In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

No. 23-2213 

TERRI LOBIANCO and LOUIS LOBIANCO, 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

v.

BONEFISH GRILL, LLC, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

____________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. 

No. 1:21-cv-04180 — Marvin E. Aspen, Judge. 

____________________ 

ARGUED FEBRUARY 14, 2024 — DECIDED MARCH 4, 2024 

____________________ 

Before SCUDDER, ST. EVE, and LEE, Circuit Judges. 

SCUDDER, Circuit Judge. Terri LoBianco slipped and fell in 

a Chicagoland Bonefish Grill, dislocating her hip. She later 

sued the restaurant, alleging negligent maintenance of the 

floor. The district court entered summary judgment for the 

restaurant, concluding that LoBianco failed to identify the 

proximate cause of her fall and injury. We see the case differently. During her deposition, LoBianco testified in no uncertain terms that she slipped upon stepping in liquid, only then 
2 No. 23-2213 

to fall hard to the floor, leaving a wet spot on part of her dress. 

That is enough to create a disputed issue of fact. So we reverse 

and return the case to the district court for trial. 

I 

A 

On July 10, 2019, Terri LoBianco went to dinner with her 

two sisters at a Bonefish Grill restaurant in Skokie, Illinois. 

After finishing her meal, she went to the restroom. On her 

walk back to the table, her foot slipped forward, causing her 

to fall. Terri dislocated her hip and, as a result, needed four 

surgeries.

Upon falling, LoBianco felt wetness on her dress, immediately identifying a pool of liquid as the reason she had 

slipped. She was not the only person who reported seeing a 

liquid. Following the fall, a Bonefish Grill employee, referring 

to the spill, stated that she had earlier “told [somebody] to 

wipe that up.” Upon arriving at a hospital, Terri met up with 

her husband, Louis LoBianco. He too noticed that Terri’s 

dress was wet.

The LoBiancos sued Bonefish Grill on two claims in state 

court brought under Illinois law. Terri alleged that she sustained her hip injury because she slipped and fell on a spill 

the restaurant negligently failed to clean. Louis brought a similar claim for his loss of consortium with Terri due to her injuries. On Bonefish Grill’s motion, Terri’s suit was removed 

to federal district court based on diversity jurisdiction. See 28 

U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1441(a). 
No. 23-2213 3

B 

Bonefish Grill moved for summary judgment following 

the close of discovery. The district court granted the restaurant’s motion, reasoning that Terri could not establish the 

proximate cause required for a negligence claim. The court 

concluded that the record did not contain a disputed issue as 

to whether Terri slipped in a liquid. In doing so, it focused on 

Terri’s testimony during her deposition that she was uncertain if the liquid she slipped in was water (as opposed to 

something else) and that she did not feel the wetness on her 

dress until after the fall. The district court also dismissed 

Louis’s loss of consortium claim since it hinged on the success 

of Terri’s negligence claim.

The LoBiancos now appeal.

II

Our review of the district court’s summary judgment ruling proceeds on “a clean slate, drawing all reasonable inferences from the record in favor of [the LoBiancos] as the nonmovant[s].” Xiong v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys., 62 F.4th 

350, 353 (7th Cir. 2023). 

A 

With the case proceeding under diversity jurisdiction, 

“state substantive [tort] law applies—here, that of Illinois.” 

Perez v. Staples Cont. & Com. LLC, 31 F.4th 560, 570 (7th Cir. 

2022). In Illinois, negligence plaintiffs must prove “[t]he 

elements of ... duty, breach, proximate causation, and 

damages” to prevail. Enadeghe v. Dahms, 95 N.E.3d 1170, 1175 

(Ill. App. Ct. 2017). At issue here is whether Terri has put forth 

sufficient evidence that liquid on the restaurant floor caused 

her to slip, so this appeal concerns only the element of 
4 No. 23-2213 

proximate cause. While proximate cause can be further 

broken down into cause in fact and legal cause, Jones v. Live 

Nation Ent., Inc., 63 N.E.3d 959, 974 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016), the 

latter—“essentially a question of foreseeability” about the 

likelihood of an injury—is not contested. People v. Mumaugh, 

94 N.E.3d 237, 244 (Ill. App. Ct. 2018). 

To that end, our focus concentrates on factual causation. 

The controlling question is whether Terri, in opposing Bonefish Grill’s summary judgment motion, put “forth facts [allowing a finding] that her fall was caused by a liquid substance on the floor ....” Ishoo v. Gen. Growth Props., Inc., 966 

N.E.2d 1160, 1164 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012). To create a jury issue, 

she must show “with reasonable certainty that [Bonefish 

Grill’s] acts or omissions caused [her]” to slip and fall, Berke v. 

Manilow, 63 N.E.3d 194, 204 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016) (citation and 

internal quotation marks omitted), by “using either direct or 

circumstantial evidence.” Barker v. Eagle Food Ctrs., Inc., 634 

N.E.2d 1276, 1279 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994). 

Illinois slip-and-fall plaintiffs can survive summary judgment when they “repeatedly and conclusively indicate[]” 

what caused them to fall. Caburnay v. Nor. Am. Hosp., 963 

N.E.2d 1021, 1028–29 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011); see Ishoo, 966 N.E.2d 

at 1164. That follows because “the credibility of [a] plaintiff[]” 

who is unequivocal in “claim[ing] that her fall was caused by 

a liquid substance on the floor cannot be decided in a summary judgment motion.” Ishoo, 966 N.E.2d at 1164; see also

Caburnay, 963 N.E.2d at 1028–30 (holding that a jury issue existed about whether a fold in a mat caused a plaintiff’s fall 

where he “repeatedly and conclusively indicated that he fell 

only after tripping on a fold or bump in [the defendant’s] 

mat”). To identify the source of their fall, a plaintiff may use 
No. 23-2213 5

their “sensory perception of what caused their fall.” Caburnay, 

963 N.E.2d at 1028.

By contrast, a plaintiff cannot offer only conjecture about 

the “mere possibility of a causal connection” between a slip 

hazard and injury and advance past summary judgment. 

Barker, 634 N.E.2d at 1279. Indeed, plaintiffs who express uncertainty about what caused their fall are not permitted to assume or infer that a nearby hazard (like a pool of liquid) was 

to blame. Id. at 1278; Brett v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 290 N.E.2d 

712, 714 (Ill. App. Ct. 1972); Kimbrough v. Jewel Cos., 416 N.E.2d 

328, 331 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981); Vance v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 480 

N.E.2d 167, 168–70 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985). Nor can a plaintiff create a jury issue by offering only after-the-fact speculation 

about whether a hazard existed at all. See Palumbo v. Frank’s 

Nursery & Crafts, Inc., 537 N.E.2d 1073, 1076–77 (Ill. App. Ct. 

1989). 

B 

Against these principles, we conclude that Terri has created a jury issue as to the proximate cause of her fall and resulting hip injury.

At every turn, Terri has repeatedly—and in no uncertain 

terms—identified a liquid as the cause of her fall. Directly after she fell, Terri told her sister that she “slipped on some water.” She repeated this to the restaurant manager moments 

later. During her deposition, she underscored the same point 

once more, testifying that she slipped in liquid while at Bonefish Grill. She explained that her foot “went like lightning” as 

she stepped in the liquid, which she described as feeling “slippery and wet” on both her and her dress after she fell. Terri’s 

unwavering account reflects her own perception of the liquid 
6 No. 23-2213 

both during and after her fall. See Caburnay, 963 N.E.2d at 

1028 (concluding that summary judgment was inappropriate 

when a plaintiff “unequivocally testified as to his sensory perceptions” about his foot getting caught in a mat); Ishoo, 966 

N.E.2d at 1164 (finding that a plaintiff’s consistent testimony 

about stepping on a liquid substance was sufficient to create 

a jury issue of whether she slipped in liquid). 

Third parties provided additional corroboration for Terri’s 

account. After seeing that Terri had fallen, one Bonefish Grill 

employee stated that she had told somebody to clean the spill 

up. The district court concluded that, as an agent of the defendant, the employee’s statement was admissible for its truth 

and thus properly considered at summary judgment. See Fed 

R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(D); Prude v. Meli, 76 F.4th 648, 661 (7th Cir. 

2023). Bonefish has not appealed that determination. 

At the hospital, Louis also noticed that Terri’s dress was 

wet. Together, these facts create a genuine issue of material 

fact as to whether Terri slipped in liquid at Bonefish Grill. See

Wiegman v. Hitch-Inn Post of Libertyville, Inc., 721 N.E.2d 614, 

622–23 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999) (holding that a plaintiff’s testimony 

that she slipped, along with wetness on her dress and witness 

testimony about the wet floor, was sufficient to survive summary judgment).

Bonefish Grill sees the analysis differently, insisting that 

Terri speculated that she slipped in water only because she 

noticed a wet spot on her dress after falling. Speculation occurs when a plaintiff expresses uncertainty about or cannot 

identify why they fell. See, e.g., Kimbrough, 416 N.E.2d at 330 

(explaining that the plaintiff stated in her deposition that she 

had “no idea” what she may have fallen on); Barker, 634 

N.E.2d at 1279 (holding that no genuine issue of material fact 
No. 23-2213 7

existed where plaintiff fell on a grocery store floor that was 

ordinarily wet but presented no evidence that it was wet 

when she fell). In those cases, “the lack of an identifiable defect was the determinative factor.” Canzoneri v. Village of 

Franklin Park, 513 N.E.2d 1103, 1107 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987). But 

that is not the situation here. Terri consistently and “specifically pointed to [the liquid] which she claimed caused her to 

fall,” so her account roots itself in recalled sensory perception, 

not speculation. Id.

When viewing the record in the light most favorable to 

Terri, we see sufficient evidence to create a jury issue about 

whether liquid on Bonefish Grill’s floor caused her to slip and 

injure herself. So we reverse on Terri’s negligence claim.

C 

The district court also granted summary judgment in favor of Bonefish Grill on Louis’s loss of consortium claim since 

that claim depends on Terri’s negligence claim. See Blagg v. 

Ill. F.W.D. Truck & Equip. Co., 572 N.E.2d 920, 927 (Ill. 1991)

Because Terri’s claim can advance to trial, we also reverse on 

Louis’s loss of consortium claim.

For these reasons, we REVERSE and REMAND for 

proceedings consistent with this opinion.