Accessible Version

MILITARY BASE 

REALIGNMENTS 

AND CLOSURES

More Guidance and 

Information Needed to 

Take Advantage of 

Opportunities to 

Consolidate Training

Report to Congressional Committees

February 2016

GAO-16-45

United States Government Accountability Office
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-16-45, a report to 

congressional committees

February 2016

MILITARY BASE REALIGNMENTS AND 

CLOSURES

More Guidance and Information Needed to Take 

Advantage of Opportunities to Consolidate Training 

Why GAO Did This Study

The 2005 BRAC round was the fifth 

round of base closures and 

realignments undertaken by DOD 

since 1988, and it was the largest, 

most complex, and costliest. DOD has 

relied on the BRAC process to reduce 

excess infrastructure and realign bases 

to meet changing force structure 

needs. According to the Secretary of 

Defense, BRAC 2005 provided 

opportunities to foster jointness among 

the military services. House Report 

113-446 included a provision for GAO 

to review the status of BRAC 2005 

recommendations to reduce 

infrastructure and promote 

opportunities for jointness. This report 

evaluates the extent to which DOD has 

(1) implemented the recommendations 

requiring the services to relocate select 

training functions to increase 

opportunities for jointness and (2) 

determined if implementing these 

recommendations has achieved cost 

savings. GAO reviewed guidance, 

course listings, and cost data; 

interviewed DOD and service officials. 

What GAO Recommends

To help improve the implementation of 

jointness-focused recommendations in 

any future BRAC rounds, GAO 

recommends that DOD provide 

additional guidance for consolidating 

training and reporting BRAC costs and 

require the development of baseline 

cost data. DOD partially concurred with 

the recommendation to clarify 

guidance for reporting BRAC costs but 

did not concur with the other 

recommendations, stating that GAO 

misunderstood its approach to joint 

training. GAO believes its findings and 

recommendations are valid and 

addresses these points in the report. 

What GAO Found

For each of the six recommendations GAO reviewed from the 2005 Base 

Realignment and Closure (BRAC) round, the Department of Defense (DOD) 

implemented the recommendations by requiring military services to relocate 

select training functions; however, GAO found that two of the six training 

functions reviewed were able to take advantage of the opportunity provided by 

BRAC to consolidate training so that services could train jointly. In implementing 

the remaining four BRAC recommendations, DOD relocated similar training 

functions run by separate military services into one location, but the services did 

not consolidate training functions. For example, they do not regularly coordinate 

or share information on their training goals and curriculums. DOD’s justification 

for numerous 2005 BRAC recommendations included the assumption that 

realigning military department activities to one location would enhance 

jointness—defined by DOD as activities, operations, or organizations in which 

elements of two or more military departments participate. For these four training 

functions, DOD missed the opportunity to consolidate training to increase 

jointness, because it provided guidance to move personnel or construct buildings 

but not to measure progress toward consolidated training. Without additional 

guidance for consolidating training, the services will not be positioned to take 

advantage of such an opportunity in these types of recommendations as 

proposed by DOD and will face challenges encouraging joint training activities 

and collaboration across services.

DOD cannot determine if implementing the 2005 BRAC joint training 

recommendations that GAO reviewed has resulted in savings in operating costs. 

For three of the recommendations in this review, the services did not develop 

baseline operating costs before implementing the BRAC recommendations, 

which would have enabled it to determine whether savings were achieved.

Without developing baseline cost data, DOD will be unable to estimate any cost 

savings resulting from similar recommendations in any future BRAC rounds. 

Further, costs reported to DOD by the training functions business plan managers 

for implementation of two of the six recommendations in this review likely did not 

include all BRAC-related costs funded from outside the BRAC account. A DOD 

memo requires BRAC business plan managers to submit all BRAC-related 

expenditures, including those funded from both inside and outside of the BRAC 

account. GAO identified at least $110 million in implementation costs that likely 

should have been reported to DOD in accordance with the memo but were not; 

therefore the $35.1 billion total cost reported for BRAC 2005 is likely somewhat 

understated. A DOD official stated that it was up to the military departments to 

ensure that all BRAC implementation costs were accounted for and that the 

military departments had the flexibility to determine which costs were associated 

with the BRAC recommendation and which were attributed to other actions. GAO 

found that this flexibility in determining which costs were to be reported as BRAC 

costs led to inconsistencies in what kinds of projects had their costs counted as 

BRAC implementation costs. By clarifying in guidance what is to be included as 

a BRAC implementation cost, DOD can help ensure that it has an accurate 

accounting of the final costs for any future BRAC implementation and that DOD 

and Congress are able to determine how much money is spent on any future 

BRAC rounds.

View GAO-16-45. For more information, 

contact Brian J. Lepore at (202) 512-4523 or 

leporeb@gao.gov
Letter 1

Page i GAO-16-45 Military Base Realignments and Closures

Background 7

DOD Implemented BRAC 2005 Recommendations to Relocate 

Selected Training Functions but Missed Some Opportunities to 

Consolidate Training to Increase Jointness 9

DOD Cannot Determine Cost Savings from Implementing BRAC 

2005 Joint Training Recommendations, and It Likely Did Not 

Report All Implementation Costs 16

Conclusions 26

Recommendations for Executive Action 27

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 28

Appendix I: List of Prior GAO Reviews Related to BRAC 2005, Related Recommendations, and DOD Actions 

to Date 34

Appendix II: Text of BRAC Recommendations Included in Our Review 64

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense 70

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 74

GAO Contact 74

Staff Acknowledgments 74

Appendix V: Accessible Data 75

Agency Comment Letter 75

Related GAO Products 89

Tables

Table 1: BRAC 2005 Recommendations Included in Our Review 4

Table 2: BRAC Actions for All BRAC Rounds 8

Table 3: Summary of BRAC 2005 Recommendations Requiring Military 

Services to Relocate Select Training Functions to Consolidate 

Training to Increase Jointness 12

Contents
Figure

Page ii GAO-16-45 Military Base Realignments and Closures

Figure 1: Movements Associated with BRAC Recommendations in Our 

Review 10

Abbreviations

ASIP Army Stationing Installation Plan

BRAC Base Realignment and Closure

COBRA Cost of Base Realignment Actions

DHA Defense Health Agency

DOD Department of Defense

HUD Department of Housing and Urban Development

LRA Local Redevelopment Authority

OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense

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Page 1 GAO-16-45 Military Base Realignments and Closures

441 G St. N.W.

Washington, DC 20548

February 18, 2016

Congressional Committees

The 2005 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) round1 was the fifth 

round of base closures and realignments undertaken by the Department of 

Defense (DOD) since 1988, and it was the largest, most complex, and costliest 

BRAC round of the five. DOD has relied on the BRAC process as a means of 

reducing excess infrastructure and realigning bases to meet changing 

force structure needs. However, in 2005, in a letter to the chairman of the 

BRAC Commission, the Secretary of Defense noted that the decade 

since the previous BRAC round had been a period of dramatic change 

involving new challenges posed by international terrorism, the 

proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, ungoverned areas, rogue

states, and nonstate actors. The Secretary saw BRAC 2005 as different 

from previous BRAC rounds, which focused on reducing excess 

infrastructure. The Secretary saw it as a unique opportunity to adjust U.S. 

base structure to meet these new challenges and to be positioned to 

meet further challenges anticipated during the next two decades, such as 

where to locate forces returning to the United States from overseas 

bases. Therefore, in addition to reducing excess infrastructure and 

producing savings, BRAC 2005 provided opportunities for furthering 

transformation and fostering jointness.2

In contrast to recommendations from prior rounds, many of the 

recommendations that came out of the BRAC 2005 round were aimed at 

creating opportunities to develop jointness, such as expanding and 

establishing joint military medical centers, creating joint bases, pursuing 

opportunities to promote joint training, and consolidating all of the military 

 

1Congress authorized BRAC 2005 with the passage of the National Defense Authorization 

Act for Fiscal Year 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-107, Title XXX (2001). The law reauthorized the 

BRAC process by amending the authority under which the 1991, 1993, and 1995 rounds 

had been carried out, the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990, Pub. L. 

No. 101-510, Title XXIX (10 U.S.C. 2687 note). 

2According to DOD, “joint” connotes activities, operations, organizations, etc., in which elements 

of two or more military departments participate. There are three military departments: the 

Department of the Army, the Department of the Air Force, and the Department of the 

Navy—which includes the Marine Corps.

Letter
services’ medical training for enlisted personnel at one installation. BRAC 

2005 included several recommendations that created new joint training 

centers of excellence and realigned training functions to, among other 

things, provide opportunities to enhance jointness.

Page 2 GAO-16-45 Military Base Realignments and Closures

3 According to DOD’s 

justification for several of the joint training-related recommendations contained 

in the 2005 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission Report, one 

part of the purpose for those recommendations was to provide a “train as 

we fight: jointly” perspective to training.

Since 2005, we have issued over 30 reports and testimonies on BRAC 

2005 planning, implementation, costs, and savings; this work highlights 

information DOD can use to improve the process for developing and 

implementing BRAC recommendations. For example, in our March 2013 

report on lessons learned from the BRAC 2005 round, we found that 

DOD’s process for providing the BRAC Commission with cost and 

savings estimates was hindered by underestimating recommendationspecific requirements and that DOD did not fully anticipate information 

technology requirements for many of the recommendations.4 Our report 

made several recommendations designed to improve any future BRAC 

rounds and also suggested legislative changes that Congress should 

consider to enhance its oversight of any future BRAC rounds. DOD

concurred with three and partially concurred with two out of the 10 

recommendations in this report but has not taken any actions because, 

according to DOD officials, these recommendations can only be 

implemented if another round of BRAC is conducted. The Related GAO 

Products page at the end of this report provides a list of our BRAC reports 

and testimonies. In addition, see appendix I for findings, 

recommendations, and DOD’s response and actions from selected 

BRAC-related reports.

House Report 113-446, which accompanied a proposed bill for the 

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015, included a 

provision for us to review the status of DOD’s actions to implement the 

BRAC 2005 recommendations that were designed to reduce 

infrastructure and promote opportunities for jointness. This report 

 

3 DOD used the term “center of excellence” to refer to several recommendations that called for 

consolidating training functions across and within services.

4 GAO, Military Bases: Opportunities Exist to Improve Future Base Realignment and Closure 

Rounds, GAO-13-149 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 7, 2013).
evaluates the extent to which DOD has (1) implemented the BRAC 2005 

recommendations requiring the military services to relocate select training 

functions to increase opportunities for joint training and (2) determined if 

implementing these BRAC 2005 recommendations has achieved cost 

savings.

To address these objectives, we first identified the BRAC 2005 

recommendations that were designed to reduce infrastructure and 

promote opportunities for jointness. Based on communication with your 

staff and language in the report provision that referred to joint centers of 

excellence and joint training activities, we focused our review on joint 

training functions created by BRAC 2005. We reviewed all 198 

recommendations in the 2005 Defense Base Closure and Realignment 

Commission Report and identified 13 recommendations that were 

designed to (1) merge or consolidate a training function to make it more 

joint, (2) reduce infrastructure, and (3) focus on training or developing 

centers of excellence. From those 13 recommendations focused on 

training or on developing centers of excellence, we identified and selected 

six for this review that were directed at multiple services and called for 

consolidating infrastructure at one location. Specifically, we identified five 

recommendations that met all of our criteria:

Page 3 GAO-16-45 Military Base Realignments and Closures

5

(1) Joint Center for 

Consolidated Transportation Management Training, (2) Joint Center of 

Excellence for Culinary Training, (3) Joint Center of Excellence for 

Religious Training and Education, (4) Joint Strike Fighter Initial Joint 

Training Site, and (5) Undergraduate Pilot and Navigator Training.6In 

addition, we chose to review the recommendation related to Ft. Bragg, North 

Carolina, because one part of this recommendation was to move the Army’s 7th 

Special Forces Group to Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, to support joint training 

 

5We also identified the recommendation that created the San Antonio Regional Medical Center, 

Texas, (recommendation #172) but excluded it from this review because we have issued reports 

recently covering this recommendation. See GAO, Defense Health Care Reform: Actions 

Needed to Help Realize Potential Cost Savings from Medical Education and Training, 

GAO-14-630 (Washington, D.C.: July 31, 2014) and GAO, Defense Health Care: Applying 

Key Management Practices Should Help Achieve Efficiencies within the Military Health 

System, GAO-12-224 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 12, 2012. We also identified 

recommendation #197, Post Graduate Education, but excluded this recommendation 

because it was never implemented. 

6

For recommendation #128, Undergraduate Pilot and Navigator Training, we reviewed the portion 

of the recommendation that realigned Randolph Air Force Base, Texas by relocating

undergraduate navigator training to Naval Air Station Pensacola, Florida because this part 

of the recommendation sought to create joint training between the Air Force and the Navy. 

The other part of the recommendation, focused on pilot training within the Air Force only.
with the Air Force Special Operations unit located there.

Page 4 GAO-16-45 Military Base Realignments and Closures

7 We visited the 

locations of all six training functions, interviewed officials, and collected relevant 

data and information. Appendix II contains the text of the BRAC 

recommendations we reviewed, and table 1 shows the recommendations 

that we reviewed, the location of the new training function, and the 

services involved.

Table 1: BRAC 2005 Recommendations Included in Our Review

Recommendation (recommendation 

number) Description of recommendation

Location of 

new training 

function

Services 

included

Fort Bragg, North Carolinaa(#4) Realign Fort Bragg, North Carolina, by relocating the 7th 

Special Forces Group to Eglin AFB, Florida, and by 

activating the 4th Brigade Combat Team, 82nd Airborne 

Division and relocating European-based forces to Fort 

Bragg, North Carolina.

Eglin Air Force 

Base, Florida

Army, Air 

Force

Joint Center for Consolidated 

Transportation Management Training 

(#122)

Realign Lackland Air Force Base, Texas, by relocating 

the Transportation Management School to Fort Lee, 

Virginia.

Fort Lee, 

Virginia

Army, Air 

Force

Joint Center of Excellence for Culinary 

Training (#123)

Realign Lackland Air Force Base, Texas by relocating 

Culinary Training to Fort Lee, Virginia, establishing it as a 

Joint Center of Excellence for Culinary Training.

Fort Lee, 

Virginia

Army, Air 

Force, Navy, 

Marine Corps

Joint Center of Excellence for Religious 

Training & Education (#124)

Realign Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama; Naval Air 

Station Meridian, Mississippi; and Naval Station Newport, 

Rhode Island, by relocating religious training and 

education to Fort Jackson, South Carolina, establishing a 

Joint Center of Excellence for religious training and 

education.

Fort Jackson, 

South Carolina

Army, Air 

Force, Navy

Joint Strike Fighter Initial Joint Training 

Site (#125)

Realign various military installations to stand up the Joint 

Strike Fighter Initial Joint Training Site at Eglin Air Force 

Base, Florida.

Eglin Air Force 

Base, Florida

Air Force, 

Navy, Marine 

Corpsb

Undergraduate Pilot and Navigator 

Training (#128)

Realign Randolph Air Force Base, Texas, by relocating 

Undergraduate Navigator Training to Naval Air Station 

Pensacola, Florida.

Naval Air 

Pensacola 

Station, Florida

Air Force, 

Navy

Source: GAO analysis of DOD information | GAO-16-45

Notes: 

a

This recommendation included multiple actions. For this review, we evaluated only the relocation of 

the 7th Special Forces Group to Eglin Air Force Base.

b

Although the Marine Corps was included in the BRAC 2005 recommendation, and originally 

conducted training at Eglin Air Force Base, it has recently moved its training to Marine Corps Air 

 

7The recommendation to move the 7th Special Forces Group to Eglin Air Force Base was included 

in Recommendation #4, Fort. Bragg, North Carolina, which also activated the 4th Brigade Combat 

Team, 82d Airborne Division and relocated European-based forces to Fort Bragg.
Station Beaufort, South Carolina due to environmental constraints at Eglin Air Force Base. Some 

Marines will continue to train with the Navy at Eglin Air Force Base on the Navy variant of the Joint 

Strike Fighter.

c

This recommendation included multiple actions. For this review, we evaluated the Undergraduate 

Navigator Training only.

To evaluate the extent to which DOD has implemented the BRAC 2005 

recommendations requiring the military services to relocate select training 

functions to increase opportunities for joint training, we reviewed the 2005 

Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission Report and 

implementing guidance for each recommendation. We compared this 

guidance to leading practices we developed in our prior work on 

consolidations.

Page 5 GAO-16-45 Military Base Realignments and Closures

8 We also reviewed documentary evidence, such as course 

listings, and interviewed DOD, service, and installation officials responsible 

for the implementation and oversight of these BRAC recommendations to 

gain a better understanding of the process used to implement each 

recommendation and to determine the extent to which each training 

function created by the BRAC recommendation was able to take 

advantage of the opportunities provided by the BRAC recommendation to 

develop more consolidated training.

To evaluate the extent to which DOD has determined whether 

implementing these BRAC recommendations has achieved cost savings, 

we spoke with relevant program and budget officials with knowledge of 

program budgets. We attempted to gather data on operating costs of 

these six training functions from before and after BRAC implementation; 

however, we found that these data were not consistently available, as 

discussed in the report. We assessed practices reported by these officials 

 

8

See GAO, Streamlining Government: Questions to Consider When Evaluating Proposals to 

Consolidate Physical Infrastructure and Management Functions, GAO-12-542 (Washington, 

D.C.: May 23, 2012). This report identifies key questions that agencies should consider 

when evaluating whether to consolidate physical infrastructure and management functions 

and presents key practices that can help these consolidations. To identify these key 

questions and practices, we identified and reviewed relevant literature on public sector 

consolidations produced by academic institutions, professional associations, think tanks, 

news outlets, and various other organizations. This report includes leading practices such 

as agreeing on specific goals, basing consolidations on clearly presented business-case 

analysis, and identifying relevant stakeholders.
against practices identified in our prior work on cost baselines.

Page 6 GAO-16-45 Military Base Realignments and Closures

9 Any 

operating costs presented in this report are estimates included to illustrate 

possible cost changes or to highlight inconsistencies in the data. In 

addition, we gathered data from the services on the costs of implementing 

these six BRAC recommendations and compared it to the data the 

services provided to DOD in 2012. We examined the data in light of 

DOD’s August 2010 memo requiring BRAC business plan managers to 

submit all BRAC-related expenditures, including those funded from both 

inside and outside of the BRAC account.

10 We discussed with relevant 

service officials differences in and the oversight of the available data. 

Specifically, we discussed the reasons for the differences and which 

costs were in fact implementation costs. We discuss the limitations of the 

data in this report.

We conducted this performance audit from September 2014 to February 

2016 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to 

obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for 

our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 

that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings 

and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

 

9

See GAO, Defense Health Care Reform: Actions Needed to Help Realize Potential Cost Savings 

from Medical Education and Training, GAO-14-630 (Washington, D.C.: July 31, 2014); 

GPRA Performance Reports, GAO/GGD-96-66R (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 14, 1996); and 

Agency Performance Plans: Examples of Practices that Can Improve Usefulness to 

Decisionmakers, GAO/GGD/AIMD-99-69 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 26, 1999). In these 

reports, we highlighted key practices that enhance the usefulness of performance reports 

from agencies under the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 

103-62 (1993). 

10 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, Base 

Realignment and Closure (BRAC) 2005 Final Business Plans and Other Reporting 

Requirements, Aug. 5, 2010.
The BRAC 2005 Commission Report contains 198 recommendations 

approved by the BRAC Commission

Page 7 GAO-16-45 Military Base Realignments and Closures

11 for closing or realigning DOD 

installations. The text of each recommendation contains several sections with 

important contextual information:

· Cost and Savings Information

· Secretary of Defense Recommendation

· Secretary of Defense Justification

· Community Concerns

· Commission Findings

· Commission Recommendations

By law, DOD must implement the actions recommended by the 

Commission unless the President terminates the process, or Congress 

enacts a resolution of disapproval.

BRAC 2005 differed from prior rounds in three significant ways—the 

circumstances under which it took place, its scale, and its scope. Unlike 

prior BRAC rounds, which were implemented during times of declining 

defense budgets and in which the focus was on eliminating excess 

capacity and realizing cost savings, BRAC 2005 was conducted in a 

global security environment characterized by increasing defense budgets 

and increasing military end strengths after the events of September 11, 

2001 and was conducted concurrently with overseas contingency 

operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.12 At the same time, DOD was engaged in 

 

11The BRAC statute establishes an independent commission to review the Secretary of Defense’s 

realignment and closure recommendations, with the authority to change these 

recommendations in certain circumstances if it determines that the Secretary deviated 

substantially from the selection criteria and a DOD force structure plan. The 2005 Defense 

Base Closure and Realignment Commission presented its list of final recommendations to 

the President, who approved them in their entirety. The President subsequently forwarded 

these BRAC recommendations to Congress, and they became effective on November 9, 

2005.

12Operation Enduring Freedom began in October 2001 and Operation Iraqi Freedom began in 

March 2003.

Background
an initiative to relocate thousands of personnel from overseas to the continental 

United States.

The scale of BRAC 2005 was much larger than the scales of the prior four 

rounds. BRAC 2005 generated more than twice the number of BRAC 

actions as all prior BRAC rounds combined. Table 2 compares the 

number of individual actions embedded in the BRAC 2005 

recommendations with the number of individual actions needed to 

implement the recommendations in the prior rounds and shows that the 

number of individual BRAC actions was larger in BRAC 2005 (813) than 

in the four prior BRAC rounds combined (387).

Table 2: BRAC Actions for All BRAC Rounds

Page 8 GAO-16-45 Military Base Realignments and Closures

Round

Major base 

closures

Major 

realignments

Minor closures 

and realignments Total actions

1988 16 4 23 43

1991 26 17 32 75

1993 28 12 123 163

1995 27 22 57 106

Total for four prior rounds 97 55 235 387

2005 24 24 765 813

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data| GAO-16-45

Note: For BRAC 2005, DOD defined major base closures as closures of bases that had a plant 

replacement value exceeding $100 million and defined major base realignments as those in which a 

base had a net loss of 400 or more military and civilian personnel. In the absence of a consistent 

definition, we relied on DOD’s characterization of which bases it considered to be major.

The scope of BRAC 2005 was broader than the scope of prior BRAC 

rounds. In addition to the traditional emphasis on eliminating unneeded 

infrastructure to achieve savings, DOD’s goals for the 2005 BRAC round 

included transforming the military by correlating base infrastructure to the 

force structure and enhancing joint capabilities by improving joint 

utilization to meet current and future threats. 13 As shown in table 2, the 2005 

BRAC round had the second lowest number of major closures, the largest 

number of major realignments, and the largest number of minor closures and 

realignments. Part of this transformation effort included a focus on providing 

opportunities to increase jointness, though many of the BRAC 

 

13In the late 1990s, DOD embarked on a major effort to transform its business processes, human 

capital, and military capabilities. 
recommendations focused on consolidations and reorganizations within 

the military departments rather than across departments. However, the 

six recommendations we reviewed, as well as other recommendations, 

including creating joint bases,

Page 9 GAO-16-45 Military Base Realignments and Closures

14 focused on jointness across multiple services.

DOD implemented the BRAC 2005 recommendations we reviewed by 

requiring military services to relocate selected training functions; however 

we found that, although DOD’s justifications for collocating each of the six 

training functions that we reviewed mentioned jointness or inter-service 

training as a potential benefit, two of the six training functions took 

advantage of the opportunity provided by BRAC to consolidate training to 

increase jointness. Specifically, we found that DOD implemented all six 

recommendations by relocating the select training functions—as 

recommended by the BRAC Commission—but that opportunities for joint 

training were realized in only two locations. Figure 1 shows the 

relocations associated with each recommendation.

 

14BRAC 2005 created 12 joint bases out of 26 service-specific, stand-alone installations: Joint 

Base Anacostia-Bolling, District of Columbia; Joint Base Andrews-Naval Air Facility 

Washington, District of Columbia; Joint Base Charleston, South Carolina; Joint Base 

Elmendorf-Richardson, Alaska; Joint Base Langley-Eustis, Virginia; Joint Base LewisMcChord, Washington; Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst, New Jersey; Joint Base MyerHenderson Hall, District of Columbia; Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam, Hawaii; Joint Base 

San Antonio, Texas; Joint Expeditionary Base Little Creek-Fort Story, Virginia; and Joint 

Region Marianas, Guam. 

DOD Implemented 

BRAC 2005 

Recommendations to 

Relocate Selected 

Training Functions 

but Missed Some 

Opportunities to 

Consolidate Training 

to Increase Jointness
Figure 1: Movements Associated with BRAC Recommendations in Our Review

Page 10 GAO-16-45 Military Base Realignments and Closures
Based on our meetings with officials, we found that officials implementing 

two of the six training functions created by those recommendations—the 

Joint Center of Excellence for Culinary Training and the 7th Special 

Forces Group—had found ways to take advantage of being located 

together to consolidate training and train jointly. For example, officials at 

the Joint Center of Excellence for Culinary Training stated that while the 

Air Force conducts its culinary training separately, the Army, Navy, and 

Marine Corps have successfully consolidated two of the three phases of 

their training and use a joint curriculum to train students. These officials 

stated that they were successful at consolidating the culinary training 

curricula for the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps because the leadership 

involved with implementing this recommendation was supportive of 

finding a way to train jointly even if that meant changing their curricula. 

Additionally, Army and Air Force Special Operations Forces officials 

stated that the relocation of the 7th Special Forces Group to Eglin Air 

Force Base allowed for increased joint training operations with the Air 

Force Special Operations Forces located at Hurlburt Field, near Eglin Air 

Force Base. These officials stated that they were successful at 

consolidating training and increasing jointness because they were already 

conducting joint training prior to the BRAC 2005 round and that since their 

move, being in closer proximity has made it even easier to train jointly.

The implementation of the remaining four BRAC recommendations that 

we reviewed relocated—moved separate functions to one location—but 

did not consolidate training functions. According to officials at the 

locations that did not consolidate training, they do not regularly coordinate 

or share information on their training goals and curricula, despite the fact 

that part of the Secretary of Defense’s justification for the moves in the 

BRAC 2005 process was that they would bring a “train as we fight: jointly” 

perspective to the learning process or would otherwise allow for joint 

training. Service officials told us that after these recommendations were 

proposed by DOD and approved by the BRAC Commission, they 

compared each of their original curricula but did not identify many areas 

of overlap. Training function officials stated that they had received 

minimal guidance related to consolidating training. Therefore, we found, 

they did not adjust curricula to take advantage of their proximity to 

consolidate training and possibly be more joint and consolidate space. 

Training function officials also stated that their four training functions have 

very different missions, making consolidation of their training more 

difficult. For example, while both the Navy and the Air Force train their 

navigators at Pensacola Naval Air Station, they train them to fly in 

different scenarios (e.g., over land or over sea) and in different airplanes.

Page 11 GAO-16-45 Military Base Realignments and Closures
Although the services may have differences in their training, the 2005 

BRAC Commission Report noted that the Secretary of Defense had 

described the 2005 BRAC round as an opportunity to promote jointness. 

The BRAC Commission Report stated that while the 2005 BRAC 

recommendations would “not move the ball across the jointness goal line, 

Commission decisions would help move the ball down the field” toward 

more jointness. Table 3 summarizes the status of each of the six BRAC 

recommendations that we reviewed.

Table 3: Summary of BRAC 2005 Recommendations Requiring Military Services to Relocate Select Training Functions to 

Page 12 GAO-16-45 Military Base Realignments and Closures

Consolidate Training to Increase Jointness

BRAC 2005 Commission 

Recommendation 

(Recommendation Number)

Did DOD implement BRAC 2005 

recommendations requiring 

military services to relocate 

select training functions?

Did DOD take advantage of opportunities to consolidate 

training to increase jointness?

Fort Bragg, North Carolina (#4) Yes – The 7th Special Forces 

Group relocated to Eglin Air Force 

Base.

Yes – According to officials, relocating the 7th Special Forces 

Group to Eglin Air Force Base allowed for enhanced joint 

training opportunities with the Air Force Special Operations 

Forces located at Hurlburt Field, near Eglin Air Force Base. 

Joint Center for Consolidated 

Transportation Management 

Training (#122)

Yes –Transportation Management 

training relocated to Fort Lee, 

Virginia.

No – In relocating the Transportation Management training to 

Fort Lee, DOD may have missed the opportunity to 

consolidate like schools and “Train as we fight: jointly.” 

According to officials, while the Army and Air Force 

communicate more frequently on an informal basis than they 

did before the implementation of the BRAC recommendation, 

each service has its own curriculum and they conduct their 

training separately. Officials stated that being at the same 

location allows the Air Force, if available, to participate at the 

end of an Army training exercise in which students load 

cargo on to an aircraft and Air Force personnel conduct an 

inspection, simulating real-world situations. 

Joint Center of Excellence for 

Culinary Training (#123)

Yes - Culinary Training relocated 

to Fort Lee, Virginia and 

established as a Joint Center of 

Excellence for Culinary Training.

Yes – According to officials, relocating Culinary training to 

one location increased jointness among the Army, Navy, and 

Marine Corps, which successfully consolidated two phases of 

their training curricula. However, the Air Force did not 

consolidate any of its training with the other services and 

trains separately. 
Page 13 GAO-16-45 Military Base Realignments and Closures

BRAC 2005 Commission 

Recommendation 

(Recommendation Number)

Did DOD implement BRAC 2005 

recommendations requiring 

military services to relocate 

select training functions?

Did DOD take advantage of opportunities to consolidate 

training to increase jointness?

Joint Center of Excellence for 

Religious Training and Education 

(#124)

Yes – Religious training and 

education relocated to Fort 

Jackson, South Carolina. 

No – In relocating the religious training and education to Fort 

Jackson, DOD may have missed the opportunity to 

consolidate training to increase jointness. Specifically, during 

the course of implementing this recommendation, officials 

said that they did not develop course curricula that would 

achieve the goals of both consolidating training where 

appropriate and providing service-unique training where 

necessary. However, other functions not related to training, 

such as the library, were merged. According to officials at the 

Armed Forces Chaplaincy Center, the Army, Air Force, and 

Navy communicate more frequently on an informal basis 

than they did before the implementation of the BRAC 

recommendation, but each service has its own curriculum 

and trains separately. Officials stated that they occasionally 

invite the other services to hear guest speakers. 

Joint Strike Fighter Initial Joint 

Training Site (#125)

Yes – A sufficient number of 

instructor pilots, operations 

support, and maintenance 

personnel relocated to Eglin Air 

Force Base, Florida, to stand up 

the Navy’s, Marine Corps’, and Air 

Force’s portion of the Joint Strike 

Fighter Initial Joint Training Site.

No – In relocating the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps at a 

Joint Strike Fighter Initial Joint Training Site, DOD may have 

missed the opportunity to consolidate training to increase 

jointness. Specifically, the joint basing arrangement did not 

establish curricula that permit services latitude to preserve 

service-unique culture and a faculty and staff that bring a 

“Train as we fight: jointly” national perspective to the learning 

process. According to officials at the Joint Strike Fighter 

Initial Training Site, while the Air Force, Navy, and Marine 

Corps communicate more frequently on an informal basis, 

each service has its own curriculum and conducts its Joint 

Strike Fighter maintenance and pilot training separately. In 

addition, the Marine Corps has recently moved its Joint 

Strike Fighter training to Marine Corps Air Station Beaufort, 

SC.

Undergraduate Pilot and Navigator 

Training (#128)

Yes – Undergraduate Navigator 

Training relocated to Naval Air 

Station Pensacola, Florida.

No – Relocating the Air Force navigator training did not result 

in a consolidated primary phase of undergraduate flight 

training functions or enhance jointness. Specifically, the 

basing arrangement did not establish curricula that permit 

services latitude to preserve service-unique culture and a 

faculty and staff that bring a “Train as we fight: jointly” 

national perspective to the learning process. According to Air 

Force and Navy officials, while the Air Force and Navy 

communicate more frequently on an informal basis than they 

did before the implementation of the BRAC recommendation, 

each service still has its own curriculum and they train 

separately.

Source: GAO analysis of DOD and service information | GAO-16-45

We found that four of the six training functions in our review missed the 

opportunity to consolidate training to increase jointness, because DOD 

provided minimal guidance to direct those implementing the 

recommendations. Service officials stated that to direct the 
implementation of the six recommendations we reviewed, DOD provided 

them with the language from the BRAC Commission report as well as 

guidance for developing business plans. Using the guidance provided, 

each of the military departments’ headquarters developed a business 

plan. This guidance focused on movement of personnel or construction. 

In our previous work on consolidation of physical infrastructure and 

management functions, we identified key practices, including developing 

an implementation plan for the consolidation. Such a plan should include 

essential change management practices such as active, engaged 

leadership of executives at the highest possible levels; a dedicated 

implementation team that can be held accountable for change; and a 

strategy measuring progress toward the established goals of the 

consolidation.

Page 14 GAO-16-45 Military Base Realignments and Closures

15 None of the guidance given to the military departments 

provided this type of direction. For example, the language from the BRAC 

Commission report for each recommendation we selected for review is 

generally less than one page long and contains high level summary 

information on costs, the action being recommended, DOD’s justification 

for the recommendation, community concerns, and the BRAC 

Commissions findings and recommendations. The business plans 

developed by the military departments included the text of the BRAC 

2005 recommendation, a description of costs and savings for each 

moving organization, a list of organizations moving, a time table for the 

movement of organizations, details on any military construction, and 

environmental information.

According to a September 2005 memorandum issued by the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense (OSD) and related to planning for BRAC 2005 

implementation, the business plans were to serve as a foundation for the 

complex program management necessary to ensure that the 

recommendations were implemented efficiently and effectively. 

Additionally, the memorandum states that the implementation challenges 

 

15GAO, Streamlining Government: Questions to Consider When Evaluating Proposals to 

Consolidate Physical Infrastructure and Management Functions, GAO-12-542 (Washington, 

D.C.: May 23, 2012). This report identifies key questions that agencies should consider 

when evaluating whether to consolidate physical infrastructure and management functions 

and presents key practices that can help these consolidations. To identify these key 

questions and practices, we identified and reviewed relevant literature on public sector 

consolidations produced by academic institutions, professional associations, think tanks, 

news outlets, and various other organizations. This report includes key practices such as 

agreeing on specific goals, basing consolidations on clearly presented business-case 

analysis, and identifying relevant stakeholders. 
presented by transformational recommendations—particularly 

recommendations to establish joint operations—underscore the utility and 

necessity of the plans. However, officials from the Basing Directorate 

under the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Energy, Installations, and 

Environment, the group that oversaw the implementation of BRAC 2005, 

stated that while the business plans do not include the BRAC 2005 

language containing DOD’s justification related to consolidating training to 

increase jointness, it is the business manager’s responsibility to 

implement the recommendation, taking into account the intent of the 

recommendation as described in the justification language. During our 

review, however, we found that officials responsible for certifying that 

these six recommendations had been implemented were not required by 

OSD to certify whether or not they had taken advantage of the opportunity 

to increase jointness. Rather, the business plan managers were focused 

on the completion of the construction of buildings and the movement of 

personnel. Further, officials at the four training functions that did not 

consolidate training told us that although they had initially compared each 

service’s curricula to identify common training, they felt that there was not 

enough overlap in the training for it to be consolidated. They also stated 

that they had not received direction from OSD or the military services on 

how to consolidate curricula in order to foster jointness in the event that 

course curricula had few similarities, prepared personnel to perform 

different missions, or used different equipment.

Like the BRAC 2005 recommendations that directed the relocation of 

several training functions in order to promote jointness or consolidate 

similar training, another BRAC 2005 recommendation directed the 

consolidation of 26 service-specific stand-alone installations into 12 joint 

bases to take advantage of opportunities for efficiencies and reduce 

duplication of similar support services. In order to implement this joint 

basing recommendation, the Office of the Secretary of Defense issued 

guidance in January 2008 designed to establish a comprehensive 

framework to consolidate installation-support functions while meeting 

mission requirements.

Page 15 GAO-16-45 Military Base Realignments and Closures

16 OSD also created an oversight structure for handling 

disputes and established a set of common standards for the installation 

support to be provided by each joint base. Furthermore, DOD issued a 

directive on military training that gives the Undersecretary of Defense for 

 

16Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, Transforming Through Base Realignment and 

Closure (BRAC) 2005-Joint Basing (Jan. 22, 2008), and DOD, Initial Guidance for BRAC 

2005 Joint Basing Implementation (Jan. 22, 2008).
Personnel & Readiness the responsibility to oversee and provide policy 

for individual and functional training programs for military personnel and 

the collective training programs of military units and staffs.

Page 16 GAO-16-45 Military Base Realignments and Closures

17

If DOD and the services believe that the training functions in our review 

can still capitalize on the opportunity to promote jointness provided by the 

BRAC 2005 recommendations, additional guidance will be an important 

first step toward being able to take advantage of this opportunity. Officials 

from the Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel & Readiness agreed 

that additional guidance would potentially be helpful in providing 

opportunities to consolidate training to increase jointness. Further, in the 

event of a future BRAC round, such guidance could provide a useful 

framework for taking advantage of the opportunities provided by similar 

recommendations focused on developing joint training capabilities.

DOD cannot determine if implementing the 2005 BRAC joint training 

recommendations that we reviewed has resulted in savings in operating 

costs. In addition, implementation costs reported to DOD by the training 

functions’ business plan managers likely did not include all costs funded 

from outside the BRAC account—we found at least $110 million in costs 

that likely should have been included based on DOD guidance requiring 

all BRAC-related costs to be reported, even those from outside the BRAC 

account. As a result, DOD may have incomplete or inaccurate cost 

information when trying to determine annual cost savings or total 

implementation costs of these BRAC recommendations.

 

17DOD Directive 1322.18, Military Training (Jan. 13, 2009). 

DOD Cannot 

Determine Cost 

Savings from 

Implementing BRAC 

2005 Joint Training 

Recommendations, 

and It Likely Did Not 

Report All 

Implementation Costs
Although we reported in 2012 that DOD had projected that four of the 

recommendations in our review would result in annual savings in 

operating costs,

Page 17 GAO-16-45 Military Base Realignments and Closures

18 we found that DOD could not determine whether 

implementing the 2005 BRAC joint training recommendations that we 

reviewed resulted in savings in operating costs. For two of the training 

functions in our review, DOD was able to provide complete baseline cost 

data; however, officials for these training functions could not determine 

whether cost fluctuations were due to the BRAC moves. For three of the 

training functions in our review, DOD was unable to provide complete 

baseline operating costs from before it implemented the BRAC 

recommendations, but officials representing these training functions 

indicated that implementing the recommendations may have increased 

some costs. The Joint Strike Fighter training program established by 

recommendation #125 was a new program and therefore there were no 

operating cost data prior to BRAC implementation.

In our prior work, we have identified the importance of developing 

baseline and trend data.19 By developing baseline operating costs, agencies 

can better evaluate whether they are achieving their cost savings targets. In 

addition, in our 1997 report on lessons learned from the four prior BRAC 

rounds, we found that initial cost and savings estimates for prior BRAC 

rounds were not based on reliable baseline data, because they were not 

of budget quality, were not consistently developed, and were poorly 

documented.20 As we also noted in our 1997 report, sound estimates of savings 

are important, because DOD may rely on savings from BRAC for other purposes. 

In 2014 we found that DOD was unable to determine whether the 

consolidation of training at the Medical Education and Training Campus 

resulted in cost savings, because it had not developed baseline cost 

information as part of its metrics to assess success.21 We recommended 

 

18The four recommendations with projected annual cost savings were Joint Center for 

Consolidated Transportation Management Training (#122), Joint Center of Excellence for 

Culinary Training (#123), Joint Center of Excellence for Religious Training and Education 

(#124), and Undergraduate Pilot and Navigator Training (#128). DOD projected that the 

Fort Bragg, NC (#4) recommendation would have additional annual operating costs. 

19See GAO-14-630, GAO/GGD-96-66R and GAO/GGD/AIMD-99-69. 

20GAO, Military Bases: Lessons Learned From Prior Base Closure Rounds, GAO/NSIAD-97-151 

(Washington, D.C.: July 25, 1997). The four BRAC rounds covered in the report occurred 

in 1988, 1991, 1993, and 1995.

21See GAO-14-630. Consolidation of training at the Medical Education and Training 

Campus was recommendation #172 of BRAC 2005.

DOD Cannot Determine 

Operating Cost Savings 

Resulting from BRAC 

2005 Joint Training 

Recommendations
that DOD develop baseline cost estimates as part of its metrics to assess 

cost savings for future consolidation efforts within the Medical Education 

and Training Campus, and DOD concurred with this recommendation. To 

date, DOD has not taken any actions to implement this recommendation, 

because, according to DOD officials, they cannot take action on these 

recommendations until another BRAC round is authorized.

Two of the training functions in our review—Undergraduate Navigator 

Training and Ft. Bragg, North Carolina (7th Special Forces Group move 

to Eglin Air Force Base)—were able to provide complete baseline cost 

data. However, for these two training functions, officials could not 

determine whether subsequent cost fluctuations were due to the BRAC 

moves, non-BRAC events, or some combination. For example, the 

budget officials from the Air Force’s Air Education and Training Command 

were able to provide us with detailed operating cost data for their 

undergraduate navigator training, going back to 1996. However, even 

with these detailed cost data, the budget officials we met with stated that 

they could not account for all of the different events that had resulted in 

cost fluctuations during that time. Air Force budget officials further stated 

that multiple events such as sequestration,

Page 18 GAO-16-45 Military Base Realignments and Closures

22 maintenance issues, and 

changes in how certain expenses are funded23 that occurred while BRAC was 

being implemented made it extremely difficult to determine whether any savings 

in the program’s operating costs were due to the implementation of the BRAC 

recommendation or to these other factors.

For the remaining three training functions—Culinary training, 

Transportation Management training, and Religious training— the 

programs could not provide complete operating cost information from 

 

22The Budget Control Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-25 (2011), established, among other things, a 

congressional Joint Select Committee on Deficit Reduction to propose legislation that would reduce 

federal deficits by $1.5 trillion over ten years (fiscal years 2012–2021), and two 

sequestration procedures: a sequestration procedure originally to be ordered by the 

President on January 1, 2013, to ensure that the level of deficit reduction would be 

achieved in the event that the Joint Committee failed to reach agreement to reduce the 

deficit by at least $1.2 trillion, and an additional sequestration procedure that would be 

triggered if appropriations exceeded established discretionary spending caps in a given 

fiscal year between fiscal years 2012 and 2021. The sequestration in fiscal year 2013 

used the former procedure, triggered because the Joint Committee did not reach 

agreement.

23For example, Air Force officials stated that the Air Force has changed which account funds fuel 

costs, making it difficult to track.
prior to the move.

Page 19 GAO-16-45 Military Base Realignments and Closures

24 For example, according to Army budget personnel, the 

Army culinary, transportation management, and chaplain training programs did 

not have data for various reasons, including a change in accounting systems, and 

because they are not required to keep data that far back. In addition, 

according to Air Force officials, because the Air Force culinary program is 

part of a larger multidisciplinary training program that includes subjects 

such as fitness and mortuary services, it is not possible to isolate the 

costs for the culinary portion of the training.

While these programs either did not have any baseline operating cost 

data or detailed operating cost baselines, in some instances officials were 

able to provide examples of where they believed operating costs have 

increased as a result of the respective BRAC moves. For example:

· Air Force officials estimated that they spend an additional $300,000 

annually to operate the department’s Chaplain Corps College at Fort 

Jackson, South Carolina than they did to operate the one at Maxwell 

Air Force Base, Alabama. Navy officials provided operating cost data 

for their chaplain training program showing that they have spent an 

average of approximately $182,000 more per year since relocating to 

Ft. Jackson. Officials with both services cited increased travel costs 

as the primary driver of these increases, because Ft. Jackson does 

not have room for the students to stay on base. Therefore, according 

to officials, students from both services must stay at hotels in 

Columbia, South Carolina, and officials have to provide transportation 

to and from the base.

· A Navy culinary official estimated that sending students to Ft. Lee 

costs the service an additional $200,000 per year for airfare compared 

to what it cost when all training was at Naval Station Great Lakes, 

Illinois.25 This official also estimated that this travel takes about three days 

per student, which results in about $400,000 in lost work time per year. In 

 

24Because the Joint Strike Fighter Initial Joint Training Site was a new training function created by 

the BRAC 2005 round, there was no cost prior to the implementation of the BRAC 

recommendation. The Commission approved this recommendation and reported that it was 

unlikely to achieve savings and would have a payback period of “never.”

25The Navy conducts entry-level basic training at Naval Station Great Lakes. According to a Navy 

official, prior to BRAC 2005, when the Navy’s culinary training program was also located at 

Naval Station Great Lakes, students would remain on the base and not have to travel to 

attend this training. The culinary training is now located at Ft. Lee as a result of the BRAC 

move, and students must now travel to attend this training. 
addition, the official added that there are other costs related to getting the 

students to and from airports. Additionally, the Navy culinary official 

added that the training program has incurred additional administrative 

costs because the Army and Navy student tracking systems are not 

linked. Specifically, because the systems are not configured to 

exchange data, all Navy student data must be manually entered twice, 

once in each system. The official said that this equates to thousands 

of records per year and could take about $45,000 in labor costs to 

accomplish.

For training functions we reviewed, Navy Joint Strike Fighter officials were 

able to identify a cost avoidance as a result of implementing the BRAC 

recommendation. As part of implementing this recommendation, the Air 

Force built a $59 million Academic Training Center at Eglin Air Force 

Base to serve the Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps. The Navy Joint 

Strike Fighter officials stated that if they had not colocated their program 

with the Air Force, the Navy would have had to pay to build and operate 

its own Academic Training Center.

Page 20 GAO-16-45 Military Base Realignments and Closures

26

It is now likely not possible to determine baseline costs for implementing 

the recommendations in our review in order to determine the extent to 

which the implementation of these recommendations resulted in cost 

savings. Also, subsequent changes to the programs make it difficult to 

determine the effect of implementing the BRAC recommendations. 

Although it can sometimes be difficult to attribute costs and savings to a 

specific event, such as a BRAC change, DOD will not be able to estimate 

whether it has achieved annual savings in operating costs if it does not 

collect complete baseline cost data with which to measure progress.

 

26The Marine Corps initially located its Joint Strike Fighter training squadron at Eglin Air Force 

Base in April 2010. However, in February 2014 the Marine Corps moved this training squadron to 

Marine Corps Air Station Beaufort, South Carolina. 
In 2012, we reported on DOD’s estimates of its final implementation costs 

for the BRAC 2005 recommendations;

Page 21 GAO-16-45 Military Base Realignments and Closures

27 however, for two of the six 

recommendations in this review—the Joint Strike Fighter Initial Training Site 

and the 7th Special Forces Group move to Eglin Air Force Base—we found 

that at least $110 million in implementation costs funded from outside of 

the BRAC account that likely should have been included were not 

reported to DOD by the business plan managers. Thus DOD’s previously 

reported total cost of $35.1 billion to implement BRAC 2005 is likely 

somewhat understated. The statute authorizing BRAC 2005 established a 

special treasury account for purposes related to implementing the BRAC 

2005 recommendations.28 During the lifetime of this account, DOD could 

also fund certain BRAC-related costs from outside the BRAC 2005 

account to complete actions needed to implement the recommendations. 

For example, the services could use money obtained through their 

military construction process to renovate existing space or build new 

facilities. In 2010, we recommended that DOD take steps to capture and

appropriately report to Congress any BRAC-related implementation costs 

that were funded from outside the BRAC account.29 DOD concurred with 

the recommendation, and in August 2010 the Deputy Under Secretary of 

Defense (Installations and Environment) issued a memo requiring BRAC 

business plan managers to submit all BRAC-related expenditures, 

including those funded from both inside and outside of the BRAC 

account.30 We reviewed the business plans for all six recommendations in our 

review, as well as data reported by the services to DOD, and found that none of 

them contained projects funded from outside of the BRAC account. Army and 

Air Force officials that we spoke with stated that there were general criteria 

for what could be included as a BRAC cost in the BRAC 2005 round. 

 

27GAO, Military Base Realignments and Closures: Updated Costs and Savings Estimates from 

BRAC 2005, GAO-12-709R (Washington, D.C.: June 29, 2012).

28The statutory section authorizing the account has since been repealed following the 

conclusion of the BRAC 2005 implementation period. See former section 2906A of the 

Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-510, Title XXIX (10 

U.S.C. 2687 note) (repealed by Pub. L. No. 112-239, Div. B, Title XXVII, § 2711(a) 

(2013)).

29GAO, Military Base Realignments and Closures: DOD Is Taking Steps to Mitigate Challenges 

but Is Not Fully Reporting Some Additional Costs, GAO-10-725R (Washington, D.C.: July 21, 

2010).

30Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, Base 

Realignment and Closure (BRAC) 2005 Final Business Plans and Other Reporting Requirements, 

Aug. 5, 2010.

Final Implementation 

Costs Reported to DOD 

for Some Joint Training 

Recommendations Likely 

Did Not Include All 

Implementation Costs
According to former business plan managers for some of the training 

functions in our review, and Army and Air Force service headquarters 

officials, some of these criteria included that the project be related to the 

physical move, the cost be for moves within the continental United States, 

the project not be related to addressing a deficiency that existed at the 

time of the BRAC recommendation, and the project be needed in order to 

comply with the original BRAC recommendation and not be used to 

accommodate personnel or mission expansion that happened after the 

BRAC decision. However, neither service nor OSD officials could provide 

us with any written guidance to this effect. Air Force officials also stated 

that language in the Form 1391—the DOD document to submit 

requirements and justification to Congress for funding for military 

construction projects—would indicate whether the project was BRACrelated.

For three of the recommendations we reviewed, the military construction 

implementation costs reported to us were approximately the same as 

those reported to DOD in 2012. Business plan managers for 

recommendation 124—Joint Center for Excellence for Religious Training 

and Education—reported military construction implementation costs of 

approximately $11.6 million to DOD in 2012 and approximately $11.8 

million to us in the course of this review. For recommendations 122—

Joint Center for Consolidated Transportation Management Training—and 

123—Joint Center of Excellence for Culinary Training—business plan 

managers reported combined military construction implementation costs 

of approximately $87.6 million to DOD in 2012, and approximately $89.4 

million to us in the course of this review.

Page 22 GAO-16-45 Military Base Realignments and Closures

31 For a fourth recommendation—

Undergraduate Pilot and Navigator Training, recommendation #128—we could 

not determine what the total military construction implementation costs reported 

to DOD in 2012 were, because this was a bundled recommendation that 

contained projects on multiple bases, not just at Pensacola Naval Air 

Station, Florida. However, the final Pensacola military construction costs 

 

31We combined the military construction implementation costs for recommendations 122 

and 123 because the culinary and transportation students share some facilities on Ft. Lee, 

specifically the dining facility and the dormitory.
reported to us—$90.1 million—were close to the preliminary military 

construction estimates of $89.5 million for those projects.

Page 23 GAO-16-45 Military Base Realignments and Closures

32

In the case of the Joint Strike Fighter and the Ft. Bragg, North Carolina 

recommendations, some projects that appear to be related to the BRAC 

move and were funded with non-BRAC money were not included in what 

was reported to DOD as required by DOD’s August 2010 memo. 

Examples of some of these projects that were not reported as BRAC 

implementation costs are

· Joint Strike Fighter (F-35) Parking Apron. In the official Form 1391 

proposing this project and the need for the parking apron, the title of 

the project is “BRAC F-35 A/C Parking Apron.” Further, in the 

“Requirement” section of the document, the justification provided by 

the Air Force states that the build-up for Joint Strike Fighter 

operations includes relocating joint military instructor pilots and 

operations support personnel from Luke Air Force Base; Sheppard Air 

Force Base; Marine Corps Air Station Miramar, California; Naval Air 

Station Oceana, Virginia;; and the Naval Air Station at Pensacola, the 

moves required by this BRAC recommendation. Air Force 

headquarters officials stated that they did not include this as a BRAC 

implementation cost because they and the Navy headquarters officials 

agreed this cost was not related to the move. However, Air Force 

officials at Eglin Air Force Base as well as the Navy Business Plan 

Manager indicated that the Parking Apron was a necessary 

implementation cost. Furthermore, the cost for every other Air Force 

project that cited “BRAC” in the Form 1391 project title was counted 

as an implementation cost. By including this reference to BRAC in the 

1391, this project was presented to Congress as a BRAC-related cost. 

The preliminary estimate for this project was $29 million dollars.

· Other Joint Strike Fighter Support Projects. This includes four 

projects related to the establishment of the Joint Strike Fighter training 

program. 33 Three of these projects have language identical to that in the 

 

32The projects at Pensacola Naval Air Station, Florida, to implement the Undergraduate Pilot 

and Navigator Training recommendation included a dormitory, a hangar, a training center, 

and other supporting infrastructure.

33These support projects include the first phase of an F-35 Hydrant Refueling System, F-35 JP8 

Flightline Fillstands, the F-35 JP8 West Side Bulk Tank Upgrades, and the F-35 POL 

Operations and Refueler Maintenance Facility.
BRAC Joint Strike Fighter (F-35) A/C Parking Apron in the Requirement 

section of their Form 1391, which states that the build-up for Joint 

Strike Fighter operations includes relocating joint military instructor 

pilots and operations support personnel from Luke Air Force Base, 

Sheppard Air Force Base, Marine Corps Air Station Miramar, Ca., 

Naval Air Station Oceana, VA and the Naval Air Station at Pensacola. 

The Form 1391 for the fourth project cites the impending 

overcrowding as a result of establishing the Joint Strike Fighter 

training program as the justification for the project. Air Force 

headquarters officials stated that, for these projects, Air Education 

and Training Command or Air Force Materiel Command did not 

submit the project to the Air Force BRAC office to determine if it was a 

BRAC requirement. However, given the requirement language that 

cites the BRAC moves and the impending overcrowding, it is not clear 

to us that these were not BRAC implementation costs. Furthermore, 

Air Force documentation and headquarters officials acknowledged 

that one of these projects—the first phase of the Hydrant Refueling 

System Station—was a companion project to the BRAC F-35 A/C 

Parking Apron. The combined final cost for these projects was 

approximately $20.6 million.

· Housing. Neither the Joint Strike Fighter nor the Ft. Bragg business 

plan managers included the housing they built for Joint Strike Fighter 

pilot trainees or Special Forces Group soldiers as BRAC 

implementation costs. Air Force headquarters officials stated that 

there was a disagreement between the Air Force and the Navy about 

who should pay for the Joint Strike Fighter housing and how it should 

be paid for. In order to complete the housing prior to the arrival of 

students, the Air Force agreed to pay for the first housing unit and the 

Navy agreed to pay for the second unit.

Page 24 GAO-16-45 Military Base Realignments and Closures

34 Regarding the barracks for 

the 7th Special Forces Group, at least one of these housing units was 

originally scheduled to be built with BRAC funding. However, Army 

headquarters and Special Operations Command officials stated that, 

due to construction delays,35 the Army reconsidered which funding 

source to use for some projects. As a result, all of the housing units 

 

34The Joint Strike Fighter dorm was completed in December 2010. At the time of our site visit, a 

second Joint Strike Fighter dormitory had not been built at Eglin Air Force Base.

35The Air Force had to conduct an Environmental Impact Study prior to establishing the Joint 

Strike Fighter training program at Eglin Air Force Base. Army officials stated that they did not 

want to begin construction until the study was finished so that they knew for sure where 

7th Special Forces Group would be located on the base.
ended up being built with regular military construction money as part 

of a larger project

Page 25 GAO-16-45 Military Base Realignments and Closures

36 and no part of that project was counted as BRAC 

implementation costs. The decisions not to count the Joint Strike Fighter 

housing unit and the 7th Special Forces Group housing unit as BRAC 

implementation costs is inconsistent with the fact that housing for the 

culinary and transportation students at Ft. Lee, as well as the housing 

for navigator students at Pensacola Naval Air Station, were counted 

as BRAC implementation costs. The Joint Strike Fighter housing unit 

cost was $17.6 million and the cost of the three Army housing units 

ranged from $6.5 to 6.7 million each.

· 7th Special Forces Group Training Ranges. The Army built several 

training ranges on Eglin Air Force Base to support the move of 7th 

Special Forces Group from Ft. Bragg to Eglin Air Force Base.37 Army 

headquarters officials told us that the cost of the ranges was initially to be 

considered part of the BRAC implementation cost, and documentation 

shows that the Army planned to use BRAC funds to construct these 

ranges. However, due to the previously mentioned construction 

delays and changes to the funding source of projects, the ranges 

ended up being funded with Army military construction funds. When 

implementation costs were reported to DOD in the final business plan, 

the business plan managers did not indicate that there were any 

implementation costs funded from outside the BRAC account. The 

reasons for not including the ranges as a BRAC implementation cost 

are unclear. Both Army and Air Force headquarters officials stated 

that this may have been because the Air Force already had ranges at 

Eglin Air Force Base that the Army could have used. Air Force 

headquarters officials added that it may have been because the 7th 

Special Forces Group did not have these ranges at Ft. Bragg. 

However, officials with the Army Special Operations Command and 

the 7th Special Forces Group stated that the existing Air Force ranges 

at Eglin Air Force Base were insufficient for their training needs, and 

that they had all of the ranges in question when they were at Ft. 

Bragg. Not including the ranges as a BRAC implementation cost was 

also inconsistent with the other implementations of BRAC 

 

36 This larger project included facilities such as a fire station, an access control facility, a tactical

communications center, and various storage facilities.

37There were 11 ranges built to support the needs of 7th Special Forces Group. Those ranges are 

the Breaching Facility, Hand Grenade Qualification Course, Shotgun Range, Shoothouse, Urban 

Assault Course, Grenade Launcher Range, Anti-Armor Tracking, Qualification Training 

Range, Light Demolition Range, 25 Meter Zero Range, and an Indoor Baffle Range.
recommendations we reviewed, where the training facilities were 

counted as BRAC implementation costs. Construction of the ranges at 

Eglin Air Force Base cost a combined $39.3 million.

An official with the Basing Directorate under the Assistant Secretary of 

Defense for Energy, Installations, and Environment—the group that 

oversaw the implementation of BRAC 2005—stated that the business 

plan managers were expected to include costs that were funded from 

outside the BRAC account in their final business plans and that, along 

with OSD General Counsel, they reviewed and provided comments on 

the cost submissions. However, the Basing Directorate official further 

stated that it was up to the military departments to ensure that all BRAC 

implementation costs were accounted for, and that the military 

departments had the flexibility to determine which costs would be 

associated with the BRAC recommendation and which would be 

attributed to other actions. We found that this flexibility in determining 

which costs were to be reported as BRAC costs led to inconsistencies in 

what kinds of projects were counted as BRAC implementation costs. By 

clarifying in guidance what is to be included as a BRAC implementation 

cost, DOD can help ensure that it has an accurate accounting of the final 

costs for any future BRAC implementation and that DOD and Congress 

are able to determine how much money is actually spent on any future 

BRAC rounds.

BRAC 2005 provided DOD with the opportunity to consolidate 

infrastructure and also to become more efficient and effective in its 

operations. To that end, the recommendations for consolidating and 

developing joint training programs provided DOD with new opportunities 

for furthering transformation and promoting jointness to meet the new 

challenges DOD faces. However, two of the six recommendations 

focused on training have led to joint training rather than colocation, 

despite the opportunity to jointly train the force as it fights. All six 

recommendations were implemented as approved, but without additional 

guidance, DOD cannot ensure that it takes advantage of the opportunities 

provided by BRAC. If Congress approves a future BRAC round, DOD will 

have another opportunity to promote jointness should the department 

choose to propose such recommendations to a future BRAC 

Commission. However, without specific guidance that the military services 

can use in implementing jointness-focused recommendations—for 

instance on responsibility for monitoring implementation and measuring 

progress—the department may again face challenges in moving beyond 

colocation of functions.

Page 26 GAO-16-45 Military Base Realignments and Closures

Conclusions
In implementing the training-focused jointness recommendations we 

examined, DOD did not collect baseline cost data for all of the 

recommendations as part of its implementation process, and without 

these data it could not determine the actual savings, if any, of 

implementing the recommendations. Unless DOD develops baseline cost 

data for the recommendations in any future BRAC rounds, it will be 

unable to determine the budgetary effect of its actions. Given that we 

found some implementation costs were paid for from other than the 

BRAC 2005-specific accounts, if DOD does not clarify in guidance the 

types of costs that are to be included as BRAC implementation costs, 

decision makers will lack reasonable assurance that the department’s 

cost data for any future BRAC round recommendations are fully reliable.

To make further progress toward taking full advantage of the opportunity 

of consolidating training in order to increase jointness following the 

implementation of the BRAC 2005 recommendations, for the training 

functions that did not consolidate training beyond colocation, we 

recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary of 

Defense for Personnel and Readiness and the Secretaries of the military 

departments to provide guidance to the program managers on 

consolidating training, if DOD decides that taking advantage of an 

opportunity to increase jointness is still appropriate.

To improve the ability of the military departments to take advantage of 

any opportunities provided by recommendations to develop joint training 

capabilities in a future BRAC round, we recommend that the Secretary of 

Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and 

Readiness—in consultation with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

Energy, Installations, and Environment—to develop and provide specific 

guidance for the military departments to use in implementing 

recommendations designed to consolidate training to increase jointness.

To improve DOD’s ability to estimate savings, if any, from future 

consolidation of training—including any consolidation resulting from a 

future BRAC round—we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct 

the military departments to develop baseline cost data.

To improve the accounting of any future BRAC rounds, we recommend 

that the Secretary of Defense direct the Assistant Secretary of Defense 

for Energy, Installations, and Environment to issue guidance clarifying 

what costs should be included in final BRAC accounting.

Page 27 GAO-16-45 Military Base Realignments and Closures

Recommendations for 

Executive Action
We provided a draft of this report to DOD for review and comment. In 

response, DOD non-concurred with three recommendations and partially 

concurred with one recommendation. 

In its letter, DOD stated that our report misunderstands DOD’s approach 

to joint and common training and does not completely recognize the 

unique circumstances of BRAC recommendation development and 

implementation. We recognize that there is a difference between joint and 

common training; however, these BRAC recommendations, which DOD 

proposed and the BRAC Commission approved, emphasized jointness, 

not just common training. In fact, for several of these recommendations, 

the Secretary of Defense’s justification included “enhancing jointness” as 

part of the rationale, or proposed that the recommendation would allow 

DOD to “train as we fight; jointly.” 

DOD further stated that our report undervalues the importance of 

providing DOD components flexibility to determine BRAC costs and has a 

misplaced emphasis on estimating savings for transformational 

recommendations. We recognize the importance of flexibility among DOD 

components for most military decisions; however, as our report notes, 

flexibility in reporting BRAC costs led to inconsistencies in reporting of 

these costs across the department. In addition, cost and savings 

estimates are a part of the BRAC process. Both DOD and the 

Commission develop such estimates for each recommendation and did 

so for these six recommendations. Moreover, DOD emphasized savings 

in some of the six recommendations in its justification to the Commission. 

Specifically, DOD’s justification for the Joint Center of Excellence for 

Culinary Training reads in part “It is the military judgement of the JCSG 

that consolidation at the location with the largest amount of culinary 

training produces the greatest overall military value to the Department 

through increased training efficiency at lower cost.” Similarly, for the Joint 

Center of Excellence for Religious Training and Education, DOD’s 

justification to the Commission reads in part “Consolidation at Fort 

Jackson, SC creates a synergistic benefit by having each Service’s officer 

and enlisted programs conducted in close proximity to operational forces. 

Realized savings result from consolidation and alignment of similar officer 

and enlisted educational activities and the merging of common support 

functions.” Saving money in implementation of any federal program is an 

important goal. We continue to believe that it is important for DOD’s goals 

to include saving money where possible.

DOD did not concur with our first recommendation, to provide guidance to 

the program managers of the training functions created under BRAC 

Page 28 GAO-16-45 Military Base Realignments and Closures

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation
2005 on consolidating training. In its response, DOD stated that our report 

misunderstands the definition of joint training and that DOD and the 

services are constantly seeking ways to improve training opportunities by 

either consolidating or collocating individual skills training. DOD further 

stated that the Interservice Training Review Organization would be the 

proper entity to address the issues identified in our report. In our report, 

we noted that the training functions were reviewed and these reviews did 

not find much overlap in training between services. Several of these 

reviews were conducted by the Interservice Training Review 

Organization. Further, one of the purposes of several of these 

transformational recommendations was to create opportunities to 

enhance jointness, as stated by DOD in proposing them to the 

Commission. Enhancing jointness would be going a step further than 

colocating services and aspiring to consolidate common training. DOD 

also states in its comments that the Interservice Training Review 

Organization was involved in implementing the Chaplain 

recommendation. Still, we found that, even with this involvement, DOD 

did not take advantage of opportunities to consolidate training to increase 

jointness in the Chaplain recommendation. We also noted that, in the 

absence of guidance from DOD, four of the training functions in our 

review did not make any further effort to consolidate training. We continue 

to believe that if DOD believes the training functions in this review would 

benefit from more consolidation of training, it should issue guidance.

DOD did not concur with our second recommendation to develop and 

provide specific guidance for the military departments to use in 

implementing recommendations designed to consolidate training to 

increase jointness in the event of future BRAC rounds. DOD stated that 

while consultation with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Energy, 

Installations, and Environment would be required within a future BRAC 

round, the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness 

already has the authority to develop this guidance. We recognize that the

Under Secretary has the authority but as our report points out, it has not 

exercised it in this instance, and that guidance is needed to ensure that 

DOD takes advantage of the opportunities provided by BRAC.

DOD did not concur with our third recommendation to develop baseline 

cost data in the event of any future consolidation of training. DOD stated 

that data calls for BRAC must ensure that the questions asked do not 

provide the personnel answering the questions insight into the various 

scenarios being considered and that all installations must be treated 

equally. Moreover, DOD stated that this is critical to maintaining the 

fairness and objectivity of the analysis by preventing the supplied data 

from being influenced by gaining and losing locations. During BRAC 

Page 29 GAO-16-45 Military Base Realignments and Closures
2005, DOD estimated that it had collected over 25 million pieces of data 

from hundreds of defense installations and presumably was able to do so 

in a way that maintained fairness and objectivity without inappropriately 

disclosing to personnel providing the information something to which they 

should not be privy. DOD further stated that collecting baseline cost data 

for training activities in advance of an authorized BRAC process is not 

effective because the department will not be able to use previously 

supplied uncertified data. Nothing in our recommendation requires DOD 

to collect data prior to the implementation of a future, authorized BRAC 

round. Finally, DOD stated that it is not clear that a future BRAC round 

would include joint training. However, baseline cost data is needed for 

measuring either increased costs or savings for changes to any program, 

not just joint training. Thus, we continue to believe that without sufficient 

baseline cost information, DOD will be unable to determine the budgetary 

effect of its actions, including demonstrating cost savings. 

DOD partially concurred with our fourth recommendation, to issue 

clarifying guidance regarding what costs should be included in final BRAC 

accounting. DOD stated that micromanaging every cost decision across 

such a vast program would have been unreasonable and that ultimately, 

whether or not to fund various requirements from the BRAC account was 

a judgment call made by military headquarters officials. However, DOD 

agreed that it would be reasonable to consider placing additional 

emphasis on accounting for BRAC costs. We agree that managing a 

program as large as BRAC is difficult and that guidance on what costs 

should be included in the final BRAC accounting would help DOD to more 

accurately report the costs of implementing BRAC. 

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional 

committees, the Secretary of Defense, the Under Secretary of Defense 

for Personnel and Readiness, and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

Energy, Installations, and Environment. In addition, the report is available 

at no charge on our website at http://www.gao.gov.

Page 30 GAO-16-45 Military Base Realignments and Closures

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact 

me at (202) 512-4523 or leporeb@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices 

of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last 
page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report 

are listed in appendix IV. 

Brian J. Lepore, Director

Defense Capabilities and Management

Page 31 GAO-16-45 Military Base Realignments and Closures
List of Committees

The Honorable John McCain

Chairman

The Honorable Jack Reed

Ranking Member

Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate

The Honorable Thad Cochran

Chairman

The Honorable Richard J. Durbin

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Defense

Committee on Appropriations

United States Senate

The Honorable Mark Kirk

Chairman

The Honorable Jon Tester

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Military Construction, Veterans Affairs and Related 

Agencies

Committee on Appropriations

United States Senate

The Honorable Mac Thornberry

Chairman

The Honorable Adam Smith

Ranking Member

Committee on Armed Services

House of Representatives

The Honorable Rodney Frelinghuysen

Chairman

The Honorable Pete Visclosky

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Defense

Committee on Appropriations

House of Representatives

The Honorable Charlie Dent

Page 32 GAO-16-45 Military Base Realignments and Closures
Chairman

The Honorable Sanford Bishop

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related 

Agencies

Committee on Appropriations

House of Representatives

Page 33 GAO-16-45 Military Base Realignments and Closures
Appendix I: List of Prior GAO Reviews Related 

to BRAC 2005, Related Recommendations, and 

DOD Actions to Date

The following table lists selected prior GAO reports on the Base 

Realignment and Closure (BRAC) 2005 round, our recommendations in 

those reports, the Department of Defense’s (DOD) response, and DOD’s 

actions to date in response to the recommendations. The 24 reports listed 

contained 69 recommendations. DOD concurred or partially concurred 

with 57 of these recommendations and has implemented 37 of them. 

According to DOD officials, DOD will be unable to take actions on many 

of these recommendations until another BRAC round is authorized.

Page 34 GAO-16-45 Military Base Realignments and Closures

1

GAO-15-274—Military Base Realignments and Closures: Process for Reusing Property for Homeless Assistance Needs 

Improvements (Mar. 16, 2015).

GAO recommendation Original DOD response DOD actions

Update the Base Realignment and Closure 

(BRAC) homeless assistance regulations to 

require that conveyance statuses be tracked. 

These regulatory updates could include 

requiring the Department of Defense (DOD) 

to track and share disposal actions with the 

Department of Housing and Urban 

Development (HUD) and requiring HUD to 

track the status following disposal, such as 

type of assistance received by providers and 

potential withdrawals by providers.

Partial concur. DOD stated that while it 

concurs with the value of tracking homeless 

assistance and other conveyances, it can do 

so without any change to existing 

regulations. DOD did not identify any actions 

it will take on how to track the homeless 

assistance conveyances in the absence of a 

regulatory update and did not indicate that it 

would work with HUD to update the 

regulations. Moreover, DOD did not explain 

how program staff would know to track the 

conveyance status in the absence of 

guidance requiring them to do so. 

Pending. Awaiting authorization of a 

future BRAC round. 

Update the BRAC homeless assistance 

regulations; establish information-sharing 

mechanisms, such as a website or 

informational pamphlets; or develop 

templates to include

· Specific guidance that clearly identifies 

the information that should be provided 

to homeless assistance providers during 

tours of on-base property, such as the 

condition of the property.

Partial concur. DOD stated that while it 

already provides generic information about 

the property, the Local Redevelopment 

Authorities (LRA) and interested homeless 

assistance providers can undertake facility 

assessments following the tours. However, 

DOD did not provide additional detail or 

explanation about how it would provide 

information about the condition of the 

property or access to it.

Pending. Awaiting authorization of a 

future BRAC round.

· Information for homeless assistance 

providers to use in preparing their notices 

of interest;

Non-concur. DOD stated that the existing 

regulatory guidance is adequate for 

providers’ expressions of interest given that 

these expressions evolve as the 

redevelopment planning effort proceeds and 

they learn more about the property.

Pending. Awaiting authorization of a 

future BRAC round.

 

1We categorize DOD actions pending if DOD had described actions underway that had not been 

completed or DOD had not yet identified action it would take in response to a 

recommendation that it concurred or partially concurred with.

Appendix I: List of Prior GAO Reviews Related 

to BRAC 2005, Related Recommendations, and 

DOD Actions to Date
Appendix I: List of Prior GAO Reviews Related 

to BRAC 2005, Related Recommendations, and 

DOD Actions to Date

Page 35 GAO-16-45 Military Base Realignments and Closures

GAO recommendation Original DOD response DOD actions

Guidance for legally binding agreements and 

clarification on the implications of unsigned 

agreements; and

Partial concur. DOD did not commit to 

taking any actions to provide this information 

and instead noted that any action should 

ensure that a legally binding agreement 

does not bind DOD to disposal actions it is 

unable to carry out. DOD further noted that 

the purpose of the legally binding agreement 

is to provide remedies and recourse for the 

LRA and provider in carrying out an 

accommodation following property disposal. 

Pending. Awaiting authorization of a 

future BRAC round.

Specific information on legal alternatives to 

providing on-base property, including 

acceptable alternative options such as 

financial assistance or off-base property in 

lieu of on-base property, information about 

rules of sale for on-base property conveyed to 

homeless assistance providers, and under 

what circumstances it is permissible to sell 

property for affordable housing alongside the 

no-cost homeless assistance conveyance.

Non-concur. DOD stated that providers 

may be considered only through specific 

expressions of interest in surplus BRAC 

property, and these suggested alternatives 

may be considered only within the context of 

what is legally permissible given the specific 

circumstances at each installation. 

Pending. Awaiting authorization of a 

future BRAC round.

GAO-14-577—DOD Joint Bases: Implementation Challenges Demonstrate Need to Reevaluate the Program (Sept. 19, 2014).

GAO recommendation Original DOD response DOD actions

Evaluate the 44 support functions identified in 

DOD’s guidance for joint base implementation 

to determine which functions are still suitable 

for consolidation. Subsequently, identify and 

make any changes that are appropriate to 

address limitations reported by the joint bases 

in consolidating installation-support functions, 

such as limitations related to workforces and 

geography.

Concur. DOD stated that it had already 

removed some installation-support functions 

from joint basing because they were not 

compelled for inclusion as part of the BRAC 

recommendation and otherwise did not offer 

opportunities for savings or consolidation. It 

further stated that in April 2014, the Senior 

Joint Base Working Group principals tasked 

their staffs to identify which installation 

support functions and performance 

standards were not providing value to the 

joint bases’ various military missions and to 

explore whether these functions and 

standards should continue to be included in 

joint basing. DOD did not provide time 

frames for completing such actions.

Pending. In July 2015, an OSD official 

stated that DOD will not revise the 12 

memorandums of agreement for the 

existing joint bases to show that some 

of the functions should not be 

consolidated but are using an 

abbreviated list of functions—excluding 

the functions we identified as poor 

candidates for consolidation—in 

evaluating the viability of new joint 

bases.
Appendix I: List of Prior GAO Reviews Related 

to BRAC 2005, Related Recommendations, and

DOD Actions to Date

Page 36 GAO-16-45 Military Base Realignments and Closures

GAO recommendation Original DOD response DOD actions

Take policy actions, as appropriate—such as 

issuing additional guidance—to address any 

challenges resulting in inefficiencies and 

inequities regarding efforts to consolidate 

installation-support functions—including, at a 

minimum, those identified in this report. 

Partial concur. DOD stated that it is mindful 

of challenges in implementing and operating 

joint bases and agreed that policy actions 

can address some challenges. However, 

DOD stated that it does not agree that these 

challenges require Office of the Secretary of 

Defense (OSD) level policies, citing instead 

the existing responsibilities and authorities 

already assigned to the military departments 

and the Joint Management Oversight 

Structure.

Pending. In July 2015, an OSD official 

told us that DOD is taking action on our 

recommendation to address any 

challenges resulting in inefficiencies and 

inequities regarding efforts to 

consolidate installation-support 

functions. DOD has drafted a joint 

basing handbook, which has been 

signed by the Air Force and the Navy, to 

address inconsistent service-level 

guidance. In addition, the Senior 

Installation Management Group now 

meets quarterly to handle conflicts and 

disputes between service policies and 

to address any challenges resulting in 

inefficiencies and inequities regarding 

efforts to consolidate installationsupport functions.

Evaluate the purpose of the program and 

determine whether DOD’s current goals of 

achieving greater efficiencies and generating 

cost savings for the joint basing program, as 

stated in the 2005 BRAC Commission 

recommendation, are still appropriate or 

whether goals should be revised, and 

communicate these goals to the military 

services and joint bases and then adjust 

program activities accordingly.

Non-concur. DOD stated that the goal of 

joint basing remains to increase the 

efficiency of delivering installation support at 

the 12 joint bases as described in the BRAC 

Commission’s recommendation number 146.

None planned. As of November 2015, 

DOD stated that no action is expected.

Subsequent to the evaluation above, provide 

direction to joint bases on their requirements 

for meeting the joint base program’s goals. 

DOD’s leadership should work with the 

military services to determine what reporting 

requirements and milestones should be put in 

place to increase support and commitment for 

the program’s goals.

Non-concur. DOD stated that the joint 

bases have been fully operational since 

October 2010 and have proven that they can 

deliver measurable and tangible savings 

across the installation-support portfolio. 

Therefore, DOD stated that it does not 

believe OSD should establish program 

milestones.

None planned. As of November 2015, 

DOD stated that no action is expected.

GAO-14-630—Defense Health Care Reform: Actions Needed to Help Realize Potential Cost Savings from Medical Education and 

Training (July 31, 2014).
Appendix I: List of Prior GAO Reviews Related 

to BRAC 2005, Related Recommendations, and 

DOD Actions to Date

Page 37 GAO-16-45 Military Base Realignments and Closures

GAO recommendation Original DOD response DOD actions

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health 

Affairs should direct the Director of the 

Defense Health Agency (DHA) to conduct a 

fully developed business case analysis for the 

Education and Training Directorate’s reform 

effort. In this analysis the Director should

Identify the cost-related problem that it seeks 

to address by establishing the Education and 

Training Directorate,

Explain how the processes it has identified 

will address the cost-related problem, and

Conduct and document an analysis of 

benefits, costs, and risks.

Concur. DOD stated that Medical Education 

and Training is the only shared service that 

has never had any type of oversight by the 

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense 

for Health Affairs or the pre-DHA TRICARE 

Management Activity. 

Pending. In a September 2014 letter, 

the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

Health Affairs stated that baseline 

costing would be a key component of 

the Medical Education and Training 

Directorate’s strategic plan and would 

be presented in the form of a 

“deliverable” in moving forward to the 

Directorate’s final operating capability. 

The letter also noted that an inventory 

of all education and training products 

and services within the Military Health 

System will be undertaken shortly, and 

that this had never been accomplished 

before. However, the letter did not 

specifically address the development of 

metrics to assess achievement of any 

cost savings as we recommended. As 

of September 2015, no further actions 

have been taken. 

Develop baseline cost information as part of 

DHA’s metrics to assess achievement of cost 

savings.

Concur. DOD stated that Medical Education 

and Training is the only shared service that 

has never had any type of oversight by the 

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense 

for Health Affairs or the pre-DHA TRICARE 

Management Activity.

Pending. According to a September 

2014 letter from the Assistant Secretary 

of Defense for Health Affairs, the 

completion of a business case analysis 

will be a key component of the 

Directorate’s strategic plan and will be 

presented in the form of a “deliverable” 

to achieve its final operating capability. 

The letter did not specifically identify the 

cost-related problem that DOD seeks to 

address by establishing the Directorate 

nor did it specifically state if this would 

be addressed in its business case 

analysis under development as we 

recommended. As of September 2015, 

no further actions have been taken.

GAO-14-538—Defense Infrastructure: DOD Needs to Improve Its Efforts to Identify Unutilized and Underutilized Facilities (Sept. 8, 

2014).
Appendix I: List of Prior GAO Reviews Related 

to BRAC 2005, Related Recommendations, and 

DOD Actions to Date

Page 38 GAO-16-45 Military Base Realignments and Closures

GAO recommendation Original DOD response DOD actions

Establish a strategic plan as part of a resultsoriented management framework that 

includes, among other things, long-term 

goals, strategies to achieve the goals, and 

use of metrics to gauge progress to manage 

DOD’s real property and to facilitate DOD’s 

ability to identify all unutilized or underutilized 

facilities for potential consolidation 

opportunities.

Concur. DOD stated that a strategy review 

is currently under way with initial guidance 

and initiatives. 

Pending. In response to a requirement 

under the Office of Management and 

Budget’s (OMB) Reduce the Footprint 

policy, DOD officials told us in July 2015 

that they had developed a draft DOD 

Real Property Efficiency Plan that 

describes DOD’s strategic and tactical 

approach to managing its real property 

effectively and efficiently. Officials 

stated that this draft plan would also 

address our recommendation in 

September 2014 that DOD establish a 

strategic plan to manage it’s real 

property and to facilitate its ability to 

identify potential consolidation and 

disposal opportunities. This plan has not 

been finalized and implemented. As of 

October 2015, an official from the Office 

of the Assistant Secretary of Defense 

for Energy, Installations, and 

Environment stated that the plan is still 

under review and has not been provided 

to OMB. The official did not have an 

estimate for when the plan will be 

finalized and implemented. Officials also 

stated that a recently developed draft 

guide for calculating facility utilization 

should complement the draft plan in 

improving utilization data to better 

identify excess facilities.

GAO-13-436—Defense Infrastructure: Communities Need Additional Guidance and Information to Improve Their Ability to Adjust to 

DOD Installation Closure or Growth (May 14, 2013).

GAO recommendation Original DOD response DOD actions

Direct the Secretary of the Army to issue 

guidance, consistent with DOD guidance, on 

specific levels of maintenance to be followed 

in the event of a base closure, based on the 

probable reuse of the facilities.

Concur. DOD stated that the Army agrees 

to publish property maintenance guidance 

prior to closing installations in the event of 

future base closures. 

Pending. Awaiting authorization of a 

future BRAC round. In July 2015, DOD 

stated that the Army has agreed to 

publish property maintenance guidance 

prior to closing installations in the event 

of future base closures. There have 

been no additional base closures since 

the date of the report.
Appendix I: List of Prior GAO Reviews Related 

to BRAC 2005, Related Recommendations, and 

DOD Actions to Date

Page 39 GAO-16-45 Military Base Realignments and Closures

GAO recommendation Original DOD response DOD actions

Direct the Secretaries of the Army, the Navy, 

and the Air Force to consider developing a 

procedure for collecting service members’ 

physical addresses while stationed at an 

installation, annually updating this 

information, and sharing aggregate 

information with community representatives 

relevant for local planning decisions, such as 

additional population per zip code, consistent 

with privacy and force protection concerns.

Partial concur. DOD stated that it agrees 

that information pertaining to the physical 

location of installation personnel helps 

affected communities plan for housing, 

schools, transportation and other off-post 

requirements and that existing policy 

requires the military departments to share 

planning information with states and 

communities. DOD also stated that in the 

event of future basing decisions affecting 

local communities, it will work with the 

military departments to assess and 

determine the best means to obtain, 

aggregate, and distribute this information to 

help ensure that adequate planning 

information is made available.

None planned. In July 2015, DOD 

stated that there is no immediate need 

to undertake these efforts.

Direct the Secretaries of the Army and the Air 

Force to consider creating or designating a 

civilian position at the installation level to be 

the focal point and provide continuity for 

community interaction for future growth 

installations and to consider establishing such 

a position at all installations.

Partial concur. DOD stated that it agrees 

with the need for a designated position at 

the installation level and will ensure that 

each military department is meeting this 

need through current practices. DOD also 

stated that many growth installation officials 

already serve as “ex-officio members” of the 

community’s growth management 

organizations and community officials agree 

that this has been quite valuable for both the 

department and affected growth 

communities.

Pending. Awaiting authorization of a 

future BRAC round. In July 2015, DOD 

stated that in the event the Department 

of Defense proceeds with future 

realignments that could result in a 

reduced footprint, there are provisions 

for Base Transition Coordinators to be 

designated as liaisons with affected 

communities. In the event these future 

realignments result in an expanded 

footprint or personnel growth, the 

department would consider this 

recommendation at that time.

GAO-13-149—Military Bases: Opportunities Exist to Improve Future Base Realignment and Closure Rounds (Mar. 7, 2013).

GAO recommendation Original DOD response DOD actions

Work with the military services, defense 

agencies, and other appropriate stakeholders 

to improve the process for fully identifying 

recommendation-specific military construction 

requirements and ensuring that those 

requirements are entered into the Cost of 

Base Realignment Actions (COBRA) model 

and not under stated in implementation cost 

estimates prior to submitting 

recommendations to the BRAC Commission.

Non-concur. DOD stated that the primary 

advantage of COBRA is to provide real-time 

comparison of scenarios to aid analysis and 

decision making, not to develop budgetquality estimates.

None planned. As of November 2015, 

DOD stated that no action is expected.
Appendix I: List of Prior GAO Reviews Related 

to BRAC 2005, Related Recommendations, and 

DOD Actions to Date

Page 40 GAO-16-45 Military Base Realignments and Closures

GAO recommendation Original DOD response DOD actions

Establish a process for ensuring that 

information technology requirements 

associated with candidate recommendations 

that are heavily reliant on such technology 

have been identified to the extent required to 

accomplish the associated mission, before 

recommendations and cost estimates are 

submitted to the BRAC Commission.

Partial concur. DOD acknowledged that 

information technology costs should be 

better estimated but added that a separate 

process is not necessary and stated that it 

can improve cost estimating by reevaluating 

the standard factors used in COBRA and by 

providing additional guidance as 

appropriate.

Pending. Awaiting authorization of a 

future BRAC round.

Ensure that, during the development and 

comparison of BRAC scenarios, all 

anticipated BRAC implementation costs—

such as relocating personnel and 

equipment—are considered and included in 

the COBRA model when comparing 

alternatives and generating cost estimates.

Non-concur. DOD reiterated that COBRA is 

not designed to develop budget quality 

estimates, nor can it reflect future 

implementation investment decisions made 

after BRAC recommendations become 

binding legal obligations for DOD. 

None planned. As of November 2015, 

DOD stated that no action is expected.

Take steps to ensure that COBRA’s standard 

factor for information technology is updated 

and based on technological developments 

since the most recent COBRA update.

Concur. Pending. Awaiting authorization of a 

future BRAC round.

Update COBRA guidance to require users to 

provide a narrative explaining the process, 

sources, and methods used to develop the 

data entered into COBRA to develop military 

personnel position-elimination savings.

Concur. Pending. Awaiting authorization of a 

future BRAC round.

Identify appropriate measures of 

effectiveness and develop a plan to 

demonstrate the extent to which the 

department achieved the results intended 

from the implementation of the BRAC round.

Non-concur. DOD stated that military value 

based on force structure and mission needs 

should continue to be the key driver for 

BRAC. DOD also stated that its business 

plan process is the best way to measure 

effectiveness.

None planned. As of November 2015, 

DOD stated that no action is expected.

Establish a target for eliminating excess 

capacity in its initiating guidance to high-level 

department-wide leadership, consistent with 

the BRAC selection criteria chosen for a 

future BRAC round.

Non-concur. DOD stated that goals or 

overarching capacity targets would subvert 

the intent of the BRAC statute to develop 

recommendations based on military value 

and would preclude examination of a full 

array of closure and realignment options.

None planned. As of November 2015, 

DOD stated that no action is expected.
Appendix I: List of Prior GAO Reviews Related 

to BRAC 2005, Related Recommendations, and 

DOD Actions to Date

Page 41 GAO-16-45 Military Base Realignments and Closures

GAO recommendation Original DOD response DOD actions

Limit the practice of bundling many potential 

stand-alone realignments or closures into 

single recommendations.

Non-concur. DOD does not believe that 

bundling is problematic and stated that the 

examples we cited had been bundled 

because they shared a common mission and 

purpose, and bundling maximized military 

value. The practice of bundling can limit 

visibility into the estimated costs and savings 

for individual closures or realignments that 

are elements of the bundle and can make 

the Commission’s review more difficult, 

although DOD disputed this latter point. The 

2005 BRAC Commission’s executive staff 

told us that bundling made their review more 

difficult because they needed to deconstruct 

the bundle to assess whether any changes 

were necessary. In some cases bundling is 

warranted, and it is for this reason that we 

recommended limiting the practice, not 

prohibiting it.

None planned. As of November 2015, 

DOD stated that no action is expected.

If DOD determines that bundling multiple 

realignments or closures into one 

recommendation is appropriate, itemize the 

costs and savings associated with each major 

discrete action it its report to the BRAC 

Commission.

Partial concur. DOD stated that where 

appropriate, the department could highlight 

cost and savings associated with major 

actions, and that action would meet the 

intent of our recommendation.

Pending. Awaiting authorization of a 

future BRAC round.

Develop a process to ensure that any datasecurity issues are resolved in time to provide 

all information to the BRAC Commission in a 

timely manner by conducting a security 

review of all BRAC data during DOD’s 

recommendation development process, to 

include a review of the aggregation of 

unclassified data for potential security 

concerns and possible classification, if 

necessary.

Concur. Pending. Awaiting authorization of a 

future BRAC round.

GAO-13-134—DOD Joint Bases: Management Actions Needed to Achieve Greater Efficiencies (Nov. 16, 2012).
Appendix I: List of Prior GAO Reviews Related 

to BRAC 2005, Related Recommendations, and 

DOD Actions to Date

Page 42 GAO-16-45 Military Base Realignments and Closures

GAO recommendation Original DOD response DOD actions

Develop and implement a plan that provides 

measurable goals linked to achieving savings 

and efficiencies at the joint bases and provide 

guidance to the joint bases that directs them 

to identify opportunities for cost savings and 

efficiencies. DOD should at a minimum 

consider the items identified in its 

recommendation to the 2005 BRAC 

Commission as areas for possible savings 

and efficiencies, including

· paring unnecessary management 

personnel,

· consolidating and optimizing contract 

requirements,

· establishing a single space management 

authority to achieve greater utilization of 

facilities, and

· reducing the number of base support 

vehicles and equipment.

Non-concur. DOD said that such targets 

would burden and restrict the authority of 

local commanders to manage the merger of 

the formerly stand-alone bases into joint 

bases while implementing new 

organizational structures, which would 

unnecessarily risk negative effects to 

mission support when operational 

effectiveness of the bases is paramount. 

DOD stated that the department should 

continue its patient approach to obtaining 

savings and efficiencies at joint bases, 

because it is working. All of the Air Force-led 

joint bases reduced civilian positions, and 

the Navy chose not to fill all of its civilian 

vacancies. Finally, the creation of the joint 

bases is equivalent to the mergers of 

corporations with very different financial 

systems, management structures, operating 

procedures, and cultural differences. DOD 

stated the importance of empowering joint 

base commanders to design, implement, 

and adapt cost efficient and effective 

approaches to their unique situations while 

adopting new and cross-cutting business 

practices, as incubators of innovation. DOD 

decided to allow for an extended transition 

period and to defer near-term savings.

None planned. As of November 2015, 

DOD stated that no action is expected.
Appendix I: List of Prior GAO Reviews Related 

to BRAC 2005, Related Recommendations, and 

DOD Actions to Date

Page 43 GAO-16-45 Military Base Realignments and Closures

GAO recommendation Original DOD response DOD actions

Continue to develop and refine the Cost 

Performance and Visibility Framework in 

order to 

• eliminate data reliability problems,

• facilitate comparisons of joint basing costs 

with the cost of operating the separate 

installations prior to implementing joint 

basing, and

• identify and isolate the costs and savings 

resulting from actions and initiatives 

specifically resulting from joint basing and 

excluding DOD- or service-wide actions and 

initiatives.

Partial concur. DOD stated that its Cost 

Performance and Visibility Framework 

already provides a method to collect 

quarterly data on performance toward the 

Common Output Level Standards, annual 

data on personnel assigned, and funds 

obligated for each joint base. However, DOD 

is addressing inconsistencies in the current 

data captured in the Framework and is 

improving its data reliability with 

considerable investment and the expectation 

to begin assessing joint base efficiencies by 

the end of fiscal year 2012. DOD stated that 

it would be able to make several 

comparisons–such as comparing the current 

fiscal year financial and performance data 

with the baseline and previous year’s 

obligations and the joint base’s baseline 

data with the costs of operating the separate 

installations—prior to implementing joint 

basing. DOD acknowledged that the 

comparison of the costs of operating 

separate installations would not identify cost 

savings resulting solely from joint basing and 

asserted the impracticality of isolating and 

distinguishing joint basing cost savings from 

the savings that result from DOD- or servicewide actions using the data contained in 

DOD’s Framework. Further, DOD pointed 

out that it did not believe that accounting 

systems were designed to track savings but 

to track expenses and disbursements.

Complete. DOD provided guidance to 

the joint bases that resulted in improved 

quality of the data obtained for fiscal 

year 2012. Subsequently, DOD 

performed an analysis comparing this 

improved operating cost data with what 

it had projected would be the costs of 

operating the separate installations if 

the joint bases had not been created. 

This analysis showed that the joint 

bases were saving money relative to the 

costs of operating the separate 

installations. Together these actions 

met the intent of our recommendation 

and provided DOD with an improved 

picture of the cost of operating the joint 

bases as well as a comparison of the 

cost of operating the joint bases with the 

cost of operating the separate 

installations.

Direct the joint bases to compile a list of those 

common standards in all functional areas 

needing clarification and the reasons why 

they need to be clarified, including those 

standards still being provided or reported on 

according to service-specific standards rather 

than the common standard.

Partial concur. DOD stated that a quarterly 

feedback process on the joint base common 

standards and an annual review process 

that incorporates input from the joint bases 

already exist. Further, standards may need 

changing as priorities change and missions 

evolve, but the current process strikes an 

appropriate balance between the analytical 

burden of repeated reviews and the need for 

clarity and refinement. DOD also stated that 

it believes that reviewing all the standards 

simultaneously does not allow for the depth 

of analysis required to make sound 

decisions, and suggested that GAO conduct 

a qualitative assessment of the standards, 

because the findings appear to be based on 

an anecdotal assessment.

None planned. As of November 2015, 

DOD stated that no action is expected.
Appendix I: List of Prior GAO Reviews Related 

to BRAC 2005, Related Recommendations, and 

DOD Actions to Date

Page 44 GAO-16-45 Military Base Realignments and Closures

GAO recommendation Original DOD response DOD actions

Amend the OSD joint standards review 

process to prioritize review and revision of 

those standards most in need of clarification 

within this list.

Partial concur. See above. None planned. As of November 2015, 

DOD stated that no action is expected.

Develop a common strategy to expand 

routine communication between the joint 

bases, and between the joint bases and OSD, 

to encourage joint resolution of common 

challenges and sharing of best practices and 

lessons learned.

Partial concur. DOD stated that it believed 

there were already mechanisms in place to 

facilitate routine communication between the 

joint bases, as well as between OSD and the 

joint bases, and that it is increasing those 

opportunities. DOD listed the various 

opportunities it has for sharing joint basing 

information, including yearly joint base site 

visits and an annual management review 

meeting with the joint base commanders.

Complete. DOD added an annual 

meeting beginning in February 2013 for 

Joint Base commanders to discuss 

issues the bases are facing, and in 

August 2013 distributed contact 

information for all Joint Base 

commanders and Deputy Joint Base 

commanders to each of the joint bases. 

As a result, joint bases have had 

expanded opportunities to share 

information on best practices and 

lessons learned and to resolve common 

challenges. In part because the annual 

Joint Base commander’s meeting takes 

place as part of an annual program 

review meeting with OSD, together 

these actions address the intent of this 

recommendation.

Develop guidance to ensure that all the joint 

bases develop and provide training materials 

to incoming personnel on how installation 

services are provided on joint bases.

Partial concur. DOD stated that it would 

ensure that each of the services is providing 

training materials to incoming personnel; 

however, joint base commanders need 

flexibility to tailor training to the needs of 

their installations.

Pending. In July 2015, an OSD official 

told us that OSD is taking action on our 

recommendation to develop and provide 

training materials to incoming joint base 

personnel. DOD has drafted a joint 

basing handbook, which has been 

signed off on by the Air Force and the 

Navy, to address inconsistent service 

level guidance. In addition, the Senior 

Installation Management Group now 

meets quarterly to handle conflicts 

between service policies and to address 

any challenges that have resulted in 

inefficiencies and inequities regarding 

efforts to consolidate installationsupport functions.

GAO-11-814—Excess Facilities: DOD Needs More Complete Information and a Strategy to Guide Its Future Disposal Efforts (Sept. 

19, 2011).
Appendix I: List of Prior GAO Reviews Related 

to BRAC 2005, Related Recommendations, and 

DOD Actions to Date

Page 45 GAO-16-45 Military Base Realignments and Closures

GAO recommendation Original DOD response DOD actions

Develop and implement a methodology for 

calculating and recording utilization data for 

all types of facilities, and modify processes to 

update and verify the accuracy of reported 

utilization data to reflect a facility’s true status.

Partial concur. DOD has already begun 

some efforts to improve its utilization data 

and will to develop and implement 

appropriate procedures. DOD did not specify 

what actions it has completed to date or its 

time frames for completion.

Complete. In January 2014, the Under 

Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, 

Technology and Logistics) issued an 

update to DOD’s policy on inventory 

and accountability of real property 

assets. It includes procedures for 

inventory data requirements such as

including accurate data submission in 

real-time or near real-time, and the 

creation of a Real Property Accountable 

Officer who is responsible for property 

inventory at the installation level. DOD’s 

corrective action plan and updated 

policy address our concerns with 

calculating, recording, updating, and 

verifying the accuracy of utilization data.

Develop strategies and measures to enhance 

the management of DOD’s excess facilities 

after the current demolition program ends, 

taking into account external factors that may 

affect future disposal efforts.

Concur. DOD stated that it will work with the 

military departments to continue to develop 

and implement the most effective and 

efficient methods to eliminate excess 

facilities and excess capacity, but it did not 

provide any details or specific time frames 

for these efforts.

Complete. The services have 

incorporated demolition into their 

installation planning and other facility 

space management programs. For 

example, the Air Force has incorporated 

demolition as a key feature in its 

ongoing initiative to consolidate space 

and personnel, and to achieve a 20 

percent reduction in its property 

inventory by 2020. Also, DOD is more 

proactively managing its processes to 

meet historic preservation requirements, 

to address environmental preservation 

concerns, and to expedite completion of 

required environmental mitigation. 

Further, the services have begun 

implementing a policy in line with a 

January 2014 update to DOD’s policy 

on inventory and accountability of real 

property assets, which clarified the roles 

and responsibilities of the officer 

responsible for managing property 

inventory at the installation level, 

including the requirement to ensure that 

all disposal records are accurately 

recorded.

GAO-11-165—Defense Infrastructure: High Level Federal Interagency Coordination Is Warranted to Address Transportation Needs 

Beyond the Scope of the Defense Access Roads Program (Jan. 26, 2011).
Appendix I: List of Prior GAO Reviews Related 

to BRAC 2005, Related Recommendations, and 

DOD Actions to Date

Page 46 GAO-16-45 Military Base Realignments and Closures

GAO recommendation Original DOD response DOD actions

Update regulations and clarify guidance for 

the Defense Access Roads certification and 

funding process; develop working-level 

guidance for potential program users; and 

effectively communicate the regulations and 

working-level guidance to all federal, state, 

and local stakeholders.

Partial concur. DOD stated that although it 

will work with the Department of 

Transportation to update Defense Access 

Roads regulations and clarify guidance, it 

believes that sufficient guidance for and 

awareness of the program exists.

Complete. In response to our 

recommendation, in August 2012 DOD 

and the Department of Transportation 

agreed to more closely coordinate 

approaches to transportation issues. 

Additionally, in March 2013, DOD 

officials stated that, based on the results 

of coordinating a potential change to the 

Defense Access Roads eligibility 

criteria, leadership determined that the 

best approach would be to direct the 

Defense Access Roads program to 

update its guidance to ensure that the 

existing criteria are applied flexibly, as 

has been the case for urban areas 

during the implementation of BRAC 

2005. Lastly, in June 2013, the Under 

Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, 

Technology and Logistics) issued a 

memo directing the Defense Access 

Roads Program to update its guidance. 

In addition, the Military Surface 

Deployment and Distribution Command 

Defense Access Roads Program office 

has begun communicating directly with 

the commanders of each growth 

installation to address previously 

reported issues regarding unawareness 

of the Defense Access Roads Program. 

These actions will allow program 

guidance to be updated to include the 

program’s procedures and will ensure 

that the guidance is effectively 

communicated to all stakeholders so 

that the program can be used to its 

fullest extent. 
Appendix I: List of Prior GAO Reviews Related 

to BRAC 2005, Related Recommendations, and 

DOD Actions to Date

Page 47 GAO-16-45 Military Base Realignments and Closures

GAO recommendation Original DOD response DOD actions

Routinely coordinate with the Secretary of 

Transportation to meet regularly, identify all 

existing federal transportation funding 

resources, and develop a strategy for 

affording priority consideration for the use of 

those funds and other resources for the 

benefit of communities most severely affected 

by DOD.

Partial concur. DOD stated that the 

department would continue to work closely 

with the department of Transportation to 

assist communities affected by DOD actions 

but that the Department of Transportation 

does not have discretionary funds that it can 

use to target communities affected by DOD, 

and instead, state and local communities 

must advance defense-related transportation 

projects.

Complete. In response to this 

recommendation, DOD hosted a 

meeting of the Economic Adjustment 

Committee in August 2012 to examine 

Defense Access Roads funding and 

coordination issues. An outcome of that 

meeting was consensus that, as DOD 

develops future re-stationing decisions, 

greater coordination with local planning 

entities is essential to assessing effects 

on transportation. In June 2013, the 

Under Secretary of Defense 

(Acquisition, Technology and Logistics) 

issued a letter to the congressional 

defense committees detailing the 

proposed plan for improving the 

Defense Access Roads Program. As 

stated in the plan, DOD’s goal is to 

improve the assessment of effects on 

transportation; enhance collaboration 

with planning entities; expand the range 

of mitigation measures, including joint 

funding opportunities; and promote 

additional measures for managing 

transportation demand. These actions 

will allow for the effective interagency 

and intergovernmental coordination that 

is needed to help address the unmet 

transportation needs of defenseaffected communities. 

GAO-10-725R—Military Base Realignments and Closures: DOD Is Taking Steps to Mitigate Challenges but Is Not Fully Reporting 

Some Additional Costs (July 21, 2010).

GAO recommendation Original DOD response DOD actions

Take steps to capture and appropriately 

report to Congress any BRAC-related 

implementation costs that are funded from 

outside the BRAC process.

Concur. DOD noted that it is in the process 

of drafting new BRAC guidance, which will

direct the services and defense agencies to 

provide a final accounting for all BRAC costs 

(both inside and outside of the account), 

among other items,.

Complete. On August 5, 2010, the 

Deputy Undersecretary of Defense 

(Installations and Environment) issued a 

guidance memo to the military services 

and DOD agencies requiring all BRAC 

business plan managers to fully capture 

the costs and savings of BRAC 2005 by 

submitting a final BRAC financial 

display that captures all BRAC related 

expenditures (both inside and outside 

the BRAC account), which will give 

Congress more visibility over all BRAC 

implementation costs.
Appendix I: List of Prior GAO Reviews Related 

to BRAC 2005, Related Recommendations, and 

DOD Actions to Date

Page 48 GAO-16-45 Military Base Realignments and Closures

GAO-10-602—Defense Infrastructure: Army Needs to Improve Its Facility Planning Systems to Better Support Installations 

Experiencing Significant Growth (June 24, 2010).

GAO recommendation Original DOD response DOD actions

Develop and implement guidance that 

requires the Army Criteria Tracking System to 

be updated as changes to facility design and 

criteria are made.

Concur. DOD stated that the Army has 

already taken action to enhance the 

accuracy of its planning systems to better 

respond to changing requirements.

Complete. In May 2010 the Army 

incorporated the functionality of the 

Army Criteria Tracking System into its 

web-based Real Property Planning and 

Analysis System, thereby linking the two 

systems and ensuring that as one is 

reviewed the other is reviewed and as 

one is updated the other is updated. 

The Real Property Planning and 

Analysis System is web based and 

changes can be made in real time. 

Similarly, because the Army Criteria 

Tracking System is now incorporated 

into the Real Property Planning and 

Analysis System, the Army Criteria 

Tracking System is now web based and 

changes to it can be made in real time.

Develop and implement policies and 

procedures for linking other systems, such as 

the Army Range Requirements Model and the 

Army Health Planning Agency’s system, to 

the Real Property Planning and Analysis 

System in order to eliminate any potential 

confusion as to the correct range and medical 

facility requirements.

Concur. DOD stated that it plans to partly 

address our recommendation by fielding a 

comprehensive range planning tool. 

Complete. The Army stated that as of 

June 2010, the Army Range 

Requirements Model was being used to 

generate the range requirements in the 

Real Property Planning and Analysis 

System and that because the Army 

Health Facility Planning Agency does 

not have an automated system to 

generate requirements, the Army was 

manually obtaining hospital 

requirements and inputting them into 

the Real Property Planning and 

Analysis System. These actions 

eliminated two sets of requirements for 

ranges and hospitals, reducing any 

potential confusion.
Appendix I: List of Prior GAO Reviews Related 

to BRAC 2005, Related Recommendations, and 

DOD Actions to Date

Page 49 GAO-16-45 Military Base Realignments and Closures

GAO recommendation Original DOD response DOD actions

Develop a streamlined mechanism to 

expedite the flow of stationing information to 

installations.

Concur. DOD stated that the Army has 

already initiated improvements in its process 

and is evaluating additional streamlining 

measures. 

Complete. In January 2012, DOD 

reported that the Army continues to 

enhance the flow of stationing 

information. All unit moves are now 

combined by installation and by fiscal 

year, significantly reducing the number 

of actions being processed. In August 

2010, the Army staff issued guidance to 

the field (Installation Management 

Command) that clarified formal lines of 

communication and established protocol 

to differentiate between official and 

unofficial taskings, enabling installation 

commanders to focus on approved 

official actions. All stakeholders are 

better involved in the early stages of 

force structure actions, force design 

updates, concept plans, and leadership 

direction. In April 2012, DOD reported 

that a copy of the August 2010 Army 

staff guidance that clarified formal lines 

of communication was provided to the 

field (Installation Management 

Command).

Modify existing guidance to enhance 

communication between decision makers and 

installations so that installation facility 

planners are notified when stationing actions 

are changed. 

Concur. DOD stated that the Army has 

already initiated improvements in its 

communication process and that the 

department is evaluating additional 

measures to ensure that data integrity and 

transparency are achieved. 

Complete. In August 2010 the Army 

issued guidance to better synchronize 

installations’ participation in stationing 

efforts. Specifically, the guidance (1) 

clarified formal lines of communication 

to ensure that all stakeholders are 

better involved in the early stages of 

force structure actions and force design 

updates and (2) established protocols to 

enable communication between staff at 

installations and Army Headquarters 

during stationing action implementation 

to ensure efficient completion of 

stationing actions. As a result, we 

believe the Army’s actions met the 

intent of our recommendation.

GAO-09-703—Military Base Realignments and Closures: DOD Needs to Update Savings Estimates and Continue to Address 

Challenges in Consolidating Supply-Related Functions at Depot Maintenance Locations (July 9, 2009).

GAO recommendation Original DOD response DOD actions

Remove savings estimates that are not 

clearly the direct result of 2005 BRAC actions 

(including savings sometimes referred to as 

“BRAC enabled”).

Concur. DOD stated that such savings 

estimates will be removed from savings 

estimates reported in the August 2009 

business plan submission.

Complete. In DOD’s 2009 biannual 

Business Plan, the Defense Logistics 

Agency had removed those savings 

from its estimates. 
Appendix I: List of Prior GAO Reviews Related 

to BRAC 2005, Related Recommendations, and 

DOD Actions to Date

Page 50 GAO-16-45 Military Base Realignments and Closures

GAO recommendation Original DOD response DOD actions

Update its 4-year-old data to reflect the most 

recent estimate of inventory levels available 

for consolidation.

Concur. DOD stated that it will use the most 

recent estimate of inventory levels available 

and update the savings calculations for 

inventory reductions in its August 2009 

business plan.

Complete. In DOD’s 2009 biannual 

Business Plan, the Defense Logistics 

Agency used updated inventory levels 

in its current estimate for savings 

related to this BRAC recommendation.

Apply current information on the timing of 

inventory consolidations (specifically, when 

they will begin and how long they will take) 

and exclude projected savings for 

consolidating Army and Marine Corps 

inventories with the Defense Logistics 

Agency.

Concur. DOD stated that savings 

calculations for projected inventory 

reductions will reflect the current schedule of 

consolidating materiel and will be updated in 

the August 2009 business plan. Moreover, 

DOD stated that the update will show that no 

Army or Marine Corps inventory is available 

for consolidation.

Complete. In DOD’s August 2009 

biannual Business Plan, The Defense 

Logistics Agency used current 

information regarding a later timetable 

for inventory consolidations and 

eliminated any savings from the Army 

and Marine Corps inventories since 

there will not be any available to 

consolidate. The resulting savings 

estimate will provide better information 

for congressional oversight and help 

maintain public confidence in the BRAC 

process. 

Revise and finalize an approved methodology 

which implements these steps and can be 

consistently followed by all the services and 

the Defense Logistics Agency over time.

Concur. DOD stated that the new 

calculations would be documented in the 

August 2009 business plan and updates and 

revisions would be incorporated and staffed 

by the end of calendar year 2009. 

Complete. According to DOD, in 2010 

and 2011, the department documented 

updates and revisions to the 

methodologies for projecting or tracking, 

or both, BRAC savings associated with 

the supply, storage, and distribution 

functions and inventories in the Cost 

and Savings Tracking Plan, which was 

in its second coordination cycle. 

GAO-09-336—Defense Infrastructure: DOD Needs to Periodically Review Support Standards and Costs at Joint Bases and Better 

Inform Congress of Facility Sustainment Funding Uses (March 30, 2009).

GAO recommendation Original DOD response DOD actions

Periodically review the installation support 

standards as experience is gained with 

delivering installation support at the joint 

bases and make adjustments, if needed, to 

ensure that each standard reflects the level of 

service necessary to meet installation 

requirements as economically as possible.

Partial concur. DOD stated that further 

action to implement the recommendation 

was not necessary because the joint base 

memorandum of agreement template 

already requires periodic reviews to ensure 

that installation support is delivered in 

accordance with appropriate, common, 

output level standards. 

Complete. In January 2011, DOD 

stated that the department now reviews 

the installation support standards 

annually for appropriateness, 

applicability, and performance. In 

addition to the annual review, the 

department implemented a cost and 

performance visibility framework under 

which the joint bases report how well 

the standards are being met. DOD 

stated that the reported information can 

assist in determining whether any 

adjustments need to be made to the 

standards.
Appendix I: List of Prior GAO Reviews Related 

to BRAC 2005, Related Recommendations, and 

DOD Actions to Date

Page 51 GAO-16-45 Military Base Realignments and Closures

GAO recommendation Original DOD response DOD actions

Periodically review administrative costs as 

joint basing is implemented to minimize any 

additional costs and prevent the loss of 

existing installation support efficiencies.

Partial concur. DOD stated that further 

action to implement the recommendation 

was not necessary because it had already 

established a process to periodically review 

joint basing costs as part of its planning, 

program, budget and execution system and 

that the joint base memorandum of 

agreement template requires periodic 

reviews of effects on missions and 

resources. 

None planned.

Complete a detailed analysis of the estimated 

installation support costs from the initial joint 

bases and report the results of the analysis to 

Congress in the department’s documents 

supporting the administration’s annual budget 

submission or other documents deemed 

appropriate.

Partial concur. DOD stated that it is 

collecting estimated installation support cost 

information at the joint bases and that the 

information will be provided if Congress 

requests it. 

Complete. In July 2011, DOD stated 

that it had established procedures for 

collecting installation support costs at 

the 12 joint bases and, by using a cost 

and performance visibility framework, 

the joint bases report cost and 

manpower annually six weeks after the 

end of the fiscal year. According to 

DOD, the information is analyzed in 

conjunction with performance data 

reported quarterly, to get an overall 

assessment of how well the standards 

for installation support are being met 

and the costs associated with those 

standards. DOD stated that it will 

continue to respond to requests for 

information from Congress with regard 

to the joint basing initiative.

Increase the attention given to facility 

sustainment spending by summarizing and 

reporting to Congress the amount of 

budgeted sustainment funds spent on other 

purposes in the department’s documents 

supporting the administration’s annual budget 

submission or other documents deemed 

appropriate.

Partial concur. DOD stated that it would 

collect and summarize the amount of 

budgeted sustainment funds spent on other 

purposes and that the information would be 

provided if Congress requested it.

Complete. In July 2011, DOD stated 

that the department was monitoring the 

budgeting and execution of facilities 

sustainment in order to determine how 

much of the funding budgeted for 

sustainment is diverted to other 

purposes. DOD also stated that the 

department was currently collecting 

information at a sampling of installations 

across DOD on the sustainment tasks 

that are deferred in a given year and 

that the information would help inform 

decision-making with regard to facilities 

sustainment funding. Finally, DOD 

previously stated that it would provide 

Congress with information on the 

amount of budgeted sustainment funds 

spent on other purposes, if Congress 

requests it.

GAO-09-217—Military Base Realignments and Closures: DOD Faces Challenges in Implementing Recommendations on Time and Is 

Not Consistently Updating Savings Estimates (Jan. 30, 2009).
Appendix I: List of Prior GAO Reviews Related 

to BRAC 2005, Related Recommendations, and 

DOD Actions to Date

Page 52 GAO-16-45 Military Base Realignments and Closures

GAO recommendation Original DOD response DOD actions

Modify the recently issued guidance on the 

status of BRAC implementation to establish a 

briefing schedule with briefings as frequently 

as OSD deems necessary to manage the risk 

that a particular recommendation may not 

meet the statutory deadline but at a minimum 

at 6-month intervals through the rest of the 

BRAC 2005 implementation period, a 

schedule that would enable DOD to 

continually assess and respond to the 

challenges identified by the services and 

defense agencies that could prevent DOD 

from completing the implementation of a 

recommendation by September 15, 2011.

Concur. DOD noted that BRAC business 

managers had and would continue to 

provide briefings on the status of 

implementation actions associated with 

recommendations exceeding $100 million, 

and that these briefings provide a forum for 

BRAC business managers to explain their 

actions to mitigate challenges.

Complete. The Deputy Under Secretary 

of Defense (Installations and 

Environment) issued a memo in 

November 2008 requiring the military 

services and defense agencies to 

provide the OSD BRAC Office status 

briefings. According to OSD, the 

briefings were needed to ensure senior 

leadership was apprised of significant 

issues affecting BRAC implementation 

by the statutory deadline. The first 

round of status briefings took place in 

December 2008.

Modify the recently issued guidance on the 

status of BRAC implementation to require the 

services and defense agencies to provide 

information on possible mitigation measures 

to reduce the effects of those challenges.

Concur. DOD noted that BRAC business 

managers had and would continue to 

provide briefings on the status of 

implementation actions associated with 

recommendations exceeding $100 million, 

and that these briefings provide a forum for 

BRAC business managers to explain their 

actions to mitigate challenges. 

Complete. According to DOD, in 2009 

and 2010, the department required 

business managers to identify specific 

mitigation measures for BRAC 

recommendations that have 

construction projects that are scheduled 

to complete within 3 months of the 

statutory deadline. The purpose of 

these mitigation measures is to reduce 

the risk of not completing 

implementation of a recommendation by 

the BRAC deadline. These mitigation 

measures are identified and monitored 

in a tracking tool to help ensure they are 

implemented and the risk is reduced. As 

appropriate, the DOD basing office 

conducts additional follow-up meetings 

with business managers for specific 

issues or follows up via other contacts 

that occur between the routine 6 month 

briefing intervals. This helps to ensure 

DOD is making progress and 

implementation of recommendations is 

on track. As part of this process, six 

recommendations were identified as 

having particular risk. DOD briefed 

these six recommendations to key 

Senate and House staff in March 2010.
Appendix I: List of Prior GAO Reviews Related 

to BRAC 2005, Related Recommendations, and 

DOD Actions to Date

Page 53 GAO-16-45 Military Base Realignments and Closures

GAO recommendation Original DOD response DOD actions

Take steps to improve compliance with 

DOD’s regulation requiring updated BRAC 

savings estimates. 

Concur. The department stated that it is 

emphasizing savings updates during its 

briefings and in all future business plan 

approval documentation.

Complete. On August 5, 2010, the 

Deputy Under Secretary of Defense 

(Installations and Environment) issued a 

guidance memo to the military services 

and DOD agencies regarding BRAC 

2005 Final Business Plans and Other 

Reporting Requirements. Among other 

things, this guidance emphasized to the 

military services and defense agencies 

that it is imperative that the final 

financial displays for BRAC 2005 

contain updated projections of recurring 

savings.

GAO-08-665—Defense Infrastructure: High-Level Leadership Needed to Help Communities Address Challenges Caused by DODRelated Growth (June 17, 2008).

GAO recommendation Original DOD response DOD actions

Develop and implement guidance—no later 

than the end of fiscal year 2008—that is 

consistent with DOD Directive 5410.12 for the 

timely, complete, and consistent 

dissemination of DOD planning information 

such as estimated time lines and numbers of 

personnel relocating, as well as demographic 

data such as numbers of school-aged 

children, and update this information 

quarterly.

Concur. Although DOD indicated it would 

continue to work with the cognizant DOD 

components to ensure compliance with the 

directive, actions taken to date have not 

resulted in the military services’ 

development and implementation of 

guidance that we believe is necessary for 

providing more complete and consistent 

personnel relocation planning data to 

affected communities. Moreover, DOD did 

not explicitly say what steps it intends to 

take to ensure that the military services have 

implemented such guidance by the end of 

fiscal year 2008. With respect to our 

recommended action to provide information 

updates on a quarterly basis, DOD indicated 

that not all situations are conducive to 

quarterly updates.

Complete. From January through 

March 2011, the military services and 

the head of the Defense Logistics 

Agency issued guidance for the timely, 

complete, and consistent dissemination 

of DOD planning information, such as 

military and civilian personnel changes 

and school-age children increases and 

decreases in accordance with DOD 

Directive 5410.12. Although DOD 

missed the deadline for implementing 

our recommendation, issuing this 

guidance facilitates the preparation of 

effective plans to minimize the 

economic impacts on communities 

resulting from changes in defense 

programs.
Appendix I: List of Prior GAO Reviews Related 

to BRAC 2005, Related Recommendations, and 

DOD Actions to Date

Page 54 GAO-16-45 Military Base Realignments and Closures

GAO recommendation Original DOD response DOD actions

Implement Executive Order 12788 by holding 

regular meetings of the full executive-level 

Economic Adjustment Committee and by 

serving as a clearinghouse of information for 

identifying expected community effects and 

problems, as well as identifying existing 

resources for providing economic assistance 

to communities affected by DOD activities. In 

addition, this information should be updated 

at least quarterly and made easily available to 

all interested stakeholders at the local, state, 

and federal levels. 

Concur. DOD stated that it will develop an 

information clearinghouse that will identify 

federal programs and resources to affected 

communities, present successful state and 

local responses, and provide the Economic 

Adjustment Committee members with a 

basis to resource their assistance programs. 

Based on DOD’s comments, it is unclear as 

to whether DOD, as chair of the Economic 

Adjustment Committee, intends to call and 

periodically hold meetings of the full 

executive-level committee to provide the 

high-level federal leadership that we believe 

is necessary to more effectively coordinate 

federal agency assistance to impacted 

communities.

Complete. DOD regularly reconvened 

the full executive level Economic 

Adjustment Committee meetings from 

February 25, 2009 to September 2, 

2010 and completed actions that met 

the intent of our recommendation by 

establishing a clearinghouse website in 

December 2009 to support states and 

communities undertaking local 

economic adjustment activity and 

federal agencies working to support 

such activities. By reconvening the full 

executive level Economic Adjustment 

Committee and setting up the 

clearinghouse website, DOD increased 

its ability to engage other federal 

agencies at a high level to promote 

interagency and intergovernmental 

cooperation and share information on a 

continual basis. DOD activated a 

publicly accessible website in 

December 2008 

(www.eaclearinghouse.gov), managed 

by the Office of Economic Adjustment, 

which contains information such as 

service migration information, 

information on federal agency 

assistance programs, community 

profiles, and community redevelopment 

plans.

GAO-08-315—Military Base Realignments and Closures: Higher Costs and Lower Savings Projected for Implementing Two Key 

Supply-Related BRAC Recommendations (March 5, 2008).

GAO recommendation Original DOD response DOD actions

Revise its business plans to exclude all 

expected savings that are not the direct result 

of BRAC actions.

Non-concur. DOD stated that while the 

$172 million in potential savings for 

implementing the supply, storage, and 

distribution recommendation and the $71 

million in potential savings for implementing 

the depot-level reparable recommendation 

were not directly the result of BRAC actions, 

the estimated savings were enabled by 

BRAC actions and should be attributable to 

the recommendations. According to DOD, 

enabled savings are savings initiatives that 

were enhanced in some way by the BRAC 

implementation actions (e.g. increased 

scope, more aggressively pursued, or 

moved in new directions).

None planned.
Appendix I: List of Prior GAO Reviews Related 

to BRAC 2005, Related Recommendations, and 

DOD Actions to Date

Page 55 GAO-16-45 Military Base Realignments and Closures

GAO recommendation Original DOD response DOD actions

Implement methodologies for periodically 

monitoring and updating net savings for the 

supply, storage, and distribution and depotlevel reparable recommendations throughout 

the implementation period. Such 

methodologies, at a minimum, should include:

· clear metrics for measuring the 

magnitude of actual costs and 

savings,

· a comparison of the actual costs and 

savings to the prior estimates to 

coincide with the required 

semiannual business plan updates, 

and

· explanations for actual cost and 

savings variances from estimates 

presented in the business plans.

Concur. Complete. According to DOD, in 2009, 

the Office of the Under Secretary of 

Defense (Acquisition, Technology and 

Logistics) established a standard DOD 

format for measuring the magnitude of 

actual costs and savings, and required 

DOD components to submit business 

plans in February and August that 

compared current costs and savings 

with prior estimates and justify any 

changes, by funding category. The 

Defense Logistics Agency has since 

updated cost and savings for BRAC 

recommendations on a semi-annual 

basis synchronized with the 

programming and budget cycles and 

compared actual costs and savings to 

prior year estimates. The magnitude of 

actual costs and savings are collected 

in a relational data base that was 

developed to compare actual costs and 

savings to prior year estimates. The 

data base has data on BRAC 

Recommendation 176-Depot Level 

Reparable Management and BRAC 

Recommendation 177-Supply, Storage, 

and Distribution Reconfiguration. For 

example, in the February 2009 business 

plans for BRAC Recommendation 176 

and BRAC Recommendation 177, the 

Defense Logistics Agency compared 

costs and savings to prior estimates for 

each funding category and when there 

was a variance in a funding category, it 

included an explanation for the change 

in cost and savings.
Appendix I: List of Prior GAO Reviews Related 

to BRAC 2005, Related Recommendations, and 

DOD Actions to Date

Page 56 GAO-16-45 Military Base Realignments and Closures

GAO recommendation Original DOD response DOD actions

Ensure that necessary funding to meet 

implementation milestones is reflected in all 

service and Defense Logistics Agency budget 

submissions for the remainder of the 

implementation period ending in fiscal year 

2011. 

Concur. Complete. According to DOD, the 

BRAC decision memorandums provide 

the resources to fully fund 

implementation during the 6-year BRAC 

implementation statutory period. 

Annually the DOD BRAC office goes 

through an extensive analysis to 

compare each business plan 

requirement to program funding 

(Program Review). If funding shortfalls 

are identified, the components are 

directed via a Program Decision 

Memorandum to fully fund 

requirements. The office of the Under 

Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, 

Technology and Logistics) issued a 

June 22, 2007 memorandum directing 

DOD Components to fully fund BRAC 

implementation during the 6-year 

statutory period.

GAO-08-159—Military Base Realignments and Closures: Cost Estimates Have Increased and Are Likely to Continue to Evolve (Dec. 

11, 2007).

GAO recommendation Original DOD response DOD actions

Explain, in DOD’s BRAC budget submission 

to Congress, the difference between annual 

recurring savings attributable to military 

personnel entitlements and annual recurring 

savings that will readily result in funds 

available for other defense priorities.

Concur. DOD noted that military personnel 

reductions attributable to a BRAC 

recommendation as savings are as real as 

savings generated through end strength 

reductions. DOD also stated that while it 

may not reduce overall end strength, its 

reductions in military personnel for each 

recommendation at a specific location are 

real and these personnel reductions allow 

the department to reapply these military 

personnel to support new capabilities and 

improve operational efficiencies.

Complete. The fiscal year 2009 DOD 

budget estimates for BRAC 2005 

included language that stated, “To the 

extent that savings generated from 

military personnel reductions at closing 

or realigning installations are 

immediately used to fund military 

personnel priorities, these resources are 

not available to fund other Defense 

priorities.” Such language was not 

included in the prior year (fiscal year 

2008) budget submittal to Congress. 

The Office of the Secretary of Defense 

stated that the insertion of this language 

would provide a better explanation to 

Congress of its estimated annual 

recurring savings resulting from BRAC.

GAO-07-1040—Military Base Realignments and Closures: Plan Needed to Monitor Challenges for Completing More Than 100 Armed 

Forces Reserve Centers (Sept. 13, 2007).
Appendix I: List of Prior GAO Reviews Related 

to BRAC 2005, Related Recommendations, and 

DOD Actions to Date

Page 57 GAO-16-45 Military Base Realignments and Closures

GAO recommendation Original DOD response DOD actions

Develop a plan for routinely bringing together 

the various stakeholders as a group, to 

include the state Army National Guard when 

appropriate, to monitor for and develop steps 

to mitigate implementation challenges should 

they occur. These steps should include ways 

to monitor and mitigate the effects of potential 

challenges on BRAC completion time frames, 

project cost and scope, construction quality, 

and capacity of the facility to meet changing 

mission requirements.

Partial concur. DOD believes that GAO 

overlooked the various groups, forums, or 

plans that the Army has in place to assist 

with BRAC execution and management. 

DOD stated that the Army already has a 

plan in place to bring the various 

stakeholders together, however Army BRAC 

headquarters officials acknowledged that 

they could be more proactive in outreaching 

and communicating with the stakeholders on 

how to deal with and mitigate particular 

challenges associated with constructing 125 

AFRCs. DOD also stated that the Army 

BRAC office will begin quarterly BRAC 

program reviews with the Assistant 

Secretary of the Army for Installations and 

Environment, which will further provide a 

forum for discussing and vetting issues 

affecting the BRAC program.

Complete. The Army BRAC Office has 

taken several steps to implement the 

recommendation. In March 2009, the 

Army BRAC Office provided a BRAC 

2005 program update to the Army Vice 

Chief of Staff, with representation from 

the Army National Guard and Reserves. 

In addition, the Army BRAC Division 

Reserve Component Branch, the Army 

Reserve Division, and the full time Army 

National Guard and Army Reserve 

liaisons assigned to the Army BRAC 

Office collaborated at BRAC summits in 

October 2009 and April 2010 where 

issues affecting US Army Reserve 

Command were discussed with Army 

National Guard and Army Reserve 

Command presenting their concerns. 

GAO-07-1007—Defense Infrastructure: Challenges Increase Risks for Providing Timely Infrastructure Support for Army Installations 

Expecting Substantial Personnel Growth (Sept. 13, 2007).

GAO recommendation Original DOD response DOD actions

Determine why there are data differences 

between headquarters and gaining bases 

with respect to the number of arriving and 

departing personnel.

Partial concur. DOD stated that the Army 

had determined the cause of the differences 

and taken corrective action by establishing 

the Army Stationing Installation Plan (ASIP) 

as the single, unified source of installation 

planning population data to be used Armywide. 

Complete. In January 2007 the Army 

designated the ASIP as the single, 

unified source of installation planning 

population data to be used Army-wide. 

In May 2008, the Army issued guidance 

that helped reduce the differences 

between the populations reported by 

Headquarters and the installations by 

ensuring that ASIP population data be 

used for reporting external to the Army 

and allowing pre-decisional unit moves 

to be used for internal planning. Lastly, 

in a memorandum of agreement signed 

in May 2009, the Army established an 

ASIP quarterly edit cycle to resolve 

discrepancies between Army official 

force structure data and “on the ground” 

situation. 
Appendix I: List of Prior GAO Reviews Related 

to BRAC 2005, Related Recommendations, and 

DOD Actions to Date

Page 58 GAO-16-45 Military Base Realignments and Closures

GAO recommendation Original DOD response DOD actions

Ensure that Army headquarters and base 

officials are collaborating to agree on Army 

personnel movement plans so that base 

commanders and surrounding communities 

can effectively plan for expected growth. This 

collaboration to reach agreement should 

continue as expected personnel movement 

actions are revised over time.

Partial concur. DOD stated that the Army 

had already taken corrective action. The 

Army stated that in May 2007 it issued 

guidance that allowed installations to plan 

for anticipated unit moves that may not be 

reflected in the ASIP and to discuss these 

plans with local communities as long as they 

are appropriately identified as pre-decisional 

and subject to change. Army officials also 

stated that, in June 2007, they would ensure 

that installations forward all population and 

stationing issues to the Department of the 

Army headquarters for resolution. 

Complete. In May 2007, the Army 

issued guidance that allowed 

installations to plan for anticipated 

moves that may not be reflected in the 

ASIP and to discuss these plans with 

local communities as long as they are 

appropriately identified as predecisional and subject to change. In 

addition, in May 2009 the Army issued a 

memorandum of agreement between 

the office of the Assistant Chief of Staff 

for Installation Management and the 

Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff G3/5/7 to close information gaps and 

improve timely reconciliation of 

disparate data among installation 

planners, force planners, and 

headquarters. The memorandum 

established an ASIP quarterly edit cycle 

to resolve discrepancies between Army 

official force structure data and the “on 

the ground” situation. 

GAO-07-641—Military Base Closures: Management Strategy Needed to Mitigate Challenges and Improve Communication to Help 

Ensure Timely Implementation of Air National Guard Recommendations (May 16, 2007).

GAO recommendation Original DOD response DOD actions

Develop a mitigation strategy to be shared 

with key stakeholders that anticipates, 

identifies, and addresses related 

implementation challenges. At a minimum, 

this strategy should include time frames for 

actions and responsibilities for each 

challenge, and facilitate the ability of Air 

National Guard headquarters officials to act to 

mitigate potential delays in interim 

milestones. 

Partial concur. DOD suggested a 

modification to the recommendation to clarify 

that the director, Air National Guard, is 

normally tasked by the Chief, National 

Guard Bureau. DOD also stated that 

mitigation plans cannot be released until 

they have been thoroughly vetted with all of 

the key stakeholders. 

Complete. The National Guard Bureau 

implemented a Strategic 

Communication Plan that provides 

affected units with the information they 

need to successfully complete BRAC 

actions and develop opportunities for 

follow-on missions at BRAC-affected 

locations. The Air National Guard 

Strategic Planning process, which is 

based on state involvement at all levels 

of the planning process, is the 

cornerstone and allows states to 

provide input to the Air National Guard 

Strategic Plan and ensures that states 

have the necessary information to 

implement those plans. The National

Guard Bureau Strategic Communication 

Plan also incorporates Air Force 

communications. 
Appendix I: List of Prior GAO Reviews Related 

to BRAC 2005, Related Recommendations, and 

DOD Actions to Date

Page 59 GAO-16-45 Military Base Realignments and Closures

GAO recommendation Original DOD response DOD actions

Expand the Strategic Communication Plan to 

include how the Air National Guard 

headquarters will provide the affected Air 

National Guard units with the information 

needed to implement the BRAC-related 

actions.

Partial concur. DOD stated it is incumbent 

upon the Air National Guard and all effected 

units to maximize established chains of 

leadership and communication to effectively 

manage and execute BRAC actions. The 

Director, Air National Guard, acknowledges 

that there are challenges in communicating 

with the units and that some unit 

commanders may not have the information 

that they feel they need to implement the 

BRAC recommendation and their new 

missions. 

Complete. The National Guard Bureau, 

an oversight organization over Air 

National Guard, is providing key 

stakeholders with access to detailed 

BRAC implementation action timelines 

and programming plans, including 

BRAC contacts at each Air National 

Guard-affected base. Further, the Air 

National Guard Strategic 

Communication Playbook, which was 

updated in 2009, now focuses 

leadership attention to various strategic 

priorities including the implementation of 

Air National Guard BRAC 

recommendations. In addition, the Air 

National Guard Strategic Planning 

Process includes both Air Force level 

and National Guard Bureau level 

communication with various state-level 

Adjutants Generals about BRAC 

implementation. As such, the Air Force 

Chief of Staff and Air National Guard 

Director have hosted a meeting for all 

state-level Adjutants Generals to 

discuss BRAC actions. As a result of 

implementing our recommendation, Air 

National Guard headquarters’ ability to 

identify strategies and determine 

resources needed to effectively meet 

BRAC goals has improved.

Report in the Air Force annual BRAC budget 

submission the costs and source of funding 

required to establish replacement missions 

for the Air National Guard units that will lose 

their flying missions as a result of BRAC 

2005.

Non-concur. DOD does not believe these 

costs are BRAC-related, because 

establishment of replacement missions was 

not part of the recommendations. DOD 

stated that BRAC funds cannot be used to 

establish these missions and that the costs 

in question have been appropriately 

programmed and budgeted in the Air Force’s 

regular military construction account.

None planned. 

GAO-07-304—Military Base Closures: Projected Savings from Fleet Readiness Centers Are Likely Overstated and Actions Needed to 

Track Actual Savings and Overcome Certain Challenges (June 29, 2007).
Appendix I: List of Prior GAO Reviews Related 

to BRAC 2005, Related Recommendations, and 

DOD Actions to Date

Page 60 GAO-16-45 Military Base Realignments and Closures

GAO recommendation Original DOD response DOD actions

Update the business plan for the fleet 

readiness centers (1) to reflect only savings 

that are directly related to implementing the 

recommendation, and (2) update projected 

onetime savings when data are available.

Concur. DOD stated it considers military 

personnel reductions attributable to BRAC 

recommendations as savings that are just as 

real as savings generated through endstrength reductions. While the department 

may not reduce overall end-strength, it

believes that the reductions in military 

personnel for each recommendation at a 

specific location are real.

Complete. The Commander, Fleet 

Readiness Centers, updated the 

business plan in August 2009 to reflect 

savings directly related to the BRAC 

action to establish fleet readiness 

centers. The Navy updated projected 

savings directly related to implementing 

the recommendation, showing that 

overall savings projections of $1.151 

billion from the August 2007 version of 

the business plan should not change, 

since changes to projected savings 

targets in some of the six Fleet 

Readiness Center locations that 

exceeded savings targets in some years 

were offset by the inability to meet 

savings targets at other locations or in 

other years. The Navy updated 

projected one-time savings when data 

became available by changing some 

savings projected in the 2009 version of 

the business plan (from our

recommendation to re-categorize 

approximately $25 million per year from 

recurring savings) to one-time savings. 
Appendix I: List of Prior GAO Reviews Related 

to BRAC 2005, Related Recommendations, and 

DOD Actions to Date

Page 61 GAO-16-45 Military Base Realignments and Closures

GAO recommendation Original DOD response DOD actions

Monitor implementation of the 

recommendation to determine the extent to 

which savings already taken from the Navy 

budget are actually achieved.

Concur. Complete. The Navy has demonstrated 

sustained leadership devoted to 

implementing the BRAC 

recommendation for establishing Fleet 

Readiness Centers, as evidenced by 

successive leaders who have 

developed implementation plans and 

completed each phase of 

implementation over time. In addition, 

the Navy’s implementation guidance for 

Fleet Readiness Centers specifies that 

key measures include, in part, achieving 

savings targets. As a result, the Navy’s 

monthly report to the Fleet Readiness 

Center Commanders includes an 

analysis of the variance between 

savings projected and those actually 

achieved at the six Fleet Readiness 

Centers. These reports provide 

objective, outcome-oriented metrics for 

improving readiness and detailing six 

separate savings categories. 

Commanding Officers or Officers-inCharge of specific centers are 

evaluated for their results and held 

accountable for achieving savings 

targets. Management tools developed 

by the implementation team for Fleet 

Readiness Centers have supported the 

identification of additional opportunities 

to realize savings. Continuing efforts to 

monitor implementation and develop 

mechanisms to improve performance 

and accountability have allowed the 

Navy to determine the extent to which 

savings already taken from the Navy 

budget for aircraft maintenance are 

actually achieved.

GAO-07-166—Military Base Closures: Opportunities Exist to Improve Environmental Cleanup Cost Reporting and to Expedite 

Transfer of Unneeded Property (Jan. 30, 2007).
Appendix I: List of Prior GAO Reviews Related 

to BRAC 2005, Related Recommendations, and 

DOD Actions to Date

Page 62 GAO-16-45 Military Base Realignments and Closures

GAO recommendation Original DOD response DOD actions

Report all costs (Defense Environmental 

Restoration Program and non- Defense 

Environmental Restoration Program)—past 

and future—required to complete 

environmental cleanup at each BRAC 

installation and to fully explain the scope and 

limitations of all the environmental cleanup 

costs DOD reports to Congress. We suggest 

including this information in the annual BRAC 

budget justification documentation, since it 

would accompany information Congress 

considers when making resource allocation 

decisions.

Concur. DOD concurred with our basic 

recommendation; however DOD’s 

comments reflect only a partial concurrence, 

because DOD did not agree with our 

suggestion to include this information in the 

annual BRAC budget justification 

documentation. DOD stated its belief that 

this would be counterproductive and that 

Congress has prescribed the types of 

environmental information it wants 

presented in the budget documentation, 

which DOD complies with. 

Complete. DOD stated that in October 

2008, the Assistant Deputy Under 

Secretary of Defense for the 

Environment, Safety, and Occupational 

Health determined that the Annual 

Report to Congress is the appropriate

and best format to provide Congress 

with cleanup information on the DOD 

BRAC environmental programs. The 

annual report data is updated annually, 

via the electronic reporting system from 

the DOD components to the Deputy 

Under Secretary of Defense for 

Installations and Environment. The 

2007 annual report provided BRAC site 

cost data through FY2007 and the 

estimated cost to complete for FY2008. 

The annual report is a comprehensive 

document designed to answer the many 

stakeholder questions that have 

developed over the many years of 

executing BRAC cleanup. The cost and 

budget data that appears in the annual 

report are also in the annual budget 

justification submitted to Congress in 

support of the President’s Budget 

Request. 

Require that the military services periodically 

report to OSD on the status and proposed 

strategy for transferring unneeded BRAC 

properties and include an assessment of the 

usefulness of all tools at their disposal. We 

suggest placing this information in an easily 

shared location, such as a website, so that 

each service, and even the local communities 

and private sector, can share and benefit 

from lessons learned.

Concur. DOD concurred with our 

recommendation to require the military 

services to periodically report to the Office of 

the Secretary of Defense on the status and 

proposed strategy for transferring BRAC 

properties and to include an assessment of 

the usefulness of all tools at their disposal. 

Although DOD did not comment on our 

suggestion to accomplish this through a 

shared website in order to maximize the 

sharing of lessons learned, DOD officials 

embraced the idea as something easily to do 

in comments they made during our exit 

interview with the department.

Complete. According to DOD, military 

departments are required to report on 

the status of all excess real property 

and to include the available acreages 

and the authority under which the land 

was transferred, conveyed, or otherwise 

disposed of. In June 2011, we 

contacted the responsible OSD office 

and were provided sufficient evidence

that all four of the military services are 

now (within the last two years) reporting 

the status of excess real property to 

OSD. In addition, the DOD Inspector 

General’s written response of February 

25, 2011, in closing out our 

recommendation, stated that the Deputy 

Under Secretary of Defense 

(Installations and Environment) 

continually reviews the need for new 

authorities and changes to existing 

authorities.

GAO-05-785—Military Bases: Analysis of DOD’s 2005 Selection Process and Recommendations for Base Closures and 

Realignments (July 1, 2005).
Appendix I: List of Prior GAO Reviews Related 

to BRAC 2005, Related Recommendations, and 

DOD Actions to Date

Page 63 GAO-16-45 Military Base Realignments and Closures

GAO recommendation Original DOD response DOD actions

Establish mechanisms for tracking and 

periodically updating savings estimates in 

implementing individual recommendations, 

with emphasis on both savings related to the 

more traditional realignment and closure 

actions and those related more to business 

process reengineering.

Concur. No written comments provided. In 

providing oral comments on a draft of this 

report, the Deputy Under Secretary of 

Defense for Installations and Environment 

concurred with our recommendation. 

Complete. The Joint Action Scenario 

Team, a joint team DOD set up to 

develop and propose various joint 

reserve component recommended 

actions, incorporated our suggestions to 

include specific information in its 

summary reports and supporting 

documentation in order to withstand 

scrutiny and provide a clear 

understanding to outside parties—

including us and the military service 

audit agencies—of the process leading 

to the ultimate decisions regarding 

recommended BRAC actions.

GAO-04-760—Military Base Closures: Assessment of DOD’s 2004 Report on the Need for a Base Realignment and Closure Round

(May 17, 2004).

GAO recommendation Original DOD response DOD actions

Include in the Secretary of Defense’s May 

2005 report on recommendations for base 

closures and realignments a full discussion of 

relevant assumptions, and allowances made 

for potential future force structure 

requirements and changes, including the 

potential for future surge requirements.

Concur. Complete. The Secretary of Defense’s 

May 2005 report to the BRAC 

Commission addressed several of these 

factors. For example, the report 

contained a discussion about current 

and future national security threats the 

department considered during its 

deliberations. In addition, the report 

included a copy of the Secretary of 

Defense’s January 2005 “Policy 

Memoranda Seven – Surge,” which 

outlined five steps DOD would take to 

meet the statutory requirements to 

consider a surge in the development of 

BRAC recommendations. Further, some 

of the military departments and joint 

cross service groups discussed during 

their analyses the steps they took to 

incorporate the possibility of future 

surge requirements.

Source: GAO summary of GAO and DOD information | GAO-16-45
Appendix II: Text of BRAC Recommendations 

Included in Our Review

Page 64 GAO-16-45 Military Base Realignments and Closures

Appendix II: Text of BRAC 

Recommendations Included in Our Review
Appendix II: Text of BRAC Recommendations 

Included in Our Review

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Included in Our Review

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Included in Our Review

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Included in Our Review

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Included in Our Review

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Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

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Appendix III: Comments from the 

Department of Defense
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

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of Defense

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Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 73 GAO-16-45 Military Base Realignments and Closures
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

Brian J. Lepore, (202) 512-4523 or leporeb@gao.gov

In addition to the contact named above, Gina Hoffman (Assistant 

Director), Leslie Bharadwaja, Michele Fejfar, Joanne Landesman, Amie 

Lesser, Stephanie Moriarty, Carol Petersen, Matthew Spiers, and Michael 

Willems made key contributions to this report.

Page 74 GAO-16-45 Military Base Realignments and Closures

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

GAO Contact

Staff 

Acknowledgments
Appendix V: Accessible Data

Page 75 GAO-16-45 Military Base Realignments and Closures

OFFICE OFTHE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3400 DEFENSE PENTAGON

WASHINGTON, DC 2030 1-3400 

FEB 1 2016 

Mr. Brian Lepore

Director, Defense Capabilities and Management

U.S. Government Accountability Office

441 G Street, N.W.

Washington, DC 20548

Dear Mr. Lepore:

This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the Government 

Accountability Office (GAO) Draft Report, GA0-16-45 "MILITARY BASE 

REALIGNMENTS AND CLOSURES (BRAC): More Guidance and 

Information Needed to Take Advantage of Opportunities to Consolidate 

Training" dated December 4, 2015 (GAO Code 351984).

We appreciate GAO's review of BRAC recommendations involving joint 

training. While portions of the report are informative and some aspects of 

the recommendations are sound, we believe the report misunderstands 

DoD's approach to joint and common training and does not completely 

recognize the unique circumstances of BRAC recommendation 

development and implementation. In particular, the report does not 

consider the role of existing organizations like the Interservice Training 

Appendix V: Accessible Data

Agency Comment 

Letter

Text of Appendix III: 

Comments from the 

Department of Defense

Page 1
Appendix V: Accessible Data

Review Organization which is empowered to provide policy guidance to 

increase effectiveness of interservice training. In addition, the report 

undervalues the importance of providing the DoD Components flexibility 

to determine BRAC costs and has a misplaced emphasis on estimating 

savings for transformational recommendations. The six recommendations 

that were transformational focused on increasing military value not 

savings. Of these, two (7th Special Forces and Joint Strike Fighter) were 

never intended to save money and the other four yielded low annual 

savings. The enclosed comments on the recommendations detail these 

concerns.

We look forward to continuing to work with the GAO on these important 

issues related to BRAC.

Daniel P.C. Feehan,

Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Readiness

Performing the Duties of the Assistant Secretary of Defense

(Readiness)

Peter J. Potochney

Deputy Assistant Secretary of defense for Basing

Performing the Duties of the Assistant

Secretary of Defense

(Energy, Installations and Environment)

Enclosure: As stated

GAO DRAFT REPORT DATED DECEMBER 4, 2015 GA0-16-45 (GAO 

CODE 351984) 

"MILITARY BASE REALIGNMENTS AND CLOSURES: MORE 

GUIDANCE AND INFORMATION NEEDED TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF 

OPPORTUNITIES TO CONSOLIDATE TRAINING" 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COMMENTS TO THE GAO 

RECOMMENDATION 

Page 76 GAO-16-45 Military Base Realignments and Closures

Page 2
Appendix V: Accessible Data

RECOMMENDATION 1: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of 

Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and 

Readiness and the Secretaries of the Military Departments to provide 

guidance to the progran1managers on consolidating training, if DOD 

decides that the opportunity to increase jointness is still appropriate 

DoD RESPONSE: Non-concur. There appears to be a misunderstanding 

of the definition of joint and common training. DoD Directive 1322.18, 

Military Training, defines joint training as "...using joint doctrine or tactics, 

techniques, and procedures to prepare joint forces or joint staffs to 

respond to strategic, operational, or tactical requirements that the 

Combatant Commanders consider necessary ..." Common training is 

defined as "Training that is not unique to a particular DoD Component; 

training that has no special distinction or quality to an individual DoD 

Component..." Two or more Military Services (including Coast Guard) 

training together on individual skills to meet individual Service 

requirements is not joint training. 

The Department and Services are constantly seeking ways to improve 

training opportunities by either consolidating or collocating individual skills 

training. To facilitate this process, the Services established the 

Interservice Training Review Organization (ITRO). The purpose of ITRO 

is to provide policy guidance for interservice training and to review 

training and related activities to increase effectiveness and efficiency. 

ITRO reviewed the GAO's report and affirmed that ITRO is the proper 

forum to address the issues identified. For example, ITRO was involved in 

the Chaplain recommendation implementation process. Every year ITRO 

acts on dozens of requests from the Services for consolidation or 

collocation of like training. For example, in FY 14, more than 40,000 

Service members from other Services attended 372 Anny TRADOC 

courses. 

RECOMMENDATION 2: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of 

Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and 

Readiness in consultation with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

Energy, Installations, and Environment to develop and provide specific 

guidance for the Military Departments to use in implementing 

recommendations designed to consolidate training to increase jointness. 

DoD RESPONSE: Non-concur. DoD Directive 1322.18, Military Training, 

specifically states that the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and 

Readiness (USD(P& R)) is responsible for oversight and policy for 

individual, functional, common, and collective

Page 77 GAO-16-45 Military Base Realignments and Closures
Appendix V: Accessible Data

training programs. While consultation with the Assistant Secretary of 

Defense for Energy, Installations, and Environment (ASD(EI&E)) would 

be required within a future BRAC round (if authorized by Congress), 

USD(P&R) already has the authority to develop guidance that would 

enable DoD to consolidate training and increase jointness. 

RECOMMENDATION 3: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of 

Defense direct the Military Departments to develop baseline cost data. 

DoD RESPONSE: Non-Concur. The unique circumstances of the BRAC 

process dictate that the Department use standardized data calls (to obtain 

certified data) to develop recommendations. In order to treat all 

installations equal l y and allow senior officials to make decisions within 

that process, data calls for BRAC must ensure that the questions asked 

do not provide the personnel answering the questions insight into the 

various scenarios being considered. This is critical to maintaining the 

fairness and objectivity of the analysis by preventing the supplied data 

from being influenced by gaining and losing locations. As such, gathering 

detailed baseline data on candidate recommendations during the 

deliberative process could unnecessarily disclose information to lower 

echelons or installation advocates prematurely. 

In the latter stages of BRAC, analytical teams supporting decision makers 

must judiciously balance the need for detailed information to flesh out a 

scenario with the need to give senior leaders the freedom to exercise 

their experience and military judgment in a deliberative process without 

concern that their discussions will be disclosed prematurely. Moreover, 

collecting baseline cost data for training activities in advance of an 

authorized BRAC process is not effective because the Department will 

not be able to use previously supplied uncertified data and it is not clear 

that a future round will involve joint training. For these reasons, we 

believe it is not practical or appropriate to obtain the level of baseline cost 

data that the GAO report suggests. 

RECOMMENDATION 4: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of 

Defense direct the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Energy, 

Installations, and Environment to issue guidance clarifying what costs 

should be included in final BRAC accounting. 

DoD RESPONSE: Partially concur. The key to an effective 

implementation process is to provide oversight without creating a 

reporting process that could diminish the authority of the DoD 

Components leadership and chain of command to make numerous 

Page 78 GAO-16-45 Military Base Realignments and Closures

Page 3
Appendix V: Accessible Data

detailed cost decisions. The BRAC 2005 business plan process properly 

balanced oversight and flexibility. GAO's report implies that this flexibility 

was the cause of the inconsistency in reporting costs. Micro-managing 

every cost decision would have been unreasonable across such a vast 

program that affected hundreds of installations and thousands of people 

working in the three Military Departments and various Defense Agencies. 

Ultimately, whether or not to fund various requirements from the BRAC 

account was a judgment call made by Military Headquarters officials. 

They made these decisions after internal and external deliberations and 

coordination within and between DoD Components during the six-year 

implementation period, business plan approval cycle, and in parallel with 

numerous other initiatives occurred (e.g., Grow the Army, worldclass medical care standards imposed by Congress, significant 

fluctuations in construction costs, etc.). 

That said, if Congress authorizes the Department to conduct a BRAC 

round, and the Department elects to institute an oversight process similar 

to BRAC 2005, it would be reasonable for the Department to consider 

providing additional emphasis on accounting for BRAC costs.

Page 79 GAO-16-45 Military Base Realignments and Closures

FORT BRAGG, NORTH CAROLINA

RECOMMENDATION # 4 (ARMY l0)

ONE-TIME COST: $334.BM

ANNUAL RECURRING COSTS/(SAVINGS): $23.BM

20-YEAR NET PRESENT VALUE: $639.2M

PAYBACK PERIOD: NEVER

SECRETARY OF DEFE NSE RECOMMENDATION

Realign Fort Bragg, NC, by relocating the 7th Special Forces Group 

(SFG) to Eglin AFB, FL, and by activating the 4th Brigade Combat Team 

Page 5

Text of Appendix II: Text of 

BRAC Recommendations 

Included in Our Review

Page 1
Appendix V: Accessible Data

(BCT), 82d Airborne Division and relocating European-based forces to 

Fort Bragg, NC.

SECRETARY OF DEFE NSE JUSTIFICATION

This recommendation co-locates Anny Special Operation Forces with Air 

Force Special Operations Forces at Eglin AFB, activates the 4th BCT of 

the 82nd Airborne Division, and relocates Combat Service Support units 

to Fort Bragg from Europe to support the Army modular force 

transformation. This realignment and activation of forces enhances 

military value and training capabilities by locating Special Operations 

Forces (SOF) in locations that best support Joint specialized training 

needs, and by creating needed space for the additional brigade at Fort 

Bragg. This recommendation is consistent with and supports the Anny's 

Force Structure Plan submitted with the FY 06 budget, and provides the 

necessary capacity and capability, including surge, to support the units 

affected by this action.

This recommendation never pays back. However, the benefits of 

enhancing Joint training opportunities coupled with the positive impact of 

freeing up needed training space and reducing cost of the new BCT by 

approximately $54-$148M (with family housing) at Fort Bragg for the 

Anny's Modular Force transformation, justify the additional costs to the 

Department.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

There were no formal expressions from the community.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found that this recommendation was consistent with 

DoD's justification. Specifically, the Commission views that the relocation 

of the 7th Special Forces Group to Eglin AFB, FL, provides this unit an 

opportunity to achieve outstanding joint training through its collocation 

with the Air Force Special Operations Command. Also, die Commission 

found that this relocation enables the activation of the 4th Brigade 

Combat Team, 82D Airborne Division at Fort Bragg, NC, and it is 

consistent with the Anny's transformation efforts and the Force Structure 

Plan.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS

Page 80 GAO-16-45 Military Base Realignments and Closures
Appendix V: Accessible Data

The Commission found the Secretary's recommendation consistent with 

the final selection criteria and force structure plan. Therefore, the 

Commission approved the recommendation of the Secretary.

JOINT CENTER FOR CONSOLIDATED TRANSPORTATION 

MANAGEMENT TRAINING

RECOMMENDATION # 122 (E&T 7)

ONE-TIME COST: $1.5M

ANNUAL RECURRING COSTS/(SA VINGS): ($1.3M)

20-YEAR NET PRESENT VALUE: ($18.0M)

PAYBACK PERIOD: 1 YEAR

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Realign Lackland Air Force Base, TX, by relocating the Transportation 

Management training to Fort Lee, VA

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

Eliminates redundancy. “Train as we fight: jointly." Consolidates like 

schools while preserving service-unique culture. Although Lackland Air 

Force Base, TX, has a higher military value than Fort Lee, VA, it is the 

military judgment of the JCSG that consolidation at the location with the 

largest amount of transportation training produces the greatest overall 

military value to the Department. Uses Inter-service Training Review 

Organization (ITRO) as the baseline.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

There were no formal expressions from the community.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found no reason to disagree with the Secretary's 

recommendation and justification. The Commission believes that locating 

all transportation management training at one location will provide 

significant joint benefits, enhance intra-service procedures, and reduce 

training duplication. The Commission also believes that course 

Page 81 GAO-16-45 Military Base Realignments and Closures

Page 2
Appendix V: Accessible Data

curriculums can be developed to provide service-unique training where 

necessary. In sum, the proposal was found to increase military value 

without posing undue risks of mission disruption.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS

The Commission finds the Secretary's recommendation consistent with 

the final selection criteria and the Force Structure Plan. Therefore, the 

Commission approves the recommendation of the Secretary.

JOINT CENTER OF EXCELLENCE FOR CULINARY TRAINING

RECOMMENDATION # 123 (E&T 8) 

ONE-TIME COST: $5.4M

ANNUAL RECURRING (OSTS/(SAV INGS): ($1.0M)

20-YEAR NET PRESENT VALUE: ($15.7M)

PAYBACK PERIOD: 2YEARS

SECRETARY OF DEFE NSE RECOMMENDATION

Realign Lackland Air Force Base, TX, by relocating Culinary Training to 

Fort Lee, VA, establishing it as a Joint Center of Excellence for Culinary 

Training.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

Consolidates Culinary Training at the installation with the largest Service 

requirement. Eliminates redundancy and costs. Provides the Services 

with culinary training under Inter-service Training Review Organization. It 

is the military judgment of the JCSG that consolidation at the location with 

the largest amount of culinary training produces the greatest overall 

military value to the Department through increased training efficiency at a 

lower cost.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

There were no forma l expressions from the community.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

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Page 3
Appendix V: Accessible Data

The Commission's review and analysis confirmed the Secretary's 

recommendation and justification. The Commission's approval of this 

recommendation endorses the concept of centers of excellence as a 

means of enhancing jointness and promoting transformation.

The Commission found, however, that the ultimate cost of this 

recommendation is still unclear.

The Commission also found that after many years of previous 

consolidation with the Air Force, the Navy had begun making plans, prior 

to BRAC, to move its culinary training program from Lackland Air Force 

Base to Great Lakes Nava l Base. The Navy cited differences in serviceunique and cultural issues as the reason for de-consolidating culinary 

training. While the Commission's approval of DoD's recommendation will 

move the Navy's program to Fort Lee, the Commission cautions DoD to 

carefully implement the program to accommodate service-specific needs.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS

The Commission finds the Secretary's recommendation consistent with 

the final selection criteria and the Force Structure Plan. Therefore, the 

Commission approves the recommendation of the Secretary.

JOI NT CENTER OF EXCELLE NCE FOR RELI GIOUS TRAINING & 

EDUCATION

RECOMMENDATION # 124 (E&T 9)

ONE-TIME COST: $1.0M

ANNUAL RECURRING COSTS/(SAVI NGS): ($0.9M)

20-YEAR NET PRESENT VALUE: ($11.9M)

PAYBACK PERIOD: 1 YEAR

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Realign Maxwell Air Force Base, AL; Naval Air Station Meridian, MS; and 

Naval Station Newport, RI; by relocating religious training and education 

to Fort Jackson, SC, establishing a Joint Center of Excellence for 

religious training and education.

Page 83 GAO-16-45 Military Base Realignments and Closures

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Appendix V: Accessible Data

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

Consolidation at Fort Jackson, SC, creates a synergistic benefit by having 

each Service's officer and enlisted programs conducted in close proximity 

to operational forces. Realized savings result from consolidation and 

alignment of similar officer and enlisted educational activities and the 

merging of common support functions. This recommendation supports the 

following DoD transformational options: (1) establish center of excellence 

for joint education and training by combining like schools and (2) establish 

joint officer and enlisted specialized skills training.

COMMUNITY (ONCERNS

There were no formal expressions from the community.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found no reason to disagree with the Secretary's 

recommendation and justification. The Commission believes a Joint 

Center for Religious Education and Training at Fort Jackson will provide 

significant jointness benefits to the Chaplain Corps, and better prepare 

chaplains to comfortably minister to members of all service branches. The 

Commission also believes that during DoD implementation, course 

curricula can be developed to achieve both goals of consolidating training 

where appropriate, and providing service-unique training where 

necessary.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS

The Commission finds the Secretary's recommendation consistent with 

the final selection criteria and the Force Structure Plan. Therefore1 the 

Commission approves the recommendation of the Secretary.

JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER INITIA L JOINT TRAI NING SITE

RECOMMENDATION # 125 (E&T 10)

ONE-TIME COST: $199.1M

ANNUAL RECURRING COSTS/(SAVINGS): $3.3M

20-YEAR NET PRESENT VALUE: $226.3M

Page 84 GAO-16-45 Military Base Realignments and Closures

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Appendix V: Accessible Data

PAYBACK PERIOD: NEVER

SECR ETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Realign Luke Air Force Base, AZ, by relocating to Eglin Air Force Base, 

FL, a sufficient number of instructor pilots and operations support 

personnel to stand up the Air Force's portion of the Joint Strike Fighter 

(JSF) Initial Joint Training Sire, hereby established at Eglin Air Force 

Base, FL Realign Marine Corps Air Station Miramar, CA, by relocating to 

Eglin Air Force Base, FL, a sufficient number of instructor pilots and 

operations support personnel to stand up the Marine Corps' portion of the 

JSF Initial Joint Training Site, hereby established at Eglin Air Force Base, 

FL Realign Naval Air Station Oceana, VA, by relocating to Eglin Air Force 

Base, FL, a sufficient number of instructor pilots, operations, and 

maintenance support personnel to stand up the Navy's portion of the JSF 

Initial Joint Training Site, hereby established at Eglin Air Force Base, FL 

Realign Sheppard Air Force Base, TX, by relocating to Eglin Air Force 

Base, FL, a sufficient number of frontline and instructor-qualified 

maintenance technicians and logistics support personnel to stand up the 

Air Force's portion of the JSF Initial Joint Training Site, hereby 

established at Eglin Air Force Base, FL Realign Naval Air Station 

Pensacola, FL, by relocating to Eglin Air Force Base, FL, a sufficient 

number of frontline and instructor-qualified maintenance technicians and 

logistics support personnel to stand up the Department of the Navy' s 

portion of the ]SF Initial Joint Training Site hereby established at Eglin Air 

Force Base, FL.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

This recommendation establishes Eglin Air Force Base, FL, as an Initial 

Joint Training Site that teaches entry-level aviators and maintenance 

technicians how to safely operate and maintain in the new Joint Strike 

Fighter OSF) {F-35) aircraft. 'The Department is scheduled to take 

delivery of the F-35 beginning in 2008. This joint basing arrangement will 

allow the Interservice Training Review Organization process to establish 

a DoD baseline program in a consolidated/joint school with curricula that 

permit services latitude to preserve service-unique culture and a faculty 

and staff that brings a "Train as we fight: jointly" national perspective to 

the learning process.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

Page 85 GAO-16-45 Military Base Realignments and Closures
Appendix V: Accessible Data

The Sheppard AFB, TX, community endorsed the concept of establishing 

a single test site for the JSF program and did not voice concerns over its 

being located at Eglin Air Force Base. The community did request, 

however, that Sheppard Air Force Base be considered as a candidate 

installation for JSF maintenance training after the initial JSF proof-ofconcept is completed.

The Pensacola, FL, community acknowledged that locating the planned 

JSF test center at Eglin Air Force Base was good for the Florida Gulf 

region, which includes the Pensacola area.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found no reason to disagree with the Secretary's 

recommendation and justification. The Commission understands that 

establishing an initial training site for the Joint Strike Fighter at Eglin Air 

Force Base will support the learning process for this new-generation 

aircraft. Careful implementation should enable DoD to harness the best 

aspects of each service branch while still meeting service-unique 

requirements.

COMMISSION RECOMME NDATIONS

The Commission finds the Secretary's recommendation consistent with 

the final selection criteria and the Force Structure Plan. Therefore, the 

Commission approves the recommendation of the Secretary.

UNDERGRADUATE PILOT AND NAVIGATOR TRAINING

RECOMMENDATION # 128 (E&T 14)

ONE-TIME COST: $71.7M

ANNUAL RECURRING COSTS/(SAVINGS): ($18.3M)

20-YEAR NET PRESENT VALUE: ($174.2M)

PAYBACK PERIOD: 4YEARS

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Realign Moody Air Force Base, GA, as follows: Relocate the Primary 

Phase of Fixed-wing Pilot Training to Columbus .Air Force Base, MS; 

Page 86 GAO-16-45 Military Base Realignments and Closures

Page 6
Appendix V: Accessible Data

Laughlin Air Force Base, TX; and Vance Air Force Base, OK. Relocate 

Introduction to Fighter Fundamentals Training for Pilots to Columbus Air 

Force Base, MS; Laughlin Air Force Base, TX; Randolph Air Force Base, 

TX; Sheppard Air Force Base, TX; and V:mce Air Force Base, OK. 

Relocate Introduction to Fighter Fundamentals Training for Weapons 

Systems Officers to Columbus Air Force Base, MS; Laughlin Air Force 

Base, l}(;Sheppard Air Force Base, TX; and Vance Air Force Base, OK 

Relocate Introduction to Fighter Fundamentals Training for Instructor 

Pilots to Randolph Air Force Base, TX.

Realign Randolph Air Force Base, TX, by relocating Undergraduate 

Navigator Training to Naval Air Station Pensacola, FL.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

This recommendation will realign and consolidate the Air Force's primary 

phase of undergraduate flight training functions to reduce excess/unused 

basing capacity, eliminate redundancy, enhance jointness for 

Undergraduate Navigator Training/Naval Flight Officer (NFO) training, 

reduce excess capacity, and improve military value.

The basing arrangement that flows from this recommendation will allow 

the Inter-service Training Review Organization process to establish a 

DoD baseline program in Undergraduate Navigator Training.INFO with 

curricula that permit services latitude to preserve service unique culture 

and a faculty and staff that brings a "Train as we fight: jointly" national 

perspective to the learning process.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

No concerns were formally expressed by elected officials or organized 

civic organizations; however, individual citizens near Moody Air Force 

Base expressed concerns about the loss of contractor jobs.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found no reason to disagree with the Secretary's 

recommendation or justification. The Commission understands the 

proposal will realign training to other installations where the same mission 

already exists, maintenance facilities are established, and capacity to 

absorb the mission is adequate. As a result, the Commission finds the 

recommendation appropriately enhances military value at reasonable 

cost.

Page 87 GAO-16-45 Military Base Realignments and Closures
Appendix V: Accessible Data

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS

The Commission finds the Secretary's recommendation consistent with 

the final selection criteria and the Force Structure Plan. Therefore, the 

Commission approves the recommendation of the Secretary.

Page 88 GAO-16-45 Military Base Realignments and Closures
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Proving Ground, Maryland, but Challenges Remain. GAO-08-1010R. 

Washington, D.C.: August 13, 2008.

Defense Infrastructure: High-Level Leadership Needed to Help 

Communities Address Challenges Caused by DOD-Related Growth. 

GAO-08-665. Washington, D.C.: June 17, 2008.

Defense Infrastructure: DOD Funding for Infrastructure and Road 

Improvements Surrounding Growth Installations. GAO-08-602R. 

Washington, D.C.: April 1, 2008.

Military Base Realignments and Closures: Higher Costs and Lower 

Savings Projected for Implementing Two Key Supply-Related BRAC 

Recommendations. GAO-08-315. Washington, D.C.: March 5, 2008.

Defense Infrastructure: Realignment of Air Force Special Operations 

Command Units to Cannon Air Force Base, New Mexico. GAO-08-244R. 

Washington, D.C.: January 18, 2008.

Military Base Realignments and Closures: Estimated Costs Have 

Increased and Estimated Savings Have Decreased. GAO-08-341T. 

Washington, D.C.: December 12, 2007.

Military Base Realignments and Closures: Cost Estimates Have 

Increased and Are Likely to Continue to Evolve. GAO-08-159. 

Washington, D.C.: December 11, 2007.

Military Base Realignments and Closures: Impact of Terminating, 

Relocating, or Outsourcing the Services of the Armed Forces Institute of 

Pathology. GAO-08-20. Washington, D.C.: November 9, 2007.

Military Base Realignments and Closures: Transfer of Supply, Storage, 

and Distribution Functions from Military Services to Defense Logistics 

Agency. GAO-08-121R. Washington, D.C.: October 26, 2007.

Defense Infrastructure: Challenges Increase Risks for Providing Timely 

Infrastructure Support for Army Installations Expecting Substantial 

Personnel Growth. GAO-07-1007. Washington, D.C.: September 13, 

2007.

Page 91 GAO-16-45 Military Base Realignments and Closures
Related GAO Products

Military Base Realignments and Closures: Plan Needed to Monitor 

Challenges for Completing More Than 100 Armed Forces Reserve 

Centers. GAO-07-1040. Washington, D.C.: September 13, 2007.

Military Base Realignments and Closures: Observations Related to the 

2005 Round. GAO-07-1203R. Washington, D.C.: September 6, 2007.

Military Base Closures: Projected Savings from Fleet Readiness Centers 

Likely Overstated and Actions Needed to Track Actual Savings and 

Overcome Certain Challenges. GAO-07-304. Washington, D.C.: June 29, 

2007.

Military Base Closures: Management Strategy Needed to Mitigate 

Challenges and Improve Communication to Help Ensure Timely 

Implementation of Air National Guard Recommendations. GAO-07-641. 

Washington, D.C.: May 16, 2007.

Military Base Closures: Opportunities Exist to Improve Environmental 

Cleanup Cost Reporting and to Expedite Transfer of Unneeded Property. 

GAO-07-166. Washington, D.C.: January 30, 2007.

Military Bases: Observations on DOD’s 2005 Base Realignment and 

Closure Selection Process and Recommendations. GAO-05-905. 

Washington, D.C.: July 18, 2005.

Military Bases: Analysis of DOD’s 2005 Selection Process and 

Recommendations for Base Closures and Realignments. GAO-05-785. 

Washington, D.C.: July 1, 2005.

Military Base Closures: Observations on Prior and Current BRAC 

Rounds. GAO-05-614. Washington, D.C.: May 3, 2005.

Military Base Closures: Assessment of DOD’s 2004 Report on the Need 

for a Base Realignment and Closure Round. GAO-04-760. Washington, 

D.C.: May 17, 2004.

Page 92 GAO-16-45 Military Base Realignments and Closures (351984)
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