BORDER SECURITY

Progress and Challenges 

in DHS's Efforts to 

Address High-Risk 

Travelers and Strengthen 

Visa Security

Statement of Rebecca Gambler, Director, 

Homeland Security and Justice

Accessible Version

Testimony 

Before the Task Force on Denying 

Terrorists Entry into the United States, 

Committee on Homeland Security, 

House of Representatives

For Release on Delivery 

Expected at 2 p.m. ET

Wednesday, May 3, 2017

GAO-17-599T

United States Government Accountability Office
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-17-599T, a testimony 

before the Task Force on Denying Terrorists

Entry into the United States, Committee on 

Homeland Security, House of Representatives

May 3, 2017

BORDER SECURITY

Progress and Challenges in DHS's Efforts to Address 

High-Risk Travelers and Strengthen Visa Security

What GAO Found

In January 2017, GAO reported that the Department of Homeland Security’s 

(DHS) U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) operates predeparture

programs to help identify and interdict high-risk travelers before they board U.S.-

bound flights. CBP officers inspect all U.S.-bound travelers on precleared flights 

at the 15 Preclearance locations and, if deemed inadmissible, a traveler will not 

be permitted to board the aircraft. CBP also operates nine Immigration Advisory 

Program and two Joint Security Program locations, as well as three Regional 

Carrier Liaison Groups, through which CBP may recommend that air carriers not 

permit identified high-risk travelers to board U.S.-bound flights. CBP data 

showed that it identified and interdicted over 22,000 high-risk air travelers 

through these programs in fiscal year 2015 (the most recent data available at the 

time of GAO’s report). However, CBP had not fully evaluated the overall 

effectiveness of these programs using performance measures and baselines. 

CBP tracked some data, such as the number of travelers deemed inadmissible, 

but had not set baselines to determine if predeparture programs are achieving 

goals, consistent with best practices for performance measurement. GAO 

recommended that CBP develop and implement a system of performance 

measures and baselines to better position CBP to assess if the programs are 

achieving their goals. CBP concurred and has established a working group to 

develop such measures and baselines.

In March 2011, GAO reported on the Visa Security Program (VSP) through 

which DHS’s U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) deploys 

personnel to certain U.S. overseas posts to review visa applications. Among 

other things, GAO found that ICE did not collect comprehensive data on all VSP 

performance measures or track the time officials spent on visa security activities.

DHS did not concur with GAO’s recommendations to address these limitations, 

stating that ICE collected data on all the required performance measures and 

tracked VSP case investigation hours. However, GAO continues to believe DHS 

needs to address these limitations. GAO has ongoing work assessing U.S. 

agencies’ efforts to strengthen the security of the visa process, including 

oversight of VSP, in which GAO plans to follow up on the findings and 

recommendations from its March 2011 report related to ICE’s efforts to enhance 

VSP performance measurement.

In May 2016, GAO reported on DHS’s oversight of the Visa Waiver Program 

(VWP), which allows nationals from 38 countries to travel visa-free to the United 

States for business or pleasure for 90 days or less. GAO reported, among other 

things, that all 38 countries entered into required agreements, or their 

equivalents, to (1) report lost and stolen passports, (2) share identity information 

about known or suspected terrorists, and (3) share criminal history information. 

However, not all countries shared such information. In August 2015, DHS 

established a new requirement for VWP countries to implement the latter two 

agreements; however, DHS did not establish time frames for instituting the 

amended requirements. GAO recommended that DHS work with VWP countries 

to implement these agreements and DHS concurred. As of April 2017, DHS 

reported that officials are continuing to work with VWP countries on time frames 

for implementing program requirements.

View GAO-17-599T. For more information, 

contact Rebecca Gambler at (202) 512-8777 

or gamblerr@gao.gov.

Why GAO Did This Study

DHS seeks to identify and interdict 

travelers who are potential security 

threats to the United States, such as 

foreign fighters and potential terrorists,

human traffickers, drug smugglers and 

otherwise inadmissible persons, at the 

earliest possible point in time. DHS

also adjudicates petitions for certain 

visa categories and has certain 

responsibilities for strengthening the 

security of the visa process, including 

oversight of VSP and VWP. State 

manages the visa adjudication process 

for foreign nationals seeking admission 

to the United States.

This statement addresses (1) CBP

programs aimed at preventing high-risk 

travelers from boarding U.S.-bound 

flights; (2) ICE’s management of VSP; 

and (3) DHS’s oversight of VWP. This 

statement is based on prior products 

GAO issued from March 2011 through 

January 2017, along with selected 

updates conducted in April 2017 to 

obtain information from DHS on 

actions it has taken to address prior 

GAO recommendations. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO previously made

recommendations to improve 

evaluation of CBP’s predeparture 

programs’ performance and strengthen 

DHS’s oversight of VSP and VWP. 

DHS agreed with GAO’s 

recommendations related to CBP’s 

predeparture programs and VWP. DHS

did not agree with some of GAO’s 

recommendations related to VSP. 

GAO has ongoing work related to, 

among other things, DHS’s 

management and oversight of VSP 

and plans to report later this year on 

the results of this work.
Letter

Page 1 GAO-17-599T Border Security

Letter

May 3, 2017

Chairman Gallagher, Ranking Member Watson Coleman, and Members 

of the Task Force:

I am pleased to be here today to discuss GAO’s body of work on U.S. 

government programs and activities related to screening foreign nationals 

seeking to travel to the United States on a temporary basis—either with a 

nonimmigrant visa, or in some cases, without a visa.1 Each year, millions 

of such temporary visitors legally enter the United States. From fiscal year 

2010 through fiscal year 2015, the Department of State (State) issued 

more than 52 million visas for business travel, pleasure, or for foreign and 

cultural exchange student programs, among other things. In addition, 

from fiscal year 2010 through fiscal year 2015, more than 116 million 

visitors were admitted to the United States under the Visa Waiver 

Program (VWP), which allows nationals from 38 countries to apply for 

admission to the country as temporary visitors for business or pleasure 

without first obtaining a visa from a U.S. embassy or consulate abroad.2

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) seeks to identify and 

interdict travelers who are potential security threats to the United States, 

such as foreign fighters and potential terrorists, human traffickers, drug 

smugglers, and otherwise inadmissible persons, at the earliest possible 

 

1Throughout this statement we generally use the term “foreign national” to refer to an 

“alien,” which is defined under U.S. immigration law as any person who is not a U.S. 

citizen or national. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3). In addition, temporary visitors are foreign 

nationals present in the United States on a temporary basis pursuant to a specific

nonimmigrant category (see 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15); see also 8 C.F.R. § 214.1(a)(1)-(2)), 

including those who are allowed to seek admission without a visa, such as Mexican 

nationals and citizens of Canada and the British Overseas Territory of Bermuda (and 

certain residents of other adjacent islands, such as the Bahamas) under certain 

circumstances, as well as Visa Waiver Program (VWP) participants. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 

212.1, 214.6(d); 22 C.F.R. §§ 41.0 to 41.3. Foreign nationals seeking permanent status in 

the United States must generally obtain an immigrant visa, which provides a path to lawful 

permanent residency. For the purposes of this statement, we use the term “visa” in 

reference to a nonimmigrant visa.

2See 8 U.S.C. § 1187. The VWP was established in 1986 as a pilot program, under which 

the nationals of up to eight designated countries which extended reciprocal privileges to 

U.S. citizens and nationals and fulfilled certain other program criteria, would not need a 

visa for admission to the United States as temporary visitors during the pilot program 

period . See Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, tit. III, pt. B, 

§ 313, 100 Stat. 3359, 3435-39. VWP became a permanent program in October 2000. 

See Visa Waiver Permanent Program Act, Pub. L. No. 106-396, tit. I, § 101, 114 Stat. 

1637 (2000).
Letter

point in the travel lifecycle to make the nation’s physical borders the last, 

not the first, line of defense.

Page 2 GAO-17-599T Border Security

3 DHS adjudicates petitions for certain visa 

categories, and also has certain responsibilities for strengthening the 

security of the visa process, including establishing visa policy and 

managing the VWP. In particular, DHS’s U.S. Customs and Border 

Protection (CBP) is tasked with, among other duties, securing U.S. 

borders and processing all travelers on U.S.-bound flights; inspecting all 

people entering or applying for admission to the United States; and 

screening VWP applicants to determine their eligibility to travel to the 

United States under the program. In addition, DHS’s U.S. Immigration 

and Customs Enforcement (ICE) oversees the Visa Security Program 

(VSP) under which it deploys officials to certain U.S. embassies and 

consulates to strengthen the visa process by working with State officials 

in reviewing visa applications. State is responsible for visa adjudication 

and issuance for foreign nationals seeking admission to the United States 

and is responsible for managing the consular officer corps and its 

functions at over 220 visa-issuing posts overseas.

Foreign nationals who wish to come to the United States on a temporary 

basis and are not citizens or nationals of countries that participate in the 

VWP must generally obtain a visa authorizing their travel. U.S. law 

provides for the temporary admission of various categories of 

nonimmigrants, such as tourists, foreign students, diplomats, and 

temporary workers, who are admitted for an authorized period of stay, 

consistent with any time limitation and other terms of admission. The 

process for determining who will be issued or refused a visa contains 

several steps, including document reviews; collection of biometrics 

(fingerprints and full-face photographs); cross-referencing an applicant’s 

name and biometrics against multiple databases maintained by the U.S. 

government; and in-person interviews. Personal interviews with consular 

officers are required by law for most foreign nationals seeking visas. For 

an overview of the visa process, see figure 1.

 

3Foreign fighters are individuals who leave home, travel abroad to terrorist safe havens, 

and join or assist violent extremist groups.
Letter

Figure 1: Nonimmigrant Visa Application and Adjudication Process

Page 3 GAO-17-599T Border Security

aPrior to this step, some nonimmigrant visas require petitioners to file a petition on behalf of the 

beneficiary, or on their own behalf, as appropriate, with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). 

DHS is responsible for approving or denying the petition, notifying the petitioner, and sending the 

approved petition to the Department of State.
Letter

The VWP was established in 1986 to facilitate the legitimate travel of 

visitors for business or pleasure to the United States. Qualifying nationals 

from the 38 countries participating in the VWP—for example, France, 

Germany, and Hungary—may travel without a visa to the United States 

for business or pleasure stays of up to 90 days.

Page 4 GAO-17-599T Border Security

4

In 2007, Congress 

passed the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act 

of 2007, which mandated several changes to modernize the program 

through enhanced bilateral cooperation on critical counterterrorism and 

information-sharing initiatives, support and expansion of tourism and 

business opportunities to enhance long-term competitiveness, and 

strengthening of bilateral relationships.5In particular, the U.S. government 

began requiring each VWP country to enter into a

· Lost and Stolen Passport (LASP) agreement to report information 

about the theft or loss of passports,

· Homeland Security Presidential Directive 6 (HSPD-6) arrangement to 

share watch list information about known or suspected terrorists,6 and

· Preventing and Combating Serious Crime (PCSC) agreement to 

establish frameworks for enhanced law enforcement cooperation, 

including sharing of criminal history information.

The Visa Waiver Program Improvement and Terrorist Travel Prevention 

Act of 2015, which became law in December of that year, amended 

 

4The 38 VWP countries include Taiwan. Although the United States does not have 

diplomatic relations with Taiwan, the Taiwan Relations Act provides that “[w]henever the 

laws of the United States refer or relate to foreign countries, nations, states, governments, 

or similar entities, such terms shall include and such laws shall apply with respect to 

Taiwan.” Pub. L. No. 96-8, § 4(b), 93 Stat. 14, 15 (1979) (classified at 22 U.S.C. § 3303).

5Pub. L. No. 110-53, tit. VII, subtit. B, § 711, 121 Stat. 266, 338-45.

6Among other things, Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-6—Integration and 

Use of Screening Information, issued on September 16, 2003, directed the Secretary of 

State to develop a proposal for enhancing cooperation with certain foreign governments, 

beginning with those countries for which the U.S. has waived visa requirements, to 

establish appropriate access to terrorism screening information of the participating 

governments.
Letter

certain requirements to provide enhanced security measures for the 

program, among other purposes.

Page 5 GAO-17-599T Border Security

7

My testimony discusses: (1) CBP programs aimed at preventing high-risk 

travelers from boarding U.S.-bound flights, (2) ICE’s management of the 

VSP, and (3) DHS’s oversight of the VWP. This testimony is based on our 

prior reports, in particular, those published in March 2011, May 2016, and 

January 2017.8 For these reports, we examined program documentation, 

such as standard operating procedures and agencies’ policies and 

guidance, as well as agency data on program performance. We also 

interviewed DHS and State officials, among others, in headquarters and 

at U.S embassies and consulates. Additional details on the scope and 

methodology are available in our published reports. In addition, this 

statement contains updates to selected information from these reports. 

For the updates, we collected information from DHS on actions it has 

taken to address findings and recommendations made in prior reports on 

which this statement is based. All of our work was conducted in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives.

 

7Pub. L. No. 114-113, Div. O, tit. II, 129 Stat. 2242, 2988-95. The law now prohibits 

individuals who are nationals of VWP countries who have been present in Iran, Iraq, Syria, 

Sudan, Libya, Somalia or Yemen on or after March 1, 2011, from traveling or being 

admitted to the United States through the VWP, with certain exceptions. According to 

CBP, these new eligibility requirements do not bar travel to the United States; instead, a 

national of a VWP country who does not meet the requirements must obtain a visa for 

travel to the United States. The law also now requires that countries fully implement 

passenger information exchange agreements in order to participate in the VWP. Additional 

requirements have been added regarding machine-readable, electronic passports for 

individuals; country certifications of a mechanism to validate passports; termination of 

designation for countries that fail to share information or fail to screen individuals admitted 

to, or departing, the country for unlawful activity; designation of high-risk program 

countries that may be suspended from the program; and other enhancements to the 

electronic system for travel authorization.

8GAO, Border Security: CPB Aims to Prevent High-Risk Travelers from Boarding U.S.-

Bound Flights, but Needs to Evaluate Program Performance, GAO-17-216 (Washington, 

D.C.: Jan. 24, 2017); Visa Waiver Program: DHS Should Take Steps to Ensure Timeliness 

of Information Needed to Protect U.S. National Security, GAO-16-498 (Washington, D.C.: 

May 5, 2016); and, Border Security: DHS’s Visa Security Program Needs to Improve 

Performance Evaluation and Better Address Visa Risk Worldwide, GAO-11-315 

(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 31, 2011).
Letter

CBP’s Air Predeparture Programs Interdict 

Page 6 GAO-17-599T Border Security

High-Risk Air Travelers, but CBP Has Not Fully 

Assessed the Programs’ Performance

CBP Identifies and Interdicts High-Risk Travelers before 

They Board U.S-Bound Flights

As we reported in January 2017, CBP electronically vets all travelers 

before they board U.S.-bound flights and continues to do so until they 

land at a U.S. port of entry.9 Through these vetting efforts, CBP seeks to 

identify high-risk travelers from the millions of individuals who travel to the 

United States each year. As we reported in January 2017, CBP’s vetting 

and targeting efforts are primarily conducted by its National Targeting 

Center (NTC) and entail (1) traveler data matching and analysis, (2) rulesbased targeting, and (3) recurrent vetting. Specifically:

· CBP’s primary method of identifying high-risk individuals is through 

the comparison of travelers’ information (such as name, date of birth, 

and gender)10 against records extracted from U.S. government 

databases, including the Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB)—the 

U.S. government’s consolidated terrorist watch list.11 Traveler data 

 

9GAO-17-216. Ports of entry are facilities that provide for the controlled entry into or 

departure from the United States. Specifically, a port of entry is any officially designated 

location (seaport, airport, or land border location) where DHS officers inspect persons 

entering or applying for admission into, or departing the United States pursuant to U.S. 

immigration law. 

10According to CBP officials, information from both the Advance Passenger Information 

System, which includes biographical information such as full name, date of birth, gender, 

flight number, date of arrival and departure, citizenship, and passport/alien registration 

card number, among others, and the Passenger Name Record, which refers to reservation 

information contained in an air carrier’s electronic reservation system and/or departure 

control system that sets forth the identity and travel plans of each traveler or group of 

travelers included under the same reservation record, are utilized in the targeting and 

vetting of individuals attempting to travel to the United States. See 49 U.S.C. § 44909; 19 

C.F.R. §§ 122.49a, 122.49d.

11Information in the TSDB comes from two sources: the National Counterterrorism Center, 

which provides information on known or suspected international terrorists, and the Federal 

Bureau of Investigation, which provides information about known or suspected domestic 

terrorists. For more information about the process by which the U.S. government manages 

this watchlist, see GAO, Terrorist Watchlist: Routinely Assessing Impacts of Agency 

Actions since the December 29, 2009, Attempted Attack Could Help Inform Future Efforts, 

GAO-12-476 (Washington, D.C.: May 31, 2012). 
Letter

matching focuses on identifying known high-risk individuals—that is, 

individuals who may be inadmissible to the United States under U.S. 

immigration law or who may otherwise pose a threat to homeland or 

national security. CBP’s primary tool for vetting and targeting travelers 

is the Automated Targeting System (ATS), which is a computer-based 

enforcement and support system that compares traveler information 

against intelligence and law enforcement data to identify high-risk 

travelers. Traveler data matching occurs throughout the travel process 

and, upon a positive or possible match, CBP officers can select these 

individuals for further vetting, interviewing, and inspection.

· CBP’s rules-based targeting efforts seek to identify unknown high-risk 

travelers—that is, travelers for whom U.S. government entities do not 

have available derogatory information directly linking them to terrorist 

activities or any other actions that would make them potentially 

inadmissible to the United States but who may present a threat and 

thus warrant additional scrutiny. CBP identifies unknown high-risk 

individuals by comparing their information against a set of targeting 

rules based on intelligence, law enforcement, and other information. 

NTC officials stated that these rules have identified potential high-risk 

travelers, including potential foreign fighters. Rules-based targeting 

evaluates travelers during the travel process and, in some cases, in 

advance of the travel process. If a traveler is a rule “hit,” this individual 

can be selected for further vetting, interviewing, and inspection.

Page 7 GAO-17-599T Border Security

12

· CBP supports its traveler data matching and rules-based targeting 

efforts through the use of recurrent vetting. NTC’s vetting, targeting, 

and traveler data matching activities in ATS run 24 hours a day and 

seven days a week and automatically scan updated traveler 

information, when available. This process is to ensure that new 

information that affects a traveler’s admissibility is identified in near 

real time. Recurrent vetting occurs throughout the travel process and 

continues until a traveler arrives at a domestic port of entry. For 

example, after checking into a foreign airport, a traveler may have his 

or her visa revoked for a security or immigration-related violation. Due 

to recurrent vetting, CBP would be alerted to this through ATS and 

could take action, as appropriate.

CBP’s Air Predeparture Programs Interdict High-Risk 

Travelers on U.S.-Bound Flights, but CBP Has Not 

 

12In general, when a traveler is identified through rules-based targeting, the traveler is 

considered to have hit a rule.
Letter

Evaluated Overall Effectiveness of Air Predeparture 

Programs

As we reported in January 2017, throughout the travel process, CBP’s 

predeparture programs use the results of NTC’s efforts to identify and 

interdict high-risk individuals destined for the United States while they are 

still overseas; however, we found that CBP had not evaluated the 

effectiveness of its predeparture programs as a whole, including 

implementing a system of performance measures and baselines to 

assess whether the programs are achieving their stated goals.

Page 8 GAO-17-599T Border Security

13

CBP operates three air predeparture programs that are responsible for all 

U.S.-bound air travelers—Preclearance; the Immigration Advisory 

Program (IAP) and Joint Security Program (JSP); and the regional carrier 

liaison groups (RCLG). As we reported in January 2017, CBP data 

indicated that these programs identified and ultimately interdicted 

approximately 22,000 high-risk air travelers in fiscal year 2015, the most 

recent data available at the time of our review. Information on individuals 

who the NTC identifies through traveler data matching or rules-based 

targeting, including recurrent vetting, is compiled automatically through 

ATS into a daily high-priority list, or traveler referral list. CBP officers at 

the NTC review the traveler referral list for accuracy and to remove, if 

possible, any automatically generated matches determined to not be 

potential high-risk individuals. After this review, CBP officers at the NTC 

use ATS to send the traveler referral list to officers at each Preclearance, 

IAP, JSP, and RCLG location, as shown in figure 2.

 

13GAO-17-216.
Letter

Figure 2: Actions Taken by U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s (CBP) Predeparture Programs to Interdict High-Risk U.S.-

Page 9 GAO-17-599T Border Security

Bound Air Travelers Throughout the Travel Processa

a

For the purposes of this statement, the term travel process denotes the sequential steps that an 

international traveler takes to travel to the United States and focuses specifically on the points in time 

when travelers reserve and purchase airline tickets; check-in at the airport; transit to the United 

States; and arrive at a U.S.-based (i.e., domestic) airport. It does not focus on steps taken by the 

traveler before a ticket is reserved or purchased, such as obtaining a requisite travel authorization.

b

This figure generally represents the actions CBP officers take to interdict high-risk travelers who will 

travel directly to the United States from a foreign last point of departure airport.

cCBP’s NTC leads all of CBP’s predeparture targeting and vetting efforts. The NTC is a 24/7 

operations entity within CBP’s Office of Field Operations responsible for providing advance 

information and research about high-risk travelers and facilitating coordination between law 

enforcement and intelligence agencies in support of CBP’s anti-terrorism mission and efforts to keep 

high-risk travelers from boarding U.S.-bound flights.

d

For the purposes of this report, the term “high-risk traveler” refers to any traveler who may be 

inadmissible to the United States under U.S. immigration law or who may otherwise pose a threat to 

homeland or national security. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (establishing grounds for inadmissibility). 

According to CBP, the predeparture programs discussed in this report aim to interdict all high-risk 

travelers, but primarily focus on national security concerns and preventing known or suspected 

terrorists or travelers with connections to known or suspected terrorists from boarding flights destined 

for the United States.
Letter

eCBP officers at air Preclearance locations conduct inspections of all U.S.-bound air travelers and 

determine whether they are admissible into the United States, as if conducted at a domestic U.S. port 

of entry.

f

If CBP determines that a traveler at an RCLG, IAP, or JSP location will likely be deemed inadmissible 

upon arrival in the United States, CBP officers responsible for the location may recommend to the air 

carrier that it not board the traveler. Air carriers, however, retain authority to board the traveler unless, 

for example, the traveler has been identified by the Transportation Security Administration as being 

on the No Fly List, which is a subset of the Terrorist Screening Database that identifies individuals 

prohibited from boarding flights to, from, within, or overflying the United States.

Preclearance. Preclearance locations operate at foreign airports and 

serve as U.S. ports of entry. Preclearance operations began in 1952 in 

Toronto to facilitate trade and travel between the United States and 

Canada. As of January 2017, CBP operated 15 air Preclearance locations 

in six countries.

Page 10 GAO-17-599T Border Security

14 Through the Preclearance program, uniformed CBP 

officers at a foreign airport exercise U.S. legal authorities to inspect 

travelers and luggage and make admissibility determinations prior to an 

individual boarding a plane to the United States.15 According to CBP 

officials, an inspection at a Preclearance location is the same inspection 

an individual would undergo at a domestic port of entry, and officers 

conducting Preclearance inspections exercise the same authority as 

officers at domestic ports of entry to approve or deny admission into the 

United States.16 As a result, travelers arriving at domestic air ports of 

entry from Preclearance locations do not have to be re-inspected upon 

entry.17 According to CBP data, in fiscal year 2015, CBP officers at 

Preclearance locations determined that 10,648 air travelers were 

inadmissible out of the approximately 16 million air travelers seeking 

admission to the United States through a Preclearance location. In 

addition to requiring that all travelers undergo a primary inspection, CBP 

 

14See 19 C.F.R. § 101.5. CBP’s Preclearance location in Victoria, Canada, only processes 

maritime travelers and, as a result, we did not include it in our January 2017 report. See 

GAO-17-216.

15See 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(7); 19 U.S.C. § 1629. See also 8 C.F.R. §§ 235.1, 235.5; 19 

C.F.R. §§ 148.22, 162.6, 162.8; and Preclearance Authorization Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 

114-125, tit. VIII, subtit. B, § 813, 130 Stat. 122, 217-18 (2016) (classified at 19 U.S.C. § 

4432) (authorizing the Secretary of Homeland Security to establish and maintain CBP 

preclearance operations in a foreign country).

16Individuals denied admission to the United States at a Preclearance location are not 

permitted to proceed beyond the point of inspection and, thus, are unable to board a flight 

to the United States.

17According to CBP officials, in accordance with CBP’s current preclearance agreements 

and processes, CBP officers retain the authority to inspect these travelers and their 

accompanying goods or baggage after arriving in the United States should further 

inspection be warranted.
Letter

officers in these locations also referred almost 290,000 individuals for 

secondary inspection.

Page 11 GAO-17-599T Border Security

18

Immigration Advisory Program (IAP) and Joint Security Program 

(JSP). IAP and JSP operate at 9 and 2 foreign airports, respectively, as of 

January 2017. According to CBP officials, under this program, unarmed, 

plainclothes CBP officers posted at foreign airports partner with air 

carriers and host country government officials to help prevent terrorists 

and other high-risk individuals from boarding U.S.-bound flights by vetting 

and interviewing them before travel.19 According to CBP program 

documentation, CBP established IAP in 2004 to prevent terrorists, highrisk travelers, and improperly documented travelers from boarding airlines 

destined to the United States. Building on the IAP concept, CBP 

established JSP in 2009 to partner with host country law enforcement 

officials to identify high-risk travelers. CBP officers at IAP and JSP 

locations have the ability to question travelers and review their travel 

documents. They are to act in an advisory manner to the air carriers and 

host governments and do not have authority to deny boarding to 

individuals on U.S.-bound flights or fully inspect travelers or their 

belongings. IAP and JSP officers are authorized by CBP to make 

recommendations to airlines as to whether to board or deny boarding 

(known as a no-board recommendation) to selected travelers based on 

their likely admissibility status upon arrival to the United States. The final 

decision to board travelers, however, lies with the carriers. According to 

CBP data, CBP officers at IAP and JSP locations made 3,925 no-board 

recommendations in fiscal year 2015 for the approximately 29 million air 

travelers bound for the United States from such locations. During this 

 

18Primary inspection refers to the procedure that CBP uses to conduct an initial inspection 

of individuals seeking to enter the United States to determine if additional review or 

scrutiny is needed to ensure compliance with U.S. law. Persons who need additional 

scrutiny and persons selected as part of a random selection process are subjected to a 

more detailed review called a secondary inspection. This involves, for example, a closer 

inspection of travel documents and possessions, additional questioning by CBP officers, 

and cross references through multiple law enforcement databases to verify the traveler’s 

identity, background, purpose for entering the country, and other appropriate information.

19See 8 U.S.C. § 1225a(b).
Letter

same time period, CBP data indicated 1,154 confirmed encounters with 

individuals on the TSDB, including 106 on the No Fly List.

Page 12 GAO-17-599T Border Security

20

Regional Carrier Liaison Groups (RCLG). RCLGs are located and 

operate at three domestic airports—Miami International Airport, John F. 

Kennedy International Airport, and Honolulu International Airport. CBP 

established RCLGs in 2006 to assist air carriers with questions regarding 

U.S. admissibility requirements and travel document authenticity. 

According to CBP officials, RCLGs are responsible for coordinating with 

air carriers on all actionable referrals from NTC on U.S.-bound travelers 

departing from an airport without an IAP, JSP, or Preclearance presence. 

Each RCLG is assigned responsibility for travelers departing out of a 

specific geographic location.21 Similar to IAP and JSP, CBP officers in 

RCLGs also make no-board recommendations, as appropriate, to air 

carriers. CBP officers at RCLGs do not have authority to make 

admissibility determinations about U.S.-bound air travelers, and the final 

decision to board or not board a traveler lies with the carrier. CBP officers 

working at the three RCLGs made 7,664 no-board recommendations in 

fiscal year 2015 for the approximately 59 million travelers bound for the 

United States from locations within the RCLGs’ spheres of responsibility. 

During this time period, CBP data indicated that RCLGs also reported 

1,634 confirmed encounters with individuals in the TSDB, including 119 

on the No Fly List.

In January 2017, we reported that CBP had not evaluated the 

effectiveness of its predeparture programs as a whole, including 

implementing a system of performance measures and baselines to 

assess whether the programs were achieving their stated goals.22 We 

reported that CBP had taken some initial steps to measure the 

performance of these programs. Specifically, CBP officials told us that 

they had collected a large quantity of data and statistics regarding the 

actions of their predeparture programs and had done so since program 

inception for all programs. However, due to changes in operational focus, 

 

20A confirmed encounter refers to when a representative of the U.S. government (in this 

case a CBP officer) comes into contact, either through physical interviewing or inspection 

or through electronic vetting, with an individual whose identity is confirmed as a match to a 

record in the TSDB. The No Fly List, which is a subset of the TSDB, identifies individuals 

prohibited from boarding flights to, from, within, or overflying the United States.

21RCLGs are not responsible for travelers departing from Preclearance locations.

22GAO-17-216.
Letter

technology updates, and the use of separate data systems at program 

locations, CBP had not collected consistent data across all of its 

predeparture programs. As a result, CBP did not have baseline data on

which to measure program performance. However, CBP officials stated at 

the time that they had updated and uniform data collection systems that 

were consistent across all predeparture programs, which would enable 

CBP to identify performance baselines from fiscal year 2015 onward. 

According to senior CBP officials, some of the results of these programs 

were not easily measured. Officials also noted that relying on data alone 

may not always present the most accurate picture of the true impact of 

predeparture programs because changes to the travel process or other 

factors may impact the programs in ways that are not fully captured by 

the data. However, on the basis of our analysis of CBP’s documentation, 

including official hearing statements, and interviews with program 

officials, we found that CBP used these data as indicators of the 

programs’ success.

According to GAO’s Program Evaluation Guide, which articulates best 

practices for program evaluation, a program evaluation is a systematic 

study using research methods to collect and analyze data to assess how 

well a program is working and why.

Page 13 GAO-17-599T Border Security

23 Moreover, consistent with 

requirements outlined in the Government Performance and Results Act of 

1993 (GPRA), as updated by the GPRA Modernization Act of 2010, 

performance measurement is the ongoing monitoring and reporting of 

program accomplishments, particularly towards pre-established goals, 

and agencies are to establish performance measures to assess progress 

towards goals.24 Agencies can use performance measurement to make 

various types of management decisions to improve programs and results, 

such as developing strategies and allocating resources, and identify 

problems and take corrective action. Therefore, we recommended that 

CBP develop and implement a system of performance measures and 

baselines for each program to help ensure that these programs are 

achieving their intended goals. By using data from fiscal year 2015, for 

 

23GAO, Designing Evaluations: 2012 Revision, GAO-12-208G (Washington, D.C.: January 

2012). The best practices outlined in GAO-12-208G are based on GAO studies, policy 

documents, and program evaluation literature. To ensure the guide’s competence and 

usefulness, drafts were reviewed by selected GAO, federal and state agency evaluators, 

and evaluation authors and practitioners from professional consulting firms.

24See, generally, Pub. L. No. 103-62, 107 Stat. 285 (1993) (GPRA) and Pub. L. No. 111-

352, 124 Stat. 3866 (2011) (updating GPRA). In particular, see 31 U.S.C. § 1115 (relating 

to agency performance plans and performance measurement).
Letter

example, to develop initial baselines, CBP could better measure program 

performance towards meeting stated goals. In response, CBP established 

a working group to develop and implement a system of performance 

measures and baselines to evaluate the effectiveness of CBP’s 

predeparture programs. As of December 2016, the working group was 

gathering baseline data from fiscal year 2015 to compare with fiscal year 

2016 data. In February 2017, CBP officials stated that the working group 

had identified potential performance measures but needs to further refine 

them. CBP officials stated that they expect to complete this work by the 

end of June 2017.

ICE Aims to Strengthen Screening of Visa 

Page 14 GAO-17-599T Border Security

Applicants through its Visa Security Program

The Homeland Security Act of 2002 authorized DHS to assign officers to 

each diplomatic and consular post at which visas are issued, and also 

authorized DHS to immediately assign personnel to Saudi Arabia to 

review all visa applications prior to final adjudication.25 In response, DHS 

implemented the Visa Security Program (VSP) in 2003, and as of March 

2016, ICE had established 26 visa security units in 20 countries. VSP 

aims to prevent terrorists and otherwise inadmissible travelers from 

attempting to enter the United States by screening visa applicants before 

the travel process begins. When reviewing applications for visas under 

VSP, ICE screens applicant information to identify applicants that 

potentially match records of individuals who are known or suspected 

threats to the United States or have immigration violations or derogatory 

information related to their criminal histories. In accordance with the 

Homeland Security Act of 2002, DHS officers assigned overseas are 

authorized to perform the following functions:

· provide expert advice and training to consular officers regarding 

specific security threats relating to the adjudication of individual visa 

applications or classes of applications,

· review any such visa applications either on the initiative of the 

employee of the department or at the request of a consular officer, or 

other persons charged with adjudicating such applications, and

 

25Pub. L. No. 107-296, tit. IV, subtit. C, § 428(e), (i), 116 Stat. 2135, 2191 (classified at 6 

U.S.C. § 236(e), (i)).
Letter

· conduct investigations with respect to consular matters under the 

jurisdiction of the Secretary of Homeland Security.

Page 15 GAO-17-599T Border Security

26

In March 2011, we reported, among other things, on DHS’s efforts to 

expand VSP and challenges to VSP operations overseas.27 For example, 

we found that training of consular officers by VSP agents varied from post 

to post, with some consular officers at some posts receiving no training. 

Therefore, we recommended that DHS issue guidance requiring ICE to 

provide training for consular officers. DHS concurred and issued guidance 

to enhance the training of consular officers by VSP offices abroad. 

We also found that ICE did not gather comprehensive data on all the 

performance measures needed to evaluate the VSP mission objectives 

and that the data that ICE collected on VSP activities were limited by 

inconsistencies. Therefore, we recommended that ICE collect reliable 

data to allow it to accurately evaluate VSP performance. DHS did not 

concur with this recommendation and stated that VSP captured all the 

required performance metrics. However, as we reported, we determined 

that ICE was collecting some data on the required performance 

measures, but that the data were not sufficient to accurately demonstrate 

the progress made toward the program’s stated objectives. We continue 

to believe that without collecting comprehensive data on performance 

measures, DHS cannot accurately demonstrate progress of VSP in 

enhancing national security. In addition, we found that VSP agents 

performed various investigative and administrative functions beyond their 

visa security responsibilities, which limited their time spent on visa 

security activities, and ICE did not track this information in its tracking 

system, making it unable to identify the time spent on investigative and 

administrative functions. Therefore, we recommended that ICE develop a 

mechanism to track the amount of time its agents spent on visa security 

activities and other investigations to determine appropriate staffing levels 

and resource needs for VSP operations. DHS did not concur with our 

recommendation and stated that ICE tracked case investigation hours 

through its case management system, and that adding the metric to the 

VSP tracking system would be redundant. However, we found at the time, 

according to ICE documentation, that ICE could not accurately determine 

the amount of time that VSP agents spent on investigative and visa 

security activities because ICE did not distinguish between the hours 

 

26See 6 U.S.C. § 236(e)(2).

27GAO-11-315.
Letter

logged by VSP agents and hours logged by other ICE officials at posts 

abroad and that ICE did not maintain accurate data on the time VSP 

agents spent on visa security activities at posts. 

ICE did not take action to implement these recommendations and we 

continue to believe that it needs to take steps to address issues we 

identified. We have ongoing work assessing DHS, State, and other U.S. 

agency efforts to strengthen the security of the visa process, including 

oversight of VSP, in which we plan to follow up on the findings and 

recommendations from our March 2011 report related to ICE’s efforts to 

enhance VSP performance measurement, among other things. We plan 

to report later this year on the results of this work.

All VWP Countries Have Entered into 

Page 16 GAO-17-599T Border Security

Information Sharing Agreements or 

Equivalents, but Not All Are Sharing Information 

as Required

In May 2016, among other things, we reported that all 38 countries 

participating in the VWP had entered into the three types of required 

information-sharing agreements, or their equivalents, to (1) report lost and 

stolen passports, (2) share identity information about known or suspected 

terrorists, and (3) share criminal history information.28 However, we 

reported that not all countries had shared information through two of the 

agreements. Specifically, we reported that all VWP countries reported 

passport information through the first agreement, but about one-third of 

VWP countries were not sharing terrorist identity information through the 

second agreement and about one-third of the countries had not yet 

shared criminal history information through the third agreement. Although 

U.S. agencies receive law enforcement and national security information 

from VWP countries through other means, such as multilateral entities, 

the U.S. government identified the information-sharing agreements as 

critical for protecting the United States from nationals of VWP countries 

who might present a threat. For example, as we reported, information 

provided through HSPD-6 arrangements has enhanced U.S. travelerscreening capabilities and improved U.S. agencies’ ability to prevent 

 

28GAO-16-498. In this statement, such required agreements are referred to as both 

agreements and arrangements.
Letter

known and suspected terrorists from traveling to the United States. Prior 

to the December 2015 enactment of the Visa Waiver Program 

Improvement and Terrorist Travel Prevention Act of 2015, U.S. law 

required VWP countries to enter into, but did not specifically require that 

countries implement, the information sharing agreements. DHS 

announced in August 2015 that it had developed a new requirement that 

countries implement the agreements by sharing information.

Page 17 GAO-17-599T Border Security

29 However, 

as we reported, DHS had not specified time frames for working with VWP 

countries to institute this and other new VWP security requirements. In 

May 2016, we recommended that DHS specify time frames for working 

with VWP countries to institute the additional VWP security requirements, 

including the requirement that the countries fully implement agreements 

to share information about known or suspected terrorists through the 

countries’ HSPD-6 arrangements and PCSC agreements with the United 

States. DHS concurred with the recommendation and, as of April 2017, 

reported that officials are continuing to work with VWP countries on time 

frames for implementing program requirements.

Chairman Gallagher, Ranking Member Watson Coleman, and Members 

of the Task Force, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be 

pleased to respond to any questions that you may have.

GAO Contact and Acknowledgments

For further information regarding this testimony, please contact Rebecca 

Gambler at (202) 512-8777 or gamblerr@gao.gov. In addition, contact 

points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may 

be found on the last page of this statement. Individuals who made key 

contributions to this testimony are Kathryn H. Bernet, Assistant Director; 

Eric Hauswirth; Paul Hobart; Brandon Hunt; Hynek Kalkus; Thomas 

Lombardi; Sasan J. “Jon” Najmi; Erin O’Brien; Mary Pitts; and Garrett 

Riba.

 

29See Pub. L. No. 114-113, div. O, tit. II, § 204(c)-(d), 129 Stat. at 2991-92 (requiring 

countries to fully implement information-sharing agreements in order to participate in the 

VWP); 8 U.S.C. § 1187(c)(2)(F).

(102034)
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety 

without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain 

copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be 

necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately.
GAO’s Mission

The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation, and investigative 

arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting its constitutional 

responsibilities and to help improve the performance and accountability of the 

federal government for the American people. GAO examines the use of public 

funds; evaluates federal programs and policies; and provides analyses, 

recommendations, and other assistance to help Congress make informed 

oversight, policy, and funding decisions. GAO’s commitment to good government 

is reflected in its core values of accountability, integrity, and reliability.

Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony

The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no cost is 

through GAO’s website (http://www.gao.gov). Each weekday afternoon, GAO 

posts on its website newly released reports, testimony, and correspondence. To 

have GAO e-mail you a list of newly posted products, go to http://www.gao.gov

and select “E-mail Updates.”

Order by Phone

The price of each GAO publication reflects GAO’s actual cost of production and 

distribution and depends on the number of pages in the publication and whether 

the publication is printed in color or black and white. Pricing and ordering 

information is posted on GAO’s website, http://www.gao.gov/ordering.htm. 

Place orders by calling (202) 512-6000, toll free (866) 801-7077, or 

TDD (202) 512-2537.

Orders may be paid for using American Express, Discover Card, MasterCard, 

Visa, check, or money order. Call for additional information.

Connect with GAO

Connect with GAO on Facebook, Flickr, LinkedIn, Twitter, and YouTube.

Subscribe to our RSS Feeds or E-mail Updates. Listen to our Podcasts.

Visit GAO on the web at www.gao.gov and read The Watchblog.

To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal 

Programs

Contact:
Website: http://www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm

E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov

Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470

Congressional Relations

Katherine Siggerud, Managing Director, siggerudk@gao.gov, (202) 512-4400, 

U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7125, 

Washington, DC 20548

Public Affairs

Chuck Young, Managing Director, youngc1@gao.gov, (202) 512-4800

U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7149 

Washington, DC 20548

Strategic Planning and External Liaison

James-Christian Blockwood, Managing Director, spel@gao.gov, (202) 512-4707

U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7814, 

Washington, DC 20548

PleasrintoRecyldPapr.