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NORTH KOREA’S SEA OF FIRE:

BULLYING, BRINKMANSHIP AND BLACKMAIL

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

MARCH 10, 2011

Serial No. 112–6

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

RON PAUL, Texas 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio 

BILL JOHNSON, Ohio 

DAVID RIVERA, Florida 

MIKE KELLY, Pennsylvania 

TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York 

RENEE ELLMERS, North Carolina 

VACANT 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

DENNIS CARDOZA, California 

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

ALLYSON SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania 

CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut 

FREDERICA WILSON, Florida 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

YLEEM D.S. POBLETE, Staff Director 

RICHARD J. KESSLER, Democratic Staff Director 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Mr. Victor Cha, professor and director of Asian studies and D. S. SongKorea foundation chair in Asian studies and government, Georgetown University ................................................................................................................... 9

Bruce Klingner, senior research fellow, Northeast Asia, Asian Studies Center, 

The Heritage Foundation .................................................................................... 19

Mr. William Newcomb (former senior economist, Bureau of Intelligence and 

Research, U.S. Department of State, and former senior economic adviser, 

Office of Intelligence and Analysis, U.S. Department of the Treasury) .......... 32

Mr. Robert Carlin, visiting scholar, Center for International Security and 

Cooperation, Stanford University ....................................................................... 45

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

Mr. Victor Cha: Prepared statement ...................................................................... 12

Bruce Klingner: Prepared statement ..................................................................... 21

Mr. William Newcomb: Prepared statement ......................................................... 34

Mr. Robert Carlin: Prepared statement ................................................................. 48

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 74

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 75

The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress from the 

Commonwealth of Virginia: Prepared statement .............................................. 77

The Honorable Brad Sherman, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of California: Letter to the Honorable Barack Obama, President of the 

United States, dated February 9, 2011 .............................................................. 78

The Honorable Christopher H. Smith, a Representative in Congress from 

the State of New Jersey: Articles submitted for the record ............................. 85

(1)

NORTH KOREA’S SEA OF FIRE: BULLYING, 

BRINKMANSHIP AND BLACKMAIL 

THURSDAY, MARCH 10, 2011

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 o’clock a.m., in 

room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ileana RosLehtinen (chairman of the committee) presiding. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. The committee will come to order. 

As we address the threats posed by the North Korean regime to 

our nation’s security interests, to our allies, and to its own people, 

I would like to take a moment to remember another brave people, 

the people of Tibet, as they commemorate the 52nd anniversary of 

the Tibetan National Uprising. 

At the recent White House State Dinner for the visiting Chinese 

leader, a Chinese pianist played a song from the long-forgotten Korean War whose lyrics portray the brave American soldiers who 

fought for freedom in the Korean peninsula as ‘‘wolves and jackals.’’

Those depicted at our Korean War Memorial are no jackals. 

These are America’s own boys. These are our beloved sons. ‘‘Our 

Nation,’’ as the memorial inscription reads, ‘‘honors our sons and 

daughters who answered the call to defend a country they never 

knew and a people they never met. Having risen from the ashes 

of war, the Republic of Korea, a thriving democracy and an economic powerhouse, is the proud legacy for those who fought and 

died over 60 years ago. 

By contrast, in North Korea, a modern Caligula pursues his nuclear bread and circuses while he lets his own people starve. He 

plays a risky game of brinkmanship, sinking a South Korean naval 

vessel, defined as an act of war, and shelling South Korean island 

villagers with a sense of impunity. 

And why does he dare to do so? He is confident that his Chinese 

patrons will protect him, both on the ground in Asia and in the 

halls of the United Nations. And the leader in Pyongyang threatens 

to turn Seoul, ‘‘the miracle on the Han River,’’ into ‘‘a sea of fire.’’

He also directed his hackers to try to disrupt joint U.S./South Korean military exercises held recently by jamming GPS, Global Positioning System devices critical to South Korean military communications. 

But the evil deeds of this modern day Caligula do not end in 

Korea. He has attempted to ship arms to the brutal regime in 

Burma and the Tamil Tigers. News reports indicate that, with ChiVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:18 Apr 20, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\FULL\031011\65056 HFA PsN: SHIRL
2

nese complicity and in defiance of U.N. sanctions, he shipped missile parts to Teheran via Beijing’s airport. 

North Korea has attempted to ship arms to Hamas and 

Hezbollah, both proxies of the Iranian regime and both designated 

by the U.S. Department of State as foreign terrorist organizations. 

And it was North Korea that helped the Syrian regime build the 

nuclear facility that Israel removed in September 2007. The International Atomic Energy Agency is still investigating and seeking 

answers on this North Korea/Syria nuclear facility. 

All this in the midst of one failed round after another of the SixParty Talks. These talks have proven to be little more than kabuki 

theater demonstrating only Pyongyang’s duplicity and broken 

promises. Former Los Alamos National Laboratory Director Siegfried Hecker reported that ‘‘his jaw just dropped’’ when he saw a 

facility in North Korea last November with ‘‘hundreds of centrifuges.’’ He added that the world should take Pyongyang’s apparent uranium enrichment program seriously. This revelation indicates that Pyongyang has had a covert second track to nuclear 

weaponry in defiance of the Agreed Framework and the Six-Party 

Talks. 

Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell is en route to Seoul 

as we meet to discuss this critical Highly Enriched Uranium issue 

with our South Korean allies. North Korea promised to accept a 

transparent verification of its denuclearization when it was removed from the list of state sponsors of terrorism by the Bush administration in October 2008. 

Pyongyang reneged on that promise and withdrew from the SixParty Talks after getting what it wanted. In January of this year, 

a court in Seoul, South Korea sentenced a spy to 10 years in prison 

for planning to assassinate a leading North Korean defector on direct orders from the regime in Pyongyang. The U.S. criminal code 

defines such action as international terrorism. Is it not high time 

for the State Department to re-list North Korea as a state sponsor 

of terrorism? 

Meanwhile, Pyongyang has requested further U.S. food aid as reports indicate renewed food shortages in North Korea. There are 

some grave concerns about this proposal. There is the question of 

the American food aid remaining in North Korean warehouses 

when Pyongyang expelled American humanitarian NGOs in the 

spring of 2009. Pyongyang distributed this food without monitoring. There must be a full accounting of these 20,000 tons of food 

aid requested. 

Lest we forget, in December 2008, U.S. shipment of food aid to 

North Korea via the World Food Program was suspended due to 

growing concerns about diversion by the North Korean military 

and regime elite and the World Food Program’s lack of effective 

monitoring and safeguards. 

Fast approaching is the 100th anniversary next year of the birth 

of Kim Jong Il’s father, and there is a danger that aid provided 

would be diverted for this spectacle. 

Much has occurred since the last full committee hearing on 

North Korea that was held in early 2007. I look forward to receiving the witnesses’ insight on North Korean actions in the last 4 

years and their recommendations for U.S. policy moving forward. 

3

I now turn to the distinguished ranking member, my good friend 

Mr. Berman, for his opening remarks. 

Mr. BERMAN. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. And 

thank you for calling this hearing. And my kudos to the individual 

who thought up the title of this hearing. I think there is a literary 

career ahead for that person. 

For over two decades, successive American administrations have 

wrestled with the puzzle called North Korea. Every President since 

Reagan has tried to put the puzzle pieces together. And just when 

it seems like they are going to fit, North Korea pulls the rug out 

from under us. 

Today, a peaceful and permanent resolution of the North Korean 

nuclear issue remains as elusive as ever. Pyongyang desperately 

wants to be recognized as a nuclear power, and refuses to fulfill its 

commitment to abandon its nuclear weapons program under international inspections and safeguards. 

At the same time, North Korea’s reckless and provocative actions 

have dramatically increased tensions on the Korean Peninsula. In 

the past year alone, North Korea has sunk a South Korean naval 

ship, shelled a South Korean island populated with civilians, and 

revealed to the world what we already believed, that it is pursuing 

a uranium enrichment program as well. 

While North Korea poses a serious threat to the stability and security of East Asia, it has also, as the chairman mentioned, exported its destabilizing influence to other regions of the world. Surpassed only by A.Q. Khan’s network as a source of illicit weapons 

technology, Pyongyang has supplied ballistic missiles to Iran and 

built the now-destroyed nuclear reactor in Syria. It could easily 

begin exporting uranium enrichment equipment, nuclear weapon 

designs, and even nuclear weapons material. 

The perennial challenge is how to change the North’s behavior. 

Is there a new approach we should take in dealing with 

Pyongyang? Is it even possible to reach an agreement with North 

Korea that will lead to a verifiable end of its nuclear program, especially now that the regime is undergoing a second dynastic succession? 

North Korea has now indicated that it wants to return to the negotiating table, more than 2 years after the last round of Six-Party 

Talks. But in light of the regime’s previous behavior, it is hard to 

view this as anything other than a thinly-veiled effort, like so many 

previous cycles of aggression and negotiation, to mitigate international sanctions, regain economic aid, bolster ties with China, 

and resume bilateral negotiations with Seoul and Washington, 

while continuing to stall on the nuclear issue. 

Nevertheless, while a healthy dose of skepticism is certainly in 

order, it would be a mistake to completely write off a policy of 

tough engagement. At the present time, there is simply no other 

viable alternative to that approach. 

Despite our differences with China on a whole range of issues, 

we can’t afford to ignore the role that Beijing plays on the North 

Korea nuclear issue. As a result of its close political and economic 

relationship with Pyongyang, China holds considerable leverage 

over the regime. Regrettably, China has been very reluctant to 

fully exercise that influence. 

4

The Chinese leadership apparently believes that coddling its 

neighbor will preserve stability in the region and perhaps enhance 

Beijing’s own prestige and influence with the West. But this is a 

dangerous game Beijing is playing, one that it may come to regret. 

Every day that Beijing fails to pressure Pyongyang is a day that 

brings the North closer to having a deliverable nuclear weapons capability, one that could directly threaten China and cause other 

states in the region to consider pursuing their own nuclear weapons programs. Continuing to enable Kim Jong Il’s truculence is the 

surest route to instability in China’s immediate neighborhood. 

While the threat of a nuclear-armed North Korea is a critical 

issue that deserves our urgent attention, we must not overlook the 

horrendous human rights situation in North Korea. Millions of 

North Koreans live in desperate conditions, many of them facing 

starvation. They live in constant fear of arbitrary arrest and know 

they could be tortured or executed at any time. 

We should make every effort to provide humanitarian assistance 

and food aid to North Korean people but only if we can get adequate monitoring to ensure that such aid is not diverted or misused. 

I look forward to the testimony of our panel of experts today and 

to hearing their views on possible creative solutions to the very serious North Korean problem. 

Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Berman. 

Unfortunately, the chairman of the Subcommittee on East Asia 

and the Pacific, Mr. Manzullo, is ill today. Thus, I am pleased to 

recognize the chairman of the functional Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade, Mr. Royce, in his stead for a 

3-minute opening statement and will allow the members of our 

committee for a 1-minute opening statement as well. 

Mr. Royce is recognized for 3 minutes. 

Mr. ROYCE. Madam Chair, thank you very much. 

This is very serious. Last fall North Korea revealed its highly enriched uranium facility. Experts estimate that these centrifuges are 

four times as powerful as those spinning in Natanz, Iran. Raising 

the stakes, exporting centrifuge technology can be very easy to 

cloak. One witness predicts a third nuclear test in the near future 

in North Korea. 

Since I came to Congress in ’93, our North Korea policy has been 

a bipartisan failure in terms of both at the administrations level, 

and what we have done. 

Even the former chief proponent of the Six-Party Talks has said 

those talks are of no use. Only a new government in North Korea 

is going to get us closer to peace and security. And this crisis comes 

as the administration is considering a request for food aid. 

Now, let me say this about the $800 million in food aid we have 

already given. A top North Korean defector told the Wall Street 

Journal last week, ‘‘We must not give food aid to North Korea. 

Doing so,’’ he said, in his words, ‘‘is the same as providing funding 

for North Korea’s nuclear program.’’

And, according to this defector, who spent a decade in a top position of power, if the regime cared about the people, they would take 

money out of the nuclear program and spend it on food. The oppoVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:18 Apr 20, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\FULL\031011\65056 HFA PsN: SHIRL
5

site is happening. The money is going to fund their build-up. So, 

looking at it through this defector’s lens, that is $800 million that 

we have given the North Korean regime. And they have pilfered 

that, and they have not had to spend it on feeding their military 

and their cronies. 

We had a French NGO sit here and tell us that that money goes 

into the hand of the military base because it is sold, the food aid 

is sold, on the Pyongyang food exchange. The French NGO traced 

it back. That is the report we get. 

Believe me, they are not asking for food to help the starving. I 

was told by the former minister of propaganda that money never 

goes to the outlying areas. That never goes to those areas. It goes 

to prop up the regime. 

So it is really hard arguing that our aid doesn’t support this brutal regime and, secondly, doesn’t support its nuclear weapons drive. 

I think the administration is on the wrong course in this request 

for food aid to North Korea. 

As we are sitting here pointing out all of the failures of the past 

policy. My question is, when are we going to learn? We have been 

feeding North Korea for decades. The plight of the average North 

Korean gets worse and worse. We should basically be blocking their 

access to hard currency and helping to put enough pressure on this 

regime from the officer corps, who won’t get paid if we do that. So 

we change the regime. 

Thank you. I yield back. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Royce. 

And now I am pleased to recognize the ranking member on the 

Subcommittee on East Asia and the Pacific, Mr. Faleomavaega, for 

his 3-minute statement. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Madam Chairwoman, thank you for calling 

this important hearing. 

For the 22 years that I have been serving as a member of this 

committee, it seems that the more we hold hearings on the crisis 

in the Korean Peninsula, the more I feel a real sense of either 

hopelessness or sheer frustration, wondering if we are ever going 

to resolve the critical issues that confront our nation and our allies 

toward the people and he leaders of North Korea. 

At the same time, Madam Chairwoman, while it is very easy for 

us to be throwing spears and daggers and even labeling North 

Korea as an axis of evil, one cannot discuss the issues of North 

Korea without including the concerns and also the frustrations on 

the part of some 42 million South Koreans who live in this current 

division, sheer frustrations on the part of both North and South 

Korea, a most profound social and political division that took place 

following World War II, not of their choosing, Ms. Chairwoman, but 

even before there was a North and South Korea. 

The Korean people were caught in the middle of the geopolitical 

rivalry between two superpowers that started the Cold War. And, 

even though the Cold War may have been over, we are still working on the remnants. And, as a child, I supposed that the crisis in 

the Korean Peninsula was never part of the solution. 

History sometimes, Madam Chairman, can do nothing but deliver misery to people. Let’s not forget there for some 60 years before the World War II, Korea was a colony of the imperial Japanese 

6

empire. The pain and suffering of the Korean people during that 

period of time is still being felt by many of the people in Korea. 

I will never forget what the South Korean friend of mine told me 

when we were in meetings in Seoul. He said, ‘‘Eni, the United 

States is our friend, but the North Korean people are our brothers 

and sisters. Please don’t forget that when you discus the Korean 

issues.’’

Let me just say, Madam Chairman, on the brighter side of 

things, I would like to urge my colleagues let’s move forward in approving the proposed free trade agreement with South Korea that 

has been carefully crafted to increase our export markets to South 

Korea between $12–20 billion and will add some 70,000 jobs for the 

American people. Let’s not play yo-yo politics with this, Madam 

Chairwoman. And I say I am confident the administration will also 

bring the Colombian and the Panama free trade agreements for us 

to consider. 

I look forward to hearing from our three distinguished witnesses 

this morning, who know a lot more about Korea than me. Is it me 

or I, Madam Chairman? I am still learning how to speak English. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Than I. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Anyway, I yield back. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much. 

Pleased to yield 1 minute to our subcommittee chair on Middle 

East and South Asia: Mr. Chabot of Ohio. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you, Madam Chair. I will be brief. 

I particularly like your comparison of North Korean leadership to 

Caligula. I think that is exactly right. 

And, as usual, China, I believe, is the problem behind the scenes 

here. They essentially shield North Korea from any ramifications 

from any consequences of their actions. So, you know, North Korea 

sinks a South Korean ship, killing 46 sailors, nearly half the crew. 

They shell a South Korean island, killing civilians and burning 70 

percent of the corps and the forests on that particular island, essentially with impunity. 

Our Stanford professor comes back and indicates how they are 

moving forward. He is stunned with how they are moving forward 

with their nuclear program. China is the real problem. North 

Korea is their vessel. They are, in essence, the tool that the Chinese use just to stir up mischief. That is the real problem here. 

I yield back. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chabot. 

I am pleased to yield to Mr. Payne, the ranking member on the 

Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, and Human Rights. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much, Madam Chair. 

I couldn’t agree more that China could certainly be more helpful. 

I think that we have to convince China. You know, we have bent 

over backwards for China. We took them from most favored nation 

status to permanent trade relations. 

And we are certainly increasing China’s modernization. I think 

the least we could do is ask them to—and it makes sense for them 

to have a stable region. I do feel that we should continue to give 

food aid. We do find that there are flaws sometimes in our program, but I think many more people will be helped with the food 

aid than those we feel should not be participating in it. 

7

And I believe that we have a humanitarian responsibility. We 

shouldn’t blame the people. They have double jeopardy from their 

leaders and from our lack of support. 

So I thank you very much. I yield back. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Payne. 

Ms. Schmidt of Ohio? 

Ms. SCHMIDT. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

And I want to voice some of my concerns with North Korea. 

First, we have known since July 2006 when North Korea first tested its nuclear device, that they are not just accumulating separated 

plutonium, but they are also creating gas centrifuge uranium enrichment, which will give them the means of producing nuclear 

weapons. 

In addition, North Korea is also developing a long-range ballistic 

missile program capable at some point in the future, possibly, of 

hitting the United States. 

It doesn’t end there. We know that they have been very, very aggressive with their neighbors. On March 26th, 2010, a North Korean submarine fired at a South Korean vessel, 46 fatalities. On 

November 23rd, 2010, the North Koreans, again without provocation, lobbed dozens of artillery shells into a South Korean island. 

And, again, South Korean civilians were killed. 

And, against this, we know that Kim Jong Il’s health is failing 

and his likely successor, his youngest son, Kim Jong-un, is untested and may be more nervous to the West than his father. 

Our policy has been a little unsure in the United States regarding this administration and North Korea. And I worry very much 

about where we are going to go with the future talks. 

I yield back. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Ms. Schmidt. 

Mr. Cicilline of Rhode Island? 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

I just look forward to hearing from the four distinguished panelists and thank the chair for convening this meeting on a very important issue. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, sir. 

Pleased to yield to the Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, 

and Human Rights, the chairman, Chris Smith, for 1 minute. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Madam Chair. 

I would hope that our distinguished witnesses would address a 

number of news reports and as well as the Agency for Defense Development briefing for members of Parliament in Seoul that said 

that the North is believed to be nearing completion of an electromagnetic pulse bomb that if exploded 25 miles above ground, would 

cause irreversible damage to electrical and electronic devices, such 

as mobile phones, computers, radio, and radar, experts say. They 

also have said that this could be used, obviously, in warfare. Kim 

Jong Il made it one of his priorities, according to numerous reports, 

to pursue electronic warfare. I hope you would speak to that. 

Secondly, very briefly, the issue of religious freedom, and human 

rights in general, remains a serious concern in North Korea. The 

U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom has said that 

negotiations with North Korea will not succeed unless rooted in a 

broader framework that includes agreements on humanitarian and 

8

human rights concerns. I hope that you would address that as well. 

They should not be decoupled, notwithstanding our concerns about 

the nuclear issue. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Smith. 

Mr. Sherman, the ranking member on the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade, is recognized for a 5-minute 

opening remarks. 

Mr. SHERMAN. The U.S.-Korea free trade agreement will open 

our markets to North Korean goods. Keeping this concealed until 

Congress approves the agreement is critical to the strategy of getting it passed. 

Goods that are, say, 65 percent North Korean content and 35 

percent South Korean content have the right to come into this 

country duty-free under this agreement. If we block those goods, as 

we may if we enforce our national security laws, then South Korea 

gets to raise tariffs. And we lose all of the advantages we negotiated for under the agreement. 

Furthermore, the Kaesong slave labor camp will be eligible for 

treatment as if it is part of South Korea. And all the goods, 100 

percent Kaesong-made goods will come into this country with the 

workers being paid maybe $7 a month without future congressional 

approval. The agreement is carefully vague in appendix or annex 

number 22. 

I have asked the USTR to clarify this. They have refused. They 

have ignored my letter for the last month and longer. And it is 

clear that there is enough vagueness there so that future executive 

branches could act and let those slave labor goods into the United 

States. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Sherman. 

Mr. Johnson of Ohio is recognized. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Madam Chairman. And I, too, applaud 

setting up this hearing. 

I am particularly interested today to hear our panel members 

talk about the security implications. You have heard my colleague 

talk about the trade agreement. I am interested in hearing your 

opinion of the security implications were we to not move forward 

with that trade agreement. 

I would also be interested to hear your thoughts on China and 

whether or not China is essentially benefitting from this perceived 

standoff with North Korea and does it not, in fact, give China significant leverage that these barriers persist. So I would be interested to hear the panel members talk about those kinds of issues. 

And, with that, I yield back, Madam Chairman. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. 

Thank you to all of our members for their opening statements. 

The Chair is pleased to welcome now our panel of witnesses. Victor 

D. Cha has been the Korean chair at the Center for Strategic and 

International Studies since May 2009. He is also a professor of government and director of Asian studies at Georgetown University 

and has academic degrees from Columbia and Oxford. 

From 2004 to 2007, Mr. Cha served as the director for Asian affairs at the National Security Council. At that time, he worked 

closely with former Ambassador Chris Hill in the George W. Bush 

9

administration on North Korean policy and served as deputy head 

of the U.S. delegation to the Six-Party Talks. 

Dr. Cha, thank you for attending. 

Bruce Klingner is the senior research fellow for Northeast Asia 

at The Heritage Foundation. He has a 20-year career at the Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency, including serving as deputy division chief for Korea at the CIA. 

Mr. Klingner has written numerous articles on the Korean Peninsula and received degrees from Middlebury College and the National War College. 

We welcome you as well, sir. 

William J. Newcomb is a former U.S. Government economist. 

From 2005 to 2008, Mr. Newcomb was the senior economic adviser 

to the assistant secretary for intelligence and analysis in the Treasury Department. 

Prior to holding that position, Mr. Newcomb spent over 20 years 

as the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research 

senior economist for North Korea. During 2003 to 2005, Mr. Newcomb served as the deputy coordinator of the State Department’s 

North Korea Working Group. 

Mr. Newcomb is a graduate of Colorado College and has done 

graduate work at St. Mary’s and Texas A&M. 

Glad to have you here, Mr. Newcomb. 

And our final witness, Mr. Robert Carlin, is currently a visiting 

fellow at Stanford University’s Center for International Security 

and Cooperation. He is also as veteran of the State Department’s 

Bureau of Intelligence and Research, where he worked for 13 years 

on North Korea. 

Mr. Carlin served as a senior policy adviser to the North Korean 

Peninsula Energy Development Organization from 2003 to 2006, 

leading numerous delegations to North Korea. 

Mr. Carlin holds a degree from Claremont Men’s College and 

Harvard University. 

Welcome, Mr. Carlin. And thank you for this excellent set of panelists. I kindly remind our witnesses to keep your oral testimony 

to no more than 5 minutes. And, without objection, the witnesses’ 

written statements will be inserted into the record. 

So we will begin with you, Dr. Cha. Thank you. 

STATEMENT OF MR. VICTOR CHA, PROFESSOR AND DIRECTOR 

OF ASIAN STUDIES AND D. S. SONG-KOREA FOUNDATION 

CHAIR IN ASIAN STUDIES AND GOVERNMENT, GEORGETOWN 

UNIVERSITY 

Mr. CHA. Thank you, Chairwoman, Congressman Berman, and 

distinguished members of the committee. It truly is a pleasure to 

be here with you today. 

The challenges that are posed by North Korea have only become 

more complex from the past. In addition to the uranium enrichment program and the possibility of a third nuclear test, the sinking of the Cheonan and the brazen firing of 170 artillery shells on 

Yeonpyeong Island are very concerning. And I think there are several theories that have been bantied about as to why the North is 

provoking in such a deliberate and rapid fashion having to do with 

the North Korean leaders’ dislike of the South Korean Government, 

10

longstanding disputes over maritime boundaries, and the internal 

leadership transition. But I would like to draw the committee’s attention to one other possible explanation. 

North Koreans have said to me in the Six-Party Talks that the 

United States attacked Iraq and it attacked Afghanistan because 

they did not have nuclear weapons and that we would never attack 

them or Iran because these countries have nuclear capabilities. 

Kim may be engaging in more provocative conventional attacks 

short of war because he believes his own rhetoric that he is now 

a nuclear weapons state and, therefore, feels invulnerable to potential retaliation by other parties. 

Now, we know that this is wrong, but this does not mean they 

may believe it mistakenly, particularly as they become less confident in their deteriorating conventional deterrent, including the 

degraded artillery that sits on the DMZ. 

I cannot overemphasize to you how dangerous a situation this is. 

The following scenario is not impossible. The North could provoke 

again because they believe their nuclear deterrent is sufficient to 

prevent retaliation. And Seoul cannot stand another attack. They 

cannot sit passively. And they respond with a military strike confident in their own minds that they could control the escalation 

ladder. This is the sort of miscalculation on both sides that could 

lead to war. 

So how do we deal with this? The Obama administration has 

been operating essentially with the same toolbox as the Bush administration: Sanctions, exercises, and counterproliferation activities. And I give the administration credit for pursuing trilateral coordination with Japan and South Korea and for the up tempo of 

military exercises, including Key Resolve and Foal Eagle, which 

finish up today. 

But one cannot help but wonder where this is all leading. I support sanctions, counterproliferation, and military exercises. But 

even a hawk has to acknowledge that a long-term policy of sanctions and military exercises in the end may lead to war before they 

lead to a collapse of the North Korean regime. 

A study I directed at CSIS did a time-series analysis over 27 

years back to March 1984 to chart on a weekly basis two pieces of 

data. One was DPRK provocations, and the other were periods of 

major negotiations involving the United States. 

Never once in the entire 27-year period was there a period in 

which the DPRK provoked in the midst of negotiations with the 

United States. This does not mean the Obama administration 

should dive right into negotiations today, but the cost of strategic 

patience, the administration’s policy, is likely to be a third nuclear 

test and more North Korean provocations. That will elicit a South 

Korean military response and potential escalation. 

No administration wants to be recorded in history as the one 

that took the peninsula to war with a policy based for 4 years on 

sanctions and exercises. So they need to think hard about their 

next steps. 

As a baseline, the U.S. must continue to intensify the sanctions 

and military exercising. They should also push forward with new 

consultations with the ROK on extended deterrence, both conventional and nuclear. The administration should seek innovative 

11

ways to enhance trilateral coordination with the allies, including a 

renewed effort at a collective security statement. And the parties 

should also consider U.N. authorization for U.S. and ROK use of 

force in self-defense in response to future violations of the armistice. 

While there is no movement on the nuclear negotiations, this 

should not discourage those who seek to advance the human rights 

agenda. And here the lowest hanging fruit is the food assistance 

program. It is my own view that the United States should consider 

providing food for North Korea if it is along the lines of a 2008 

agreement that the Bush administration negotiated and if they can 

use that as an opportunity to try to push North Korea to make an 

apology on the Cheonan or on the Yeonpyeong Island shelling. 

North Korea is truly the land of lousy options. There are no good 

choices, and there are only bad choices and worse choices. Rewarding bad behavior may elicit more bad behavior. But the alternative 

is to do nothing on nuclear diplomacy or human rights, and that 

will buy you a runaway nuclear program, rampant proliferation, 

and now rumblings in South Korea about nuclear weapons. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Cha follows:]

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Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Klingner? Thank you so much for being here. 

And if you could summarize your statement? 

STATEMENT OF BRUCE KLINGNER, SENIOR RESEARCH FELLOW, NORTHEAST ASIA, ASIAN STUDIES CENTER, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION 

Mr. KLINGNER. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman, Ranking Member Berman, and distinguished members of the committee. It is indeed an honor to appear before you on an issue of such importance 

to the United States. 

North Korea poses a multi-faceted military threat to peace and 

stability in Asia as well as a global proliferation risk. The disclosure last November of a previously unknown uranium enrichment 

facility validates earlier U.S. assertions that Pyongyang was pursuing a parallel uranium nuclear weapons program. It not only 

augments North Korean capabilities to increase its nuclear arsenal 

but also increases the risk of nuclear proliferation. 

Secretary of Defense Robert Gates recently warned that ‘‘North 

Korea is becoming a direct threat to the United States’’ since it will 

develop an ICBM within 5 years. And Pyongyang has already deployed 1,000 missiles that can target South Korea, Japan, and U.S. 

bases in Asia. 

Pyongyang’s two unprovoked acts of war last year were a chilling 

reminder that its conventional forces remain a direct military 

threat to South Korea. 

For years, many sought to absolve North Korea for its provocative acts and noncompliance by, instead, blaming U.S. and South 

Korean policies. They also claimed that simply returning to negotiations, offering concessions, and abandoning sanctions would resolve the nuclear issue and prevent provocations. Yet, dialogue did 

not prevent North Korean provocative acts nor resolve the nuclear 

stalemate. 

Last March, behind-the-scenes discussions were moving toward 

resumption of the Six-Party Talks, but that did not prevent 

Pyongyang’s attack on the Cheonan. Nor did secret talks between 

North and South Korea last November, including discussions of humanitarian assistance, prevent the regime from shelling 

Yeonpyeong Island. 

During the last 4 years of the Bush administration, the U.S. engaged not only in multilateral negotiations but also in frequent direct bilateral diplomacy with Pyongyang, even removing North 

Korea from the state sponsors of terrorism list. But North Korean 

intransigence, noncompliance, and brinkmanship continued. 

In early 2009, there were euphoric expectations that the transition from George Bush to Barack Obama would lead to dramatic 

breakthroughs with North Korea. Instead, Pyongyang quickly sent 

clear signals that it would not adopt a more accommodating stance 

post-Bush. North Korea rejected several attempts by the new administration to engage in dialogue and, instead, engaged in a series 

of rapid-fire provocations. 

U.S. policymaking toward North Korea has been hampered by a 

binary debate over whether Washington should use pressure or engagement. The reality, of course, is that pressure and engagement, 

20

along with economic assistance, military deterrence, alliances, and 

public diplomacy, are most effective when integrated into a comprehensive strategy utilizing all the instruments of national power. 

Sanctions are not an alternative to diplomacy but are, rather, a 

component of a broader foreign policy strategy. 

I will quickly summarize some of the extensive policy recommendations I included in my testimony. The U.S. should continue the two-track policy of pressure and conditional engagement. 

Overall, it is a good strategy but has been weakly implemented to 

date. Stronger measures, both more pain and more gain, should be 

put into effect. 

Track one, increase punitive and coercive measures. We need to 

fully implement existing U.N. resolution requirements, including 

freezing and seizing the financial assets of any violator. We need 

to target both ends of the proliferation pipeline. To date, both the 

U.N. and U.S. have been reluctant to target any non-North Korean 

violator. We should maintain international punitive sanctions until 

North Korea complies with international law and U.N. resolutions. 

We should not negotiate them away for simply returning to the 

Six-Party Talks. 

Track two, simultaneously keep the door open for negotiations. It 

is not a question of whether to engage North Korea but of how to 

do so. Negotiations should be based on principles of compliance, 

conditionality, reciprocity, and verification. Create a strategic blueprint that clearly defines the desired end-state, objectives, and requirements for all parties, rather than continuing vaguely worded 

documents, and insist on an effective verification mechanism. 

Track three, strengthen defensive measures. Since international 

diplomacy and U.N. resolutions did not prevent North Korea from 

continuing its development and testing of nuclear weapons and 

ICBM delivery capabilities, the U.S. should: Continue to develop 

and deploy missile defense systems, augment nonproliferation efforts, and strengthen its alliances with South Korea and Japan. 

And track four, adding lanes to the road of engagement. The SixParty Talks need not be the only focus of U.S. policy toward North 

Korea. Other issues that could be addressed are the missile threat, 

a peace treaty, the conventional forces threat, humanitarian aid, 

economic development assistance, human rights, and confidencebuilding measures. Yet, each of these lanes has a number of issues 

that must be carefully considered before going down them. 

The current two-track policy of pressure and conditional negotiations is an improvement over earlier approaches. Yet, when weakly 

implemented, strategic patience is insufficient as a long-term strategy. Simply trying to contain North Korea in a box is problematic. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you. And 

I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Klingner follows:]

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Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. You guys are 

wizards at being the under 5-minute guys. Thank you. 

Mr. Newcomb? 

STATEMENT OF MR. WILLIAM NEWCOMB (FORMER SENIOR 

ECONOMIST, BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH, 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, AND FORMER SENIOR ECONOMIC ADVISER, OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE AND ANALYSIS, 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY) 

Mr. NEWCOMB. Madam Chairman, Ranking Member Berman, 

and distinguished members of the committee, it is a privilege to be 

invited to speak here today about North Korea’s illicit activities. 

I don’t have a law enforcement background. I learned about these 

on the job. At the North Korean Working Group, I helped to develop and implement the illicit activities initiative, a multi-agency 

and multinational effort to restrict the DPRK’s ability to conduct 

and profit from illegal activities. 

At Treasury, I worked on Banco Delta Asia affairs and assisted 

the Department’s efforts to identify and counter North Korea’s attempts to use the international financial system to launder proceeds from proliferation and crime. 

The statement I submitted to the committee briefly examines the 

history and the extent of North Korea’s illicit activity and notes 

how it has compromised DPRK institutions and officials. 

North Korea continues to engage in manufacture and distribution of counterfeit cigarettes and counterfeit U.S. currency. It may 

have reduced its involvement in narcotrafficking. Neither Japan 

nor Taiwan has reported any major seizure of DPRK-sourced 

methamphetamines for 8 years. 

Methamphetamines and other drugs are perhaps being transshipped through China or sold in bulk there to criminal groups. 

Multiple reports of active drug trade on the DPRK-China border 

also suggest that China may have become North Korea’s preferred 

market. 

Evidence is insufficient to gauge the size of this drug trade, but 

a recent press report contends the Chinese Minister of Public Security, Meng Jianzhu, probably expressed China’s concerns about this 

matter last month, when he visited Pyongyang and met with Kim 

Jong Il. 

Executive Order 13551 issued last August labels DPRK counterfeiting, narcotics smuggling, and money laundering as constituting 

an ‘‘unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States.’’

I would like to make four points about ongoing trends and the 

possibility that North Korea in the near term could choose to increase its involvement in illicit and proliferation activities in an 

even more threatening way. 

First, North Korea’s economy is performing poorly, and food 

shortages again appear severe. Preliminary partner-country foreign 

trade statistics for 2009 show a falloff in DPRK exports and a 

sharp drop in its imports. The trade deficit was smaller than the 

average of recent years but exceeded $1 billion. The trade results 

for 2010 are scant. Except for China, foreign trade last year with 

most partners likely was down again. 

33

Second, UNSCR 1874 is disrupting North Korea’s arms trade and 

its general trade. The report of the Panel of Experts on Implementation of UNSCR 1874, issued last November, attributed the sharp 

decline in overall trade to the imposition of additional measures in 

June 2009. 

The recently released U.N. Combined Appeal for 2011 also linked 

the fall in total trade in part to ‘‘stringent and increasing sanctions’’ from major economies as well as to rising tensions with the 

ROK, the North’s second largest trade partner. 

Third, North Korea is poor, financially isolated, and lacks capacity to borrow to cover chronic current account deficits. With trade 

down, risk rises that an increasingly cash-starved DPRK will attempt to boost earnings from illicit activities and ramp up exports 

of arms and proliferation-related items and know-how. 

Underscoring this danger are North Korea’s past proliferation to 

Libya and Syria; troubling signs of extensive, although not well-understood, military trade and exchanges with Burma; and recently 

expanded trade in weapons and weapons development, including 

missiles, with its best customer, Iran, where rising demand for enriched uranium matches up with North Korea’s apparent ability to 

supply it. 

Fourth, North Korea is adept at making counter moves to evade 

containment efforts, including deceptive techniques to conceal the 

origin and content of shipping containers and use of networks of 

overseas agents and front companies to manage acquisitions, sales, 

and banking arrangements. 

Most troubling, however, is the DPRK’s potential ability to exploit close contacts with transnational criminal groups, with their 

own extensive networks and well-honed skills in smuggling contraband, to assist in transporting proliferation-linked items and acquiring restricted goods and weapons technology. 

Thank you for this opportunity, and I welcome any questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Newcomb follows:]

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Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Wonderful. Thank you so much. 

Mr. Carlin? 

STATEMENT OF MR. ROBERT CARLIN, VISITING SCHOLAR, 

CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND COOPERATION, STANFORD UNIVERSITY 

Mr. CARLIN. My thanks to the committee for letting me take part 

in this important discussion on North Korea. We start with bullying, brinkmanship and blackmail. I think we can add bluster and 

baloney——

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Oh, well. Here we go. Dennis, did you 

hear that? 

Mr. CARLIN [continuing]. Because North Korea has indulged in 

all of those things at one time or another. 


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As we start a discussion on North Korea, I think it is useful at 

the outset to remind ourselves that North Korea is not an expansionist power. That is, it doesn’t have designs on territory outside 

the Korean Peninsula. And in recent years, that is even putting 

unification very low on its list of priorities. However, it is engaged 

in a long-term violent political struggle with South Korea. And that 

makes this a very tough neighborhood. 

Where does that leave the United States? I am afraid it leaves 

us in the midst of a deteriorating situation that began in late 2002, 

when we stepped out of an airplane without a parachute. And we 

have been in policy free fall ever since. 

What should be our first priority, which is protecting the national security of the United States, has been diluted in a soup of 

bromides. 

Is the situation retrievable? It think that it is. I wouldn’t have 

spent 38 years of my life working on it if I didn’t think there was 

some hope. But there are several steps we ought to take, and I just 

want to highlight a couple of them in my remarks right now. 

The first thing we need to do is recelebrate our understanding 

of the problem. And the second thing we need to do is engage the 

North Koreans directly. 

For the past 20 years, Washington has looked at North Korea 

primarily as a WMD problem. It is not just that. It is a political 

problem with a WMD component. This is not hairsplitting. If we 

don’t get the problem right, if we keep getting the problem wrong, 

we are going to keep wandering around in the forest, the wrong 

forest, looking for solutions to a problem that doesn’t fit what actually is in front of us. 

Engagement. I know ‘‘engagement’’ is a dirty word in many quarters. But the goal of engagement is not to help the North Koreans. 

It is to advance our own national security interests. By itself and 

as Mr. Klingner pointed out, by itself, it is not going to solve our 

problems, but without it, we are not going to begin to solve any of 

our problems. 

Past experience. And here I would disagree perhaps with some 

of the statements made earlier. Past experience has shown that if 

it is intelligently and coherently carried out, engagement gives us 

influence on North Korean decision-making and influence in the region as a whole. 

For the past 10 years, however, there has been no serious and 

no effective engagement with the North Koreans. I say that because they have conducted two nuclear tests, developed their uranium enrichment capability, and worked to perfect their missile capability in those years. 

Well, doesn’t engagement legitimate the North Korean regime? It 

does not. It doesn’t compromise our interests. It doesn’t compromise 

our values. 

Diplomacy has been and can be again with North Korea a powerful tool for advancing and protecting our national interests. And for 

us to let it rust unburnished is a mistake. 

What about Six-Party Talks? I say let them go to the elephant 

graveyard. They weren’t anything more than a speed bump to the 

North Korean nuclear program. They have this industrial-scale 

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vember along with Sig Hecker. And, with that facility, they could 

in the worst case double their existing nuclear arsenal sometime in 

the not-too-distant future. 

This is not a future problem. However, it is a problem of the here 

and now. And we need to deal with it effectively. Effectively, what 

does that mean? It means realistically recognizing, realistically, 

what we can accomplish in the short term. It means stabilizing the 

situation, not just talking about it, stabilizing it to prevent it from 

becoming worse and preparing the foundations for long-term 

progress. 

This is going to be more difficult than it was 10 years ago. It is 

going to be more difficult still the longer we wait to get started. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Carlin follows:]

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Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. Excellent set of 

panelists. 

Hezbollah and Hamas. In a visit to Tokyo last May, Israeli Foreign Minister Lieberman told Japanese authorities that he had evidence that a shipment of North Korean weapons intercepted at 

Bangkok Airport in late 2009 were headed for Hezbollah and 

Hamas-designated terrorist organizations. Israeli soldiers also reportedly found evidence of North Korean tunneling techniques in 

southern Lebanon after the 2006 war. 

Can you please comment on the extent, if any, if Pyongyang’s 

ties to Hezbollah and Hamas? And then do you believe that North 

Korea has committed enough infractions to merit relisting it as a 

state-sponsored terrorism? What would the reaction in Pyongyang 

be to such a relisting? And how would it impact the negotiating 

process? 

Thank you. Anyone who would like to answer would be fine. 

Mr. Klingner? 

Mr. KLINGNER. I do believe North Korea should be returned to 

the state sponsors of terrorism list now. I earlier resisted such calls 

when it was based only on a reaction to the U.S. negotiator having 

the wool pulled over his eyes in negotiations in 2008 or for North 

Korea’s unprovoked acts of war. Those did not fit the legal requirements for listing a country on the state sponsors list. 

However, I do think a South Korean court’s conviction of two 

North Korean agents for attempting to assassinate Hwang Jangyop as well as the intercepted conventional arms that were going 

to Hamas and Hezbollah as well as other indications that North 

Korea has been providing aid and assistance to terrorist groups do 

met the legal requirements for relisting them. 

North Korea’s reaction will be strong, but I don’t think we should 

hesitate from enforcing U.S. law due to the reaction of the recipient 

nation. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. 

Any others? Yes, Mr. Carlin? 

Mr. CARLIN. I would like to note—and probably very few people 

remember it—that in October 2000, we signed a joint statement 

with the North Koreans on international terrorism. Nobody has 

paid any attention to this in the intervening years. Nobody has 

taken advantage of it to discuss the problem with the North Koreans. And so it is not a surprise to me in the least that the North 

Koreans have gone back to what we would consider their old tricks. 

We don’t want them to do that. We should do what we can to 

stop it. But it seems to me that we shouldn’t sign agreements with 

them and then let them fly away when, in fact, they provide tools 

for us to address the problem. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. 

Mr. Newcomb? Dr. Cha? 

Mr. CHA. Well, I would agree with Mr. Klingner’s statements. I 

think they do now meet the legal requirements. I thought they met 

them before, but now they do really meet the legal requirements, 

especially after the conviction of these two individuals who tried to 

assassinate Hwang. 

I would also agree that their reaction will be negative, but at the 

same time I expect negative behavior from them this year anyway. 

53

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. In the land of lousy options. 

Mr. Newcomb? 

Mr. NEWCOMB. About the seizure of the arms at Bangkok Airport, that shows the success of UNSCR 1874. And so my recommendation would be working closely with other member countries because North Korea has alternative ways to ship these weapons. 

But good cooperation and effective enforcement of and surveillance of these different shipping avenues I think would continue to 

put a crimp in these kinds of military earnings. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, gentlemen. 

Pleased to recognize Mr. Berman, the ranking member, for his 

set of questions. 

Mr. BERMAN. I am curious how you define this strategy of strategic patience. Is it a mix of sanctions and engagement or is it a 

sanctions with holding out the possibility of engagement? I don’t 

know if any of you could just—I mean, is there a—what is your understanding of current U.S. policy? 

Mr. CHA. Well, Congressmember, I think that essentially strategic patience is an effort by the administration to maintain the 

baseline of these counterproliferation measures that Mr. Newcomb 

mentioned as well as other sanctions and hold out the possibility 

for negotiation, but I think they were seeking to wait for a period 

of time as economic pressures and other political pressures build 

up on the regime to try to find the right moment at which to negotiate. 

Now, I would say, quite frankly, that every administration has 

said that this has been their policy when they started on North 

Korea. And this administration has carried it for 21⁄2 years, in no 

small apart because they started with the missile test and the nuclear test and, therefore, really did not have an opportunity to engage. 

So I think it is kind of a similar animal by a different name that 

we have seen in past administrations. 

Mr. BERMAN. Sort of a fundamental question the witnesses all 

pose, what elicits North Korea’s concessions and cooperative behavior? We know several things happened. They decommissioned their 

plutonium, their reactor. They destroyed the cooling tower. They 

dismantled key portions of the reprocessing facility. They allowed 

U.S. to participate. At the same time, we heard inklings of it. And 

now you have seen it. They were working on a uranium enrichment 

facility program. 

Were those meaningful acts in retrospect? Do we get something 

through that 2007–8 period in terms of negotiations or is it right 

to say the wool was pulled over our eyes? 

Mr. KLINGNER. In response to your first question, sir, ‘‘strategic 

patience’’ was not the administration’s intended policy. Instead, 

they were going to be very forward leaning on engagement, even 

perhaps an unconditional summit with Kim Jong Il. 

They clearly in the campaign indicated they were going to be 

very forward leaning and even initiated several attempts to try to 

engage with North Korea, which were rejected by Pyongyang. 

After all of the provocations in the first 6 months of 2009, the 

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mistice, et cetera, the Obama administration reversed itself virtually 180 degrees and now adopted a much firmer policy. It is of 

much stronger sanctions and punitive measures as well as offers of 

conditional engagement. 

So it is a response to the provocations that North Korea did, despite the hopes that engagement——

Mr. BERMAN. Wait a minute. What about to this last question in 

terms of the specifics we got? Did we really get something here? 

Mr. KLINGNER. The steps we received from North Korea in 2007 

and ’8 were good steps. The problem was that the joint statements 

of the Six-Party Talks were so vaguely worded that we could not 

push North Korea when it did not comply because they could point 

to numerous loopholes. 

So that is one of the reasons why in any subsequent agreements 

that we have we must have more definitively worded agreements, 

such as the arms control treaties the U.S. had in order to assure 

that all parties know their responsibilities. 

Mr. BERMAN. I guess to the ‘‘Yes’’ or ‘‘No,’’ do all of you agree 

with the Six-Party Talks should be put in—what was your phrase, 

the elephants? 

Mr. CARLIN. Elephant graveyard. 

Mr. BERMAN. Burial ground? 

Mr. NEWCOMB. No, I do not agree that they should be buried. I 

think Six-Party Talks have utility in their own right. Certainly 

five-party talks do, and so do three-party talks to strategize in the 

neighborhood about how to handle the North Korean problem. 

Mr. CHA. I would say that both the 2007 agreements as well as 

the 1994 agreements aimed to do two things. That was to freeze 

the North programs and to disable and dismantle pieces of it. And 

I would say that both agreements were able to do some of that. 

The ’94 agreement was able to disable essentially the 50 and the 

200-megawatt reactors that were under construction. Those have 

been mothballed. They have not been restarted. And the 2007 

agreement did result in the collapsing of the cooler tower at 

Yongbyon. 

So they have made incremental progress, but at the same time, 

as you say, the North has been doing things while these agreements were reached behind our backs. And that is the frustration 

of negotiating. You are negotiating pieces of this program but never 

certain in the end that you will get all of it. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Berman. 

The chairman of the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade, Mr. Royce of California? 

Mr. ROYCE. Yes. I wanted to ask Mr. Newcomb a question. I remember the evidence we were presented in this committee back in 

2002 in terms of North Korea becoming the world’s best counterfeiter of $100 bills using the same type of equipment and presses 

that we use on our currency. And they presented us also—the U.S. 

had evidence that the distribution to criminal groups typically occurred through senior officers at the Embassies and through state 

trading companies was routine and went all the way up to the top 

of the regime. 

And so, as it was called, this supernote conspiracy led to the concept of prosecuting some of these state officials with the idea that 

55

we could freeze the funds, freeze the funds under section 311 of the 

PATRIOT Act. And that, in fact, was done. 

In August of ’05, arrests were made. The Justice Department 

was instructed by the NSC, however, to, in effect, bury the evidence and keep it out of court, mask the role of the North Korean 

Government. Why? We didn’t want to embarrass it. We didn’t want 

to embarrass it. We wanted to negotiate with North Korea. 

I just have a problem with the fact that the State Department 

took steps to eliminate the Working Group, the North Korean 

Working Group, and the North Korea Illicit Activities Group that 

developed this strategy because the strategy cut off hard currency 

into North Korea, right? 

The Ambassador at the time was convinced the pressure would 

get in the way of dialogue. We don’t want to get in the way of a 

dialogue. But, frankly, it is the only thing that I have seen that has 

been effective. 

And then last June, traveling to South Korea, the Secretary of 

State began to articulate what she called new measures to target 

North Korea’s illicit activity. I thought this was a good idea. They 

were going to go after cigarettes, drugs, and counterfeit currency. 

And, Mr. Newcomb, you were deputy in the group in the last administration that tackled this. And in a new report, David Asher, 

your partner on this, details a very robust approach to confronting 

North Korea on its illegal gains. It was State and Treasury but also 

the FBI and ATF on the cigarettes and the Secret Service on counterfeiting. Something like a dozen government agencies were involved. It had high-level support until again it was undercut by the 

diplomats. 

In your view, what is going on here? Is the administration even 

close to reconsidering this? I am not beating up on this administration. It has been every administration that has held back on the 

approach of freezing these funds, of doing what we temporarily 

were able to do with Banco Delta Asia and cut off the hard currency. And the people that I know that were close to this say that 

that brought a tremendous amount of pressure on this regime, but 

it was amazing how much pressure came the other direction to list 

those sanctions. 

Could you give me your views? 

Mr. NEWCOMB. Yes, sir. I think the circumstances and the developments are much as you described at the time. The August ’05 arrests were a result of the well-publicized Smoking Dragon and 

Royal Charm sting operations that were run by the FBI with a lot 

of help from Secret Service and others. 

They had something like 89 indictments. And when it came time 

to publish the indictments, they dropped the original language and 

substituted ‘‘country 1’’ and ‘‘country 2,’’ which were China and 

North Korea it was later revealed. There were other developments 

as well. 

U.S. sought to arrest Sean Garland, an IRA terrorist, for his involvement in distributing supernote. So there was a very aggressive law enforcement program underway. 

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tion internationally among police agencies. And to get that, you 

have to have high-level political support, the diplomatic support 

that encourages police officers that are not accustomed necessarily 

to working with one another to go that extra mile and establish relationships. 

And, to be quite frank, the evidence that we use to convince folks 

about the seriousness of our alarm mostly came out of police reporting because of the suspicion a lot of intelligence reporting was 

held in at the time. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much. 

Mr. NEWCOMB. Thank you. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Payne, the ranking member on 

the Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, and Human Rights. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much. And let me thank the witnesses for your excellent testimony. 

In your opinion—and anyone could take a stab at it—what do 

you attribute the sort of aggressiveness of the North Koreans at 

this time, the sinking of the ship, the shelling of the island, you 

know, saber rattling? In your opinion, what has created or caused 

this? 

Mr. KLINGNER. All of us I am sure have theories, but one can 

also just jump over thinking of the motivations for this and, instead, look at the acts themselves. They have committed acts of terror, acts of war. We can figure our own reasons for those objectives, 

but I think we really have to focus on the acts themselves. 

That said, I think there are multiple reasons. And they are not 

contradictory for North Korea to engage in this behavior. It is a 

demonstration of military prowess to show that they are not weak, 

they will not be cowed, to ensure regime survival, reestablish relevance on the international stage. 

They don’t want to be ignored. They feel that when they are not 

ignored, it gives them increased negotiating leverage and they create a dispute and escalate tensions in order to demonstrate a need 

for a peace treaty, which they feel they would be able to gain additional foreign policy objectives and economic benefits as well as to 

divert attention from the previous North Korean bad act. 

Some would say the Yeonpyeong-do attack may have been a way 

of diverting attention from its revelation of uranium enrichment facility, which is yet another violation of the U.N. resolution. So 

there are many reasons I think, sir. 

Mr. BERMAN. The only thing I would add to that is that, as I said 

earlier, I am concerned that they really do believe they are a nuclear weapon state now. And, therefore, they can act with impunity 

short of war, and they don’t think the U.S. or other South Koreans 

or anybody else in the region will respond. And that, again, to me 

is a very dangerous thing because that is, of course, not the case. 

The South Koreans may respond or we may respond the next 

time. But if they go around believing they are a nuclear weapon 

state, they may start doing more provocations. And, you know, historically it is this sort of miscalculation that always leads to escalation and potentially war. 

Mr. CARLIN. I think we should look at the West Sea as a particular problem. It has become a powder keg. And the tensions 

there are going to continue to rise. There is a dynamic that has 

57

been put in place in the West Sea of action, counteraction, mostly 

below the radar of international reporting, but it is what builds the 

tensions up until they pop over the top into something like an incident that we had. 

Those tensions have not been resolved. And I am afraid that the 

West Sea is going to continue to be a locus of clashes unless somehow someone can address the problems. 

Mr. NEWCOMB. I personally have concerns that succession politics also plays a role in how they decided to respond recently. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much. Interesting answers. 

The strength of their military—I am not talking about the nuclear potential, but they have a very large Army. But so did Saddam Hussein have a very large Army. I found out that a lot of 

them were old persons. They showed up in large numbers. But 

when it came to it, it was basically the Republican Guard that was 

about the only fit fighting unit. 

What about the in your opinion strength of their infantry, their 

land, soldiers that you see on display in so large numbers? 

Republican Guard 

Mr. KLINGNER. North Korea has approximately a million-man 

Army. And 60 or 70 percent of it is forward deployed near the 

DMZ. There are mechanized corps, armored corps, artillery corps, 

all very close to the demilitarized zone. They have thousands of 

tubes of artillery that can hit Seoul without further movement. 

They forward deployed a number of POL and other logistical 

issues, which reduces the U.S. intelligence community’s ability to 

warn of even a short-notice attack. 

That said, there are credible reports that the capability has been 

declining. They have not deployed new modern weapons as well as 

the infantry themselves are suffering from the poor food conditions. 

That said, any U.S. war game and simulation still posits horrendous casualties, trillions of dollars of damage and that, even after 

the initial week of hostilities in these simulations, the situation is 

still very dire. We feel——

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Chabot, the chair of the Subcommittee on Middle East and 

South Asia, is recognized. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Given that virtually all of North Korea’s imported energy and the 

large majority of its food comes through China—one report indicated that Beijing provides North Korea with 70 percent of its food 

imports and 90 percent of its oil imports—how can Chinese leaders 

credibly maintain that it has no leverage over North Korea, especially since its direct support and increasing investments over 

North Korea are crucial to keeping the North Korean economy 

functioning? 

Is there any evidence that Chinese has used its enormous influence to directly pressure Pyongyang to halt and dismantle its nuclear weapons program or, instead, limit its influence to occasionally and mildly advising Pyongyang to temporarily tone down its 

aggressive policies? 

And I would invite any of the panel. Maybe start with you, Dr. 

Cha. 

58

Mr. CHA. Thank you for the question. I think that you are absolutely right in terms of the metrics that you mentioned. China does 

have incredible material leverage on North Korea. And I think in 

the past, they have done things to help calm the situation down 

and push North Korea toward some of the agreements that we 

have reached in the past. 

I think the problem right now is that China has basically chosen 

its side. And the side it has chosen is the side of not allowing this 

regime to collapse because for them, that is a strategic buffer. 

Therefore, they are giving all of this fluid and energy. They are 

supporting the internal regime transition because as unstable as 

the situation is, a collapse of North Korea is more unstable to 

them. 

And, therefore, they are doing all of these things to help the regime because they think—I mean, this is China, their own parochial interest—it puts them in a better place when they come out 

of this transition tunnel that the leadership is going through in 

North Korea. 

So in the past, when we were doing Six-Party Talks, we relied 

on China a lot. We hoped that China could do a lot in terms of this 

leverage. These days, watching this from the outside, I don’t think 

China is very helpful at all. And I don’t think we can rely on them 

to help us solve this problem now. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. 

Mr. Klingner or any of the other witnesses? 

Mr. KLINGNER. I agree with Mr. Cha. I think China has shown 

itself to be part of the problem, rather than part of the solution. 

Despite the figure you mentioned, I think China has less influence 

over North Korea than many presume and has also shown itself to 

be less willing to use what influence it does. I had been somewhat 

encouraged when China did take some actions in the U.N. Security 

Council in response to the nuclear missile test. 

And I thought last year with the Cheonan and Yeonpyeong-do attacks that were so blatantly against the norms of international behavior, that China, of course, must not be able to ignore the evidence, let alone the need for action. And, yet, they did. 

So it was very discouraging that China was refusing to accept 

the clear, compelling evidence and was unwilling to agree to additional U.N. Security Council resolutions or even to fully implement 

the agreements that are in place. 

Mr. CHABOT. Let me just ask my second question here because 

I am running out of time. Christopher Hill, former Chief, North 

Korea negotiator in the Bush administrator, wrote on February 

22nd, and I quote,

‘‘More recently the North Korean regime proudly unveiled a 

modern high-tech uranium enrichment facility. The North Koreans lied in writing, not only to the United States, which they 

have done repeatedly in the past, but also to China, Russia, 

Japan, and South Korea.’’

If even Chris Hill now thinks that the North Koreans lied, how 

can anyone else really trust them in further negotiations? And 

maybe I will go to Mr. Newcomb and Mr. Carlin at this point. 

59

Mr. NEWCOMB. I think trust is a hard commodity to come by in 

negotiations with North Korea. And I think China is just refusing 

to recognize what Mr. Carlin and others saw there so it doesn’t 

have to deal with that particular matter. 

Mr. CHABOT. Mr. Carlin? 

Mr. CARLIN. We don’t negotiate with the North Koreans on the 

basis of trust. We don’t reach agreements with them on the basis 

of trust. If we can’t verify an agreement with them, we shouldn’t 

reach it. If we can verify, then we should, you know, place a lot 

of emphasis on that and make sure that they do follow through. 

We do have examples where they follow through with agreements. And we should try to reproduce that environment to make 

sure that we can get there again I think. 

Mr. CHABOT. Madam Chair, I yield back. Thank you. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Chabot. 

And now the ranking member on the Subcommittee on East Asia 

and the Pacific, Mr. Faleomavaega, is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. 

As I have said earlier in my statement, I am still learning how 

to speak the English language. And in the process, I have come up 

with some words that maybe our experts here can help me with: 

Deterrence, detente, multilateralism, unilateralism, preemption. 

Now it is hedge politics. 

And I must say I was very impressed with all of you gentlemen’s 

statements and what we have here. What I have pointed out is 

that not one of you ever mentioned about whether or not South 

Korea is an important element of what we are talking about when 

we talk about North Korea, nothing. And I think it is critical because if there is a war, it is the Korean people that are going to 

end up dead, not as much as Japan or Russia or the United States 

or even China. It is the Korean people that are going to end up in 

the pot potentially if we are going to have a nuclear war. 

And I was just wondering, am I missing something here, the fact 

that we don’t even talk about South Korea as an integral part of 

the whole issue that we are discussing here. Mr. Cha? 

Mr. CHA. Well, you point up correctly an omission in all of our 

statements. I think South Korea is a very important part of any 

policy puzzle with North Korea. The current administration——

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. See, this is the problem. We only say it in 

passing. 

Mr. CHA. Yes, yes. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. So oh, yes. By the way, there is a South 

Korea. 

Mr. CHA. Yes. No. Point well-taken. The Obama administration 

actually in many ways has put the initiative for any future policies 

with North Korea in the hands of Seoul currently in the sense that 

the administration wants to see rectification of inter-Korean relations before they are willing to move forward on other tracks. 

The current government, as you know, is more conservative. It 

has more of a conditional reciprocity engagement policy. And the 

North Koreans don’t like that. They got very used to 10 years of 

sunshine policy under Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo-hyun, which 

was unconditional in many ways. 

60

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Well, the preconditions that I want to say 

that I agree with Mr. Carlin’s statements that for the past 10 

years, they really have not had any real effective engagement process in dealing with North Korea. And what I mean by this is that—

and, again, I have a different take from my colleagues about this 

whole thing—in this history, when Kim Dae Jung after 60 years 

of this political separation that was not of their doing was able to 

go up to Pyongyang and shook the hands with Kim Jong Il, to me 

that was a very important thing because why did this occur? 

The Koreans themselves are trying to solve the issues or the 

problems between North Korea and South Korea. What did we do? 

We criticized. We condemned Kim Dae Jung’s initiative by saying, 

if anything else, can we at least let the Koreans encourage them 

in some way or somehow that they can solve these problems if we 

give them the tools that are the necessary support process because 

all we are talking about here, of course, we all know that our first 

priority is our national security interest in this region of the world, 

but the poor Koreans are caught in the middle of this geopolitical 

situation between China and the United States. And I am a little 

puzzled by this because I don’t get a sense that we are really serious about including South Korea in this whole dialogue. 

Mr. Carlin? 

Mr. CARLIN. I guess I would make two quick points. First, from 

where I sat anyway in the State Department, we were perfectly 

happy with Kim Dae Jung’s trip to Pyongyang and supported it because it reinforced our own policies. 

Second point is we have got a range of problems in dealing with 

the interests of the South Koreans. Of course, they should take priority to a certain extent. It is their country. It is their people. It 

is their risk. 

On the other hand, as you know, we have got much broader concerns in the region. And those have to be balanced. When we are 

working truly with the South Koreans, I think everybody’s interests get looked at. When the South Koreans are pulling in a slightly different direction, then it gets more difficult to make the policies work. 

Mr. NEWCOMB. I think I, too, agreed with the trip of Kim Dae 

Jung up to Pyongyang. I am not certain, though, that the North 

Koreans saw it in the same light. If you recall, North Korea required an advance $500 million payment before they agreed to——

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. I’m sorry. I know my time is up, but let me 

just say this. The sunshine policy I adore and really with the utmost respect what Kim Dae Jung was able to accomplish for one 

simple reason, that the Koreans themselves are trying to solve a 

serious problem just to say hello. Give them the credits. 

Oh, shoot. I am sorry, Madam Chair. Time is up. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. 

Faleomavaega. 

Mr. Smith, Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, and Human 

Rights chairman, is recognized. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Dr. Cha and Mr. Klingner, you both made strong reference to the 

need for food aid. And I would echo that call to the administration. 

61

The World Food Program has said that there is a severe problem 

with lactating women, pregnant women, and small children. Thirty-three percent of the kids are stunted. Twenty-five percent of the 

pregnant women are malnourished. And TB, especially drug-resistant TB, which has a problem associated with malnutrition, is bad 

and getting worse. 

So I would hope, as you both said, as long as there is very good 

monitoring to ensure that those highly at risk get the food, this 

ought to be done yesterday. And I would add my voice to yours asking that there be movement on that by the administration. You 

might want to speak to that. 

Secondly, Mr. Klingner, you made a very good call as well on the 

human rights issue. There is no reason why we should in any way 

silence, both through the international work that we do at the U.N. 

as well as on our own, our voice on the egregious human rights 

abuses, whether it be religious freedom, a woman was executed 

simply for distributing Bibles last year or the ongoing incarcerations in the hideous gulags of North Korea for Christians especially needs to be confronted. When it comes to refugees, many 

women who make it out of North Korea are trafficked. 

I held three hearings several years ago on the human rights 

plight of those women. And we had women who were actually the 

lucky ones who got to South Korea through a very long, circuitous 

route. That, plus the fact that China, completely contrary to the 

refugee convention, sends people right back. And they go right to 

the gulag, where they are tortured and even executed. So you 

might want to speak to that. 

Finally, in my opening comment, I mentioned Defense Minister 

Kim and others who have been raising the alarm about the electromagnetic bomb that they seem to be working on. Any thoughts that 

you might have about that? 

As a matter of fact, it was pointed out in the Korea Herald yesterday that the jamming equipment, talking about electronic warfare, could pose serious problems to the South in case another 

armed conflict with their neighbor, with their northern neighbor. 

The North can use it not only to jam GPS signals, but also to disseminate misleading, fake signals so as to confuse its enemy’s 

forces; in other words, South Korea and us. 

The equipment would also preclude the South from using GPSguided weapons to bomb its long-range artillery pieces that put the 

Seoul metropolitan area within striking range. 

The North is also thought to be seeking to develop electromagnetic post bombs and effectively paralyze computers. And you 

know that issue. So if you could speak to that as well? 

Thank you. 

Mr. CHA. Well, let me just address quickly your comments on 

food and human rights. And I will let others address EMP. On 

food, you know, the North Koreans have asked for basically the remaining 330,000 tons left from the 2008 agreement. 

And, as I said, my own view is that if they will agree to the same 

terms they did in 2008, the letter of protocol, that was a good 

agreement. It was the only time that we had access to every province except two, nutritional surveys as well as Korean speakers, as 

part of the A team. And that is much better than simply dumping 

62

the food at the port and then letting them divert 30 percent of it 

to the military. So I think if they can get those terms, it certainly 

is a good thing. 

And, as you know, sir, all of these bags go into the country with 

the American flag on it. And in Korean, it says, ‘‘Gift of the American people.’’ So that is not a bad thing for us in North Korea. 

On human rights, I guess the one thing I would say is that, you 

know, the United States now has a refugee resettlement program 

for North Koreans. They have a special envoy for human rights. I 

would like to see this administration be a little bit more active on 

the human rights agenda. 

As you know, the previous administration did things like statement on this question of Chinese sending North Korean refugees 

back as well as having North Korean defectors in the Oval Office. 

And that really brought a high-profile nature to the issue around 

the world for others to see. 

Mr. KLINGNER. I would comment on food aid. Clearly there is a 

need. And, as a father, one can’t help but be compelled by the reports and the pictures, particularly of children and babies that are 

starving and emaciated. So if we were to provide aid, at a minimum, we must have an effective verification and monitoring regime to ensure that it actually gets to the people who require it. 

Humanitarian aid is supposed to be divorced from politics, but 

we can’t help overlook some other factors. North Korea’s actions. It 

is hard to advocate having the UNDP and the World Food Program, which is part of the U.N., providing aid and assistance when 

North Korea is in violation of U.N. resolutions. 

And, even setting aside that, there are donor dynamics. In the 

20 years we have been providing aid, there have been more recent 

horrendous natural disasters suffered by other countries. So one 

wonders with a limited pool of donor assistance whether it should 

instead be going to countries that are willing to make economic reforms and have suffered calamities more recently. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Sherman, the ranking member on 

the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade, is 

recognized. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Yes. I am torn between the vision of hungry North 

Koreans overthrowing their government and the fact that I don’t 

want to see people hungry. 

I want to focus my attention on this South Korea free trade 

agreement because that is something Congress will actually focus 

on. Right now we have got 40,000 workers there. Would the North 

Koreans have any difficulty providing 400,000 workers to Kaesong 

and similar export-oriented labor facilities? Is there any shortage 

of labor in North Korea? Mr. Carlin or Mr. Newcomb? 

Mr. NEWCOMB. In North Korea right now there is a shortage of 

jobs. But I don’t know that they could supply the number that you 

indicated to replications of Kaesong scattered about the country. 

Personally I have never been a big fan of Kaesong because Kaesong 

requires South Korea to pay North Korea in U.S. dollars. I keep 

asking them, ‘‘Why don’t they use South Korean won?’’ They don’t 

have a good answer for that. And I also think it’s sort of a——

Mr. SHERMAN. No, it is not. Those U.S. dollars, I am told that 

the amount the worker actually gets—and worker, I mean, arguVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:18 Apr 20, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00066 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\FULL\031011\65056 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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ably, the word is ‘‘slave’’ because when you are forced to do work 

and your owner rebuts, you know, the national government is the 

one that receives the payment. It is by no means clear that that 

is a work relationship. 

Any idea how much they receive? 

Mr. NEWCOMB. It is possible that the figure is correct. I haven’t 

looked at this in a couple of years. On the other hand, they line 

up for these jobs. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Look, the fact that it is better than other things 

available to North Koreans does not mean that even the word 

‘‘slavery’’ is too strong. So certainly it provides foreign currency, 

U.S. dollars to the North Korean Government. 

Now, the agreement provides, the free trade agreement provides 

that we have to accept and do our country anything that is—in various categories, including auto parts, anything that is 35 percent 

made in South Korea, which means 65 percent of the work could 

be done in North Korea. 

Do any of you have any focus on the trade agreement that would 

contradict that? 

Mr. KLINGNER. Well, I would say, sir, the agreement I think has 

provisions that preclude the use of Kaesong goods as part of——

Mr. SHERMAN. You haven’t read the annex 22, which first says 

that there is nothing in the agreement that says that goods that 

are 65 percent North Korean, whether it be Kaesong or otherwise, 

and 35 percent South Korean are not given access to the U.S. market. 

Now, it is true that we have laws that might prohibit such import, which we would be violating the agreement and subject to 

sanctions by the South Koreans just as soon as we signed it unless 

the executive branch removed those restrictions. 

But if you also look at annex 22, you will see that the agreement 

envisions future discussions, in which Kaesong would be considered 

for purposes of the agreement part of South Korea so you could 

have 100 percent Kaesong-produced goods, rather than just 65 percent Kaesong-produced goods coming into the United States dutyfree. 

And the agreement is cleverly drawn so you can’t tell whether 

any such future decision to count Kaesong as part of ‘‘South Korea’’ 

would require future congressional approval or not. And that is 

why in hearings from our subcommittee we asked that question in 

2007, still haven’t gotten an answer. I asked that question by letter 

on February 9th of this year to the current USTR, still haven’t gotten an answer. 

And this is why the current Ambassador to the United States 

from South Korea is on record as saying at Kaesong when he was 

Prime Minister that this agreement will pave the way for Kaesongproduced products to come into the United States duty-free. 

I just don’t know which is worse: The national security aspect of 

huge dollars flowing to the Government of North Korea or the economic impact of telling American workers that they have to compete against products made at the labor rates that we find in 

Kaesong. 

My time has expired. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Sherman. 

64

Ms. Ellmers of North Carolina. 

Ms. ELLMERS. Thank you, Madam Chairman. And thank you to 

our distinguished panelists today. 

My question is also on South Korean free trade agreements. I am 

generally a free trade person, but there is great pause that I have 

on the national security issue. And I believe, of course, as many of 

us do, that national security trumps any possibility of trade with 

South Korea, especially in conjunction with the flooding of the 

South Korean market, with Chinese and North Korean goods. And 

that is particularly of concern to my North Carolinian textile industry. 

I would like to know, Mr. Newcomb and Mr. Carlin, how do you 

feel about the South Korean free trade agreement in relation to the 

national security issue. I will start with you, Mr. Newcomb. 

Mr. NEWCOMB. I am an economist. I love free trade agreements. 

I also think Kaesong poses a danger, that goods could be let in that 

are not produced up to acceptable labor standards. 

Ms. ELLMERS. What can we do? What can the United States do 

to prevent that? What could we put in place in relation to the 

South Korean free trade agreement that might actually help us in 

this situation? 

Mr. NEWCOMB. Well, I mean, that is a question you have to ask 

of USTR because they are the ones that deal with this. They are 

the ones that have to strike the agreement. 

Ms. ELLMERS. So, in your opinion, is it something that we should 

grapple with now or is it something that we should take pause and 

maybe hold off for a while until we get some of the answers that 

we need? 

Mr. NEWCOMB. Well, Kaesong does have advantages as well. 

South Korea invested in Kaesong partly because they thought they 

could gain some economic leverage over the North. I think, actually, it gives the North economic leverage over South Korea to a degree. 

But there is also a demonstration effect. You have well-educated, 

well-dressed, highly trained South Koreans operating these factories. You have South Korean technology. You have South Korean 

goods there. They are exposing a large number of North Korean 

workers to what is otherwise denied information. 

So it is a two-way street here. And I don’t want to dismiss the 

long-term corrosion of North Korea that association with people at 

Kaesong might bring. 

Ms. ELLMERS. Okay. Mr. Carlin? 

Mr. CARLIN. Under present circumstances, with the government 

that is in power in South Korea now, we don’t really have a big 

problem about Kaesong because they are going slow. But I can 

imagine circumstances in which another election brings a government with different priorities, which, in fact, may reinvigorate 

Kaesong and maybe expand it. 

And then where are we going to be? We are going to be crosswise with our South Korean allies on what they will consider to be 

a very important part of their policy toward North Korea. At that 

point we are going to have to weigh these things about U.S. economic interests, interests of our workers, and broader security 

problems. 

65

I am not an economist. I don’t focus on these things. I just think 

I can see clouds on the horizon on this one. 

Ms. ELLMERS. So you would say at this point that we really need 

to proceed very cautiously? 

Mr. CARLIN. Yes, I think that is right. 

Ms. ELLMERS. I do have about 11⁄2 minutes. And I was just going 

to say to Mr. Cha and Mr. Klingner, if you would like to make a 

comment, that would be wonderful. 

Mr. KLINGNER. Begging the committee’s indulgence for an advertisement, on April 1st in this building, The Heritage Foundation 

and Brookings Institution are having a joint conference that points 

out the geostrategic and economic benefits of all three free trades. 

So the two organizations are in agreement. 

On Kaesong, the U.S. negotiator in 2007, when the agreement 

was first signed, made very clear that the Kaesong goods before 

they were allowed into the United States would have to be discussed through a bilateral committee and that clearly the U.S. 

would not be in favor of that. And now we have a new conservative 

government in South Korea that I think also would be less willing 

to push for Kaesong goods, particularly after North Korea’s actions 

in the last several years. 

Ms. ELLMERS. Okay. Mr. Cha? 

Mr. CHA. Yes. I mean, the only thing that I would—I mean, in 

2007, that is the way I recall it in 2007 in the administration that 

there were checks against sort of just the free flow of Kaesong 

goods into the United States. 

The other thing that I would add is that the goods we are talking 

about that come out of Kaesong—and they could change, admittedly, in the future—we are largely talking about things like chopstick sets, cheap watches, things of this nature, so not things that 

necessarily pose a national security risk. 

Ms. ELLMERS. Thank you very much. I appreciate all of your 

input. And I yield back the rest of my time. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Madam Chair? 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. 

Mr. Connolly of Virginia is recognized. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Madam Chair? 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Yes? 

Mr. SHERMAN. If I could just have unanimous consent to insert 

here in the record my letter of February 9th to the President of 

USTR——

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Without objection. 

Mr. SHERMAN [continuing]. That deals with the very issues these 

gentlemen were discussing. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. 

Gerry? 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Madam Chairman. And welcome to 

the panel. 

Perhaps starting with you, Professor Cha, in situations like this, 

often historically the military has played multiple roles, one of 

which is maintaining cohesion and order and long-term stability for 

a regime. Given the transitional period we are apparently looking 

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tary in this transition? And how should we assign responsibility 

when we look at very provocative actions, obviously the shelling of 

the island, the sinking of the ship of South Korea to the military 

versus civilian leadership if one can even paraphrase it that way? 

Mr. CHA. Thank you for the question. 

I don’t think acts of that magnitude, the sinking of the Cheonan 

or the shelling of Yeonpyong—they are not random acts by, you 

know, a so-called mad colonel. These are remediated actions taken 

by the military as a group and I would imagine in conjunction with 

the party and political leadership going up to the top. 

So I don’t see these things as a rogue military but as in many 

ways a unitary actor, the state acting together. 

What role would the military play in any possible transition? 

They will clearly play an important role. Since 1995, Kim Jong Il 

has really raised the role of the military in North Korean decisionmaking. And as he tries to promote his third son, he is really now 

trying to balance that with an increasing role of the party in the 

management of the country. 

So I think we will see. We will have to watch very carefully the 

extent to which this creates competition between two units within 

the government or whether they are able to manage this in a way 

that allows for a smooth transition. 

Probably the most important variable in that sense will be the 

longevity of the current leader: Kim Jong Il. If he were to die suddenly tomorrow, next week, I would be much less certain that they 

could carry this off. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Is there evidence that there is unease or difficulty of acceptance of the passing on of the baton in terms of leadership in North Korea? 

Mr. CHA. We read about some of it in the newspaper, that there 

appears to be some unease. It is not just the passing to the son, 

but it is also the promotion of a group or younger generation of 

military leaders, generals that many may not see as being qualified. 

The young son himself, Kim Jong Il’s sister were both promoted 

to the rank of four-star general last September. And they never 

served a day in the military. So I think that that also can create 

some tensions. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Anyone on the panel, but we were talking earlier 

about food shortages. Is it necessarily true that severe food shortages, in fact, can be destabilizing to a regime? And is there evidence it is destabilizing in North Korea? 

Mr. CHA. The assessment that the U.S. NGO group brought back 

this month said that there is clearly a need. There is clearly a confirmed need. But these are not conditions like the mid 1990s, that 

if we were not to provide food, it will not lead to a famine-like situation. 

This has led to periodic reported riots at food distribution centers, but the question as to whether it could create a larger revolution I think remains unanswered. It is very clear that the North 

Koreans are very sensitive to what was happening in Egypt and in 

Libya and in Tunisia and worked at their best to try to clamp down 

on any news with regard to them getting into their country. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Madam Chairman, I see I have 50 seconds left. 

67

There was a group of American experts that observed last November the construction of a light water reactor and new uranium 

enrichment facility at Yongbyon. Any evidence that the North Koreans have proceeded or included that construction and what it 

means in 30 seconds? Mr. Carlin? 

Mr. CARLIN. They are a long way off from finishing the light 

water reactor. That is going to take them several more years. The 

centrifuge facility had, as far as we could tell, 2,000 centrifuges. 

We could not tell whether they were operating standing there. And 

so I can’t tell you at this moment whether they are actually producing enriched uranium or not. And until we get somebody in 

there, I don’t think we are going to be able to answer that question. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much. 

And we are so pleased to recognize Ambassador Han of our ally, 

the Republic of Korea, who is in our audience today. We welcome 

you, sir. 

And I am pleased to yield 5 minutes to the chairman of the Subcommittee on Europe and Eurasia, Mr. Burton. 

Mr. BURTON. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. I am 

sorry for my tardiness, but I had another committee hearing going 

on. 

I just wanted to ask you, particularly The Heritage Foundation 

but all of you, in your opinion, what would the security implications be in Northeast Asia of a failure by the U.S. Congress to expeditiously approve the free trade agreement with South Korea? 

Mr. KLINGNER. As strong advocates of free trade as well as a 

very strong relationship between the U.S. and our critical and indispensable ally South Korea, The Heritage Foundation sees the 

many benefits, economic and geostrategic, for approval of the 

KORUS FTA. 

I was particularly struck when I was in South Korea shortly 

after the Senkaku incident between China and Japan. I met with 

senior officials, including Presidential advisers, who said that they 

were very concerned about China’s behavior, as exhibited there, because South Korea felt even more susceptible to Chinese pressure 

than Japan, particularly the export of rare earth materials. And 

they said, because South Korea has become more reliant on the 

Chinese economy, they are nervous of that pressure and that they 

advocated a free trade agreement with the United States because 

it would help the U.S. regain market share or at least the ability 

to compete better against EU and Chinese competitors. So they 

saw it as a way of reducing Chinese ability to influence an ally of 

the United States. 

Mr. BURTON. So you think the free trade agreement is extremely 

important not only because of economic issues but as well because 

of other issues in that area? 

Mr. KLINGNER. Very much so, sir. 

Mr. BURTON. Anybody else have a comment on that? 

Mr. CHA. Congressman, I would agree entirely with what Mr. 

Klingner said. I mean, historically the U.S. position in Asia, its 

leadership position, has rested on two legs. That is the security 

umbrella it provides and its support of free trade. 

68

And, quite frankly, until very recently, there were lots of concerns in the region about where the United States was on trade. 

And many saw it as the first indicator of a receding U.S. presence 

in Asia. 

So the free trade agreement, the biggest bilateral free trade 

agreement the United States has ever negotiated, has very broad 

strategic implications for the United States and how others in the 

region see the U.S. as a leader. 

Mr. BURTON. Well, if you don’t have any other comments about 

that, I appreciate your response. My colleague Mr. Smith of New 

Jersey had a question he would like to ask. So I am going to yield 

my time to him. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Chairman Burton. 

It was the other question about the electromagnetic bomb if any 

of you would like to talk about that as well as electronic warfare. 

What threat is that to South Korea and to our troops that are deployed there? So I yield to the witnesses. 

Mr. KLINGNER. The information on an EMP weapon is very 

sketchy. It has just come out this week. And, in fact, the day before 

reports of a North Korea EMP weapon, there were reports about 

a South Korea EMP weapon. So I wonder if perhaps there is some 

media confusion. 

And also the jamming of the GPS signals during the joint U.S.-

South Korean exercise doesn’t necessarily have to have been done 

by an EMP weapon. It could simply be by massive radio jamming. 

So I think we are very unclear, sir, at this point the extent of 

North Korean EMP capabilities, but we also know they do have 

cyber terrorism capabilities and units and that they very well may 

have been behind the cyber attacks, both this year and a year or 

2 ago, in South Korea. 

Mr. SMITH. Anybody else want to comment? 

Mr. CARLIN. Mr. Smith, may I return real briefly to human 

rights and what you said. I can recall 30 years ago when there 

were members of this committee who were speaking out on human 

rights in Korea and nipping at the heels of the administration. And 

it was South Korea that they were talking about. And they were 

right to talk about it then. It was important to focus on. And we 

ended up with a better situation. 

I think it is equally important that this committee also continue 

to speak out on the question of human rights in North Korea but 

also continue to put it in perspective so that it enhances the policy 

and doesn’t, in fact, turn out to be an anchor on it. 

Mr. SMITH. If I could—thank you for yielding, Chairman Burton—I would ask unanimous consent that an ABC News piece, 

‘‘North Korea Nears Completion of Electromagnetic Pulse Bomb’’ as 

well as a Korea Herald article, ‘‘South Korea behind North in Electronic Warfare’’——

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Without objection. 

Mr. SMITH [continuing]. Be made a part of the record? 

And if any of our distinguished witnesses, because obviously a lot 

of this is breaking this week, have any additional thoughts that 

they could provide to the record, it would be most helpful. 

And I thank my friend for yielding. 

69

Mr. BURTON. Madam Chairperson, I think this is a question that 

we ought to send to the State Department, the Defense Department to see if our intelligence——

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. We shall do so. 

Mr. BURTON [continuing]. Has any answers on these. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Absolutely, very important. Thank 

you, Mr. Burton. Thank you, Mr. Smith. 

Mr. Marino of Pennsylvania? 

Mr. MARINO. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Gentlemen, if you would each respond to this if you have a response, starting with Mr. Cha? Given the wave of revolution in the 

Middle East today, what is the reality? What is the reality of an 

uprising in North Korea? And would South Korea facilitate that? 

Mr. CHA. Well, I would say that the chances of an uprising as 

we have seen of the magnitude in Tunisia, Libya, or Egypt is not 

very likely in the North Korea. The conditions are very different. 

I think in the case of North Korea, you have a population that 

literally is starving. And moms, dads, uncles, grandfathers are 

really just looking to see how to make it through the next day or 

the next week. And that is not the condition for revolution. 

Revolutions occur when people have access to outside information 

and their own situation starts getting better and they feel it is not 

getting better fast enough. That is what Montesquieu once referred 

to as the spiral of expectations. Those conditions don’t exist in 

North Korea. 

Having said that, the North Koreans are incredibly, incredibly 

concerned about what they’re seeing and, therefore, doing everything possible to block information. In many ways, this regime, 

though it blames the outside world for its nuclear weapons, is 

afraid of its own shadow. 

And in that sense, the people still offer a potential for the future, 

but I don’t think at this point——

Mr. MARINO. Quickly, gentlemen, because I have a follow-up. 

Mr. KLINGNER. I would agree with Dr. Cha. At this point we 

don’t see the likelihood of a mass uprising or revolution in North 

Korea to that extent, but that is I think another reason why North 

Korea is unlikely to open its country to outside influence, such as 

engagement. 

Mr. MARINO. No. Please go ahead. Go ahead. I will come back 

with that question. 

Mr. NEWCOMB. North Korea has a lot of workers in the Middle 

East. They have nurses and construction workers in Libya. They 

have workers in the UAE. When they go back to North Korea, they 

will probably go to reeducation camps, but what they saw, what 

they learned, what they heard will be communicated over time. So 

while it may not prompt anything immediately, I think there is 

going to be a slow corrosion of society because of it. 

Mr. MARINO. Mr. Carlin? 

Mr. CARLIN. We usually find the precursors to revolutions and 

uprisings after they take place. So I am pretty cautious about predictions. 

Mr. MARINO. And briefly what could the relationship be potentially between the United States and North Korea when its present 

70

dictator dies or steps aside, regardless if it is his son or another 

military leader? Mr. Cha? 

Mr. CHA. I mean, I think the United States over the past 25 

years has been pretty clear about what sort of relationship it would 

have. I mean, it would be willing to have one with fully normalized 

relations and exchange of ambassadors if the North nuclear question was addressed. 

I don’t think the new leadership, the coming leadership is any 

different from the current one in terms of their nuclear ambitions, 

unfortunately. So I am not very confident. 

Mr. MARINO. And I apologize for mispronouncing your name just 

now. I am very sorry. 

Mr. KLINGNER. I would agree. Some have hoped that because the 

third son was educated in Switzerland that perhaps he has more 

Western ideals of reform and governance, but I don’t think there 

is any evidence for that. He is a product of the system. 

His legitimacy is not only from his bloodline but also continuing 

the policies of his father and his grandfather. So I don’t see the 

likelihood of change in the North Korean policy after the transition. 

Mr. MARINO. Thank you. 

Mr. Newcomb, do you concur? 

Mr. NEWCOMB. Yes, I concur. 

Mr. MARINO. Mr. Carlin? 

Mr. CARLIN. There was a time when the North Koreans were 

looking to us to protect them from the Chinese and the Chinese influence. And they thought that they might be a piece on the chess, 

on the U.S. chessboard against the Chinese. I don’t know if that 

is still in their thinking and if, in fact, in the strategic sense, the 

North Koreans would actually be helpful to us in sort of enhancing 

our influence in the region. 

Mr. MARINO. Thank you, gentlemen. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

I yield my time. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Excellent questions. Thank you, Mr. 

Marino. 

And our batter-up, clean up, David Rivera of Florida. Thank you. 

Mr. RIVERA. Thank you so much, Madam Chairman. 

The Cuban and North Korean regimes, spearheaded by the 

armed forces of each country, of Cuba and North Korea, have a 

well-documented history of cooperation and exchange. 

Most recently Cuban and North Korean authorities have reportedly signed a protocol in December 2010 to develop economic and 

scientific, technical partnerships, projects in 2011. Given these regimes’ open hostility toward the United States and Cuba’s demonstrated pursuit of biotechnology capacities, what implications do 

you believe this type of cooperation may hold for U.S. national security? 

Now, I will begin with perhaps Mr. Carlin. 

Mr. CARLIN. Since I really don’t know the details of that, all I 

know is that the Chief of Staff visited in December, it is very difficult to try to predict what the influence will be, if it is just economic and scientific, even though it was signed by the military. I 

don’t know how, what sorts of things they are going into. 

You know, it is worth looking at, I agree with you. It is very important. But I just don’t have at the tip of my fingers the details. 

71

Mr. RIVERA. Any other comments? Yes? 

Mr. NEWCOMB. Yes. I truly don’t have any details on the agreement. I would like to note that they have been dealing with each 

other for 35–40 years. And from time to time, the Cubans have 

been very critical of the North Korean system and some of the 

measures it has taken. 

So the relationship can be a bit prickly. So how it plays out may 

well depend upon whether or not they can find a coincidence of economic interests. In the past, it has been a little tough. North Korea 

doesn’t pay for anything. 

Mr. RIVERA. Do you have anything to add? 

Mr. KLINGNER. I have not seen a lot of information about direct 

North Korean, Cuban military assistance, certainly not to the degree of, say, North Korea and Iran, where we know Iranian officials 

are present during missile tests and nuclear tests. And I think 

there is a much closer relationship between North Korea, Iran, 

Burma, Syria than we see sort of direct military ties with Cuba. 

Mr. CHA. I would agree that the countries that they have relationships with that pose the most security risk to us are countries 

like Iran, as Bruce said, and Burma at this point. 

The relationship with Cuba historically has gone back quite a bit 

of time. Kim Il-sung and Castro were quite close. 

But the relationship is prickly today. But I would add North Korea’s relationship with every country in the world today is prickly, 

even China. I mean, even though the Chinese are very close to the 

North Koreans and protect them like a big brother, the two hate 

each other. I mean, they just despise each other. The mistrust and 

distrust is really quite palpable. 

Mr. RIVERA. Well, since several of you have mentioned Iran and 

considering its increasing engagement in places in Latin America, 

like Venezuela and Cuba, perhaps that is also something that we 

should monitor in terms of some sort of a North Korea, Iran, Cuba 

or North Korea, Iran, Cuba, Venezuela axis developing. 

Also, is there any information from any of you that the Cuban 

dictatorship perhaps shares the results of their espionage efforts 

against the United States with North Korea? Maybe, Mr. Carlin, 

in your experience have you seen any espionage activity that may 

be shared between Cuba and North Korea, particularly anti-U.S. 

espionage activity? 

Mr. CARLIN. That is a good question. And I am afraid I don’t 

really recall anything, but that doesn’t mean the answer is no. 

Mr. RIVERA. Anyone else? 

[No response.] 

Mr. RIVERA. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much. And I think this 

is probably due to the repressive police states it is so hard to get 

information from either one of those two countries. 

Thank you for such excellent testimony. And thank you to the 

members for wonderful questions as well. And we will consider editing that to include ‘‘baloney and bluster.’’

So the committee is now adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:58 a.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

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