J-S61021-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

TIMOTHY BALDWIN

Appellant No. 436 MDA 2015

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence of January 15, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County

Criminal Division at No.: CP-36-CR-0000769-2014

BEFORE: PANELLA, J., WECHT, J., and STRASSBURGER, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY WECHT, J.: FILED DECEMBER 02, 2015

Timothy Baldwin appeals the January 15, 2015 judgment of sentence, 

which was imposed after Baldwin was convicted of two counts of possession 

of a controlled substance with intent to deliver (“PWID”), 35 P.S. § 780-

113(a)(30). We affirm.

The trial court summarized the factual and procedural history of this 

case as follows:

On October 26, 2013, Detective [Roland] Breault was 

investigating a report of shots fired in the 500 block of East 

Strawberry Street, Lancaster, PA. Eventually, Kyle Baldwin was 

identified as a suspect; he was ultimately arrested and charged 

with discharge of a firearm into an occupied structure and 

recklessly endangering another person. On October 28, 2013, 

Detective Breault spoke to the victims of that incident; the 

victims informed Detective Breault that “within two days after 

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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the incident, three black males had approached [him] at his 

residence and had made comments to him about it.” Detective 

Breault testified that the “main part that really stuck was one of 

the individuals had commented that we watch your wife walk to 

work everyday and that they’re up there just to make money.” 

Detective Breault began an investigation to identify the three 

black males who made those comments to the victims. Based 

on his investigation, Detective Breault prepared a photo array 

including eight similarly featured individuals; [Baldwin] was one 

of the individuals in the photo array. The victim positively 

identified [Baldwin] as the person who had approached the 

victim and made comments to him. A week later, Detective 

Breault received information that [Baldwin] had parked his 

vehicle in front of the victim’s residence and stood in front of the 

residence for a period of time. The victim called police, but 

[Baldwin] was gone by the time officers arrived. On December 

6, 2013, Detective Breault received approval to file charges 

against [Baldwin] for intimidation of a victim or witness, which is 

graded as a [third-degree felony], based on the fact that the 

underlying charge was a discharge of a firearm into an occupied 

structure. The charges were filed before the issuing authority on 

December 19, 2013.

Detective Breault informed the other patrol officers that 

[Baldwin] was a suspect in an intimidation related to the 

shooting of October 26, 2013, and that Detective Breault would 

be preparing charges and obtaining a warrant. Officer [J.] 

Hatfield was one of the patrol officers informed before going out 

on duty and he saw a memorandum that included a picture of 

[Baldwin]. Officer Hatfield believed that there was an actual 

warrant out for [Baldwin’s] arrest and that [Baldwin] was 

actually still out and not arrested on that warrant. On December 

18, 2013, Officer Hatfield was on duty when he observed a 

vehicle traveling east on West Strawberry Street towards Vine 

Street; Officer Hatfield ran the registration tag on the vehicle, 

which indicted [that Baldwin] was the registered owner. Officer 

Hatfield asked over the radio if [Baldwin] was still wanted on the 

warrant; Officer Weaver[1] and Detective Breault advised 

[Officer Hatfield] that the warrant was still active. As the vehicle 

turned left, Officer Hatfield observed the driver of the vehicle; 

____________________________________________

1 Officer Weaver’s first name does not appear in the notes of testimony. 
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Officer Hatfield indicated [that] he believed [that Baldwin] was 

operating the vehicle. Detective Breault advised Officer Hatfield 

that if Officer Hatfield stopped [Baldwin], then Officer Hatfield 

should take [Baldwin] into custody, as Detective Breault had 

charges prepared for him; no warrant had been obtained at that 

time. Officer Hatfield called for other officers and they 

conducted a felony stop. Three occupants were in the car; 

[Baldwin] was called out first and [was] escorted [] back to the 

police vehicles. Officer [Jared] Snader handcuffed [Baldwin] and 

transported him from the scene. 

Before transporting [Baldwin], Officer Snader searched [Baldwin] 

at the scene, searching his pockets and conducting a pat-down 

for weapons; Officer Snader found $770 in [Baldwin’s] pockets. 

During booking, [Baldwin] was required to remove his shoes; 

upon removal, Officer Snader found that [Baldwin’s] pants had 

drawstrings at the bottom and [Baldwin’s] right pant leg was 

tucked into his boot and the drawstring was tight at the bottom. 

After releasing the drawstrings, Officer Snader found a plastic 

sandwich bag that contained sixty-nine (69) smaller bags of 

heroin and thirty-six (36) bags of crack cocaine. No 

paraphernalia related to the heroin or cocaine was found on 

[Baldwin]. [Baldwin] did not present any characteristics of 

someone who is under the influence or addicted to heroin or 

cocaine. The narcotics were sent to the Pennsylvania State 

Police Harrisburg Regional Crime Laboratory, where it was 

confirmed that the substances were, in fact, heroin and cocaine.

[Baldwin] was charged with [PWID—heroin and PWID—cocaine]. 

On April 14, 2014, [Baldwin] filed a motion to suppress evidence 

and a suppression hearing was held on October 27, 2014. The 

suppression motion was denied based on the [trial court’s] 

findings that Detective Breault had probable cause to arrest 

[Baldwin] as of December 6, 2013, for felony charges of 

intimidation of a victim and that probable cause was 

transferrable to Officer Hatfield, particularly when Officer Hatfield 

received the information both in memo form before going on 

duty and by personal contact via radio with Detective Breault 

prior to the stop. A stipulated bench trial followed the 

suppression hearing. The only additional testimony came from 

the forensic scientist who tested and confirmed the narcotics and 

from Officer Thomas Ginder, a member of the Selective 

Enforcement Unit, who testified that based on the amount of 

drugs, the presence of a significant amount of money, and the 

lack of paraphernalia, he believed the narcotics were possessed 
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with the intent to deliver, as opposed to personal use. The [trial 

court] found [Baldwin] guilty of both charges. A pre-sentence 

investigation was ordered.

On January 15, 2015, [Baldwin] was sentenced to an aggregate 

sentence of ten (10) to fifty (50) years; at Count 1 [PWID—

cocaine, Baldwin] received a sentence of five (5) to twenty (20) 

years and at Count 2 [PWID—heroin, Baldwin] received a 

consecutive sentence of five (5) to thirty (30) years. [Baldwin’s] 

sentencing guidelines indicated the standard range for the 

charge of [PWID—heroin] was 24-30 months; the standard 

range for the charge of [PWID—cocaine] was 27-32 months. 

[Baldwin] had a prior record of felony drug charges, which 

increased his maximum penalty for the heroin charge to thirty 

(30) years and for the cocaine charge to twenty (20) years. At 

sentencing, the Commonwealth pointed out [Baldwin’s] lack of 

verifiable work history in contrast to the leisure activities 

[Baldwin] reported in his pre-sentence investigation, such as 

riding four-wheelers and vacationing. 

* * *

On January 23, 2015, [Baldwin] filed a post-sentence motion to 

reconsider and modify sentence, claiming the imposition of the 

statutory maximum sentence for each count to run consecutively 

to each other and was unreasonable and that the sentencing 

judge improperly considered [Baldwin’s] prior record, as it was 

already factored into the sentencing guidelines. After giving the 

Commonwealth the opportunity to respond, the [trial court] 

denied [Baldwin’s] post-sentence motion on February 2, 2015. 

Trial Court Opinion (“T.C.O.”), 4/28/2015, at 1-5. (references to notes of 

testimony omitted; bracketed material within direct quotes in original; 

footnotes omitted).

On March 4, 2015, Baldwin filed a notice of appeal. In response, the 

trial court directed Baldwin to file a concise statement of errors pursuant to 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). Baldwin timely filed a concise statement on March 27, 

2015. On April 28, 2015, after receiving an answer to the concise statement 
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from the Commonwealth, the trial court issued an opinion pursuant to 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a). 

Baldwin raises the following three questions for our consideration:

I. Did the trial court err in imposing a sentence above the 

aggravated range pursuant to the sentencing guidelines 

set forth by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania 

Commission on Sentencing, without acknowledging that it 

was imposing a sentence above the aggravated range and 

without stating the basis for the sentence on the record?

II. Was the sentence imposed by the court so manifestly 

excessive as to constitute too severe a punishment and 

clearly unreasonable under the circumstances of the case, 

as a sentence of ten to fifty years’ incarceration was not 

consistent with the protection of the public, the gravity of 

the offenses, and the rehabilitative needs of the defendant, 

and the court did not impose an individualized sentence, 

and instead focused solely on Baldwin’s prior record?

III. Did the trial court err in denying Baldwin’s motion to 

suppress, where police officers did not have a warrant to 

arrest Baldwin nor did they have probable cause to believe 

that Baldwin had committed any crime; and should 

evidence seized as a result of this unlawful arrest have 

been suppressed?

Brief for Baldwin at 6. 

We begin with Baldwin’s third issue because, if successful, the two 

sentencing issues would be moot. Our standard of review for issues 

pertaining to the denial of a suppression motion is well-settled, and follows:

In addressing a challenge to a trial court’s denial of a 

suppression motion, we are limited to determining whether the 

factual findings are supported by the record and whether the 

legal conclusions drawn from those facts are correct. Since the 

Commonwealth prevailed in the suppression court, we may 

consider only the evidence of the Commonwealth and so much of 

the evidence for the defense as remains uncontradicted when 
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read in the context of the record as a whole. Where the record 

supports the factual findings of the trial court, we are bound by 

those facts and may reverse only if the legal conclusions drawn 

therefrom are in error. 

Commonwealth v. Brown, 64 A.3d 1101, 1104 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation 

omitted). Our scope of review in suppression matters includes only the 

suppression hearing record, and excludes any evidence elicited at trial. See

In re L.J., 79 A.3d 1073, 1085 (Pa. 2013).

The crux of Baldwin’s argument is that he was arrested 

unconstitutionally because the police neither had an arrest warrant nor 

probable cause to arrest him. As such, Baldwin contends that the evidence 

seized following his arrest, i.e., the cocaine and the heroin, should have 

been suppressed. We disagree. 

The Fourth Amendment [to] the United States Constitution and 

Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution provide that 

individuals shall be free from unreasonable searches and 

seizures. U.S. Const. amend. XIV; Pa. Const. art. I, § 8. An 

officer may conduct a full custodial search of a suspect when the 

suspect is lawfully arrested. Commonwealth v. Long, 414 

A.2d 113, 115 (Pa. 1980). When an officer makes an unlawful 

arrest, any evidence seized during a search incident to the arrest 

must be suppressed. See Commonwealth v. Lovette, 450 

A.2d 975, 981 (Pa. 1982). Consequently, the propriety of a 

search depends upon the validity of the arrest. In considering 

whether the illegal drugs recovered from the search of [an 

appellant] are admissible into evidence, therefore, we must first 

determine whether the officer’s search of [an appellant] was 

made pursuant to a lawful arrest.

In determining whether [an appellant] was lawfully arrested, we 

begin with the notion that law enforcement authorities must 

have a warrant to arrest an individual in a public place unless 

they have probable cause to believe that 1) a felony has been 
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committed; and 2) the person to be arrested is the felon. 

Commonwealth v. Travaglia, 467 A.2d 288, 292 (Pa. 1983).

Commonwealth v. Clark, 735 A.2d 1248, 1251 (Pa. 1999) (citations 

modified). The circumstances when a person may be arrested without a 

valid arrest warrant also are codified in our rules of criminal procedure. 

Pursuant to Rule 502 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure, a 

person may be arrested without a warrant: 

(a) when the offense is a murder, felony, or misdemeanor 

committed in the presence of the police officer making the 

arrest; or

(b) upon probable cause when the offense is a felony or murder; 

or

(c) upon probable cause when the offense is a misdemeanor not 

committed in the presence of the police officer making the 

arrest, when such arrest without a warrant is specifically 

authorized by statute.

Pa.R.Crim.P. 502(2)(a)-(c).

Baldwin maintains that his arrest was unconstitutional both because of 

the lack of a warrant and the absence of probable cause. It is undisputed 

that the police in this case did not have valid arrest warrant at the time that 

Baldwin was arrested, even though some of the involved officers mistakenly 

believed that, at some point, a valid warrant had issued. However, the 

arrest still is lawful if the arresting officers had probable cause to believe 

that Baldwin had committed a felony. See id. 

In order to determine whether probable cause exists to justify a 

warrantless arrest, we must consider the totality of the 

circumstances. Clark, 735 A.2d at 1252; see also Illinois v. 

Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 233 (1983). “Probable cause exists where 
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the facts and circumstances within the officer’s knowledge are 

sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief 

that an offense has been or is being committed,” and must be 

“viewed from the vantage point of a prudent, reasonable, 

cautious police officer on the scene at the time of the arrest

guided by his experience and training.” Clark, supra at 1252 

(quotation omitted). As we have stated:

Probable cause is made out when the facts and 

circumstances which are within the knowledge of the 

officer at the time of the arrest, and of which he has

reasonably trustworthy information, are sufficient to 

warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the 

suspect has committed or is committing a crime. The 

question we ask is not whether the officer’s belief was 

correct or more likely true than false. Rather, we require 

only a probability, and not a prima facie showing, of 

criminal activity. In determining whether probable cause 

exists, we apply a totality of the circumstances test.

Commonwealth v. Thompson, 985 A.2d 928, 931 (Pa. 2009) 

(emphasis in original; citations and quotation marks omitted).

Commonwealth v. Martin, 101 A.3d 706, 721 (Pa. 2014) (citations 

modified). 

Instantly, Detective Breault was investigating reports that multiple 

individuals were intimidating the victims of the October 26, 2013 shooting. 

The perpetrator of that crime was Baldwin’s brother Kyle. Kyle Baldwin was 

charged with discharging a firearm into an occupied structure, which is 

graded as a third-degree felony. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 2707.1(b). 

Detective Breault received reports that, within a couple of days after 

the shooting, three individuals had threatened and intimidated the victims of 

Kyle Baldwin’s shooting. Detective Breault presented a photo array to the 

victim. The victim selected Baldwin’s photograph from the eight contained 
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in the array. One week later, Baldwin again appeared at the victim’s home 

and parked his car in front of the residence, but he left before he could be 

apprehended. 

From this information, a reasonable police officer could have concluded 

that probable cause existed to arrest Baldwin for the crime of intimidation of 

a witness, which would have been graded as a felony because the underlying 

offense, discharging a firearm into an occupied structure, was a felony. See 

18 Pa.C.S. § 4952(b)(4). Baldwin appeared at the home of the victims of a 

crime that his brother perpetrated and threated the occupants. One of the 

victims identified Baldwin as one of the actors. Finally, Baldwin revealed 

himself as one of the actors when he went back to the victim’s home a short 

time later and parked in front of the residence. Probable cause existed to 

arrest Baldwin for a felony, and, consequently, the arrest was not 

unconstitutional. The trial court correctly did not suppress the evidence that 

resulted from Baldwin’s arrest.2 

____________________________________________

2 Baldwin does not challenge the fact that Detective Breault, who 

investigated the case and obtained all of the relevant information, did not 

make the actual arrest. Officer Hatfield did. Baldwin notes only that “the 

court found that Officer Hatfield had probable cause to arrest Baldwin, 

because it was passed from Detective Breault.” Brief for Baldwin at 24. He 

does not allege that the transfer of information, itself, was unconstitutional. 

Hence, we do not consider the “collective knowledge” doctrine, or whether 

the police in this case satisfied the mandates of that principle. See 

Commonwealth v. Yong, 120 A.3d 299, 310-11 (Pa. Super. 2015) (“The 

collective knowledge doctrine unquestionably authorizes police officers to act 

upon information or instructions from their fellow officers.”). 
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In his two remaining issues, Baldwin challenges the discretionary 

aspects of his sentence. A challenge to the discretionary aspects of a 

sentence must be considered a petition for permission to appeal, as the right 

to pursue such a claim is not absolute. This Court repeatedly has stated 

that, in order to invoke this Court’s jurisdiction when raising a challenge to 

the discretionary aspects of a sentence, an appellant must: (1) file a timely 

appeal; (2) preserve the issue he or she wishes to present on appeal; (3) 

include in his or her brief a concise statement of the reasons relied upon for 

allowance of appeal with respect to the discretionary aspects of sentence 

pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) present a substantial question in his 

or her concise statement that the sentence is not appropriate under the 

sentencing code. Commonwealth v. Griffin, 65 A.3d 932, 935 (Pa. Super. 

2013) (citations omitted). An appellant must satisfy all four requirements. 

Commonwealth v. Austin, 66 A.3d 798, 808 (Pa. Super. 2013). 

Here, Baldwin filed both a timely notice of appeal and a post-sentence 

motion. He also has included a Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) statement in his brief. 

See Brief for Baldwin at 11-13. Thus, Baldwin has complied with the 

technical aspects necessary for a discretionary aspects of a sentence 

challenge. We now must determine whether Baldwin has raised a 

substantial question. We must consider whether the sentence “violates 

either a specific provision of the sentencing scheme set forth in the 

Sentencing Code or a particular fundamental norm underlying the sentencing 

process.” Commonwealth v. Hill, 66 A.3d 365, 368 (Pa. Super. 2013) 
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(citations omitted). “Our inquiry must focus on the reasons for which the 

appeal is sought, in contrast to the facts underlying the appeal, which are 

necessary only to decide the appeal on the merits.” Id.

Baldwin essentially raises two specific points to prove that he has 

raised a substantial question. First, Baldwin argues that the trial court failed 

to state on the record its reasons for imposing an aggravated range 

sentence. Second, Baldwin maintains that the trial court imposed an unduly 

excessive sentence based only upon his prior record, which already receives 

adequate consideration in the guideline calculation, and without considering 

his rehabilitative needs. Both arguments raise substantial questions, and we 

will proceed to review the merits of his claims. See Commonwealth v. 

Booze, 953 A.2d 1263, 1278 (Pa. Super. 2008) (“an allegation that the 

[trial] court failed to state adequate reasons on the record for imposing an 

aggravated-range sentence . . . raises a substantial question for our 

review”); Commonwealth v. Boyer, 856 A.2d 149, 151-52 (Pa. Super. 

2004) (finding substantial question where defendant argued “that his 

sentence was manifestly excessive and that the court erred by considering 

only the serious nature of the offenses and failing to consider mitigating 

factors such as his age (19) at sentencing, his rehabilitative needs, his 

limited education, his years of drug dependency, and his family 

dysfunction”).

In his first issue, Baldwin argues that the trial court failed adequately 

to state the reasons for imposing a sentence that exceeded the aggravated 
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range of the sentencing guidelines. Our Sentencing Code delineates the 

considerations that a trial court must take into account when formulating a 

sentence:

[T]he court shall follow the general principle that the sentence 

imposed should call for confinement that is consistent with the 

protection of the public, the gravity of the offense as it relates to 

the impact on the life of the victim and on the community, and 

the rehabilitative needs of the defendant.

42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b). Furthermore:

In every case in which the court imposes a sentence for a felony 

or misdemeanor, modifies a sentence, resentences an offender 

following revocation of probation, county intermediate 

punishment or State intermediate punishment or resentences 

following remand, the court shall make as a part of the record, 

and disclose in open court at the time of sentencing, a statement 

of the reason or reasons for the sentence imposed.

Id. When a trial court sentences a defendant beyond the ranges 

recommended by the sentencing guidelines, that court must state its 

reasons for departing from the guidelines on the record. Commonwealth 

v. Bowen, 55 A.3d 1254, 1263-64 (Pa. Super. 2012). When doing so,

a trial judge . . . [must] demonstrate on the record, as a proper 

starting point, [its] awareness of the sentencing guidelines. 

Having done so, the sentencing court may deviate from the 

guidelines, if necessary, to fashion a sentence which takes into 

account the protection of the public, the rehabilitative needs of 

the defendant, and the gravity of the particular offense as it 

relates to the impact on the life of the victim and the 

community, so long as [it] also states of record the factual basis 

and specific reasons which compelled [it] to deviate from the 

guideline range.

Id. at 1264.
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Baldwin concedes that the trial court stated plenty of reasons for the 

specific sentence that the court imposed on the record. However, he argues 

that “at no time did the court state that any of its reasons for imposing 

sentence constituted aggravating factors or that they justified the maximum 

sentence which was above the aggravated range of the sentencing 

guidelines.” Brief for Baldwin at 16. Baldwin also points out that the trial 

court never directly acknowledged that the sentence was above the 

aggravated range. Id. Baldwin’s hyper-technical argument is unavailing. 

Nothing in the above standards requires a trial court to use any particular 

buzzwords in fashioning the sentence. It is of no moment that the trial court 

did not specifically state that the sentence fell above the aggravated range. 

The court need only demonstrate its awareness of the sentencing guidelines 

and offer reasons for its departure therefrom. Id. The trial court did that in 

this case.

At sentencing, the court offered the following reasons for imposing the 

lengthy sentence upon Baldwin:

Having heard the comments of counsel, the defendant and the 

Commonwealth, the Court imposes the sentence for the 

following reasons:

The defendant is 33 years of age, which shows sufficient 

maturity to understand the significance of his acts, having been 

a high school graduate, in addition passed the certification 

relative to becoming a licensed barber.

He can read, write and understand the English language. He has 

somewhat of a limited employment history. However, since 

becoming a barber, [] working at $40 per hour certainly shows 

he can follow directions.
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He has a significant prior criminal record. This includes simple 

assault as a juvenile, two manufacturing cases as a juvenile in 

’87—I’m sorry, ’97 and ’98. 

His felony drug history began in 2001 as an adult, having 

already been convicted of felonies as a juvenile. 2001 a felony 

drug charge. 2002 a firearms charge. 2003 a firearms charge. 

2003 a felony drug charge. 2008 a felony drug charge, which he 

was given basically a maximum county sentence. 2007, felony 

drugs, where he was given – multiple felony drug counts, where 

he was given on one a three-to-six year state prison sentence, 

followed by a consecutive two-to-four year prison sentence 

equaling a five-to-ten year state prison sentence. He has had 

three violations of his probation and parole.

Noting that he grew up in poverty as a young man, he did 

actually have at least a mother who cared and did as much as 

she could for him. 

He’s lived in New Jersey, Philadelphia, and Lancaster. The only 

indication relative to drugs was a significant marijuana habit.

He then gained employment as a licensed barber and when 

working was making a significant hourly rate at $40 per hour.

The Court notes that based on his prior felony drug offenses, he 

owes Collections Enforcement in probation and parole in excess 

of $44,000.

The Court counts at least a minimum of five prior felony drug 

offenses. Those, in relation to the firearms offenses, show that 

Mr. Baldwin is not only someone who refuses to change his 

lifestyle, but continues to become involved immediately upon his 

release from state prison or county prison right back into the 

drug environment. Despite the fact that he has significant ability 

to earn an income, has decided that delivering and possessing 

with intent to deliver drugs will be his lifetime ambition. 

I have considered the pre-sentence report in detail. I have 

considered the sentencing guidelines and the maximum penalties 

authorized by law. The maximum penalties, if consecutively 

imposed, would be 50 years of incarceration and fines of up to 

$700,000.

I’ve considered the character and statement of the defendant, as 

well as the arguments of counsel. 
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This is the type of individual who, since a juvenile, has decided 

his life will be that of a felon, of a drug deliverer and nothing 

but. The dangerous part of all of this is having two firearms 

violations. 

This gentleman’s incarceration is warranted because a lesser 

sentence would not only depreciate the seriousness of the 

crimes, but the seriousness of his prior record and his 

involvement in the drug culture. 

Notes of Testimony (“N.T.”), 1/15/2015, at 8-11. 

The trial court understood the sentencing guidelines, and offered 

multiple bases for the significant sentence that it imposed upon Baldwin. 

Most notably, the court explained that Baldwin’s lengthy and persistent 

criminal history necessitated a substantial sentence, inter alia, to protect the 

public and community from Baldwin’s criminal activities. The court satisfied 

42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b), and did not abuse its discretion.

In his final issue, Baldwin argues that the trial court imposed a 

manifestly excessive sentence that was based exclusively upon Baldwin’s 

prior record, and that ignored the mitigating evidence. Baldwin is not 

entitled to relief.

Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the 

sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal 

absent a manifest abuse of discretion. In this context, an abuse 

of discretion is not shown merely by an error in judgment. 

Rather, the appellant must establish, by reference to the record, 

that the sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law, 

exercised its judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias 

or ill will, or arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision.

Commonwealth v. Anderson, 830 A.2d 1013, 1018 (Pa. Super. 2003) 

(quotation omitted).
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Baldwin’s assertion that the trial court relied only upon his prior crimes 

is belied by the record. As is apparent from the trial court’s rationale above, 

the trial court did place great weight upon Baldwin’s prior criminal history, 

which the court was entitled to do. Since his juvenile days, Baldwin has 

been selling drugs and illegally owning firearms. Baldwin has been 

sentenced to probation, county jail, and state prison, none of which 

effectively has deterred Baldwin from committing crimes. The trial court 

correctly placed great emphasis upon the failure of shorter punitive 

measures to alter Baldwin’s criminal lifestyle. However, contrary to 

Baldwin’s argument, this was not the only factor that the trial court 

considered. The court contemplated the contents of the pre-sentence 

report, as well as Baldwin’s education, his barber’s license, his earning 

capacity, his intelligence, and his family history. In the trial court’s mind, 

those factors simply could not overcome Baldwin’s criminal history or his 

inability and unwillingness to stop selling drugs. To so conclude was the trial 

court’s prerogative, and within the court’s discretion. 

Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 12/2/2015