early intervention 

approach will increase the demand for an increasing number of SFA missions. In doing so, it raises three important questions: one, will SOF have sufficient capacity to meet demand, or must the conventional forces be engaged; 

two, do SOF have the appropriate skill sets to train and mentor weak state 

military and paramilitary forces to become both operationally effective and 

professionally accountable; and three, if strengthening and professionalizing 
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the defense institutions that manage a host nation’s military forces becomes 

an integral part of SFA missions, then what SSR capacity will DOD require? 

The remainder of this study will comment on each of these issues.

Expanding the SFA Force

While the DOD and military services have initiated a number of changes in 

“doctrine and training manuals, focusing on counterinsurgency, stabilization, and training/advising foreign militaries ... what has lagged behind in 

these initiatives,” according to one recent assessment, “is a commensurate 

degree of force structure capabilities to meet our future requirements.”103 If 

the demand for SFA expands, then the gap between SFA missions and the 

capabilities needed to carry them out will become wider. And those missions 

will require skills that have either been in short supply or nonexistent as part 

of the capacity building programs the U.S. offers to host-nation military 

forces. 

The suggestions that follow address both the forces needed for SFA missions and the skill sets that have to be added to those expanding SFA forces. 

Writing in 2010, Brigadier General Edward Donnelly, the Army’s deputy 

director for strategy observed that “with the heightened threat extremist 

groups pose to regional and global stability, the U.S. Army must accept this 

SFA role. Because the threat is persistent, the response must be persistent.”104 

For the Army to do so, the size of the force needed for SFA missions will 

have to expand. There will not be sufficient SOF to meet the SFA demands 

from the geographic combatant commanders. 

This fact was recognized in the 2011 U.S. Special Operations Command 

(USSOCOM) introductory guide for SFA. It explained that SFA activities 

have been growing over the last decade, and to build the operational proficiency and professional accountability of foreign security forces for an 

expanding number of states will require more SOF and other DOD capabilities.105 But hastily expanding SOF, which are the most appropriate for 

SFA missions because of their interpersonal and military skills, language 

ability, and the facility to comprehend and influence other people, is not a 

viable short-term solution; developing SOF personnel is a long-term process 

that involves considerable amounts of training and education coupled with 

several deployments where advisory skills are honed through operational 

experiences with foreign security forces.
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Consequently, the USSOCOM guide asserts that Army conventional 

forces will have to be employed to augment the SFA missions conducted by 

SOF. Indeed, there is the assumption that the “role of conventional forces 

in SFA will continue to grow.”106 In recognition of these developments the 

Army issued Field Manual 3-07.1 Security Force Assistance (FM 3-07.1) to 

provide a framework for adapting conventional force brigade combat teams 

(BCTs) for SFA employment.107 To do so, the manual proposed procedures to 

adapt Army force management institutions to meet expanding SFA mission 

requirements and to make SFA part of conventional forces core competencies. What follows is a brief synopsis of how FM 3-07.1 proposed to carry 

this out.

Drawing on lessons from Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation 

Iraqi Freedom where the Army employed maneuver brigade combat teams 

to build and train the Iraqi and Afghan security forces, conventional forces 

brigades will be tailored and augmented during the regular training cycle to 

execute SFA missions. This will support a dual system of supply to meet the 

growing SFA demand. When the demand for an SFA mission can be met by 

SOF, USSOCOM will task the appropriate elements to execute the mission. 

If need be it will be augmented with the necessary support elements. When 

the source of supply is a conventional force brigade, Army Forces Command 

will task the appropriate BCT to prepare for SFA within the Army Force 

Generation training cycle for BCTs, and request appropriate augmentation 

as needed. 

Once a BCT is selected for SFA missions, according to FM 3-07.1, it is 

then prepared for those missions during its regular 18-month train-ready 

phase, which is focused mostly on conventional combined arms maneuver 

preparation (conventional warfighting). SFA training will become part of 

the BCTs work up to prepare for full-spectrum operations. During the trainready phase, units will receive those individuals, capabilities, training, and 

any special equipment required for the SFA mission.108

To manage and facilitate this preparation, the Army established the 162d 

Training Brigade. During a 60-day training program, it is said to provide 

the BCT with relevant language, regional, and cultural awareness education, 

as well as training in a range of counterinsurgency related tactical skills. 

The latter includes patrolling, small arms training, urban operations, and 

countering improvised explosive devices. During this train-ready phase, 

BCTs coordinate with Army service component commands, country teams, 
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offices of defense cooperation or coordination, and regionally focused SOF 

to enhance SFA mission preparation and regional orientation. 

This decision by the Army to meet the growing demand for indigenous 

security force capacity building by folding the SFA mission within the full 

spectrum training cycle for conventional forces has been questioned. Some 

critics doubt that the Army can meet indigenous security force capacity building mission requirements through this approach. They question 

whether this approach will be able to meet the growing demands of the 

geographical commands for more SFA missions to support their agendas 

for theater security cooperation, military engagement, and partner capacity building. These requests will continue to grow in a period of persistent 

irregular conflict, but BCTs, trained for SFA missions in this manner, are 

unlikely to have the capacity or skill sets needed to successfully execute 

those missions.109 

Other solutions are needed to generate effective SFA capabilities to assist 

weak states manage the irregular challenges of armed groups by providing 

the right kind of security force capacity building. Perhaps a starting point 

to do so is for the DOD to consider establishing an SFA agency that has the 

primary responsibility of managing the growing SFA demands of the geographic commands. That agency will meet those demands by fostering the 

development of a critical mass of specialized forces with the skills needed 

to train foreign military forces, foreign paramilitary security forces such 

as border and coastal control forces, and counterterrorist personnel. The 

scope of the training and mentoring provided to these indigenous forces will 

center on how best to help them manage irregular and population-centric 

conflicts that can range from ones that are in an embryonic stage to those 

that are more intense. The agency should be sub-divided and aligned with 

the different geographic commands. The details for establishing such an 

SFA organization are beyond the scope of this paper, but as a starting point, 

it should be given consideration as a way of managing the SFA challenge. 

Expanding SFA Skill Sets

The skill sets needed to train indigenous security forces likewise have some 

identifiable gaps that have to be addressed if the SFA mission is broadened 

to include military effectiveness, accountability, and reform. As noted previously, SOF retain the most appropriate skill sets for SFA missions because 
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they maintain the training and mentoring know-how most appropriate for 

assisting host-nation indigenous forces.

With respect to those indigenous forces that SOF traditionally have 

trained—military and paramilitary forces—there are aspects of that training that are deficient. A review of Special Forces (SF) training guides supports this proposition.110 Much of what SF provides to indigenous military 

and paramilitary forces can best be characterized as small unit training to 

counter insurgents, guerrillas, and other irregular forces. Of course, this is 

tailored to the needs of the host nation and can vary from mission to mission. 

Nevertheless, the following subjects are generally part of standard training 

missions: patrolling and small unit tactics, weapons use, communications, 

intelligence, field fortifications, small unit exercises, and instruction in the 

law of land warfare. 

While SOF retain robust skill sets to execute these activities, gaps and 

deficiencies are also present. For example, while education in the law of 

land warfare is necessary for indigenous military and paramilitary forces 

involved in fighting or seeking to prevent irregular population centric conflict, it is not sufficient. Like police forces, 

military and paramilitary forces likewise 

need to be provided with rule of law and 

integrity training for operating within 

the population because that is the context in which today’s irregular intrastate 

conflicts are taking place. But SOF do not 

have that capacity and the requisite skill 

sets to provide it to indigenous forces. 

They need to be developed, and there are 

nongovernmental organizations that can 

be engaged who have expertise in these areas.111 

Additionally, a broader approach to SFA that encompasses military 

effectiveness, accountability, and reform would introduce into the training 

regimen the norms and standards of the legal framework that regulates 

civil-military relations in democratic systems. This would entail, according to the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, the 

“development of educational measures that attempt to inculcate a new security culture ... through a focus on such issues as civil-military cooperation 

... [and] training of security personnel on such issues as democratic values, 

... a broader approach to SFA 

that encompasses military 

effectiveness, accountability, 

and reform would introduce 

into the training regimen the 

norms and standards of the 

legal framework that regulates civil-military relations in 

democratic systems.
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human rights, international humanitarian law, and democratic control of 

armed forces norms.”112 It would also involve related educational measures 

that focus on other “key features of an effective system of democratic control” including “respect for a clear chain of command, civilian oversight and 

control, a professional code of conduct, and rules of engagement that respect 

human rights and adhere to rule of law.”113 

Expertise in these subjects does exist within the U.S. professional military 

education system. For example, the Naval Postgraduate School’s Center for 

Democratic Civil-Military Relations has developed curriculum and instructional methods for these aspects of SSR. These activities include sending 

mobile education teams to assist countries in transition to strengthen their 

military and security institutions to become more democratically accountable. International organizations like the Geneva Centre for the Democratic 

Control of Armed Forces likewise have developed similar methods. This 

expertise can be drawn on to help develop the kinds of skill sets and capacity 

building assets that should be added to the expanded SFA process proposed 

here.

Capabilities for Professionalizing Defense Institutions 

Finally, the expanded approach to SFA policy proposed here includes capabilities for strengthening and professionalizing the defense institutions that 

manage a host nation’s military forces. This concept echoes former Secretary 

Gates’ call to advance the process of transforming the capacity of defense 

institutions in states where the U.S. is providing training and assistance to its 

military forces. What Gates had in mind has come to be referred to as defense 

institution building (DIB) within the Pentagon. According to the findings 

from a 2011 conference focused on it, DIB refers to “programs, structures, 

and processes used to develop effective, efficient, and accountable partner 

defense establishments, including defense ministries, joint and general staffs 

and commands, and the supporting institutions of the armed forces.”114 The 

focal point for such efforts includes “newly independent nations, developing 

countries, and those states in transition or emerging from conflict.”115 The 

reality is that in such weak states, civilian-managed defense ministries are 

underdeveloped or nonexistent. Where such institutions exist, the interaction between the military and its civilian counterparts tends to be dominated 

by those in uniform.
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JSOU Report 13-5

The core elements and boundaries of defense institution building revolve 

around fostering a civil-military relationship in which a civilian-led defense 

institution exercises legitimate authority over the states military forces, overseeing and managing those forces within a legal-based framework that specifies duties, processes, and accountability. However, as the DIB report noted, 

“Developing the effectiveness of [such] defense institutions can be a challenge” for third parties because those strengthened defense institutions need 

to be “in harmony with other elements of the partner nation’s government. 

A partner nation’s defense institutions must be able to effectively respond 

to national security threats, but also must be accountable to the public and 

respect the rule of law, human rights, and practice good governance and 

general accountability.”116 This adds to the challenge that DOD-sponsored 

defense institution building faces.

Defense institution building, as described above, can be understood as a 

part of the larger SSR process. Recall that SSR theory defines the statutory 

security sector of a state as encompassing those agencies responsible for 

internal and external security, including military forces, police and other 

law enforcement agencies, gendarmerie and paramilitary forces, intelligence 

and secret services, border guards and customs authorities, as well as those 

government bodies that oversee, manage, and give direction to them. Consequently, SSR encompasses not just defense, but also includes the justice, 

intelligence, and internal security systems of the state. With respect to military forces, SSR would include, most importantly, promotion of the establishment of a civilian led defense ministry. Similar agencies or ministries 

would perform the same functions for other nonmilitary statutory security 

forces. While DIB is an integral part of this broader SSR process, it can be 

undertaken more narrowly as part of a third party’s focus on military forces 

and management institutions, serving as a prelude to a larger SSR effort. 

To add defense institution building as part of the broader approach to SFA 

proposed here, the DOD will require the development of a cadre of civilian 

advisors who specialize in the key functional tasks of a defense ministry. 

During the late stages of Secretary Gates’ stewardship, modest steps were 

taken to do so. But if DIB programs are to expand, shortfalls in personnel 

with the appropriate skill sets will have to be addressed. These advisory 

competencies include fostering both ministry effectiveness and accountability. While effectiveness in performing specific functional specializations 

such as policy and strategy formulation, force development, and planning, 
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budgeting and management are critical in reforming a defense ministry; 

equally, if not more important, is the capacity to help defense ministries 

embrace a culture of accountability. 

In sum, for the DOD to increase its engagement in DIB as part of an 

expanded SFA policy, important capacity challenges will have to be identified and addressed. Currently, DIB programs are scattered in DOD and the 

scale of those programs would not be adequate for the policy proposed in 

this study. It will be necessary, as a starting point, to develop a capabilities 

framework for DIB that both identifies the essential roles and responsibilities 

for advisors, and the skill sets needed by them to carry out those activities 

for a host government’s defense ministry.

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6. Conclusion

Key Findings and National Security Implications

Former Secretary Gates, during the latter period of his tenure in the 

Pentagon, frequently asserted that the security challenges the U.S. will 

most often face in the 21st century would differ from those of the Cold War. 

He emphasized that weak and failing states were a key part of a transforming international security environment. And in these fragile states non-state 

armed groups were mushrooming in number and in the capacity, and could 

cause major geopolitical damage in their own territory and beyond through 

the use of irregular and unconventional means. The secretary believed that 

these situations would result in most persistent and dangerous challenges 

the U.S. was likely to face to its interests and security. Unlike the Cold War 

when the most serious threats came from strong and powerful states, in 

the 21st century weak and failing states will be the source of acute security 

challenges posed by non-state armed groups. 

To meet these irregular challenges, Former Secretary Gates proposed 

that an “early intervention” approach was essential. He believed this was 

necessary because the Obama administration was moving away from major 

interventions like those that had taken place in Afghanistan and Iraq following 9/11. As a substitute, he proposed the U.S. employ “indirect approaches—

primarily through building the institutional capacity of partner governments 

and their security forces—to prevent festering problems from turning into 

crises that require costly and controversial direct military intervention.” This 

approach, the secretary concluded, “is arguably as important as, if not more 

so than the fighting the United States does itself.”117

This study sought to determine in the first part whether Secretary Gates’ 

assertion that weak and failing states constitute a serious and persistent 

challenge to international peace and stability is the case, and if so to what 

degree. Weak states have been the subject of considerable recent academic 

and public policy attention. Several research projects have identified key factors that contribute to state weakness and incapacity, and the impact these 

factors have on local, regional, and international stability. To gain a better 

understanding of the extent to which weak states constitute a burgeoning 
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international problem, the findings from the 2011 Failed States Index were 

examined. 

Annually since 2005, the index has categorized states along a continuum 

from strong to weak, very weak, failing, and failed, identifying the principle 

sources of state strength and weakness. Of the 177 states assessed in 2011, 

73 were classified as weak, 22 as very weak, and 13 as failing or failed. These 

states, to varying degrees, were described as unable to maintain control 

over the territory within their official borders, to retain a monopoly over 

the use of force within that territory, and to perform core governmental 

functions beginning with the security of their citizens. Many of these states 

were also said to be plagued by corrupt and moribund institutions, poverty, 

the violation of human rights, and disregard for the rule of law. As a result, 

acute capacity gaps in these fragile states frequently generated violent and/

or nonviolent opposition groups and movements. 

An unpacking of the 2011 aggregate scores for weak, very weak, and failing states finds that these preconditions or underlying sources of instability 

can trigger uprisings like that of the Arab Spring and, consequently, constitute a serious global challenge for the international community today and 

into the future, as Secretary Gates asserted. These sources of instability have 

serious repercussions not just for the weak state and its people, but also for 

its neighbors and even other states beyond the immediate regional milieu. 

This is particularly the case when a weak state’s performance gaps, political 

tensions, and dysfunctional policies deteriorate into internal conflict and 

violence. 

A second key finding in the study that supports Secretary Gates’ contention that the most persistent and dangerous irregular security challenges will 

be fostered by fragile states in the ungoverned territory that exists within 

the boundaries of many of those states. The second section of the study 

describes four subtypes of ungoverned territories: abdicated, incomplete or 

under-governed, contested, and exploitable areas. In each subtype, to varying 

degrees, the central government is unable or unwilling to extend control, 

effectively govern, or exert influence. Moreover, numerous examples cited 

in the study reveal that each of these subtypes exists in the rural, urban, 

maritime, or virtual domains of fragile states, and each has been exploited 

as sanctuaries and safe havens for operational, financial, or informational 

purposes by various indigenous and transnational illicit actors. 
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Finally, the study finds that post-Cold War and post-9/11 intrastate conflict trends coincide with state weakness and ungovernability, and these 

trends will persist in the decade ahead. Starting in the 1990s, scholars began 

observing a detectable and significant shift in the patterns of violent conflict 

and war that was taking place across different regions of the world. Interstate 

wars were sharply declining, while intrastate conflicts were burgeoning in 

fragile states. These intrastate conflicts pitted non-state armed groups against 

the institutions and authorities of the state. Accounting for this shift was the 

fact that in many areas of the world, fragile states lacked legitimacy due to 

their high levels of corruption, excessively repressive state security institutions, and inability to carry out the core functions of government beginning 

with the protection of their citizens. This escalation in intrastate conflict was 

also fostered by a proliferation in different types of non-state armed groups 

challenging weak states. Some of them can pose complex irregular security 

threats at the local, regional, and even global levels. Moreover, these armed 

groups are developing cooperative relationships ranging from de facto coalitions to loose affiliations, magnifying the challenges to fragile states.

Contrary to those specialists who argue that the decline in the number of 

intrastate conflicts in the 1990s signaled an irreversible trend, this study does 

not concur. As the escalation in the numbers of intrastate conflicts between 

2004 and 2008 and again in the Arab Spring demonstrates, these trends 

are far from unalterable. This is due to the fact that in many of the weak, 

very weak, and failing states discussed in this study protracted and deep 

seated struggles are taking place over political, social, and cultural values 

and visions. These internal cleavages between state and non-state groups 

and movements are not easily resolved. A range of political, religious, and 

cultural differences exist in fragile states that, as the Arab Spring demonstrated, can with little early warning result in serious violent and nonviolent 

challenges to state authority. In such situations, human agency can trump 

the political power and institutions of regimes that have been considered 

impervious to such challenges. 

In sum, many of the fragile states identified in studies like the 2011 Failed 

States Index are vulnerable to internal challenges from both armed groups 

and civil resistance movements. This is because highly contentious politics 

with deep roots are at play within their borders. The environment generating these situations—the large number of weak, very weak, and failing 

states—will not wane any time soon. A decade into the 21st century, an 
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enduring pattern of irregular conflict is discernible. This trend is here to stay 

for the foreseeable future. It constitutes the prevalent pattern of instability 

and conflict.

The findings of this study have important implications for U.S. interests 

and national security policy in the decade ahead. The security challenges 

that weak states and armed groups pose will continue to have an impact 

on those interests and policies, and Washington will be unable to avoid 

these challenges. However, it will be much more cost effective for the U.S. 

to address these challenges if, as Secretary Gates proposed, it develops an 

“early intervention” approach. Such an approach would seem to dovetail 

with the Obama administration’s emerging “light footprint strategy,” with 

the intent of avoiding large U.S. military interventions around the world. 

Rather, this course of action will emphasize “caution, covert action and a 

modest American military footprint.” This new national security strategy 

for President Obama’s second term will seek to “limit American interventions, whenever possible, to drones, cyber-attacks, and Special Operations 

Forces,” all of which are seen as “low-cost, low-American-casualty tools.”118 

This study proposes that to conduct both the “early engagement” and 

“light footprint strategy” effectively, Washington must develop a range of 

capabilities it currently does not have. The role of the DOD in this strategy 

as it relates to weak and/or transitioning states should focus on the twin missions of military-centric SSS and SSR. It can do so by fostering the development of capable and accountable military forces in weak states that can both 

protect and win the support of their population, and which are supervised 

by professional defense ministries.

To execute the twin missions of military-centric SSS and SSR, the U.S. 

will have to make a significant commitment to enhancing its SFA and DIB 

capabilities for assisting, training, and mentoring indigenous military forces 

and the institutions that manage them in weak states. To do so would entail 

developing and maintaining sufficient U.S. capabilities with the appropriate skill sets. But as this study found, existing forces, tools, and techniques 

needed to carry out these missions are either insufficient or missing from 

the inventory of the DOD.

Of those existing DOD capabilities, SOF are the most appropriate for 

executing SFA missions because of how they are organized, trained, and 

equipped to include regionally focused language and cultural skills. Since 

9/11, they have been employed extensively on SFA missions that involve 
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indigenous force capacity building to meet irregular threats. But if SFA policy 

is to move in the direction proposed in this study, the number of SFA missions will expand because along with defense institution building ,it will be 

raised to a core mission for the Pentagon. 

In an era of persistent irregular conflict and the need for persistent 

engagement, SFA and DIB should be approached as strategic tools for managing irregular challenges to U.S. interests. This approach will increase the 

demand for a greater number of SFA missions. To meet that demand, the 

study found that three important steps have to be taken to develop the necessary capabilities. 

First, existing SOF capabilities will have to be augmented with Army 

conventional forces. However, the existing approach for adapting conventional force BCTs for SFA missions, as established in FM 3-07.1 was found 

to be unlikely to produce the kinds of capacity and skill sets needed to 

successfully execute SFA missions. A new approach is needed if, as called 

for in the 2011 USSOCOM introductory guide for SFA, conventional army 

forces are to be employed to augment those of SOF to execute the growing 

demands of the geographical commands for more SFA missions to support 

their agendas for theater security cooperation, military engagement, and 

partner capacity building.

Next, while SOF retain robust skill sets to execute SFA missions, gaps and 

deficiencies are also present and have to be addressed if their SFA activities 

are to be broadened beyond military effectiveness to include accountability 

and reform. A broader SOF approach to SFA that encompasses these activities would introduce into their training regimen norms and standards that 

regulate civil-military relations in democratic systems. Included would be 

attention to such issues as democratic values, a clear chain of command, 

civilian oversight and control, a professional code of conduct, and rules of 

engagement that respect human rights and adhere to rule of law. These are 

the kinds of skill sets and capacity building assets that should be added to 

an expanded SFA mission for SOF.

Finally, a SFA and SSR strategy for early engagement must include DOD 

capabilities for strengthening and professionalizing the defense institutions 

that manage a host nation’s military forces. Referred to as DIB within the 

Pentagon, this involves programs and processes employed by skilled advisors 

to develop effective, efficient, and accountable partner defense institutions to 

include civilian defense ministries, joint and general staffs and commands, 
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and supporting agencies. The core DIB activities revolve around fostering a 

civil-military relationship in which a civilian led defense institution exercises 

legitimate authority over the states military forces, overseeing and managing 

those forces within a legal-based framework that specifies duties, processes, 

and accountability. DIB is a key part of the broader approach to the SFASSR policy proposed in this study. To execute it, the DOD will require the 

development of a cadre of advisors who specialize in the key functional tasks 

of DIB. Modest steps have been taken to do so, but if DIB programs are to 

expand as proposed in this study, shortfalls in personnel with the appropriate 

skill sets will have to be addressed.
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Endnotes 

1. Stewart Patrick, Weak Links: Fragile States, Global Threats, and International 

Security (Oxford University Press 2011), p. 3.

2. Ibid., 3-4.

3. Robert Gates, Speech delivered to the U.S. Global Leadership Campaign in Washington, D.C. (July 15, 2008). Available at http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.

aspx?speechid=1262. 

4. Robert Gates, “A Balanced Strategy: Reprogramming the Pentagon for a New 

Age,” Foreign Affairs (January–February 2009), p. 31.

5. 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 

2006). See pp. 1–19.

6. Irregular Warfare (IW)-DOD Directive 3000.07 (December 1, 2008), p. 2.

7. 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 

2010). See pp. 5-16.

8. Ibid., pp. 20-30.

9. Robert Gates, A Balanced Strategy: Reprogramming the Pentagon for a New 

Age,” Foreign Affairs (January/February 2010).

10. The Fund for Peace has developed content analysis framework—the Conflict 

Assessment Software Tool (CAST)—that is used as the basis for the annual Failed 

State Index, as well for “other applications including specific risk assessment, and 

in-depth national-, regional- and provincial-level analysis.” CAST is employed to 

develop “in-depth assessments, country-by-country.” This analysis, coupled with 

regional contextualization, provides a unique informational tool for policy-makers to identify serious pressures and to enact sensible, well-informed policies. For 

more information on this methodology and the computer techniques used “to 

scan thousands of news reports and track trends in pressures at the national and 

provincial levels” go to http://www.fundforpeace.org/global/?q=contentanalysis. 

11. For more information on the Fund for Peace’s country analysis indicators and 

how each is measured see their publication Conflict Assessment Indicators at 

http://www.fundforpeace.org/global/library/cr-10-97-ca-conflictassessmentindicators-1105c.pdf. 

12. Drawing on both the Failed States Index and the Freedom House Survey (which 

ranks states as “free” or “partly free”), weak democratic states include the following: Albania, Antigua/Barbados, Bahamas, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Bosnia, 

Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cape Verde, Colombia, Comoros, Croatia, Cyprus, 

Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Georgia, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Lesotho, Macedonia, Madagascar, Mali, Mexico, Micronesia, Moldova, Mongolia, Mozambique, Namibia, 

Nicaragua, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Romania, Samoa, Sao Tome, Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, South Africa, Suriname, Trinidad, Turkey, Ukraine, and 
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Zambia. Additionally, there are also states ranked by Freedom House as “partly 

free” that fall into the very weak category of the Failed State Index such as Sri 

Lanka and Bangladesh. Arch Puddington, “The Freedom House Survey for 2010: 

Democracy under Duress,” Journal of Democracy (April 2011). For the survey see 

www.journalofdemocracy.org/.../freedom-house-survey-2010-democracy.

13. Samuel Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the late Twentieth 

Century (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1995).

14. Larry Diamond, Larry, “Is the Third Wave Over?” Journal of Democracy (March, 

1997).

15. Querine Hanlon, Richard Shultz, Roy Godson, and Samantha Ravich, “States in 

the 21st Century,” Geopolitics, History and International Relations 4:1 (forthcoming 2013).

16. Fund for Peace, Failed States Index 2011, p. 15. Available at http://www.fundforpeace.org/global/?q=fsi-grid2011.

17. Fund for Peace, Failed States Index 2011, p. 8.

18. Others assessments consulted as part of this study include the Index of State 

Weakness in the Developing World, developed by Susan Rice and Stewart Patrick for The Brookings Institution, the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance 

Indicators and Freedom House’s 2009 survey of 193 states. See Susan Rice and 

Stewart Patrick, Index of State Weakness in the Developing World at http://www.

brookings.edu/research/reports/2008/02/weak-states-index; the Worldwide 

Governance Indicators at http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/resources.

htm; and Freedom in the World at http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/fiw09/

FIW09_Tables&GraphsForWeb.pdf. 

19. National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, DC: The 

White House, 2002), pp. 4-6. See merln.ndu.edu/whitepapers/USnss2002.pdf. 

20. “Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States,” Hearing 

before the Select Committee on Intelligence of the United States Senate (February 

24, 2004). Accessed at http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/pdfs/108588.pdf. 

21. George Tenet, “Worldwide Threat in 2003: Evolving Dangers in a Complex 

World”, Hearing before the Select Committee on Intelligence of the United States 

Senate (February 11, 2003). Accessed at http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2003_

hr/021103tenet.pdf. 

22. In a 2003 public address he asserted that “The attacks of September 11, 2001 

reminded us that weak states can threaten our security as much as strong ones, 

by providing breeding grounds for extremism and havens for criminals, drug 

traffickers, and terrorists. Such lawlessness abroad can bring devastation here 

at home.” Quoted in Patrick, Weak Links: Fragile States, Global Threats, and 

International Security, p. 4.

23. “Possible Remote Havens for Terrorists and other Illicit Activity” (Washington 

DC; National Intelligence Council, 2003). 

24. Lamb, “Ungoverned Areas and Safe Havens: Final Report of the Ungoverned 

Areas Project,” pp. 15, 18.The study was undertaken in 2007 for the Office of the 
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Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and was managed by the Deputy Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for Policy Planning. The final report was made public in 2008. 

It was accessed at http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA479805. 

25. Angel Rabasa, et. al., Ungoverned Territory (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2007), p. 29.

26. Ibid.

27. Phil Williams, “Here be Dragons: Dangerous Spaces and International Security,” 

in Anne Clunan and Harold Trinkunas, ed., Ungoverned Spaces (Stanford, CA: 

Stanford Security Studies, 2010), ch. 3.

28. Rabasa, et. al., Ungoverned Territory, p. 16.

29. Ibid., 30.

30. Lamb, “Ungoverned Areas and Safe Havens: Final Report of the Ungoverned 

Areas Project,” p. 19.

31. Ibid., 30.

32. Lamb, “Ungoverned Areas and Safe Havens: Final Report of the Ungoverned 

Areas Project,” p. 19.

33. Ibid., 22.

34. Ibid., 19-20.

35. Williams, p. 46.

36. Ibid., 47.

37. Lamb, “Ungoverned Areas and Safe Havens: Final Report of the Ungoverned 

Areas Project,” p. 25.

38. Richard Norton, “Feral Cities,” Naval War College Review (No. 4, 2004), p. 99.

39. Ibid.

40. Lauren Ploch, et al., Piracy off the Coast of Africa (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2011), p. 2.

41. “Horn of Africa piracy Declines by almost Half in 2011,” African Business Review 

(Jan. 12, 2012) and “Africa: Piracy Declines off Somali Coast,” Maritime Security 

Review (May 14, 2013).

42. African Economic Development Institute, “West Africa And Drug Trafficking” (June 

22, 2012). Accessed at http://africaecon.org/index.php/africa_business_reports/

read/70. 

43. Ibid. 

44. Rabasa, et. al., Ungoverned Territory, p. 15.

45. Rupert Smith, “The Utility of Force; The Art of War in the Modern World” (New 

York: Alfred A Knopf 2007) p. 5.

46. Rabasa, et. al., Ungoverned Territory, p. 18.

47. Lamb, “Ungoverned Areas and Safe Havens: Final Report of the Ungoverned 

Areas Project,” p. 31.

48. Rabasa, et. al., Ungoverned Territory, p. 17.
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49. “Update on the Global Campaign Against Terrorist Financing,” Second Report 

of an Independent Task Force on Terrorist Financing Sponsored by the Council 

on Foreign Relations (June 2004), p. 19. www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/Revised_Terrorist_Financing.pdf. Also see Matthew Levitt, HAMAS: Politics, Charity and Terrorism in the Service of Jihad (New Haven: Yale University 

Press, 2006); J. Millard Burr and Robert J. Collins, Alms for Jihad (Cambridge: 

Cambridge University Press, 2006).

50. Daniel Byman et al., Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements (Santa 

Monica, CA; RAND, 2001). 

51. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 9/11 Commission Report, July 22, 2004. 

52. Rabasa, et. al., Ungoverned Territory, p. 16.

53. K.J. Holsti, The State, War, and the State of War (Cambridge University Press, 

1996), p. 21-22.

54. Ibid.

55. Ibid., 17.

56. Ibid., 21.

57. Theodor Winkler, “The Shifting Face of Violence,” Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (Policy Paper 18, 2007), p. 18.

58. Richard Shultz, Roy Godson, and Querine Hanlon, Armed Groups and Irregular 

Warfare: Adapting Professional Military Education (Washington, DC: National 

Strategy Information Center, 2008), pp. 38-41.

59. Ibid., 18.

60. See for example Mary Kaldor, New Wars and Old Wars: New and Old Wars: 

Organizing Violence in a Global Era (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 

2002); Robert I. Rotberg, ed., When States Fail: Causes and Consequences (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004); Richard H. Shultz and Andrea J. Dew, 

Insurgents, Terrorists, and Militias: The Warriors of Contemporary Combat (New 

York: Columbia University Press, 2006); Troy S. Thomas, Stephen D. Kiser, and 

William D. Casebeer, Warlords Rising: Confronting Violent Non-State Actors 

(Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2005); Anthony Vinci, Armed Groups and 

the Balance of Power: The International Relations of Terrorists, Warlords and 

Insurgents (New York: Routledge, 2006); Robert H Dorff, “Failed States after 

9/11: What Did We Know and What Have We Learned?” International Studies 

Perspectives (February 2005).

61. Charles Krulak, “Ne Cras: Not like Yesterday,” in The Role of Naval Forces in 21st 

Century Operations, eds. Richard Shultz and Robert Pfaltzgraff (Washington: 

Brassey’s, 2000), xi–xii. Also see Krulak, “Operational Maneuver from the Sea,” 

Joint Force Quarterly (Spring 1999), 79.

62. Writing just before 9/11, Anthony Lake wished that he and others in the Clinton 

administration had devoted more attention to what were usually tier II and III 

concerns in most of the Clinton years. See Anthony Lake, Six Nightmares: Real 
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Threats in a Dangerous World and How America Can Meet Them (Boston: Little, 

Brown and Co., 2000).

63. Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern Age (New York: 

Alfred Knopf, 2007), p. 5.

64. Mikael Eriksson, Peter Wallensteen and Margareta Sollenberg, “Armed Conflict, 

1989-2002,” Journal of Peace Research (No. 5, 2003), p. 593.

65. Human Security Report 2005 key findings. www.hsrgroup.org/human-securityreports/2005/overview.aspx. 

66. Kofi Annan, “Forward,” Human Security Report 2009/2010 (December, 2010), p. 

v. www.hsrgroup.org/human-security-reports/20092010/overview.aspx. 

67. Human Security Report 2009/2010: The Causes of Peace and the Shrinking Costs 

of War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 159-160.

68. Ibid., 159.

69. Ibid.

70. Ibid., 166.

71. Ibid.

72. Ibid., 164.

73. Ibid., 13.

74. Jack Snyder, “The End of War? Not So Fast” (paper prepared for The End of War: 

A Conference in Honor of Randall Forsberg, City College of New York, New York 

City, May 2008). Cited in Ibid., p. 64.

75. J. Joseph Hewitt, “Unpacking Global Trends in Violent Conflict, 1946-2005,” in 

Hewitt, Jonathan Wilkenfeld and Ted Robert Gurr, ed., Peace and Conflict 2008 

(Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers, 2008), p. 107.

76. Human Security Report 2009/2010: The Causes of Peace and the Shrinking Costs 

of War, p. 163.

77. Ibid., 13.

78. Bassma Kodmani and May Chartouni-Dubarry, “The Security Sector in Arab 

Countries: Can it be Reformed,” IDS Bulletin (no. 2, 2009), p. 97.

79. Mehran Kamrava, ‘Military Professionalization and Civil‐Military Relations in 

the Middle East,” Political Science Quarterly (no. 1, 2000), pp. 67–92; Eva Bellin, 

‘The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East. Exceptionalism in Comparative Perspective,” Comparative Politics (no. 2, 2004), pp. 139–157; Barry Rubin, 

‘The Military in Contemporary Middle East Politics’, in Barry Rubin and Thomas 

A. Keaney, eds., Armed Forces in the Middle East. Politics and Strategy (London 

and New York: Routledge, 2002), pp. 1–22; and Risa Brooks, Political‐Military 

Relations and the Stability of Arab Regimes, Adelphi Paper No. 324 (Oxford: 

Oxford University Press, 1998).

80. Ibid., 162.
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81. This discussion draws heavily on Querine Hanlon, Richard Shultz, Roy Godson, 

and Samantha Ravich, “States in the 21st Century,” Geopolitics, History and International Relations 4:1 (forthcoming 2013).

82. See Arch Puddington, Freedom in the World 2009: Setbacks and Resilience (January 2009) http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/fiw09/FIW09_OverviewEssay_Final.pdf.

83. Hanlon, et al, “States in the 21st Century,” p. 18.

84. According to Freedom House’s Freedom in the World 2009, 42 states are ranked 

as “Not Free.” “Not Free” states are those in which “basic political rights are 

absent, and basic civil liberties are widely and systematically denied.” With the 

addition of “Partly Free” countries that score lowest in terms of Political Rights 

(PR) and Civil Liberties (CL), that number rises to approximately 70 states. http://

www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/fiw09/FIW09_Tables&GraphsForWeb.pdf.

85. Hanlon, Shultz, Godson, and Ravich, “States in the 21st Century.”

86. Ibid.

87. Ibid.

88. SSR in a Nutshell: Manual for Introductory Training on Security Sector Reform 

(Geneva: DCAF and ISSAT, 2011).

89. Ibid., 4.

90. Ibid., 5.

91. Ibid., 7. Also see Laurie Nathan, No Ownership, No Commitment: A Guide to Local 

Ownership of Security Sector Reform (Birmingham: University of Birmingham), 

2007.

92. SSR in a Nutshell: Manual for Introductory Training on Security Sector Reform, 

p. 9.

93. Accountability can also be advanced through informal oversight mechanisms. 

For example, it can take place through “by civil society groups, elders and/ or 

religious groups, research organizations, the media, human rights organizations 

and other non-governmental organizations.” Ibid.

94. Peter Dahl Thruelsen, Security Sector Stabilization in a Non-Permissive Environment (Copenhagen: Royal Danish Defence College, 2011), p. 5.

95. Ibid., 8.

96. Ibid., 14.

97. Ibid.

98. Robert M. Gates, Secretary of Defense, “Landon Lecture,” Manhattan: Kansas 

State University, November 26, 2007, available from www.defenselink.mil/

speeches/speech. aspx?speechid=1199.

99. DOD Instruction p. 2.

100. Ibid., 18.

101. SFA Guide, p. 5-6.
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102. Ibid., 14.

103. Scott G. Wuestner, Building Partner Capacity/Security Force Assistance: A New 

Structural Paradigm (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies 

Institute, 2009), p. 1.

104. Brigadier General Edward Donnelly, “The U.S. Army Approach to Security Force 

Assistance,” Military Review (November-December 2010), p. 79.

105. SFA Guide, ch. 5.

106. Ibid., 16.

107. FM 3-07.1.

108. General Charles Campbell, “ARFORGEN: Maturing the Model, Refining the 

Process.” 

109. Wuestner, Building Partner Capacity/Security Force Assistance: A New Structural 

Paradigm; Theresa Baginski, et. al., A Comprehensive Approach to Improving 

Security Force Assistance Efforts (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2009); and Ronald Metternich, Security Force Assistance: 

Organization for the Long War (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic 

Studies Institute, 2010).

110. See for example U.S. Special Forces Command, Special Forces Advisor’s Reference 

Book (2001) and Special Forces Advisor Guide (2008).

111. For example the National Strategy Information Center has been “developing the 

capacity of local and national governmental and civil society leaders to foster 

widespread societal support for the rule of law. These leaders, their organizations, and their constituencies become champions of a culture of lawfulness 

and engender support for the personnel and institutions charged with upholding the rule of law.” This kind of capacity building by NSIC has included foreign police forces and has involved integrity training. For information on these 

programs and NSIC’s activities go to http://www.strategycenter.org/programs/

education-for-the-rule-of-law. 

112. DCAF Backgrounder, Democratic Control of the Armed Forces (May, 2008), p5. 

http://www.dcaf.ch/Series-Collections/DCAF-Backgrounders. 

113. Ibid., 2.

114. Summary report from the 2011 Defense Institution Building Conference sponsored by the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Partnership 

Strategy & Stability Operations (June 2011), p. 3.

115. Ibid., 4.

116. Ibid., 8.

117. Robert Gates, A Balanced Strategy: Reprogramming the Pentagon for a New 

Age,” Foreign Affairs (January/February 2010).

118. David Sanger, “In Step on ‘Light Footprint,’ Nominees Reflect Shift,” New York 

Times (January 8, 2013).