DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY PAMPHLET NO. 20-202 

mSTORICAL STUDY 

GERMAN TANK 

MAINTENANCE 

IN 

WORLDWARII 

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY JUNE 1954 
'No. 

2(}-201 

2(}-230 

2G-231 

20-282 

20-233 

20-234 

20-236 

20-240 

20-242 

20-260 

20-269 

20-290 

20-291 

20-292 

Department of the M-my ~pbleta Publfabed 

•n the 

GERMAN REPORT SERIES 

J>.lllfeatln 

Tllll . ~aU 

Military Improvisations During the Russian Campaign _______ . Aug 51 

Russian .Combat Methods in World War II, ________________ . Nov 50 

Combat in Russian Forests and Swamps-----------------.. -- Jul 51 

Airborne Operatioria: A German Appraisal.----------------_:- Oct 61 

German Defense Tactics Against Russian Break-Throughs---- Oct 61 

Operationa of Enc:ii-cled Fortes: German Experiences in 

Ruasia. _ --------------------------------.. -----------.. Jan 62 

Night Combat.--.. -------------------,..-·-----------------. Jun 68 Rear Area Security in :auesia ________________________ :. ____ Jul 61 

German Armored Traffic Contsrol During the Ruealan Cam- · 

palgn.~---------------------------------------------- Jun 52 

The German Campaigns hi the Balkana (Spring 1941) ____ . ___ Nov~ 

Small Unit Actions During t.he German Campaign In Ru.asia...' Jul 53 

Terrain Factors in the Ruaaian Campaign ______ :. _______ : ___ Jul 61 

Effects of CUmAte on Combat in European Ruseia___________ Feb 62 

Warfare Jn the Far North-------------------------------'-· Oct 61 
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY 

GERMAN TANK 

MAINTENANCE 

IN 

WORLD WAR II 

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY 

NO. 20-202 

JUNE 1954 
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY 

WASHINGTON 25, D. C., ~5 June 1954, 

DA Pamphlet 20-202 is published for the information and use of 

all concerned. 

[AG 3M (26 Apr. M)] 

BY OBDER OJ' THI!l SEOBETABY OJ' THI!l AB:u:Y : 

OJ'J'ICIAL: 

M. B. RIDGWAY, 

General, United. 8tatea Jtrmv, 

Ohi.ef ot Staff. 

JOHN A. KLEIN, 

Major General, United. States Jtnny, 

The .4d.jutant General. 

DI6TBIB'O'l'ION ; 

II 

Active Army: 

Gen Statr, DA (5) 

SS, DA (5) 

Tee Svc DA, (26) 

Admin & Tee Svc Bd (10) 

AFF (10) 

OS Maj Comd (50) 

Armies (10) 

Corps (10) 

NG: State AG (1). 

USJt.R: None. 

In!, Div (2) 

Armored Div (8) 

In! Brig (3) 

Armored Gp (8) 

Armored Bn ( 4) 

Gen & Br Svc Scb (25) 

PMST ROTC units (1) 

Mil Dist (1) 

Unless otherwise noted, distribution appUes to ConUS and overseas. 

For explanation of abbreviations used, see SR 820-50-1. 

Facsimile Edition 

Center of Military History 

United States Army 

Washington, D.C., 1982 
FOREWORD 

The material for this pamphlet was prepared for the Historical 

Division, EUCOM, by a. group of former German generals, general 

sta1f officers, and tank maintenance specialists. The principal author, 

General Burkhart H. Mueller-Hillebrand, served as aide to the Chief 

of the Army General Sta1f before assuming command of an armored 

regiment on the Russian front. Successively appointed chief of staff 

of a panzer corps and a panzer army, he saw action in the Ukraine, 

Poland, and East Prussia.. 

The reader is reminded that all publications in the GERMAN REPORT SERIES were written from the German point o£ view, and 

that the procedures of the German Army normally differed widely 

from those of the United States Army. "German Tank Maintenance 

in World War II" will be of interest to persons who want to compare 

the United States and German systems of tank maintenance. 

Ill 
' I 
CONTENTS 

CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION Page 

I. The Centralized Tank MAintenance System •• ·····------- 1 

II. The Collapse of the Centralized System. •• _.··-···------- 2 

III. Decentralization __ ·----------·-----------••• --.--__ --- 8 

IV. New Tanks versus Spare Parte.----------------------·-- • CHAPTER 2. ORGANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT 

I. GenenU------------·-------------·------·------------ 5 

II. The Tank MAintenance Detachment_____________________ 5 

Ill. The Tank Maintenance CompanY-----------·----------- 6 IV. Nonorganlc Tank MAintenance Units____________________ 14 

V. Automotive Maintenance.-----·-·--------·------------ 14 

CHAPTER 3. OPERATING PROCEDURES 

I. Gener.M·---------------------------------·----------- 17 

II. The Tank MAintenance Detachment_____________________ 17 

III. The Tank MAintenance CompanY----------··------·---- 17 

IV. The Casual Company •••• -----·--· ________ ------------- 20 

V. Spare Parte Supply____________________________________ 21 

VI. Depot MAintenance Installations________________________ 26 

VII. ~nin8-------- -----·-· --- --·-···-----·--- ---------- 29 

CHAPTER 4. OPERATIONS 

I. In BivouaC-------·-·-···--·-----------·-···-··------- 32 II. On the March. ________________ • ___________ ._-----____ 32 

III. Before and During an Attack..·-··------··-·-·-·-------- 33 

IV. During Advance and Pursuit--------------------·------ 34 

V. After an Attack...·-------··-·------------------------- 35 

VI. In Statio Situations_____________________________ _______ 37 

VII. On the Defensive.-----------·--··-·-····--·---------·- 37 

VIII. During a Retrograde Movement ••• ------·-··----------- 39 

CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSIONS 

I. General---------------------------------------------- 41 II. Basic Principles __ •• _. ____ ____ __ •• _____ • __ • _____ ------- 41 

III. Summary·--------------------------·--------------·· 44 

MAPS AND CHARTS 

General Reference MaP-------------------------------------------- vi 

Chart 1-Qrganlzation of a German Tank MAintenance Detachment_____ 7 

Chart 2--0rganlzation of a German Tank MAintenance Company_______ 8-9 

., 
~ 

GENERAL REFERENCE MAP 

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u. s. s. II. 

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u II K E y 

. /"'' 
CHAPTER 1 

INTRODUCTION 

I. The Centralized Tank Maintenance System 

Even before the outbreak of World War II, German experts in 

armored warfare realized that a well-functioning tank maintenance 

system would be essential. Initially, a centralized system was planned 

in which only minor repairs would be carried out in the field, and 

tanks that had sustained more serious damage would be returned to 

the factory of origin in the zone of interior. 

During the short Polish campaign in September 1989, this system 

worked well and very few difficulties were encountered. As soon as 

Poland had been conquered, the armored divisions returned to their 

respective peacetime garrisons in Germany, where all vehicles were 

quickly repaired and restored to maximum efficiency at depot maintenance installations and tank production plants. 

The French campaign of Me.y-June 1940 presented only a few maintenance problems. Minor organizational deficiencies that had first 

cropped up during the Polish campaign were corrected and the 

strength of the organic maintenance personnel was inc~sed. A large 

tank spare parts depot, from which the armored forces drew their supplies, was established in northern France. At the end of the campaign, which lasted only 6 weeks, most of the armored divisions 

returned once more to their garrisons in Germany. Those divisions 

remaining in France were able to utilize the services and facilities of 

the many former French Army repair shops. Moreover, the distance 

to the tank factories in Germany was relatively short. AB a result, all 

armored divisions were combat-ready shortly after the conclusion of 

the French campaign. 

During the campaigns in the Balkans in the spring of 1941 the Germans committed numerous panzer divisions. These campaigns were 

also short and involved few tank losses, most of them caused by bad 

road conditions and accelerated march movements during which it was 

not always possible to perform preventive maintenance. After the 

conclusion of the operations against Yugoslavia and Greece, the 

armored divisions were rehabilitated in the zone of interior and transferred to assembly areas for the campaign against Russin. 

1 
2 GERMAN REPORT SOliS 

When German armored units first landed in North Africa in February 1941, it was realized that a rigidly centralized maintenance system was not feasible in the new theater. Since relatively few damaged 

tanks could be returned to the zone of interior, greater emphasis had to 

be placed on field maintenance. As the German Army became more 

heavily engaged in .Russia, the supply situ11;tion within the North 

African theater grew precarious and tank maintenance personnel had 

to rely mainly on improvisation and cannibalization. 

For the Russian campaign the Germans intended to apply a. slightly 

modified, but essentially centralized system of tank maintenance. Most 

of the tank repairs were still to be performed in the zone of interior. On the other hand, each of the three army groups in tb& 

Russian theater was to have a spare-parts depot. Improved maintenance vehicles, recovery vehicles, and better shop equipment wer& 

issued to the maintenance units in the field. No further planning was 

considered necessary because both the military and the political leaders 

assumed that military operations would reach their climax du~ing the 

autumn of 1941 and that most of the armored forces would return to 

Germany before the winter. Those remaining in the Russian theater 

would be withdrawn from action and rehabilitated in suitable areas 

during the winter months. 

II. The Collapse of the Centralized System 

Once the Russian campaign got under way, the need for tank maintenance installations and the demand for spare parts increased by leaps 

and bounds. German tank losses in Russia were far heavier than 

during the preceding campaigns. For the first time large numbers 

of tanks were put out of action by enemy fire and mines. With·opera.-

tions being conducted over great distances under unusual conditions, 

such as extreme heat and dust in summer and subzero temperatures 

in winter, the mechanical operation of tanks was greatly affected, 

resulting in an unexpectedly high attrition rate. The tank maintenance services were handicapped because only the larger towns 

contained buildings that provided even minimum shop and billeting 

facilities. Despite strenuous efforts, the maintenance personnel were 

unable to cope with the ever-increasing volume of repair work. The 

German Army's requirements for all types of supplies, particularly 

ammunition, fuel, and medical supplies, exceeded all expectations. 

The inadequate road and rail nets made it impossible to support the 

rapidly advancing armored columns. Since very little rolling stock 

was captured, the railroad tracks bad to be converted from the wide 

Russian to standard European gage. Moreover, the Russians demolished most railroad bridges and locomotive maintenance shops 

during their withdrawal. The unsatisfactory rail transportation situ-
GERMAN TANK MAINTINANCE IN WORLD WAR II 3 

ation had a disastrous effect on the tank maintenance system at a 

time when the number of disabled tanks reached an alltime high. 

Obviously the centralized system of maintenance was no longer practical, and major changes had to be introduced without delay. 

Ill. Decentralization 

Most of the repair work that had hitherto been performed in the 

zone of interior had to be undertaken by maintenance units in the field. 

The following measures were therefore initiated : 

a. The strength of the maintenance units in the field was considerably increased and replacements were given better technical training. 

b. Improved equipment and more efficient recovery vehicles were 

made available. Some new special-purpose equipment was developed. 

o. New depot maintenance installations were established in the 

Russian theater to take over those repair functions that formerly had 

been performed in Germany. 

d. The manufacture of spare parts in Germany was stepped up to 

meet the increased demands of units in the field. 

e. The parts supply organization was radically changed in order 

to afford a more rapid and efficient distribution of spare parts. 

f. Qualified officers were given specialized tank maintenance training before being assigned to commands in the field and to technical 

staff positions. 

g. Certain functions hitherto accomplished by top-level agencies 

in the zone of interior were transferred to headquarters in the field. 

Since such a comprehensive reorganization program could not materialize overnight, the new system did not become fully effective until 

the summer of 1942. During the interim period new tank models 

were developed, and those in service were improved so that they would 

be at least equal if not superior to the excellent Russian tanks. Because of the limited capacity of the German armament industry, it 

was not feasible to scrap obsolete tank models and replace them with 

better ones. .As a result, the number of tank models and types within 

each series issued to the field forces increased steadily, which in turn 

had an adverse effect on the efficiency of the maintenance services. 

The measures designed to increase personnel strength and provide 

better equipment were carried out without much trouble, but the rest 

of the program was more difficult to execute. Large quantities of 

spare parts stored in the zone of interior were hurriedly loaded on 

trains and shipped to the Russian theater. Since the average staff 

officer was not acquainted with the intricacies of tank maintenance, 

464-729 0 - 85 - 2 
.. GERMAN REPORT SliiiS 

many of the trains were misdirected. Army Group South, for instance, received several shipments of spare parts for tank models it did 

not have, whereas Army Group North was in urgent need of the very 

same parts. 

During the summer offensive of 1942 the Germans discovered that 

the tank ma.intenance personnel were still inadequately trained. Supplementary on-the-job training and refresher courses were given to 

officer and enlisted personnel. Manuals stressing the importance of 

safeguarding equipment and the responsibilities of first and second 

echelon maintenance were given wide distribution. Additional personnel and equipment were provided for the maintenance units to 

assist in reducing the accumulated backlog of repairs. 

Most of the difficulties encountered in 1942 arose because decentralization was not consistently applied. There was constant interference 

in the allocation of parts between depot and field maintenance units. 

Although the transportation system was functioning more smoothly 

by the middle of 1942, a new and even more urgent problem was to 

overshadow all other deficiencies of the tank maintenance system. 

IV. New Tanks Versus Spare Parts 

The stocks of spare parts, of which there had never been an abundance, fell below the critical level during the summer ot 1942. Some 

of the armament production officials who had failed to re!l.lize the 

importance of spare parts in the field of maintenance were partly responsible for the seriousness of the situation. While pressing for an 

increase in the production of new tanks, they had neglected the urgent 

need for spare parts until it was too late and irreparable damage had 

been done. 

With its limited industrial capacity, Germany was unable to produce more new tanks and a. satisfactory amount of spare parts at the 

same time. The armored forces therefore suffered from a constant 

shortage of tank spare parts until the end of the war. 

For a better understanding of the above-mentioned problems and 

the solutions that the Germans attempted to find, it is necessary to 

analyze the organization, procedures, and operations of their tank 

maintenance services. 
I. General 

CHAPTER 2 

ORGANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT 

~faintenance of track-laying vehicles was the function of organic 

and nonorganic units. The organic units were established exclusively 

at the company and regimental levels, while the nonorganic ones were 

attached~ither as entities or in partr-to the maintenance detachments or companies in the field to assist them in carrying out their 

mission. 

II. The Tank Maintenance Detachment 

The smallest organic unit was the maintenance detachment of the 

tank company, which was composed of 19 enlisted men. (Chart 1.) 

The senior noncommissioned officer-the detachment leader---6Upervised operations. He was assisted by two crew chiefs. Among the 

privates were 6 meehanies (2 of whom drove the shop trucks), 2 

radio repairmen, 2 armorers, 1 electrician, 1 welder, 1 spare parts. 

clerk, and 8 drivers. Initially, wheeled equipment of the detachment 

consisted of 3 to 4 vehicles, including a motorcycle with sidecar or 

a personnel carrier, a light 1-ton half-track prime mover, and a parts 

truck. During the later phases of the Russian campaign, the T/E 

for the maintenance detachment was changed to 2 shop trucks, 2 

light 1-ton half-track prime movers, a parts truck, and 1 passenger 

car. The shop trucks were used exclusively for the transport of such 

tools and equipment as a workbench with vise, a gas welding unit, a 

hand drill set, as well as mechanics', tinsmiths', and electricians' tools. 

The recovery equipment carried on the shop truck included cables, 

winches, pulleys, and jacks. The repair crews were transported on 

the prime movers. 

The detachment was responsible for on-the-spot repairs of disabled 

tanks, including soldering and welding. It was highly mobile and 

capable of operating in any terrain. The personnel were trained to 

determine the extent of damage and either perform the necessary 

repairs or arrange for evacuation by the recovery platoon of the tank 

regiment's maintenance company. 

5 
6 GERMAN lEPOif SIIIIS 

Ill. The Tank Maintenance Company 

The principal function of the maintenance company of a tank regiment was to perfonn those repairs which could not be carried out by 

the detachments in the tank companies. The company's mission was 

to eliminate technical defects, repair electrical equipment, radio sets, 

tank weapons, optical instruments, damage resulting from direct hits, 

recover and remove disabled tanks from the battlefield, and maintain 

stocks of spare parts. In addition, the co~pany was responsible for 

the welfare of the tank crews who accompanied their disabled vehicles to the field repair shop. The repair of the regiment's wheeled 

vehicles was not within the scope of a tank maintenance company's 

responsibilities because such an additiona.l workload would have required the handling of greater stocks of parts and would have hampered tank repair operations. 

The strength of the company depended upon tne type of armored 

vehicles issued to the tank regiment and varied between 120 and 200 

men. Th~ company consisted of a company headquarters, 1 recovery 

and 2 maintenance platoons, and a weapons, a radio repair, and a 

spare parts section. (Chart 2.) 

a. Oompany Headguartera. According to the T/0, the company 

headquarters consisted of 2 officers, 8 noncommissioned officers, and 

24 privates. Its vehicular equipment included 5 command cars, 4: 

passenger vehicles, and 5 trucks. 

The company commander, preferably an officer with a degree in 

automotive engineering, was directly subordinate to the commander 

of the tank regiment. 

The assistant company commander, an officer with a background 

in automechanics, was responsible for the operation of the field repair 

shop. He directed and coordinated the activities of the ma.futenance 

platoons as well as of the weapons, radio repair, and spare-parts sections and was responsible for all matters pertaining to repairs and 

spare parts. 

The first sergeant, assisted by a company clerk, was responsible 

for administrative matters and had no part in.shop operations. 

The m9tor sergeant, assisted by a clerk, a mechanic, and three 

drivers, was responsible for the maintenance of the company's organic 

vehicles, including the requisitioning of POL and spare parts. He 

assigned vehicles to headquarters section personnel employed as temporary drivers. 

The mess personnel, consisting of 2 cooks and 2 assistants, operated 2 field kitchens because the maintenance personnel were usually 

divided into 2 echelons. Their hours of duty were long because of 

the unscheduled arrivals of tank crews accompanying their disabled 
Chari I 

ORGANIZATION OF A GERMAN TANK MAINTENANCE DmTAOlDIJlNT 

Detachment Leader (NCO) 

1 Spare Parts Clerk 

1 Driver 

1 Passenger car 

1 Spare Parts Truck 

Crew Chief (NCO) 

8 Mechanics 

1 Armorer 

1 Radio Repairman 

1 Electrician 

1 Driver 

1 Shop Truck 

1 Prime Mover 

ToTAL STRENGTH : 

8 NCO's 

16 Privates 

19 Enlisted Men 

6 Motor Vehicles 

Crew Chief (NCO) 

8 Mechanics 

1 Armorer 

1 RadJo Repairman 

1 Welder 

1 Driver 

1 Shop Truck 

1 Prime Mover 
Compcny beadqu.nen 1st m.alniAID&Doe platoon 

C010pao.y CoiDIXWlder Sbop l'oreiDSD 

AJ:stCoCmdr 24 MecbaD.Ica 

Fint Seraecnt 2 lAthe Operators 

Payroll Clerlt 2 Welders 

Compcny Clerk 2 Electrk:lao.s 

aMesseoaers 2 Crane Operators 

2 Medical Aidmen IBiaeltsmltb 

I Cobb!« I Carpenter 

I TaUor I Pe.lnter 

1 Clerk 

Motor Serceaot 1 Canvas & Webblna 

Clerk ReJ)61rman 

MecbaDlc 

3Drlnn 

2Coob 

2 A.sst Coolts 

ObJet, SIIIDAI Section 

3 Radio Openton 

1 Driver 

Cblel, A.A. Sectloo 

3 Crew Memben 

Supply Ser~eaot 

2 Drivers -

Ckn I. Or11011lrctlo!t tJ( c a- Ta..t NafaUMt~tC c-JlGJit 

ad m.alntenaooe platoon Recovery platoon W ecpoo.s sootlon Radio repair section 

Same as 1St Platoon Leader Sectloo Chlet Seetloo Oblet 

Me.lntenanoe Platoon Driver 2Armorers 3 Radio Rep&lrmen 

• Sectioos, eccb w1tb 1 ·~ta 

Sectloo Chlet, 2 

Dr! vers, and 2 Am 

Dr! vera, 2 Prime 

Movers per Sectloo 

-----

Spare puts section 

Seetloo. ObJet 

4 Stock Clerb, each In 

cbarce ol 1 Puts 

Tnlclt. 

• J.>rlnn Cor Paru 

Trucb. 

2 Driven Cor SUpply 

Plcltup Trucb 

----- -

CD 

0 

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z 

a = 

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.. ... 
2 Otllcers IS NCO's 

8NCO'e 30 Privates 

2f Private~ 

6 Command Can I Motorcycle 

4PasaenlcrCan 4SbopTrucb 

6Trucb 1 Bus 

I Wrecker 

1 Trailer for Oellerator 

SNCO'a 1 0111oer 

ao Privates &NCO's 

25 Privates 

~as lit 1 Pasaenaer Cac « Malolel&noe Pletoon Be&'t'Y MO!Of"Cye.._ 

12 Prime Movers 

4Tank~s 

-----···--

TGW Strmgt~ 4 Ollklen 

38 NCO's 

122 Prl vale! 

3 NOO'e 

4 Prlvates 

2Trucb 

t.M omen and Enlisted Mea 

57 Motor V eblcles 

INOO 

3Prtntel 

1 Truck 

I OffjCl't'. Tecbnlclazl 

4 NOO's 

II Privates 

IITrueb 

tP-..Cac 

-··---··- -

I 

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6 

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• 
10 GERMAN l!POin' SHIH 

vehicles to the field repair shop. In some instances, the feeding of 

such tank crews was taken care of by the casual company attached 

to the field repair shop. 

The personnel of the signal section, consisting of a chief, 3 radio 

operators, and 1 driver, maintained radio communication with regimental headquarters, transmitting reports on the status of the tanks 

lmder repair and receiving messages on the location of disabled tanks. 

The antiaircraft personnel consisted of 1 noncommissioned officer 

and 8 privates, equipped with a four-barreled 20-mm. antiaircraft 

gun mounted on a truck. 

The supply sergeant, assisted by 1 or 2 drivers with trucks, 

was responsible for the issue of clothing, equipment, and rations. 

Drawing the proper number of rations presented a problem because 

of the great variations in the daily ration strength. The supply 

sergeant also had to obtain fresh milk to supplement the ration of 

welders and painters. As a rule, he drew clothing and equipment 

from the regimental supply point. On many occasions, however, 

when the company was far removed from this source, supplies were 

obtained from the nearest depot. 

Other personnel of the headqua1ters section included a payroll 

clerk, a cobbler, a tailor, and several medical aidmen and messengers. 

b. The Maintenance Platoon. Each maintenance platoon consisted 

of 8 NCO's and 30 privates-! shop foreman, 24 mechanics, 2 lathe 

operators, 2 welders, 2 electricians, 2 crane operators, 1 blacksmith, 

1 carpenter, 1 canvas and webbing repairman, 1 painter, and 1 clerk. 

The wheeled vehicles included 1 motorcycle, 4 shop trucks, 1 bus, 1 

wrecker, and 1 trailer. 

The foreman, assisted by the shop clerk, was in charge of the 

platoon. He formed crews according to the nature of each repair job 

and supervised the men while they were at work. Being responsible 

for the tools and equipment issued to the platoon, he checked toolboxes and nonexpendable items of equipment at regular intervals. 

After repairs had been completed, he inspected each tank before its 

return to the combat unit. 

The 12 engine and 12 transmission mechanics formed crews of 3 

to 4 men each under the supervision of a nonco~ioned officer 

who acted as crew chief. On the march to a new operating site, all 

mechanics were transported by bus except those who were employed 

as drivers and assistant drivers of the four shop trucks. 

The lathe operators performed simple machining .work. They were 

also responsible for the care and servicing of the machinery in Shop 

Truck No. 1 and the issue of special tools carried on this vehicle. 

The welders were trained in acetylene and arc welding, and had to 

be capable of carrying out major jobs. They were responsible for 
OltMAN TANK MAINTENANCE IN WOlLD WAl II 11 

the equipment in their ca.re. On the march, the welders drove one of 

the company vehicles. 

The electricians repaired electrical systems and were responsible 

for the electrical equipment in the company. Occasionally, they were 

t\SSigned to drive a company vehicle during a march. 

The blacksmith, carpenter, canvas and webbing repairman, and 

painter performed their respective routine duties and kept their tools 

and equipment on one of the shop trucks, When on the move, they 

rode in the company bus. 

The equipment of each maintenance platoon was carried on the four 

shop trucks as follows: 

(1} Shop Truck No. 1 contained one light precision lathe, one 

electrical drill, and an emery wheel, all of which were bolted 

to the floor. In addition to a workbench, there were bins and 

lockers for the storage of tools and.equipment such as blocks, 

drills, special pliers, wheel pulleys, and precision gages. The 

special tools of the engine and transmission mechanics were 

also carried on this vehicle. 

(2} Shop Truck No.2 carried electrical equipment, such as ba~ 

tery chargers and electrical testing devices, and electricians' 

tools. 

(3) Shop Truck No.3 usually carried a forge, gas welding units, 

a transformer for arc welding, and some mechanics' toolboxes. 

( 4) Shop Truck No: 4 carried the remaining mechanics' toolboxes, 

carpenter and canvas repair tools, the painter's equipment, 

the repair-shop tents, and sundry items. 

The mechanics' toolboxes contained all the basic tools, including 

complete sets of wrenches, hammers, files, pliers, screwdri-vers, and 

p'Unches. All toolboxes were numbered and each mechanic was held 

responsible for the contents of the toolbox he was issued. 

The forge was equipped as a complete blacksmith unit, including 

anvil, hammers, and tongs. A small supply of forge coal was kept 

on hand. 

The welding equipment consisted of a high-voltage transformer, 

protective shields, aprons, electrodes of various diameters, and welding and cutting devices. Gas and oxygen cylinders were carried 

in stock. 

The electrical power for the operation of the field repair shop was 

produced by a. powerplant consisting of a heavy diesel engine and 

an electric generator. This equipment was mounted on four-wheeled 

trailers attached to Shop Truck No. 1 or 2 of each platoon. Whenever possible, each company was issued a reserve unit. The powerplant had to furnish current for the machines mounted in Shop Trucks 

464-729 0 - 85 - 3 
12 GEIMAN aEPOitT SEIIU 

No. 1 and 2, the a1·c-welding equipment, and the emergency lighting 

system. A sufficient supply of wire and light bulbs was carried in 

stock for night operations. 

The wrecker was equipped with a traversable lever crane capable 

of lifting 3 tons. The shop personnel often installed special devices 

on the wrecker for lifting heavy assemblies, such as cross shafts and 

drive sprockets, at their proper angle. 

c. The Rec01Jery Platoon. The recovery platoon of a tank maintenance company consisted of 1 officer, 6 noncommissioned officers, and 

25 privates. Its equipment included 1 passenger car or heavy motorcycle, 12 prime movers, and 4 tank transporters. 

The platoon leader was an officer with some training in automotive 

engineering who was well versed in 'both technical matters and armored tactics. His platoon was divided into 6 sections of 2 prime 

movers each, with a noncommissioned officer in charge of each section. The crew of each prime mover consisted of 1 driver and 1 assistant driver. 

The personnel were selected on the basis of their technical training 

and knowledge. Reliability combined with all other characteristics 

of a good soldier were prerequisites because the men were often away 

from the supervision of the tank maintenance company commander 

for long periods of time. Recovery personnel also had to be capable 

of performing temporary repairs in order to permit the removal of 

damaged tanks under their own power. Repeated attempts to increase the strength of the organic recovery units were frustrated by 

the shortage of prime movers and tank transporters. Equally unsuccessful were the many efforts to establish a separate tank recovery 

organization that would have operated independently of the field repair shop units. 

The equipment used for the recovery of disabled tanks consisted of 

tow bars, cables, cable winches, grapnels, prime movers, and tank 

transporters. The normal recovery procedure was to use a prime 

mover, with a tow bar, having a pulling capacity of 12 tons. Cables 

were used whenever tow bars were unavailable and the brakes of the 

disabled tank were in working condition. The tractive power of a 

cable winch equipped with a pulley was 7 tons when mounted on a 

prime mover, and 40 tons when mounted on a heavy tank. With the 

aid of a grapnel a. prime mover could pull even a 50-ton vehicle. 

The prime mover, used both for towing and evacuation, was an 

18-ton half-track vehicle with a Maybach engine. It was adequate 

for towing standard tanks weighing up to 20 tons. The recovery of 

heavier tanks presented no problem because 2 or 3 prime movers were 

coupled together whenever necessary. The 18-ton prime mover was 
GERMAN TANK MAINTENANCE IN WORLD WAlt II 13 

easy to operate in any type of terrain. Wherever possible, tanks 

bogged down in the mud were extricated by prime movers anchored 

to the base of a tree. 

Tank transporters were used for the removal of tanks that could 

not move under their own power. The transporter was a specialpurpose vehicle with eight wheels and a wide loading surface. It 

had two ramps and a low bed on which the tank was transported. The 

steering mechanism was in the rear ramp. In order to load a tank on 

the transporter, the rear ramp was removed and the bed lowered to 

the ground. After the tank was loaded, the rear ramp was hooked on 

and the bed raised to traveling position. There were three types of 

transporters with carrying capacities of 12, 22, and 60 tons, respectively. 

Tank recovery implied the removal of disabled vehicles from the 

battlefield, their colle.}tion at a point where they were protected from 

enemy observation and fire, and their evacuation from the collecting 

point to the field repair shop or the nearest railhead for shipment to 

a. rear area. installation. It a.lso included pulling immobilized tanks 

out of mud, snow, swamps, and ditches as well as righting overturned 

vehicles. If the organic recovery elements were unable to accomplish 

their mission alone, the assistance of one of the nonorganic recovery 

units attached to army or army group headquarters could be requested. 

d. The W eap01UJ Section. The weapons section was composed of 

8 noncommissioned officers and 4 privates. The section chief had the 

rank of master sergeant. The vehicular equipment consisted of two 

trucks that carried spare parts. 

The section was responsible for the repair or replacement of defective tank guns and mounts, stabilizers, a.nd turret traversing mechanisms. 

Gun and equipment replacements were requisitioned directly from 

regimental headquarters. 

e. The Radio Repair Section. The radio repair section consisted 

of a radio technician with the rank of sergeant, and three repairmen. 

The section was assigned one truck to carry its tools, equipment, and 

spare parts. The sergeant was responsible for all tank radio repairs 

in the regiment. 

f. The Spare Part8 Section. The total strength of the spare parts 

section was 1 officer or civilian technician, 8 noncommissioned officers, 

and 7 privates. The section chief, a company-grade officer with some 

background in automotive engineering or a civilian inspector with 

assimilated rank, was responsible for the control of spare parts. The 

vehicular equipment consisted of 6 trucks and 1 passenger car. Four 

of the trucks had fixed superstructures with facilities for the storage 

and issue of parts. These trucks always remained in the field ·repair 
14 GERMAN REI'OIT SRIIS 

sliop area. The other two trucks were employed to pick up spare 

parts requisitioned from depots. 

IV. Nonorganic Tank Maintenance Units 

a. The Tank Maim.tenance Platoon. The maintenance platoon was 

the lowest-echelon, nonorganic tank maintenance unit. It was usually 

attached to a tank battalion operating separately. Its strength varied 

between 50 and 120 men, including recovery crews. Its mission was 

to perform field maintenance, including the replacement of engines 

and transmissions as well as some of the more complicated welding 

jobs. During operations the platoon deta<:hed one maintenance detail 

to each tank company and set up a repair shop at platoon headquarters. Depending on the tactical situation and the condition of the 

disabled tank, the latter would either be repaired on the spot or 

evacuated to the repair shop. 

1u The Ta'Tik Maintenance and Tatnlc Ilecoverf; Oompam:ie8. These 

companies were GHQ units under the jurisdiction of the Army High 

CommMld, which attached them to an army group or army headquarters as the need arose. The composition of the nonorganic tank 

maintenance companies was similar to that of the organic ones forming part of the tank regiments, except that they had no recovery personnel and equipment. Separate recovery companies were responsible 

for the removal and evacuation of 'disabled tanks. The function of 

the nonorganic companies was to support armored forces that did not 

have adequate maintenance facilities at their disposal and to remforce the organic maintenance units whenever the rate of tank attrition 

became particularly heavy. 

c. Tank Maintenance BattalMmJJ. In December 1944 the Germans 

organized eight tank maintenance battalions, whose composition, 

capacity, and mission were essentially the same as those of fullstrength nonorganic tank maintenance companies. The main ditference was that each battalion included a tank recovery platoon or 

company. 

V. Automotive Maintenance 

The wheeled and half-track vehicles in an armored division far outnumbered the track-laying ones. The mission of the automotive 

maintenance units was complicated because of the great variety of 

requisitioned civilian vehicles used by the German Army . . Attempts 

to standardize division vehicular equipment by intraunit exchange in 

order to simplify parts supply procedures were unsuccessful because 

the high rate of attrition necessitated the constant replacement of 

motor vehicles from the zone of interior. 
ORMAN TANK MAINTENANCE IN WOaLD WAa II 1S 

Each motorized company and battalion had its respective automotive maintenance section or platoon. There was no need for any automotive maintenance units at the regimental level because 1 heavy and 2 

medium automotive maintenance companies at the division level effected third and •fourth echelon repairs that could not be carried out 

on the spot. 

a. The Divisitm Ordinance Officer. The three automotive maintenance companies plus a spare parts section were under the technical 

supervision of the division ordnance officer. He was responsible for 

the maintenance of the wheeled and half-track vehicles in the division. Self-propelled artillery and assault gun battalions had their 

own organic maintenance units for routine repair work and could 

call on the tank maintenance company of the tank regiment for all 

major repairs. 

The heavy automotive maintenance company performed body, 

frame, and engine repairs, rebored cyli~der walls, turned down crankshafts, cast bearings, overhauled motors, installed connecting rods, 

relined brakes, and reconditioned electrical systems and diesel injection pumps. In addition, it rebuilt engines, starters, and generators. 

One of the two medium automotive maintenance companies was primarily concerned with the maintenance of wheeled vehicles; the other, 

to which a weapons section was attached, specialized in the repair of 

the many half-track vehicles that were issued to each armored division. 

The spare-parts section, whose trucks were capable of carrying 75 

tons of automotive parts, was always located in the immediate vicinity 

of one of the maintenance companies. 

b. The Regimental Motor Officer. The regimental motor officer advised the commander of the tank regiment on technical matters pertaining to motor transportation and was his deputy for the operation 

of all motor transportation in the regiment. The battalion motor officers were under his technical supervision, and the tank maintenance 

company was under his operational control. He maintained contact 

with the division ordnance officer and other technical staff agencies 

responsible for motor transportation. 

Although he did not exercise immediate control over the various 

maintenance units, the regimental motor officer was responsible for 

coordinating all maintenance efforts within the tank regiment. He 

also produced advance estimates of spare-parts requirements. In the 

field of tank maintenance the regimental motor officer was primarily 

concerned with expediting operations. 

c. The Battalion Motor Officer. The battalion motor officer advised the tank battalion commander on matters pertaining to motor 

transportation. The automotive maintenance elements were under 
16 GEIMAN UPOIT Slltlll 

his technical supervision. He was also responsible for the supervision 

and employment of all tank maintenance detachments in the battalion 

as well as for the procurement of spare parts. This centralized· control guaranteed efficient battlefield repair operations. He divided the 

workload in a.coordance with the mission and capability of ·each unit. 

He was assisted by a civilian technician with assimilated military rank 

who supervised the maintenance detachment leaders under his control. 

The battalion motor officer submitted a daily report to the battalion 

commander and the regimental motor officer, indicating the location 

of disabled tanks, the extent of damage, and whether they could be 

repaired by the maintenance detachments or whether their evacuation 

to the field repair shop or to the rear was necessary. 
I. General 

CHAPTER 3 

OPERA liNG PROCEDURES 

More than any other motor vehicle, the tank is subject to defects. 

Some part is always in need of attention, even if it is only a loose nut 

or bolt that needs tightening. For this reason, the drivers as well as 

the tank crews were instructed to constantly check even apparently 

serviceable tanks for defects and repair them immediately. Whenever a minor defect was overlooked, it eventually developed into a 

major repair job. German field maintenance personnel made every 

effort to repair disabled vehicles within the tunk regiment. Tank 

crews had to feel confident that the organic maintenance units were 

as well qualified to look after their vehicles as those at a higher level. 

Moreover, the personnel of the tank maintenance detachments and 

company knew each tank and tank crew in the regiment. They made 

every effort to get the tank back into action as quickly as possible. 

II. The Tank Maintenance Detachment 

Tank maintenance detachment personnel were responsible for effecting any repair that did not require more than half a day's work. Damages of greater magnitude could be repaired by detachment personnel 

on condition that they were staying in one location for an extended 

period. When necessary, a maintenance detachment could replace an 

engine by means of an improvised hoist, even though this work went 

beyond the scope of its normal duties. This was done particularly 

in instances when a replacement engine could be obtained from the 

field repair shop in less time than was required to move the damaged 

tank to the shop. More serious damages that could not be repaired 

by the maintenance detachments were brought to the attention of the 

battalion motor officer. There was no strict delineation between the 

functions of the detachments and those of the company; the decision 

of assigning repair jobs to specific units usually depended on the tactical situation and the capacity of the maintenance detachments. 

Ill. The Tank Maintenance Company 

The principal task of the tank maintenance company was to repair 

those tanks which could not be repaired by the maintenance detach17 
11 OlaMAN llf'OIT SRJII 

ment or, if necessary, to transfer them to the depot maintenance installations in the rear. In order to carry out this mission, the maintenance company had to have the proper tools and spare parts .as 

well as carefully selected personnel. With respect to the latter, a man 

had to be both experienced and able to improvise, since the repair shop 

often operated on its own for prolonged periods of combat. 

According to standing operating procedures, the crew of a disabled 

tank reported to one of the shop foremen immediately upon arriva~ at 

the field repair shop. The shop foreman inspected the vehicle and 

entered the damages on a. maintenance record. The crew had to report any possible defect at the time the tank was inspected so that 

the work of the shop personnel would not have to be duplicated. The 

shop could handle 30 to 40 tanks at a time. 

The shop foreman decided the order in which repairs were to be 

made and by whom. Normally, he assigned engine, transmission, or 

gear mechanics to work on the tank first, followed by the welders, 

electricians, and painters, respectively. Subsequently, the tank was 

turned over to the weapons or radio sections. He also decided in which 

maintenance and repair jobs the tank crew members could assist. 

Usually, these consisted of servicing the tank or replacing damaged 

bogie wheels. Upon the completion of such minor duties as they were 

assigned, the crew members were sent to the casual company where 

they remained until the tank was repaired. The tank driver remained 

with his vehicle and assisted with the repairs. 

Final tests were performed by the shop foreman in the presence. of 

the crew member responsible for the tank. Upon the completion of the 

test, an entry was made on the maintenance record indicating that the 

tank had been repaired and was in perfect working condition. 

Ammunition and fuel, which had been removed upon arrival, were 

replaced before the tank was checked out. If the repair shop was 

located at a considerable distance from the front, the tank would be 

returned to its unit by rail, the maintenance company making the 

necessary arrangements for transportation. Normally, tanks returned 

to their units under their own power in groups of 4 to 8, each group 

under the command of an officer and accompanied by a maintenance 

vehicle. 

Theoretically, the maintenance company field repair shop handled 

only those repairs which could be completed within a specified time. 

Work requiring more than 14 days was supposed to be turned over 

to depot maintenance installations. In practice, however, most of the 

field repair shops were able to handle all types of repairs, provided adequate stocks of spare parts were available. Usually the larger items 

were in short supply. If, for example, three tanks were disabled 
OilMAN TANK MAINTENANCI IN WOll.D WAl II 19 

because of damaged engines and the time required to supply the necessary parts was 3 weeks, the tanks would usually remain at the shop 

and return to service within 4 weeks. Had they been dispatched to 

some depot maintenance installation, the unit of origin would surely 

have been compelled to wait longer for their return and probably 

would not have seen them again. This unsatisfactory condition was 

caused by jurisdictional conflicts, the critical shortage of spare parts, 

the great distances between depot maintenance installations and the 

front lines, as well as inter- and intra-theater transfers of armored 

units. 

Under these circumstances, the personnel at the field repair shops 

preferred to deadline the tanks for prolonged periods or even cannibalize them rather than use the depot maintenance services. Among the 

armored forces in Russia there was a strong aversion to allowing a 

disabled tank to leave the regimental area. Even though cannibalization of a tank meant its loss, this procedure enabled the maintenance 

personnel to put other tanks back into operation. 

In selecting a suitable location for the field repair shop, the tank 

maintenance company commander took under consideration such factors as the availability of facilities, protection against inclement 

weather, security, parking areas for maintenance equipment and disabled vehicles, and proximity to a road net. Operating efficiency was 

considerably higher when buildings containing shop facilities were 

available. On some occasions these buildings were located at a considerable distance from the front lines, but the advantage of having 

good facilities outweighed the disadvantage of longer hauls. Whenever the field repair shop was set up in the field, an area bordering a 

forest and having access to fresh water was most desirable. Parking 

in such areas presented no problem as long as the forest wn,g dense or 

extensive. In general, the field repair shop was near regimental headquarters and not far from the front, so as to expedite work and reduce 

towing time. An antiaircraft gun with a trained crew was attached 

to the company to protect the repair shop against attacks by low-flying 

aircra.ft. 

Before the outset of an o1fensive operation, the regimental motor 

officer and the tank maintenance company commander discussed organizational matters. On such occasions they usually decided that unnecessary equipment and spare parts were to be left behind and only items 

of equipment whose attrition rate had proved to be high were to be 

taken along. Such factors as the model of tanks on hand in the regiment, the type of terrain to be cover~d, the season of the year, and the 

probable weather conditions to be encountered during the forthcoming 

ofl'ensive played an important part in making these decisions. 

464-729 0 - 85 - 4 
20 GillMAN IEPOIT SIIIIS 

IV. The Casual Company 

In Russia, where operations extended over great distances, the Germans experienced the need for closer control over the crews of disabled tanks. The tank crews usually remained at the field repair shop 

until the repairs to their vehicles had been completed. The unannounced arrival of replacements presented another personnel problem 

because tank company commanders were often unable to take charge 

of the new men while operations \<'ere under way. On such occasions 

these replacements were temporarily attached to the field repair shops, 

where they, as well as the crews of disabled tanks, constituted an administrative liability for the tank maintenance companies. 

The number of tank personnel immobilized while awaiting repairs 

to their vehicles at the field repair shop averaged from 80 to 100 men. 

The commander of the maintenance company had to provide them 

with quarters a~d rations, in addition to keeping them occupied. During the winter months the administrative problem was aggravated by 

the scarcity of heated billets. 

While the tank drivers were able to assist in minor repair \VOrk, 

an attempt was made to keep the other crew members busy with first 

echelon maintenance of their vehicle. As a rule, however, the crew 

members would stand around and interfere with the work of the shop 

personnel. 

Starting in 1943, some commanders of tank regiments organized 

casual companies to take care of tank crews at the field repair shops 

and replacements aniving from the zone. of interior. The casual 

company of the tank regiment was set up next to the field repair shop 

so that closer supervision could be exercised over the activities of its 

personnel. 

The commander of the tank regiment assigned a qualified line officer 

to command the casual company, which represented the manpower 

reserve pool of the regiment. The casual company commander was 

responsible for the welfare of crews awaiting repairs of their vehicles, 

the supervision and training of extra tank crews and replacements, 

and the security of the field repair shop. The accomplishment of 

these duties required special ability and experience, and casual company commanders were therefore exempted from reassignment whenever possible. During extended periods of inactivity, casual companies were sometimes deactivated. 

During the later phases of the Russian campaign when the fortunes 

of war turned against Germany, tank personnel showed a tendency 

toward considering the field repair shop as a place of quiet and therefore as a desirable refuge. Since certain tank crews brought in their 

vehicles more often than others, maintenance company cQmmanders 
GERMAN TANK MAINTENANCE IN WORLD WAR II 21 

were requested to investigate the causes of unusually frequent mechanical breakdowns. Moreover, to promote strict discipline, commanders of tank maintenance companies would usually authorize only 

the tank drivers to assist with the repair work, while the other crew 

members and incoming replacements attended training courses. 

V. Spare-Parts Supply 

a. General. An adequate supply of spare parts is essential for 

the efficient operation of a maintenance system. During the initial 

campaigns of ·world War II, Germany's supply of tank spare parts 

wns satisfactory. In Mnreh 1940 Hitler created the Ministry of Armaments and Ammunition, headed by a civilian who was made directly 

responsible to the Fuehrer. Even though the activities of this civilian 

agency tended to curtail the influence of the military, its creation was 

welcomed by the latter because it fulfilled an urgent need. Friction 

between the Army and the Ministry of Armaments arose during the 

Russian campaign, when the production of new tanks was ~:~tepped 

up and that of spare parts neglected. 

b. Planning and Procurement. At the beginning of World War 

II, the Ordnance Inspectorate of the General Army Office was responsible for the procurement of spare parts. The Inspectorate submitted requisitions for tanks and spare parts to the Army Ordnance ·office which, in turn, awarded contracts for their manufacture 

to the armament industry. Before being accepted the tank or part 

was inspected and tested, whereupon it was shipped to the Armored 

Ordnance Depot at Magdeburg for storage and issue. 

When a new tank model was being introduced, the Ordnance Inspectorate sent qualified personnel to the prime contractor to assist 

the tank designers in compiling a standard nomenclature list for spare 

parts. Each item was listed under the proper group heading, such as 

engine, suspension, turret, hull, track, and ignition. Great care had 

to be taken in compiling these lists and in numbering and illustrating 

each item. The terminology had to be so simple that any mechanic 

could understand what was meant. 

The compilation of the standard nomenclature lists was complicated by the frequent changes in design introduced during the production of a new model. As a. rule, however, the lists were ready for 

distribution by the time the first tank left the factory. 

Proper planning for the production of an adequate amount of 

spare parts was difficult before the new tank had been field tested and 

the attrition rate of the various parts established. Provisional estimates, which took every known factor into account, served as basis 

for contracts placed with the armament industry. 
22 GERMAN IIPOIY SIIIU 

From the very beginning, the number of spare parts actually delivered was by no means equal to the demand. Some tanks required 

spare parts immediately after their first test run. The limited stocks 

of spare parts on hand were often insufficient to meet the demands. 

Supplementary requisitions for certain parts were placed in good time 

with the Ordnance Office, but deliveries to the parts depots usually 

suffered long delays. The rapid expansion of the armored forces may 

have had a considerable effect on the manufacturers' capabilities of 

delivering spare parts on schedule. Most industrial enterprises were 

overloaded with military and civilian orders. 

c. DiBtribution. During the initial phase of the Russian campaign-June to December 1941-manufa.cturers in the zone of interior 

shipped parts either to tank ordnance depots in Germany or directly 

to the three army groups in the Russian theater. Each army group 

maintained a separate tank spare-parts depot and established advance 

dumps at army level. 

The tank maintenance companies requisitioned and drew the spare 

parts for the entire tank regiment from an army advance dump or 

army group depot. The motor sergeant of each tank company was 

responsible for parts supply and stock control. 'Whenever an item 

was in low supply or out of stock, he requisitioned it from the spareparts section of the tank maintenance company. For items in critical 

demand, the motor sergeant dispatched a vehicle to the tank maintenance company or requested by radio that the item be brought forward. The armorers and radio mechanics, on the other hand, requisitioned parts directly through ordnance or signal channels. 

d. Stock Control and Storage. Each tank maintenance company 

had a spare-parts section, which was responsible for the storage, stock 

control, and issue of spare parts. A card index filing system was set 

up on the basis of the standard nomenclature list. By maintaining an 

efficient stock record system, the parts clerks were able to ascertain 

at all times the type and quantity of parts on hand. As soon as the 

stock levels dropped to a specified minimum, stocks were replenished 

automatically. At periodic intervals, inventory was taken to determine which parts were not moving or had become obsolete. This was 

particularly important whenever a new tank model or series was issued. Since the storage of obsolete parts served no useful purpose and 

took up valuable space, the tank maintenance companies returned 

them to fixed installations and depots. 

Special requisitions were sent to the nearest dump or depot whenever certain parts were used at a more rapid rate than expected. Within the field repair shops, parts were issued only upon the presentation of a request slip signed by one of the foremen. This procedure 
OilMAN TANK MAINTENANCE IN WOILD WAI II 

was necessary because such items as electrical equipment and kerosene 

could be used for barter on the black market. 

Special care was given to the proper storage of spare parts. The 

shop trucks.were equipped with solid superstructures and contained 

bins, drawers, and shelves to keep the parts in place, so that even severe 

jolts during a march would not dislodge them. · 

Parts such as ball bearings, w~ch were shipped in waterproof con· 

tainers from the manufacturer or tank ordnance depot, were stored 

in their original wrapping. Exposed parts were coated with protective grease before being placed in stock. 

e. Suppl!y Problem8 OIIUl Tentatwe Sollutiom. During the first 3 

months of the Russian campaign, th"e German armored units had sufficient spare parts. In the autumn of 1941, however, parts grew scarce 

in the Russian theater. The supply lines were overextended at the 

time when the muddy season set in. Most of the roads in Russia b&-

came impassaple and truck columns were therefore unable to move 

up supplies. At the same time the railroads proved incapable of carrying the entire supply load. Damaged tanks could not be repaired for 

lack of spare parts and could not be evacuated to the zone of interior 

because of the transportation bottleneck. 

Throughout this period the Ministry of Armaments pushed the production of new tanks to the detriment of the manufacture of spare 

parts. With the increase in the number of tank models and the continuous changes in design, many parts became obsolete by the time 

they reached the maintenance units in the field. : This Wl\8 primarily 

the result of excessive procurement lead time for parts. 

In May 1942 the Ministry of Armaments decided to curtail new 

tank production and increa-se the output of spare parts. This change 

failed to remedy the situation because the total quantity of spare parts 

thus gained amounted to no more than the loss in new tank production, but in disassembled form. In other words, for each tank that 

was not a-ssembled, only 1 engine, 1 transmission, and 1 steering mechanism, etc., were made available as spare parts. This solution was 

very unsatisfactory and did little to alleviate the spare-parts problem. Urgently needed parts, such as engines and transmissions, were 

produced in equal number to hulls and other parts which were not 

in great demand. 

When the Germans launched their summer offensive in 1942, more 

than 75 percent of their total tank strength was employed in the 

southern part of the Russian theater. Within a short time hundreds 

of tanks were disabled and a major backlog of repairs accumulated 

because the necessary spare parts were not available. Most of the 

disabled tanks could have been quickly restored to service since the 

repairs involved only the replacement of defective parts. Less than 
I 

/ 

GERMAN IIPOIT SHtU 

80 percent of the damaged tanks required welding or time-consuming labor. Had parts been in stock or available at a nearby depot, 

most of the repairs involving the replacement of defective parts could 

probably have been accomplished within 2 weeks. However, at this 

time the spare-parts problem had become so critical that it had a 

paralyzing effect on the simultaneous thrusts toward Stalin.grad and 

into the Caucasus. 

In the autumn of 1942 the Ministry of Armaments introduced 

three additional measures to relieve the shortage of spare parts. First, 

it designated various plants whose production capacity was to be devoted exclusively to the manufacture of spare parts. Certain factories were to turn out only tank engines, whereas others produced 

transmissions, etc. While this measure was sound in principle, it did 

not work out in practice because the contra~tors were unable to convert their plants quickly. By the time they w.ent into full production, their effort was insufficient to relieve the shortage of spare parts, 

because the Ministry of Armaments had to divert most, if not their 

entire output to new tank production in order to compensate for the 

damage inflicted on the tank manufacturing plants by Allied air 

bombardments. 

The second measure was the institution of the so-called contract 

exchange in October 1942. .At this exchange, various spare parts in 

critica.l demand were e~ibited. Manufacturers interested in producing these parts were requested to submit their bids. To be eligible for 

consideration, each manufacturer had to indicate in writing that, if 

awarded, the new contract would not interfere with deliveries on 

previously awarded war contracts. If a manufacturer's bid was accepted, his plant received a higher priority rating which protected 

his manpower and production facilities from being diverted against 

his wishes. 

The third step was to transfer machinery from the large tank plants 

to machine shops and small factories in order to enable the latter to 

enter the field of spare-parts production. This measure achieved a 

limited decentralization of the war industry and thus cOntributed to 

reducing the effect of .Allied air raids on . the German armaments 

program. 

While the cumulative effect of these measures resulted in a temporary. easing of the spare-parts problem, the lack of proper planning, 

which had characterized the production of tanks and spare parts from 

the outset, was to have a lasting effect until the very end of the war. 

On many occasions the limited relief that resulted from these measures was offset by serious mistakes. 

In the autumn of 1942, for instance, heavy Tiger tanks were committed for the first time in the Russian theater. The production of 
OilMAN TANK MAINTENANCE IN WOILD WAI II 25 

extra parts ·for this tank had been neglected to the extent that only 

1 spare engine and 1 spare transmission were produced for every 10 

tanks. Within a. short time almost all of the new Tiger tanks were 

lost or deadlined because of lack of parts. 

A similar mistake with even more far-reaching consequences took 

place a few months later when the new Panther tanks came off the 

assembly line. In a desperate attempt to speed up production, the 

Ministry of Armaments had ordered the mass production of this new 

tank model before it had been properly tested. Early in 1943 the 

first Panther tanks arrived in the Russian theater and were immediately committed. Almost at once major defects in design and construction-particularly of the steering and control mechanism-were 

discovered with the result that all 326 Panther tanks had to be withdrawn and returned to the zone of interior for complete rebuilding. 

To perform the necessary work, a special tank-rebuild plant was 

established near Berlin. By the time the initial deficiencies had been 

corrected, the engine proved inadequate. It was not until the autumn 

of 1948 that a fully satisfactory engine became available. Under 

these circumstances it was hardly surprising that most of the Panther tanks shipped to Russia arrived without sufficient spare parts. 

Many a Panther was lost because of the shortage of some elementary 

spare part or because it could not be repaired in time. 

Late in 1948 a shortage of spare tank engines was caused by the 

multiple defects that the standard German tank engines produced by 

Maybach developed in the field. Instead of simplifying the design 

of the engine, Maybach continued to turn out new, improved series, 

so that eventually a tremendous variety of spare parts was required 

for the repair of the tank engines. 

f. hrvpr()'l)uati<m-8. The failure of the armament industry to provide sufficient spare parts forced the tank maintenance personnel to 

improvise. One of the most widespread expedients was the practice 

of cannibalizing disabled tanks, especially those destined for return 

to the zone of interior. The cannibalization crews were so thorough 

that the manufa.cturer would rarely receive more than the empty hull 

by the time the tank reached his plant. Disabled tanks awaiting 

engine replaeements at field repair shops were also subject to being 

stripped, and by the time the new engine arrived there usually was 

little left of the tank for which it had been intended. 

Since the advance dumps and army group depots were usually out 

of those parts for which there was a heavy demand, the tank maintenance companies began to send details to the depots to represent 

their interests. Upon the arrival of a supply train carrying spare 

parts, each detail tried to secure the parts its company needed most 

urgently. When more and more companies adopted this procedure, 
26 GERMAN III'Oif ~ 

the depots became the scenes of fierce struggles for priority items. 

As soon as a detail bad secured some parts, it would contact its parent 

organization by radio or telephone. In a matter of minutes the trucks 

would be on their way to the depots to pick up the "spoils." If the 

distance between the depot and the field repair shop was too great, 

t.he spare parts would be shipped by rail under escort. In order to 

maintain some control over the various details between the arrivals 

of supply trains, the depot commanders eventually organized casual 

companies and assigned the men to minor tasks. 

More arbitrary measures were often employed by some of the tank 

maintenance company commanders who believed that they were acting 

in the interest of their own unit. During the latter part of the war 

some of them even resorted to bribery. Others would contact manufacturers in the zone of interior outside of normal channels to procure parts directly at the source. Occasionally, even tactical commanders took part in the hunt for parts when the number of serviceable tanks at their disposal began to dwindle. It happened in sevet:al 

instances that a private or noncommissioned officer escorting a rail 

shipment of laboriously acquired spare parts would suddenly be confronted by a field grade officer of some other regiment or division who 

simply ordered him to surrender the entire cargo. 

Such expedients obviously did more harm than good. Moreover, 

the persistent shortage of spare parts affected the morale of the tank 

maintenance personnel who, though capable and willing, were unable 

to accomplish their mission at a time when every tank counted. 

During the final phase of the war in 1944, the fighting rapidly drew 

nearer to the German borders. The shortening of the supply lines 

might have improved the spare-parts situation, had not the withdrawal movement been coupled with the loss of vital armament plants 

and depots through evacuation and air attacks. 

VI.. Depot Maintenance Installations 

Until the autumn of 1941, disabled tanks that could not be repaired 

by the maintenance units in the field were usually shipped to a tank 

ordnance depot in Germany before being returned to the original 

manufacturer. Upon the completion of repairs at the factory, the 

vehicles were dispatched to a tank ordnance depot for the installation 

of radio equipment and armament before being reissued to the combat 

units. However, since the production of new tanks took up their full 

capacity in late 1941, manufacturers were unable to handle tank repairs, and it was not long before an enormous backlog in repair work 

had accumulated. 

a. Fwe4 Imtallations Vn Rwsia. When this matter was brought 

to Hitler's attention, the Fuehrer ordered three major depot main-
GEIMAN TANK MAINTENANCE IN WOlLD WAl II 27 

tenance installations-one for each army group-established in the 

Russian theater. The mission of these installations was to perform 

a general overhaul of badly damaged tanks according to modem 

methods and thus eliminate the necessity of shipping them to Germany. A civilian agency was put in charge of this project because 

Hitler expected a higher degree of efficiency from civilians using 

modern engineering methods than from military personnel. 

Damaged vehicles were to be shipped by rail at regular intervals, 

and each train was to carry only vehicles of the same type or model. 

The internal organization of each installation was drawn up along 

civilian lines, with one German firm providing the personnel and 

assuming the responsibility for plant operations. Small military 

staffs, which were under the Ordnance Inspectorate, were responsible 

for such administrative details as rations and billets of the civilian 

personnel, security measures, spare-parts supply, acceptance of disabled equipment, and delivery of repaired tanks. 

To guarantee a sufficient supply of spare parts, a tank spare parts 

depot was set up near each installation. In addition, a stockroom carrying the most important tank parts was attached to each installation. 

All other parts needed by the maintenance personnel could be obtained 

directly from the tank spare-parts depot. 

Though sound on paper, the plan failed from the outset because of 

the confusion created by the sudden decentralization efforts. The idea 

of sending damaged equipment to the maintenance installations in 

shipments separated a«<rding to types or models proved impractical 

for the simple reason that vehicles do not become disabled according 

to categories. 

Moreover, the civilian personnel engaged in constructing the depot 

maintenance installations were unable to adapt themselves to the conditions in Russia and give up the high standards to which they were 

accustomed. This gave rise to such dela.ys in construction that the 

unfavorable tum meanwhile taken by military events prevented the 

installations from opera.ting at full efficiency. The civilian managements adhered to their customary operating procedures, which resulted 

in more thorough but also more time and materiel-consuming maintenance. What the military considered reparable, the civilians regarded as scrap. Time and again the civilian .firms were guided by 

principles of economy rather than of expediency. Thus, there was 

constant friction between the civilian managements and the military 

staffs. 

The displacement of a. depot maintenance installation to a new 

location interrupted repair work for several months. The evacuation of these installations to the rear, which became necessary in 

1943-44, was really a. mad scramble to save personnel and m&teriet 
28 GERMAN REPORT SERIES 

Because these installations took so long to start operations and 

performed in such an unsatisfactory manner, the Army High Command decided in 1944 to establish its own depot maintenance installations along purely military lines. This measure was taken to 

eliminate the difficulties that had arisen from employing civilian personnel. However, the war ended before any conclusions could be 

drawn from this experiment. 

Aside from the above depot maintenance installations, existing 

facilities and installations in German-occupied countries were used 

for the repair of tanks. By late 1942 a number of the installations 

had gone into operation, with the result that a marked relief was felt 

by the overburdened armament industry. 

Typical examples of such installations were the tank repair shop 

at Vienna, whose main function was the repair of tanks disabled on 

the Russian front, and the tank rebuild~hop at G~en, France, which 

specialized in salvaging former French armored equipment and repairing German tanks. 

b, The TOII'tk Repair Shop in Vienna. The tank repair shop in 

Vienna was the former Austrian Army's central automotive maintenance shop, which had been converted to tank repair by the Germans. 

Its installations included all depot maintenance facilities needed for 

the repair of wheeled and track-laying vehicles. Spare-parts procurement was transacted through normal channels with some parts 

being obtained locally. 

Being well equipped and efficiently organized, the Vienna shop 

repaired from 60 to 100 tanks per month with a personnel strength 

of 1,200 civilian workers. When more and more disabled tanks 

arrived from the Russian theater in 1942, the Vienna shop had to 

discontinue the repair of wheeled vehicles. 

In 1943, when the first disabled Panther and Tiger tanks began 

to arrive in Vienna, new facilities were needed because the hydraulic 

lifts were not strong enough to handle the heavier equipment. A 

nearby locomotive shed contained one 40-ton and two 16-ton cranes 

as well as suitable workshop areas for turret, weapon, engine, and 

transmission repairs. The supervisors selected for the repair of the 

heavy tanks were particularly skilled mechanics who were in charge 

of military shop personnel. After 1943 the efficiency of the repair 

shop was greatly reduced because of the increasing intensity of air 

attacks. During one raid the workshops were so severely damaged 

that many of the subsequent operations had to take place in the open, 

regardless of the weather. 

As the overall situation deteriorated during the last year of the 

war and parts became a critical item, the Vienna shop organized a 

special section for salvaging parts from irreparable tanks. This 
GEIMAN TANK MAINTENANCE IN WORLD WAR It 29 

measure proved successful and helped to overcome many difficulties 

which otherwise might have been insurmountable. 

c. The Tank Rebuild Shop in GWn. After their speedy campaign 

against France in the spring of 1940, the Germans took over the 

French tank repair shop in Gien, along with about 3,000 French 

armored vehicles and an almost inexhaustible supply of raw materials, tools, and spare parts. The Germans were quick to convert 

the installation to their own needs and decided that a large number 

of French tanks of various types could be restored to service. Unserviceable tanks that were beyond repair were stripped and the 

parts installed on other vehicles. Parts not available at the depot 

were manufactured in the local workshops or procured from other 

depots and salvage dumps. Similarly, older and obsolescent tanks 

were modernized and their maneuverability, speed, and firepower 

improved. Some of the chassis were rebuilt and converted into selfpropelled mounts for heavy field pieces or antiaircraft guns. 

The personnel in Gien consisted of 6 officers, 46 NCO's, 14 civilian 

technical inspectors, and about 200 French civilian mechanics. A 

casual company, the strength of which fluctuated, was also part of the 

Gien organization. 

The output of the depot averaged about 40 tanks per month despite 

two heavy air raids, which destroyed or badly damaged some of the 

workshops and storage buildings. Later in the war, when the supply 

of spare parts became more difficult, increasing emphasis was placed 

on stripping unserviceable tanks in order to maintain a steady production of repaired tanks. 

The former French tanks \vere issued to combat units, Army service 

schools, internal security forces in Germany and in occupied areas, airbases, and higher headquarters. A substantial number of them were 

shipped from Gien to the Hungarian Army. 

User agencies sent receiving personnel to Gien before the tanks 

were ready for delivery so that the men could familiarize themselves 

with ·the operation and maintenance of the French tanks and tank 

weapons. For this purpose the enlisted personnel performed routine 

maintenance on serviceable tanks under the supervision of the civilian 

technicians working at the depot. 

VII. Training 

The German Army did not have a uniform basic training program. 

Upon induction, each recruit joined a unit of the arm or service to 

which he had been assigne~t In peacetime, the recruit destined for the 

armored forces was immediately assigned to a tank company, 'vhereas 

in wartime he joined a tank training company of the replacement 

army. Early in World War II basic training was conducted for a 
GElMAN UI'OaT S .... 

period of 12 weeks-later reduced to 8 weeks-at the end of which the 

recruit was considered fully trained and ready for assignment. 

Until the Russian campaign got under way in 1941, the training of 

tank maintenance personnel received little attention. Only the tank 

drivers and the organizational maintenance personnel were given 

special instruction as part of their basic training. When this method 

proved unsatisfactory, tank maintenance and recovery personnel were 

given specialized courses upon completion of their basic training. In 

addition, they received special instruction in the operation of tanks 

in extreme heat, under heavy dust, and in subzero temperatures. 

The theory that maintenance personnel would acquire the necessary 

skill through practical experience in the field repair shops proved 

erroneous. Additional courses tl1erefore had to be organized at the 

armored schools in order to provide specialized training for maintenance and recovery personnel, drivers, and officer candidates of the 

armored forces. Civilian technicians as well as tank maintenance and 

motor officers also attended these courses in order to improve their 

technical knowledge. The students assisted in the preparation of 

maintenance directives and technical manuals. 

Being responsible for the training of all replacements withiu their 

areas, the Wehrkreis [Ed : the basic military area. in Germany under 

the jurisdiction of a corps-size unit] headquarters later established 

technical training courses of 6 weeks' duration for tank maintenance 

personnel. Trainees took specialized courses, the completion of which 

qualified them for assignment to depot maintenance installations as 

specialists in the repair of tank chassis, engines, hulls, and transmissions, and as electricians and electrical welders. 

Advanced training wa,s provided at the depot maintenance installations, where enlisted tank maintenance personnel performed repair 

work under the supervision of civilian technicians and expert m&-

chanics, thus gaining some practical experience before joining a tank 

maintenance unit in the field. Similar advanced training courses were 

also given to armor officers up to the rank of general. 

This type of advanced training offered numerous advantages because it provided tank maintenance units with personnel familiar with 

various tank models and skilled in their specialty. During his assignment to a. depot maintenance installation, the trainee became thoroughly acquainted with the military repair methods, tools, and equipment 

that frequently differed from the ones he had known in civilian life. 

In general, he was not supposed to work with any other tools or 

equipment than those which would actually be available to him in 

the field. At the same time, great emphasis was placed on teaching 

the trainee to improvise because in the field some essential item or 

part would often be missing and, if the tank was to be put back into 
OilMAN TANC MAINTENANCI IN WOaLD WAa II 

service as quickly as possible, the repairman would have to use expedients. 

When new tank models such as the Panther and the Tiger were 

introduced, specialized training courses had to be conducted for the 

tank maintenance personnel On such occasions the maintenance uruts 

in the field found it expedient to send some of their personnel to the 

W ehrkreis schools, where they could familiarize themselves with the 

operation and repair of the new tanks. 

During periods of relative inactivity in the field, the personnel of 

the tank maintenance detachments were often detailed to the field 

repair shops of the tank maintenance companies. There, the men 

were given on-the-job training based on the lessons learned from 

previous experience and were also instructed in new methods and 

procedures. 
I. In Bivouac 

CHAPTER 4 

OPERATIONS 

In bivouac or assembly areas the tank maintenance personnel were 

dispersed in such a manner that they could easily check the condition 

of the track-laying vehicles, perform minor repairs, and assist the 

tank crews. Except in emergencies, the personnel performed only 

those repairs the battalion motor officer assigned to them. 

II. On the March 

The smooth functioning of the tank maintenance services could be 

achieved only by carefully planning, routing, scheduling, and directing each march movement. Instructions were issued during the daily 

briefing or sent by messenger during periods of radio silence. 

All tank maintenance vehicles were marked very plainly in prominent places to insure easy identification by the armored units. In the 

performance of their duties, maintenance personnel were authorized 

to overtake any unit on the march. 

a. Th.e Tank Mainte7UJ!nce Detachnnents. The basic priBciple 

applied in planning the march of a tank regiment was to separate the 

track-laying from the wheeled vehicles. As a rule, the track-laying 

vehicles of each tank company were followed by one prime mover and 

the passenger car. The other elements of the maintenance detachment normally marched at the end of the column under the supervision 

of the battalion motor officer and made repairs on vehicles that had 

fallen out en route. 

Before n march, the key maintenance personnel were briefed on the 

route to be followed and the destination of the combat and maintenance 

units. 

Whenever a tank became disabled on the march, the maintenance 

detachment leader determined the nature of the damage and, if the 

damage was slight, assigned a crew to perform the necessary repairs 

on the spot. As soon as the tank was repaired, it fell in at the end 

of the march column and resumed its proper place at the next halt. 

In the event that repairs could not be made 011: the spot, the tank was 

readied for evacuation, moved off the road so that it would not obstruct 

32 
OHMAN TANK MAINTENANCE IN WOILD WAI II 33 

traffic, and-if there was the possibility of an enemy air attackcamouflaged tp prevent its totall<>$. 

The detachment leader then rejoined the column and proceeded to 

the new location, where he prepared a report indicating the number 

of tanks disabled during the march, the extent of damage, unit designation number, names of the drivers, and the location of each piece 

of disabled equipment, complete with sketch. Copies of this report 

were submitted to both the battalion and regimental motor officers. 

b. The Tank Mainteruznce Company. When the distance to be 

oovered was relatively short, the tank maintenance company moved 

as one serial. On longer marches, the company was subdivided into 2 

or 3 march units, which displaced forward in such a manner that each 

group bad at least 3 days of uninterrupted work between moves. Dur-· 

ing long-distance marches, tank transporters were occasionally used 

for hauling repaired tanks to the front. 

Ill. Before and During an Attack 

Before an attack the tank maintenance company set up its field 

repair shop as close as possible to the assembly areas; the detachments 

remained with their respective tank companies. At the start of an 

attack, the detachments moved up behind the second wave of the 

attacking forces together with the vehicles of the recovery platoon. 

The leaders of these maintenance elements were briefed on the direction of the attack and its objectives. 

The commander of the tank maintenance company was kept informed of the progress of operations and was given timely advance 

notice concerning a p0$ible change of location. Before an attack, 

the tank maintenance company was divided into 2 or 3 echelons capable of carrying approximately equal workloads, much as during a 

march movement. Command over the individual echelons was exercised by one of the shop or motor officers. During an attack the forward echelon operated close behind the combat elements, performing 

those repairs which could not be made by the detachments. The rear 

echelons meanwhHe completed the repairs on hand before displacing 

forward. 

The displacement of any echelon depended on the progress of the 

attack. Too frequent change of location was detrimental to unit 

efficiency as each displacement meant the loss of at least 1 workday. 

In submitting suggestions for the employment of his unit, the company commander therefore based his recommendations on both tactical 

and operational considerations. 

The maximum distance between field repair shops and the frontline 

was not supposed to exceed 70 kilometers. Any distance beyond this 
34 OilMAN UPOIT SHIU 

limit resulted in excessive wear and tear of the prime movers and re--

paired tanks. In areas where the roads were exceedingly bad, as in 

Russia during the muddy seasons in the spring and fall, the Germans 

were often unable to remove disabled tanks to the field repair shops. 

In such instances the disabled tanks were assembled at collecting 

points behind the attack zone, where maintenance company personnel 

eventually caught up with them. 

The employment of maintenance units during night attacks was 

governed by the same principles, but with more emphasis on briefing 

the crew chiefs regarding the direction of the attack and its objectives. 

IV. During Advance and Pursuit 

During advances in Russia, where the Germans initially had absolute air superiority, the tank maintenance company was moved up to 

within a few kilometers of the scene of fighting before the tanks went 

into action. During forward displacements involving great distances, only tanks within a 16-kilometer radius were brought to the 

operating site of the company. Disabled tanks farther ahead along 

the axis of advance were taken to a collecting point designated by 

regimental headquarters as a future operating site. The bulk of the 

maintenance company prepared for forward displacement after the 

tanks at the shop had been inspected for damage and the personnel and 

spare parts requirements had been established. The time needed to 

break camp varied from 3 to 12 hours, depending on the type of quarters occupied. A detachment was left behind to complete the repairs 

under way while the remainder of the company moved forward in 

one body. In some instances, a platoon was sent forward to the new 

location while the remainder of the company repaired disabled tanks 

along the route. The latter procedure was used successfully in 1942 

during the German advance to Stalingrad by way of Kursk and 

Voronezh, a distance of approximately 900 kilometers. Whenever 

this method was impractical, the disabled tanks were brought forwarP. 

by the recovery platoon. 

During pursuit operations the tank maintenance detachments, having to keep up with the rapidly advancing combat elements, liad to 

carry the main burden. If necessary, the detachments were reinforced and issued extra parts. In order to keep a maximum number 

of tanks in serviceable condition, the detachments often performed 

repairs that were beyond the scope of their normal missions. The 

tank maintenance company carried out major repairs exclusively and 

followed its tank regiment in long uninterrupted movements. 

Whenever radio equipment of the type used by the armored units 

was available, the tank maintenance detachment could improve its 

efficiency by equipping one of the half-track prime movers with a radio 
OHMAN TANK MAINTENANCE IN WOILO WAI II 35 

set. The detachment leader could thus maintain contact with the 

tank battalion and company commanders and exercise close control 

<>ver the operations of his various crews. The latter could be dispatched to different points and immediately upon the completion of 

<>ne job be directed to the next one. The disadvantage of this pro-

<:edure, however, was that the detachment leader had to monitor all 

traffic in order to determine which messages referred to him or his 

erews. 

V. After an AHack 

As soon as an attack was broken off-generally at dusk-the maintenance crews reassembled and pooled their resources until the attack 

was resumed. The crew and detachment chiefs, assisted by an armorer, inspected all tanks to determine which ones were unable to participate in the next attack. The results of their inspections were 

t-eported to the tank company commander and the battalion motor 

officer. 

Tanks disabled during an advance automatically remained in 

friendly territory. Their recovery was not so urgent because they 

were not in danger of being captured by the enemy. Because of fre. 

quent discrepancies between the reported and actual location of disabled tanks, units reporting a disabled tank had to pinpoint its location by giving map coordinates. 

After a disabled tank was located, it was quickly prepared for 

evacuation. Tracks and suspensions were checked to determine 

whether the tank could be moved. In the event that the sprocket 

and several bogie wheels were severely damaged, the track was short-

~ed and placed around the idler wheel and the undamaged bogie 

wheels. If the tank was still immobilized, new bogie wheels were 

installed. Normally, this work was performed by the tank maintenance crews. However, the recovery personnel were also capable 

of making such temporary repairs as well as loosening brakes and 

separating connections between the transmission and the steering 

mechanism. 

After ~he track suspension system was made operative, a prime 

mover was hooked up to the tank by means of a tow bar. Depending 

on the condition of the track and suspension system, the tank could 

be towed from_the front or the rear . . As a rule, the tracks were not 

completely removed during a towing operation so that the undamaged 

bogie wheels would be protected from unnecessary wear and tear. 

Recovery personnel were inclined to disregard this principle in an 

effort to expedite the removal of disabled tanks. Tank maintenance 

unit commanders therefore had to constantly remind their personnel 
36 OHMAN 01'011' HillS 

that tanks should not be moved on their bogie wheels and that dis· 

ciplinary action would be taken against recovery crews violating 

this order. 

On occasion, some smoothly operating recovery crews were capable 

of extraordinary feats such as the one performed by two 18-ton prime 

movers in Russia. Their crews succeeded in recovering 14 seriously 

damaged tanks during one single night despite the fact that the disabled vehicles were stuck in deep mud that had frozen because of a 

sudden drop in temperature. 

In Russia two prime movers were usually coupled for the recovery 

of a 40-ton Stalin tank. Occasionally, the much heavier German 

self-propelled antitank gun, the so-called Porsche-Tiger, was recovered in the same manner. Since prime movers alone were unable to 

meet all requirements, armored recovery vehicles were also employed 

in the Russian theater. Heavy German tanks that 'o/ere no longer fit 

for combat, and captured Russinn ones in operating condition, were 

used fOr' this purpose. 

The transporter was not widely used in the field because it bogged 

down in swampy or rain-soaked terrain. Good paved roads were 

scarce in Russia. Wherever such roads existed, the transporter 

stopped on the improved road at the point closest to the disabled tank. 

A prime mover then towed the tank tq the transporter for loading. 

During the later phases of the Russian campaign, however, tank 

transporters were not issued to organic maintenance units if nonorganic recovery units possessing such equipment were within reach to 

lend their assistance in an emergency. 

The Germans experienced very f~w instances in which it was not 

considered worthwhile to recover a disabled tank. The guiding principle was that no tank would be abandoned unless it was blown to 

bits or completely burnt out. In every other case recovery was mandatory, even though cannibalization was often the only possible use 

to which the TeCOvered vehicle could be put. 

The disposition of captured enemy ta.nks often confronted the Germans with major problems. Even though the use of captured tanks 

was against standing operating procedures, there were instances in 

which enemy tanks were repaired a.nd employed for the protection of 

service units and for recovery operations. Tank maintenance company commanders opposed the repair of captured tanks because it involved the handling of a complete stock of Russian tank parts in addition to familiarizing the shop personnel with the operation of enemy 

equipment. 
OIRMAN TANK MAINTENANCE IN WORLD WAR II J7 

VI. In Static Situations 

One of the crucial factors considered in selecting an operating site 

for a tank maintenance company was safety against enemy breakthrough attempts. Even so, it was desirable that the field repair shop 

be located at a minimum distance from the front. Another factor 

that was found to have a favorable influence on the performance of 

the company was the availability of permanent buildings providing 

shelter against inclement weather, of lifting devices, and of rail sidings. In some rare instances tank maintenance companies were able 

to use the powerplant and some of the machinery they found upon 

moving into a new shop area. 

As soon as the company had moved into its new quarters, the spare 

parts were unloaded from the trucks and stored in a separate building 

situated close to the repair shop. Occasionally, special crews were 

organized to overhaul engines and rebuild assemblies. At Nikopol 

in 1943, for instance, a crew of four mechanics overhauled 20 tank 

engines within 2 months at a time when no spare engines were available. Even though, as a rule, the lifespan of a reconditioned engine 

was only about half that of a new one, this improvisation added 20 

urgently needed tanks to the combat strength of the frontline units. 

In static situations special attention was placed on rescuing disabled 

tanks in areas exposed to enemy observation and fire. For this purpos~ a serviceable tank of the snme or a heavier type than the disabled 

one would tow the latter by means of a cable to the nearest depression 

or behind a hill offering cover and concealment. At this point 2 or 

3 prime movers would take over and remove the disabled tank to the 

field repair shop. Because of their high silhouette, prime movers 

attracted enemy fire when operating in terrain exposed to enemy observation. In order to avoid losing too many prime movers, the maintenance units improvised low-silhouetted recovery vehicles by removing severely damaged turrets from disabled tanks. 

VII. On the Defensive 

During defensive operations the mission of the recovery crews was 

more difficult than during an attack because tanks that became disabled had to be removed directly from the battlefield. Although the 

combat troops were trained to remove their disabled equipment fr~m 

the range of antitank guns, the recovery crews had to perform this 

function whenever the combat troops failed to do so. In such instances the recovery crews waited until dark before moving the disabled tanks from the battlefield and enemy observation. The evacua.-
OilMAN IIPOIT SIIJIS 

tion of disabled tanks to the field repair shop was usually carried out 

during daylight hours. The recovery platoon leader had to familiarize himseJf with every terrain feature in his sector so that he could control recovery operations during all hours of the day or night. Guides, 

preferably crew members, directed the recovery vehicles to the disabled tanks. Difficult terrain, such as swamps, gullies, and ravines, 

often caused delay in the recovery of tanks. Changes in temperature 

also had their effect on operations, particularly a sudden drop, which 

usually resulted in equipment being frozen fast to the ground. 

Towing heavy tanks over long distances, the Tiger model in particular, was very complicated and therefore avoided whenever possible. 

In one instance in Russia in 1944 an attempt to evacuate a Tiger tank 

turned out to be a full-scale operation. It had to be interrupted for 

several weeks because a hard-surface road caved in under two 18-ton 

prime movers, one tank transporter, and one Tiger Model B (King 

Tiger) tank, weighing a total of about 140 tons. Over short distances, 

a superheavy tank such as the King Tiger, which weighed 75 tons, 

could be moved by another tank of the same type. 

During defensive operations in which armored units were employed 

to support infantry, the organic tank maintenance services were echeloned in depth. The field repair shop was located beyond the range 

of enemy artillery fire and camouflaged against detection by enemy 

air reconnaissance. The normal distance from the front varied 

between llS and 30 kilometers. All roads leading into the shop area 

were camou1laged. Alternate roads were used whenever possible and 

dummy installations set up. Precautions were taken against losing 

any of the shop trucks because replacements were not immediately 

available and had to be requisitioned from the zone of interior. 

Radio communication with regimental headquarters was supplemented by field telephones. The radio section carried ample wire to 

lay a direct line to the nearest division switchboard. 

The maintenance detachments of the tank companies stood by during defensive operations and remained beyond the range of light 

enemy artillery. They repaired any slightly damaged tank that withdrew from action. With the arrival of darkness they drove up to 

the combat elements, provided the latter were no longer engaged in 

combat. In general, only one vehicle was employed for this purpose 

while the others remained with the tank company's support echelon, 

where they perfonned major repairs. 

If o.n organic maintenance company or its elements became separated 

from its tank regiment, some other tactical commander would usually 

attempt to assume control over the maintenance personnel. In 1942, 

for example, a tank maintenance company had its field shop at Novo-
OUMAN, TANK M.AINTINANCE IN WORLD WAR II 

oherka.ssk when the regiment to which it belonged was alerted for 

transfer to France. One maintenance platoon remained ~ind to emplace-disabled tanks in defensive positions while the other regimental 

elements assembled near Dnepropetrovsk. The platoon leader had 

orders to follow his company as soon as his work was completed. No 

sooner had the regiment departed than the commander in charge of 

the defense of Novocherkassk attempted to place the platoon under 

his control. The platoon leader prevented this action by having his 

men pack up and leave without delay. 

VHI. During a Retrograde Movement 

During a withdrawal every effort was made to safeguard valuable 

maintenance equipment and leave behind as few disabled tanks as possible. The tank maintenance company had to move its field repair 

shop in good time so that it would not become involved in direct combat. All those tanks which could not be repaired within a short time 

had to be evacuated by rail in order not to delay the retrograde movement of the company. If existing difficulties in the exercise of command were not to be aggravated, the tank maintenance company had 

to be employed as a unit and its commander had to be issued missiontype orders. All motor vehicles and parts that were not essential had 

to be evacuated to future operating sites, which were selected on the 

basis of the availability of technical facilities and protection from 

air attacks. 

Road conditions were an important factor in considering the feasibility of successful retrograde movements. In Russia the road conditions depended almost entirely on the weather. Rain or thaw would 

make the Russian roads impassable for ordinary wheeled vehicles. 

Only track-laying, half-track, and 4 by 4 vehicles were able to negotiate 

such roads. 

In the spring of 1944, for instance, a tank regiment suddenly received orders to withdraw from a bridgehead near Nikopol. It was 

decided that the -field repair shop would stay behind and complete 

the repair of the disabled tanks. After the departure of the regiment, 

a. sudden thaw set in, and the Russians succeeded in reducing the 

bridgehead. Thousands of German vehicles clogged the only available 

road leading to safety. The vehicles bogged down in the mud and 

were unable to move in any direction. The maintenance company 

personnel, having three heavy prime movers at their disposal, 

attempted to get through by moving cross-country parallel to the 

road. The first day the company advanced only a few hundred meters. 

Its progress was so slow that it was engulfed by the enemy advance, 

losing all its vehicles and equipment. 
OilMAN UPOif SIIIIS 

Therea.fter, tank maintenance companies were always divided into 

echelons, a highly mobile one remaining near the tanks in combat 

while the remainder of the shop personnel displaced to the rea.r as a 

group. Command vehicles were equipped with radio receivers tuned 

in on the regimental tactical net. By monitoring the traffic, the maintenance company commander and the shop foremen were kept abreast 

of developments at the front and were able to take the necessary precautions by evacuating the field repair shop in time. In the event 

contact with regimental headquarters was lost, the maintenance company commander contacted the nearest tactical commander for 

instructions or acted on his own initiative. 
I. General 

CHAPTER 5 

CON<;LUSIONS 

During World War II the German Army acquired a wealth of experience in the field of tank maintenance and recovery. The long 

duration of the war and the c:listances over which military operations 

were conducted resulted in an extremely high expenditure of tanks, 

compelling the Germans to repeatedly reorganize their maintenance 

services. In Russia the difficulties of tank maintenance were aggravaood by the scarcity of hard-surface roads, the limited capacity of 

the railroad net, and the almost complete lack of technical facilities. 

In adc:lition, the German armament industry was overtaxed, and deficiencies in war production planning led to a shortage of spare parts. 

In the course of the war it became evident that the factors determining the operation of a tank maintenance service varied according 

to theater of operations, technical developments, etc. These variations necessitated constant adaptation and improvement in the organic 

structure and equipment of the maintenance units. Consequently, no 

standard tank maintenance system having a general application could 

be evolved. On the other hand, some basic principles worth remembering can be derived from the German experience in World War II. 

II. Basic Principlos 

a. Equipment. An army's fighting power depends to a large extent 

on adequate maintenance of its equipment. The importance of this 

principle cannot be overemphasized. Tanks require maintenance to 

the same extent that combat soldiers need mec:lical attention. Under 

certain conc:litions, such as in Russia where the German ratio of 

strength was approximately 1,000 men to every tank, the loss of a 

tank was far more serious than that of a man. 

b. Personnel. .An efficient tank maintenance service must be organized before the outbreak of hostilities, otherwise it will not function properly during military operations. Failure to provide such 

a service in peacetime cost the Germans heavy losses in tanks and 

equipment. The training of tank maintenance personnel, for instance, 

had been neglected because of the generally accepted assumption that 

men who had worked as automobile mechanics and in related profes41 
42 GERMAN REPORT SEIIIS 

sions in civilian life would instantly qualify for work in a tank maintenance company. With regard to officer personnel, it was found that 

engineers and technicians were unsuitable for the command of tank 

maintenance units unless they were given thorough military training. 

The civilians who were given direct commissions were primarily concerned with the repair of equipment. If there was any change in the 

tactical situation, they lacked the ability to initiate independent action and relied too heavily on detailed orders from their immediat~ 

superiors. In fluid situations such procedures were impractical because unit commanders had to be capable of using their own initiative 

and of making the correct decision at the proper time. 

The Germans also found that the 6-week specialized training coursefor tank maintenance personnel was much too short to be really effective. Both in the North African and in the Russian theaters the 

tank maintenance personnel had to opera~ independently and often 

without the support of major depot maintenance installations. Their 

performance under pressure failed to live up to expectation, and many 

a valuable tank had to be abandoned or destroyed on the battlefield 

because the maintenance crews were unable to recover or repair it. 

c. Proper EmphMi8. Sudden changes in the tactical situation, 

unfavorable weather conditions, or the breakdown of a new tank sent. 

into battle before being fully tested, may lead to unexpectedly high 

tank lo$es. I n such instances, speed in repairing the disabled tanka 

will be of the essence. The maintenance units in the field will be best 

qualified to cope with emergencies because in tank maintenance, as 

in other spheres of military service, personnel will perform best if 

they identify themselves closely with their respective unit and its 

equipment. The men will strive hard to accomplish a given task when 

they feel that they form part of a team. 

No mechanic of a tank maintenance detachment or company adhered to fixed working hours when a deadline for the repair of a tank 

had to be met. On the other hand, tanks'that were removed to depot 

maintenance installations in the rear were in transit for an .indefinit.e 

period. Upon arrival at their destination they were handled like any 

other disabled vehicle, no one taking a personal interest in their repair • 

.After a delay of many weeks the tanks would occasionally be returned 

to their original unit, but as a rule the tank regiment never saw its 

vehicles again. 

In unusual situations the organic ma;intenance companies of tank 

regiments should be reinforced with skilled technicians from the zone 

of interior. The employment of such specialists will not only expedite 

the efficient repair of disabled tanks but will also save time and transport space since it is much simpler and faster to bring men and spare 

parts to the points where they are needed than to set up additional 
.. aMAH TANK MAINTENANCE IN WORLD WAR II 43 

maintenance shops, not to mention moving disabled tanks hundreds of 

m:iks to the rear and returning them over similar distances to the 

field forces after they have been repah·ed. In weighing the pros and 

cons of field versus depot maintenance, the availability of transportation should therefore be a determining factor. 

The major part of all repair work should be carried out within the 

framework of the tank regiment so that the maintenance personnel 

work on "their own" tanks. Some German advocates of decentralization went to the extreme of recommending that field maintenance become the exclusive domain of the maintenance detachments forming 

part of the tank companies. 

d •. Ta'lllc Design. Maintenance requirements must be considered in 

the· design of a tank if subsequent difficulties are to be avoided. To 

insure a high percentage of serviceable tanks, the design must be simple, the construction sturdy, and the parts easily accessible for service 

or repair. The number of different models must be kept to a minimum. 

Simple, sturdy, and compactly designed tanks will require a smaller 

variety of spare parts and less maintenance than those of a more complex nature. If, for instance, a tank regiment was equipped with 8 

basic models of tanks, each of which came in 8 or 4 modified types, 

the maintenance system could not possibly function properly. The 

Germans would have done better to retain one standard tank modelas the Russians did with their T34-and forget about improvements, 

than to constantly introduce new and improved VerSions for which no 

spare parts were available. In general, a few weeks after a new shipment of tanks arrived at the Russian front, most of the vehicles were 

deadlined and many became a total loss, simply because parts whose 

installation would have required only a few hours were missing. This 

criticism does not imply that items of equipment, and tanks in p~rticular, should not undergo constant improvement. However, before modifying the design of a tank, one must carefully examine 

whe~her any advantage resulting from such a change will not be lost 

because of the difficulty of obtaining the necessary parts. Every time 

a tank part is modified, the corresponding spare parts issued before 

the change automatically become obsolete and have to be replaced. 

Experienced maintenance officers should therefore be consulted frequently while a new model is still in the blueprint stage. Changes in 

tank design should be the result of long-range planning and must be 

put into effect systematically or they will only tend to weaken the 

fighting power of armored units. 

e. Spare Parts. Tank maintenance requirements must be considered in establishing new tank and spare parts production schedules, 

which in turn are closely interrelated. Under normal circumstances 

the production of a sufficient amount of spare parts should have prece-
OHIIlAH UPOII' IBIU 

dence over that of new tanks. No advantage can be gained from 

sending new tanks into combat if they cannot be repaired for lack of 

spare parts. Some of the new German tanks that arrived in the Russian theater needed parts after being driven only a few miles. In the 

German experience, 7 out of 10 repair jobs involved the replacement 

of part& 

Ill. Summary 

hy nation that anticipates conducting large-scale military .operations in a distant theater of war can conserve the combat efficiency of 

its armor only if proper tank maintenance is performed in the field . 

.AJl adequate amount of spare parts must be made available to the tank 

maintenance units in order to enable them to function effectively. For 

the proper aecomplishment of their mission, the tank maintenance 

units must also be issued the proper tools and equipment and assigned 

fully trained officer and enlisted personnel. 

U. S . GOVERNHEm' PRI NTING OFFICE 1 1985 0 - 46 4-729