Filed 9 / 24 / 15 CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. JENNIFER ROSE SELLNER, Defendant and Appellant. 2d Crim. No. B261487 ( Super. Ct. No. 2011005319) (Ventura County)

Jennifer Rose Sellner appeals a n order resentencing her to two years felony jail for receiving stolen property

. (Pen. Code, § 496.) 1 In 2014, appellant was sentenc ed to eight months
, one

- third the two year midterm
, in case number 2011005319 , to be served consecutive to a three year principal term se ntence in case number 2014007685

. (§ 1170.1, subd. (a).) T he trial court denied Proposition 47 relief in case number
2011005319 but granted a Proposition 47 pe tition in case number 2014007605 and
reduced the conviction on the principal term to a misdemeanor (§ 1170.18). A ppellant

was " resentenced " to two years felony jail in case number 2011005319 awarded credit for
time served ( i.e. 737 days ), and was released from custody. Appellant contends that the trial court could not lawfully "resentence" her to two years in case number 2011005319. According to appellant, she should have been sentenced t o eight months county jail. We disagree and affirm.
Claimed Mootne ss

1 All statutory references are to the Penal Code.2 The Attorney General contends that the appeal is moot and should be dismissed because the sentence has been deemed served. (See e.g., People v. Valencia (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 326, 329.) We deny the motion to dismiss because the new
sentence affects the custody credits that can be applied to outstanding fines or fees. (§ 2900.5, subd. (a) [$30 per day or more, in the discretion of the court imposing sentence];

see People v. Robinson (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 401, 406

- 407.) When appellant was

resentence d to two years felony jail, she was ordered to pay all fines and fees previously imposed.
Jurisdiction To Resentence

Appellant's argument that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to resentence is without merit. Section 1170.1, subdivision (a) creates a n exception to the general rule that jurisdiction ceases when execution of sentence begins. "[W]hen a defendant is sentenced consecutively for multiple convictions, whether in the same proceeding or in different proceedings, the judgment or aggregate dete rminate term is to be viewed as interlocking pieces consisting of a principal term and one or more subordinate terms. (§ 1170.1, subd. (a).) Section 1170.1, with certain exceptions, also places certain restrictions on the sentencing judge's discretion su ch as limiting the term of imprisonment
for a subordinate term to no more than one

- third the middle term of imprisonment for
such conviction

. . . . " ( People v. Begnaud (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1548, 1552.)

Here the eight month sentence was a subordinate consecutive term to the
three

- year sentence in case number 2 011005319

. Based on the Proposition 47 modification of the principal sentence, the trial court not only was vested with jurisdiction to resentence in case number 2014007685
, it was required to d o so

. ( People v. Begnaud, supra, at p. 1552; People v. Bustamante (1981) 30 Cal.3d 88, 104, fn. 12.) Appellant was not strictly "resentenced" but, instead, ordered to serve the sentence originally imposed, two years county jail.

Appellant claims that the increased sentence presents a jeopardy issue
because appellant has been subjected to a sentence greater than originally imposed. Were one to put horse blinders on an d view only the sentence in case number 2011005319
,3

appellant would be correct. We mu st, h owever, look at the big picture. The initial aggregate sentence was three years and eight months. Two years is less than that and thus, appellant received a lesser sentence

. W hen the principal term is no longer in existence, the subordinate term mu st be recomputed. That is the case here. As long as the recomputed term is less than the prior aggregate term
, the defendant has not been punished more severe ly for the successful filing of a Proposition 47 petition.

Section 1170.18, subdivision (e) p rovides: "Under no circumstances may resentencing un d er th i s section result in the impos ition of a term longer than the original
sentence." It d oes not trump section 1170.1, su bdivision (a) or govern aggregate consecutive sentences which are treated as i nterlocking pieces

. ( People v. Begnaud.

s up ra, 235 C a l.App.3d at p.1552,)

The judgment is affirmed.
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

YEGAN, J.

We concur:

GILBERT, P. J.

PERREN, J.4 Gilbert Romero, Judge
Superior Court County of Ventura

________ ______________________

Stephen P. Lipson, Public Defender and Michael C. McMah o n, Chief Deputy, for Defendant and Appellant.

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Steven D. Harris, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Robert C. Schneider, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.