alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
§ 1.1311(b)-3 Existence of relationship in case of adjustment by way of deficiency assessment. ( a ) Except for cases described in paragraph (b) of § 1.1312-3, no adjustment by way of a deficiency assessment shall be made, with respect to a related taxpayer, unless the relationship existed both at some time during the taxable year with respect to which the error was made and at the time the taxpayer with respect to whom the determination is made first maintained the inconsistent position with respect to the taxable year to which the determination relates. In the case of an adjustment by way of a deficiency assessment under the circumstance described in paragraph (b) of § 1.1312-3 (where the maintenance of an inconsistent position is not required), the relationship need exist only at some time during the taxable year in which the error was made.
( b ) If the inconsistent position is maintained in a return, claim for refund, or petition (or amended petition) to the Tax Court of the United States for the taxable year in respect to which the determination is made, the requisite relationship must exist on the date of filing such document. If the inconsistent position is maintained in more than one of such documents, the requisite date is the date of filing of the document in which it was first maintained. If the inconsistent position was not thus maintained, then the relationship must exist on the date of the determination as, for example, where at the instance of the taxpayer a deduction is allowed, the right to which was not asserted in a return, claim for refund, or petition to the Tax Court, and a determination is effected by means of a closing agreement or an agreement under section 1313(a)(4).
[T.D. 6500, 25 FR 12033, Nov. 26, 1960]
_______________________________________ __ Michigan Supreme Court 

# Order

Lansing, Michigan



### July 29, 2008 Clifford W. Taylor, Chief Justice



### 136202 Michael F. Cavanagh Elizabeth A. Weaver Marilyn Kelly Maura D. Corrigan 

### PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, Robert P. Young, Jr. Stephen J. Markman, Justices



### v SC: 136202 COA: 269298 Genesee CC: 05-017154-FC OMAR RASHAD POUNCY, Defendant-Appellant.

________________ _______________ __________/

On order of the Court, the applicati on for leave to appeal the March 25, 2008 judgment of the Court of Appeals is consid ered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

t0721 I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Mi chigan Supreme Cour t, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

July 29, 2008

Clerk
Editorial Note on Part 864
Editorial Note: Nomenclature changes to part 864 appear at 73 FR 35341, June 23, 2008.

§ 864.9205 Blood and plasma warming device. ( a ) *Nonelectromagnetic blood or plasma warming device* — ( 1 ) *Identification.* A nonelectromagnetic blood and plasma warming device is a device that warms blood or plasma, by means other than electromagnetic radiation, prior to administration.
( 2 ) *Classification.* Class II (performance standards).
( b ) *Electromagnetic blood and plasma warming device* — ( 1 ) *Identification.* An electromagnetic blood and plasma warming device is a device that employs electromagnetic radiation (radiowaves or microwaves) to warm a bag or bottle of blood or plasma prior to administration.
( 2 ) *Classfication.* Class III (premarket approval).
( c ) *Date PMA or notice of completion of a PDP is required.* No effective date has been established of the requirement for premarket approval for the device described in paragraph (b)(1). See § 864.3.
[45 FR 60642, Sept. 12, 1980, as amended at 52 FR 17733, May 11, 1987]
exv10wnn



 





Exhibit 10(nn)




CenterPoint Energy, Inc.

Summary of Named Executive Officer Compensation




     The following is a summary of compensation paid to the named executive officers of CenterPoint
Energy, Inc. (the “Company”). For additional information regarding the compensation of the named
executive officers, please read the definitive proxy statement relating to the Company’s 2007
annual meeting of shareholders to be filed pursuant to Regulation 14A and the Company’s Current
Report on Form 8-K referenced below.



     Base Salary. The following table sets forth the annual base salary of the Company’s named
executive officers effective April 1, 2007:



	 	 	 	 	 
	Name and Position	 	2006 Base Salary
	 
	 	 	 	 
	David M. McClanahan

President and Chief Executive Officer

	 	$	1,030,000	 
	 
	 	 	 	 
	Gary L. Whitlock

Executive Vice President

and Chief Financial Officer

	 	$	475,000	 
	 
	 	 	 	 
	Scott E. Rozzell

Executive Vice President, General

Counsel and Corporate Secretary

	 	$	445,000	 
	 
	 	 	 	 
	Thomas R. Standish

Senior Vice President and Group

President — Regulated Operations

	 	$	421,000	 
	 
	 	 	 	 
	Byron R. Kelley

Senior Vice President and Group

President,

CenterPoint Energy Pipelines and Field Services

	 	$	372,000	 






     Short-Term Incentive Compensation Plan. Annual bonuses are paid to the Company’s named
executive officers pursuant to the Company’s short-term incentive compensation plan, which provides
for cash bonuses based on the achievement of certain performance objectives approved in accordance
with the terms of the plan at the commencement of the year. Information regarding performance
goals for the named executive officers for 2007 is contained in the Company’s Current Report on
Form 8-K dated February 21, 2007.



     Long-Term Incentive Compensation. Under the Company’s long-term incentive plan, the Company’s
named executive officers may receive grants of (i) stock option awards, (ii) performance share
awards, (iii) performance unit awards and/or (iv) stock awards. The forms of the award agreements
pursuant to the Company’s long-term incentive plan are contained in the Company’s Current Report on
Form 8-K dated February 21, 2007.
39336.

#### EMPLOYERS MUTUAL LIABILITY INSURANCE COMPANY *et al.*v. SHEETS.

Frankum, Judge.

“ (a) An agreement between the parties to a workmen’s compensation case duly signed and approved by the board is, in the absence of fraud, accident, or mistake, conclusive as to the matters agreed upon, and the approval by the board of the agreement has the same legal effect as an award of the board made after a hearing of the issues, (b) *735By ‘change of condition’ is meant a change in the physical condition of the claimant *subsequent to*the entering of the award. Proof, therefore, by the claimant on rehearing that he is disabled, if such disability existed in the same degree and to the same extent at the time of the first hearing, is not sufficient to justify a change in the award based on a change of condition, as the previous hearing on this theory becomes *res judicata*up to and including the time of such hearing.” *Georgia Marine Salvage Co. v. Merritt,*82 Ga. App. 111, 112 (1) (60 SE2d 410). See also *Hartford Accident &c. Co. v. Camp,*69 Ga. App. 758 (26 SE2d 670); *Miller v. Hartford Accident &c. Co.,*86 Ga. App. 503 (71 SE2d 782).

Decided April 10, 1962.

The employer made an application under *Code Ann.*§ 114-700 to the State Board of Workmen’s Compensation for a hearing based upon an alleged change in condition of the employee, which application was made after an agreement for compensation between the employer and employee had been filed with and approved by the board. Upon a hearing, a single director determined the issue adversely to the employer. The employer appealed to the superior court, and the award of the director was affirmed. From this ruling the employer appealed to this court, assigning error upon the affirmance of the award. The basis of the alleged change of condition was that a doctor, who examined the claimant (employee) after the injury and whose diagnosis was the basis of the company entering into an agreement to pay compensation, had changed his diagnosis from the one he first gave, which indicated a compensable injury, to one which showed a non-compensable injury. However, there was evidence before the director showing no change of condition. As stated by the superior court judge in affirming the award: “There is evidence that the *diagnosis*of claimant’s condition has changed. There is evidence, however, to support the award that there has been *no change in condition.”*(Emphasis added.) See *Miller v. Hartford Accident &c. Co.,*86 Ga. App. 503, supra. Accordingly, “Where an award of compensation is supported by any competent evidence it is binding on the courts, . . ” *Bussey v. Globe Indem. Co.,*81 Ga. App. 401 (50 SE2d 34).

*Judgment affirmed.*

*Nichols, P. J., and Jordan, J., concur.*

*736*Lee B. Williams,*for plaintiffs in error.

*Poole, Pearce & Hall, Martin H. Bubin,*contra.
(logo)Rialto

CAPITAL

 

 

**2018 Annual Statement of Servicer Compliance (Item1123)**

 

 

Poolingand Servicing Agreement (the "Pooling and Servicing Agreement") datedas of August 1, 2015 by and among J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial MortgageSecurities Corp., as Depositor, Midland Loan Services a division of PNC Bank,National Association as Master Servicer, Rialto Capital Advisors, LLC asSpecial Servicer, Wells Fargo Bank, National Association as CertificateAdministrator and as Trustee and Pentalpha Surveillance LLC as Senior TrustAdvisor relating to the JPMBB Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2015-C31,Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2015-C31 **(JPMBB2015-C31)**

 

Theundersigned, a duly authorized officer of Rialto Capital Advisors, LLC, asspecial servicer (the "Special Servicer") herein certifies to thefollowing: 

 

1.       All servicing activities and performanceof such servicing activities under the Pooling and Servicing Agreement areperformed on behalf of the Special Servicer.

 

2.       A review of the servicing activities andperformance by the Special Servicer for the period of July 5, 2018 to December31, 2018 (the "Reporting Period") in accordance with the Pooling andServicing Agreement has been conducted under my supervision.

 

3.       Tothe best of my knowledge, based on such review, the Special Servicer hasfulfilled all of its obligations under the terms of the Pooling and ServicingAgreement, in all material respects for the Reporting Period and if there hasbeen a failure to fulfill any such obligations in any material respect, eachfailure and the nature and status thereof has been specifically identifiedherein.

 

 

Certifiedby: /s/ Adam Singer

AdamSinger, Managing Director 

 

Date:March 1, 2019
#### § 1.1402(e)(4)-1 Treatment of certain remuneration paid in 1955 and 1956 as wages.

If in 1955 or 1956 an individual was paid remuneration for service described in section 3121(b)(8)(A) which was erroneously treated by the organization employing him (under a certificate filed by such organization pursuant to section 3121(k) or the corresponding section of prior law) as employment, within the meaning of the Federal Insurance Contributions Act (Chapter 21 of the Internal Revenue Code), and if on or before August 30, 1957, the taxes imposed by sections 3101 and 3111 were paid (in good faith and upon the assumption that the insurance system established by title II of the Social Security Act had been extended to such service) with respect to any part of the remuneration paid to such individual for such service, then the remuneration with respect to which such taxes were paid, and with respect to which no credit or refund of such taxes (other than a credit or refund which would be allowable if such service had constituted employment) has been obtained either by the employer or the employee on or before August 30, 1957, shall be deemed, for purposes of the Self-Employment Contributions Act of 1954 and the Federal Insurance Contributions Act, to constitute remuneration paid for employment and not net earnings from self-employment. For regulations relating to section 3121(b)(8)(A) and (k), see § 31.3121(b)(8)-1 of subpart B of part 31 of this chapter (Employment Tax Regulations).

[T.D. 6500, 25 FR 11402, Nov. 26, 1960, as amended by T.D. 9849, 84 FR 9237, Mar. 14, 2019]
EX-31 Rule13a-14(d)/15d-14(d) Certifications.

 

 

I, Anthony Sfarra,certify that:

 

1. I have reviewedthis report on Form 10-K and all reports on Form 10-D required to be filed inrespect of the period covered by this report on Form 10-K of the Wells FargoCommercial Mortgage Trust 2015-C30 (the "Exchange Act periodicreports");

 

2. Based on myknowledge, the Exchange Act periodic reports, taken as a whole, do not containany untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material factnecessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances underwhich such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the periodcovered by this report;

 

3. Based on myknowledge, all of the distribution, servicing and other information required tobe provided under Form 10-D for the period covered by this report is includedin the Exchange Act periodic reports;

 

4. Based on myknowledge and the servicer compliance statements required in this report underItem 1123 of Regulation AB, and except as disclosed in the Exchange Actperiodic reports, the servicers have fulfilled their obligations under theservicing agreements in all material respects; and

 

5. All of the reportson assessment of compliance with servicing criteria for asset-backed securitiesand their related attestation reports on assessment of compliance withservicing criteria for asset-backed securities required to be included in thisreport in accordance with Item 1122 of Regulation AB and Exchange Act Rules13a-18 and 15d-18 have been included as an exhibit tothis report, except as otherwise disclosed in thisreport. Any material instances of noncompliance described in such reports havebeen disclosed in this report on Form 10-K.

 

In giving thecertifications above, I have reasonably relied on information provided to me bythe following unaffiliated parties:

 

National CooperativeBank, N.A., as NCB Master Servicer, Rialto Capital Advisors, LLC, as SpecialServicer, National Cooperative Bank, N.A., as NCB Special Servicer, Wilmington Trust, National Association, as Trustee, PentalphaSurveillance LLC, as Trust Advisor, CoreLogic Commercial Real Estate Services,Inc., as Servicing Function Participant, and National Tax Search, LLC, asServicing Function Participant.

 

 

 

Dated: March 18,2020

 

 

/s/ AnthonySfarra

 

 

President

(seniorofficer in charge of securitization of the depositor)
39312.

#### JACOBS v. FELMET *et al.*

*235Decided January 17, 1962

Rehearing denied January 25, 1962.

*Nick Long, Jr., Cook, Lloy*<cft *Long,*for plaintiff in error.

*Hurt, Gaines, Baird, Peek & Peabody, Joe C. Freeman, Nall, Miller, Cadenhead & Dennis, A. Paul Cadenhead, Thomas Allan Bice,*contra.

Custer, Judge.

The plaintiff Jacobs was riding as an invited guest in the automobile of the defendant Felmet, which was proceeding north on Lee Street in the City of Atlanta in the left hand north traffic lane in a four-lane street. Suddenly and without warning the brakes on Felmet’s vehicle failed and although he was driving only 15 miles per hour, in an effort to avoid a collision with the northbound traffic, he pulled his automobile to the left attempting to enter an intersecting street. He testified that his left front wheel “grabbed and pulled me out in the other lane”; as it pulled to his left he let up on his brake and applied it again. When he applied it the second time it pulled him farther to the left, completely out of the northbound lane. “I meant to get back into my lane going-north but there wasn’t room because this station wagon pulled into my lane after I was having this difficulty. . . I had pulled across into the approaching southbound lane when I noticed the station wagon going to my right. . . When I looked I knew I couldn’t get in there, it was impossible without hitting it.”

When the defendant Felmet had discovered that he had no brakes, he made the statement, “Lord help me, I have no brakes.” The plaintiff testified that there was a big Cadillac station wagon in front of him and the plaintiff said, “Don’t hit this station wagon over here.” He was traveling at 15 miles per hour but ran head on into a southbound vehicle belonging to the defendant Collins which was traveling in the Collins’ *236traffic lane at approximately 35 miles per hour, which was not in violation of the ordinance regulating speed at that place.

The plaintiff testified: “Before the accident there was never any indication to me except that Mr. Felmet was driving in a safe and cautious manner. I felt perfectly safe with him and I relied on him. Then all of a sudden the brakes gave way.” There was no evidence that the defendant Felmet had any knowledge or notice of any defect in his brakes until they suddenly gave way as above related. *Mathis v. Mathis,*42 Ga. App. 1 (3) (155 SE 88) is authority for our holding that there was no proof of negligence, either ordinary or gross, on the part of the defendant Felmet. It takes no argument to> demonstrate that there was no proven negligence as against the defendant Collins.

Therefore, the trial judge correctly directed verdicts in favor of both defendants.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*Carlisle, P. J., and Eberhardt, J., concur.*
39371.

#### HARROLD v. THE STATE.

Nichols, Presiding Judge.

On April 17, 1961, the plaintiff was indicted for burglary and on May 31, 1961, after formal arraignment and a plea of not guilty, was tried and convicted. Thereafter, his motion for new trial as amended was denied and he now assigns error on such judgment. *Held:*

1. The defendant expressly abandons special ground number 1 of the amended motion for new trial.

2. The sole remaining special ground of the amended motion for new1 trial complains that the defendant was denied his constitutional rights to have benefit of counsel at all times before the trial of the case, while a confession was made and while the defendant pointed out to the investigating officers the route taken by him on the night of the alleged burglary; however, the real complaints seem to be that such evidence was introduced on the trial, but no objection was made, according to the record, to any evidence adduced on the trial of the case, and no question for consideration is made, for, at the time the evidence was introduced, the defendant was represented, and the time to object to such evidence was on the trial of the case and not for the first time in the motion for new trial. See *Seymour v. State,*210 Ga. 21 (77 SE2d 519); s.c., 210 Ga. 571 (81 SE2d 808); *Harrison v. State,*83 Ga. App. 367 (64 SE2d 83). Such situation is distinguishable from such cases as *Fair v. Balkcom,*216 Ga. 721 (119 SE2d 691), where a writ of habeas corpus was sought because the defendant was not represented by counsel at any time until after judgment.

The evidence authorized the verdict of guilty and the trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion for new trial.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*■ Frankum and Jordan, JJ., concur.*

*556Decided March 1, 1962

denied Rehearing March 15, 1962.

*Al Jennings,*for plaintiff in error.

*George D. Lawrence, Solicitor-General,*contra.
# C_2014261EN.01003401.xml

| 11.8.2014 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 261/34 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

11.8.2014

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 261/34

---

Action brought on 26 May 2014 — NICO v Council

(Case T-371/14)

2014/C 261/59

Language of the case: English

Parties

Parties

Applicant: Naftiran Intertrade Co. (NICO) Sàrl (Pully, Switzerland) (represented by: J. Grayston, Solicitor, P. Gjørtler, G. Pandey and D. Rovetta, lawyers)

Applicant:

Defendant: Council of the European Union

Defendant:

Form of order sought

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | annul the Council decision contained in the letter of 14 March 2014, addressed to the lawyers of the applicant, concerning review of the list of designated persons and entities in Annex II to Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against Iran, as amended by Council Decision 2012/635/CFSP of 15 October 2012, and in Annex IX to Regulation (EU) No 267/2012 concerning restrictive measures against Iran, as implemented by Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 945/2012 of 15 October 2012, in so far as the contested decision constitutes a refusal to remove the applicant from the list of persons and entities made subject to the restrictive measures; |
| --- | --- |

—

annul the Council decision contained in the letter of 14 March 2014, addressed to the lawyers of the applicant, concerning review of the list of designated persons and entities in Annex II to Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against Iran, as amended by Council Decision 2012/635/CFSP of 15 October 2012, and in Annex IX to Regulation (EU) No 267/2012 concerning restrictive measures against Iran, as implemented by Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 945/2012 of 15 October 2012, in so far as the contested decision constitutes a refusal to remove the applicant from the list of persons and entities made subject to the restrictive measures;

| — | join the present proceedings with the case T-6/13 in accordance with Article 50(1) of the Rules of Procedure; |
| --- | --- |

—

join the present proceedings with the case T-6/13 in accordance with Article 50(1) of the Rules of Procedure;

| — | order the Council to bear the costs of the present proceedings. |
| --- | --- |

—

order the Council to bear the costs of the present proceedings.

Pleas in law and main arguments

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the applicant relies on two pleas in law, alleging that the statement of grounds was insufficient and that the Council committed a manifest error of assessment.

The applicant argues that it is a not a subsidiary of Naftiran Intertrade Company (NICO) Limited, as this company no longer exists in Jersey, and in any case the Council has not substantiated that even if the applicant were a subsidiary of Naftiran Intertrade Company (NICO) Limited, this would entail an economic benefit for the Iranian State that would be contrary to the objective pursued by the contested measures.

---
Exhibit 4.6


                             CERTIFICATE OF TRUST OF
                      SCOTTISH HOLDINGS STATUTORY TRUST III

          THIS CERTIFICATE OF TRUST of Scottish Holdings Statutory Trust III
(the "Trust"), dated as of April 11, 2003, is being duly executed and filed by
the undersigned, as trustees, to form a statutory trust under the Delaware
Statutory Trust Act (12 Del. C. ss. 3801, et seq.).

          (i) Name. The name of the statutory trust being formed hereby is
Scottish Holdings Statutory Trust III.

          (ii) Delaware Trustee. The name and business address of the Trustee of
the Trust with a principal place of business in the State of Delaware is The
Bank of New York (Delaware), White Clay Center, Route 273, Newark, DE 19714.

          (iii) Counterparts. This Certificate of Trust may be executed in one
or more counterparts, all of which together shall constitute one and the same
instrument.

          (iv) Effective Date. This Certificate of Trust shall be effective as
of its filing.

          IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, being the trustees of the Trust,
have executed this Certificate of Trust as of the date first above written.

                                        The Bank of New York (Delaware),
                                        as Trustee


                                        By:    /s/ Michael Santino
                                               Name:   Michael Santino
                                               Title:  Senior Vice President


                                        ----------------------------------------
                                        Paul Goldean,
                                        as Trustee