NAVY FORCE 

STRUCTURE

Actions Needed to 

Ensure Proper Size 

and Composition of 

Ship Crews

Report to Congressional Committees

May 2017

GAO-17-413

United States Government Accountability Office
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-17-413, a report to 

congressional committees

May 2017

NAVY FORCE STRUCTURE

Actions Needed to Ensure Proper Size and 

Composition of Ship Crews

What GAO Found

Total ship operating and support costs—which include personnel and 

maintenance costs—and maintenance backlogs increased during the optimal 

manning period (2003–2012) and have continued to increase for most ship 

classes since the initiative ended. Since the implementation of optimal manning, 

the Navy reduced crew sizes, which decreased the associated personnel costs

for most ship classes, even as crews were partially restored. However, increased 

maintenance costs offset the reductions in personnel costs, as shown below. 

Navy officials attributed maintenance cost increases to reduced crews, longer

deployments, and other factors. GAO’s analysis did not isolate the relative 

effects of reduced crews from these other factors. Maintenance backlogs also 

increased during the optimal manning period and have continued to grow.

Changes in Average Annual Personnel and Maintenance Costs from Start of Optimal Manning 

Period through Fiscal Year 2015

The Navy’s process to determine manpower requirements—the number and skill 

mix of sailors needed for its ships—does not fully account for all ship workload. 

The Navy continues to use an outdated standard workweek that may overstate 

the amount of sailor time available for productive work. Although the Navy has 

updated some of its manpower factors, its instruction does not require 

reassessing factors to ensure they remain valid or require measuring workload

while ships are in port. Current and analytically based manpower requirements 

are essential to ensuring that crews can maintain readiness and prevent 

overwork that can affect safety, morale, and retention. Until the Navy makes 

needed changes to its factors and instruction used in determining manpower 

requirements, its ships may not have the right number and skill mix of sailors to 

maintain readiness and prevent overworking its sailors. 

Moving forward, the Navy will likely face manning challenges as it seeks to 

increase the size of its fleet. The fleet is projected to grow from its current 274

ships to as many as 355 ships, but the Navy has not determined how many 

personnel will need to be added to man those ships. In addition, as the Navy has 

gained experience operating its new ship classes, their crew sizes have grown 

and may continue to do so. Without updating its manpower factors and 

requirements and identifying the personnel cost implications of fleet size 

increases, the Navy cannot articulate its resource needs to decision makers. 

View GAO-17-413. For more information, 

contact John Pendleton at (202) 512-3489 or 

pendletonj@gao.gov.

Why GAO Did This Study

In 2001, the Navy began reducing crew 

sizes on surface ships through an 

initiative called optimal manning, which 

was intended to achieve workload 

efficiencies and reduce personnel 

costs. In 2010, the Navy concluded 

that this initiative had adversely 

affected ship readiness and began 

restoring crew sizes on its ships.

The conference report accompanying 

the National Defense Authorization Act 

for Fiscal Year 2016 included a 

provision that GAO review the Navy’s 

reduced manning initiatives in the 

surface fleet. This report examines (1) 

any trends in ship operating and 

support costs and maintenance 

backlogs, (2) the extent to which the 

Navy’s manpower requirements 

process accounts for ship workload, 

and (3) any manning challenges and 

implications for the future.

GAO analyzed and reviewed data from 

fiscal years 2000 through 2015 (the 

most current available) on crew sizes, 

operating and support costs, material 

readiness, and the Navy’s manpower 

requirements determination process. 

GAO also interviewed Department of 

Defense (DOD) officials and ship 

crews to discuss workload, manning 

levels, enablers of smaller crew size, 

and implications for the future. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO is making four recommendations

that the Navy (1) reassess the 

standard workweek, (2) require 

examination of in-port workload, (3) 

require reassessment of the factors

used to develop manpower 

requirements, and (4) identify the 

personnel costs needed to man a 

larger fleet. DOD concurred with each 

recommendation.
Page i GAO-17-413 Navy Force Structure

Letter 1

Background 3

Ship Operating and Support Costs and Maintenance Backlogs 

Have Continued to Increase for Most Legacy Ship Classes 

since Optimal Manning Ended 8

The Navy’s Manpower Requirements Process Does Not Account 

for All Ship Workload 16

The Navy May Be Challenged to Man Its Growing Fleet 25

Conclusions 32

Recommendations for Executive Action 33

Agency Comments 33

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 36

Appendix II Shore Support Manpower Requirements Process 42

Appendix III Ford-Class Aircraft Carrier 45

Appendix IV Zumwalt-Class Destroyer 46

Appendix V Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) 47

Appendix VI San Antonio–Class Amphibious Transport Dock 48

Appendix VII Shore Support Personnel 49

Appendix VIII Average Operating and Support Costs and Crew Sizes by Ship Class 50

Contents
Page ii GAO-17-413 Navy Force Structure

Appendix IX Comments from the Department of Defense 53

Appendix X GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 54

Tables

Table 1: Status of Factors and Allowances Used in the Navy 

Manpower Requirements Model for Ships 18

Table 2: Crew Size Changes for New Ship Classes as of February 

2017 29

Table 3: Status of Manpower Requirements for New Ship Classes 

and Enablers of Crew Size Reductions 31

Table 4: CVN 78 Technologies, with Projected Manpower 

Reductions 45

Table 5: Growth in Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Crew Size 47

Figures

Figure 1: Navy Processes for Determining Manpower 

Requirements and Manning Ships 4

Figure 2: History of Reduced Manning Initiatives 6

Figure 3: Average Crew Size by Ship Class, Fiscal Years 2000–

2015, Including Changes and Percent Changes in Crew 

Size during and after the Optimal Manning Period 9

Figure 4: Changes in Average Annual per Ship Personnel and 

Maintenance Costs from Start of Optimal Manning 

through Fiscal Year 2015 10

Figure 5: Average Organizational-, Intermediate-, and Depot-Level 

Maintenance Costs and Ship Crew Sizes for Cruisers 

(CG 47) and Destroyers (DDG 51), Fiscal Years 2000–

2015 12

Figure 6: Average Organizational-, Intermediate-, and Depot-Level 

Maintenance Costs and Ship Crew Sizes for Amphibious 

Assault Ships (LHD 1), Dock Landing Ships (LSD 41/49), 

and Aircraft Carriers (CVN 68), Fiscal Years 2000–2015 13

Figure 7: Average Maintenance Backlog by Ship Class, Fiscal 

Years 2000–2015 15

Figure 8: Comparison between Navy Standard Workweek and 

Actual Hours Spent per Component 20
Page iii GAO-17-413 Navy Force Structure

Figure 9: Planned Number of Navy Ships and Projected Personnel 

End Strength 26

Figure 10: Navy Process for Determining Shore Manpower 

Requirements 42

Figure 11: Average Operating and Support Costs and Crew Sizes 

by Ship Class for Cruisers (CG 47) and Destroyers (DDG 

51), Fiscal Years 2000–2015 51

Figure 12: Average Operating and Support Costs and Crew Sizes 

by Ship Class for Amphibious Assault Ships (LHD 1), 

Dock Landing Ships (LSD 41/49) and Aircraft Carriers 

(CVN 68), Fiscal Years 2000–2015 52
Page iv GAO-17-413 Navy Force Structure

Abbreviations 

CG cruiser

DOD Department of Defense

CVN aircraft carrier

DDG destroyer

LCS littoral combat ship

LHD amphibious assault ship

LPD amphibious transport dock 

LSD dock landing ship 

OPNAV Office of the Chief of Naval Operations

VAMOSC Visibility and Management of Operating 

and Support Costs system

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Page 1 GAO-17-413 Navy Force Structure

441 G St. N.W.

Washington, DC 20548

May 18, 2017

Congressional Committees

The Navy began an initiative in 2001—referred to as optimal manning—to 

reduce crew sizes aboard various legacy surface and amphibious ships 

by gradually reducing the required number of crew members.1 In 

implementing this initiative, which was intended to achieve workload 

efficiencies and drive down costs, the Navy reduced the number of sailors 

required to operate the ships. In 2002, the Navy also made changes to its 

manpower factors and assumptions, which contributed to reductions in 

crew sizes. However, we found in 2010 that the Navy had implemented 

these manning reductions without sufficient analysis.2 We recommended 

that the Navy validate the factors and assumptions it used to calculate 

manpower requirements. The Navy agreed with our recommendation, but 

as of May 2017, has not fully implemented it.

In a 2010 review of the surface fleet, the Navy found that it had reduced 

shipboard and shore-based manning to a level that was insufficient to 

allow the surface fleet to meet minimal standards of material readiness.3

Between 2010 and 2014, the Navy ended the optimal manning initiative 

and partially restored crew sizes on its legacy ships. Although the Navy 

had found that the optimal manning initiative had a detrimental effect on 

the readiness of legacy ships, it designed its newest surface ship classes 

to have smaller crews than predecessor ships. The Navy established 

lower crew size goals for these ships and attempted to reduce their crew 

sizes by relying to varying degrees on new technologies, automation, and 

shore support to execute workloads normally completed by larger crews.

Conference Report 114-270, accompanying a bill for the National 

Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016, included a provision for 

us to review matters related to the Navy’s reduced manning initiatives.4

 1

Legacy surface and amphibious ships within our scope include aircraft carriers (CVN 68–

class), destroyers (DDG 51–class), cruisers (CG 47–class), amphibious assault ships 

(LHD 1–class), and dock landing ships (LSD 41/49–classes). 

2

GAO, Military Readiness: Navy Needs to Reassess Its Metrics and Assumptions for Ship 

Crewing Requirements and Training, GAO-10-592 (Washington, D.C.: June 9, 2010).

3

U.S. Navy, Fleet Review Panel, Final Report, Fleet Review Panel of Surface Force 

Readiness (Feb. 26, 2010).

4

H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 114-270, at 745-746 (2015).

Letter
Page 2 GAO-17-413 Navy Force Structure

This report discusses (1) any trends in legacy ship operating and support 

costs, including personnel and maintenance costs, and maintenance 

backlogs, since the implementation of reduced manning initiatives; (2) the 

extent to which the Navy’s manpower requirements process fully 

accounts for ship workload; and (3) the challenges, if any, for manning 

the surface fleet and implications for the future.

To describe trends in operating and support costs for legacy surface and 

amphibious ships, and maintenance backlogs, we analyzed annual data 

from fiscal years 2000 (1 year before the Navy began optimal manning) 

through 2015 (the latest full year for which data were available at the time 

of our review) from the Navy’s cost-reporting system.5 To describe trends 

in maintenance and ship material condition, we analyzed data and 

reviewed documentation on maintenance backlogs, casualty reports, and 

inspection results from 2000 through 2015. We assessed the reliability of 

these data and found them to be reliable for the purposes of describing 

trends and making comparisons for ship crew sizes, operating and 

support costs, shore support personnel, and ship material condition. 

Specifically, we reviewed our prior work making use of these data, and 

interviewed Navy officials with knowledge of the data and reviewed 

documentation on the data and related systems.6 Where possible, we 

also corroborated the data with other data sources. To describe the 

Navy’s process for determining manpower requirements (the size and 

composition of ship crews and shore-based support units), we analyzed 

Navy policies and procedures for determining crew sizes on surface and 

amphibious ships as well as various studies and reports on the Navy’s 

manpower requirements process, including on its factors and 

assumptions.7 We also interviewed officials from multiple Navy offices 

and met with officers and enlisted personnel from two destroyers and two 

 5

Ship operating and support costs include the costs of operating, maintaining, and 

supporting a ship, including personnel, operations, maintenance, sustainment, and 

modernization.

6

GAO, Navy Force Structure: Sustainable Plan and Comprehensive Assessment Needed 

to Mitigate Long-Term Risks to Ships Assigned to Overseas Homeports, GAO-15-329 

(Washington, D.C.: May 29, 2015).

7

Department of Defense (DOD) Directive 1100.4, Guidance for Manpower Management

(Feb. 12, 2005); Office of the Chief of Naval Operations Instruction (OPNAVINST) 

1000.16L, Navy Total Force Manpower Policies and Procedures (June 24, 2015) (change 

transmittal 1, Apr. 28, 2016); Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness 

Memorandum, Interim Policy and Procedures for Strategic Manpower Planning and 

Development of Manpower Estimates (Dec. 10, 2003). 
Page 3 GAO-17-413 Navy Force Structure

amphibious transport dock ships, and with crew members from both 

variants of the littoral combat ship, to discuss crew workload, size, and 

composition. To describe the Navy’s challenges for manning the surface 

fleet and implications for the future, we analyzed Navy plans and reports 

and interviewed program officials and ship crews. Our scope and

methodology is described in detail in appendix I.

We conducted this performance audit from March 2016 to May 2017 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives.

The Navy determines the number of sailors and the skills needed to 

operate its ships through a standardized manpower requirements 

process. The Navy then mans the ships by filling the required positions—

to the extent that the number and type of positions are funded and the 

trained and qualified personnel are available to fill them—as summarized 

in figure 1.

Background

Ship Manpower 

Requirements and 

Manning
Page 4 GAO-17-413 Navy Force Structure

Figure 1: Navy Processes for Determining Manpower Requirements and Manning Ships

a

The Navy standard workweek is the total 168 hours in a week divided into components with 

associated time allowances. A sailor has a specific number of hours allocated under each component 

to perform primary duties such as productive work (watchstanding and maintenance), but also for 

sleep, eating meals, and for personal needs. The time allowance for productive work is 70 hours per 

week for military personnel at sea. The number of hours allocated for productive work is used to 

translate the total weekly work hours into manpower requirements.

This manpower requirements process is based primarily on the 

documents that lay out a ship class’s required operational capabilities and 

projected operational environment (i.e., the missions the ship will fulfill 

and how it will operate to carry them out).8 The Navy Manpower Analysis 

Center is the chief agent in determining manpower requirements by 

validating a ship’s primary workload; applying allowances to account for 

working conditions, among other factors; and computing the manpower 

requirements—the number and mix of positions needed to meet the 

 8

Required Operational Capabilities and Projected Operating Environment documents 

detail the capabilities required of ships in various operational situations and the 

environment in which the ship is expected to operate, including the military climate. 
Page 5 GAO-17-413 Navy Force Structure

Navy’s operational expectations. The Navy Manpower Analysis Center 

develops manpower requirements for new ship classes either after a 

ship’s first deployment or about 1 year after the ship has become 

operational, and publishes the validated requirements in Ship Manpower 

Documents.9 Navy Manpower Analysis Center officials reassess a ship’s 

manpower requirements to ensure that they are up to date every 5 years 

or after major capability upgrades, changes to allowances, or other 

changes. After the manpower requirements are determined for a ship, the 

Navy mans the ship by filling the required positions to the extent that the 

number and type of positions are funded, and the trained and qualified 

personnel are available to fill them. After the budgeting and sailor 

distribution process, a ship’s manning level may be lower than the 

manpower level that the manpower requirements process has determined 

was needed. The process by which manpower requirements are 

determined for shore-based personnel is described in appendix II.

The Navy has tried several ways to reduce the size of ship crews in order 

to reduce costs. The optimal manning initiative, introduced as a pilot 

program on a cruiser and destroyer in 2001 and implemented fleet-wide 

on other surface and amphibious ships beginning in 2003, was intended 

to improve efficiency. Initially, optimal manning levels were often derived 

by changing watchstanding requirements.10 As an example, the number 

of watchstanders required to serve as battle station phone operators and 

stretcher bearers was reduced, and, as a result, 10 positions were 

removed from ships with these positions. Other watchstations were 

consolidated or eliminated. Between 2003 and 2007, the Navy transferred 

some administrative workload from ship to shore personnel, which further 

reduced the size of ship crews. This corresponding effort, known as Pay 

and Personnel Ashore, had the effect of moving two-thirds of the 

 9

Until new ship classes have operational experience, which is used to develop formal 

manpower requirements, the Navy relies on preliminary manpower requirements 

estimated by Navy acquisition programs. Preliminary manpower requirements follow 

manpower standards and procedures and are documented in preliminary ship manpower 

documents. 

10The Navy has a number of positions that must be filled in order to maintain the safety 

and security of its ships. These positions are referred to as watchstations, and Navy 

personnel fill these positions on a rotational basis, typically standing watch for 4 to 6 hours 

at a time. The numbers and types of watches vary depending on whether the ship is under 

way or in port. For example, a ship that is in port will require more security watchstanders, 

while a ship that is under way will require navigation watchstanders who are not needed in 

port.

Reduced Manning 

Initiatives
Page 6 GAO-17-413 Navy Force Structure

personnel specialist positions responsible for these administrative 

functions from ship crews to shore support units.11 To further drive down 

ship crew sizes, the Navy changed workload assumptions and the 

equation used to determine manpower requirements in 2002. For

example, it increased the Navy standard workweek from 67 to 70 

productive hours per sailor, which further reduced shipboard manning by 

up to 4 percent. A time line of reduced manning initiatives that were 

implemented from 2001 to 2016 is included in figure 2.

Figure 2: History of Reduced Manning Initiatives

In addition to reducing crew sizes on legacy ships through the means 

described, the Navy also designed its newest ship classes to operate with 

smaller crew sizes, relying on new technologies, automation, and shore 

support to enable these reductions. Profiles of new ship classes designed 

to operate with reduced crew sizes are included in appendixes III, IV, V, 

and VI.

As noted in the Navy’s 2010 Fleet Review Panel report, a primary lesson 

of the optimal manning period is that using unvalidated assumptions to 

reduce crews contributed to the erosion of the material condition of the 

fleet.12 In response to these findings, the Navy has partially restored crew 

sizes on its legacy ships and has increased the size of shore units to 

better support its ships (see app. VII for information on shore support 

personnel). In addition, the Navy took several other steps to address the 

declining material condition of the surface fleet, such as the following:

 11Net decreases ranged from 4 positions transferred from destroyer crews to 28 positions 

from amphibious assault ship crews.

12Fleet Review Panel, Fleet Review Panel of Surface Force Readiness.

Actions Taken in 

Response to Lessons 

Learned from Optimal 

Manning
Page 7 GAO-17-413 Navy Force Structure

• Establishing the Surface Maintenance Engineering Planning Program 

in 2010 to provide centralized life-cycle maintenance engineering for 

surface ships, maintenance and modernization planning, and 

management of maintenance strategies. The Navy also established 

the Commander, Navy Regional Maintenance Centers (CNRMC) in 

2010, to coordinate the depot- and intermediate-level maintenance of 

its surface fleet. The goal of these efforts is to improve the material 

condition and readiness of the surface fleet and to adhere to a more 

disciplined deployment and maintenance schedule. Navy officials told 

us that, as a result of these initiatives, the Navy has developed a 

better understanding of its ships’ material condition and maintenance 

needs, and maintenance requirements have generally increased.

• Creating the Surface and Expeditionary Warfare Training Committee 

in 2013, which is to inform leadership of surface manpower and 

training investments, resourcing, acquisition, and execution. Officials 

said that program offices for new ships are now required to annually 

update manpower estimates and adjust manpower requirements 

based on lessons learned.

• Introducing a revised operational schedule known as the Optimized 

Fleet Response Plan in 2014, which was intended, among other 

things, to provide for the predictable scheduling of ship maintenance 

tasks and ensure that ship crews were manned with a sufficient 

number of sailors with the right qualifications.13

 13For more information on the Optimized Fleet Response Plan, see GAO, Military 

Readiness: Progress and Challenges in Implementing the Navy’s Optimized Fleet 

Response Plan, GAO-16-466R (Washington, D.C.: May 2, 2016).
Page 8 GAO-17-413 Navy Force Structure

Ship operating and support costs—the total cost of operating, 

maintaining, and supporting a ship, including personnel, operations, 

maintenance, sustainment, and modernization—increased during the 

optimal manning period and have continued to increase for most ship 

classes, in part because increases in maintenance costs offset reductions 

in personnel costs.14 Since the end of the optimal manning period around 

2010, the Navy has partially restored crew sizes, and personnel costs 

have increased for all ship classes. In addition, maintenance costs have 

increased for some ship classes and decreased for others, although 

maintenance costs are still above pre–optimal manning levels for all ship 

classes. Navy officials attributed maintenance cost increases to reduced 

crews, longer deployments, and other factors. Maintenance backlogs also 

increased during the optimal manning period for the same reasons and 

have continued to grow for most ship classes.

During the optimal manning period—which varied among ship classes but 

generally was around fiscal years 2004 to 2010—the Navy reduced 

average crew sizes, as shown in figure 3, resulting in reductions in 

personnel costs. Since the end of optimal manning, the Navy has 

increased crew sizes, leading to increases in associated personnel costs. 

However, the crews and associated personnel costs for all ship classes—

with the exception of dock landing ships (LSD 41/49–classes)—are still 

smaller than they were before the optimal manning initiative, in part 

because the Navy has retained the longer 70-hour workweek component 

for productive work that it had adopted during the optimal manning period, 

which results in a requirement for fewer crew members.

 14For additional information on ship operating support costs, see app. VIII.

Ship Operating and 

Support Costs and 

Maintenance 

Backlogs Have 

Continued to Increase 

for Most Legacy Ship 

Classes since 

Optimal Manning 

Ended

The Navy Has Partially 

Restored Crew Sizes 

since Optimal Manning 

Ended, and Personnel 

Costs Have Increased
Page 9 GAO-17-413 Navy Force Structure

Figure 3: Average Crew Size by Ship Class, Fiscal Years 2000–2015, Including Changes and Percent Changes in Crew Size 

during and after the Optimal Manning Period
Page 10 GAO-17-413 Navy Force Structure

Our analysis found that, at the same time that the Navy reduced crew 

sizes and personnel costs, average maintenance costs per ship 

increased for all ship classes. These increases more than offset the 

decreases in personnel costs that were achieved during the optimal 

manning period. Since the Navy ended the optimal manning initiative, the 

change in maintenance costs has varied; maintenance costs continued to 

increase for cruisers and destroyers, but have decreased for aircraft 

carriers, amphibious assault ships, and dock landing ships. In all cases, 

maintenance costs are above pre–optimal manning levels, as shown in 

figure 4. Further, our analysis found that overall operating and support 

costs increased for all classes during the optimal manning period and 

have continued to increase for most ship classes since optimal manning 

ended. This increase was driven in part by increases in maintenance 

costs offsetting decreases in personnel costs.

Figure 4: Changes in Average Annual per Ship Personnel and Maintenance Costs 

from Start of Optimal Manning through Fiscal Year 2015

Note: Total change from start of optimal manning period is calculated as the change in the average 

annual cost for a ship class from the pre–optimal manning level to fiscal year 2015, including both the 

optimal manning period and the post–optimal manning period. The optimal manning period varied 

among ship classes. For the purpose of our analysis, we determined the optimal manning period for 

each ship class to be as follows: aircraft carriers (CVN 68) and amphibious assault ships (LHD 1), 

Maintenance Costs 

Increased during Optimal 

Manning and Have since 

Continued to Increase for 

Some Ship Classes
Page 11 GAO-17-413 Navy Force Structure

2005 to 2012; dock landing ships (LSD 41/49), 2006 to 2010; cruisers (CG 47), 2003 to 2012; and 

destroyers (DDG 51), 2004 to 2010.

Navy officials acknowledged that the reduced crew sizes during the 

optimal manning period, along with reductions in shore support, may have 

yielded short-term cost savings, but also increased maintenance costs 

over the longer term, in part because reduced crew sizes resulted in 

maintenance being deferred, which developed into more costly issues 

that had to be addressed later. Navy officials also attributed increases in 

maintenance costs to increased deployment lengths, increased reliance 

on contractors to perform maintenance, and some class-specific 

maintenance and modernization efforts. Other factors, such as the age of 

a ship, may also affect maintenance costs. Our analysis does not isolate 

the effects of these factors from the effect of the optimal manning 

initiative.

Navy officials told us that shifts from organizational- and intermediatelevel to depot-level maintenance increased overall maintenance costs. As 

noted above, this change occurred in part because reduced crew sizes 

resulted in minor maintenance being deferred, which developed into more 

costly issues that had to be addressed later at the depot level.15 Our 

analysis of Navy maintenance costs found that intermediate-level 

maintenance costs increased for most classes during the optimal 

manning period, and depot-level maintenance costs increased for all

classes, as shown in figures 5 and 6. Depot maintenance costs have 

continued to increase for most classes and are above pre–optimal 

manning levels for all classes as of fiscal year 2015.

 15Organizational-level maintenance is performed by a ship crew and normally consists of 

routine preventive work such as inspecting, servicing, and replacing parts. Intermediatelevel maintenance is performed by shore support units, including contractors, and consists 

of work such as calibration, repair, or replacement of damaged or unserviceable parts, 

and providing technical assistance to operators. Depot-level maintenance is performed at 

private and public shipyards and typically consists of major overhaul, modification, and 

rebuild of ship components. Organizational-level maintenance costs include the cost of 

parts and other materials but does not include the cost of labor, and therefore may 

understate the full cost of organizational maintenance. Intermediate- and depot-level 

maintenance costs include the cost of labor as well as parts and other materials.

Increased Reliance on 

Depot and Contractor 

Maintenance Increased 

Costs during and since 

Optimal Manning
Page 12 GAO-17-413 Navy Force Structure

Figure 5: Average Organizational-, Intermediate-, and Depot-Level Maintenance Costs and Ship Crew Sizes for Cruisers (CG 

47) and Destroyers (DDG 51), Fiscal Years 2000–2015
Page 13 GAO-17-413 Navy Force Structure

Figure 6: Average Organizational-, Intermediate-, and Depot-Level Maintenance Costs and Ship Crew Sizes for Amphibious 

Assault Ships (LHD 1), Dock Landing Ships (LSD 41/49), and Aircraft Carriers (CVN 68), Fiscal Years 2000–2015
Page 14 GAO-17-413 Navy Force Structure

Navy officials also acknowledged that reduced manning is enabled by an 

increased reliance on outside entities, such as contractors, to perform 

maintenance. Our analysis found that the cost of maintenance performed 

by contractors and in private shipyards increased for all ship classes 

during the optimal manning period and has continued to increase for most 

ship classes since crew sizes were restored. However, increases in

contractor costs have been driven primarily by the increase in depot-level 

maintenance. The Navy generally contracts with private shipyards and 

other firms for the repair, maintenance, and modernization of nonnuclear 

surface ships.16 Private shipyards and contractors are generally focused 

on depot-level maintenance, and are responsible for most depot-level 

maintenance. As a result, increases in depot-level maintenance have 

driven increases in contractor maintenance costs. Contractor 

maintenance costs at the intermediate level decreased for most classes 

during the optimal manning period and have continued to decrease for 

most classes in the period since.

The Navy’s 2010 Fleet Review Panel found that reduced manning 

prevented ship crews from performing the minimum required level of 

preventive maintenance, resulting in a growing maintenance backlog—a 

measure of the deferred maintenance for a particular ship—as well as 

increased equipment malfunctions (i.e., casualty reports). Navy officials 

have also acknowledged that the reduced crew sizes during the optimal 

manning period, along with increased deployment lengths, contributed to 

decreases in the material condition and readiness of ships. Our analysis 

of Navy maintenance backlog data found that backlogs increased for all 

ship classes during the optimal manning period, as shown in figure 7. 

While increases in backlogs were occurring before the optimal manning 

initiative, these increases accelerated during the optimal manning period 

for most ship classes. Since optimal manning ended, backlogs have 

continued to increase for most ship classes, but the rate of increase has 

slowed for most classes. Although Navy officials told us that reductions in 

manning can affect maintenance backlogs, they have not quantified the 

magnitude of that relationship.

 16These contractors constitute what is referred to as the ship repair industrial base. 

Although the Navy operates several government-owned shipyards, those shipyards are 

generally used to support the repair, maintenance, and modernization of nuclear powered 

ships, such as submarines and aircraft carriers.

Both Maintenance 

Backlogs and Equipment 

Malfunctions Increased 

during Optimal Manning 

and Have Continued to 

Increase
Page 15 GAO-17-413 Navy Force Structure

Figure 7: Average Maintenance Backlog by Ship Class, Fiscal Years 2000–2015

Note: The optimal manning period varied among ship classes. For the purpose of our analysis, we 

determined the optimal manning period for each ship class to be as follows: aircraft carriers (CVN 68) 

and amphibious assault ships (LHD 1), 2005 to 2012; dock landing ships (LSD 41/49), 2006 to 2010; 

cruisers (CG 47), 2003 to 2012; and destroyers (DDG 51), 2004 to 2010.

The Fleet Review Panel also noted that casualty reports increased during 

the optimal manning initiative.17 Our previous work found that casualty 

reports continued to increase following the end of optimal manning. In 

2015, we found that casualty reports had nearly doubled for cruisers, 

destroyers, and amphibious ships between January 2009 and July 

2014.18 According to Navy officials, their initiatives to improve ship 

material condition are beginning to make progress, and Navy 

documentation we reviewed shows that the numbers of surface ship 

casualty reports decreased between July 2014 and December 2016. 

Another measure of ship material readiness, the Board of Inspection and 

 17Casualty reports include information on individual pieces of equipment or systems on a 

ship that are degraded or out of service, preventing a ship’s ability to support required 

mission areas. 

18GAO-15-329.
Page 16 GAO-17-413 Navy Force Structure

Survey’s Figure of Merit Scores, has generally improved since the Navy 

ended the optimal manning initiative.19

The Navy has updated some of the factors it uses to determine the 

manpower required on its ships, but its process does not fully account for 

all ship workload. The Navy continues to use the workweek standard 

adopted during the optimal manning period, which increased the hours for 

productive work from 67 to 70 hours a week. This change was part of 

what enabled the Navy to reduce crew sizes. However, a 2014 Navy 

study indicated that this standard may be outdated. Although the Navy 

has updated some manpower factors, its guidance on total force 

manpower policies and procedures, Office of the Chief of Naval 

Operations (OPNAV) Instruction 1000.16L, does not require that these 

factors be reassessed to ensure that they remain current and that ship 

crews are sized appropriately.20 Further, the Navy’s manpower 

requirements process does not account for growing in-port workload, 

which is distributed among fewer crew members than when ships are at 

sea.

Since it ended the optimal manning initiative, the Navy has updated or is 

in the process of updating several of the factors and allowances it uses to 

determine manpower requirements on all ships, but it has not updated the 

standard workweek. In 2012, the Navy Manpower Analysis Center 

studied the “make ready / put away” allowance, which accounts for the 

time needed to prepare and close out of a maintenance activity. The 

center recommended increasing the allowance from 15 percent to 30 

percent of the total preventive maintenance man hours on a ship, and the 

 19The Board of Inspection and Survey is responsible for inspecting Navy ships and 

reporting on their readiness. As a result of its inspections, the board assigns ships an 

overall inspection score—the Figure of Merit—which is a single-number representation of 

the ship’s overall material condition and represents a ranking of material condition relative 

to other ships. The score ranges from 0 to 1, with higher scores representing better overall 

material condition. According to Board officials, changes to the inspection criteria in 2003 

resulted in an increase in scores from 2004 onward. As a result, we did not compare 

Figure of Merit scores from before the optimal manning period to those during the optimal 

manning period. 

20OPNAVINST 1000.16L. This instruction requires periodic review of fleet and shorebased manpower requirements, but not for the factors that are used to calculate those 

requirements. This instruction also requires the periodic review of shore manpower 

requirements. See appendix II for details about the manpower requirements determination 

process for shore support. 

The Navy’s 

Manpower 

Requirements 

Process Does Not 

Account for All Ship 

Workload

The Navy Has Updated 

Some Manpower Factors 

but Continues to Use an 

Outdated Workweek 

Standard
Page 17 GAO-17-413 Navy Force Structure

Navy began implementing this change in 2013. Navy manpower officials 

found that, over the years, changes to regulations, instructions, and basic 

safety requirements had increased the time it takes for sailors to perform 

duties associated with this allowance. In addition, the Office of the Chief 

of Naval Operations directed Navy manpower officials to update the 

productivity allowance, which accounts for delays arising from fatigue and 

work interruptions, among other factors. They increased the allowance 

from a range between 2 and 8 percent of productive work requirements to 

a range between 2 and 20 percent for selected ship classes.21 This 

change to the productivity allowance accounts for a new measure of 

mental fatigue associated with monitoring technology. The Navy is 

examining other factors—the corrective maintenance allowance, ship 

aging factors, and its pay-grade distribution model. Table 1 shows the 

status of the factors in the Navy manpower requirements model.

 21The Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Total Force Manpower, Training and 

Education Requirements, has the authority to issue additional policy and technical 

guidance to achieve the objectives of the Navy total force manpower policies and 

procedures. The Navy changed this allowance for CG 47, DDG 51, LHD, LPD, and LSD 

ships.
Page 18 GAO-17-413 Navy Force Structure

Table 1: Status of Factors and Allowances Used in the Navy Manpower Requirements Model for Ships 

Source: GAO analysis of Navy information. | GAO-17-413

a

GAO, Military Readiness: Navy Needs to Reassess Its Metrics and Assumptions for Ship Crewing 

Requirements and Training, GAO-10-592 (Washington, D.C.: June 9, 2010).

b

Ibid.

c

The Navy changed this allowance for cruisers (CG 47), destroyers (DDG 51), amphibious assault 

ships (LHD), amphibious transport docks (LPD), and dock landing ships (LSD).

Factor Definition Status as of February 2017

Hours in a week allotted for work

Navy Standard 

Workweek

The number of hours per week 

available to accomplish the required 

workload while a ship is under way

In 2002, the Navy increased the amount of time it expects sailors to carry out 

productive work each week from 67 to 70 hours without conducting required 

analysis.a

In fiscal year 2014, the Navy studied the components of the workweek, but 

has not addressed the study’s recommendations. Navy officials and crew 

members we spoke with suggested that the workweek should be reassessed.

Working conditions and productivity constraints that add to workload

Make Ready / 

Put Away 

Allowance

The amount of time it takes to 

prepare for the execution of a 

preventive maintenance task and 

the time it takes to return the items 

used to execute the task

In 2002, the Navy reduced this allowance without required analysis from 30 to 

15 percent of the total preventive maintenance man hours required on the 

ship.b

In 2012, the Navy assessed the allowance, and in 2013 restored it to 30 

percent. The Navy is in the process of updating manpower requirements 

based on this change.

Productivity 

Allowance 

Reflects delays arising from fatigue, 

environmental effects, personal 

needs, and unavoidable 

interruptions that increase the time 

required to complete work

In 2002, the Navy reduced this allowance without required analysis from a 

uniform 20 percent of productive work requirements to a floating range up to 8 

percent.

In 2016, the Navy assessed and altered the allowance to a range of up to 20 

percent for selected ship classes.c The allowance varies between ship 

classes, and Navy officials told us that it has yet to be updated for all ship 

classes, which is contingent on resources being available. The Navy is in the 

process of updating manpower requirements for the ships affected by the 

allowance change.

Corrective 

Maintenance 

Allowance

Reflects unscheduled maintenance 

conducted in response to 

malfunction, failure, or deterioration 

The allowance for corrective maintenance is a ratio of the time allowed for 

preventive maintenance. The Navy is currently reexamining this allowance.

Ship aging 

factors

The number of years a ship has 

been operating (to account for the 

different needs of newer and older 

ships)

This factor was established in 2001, is currently in use for developing 

manpower requirements, and is under further development. 

Distribution of work among pay grades

Pay-grade 

distribution 

models

The distribution of pay grades to 

perform the workload

The Navy is currently reexamining these models. 
Page 19 GAO-17-413 Navy Force Structure

Although the Navy has updated several of its manpower factors, it has not 

made any changes to the standard workweek that it adopted during the 

optimal manning period. In 2002, the Navy changed the portion of the 

standard workweek allocated for sailors to perform productive work, 

which is used, in part, to determine manpower requirements and calculate 

the size of the crew.22 By increasing the time allotted for productive work 

in a standard workweek, the Navy reduced the number of personnel on its 

surface and amphibious ships. In 2010, we found that the Navy had 

adjusted the workweek without sufficient analysis, and we recommended 

that it reassess the standard workweek to assure that the Navy was 

appropriately sizing ship crews.23 The Department of Defense (DOD) 

agreed with our recommendation. In 2014, the Navy conducted a study of 

the standard workweek and identified significant issues that could 

negatively affect a crew’s capabilities to accomplish tasks and maintain 

the material readiness of ships, as well as crew safety issues that might 

result if crews sleep less to accommodate unaccounted for workload.

The Navy study found that sailors were on duty 108 hours a week, 

exceeding their weekly on-duty allocation of 81 hours. This on-duty time 

included 90 hours of productive work—20 hours per week more than the 

70 hours that is allotted in the standard workweek. This, in turn, reduced 

the time available for rest and resulted in sailors spending less time 

sleeping than was allotted, a situation that the study noted could 

encourage a poor safety culture. Figure 8 shows how sailors actually 

spent their time compared to the time allotted for each component in the 

Navy standard workweek, as reported in the Navy’s 2014 study.

 22When the Navy adjusted the workweek in 2002, it held the sailor’s total on-duty hours 

constant at 81 hours but increased productive work from 67 to 70 hours and reduced time 

allotted for administrative activities from 7 to 4 hours. 

23GAO-10-592.
Page 20 GAO-17-413 Navy Force Structure

Figure 8: Comparison between Navy Standard Workweek and Actual Hours Spent 

per Component

a

“Administrative and other” accounts for administrative tasks and other activities that are required of 

sailors, including inspections and receiving medical attention, among other things.

b

Messing refers to the time taken for meals.

c

Actual hours represent data collected from three ship crews based on how sailors spent their 

previous 24 hours, which was then multiplied by 7 to attain weekly estimates. In the study, sailors 

reported spending about 2 actual hours in an additional “Other” category for time spent outside of the 

predetermined categories. The actual workweek does not add up to 168 hours because of rounding 

numbers.

An example of work that is not accurately accounted for in the workweek 

is time spent by experienced personnel providing on-the-job training or 

time spent by new arrivals receiving this training. Navy manpower 

calculations do not include on-the-job training, and it is not accounted for 

in the 7 hours allocated for training in the standard workweek. Navy 

officials and crew members we interviewed told us that sailors often arrive 

to their assigned ship without adequate skills and experience. Crew 

members in 10 of the 12 crew interviews we conducted told us that more 

experienced sailors routinely provide on-the-job training for less 

experienced sailors, so the time doing this must come out of sleep, 

personal time, or other allotted work time. In addition, Navy officials said 

that the time allocated for administrative and other duties should be 
Page 21 GAO-17-413 Navy Force Structure

greater, because it does not account for all of a sailor’s collateral duties. 

Similarly, the 2014 Navy study concluded, among other things, that the 

Navy lacked support for the time needed for some workweek 

components, and recommended that they be better supported by 

documentation.

However, as of February 2017, the Navy had not taken action to validate 

the standard workweek, as we and its own study had recommended. 

Navy officials said that they had not taken any action in response to the 

2014 study’s recommendations because the study’s narrow scope of 

three ships limited its applicability across the fleet. OPNAV Instruction 

1000.16L specifies the total time available to accomplish the required 

workload, which is a key element in the calculation of manpower 

requirements.24 According to the Navy instruction, the process for 

determining the manpower necessary to perform the required workload is 

to be based on a validated and justifiable technique; that is, it should be 

analytically based. Without an analytically based standard workweek that 

accounts for all of the work that a sailor is expected to do, the Navy runs 

the risk of negatively affecting the condition of the ship, overworking 

sailors, and adversely affecting morale, retention, and safety.

The Navy instruction does not require the factors used to develop ship 

manpower requirements to be reassessed periodically or when conditions 

change.25 The effect of this absence is that inaccurate factors can persist 

in developing manpower requirements. Factors and allowances are used 

to calculate manpower requirements; thus, if these factors are inaccurate, 

the resulting manpower requirement will be inaccurate. Our prior work 

found that the changes the Navy made to several of these factors in 2002 

were not substantiated with analysis.26 As a result, the Navy was using 

these unsubstantiated factors for at least a decade without reassessment, 

leading it to underestimate its manpower requirement and underman its 

ships, and the Navy found that reductions in crew sizes over the optimal 

manning period adversely affected ship condition. Prior to recent 

reassessments of the make ready / put away allowance and productivity 

allowance, some factors had not been reassessed and updated in 

decades—even though there had been changes to how the Navy trains, 

 24OPNAVINST 1000.16L.

25Ibid. 

26GAO-10-592.
Page 22 GAO-17-413 Navy Force Structure

operates, and uses technology that affected the validity of these factors. 

Navy officials told us that part of the reason they had not reassessed the 

factors until directed to do so is that the relevant Navy instruction does 

not require that they be reassessed periodically or when conditions 

change, and they explained that having up-to-date factors would be 

useful to ensure that sailor workload could be accurately captured.27 If 

there was a requirement to reassess these factors, then the 

unsubstantiated changes made to them in 2002 may have been corrected 

sooner and some of the negative effects of the resulting undermanned 

crews could have been curtailed or avoided. Additionally, a reassessment 

requirement could prevent inaccurate factors like the standard workweek 

from continuing to be used across the fleet. The Navy estimated in 2017 

that if it were to revert to the analytically based standard workweek in 

effect before 2002, more than 1,200 additional sailors would be required 

across the surface fleet.

A memorandum from the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and 

Readiness states that, when developing strategic manpower plans, 

manpower officials shall assess how changes to roles, missions, and 

management strategies will affect workloads and require a change to the 

manpower, and that manpower officials shall be consulted concerning 

manpower adjustments, including changes to missions, priorities, and 

technologies.28 DOD Directive 1100.4 states that it is DOD policy that new 

policy shall be evaluated before implementing to decide its effect on 

manpower and personnel performance. The directive further states that 

existing policies, procedures, and structures shall be periodically 

evaluated to ensure efficient and effective use of manpower resources.29

Unless the OPNAV instruction used by the Navy to develop its manpower 

requirements requires that the factors be reassessed periodically or when 

conditions change, the Navy manpower requirements model will not 

reflect changes in training, technology, or regulations that occur over time 

and that affect sailor workload. Requiring that these factors be 

reassessed periodically or when conditions change would help ensure 

 27Navy manpower officials told us that their capacity to carry out periodic reassessments 

is limited by their staff size and data collection capacity—that, as of January 2017, the 

Navy Manpower Analysis Center had 101 personnel, with about 15 staff members 

available for surface ship data collection. 

28Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness Memorandum, Interim Policy 

and Procedures for Strategic Manpower Planning and Development of Manpower 

Estimates (Dec. 10, 2003). 

29DOD Directive 1100.4, Guidance for Manpower Management.
Page 23 GAO-17-413 Navy Force Structure

that they are accurate and current, and result in more accurate manpower 

requirements. Without accurate manpower requirements, the Navy risks 

having ship crews that are not appropriately sized and composed to carry 

out missions, maintain ship readiness, and prevent overwork of sailors.

OPNAV Instruction 1000.16L calls for measuring only a ship’s at-sea 

workload and not its in-port workload. The Navy has traditionally assumed 

that at-sea workload is greater. However, we reported in 2010 that in-port 

workload had increased for a number of reasons, including the addition of 

new watchstanding requirements for Anti-Terrorism Force Protection.30

We recommended that the Navy include the relative magnitude of in-port 

and at-sea workload in its assessment of the underlying assumptions and 

standards it uses to calculate manpower requirements, and DOD agreed 

with this recommendation.

During our current review, we found that in-port workload is still not 

captured in the process and is a persistent problem for crews, who must 

complete this workload with fewer sailors than when at sea, and whose 

time is also in demand for addressing other in-port priorities. The Navy 

has not measured in-port workload and therefore cannot determine the 

manpower requirements needed to execute this workload. Navy 

operational capability documents describe the in-port period as the time 

for the crew to accomplish required maintenance; take maximum 

advantage of training; and be provided the maximum opportunity for rest, 

leave, and liberty. Officers and enlisted personnel from all 12 of the crew 

interviews we conducted told us that sailors were overworked in port. 

Sailors consistently said that there were fewer crew members in port than 

during deployment, because sailors were attending training and taking 

leave, or because the Navy was prioritizing the manning of ships on 

deployment over ships in port. For example, one ship department had 5 

crew members while in port compared with 10 to 12 crew members 

during deployment, so workload had to be redistributed among the 

remaining sailors. In addition, sailors from a supply department said that 

their workloads on the ship were the same when in-port and when on 

 30The Navy has Anti-Terrorism Force Protection watchstanding requirements to reduce 

the effect of terrorist and other security threats that threaten U.S. naval vessels worldwide. 

This is accomplished by implementing certain security watches, criteria, and practices. 

The duty of the security watches is to safeguard the ship and ship’s company from 

sabotage, terrorism, civil disturbance, danger, or compromise. Emphasis is directed 

toward antiterrorism measures designed to protect vessels in port or at anchorage. 

The Navy’s Manpower 

Requirements Process 

Does Not Account for InPort Workload
Page 24 GAO-17-413 Navy Force Structure

deployment, but there were fewer sailors available in port to execute the 

workloads. As in our 2010 review, crew members cited Anti-Terrorism 

Force Protection watchstanding requirements as creating additional 

training and work demands on them, and added that standing these 

watches in port comes at the expense of their other work. Both officers 

and enlisted personnel told us that ship crews are stressed and 

overburdened during in-port periods because they must stand watch and 

cover the workload of multiple sailors. Crew members told us that when 

they returned from deployment, this additional workload placed a strain 

on them and their families, affecting crew member morale.

During the course of our review, in December 2016, Navy manpower 

officials began a study on the nature and amount of in-port workload; they 

are scheduled to complete this study in July 2017. The Navy directed the 

in-port workload study to inform development of its new training initiative, 

known as Ready Relevant Learning, to begin implementation in fiscal 

year 2017.31 However, Navy officials are still uncertain how this new 

approach to training will be managed, and officials have expressed 

concerns about its potential effects on in-port workload and the effects of 

having sailors who are not fully trained arrive for duty on their assigned 

ships.

Although the Navy is currently in the process of measuring in-port 

workload, officials said that there are no efforts planned to use the study 

results to translate in-port workload into manpower requirements, and that 

a future determination will be made as to the implementation of any 

results of the study. OPNAV Instruction 1000.16L requires that the Navy 

determine at-sea manpower requirements, but does not require the Navy 

to determine—nor does it have a formal process or protocol to model—inport manpower requirements. Without identifying the manpower needed 

to execute in-port workload, the Navy risks overworking its sailors during 

in-port periods and having this workload executed without the appropriate 

number and mix of sailors, which in turn may affect ship readiness, 

safety, and sailor morale.

 31Under the Ready Relevant Learning initiative, the Navy plans for sailors to receive 

training in phased blocks during in-port periods instead of completing their initial training 

qualifications all at once.
Page 25 GAO-17-413 Navy Force Structure

Moving forward, the Navy will likely face manning challenges, especially 

given its current difficulty in filling authorized positions, as it seeks to 

increase the size of its fleet as much as 30 percent over its current size. 

Moreover, new ship classes being introduced now are sometimes 

requiring more personnel than originally estimated as the Navy gains 

experience with the ships. Navy officials stated that even with manpower 

requirements that accurately capture all workload, the Navy will be 

challenged to fund these positions and fill them with adequately trained 

sailors at current personnel levels.

Even with the reduced personnel authorized since optimal manning, the 

Navy has had difficulty filling authorized personnel slots, called “billets” in 

the Navy. The Navy’s commands responsible for manning, equipping, 

and training the surface fleet have cited the lack of personnel available to 

be distributed to ships as their primary challenge. Unfilled positions on 

ship crews and in shore support positions result in workload that must be 

redistributed among the remaining crew and also represent skills and 

abilities that are absent from a crew, exacerbating the risks associated 

with smaller authorized crews. Officials said that it is not uncommon for 

billets to remain unfilled for 6 months or more and that shore commands 

are more likely to experience such “gapped billets” for even longer 

periods.

A 2014 Naval Audit Service report examined critical gapped billets, based 

on a concern that shortfalls among senior enlisted personnel made it 

impossible to meet shipboard manning requirements.32 The report found 

that the Navy has taken actions to reduce gapped billets, but the issue 

persists. As a result, gapped billets continue to exist, sailors may be 

required to work longer hours to make up for gapped billets, and junior 

sailors may not be receiving needed supervision. The report concluded, 

among other things, that unless the Navy increases enlisted personnel, 

recurring gaps will not be corrected.

Given the continued demand for ships to support combatant 

commanders, the Navy plans to increase its fleet from 274 ships (as of 

March 7, 2017) to 308 ships by 2021.33 As of March 2017, the Navy had 

 32Naval Audit Service, Fleet Gapped Critical Billets, N2014-0022 (Washington, D.C.: May 

20, 2014).

33This plan to increase the size of the fleet is included in the Fiscal Year 2017 Shipbuilding 

Plan. 

The Navy May Be 

Challenged to Man Its 

Growing Fleet

Increasing Fleet Size May 

Exacerbate Manning 

Challenges
Page 26 GAO-17-413 Navy Force Structure

an end strength of 323,197 active-duty personnel. According to the Navy, 

this number is expected to remain largely flat through 2021, even though 

an increasing number of ships are entering the fleet. Navy officials have 

expressed concern about the growing gap between end strength and ship 

numbers, and said that the Navy would have to increase its end strength 

in order to adequately man its ships. Figure 9 shows the Navy’s projected 

end strength and fleet size.

Figure 9: Planned Number of Navy Ships and Projected Personnel End Strength

Note: Number of ships from 2017 to 2021 is based on the 308-ship fleet size in the Navy’s Fiscal 

Year 2017 shipbuilding plan. The Navy has not yet updated its shipbuilding plan to reflect its new goal 

of 355 ships. Projected personnel end strength is the total number of active-duty personnel in the 

Navy.

The Navy has also identified the need for an even larger fleet, which 

would add to personnel needs and costs. Specifically, the Navy released 

an updated Force Structure Assessment in late 2016 that called for a 

355-ship fleet to meet global threats—a 15 percent increase from the 

previous 308-ship goal and a 30 percent increase from the size of its 

current fleet.34 In a February 2017 report, the Congressional Research 

Service estimated the additional shipbuilding costs that would be needed 

 34As of March 7, 2017, the fleet contained 274 battle force ships. 
Page 27 GAO-17-413 Navy Force Structure

over a 30-year period based on the Force Structure Assessment, but 

added that these additional shipbuilding funds are only part of what would 

be needed to achieve and maintain a 355-ship fleet instead of 308-ship 

fleet.35 According to DOD, operating and support costs—which include 

personnel and maintenance costs—have traditionally constituted about 

70 percent of a ship’s total life-cycle costs.36 Our analysis has shown that 

personnel costs were the largest share of total operating and support 

costs for surface ship classes between fiscal years 2000 to 2015 (see 

app. VIII for total ship operating and support costs).

The underlying cause for this apparent ship–personnel mismatch is that 

the Navy is seeking to grow its fleet but is not fully assessing the 

personnel implications of the growth. Navy officials told us that it mans its 

ships and all other positions within its approved end strength, but has not 

determined the number or cost of personnel needed to man the 

increasing number of ships or made concrete plans for adding the needed 

personnel. The personnel needs will be significant. The Congressional 

Research Service estimated that about 15,000 additional sailors and 

aviation personnel might be needed to man the 47 additional ships above 

the previous 308-ship plan.37 Plans to grow the fleet further to 355 

ships—and our findings that manpower validation processes are based 

on questionable assumptions that likely understate personnel needs—

could further exacerbate the mismatch. However, the Navy has not fully 

assessed whether the service will need increased end strength and, if so, 

how much. Navy officials told us that if overall Navy end strength is not 

increased, the billets would likely have to be taken from other 

organizations as new ships are delivered, potentially continuing to 

perpetuate the gapped billets challenge.

Our prior work has shown that identifying needed resources and 

investments is a key characteristic that helps to establish a 

comprehensive, results-oriented management framework to guide 

 35Congressional Research Service, Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: 

Background and Issues for Congress (Feb. 2, 2017). 

36Office of the Secretary of Defense, Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation, 

Operating and Support Cost-Estimating Guide (Mar. 2014).

37Congressional Research Service, Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans. GAO 

reviewed the methodology used to estimate additional sailors and found it to be 

reasonable. 
Page 28 GAO-17-413 Navy Force Structure

implementation of plans and strategies.

38 This activity includes identifying 

what a strategy will cost and the sources and types of resources and 

investments associated with the strategy. According to Navy officials, in 

order to compensate for the lack of distributable personnel who would be 

needed to fill all manpower requirements within the current end strength, 

they currently prioritize which positions to fill and which to keep unfilled in 

order to maintain a permissible level of risk and readiness in the surface 

fleet. As the Navy continues to update ship manpower requirements 

based on recent changes to the factors and allowances used to calculate 

them, these requirements are likely to increase. Already-strained 

manpower resources will be even more stressed as the Navy 

commissions increasing numbers of ships without a commensurate 

increase in personnel. Unless it updates its manpower factors and 

requirements, and identifies the personnel cost implications associated 

with any planned increases in the fleet size, the Navy will not be 

positioned to accurately articulate internally within DOD or externally to 

Congress the personnel needs of the Navy.

In addition to using the outdated standard workweek and not accounting 

for in-port workload, the Navy developed estimates of manpower 

requirements and crew size targets for its new ships based on 

assumptions that technologies would enable smaller crews. However, 

crew sizes on most new ship classes have grown over time as anticipated 

workload reductions from new technologies have not materialized and the 

Navy gains more experience operating the new ships.39 These 

technologies include networks that integrate ship systems to allow for 

remote monitoring, redesigned propulsion systems on some ships, and 

extensive use of automation to relieve crews of some manual work; 

however, some of these technologies are still not fully developed, tested, 

or fielded and remain immature. As a result, crew sizes have grown to 

allow sailors to do this manual work.

 38See GAO, Combating Terrorism: Evaluation of Selected Characteristics in National 

Strategies Related to Terrorism, GAO-04-408T (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 3, 2004); Defense 

Management: Comprehensive Strategy and Annual Reporting Are Needed to Measure 

Progress and Costs of DOD’s Global Posture Restructuring, GAO-06-852 (Washington, 

D.C.: Sept. 13, 2006); Defense Management: More Reliable Cost Estimates and Further 

Planning Needed to Inform the Marine Corps Realignment Initiatives in the Pacific, 

GAO-13-360 (Washington, D.C.: June 11, 2013).

39New ships classes with reduced crew size targets include the Ford-class aircraft carrier 

(CVN 78), Zumwalt-class destroyer (DDG 1000), Littoral Combat Ship (LCS), and San 

Antonio–class Amphibious Transport Dock (LPD 17).

Crew Sizes on RecentlyInducted Ship Classes 

Have Grown as the Navy 

Gains Experience 

Operating Them
Page 29 GAO-17-413 Navy Force Structure

For example, crew sizes for the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS), Zumwaltclass destroyer (DDG 1000), and San Antonio–class Amphibious 

Transport Dock (LPD 17) have increased since these ships entered 

service, as shown in table 2, and LCS and DDG 1000 have reached the 

upper limits for crew size as laid out in their acquisition strategies. Navy 

officials acknowledged that LCS and DDG 1000 crew sizes have grown 

due to the inadequacy of the original manpower assumptions coupled 

with additional mission requirements to support ship operations. The new 

Ford-class aircraft carrier (CVN 78) has not yet entered service, and its 

crew size so far remains within the Navy’s targets—currently 663 sailors 

below that of legacy Nimitz-class carriers. However, some planned 

features of the ship that were expected to reduce workload have been 

canceled, and delays in developing and testing some of the new 

technologies on the ship create unknowns about their ability to enable a 

smaller crew. See appendixes III, IV, V, and VI for specific information on 

each new ship class.

Table 2: Crew Size Changes for New Ship Classes as of February 2017

Ship class Initial crew sizea Current crew size Percent change

Ford-class aircraft 

carrier (CVN 78)b 2,628 2,628 0

Zumwalt-class 

destroyer (DDG 

1000)

158 175 +11

Littoral Combat Ship 

(LCS)

75c 98d +31

San Antonio–class 

amphibious transport 

dock (LPD 17)

363 378 +4

Source: GAO analysis of Navy information. | GAO-17-413

a

Initial crew sizes are from Preliminary Ship Manpower Documents.

b

Crew sizes are for the ship’s force—all personnel aboard the carrier except those designated as part 

of the air wing and in certain support or other assigned roles. An additional 1,912 personnel are 

expected to embark with the ship in addition to the ship’s force.

c

This figure includes the total initial LCS crew including the core crew of 40, mission module crew of 

15, and aviation detachment of 20 personnel.

d

This figure includes the total current LCS crew including a merged core and mission crew of 70, an 

aviation detachment of 24, and four ensigns (junior officers) whom the Navy does not consider to be 

required per Navy manpower analysis but who nonetheless serve as functional members of every 

LCS crew due to their availability.

The LCS program illustrates how crew size can grow over time as the 

Navy gains operational experience with the ship class and its new 

technology. The Navy originally designed and built these ships to 

accommodate a total crew size of 75, but gradually increased the ships’
Page 30 GAO-17-413 Navy Force Structure

crews as it gained more experience operating them, and has since had to 

redesign the ships to accommodate 98 sailors—a 31 percent increase. As 

of March 2017, three of the Navy’s nine LCS ships have been deployed 

overseas. Automation and the use of condition-based maintenance have 

not decreased workload as they were intended to do, and the unreliability 

of shipboard systems has led to major equipment failures and 

unanticipated corrective maintenance.40 Officers and enlisted crew 

members told us that the LCS’s minimally sized crews are challenged to 

complete their workload. In 2014, we found that the LCS program had a 

number of manning challenges and that without validating the crew size 

and composition for all LCS crews and without accounting for the full 

scope and distribution of work performed by sailors across all ship 

departments, the Navy risked that crew fatigue would exceed Navy 

standards and could negatively affect crew members’ performance as 

well as morale, retention, safety, and ultimately the operational readiness 

of the ship class.41

In response to LCS manning and other challenges, the Navy conducted a 

program review in 2016 and announced changes to the ships’ crewing 

and other operational concepts that are now being implemented across 

the program.42 LCS officials told us that some of the program changes are 

meant to alleviate the heavy workload of LCS sailors. Specifically, the 

Navy has formed LCS maintenance execution teams to assist with heavy 

in-port workload, build organic expertise, decrease dependence on 

maintenance contractors, and serve as a pool of qualified sailors who can 

fill in for unplanned losses in LCS crews. Officials responsible for 

implementing program changes told us that they are in the process of 

 40Condition-based maintenance is the process of scheduling maintenance based on 

actual need through analysis of data from the ship’s equipment. The data are obtained in 

real time or near-real time from sensors embedded in ship components or systems, and 

then monitored and analyzed ashore.

41GAO, Littoral Combat Ship: Deployment of USS Freedom Revealed Risks in 

Implementing Operational Concepts and Uncertain Costs, GAO-14-447 (Washington, 

D.C.: July 8, 2014). 

42Original LCS operational concepts called for each ship to have a “core crew” to carry out 

basic functions like engineering, propulsion, and navigation, and a separate “mission 

module” crew to carry out one of the three LCS missions. Mission-related equipment and 

combat systems were to be modular so that the mission package and the crew 

responsible for operating it could be swapped out of each ship as needed. In 2016, the 

Navy integrated core crews of 50 and mission module crews of 15–20 into one crew of 70, 

meaning that there will be more positions in some of the integrated crews than there were 

before in the core-plus-mission-module crewing construct.
Page 31 GAO-17-413 Navy Force Structure

determining the composition of LCS integrated crews, and are using all 

available inputs and information to determine the best mix of sailors. 

However, Navy manpower officials have yet to validate these changes to 

the LCS crewing concept, and delays in LCS mission module 

development and testing do not allow for them to validate needed crew 

size and composition since the modules are immature.

Navy officials told us they validate manpower requirements for new ship 

classes after testing is complete and the first ship of the class has been 

deployed. Most new ship classes have unvalidated manpower 

requirements due to lack of operational experience or system immaturity. 

Table 3 summarizes the status of manpower requirement validation for 

new ship classes with reduced crews.

Table 3: Status of Manpower Requirements for New Ship Classes and Enablers of Crew Size Reductions

Ship class Entered service Manpower requirements 

validated 

Enablers of crew size reductions

New 

technologies

Automation Shore 

support 

Ford-class aircraft 

carrier (CVN 78)

Delivery scheduled for 2017 

with active service date to 

be determined

No—awaiting ship delivery, 

testing, and deployment

Yes Yes No

Zumwalt-class destroyer 

(DDG 1000)

October 2016a No—ship is in testing and no 

deployment date scheduled

Yes Yes Yes

Littoral Combat Ship 

(LCS)

Variant 2: January 2010

Variant 1: November 2008

Variant 2: No—first of variant 

currently deployed

Variant 1: No— manpower 

requirement validated for previous 

manning constructb

Yes Yes Yes

San Antonio–class 

amphibious transport 

dock (LPD 17)

January 2006 Yes No Yes No

Source: GAO analysis of Navy information. | GAO-17-413

a

Only the ship’s hull, mechanical, and electrical systems are in service. Combat systems have not 

been tested or activated. 

b

The Navy has separate manpower documents for the two LCS variants to account for their 

significant differences. The Navy Manpower Analysis Center validated the core crew size for one of 

the two LCS variants in 2015, but the Navy changed the crewing concept for all LCS ships in 

September 2016.

As noted above, crew sizes on three of the Navy’s four new ship classes 

have grown partly because the technologies in use have not led to the 

expected reductions in workload. In the case of LCS and LPD 17, the lack 

of physical space limits the ability of the crews to grow further without 
Page 32 GAO-17-413 Navy Force Structure

significant redesign of ship interiors. The DDG 1000 crew has reached its 

upper crew size target, but program officials have said that the ship could 

accommodate additional sailors as the ship gains more operational 

experience—if it is determined that they are necessary.43 CVN 78 crews 

may also grow until technologies meant to reduce workload and crew 

sizes mature. Until technologies on new ships are mature and 

demonstrate their ability to decrease workload, crew sizes on new ships 

may continue to grow, placing further pressure on the Navy’s resources.

During the optimal manning period of the early 2000s, the Navy made 

changes to its manpower requirements process that were intended to 

drive down crew sizes and thus save on personnel costs. However, these 

changes were not substantiated with analysis. The result was that with 

fewer sailors operating and maintaining surface ships, the material 

condition of the ships declined, and this effect ultimately contributed to 

increased overall operating and support costs. The Navy has reassessed 

and reversed some of the changes it made during the optimal manning 

period, but it continues to use a workweek standard that does not reflect 

the actual time sailors spend working, and the Navy still does not account 

for in-port workload—both of which may be leading to sailors being 

overworked and creating a readiness and safety risk. In addition, the 

Navy’s guidance does not require that the factors used to calculate 

manpower requirements be reassessed periodically or when conditions 

change to ensure that these factors remain valid and crews are 

appropriately sized. A requirement to reassess these factors would help 

ensure that they stay current and analytically based, and would provide 

the Navy a sound basis for its manpower requirements. Looking to the 

future, the Navy plans to grow its fleet as much as 30 percent but has not 

determined how many personnel will be needed to man the larger fleet or 

what these personnel will cost. As the number of ships increases—and if 

crew sizes continue to grow on new ship classes—the Navy will be 

challenged to distribute its sailors across the fleet without an increase in 

personnel. Unless it identifies the personnel needs and costs associated 

with a larger fleet size, the Navy runs the risk of buying ships that it 

cannot fully man, potentially repeating the mistakes associated with the 

optimal manning period and resulting in degraded surface fleet readiness 

and increased maintenance costs.

 43Although the ship has entered active service, DDG 1000 combat systems have not been 

activated or tested.

Conclusions
Page 33 GAO-17-413 Navy Force Structure

To ensure that the Navy’s manpower requirements are current and 

analytically based and will meet the needs of the existing and future 

surface fleet, we recommend that the Under Secretary of Defense for 

Personnel and Readiness direct the Secretary of the Navy to have the 

Navy take the following four actions:

• conduct a comprehensive reassessment of the Navy standard 

workweek and make any necessary adjustments;

• update guidance to require examination of in-port workload and 

identify the manpower necessary to execute in-port workload for all 

surface ship classes;

• develop criteria and update guidance for reassessing the factors used 

to calculate manpower requirements periodically or when conditions 

change; and

• identify personnel needs and costs associated with the planned larger 

Navy fleet size, including consideration of the updated manpower 

factors and requirements.

We provided a draft of this report to DOD for review and comment. In its 

comments, reproduced in appendix IX, DOD concurred with our 

recommendations, citing its commitment to ensuring that the Navy’s 

manpower requirements are current and analytically based and will meet 

the needs of the existing and future surface fleet. DOD also provided 

technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate.

Recommendations for 

Executive Action

Agency Comments
Page 34 GAO-17-413 Navy Force Structure

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional 

committees; and to the Secretary of Defense; the Under Secretary of 

Defense for Personnel and Readiness; and the Secretary of the Navy. In 

addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at 

http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact 

me at (202) 512-3489 or pendletonj@gao.gov. Contact points for our 

Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on 

the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in 

appendix X.

John Pendleton 

Director 

Defense Capabilities and Management
Page 35 GAO-17-413 Navy Force Structure

List of Committees

The Honorable John McCain

Chairman

The Honorable Jack Reed

Ranking Member

Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate

The Honorable Thad Cochran

Chairman

The Honorable Richard J. Durbin

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Defense

Committee on Appropriations

United States Senate

The Honorable Mac Thornberry

Chairman

The Honorable Adam Smith

Ranking Member

Committee on Armed Services

House of Representatives

The Honorable Kay Granger

Chairwoman

The Honorable Pete Visclosky

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Defense

Committee on Appropriations

House of Representatives 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 36 GAO-17-413 Navy Force Structure

To describe trends in Navy crew sizes and operating and support costs 

on its legacy ships, we analyzed annual data from fiscal years 2000 

through 2015 (the most current data available at the time of our review) 

from the Navy’s Visibility and Management of Operating and Support 

Costs (VAMOSC) system. We included all classes and flights of surface 

ships that were (1) in service during the optimal manning period, (2) 

subject to crew size reductions during that period, and (3) still in service 

as of fiscal year 2015. The following ship classes and flights were 

included in our analysis:

• Nimitz-class (CVN 68) Aircraft Carriers;

• Arleigh Burke–class (DDG 51) Destroyers (including Flights I, II, and 

IIA);1

• Ticonderoga-class (CG 47) Cruisers;

• Wasp-class (LHD 1) Amphibious Assault Ships;2 and

• Whidbey Island– (LSD 41) and Harpers Ferry–class (LSD 49) Dock 

Landing Ships.3

As noted in our report, the years of the optimal manning period varied 

among ship classes. To determine the optimal manning period for each 

class, we analyzed Navy documentation and data on crew levels for each 

ship class. Based on this analysis, we defined the optimal manning period 

as the following for each class, and used these years in our analyses of 

changes during the optimal manning period:

• Nimitz-class (CVN 68) Aircraft Carriers: fiscal years 2005–2012;

• Arleigh Burke–class (DDG 51) Destroyers (including Flights I, II, and 

IIA): fiscal years 2004–2010;

• Ticonderoga-class (CG 47) Cruisers: fiscal years 2003–2010;

 1

For analysis and reporting purposes, we used the weighted average crew sizes and 

operating and support costs for all three destroyer flights.

2

Based on discussions with Navy Sea Systems Command, we excluded the USS Makin 

Island (LHD 8) from our analysis. This decision was based on the fact that (1) the ship had 

a different propulsion system from other Wasp-class ships, and is effectively its own class, 

and (2) the ship was commissioned during fiscal year 2010, and therefore was not in 

service for the majority of the optimal manning period. 

3

For analysis and reporting purposes, we used the weighted average crew sizes and 

operating and support costs for both classes of dock landing ships.

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 37 GAO-17-413 Navy Force Structure

• Wasp-class (LHD 1) Amphibious Assault Ships: fiscal years 2005–

2012; and

• Whidbey Island– (LSD 41) and Harpers Ferry–class (LSD 49) Dock 

Landing Ships: fiscal years 2006–2010.

For our analysis, we used the following elements in the VAMOSC 

database:

• Crew size: “Number of Personnel—Navy.”

• Total operating and support costs: all cost elements.

• Personnel costs: all cost elements within “Unit-Level Manpower.”

• Maintenance costs: all costs elements within “Maintenance”:

• Organizational-level maintenance: “Consumable Materials and 

Repair Parts” and “Depot Level Repairables.”

• Intermediate-level maintenance: all cost elements within 

“Intermediate Maintenance.”

• Depot-level maintenance: all costs elements within “Depot 

Maintenance.”

• Maintenance performed by private shipyards and contractors: 

“Intermediate-Level Contractor Maintenance,” all cost elements for 

private shipyards within “CNO-Scheduled Depot Maintenance,”

and all cost elements for private shipyards within “Fleet Depot 

Maintenance.”

• Other operating and support costs: all costs elements within “Unit 

Operations,” “Sustaining Support,” and “Continuing System 

Improvements.”

We reviewed trends in these elements for each ship class in our scope. 

We also calculated the change in each element during and since the 

optimal manning period, as well as the total change since the beginning 

of the optimal manning period, for each ship class in our scope, as 

described below:

• change during optimal manning period is calculated as the change in 

dollars and percent from the pre–optimal manning level and the last 

year of optimal manning for a ship class;

• change since optimal manning period is calculated as the change in 

dollars and percent from the last year of optimal manning for a ship 

class and fiscal year 2015; and
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 38 GAO-17-413 Navy Force Structure

• total change since start of optimal manning period is calculated as the 

change in dollars and percent from the pre–optimal manning level for 

a ship class and fiscal year 2015.

To describe maintenance and ship material condition trends, we analyzed 

maintenance backlog, casualty report, and inspection result data from 

2000 through 2015, as specified below:

• For maintenance backlog data, we requested data on the number of 

maintenance backlog items for each ship in our scope and calculated 

class and type averages of the number of maintenance backlog items 

as of September 30 of each fiscal year. To analyze the change in 

maintenance backlogs in the pre–optimal manning, optimal manning, 

and post–optimal manning periods, we compared the average annual 

rate of change in the number of backlog items for each ship type 

during each period, as defined above for each ship class.

• For casualty report data, we reviewed Navy reports and other 

documentation, as well as our prior work, which reported on trends in 

casualty reports during the optimal manning and post–optimal 

manning periods.4

• For inspection report data, we compared average scores for the 

Board of Inspection and Survey’s Figure of Merit for the optimal 

manning and post–optimal manning periods for each ship type. 

According to board officials, changes to the inspection criteria in 2003 

resulted in an increase in scores from 2004 onward. As a result, we 

did not compare Figure of Merit scores from before the optimal 

manning period to those during the optimal manning period.

We assessed the reliability of the Navy’s VAMOSC, maintenance 

backlog, casualty report, and inspection report data and found them to be 

reliable for the purposes of describing trends and making comparisons 

over time in ship crews, operating and support costs, shore support 

personnel, and material conditions. Specifically, we reviewed prior GAO 

reports making use of these data, interviewed Navy officials with 

knowledge of the data, and reviewed documentation on the data and 

related systems. Where possible, we also corroborated the data with 

other data sources.

 4

GAO, Navy Force Structure: Sustainable Plan and Comprehensive Assessment Needed 

to Mitigate Long-Term Risks to Ships Assigned to Overseas Homeports, GAO-15-329 

(Washington, D.C.: May 29, 2015).
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 39 GAO-17-413 Navy Force Structure

To analyze trends in shore support personnel, we requested that officials 

from the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations’ Expeditionary Warfare 

(N95), Surface Warfare (N96), and Air Warfare (N98) directorates identify 

those shore support units that provided support specific to amphibious 

ships, surface combatants, and aircraft carriers. We then analyzed data 

from VAMOSC on trends in the number of full-time-equivalent military 

personnel assigned to these units from fiscal years 2002 to 2015. As part 

of this analysis, we also analyzed trends in units responsible for training 

as well as trends in units that are associated with Navy regional 

maintenance centers.

To assess the extent to which the Navy’s manpower requirements 

process fully accounts for ship workload, we examined the factors and 

assumptions used in determining crew sizes for surface and amphibious 

ships, and we analyzed various Navy documents and instructions related 

to determining crew sizes, including Office of the Chief of Naval 

Operations Instruction 1000.16L, Navy Total Force Manpower Policies 

and Procedures, in order to identify the steps required in the Navy’s 

process to determine crew sizes.5 Furthermore, we reviewed prior GAO 

work on shipboard and shore-based manpower requirements 

determination,6 as well as previous Navy studies on the process, 

including on the sufficiency of its factors. We also interviewed Navy 

officials to discuss their process in determining manpower requirements, 

changes to the process (including its factors and allowances) since the 

end of optimal manning, current studies under way, and the status of the 

newest ship classes.

We also conducted group discussions with crews from six ships, having 

separate discussions with officers and enlisted personnel from each ship 

for a total of 12 group discussions. We met with crews from two 

destroyers, two amphibious transport dock ships, and both variants of the 

littoral combat ships (LCS) to discuss crew size, composition, and 

workload. We selected these ship classes for their years of operational 

experience as well as their representation of ships subject to different 

 5

Office of the Chief of Naval Operations Instruction (OPNAVINST) 1000.16L, Navy Total 

Force Manpower Policies and Procedures (June 24, 2015) (change transmittal 1, Apr. 28, 

2016).

6

GAO, Military Readiness: Navy Needs to Reassess Its Metrics and Assumptions for Ship 

Crewing Requirements and Training, GAO-10-592 (Washington, D.C.: June 9, 2010); and 

Force Structure: Streamlining Plans Could Enable Navy to Reduce Personnel Below 

Fiscal Year 1999 Goal, GAO/NSIAD-97-90 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 18, 1997).
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 40 GAO-17-413 Navy Force Structure

reduced manning initiatives: (1) optimal manning initiative (DDG 51), (2) 

minimal manning construct (LCS), and (3) reduced crew size targets from 

their predecessor ship classes (LPD 17). Specifically, we visited ship 

classes homeported in both the Pacific and Atlantic Fleet, which included 

the USS Higgins (DDG 76), USS Bainbridge (DDG 96), LCS Crew 101, 

LCS Crew 203, USS Anchorage (LPD 23), and USS Arlington (LPD 24). 

For each visit, we requested to speak with a cross section of personnel 

from each ship department and carried out group discussions with the 

officers and enlisted personnel available.

We interviewed officials or obtained documentation at the following 

locations:

Department of Defense

• Office of the Secretary of Defense

• Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation

• Defense Manpower Data Center

Department of the Navy

• Office of the Chief of Naval Operations

• Force Manpower and Assessments Branch

• U.S. Fleet Forces Command

• Commander, Naval Surface Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet

• Command Manpower Analysis Team

• Board of Inspection and Survey

• Commander, Naval Surface Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet

• Commander, Littoral Combat Ship Squadron One

• Naval Sea Systems Command

• Cost Engineering and Industrial Analysis Division

• Program Executive Office Aircraft Carriers

• Program Executive Office Littoral Combat Ships

• Program Executive Office Ships

• Surface Maintenance Engineering Planning Program

• Commander, Navy Regional Maintenance Center
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 41 GAO-17-413 Navy Force Structure

• Naval Center for Cost Analysis

• Naval Education and Training Command

• Bureau of Naval Personnel

• Naval Personnel Command

• Navy Manpower Analysis Center

• Navy Safety Center

• Naval Audit Service

To determine the challenges, if any, for manning the surface fleet and 

implications for the future, we analyzed the Navy’s 2017 30-year 

Shipbuilding Plan, 2016 Force Structure Assessment, and 2017 

Department of Navy budget. We also reviewed and analyzed reports on 

manpower and manning by the Center for Naval Analyses, Naval Audit 

Service, Congressional Research Service, and GAO. We also analyzed 

acquisition, manpower, and operational documents to determine the crew 

size goals and current crew sizes for new ship classes. We interviewed 

program and other Navy officials to discuss the status of new 

technologies, manning challenges, and crew sizes growth on new ships. 

We also interviewed Navy officials and ship crews to discuss fleet-wide 

manpower and manning challenges.

We conducted this performance audit from March 2016 to May 2017 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Appendix II: Shore Support Manpower 

Requirements Process

Page 42 GAO-17-413 Navy Force Structure

The Navy has a decentralized process for determining its shore support 

manpower requirements. Each of the 20 major shore commands is the 

primary agent for determining and approving the scope of their activities, 

whether they are personnel, training, and maintenance functions or 

activities like research and development. The major shore commands 

cover multiple warfighting enterprises and providers, such as U.S. Fleet 

Forces Command, U.S. Pacific Fleet, Naval Sea Systems Command, and 

others. This process is illustrated in figure 10.

Figure 10: Navy Process for Determining Shore Manpower Requirements

The major shore command or activity1 writes the mission, functions, and 

tasks (MFT) statement, which is the primary document for identifying the 

shore activity’s workload. Each major shore command provides its own 

analysts with training to conduct manpower reviews for various activities. 

These analysts draw from the MFT statement to develop a performance 

work statement that identifies the work to be done. In determining 

manpower requirements, analysts also consider maintenance 

requirements and staffing standards, among other factors. In contrast to 

shipboard manpower requirements, which are determined using a model, 

each shore command establishes its own procedures and methodology to 

determine and validate manpower requirements due to the variations 

among the commands’ missions and workload. These procedures and 

methodology are to be analytically proven, such as through industrial 

 1

An activity is a unit, organization, or installation performing a specific mission or function 

and established under a commanding officer or officer in charge.

Appendix II: Shore Support Manpower 

Requirements Process
Appendix II: Shore Support Manpower 

Requirements Process

Page 43 GAO-17-413 Navy Force Structure

engineering studies, mathematical models, and better business practices, 

among others.2 Major shore commands develop manpower requirements 

for peacetime and wartime scenarios separately, in which the workload 

and thus manpower requirements could vary. Major shore commands 

must review manpower requirements on a continuous basis to ensure 

they support the MFT, and should determine manpower requirements 

after major revisions to the MFT, new equipment changes, technology 

adjustments to workflow, or other changing conditions.3

After major shore commands determine and validate their manpower 

requirements, the positions are filled based on budget and resource 

allocation decisions. The major shore commands create a Program 

Objective Memorandum, which informs the service’s, department’s, and 

ultimately the President’s budget submission, which is subject to 

congressional approval. Thus, changes to manpower requirements do not 

result in immediate changes to shore personnel manning and, 

furthermore, there may be a gap between the validated requirements and 

the shore personnel manning due to funding and personnel inventory as 

established by annual defense authorization and appropriation acts.

In January 2008, responding to a request from the Office of the Chief of 

Naval Operations (OPNAV), the Center for Naval Analyses identified 

challenges with the shore manpower determination process, including a 

lack of standardization among similar activities and issues with staff 

qualifications, among others, which echoed our previous findings in a 

1997 report on Navy personnel.4 According to Navy officials, OPNAV is 

chairing a project team to improve the process and deliver revised 

direction for making shore activity plans and establishing training for 

determining shore manpower requirements, due in fiscal year 2017. The 

project team also plans to encourage major shore commands to measure 

workload using standard methods of analysis for similar activities. In 

September 2016, Fleet Forces Command launched a pilot training 

program for analysts of other shore commands, intended to improve the 

consistency in how various major shore commands conduct their 

 2

Office of the Chief of Naval Operations Instruction (OPNAVINST) 1000.16L, Navy Total 

Force Manpower Policies and Procedures (June 24, 2015) (change transmittal 1, Apr. 28, 

2016). 

3

Ibid.

4

GAO, Force Structure: Streamlining Plans Could Enable Navy to Reduce Personnel 

Below Fiscal Year 1999 Goal, GAO/NSIAD-97-90 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 18, 1997).
Appendix II: Shore Support Manpower 

Requirements Process

Page 44 GAO-17-413 Navy Force Structure

manpower reviews. In addition, Fleet Forces Command is working with 

OPNAV to develop a model to predict changes in shore manpower 

needs.
Page 45 GAO-17-413 Navy Force Structure

Appendix III: Ford-Class Aircraft Carrier

Ford-Class Aircraft Carrier

(CVN 78)

Technology and automation: 

Technologies and ship design initiatives are expected to reduce 

watchstanding workload requirements and touch-labor required for some 

tasks (e.g., redesigned nuclear reactor plant is expected to result in a 50 

percent manning reduction). Some of these technologies are detailed in table 4.

Table 4: CVN 78 Technologies, with Projected Manpower Reductions

Technology Manpower reduction (in positions)

Advanced arresting gear 41

Advanced weapons elevator Over 20

Dual band radar: multifunction radar and volume 

search radar 28

Electromagnetic aircraft launch system 32

Nuclear propulsion and electric plant 

220 (includes reverse osmosis desalination 

system)

Source: GAO analysis of Navy information. | GAO-17-413

Shore support:

CVN 78’s projected crew reductions do not depend on transferring 

maintenance or other work ashore. Program officials said that manpower 

reductions have been realized through the above technologies and design 

efficiencies or through changing work processes.

Crew size growth: 

CVN 78 has not experienced crew size growth but has not yet entered active 

service. The preliminary manpower requirement set in 2011 and 

reestablished in 2017 called for 2,628 personnel, which is the current ship’s 

force crew size.1 Technology schedule delays (e.g., advance weapons 

elevators and dual band radar) have impacted the validation of preventive 

maintenance or watchstanding assumptions, or both, but are not believed by 

Navy officials to impact crew levels. Program officials noted that the crew 

size can grow by an additional 163 positions and still remain within the 

parameters. However, we have found that because of the lack of operational 

data on key systems, these ships will likely require additional personnel, and 

that the aircraft carrier can only accommodate a slight increase in personnel 

without requiring significant ship redesign.2

Operating and Support Costs: 

The Department of Defense (DOD) estimates that it will cost an average of 

about $391 million to operate and support a CVN 78 ship per year, and 

calculates the average annual cost for Nimitz-class aircraft carriers to be

about $490 million. There are not sufficient cost data available to determine 

CVN 78 operating and support savings because this ship is not yet in active 

service. 

 1

The ship’s force includes all personnel aboard the carrier except those designated as part of the air 

wing and in certain support or other assigned roles. An additional 1,912 personnel are expected to 

embark with the ship in addition to the ship’s force. 

2

GAO, Ford-Class Aircraft Carrier: Congress Should Consider Revising Cost Cap Legislation to 

Include All Construction Costs, GAO-15-22 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 20, 2014). 

Ship basics

CVN 78 ships are designed to 

replace Nimitz-class (CVN 68) 

aircraft carriers and operate with 

nearly 700 fewer crew members. 

Each ship in the new class is 

expected to save $3.7 billion in 

manpower costs and $2 billion in 

maintenance costs over its 50-year 

service life in comparison to Nimitzclass carriers. 

Crew size 

Goal: CVN 78 has manpower key 

performance parameters that 

reflect a reduction of 900 

(objective) and 500 (threshold) 

positions compared to Nimitz-class 

carriers, which have a crew of 

3,291 sailors. 

Actual: CVN 78 crew size is 

currently 2,628, a reduction of 663 

sailors below the Nimitz class, and 

within the threshold of 2,791. 

Challenges

Four of CVN 78’s 13 critical 

technologies remain immature, 

testing continues to reveal issues, 

and ship delivery has been delayed 

multiple times since 2014, with 

expected delivery in 2017. 

In August 2016, DOD 

commissioned a review to 

determine where system 

dependencies pose risk to CVN 78 

performance and to identify 

alternatives for mitigating those 

risks. The study concluded that it 

would be too disruptive to make 

any technological changes at this 

point, but noted the ongoing risk.
Page 46 GAO-17-413 Navy Force Structure

Appendix IV: Zumwalt-Class Destroyer

Zumwalt-Class Destroyer

(DDG 1000)

Technology and automation: 

The DDG 1000 has multiple new technologies designed in part to minimize 

manpower requirements, enhance efficiency, and reduce operating costs:

• multifunction radar that significantly reduces manning by enabling 

automatic operation with minimal human intervention,

• fire control systems that mitigate firefighting risks while enabling 

manpower reductions, 

• a total ship computing environment that integrates all warfighting and 

peacetime applications into a single network and enables reduced 

numbers of watchstanders. 

According to program officials, the ship’s efficient interior layout has also 

made it possible to reduce crew size. 

Shore support: 

DDG 1000’s shore-side support and maintenance are key elements that 

enable a significant reduction in crew when compared with previous 

destroyers, but shore-based maintenance will be accomplished through 

existing infrastructure such as regional maintenance centers and shipyards, 

while the training, logistics, and administrative assistance will be 

accomplished using military, civilian, and contractor personnel from the 

program office and class squadron. 

Crew size growth: 

The preliminary manpower requirement set in 2012 called for a crew of 158, 

and DDG 1000 has reached its crew size threshold of 175 personnel (crew 

size growth of 11 per cent). According to program officials, crew size 

increase was the result of lessons learned, and the crew approach was 

developed and updated as the ship design matured and ship construction 

progressed. Program officials suggested that crew size parameters should 

be reassessed and, if additional personnel are needed on the ship, there is 

space to accommodate them. Based on the Navy’s ship delivery approach, 

DDG 1000 entered service in 2016 without any of its combat systems tested 

and sufficient time has not elapsed to evaluate the impact of the design and 

new technologies on manpower and costs. According to program officials, 

due to the crew’s initial learning curve for new combat systems, ship 

commanders may require more crew in the short term.

Operating and Support Costs: 

The Department of Defense estimates that it will cost an average of about 

$74 million to operate and support a DDG 1000 per year, and calculates the 

average annual cost for DDG 51 ships to be about $33 million, so there is not 

a cost savings expected. Since DDG 1000 has recently entered service, 

there are not sufficient actual cost data available to compare against the 

estimate. 

Ship basics

Compared to DDG 51 destroyers, 

which have an average crew size 

of 307 sailors, the DDG 1000 class 

is meant to require fewer crew 

members to carry out similar 

functions for watchstations, 

damage control, combat systems 

maintenance, and turbines. 

Crew size 

Goal: DDG 1000 has manpower 

key performance parameters for a 

crew of 125 (objective) and 175 

(threshold). 

Actual: The ship’s current crew 

size is 175 (this includes a ship’s 

force of 147 and an aviation 

detachment of 28).

Challenges

Six of DDG 1000’s 11 critical 

technologies remain immature. The 

program reports that the ship’s 

design is stable, but ongoing 

development and shipboard testing 

of technologies pose risk for design 

changes. DDG 1000 was delivered 

to the Navy in May 2016 and was 

commissioned in October 2016. 

The performance of DDG 1000’s 

critical technologies and how they 

will be implemented in the fleet will 

not be known until all combat 

systems have been installed on the 

ship and it gains more operational 

experience. 
Page 47 GAO-17-413 Navy Force Structure

Appendix V: Littoral Combat Ship (LCS)

Littoral Combat Ship (LCS)

Freedom (LCS 1) variant

Independence (LCS 2) variant

Technology and automation: 

The extensive use of automation and the overall design of the ship are meant 

to reduce manning on LCS. The class relies on a condition-based 

maintenance system wherein sensors and cameras remotely monitor 

equipment and spaces, reducing watchstanding requirements and thus crew 

sizes. 

Shore Support: 

Crew size reductions were also achieved by moving much of the 

maintenance traditionally executed by the ship’s crew to shore-based 

contractors. Administrative, supply, and logistics tasks are also moved 

ashore, to be conducted by LCS Squadron staff. The number of squadron 

staff has increased along with the number of LCSs entering the fleet: from 

around 40 staff to support the first LCS in 2008 to about 470 total staff to 

support the seven LCSs delivered to the fleet by June 2016. 

Crew size growth: 

Total LCS crew size has grown from 75 in 2003 to 98 personnel in 2016, a 

31 per cent increase that is detailed in table 5. Following a program review in 

2016, LCS core and mission crews were integrated into a 70-sailor unit. 

There are 98 sailor berths within the ship; additional crew growth is not 

possible without redesigning interior spaces to accommodate more sailors. 

Table 5: Growth in Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Crew Size

Number of crew 2003 Changes through 2014 2016 

Core crew 40 50 Integrated core and 

mission crew of 70 Mission crew (1 of 3):

Antisubmarine (ASW)

Surface warfare (SUW)

Mine countermeasure (MCM) 15

ASW:15

SUW: 19

MCM: 20

Aviation detachment 20 23 24

Ensignsa 0 3 4

Total 75 91-96 98

Source: GAO analysis of Navy information. | GAO-17-413.

a

The Navy does not consider ensigns (junior officers) to be required by manpower analysis, but they 

nonetheless serve as functional members of every LCS crew due to their availability.

Operating and support costs: 

The Department of Defense estimates that it will cost an average of about 

$55 million to operate and support an LCS per year. Although the Navy has 

described the LCS as a low-cost alternative to other surface ship classes, we 

found in 2014 that the available data indicate that the costs of the LCS may 

exceed or closely align with the costs of other multimission surface ships with 

larger crews.1

 According to Navy officials, the recent restructuring of LCS 

operational concepts demonstrates that reducing crew size does not 

generate the cost savings or cost avoidance that the Navy had anticipated.

 1

GAO, Littoral Combat Ship: Deployment of USS Freedom Revealed Risks in Implementing 

Operational Concepts and Uncertain Costs, GAO-14-447 (Washington, D.C.: July 8, 2014).

Ship basics 

The LCS class consists of two 

different variants that are expected 

to replace frigates, mine 

countermeasures ships, and patrol 

coastal ships. Each ship is to 

undertake one of three missions: 

antisubmarine warfare, surface 

warfare, or mine countermeasures. 

The use of minimal manning was 

meant to lower operating and 

support costs over the ships’ life 

cycle, compared to legacy frigates 

that had a crew size of 215. 

Crew size 

Goal: LCS has manpower key 

performance parameters for a core 

crew of 15 (objective) and 50 

(threshold). 

Actual: Recent changes to the 

LCS program have created an 

integrated core and mission crew 

of 70 sailors. Total number of ship 

crew including an aviation 

detachment and ensigns is 98. 

Challenges

Sensors and other condition-based 

maintenance elements have 

functionality issues. Ship systems, 

including those in the propulsion 

plant that have recently 

experienced major casualties, 

indicate additional reliability issues. 

The Navy required LCS engineers 

to retrain following these major 

equipment failures, attributing 

some of them to human error. LCS 

personnel are concerned that these 

problems will continue with 

manning at current levels, even 

with the latest program changes. 
Page 48 GAO-17-413 Navy Force Structure

Appendix VI: San Antonio–Class Amphibious Transport Dock

San Antonio–Class Amphibious Transport 

Dock

(LPD 17)

Technology and automation: 

Some system integration and automation was installed on the ship in part to 

help reduce watchstanding workload and reduce crew sizes, including a 

shipboard-wide network that integrates combat, navigation, and other 

systems.

Shore support: 

The ship class does not rely upon shore support for maintenance or other 

activities more than other amphibious ships, and not to the extent of newer 

platforms like the Littoral Combat Ship and DDG 1000. 

Crew size growth: 

The preliminary manpower requirement set in 2003 called for a crew of 363, 

and the ship’s current manpower requirement is 378 personnel, a 4 percent 

increase. The average crew size of its antecedent ship class, LPD 4, was 

364 sailors. Since the first ship of the class began construction in 2000, LPD 

17 manpower requirements were adjusted through multiple iterations. The 

increase in the average crew size was driven by additional manning 

requirements related to system upgrades, and by manpower studies that

identified and subsequently corrected other manning deficiencies. Crew 

members told us the ships do not have berthing spaces to accommodate 

additional Navy personnel without infringing upon designated spaces for 

Marines, who embark with the ship. 

Operating and Support Costs: 

Average annual LPD 17 operating and support costs are $42.8 million, 

compared to $36.4 million for its antecedent ship, LPD 4, an average annual 

per ship increase of $6.4 million. 

GAO reported in 2016 that the Navy plans to build a replacement class of 

amphibious ships based on LPD design but with no new critical technologies. 

The Navy considers the LPD 17 design unaffordable and plans to remove 

some LPD 17 features on its replacement. The program office would not 

comment more about the planned replacement given its competition 

sensitivity.

Ship basics

These ships are designed to 

transport Marines and their 

equipment and allow them to land 

using helicopters, landing craft, and 

amphibious vehicles. This class 

was designed to reduce crew sizes 

from earlier LPDs but does not rely 

upon new technologies, 

automation, or shore support as do 

newer ship classes. 

Crew size 

Goal: The LPD 17 program was 

tasked to reduce the manning for 

the 12 ships of its class by 25

percent of the total for the 41 ships 

it has replaced. 

Actual: While there were about 

14,000 crew members on 

antecedent ships, the LPD 17 class 

has a total crew size of less than 

5,000, which falls within the 25

percent reduction target. There 

were no crew size target numbers 

or key performance parameters 

specified for LPD 17. 

Challenges

During interviews with the LPD 

crews, officers and enlisted crew 

members we interviewed from two 

ships of this class told us that they 

did not believe the manpower 

requirement was sufficient for 

carrying out all required operations. 

The Navy last validated the LPD 17 

manpower requirement in 2011, 

and officials told us they are

tentatively scheduled to update it in 

fiscal years 2018 or 2019. 
Appendix VII: Shore Support Personnel

Page 49 GAO-17-413 Navy Force Structure

As the Navy reduced crew sizes aboard its ships as part of optimal 

manning and related initiatives beginning in 2001, it also reduced shore 

support positions in units responsible for maintenance and training. 

However, these positions have been mostly restored as of fiscal year 

2015. From a peak in fiscal year 2006, the Navy reduced military 

personnel in units supporting surface ships by about 1,800 full-time 

equivalents (or about 24 percent) by fiscal year 2011. The Navy’s Fleet 

Review Panel found that these reductions in shore support also 

contributed to degraded material condition of the surface fleet, and Navy 

officials told us they concluded that that the reductions in shore support 

contributed to declines in readiness during optimal manning. As of fiscal 

year 2015, the Navy has restored shore positions in units supporting 

surface ships to approximately their previous peak in fiscal year 2006.

Within shore support, however, there is variation in the extent to which 

positions have been restored. For example, positions in regional 

maintenance centers—which are responsible for conducting and 

overseeing intermediate-level maintenance on Navy ships—are about 19 

percent above their prior peak in fiscal year 2006. Conversely, positions 

in training units that support surface ships and their crews remain about 

13 percent below their prior peak in fiscal year 2006.

Appendix VII: Shore Support Personnel
Appendix VIII: Average Operating and Support 

Costs and Crew Sizes by Ship Class

Page 50 GAO-17-413 Navy Force Structure

Our analysis found that overall operating and support costs increased for 

surface and amphibious ship classes during the optimal manning period 

and have continued to increase for most classes since the end of the 

optimal manning period.1 This increase was driven in part by increases in 

maintenance costs offsetting decreases in personnel costs over this 

period. In technical comments on a draft of this report, Navy officials cited 

growth in entitlements and allowances as an additional contributing factor 

to increasing personnel costs over this period. Navy officials also noted 

that using different deployment models such as overseas homeporting 

and rotational crewing can also drive significant differences in operating 

and support costs even within a ship class, usually with the benefits of 

increased time on deployment. However, as we found in 2015, these 

approaches can also contribute to higher maintenance costs over the 

long term. Specifically, we found that ships homeported overseas incur 

higher operating and support costs than U.S.-homeported ships, and that 

some of these ships have had consistently deferred maintenance that 

resulted in long-term degraded material condition and increased 

maintenance costs.2 Our 2015 analysis also showed that homeporting 

ships overseas provides additional time in a forward area of operations 

and additional deployed under way time compared to ships homeported 

in the United States, but that the additional time provided was primarily 

because training and maintenance periods are shorter than those 

provided for U.S.-homeported ships. Trends in ship operating and support 

costs for each ship class over this period are illustrated in figures 11 and 

12.

 1

Operating and support costs include all costs reported in the Navy’s Visibility and 

Management of Operating and Support Costs system. The costs reported include 

personnel, operations, maintenance, sustainment, and modernization for each ship. 

Personnel costs include the costs of all military, civilian and contractor manpower. 

Operations includes consumption of operating materials such as fuel, electricity, 

expendable stores, training munitions and other operating materials, unit-funded support 

activities, temporary additional duty/temporary duty associated with the unit’s normal 

concept of operations, and unit-funded transportation services. Maintenance includes the 

cost of labor (outside of the scope of organizational-level) and materials at all levels of 

maintenance. Sustainment includes the cost of support services provided by centrally 

managed support activities, such as system-specific training and engineering support. 

Modernization includes the cost of hardware and software updates that occur after 

deployment of a system that improve a system’s safety, reliability, maintainability, or 

performance characteristics to enable the system to meet its basic operational 

requirements throughout its life. 

2

GAO, Navy Force Structure: Sustainable Plan and Comprehensive Assessment Needed 

to Mitigate Long-Term Risks to Ships Assigned to Overseas Homeports, GAO-15-329 

(Washington, D.C.: May 29, 2015). 

Appendix VIII: Average Operating and 

Support Costs and Crew Sizes by Ship 

Class
Appendix VIII: Average Operating and Support 

Costs and Crew Sizes by Ship Class

Page 51 GAO-17-413 Navy Force Structure

Figure 11: Average Operating and Support Costs and Crew Sizes by Ship Class for Cruisers (CG 47) and Destroyers (DDG 51), 

Fiscal Years 2000–2015

a

Other costs” consists of operations, sustainment, and modernization costs.
Appendix VIII: Average Operating and Support 

Costs and Crew Sizes by Ship Class

Page 52 GAO-17-413 Navy Force Structure

Figure 12: Average Operating and Support Costs and Crew Sizes by Ship Class for Amphibious Assault Ships (LHD 1), Dock 

Landing Ships (LSD 41/49) and Aircraft Carriers (CVN 68), Fiscal Years 2000–2015

a

”Other costs” consists of operations, sustainment, and modernization costs.
Appendix IX: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 53 GAO-17-413 Navy Force Structure

Appendix IX: Comments from the 

Department of Defense
Appendix X: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

Page 54 GAO-17-413 Navy Force Structure

John H. Pendleton, (202) 512-3489 or pendletonj@gao.gov

In addition to the contact named above, Suzanne Wren, Assistant 

Director; Steven Banovac; Kerri Eisenbach; Bonnie Ho; Joanne 

Landesman; Amie Lesser; Shahrzad Nikoo; Daniel Ramsey; Michael 

Silver; John Van Schaik; and Chris Watson made key contributions to this 

report.

Appendix X: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

GAO Contact

Staff 

Acknowledgments

(100702)
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