THE AL-QAEDA 

ORGANIZATION

AND THE 

ISLAMIC STATE

ORGANIZATION

History, Doctrine, Modus 

Operandi, and U.S. Policy to 

Degrade and Defeat 

Terrorism Conducted in the 

Name of Sunni Islam

PAUL KAMOLNICK

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Carlisle Barracks, PA and

UNITED STATES 

ARMY WAR COLLEGE

PRESS

i

The United States Army War College

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

CENTER for

STRATEGIC

LEADERSHIP

The United States Army War College educates and develops leaders for service 

at the strategic level while advancing knowledge in the global application 

of Landpower.

The purpose of the United States Army War College is to produce graduates 

who are skilled critical thinkers and complex problem solvers. Concurrently, 

it is our duty to the U.S. Army to also act as a “think factory” for commanders 

and civilian leaders at the strategic level worldwide and routinely engage 

in discourse and debate concerning the role of ground forces in achieving 

national security objectives.

The Strategic Studies Institute publishes national 

security and strategic research and analysis to influence 

policy debate and bridge the gap between military 

and academia.

The Center for Strategic Leadership contributes 

to the education of world class senior leaders, 

develops expert knowledge, and provides solutions 

to strategic Army issues affecting the national 

security community.

The Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute 

provides subject matter expertise, technical review, 

and writing expertise to agencies that develop stability 

operations concepts and doctrines.

The School of Strategic Landpower develops strategic 

leaders by providing a strong foundation of wisdom 

grounded in mastery of the profession of arms, and 

by serving as a crucible for educating future leaders in 

the analysis, evaluation, and refinement of professional 

expertise in war, strategy, operations, national security, 

resource management, and responsible command.

The U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center acquires, 

conserves, and exhibits historical materials for use 

to support the U.S. Army, educate an international 

audience, and honor Soldiers—past and present.

STRATEGIC

STUDIES

INSTITUTE

The Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) is part of the U.S. Army War 

College and is the strategic-level study agent for issues related 

to national security and military strategy with emphasis on 

geostrategic analysis.

The mission of SSI is to use independent analysis to conduct 

strategic studies that develop policy recommendations on:

• Strategy, planning, and policy for joint and combined 

 employment of military forces;

• Regional strategic appraisals;

• The nature of land warfare;

• Matters affecting the Army’s future;

• The concepts, philosophy, and theory of strategy; and,

• Other issues of importance to the leadership of the Army.

Studies produced by civilian and military analysts concern 

topics having strategic implications for the Army, the Department of 

Defense, and the larger national security community.

In addition to its studies, SSI publishes special reports on topics 

of special or immediate interest. These include edited proceedings 

of conferences and topically oriented roundtables, expanded trip 

reports, and quick-reaction responses to senior Army leaders.

The Institute provides a valuable analytical capability within the 

Army to address strategic and other issues in support of Army 

participation in national security policy formulation.

iii

v

Strategic Studies Institute

and

U.S. Army War College Press

THE AL-QAEDA ORGANIZATION AND THE 

ISLAMIC STATE ORGANIZATION: HISTORY, 

DOCTRINE, MODUS OPERANDI, AND 

U.S. POLICY TO DEGRADE AND DEFEAT

 TERRORISM CONDUCTED IN THE NAME OF 

SUNNI ISLAM

Paul Kamolnick

February 2017

The views expressed in this report are those of the author and 

do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the 

Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. 

Government. Authors of Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) and 

U.S. Army War College (USAWC) Press publications enjoy full 

academic freedom, provided they do not disclose classified 

information, jeopardize operations security, or misrepresent 

official U.S. policy. Such academic freedom empowers them to 

offer new and sometimes controversial perspectives in the interest of furthering debate on key issues. This report is cleared for 

public release; distribution is unlimited.

*****

This publication is subject to Title 17, United States Code, 

Sections 101 and 105. It is in the public domain and may not be 

copyrighted.
vi

*****

Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should 

be forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. 

Army War College Press, U.S. Army War College, 47 Ashburn 

Drive, Carlisle, PA 17013-5010. 

*****

This manuscript was funded by the U.S. Army War 

College External Research Associates Program. Information on 

this program is available on our website, www.StrategicStudies

Institute.army.mil, at the Opportunities tab.

*****

All Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) and U.S. Army War 

College (USAWC) Press publications may be downloaded 

free of charge from the SSI website. Hard copies of certain 

reports may also be obtained free of charge while supplies last 

by placing an order on the SSI website. Check the website for 

availability. SSI publications may be quoted or reprinted in 

part or in full with permission and appropriate credit given 

to the U.S. Army Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army 

War College Press, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA. Contact SSI by visiting our website at the following address: 

www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil.

*****

The Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War 

College Press publishes a monthly email newsletter to update 

the national security community on the research of our analysts,

recent and forthcoming publications, and upcoming conferences sponsored by the Institute. Each newsletter also provides 

a strategic commentary by one of our research analysts. If you 

are interested in receiving this newsletter, please subscribe on the 

SSI website at www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/newsletter.

ISBN 1-58487-744-8
vii

CONTENTS

Foreword........................................................................xi

About the Author........................................................xiii

Summary.......................................................................xv

Prologue............................................................................1

1. Belief-System, Creed, Worldview, Doctrine............3

I. Introduction............................................................3

II. The Al-Qaeda Organization (Tanzim 

 Qa’idat Al-Jihad)....................................................5

 Sunni Islamic Orthodoxy.....................................................5 

 Sunni-Salafism/“Fundamentalism”..................................6

 The Muwahhidun/Wahhabism/ 

 Salafi-Wahhabism..............................................................6

 Shaykh Scholar-Mujahid, Dr. Abdallah Azzam:

 The Individual Obligation to Join the Caravan 

 in Defense of Muslim Lands: An Armed 

 Muslim Brotherhood-Salafi-Wahhabi

 Synthesis............................................................................11

 The “Base of the Jihad”; Al-Qaeda 

 (Qa‘idat Al-Jihad)...............................................................17

 From Qa'idat Al-Jihad to Bin Ladenism............................26

 From Bin Ladenism Back to Qa‘idat Al-Jihad? 

 Back to the Future? Hubris, Delusion, Disaster, 

 and the Remaking/Rebirth of a Post-Bin Laden, 

 Post-Arab Spring Qa'idat Al-Jihad....................................35

 “What is Qa'idat Al-Jihad?” In a Nutshell: 

 Fazul Abdullah and Adam Gadahn..............................44

III. Islamic State Organization (Tanzim 

 Al-Dawla Al-Islamiyya).......................................53
 “Zarqawism” vs. AQO: Abu Musab

 Al-Zarqawi’s Worldview and Doctrine:

 1989-June 7, 2006..............................................................57

 From Non-Religious Violent Street Tough to

 Ultra-Sectarian Salafi-Wahhabi Jihadist Prison

 Tough: 1980-1999..............................................................61

 Al-Zarqawi’s Private Jihasist Armies of the

 Levant: 1999-2004..............................................................64

 Abdallah Al-Muhajir’s Ultra-Extremism in Takfir,

 and Takfir of the Shia .......................................................66

 Abu Musa’b Al-Zarqawi's Embrace of Abu 

 Abdallah Al-Muhajir's Extremism in Takfir..................68

 Zarqawism Unveiled as Doctrine and Strategy:

 Al-Zarqawi’s Negotiation and Bay’ah to

 Osama Bin Laden.............................................................72

 Zarqawism: Its Three Essential Elements........................77

 “Neo-Zarqawism”: The Birth and Declaration

 of the Islamic State of Iraq (Dawlat Al’Iraq 

 Al-Islamiyyah), and Rise of the New Emirs....................81

 Creedal/Doctrinal/Policy Comparision of 

 ISO and AQO....................................................................91

 Apocalypticism and Mahdism in Abu Hamza 

 Al-Muhajir and Abu Omar Al-Baghdadi.......................96

 The History, Doctrines, and Worldview 

 of Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi’s “Caliphate”: 

 May 2010-Present.............................................................97

 From ISI to the Caliphate: Brief Organizational

 History...............................................................................99

 Self-Proclaimed Emir Al-Muminin Abu Bakr 

 Al-Hussaini Al-Qurayshi Al-Baghdadi:

 A Brief History................................................................102

 Current ISO Worldview, Beliefs, Creed, 

 and Doctrine...................................................................112

 ISO’s Differentia Specifica: Four Essential

 Categorical Divergences from AQO............................112

 The Imminence of the End Times 

 (Apocalypticism and Eschatology)...............................113

 The Caliphate Now!..........................................................118

 The “Final Solution” to the “Shia Problem”..................120

 The Nearest Enemy is the Ummah’s

 Truest Enemy!.................................................................123

 ISO Relative Divergences from AQO.............................124

viii
ix

2. Terrorist Modus Operandi.....................................127

I. Introduction........................................................127

 Terrorist Quadrangle Analysis (TQA)............................127

II. The Al-Qaeda Organization (Tanzim 

 Qa’idat Al-Jihad).................................................131

 TQA, I: The “Classical” Base First Bin Ladenist 

 “Far Enemy“ Strategy......................................................131

 TQA, II: The AQAP “Lone Mujahid” 

 “Far Enemy” Strategy......................................................137

III. Islamic State Organization (Tanzim 

 Al-Dawla Al-Islamiyya).....................................143

 TQA: The ISO “State/Caliphate-First” 

 Strategy.............................................................................143

3. Conclusions, Implications, and 

 Recommendations for U.S. Government 

 Policy and Strategy.................................................167

I. Key Findings......................................................167

 Macro-Level Conclusion..................................................167

 Belief-Systems, Worldviews, Doctrines, Creeds...........170

 Strategies and Terrorist Modus Operandi.....................172

II. Implications for U.S. Government

 Policy and Strategies.........................................177

 Implications for Existing USG Policy 

 and Strategy to Permanently Defeat AQO 

 and its Affiliates................................................................177

 Implications for Existing USG Policy and

 Strategy to Permanently Defeat the ISO........................181
x

III. Recommendations...........................................191

 Recommendations for Senior Military Leaders, 

 Planners, and Strategists.................................................191

 Recommendations for Leader Development

 and Education..................................................................195

Endnotes.......................................................................198
xi

FOREWORD

Dr. Kamolnick’s book is a meticulously documented investigation and comparison of the al-Qaeda 

Organization (AQO) and the Islamic State Organization (ISO) across three key strategically relevant dimensions: essential doctrine, beliefs, and worldview; 

strategic concept, including terrorist modus operandi; 

and in the final chapter, specific implications, and recommendations for current U.S. Government policy 

and strategy. Through this comparison, he supplies 

far greater clarity on, incisive analysis of, and potential answers for such key questions as: How is each 

terrorist entity related historically and doctrinally to 

the broader phenomenon of transnational Sunni “jihadism”? What is the exact nature of the ISO? How, 

if at all, does ISO differ in strategically relevant ways 

from AQO? What doctrinal differences essentially 

define these entities? How does each understand and 

operationalize strategy? What critical requirements 

and vulnerabilities characterize each entity? Finally, 

what implications, recommendations, and proposals are advanced that are of particular interest to U.S. 

Government strategists and professional military educators? 

Dr. Kamolnick’s book substantially advances 

the knowledge and strategy pertinent to combating these terrorist entities more effectively. I highly 

recommend it. 

 DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

 Director

 Strategic Studies Institute and

 U.S. Army War College Press

xiii

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

PAUL KAMOLNICK is a professor of sociology at 

East Tennessee State University, USA, where he teaches courses in classical and contemporary sociological 

theory, and the sociology of global terrorism. He has 

published articles and reviews in Studies in Conflict 

and Terrorism; Terrorism and Political Violence; Perspectives on Terrorism; and The Small Wars Journal. Dr. Kamolnick is also the author of two previous Strategic 

Studies Institute monographs focused on countering 

al-Qaeda-based anti-American mass casualty terrorism: Delegitimizing Al-Qaeda: A Jihad-Realist Approach

(2012), and Countering Radicalization and Recruitment 

to Al-Qaeda: Fighting the War of Deeds (2014). He holds 

a Ph.D. from Florida State University, Tallahassee, 

Florida, USA.

xv

SUMMARY

INTRODUCTION

It is declared U.S. Government (USG) policy to 

degrade, defeat, and destroy two transnational adversaries that conduct terrorism in the name of Sunni 

Islam: the al-Qaeda Organization (AQO) and the Islamic State Organization (ISO). The present book has 

been written to assist policymakers, military planners, strategists, and professional military educators 

to more effectively accomplish that objective. Chapter 

1 documents the distinct history and doctrinal beliefs 

of each organization; Chapter 2 examines AQO’s and 

ISO’s basic strategic concept and terrorist modus operandi; and Chapter 3 recapitulates chief conclusions, 

considers strategic implications, and supplies select 

recommendations.

AQO and ISO claim to represent the true and abiding interests of the world’s Sunni Muslims (Ahl-us 

Sunnah), estimated to number 1.4 billion persons. This 

book finds that this is unsupported by the evidence. 

Instead, AQO and ISO may be conceived in the very 

terms of the Sunni Islam they themselves profess, as 

deviant criminal terrorist organizations guilty of committing reprehensible and forbidden acts, undermining Islamic interests, and besmirching rather than elevating Islam in the eyes of the non-Muslim world. A 

more optimistic prognosis for the future destruction 

of each entity is therefore warranted. The world’s 

Sunni Muslims must make that determination, however, and define for themselves where the bounds of 

faith, godly fear (taqwa), and righteous conduct begin 

and end; who may or may not legitimately claim to 

speak and act in their name; and who may or may not 
xvi

be deemed a genuine ally, fellow soldier, friend, or 

enemy in this historic endeavor.

CONCLUSIONS

Despite their common genus as violent transnational Sunni “jihadist” organizations, AQO and ISO 

are distinct species that substantially diverge in conceptions of doctrine and creed, strategy, and terrorist modus operandi. Doctrinally, the original AQO 

“idea” first arises in opposition to Palestinian-Jordanian Shaykh Dr. Abdallah Azzam’s conception of Sunni 

global jihadism. AQO shares with “Azzamism” a 

Sunni pan-Islamic ecumenical approach embodied in 

Azzam’s Muslim Brotherhood-Salafi-Wahhabi fusion. 

This mission is originally one of lumping, not splitting, Church not sect, openness not exclusivity, and 

emphasizes intra-Sunni solidarity, unity, community, 

brotherhood, and the tolerance of differences among 

all fighting elements willing to serve as force multipliers and allies within broader alliances in a nowfermenting Arab Muslim world. 

AQO differs from Azzamism in two key respects. 

Osama bin Laden sought to create an autonomous bin 

Laden-led army; whereas Azzam viewed his role as 

one of assisting, complementing, and subordinating 

Arabic volunteers to the Afghan-led Islamic forces 

fighting against the Communist-installed and backed 

Afghan regime. Second, for Azzam, Palestine occupied 

a privileged theater of future near-term operations, 

whereas the original AQO, instead, de-privileged 

Palestine and conceived itself as an Arab-led transnational military expeditionary force, a type of Arabic 

jihadi Foreign Legion, serving as a force multiplier. 

Consequently, they deployed high-quality operatives 
xvii

with advanced training possessed of the AQO worldview, belief-system, and a desire to co-opt localized 

insurgencies into various AQO nodes, fighting to first 

win Islamic lands with the intent of reestablishing an 

Islamic Caliphate, and eventually launching a future 

offensive jihad against the original infidels. 

The AQO idea’s second chief opponent was jihadi 

takfirism, i.e., rigidly-extremist sectarians who extravagantly accuse other Muslims of apostasy (Ridda). 

Though bin Laden’s emergent “Base of the Jihad Organization” (Tanzim Qa’idat al-Jihad) viewed the Shia 

as a wayward and deviant sect, it did not at any time 

privilege a war against Shi’ism per se as the essential 

starting point for the purification and revivification 

of Sunni orthodoxy as a ruling imperium. Moreover, 

AQO in its training camps deliberately policed and 

opposed takfirism, and in its stead supplied indoctrination into the uniquely ecumenical AQO pan-Islamist 

Sunni jihadist vision of a vanguard Sunni armed organization whose singular mission was to unite disparate struggles into a broader transnational struggle 

to eventually restore a supranational Caliphal sovereign. The AQO idea is not exclusively Salafist, though 

it includes a significant number. It is not exclusively 

Salafi-Wahhabi or Wahhabi, though it also includes 

their number; it is not exclusively inspired by Sayyid 

Qutb, though he is recognized and honored as a pioneering jihadi thinker. It is rather a broad, transnational Church-like conglomerate whose vision, values, and mission statement prohibit extremely strict 

“Muslimness” tests or other instruments designed to 

split into ever-smaller numbers those considered virtuous enough to wage a united Sunni war against the 

occupying “Crusaders” of Muslim lands.
xviii

This original AQO idea was eventually transformed 

into a terrorist entity controlled by bin Laden and focused nearly exclusively on orchestrating highly symbolic mass casualty attacks against all Americans—

civilian and military—wherever they may be found. 

Five key elements, according to AQO chief spokesman 

Adam Yahiye Gadahn, characterize this “bin Ladenism”: its global/international reach and membership 

as a type of “Islamic Internationale”; its exclusive focus on fighting America, the Crusader West, and the 

Jews; its lack of a written religious creed, doctrine, or 

specific strategy that every prospective member must 

agree to before joining; emphasis on the critical role of 

Muslim popular support for an enduring, long-term 

victory; and its unique privileging of, and subordination to, the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (i.e., the 

Afghan Taliban). 

Bin Ladenism is characterized by a unique mixture 

of profound ignorance, delusion, resentment, and hubris. It rests on a deeply flawed analogy between the 

United States and the former Union of Soviet Socialist 

Republics (USSR), and a grossly caricatured understanding of the civil society foundations of enduring 

American power. Moreover, there is no precedent in 

Sunni Islam for bin Ladenism’s signature “Far Enemy” doctrine. It was never embraced by the vast majority of existing Sunni Islamist insurgents. Bin Laden 

was deeply criticized from within his own ranks for 

having caused the practical extinction of a decade’s 

long effort to recruit, train, deploy, and create a global 

Sunni jihadist movement, and by other Salafi-Jihadists as unlawful and at the very least imprudent. 9/11 

may be usefully viewed as a “lone wolf” terrorist attack and AQO’s first and last great “one-off” based in 

treachery, criminality, and the USG’s unpreparedness 
xix

for that plot’s unprecedented use of American civil 

aviation as a weapon of mass destruction.

AQO’s most lethal affiliate, Qa’idat al-Jihad in the 

Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), has amended but not 

ended classical bin Ladenism. There is no discernible 

difference from classical bin Ladenism as doctrine, 

and its accompanying “Far Enemy” economic attrition conception of collapsing the American economy 

and forcing its withdrawal from Islamic lands.

ISO, in stark contrast, is that very type of extreme 

ultra-sectarian jihadi takfiri organization AQO opposes. ISO’s “idea” originates in Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s 

“Zarqawism,” and is characterized by three principal 

doctrines: ultra-sectarianism, an abiding fundamental 

commitment to annihilate in masse all Shia Muslims, 

leader and lay; an unprecedented conduct of ultraviolence as a media-based spectacle; and focus on the 

immediate creation of an Islamic State as a base for the 

prophesied return of the Caliphate. Zarqawi’s original 

notions are later extended to “Neo-Zarqawism,” and 

its current incarnation as “Baghdadism.” Four doctrines uniquely characterize the present ISO’s “idea,” 

each of which starkly contrasts with the AQO’s species of Sunni global jihadism: apocalyptic and eschatological beliefs informing its sense of temporality 

and morality; its doctrine proclaiming the mass annihilation of all Shia Muslims; its prioritizing of the 

“Nearest” and “Near Enemies,” and postponement 

of jihad against the “original Kufr”; and, its belief in 

its right to monopolize and immediately declare the 

Islamic State/Caliphate. These key elements of ISO’s 

worldview and doctrine place it on the remote fringes 

not just of Sunni Islam generally, but also of the vast 

majority of Sunni global jihadist organizations.
xx

AQO and ISO exhibit similarities as transnational 

terrorist entities, but as the author’s Terrorist Quadrangle Analysis (TQA) heuristic confirms, they substantially diverge in their respective conceptions of 

strategy and terrorist modus operandi. Bin Ladenism’s sequenced strategy requires the removal of U.S. 

and allied militaries from the Arab Muslim world and 

territories, thus undermining U.S. military presence, 

power projection, and access to energy reserves; the 

overthrow of so-called apostate pro-Western regimes 

and replacing them with orthodox Sunni Muslim governments that adhere to strict Islamic legal orthodoxy; 

uniting Muslim states into a supra-state caliphate that 

shall serve as a religio-political base for further amassing Muslim power and conducting offensive jihad to 

confront the remaining world of infidelity (dar al-Kufr); and, a sustained, permanent offensive jihad to be 

fought until all other forms of worship and polity are 

overthrown. 

The USG, while still focused on AQO external 

operations, intentions, and capacities, has practically 

decimated AQO. Assisted by recent upheavals in the 

Arab Muslim world, AQO has apparently shifted to 

focus far more on the Near rather than Far Enemy. This 

new direction suggests a more gradual, evolutionary 

insurgent strategy involving a greater emphasis on 

preaching (da’wa); embedding within various ongoing rebellions and working within and through the 

various nationalist-Islamist currents often dominant 

in these theaters; and rebranding as local supporters/

helpers for the rule of Islamic law (Ansar al-Sharia), 

such as has appeared in Tunisia, Yemen, and Egypt.

AQO’s affiliate AQAP, while maintaining deep 

doctrinal affinities to AQO, has substantially departed 

in practice from the classic Bin Ladenist, top-down 
xxi

model for carefully planned, long-term, high-visibility, strategically symbolic “Far Enemy” targeting. 

AQAP’s terrorist modus operandi is based in what it 

calls “lone jihad” or the “lone mujahid” strategy. In 

its essence, it combines media and non-media terrorist 

operations to incite, galvanize, mobilize, train, and deploy individual persons—glorified in its media operations as “lone mujahids” whose martyrdom (Shuhada) 

destines them for the highest reaches of Paradise—to 

commit what the vast majority of Muslims consider 

forbidden terrorist acts, such as sabotage, targeted assassination, mass arson, mass-casualty bombings, and 

a vast array of highly deviant acts generally classified 

within religious law as major sins and crimes, and 

within secular law as intentional acts of malicious, felonious criminal conduct.

The ISO’s strategy and terrorist modus operandi 

is carefully outlined in its inaugural online publication Dabiq, and ideally comprises five key stages: (1) 

emigration from a hostile milieu to one where sanctuary exists or can be created through terrorist acts 

(Hijra); (2) creation of the nucleus jihadist organization (Jama’ah); (3) destabilization of the existing “infidel” regime through inflicting mass injury (Nikayah) 

eventuating in the collapse of existing authority, and 

thereby fomenting chaos and mayhem (Tawahhush); 

(4) creation and consolidation of a territory, resources, 

and base accompanied with the immediate declaration of the Islamic State (Tamkin); and (5) further consolidation and expansion of the Islamic State with the 

immediate declaration of the Caliphate (Khilafa). 

However, this idealized five-stage blueprint for 

restoring the Caliphate (Khilafa) was not followed in 

practice. The very nature of the ISO as an ultra-sectarian jihadi takfiri organization led it to hereticize (takfir) 
xxii

virtually all other organizations, tendencies, groups, 

and movements. As a result, the stage of Fitnah (conflict, strife)—a stage not specified in their ideal model—has accompanied ISO from its beginnings in Abu 

Musab al-Zarqawi through each of its metamorphoses. Further, the ISO’s blueprint exhibits ambiguity 

regarding the precise timing for declaring a State and 

later Caliphate. ISO’s achievements have been substantially assisted by its fearsome and highly professional military leadership cadre, comprised of former 

Ba’athist military and intelligence officers, and by 

the revengeful anti-Sunni policies pursued by former 

Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri Kamil Mohammed Hasan 

al-Maliki in the context of a dramatically changed regional dynamic enervated by the “Arab Spring.”

Our findings largely support existing USG policy 

and strategy vis-à-vis classic bin Ladenism. What 

arose in its wake, however—though AQO classic “Far 

Enemy” attacks must still be countered—was an alternative “lone mujahid” terrorist modus operandi 

currently employed by AQO’s most lethal affiliate, 

AQAP. Current policy and strategy are sufficient to 

meet that latter challenge. Findings also substantially 

support current USG policy and strategy to degrade, 

defeat, and destroy ISO, though further recommendations are suggested by the present author to address 

its specific “stateness” dimension. Our findings also 

strongly support current USG explicit repeated declarations that the USG could temporarily defeat ISO 

within a brief period; however, the permanent defeat

of the ISO idea will only occur when Iraqis themselves 

make the choice to create a new social compact in 

which its Sunni citizens are respected, represented, 

and protected.
xxiii

RECOMMENDATIONS

Doctrine-independent recommendations include 

advocating well-known methods for combating terrorism. Doctrine-dependent recommendations include developing a deeper understanding of Sunni Islam, of AQO’s and ISO’s extreme deviance in relation 

to Sunni Islam, and of how Sunni Islamic orthodoxy, 

including some militant strands, may be leveraged 

to more effectively delegitimize, marginalize, and 

implode these unlawful criminal terrorist entities.

1

PROLOGUE

RELEVANCE 

The present book holds relevance for military 

planners, strategists, and professional military educators whose mission demands a deep understanding 

of the strategically relevant differences between two 

transnational terrorist entities, the al-Qaeda Organization (AQO) and the Islamic State Organization (ISO). 

The only investment required is one’s willingness to 

sequester an afternoon or two for careful reading and 

reflection. It is presumed that a significant sub-set of 

readers do not possess requisite knowledge of Islam 

generally, and militant Islamic politics specifically; 

therefore, brief expository asides and explanatory 

notes clarifying key Islamic religious and religio-political concepts are sprinkled throughout. 

INTRODUCTION 

This book analyzes the AQO (Tanzim Qa’idat alJihad) and the ISO (Tanzim al-Dawla al-Islamiyya) and 

proposes U.S. Government (USG) strategies for their 

permanent defeat.1 AQO and ISO claim to represent 

the true and abiding interests of the world’s Sunni 

Muslims (Ahl-us-Sunnah), estimated to number 1.4 

billion persons.2 It is the argument of this book, however, that grounds exist for why this need not be the 

case. AQO and ISO may be conceived in the theology 

they themselves profess as two deviant organizations 

guilty of committing major sins and besmirching the 

Islamic Call. I believe a more optimistic prognosis for 

the future destruction of each entity is warranted. It 

will be for the world’s Sunni Muslims (Ahl-us Sunnah) 
2

to make that determination; to define for themselves 

where the bounds of faith, godly fear and piety (taqwa), 

and righteous conduct begin and end; and who may 

or may not legitimately claim to speak in their name.

AQO and ISO have distinct doctrines, methodologies, and strategies of victory. Each entails distinct 

implications for USG strategy. This book is organized 

as follows. Chapter 1 documents the distinct history 

and doctrinal beliefs of each organization. In Chapter 

2, AQO’s and ISO’s basic terrorist modus operandi is 

examined. Lastly, in Chapter 3, a summary of conclusions is first supplied, and implications and recommendations are then offered for further enhancing 

USG policy, strategy, and professional military educators’ effectiveness in expediting the demise of these 

two terrorist entities. 
3

CHAPTER 1

BELIEF-SYSTEM, CREED, WORLDVIEW, 

DOCTRINE

I. INTRODUCTION

The concept “doctrine” as used throughout refers 

to a more or less presumed “worldview” or “ideology” rooted in a set of core beliefs about how the world 

works, and in particular, about a presumed reality 

that describes the factual state of Islam and Muslims 

in the present socio-political, socio-cultural world. 

Doctrine is rooted in belief-systems: it is about what 

is true or false, real or unreal. Belief-systems are about 

statements of fact; and for their adherents, about what 

they take to be the definite factual reality of the world 

as it is. Belief-systems are not knowingly rooted in the 

will or intention to deceive others; they are Truth, and 

a Truth to be known and shared. Beliefs are not therefore deceptive, manipulative, or intentionally distorted propaganda—a form of communication, which 

will be discussed in Chapter 2. One can refer to an adherent as a believer, ideologue, or doctrinaire, but not 

a deceiver, or not an intentional deceiver at least. 

The term “doctrine” is similar but distinct from 

the term “creed” (aqida) in that doctrine extends beyond orthodox beliefs that cannot be denied if one is 

to maintain one’s status as an orthodox adherent of 

a particular faith. They include religious faith but extend beyond to beliefs about past and current history 

as it pertains to the origins, development, rise and 

fall, and the current status of Sunni Muslims in the 

present world. In other words, it also involves certain 

fundamental beliefs about the how, why, and “what 
4

for” of politics, culture, power, and violence that encompass and extend beyond the articles of creedal 

faith that makes one an “orthodox Sunni Muslim,” 

a term that seems to encompass both worldview or 

weltanschauung—literally “world picture”—captures 

these elements in a simple phrase and will be used 

interchangeably with belief-system in this course of 

exposition.
5

II. THE AL-QAEDA ORGANIZATION 

(TANZIM QA’IDAT AL-JIHAD)

SUNNI ISLAMIC ORTHODOXY

AQO’s worldview or doctrine has been consistently propounded over the course of nearly 30 years and 

is contained in a number of publicly available sources. 

Relative to the ISO, it has been subject to extensive 

scholarly analysis, and a more or less rough consensus has been reached regarding its essential premise. 

Though simplified, the following is an accurate depiction. First, a Perfect and Final faith was revealed by 

the seal of the prophet, Prophet Muhammad. Second, 

the one and almighty sovereign, Allah (God), blessed 

this singular faith to conquer the Earth and eventually to establish Allah’s rule, manifest especially in 

the maintaining of essential legal requirements and 

punishments contained in Allah’s Divine word, the 

Quran and other sources and principles deemed essential to a proper legal judgment; for example, the 

Traditions of the Prophet (ahadith), consensus of the 

learned scholars and jurisprudents (ijma), and use 

of analogical reasoning to infer to new cases from 

past judgments (qiyas). Third, Allah’s rule on Earth 

as manifest in conquered lands ruled by an imperial 

Muslim religio-political sovereign, the Caliph, represented the singular triumph and exclusive example of 

Allah’s word, law, and sovereignty. That Islam is the 

perfected final faith—revealed through the perfected 

final prophet and his immediate companions and 

successors; blessed by the singular sovereign Allah 

to conquer and rule; and to be manifest in an earthly 

Caliphal imperium charged with upholding and further spreading the worship of Allah—is an essential 
6

starting point for discerning the AQO worldview. 

Contained here is an inarguable premise within Sunni 

orthodoxy that Allah is the one and only God, and that 

Muhammad is his final messenger.

SUNNI SALAFISM/“FUNDAMENTALISM” 

A “Salafist” sub-set of Sunnism is also key, however. Salafism as a genus—despite its varieties—is 

manifest in the belief that Islam reached its noblest 

and purest expression in Prophet Muhammad’s own 

exemplary conduct (Sunnah), and those of his closest 

companions and the first three generations of his successors known collectively as al-salaf al-salih (the pious 

ancestors).3 Salafists seek to emulate these truest and 

most faithful exemplars of the Prophet’s Message, and 

believe that genuine Islam—Prophet Muhammad’s Islam—requires that one adhere as faithfully as possible 

to what is known of their sayings and doings, without 

amendment. To introduce innovation (bida) to what 

is believed to be the Prophet’s own exemplary path 

(Sunnah), or “the prophetic methodology” (manhaj), 

is to insinuate an imperfect present into the perfected 

past.

THE MUWAHHIDUN/WAHHABISM/

SALAFI-WAHHABISM 

The reformist Muwahhidun (Oneness of Allah) or 

“Wahhabi” movement established by the neo-Hanbali Najd Shaykh Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab (d. 

1792) and his faithful adherents and proponents furnish an essential re-statement of the orthodox Sunni 

fundamentals in their most rigorous form.4 These consist in the following. Chief among al-Wahhab’s con-
7

tributions was his reconceptualization of the manner 

in which “faith” or Iman—what it actually means to 

believe—is to be proven as fact. This also applies to 

its opposite—Kufr (unbelief/infidelity), and whether 

takfir (apostasy, heresy) is declared against persons accused of such. Al-Wahhab declared that genuine faith 

is not merely a matter of an internal belief—belief of 

the heart or the mind—of those twin creedal essentials 

comprising the Shahada or first pillar of Islam—Allah 

is One, and Muhammad is his final messenger. Private 

confessions of faith are necessary, but insufficient. 

Faith must also and especially be manifest publicly 

through active worship of Allah in public utterance, 

as well as deeds that openly signify the operationalization of the principle of Allah’s Oneness (tawhid) in 

one’s life activities. Other pillars of Islam—the obligatory five prayers (salat), obligatory giving of alms (zakat), obligatory fasting on Ramadan (sawm), and the 

obligatory pilgrimage (Hajj)—are essential dimensions of faith in action and as action. 

Failure to actively and correctly worship Allah may 

indicate ignorance, error, moral weakness, or coercion, 

and an active program of education, instruction, and 

moral rectification may be required. This is the function of preachers and learned scholars (ulema), and the 

Call to Tawhid (da’wa). However, to voluntarily and intentionally deny in one’s mind, heart, tongue, or hand 

these practical manifestations of faith; to willfully and 

knowingly deny the worship of Allah through these 

visible signs of submission and surrender, is to be 

guilty of infidelity (Kufr). It is to deny Allah what is 

owed to Allah. It is to be guilty of disloyalty, infidelity (Kufr). For al-Wahhab, the rigorous enforcement of 

all practical dimensions of worship, including but extending far beyond an internal conviction of belief, is 
8

therefore essential to proving one’s faith in Islam. The 

question of what exactly constitutes idolatry (shirk), 

distinctions between greater and lesser shirk, and the 

lawful and prudent means for combating shirk, are 

core theological questions at the heart of the present 

schism between AQO and ISO.

At the core of al-Wahhab’s preaching and program 

for reforming Islam is the essential master concept that 

Judaism, and later Islam, bequeaths to the world: the 

concept of God’s/Allah’s Oneness (tawhid). Tawhid, 

according to al-Wahhab, following Shaykh ul Islam 

Ibn Taymiyyah’s (d. 1328) original coinage, comprises 

three integral dimensions: Allah’s Oneness as Sovereign Creator, Sustainer, Provider (Tawhid al-Ruboobiyyah); Allah’s Oneness as Sovereign Lord worthy of 

exclusive worship (Tawhid al-Uloohiyyah); and Allah’s 

Oneness as His Unique Names (Tawheed al-Asma’ wasSifaat).5

 The implications al-Wahhab derived from 

this re-statement of Sunni orthodoxy was profound, 

highly controversial, profoundly unsettling, and even 

revolutionary for his present milieu. The opposite of 

tawhid, and the greatest of sins in Islam which even 

Allah does not forgive, is the sin of worshipping/

associating other deities with Allah (shirk). The absolute uncompromising monotheism represented by alWahhab’s Muwahiddun reformist movement demands 

monolatry. It is unsparing in its denunciation and disavowal of, and obligation to, uproot shirk.

Theologically armed with a re-conceptualized notion of Iman as faith, as actualized in essential worshipful acts and rituals; and Tawhid actualized in 

beliefs and actions displaying loyalty to the Singular 

Absolute Sovereign that is Allah as Creator, Lord, 

and Unique and Ineffable Names; al-Wahhab and his 

Muwahiddun movement proceeded to purge the Saudi 
9

landmass and its immediate environs. Sharing a divine 

kinship with Islam, we find the “People of the Book/

Covenant/Divine Scripture” (Ahl al-Khitab). Jews, 

Christians, and often Zoroastrians, though deemed 

guilty of adulterating original scripture were—owing 

to their adherence to worshiping a singular Deity—

granted the right to retain ancestral faiths and practices, though not in Prophet Muhammad’s ancestral 

homeland. Though subject to submission and humiliation displays, and liabilities to their further expansion and preservation, these groups could maintain 

their worship in their status as dhimmis required to 

pay a “protection” or head tax, the jizya. 

Toleration, even if intolerant, was not to be extended any further, however. For the Muwahhidun

followers of al-Wahhab, the true eternal, abiding 

threat to Allah’s Sovereignty does not come from the 

original infidels (original Kufr)—obvious enemies 

from without and against whom jihad, both defensive if necessary and offensive if legal and prudent, 

be waged.6 True, targets outside the faith included 

sorcerers, magicians, and others claiming intercessory 

powers that the Muwahhidun claimed were the exclusive prerogative of Allah. However, within the faith, 

the Muwahhidun waged war against Sufi mysticism 

and its doctrines and practices granting mystics and 

holy men intercessory powers. And, also against the 

Shia—those partisans of the Prophet’s son-in-law Ali, 

the fourth Caliph—who based in unique theological 

conceptions endowing and privileging the Prophet’s 

family with divinely-sanctioned spiritual powers, engaged in reverential treatment and worship of saints, 

shrines, and tombs, and attributed divine qualities 

and powers to an infallible Imamate. 
10

For the followers of al-Wahhab—the Muwahhidun—the genuine, abiding, and eternally greatest 

threat is this internal enemy—this nearest enemy. At 

best, it is the one who claims Islam, but who is either 

a pretender (the hypocrite), or an innovator (bida) (the 

heretic). At worst, it is a Muslim apostate (murtadd) 

who willfully, with complete knowledge, publicly 

disavows essential tenets of tawhid as conceptualized 

by al-Wahhab and, if unrepentant, is guilty of Islam’s 

greatest sin: apostasy (ridda). The narrowness of the 

Muwahhidun bridge to salvation—rooted in its unique 

conceptions of iman/Kufr, Sunnah/bida, tawhid/shirk—

narrows the distance between salvation and sin, salvation and heresy, and salvation and apostasy. 

It is not just in Islam that the true enemy of genuine faith arises from within. It is the unique nature of 

orthodoxy (literally, “correct belief”) that gives rise to 

the fact that it is what is closest, not furthest and most 

obviously distant, from one’s essential core tenets that 

genuinely threatens one’s foundations. One only has 

to recall the very origins of the concept of the satanic 

in the Gospel of Matthew’s denunciation of the Jewish Pharisees,7

 or the rise of the Reformation and its 

inauguration of bloody centuries of intra-Christian 

warfare, to understand an essential sociological law 

explaining the intensity of conflict: i.e., that a feared 

and dreaded treason within mobilizes far greater enmity, and policing, than the expected and prepared for 

enemy without; again, the smaller the differences that 

divide, the greater the perceived injury those smaller 

differences make.8 

This depiction of Sunni theological orthodoxy, 

Sunni conservative Salafism, and Muhammad alWahhab’s Muwahiddun movement provides the essential theological background required for under-
11

standing precisely how the AQO and ISO dip from the 

same well—Sunni, Salafi-Muwahhidun/Wahhabi—but 

with varying foci, in quite different doses, and with 

quite different additives that led to novel synthetic 

organisms.9 It marks an essential point of departure 

required to understand their last shared common ancestor before their marked divergence as species, and 

eventually with additional mutation, as contemporary 

terrorist entities claiming to represent the worldwide 

Sunni (Ahl-us Sunnah). Our first task is to describe 

the terrorist species Tanzim Qa’idat al-Jihad (AQO). To 

do so, we will trace a brief history that begins with 

Abdullah Azzam and ends with the codification of 

Osama bin Laden’s mature “Far Enemy” doctrine. 

SHAYKH SCHOLAR-MUJAHID, DR. ABDALLAH 

AZZAM: THE INDIVIDUAL OBLIGATION TO 

JOIN THE CARAVAN IN DEFENSE OF MUSLIM 

LANDS: AN ARMED MUSLIM BROTHERHOODSALAFI-WAHHABI SYNTHESIS

Dr. Abdullah Azzam is the Palestinian-Jordanian 

Shaykh, scholar, charismatic preacher, and inspirational organizer whose firebrand sermons and 

passionate calls for mobilization against the Soviet 

Communist-installed and militarily backed Afghan 

regime, provides the entre point for understanding 

AQO’s mature doctrine.10 Besides the qualities listed 

earlier, there are three essential contributions Azzam 

made toward AQO. First, Azzam characterized the 

armed Muslim opposition to Soviet occupation as a 

defensive jihad (jihad al-daf),11 and authored the key 

legal opinion (fatwa)—backed by evidence from the 

Quran, authoritative traditions (ahadith), and scholarly consensus (ijma) of all four Sunni schools (mad’haab) 
12

of jurisprudence (fiqh)—requiring participation in the 

anti-Communist jihad as an individual obligation 

(fard ‘ayn) devolving on every able-bodied, capable 

member of the Muslim community (the Ummah). This 

opinion, Defense of Muslim Lands: The First Obligation 

After Iman, was vetted by highly-prestigious senior religious scholars, and provided what became the contemporary restatement of the classical jurisprudence 

governing the waging of defensive jihad.12

Second, Azzam re-conceptualized the concept of 

“defensive jihad” to justify military jihad against all 

existing non-Muslim governments ruling over majority or minority Muslim populations. For this Shaykh, 

and Sunni orthodoxy generally, once a land has been 

conquered and ruled by Islam, it forever remains 

a permanent territory belonging to the Abode of Islam (Dar al-Islam) and Allah’s True Faith. Azzam’s 

conception of a nation’s “Muslimness” is essentially 

populist-territorial, and it is not the existence or nonexistence of Islamic law, but the existence of a Muslim 

populace that defines the “Muslimness” of this land. 

Having a people, and a land, what is needed is the 

restoration of the state governed by the Sharia or legal prescriptions and proscriptions enjoined by the 

Quran and learned jurisprudents and legal officials. 

Of special importance to the Brotherhood, to Azzam, 

and to many that would later be enticed to AQO’s 

call, was what was regarded as the great catastrophe or nakhbah that befell the indigenous Palestinian 

population following the creation of the State of Israel 

in 1948; and over the next several decades, the degradation, humiliation, and powerlessness befalling a 

Palestinian population uprooted, and now a diasporic 

people unwelcome in other lands and occupying permanent refugee camps. While many Muslim peoples 

now living in non-Muslim lands would eventually be 
13

encompassed in Azzam’s transnational call to individual Muslims to assist brothers and sisters fighting 

to recover, secure, or restore Muslim-ruled states or 

statelets in Chechnya, Bosnia, Kashmir, and the Philippines, for example, Palestine was without question 

at the very heart of Azzam’s mission. It was the next 

stop, after Afghanistan, which the caravan enjoining 

defensive jihad should travel. 

Azzam’s affiliation with and assimilation of a panIslamic and ecumenical conception of the Muslim 

Ummah likely derives from his Muslim Brotherhood 

roots. This earliest modern pan-Islamic organization, 

conceived and founded in 1928 by the Egyptian school 

teacher Hassan al-Banna, arose as a direct response 

to his revulsion toward the European colonization of 

formerly Islamically-governed territories and their 

broader Western, secular, scientific civilizational imports that demoted and delegitimized a conservative 

Islamic-centered polity, culture, and social order. As 

a form of anti-colonial, anti-imperialist, anti-secular, 

conservative religious social movement, the Brotherhood eventually spread to dozens of nations, and pioneered a variety of reformist strategies for re-Islamizing these secular liberal colonial-oriented states. 

Azzam was also influenced, like many others of 

his generation—as noted in his published writings—

by the emergence of a uniquely radical variant of 

Brotherhood thought and activism originating in the 

writings, personal example, and inspired followers of 

the Egyptian literary intellectual and totalistic Islamic 

philosophical system builder Sayyid Qutb.13 It was 

Qutb who decried the gradualist, reformist, cultural, 

and educational Islamization strategy of the existing 

mainstream Brothers, and in its place, appropriating 

key concepts from secular revolutionary thinkers like 

Marx and Lenin, and also the thought and writings of 
14

the Pakistani Islamist intellectual Mawlana Mawdudi, 

he argued in favor of the creation of an elite vanguard 

leading a comprehensive revolution against the existing Muslim and Western orders. This total revolution 

was required to reinstall what Qutb believed had been 

a Past Perfect Quranic revelation that owing to contemporary forms of non-Allah-centered sociocultural, 

sociopolitical order was subverted and completely 

extracted from current history. Qutb claimed that a 

modern ignorance of Allah, a modern Jahiliyyah or 

Age of Ignorance, one analogous to that Arab pagan 

and polytheistic ignorance preceding the Truthful 

Revelation received by the very first Quranic generation, had now enveloped all existing Muslim societies. 

The overthrow of this Modern Jahiliyyah by a Revolutionary Vanguard re-immersed into the now-hidden 

truth of Allah’s Absolute Rulership, was the method 

required for a complete liberation. 

The modern Jahiliyyah is defined by Man’s rule over 

Man, subject to the tyranny of Man’s vicarious whims 

and oppressive and unjust instincts, and ensconced in 

materialist ethics. It was Man’s absolute and complete 

dependence on God’s Absolute Sovereignty—the Rule 

of Divine Law and the Divine Legislator—and complete and total submission to this Absolute, that is the 

liberating condition of Man’s emancipation from the 

Rulership of Man, and its replacement by the Absolute Sovereignty of God. Gone would be the alienated 

social order evacuated from the contemporary world; 

present would be the absolute authority of Allah at 

the level of Rulership, Legislation, and Sovereignty. 

Qutb’s principal contribution, then, was to propose 

an amendment to Ibn Taymiyyah’s, and later Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s, tri-partite conception 

of Tawhid. Added to Allah’s Unicity as Sole Creator, 
15

Sole Lord, and Uniquely Named, is Allah’s character 

as Sole Divine Ruler/Legislator/Law-Giver and LawMaker, captured in the Qutbist employed concept 

Hakimiyyah. 

Qutb claimed that it was this fourth dimension of 

tawhid, Hakimiyyah, then, that truly provides the missing master key explaining in total the abyss in which 

existing Islam has fallen, and despite a somewhat enviable material success, the vacuousness, spiritual putridness, and worship of Man typified by the Western 

mind, philosophy, and sociopolitical order remains. 

We shall see that this Qutbian Hakimiyyah straddles 

the AQO versus ISO divide, and each finds in it a 

means of legitimizing the violent overthrow of every 

existing Muslim order. For now, however, we return 

to the remaining Azzamist contributions to the AQO 

Doctrine.

Third, Azzam viewed his role as one of assisting and complementing the Islamic forces fighting 

against the Communist-installed and backed Afghan 

regime, and not one of creating an autonomous Arab 

army that would usurp existing forces and impose 

its will, vision, and particular Islamic creedal beliefs 

on these indigenous forces. Melting into the fabric of 

the Afghan jihad and assisting in the recruitment of 

Arab manpower to its cause, Azzam played the role of 

catalyst, charismatic preacher, and a scholar-mujahid, 

not an imperious and distant commander demanding 

obedience to an alien cause. Solidarity with the Afghan mujahidin, and the willingness to accede to their 

unique cultural milieu and in solidarity fight the forces 

of the invading Communist Kufr, was essential to his 

mission.

Finally, Shaykh Azzam was remarkable for his 

obsessive fascination with and prolific contribution 

to what may be called jihadist martyrology. As ably 
16

documented by David Cook,14 ample precedent exists 

within Islam for the production of a unique form of 

literature, which exalts, celebrates, and creates a virtual cult around the superlative and extraordinary 

rewards that accompany those who willingly sacrifice 

themselves on the field of jihad. Killing in the process 

of one being killed is viewed as a means of salvific 

action, a means of worshiping Allah and receiving in 

exchange for one’s life an eternal paradise resplendent 

with the sumptuous delights befitting a noble knight 

upholding with one’s life, honor, and wealth—Allah’s 

True Word. The virtues, delights, and superlatives of 

jihad as salvific martyrdom are another contribution, 

we shall see, that also spans the AQO-ISO divide. 

To summarize, Azzam’s main contributions to the 

AQO Doctrine are the following: authoring the legal 

opinion (fatwa) justifying defensive jihad (jihad al-daf) 

in Afghanistan as an individual obligation (fard ‘ayn); 

his conception that this defensive jihad was obligatory not just in Afghanistan but in all former Muslimconquered territories and peoples, now under the sovereignty of non-Muslim rulers; his prioritizing of the 

Palestine question as central to the Ummah’s concerns; 

and Azzam’s Muslim Brotherhood-influenced conceptions that first include commitment to an anti-colonial, anti-imperialist, pan-Islamic Ummah, conceived 

broadly and in non-sectarian terms in opposition 

primarily to the original Kufr—European Christianity 

and secularism in particular—and not in opposition to 

other Muslims on the basis of their strictness in adherence to “Wahhabi” or Salafist orthodoxy. In addition, 

the Qutbist legacy identifies the militant requirement 

to privilege Allah’s Sovereign Rule as an element of 

fully restoring the Islamic State. 
17

THE “BASE OF THE JIHAD”; AL-QAEDA 

(QA’IDAT AL-JIHAD)

Al-Qaeda, or Qa’idat al-Jihad, is the name given for 

a type of expeditionary or mobile global army—the 

Revolutionary Sunni International fighting force—

that emerged in 1988 from the coalescence of several 

fighting organizations from various lands who, having determined the Afghan jihad was nearing its end, 

sought to create an enduring organizational form to 

permanently institutionalize an elite army of Islamic 

fighters—a kind of Islamic Foreign Legion.15 The idea 

behind this organization, whose Founding Minutes 

make for fascinating reading, was to basically seed 

various theaters of jihad with a highly-skilled, highly 

trained cadre of Islamic fighters whose goal was to 

support and direct armed fighters toward the overthrow of non-Muslim or so-called apostate governments and supplant them with governments based on 

the primacy of Islamic law or Sharia, and the rulership 

of Muslim sovereigns. These Islamic insurgents, guerrillas, or “jihadis” differed from the vast majority of 

insurgents by privileging a transnational, pan-Islamic, 

Ummah-based concept. Just as in a previous century, 

Karl Marx imagined workers who had no nation to 

defend, or to lose, since it was only the universality 

of the proletarian class and international communism 

that represented the perfected future; this Qa’idat al-Jihad, though composed of specific fighters from specific lands, was to disprivilege land, people, nation, and 

all other affiliations other than their soldiery on behalf 

of Allah wherever Allah’s soldiers would be needed. 

These quality recruits would be force multipliers, a 

kind of highest quality recruit, a kind of special forces 

operative, who would embed, train, supply, and assist 
18

in the triumph of polities whose identities would melt 

into and become one node in a broader re-imagined, 

and recreated proto-caliphate—though one in its very 

earliest and barely sketched features. This Army of

Allah, or Islamic Army, had its marching orders. 

The very name of this entity—The Base of the Jihad—tells all. This Base, as the Founding Minutes, 

By-Laws, and Constitutional Charter confirm,16 was 

initially understood in a military sense as a military 

base camp for general and more highly qualified recruits that would—through a process of recruitment, 

vetting, training, supplying, and deploying—make 

the critical difference. The ultimate religio-political 

goal is repeated in these earliest documents and is unambiguous: “To Raise the Word of Allah until it is triumphant throughout the Earth.” Moreover, the means 

to pursue this ultimate objective is also unambiguous: 

“Jihad.” Other organizations can be involved in relief 

work, da’wa work, political work, educational work, 

and cultural work. However, Qa’idat al-Jihad is exclusively dedicated to jihad as a fighting vanguard, as 

Mujahidin—those who engage in military jihad—and 

nothing else. This self-definition is aptly represented 

in the term “jihadism” or “jihadist,” and in its adjectival form “global jihadism” and “global jihadist.” 

This may also be expanded slightly and accurately to 

“global Sunni Islamic jihadism.” 

Contained in this formula is Qa’idat al-Jihad’s ultimate identity as a distinct type of fighting organization; 

but also contained, as we will soon see, are the seeds 

of its ultimate conflict with other types of “jihadist” 

organizations whose passion and mission is far closer 

to that espoused by Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab 

and other variants of Salafism. The first fracture was 

between Osama bin Laden and Shaykh Azzam over 
19

the precise nature and function of this newly constituted “Base.” Abdullah Azzam envisioned a more protracted involvement, with the Afghan mujahidin as a 

supporting player and not the organizer of a separatist contingent of “Arab” Afghans.17 This tension was 

evident at the time of the formation with bin Laden 

of the Peshawar-based processing center, or Services 

Center (Maktab al-Khidimat), for newly arriving Arab 

recruits seeking to “join the caravan” in the Afghan 

theater. Bin Laden had already embarked, despite his 

lack of battlefield skill, on creating what amounted to 

a private Arab army under his direct command, and 

also a “legend” surrounding his actual role and accomplishments in a particular battlefield engagement 

in Baiji against Soviet units. Lauded in the Arab press 

at the time, bin Laden would (assisted by his financial 

largesse and unique persona as a tall, wealthy, softspoken, deeply pious, apparently world-renouncing, 

martyrdom-seeking son of a Yemeni-born Saudi billionaire father) continue to cultivate his image. It was 

this emergent private army that bin Laden had assembled that became part of the founding moments of 

“The Base.” A second dispute arose between Shaykh 

Azzam and bin Laden over prioritizing the next phase 

of the jihad. For Azzam, Palestine beckoned; for bin 

Laden, despite definite allegiances shared over the 

centrality of Palestine for Islam, it was other newly 

emerging fields that beckoned, including the desire 

to wage jihad in his ancestral homeland Yemen, its 

southern half then occupied by a Marxist state. 

On November 24, 1989, Shaykh Abdullah Azzam, who was a hugely significant inspiration for 

the mobilization of Sunnis for the Afghan jihad, and 

more generally the “defense of Muslim lands,” was 

assassinated along with two of his sons by a road-
20

side improvised explosive device (IED). His enemies 

had earlier placed, and his allies discovered, a bomb 

planted behind the lectern where he was to deliver 

the mosque sermon. The case remains unsolved, with 

various potential perpetrators in conflict with the 

Shaykh being suggested: Ayman al-Zawahiri and the 

Egyptians from Islamic Jihad; Osama bin Laden; or 

others annoyed by his alleged role in mismanagement 

or sequestering of funds for his beloved Palestinian 

cause. Azzam’s absence was still notable by its presence in having inspired a reawakening to the necessity of defensive jihad, and those other contributions 

noted previously (i.e., his legal argument, expansive 

conception of defensive jihad and Muslim lands, and 

his passionate jihadism and martyrological beliefs 

and writings). The scholar-mujahid Dr. Abdullah Azzam’s exit further narrowed the leadership cadre and 

self-definition of the post-Afghan phase of this newly 

anointed global transnational conception of individualized Sunni jihadism. 

Bin Laden’s other fracture was not with what 

might be termed “Azzamism” or the Azzamist variant of Sunni global jihadism. In fact, it shares with Azzamism a Sunni ecumenicalism that has far more to 

do with the Muslim Brotherhood quest for a unified 

Muslim front, without strict tests of “Muslimness,” beyond obvious adherence to general tenets and a militant desire to confront the cultural and socio-political 

imperialism encased in the modern, secular, liberaldemocratic—or Communist—state. The awakening of 

a stupefied Muslim Ummah through education, proselytization, organization, and “lumping” rather than 

“splitting” based on acid tests of “Muslimness,” was 

the path, it was believed, for eventually reconquering 

the state for Islam. This Sunni pan-Islamic ecumenical 
21

approach was embodied in Azzam’s Muslim Brotherhood-Salafi-Wahhabi fusion; it was also at the heart of 

how bin Laden envisioned the al-Qaeda mission and 

doctrine. 

The danger bin Laden detected came from the 

Salafi-Wahhabi direction. It was represented in individuals, organizations, movements, and parties who 

focused far more on the internal enemy than the external. In common with the mission of the Muwahiddun

movement and also many Salafist-inspired offshoots, 

these groups espoused what from bin Laden’s and 

many orthodox Sunni Muslim quarters is a deviant 

and extremist penchant to emphasize sectarian purity, 

which taken to its extreme lends itself to what may be 

termed jihadi takfirism, or excessiveness in accusations 

against and the willingness to takfir other Muslims. 

This takes two forms. First, bin Laden’s emergent 

Qa’idat al-Jihad, though viewing the Shia as a wayward 

and deviant sect, did not at any time privilege a war 

against Shi’ism per se as the essential starting point 

for the purification and revivification of Sunni orthodoxy as a ruling imperium. The problem of Shi’ism 

was a secondary matter that would await the necessary focus that now must be placed on the permanent 

mobilization of Sunni mujahidin, and arousing of 

the Sunni Muslim masses (Ummah), to rid formerly 

Muslim-conquered lands of their infidel overlords. 

From Spain to Indonesia, from Mauritania to Afghanistan, European and Westernized secular hegemony first required removal. Seeding the battlefields 

of jihad as empires or secular despotisms receded or 

collapsed—for example, Afghanistan, Chechnya, Bosnia, and South Yemen—was the order of the day. The 

fight against Kufr, and original Kufr at that, required 

a Sunni Muslim “church” in the sociological sense—
22

that is, a broad-based, inclusive united front whose 

criteria for membership was significantly broad and 

its defining feature—the readiness and willingness to 

join the caravan and fight in the path of Allah to make 

Allah’s Word supreme in the lands now occupied by 

the Cross.18 This United Sunni Front approach applied 

equally to the key goal of recovering the now Zionistoccupied land of Palestine and the revered holy sites, 

including al Haram Al Sharif (Temple Mount) and Al 

Aqsa Mosque in occupied Jerusalem (al-Quds). 

Additional sources of bin Laden’s penchant to 

demote the struggle against the Shia likely includes 

Qa’idat al-Jihad’s unique post-9/11 dependence on, 

and sometimes exploitation of, their Iranian captivity. 

Several high-ranking members of al-Qaeda remained 

in what amounted to house arrest with restricted privileges, and al-Qaeda engaged in tit-for-tat bargaining 

which in recent times, has led to the freeing of some 

of the USG’s most sought after terrorist operatives.19

Additionally, bin Laden’s mother is Syrian with an 

Alawite background, and his known filial tenderness 

cannot be discounted. However, it is likely that these 

factors were secondary to bin Laden’s vision of the 

true and genuine enemy—the original Kufr. To this 

day, al-Qaeda’s jurisprudence strictly differentiates 

Shia culpability. Known and openly professing leaders engaged in war against the Sunni are legitimate 

targets, and any and all who assist in the support of 

subverting or denying Allah’s Rule are to be fought. 

However, the Shia masses are not targeted, owing to 

the fact that like the vast majority of Sunnis, they are 

likely ignorant of the fundamentals of their own faith, 

and this ignorance is a hindrance for takfir of the Shia 

lay masses. Unlike the ISO, as we shall soon see, there 

is no cosmic backdrop asserting that venomously 
23

treacherous Shia are the chief antagonists responsible 

for present Sunni humiliation and powerlessness. 

In short, a principled focus on targeting the Shia on 

grounds of their apostasy, heresy, or supposed treasonous nature is rarely to be found. 

The predominant sectarian threat for bin Laden 

occurs within the people of the Sunnah (Ahl us-Sunnah). Sunnis attacking Sunnis on the grounds of their 

insufficient creedal orthodoxy, or orthopraxy, led to 

one negative object lesson in “How not to do jihad!” 

This involved what began and could have ended as a 

successful Sunni overthrow of a secular Westernized 

Algerian Government, but instead led to a bloodbath, 

which eventually consumed the jihadi movement itself. Takfir, Qa’idat al-Jihad proclaims, can be applied to 

the ruling regime and its loyal and obvious supporters in the security forces, police, and essential internal 

security apparatuses. This “takfir of the regime,” however, is very different from the “takfir of society.” In 

the Algerian case, takfir was eventually extended, by 

the bloody logic of its own extremist premises: first to 

apply to the regime; then to supporters of the regime; 

then to families—including women, children, and the 

elderly—of the supporters of the regime; and finally, 

to those denying that these persons are guilty of apostasy from Islam. The Algerian Armed Islamic Group 

(GIA; from the French, Groupe Islamique Arme; Arabic, 

Jama’ah al-Islamiyya al-Musallaha) became for al-Qaeda 

in the mid-to-latter 1990s, and many other Sunni jihadists including senior Sharia official and operative 

Atiyatullah al-Libi, a negative case study confirming 

the fratricidal consequences that arise from what is in 

effect, an uncontainable logic. This highly policed containment of takfirism within the “Base of the Jihad,” 

and indoctrination into the uniquely pan-Islamist 
24

Sunni jihadist vision of a vanguard seeding various 

insurgencies and rebellions against secular autocratic 

rule, meant that al-Qaeda would be viewed as a broad, 

inclusive, Sunni-armed organization whose singular 

mission was to unite disparate struggles into a broader 

transnational struggle to eventually restore a supranational Caliphal sovereign empowered to continue the 

long-term battle against the original Kufr and continuing infidelity. This Qa’idat al-Jihad is not exclusively 

Salafist, though it includes a significant number. It is 

not exclusively Salafi-Wahhabi or Wahhabi, though it 

also includes their number; it is not those exclusively 

inspired by Sayyid Qutb, though he is recognized and 

honored as a pioneering jihadi thinker. Qa’idat al-Jihad 

is rather a broad, transnational church-like conglomerate whose vision, values, and mission statement do 

not employ “Muslimness” tests, purity tests, or other 

instruments designed to split into ever smaller numbers, those who are considered virtuous enough to 

wage a united Sunni war against the occupying “Crusaders” of Muslim lands.

One excellent recent example illustrating this fact 

is exemplified by Adam Yahiye Gadahn’s (whom we 

shall later encounter) account of his own journey to 

becoming a Muslim, and his answer to the question 

“Who is a Muslim?” 

Strictly speaking, one becomes a Muslim by pronouncing the Shahaadah even if there is no one around to 

hear you; announcing it publicly is not a precondition 

of your Islam to be correct for you to be considered a 

Muslim in the eyes of God. Islam isn’t like the manmade and adulterated religions which have elaborate 

and formal initiation ceremonies presided over by 

priests and rabbis. Therefore, as soon as one comes to 

the realization that Islam is the truth and all other reli-
25

gions today are either false or abrogated, he must declare right then and there that there is no God worthy 

of worship but God and Muhammad is the Messenger of God (from the bottom of his heart and with full 

conviction), and preferably in Arabic too (if possible), 

because death can come suddenly and unexpectedly 

and one never knows when his time might come; and 

then after that, he is obligated to start discharging his 

Islamic duties as they come along [italics in original].20

Gadahn’s view that becoming a Muslim is first 

achieved as a deeply private act based in the “leap of 

faith” one makes when professing a complete belief in 

a chosen creed, is not based in the Hanbali, Salafi-Wahhabi tradition at all. It is essential to the Hanafi School, 

the most “liberal” of schools; but for Salafi-Wahhabis, 

it is a deficient and even heretical approach to faith 

(Iman). As described earlier, faith for them consists 

of “faith as action,” and only exists when beliefs are 

externalized in visible, essential worshipful practices 

that uphold the doctrine of Allah’s Oneness (tawhid), 

and also, the complete disavowal and disassociation 

from infidels, and avowal and love of worshipers of 

Allah’s Oneness (al-wala wa’l bara).21

Shared by al-Qaeda and the worldwide Muslim 

Ummah is the basic Quranic idea that humans are created with great moral liabilities, though they may aspire to righteous faith and virtuous conduct. Muslims, 

like all human beings, are prone to sin; and as sinners, 

are fallible, morally weak, prone to hedonic excess, 

slow to forgive, and quick to anger. This basic conception of a constrained and limited capability for human 

goodness, and the expectation of a permanent though 

malleable imperfection, explains the general mercy 

and leniency with which bin Laden and the senior 

theoreticians, religious scholars, jurisprudents, and 
26

ideologues associated, extend to the Sunni Ummah, 

and often though with far more restriction, beyond. 

The project of purifying the Ummah of its moral foibles 

and failings shall continue under the guidance of the 

righteous scholars and Callers (Du’at; preachers). 

FROM QA’IDAT AL-JIHAD TO BIN LADENISM

A final move is required before fully understanding the doctrinal DNA of Qa’idat al-Jihad: the shift from 

Qa’idat al-Jihad to what may be infelicitously described 

as “Bin Ladenism.” Let us examine this more closely. 

Qa’idat al-Jihad’s original uniqueness was defined by 

its conception as a military expeditionary force serving as a seeding mechanism, force multiplier, and 

insurgency-directing organization that sought to 

transform locally focused national liberation movements into transnational Islamic insurgencies. Following Gompert and Gordon,22 we may distinguish 

among four insurgency types: purely local, based on 

purely local resources; local, with external help; local, 

transformed with internal and external support into 

insurgency conceived in transnational, pan-Islamic 

terms; and global, pure and simple. Qa’idat al-Jihad 

is an excellent example of the “Type 3” insurgency 

strategy, whereby high-quality operatives and training enter the fray and, based in its unique worldview 

and belief-system, transform localized insurgents into 

nodes seeking to win Islamic lands back generally, 

and placing this local context, in those general Sunni 

Islamic terms. However, this original Qa’idat al-Jihad 

underwent what in retrospect must be deemed a great 

metamorphosis.
27

“Bin Ladenism”: The Far Enemy is the Master Key 

to the Near Enemy. 

The original Qa’idat al-Jihad “idea” arose as a joint 

endeavor anointed in two meetings during August 

1988 as referenced in the Founding Minutes cited 

earlier. Over the next decade, this same organization 

morphed into a terrorist entity controlled by Osama 

bin Laden, whose uniqueness consisted in creating a 

global conspiratorial underground terrorist organization. Its “brand” was based in a type of high-quality, 

carefully-planned, mass casualty terrorist attack designed to monopolize the world’s attention, galvanize 

the world’s Sunni population, and following successive assaults in a prolonged war of attrition, destroy 

the American economy, eliminate the American presence in the Muslim Middle East and North Africa (and 

other lands), eliminate American support for the Zionist occupation of Palestine, and over time, permit 

the operational space to recommence the struggle 

against apostate Muslim regimes, ultimately restoring 

Islamic hegemony and the long-lost Sunni Caliphate 

throughout the now-recovered Muslim world. 

In retrospect, one may identify two unique causes 

leading to the rise of “bin Ladenism” and the end of 

the original Qa’idat al-Jihad “Base” concept. The first 

is the failure of the violent Sunni armed movements 

in the 1980s and 1990s to overthrow their respective 

governments. This was especially the case with current Emir Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri, who took what was 

a haunted, hunted, and bankrupt Egyptian Islamic Jihad organization, and folded it into bin Laden’s enterprise. Joining Qa’idat al-Jihad in this manner amounts 

to turning a vice—weakness, marginalization, implosion, repression—into a virtue, i.e., re-focusing one’s 
28

jihadi animus in the direction of a very different enemy known not for its nearness and apostasy, but 

farness and original infidelity. The second was bin 

Laden’s personal agenda.

Bin Ladenism’s Anti-Americanism and AntiSemitism: Irrational, Delusional, and Strategically 

Disastrous. 

Osama bin Laden’s mature doctrine arises in the 

1990s. Its precise motivation is hard to discern, but 

some hints exist. Beginning during the Gulf War commencing on August 2, 1990, and soon thereafter, the 

original Qa’idat al-Jihad was transformed into bin Laden’s primary vehicle for plotting and planning mass 

casualty terrorist attacks against the United States. 

This began with his apparent humiliation and possible 

deep resentment at the Saudi Government rejecting 

his offer to use his private Mujahidin army to counter 

Saddam Hussein‘s invasion of Kuwait in July 1990. 

This was seconded by his apparent humiliation and 

resentment of having the United States invited instead 

to fight against Saddam’s forces, and during the early 

to mid-1990s, to be stationed in various installations 

and barracks on Saudi soil. The Kingdom of Saudi 

Arabia’s (KSA) reasoning was that, given Saddam 

Hussein’s formidable military and the likelihood that 

Saudi Arabia was also vulnerable to invasion, instead 

of the mere paltry force of bin Laden’s hundreds or 

few thousands, a massive counter-attack was required 

for which only a great power could muster. Further, 

there is precedent within Sunni jurisprudence for 

seeking the assistance of infidel forces if deemed necessary and prudent if one is under attack by other infidel forces. Saddam’s Ba’athist regime was nominally 
29

secular, pan-Arabist, socialist, and anti-Persian racialist, and it was therefore permissible and legal, and the 

KSA managed, though with controversy, to secure 

from the Wahhabi senior ulema (religious scholars) the 

necessary fatwa (legal opinion) permitting such.23

By the early-1990s, then, one can say the transition 

occurred from the original Qa’idat al-Jihad to bin Ladenism as defined through an obsessive “Far Enemy” 

focus on attacking the United States as the closest path 

to freeing Muslim lands and occupied Palestine. Relocating to East Africa between 1992 and 1996, al-Qaeda 

organized attacks in Aden in 1992 and in Somalia 

in 1993. Bin Laden would soon declare war against 

America in a 1996 message; and through a new selfnamed “World Islamic Front for Jihad Against Jews 

and Crusaders,” he would issue a February 1998 hukm

(judgment) asserting the Islamic legality of killing 

Americans, civilian or military, anywhere they may 

be found. The world would soon discover that this 

legal cover was necessary for what would come to be 

bin Laden’s inaugural signature attack: the August 11, 

1998, major mass casualty terrorist attacks against two 

United States embassies, one in Kenya and the other 

in Tanzania.24

Over the next 13 years until his targeted killing by 

the United States on May 2, 2012, bin Laden would 

strike or attempt to strike the United States, its chief 

allies, and interests. From the most infamous attack, 

9/11, to others less spectacular or prevented, the newly defined enemy would be the supposed “CrusaderZionist,” “Zio-Crusader,” or “Crusader,” and bin 

Ladenism’s chief charge would be repeated ad infinitum: that this supposed Zionist-Crusader alliance was 

waging an unrelenting, hateful, deceitful war against 

Islam; that bin Ladenism represented the chief adversary of this global conspiracy to subvert and destroy 
30

Islam and Muslims; and that the Mujahidin carrying 

out these attacks were the vanguard of the worldwide 

Ummah, nobly engaged in fighting the mortal enemies 

of Islam in order to prevent the humiliation, subservience, and utter degradation of Islam and Muslims. Bin 

Laden actually believed—or certainly seemed to believe—these things, not in words destined for public 

consumption, but in words intended for the privacy of 

secret communiques or spoken within his privileged 

inner circle. 

Bin Ladenism as a belief system—as a worldview—

is premised in what at best, must be regarded as profound ignorance and unlearnedness about the nature 

of the enemies he believed he was destined to fight 

and conquer—first and foremost, the United States. At 

worst—and I suspect this is closer to the mark—bin 

Ladenism is premised in hubris, or even a delusional 

or nearly delusional conception of his own powers, 

and those of his arch foes. The following assertions 

succinctly summarize bin Laden’s beliefs sustaining 

his obsessive focus on attacking the “Far Enemy.” 

A Deeply Flawed Analogy and a Deeply Flawed 

Strategy. 

Osama bin Laden’s “Far Enemy” strategy was 

based on a deeply flawed analogy. In his telling, it 

goes something like this: The former Communist Soviet Union was a mighty empire. The Sunni Mujahidin, owing to their willingness and ability to wage 

jihad, and to Allah’s Divine mercy and assistance, 

dealt a crushing blow to this atheistic empire. Locked 

into an unwinnable counterinsurgency, the Mujahidin 

would force a war of attrition; and owing to its crushing economic costs, the Soviet empire would collapse. 

Allah’s Divine aid, the Mujahidin’s glorious triumphs, 
31

the former Soviet Union’s atheistic shallowness, and 

the economic costs borne were the necessary and sufficient factors explaining the Soviet withdrawal, and 

later, the Soviet collapse. 

Before interrogating bin Laden’s forced analogy, 

it is worth offering an alternative account of these 

events, one that does not require Divine aid or mythic 

thinking, and one that is very much keeping with the 

facts. The Soviet Union by 1979, the year of its decision 

to intervene in Afghanistan to support a pro-Soviet 

surrogate, was a weakened and weakening Communist state 6 years away from its future disintegration, 

which began under Gorbachev’s call for “perestroika,” 

or restructuring. The United States had entered upon 

a Cold War commencing in the immediate aftermath 

of World War II, its former tactical ally against Nazism and Japanese Imperialism, now a Stalinist totalitarian enemy whose social system and one-party state 

represented the theoretical and practical antithesis of 

the voluntarist, liberal-democratic capitalist federal 

republican United States. The collapse of Soviet Communism began well before their Afghan debacle, but 

the United States wasted no time in helping to turn 

that debacle to the Soviet’s supreme disadvantage and 

help to create for them a Soviet “Vietnam.” 

Through an anti-Communist alliance involving 

primarily the United States, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan, money from the Saudis and Americans would be 

funneled primarily through Pakistan, and through the 

covert services of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency 

(CIA) and Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), 

anti-Soviet guerrillas would be recruited, trained, 

armed, and deployed. A decisive turning point occurred when the USG supplied the extremely lethal 

anti-aircraft shoulder-fired, ground-to-air Stinger mis-
32

siles to Islamist guerrillas. Suffering greatly in their 

air campaign as a result, and increasingly bogged 

down in an unwinnable war of attrition, the Soviets 

determined they would end their involvement, and by 

1988, began the exodus that was concluded by 1989.25

Though the Mujahidin inarguably played a role 

in the Soviet defeat, without Saudi and U.S. largesse, 

CIA and ISI involvement, and the furnishing of the 

game-changing Stinger missiles to neutralize Soviet 

air assets, the Mujahidin and others contesting the 

Soviet intervention would likely have been crushed. 

Possessed of a more objective account of facts, let us 

now consider bin Laden’s deeply flawed analogy. 

Bin Laden believed that, if subject to direct assault 

through mass casualty terrorist attacks, the United 

States—“the head of the [infidel] snake” or “base of 

the tree”—would, like the Soviet Union, be pushed to 

a state of economic exhaustion and ultimate collapse. 

However, there is a serious problem here. The Soviet 

Union’s collapse was not rooted in the exhaustion of 

its economic resources, but rather, in a Communist order whose command economy, inefficiency, crisis of 

human motivation, and corrupted totalitarian police 

state, had developed deep and potentially irreparable 

fractures. Furthermore, a calculated effort by stridently 

anti-Communist American officials and citizens, who 

rejected a policy of détente and peaceful coexistence 

for rollback and collapse of the Soviet state, intentionally expedited this process of dissolution, decay, and 

bankruptcy by inaugurating an arms buildup, placing 

further massive pressure on an already creaking economic order. One may add to this the deliberate objective by these self-same persons of bogging the Soviet 

Union down in a very expensive, unwinnable war of 

attrition, and one comes much closer to a fuller understanding of the causes of the eventual Soviet collapse. 
33

Finally, just as it was not economic exhaustion 

per se that doomed the Soviet Union, bin Laden profoundly misunderstood the true nature and power of 

America’s liberal democratic capitalist social structure and its capacity for absorbing shocks, adjusting 

course, empowering a free populace with expansive 

opportunities for employment, education, mobility, 

property ownership, self-government and, if deemed 

necessary, deploying its fighting forces and economic 

resources to challenge any foe that would endanger 

such. Bin Laden failed profoundly to understand the 

forces and values that lie behind the American economic juggernaut. This was a rather predictable consequence of his other prejudices to which we now turn.

Delusional Anti-Semitism and Anti-Americanism. 

Bin Laden held an economic-reductionist theory of 

America’s strength: that it is only owing to vast material and economic resources at its command, and it 

possesses no other redeeming values. This wealth is 

believed to be tightly held by a relatively small cabal 

of soulless, greedy, powerful capitalists. Not only does 

this wealthy money-grubbing capitalist elite control 

American society through its control of capital, assets, 

banking and finance, and stock and bond markets, 

they are controlled in turn by an even tinier minority of Zionists. It is owing to this Zionist stranglehold 

on the American Government, economy, and military, that the existence of de-fanged pro-American, 

Zionist-accommodating regimes are put in place and 

supported throughout the Arab Muslim world. As an 

ultimate consequence, the Muslim world is robbed 

of its wealth and energy reserves; subjected to antiIslamic tyrannies; the Zionist regime that usurped 
34

the Ummah’s sacred lands and rights is defended; and 

the Sunni world, which should have the world beholden to it, kneels divided, subjugated, conquered, 

and humiliated. 

Bin Laden’s “demon theory” of Sunni Muslim humiliation, which is used to explain the present predicament of the Arab Muslim world, does not originate 

with him. Rather, bin Laden is a fellow traveler perpetuating and trafficking in unfortunately commonly 

believed frustration, resentment, and hate-based unidimensional, demonized caricatures widely circulating throughout these lands. While understandable as 

products arising in despair, projection, humiliation, 

scapegoating, and a will for revenge, these premises 

utterly fail to accurately, coherently, and judiciously 

comprehend the actual qualities of his chosen foe. 

This preposterous caricature of American society, 

economy, and government led bin Laden to massively 

inflate his own strengths and capacities for inflicting 

damage on America and Americans. This flawed preception caused him to massively underestimate the 

actual power that would be brought to bear against 

his terrorist enterprise and the actual sources of that 

power. 
35

FROM BIN LADENISM BACK TO QA’IDAT 

AL-JIHAD? BACK TO THE FUTURE? HUBRIS, 

DELUSION, DISASTER, AND THE REMAKING/

REBIRTH OF A POST-BIN LADEN, POST-ARAB 

SPRING QA’IDAT AL-JIHAD

The Catastrophe (The Nakhbah). 

Against the significant plurality of his own Shura 

Committee, and with senior level dissenters having 

made their opinions known, bin Laden nevertheless carried out the 9/11 attack.26 The United States 

of America, it turns out, was in fact, far from being 

a cowardly, hollowed-out, spiritually vacuous and 

materialistic “Paper Tiger.” From that date until his 

own demise nearly 11 years later, bin Laden would 

face a global war of his own making, and in the process, its brand would suffer irreparable harm, and its 

operatives would be practically hunted to extinction. 

9/11 was in its essence a lone-wolf terrorist operation: 

the final and successful operationalizing of a plan 

originally attempted in its first incarnation by Khalid 

Shaykh Muhammad’s (KSM) nephew Ramzi Yousef 

in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing; successfully 

thwarted owing to operational errors in its second incarnation as the 1995 Bojinka plot; and consummated 

in a plot known fully to only a half-dozen insiders, 

and excluding current Qa’idat al-Jihad Emir al-Zawahiri. The “planes operation” was suggested by KSM 

to bin Laden in 1996, and 3 years later, finally set in 

motion. Two years from then, KSM finally extracted 

the revenge he and his nephew sought,27 their selfprofessed motive to punish America for what they 

claimed was its support for authoritarian regimes 

countenancing Israel’s existence and thus underwrit-
36

ing and enabling “Zionist” attacks, oppression, and 

the continued occupation of Palestinian lands. Whatever the imagined virtues of the 9/11 “planes operation” to its perpetrators were, the consequences were 

clear: those whose unilateral actions to organize and 

execute this ignominious attack—one based in stealth, 

treachery, and the willful desire to murder thousands 

in cold blood—and potentially tens of thousands of 

ordinary civilians and residents, 32 of whom were 

Muslim28—would launch a war to hunt down and 

bring to justice those responsible. The world’s most 

formidable superpower would—and did—act,29 the 

consequences of which have led to what now appears 

to be the latest metamorphosis in the Qa’idat al-Jihad

saga: a recent practical abandonment of bin Ladenism 

as doctrine, and a return with a difference, to a previous strategy focused far more on the “Near” rather 

than “Far Enemy,”30 and among its Qa’idat al-Jihad in 

the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) affiliate, a new strategy of “lone mujahid” terrorism. 

A Name Change Anyone? 

Hunkered down in Abbottabad, Pakistan for several years, connected to the world through trusted 

couriers and flash drives for uploading instructions to 

key operatives, it appears bin Laden well-understood 

the practical failure of his strategy to attack the “head 

of the snake,” or the “base of the tree trunk.” Attacking the head of a snake does not make sense if you are 

a gnat, and sawing at the base of a massive tree does 

not make sense if you have a plastic knife. Strangely, 

bin Laden had learned little from the theory and practice of asymmetric warfare or of the data reporting 

that nations who believe attacks are existential will 
37

respond mercilessly to such.31 Owing to his prejudices, ignorance, arrogance, and hubris, he imagined that 

he would be the new Salahuddin who would usher in 

the age of a defeated Crusaderdom, and re-open the 

Gates of Jerusalem to Allah’s faithful. Of the discoveries learned in Abbottabad,32 several are of relevance 

to the issues under consideration here. First, former 

President George W. Bush’s gut and basic instincts 

proved exactly right in the aftermath of that dastardly 

attack. It was not Islam that was at issue—a great faith, 

with noble values, and fully welcomed in our pluralistic nation, even in a religiously conservative mode—it 

was terrorism, and very specifically the Qa’idat al-Jihad 

terrorist organization, with whom we were now “at 

war.” Bush succeeded in detaching Qa’idat al-Jihad 

from Sunni Islam far more effectively than bin Laden 

detached President Bush from a legitimate war waged 

in self-defense against terrorists. Terrorism belongs to 

no religion, he would say. A murderer is not a martyr.33

Despite his Texas folksiness, and infamous “Bushisms,” Bush understood clearly what the battle lines of 

this new war would be. Apparently, some years later, 

bin Laden did as well. President Bush would declare, 

in a joint session of Congress merely 9 days after 9/11: 

The evidence we have gathered all points to a collection of loosely affiliated terrorist organizations known 

as al Qaeda. They are some of the murderers indicted 

for bombing American embassies in Tanzania and 

Kenya and responsible for bombing the USS Cole

 . . . Al Qaeda is to terror what the Mafia is to crime. 

But its goal is not making money, its goal is remaking 

the world and imposing its radical beliefs on people 

everywhere. The terrorists practice a fringe form of 

Islamic extremism that has been rejected by Muslim 

scholars and the vast majority of Muslim clerics; a 
38

fringe movement that perverts the peaceful teachings 

of Islam. The terrorists’ directive commands them to 

kill Christians and Jews, to kill all Americans and make 

no distinctions among military and civilians, including women and children. This group and its leader, a 

person named Osama bin Laden, are linked to many 

other organizations in different countries, including 

the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, the Islamic Movement of 

Uzbekistan. There are thousands of these terrorists in 

more than 60 countries. . . . The Taliban must act and 

act immediately. They will hand over the terrorists or 

they will share in their fate. . . . I also want to speak 

tonight directly to Muslims throughout the world. 

We respect your faith. It’s practiced freely by many 

millions of Americans and by millions more in countries that America counts as friends. Its teachings are 

good and peaceful, and those who commit evil in the 

name of Allah blaspheme the name of Allah. The terrorists are traitors to their own faith, trying, in effect, 

to hijack Islam itself. The enemy of America is not our 

many Muslim friends. It is not our many Arab friends. 

Our enemy is a radical network of terrorists and every 

government that supports them. Our war on terror begins with Al Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will 

not end until every terrorist group of global reach has 

been found, stopped and defeated.34

Eight years later, during his 2009 speech in Cairo, 

former President Obama would do the same:

I have come here to seek a new beginning between 

the United States and Muslims around the world; one 

based upon mutual interest and mutual respect; and 

one based upon the truth that America and Islam are 

not exclusive, and need not be in competition. Instead, 

they overlap, and share common principles—principles of justice and progress; tolerance and the dignity of all human beings. . . . Moreover, freedom in 

America is indivisible from the freedom to practice 

one’s religion. That is why there is a mosque in every 

state of our union, and over 1,200 mosques within our 
39

borders. That is why the U.S. government has gone to 

court to protect the right of women and girls to wear 

the hijab, and to punish those who would deny it . . . 

So let there be no doubt: Islam is a part of America. 

And I believe that America holds within her the truth 

that regardless of race, religion, or station in life, all 

of us share common aspirations—to live in peace and 

security; to get an education and to work with dignity; 

to love our families, our communities, and our God. 

These things we share. This is the hope of all humanity 

. . . In Ankara, I made clear that America is not—and 

never will be—at war with Islam. We will, however, 

relentlessly confront violent extremists who pose 

a grave threat to our security. Because we reject the 

same thing that people of all faiths reject: the killing of 

innocent men, women, and children. And it is my first 

duty as President to protect the American people.35

In his November 2015 speech at the Association of 

Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) summit in Kuala 

Lumpur, the widely read, influential English-language daily Islamabad outlet The News International

would report:

US President Barack Obama has said that his country 

cannot be at war with an entire religion simply because of the actions of the Islamic State (IS) or Daesh 

militants . . . He added that many Muslim leaders 

have joined the global movement against the terrorist 

group, and Daesh only represents a ‘tiny fraction’ of 

the Muslim community. He said that the US is not at 

war with Muslims but with IS militants . . . whom he 

described as a ‘bunch of killers with very good social 

media.’36

Three months later, in his first speech as president delivered in an American mosque, President Obama on 

February 3, 2016, again adamantly asserted that the 

United States is allied with the vast majority of Mus-
40

lims in a common war not against Islam, but against 

a terrorist fringe whose principal victims are mostly 

Muslim and whose forbidden and reprehensible murderous acts committed against non-combatant civilians condemn them to the furthest fringes of deviant 

criminality. Seven years after his 2009 speech in Cairo, 

the President would again proclaim:

[T]here is an organized extremist element that draws 

selectively from Islamic texts, twists them in an attempt to justify their killing and their terror. They 

combine it with false claims that America and the 

West are at war with Islam. And this warped thinking 

that has found adherents around the world—including as we saw, tragically, in Boston and Chattanooga 

and San Bernardino – is real. It’s there. And it creates a tension and pressure that disproportionately 

burdens the overwhelming majority of law-abiding 

Muslim citizens. . . . Groups like ISIL are desperate 

for legitimacy. They try to portray themselves as religious leaders and holy warriors who speak for Islam. 

I refuse to give them legitimacy. We must never give 

them legitimacy. (Applause.) They’re not defending 

Islam. They’re not defending Muslims. The vast majority of the people they kill are innocent Muslim men, 

women, and children. (Applause.) And, by the way, 

the notion that America is at war with Islam ignores 

the fact that the world’s religions are a part of who we 

are. We can’t be at war with any other religion because 

the world’s religions are a part of the very fabric of the 

United States, our national character. (Applause.) So 

the best way for us to fight terrorism is to deny these 

organizations legitimacy and to show that here in the 

United States of America, we do not suppress Islam; 

we celebrate and lift up the success of Muslim Americans. That’s how we show the lie that they are trying 

to propagate. (Applause.)37
41

In a telling letter from an unknown author, the damage done to Qa’idat al-Jihad’s “brand” is explicitly addressed. Not blaming AQO’s own terrorist modus 

operandi as the principal culprit, this author instead 

blames its name—“al-Qa’ida”—for it fails to signify a 

cause, rather than merely an organization (Tanzim).38

An organization, no less, that now stands marginalized, divorced from its self-proclaimed mission as 

vanguard of the people of the Sunnah (Ahl-us Sunnah).39 It is worth quoting in full:

I make mention to you (plural) of a very important 

matter that came to me, which is changing the name of 

[Qa’ida al-Jihad], because there are several necessary 

and attention-worthy reasons to change it, of them: 

1. This name (Qa’ida al-Jihad) was abridged by the 

people and only a few people remember this name; 

it has come to be known as (al-Qa’ida) and this name 

reduces the feeling of Muslims that we belong to them, 

and allows the enemies to claim deceptively that they 

are not at war with Islam and Muslims, but they are 

at war with the organization of al-Qa’ida, which is an 

outside entity from the teachings of Islam and this is 

what was raised repeatedly in the past as indicated by 

Obama, that our war is not on Islam or on the Muslim 

people but rather our war is on the al-Qa’ida organization, so if the word al-Qa’ida was derived from or 

had strong ties to the word Islam or Muslims; or if it 

had the name Islamic party, it would be difficult for 

Obama to say that. It is clear from the past also that 

they [the enemies] have largely stopped using the 

phrase “the war on terror” in the context of not wanting to provoke Muslims, because they felt that saying 

the war on terror could appear to most people to be a 

war on Islam . . . 
42

2. The name of an entity carries its message and represents it. Al-Qa’ida describes a military base with 

fighters without a reference to our broader mission 

to unify the nation. Building on what is presented, it 

would be nice if you could discuss and come up with 

appropriate names that would not be easily shortened 

to a word that does not represent us. It would help if 

the name is a method of delivery of our message to 

reach the sons of the Ummah/nation. 40

This unknown author then suggests potential alternative names that attempt to re-brand AQO in a manner that masks its militarist roots and terrorist modus 

operandi: 

These are some suggestions [for alternative names]:

Taifat al-tawhid wal-jihad (TN: Monotheism and Jihad 

Group)

Taifat al-tawhid wal-difa’ an al-Islam (TN: Monotheism 

and Defending Islam Group)

Jama’at i’at al-khilafat al-rashida (TN: Restoration of the 

Caliphate Group)

Jama’at nasr al-Islam wal-aksa (TN: Support of Islam 

and Al-Aqsa Group)

Jama’at wihda al-Muslimin (TN: Muslim Unity Group)

Tanthim al-Jihadi li-tawhid al-Ummah wa-inkathiha (TN: 

Jihad Organization for Unification [Monotheism] and 

Rescue of the Nation)

Tanthim al-Jihadi litahrir al-aksa wa-tawhid al-Ummah

(TN: Jihad Organization to Liberate Al-Aqsa and Unify the Nation)

Hizb tawhid al-Ummah al-Islamiya (TN: Islamic Nation 

Unification Party)

Jama’at tahrir al-aksa (TN: Al-Aqsa Liberation Group)

Jama’at inkath wanahdat al-Ummah (TN: Rescue and Revitalization of the Nation Group)41

A second theme emerges from these captured documents.42 Bin Laden was in the midst of “new think-
43

ing.” Although killed in the beginning months of the 

“Arab Spring,” bin Laden had earlier begun to question 

whether an alternative path to the Caliphate might be 

required. It was not the Muslim Brotherhood path of 

education, politics, reform, eschewal of violence, and 

pursuit of a long-term cultural revolution Islamizing 

societies from below, slowly capturing them through 

a creeping majority seeking, and winning office to 

return Islamicity to the public square. Nor, however, 

was it exclusively the planning and executing of mass 

casualty terrorist attacks directed at the head of world 

infidelity. This new direction seemed to suggest a 

gradual, evolutionary insurgent strategy involving 

a greater emphasis on preaching (da’wa), on embedding within various ongoing rebellions, and working 

within and through the various nationalist-Islamist 

currents often dominant in these theaters. This slow 

march also called for working within existing “SykesPicot” borders, rather than advocating their smashing. 

Nationalist sensibilities and territorial boundaries, 

while anathema to the ultimate reconstituted global 

Caliphate, were the necessary starting-points, and it 

was crucial not to proceed faster than the Ummah was 

prepared to go. Also, a rebranding of the local supporters and helpers for the rule of Islamic law (Ansar al-Sharia) is one organizational result that has appeared in Tunisia, Yemen, and Egypt, for example.43

It was still a seeding process, and the furnishing of 

high-quality Qa’idat al-Jihad’s recruits, but the openings now presented by the tottering, falling, and decaying dictatorships called for a new way to approach 

the question of raising Allah’s Word supreme; as well 

as its timing, and alliance strategy.
44

“WHAT IS QA’IDAT AL-JIHAD?” IN A 

NUTSHELL: FAZUL ABDULLAH AND ADAM 

GADAHN

Following bin Laden’s death, the non-linear course 

of an unanticipated Arab Spring and AQO’s role 

within it remained undefined. Some fresh beginnings 

were suggested, and organizational forms founded. 

What futures these hold remain to be seen in the coming years. It is prudent, however, to conclude this 

historical account with a final summation of the classical AQO doctrine: that belief system, worldview, 

doctrine, and a set of assumptions at the heart of bin 

Laden’s declaration of a jihad against the Jews and 

Crusader America; that which anchored his terrorist 

campaign beginning in the early-1990s.44

Fortunately, two such accounts exist: the first is 

a brief, telling excerpt from long-time AQO terrorist 

mastermind Fazul Abdullah Mohammed, appearing 

in the Spring 2013 10th Issue of AQAP online magazine, Inspire;45 and the second excerpt is by long-time 

AQO member, senior AQO spokesman, and senior 

communications operative Adam Yahiye Gadahn.46

Let us consider in turn each answer to the question, 

“What is Qa’idat al-Jihad?” For Fazul Abdullah:

Al-Qaeda is an Islamic group which raises the flag of 

Jihad to espouse and support the Haqq (truth of Islam) 

wherever it is found. 

Al-Qaeda literally means ‘a firm foundation,’ this 

name is enough to clarify that it was found[ed] to 

remain fighting Jihad. Allah says, ‘And [remember; 

sic] when you, [O Muhammad; sic] left your family 

in the morning to post the believers at their stations 

(maqaa’ida—a derivation of Qa’idah) for the battle [of 

Uhud; sic]—and Allah is All-Hearer and All-Knower.’ 
45

Thus it is military posts with equipments [sic] prepared to fight the enemies of Allah among the combatant kuffar and their allies wherever they are by the 

Grace of Allah. Allah says about the mujahideen who 

fight His enemies, ‘You [believers; sic] are more terrorizing within their breasts than Allah.’ We ask Allah to 

make us among those who terrorize the infidels. 

Al-Qaeda is not a separated [sic] party as many think, 

we do not believe in any party but one—The Glorious Party of Allah. And this group is made up of [the] 

Ummah (nation) of Muhammad. We are against the 

concept of partisanship which lays down certain special program [sic] and obliges the members to abide by 

their understandings. And whoever differs with them 

is counted [i.e., considered] to be on batil (the wrong 

path). There are many Islamic movements founded on 

these policies, and this opposes the principle of ‘It is 

He (Allah) who has named you Muslims’ and ‘Truly! 

This, your Ummah . . . is one religion.’ Therefore, we 

are Muslims of the vanguard of the Muslim Ummah 

who call not to partisanship.

Al-Qaeda’s main goal in this stage—at least—is to aid 

every oppressed Muslim in the world regardless of his 

madhhab [i.e., his jurisprudential orientation, whether 

Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi’i, or Hanbali] and race. As for 

its long-term goal, [it] is to reestablish the Islamic Caliphate through Jihad in cause of Allah and to implement the Shari’a of Allah in the whole land of Allah, 

Bi’idhnillah. [sic; i.e., ‘God willing’]

We are proud that every Muslim believes in Islamic 

unity and waging jihad against kuffar who occupy our 

lands. And every Muslim has the same ideology as 

that of Al-Qaeda’s. 

Alhamdulillah [i.e., ‘Praise Allah’] we have conveyed 

the ideology to the people. It is up to them to stand 

and strive for the Islamic caliphate through different 

ways, and to implement the pure law of Allah.47

In a recently published extensive interview in the 

new online magazine Resurgence, Gadahn provides 
46

an excellent precis of AQO’s doctrine.48 As the reader will soon detect, Gadahn’s account incorporates, 

though spun to magnify AQO’s truth and greatness, 

every key dimension examined earlier. According to 

Gadahn, AQO is distinguished by five key doctrines:

First, its global/international reach and membership,

as opposed to some other groups which focused almost 

exclusively on particular countries or regions . . . [A]lQa’eda from its inception has always been an ‘Islamic 

Internationale’ and has never limited itself to a particular country or region. Rather, it has always had a global 

outlook and a presence in dozens of countries around 

the region, and has [leadership and rank-and-file from] 

many different countries and origins: Hijazis, Najdis, 

Yemenis, Egyptians, Iraqis, Syrians, Lebanese, Libyans, 

Maghrebis, Tunisians, Europeans, Pakistanis, Indians, 

Bengalis, Balochis: you name it [emphasis in original].

The second thing which distinquishes al-Qa’eda—and 

still does is its focus on fighting America, the Crusader 

West, and the Jews (the far enemy/original unbelievers)

[emphasis in original].49

It is worth pausing to focus on this second point 

for a moment as Gadahn feels it is necessary to defend 

it in a way that he does not the others. In this defense, 

he quotes from an actual captured Abbottabad letter 

written by bin Laden that employs the “base of the 

tree trunk” simile, and acknowledges that this “Far 

Enemy” doctrine is still resisted by many. Gadahn’s 

excerpt is taken from a letter from Qa’idat al-Jihad’s

Emir Osama bin Laden to the AQAP emir and former 

bin Laden personal secretary, Shaykh Abu Baseer 

al-Wuhayshi: 
47

I would like to remind you of the general policy of al-Qaida 

in the military and media spheres. Al Qaida has been distinguished by its concentration on the larger external enemy 

before the internal enemy, because while the internal enemy 

is greater in terms of unbelief, the external enemy’s unbelief 

is clearer, and is also more dangerous at the present time. 

[Today,] America is the head of unbelief. If Allah cuts it 

off, the wings will be weakened. . . . [T]he enemies of the 

Ummah are like a malignant tree, and America is its trunk 

with a diameter of 50cm . . . We want to topple this tree 

by sawing it down, but our power and energy is limited. 

Therefore the safest and most effective way to bring down 

the tree is for us to focus on the sawing at the American 

base of the tree . . . You have a practical example of that, 

which is how the Mujahideen in Afghanistan were able to 

cut the root of the Russian tree, after which all its branches 

fell one after the other, from South Yemen to Eastern Europe, without us expending any effort on these branches at 

that time. Therefore, any arrow and landmine which can be 

used to target Americans while other enemies are present 

should be spent on Americans instead of on other members 

of the NATO pact, to say nothing of lesser enemies. . . . The

one who keeps abreast of events can see that it is our operations and messages which have really exhausted and 

strained Americans, especially after September 11th. So we 

should increase pressure on them until the balance of terror 

is achieved and the cost of war, occupation, domination of 

our countries becomes more than its benefits for them and 

they reach a state of exhaustion which will motivate them to 

submit, withdraw from our countries and stop supporting 

the Jews [italics in original].50

Gadahn, admitting that this is a controversial position, then attempts its defense: 

Regrettably, this strategic policy choice was—and still 

is—viewed by some other groups and movements as 

amounting to deviation from the path of Jihad and 

the ‘true methodology,’ and is used as a gateway for 

criticism and condemnation of al-Qa’eda, even though 
48

the issue is essentially one of strategy, tactics, and priorities and not a dispute over the obligatory nature of 

fighting the apostate regimes. In this regard, Shaykh 

Usama says in the recently released video entitled 

Bushriyaat (Glad Tidings), in reply to a question concerning the groups which prefer to focus on the near 

enemy: “As I said, strike the head, and the legs, arms and 

everything else will come down. It’s an octopus, and its 

head is Crusader/Zionist America and Israel. Some people 

are of the opinion that it is beneficial to strike the tentacles 

of the octopus . . . [B]ut . . . as long as the number of [Mujahid] youth is few and our capabilities are limited, we should 

condense matters by striking the head. They [i.e., those who 

believe in striking the tentacles] deserve to be rewarded for 

their ijtihad [discretionary judgment] and their deeds, but 

according to our fiqh, we believe that we should strike the 

more important part, the head. This is what we believe, and 

in any case, these are matters of ijtihad (discretion); do you 

strike America first or Hosni Mubarak first, or second, or 

third. These are matters of discretion, and our ijtihad has led 

us to take the position that we should first strike the head of 

Unbelief and the leaders of Unbelief, in accordance with the 

texts [italics in original].51

Gadahn concludes his attempted “Islamic” case by 

citing a case from Islamic history where the first two 

caliphs succeeding Prophet Muhammad (Umar and 

Abu Bakr) launched attacks against the Byzantines, 

despite the fact that they were fighting internal wars 

against rebels and early seceders, and cites Quran 9:12, 

“Then fight the leaders of disbelief—for they have no 

binding oaths—in order that they may desist.”52

A third distinctive feature, Gadahn claims, is 

Qa’idat al-Jihad’s: “lack of a written ‘aqeedah (doctrine/creed) or manhaj (methodology) which every 

prospective member has to agree to before joining

[emphasis in original].”53 He continues that this is:
49

in contrast to some groups which have strict conditions for membership which may lead to many people 

being excluded for not being up to the mark, as if Jihad 

is the exclusive domain of an elite few. Al Qa’eda, on 

the other hand, tends to be much more open in accepting members even if they may not agree with all the 

positions of the leadership, so long as they are Muslims who have been vetted security-wise and are not 

known for major bid’a, or outright criminality. I for 

one think this approach is the best suited for making 

use of the capabilities of the Ummah and rallying the 

Muslims to fight their enemies, and restore the Islamic 

system. On the other hand, when you limit membership of your group to those who agree with you in every minutae of fiqh and ‘aqeedah, I think you may be 

guilty of closing doors which Allah has left open and 

isolating your self, the Jihad, and the Mujahideen from 

the wider Ummah. Allah has not limited Jihad to people 

who follow a certain fiqh or madhhab; on the contrary, 

Allah has ordained Jihad for the entire Ummah, even 

sinful Muslims, so what about those who follow a different madhhab from ours or even the same madhhab 

except that they differ with you on a few minor points 

of fiqh or ‘aqeedah? How can you turn them away unless they change their views and positions which are 

open to debate and discussion and—more often than 

not—have little bearing on day-to-day operations? As 

long as someone agrees with the practical approach 

and policies of your group and is prepared to listen 

and obey the ameer except in disobedience to Allah, 

then why should they be prevented from joining you? 

I would like to point out that I am not talking here in 

terms of permissibility or impermissibility, but rather 

in terms of appropriateness and what is in the best 

interest of the Ummah.

54

Fourth, for Gadahn, AQO’s distinctiveness is in:

its recognition of the importance of public relations 

for the Mujahideen and of winning and preserving 
50

popular support of the Muslim masses (while always 

relying on Allah alone), as opposed to some groups 

which reject or belittle the concept of maintaining a 

popular support base and consider it be a ‘sophism’ 

or even an ‘idol’ (we seek refuge in Allah) [emphasis 

in original]. 55

The fifth and final distinct AQO doctrine is “its 

particularly close ties with the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.”56 At this point, Gadahn begins a discussion of various groups that denounced the Taliban on 

grounds of party, or:

due to their deviant understanding of Islam and extreme application of the principle of takfeer (excommunication). The irony was that when these Takfeeri 

types came to Afghanistan for training—or were 

forced to come to Afghanistan after being chased out 

of their homes in Peshawar and Khyber . . . they were 

warmly welcomed by the Emirate . . . But . . . these 

extremists have always been relatively few in this part 

of the world and never very well organized.57

Having identified this “takfiri” extremism, the interviewer then asks Gadahn for his own definition of 

that phenomenon. Gadahn responds: 

A Takfeeri is someone who has gone beyond the limits of the Shari’ah in terms of his application of the 

principle of Takfeer and has adopted excessiveness 

and extremism as his methodology, thus making it 

his defining characteristic. In other words, we’re not 

talking about someone who has made a few mistakes 

in this regard; we’re talking about a person who lives 

and breathes unregulated Takfeer. . . . [W]hat is important for us to know [is] that both Takfeerism and Kharijism are deviant ideologies which we must never tire 

of warning against and combating, due to the danger 
51

they pose to Islam and Muslims in general and the 

Jihad and Mujahideen in particular.58

Toward the very end of the interview, Gadahn 

again lists what he believes is, in essence, that upon 

which Qa’idat al-Jihad as a distinct organization is 

founded. Again, we shall see a distinction drawn 

between an open church and a closed sect; between 

softness, mercy, and leniency, and hardness, brutality, 

and severity.

let us . . . make sure our intentions are sound and our 

actions correct . . . we are fighting for . . . Allah, not for 

[the] sake of ameer, group, temporal power or worldly 

gain . . . let us show mercy and kindness toward the 

weak and helpless; let us display tolerance of our fellow Muslims and Mujahideen [even if] . . . they have 

let us down; let us beware of the deviant Takfeeri methodology which continues to rear its ugly head every 

now and again in some of the theatres of jihad; let us 

beware of making Takfeer of Muslims or Mujahideen 

or deeming their blood, wealth and honor to be permissible without right; let us beware of turning into 

‘Jihadi supremacists’ (if you get my drift); let us show 

respect for our ‘Ulama, leaders and elders and let us 

abide by their rulings, advice and instructions except 

in clear disobedience to Allah; let us adhere to and 

comply with the principles of Shari’ah and justice in all 

of our actions and dealings; and let us work towards 

unity on a sound basis of taqwa and Islamic precepts, 

because if we can’t unify our own ranks, how can we 

expect the Ummah to unify itself [italicis in original].59

Having examined AQO’s worldview and doctrines 

from its origins to the present, Gadahn provides us 

with the perfect segue for transitioning from Qa’idat 

al-Jihad’s worldview, beliefs, and doctrine to that 

about which he warned, posed the greatest of dangers 
52

to “Islam and Muslims in general and the Jihad and 

Mujahideen in particular”60—a second species of deviant Sunni terrorist organization, Tanzim al-Dawla alIslamiyya, the ISO. It is to that terrorist entity that we 

now turn.
53

III. ISLAMIC STATE ORGANIZATION 

(TANZIM AL-DAWLA AL-ISLAMIYYA)

To understand the uniqueness of ISO vis-à-vis 

AQO, we must first return to the place where their 

common ancestry diverges: the Salafi-Muwahhidun

(Wahhabi) Call. We shall then more fully understand 

why the ISO and AQO, although Sunni and jihadist, 

are and have always been distinctly different at the 

level of core beliefs, worldview, and doctrine. It is a 

profound error to view AQO and ISO as disagreeing 

only about the path or strategy to the Caliphate. No, 

these organizations disagree on genuine religious fundamentals. ISO and AQO differ, for example, on such 

core questions as: What does it actually mean to be a 

“Muslim”? Who is a Muslim? What constitutes proof 

of one’s faith (Iman)? What constitutes proof of one’s 

lack of faith (Kufr)? What are the necessary legal requisites for proof of another’s apostasy (ridda)?

While these disagreements are vital, four key 

creedal differences are perhaps the most distinctive 

and consequential, and most fully distinguish ISO 

from AQO. These, considered collectively, explain 

why ISO has engaged in a level of brutality, cruelty, 

and inhumane conduct so extreme that it has led Muslims and non-Muslims alike to proclaim that “these 

are not men of religion” and that “no religion on 

Earth,” no matter how militant, engages in this type 

of “barbaric, cruel, and evil” behavior.61 These most 

distinguishing elements include: (1) an apocalyptic 

and eschatological belief in the “Imminence of the End 

Times”; (2) a belief in the necessity of immediately 

reestablishing the Islamic Caliphate; (3) a belief that 

the Shia represent an existential threat to Sunni Islam 

and must be completely exterminated; and, (4) that it 
54

is the “Nearest Enemy” and not the “Far Enemy” that 

is the Ummah’s truest existential foe. Considered collectively, these four core beliefs transform what was in 

the beginning, an extremely sectarian variant of SalafiWahhabism into a kind of monstrous killing machine 

that seems devoid of a moral compass except for that 

required to secure absolute authority and absolute 

loyalty, through consent or coercion, through power 

and conquest, over those poor souls unlucky enough 

to be in their way, and which ISO truly believes is 

the only salvific path to be followed as precursor to 

Allah’s imminent “Divine Judgment” of souls. 

The ISO’s present status as a seemingly merciless 

killing machine now ensconced in a type of protostate did not occur in a vacuum, of course. The ISO 

would not exist, or at this level of severity at least, had 

the ruling Shia elements in Iraq following the USG occupation made the essential, painful choices required 

to pursue a new social compact with the nation’s Sunni population. Or, had the USG not operationalized 

Ahmad Chalabi’s long-dreamt of goal of imposing 

a punitive de-Ba`athification.62 Or, had the USG not 

imposed the disastrous policy of dissolving the Iraqi 

armed forces and security forces, numbering in the 

hundreds of thousands;63 or had been prepared for a 

Sunni insurgency; or had developed a realistic postoccupation, longer-term stabilization policy based in 

a keen and learned awareness that the USG’s decapitation, occupation, and empowerment of Iraq’s Shia 

would profoundly destabilize an existing equilibrium 

in Iraq;64 or understood that the decapitation of the 

Iraqi regime would profoundly alter the terms of the 

broader Sunni-Shia rivalry inaugurated by the emergence of a Shia revolutionary State in 1979, and thereby further energizing proponents and antagonists 

who view this schism as a difference so wide as that 
55

between God and the Devil; or, finally, had the USG 

not first gone into Iraq the wrong way, and later repeated the error by disengaging from Iraq the wrong 

way. The pretext for decapitation was proved wrong, 

and the consequences of a premature exit, though understandable owing to Iraqi intransigence, bad faith, 

and an Iranian-backed political agenda, have proved 

enormously costly.

Another way to understand what the United States 

is now dealing with is the following: when the ISO’s 

previous incarnation as the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) 

was hunted to practical extinction, the United States 

failed to completely douse the fire. It left a burning 

ember. It did not understand at the time the profound 

and unique nature of this distinct terrorist organization. It had much too casually and erroneously viewed 

the ISI as AQO on steroids. And despite AQO’s genuine concerns, they did not publicly denounce this organization’s penchant for extreme brutality and alienating its Sunni base, though they did so in private. 

The USG possessed captured letters between senior AQO and the Emir al-Zarqawi of what was then 

known as al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI; “The Base of Jihad in 

the Land of the Two Rivers [Tigris and Euphrates]”; 

Tanzim Qa’idat al-Jihad fi Bilad al Rafidayn). It knew of 

a captured letter sent in January 2004, 10 months before al-Zarqawi’s official October 14, 2004, pledge of 

loyalty (bay’ah) to AQO Emir Osama bin Laden; one 

that strongly intimated the distinctly different priorities of each organization.65 More recently we learned 

through captured documents that, by 2006, a profound 

disconnect had emerged between the former ISI and 

AQO, to the extent that senior spokesman and communications operative Adam Yahiye Gadahn would 

request that AQO openly denounce and disavow any 
56

relation to ISI; this, in late-2010, a full 4 years before 

this was finally consummated by AQO’s current Emir 

al-Zawahiri on February 3, 2014.66 But since 9/11, and 

perhaps understandably, the world understood the 

words “al-Qaeda terrorism” and through ignorance, 

error, and good intentions, no public distinctions were 

made between what was obviously a level of unprecedented savagery and cruelty being meted out by the 

al-Zarqawi organization in Iraq, and AQO’s various 

plots directed primarily at the American homeland 

and American interests and embassies overseas. 

Through a combination of re-learned counterinsurgency, U.S. Special Forces, working with and empowering the newly-emergent Anbar tribal resistance, as 

well as ultra-lethal counter-terrorism operations conducted by the U.S. CIA, the Joint Special Operations 

Command (JSOC), and Iraqi Special Forces, nearly 

eviscerated high-value leadership targets of the former 

ISI by 2008-2009, through killing and imprisonment. 

But, and this cannot be stressed too strongly, absence 

of evidence is not evidence of absence. Unbeknownst 

to the USG at the time, and only truly understood over 

the past few years, a hidden, smoldering, white-hot 

ember had been left behind. Its glow and smoke and 

other signs carefully hidden from view, in safe houses, 

sanctuary in cities and remote regions, or in plain sight 

in a major prison—Camp Bucca—later turned out to 

have been a virtual hatchery, incubator, and launching 

pad for the latest mutation of the original al-Zarqawi

organization.

A systematic campaign that began with carefully 

orchestrated prison breaks, a talented and vicious 

leadership cadre, and the kindling, tinder, gasoline, 

and oxygen provided by those contextual factors cited 

previously—now also include the Syrian rebellion 
57

and civil war, and the emergence of an unanticipated 

Syrian sanctuary beginning especially after March 

2011—transformed this ISI remnant into one that 

would explode on the world stage as a type of exotic 

and unexpected state-building killing machine which 

seemed, and to some still seems, unstoppable. Still 

thinking only in terms of Qa’idat al-Jihad, the ISO was 

misnamed, misrecognized, and its unique sameness, 

but also critical differences as a unique species—ultrasectarian, former Ba’athist-led, Sunni Salafi-Wahhabi, 

apocalyptic global jihadism—remained, and still remains, misunderstood. Let us now retrace the steps 

that must be understood to discover how this divergent path from their last commonly shared ancestor 

within a renascent Sunni global jihadism occurred; 

and its consequences for creed, strategy, and intrajihadi civil war. It is to that journey we now turn.

“ZARQAWISM” VS. AQO: ABU MUSAB 

AL-ZARQAWI’S WORLDVIEW AND DOCTRINE: 

1989-JUNE 7, 2006

The phenomenon represents a series of continuities and discontinuities commencing with the rise 

of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in the latter 1990s—original progenitor of the doctrine and modus operandi 

now under investigation—to the June 29, 2014, selfproclamation of a so-called Islamic State (al-Dawlat alIslamiyya, or al-Khalifa al-Islamiyya) of the Caliphate, to 

which the world’s Sunni Muslims (Ahl-us Sunnah) are 

now obligated to pledge obedience (bay’ah). 

History and doctrine intertwine, and we will discover that al-Zarqawi’s original notions are never 

negated, but are extended from “Zarqawism” to 

“Neo-Zarqawism,” to what might now be termed 
58

“Baghdadism.” Because of our ignorance of certain 

details of this highly secretive terrorist entity, it is not 

yet possible to fully paint the differences between the 

original progenitor and his successors. 

As described previously, sectarian bloodbaths are 

always fierce—whether based in Islam, Communism, 

or Christianity, to take three faiths proclaiming a 

universal mission and followership. Everything is at 

stake in that smallest of smallest differences. It is as if 

a millimeter separates two men standing on the edge 

of a cliff, and the one just a thousandth of a millimeter 

closer to its edge must now, owing to an unpardonable error, face eternal death. In addition, this splintering of splinters leads to ever more severe acid tests 

of what it means to be “true” to the genuine “Truth.” 

Who is a loyal adherent? Who, an enemy within? Who 

is the greater enemy to be fought? For splintered splinters, it is invariably the one closest in creed that commits the greatest of travesties endangering the path to 

Salvation. They took the road before the true road, or 

a left fork and not a right fork, and it is they who took 

the wrong path to eternal perdition and damnation. 

But this is not merely a matter for the damned. It is 

one that also, and especially for these ultra-sectarians, 

threatens to carry all others (including themselves) 

in their path. Obliterating the followers of the wrong 

path, then, translates into an obsessive demand to create the “Truest Sect of the Pure,” all of this of course as 

a self-proclaimed vanguard speaking in the name of 

the entire multitude to be saved. For communism, the 

vanguard represents the proletariat. For the adherents 

of the ISO, the true Mujahidin professedly represents 

the worldwide Muslim Ummah. 

For these ultra-sectarians, the Muslim Ummah must 

first be cleansed of its greatest internal enemies—the 
59

Shia—and nearly as close, of Sunnism’s own false 

and heretical, and even apostate elements. Then, and 

only then, should the final battles commence against 

the ultimate and final Enemy, the original Kufr or 

Worshippers of the Cross, and all other forms of supposedly modern idolatry—nationalism, secularism, 

and democracy, the most often mentioned. And for 

these ultra-sectarians, Islam is to be understood not

as an ethic of all times—proclaiming the necessity of 

righteous intention, praiseworthy deeds, mercy, and 

forgiveness—but as an ethic of the “End Times,” demanding a virtually unlimited relaxing of moral strictures and unleashing of unprecedented vicious brutality, against Allah’s most determined final antagonists. 

ISO is not Qa’idat al-Jihad, the Church for all Sunnis, whose principal and immediate arch-enemy is 

the original external “Far Enemy” Kufr, demonically 

presented in AQO’s terrorist messaging as the CrossWorshipping, Muslim-hating “Crusader” America 

and the Cross-Worshippers’ true behind-the-scenes 

demonic master, “Zionism.” ISO is not Qa’idat al-Jihad, 

the Base for a Sunni Islamic International Organization or for a “World Front for Jihad Against the Jews 

and Crusaders.” As a conglomerate organization, it is 

designed to welcome the maximum number of Sunnis 

willing to go to war with these original Kufr who have 

usurped Muslim lands, honor, power, and the right 

to rule; to maximize and synchronize the combined 

power of its parts; accommodate Salafis and nonSalafis, Salafi-Wahhabis and non-Salafi-Wahhabis, 

Salafi-Jihadis and non-Salafi-Jihadis, and all Sunnis—

saints and sinners; and shall all remain, for all times, 

sinners that must constantly pray for Allah’s Divine 

mercy and compassion—who profess an intention to 

adhere to the empowerment of Ahl-us Sunnah, and 
60

work for the elimination of the “Crusader-Zionist” occupation of “Muslim” lands. 

A remarkable example of the AQO ecumenical 

conception of “Sunniness” and “Muslimness” is evidenced in two separate documents by Qa’idat al-Jihad 

senior spokesmen and senior communication representative Adam Gadahn. First, Gadahn’s truly broad 

conception of Sunnism is evident in his biting criticism 

of the ultra-sectarian, exclusivist, and self-righteous 

nature of certain so-called jihadist online forums.67

A second example is provided in that posthumously 

published interview earlier referenced, in which Gadahn discusses his own conversion to Islam, and also 

his reflections on the essential requirements of faith.68

Lumping not splitting, Church not sect, openness 

not closedness, patience not impatience; these are 

AQO’s signature attributes, declared by one at the 

apex of AQO since his bay’ah in the latter 1990s, and 

one trusted and actually charged with presentations 

of AQO’s creed and methods. It is important to understand how powerful this path emphasizing intraSunni solidarity, unity, community, brotherhood, and 

the tolerance of differences may become if, as is possible, the AQO is in transition from its “Far Enemy” 

exclusive “Bin Ladenism,” to a revised “Qa’idat alJihad” focused far more on becoming fully embedded 

as force multipliers and allies within broader alliances 

in a now-fermenting Arab Muslim world. Further reflections on strategy must wait; however, and will be 

taken up in subsequent chapters of this book.

Having introduced the ISO by way of a broader 

reflection on the genus to which it belongs—ultrasectarianism—and having drawn preliminary contrasts between a Churchly AQO and Sectarian ISO, we 

shall now begin with Zarqawism and end with selfdeclared Caliph Ibrahim’s Caliphate of the End Times, 
61

tracing the rise of this other markedly sectarian, and 

in other highly consequential ways unique, species of 

Sunni global jihadism. 

FROM NON-RELIGIOUS VIOLENT STREET 

TOUGH TO ULTRA-SECTARIAN SALAFI-WAHHABI JIHADIST PRISON TOUGH: 1980–1999 

If one attempts a composite based on standard 

sources and known writings, “Zarqawism” appears to 

be a novel synthesis derived from several elements.69

First, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi (b. 1966, birth name: Ahmad Fadil Nazal-Khalayah) in his youth and youngest 

adulthood appears as a sinner among sinners, born in 

and roaming the urban, industrial, gritty Jordanian 

city Zarqa’s streets, and sharing a profile that is not 

dissimilar from that of a particular demographic now 

finding its way into the global jihad: petty thieves and 

criminals engaged in violent assault, including sexual 

battery, and spending time imprisoned. We may add 

to this al-Zarqawi’s loss of his father when he was 17. 

The portrait presented is of a street tough, known for 

petty criminality and a kind of fearless toughness. He 

was known to do drugs, imbibe alcohol, engage in 

non-marital sex, and other activities anathema to the 

trends to which he would later declare unconditional 

fidelity. 

Al-Zarqawi at some point “found” or reverted 

to Islam, having been drawn in and convinced of its 

truth. Again, not unlike others similarly disposed, alZarqawi’s reversion to a variant of Salafist Islam led 

him to abandon his criminal activities and commit to 

a strict behavioral regimen prohibiting drugs, alcohol, 

tobacco, pre- or non-marital sex, and a strict sex–segregation and expectation of female sexual modesty in 

demeanor and dress. 
62

Al-Zarqawi sojourned to Afghanistan to partake 

in the jihad against the Soviet occupation, but by the 

time he arrived in 1989, the Soviets were in the process 

of exiting the theater and the jihad had entered a postSoviet occupation phase characterized by an emerging 

civil war among the various armed organizations, and 

uncertainty regarding the fate and future of the Arab 

Afghan emigrants, and also the many “Near Enemy” 

insurgents from Libya, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, and 

elsewhere now caught between a homeland to which 

they could not return, and a jihad with an ill-defined 

future. Al-Zarqawi’s role was that of an amateur journalist writing for the periodical Al-Bonian al Marsous, 

but more fateful for his future was his introduction 

and later discipleship to Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi 

(b. 1959, Asim Muhammad Tahir al-Barqawi).70

Al-Maqdisi is deemed one of the most influential 

and consequential major scholarly authorities to which 

AQO and others refer.71 His creedal orientation is based 

in a specific strand of Salafi-Wahhabism originating in 

a particular ultra-conservative 19th-century Wahhabi 

movement of scholars from the Najd region of Saudi 

Arabia (the Najd Scholars Movement [NSM]).72 Its 

form is a variant of “Rejectionist” Salafi-Wahhabism 

represented by Juhayman al-Otaybi and those of his 

circle, who, building their case on the NSM and the 

authority of an earlier incarnation known as the Ikhwan73 (Brotherhood),—a fierce, uncompromising jihadist army deployed against perceived adversaries 

including what was deemed Ottoman usurpation of 

Salafi-Wahhabism—called into question the Islamic 

nature of the existing Saudi State.74 Unlike al-Otaybi, 

who did not call for the actual overthrow of the Saudi 

State, despite its demonstrable infidelity on important 

matters, al-Maqdisi, in a series of key works, did. 
63

Despite al-Maqdisi’s critique of the Saudi state, 

however, it was Jordan, Jerusalem, and the more immediate Levantine environs that provided the basis of 

his focus. Organizing semi-underground, and preaching and recruiting for their secretive ultra-conservative 

Salafi-Wahhabi Call, an organization informally called 

Jama’at al-Muwahhidin (Society for the Upholders of 

Absolute Monotheism) would capture this mission.75

The group’s activities consisted of vigilante-style activities, a kind of privatized hisbah or policing of prohibited or reprehensible conduct, and was directed at 

what they considered secular debauchery: bars, redlight districts, and co-mingling of the sexes. It was alMaqdisi’s decision to smuggle in hand grenades, and 

their mutual decision to oppose the recently conducted Oslo accords and Jordanian treaty-in-the-making 

with the Israeli state, declared in 1994, that led later 

to their imprisonment on terrorism-related charges. 

Al-Zarqawi’s transition from street tough to Salafist 

to Maqdisian-inspired ultra-conservative Salafi-Wahhabi Jihadism was on display in his trial as he denied 

the legitimacy of the court and its laws. Sentenced to 

15 years in prison, a decisive phase had begun.

Al-Zarqawi and al-Maqdisi were imprisoned from 

1994 to 1999, their sentences cut short by the accession 

and royal pardon of Jordanian King Abdullah II. Accounts of this period agree that the al-Zarqawi and alMaqdisi relationship underwent a fundamental transformation. Initially, his student-disciple al-Zarqawi 

proved to be a determined, fearless, loyal enforcer. 

He developed a reputation as a tough, charismatic, 

dominating leader, imposing exacting demands from 

inmates regarding their Islam and decorum. He was 

also noted for a type of fearless loyalty, and known 

for unusually overt displays of emotion, for example, 
64

while memorizing the Quran, one of the achievements 

of this period. With regard to the latter, al-Zarqawi 

was also known for a juvenile-like effusive and almost 

romantic affection directed toward his mother and 

sisters. 

The net result of these prison years together (1994-

1999) was a transformation in the authority relations 

between emir-scholar-teacher al-Maqdisi and pupildisciple al-Zarqawi. Al-Maqdisi eventually conceded 

emirship to al-Zarqawi, and continued in his studies 

and fastidious commitment to produce an exacting 

scholarship using classical sources to support a maximalist position calling for the overthrow of existing 

Arab states that did not rule by the Sharia. Al-Zarqawi, 

transforming himself into a muscular and tough person through daily routines of bench-lifting rock-laden 

buckets, developed a reputation as a fearless leader, 

defender of inmates, and was no longer in a subordinate relation to the man who had taught him the ultimate meaning of “The Community of Abraham,” as 

al-Maqdisi professed it. 

AL-ZARQAWI’S PRIVATE JIHADIST ARMIES 

OF THE LEVANT: 1999-2004 

Al-Zarqawi’s second and most consequential journey to Afghanistan occurred upon his release. Two 

years before 9/11, and equipped with a basically 

Maqdisian ultra-conservative Salafi-Wahhabi Jihadism, al-Zarqawi traveled to the land ruled by thenemir of the Afghan Taliban, Mullah Muhammad bin 

Omar, to build an army designed to overthrow the 

Jordanian state, and more broadly, to target regimes 

throughout the Levant. Though supplied a letter of 

introduction vouching for his character, the senior 
65

leadership of AQO was not impressed. Bin Laden and 

others expressed disdain and genuine concern over 

his brashness, arrogance, and extremist and sectarian 

tendencies. Senior AQO operative Sayf al-Adl indicates in an important recollection how AQO initially 

placed al-Zarqawi under surveillance not only to ensure his trustworthiness, but also to determine his 

character and creed. Evidence is cited of a genuine distance between Osama bin Laden and al-Zarqawi, and 

al-Zarqawi’s repeated refusals to pledge allegiance/

obedience (bay’ah) to bin Laden, the undisputed emir 

of AQO. 

Though al-Maqdisi was a key mentor from the 

latter 1980s through their mutual imprisonment, and 

during this second Afghan sojourn, he does not furnish al-Zarqawi’s Nazi-like anti-Shi’ism. Another key 

influence, Sheikh Abu Abdallah Al-Muhajir (born, 

Abdul Rahman al-Ali), appears to provide the key to 

al-Zarqawi’s signature vitriolic, ultra-sectarian antiShi’ism, and his doctrine calling for the mass annihilation of the Shia, laypersons included.76 Without this, 

al-Zarqawi would have been another Salafi-Jihadist 

waging war on “apostate” Arab regimes, Jordan especially; with this, Zarqawism was unleashed in a 

manner the jihadi currents had neither witnessed, nor 

condoned. Let us examine this more closely.
66

ABDALLAH AL-MUHAJIR’S ULTRAEXTREMISM IN TAKFIR, AND TAKFIR 

OF THE SHIA

An Egyptian national, Abu Abdallah al-Muhajir 

graduated from the Islamic University in Islamabad, 

participated in jihad in Afghanistan, and taught at 

jihadi camps in Kabul. He was later recruited by alZarqawi to become the senior Sharia instructor for his 

camp in Herat.77 Abu Abdallah al-Muhajir’s extremism in takfir was well known. According to al-Khateeb, Abu Abdallah al-Muhajir’s “book on the dogma 

of jihad greatly influenced al-Zarqawi, who actually 

studied the book under [Abu Abdallah al-] Muhajir.”78

Al-Khateeb summarizes Abu Abdallah al-Muhajir’s 

book in the following manner:

More a book about the dogma of blood, [Abu Abdallah al-] Muhajir posits that any country deferring to 

the rule of positive law is a land of infidelity that Muslims are obligated to leave. He also wrote that there 

is absolute consensus on the unconditional bloodshed 

of an infidel unless he or she is under the protection 

of circumstances stipulated by Shariah. He adds that 

siding with apostates against Muslims is the greatest 

infidelity of all, and that Islam does not differentiate 

between military and civilians. He wrote that ‘the brutality of beheading is intended, even delightful to God 

and His Prophet.’79

A document posted anonymously online in 2012, 

supposing it is accurate, offers far greater detail on 

Abu Abdallah al-Muhajir’s pivotal role in Afghanistan, and also his unique influences on al-Zarqawi’s 

doctrine, than any others of which the present author 

is aware. The following claims are made therein. First, 
67

a shorthand summation of Abu Abdallah al-Muhajir’s 

doctrine is made: extremes in takfir, sectarianism, and 

anti-Shi’ism, and with reference to the latter, legalizing the categorical annihilation of the Shia laity; and 

finally, on these takfiri grounds, he opposed both the 

Afghan Taliban’s and Osama bin Laden’s doctrines. 

Second, that other analysts have overestimated Abu 

Muhammad al-Maqdisi’s influence on al-Zarqawi and 

that in fact his mentorship was restricted to a specific 

time of al-Zarqawi’s life, and was only one of several 

potential influences. Third, despite a fairly lackluster 

online presence, Abu Abdallah al-Muhajir’s influence at the camps in Afghanistan was very significant. Fourth, he was an Egyptian who traveled to Afghanistan in the 1980s, received his master’s degree in 

Sharia from the Islamic University of Islamabad, and 

remained in Afghanistan. Fifth, he was a major figure 

whose primary mission was to recruit and indoctrinate 

those takfiri factions, mostly Arabs from the Maghreb, 

to return home to overthrow their respective regimes. 

Sixth, within this capacity, he held court in Khalden 

camp in Khost, Afghanistan, becoming its senior Sharia official (mas’ul shara’i), thus overseeing Sharia matters, and theological sessions dealing with governance 

and creed. He further institutionalized his takfirism

through the creation of an Institute for Faith Brigades 

(ma’had kata’ib al iman). This Institute was an annex to 

Khalden camp, and consisted of a dormitory, lecture 

hall, and a small room for Abu Abdallah al-Muhajir’s 

workspace and library. It was there that he delivered 

a series of seven lectures, whose primary focus was to 

provide the Sharia foundations of takfirist operations 

and create groups of various nationalities to fight 

their respective “apostate” governments. In sum, an 

anonymous blog entry concludes that Abu Abdallah 
68

al-Muhajir essentially represented the takfiri faction in 

Afghanistan, and embodied a hardline, doctrinaire, 

and extremely inflexible takfiri line, one that led him 

to accuse bin Laden of deviance; and to actually takfir

the Taliban, owing to their willingness to permit traditional prohibited intercessory practices among the 

populace.80

ABU MUSA’B AL-ZARQAWI’S EMBRACE OF 

ABU ABDALLAH AL-MUHAJIR’S EXTREMISM 

IN TAKFIR 

The anonymous blog entry provides essential 

insight into al-Zarqawi’s transformation from one 

who, though a Salafi-Jihadi committed to overthrowing “apostate” regimes, did not engage in actions for 

which he would later be widely condemned throughout his own Salafi-Jihadi community. 

[H]e [Abu Abdallah al-Muhajir] passed on his doctrinal legs in Herat [al-Zarqawi’s own training camp] 

to al Zarqawi and his Levantine group [Jund al-Sham; 

Soldiers of the Levant]. It is here worthwhile remembering that before getting along [i.e., agreeing] with 

[Abu Abdallah] al-Muhajir, al Zarqawi had always 

been against suicide operations. That was his position 

both during his first stay in Afghanistan and when he 

went back to Jordan. Given how later al Qa’ida in Iraq 

heavily reflected this method, it is safe to say that this 

encounter has been a major step in his radicalization 

trajectory. Al Zarqawi explained that he changed his 

mind after having ‘discussed the matter of martyrdom’ 

and listened to several tapes of the Shaykh (he also 

said that he read what he deemed ‘an excellent paper’ 

by Abu Abdallah al-Muhajir on the issue). He further 

remembered that ‘Allah has expanded my breast to accept his position on martyrdom operations. Not only 
69

did I see that they (martyrdom operations) are permitted but I was convinced that they were desirable. I 

proceeded then to arrange for Sheikh [Abu Abdallah] 

Al-Muhajir to give a 10-days [sic] work shop in Hirat 

[sic] Camp to explain the legality of these operations 

to the brothers there—this had a very positive impact 

on the brothers.’ According to a takfiri militant, the 

suicide operations issue was one of the various topics 

which have been dealt with during the Institute heyday, during a course on jihad.81

The anonymous blog entry further reveals that 

Abu Abdallah al-Muhajir’s Pioneers of Spreading the 

Sunnah and the Landmarks of the Victorious Sect, and The 

Jurisprudence of Jihad, were the works most extensively 

taught in the camps. In addition, it was Abu Abdallah 

al-Muhajir who provided to al-Zarqawi the justifications he would use in his refutations of al-Maqdisi’s 

refusals to legitimate the blood, honor, and wealth of 

the Shia in jihad. Finally, the anonymous blog entry 

reports that al-Zarqawi reportedly said, according to a 

senior Tanzim Qa’idat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn figure 

(the late Abu Azzam al-Iraqi): 

I was not influenced by anyone I met among the seekers of knowledge in my whole life like (as I was by) 

Shaykh Abu Anas al-Shami (may Allah accept him) 

and Shaykh Abu Abdallah al-Muhajir (may Allah protect him).82

Nibras Kazimi also offers critical insight into alZarqawi’s embrace of Abu Abdallah al-Muhajir’s 

extremeness in takfir.

83 Kazimi here reproduces an excerpt from a speech in which al-Zarqawi upbraids his 

former mentor al-Maqdisi, and in so doing, identifies 

Abu Abdallah al-Muhajir’s doctrinal significance for 

the takfir of all Shia. Al-Zarqawi asserts to al-Maqdisi: 
70

He who knows their [the Shia] situation in Iraq would 

surely realize that they are no longer laypeople in the sense 

you [al-Maqdisi] put, for they have become soldiers for 

the unbeliever occupiers, and the eyes that watch the true 

mujahedeen, and would Ja’afari and Hakim and other 

reprobates have come into power had it not been for the 

votes of these laypeople?! And it is unjust to cite a fatwa 

from Ibn Taymiyyeh’s era and have it apply to the reprobates today without judging the differences between the 

two eras, and then there are scholars who have spoken 

of lay Shias as unbelievers like Sheikh Hmoud Al-‘Aqla’ 

may he rest in peace, and Sheikh Suleiman Al-‘Alwan 

and Sheikh Ali Al-Khudhair (may God set them free) and 

Sheikh Abu Abdallah Al-Muhajir and Sheikh Al-Rashoud 

may he rest in peace, and others [emphasis added].84

Despite al-Zarqawi’s penchant for extremism, 

AQO ultimately decided that its dearth of Levantine 

connections and al-Zarqawi’s success as an inspirational leader warranted the expenditure of “$5,000 

or so in ‘seed money’” to establish his own training 

camp outside the western Afghan city of Herat, near 

the Iranian border. Then-Qa’idat al-Jihad chief of security Saif al-Adl—a former Egyptian Army colonel who 

had trained in special operations—perceived merit in 

al-Zarqawi’s focus on “apostate” Arab regimes, and 

was designated the middleman.85

His newly named group, Jund al-Sham (Soldiers of 

the Levant), starting with a few dozen recruits from 

Jordan, Syria, Palestine, and Lebanon would eventually grow to hundreds, and then to the low thousands.86

Soon Jund al-Sham, under the influence of another key 

Salafi-Jihadi religious influence and his chief spiritual 

advisor, Abu Anas al-Shami (killed September 17, 

2004), would take on its new name Jama’at al-Tawhid 

wal-Jihad (Group for Monotheism and Jihad), one it 
71

would only abandon upon finally making bay’ah to 

Osama bin Laden 5 years later, on October 17, 2004. 

Al-Zarqawi’s Jama’at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad operated 

on two distinct fronts. One privileged the overthrow of 

the Jordanian monarchy and focused on terrorist operations in the Levant.87 This included the attempted 

1999 Millennium bombing, 2002 assassination of the 

U.S. Diplomat Lawrence Foley, a disrupted massive 

bombing plot in 2004 targeting the headquarters of the 

Jordanian intelligence services, and the November 9, 

2005, hotel bombing in Amman, Jordan.88

The second front is the one that would soon open 

up in Iraq. The American attack on the Afghan Taliban 

and AQO following 9/11 led to al-Zarqawi’s departure, first into Iran along with many AQO senior level 

operatives, and soon thereafter into a region a few 

miles from the Iranian border in northern Kurdistan, 

then controlled by a virtual mini-statelet run by the 

ultra-conservative Salafi-Wahhabi Sunni Kurdish organization, Ansar al-Islam. It was from this camp that 

al-Zarqawi departed in the run-up to the U.S. invasion—something becoming increasingly imminent—

following 9/11 and the disastrously inaccurate argument linking weapons of mass destruction (flawed 

premise no. 1), and an al-Qaeda terrorist presence 

(flawed premise no. 2), with a rogue regime (correct 

premise no. 3). Al-Zarqawi began carefully preparing 

for a future assault by building networks, establishing 

safe houses, and storing weapons and munitions. 

The American invasion, occupation, and failed 

stabilization of Iraq, commencing in March 2003, provided the context in which al-Zarqawi’s ultra-conservative Salafi-Wahhabi Jihadist Jama’at al-Tawhid walJihad would soon introduce the world to a particularly 

brutal and savage type of jihad, one that owing to the 
72

utter dominance of AQO and wildly inaccurate official 

claims that directly linked 9/11 and bin Laden to Saddam Hussein, and also to al-Zarqawi, failed to do justice to the phenomenon that in fact existed. What was 

occurring in Iraq under al-Zarqawi was not Qa’idat 

al-Jihad 2.0, or Qa’idat al-Jihad’s “Second Generation.” 

It was not Qa’idat al-Jihad at all. In an important sense, 

it was everything Qa’idat al-Jihad was not. This was 

al-Zarqawi’s ultra-sectarian Salafi-Wahhabi Jihadi 

Jama’at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad launching its own war, in 

its own name, for its own goals. It is the very type of 

Islam silenced or expelled from Qa’idat al-Jihad’s fold, 

owing to its penchant for intra-Sunni division, extremism, and takfiri nature.

ZARQAWISM UNVEILED AS DOCTRINE AND 

STRATEGY: AL-ZARQAWI’S NEGOTIATION 

AND BAY’AH TO OSAMA BIN LADEN

Al-Zarqawi’s Zarqawism is on full display in its 

earliest documents, particularly those involved in 

the negotiations that unfolded over the course of 10 

months as al-Zarqawi considered Qa’idat al-Jihad’s

offer to become an official AQO affiliate.89

The January 2004 Letter to Osama bin Laden. 

[T]he only solution is for us to strike the religious, 

military, and other cadres among the Shi`a with blow 

after blow until they bend to the Sunnis. Someone may 

say that, in this matter, we are being hasty and rash 

and leading the [Islamic] nation into a battle for which 

it is not ready, [a battle] that will be revolting and in 

which blood will be spilled. This is exactly what we 

want, since right and wrong no longer have any place 

in our current situation. The Shi`a have destroyed all 

those balances. God’s religion is more precious than 
73

lives and souls. When the overwhelming [Sunni] majority stands in the ranks of truth, there has to be sacrifice for this religion. Let blood be spilled, and we will 

soothe and speed those who are good to their paradise. [As for] those who, unlike them, are evil, we will 

be delivered from them, since, by God, God’s religion 

is more precious than anything and has priority over 

lives, wealth, and children.90

This letter from al-Zarqawi to al-Qaeda’s most 

senior leaders, Osama bin Laden and Ayman alZawahiri, discloses his theory of victory, including 

discussion of key target audiences and groups, and 

valuable insight into potentially fatal strategic challenges. It also offers a window into the mind of a 

fanatically self-righteous killer. Al-Zarqawi reveals 

himself as “Sheikh of the slaughterers,” whose conscience is clear, owing to the satanization of various 

“others” dehumanized beyond the pale of empathy or 

sympathy. 

In this letter, bin Laden and al-Zawahiri are presented with an offer: either to endorse al-Zarqawi’s 

doctrine and strategy, and thereby earn al-Zarqawi’s 

oath of fealty (bay’ah), or to stand aside offering their 

“brotherly” advice and support. Al-Qaeda Emir bin 

Laden and second-in-command al-Zawahiri are referred to as “gracious brothers, . . . the leaders, guides, 

and symbolic figures of jihad and battle,” and al-Zarqawi stated that he does not see himself as one that is 

“fit to challenge you,” but only to be “the spearhead, 

the enabling vanguard, and the bridge on which the 

[Islamic] nation crosses over to the victory that is 

promised and the tomorrow to which we aspire.”91

Al-Zarqawi, having taken the time to explain his “vision” and “path,” then issued what amounted to be an 

ultimatum.
74

If you agree with us on it, if you adopt it as a program 

and road, and if you are convinced of the idea of fighting the sects of apostasy, [then] we will be your readied 

soldiers, working under your banner, complying with 

your orders, and indeed swearing fealty to you publicly and in the news media . . . If things appear otherwise to 

you, [then] we are brothers, and the disagreement will 

not spoil [our] friendship. [This is] a cause [in which] 

we are cooperating for the good and supporting jihad. 

Awaiting your response . . . [emphasis added].92

Zarqawi’s primary political objective is sectarian: 

to empower Sunni Islam and violently attack, suppress, and uproot Shia Islam. While anti-Shi’ism is a 

long-standing orthodox Sunnite policy, one enhanced 

since the 1979 Iranian Khomeinist revolutionary Shia 

revival and self-conscious Salafist and Wahhabi-Salafi 

Sunni-led opposition to this revival,93 Al-Zarqawi’s 

anti-Shi’ism is fanatical, obsessive, and characterized 

by satanization/demonization.94 The language he 

uses to describe the Shia is identical to that used in 

precursors to mass atrocities committed by a variety 

of violent hate-based movements,95 and represents the 

furthest extremes of dehumanization required to morally disengage and justify wholesale slaughter. Consider for example, the terms used to characterize, in 

toto, the Shia of Iraq and the Levant:

[T]he Shi`a, have declared a secret war against the 

people of Islam. They are the proximate, dangerous 

enemy of the Sunnis, even if the Americans are also 

an archenemy. The danger from the Shi`a, however, is 

greater and their damage is worse and more destructive to the [Islamic] nation than the Americans, on 

whom you find a quasi-consensus about killing them 

as an assailing enemy.
75

[They are] the insurmountable obstacle, the lurking 

snake, the crafty and malicious scorpion, the spying 

enemy, and the penetrating venom.

[They are] a crafty enemy who wears the garb of a 

friend, manifests agreement, and calls for comradeship, but harbors ill will.

Shi`ism is the looming danger and the true challenge. 

They are the enemy. Beware of them. Fight them. By 

God, they lie.

These [have been] a sect of treachery and betrayal 

throughout history and throughout the ages. It is a 

creed that aims to combat the Sunnis.

They are infiltrating like snakes to reign over the army 

and police apparatus, which is the strike force and iron 

fist in our Third World, and to take complete control 

over the economy like their tutors the Jews.

The Qur’an has told us that the machinations of the 

hypocrites, the deceit of the fifth column, and the cunning of those of our fellow countrymen whose tongues 

speak honeyed words but whose hearts are those of 

devils in the bodies of men-these are where the disease 

lies, these are the secret of our distress, these are the 

rat of the dike. They are the enemy.

[T]hey are a bone in the throats of the mujahidin and 

a dagger in [the backs of] their leading personalities. 

People without exception know that most of the mujahidin who have fallen in war have done so at the hands 

of these people. The wounds are still spreading, and 

they are working the daggers of hatred and cunning 

in them assiduously, Night or day, they do not let up.

I mean that targeting and hitting them in [their] religious, political, and military depth will provoke them 

to show the Sunnis their rabies . . . and bare the teeth of 

the hidden rancor working in their breasts.96
76

The October 17, 2004, Bay’ah by Emir al-Zarqawi 

(Jama’at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad) to Emir Osama bin 

Laden (Qa’idat al-Jihad).97

Al-Zarqawi’s bay’ah to bin Laden does not substantially compromise in any recognizable way the path 

he charts in this letter. First, it indicates that it is bin 

Laden who has “seen the light” and come to accept 

al-Zarqawi’s vision for Iraq. Consider al-Zarqawi’s account of these “past 8 months,” roughly the date separating the previous letter from this one. 

Numerous messages were passed between ‘Abu Musab’ (God protect him) and the al-Qaeda brotherhood 

over the past eight months, establishing a dialogue 

between them. No sooner had the calls been cut off 

than God chose to restore them, and our most generous brothers in al-Qaeda came to understand the strategy of 

the Tawhid wal-Jihad organization in Iraq, the land of the 

two rivers and of the Caliphs, and their hearts warmed 

to its methods and overall mission [emphasis added].98

It is on this basis, then, that al-Zarqawi’s organization Jama’at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad assumes a name 

change—but neither a doctrinal nor a strategic change. 

The new name, Tanzim Qai’dat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn, which would in public commentary almost always be signified by the shorthand, al-Qaeda in Iraq 

or AQI, appeared to indicate a subordinate franchise 

in a superordinate conglomerate. Moreover, in public, al-Zarqawi seemed to have fully subordinated his 

organization and placed its entire machinery at bin 

Laden’s disposal. Al-Zarqawi declared here that: 
77

[A]l-Tawhid wal-Jihad pledges both its leaders and its 

soldiers to the mujahid commander, Sheikh “Osama 

bin Laden” (in word and in deed) and to jihad for the 

sake of God until there is no more discord (Fitnah) and 

all of the religion turns toward God. . . . By God, O 

sheikh of the mujahideen [bin Laden], if you bid us 

plunge into the ocean, we would follow you. If you 

ordered it so, we would obey. If you forbade us something, we would abide by your wishes. For what a fine 

commander you are to the armies of Islam, against the 

inveterate infidels and apostates! . . . Now then, people of Islam, come rally to the flag of the leader of the 

mujahideen, which we raise together, and let us cry 

[‘there is no God but the one God’], as the flag waves, 

raised by our newest heroes. Let us cleanse all Muslim 

lands of every infidel and wicked apostate until Islam 

enters the home of every city-dweller and nomad.99

ZARQAWISM: ITS THREE ESSENTIAL 

ELEMENTS

Zarqawism is defined through its ultra-sectarianism, uncompromising ultra-violence, and focus on the 

immediate creation of an Islamic State as a base for the 

prophesied return of the Caliphate.100 Let us consider 

its three signature elements. 

First, al-Zarqawi declared that the Shia were the 

single greatest threat to the very existence of Ahl-us 

Sunnah. As an existential threat, the language he employed is calculated to inoculate persons from any 

form of empathy or recognition that the Shia are even 

human beings. As stated previously, it is virtually 

identical to that used by persons, groups, and organizations who have committed mass murder, widespread atrocities, and even genocide against a categorical enemy declared the archenemy. For Hitler, for 

example, the singular greatest divide among humans 

was that between “the Aryan” and “the Jew”; the lat-
78

ter was not only subhuman, but also the pernicious, 

treacherous parasite that was the exclusive cause of 

Germany’s then-present humiliation, powerlessness, 

and subversion of its destined rulership of the Earth’s 

natural resources and inhabitants. For al-Zarqawi, the 

great world division was that between the “Ahl-us 

Sunnah,” and the “Shia.” This ultra-sectarian, genocidal “Final Solution” doctrine toward the Shia, as we 

shall see, remains a fundamental ISO premise maintained to this day.101

Second, Zarqawism expressed its will to power in 

a theretofore-unprecedented combination, in global 

jihadist circles of the commission of barbaric ultra-violence, and just as important, its transformation into 

a media-borne grotesque spectacle and weapon of 

terror-inducing coercion. Here, it was not the mass annihilation of the Shia, declared as a fundamental first 

principle of policy, but the carefully-staged, carefullyfilmed, carefully-calculated horror inducing spectacle 

of a hooded executioner standing above a helpless, 

terrified, non-combatant captive, berating and blaming the United States for the horror soon to unfold, 

climaxing as the executioner’s knife saws off this hapless victim’s head and then, in macabre fashion, later 

dropped into place and displayed on its lifeless torso. 

Unpublicized and unprecedented brutality in the 

name of Ahl-us Sunnah was also being committed as 

al-Zarqawi’s campaign pursued the systematic, coldblooded assassination of all opponents from all parties 

deemed apostate, owing to their capacity and willingness to partake in a non-sectarian, non-Salafi-Wahhabi 

Jihadi Sunni political organization.102 These enemies 

were Sunni Muslims, but in al-Zarqawi’s eyes, they 

could be at best hypocrites, but more likely heretics, 

or apostates only worthy of death. 
79

Finally, al-Zarqawi focused on the necessity of immediately establishing the foundations of an Islamic 

State as a necessary precursor for the liberation of 

the entire Levant, and ultimately the future restoration and final triumph of the historic Sunni Caliphate. 

This policy was originally pursued under the banner 

of Jama’at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad. Following al-Zarqawi’s 

bay’ah to bin Laden on October 17, 2004, and under the 

banner of this new AQO “affiliate,” Tanzim Qa’idat alJihad fi Bilad al Rafidayn (The Base of Jihad in the Land 

of the Two Rivers; AQI)—beginning on October 17, 

2004, until his demise June 7, 2006, since al-Zarqawi’s 

organization’s name was almost always translated as 

al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI)—these actions would appear 

to the world to be those sanctioned and perpetrated 

by AQO itself. And despite internal pleas to overtly 

distance AQO from these acts, in principle and owing to their damage to the AQO brand, AQO’s advice 

and counsel to al-Zarqawi occurred only in secret 

correspondence, while officially the AQO continued 

publicly to endorse the overall goal of mercilessly attacking the Iraqi state and preventing the emergence 

of a democratic transition. This urgency to create an 

ultra-sectarian Salafi-Wahhabi state when manifest in 

its severest, most punitive, and least flexible forms, 

spawned Sunni resistance based in tribes and personages attacked and disprivileged in Iraq’s western 

Al-Anbar province. Later assisted by a USG unconventional warfare strategy and organized into a USGassisted full-blown tribal revolt, this was a proximate 

cause of the organization’s future marginalization, 

implosion, short-term defeat, and near-extinction.103

It is important to note that though apocalypticism can be found in al-Zarqawi’s speeches and writings, compared to their elevated status in current ISO 
80

media operations, it appears far less pronounced. For 

example, the quote appearing at the top of the contents page in each issue of the ISO’s flagship online 

English-language magazine Dabiq, is excerpted from a 

single sentence from a single speech, in which al-Zarqawi states: “Behold, the spark has been lit in Iraq and 

its flames will blaze, Allah willing, until they consume 

the Armies of the Cross in Dabiq.”104 Other instances 

have been noted, but they are relatively few.105 It is 

unlikely, then, that the apocalypticism animating the 

present ISO represents continuity from al-Zarqawi’s 

Zarqawism. Its existence, or at the very least its amplification and prominence, likely originates in the 

beliefs of other ISO progenitors. 

In the end, al-Zarqawi failed to foment a SunniShia civil war, prevent democratic participation in 

the new Iraqi government-in-the-making, establish 

abiding alliances with other insurgent groups, or defeat the tribal “Awakening” councils (Sahwat). In a 

despairing, semi-delusional letter written 5 months 

before his June 7, 2006, targeted killing, he speculated 

that possibly a new strategy might be required: fomenting a major war between the United States and 

Iran. He opined that a calculated deception campaign 

could be orchestrated to induce an offensive attack 

by the USG on Iran. Secretively manipulating these 

adversaries into the presumption that Iran possessed 

and was prepared to attack the United States with 

weapons of mass destruction (WMD’s), a war between 

these adversaries would neutralize each in the Iraqi 

theater, thus enabling his organization the possibility 

of regaining its positioning in this theater of war. Resigned to defeat, he would invoke the inevitability of 

fate that awaited those true bearers of the Prophet’s 

Religion, “Al-Ghuraba” (The Stranger): an often-cited 
81

trope based in the Quran that basically states that Islam entered the world as a stranger, and as a stranger, 

it shall depart. This truth shall be and remain in the 

end, unrecognized as Truth.106

Had al-Zarqawi’s death ended his terrorist enterprise, a very different history would have been written. That was not to be. Waiting in the wings were 

others ready and willing to continue Zarqawism as 

doctrine, and as strategy. It is to them we now turn. 

“NEO-ZARQAWISM”: THE BIRTH AND 

DECLARATION OF THE ISLAMIC STATE OF 

IRAQ (DAWLAT AL ‘IRAQ AL-ISLAMIYYAH), 

AND RISE OF THE NEW EMIRS

“Neo-Zarqawism” refers to a phase following 

the killing of al-Zarqawi on June 7, 2006, characterized not only by definite doctrinal continuity, but also 

by the actual declaration and creation of an Islamic 

State, which remained in al-Zarqawi’s lifetime as a yet 

unrealized goal. Let us now consider some of its historical landmarks, and then examine its key doctrinal 

elements. 

History. 

The process concluding in the declaration of the Islamic State of Iraq occurred over a 10-month period in 

2006. To this point, al-Zarqawi’s original Army of the 

Levant had gone through several phases, from Jund alSham, to Jama’at al-Tawhid wa’al Jihad, to AQO-affiliated Tanzim Qa’idat al-Jihad fi Bilad al Rafidayn. Three key 

phases awaited. First, on January 15, 2006, 6 months 

before al-Zarqawi’s death, his Tanzim Qa’idat al-Jihad fi 

Bilad al Rafidayn was folded into a newly formed larger 
82

group of like-minded insurgent factions, the Mujahidin Shura Council (MSC; Majlis Shura al-Mujahidin). 

Al-Zarqawi remained emir of Tanzim Qa’idat al-Jihad 

fi Bilad al Rafidayn, but was also a key member of MSC 

leadership. While putting on an “Iraqi face” and partially heeding AQO’s advice from afar may partially 

explain this emergent organization, for al-Zarqawi it 

was a key milestone on the way to the Islamic State.

In an April 21, 2006, video posted to the Internet, 

he states: 

[W]e bring good tidings to the nation: The establishment 

of the Shura Council of Mujahideen in Iraq, which, Allah 

willing, will be the nucleus for the establishment of an Islamic state in which the word of Allah will reign supreme

. . . Allah willing, this council will serve as an umbrella 

for every loyal mujahid. I have the honor to be one 

of the members of this blessed council which has a 

blessed leadership. At the same time, I am the emir of 

Al-Qaeda in the Land of the Two Rivers, the servant 

of jihad and the mujihadeen, who derives his strength 

from Allah [emphasis added].107

Al-Zarqawi did not live to see the birth of his 

proto-caliphal Islamic State of Iraq. Al-Zarqawi was 

killed June 7, 2006, and during the next 6 months, an 

additional series of milestones were passed. First, a 

new emir, former Egyptian Islamic Jihad member Abu 

Hamza al-Muhajir (b. 1968, aka Abu Ayyub al-Masri), 

was selected 6 days later on June 13, 2006. Second, 4 

months later, for 3 days (October 12, 2006, to October 

15, 2006), an oath-bound group was formed. Their culminating oath, known as the Hilf al-Mutayyabin (“Oath 

of Scented Ones”), spearheaded by the MSC, symbolically re-enacts a ritual originating in the pre-Islamic era 

among several of the clans in the Prophet’s Quraysh 

tribe, later adopted into Islam by the Prophet. The 
83

re-enacted ritual has each party to the pact—in this 

case, five white-robed representatives—assemble and 

dip their hands in a perfumed mix and later, placing 

their hands upon each other, and uttering an oath 

concluding a permanent pact of solidarity on “behalf 

of the oppressed and wronged.”108 The organizations 

committing to this oath reportedly include: the MSC 

itself, consisting of the Tanzim Qa’idat al-Jihad fi Bilad 

al Rafidayn and its seven other allied groups, including among them four jihad groups in Iraq, the Shura 

Council of the Jihad Fighters in Iraq; Jaysh Al-Fatihin

(“The Army of the Conquerors”); Jund Al-Sahaba

(“The Army of the Companions”); and Kataib Ansar 

Al-Tawhid wal-Sunna (“The Monotheism and Sunna 

Brigades”), as well as tribal elements. 

On October 15, 2006, the long-awaited Islamic State 

of Iraq (ISI; Dawlat al ‘Iraq al-Islamiyyah) was officially 

declared. Owing to this pivotal moment in clarifying 

the fundamental distinction between ISO “stateness” 

and AQO “baseness” as paths to the resurrected Sunni 

global caliphate, and also signifying what in retrospect 

was the formal emergence of a formal independence 

from AQO, the complete announcement is reprinted 

below:109

The Mutayibeen Alliance [Hilf al-Mutayibeen] 

Brings You Good News of the Establishment of The 

Islamic State of Iraq [emphasis added].

After the Kurds turned to the State of the North, and 

the Rafidah [Shiites] were granted the federation of the 

South and Central Province, and with aid from the Jews 

in the North and the Saffavids in the South, protected by 

black-minded, black-hearted and black-acting military 

militias, they turned to our brothers from Ahl-us-Sunnah

and went far in spilling their blood and desecrating their 

honor, making them suffer the most ugly forms of killing, torture and explusion, until Ahl-As-Sunnah became 

like the orphans in the banquet of the wicked. It therefore 
84

became necessary for the honorable and the free among 

Ahl-As-Sunnah, the Mujahideen, the working Ulema and 

the dignitaries to offer something to their brothers, their 

sons and families, especially under this façade called the 

State of Maliki, who regretfully carried out acts of [the] 

traitors of [better: ‘from’] Ahl-As-Sunnah, obscuring the 

religion of the people and willingly forfeiting the nation’s rights.

Therefore, your brothers in the Mutayibeen Alliance 

(Hilf al-Mutyibeen) bring you good news of the establishment of the Islamic State of Iraq, in Baghdad, Anbar, Diyala, Kirkuk, Salahadeen, Naynawa [Ninawah] 

and parts of Babel and Waset province [emphasis added], in order to protect our religion and our people so 

that there is no Fitnah (Disbelief; [better: Strife, Disunity]) 

and so that the blood and sacrifices of your Mujahideen

sons are not lost in vain.

And why not since we are blessed with Allah’s 

Power and Assistance that is spread widely, our arms 

reaching farther, and our bases more secure than the 

government of Palestine whose legitimacy was accepted 

by many despite the fact that the occupying Zionist kills 

and captures whoever they will and frees whoever they 

will at any time and place, as is clear from the capture of 

more than 60 of their ministers and statesmen, while the 

American occupier doesn’t even reach one of our soldiers 

without us spilling their blood, and Allah is a witness to 

that many times over.

And we, as we announce the establishment of this 

state [emphasis added], relying on the Sunnah of the 

Prophet . . . when he went from Mecca to Medina and 

established the State of Islam there, despite the fact that 

a coalition of polytheists and the people of the book were 

against him. Since the Jews had their separate areas and 

were at the very high levels [i.e., highly competent and 

organized] of administration, military training and organization and while the hypocrites and the polytheists 

who joined them headed by Ibn Sulul who craved to rule 

over Medina, challenged the young state, the Prophet

 . . . was ready to give a third of Medina’s harvest [to those 

enemies]. Despite their limited numbers and equipment, 

it was necessary so that the state became a refuge to the 
85

Muslims, where their rights were protected against those 

who sought to hurt them. And we, with Allah’s Might 

and Power, [now] have control over many parts (of Iraq) 

that [are] equal to the area of the first Medina state; a 

state where the enemies had no presence and the Mujahideen established the Sharia Hudud (Punishments) at the 

earnest request of Ahl-us-Sunnah themselves.

Let the invader aggressors [USG] and the spiteful 

Rafidah (Shiites) know that the blood of Ahl-As-Sunnah

is dear and valuable and they will not be spilt apparently 

in vain after today. We will face any transgression from 

them with Allah’s Strength, with a harsher and more severe retaliation that has no limits. And let them know 

that the Baghdad of Rasheed, the Land of the Khilafah, 

was built by our ancestors and it will not leave our hands 

except over our dead bodies and skulls, and we will continue to plant in it anew the Flag of Tawhid, the Flag of 

the State.

And we call upon all the Mujahideen, the Scholars of 

Iraq, the Tribal Chiefs, and the masses among Ahl-usSunnah to pledge allegiance [bay’ah] to the Emir of the 

Mu’mineem, [“Leader/Ruler of the Faithful”] the honorable Sheikh Abu Umar al-Baghdadi today, to listen and 

obey his orders whether favorable or not, and to work 

hard to strengthen the pillars of this state; to sacrifice for 

it our lives and what we hold valuable, and we promise 

you that we will be sincere and loyal, dealing with you in 

justice and kindness, pro[viding] you us[e] . . .the Book 

of Allah, and the Sunnah of the Prophet . . . not deviating from it a single inch. We will drive away invaders, 

and establish peace and security, an honorable life, not 

depriving you of your goods of your land, for it is yours, 

and we will extend our hands to our Muslim brothers 

around the world, especially, around our dear country, 

providing them our good[s] and experience, while we 

benefit from what they have that is good and knowledge.

In addition, we call upon all Muslims from Ahlus-Sunnah around the world, to aid us in starting with 

words and ending with blood for you are the source of 

power and it is in you we extend our hope after Allah, so 

do not fail us, and stand with us. Defend us and burn the 

land under the one who wants to harm us.
86

And we extend a special appeal to the learned, the people 

of Knowledge, asking them to fear Allah in us, and be a 

support for us, and incite the people to defend us and 

pray for us.

Honor, power and glory belong to Allah, to his messenger, and to the believers, but the hypocrites know not.

—Spokesman, Ministry of Information, The Islamic 

State of Iraq, 22 Ramadan 1427, October 15, 2006.110

As a formal public declaration, this document 

contains not only elements of deliberate agitational, 

motivational, and incitement propaganda, but also 

key evidence for ISI’s worldview. The latter is our primary interest. Two sets of observations are significant. 

First, two of three key elements deemed core to Zarqawism, and in opposition to AQO, are present—an 

ultra-conservative, Salafi-Wahhabi Jihadism manifest 

in ultra-sectarian, genocidal anti-Shi’ism; and a focus 

on founding without delay an Islamic State. The third 

element—ultra-violence—is implicit in the dehumanizing language used to place the Shia not only beyond 

the pale of humanity, but also in several other categories of intolerable being—hypocrites, traitors, betrayers, back-stabbers—not possessed of the Truth of the 

Islamic State. Also implicit is not only the creation of 

a brand-new obligation for all persons now inhabiting this self-declared Islamic State’s self-claimed geographic boundaries—the predominantly and partially 

Sunni provinces listed above—but also the predicament now placed on the worldwide Ahl-us Sunnah 

to defend a state conceived on the model of Prophet 

Muhammad’s very own, with an analogy drawn to 

Prophet Muhammad’s Medinan phase (c. A.D. 622-

632), with the apparent intention of recreating Prophet Muhammad’s, and the later Sunni Caliphate’s, very 

own state in the heart of the earlier Abbasid empire 
87

(c. 750-1258), Baghdad. It is not just that an Islamic 

State of Iraq has been proclaimed, but a state to which 

all occupants of its territory are either loyal or in rebellion, and an Islamic State, to which Iraq’s and the 

world’s Ahl-us Sunnah should now look to for leadership of the renaissance of global Sunni supremacy. 

The second set of observations concerns the stillunresolved question of whether, and if so how, the 

ISI-AQO relationship was altered by ISI’s formal declaration of statehood. Upon al-Zarqawi’s death, Abu 

Hamza al-Muhajir was selected as emir of Tanzim 

Qa’idat al-Jihad fi Bilad al Rafidayn. Documents indicate that AQO was not involved in this leadership 

choice, expressed deep reservations, and requested 

a detailed response to several questions. AQO states 

that Abu Hamza al-Muhajir pledged bay’ah to AQO, 

though this was kept secret. Abu Hamza al-Muhajir 

denied any formal bay’ah, though openly expressed a 

willingness to make available to AQO the forces at his 

disposal. Once the formal dissolution of AQO’s “affiliate” Tanzim Qa’idat al-Jihad fi Bilad al Rafidayn was 

accomplished, and the ISI was declared, it appears 

that any formal connections between these two entities was dissolved. Al-Zarqawi’s October 17, 2004, 

bay’ah to bin Laden needed to be renewed, as it does 

not transfer as a hereditary artifact. Soon thereafter, 

Abu Hamza al-Muhajir stepped aside and pledged allegiance to the new Emir Abu Omar al-Baghdadi. It 

clearly appears that it is Omar al-Baghdadi (not to be 

confused with the present Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi) and 

not AQO that receives the disposition of Abu Hamza 

al-Muhajir’s forces. As Kazimi states:

[Abu Hamza] Al-Muhajir pledges allegiance to the 

hitherto unheard of ‘Abu Omar al-Baghdadi.’ The 
88

glaring hint that he is indeed Al Qaeda’s [read: ISI’s] 

candidate for the job of caliph is [Abu Hamza] al-Muhajir’s insistence on highlighting [Abu Omar] al-Baghdadi’s Hashemite pedigree—a traditional must-have 

for any would-be caliph . . . [Abu Hamza] Al-Muhajir 

also pledges the allegedly 12,000-strong ‘Army of 

Al Qaeda’ and their 10,000 reservists to fight under 

[Abu Omar] al-Baghdadi’s banner to the death. Oddly 

enough, there is no mention of Osama bin Laden, who 

is not a Hashemite. But probably [Abu Hamza] alMuhajir sees bin Laden as a relic of the past . . . and 

consequently he really doesn’t have a role to play in 

this current phase of the jihad.111

Beyond AQO being left out of the leadership loop, 

which would involve a fundamental breach of the 

terms of any binding bay’ah, we also learn through captured documents that AQO was not consulted in any 

way before the formal declaration of the ISI; and according to Gadahn, relations between the two entities 

had been practically non-existent for several years.112

AQO’s al-Zawahiri claimed that the new Emir Abu 

Omar al-Baghdadi did in fact give bay’ah to AQO, but 

that by mutual agreement and for strategic reasons, 

this would remain unpublicized.113 Let us now examine the sources of continuity and discontinuity in key 

elements of the Zarqawist worldview and doctrine. 

Key Doctrinal/Creedal Elements. 

Senior military commander Abu Hamza al-Muhajir and Emir Abu Omar al-Baghdadi (born, Hamid 

Dawud Mohamed Khalil al-Zawi) were at the helm of 

the ISI from late-2006 until their April 18, 2010, killing in a joint U.S.-Iraqi military attack on their safe 

house, about 6 miles southwest of the Iraqi city of Tikrit. Abu Omar would, during that period, assume the 

caliphal-originated title “Commander of the Faithful” 
89

(Emir al-Mu’minin), and his earlier pseudonym suitably expanded to “Abu Omar al-Husseini al-Qurayshi 

al-Baghdadi,” signifying his Qurayshite and therefore 

caliph-in-waiting genealogical pedigree. 

Known facts about Abu Omar al-Baghdadi’s specific path to the ISI are few. A former Iraqi officer, after 

dismissal from the army he began actively preaching 

in mosques an extreme variant of Salafi-Jihadism. He 

first reportedly joined Tanzim Qa’idat al-Jihad fi Bilad 

al Rafidayn under al-Zarqawi, and later, the MSC and 

ISI.114

Fortunately, a sufficient number of available 

speeches and writings exist, clarifying the essential core beliefs and doctrines of ISI’s first leaders.115

What is essential is the ability to discern ISI’s relation 

to AQO on doctrinal grounds, seeking both common 

ground and that which marks each off as unique species. It is both the sameness and difference within the 

Sunni global jihadist forces that is at issue. This is key 

for doctrine, but as we shall discover later, also for 

strategy.

Fundamentals of an Ultra-Conservative, 

Salafi-Wahhabi, Jihadi, and Anti-Shia Sectarianism. 

An excellent starting-point is provided in Abu 

Omar’s third speech as ISI emir/“Emir al-Muminim”/proto-caliph.116 By March 13, 2007, the date of 

this speech, the combined forces of the USG’s counterinsurgency, counterterrorist, and unconventional 

warfare strategies; and the self-defeating policies of 

the ISI had clearly reversed the ISI’s short-term fortunes. Kazimi asserts that this speech’s content addresses that context, and in it, Abu Omar has determined he must “clearly spell out the doctrine of his 

faction.” Determined to counter what he believed to 
90

be an orchestrated smear campaign by venomous 

enemies, and also the need to reassure potential recruits and donors that ISI’s path to the Caliphate remained viable, he provided a summation of ISI doctrinal essentials. Abu Omar declares:

The people have libeled us with countless and unfounded lies about our doctrine, saying that we have 

cast the accusation of ‘infidels’ against lay Muslims, 

and that we legitimize [the shedding of] their blood 

and [the looting of] their money, and that we force 

the people to enter into our State by the sword, and as 

such, here are a few of our tenets to answer those lies 

so that the liar would have no more excuse [to continue lying] and so that bewilderment is lifted from he 

who loves us.117

Of the 19 doctrinal elements soon to be listed, according to Kazimi only two are “notable innovations,” 

namely: 

judging that Jews and Christians who live among 

Muslims are no longer protected as Dhimmis [see #12 

below], and that the Sunnis who participated in the 

political process, specifically Tariq al-Hashemi’s [Sunni] Islamic Party, are apostates and infidels, who are 

marked for death [#7 below].118

We have taken the liberty of providing subheadings, 

rearranging, and more succinctly stating these 19 

doctrinal points in order to facilitate a comparison of 

ISI and AQO. The original numbering is retained in 

square brackets. If we accept Abu Omar’s assertions 

at face value, 9 points of convergence and 10 points 

of divergence seem to exist. It is critical to remember, 

however, that AQO should not be understood as a 

compulsory ultra-conservative Wahhabi-Salafi Jihadi 

ultra-sectarian organization, though in principle all 
91

who accepted its overall doctrine and modus operandi, no matter how conservative, were welcomed. AQO 

provides a large tent and seeks maximal force to attack the original Kufr. The very opposite is illustrated 

below, particularly in the 10 or so points of clearest 

divergence. 

CREEDAL/DOCTRINAL/POLICY COMPARISION 

OF ISO AND AQO

Most Likely Points of Divergence from AQO—

Extremism in the Application of Takfir. 

Extreme Salafi-Wahhabi Anti-Shia Eliminationism/

Magic-Sorcery Eliminationism.

[1] Annihilate all manifestations of shirk (idolatry), including statues and raised graves; 

[2] All Shia are idolatrous, apostates, inhibit 

Sunni rites, and must be eliminated;

[3] Execute sorcerers and magicians.

Extreme Salafi-Wahhabism Jihadism Applied to 

Fight Against Nearest Enemies.

[8] Any support of any type, including medicine 

and food [provided by contractors], to American occupiers is unbelief and apostasy;

 [10] The unbelief of all rulers and armies in all the 

lands of Islam require that they first be fought, 

and not the Crusader; unbelief does not apply to all inhabitants of the lands ruled by the 

Taghut: 

We see that the lands where the laws of the infidel 

are prevalent over the laws of Islam as lands of 
92

unbelief and this does not necessitate counting a 

resident of this land an infidel, but since the laws 

of the tyrant prevail over the laws of Islam in all 

the lands of Islam, then we see the apostasy and 

heresy of all the rulers of these lands [as well as] 

their armies, and fighting them is more pressing 

than fighting the crusading occupier [emphasis 

in original]. Thus we want to call to attention that 

we will fight any armies invading the State of Islam in Iraq whether they be under any Arab or 

Islamic name, and we advise and warn them that 

this army should not be the scapegoat for the occupier, as is being suggested to end the crisis of 

the crusading occupier in Iraq.119

Extreme Salafi-Wahhabism Applied to “People of the 

Book” (Ahl al-Kitab).

[12] People of the Book must renew their dhimmi 

contracts owing to treacherous violations they 

have committed:

We find that the sects of the people of the book 

[Jews, Christians] and other from the Sabians 

and so in the State of Islam today are people of 

war who qualify for no protection, for they have 

transgressed against whatever they agreed to in 

many countless ways, and if they want peace and 

security then they must start a new era with the 

State of Islam according to [the Caliph] Omar’s 

stipulations that they have annulled.120

Islamic State of Iraq is Exclusive Leader of Ahl-us 

Sunnah and the Mujahidin of Iraq.

[13] All jihadis from other groups that do not 

subordinate to the ISI are neither infidels nor 

heretics, but they are rebels (bughat) and must 

unite behind the ISI banner; 
93

[14] All agreements between the occupier and other groups other than the Islamic State are null 

and void;

[15] Defend “active and truthful ulama,” and oppose all who oppose us. 

Extreme Salafi-Wahhabi Sexual Conservativism.

 [19] Mandatory veiling of female face, and censoring of media to prevent female public displays 

or any activities that violate strict sex segregation and mate-guarding. 

Most Likely Points of Convergence with AQO. 

Basic Privileging of the “Ahl-us-Sunnah” in Jihad.

[4] Do not hereticize/takfir Sunnis who pray, believe, and observe Sunni rites; Sunni sinners 

are not heretics or apostates, and sins may vary 

in their severity; only the greatest of sins nullify one’s Islam. Judgments of apostasy must 

be established in each individual case, and all 

conditions and factors considered; claim to 

represent the “middle way” between those 

who equate sin with infidelity (the Kharijites), 

and those who are negligent in judging even 

major sins (Murji’ites).121

[6] Necessity of revering and protecting the 

Prophet; 

[9] Jihad to free all Muslim lands from the fall of 

Andalus [Spain] to the liberation of [all] Muslim lands is an individual obligation second 

only to Belief;

[16] Honor predecessors in jihad;
94

[17] Take care of prisoners and martyrs’ families; 

[18] We engage in da’wa; encourage worldly knowledge, as long as does not violate Tawhid.

Takfir of Existing “Apostate” Governments.

[5] Only Allah’s Sharia is valid and Sharia courts 

shall rule.

[7] Every leader of every political party that participates in the democratic process, and every other form of secularism or nationalism, 

is apostate, though this does not apply as a 

general rule to all who enter the process, i.e., 

individual voters:

 We believe that secularism, in all its different banners and varied sects such as nationalism or patriotism or Communism or Ba’athism, is clearly 

faithless and in contradiction to Islam and it takes 

[one] outside the [bounds] of religion. We also see 

the apostasy and heresy of whoever participates 

in the political process like the party of Mutleg 

and Duleimi and Hashemi and others. Because 

this process seeks to replace the law of Allah and 

pave the way for the enemies of Allah such as 

the Crusaders and the rawafidh [Shia] and all the 

apostates to lean upon the necks of the believers. . .

We also see that the program of the Islamic Party 

is one of apostasy and heresy that is no different 

from all the other infidel and apostate programs 

such as the parties of Ja’afari and Allawi. And 

as such, their leaders are apostates and there is 

no difference between a party branch head or an 

official in the government, but we do not see the 

heresy of all its members unless a judicial opinion is reached [in individual cases].122
95

[11] All army, police, and security forces of these 

states are apostates.

The previous contrast suffices to illustrate key 

points of convergence and divergence between Abu 

Omar al-Baghdadi’s ISI and AQO. The convergences belong to their genus—global Sunni jihadism in 

defense of Ahl-us Sunnah—and are most evident in 

those doctrines subsumed under “Basic Privileging 

of the Ahl-us-Sunnah in Jihad.” Next, we find a basic 

convergence arising in Salafi-Wahhabi Jihadism for 

pronouncing “Takfir on Existing ‘Apostate’ Governments.” However, AQO would be more discriminant 

and determine whether those supporting the state 

were in positions of power or weakness, plenty or necessity, cooperating or coerced, and whether neutrality 

was also an option. Yet serious doctrinal divergences 

mark each organization off as a competitor rather than 

complementary global jihadist species. 

AQO’s focus on a “Crusader-Zionist” enemy is 

conspicuous by its complete neglect, or its repudiation 

and reversal (see, number 10 above). For Abu Omar 

al-Baghdadi and the ISI, it is all about the internal purification of Nearest and Near Enemies that threaten 

the self-understanding of salvation provided in the 

narrowest passages of an ultra-conservative SalafiWahhabi ultra-sectarianism. Internal enemies are targeted ferociously, Sunnis who accede to the prescribed 

orthodoxy receive a warm and inviting welcome, and 

the Far Enemy that stays far away will be spared for 

now, as a relentless war is waged against their supposed idolatrous lackeys. The pact with Jews and 

Christians, and many other religious minorities who 

adhere to a variant of monotheist worship, is considered abrogated and must therefore be renegotiated. 
96

For AQO, the execution of magicians and sorcerers, 

blowing up of Shia graves and shrines, and the condemnation of all Shia, leaders and led, scholars and 

lay, is barred by the authority of a still-valid ruling 

by medieval jurist Ibn Taymiyyah, and in more proximate range, the very influential Sunni Salafi-Wahhabi 

Jihadi Shaykh Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi.

Yet, the species of Sunni global jihadist exemplified in Abu Omar al-Baghdadi has placed these very 

Shia laity, whose blood is forbidden, at the very top of 

its hit list of Ahl-us Sunnah’s chief idolatrous enemies, 

and therefore of Allah’s chief enemies. Finally, the new 

ISI demand that all existing Mujahidin in Iraq must 

be subordinate, or be declared rebels, contrasts with 

AQO’s vision of political authority as a more distant 

aspirational objective, and supposes a broader process 

of affirmation and consultation. For ISI, however, the 

debate has ended, the Emir is chosen, the Jihad on the 

model of the Prophet’s Sunnah is in process, and all 

not ready to commit to this State, and this leadership, 

are forewarned that they stand as rebels and must repent, or will be fought into submission or death.

APOCALYPTICISM AND MAHDISM IN ABU 

HAMZA AL-MUHAJIR AND ABU OMAR 

AL-BAGHDADI

The previous speech provides an excellent means 

for drawing key contrasts between ISI and AQO. Absent from that list of 19 elements, however, was mention of a critical doctrinal belief maintained by both 

Abu Hamza al-Muhajir and Abu Omar al-Baghdadi: 

belief in an End Times apocalypticism, and also in the 

imminent appearance of a Redeemer Messianic figure, 

the Mahdi. An element appearing only occasionally in 
97

Zarqawism, it is manifest here to a far greater degree.123

For example, William McCants reports that Abu 

Hamza al-Muhajir speedily dissolved Tanzim Qa’idat 

al-Jihad fi Bilad al Rafidayn and the MSC and “rushed to 

establish the State because he believed the Mahdi, the 

Muslim savior, would come within a year.”124 Further, 

both Abu Hamza al-Muhajir and Abu Omar al-Baghdadi maintained beliefs in the imminence of the End 

Times, leading them to privilege the Iraqi locus for the 

re-emergence of the historic Baghdad-based Abbasid 

Caliphate, and the northern Syrian town of Dabiq—

earlier mentioned by al-Zarqawi—as the prophesized 

theater for End Times battles involving the anti-Christ 

and eventually the Mahdi’s final return.125 McCants 

further notes that despite continuity in beliefs in the 

End Times and apocalyptic worldviews, the Mahdist 

focus of these earliest progenitors is later replaced by 

the ISO’s emphasis on the great battles, signs, and 

events prophesied before that culminating event.126

THE HISTORY, DOCTRINES, AND WORLDVIEW 

OF ABU BAKR AL-BAGHDADI’S “CALIPHATE”: 

MAY 2010-PRESENT 

On April 18, 2010, Abu Hamza al-Muhajir and ISI 

Emir and proto-Caliph Emir al-Muminin ‘Umar alHusseini al-Qurayshi al-Baghdadi, lie dead. A long 

manhunt had finally culminated in a joint Iraq-U.S. 

operation in the Tharthar area near Tikrit in Salahuddin province. Subsequently, the USG and its Iraqi allies exploited intelligence and captured documents 

to quickly decimate 34 of 42 known high value ISI 

targets.127 Despite profound doctrinal and strategic 

differences between AQO and ISI, then deputy-Emir 

Ayman al-Zawahiri would issue a public eulogy 
98

praising these leaders’ efforts in jihad and against the 

Crusader-Zionist visions for the new Iraq.128

The ISI was not decimated, however. Its “idea” 

was kept alive. Seasoned military intelligence analysts 

have described it as a deliberate, highly organized, 

brutally-executed systematic campaign—from prison 

breaks, to annihilating Iraqi security forces, to taking 

and holding ground.129 Evidence now also confirms 

that during imprisonment at Camp Bucca in Iraq, several persons who would later fill the highest leadership ranks of the organization were busily creating 

strategic blueprints, rebuilding its secret network, 

reconstituting its leadership, and forging new alliances between highly competent Sunni-Salafist former 

Ba’athist military and intelligence officers, and those 

already possessed of the Zarqawist and neo-Zarqawist doctrine and worldview.130 Indeed, this actually 

continues a policy begun under Abu Omar al-Baghdadi who reached out to those officers whose lives 

were likely shattered by the USG’s de-Ba`athification 

policies. He states in his inaugural address from 

December 22, 2006:

Initially, we call upon officers of the former Iraqi Army 

and that is from the rank of lieutenant to major to join 

the army of the Islamic State on condition that the applicant must know, at a minimum, three sections of 

the Holy Koran by rote and must pass an ideological 

examination by a clerical commission, that exists in every region, to make sure that he is not beholden to the 

idolatry of the Ba’ath and its tyrant [Saddam]. And we 

will, Allah willing, provide him with transportation, 

housing and the appropriate salary that guarantees an 

honorable life for him as is provided to the mujaheddin who fight under the banner of the Islamic State of 

Iraq. 131
99

Any effort to accurately characterize this period 

must presume humility, and in former Secretary of 

Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s coinage, admit to varying 

degrees of knowledge from known knowns, some of 

which shall be discussed shortly; known unknowns, 

many to which we shall refer; unknown knowns, 

which the present author will humbly assume afflicts 

both his and others’ present accounts; and finally, unknown unknowns, probably the greatest sum of what 

truly exists. The full story can only be told in retrospect, on the basis of now-classified data, and only 

after the dust finally settles—as hopefully it must—so 

that this particular species of terrorist entity can be 

fully dissected and understood for “its idea” and “its 

strategy.”

Fortunately, enough open source information exists to sketch a reasonably accurate account of some 

features of select key landmarks—organizationally, 

doctrinally, and strategically—of the ISI’s path to the 

self-proclaimed caliphate. We first begin with a very 

brief summation of the ISI’s organizational evolution; then we proceed to describe relevant biographical facts about the ISO’s current self-declared caliph, 

whose full and proper name has unmistakable parallels to his immediate predecessor is Emir al-Muminin 

Abu Bakr al-Hussaini al-Qurayshi al-Baghdadi; and 

we conclude with an analysis of the ISO’s worldview, 

creed, and doctrines.

FROM ISI TO THE CALIPHATE: BRIEF 

ORGANIZATIONAL HISTORY 

The ISO is the latest organizational incarnation 

of the “idea” that originated in al-Zarqawi’s Zarqawism: transitioning into its embodiment as State, and 
100

unequivocally and unambiguously declaring itself as 

the Caliphate of the world’s Sunni Muslims. Let us 

now retrace these steps. 

Zarqawi lived to create and bequeath four distinct 

organizational forms before his death on June 7, 2006. 

During his second Afghan sojourn (c. 1999–2001), 

he founded and was undisputed emir of an organization called Soldiers of the Levant (Jund al-Sham). 

Later changed to Jama’at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad, this latter organization existed until al-Zarqawi’s October 14, 

2004, official bay’ah to Osama bin Laden. A few days 

later, the new organization, Tanzim Qa’idat al-Jihad fi 

Bilad al Rafidayn (The Base of Jihad in the Land of the 

Two Rivers), was declared. Careful examination of 

the 10-month “negotiation” between al-Zarqawi and 

AQO preceding his bay’ah, and the terms of the bay’ah

itself, furnish evidence that this new organization 

retained full-throttle the Zarqawist “idea.” Its shorthand media tag, al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), the failure of 

AQO to openly and publicly denounce and disavow 

this organization, and a more general ignorance about 

how fundamentally distinct these organizations were, 

led to a general misrecognizing of Zarqawism. It was 

viewed by many as merely a more brash, unrelenting, 

inflexible, and violent version of AQO. Except for an 

expert and largely unknown scholarly trickle continuing to note this fact, most would rediscover this difference only in this most recent era (c. 2013-present) 

of a renascent organization whose brutal conquest of 

Sunni lands and re-introduction of unconscionable 

slaughter and advertised genocide as spectacle, has 

caused the world to again take notice. 

Al-Zarqawi’s Tanzim Qa’idat al-Jihad fi Bilad al Rafidayn was later dissolved. This occurred in two stages. 

The first was in January 2006 when it was folded into 

a broader coalition of its own making, the MSC on 
101

whose leadership council al-Zarqawi would serve. 

The next two organizational incarnations followed 

al-Zarqawi’s death. If McCants is correct, the prime 

mover behind the expedited timing for dissolving the 

MSC was Abu Hamza al-Muhajir, and he did so based 

on his belief that the long-prophesied Mahdi would 

imminently return. Whatever the motive for timing, 

however, the logic of the Zarqawist “idea” was to create a separate entity—an actual State of Islam. To this 

end, the Hilf al-Mutayyibin or “Oath of Scented Ones,” 

was concluded on October 12, 2006, and 3 short days 

later, the organizational realization of the Zarqawist idea—the Islamic State of Iraq (Dawlat al-‘Iraq 

al-Islamiyya)—was proclaimed.132

The ISI existed from October 15, 2006, to April 7, 

2013. Upon that latter date, then Emir Abu Bakr alBaghdadi transformed its nomenclature to reflect a 

dramatic expansion in its intended sovereign reign.133

Its new name, Dawla Islamiya fi al-Iraq wa al-Shaam (The 

Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham), signified its newly 

extended self-proclaimed domain in both Iraq and 

al-Sham (i.e., the Levant, or Levantine states of Syria, 

Lebanon, Jordan, and Palestine). The English acronym 

ISIS and ISIL reflect this alternation in referring to either Syria (ISIS) or the Levant (ISIL); ISIL is the more 

accurate term. The word “Daesh” is an acronym fashioned from its fuller Arabic name but is itself not an 

Arabic word, and its use among the opposition and 

USG officials—civilian and military—deliberately intends to counter any associations to legitimate Islamic 

statehood when discussing this terrorist entity.134

Despite AQO’s formal rejection of its April 7, 2013, 

expansion from the ISI to Dawla Islamiya fi al-Iraq wa 

al-Shaam,

135 only further extensions and no reversal 

in scope have occurred. The final extension, and logically its last, is from Emirship of Ahl-us Sunnah in the 
102

“apostate ruled” lands of Iraq and the Levant, to Caliph, sovereign and supreme religio-political rulership 

of the Ahl-us Sunnah throughout the “apostate ruled 

lands” of the Earth. This was formally proclaimed 

June 28, 2014, by formerly incarcerated Camp Bucca 

inmate and now deceased chief spokesman Abu Mohammed al-Adnani. On that day, for those self-proclaiming this event, the Islamic State (al-Dawla al Islamiya) or Islamic Caliphate (al-Khilafa al-Islamiya) was 

born. The final symbolic moment was yet to come: the 

newly installed Caliph Ibrahim’s first speech on July 

2, 2014, a Friday sermon in Ramadan proclaiming the 

Caliphate from the grand mosque of newly conquered 

Mosul, to his worldwide flock, and to the infidels and 

apostates of the Earth.136

SELF-PROCLAIMED EMIR AL-MUMININ ABU 

BAKR AL-HUSSAINI AL-QURAYSHI 

AL-BAGHDADI: A BRIEF HISTORY

“The journey was complete, and Ibrahim Awwad 

Ibrahim Ali al-Badri al-Samarrai [sic]—the local imam, 

academic, US-held prisoner and al-Qaeda officer—had 

become Caliph Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.”137

Contained in the previous quote from Hashem is 

the journey we shall now briefly trace. We are provided his birth name—Ibrahim bin Awwad bin Ibrahim al-Badri al-Samarrai—indicating his kinship to 

the Al-Bu’Badri tribe, and his location, the Sunni Anbar province containing the Iraqi city of Samarra. We 

learn that he was an imam and an academic, and as 

we shall soon learn, extremely devout and devoted to 

pursuing religious scholarship. We will also examine 

his time at Camp Bucca, and its consequences. Finally, 

we learn he was “an al-Qaeda officer”—soon to be 

specified with more detail—and that in the end, this 
103

person is the same who is now the self-proclaimed 

Caliph of the world’s Sunni Muslims. His mission is 

to engage on multiple fronts those various agents of 

infidelity he and his organization perceive as warring 

against and subverting Allah’s chosen instrument 

for a final consummation of world history. For convenience, a few select sub-headings are employed to 

assist in navigating this journey.138

Biography, Temperament, Early Primary Religious 

Influences, and Education. 

Self-proclaimed Caliph Ibrahim was born near the 

city of Samarra in 1971; his name of birth: Ibrahim bin 

Awwad bin Ibrahim al-Badri al-Radawi al-Husseini 

al-Samarrai.139 He was raised in a deeply, or even 

ultra-conservative Sunni (possibly) Salafi religious 

family with some of these to include preachers and 

professors of Arabic language, rhetoric, and logic. 

His father, Sheikh Awwad, is among the elders of the 

Al-Bu’Badri tribe, and his grandfather, Haj Ibrahim, 

passed on at nearly 95 years of age. Ibrahim bin Awwad focused intensely, even in his youth, on religious 

studies. In the mosque where his father taught, he was 

wholly committed to mastering techniques of Quranic 

recitation, and he engaged in a “fastidious devotion 

to master the subtleties of the art.”140 This fastidiousness was accompanied by other temperamental traits, 

for example, a tendency to be withdrawn, taciturn, 

of glowering intensity, quick to admonish, strict, and 

uncompromising, and barely audible in his personal 

interactions.141 

At 18, he moved with his family to Tobji, in northwest Baghdad, where he later was a Sunni mosque 

imam.142 At the mosque, besides the call to prayer 
104

over the mosque loudspeakers, Ibrahim bin Awwad 

taught Quranic recitation to the neighborhood’s children. He also exhibited a deep sexual conservatism. 

His two wives were sequestered from public view as 

they shared a small apartment in a poor neighborhood 

near the mosque, and he openly forbade any public 

mixing of sexes, including dancing at weddings.143

An exception to what otherwise appears to be a 

strict, ultra-conservative Salafi Sunnism was Ibrahim bin Awwad’s passion for soccer (football). As a 

youth and young adult, he was widely regarded as an 

outstanding player and was the star of his mosque’s 

football club. However, he was also known for his 

competitiveness, obsession with scoring goals, and 

for getting extremely upset at losing. Other inmates 

also later noted his soccer expertise during his stint at 

Camp Bucca. 

Ibrahim bin Awwad earned both an M.A. (1999) 

and a Ph.D. (2007) from the College of Islamic Sciences, University of Baghdad. His specialization across 

both was phonetics and recitation of the Quran. He 

produced for his Ph.D. project in Quranic Sciences a 

commentary on a medieval poem on Quran recitation. 

It was defended March 13, 2007, receiving the grade of 

“Very Good.”144

Ibrahim bin Awwad’s Path to Ultra-Conservative 

Salafi-Wahhabi Jihadism: Before the U.S. March 

2003 Overthrow of Iraqi Dictator Saddam Hussein 

and Occupation of Iraq. 

To this point, the “known knowns” of Ibrahim bin 

Awwad’s journey are relatively unambiguous. Documents, interviews, transcripts, and good investigative journalism turn up an archival trail that seems 

reasonably sound. We now enter a zone of greater 
105

uncertainty and attempt to reconstruct the broad lines 

of what may be deemed his behavioral evolution from 

an ultra-conservative Sunni Salafi-Wahhabi, and a life 

characterized by a rigidly-maintained sexual conservatism, intense immersion in religious scholarship, 

a vocational dedication to the mosque, and teaching 

the young Quran recitation, to that of a member and 

eventual leader in armed, violent Salafi-Jihadi organizations. This journey of theological politics, or “theopolitical”145 engagement, is murkier, less defined, and 

by design, enveloped by that secrecy characterizing 

underground organizations. Nevertheless, some important facts have been reported and are useful as a 

starting point for the detailed history yet to be written. 

Ibrahim bin Awwad’s transition began well before 

the March 2003 U.S. decision to overthrow the regime 

of Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein. McCants’ conclusion here seems well in line with other observations 

when he states: 

Although the American invasion fed the fire and enabled it to spread, in fact, his radicalization began 

much earlier, ignited by an unlikely but highly volatile mixture of fundamentalism, Saddam Hussein’s 

secular totalitarianism, and his own need to control 

others.146

McCants dates this to a period after 1999-2000, 3 years 

before the U.S. occupation, as Ibrahim bin Awwad 

“moved rapidly to the right” and went from being an 

ultra-conservative Salafist flirting with a Qutbi wing 

of the Muslim Brotherhood, to “embracing revolutionary jihadist Salafism.”147

One may begin with Ibrahim bin Awwad’s brother 

‘Jomaa. According to reports, ‘Jomaa, unlike Ibrahim 

bin Awwad at the time, was an “extreme Salafist” 
106

well before the U.S. invasion and occupation. It is 

further reported that “[Abu Bakr] Baghdadi was not 

yet part of that circle, [and that it ended up] causing 

many problems between them.”148 ‘Jomaa is now his 

brother’s body guard and one of his closest aids. The 

period McCants describes as a transition (1999-2000) 

is characterized by a very significant shift in Ibrahim 

bin Awwad’s theo-political orientation. It was a Dr. 

Ismail al-Badri who directed him to membership in a 

“Qutbist” or “jihadist Ikhwan” (Brotherhood) tendency. 

However, at that point he was seeking what must be 

considered a violent alternative to that being offered, 

and concluded that action, and not mere talking, was 

required.

Ibrahim bin Awwad’s Path to Ultra-Conservative 

Salafi-Wahhabi Jihadism: After the U.S. March 2003 

Overthrow of Iraqi Dictator Saddam Hussein and 

Occupation of Iraq. 

The U.S. overthrow of the Saddam Hussein regime, and subsequent occupation, inaugurated a 

new phase of Ibraham bin Awwad’s involvement in 

violent insurgent activities. Abu Muhammed al-Mufti 

al-Aali, a major “ideologue” on the Iraqi Salafi-Jihadi 

scene, seems to have been instrumental in Ibrahim bin 

Awwad’s transition into an actual armed insurgent. 

Muhammad al-Mufti al-al-Aali’s Salafi-Jihadi Ahlus 

Sunna wal-Jama’a movement had members based in 

Baghdad and Samarra, and it was only a short period 

afterwards that Ibrahim bin Awwad would co-found 

and become the head of the Sharia committee for a 

new Salafi-Jihadi insurgent organization, Jaysh Ahl alSunnah wa’al-Gama’ah (Army of the Sunni Creed and 

Community), that would establish an active presence 

in Diyala province, Samarra, and Baghdad.149
107

Contrary to several published accounts, Ibrahim 

bin Awwad did not spend 5 years in Camp Bucca; 

he was arrested on January 31, 2004, and released on 

December 6, 2004, just under 1 year.150 His time there 

proved highly consequential, however, for what he 

himself became and the future operational linkages 

he would form, and as a virtual hatchery for elements 

that would, when freed through prison breaks, help 

reconstitute and repopulate in an even more brutal 

fashion the then-decimated ISI leadership cadre.151

Accounts of his Bucca incarceration indicate that he 

led religious prayers and on many occasions Friday 

sermons; asserted himself as an intermediary and 

mediator in various disputes; and continued his soccer stardom; but of greatest consequence, he acquired 

key ingredients essential to his future path. 

It was in Bucca that Ibrahim bin Awwad developed a “Rolodex” of contacts for future operational 

pursuits. There, he also developed a symbiotic relationship with former Ba’athist military and intelligence officers, including: Haji Bakr (birth name: Samir 

Abd Muhammad al-Khlifawi), Abu Mumammad 

al-Suedawi, and Abu Ahmed al-Alwani. They were 

impressed with his extensive religious background, 

especially Quranic expertise, and he was impressed 

with their military knowledge. It was at Bucca that he 

secretly pledged bay’ah to al-Zarqawi, and increasingly absorbed Salafi-Jihadism. Though his sermons were 

noted for their lack of power and charisma, notice was 

taken by others deemed major heavy weights in the 

Salafi-Jihadi movement—for example, Abu Mutaz, 

Abu Abdul Rahman al-Bilawi, and IS spokesman Abu 

Muhammed al-Adnani.152

Ibrahim bin Awwad exited Camp Bucca on December 6, 2004. Immediately assuming the alias “Abu 

Dua,” he would begin a methodical climb beginning 
108

with the lowest rungs established in Camp Bucca to 

eventually occupy the very highest rung of the ISI. It 

is probably apt to conclude—as McCants has—that 

Ibrahim bin Awwad is “a cunning bureaucrat that 

rose through the cutthroat ranks of the Islamic State 

by building alliances among its factions and eliminating his rivals once he got to the top spot.” 153 Data is 

sparse for Abu Dua’s activities after his release, but 

facts are now known about several key developments 

in his organizational relationships. It is known that 

his organization Jaysh Ahl-us Sunnah wa’al Al-Gama’a 

pledged bay’ah and joined the Majlis Shura al-Mujahidin (MSC) 1 week after its January 15, 2006, declaration. Abu Dua, through the influence of an important 

Shaykh Fawzi al-Jobouri, was granted permission by 

Tanzim Qa’idat al-Jihad fi Bilad al Rafidayn’s Minister of 

Information Muharaib Abdul Latif al-Jubouri to travel 

to Syria in order to complete his doctoral studies. This 

permission was granted pending Abu Dua’s willingness to assist in media-related functions if requested. 

Having completed his doctoral work after June 2006, 

Abu Dua traveled back to Syria as a key facilitator for 

foreign fighters entering Iraq. An airstrike killed his 

assistant Abu Ghadiya, and following this near miss 

on his own life, Abu Dua returned to Baghdad where 

his quick ascent began. 

Abu Dua’s former prison mate, Haji Samir, introduced him to Abu Hamza al-Muhajir—second-incommand and military chief of Tanzim Qa’idat al-Jihad 

fi Bilad al Rafidayn. Abu Hamza al-Muhajir’s highly 

favorable impressions led him to introduce Abu Dua 

to the Emir of Tanzim Qa’idat al-Jihad fi Bilad al Rafidayn, Abu Omar al-Baghdadi. Abu Hamza al-Muhajir 

as well as others within the organization were very 

impressed and greatly assisted his vertical ascension, 

particularly on matters related to Sharia, but also in a 
109

senior advisory capacity. Abu Dua was charged with 

such high-level tasks as drafting letters on behalf of 

Emir Abu Omar al-Baghdadi to AQO Emir Osama bin 

Laden; and, the highly selective and secretive task of 

ensuring coordinated communication among leaders 

and the Wilayat (provinces).

Abu Dua first joined the Sharia Committee of the 

MSC, and then became a member of its more restricted 

Majlis Al-Shura (Senior Advisory Council). After the 

October 15, 2006, declaration of Dawlat al-‘Iraq al-Islamiyya (ISI), as supervisor of the ISI Sharia Committee, 

he was given a general supervisory role over all Sharia 

committees operating in the ISI’s provinces (Wilayahs). 

He also became a member of the ISI’s 11-member Majlis Al-Shura. Abu Dua rose further and, it is strongly 

suggested, that he was appointed chief of the Islamic 

State’s powerful three-person Coordination Committee, a position reserved for persons deemed most 

worthy and trusted, whose task involved coordinating between ISI Emir Abu Omar al-Baghdadi and the 

governors of the ISI’s Wilayat (provinces).154

From Abu Dua, to Emir Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi of 

ISI (Dawlat al-‘Iraq al-Islamiyya) and ISIS/ISIL 

(Dawla Islamiya fi al-Iraq wa al-Shaam), to Emir 

al-Muminin Abu Bakr al-Hussaini al-Qurayshi 

al-Baghdadi of The Islamic State (al-Dawla al 

Islamiyya) of the Islamic Caliphate (al-Khilafa 

al-Islamiyya). 

The April 18, 2010, targeted killing of ISI secondin-command Abu Hamza al-Muhajir and the ISI 

Emir and self-declared Emir al-Muminin Abu Umar 

al-Husseini al-Qurayshi al-Baghdadi (Abu Omar 

al-Baghdadi) proved to be a momentous event. Within 

the next 2 years, an organization that had appeared 
110

beaten into dormancy would re-emerge and begin a 

carefully calculated strategy, later taking full advantage of dramatic changes inaugurated by an “Arab 

Spring” and later Syrian civil war, and utterly transforming the Sunni Salafi-Jihadi organizational landscape. The first steps lay, however, in selecting a new 

emir; and owing to the USG eliminating 34 out of 42 

key ISI leadership targets, that began in early January 

2006, replacing these leaders with a new, very distinct 

cadre as well.155

Osama bin Laden’s choice for emir, Haji Iman, was 

not to be. Rather, a heretofore unknown shadowy individual Haji Bakr156—a former colonel, weapons development expert, and military intelligence operative 

in Saddam Hussein’s Air Force—would lobby and 

manipulate the existing Shura to secure a 9-2 vote in 

favor of the 39-year old Abu Dua. The Sharia Council reportedly abstained. The new emir, formerly Abu 

Dua, took on the new alias Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, and 

his chief mission was revitalizing the ISI and reconstituting its leadership. Two scholarly accounts provide 

information on this phase. McCants claims: 

According to insiders, the first order of business [as 

the new senior Military Emir] for the prince of shadows [Haji Bakr] was to purge the Islamic State of leaders he suspected of disloyalty; those who didn’t leave 

their posts willingly were killed. He and his boss [Abu 

Bakr al-Baghdadi] replaced them with their Iraqi allies, many of whom had served as officers in Saddam’s 

military and intelligence services.157

Hasan Haniyeh, in a highly detailed and illuminating analysis of the ISI’s organizational structure, 

adds additional clarity.158 First, though the post-Mosul 

(June 2014) conquest has led to a greater number of 
111

non-native Arab and foreign-born leaders, “Iraqis still 

dominate the highest, most sensitive positions in IS’ 

upper echelons.”159 Second, a profound reorganization and professionalization of the military and security forces was carried out.160 He claims:

Under Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the [ISI] organisation 

[sic] entered a phase of extreme secrecy and paranoia. 

Once he took over, he restructured the organisation 

[sic], putting Salafis and former Iraqi Army officers 

in charge of the military, such as Haji Bakr and Abdul Rahman al-Bilawi, turning the military corps into 

a more professional, cohesive entity . . . [Abu Bakr] 

Baghdadi put Turkmen from Tal Afar into key security positions, most prominently Abu Ali al-Anbari [a 

former Iraqi Major General]; and put Arabs and foreigners in charge of his media machine, led by Abu 

Mohammed al-Adnani, the Syrian spokesman for IS.161

The final organizational metamorphoses occurred 

as described earlier: the August 7, 2013, official declaration of the expansion from the ISI to Dawla Islamiya fi 

al-Iraq wa al-Shaam (ISIS/ISIL; The Islamic State of Iraq 

and al-Sham). On June 28, 2014, based on Abu Bakr 

al-Baghdadi’s appointment as Caliph by only four 

persons—Abu Mohammad al-Adnani, Abu Ibrahim 

al-Masri, Turki al-Binali, and Abu Suleiman al-Utaybi—the declaration of a self-proclaimed Islamic State 

(al-Dawla al Islamiya) or Islamic Caliphate (al-Khilafa 

al-Islamiya) had finally arrived. Claiming descent from 

Prophet Muhammad through the tenth Shia Imam,162

and secretly declaring bay’ah to both Osama bin Laden, 

and later Ayman al-Zawahiri,163 this new entity would 

soon overtly clash with AQO on matters of doctrine 

and strategy. 
112

CURRENT ISO WORLDVIEW, BELIEFS, CREED, 

AND DOCTRINE 

Despite their common genus as Sunni global jihadist terrorist organizations, ISO and AQO profoundly 

differ in doctrine, creed, jurisprudence, and strategy. 

AQO’s has already been laid bare and, in the earlier 

discussion, key contrasts were drawn between the 

“AQO Sunni Jihadist Church” and the “ISO UltraConservative, Salafi-Wahhabi Jihadist Sect.” 

The historical journey we just examined began 

in the birth of al-Zarqawi’s Zarqawism in the latter 

1980s, and continued through neo-Zarqawism and 

and its various metamorphoses, marking the rise of 

the self-proclaimed Islamic Caliphate. ISO doctrine 

has been described, but not yet exclusively focused 

on. In this concluding section, we offer a succinct summary of ISO doctrine as we earlier did for AQO. These 

key doctrinal elements are “DNA-like” in that they 

practically define the precise mutation ISO represents. 

ISO’S DIFFERENTIA SPECIFICA: FOUR 

ESSENTIAL CATEGORICAL DIVERGENCES 

FROM AQO

Four key beliefs account for the greatest source 

of ISO’s divergence from AQO: (1) the imminence 

of the End Times (apocalypticism and eschatology), 

(2) the immediate demand to re-establish the Islamic 

Caliphate, (3) the takfir and policy of extermination of 

all Shia, and (4) an absolute priority of jihad against 

the nearest enemies. These four, considered together, 

constitute the “essential ISO difference” from AQO. 

There is here no overlap with AQO as it is a matter of 

presence or absence, and not one of degree. 
113

THE IMMINENCE OF THE END TIMES 

(APOCALYPTICISM AND ESCHATOLOGY)

ISO believes that humankind is approaching the 

End Times, and as the True Saved Sect, they must 

wage a series of prophesized battles that will soon 

lead to the final and greatest of battles (Al-Malahim). 

There is a voluminous, systematic, and persistent focus within ISO’s publicly available media production 

in support of this belief. These battles are essential 

before the truly culminating events involving the return of Jesus (Isa) to fight the anti-Christ (Dajjal), the 

return of the Redeemer (Mahdi), and the Final Day of 

Judgment (Yawm al-Qiyamah, literally, “Day of Resurrection”), when Allah shall, on the basis of true belief 

and righteous deeds, determine the eternal abode of 

all human souls.164

The quantitative divergence in the attention given 

to this theme by the ISO versus that given by the AQO 

is dramatic. Consider these results arising from a comprehensive content analysis of their respective flagship 

publications.165 The total of articles or lift-out paragraphs/graphics devoted to specifically apocalyptic 

(i.e., writings devoted to revealing the secret meanings of the past, present, and future) and eschatological End Times (i.e., writings concerned with the final 

culmination of all existence and its portents and signs) 

themes appearing in Inspire, Resurgence, and Al-Risala

include the following: Over a period of 5 years—from 

summer 2010 to summer 2015—across 14 separate 

issues of Inspire, a single reference appears in Issue 

13 by Abu Saleh. However, in this single reference to 

the “fitnah of Masih Ad-Dajjal” (Anti-Christ), it is recontextualized as an anti-American diatribe. He asks: 
114

“If you are weak and deceived by the fitnah of America, how will you be safe from the Dajjal?”166 Within 

the new AQIS online magazine, Resurgence, across its 

two issues, a single article appears—by Shaykh Muhammad bin Mahmud al Bahteeti (aka: Abu Dujana 

al Pasha)—referring to the prophesied “End Times” 

battles.167 This is described in stock fashion in a long 

paragraph. Overall, however, the article emphasizes 

the need to privilege Syria for several reasons at this 

moment as a key field of jihad.168 Finally, AQO’s formal Syrian affiliate’s new magazine, Al-Risala, contains 

not a single reference to any apocalyptic themes in its 

first two issues.169 In sum, three flagship AQO-based 

online magazines over the course of 5 years contain 

no more than one actual apocalyptic quote—and that 

along with several other reasons for jihad in Syria—

and one reference to the future Dajjal or anti-Christ. 

Now let us consider a comprehensive content 

analysis of the ISO’s flagship English-language online publication, Dabiq, Issues 1-14, from July 5, 2014, 

to April 14, 2016.170 Apocalyptic and eschatological 

themes are evidenced in the following. First, each issue is sandwiched by apocalypticism on its contents 

page and back cover. The contents page in every issue, except Issue 7, brands the publication with a 

quote from Abu Musab al-Zarqawi: “The spark has 

been lit here in Iraq, and its heat will continue to intensify—by Allah’s permission—until it burns the 

crusader armies in Dabiq.” This quote is excised from 

a September 11, 2004, audiotape issued 2 months before the historic and tactically decisive “second battle 

for Fallujah,” (November-December 2004); the first 

was April 2004—Operation al-Fajr (“The Dawn”) and 

“Operation Phantom Fury”—where he issues the following call:
115

This is a call for help from the depths to the lions in 

Baghdad and Al-Anbar, and to the heroes in Diyala 

and Samarra, and to the tigers in Mosul and the north: 

prepare for battle . . . be alert to what is going on 

around you. . . . You are facing fierce civil strife, but 

then victory shall be yours, Allah willing. . . . Behold, 

the spark has been lit in Iraq and its flames will blaze, 

Allah willing, until they consume the Armies of the 

Cross in Dabiq.171

Second, the back page of 10 out of 14 issues explicitly addresses apocalyptic themes. One quote in particular, a locus classicus for ISO apocalypticism, but by 

no means the only one, is found in one highly-cited 

apocalyptic tradition in particular (No. 6924), found 

in one of the most authoritative collections of ahadith

in Sunni Islam, Sahih-Muslim.

172 It appears on the back 

page of the first issue, and is frequently encountered 

in ISO writings. The full quote is:

Abu Hurayrah [Prophet Muhammad’s companion] 

reported that Allah’s Messenger [Prophet Muhammad] . . . said: “The hour will not be established until 

the Romans land at al-‘A’maq or Dabiq (two places 

near each other in the northern countryside of Halab). 

Then an army from al-Madinah of the best people on 

the earth at that time will leave for them. When they 

line up in ranks, the Romans will say, ‘Leave us and 

those who were taken as prisoners among us so we 

can fight them.’ The Muslims will say, ‘Nay, by Allah, 

we will not abandon our brothers to you.’ [So] they 

will fight them. Then one third of them will flee; Allah 

will never forgive them. One third will be killed; they 

will be the best martyrs with Allah. And one third will 

conquer them; they will never be afflicted with fitnah 

[internal strife]. They will conquer Constantinople. 
116

While they are dividing the war booty, having hung 

their swords on olive trees, Shaytan [Satan] will shout, 

‘The [false; sic] Messiah has followed after your families [who were left behind.; sic] So they will leave [for 

their families; sic], but Shaytan’s claim is false. When 

they arrive to Sham he comes out. Then while they are 

preparing for battle and filing their ranks, the prayer 

is called. So ‘Isa Ibn Maryam [Jesus, son of Mary], will 

descend and lead them. When the enemy of Allah sees 

him, he will melt as salt melts in water. If he were to 

leave him, he would melt until he perished, but he 

[Jesus] kills him with his own hand, and then shows 

them his blood upon his spear.173

A consistent drumbeat of apocalypticism also appears between the contents and final page.174 These establish beyond any reasonable doubt that, at the very 

least, those charged with the production, distribution, 

and publication of this flagship online English language magazine have determined that apocalypticism 

is an essential feature of ISO branding. This profound 

divergence between AQO and ISO, i.e., its virtual 

non-existence for the former versus its centrality as a 

foundational, doctrinal, and core belief for the latter 

is remarkable and highly consequential. Furthermore, 

the ISO or at least some elements in the ISO have 

published an enormous amount of online material beyond Dabiq, focusing on “End Times” prophetic materials celebrating, elaborating upon, and amplifying 

apocalypticism.175

Why is it important to establish whether apocalyptic and eschatological themes are present in Sunni 

global jihadist publications and writings, and why, 

one must assume, genuine beliefs and worldviews? 

First, to confirm, in fact, that a divergence exists between AQO and ISO. However, more important is to 
117

establish the likelihood that a fundamentally different 

conception of historical time is operative for each organization. A highly instructive scholarly literature on 

apocalypticism exists.176 Apocalypticism is by no means 

an invention of Islam, and with respect to the specific 

traditions of greatest relevance to us—those ancient 

Near Eastern civilizations that gave birth to the Abrahamic salvation religions—apocalypticism has its earliest known origins in Zoroastrianism and Judaism, 

and is later developed by Christianity and Islam. 

The greatest practical consequences arising from 

these beliefs are in the realm of human morality and 

practical action. If one believes one is actually and 

undoubtedly living in a time of imminent and catastrophic battles; an active, essential agent in catalyzing these battles; fighting the final enemies of the 

One True God and the destination of one’s soul is 

critically—as in no other time before or after—in the 

balance; that the enemies of the Truth are presenting 

themselves deceptively as Friends of the Truth; that 

within one’s own lifetime events of a scale heretofore 

unimaginable will happen—these thoughts, these beliefs, must have consequences. What they create is an 

“Ethic of the End Times,” rather than an “Ethic for All 

Times.” They affect life choices. Acting as if one will 

not be living tomorrow is radically unlike believing 

that one’s life and circumstances will unfold similarly 

over the course of one’s natural life with no dramatic 

ruptures destined to occur in any near-term at the very 

least. Whether one believes tomorrow is the last day, 

or tomorrow is another day with thousands more to 

follow, is of profound consequence for how one will 

choose to act. It is conceivable then, if this apocalypticism is something other than a bizarre side note with 

a tiny number of proponents within ISO, that some 
118

portion of ISO’s impatience, brutality, and will to absolute power finds explanation here.177 It is now time 

to turn to other themes that may also have dramatic 

consequences for ISO’s ways of thinking, being, and 

acting. 

THE CALIPHATE NOW! 

AQO and ISO also fundamentally differ not on 

whether the Sunni Caliphate should be re-instituted, 

but on how this is to be realized. This is not just a matter of strategy, prudence, and timing, but of fundamental divergences in worldview. AQO’s conception 

of the Caliphate is inspirational, aspirational, and a 

longer-term achievement that presumes several necessary stages of building popular support, transforming states, acquiring the necessary prerequisites for 

sustaining defense, education, welfare, and upholding the essential legal requisites of an Islamic State. 

It is conceived as resting in the Ummah’s ultimate 

consent to its legitimacy, not through unbridled force, 

but through legal means; it is an Islam that belongs to 

the Ummah, but is won and led by its “Mujahid vanguard,” Qa’idat al-Jihad, charged with the long-term 

strategy for its culmination. For AQO, “right makes 

might” when it comes to Ahl-us Sunnah’s ultimate 

dream realized in the restored Caliphate. 

ISO’s “Caliphate Now!” is likely based first and 

foremost on its eschatological worldview. The Caliphate is a necessary milestone that must be attained before the destined End Times battles consummate human history and all shall be judged. Its organizational 

imperative is therefore rooted in the same “Ethic of 

End Times” driving a variety of other—if viewed from 

the standpoint of normal, historical time—extremely 
119

deviant behaviors: in particular, a heightened sense 

of a finalized cosmic duality of Good and Evil, Allah, 

and Shaytan (Satan). In Dabiq, though a few key articles lay the doctrinal foundations of the necessity of 

the Khilafa Now,178 the Caliphate is treated far more 

as a practical fact, i.e., legitimized as delivering security, services, and enforcing the Sharia of a state 

to which it is now time to declare allegiance.179 The 

Caliphate’s fuller eschatological sense can be found 

in a series of “Black Flag” publications specific to the 

Caliphate;180 in self-proclaimed Caliph Ibrahim’s July 

2, 2014, Caliphal inaugural address;181 and in ISO’s 

now-deceased former senior spokesman al-Adnani’s 

Caliphate announcement.182

A second basis for the ISO’s Caliphate declaration 

is its sense of election: that the ISO, and no other, is 

the destined sect—the Victorious Sect—chosen to establish Allah’s Khalifa, thereby accelerating momentum toward End Times. A chief consequence of this 

self-proclaimed status as the Victorious Sect—of this 

arrogance regarding sovereign leadership—was that 

from that moment forward, all existing groups, organizations, and individuals not bound by bay’ah to 

the new sovereign were presented a stark choice: between bay’ah to Caliph Ibrahim, or being regarded as 

a rebel (bughat) at best or apostate (murtadd) at worst. 

This demand that all existing organizations, including Qa’idat al-Jihad’s affiliate Al-Nusrah, dissolve and 

declare bay’ah to their new Caliph Ibrahim was at first 

met with confusion and consternation, but after advice, mediation, and legal remedies were categorically 

or surreptitiously refused by ISO, a state of outright 

rebellion and civil war recommenced. 
120

THE “FINAL SOLUTION” TO THE 

“SHIA PROBLEM” 

There is little novelty in the current ISO’s approach to the Shia. ISO continues the policies of its 

founding father Abu Musab al-Zarqawi vis-à-vis the 

“Shia Question”: the Shia are considered unredeemable apostates, treacherous subverters of Allah’s Ahlus Sunnah, and must be decimated. Throughout ISO 

speeches and publications, the Shia are referred to pejoratively as Rafidah (rejectors, those who reject, those 

who refuse), based on the Shia doctrine that Prophet 

Muhammad’s son-in-law Ali was illegitimately denied 

his right to succeed the Prophet as Khalifa and lead the 

nascent Muslim community, and thus all successors 

after Muhammad except for Ali are denied (rejected). 

Within militant Shi’ism, indeed, there is a systematic 

disparagement and delegitimization of the first three 

successors after Muhammad (Abu Bakr, Umar ibn 

al-Khattab, and Uthman ibn ‘Affan). This also finds 

expression in Shia rituals of cursing those first successors, and all of those who illegitimately usurped the 

Prophet’s own family. Moreover, owing to the depth 

of this schism, Shi’ism and Sunnism (those claiming successorship through the first three successors, 

but also Ali, for them, the fourth legitimate Caliph) 

have developed distinctly different theological, juridical, ritual, and canonical traditions. Disregarding 

Shi’ism’s further splintering—quite numerous—this 

primordial split has distinct parallels in the Christian 

faith to the bitter, bloody battles pitting defenders 

of the True Universal Church (Roman Catholicism) 

against Protestants, who from the point of view of 

Catholic orthodoxy were deemed heretics and apostates to be converted or killed. For Protestants who 
121

consider themselves the “True Universal Church,” it 

is Catholics who are accused of Romanism, Papism, 

and being agents of the Anti-Christ or Satan. We earlier described, when examining Zarqawism and neoZarqawism, the nature of this sectarianism. What is 

key here is to contextualize it within a broader revival 

of Sunni Salafi orthodoxy, the 1979 Iranian revolution, 

and finally, the cataclysmic effects for Sunnis in general and Sunni Salafis in particular of the U.S. decision 

to decapitate the Saddam Hussein regime and thus by 

default, empower their greatest earthly foes, the Shia 

and Iran.

The ISO’s uniqueness, again earlier described, is 

not their demonization of Shi’ism as heresy or their 

doctrine calling for the conversion or killing of their 

leadership. It is ISO’s extension of that charge and the 

actions it sanctions against the Shia laity itself. Every 

Shi’ite is to be killed, regardless of how learned, powerful, or likely to be responsible for systematic policies 

dis-privileging Sunnism that they may be. The reasons 

are two-fold. First, they are accused of an unpardonable idolatry and are therefore guilty of the greatest 

sin a Muslim can commit: shirk, i.e., associating others worthy of worship, with Allah. This is manifest, 

ISO and many militant Sunni Salafis would claim, in 

various rituals of veneration and adoration directed 

toward persons deemed in possession of intercessory 

spiritual powers, and has its most common ritual expression in the visitation of tombs and shrines; therefore, for ISO, there was the necessity of destroying 

them.183 This destruction of Shia tombs, shrines, and 

attack on all forms of ritual associated with intercessory means is not an ISO invention, but rather a SalafiWahhabi trademark, as earlier described. Yet, even 

Ibn Taymiyyah (d. 1328), the esteemed neo-Hanbali 
122

scholar-mujahid and Salafi-Wahhabi exemplar for orthodoxy and orthopraxy, did not takfir the Shia laity. 

Their ignorance, lack of proximate responsibility, and 

their proximity to Allah led to a policy of immunity 

from those punishments required for genuine idolatry 

and shirk. Al-Zarqawi’s rejection of Ibn Taymiyya’s 

fatwa legalizing Shia lay immunity has been continued by the ISO. Recall also Abu Omar al-Baghdadi’s 

clarification, in 19 principles of the ISI’s core creed, 

and the priority placed on the Shia as the first two of 

these. Its more brutal execution lay not in the intent 

but in ISO’s dramatically increased means for realizing their intended “final solution.” 

Despite their common ancestry in Sunnism and 

Salafism, and to a lesser extent Salafi-Wahhabism, 

AQO’s divergence from ISO on the “Shia question” 

is enormous. A comprehensive examination of Inspire,

Resurgence, and Al-Risala turns up merely two articles 

that discuss the “Rafida.” The first is by former founder 

and editor Samir Khan, though even here, he excludes 

a particular Shia offshoot, the Zaydi, from criticism 

altogether.184 The second is in the earlier-mentioned 

single instance of an apocalypticism in the article by 

Shaykh Muhammad bin Mahmud al Bahteeti.185 His 

comment does not takfir the Shia, but he accuses them 

in the context of the Syrian civil war and their support 

of the regime of Bashar Assad, and of revealing their 

“true colors” as hypocrites. He states: “[T]he war in 

Syria has uncovered the true nature of the Rawafid 

[i.e., “Rafidah”] and their deep loathing for Islam 

and the Muslims. The hollow slogans with which the 

Rawafid have tried to deceive the Ummah for so long 

have now lost their efficacy. The veneer they had coated their hypocrisy with has finally worn out.” Hardly 

a call to arms, and certainly a vast distance from the 
123

policy of systematic extermination currently being 

prosecuted by the ISO.186

THE NEAREST ENEMY IS THE UMMAH’S 

TRUEST ENEMY! 

The prioritizing of the “Nearest Enemy” rather 

than the “Far Enemy” is a final point of furthest divergence. This is not strategic but instead a fundamental 

disagreement rooted in creed and ultimate beliefs. 

AQO’s “Far Enemy” focus is derived from its orienting principle: “The Sunni Church of the United 

Ummah and Its Mujahidin versus The Craven Original Kufr and Their Apostate Lackeys Who Oppress 

and Exploit the Muslim World.” For ISO, the world 

is quite different. The original sin is not the original 

Kufr, but the nearest of my former Muslim brothers 

who treacherously left Allah for shirk, and in so doing, split Allah’s true faith and true warriors with 

the ultimate consequence that the original Kufr now 

dominate the Ummah. Internal treason, subversion, 

and treachery must first be exorcised; then, Allah’s 

true army is organized from those remnants who survive these battles; and finally assembled on the fields 

of Dabiq, they fight the final battles of the End Times. 

The ISI’s first proto-caliph, Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, 

clarifies this worldview in a form that only the blind 

could fail to recognize:

And know this well: the malicious rafidah [Shiites] and 

the infidel occupiers will never forget that only yesterday you were their enemies, and they have begun to 

stab you already, so return to us and we will not forget 

that yesterday you were our friends. . . . If you refuse 

to repent before we get a hold of you then, by Allah, 

to kill an apostate is more preferable to me than a hundred 
124

Crusader heads, and you know all about our vigor and 

our reach, and the mantle of the [Shias] and the wood 

of the Crusader occupiers will do you no good [italics 

supplied].187

This speech was delivered in the midst of the ISI’s 

precipitous decline and the fundamental threat now 

posed to its Caliphal ambitions by the “apostate” Sunni 

elements that had “abandoned” the ISI. Three primary 

enemies are identified—“the malicious rafidah,” “the 

infidel occupiers,” and “unrepentant apostate[s].” “If 

you refuse to repent before we get hold of you then, 

by Allah, to kill an apostate is more preferable than 

a hundred Crusader heads” refers to the Sunni “Sahwat” or “Tribal Awakening,” as well as other insurgent Sunni formations that ultimately doomed any 

pretense that the ISI represented the heart and soul of 

Ahl-us Sunnah. Note, takfir has been declared against 

Sunnis who refuse ISI rule. Since ISI is Allah’s chosen 

instrument for the realization of the End Time, they 

are guilty of shirk. Second in priority is “the malicious 

rafidah,” and a distant third, “the infidel occupiers.” 

Abu Omar al-Baghdadi’s ISI, which has alienated the 

Ahl-us Sunnah beyond any possible reconciliation, attempts to persuade these Ahl-us Sunnah that they are 

not your friends or your future—“never forget that 

only yesterday you were their enemies, and they have 

begun [again] to stab you already, so return to us 

and we will not forget that yesterday you were our 

friends.”188

ISO RELATIVE DIVERGENCES FROM AQO

ISO’s less definitive divergences from AQO, 

though highly consequential, are more finely nuanced, require extensive elaboration, and suppose a 

specialized knowledge of Islamic theology and juris-
125

prudence (Fiqh) exceeding that possessed by the present author.189 These debates concern such fundamental 

concepts as faith and its opposite, infidelity (Iman versus Kufr); and based on one’s answer to the questions, 

“What is faith? What is infidelity?” How one determines, in fact, whether one has veered too far from the 

“middle path”—claimed to be Prophet Muhammad’s 

true path—and instead has become either negligent 

and guilty of postponing (irja) essential acts of faith 

and thereby accused of belonging to the negligent 

postponers (Murj’ites); or on the other extreme, judge 

sinning itself as Kufr, and thereby exhibit an extremist 

ultra-radicalism like the early sect of Kharijites (Khawarij).190 Still other debates deal with key theological 

and theopolitical concepts such as: the doctrine of al 

Wala wa’l bara—the notion that a true Muslim must 

openly disavow, disassociate from, and hate idolaters—and on the other hand, exclusively avow, associate with, and love the advocates of monotheism; the 

doctrine of tawhid, or the absolute Oneness of Allah 

as Creator, Lord, and in His Names, and its opposite, 

shirk or idolatry, and what in fact counts as idolatry 

particularly in the modern world; the doctrine of Hakimiyyah, and the notion that a state can only be governed by the “Rulings that Allah Sent Down,” i.e., the 

Sharia, and how that is to be operationalized; and, the 

question of when and how the obligatory prescribed 

criminal punishments (Hudud) of lashing, permanent 

dismemberment, and stoning are to be enforced for 

the crimes of fornication, theft, adultery, and intentional homicide. 

The point of greatest convergence and with which 

we conclude this section, is the genus “global Sunni 

jihadism” to which each of these deviant species subscribe. The definitive quality that marks these orga-
126

nizations off from every other form of Islamic activism is their claim that jihad fi sabil Allah—fighting and 

striving in the path of Allah to Raise Allah’s Word—is 

until the Day of Final Judgment, an immediate and 

unconditional obligation that is at the same time, 

the superlative means of worshipping Allah, expiating one’s sins, and purchasing (through sacrifices of 

blood and treasure) those superlative privileges only 

attained by those killing and being killed on this path 

(Shuhada) (re: Quran 9:111).191
127

CHAPTER 2

TERRORIST MODUS OPERANDI

I. INTRODUCTION

Having systematically examined AQO’s and ISO’s 

core beliefs, worldviews, doctrine, and creed, let us 

now examine the governing dynamics of their terrorist strategies: their terrorist modus operandi. The 

author’s Terrorist Quadrangle Analysis (TQA), a heuristic for modeling the dynamics of terrorist organizations, is employed to facilitate this task. This heuristic 

is first briefly described, and subsequently applied to 

AQO (part one) and ISO (part two). 

TERRORIST QUADRANGLE ANALYSIS (TQA) 

The Terrorist Quadrangle Analysis (TQA) is a tool 

created by the present author for conceptualizing the 

four key intrinsically-related dynamic elements of a 

terrorist organization—(1) religio-political objectives, 

(2) media warfare, (3) terrorist operations (other than 

media), and (4) proximate strategic objectives.192 A 

brief discussion of each element and their interrelation follows (see Figure 1). 
128

Figure 1. The Terrorist Quadrangle: Relations of 

Religio-Political Objectives, Media Operations, 

Terror Operations (Non-Media) and Strategic

 Objectives.

“Religio-Political Objectives” refers to the proximate 

and ultimate “end state” sought by the terrorist entity: 

its declared ideal ultimate objective and those proximate to it. “Media Operations” refers to the deliberate use of all available media to facilitate the achievement of terrorist organizational objectives. “Terrorist 

Operations (Non-Media)” are all actions, operations, 

and campaigns designed and executed for attaining 

proximate and ultimate religio-political objectives. 

“Strategic Objectives” are key proximate end states 

necessary for the full realization of the terrorist entity’s ultimate religio-political objectives. They maintain a direct causal relation to proximate and ultimate 

religio-political objectives. For example, if an ultimate 

religio-political objective were the creation of a state 
129

ruled exclusively by Sharia, a key strategic objective 

would be the successful elimination of a non-Shariabased legal system, and the successful creation of an 

alternative juridical system. 

Terrorism as strategy is motive-independent. It is 

in its essence, reducible to a stick of dynamite, a film 

crew, an immediate target that serves as a sign vehicle, and a broader indirect target audience whose will, 

resolve, and psychological state is deemed essential 

to the realization of the terrorist’s ultimate objectives. 

Though ultimate objectives, means of destruction, media, direct targets, and indirect targets are variables, 

terrorism as strategy remains identical to what it has 

always been: the deliberate use of terrorism directed 

at direct and indirect targets (the way), using media and non-media instruments of power/influence 

(the means), to achieve ends (in this case, religiopolitical ends).193 Let us now examine the terrorist 

modus operandi of AQO and ISO. 

131

II. THE AL-QAEDA ORGANIZATION 

(TANZIM QA’IDAT AL-JIHAD)

Despite the previous chapter’s focus on core 

beliefs, worldviews, creed, and doctrine, we also 

learned about AQO’s basic terrorist modus operandi. 

The AQO doctrine as we observed sought to galvanize and mobilize Sunni Muslims to deploy as part of 

bin Ladenism’s “Sunni Internationale,” to systematically attrite the “Crusader-Zionist” alliance through 

persistent, economically damaging attacks on “Far 

Enemy” targets. Let us now briefly describe the TQA 

of the “classical” AQO “Far Enemy” bin Ladenism 

strategy.194

TQA, I: THE “CLASSICAL” BASE FIRST BIN 

LADENIST “FAR ENEMY” STRATEGY

Proximate and Ultimate Religio-Political 

Objectives. 

AQO’s ongoing transnational terrorist campaign is 

directed at attaining an ultimate religio-political object: Islamic supremacy, global worship of Allah, and 

the reign of an Islamic super-state. This objective is 

to be attained in stages.195 First, the United States and 

its principal allies are to be territorially and militarily 

removed from the Arab Muslim world, thus undermining U.S. military presence, power projection, and 

access to energy reserves. Second, is the overthrowing 

of so-called apostate pro-Western regimes and replacing these with orthodox Sunni Muslim governments, 

which are adherent to strict Islamic legal orthodoxy. 

Third, is uniting Muslim states into a supra-state 
132

caliphate that shall serve as a religio-political base for 

further amassing Muslim power and conducting offensive jihad to confront the remaining world of infidelity (dar al-Kufr). This supra-state caliphal Sovereign 

is envisioned as an alternative international order that 

eschews, denies, and is at war with the present United 

Nations-based system of territorially independent, 

equal, sovereign nation-states. Fourth, mobilized 

within this caliphal block of militant Muslim states, 

a sustained, permanent offensive jihad is to be fought 

until all other forms of worship and polity are overthrown. It is at that point that Allah’s worship will be 

universal throughout the Earth and the reign of justice, 

peace, and Allah’s absolute sovereignty fully realized. 

The Instrumental Role of Media Warfare, Terrorist 

Attacks, and the Strategic Object. 

Media warfare is viewed by AQO as an essential 

dimension of their strategy.196 Media warfare, terrorist attacks, and strategic objectives are conceived by 

AQO as strictly subordinate to AQO’s religio-political 

objectives. Phases one and two of the religio-political 

object are paramount at the present time, i.e., removal 

of the United States and its principal allies territorially 

and militarily from the Arab Muslim world, and overthrowing so-called apostate pro-Western regimes and 

replacing these with Sunni Muslim governments that 

adhere to strict Islamic legal orthodoxy. 

A central task of media warfare during these initial phases is to reinforce an essential Manichaean 

dichotomy between the “Crusader” United States 

of America and the “Defender” AQO. The Crusader 

must be portrayed as the Satanic other: a mortal foe 

of Godly forces mobilized to vanquish evil personi-
133

fied. Designed to galvanize, incite, and morally outrage, this process of “satanization” has, since Harold 

D. Lasswell’s early study,197 been well-documented 

as a key strategic dimension of wartime propaganda. 

This first key strategic media warfare task—mobilize 

animosity/hatred by the Muslim Nation (Ummah) of 

the enemy—is complemented by three other strategic media warfare tasks that correlate with key target 

audiences: securing and preserving the friendship of 

allies; preserving and if possible, securing, the cooperation of neutrals or even arousing neutrals‘ opposition to one’s own enemies; and, demoralizing and 

disintegrating the enemy’s will to persevere.198

The terrorist attacks AQO conceptualized, organized, executed, and endorsed are strictly subordinate 

to the attainment of the proximate religio-political 

object; and, the rationale and subsequent justification 

for these terrorist attacks is provided in AQO media 

warfare. They aim, again, at specific target audiences 

whose function is deemed essential at this stage of 

the campaign. The enemy’s determination, resolve, 

and willingness to pay the price of military power 

projection and support of regional allies must be undermined. Potential AQO allies and neutrals are excluded from these carefully selected, highly symbolic 

terrorist targets and thus, appealed and recruited to 

the AQO cause. Inciting, catalyzing, and galvanizing 

the Ummah is also key. 

Finally, AQO’s key strategic objectives directly 

correlate with its strategic media warfare and terrorist 

attacks. Given this present phase focused on removing the U.S. presence in the Arab Muslim world and 

installing strictly adherent Sunni Muslim states, these 

four objectives are realized if AQO is successfully undermining “Crusader” enemy motivation, means, and 
134

opportunity to remain militarily, economically, and 

politically engaged in the Arab Middle East; expanding AQO’s terrorist enterprise, base of support, and 

unity among potential allies; securing neutrality or 

even cooperation among neutrals; and further galvanizing AQO’s fighting forces and broader base within 

the Muslim Ummah. In Figure 2, we present AQO’s 

five-stage theory of realizing the Khilafa, along with 

the TQA model used to analyze each stage. 
135

Figure 2. From Qa’idat al-Jihad to Khilafah: 

A TQA Analysis of AQO.

However, a calculated USG policy during nearly 

15 years following 9/11 to degrade, disrupt, and ultimately defeat AQO has successfully accomplished 

two of three key strategic objectives: relentlessly attacking AQO’s leadership and network, and success-
136

fully protecting the U.S. homeland from mass casualty 

terrorist attacks. The third objective—countering radicalization and recruitment to AQO—remains a work 

in progress.199 Fortunately, AQO’s marginalization 

from the vast majority of Ahl-us Sunnah, and Sunni rejection of AQO’s terrorist modus operandi, has assisted where less successful counter-radicalization efforts 

have not.200 We shall return in Chapter 3 to examine 

USG efforts along that line of effort. 

It is possible, as suggested in Chapter 1, that AQO 

is now reorienting in the direction of a type of unconventional warfare strategy—embedding, training, and 

acting as force multipliers among an auxiliary training 

to overthrow an existing state, as well as establishing 

essentially political fronts—Ansar al-Sharia organizations (i.e., supporters/helpers of the Sharia)—as was 

noted in relation to its present Syrian affiliate Jabhat 

al-Nusrah li-ahl al-Sham min Mujahidi al-Sham fi Sahat 

al-Jihad (“Protection Front for the People of the Levant 

by the Mujahadin of the Levant in the Battlefields of 

Jihad”; hereafter, Jabhat al-Nusrah), and the broader 

Islamist coalitions within which it operates.201 This is 

actually closer to the original al-Qaeda idea—a mobile 

Islamic foreign legion assisting embattled Brothers 

on various fronts—before it morphed via bin Laden’s 

post-1990s obsession with anti-American mass casualty terrorism.202

“Classical” AQO still requires USG attention. 

However, it is widely acknowledged that AQO’s 

Yemeni-based affiliate AQAP now poses the greatest present threat to the U.S. homeland. This is particularly true of its external operations branch. AQAP 

has practically amended the “classical” AQO model 

of top-down, long-range, high-quality, mass casualty, 

anti-American terrorism to pioneer a very different 
137

terrorist modus operandi centered on an individualized “lone mujahid” model of decentralized direct 

terrorist action. The emergence of homegrown and 

home-based terrorism as a direct result of this “lone 

mujahid” strategy represents a fundamental strategic shift. Let us now examine this most lethal AQO 

affiliate of greatest concern to the West and USG in 

particular. 

TQA, II: THE AQAP “LONE MUJAHID” 

“FAR ENEMY” STRATEGY

AQAP’s “lone mujahid” strategy represents a major development in AQO’s strategic evolution.203 It has 

recently been suggested that because bin Laden often 

questioned AQAP’s strategic acumen and registered 

criticisms of its target selection, that it should not really be characterized as the “real” AQO, at least not 

as bin Laden’s “classical,” “Far Enemy” strategy is 

concerned.204 Futhermore, bin Laden maintained “a 

seeming distrust of AQAP’s competence as a jihadi 

entity, not least its lack of a sound understanding of 

politics.”205 This observation is accurate, but practically irrelevant. For one, it is possible to lodge the 

same criticism of bin Laden whose knowledge of reality, politics included, was based in a profound ignorance, conspiracism, delusion, and hubris, enough 

so that key members of his own inner circle accused 

him of destroying in months what it had taken years, 

even decades, to build. Second, classical bin Ladenism has been hammered into oblivion by a sustained 

U.S. campaign that has attrited its leadership, gutted 

its finances, and overcome initial sanctuary-based 

AQO advantages through a lethal and relentless policy of drone-based targeting206 of high value targets.207
138

Third, AQAP remains a clear and present danger to 

the U.S. homeland, and its “lone mujahid” strategy 

currently poses the single greatest ongoing threat to 

law enforcement, the intelligence community, and all 

who are charged with preventing lone-wolf-style terrorist attacks on American soil. We believe it is highly 

likely that this phase of AQAP’s evolution represents 

not just a strategic evolution but also a strategic dead 

end. One way terrorist groups finally end, Audrey 

Cronin points out, is by reorienting into pure criminality.208 As we will soon see, AQAP’s terrorist modus operandi appears not only to promote this kind of 

conduct, but also to elevate those who engage in this 

truly reprehensible and forbidden (haram) conduct to 

the highest levels of Paradise as Shuhada.

It is highly unlikely that Ahl-us Sunnah will recognize this conduct as anything other than what it actually is: sinful, ghastly, evil, and wrong; and more to 

the point, not the Islam that embodies those ideals and 

religious principles upon which the world’s 1.6 billion 

Muslims—Sunni and Shia—stand. These objections 

will be more fully discussed in our final chapter. For 

now, let us take a brief and telling tour of AQAP’s selfprofessed path to the highest of seven levels of Jannah

(Paradise).

The online magazine Inspire provides the master 

key to AQAP’s terrorist modus operandi. The objective of our earlier tour through each of its fourteen 

issues published between summer 2010 and summer 

2015 (see Chapter 1) was to document certain sources 

of major divergence from ISO. We discovered that 

ISO’s four signature creedal/doctrinal themes most 

divergent from AQO—apocalypticism, ultra-sectarian anti-Shi’ism, Caliphate Now! and Nearest Enemy 

Now!—were virtually non-existent in AQAP’s Inspire. 
139

Doctrinally, a comprehensive analysis reveals that 

AQAP embraces AQO’s “party line” privileging, attacking the “Far Enemy” and, importantly, a longerterm, stage-theory for eventually restoring the rightful 

Caliphate.209 What we seek to document in this second 

tour of Inspire is not doctrine, but its “lone mujahid” 

strategy for attaining its declared proximate and ultimate religio-political objectives. To do so, we will 

again attempt to use the TQA to capture the dynamics 

of a terrorist modus operandi which links religio-political objectives with its media operations, non-media 

terrorist operations, and strategic objectives. 

AQAP Media Operations. 

AQAP’s media operations are single-mindedly 

and unabashedly devoted to promoting the strategy of “lone mujahid” terrorism. First, the works and 

speeches of key strategists, advocates, and theorists 

of individualized jihad, such as Abu Musab al-Suri’s 

Global Islamic Resistance Call210 and Anwar al-Awlaki’s 

Why Did I Choose Al Qaeda?211 extolling individualized jihadi terrorism, are made accessible in serialized 

form. Second, Sharia scholars produce a legal rationale in defense of individualized jihadi terrorism.212

Third, knowledge of terror craft tactics, techniques, 

and procedures is made available through publication of the “Open Source Jihad” section in Inspire.

213

Fourth, major “special operations,” particularly those 

envisioning the “lone mujahid” or lone wolf type terrorist attack are celebrated.214 Fifth, encrypted communication links are routinely advertised that permit 

anonymized, individualized terrorist communication 

links with AQAP.215
140

Finally, the lion’s share of AQAP’s focus, if measured by sheer column inches, is its obsessive advocacy of “martyrdom” (Shuhada). 216 This involves extolling, celebrating, honoring, inspiring, inciting, and 

lionizing martyrdom in general, and individualized 

“lone mujahid,” “martyrdom operations,” and “martyrs” in particular. 

“Jihadism” by its very nature has reduced Islam 

to fighting and dying in the process of killing others. 

As the singular path advanced for the raising of Allah’s Word, empowering individuals to sacrifice all 

that is dear on this Earth, and in this life, is essential. 

Individualized jihadism (the “lone mujahid”) is the 

true “center of gravity” for AQAP’s media operations, 

because it focuses directly on the critical requirement 

and the potential critical vulnerability of this terrorist modus operandi: generating, motivating, and deploying an ample supply of persons willing to kill 

fellow human beings and citizens in the process of 

killing themselves. Such an unnatural, aberrant, truly 

reprehensible, and morally condemnable act requires 

the most careful attention—to emotive manipulation, 

addressing fears and doubts, providing assurances 

for loved ones left behind, sowing doubt about one’s 

manliness and courage, exacerbating alienation and 

identity crises—should Shahada not be pursued to the 

end. 

Non-Media Terrorist Operations and Strategic

Objectives. 

A comprehensive analysis of Inspire’s media operations also discloses the types of non-media terrorist operations pursued, and their relation to strategic objectives. First and foremost are “Far Enemy” 
141

operations designed to attack predominantly economic targets—institutions, infrastructure, energy 

corridors, global shipping, commercial aviation—and 

personalities, including world-renowned entrepreneurs, scholars, intellectuals, and philanthropists. 

Second, is the emergent focus on a type of radically 

individualistic violence comprised of a hybridization 

of ultra-anarchism and gangsterism.217 Possessed of 

the knowledge, motivation, opportunities, and tools, 

every Muslim is urged to murder any non-Muslim, 

destroy their honor, steal their wealth, and wreak 

havoc on their lives. The ideal Muslim is portrayed as 

a treacherous, murderous, criminal psychopath who 

spills oil on highways to ambush and later murder his 

hapless victims; sets fire to forests and burns every life 

form and residence that would lie in its path; and who 

would assassinate the creators, inventors, and intellects responsible for pioneering institutions and running global enterprises. This appears to be AQAP’s 

most considered answer to the question, “What would 

Prophet Muhammad Do?” It does not take much 

imagination to predict the probable trajectory of an 

entity whose highest ideals for contemporary Islam 

are the greatest sins after apostasy: homicide, suicide, 

treachery, deceit, and attacking the lives, honor, posterity, and wealth, of Allah’s creation. 

AQAP’s primary strategic objective is captured in 

its simplified formula: If we Remove the United States 

from Muslim Lands + If we Preach the Call (Da’wa) + 

If we Defend the Ummah’s State and Lands = Then we 

will realize Caliphate.218 The first (If we Remove the 

United States from Muslim Lands) of this Caliphate 

syllogism presumes knowledge of the United States. 

However, like Osama bin Laden, AQAP appears profoundly and dangerously ignorant and maintains 

delusions about its chief “Crusader” nemesis. It has 
142

mistaken its hollowed out, demonized, conspiracyriddled, anti-semitic caricature for the real thing. Based 

on its own published record, along with the virtual 

decimation of its first-tier leadership cadre, one might 

conclude that AQAP lacks knowledge of the adversary it insists on terrorizing. This includes its apparent 

ignorance of U.S. values, institutions, motivations, and 

the sustained commitment of its residents and citizens 

who identify with America’s promise, opportunities, 

and freedoms—including genuine religious freedoms 

cherished and celebrated by its Muslim citizens and 

residents. 

It is likely, as suggested earlier, that AQAP is 

transforming from an AQO-based “Far Enemy” terrorist organization possessed of a leadership, resources, sanctuary, finances, logistics, and recruits, to little 

more than an inspirer of anarchistic-like individualized terrorism, parasitizing the electromagnetic and 

cyber dimensions to promote what has become nothing more—to persons less ignorant and deluded—

than sinful and criminal conduct. The strategic implications for USG efforts to counter this organization 

are straightforward, and shall be taken up in our final 

chapter. It is now time to take up our second terrorist 

entity: the ISO (Tanzim al-Dawla al-Islamiyya).
143

III. ISLAMIC STATE ORGANIZATION 

(TANZIM AL-DAWLA AL-ISLAMIYYA)

Let us now examine the ISO’s strategy and terrorist modus operandi. We anchor our analysis in 

the ISO’s own selective, apologetic history of its own 

beginnings in al-Zarqawi and Zarqawism, the pithiest formulation of which is ISO’s proposed five-stage 

strategy for realizing the Caliphate in Dabiq’s inaugural issue.219 We will learn in ISO’s re-telling of its 

self-understanding of Zarqawism’s distinct differences from every other jihadist tendency, and why it 

is deemed the exclusive “bridge” to Khilafa. However, 

instead of parroting ISO’s self-presentation, where 

necessary and practicable, we supply known facts in 

place of ISO distortions and myths. We shall also further substantiate ISO’s self-presentation by drawing 

on the fuller range of materials made available across 

11 issues of Dabiq. As we shall soon see, the ISO has in 

practice significantly departed from its idealized fivestage strategy. The reasons for this shall be obvious in 

the course of our presentation. 

TQA: THE ISO “STATE/CALIPHATE-FIRST” 

STRATEGY

ISO declares five necessary stages (see Figure 

3) marking the path to the restoration of the Sunni 

Islamic Caliphate:

1. Emigrating to an ideal locale (Hijrah);

2. Establishing the jihadist state-building nuclei 

(Jama’ah); 

3. Using terrorist “vexation and exhaustion” operations to attack, collapse, and destroy existing 

state authority (Nikayah), to create mayhem/

chaos (Tawahhush);
144

4. Controlling territory, persons, resources, and 

consolidating an alternative Islamic State structure (Tamkin); and finally,

5. Declaring, consolidating, and expanding the 

Islamic State/Caliphate (Khilafa). These may be 

visually represented using the TQA heuristic.

Figure 3. From Hijra to Khilafah: A TQA 

Analysis.220
ISO Proximate and Ultimate Religio-Political 

Objectives. 

ISO declares very clearly its ultimate religiopolitical objective. It is stated thrice: “[e]stablishing 

Khilafah”; “reviving the Khilafah”; and “The goal of 

Khilafah without hesitation.”221 What ISO meant precisely by “without hesitation” is unclear, since this 

could mean: “We must begin now to work toward the 

Caliphate” or “We must now without hesitation declare The Islamic State of the Caliphate.” In practice, 

it appears the latter course was taken, and if so, this 

contradicts ISO’s own self-declared stage strategy by 

placing the Caliphate far ahead of the other necessary 

stages it posits are essential to its effective “remaining 

and expanding.” We shall leave this for now, as it will 

soon reappear as an essential ingredient of ongoing 

Fitnah and ISO’s civil war with other Islamic, Salafi, 

and Salafi-Jihadist organizations.

ISO Terrorist Operations (Non-Media), and 

Accompanying Media Operations. 

The ISO lays out a very brief and telling summary 

of its grand strategy. It clarifies for us exactly how it 

envisions strategy, and the essential phases for realizing its end state. This description is based on its recapitulation of the stages it claims al-Zarqawi’s initial 

organization followed: 

In short, these phases consist of [1] immigrating [hijra] to a land with a weak central authority to use as a 

base where a [2] jama’ah can form, recruit members, 

and train them. (If such a land does not exist or hijrah is not possible, the place can be formed through 

long campaigns of nikayah [vexation and exhaustion] 

145
attacks carried out by underground mujahid cells . . . 

These attacks will compel apostate forces to partially 

withdraw from rural territory and regroup in major 

urban regions.) The jama’ah would then take advantage of the situation by [3] increasing the chaos to 

the point of leading to the complete collapse of the 

taghut regime in entire areas, a situation some refer 

to as ‘tawahhush’ (‘mayhem’). The next step would 

be to fill the vaccuum by managing the state of affairs 

to the point of [4] developing into a full-fledged state

[tamkin], and continuing expansion into territory still 

under control of the taghut [emphasis added].222

A concluding sentence, in boldface type and a larger 

font size, supplies our final stage. “This has always 

been the roadmap towards [stage 5] Khilafah for the 

mujahidin.”223 Let us now attempt to follow this path.

Phase 1: Emigration (Hijra). 

In the beginning is Emigration (Hijra). Conceived 

on the model of Prophet Muhammad, ISO envisions 

its origins in emigration from a land of persecution to 

one where the rudiments of a new organization may 

be planted and defended. For al-Zarqawi, this new 

land is “a place where they could operate without 

the threat of a powerful police state,” and ISO asserts 

that this led him from Afghanistan (recall his Jund 

al-Sham based in Herat), to Kurdistan, “as a base to 

form Jama’atut-Tawhidi wal-Jihad [italics added].”224

Phase 2: Group Formation (Jama’ah). 

Interestingly, Dabiq asserts that the creedal core of 

Zarqawism is the way of moderation, or the middle 

way, and that the ISO is based on Quran, Sunnah, and 

146
147

a Salafism “free from the extremities,” i.e., neither negligent (murji’ite) nor equating sin with disbelief (khawarij). Further, it is based in the doctrines of tawhid, 

al-wala wa’l bara, and the demand that all governance 

be based in Sharia. It views “jihad as its fundamental 

means for change” (citing, Quran 8:39), and that jihad 

be based upon “hijrah [emigration], bay’ah [an oath 

of loyalty to the emir], sam’ [listening], ta’ah [obedience], and i’dad [training], leading to ribat [manning 

frontiers] and qital [fighting], then Khilafah or shahadah [martyrdom], [italics added].”225 Having claimed 

to adhere to what seems like a mainline Salafi-Jihadi 

creed, however, we soon learn otherwise. Zarqawism 

is presented instead as the exclusive “bridge” to the 

Caliphate, with all others accused of varying degrees 

of intolerable deviance.

The story begins in the Afghanistan camps, the era 

of united fronts, anti-Communist coalitions, and Azzamist defensive jihad. Because of the overwhelming 

emphasis placed on fighting a “common enemy,” it 

is claimed this led to “ignoring all matters that distinguished them from each other, even if those matters were an obstacle in the pursuit of Khilafah,” with 

the most significant of these being “nationalism” and 

other “serious innovations that destroyed the creed 

and healthy body of the Muslim jama’ah required for 

reviving the Khalifah.”226 Note here ISO’s declared 

opposition to Azzamism and AQO-based Church-like 

“lumping” strategies. Those ecumenical conceptions 

of “Muslimness” were vehemently opposed to sectarian splitting and internecine warfare at the expense of 

the “apostate” government installed by the “original 

Kufr,” in this case the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). For al-Zarqawi and the ISO, 

however, what is decisive is “all matters that distin-
148

guished them [each fighting group] from each other.” 

In other words, it is only the purity of the Pure Sect 

that ensures the True Muslimness of the Muslim, and 

therefore it is in the process of winnowing wheat from 

chaff and True Believers from hypocrites, negligence, 

heresy, and outright apostasy, that Khilafa can and 

should be restored. The Caliphate can only be built 

from steel. It is “the creed and healthy body of the 

Jama’ah” cleansed of “serious innovations” that will 

be the instrument for the restoration. Moreover, many 

“would become the bridges upon which jihad would 

pass over toward the awaited Khilafah,” the one of 

greatest consequence “was that of the mujaddid (reviver) Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.”227

It is essential to pause for a moment to see that this 

second stage of—Jama’ah—Zarqawism, by its very nature, views itself as operating on two key battle fronts. 

The least important is the front that fights “the occupier” in the wake of the U.S. occupation of Iraq, and 

involves a number of Islamic, nationalist, Ba’athist, 

and other opponents;228 the most important was the alZarqawi-incited civil war against other Islamic groups 

for their alleged failure to rigidly adhere to his particular variant of ultra-conservative, ultra-sectarian 

Wahhabi-Salafi jihadism. This second front is the front 

against the nearer (Shia) and nearest enemies (insufficiently Muslim Sunnis); and as we have already 

learned, is the essential, obsessive front that sectarians 

must first—and forever—fight. It is only in this purging, cleansing, and destruction of opponents (i.e., the 

tribulations that are the oven that separates the pure 

and impure) that Allah opens the way for Allah’s True 

Soldiers and exposes and destroys hypocrites, sinners, 

heretics, and apostates, to create the State of the Caliphate. The moment al-Zarqawi’s Jama’at al-Tawhid 
149

wal-Jihad is born (Jama’ah), Fitnah is also born. We shall 

treat this more extensively in the following section, 

but for now “Fitnah,” defined as intra-Muslim “tribulation,” “trial,” or “conflict,” refers to a state of civil 

war or conflict among jihadist groups based on a state 

of enmity, fundamental disagreement, and is characterized by the outbreak of overt hostilities. Its deeper 

meaning for ISO is that it is Allah’s method for refining and distilling through trials, tribulations, conflict, 

and fighting, that steel from which the true bridge to 

Khalifa shall be built. 

Phase 3: Injury, Vexation, Exhaustion (Nikayah), and 

Collapse, Chaos, Mayhem (Tawahhush). 

By using methods that led to maximum chaos and targeting apostates of all different backgrounds, the mujahidin were able to keep Iraq in constant instability 

and war, never allowing any apostate group to enjoy a 

moment of security [emphasis added].229

Phase 3 commences as al-Zarqawi’s organization Jund 

al-Sham, and later Jama’at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad, destroy 

all that is not him, and leaves chaos in his wake: “In 

short,” Dabiq claims:

he strived to create as much chaos as possible with the 

means permitted by the Shari’ah using attacks sometimes referred to as operations of ‘nikayah’ (injury) 

that focus on causing the enemy death, injury, and 

damage . . . [And] [w]ith chaos, he intended to prevent 

any taghut [idolatrous] regime from ever achieving a 

degree of stability that would enable it to reach a status quo similar to that existing in the Muslim lands 

ruled for decades by tawaghit. . . . To achieve maximum chaos, the Shaykh focused on the most effective 

weapons in the arsenal of the mujahidin for creat-
150

ing chaos—vehicle bombs, IEDs, and istishhadiyyin

[specialized suicide ops brigades].230

What truly distinguished al-Zarqawi’s organization, however—and not adequately captured in the 

previous quote—was not his attacks on regime targets 

or American forces, or even on those in the highest 

levels of leadership who could be reasonably accused 

of voluntarily aiding and abetting the occupation. Instead, virtually all Islamic insurgents could agree on 

the objective of launching “daily operations against 

the crusader forces in Iraq whose main goal was to 

set up an apostate puppet regime loyal to them.”231

Zarqawism as Zarqawism was defined rather by its 

legitimation of targets deemed by the vast majority of 

these insurgents as forbidden on Islamic grounds or 

detrimental to the insurgency on practical grounds. It 

is through al-Zarqawi’s use of ultra-takfiri epithets and 

euphemistic language that this dramatic expansion of 

theretofore forbidden targets is condoned. 

For example, it is stated that: “He [al-Zarqawi] 

would order [persons] to carry out nikayah operations dozens of times in a dozen areas daily, targeting 

and killing sometimes hundreds of apostates from the 

police forces and Rafidah.”232 However, “hundreds 

of apostates from the police forces” refer not just to 

leadership and collaborators, but everyday persons, 

Sunni and Shia, who are far from a chain of command 

and are the sons of the Iraqi masses. “The Rafidah,” of 

course, refers to al-Zarqawi’s wholesale slaughter of 

the Shia, leaders and led; this is deemed reprehensible 

and indeed forbidden (haram), even among deeply 

conservative Sunni Salafi-Wahhabis. This panoply of 

prohibited targets and forbidden conduct is further 

celebrated as Zarqawism’s fodder in this phase whose 
151

proximate objectives are maximum injury, chaos, and 

collapse. But the list of al-Zarqawi’s permissible targets is further clarified, and extended. “In addition,” 

Dabiq declares:

he tried to force every apostate group present in Iraq 

into an all-out war with Ahlus-Sunnah. So he targeted the Iraqi apostate forces (army, police, and intelligence), the Rafidah (Shia markets, temples, and 

militias), and the Kurdish secularists (Barzani and 

Talabani partisans). . . . In his speech titled ‘Hadha 

Bayanullin-Nasi wa li Yundharu Bih’ (This is a Declaration for the People That They May Be Warned by It), 

he threatened war on any Sunni tribe, party, or assembly that would support the crusaders. . . . Then when 

some so-called ‘Islamists’ entered into the democratic 

political process—ignoring what it entails of clear-cut 

major shirk—he officially declared war on them in his 

speech titled ‘Wa li Tastabina Sabilul-Mujrimin’ (And 

Thus the Way of the Criminals Becomes Evident).233

Let us consider these now licit targets, i.e., Iraqi “apostate” forces, the Rafidah (Shia markets, temples, and 

militias, Kurdish secularists, any Sunni tribe, party, 

or assembly that would support the Crusaders, and 

so-called Islamists [that] entered into the democratic 

political process. Count the bodies, count the souls. 

Recall that these were the days (2004-2006) of dozens of bombs and bombers, in dozens of cities, leading to hundreds and hundreds of dead, mangled, 

wounded, shocked, displaced, and horrified. This is 

the precise moment (see Chapter 1) that al-Zawahiri, 

al-Maqdisi, and Atiyatullah al-Libi, among others, 

privately registered their deep reservations on legalmoral and prudential grounds. Moreover, following 

the October 17, 2004, bay’ah to bin Laden, this would 

all be publicly attributed to AQO’s Tanzim Qa’idat 
152

al-Jihad fi Bilad al Rafidayn. Those darkest days marked 

by violence, injury, chaos, and mayhem were precisely the days sought during this third phase, supposedly marking the path to the Caliphate. Moreover, in 

Dabiq’s telling, no sacred blood had ever been targeted 

or spilled in this strategic phase. “Obviously,” Dabiq

asserts:

their operations never targeted Sunni public places 

and gatherings—contrary to the claims of the crusader 

and apostate media. Those crimes were carried out by 

rafidi militia seeking revenge against Ahlus-Sunnah, 

and by crusader mercenaries trying to blemish the 

true image of the mujahidin.234

Supposing facts do matter, this is a blatant falsehood. Based on a detailed study of open source 

data on reported terrorist incidents in Iraq—using 

exclusively the Arabic language press to enhance 

credibility—from 2004-2008 a very different conclusion is revealed:

The results show that non-Westerners are much more 

likely to be killed in an al-Qa’ida [in Iraq] attack. From 

2004 to 2008, only 15% of the 3,010 victims were Western. During the most recent period studied the numbers skewed even further. From 2006-2008, only 2% 

(12 of 661 victims) are from the West, and the remaining 98% are inhabitants of countries with Muslim majorities. During this period, a person of non-Western 

origin was 54 times more likely to die in an al-Qa’ida 

[in Iraq] attack than an individual from the West. The 

overwhelming majority of al-Qa’ida [in Iraq’s] victims 

are Muslims living in Muslim countries, and many are 

citizens of Iraq, which suffered more al-Qa’ida attacks 

than any other country courtesy of the al-Qa’ida in 

Iraq (AQI) affiliate.235
153

Of course, al-Zarqawi and Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi 

could easily retort on the basis of their creed, which 

essentially states: We do not distinguish between 

Westerners and non-Westerners, but only between believers and apostates, and we have killed only those, 

regardless of residence or nationality, who have forsaken Allah for idolatry.

That claim though, in the end, did not prove very 

persuasive to Ahl-us Sunnah. The fact that the greatest fear an Iraqi would face—whether man, woman, 

child, elderly, Sunni, Shia, secular, religious, sinner, 

or pious—was from a fanatical, blood-thirsty, violent, 

ultra-sectarian organization committed to inflicting 

massive injury, chaos, and mayhem on persons who 

worship Allah, and not on the “Crusader” occupier, 

did not require circuitous reasoning, dubitable assumptions, or questionable facts. The facts, by design

(Nikayah and Tawahhush, Phase 3), were laid bare for 

all to see: bodies blown to bits, families torn apart, 

worshippers turned into flying body parts, and “martyrdom seekers” turned into human shrapnel. The renewal of these attacks subsequent to ISO’s post-2010 

reorganization and reconstitution is well-attested and 

fully celebrated in Dabiq’s own pages.236

Phase 4: Consolidation, Remaining, Declaration of the State 

of Islam (Tamkin). 

“The State” (Tamkin) stage is the next “signature” moment of Zarqawism. So far, all other stages 

traversed—Hijra, Jama’ah, and Nikayah/Tawahhush—

are mere preface. Again, this is claimed to be “the 

Prophetic methodology,” i.e., a recapitulation of 

Prophet Muhammad’s earliest Medinan state, and 

later that tiny statelet of Shaykh Muhammad ibn Abd 
154

al-Wahhab. Every state has its founding myths, and 

those surrounding Dabiq’s portrayal of ISI’s birth are 

no exception. In Chapter 1, we carefully traced the 

evolution of the ISI from al-Zarqawi’s Zarqawism in 

the latter 1980s to its official declaration on October 

15, 2006. Its chief characteristics are the urgency with 

which the State’s declaration was sought, the paltry 

number of persons involved in its declaration, and the 

complete surprise with which AQO and every other 

organization was taken. It was also discovered, if McCants is correct, that a decisive reason for its early 

proclamation was Abu Hamza al-Muhajir’s belief in 

the imminent return of the Mahdi.237 We also learned 

from al-Zarqawi’s final letter that he despaired, owing 

to his failure to foment a Sunni-Shia civil war, turn 

back the tide of the emergent “Sahwat,” or successfully obstruct the nascent Iraqi democratic process. 

He was reduced to either contriving a war between 

the two great Satans, “Rafidi” Iran and the “Crusader” 

United States—on the basis of fabricated evidence—or 

ending up again al-Ghuraba (a stranger) in a strange 

land, pushed to again roam to find a land of possibility for Allah’s Truest Soldiers. The tide had turned by 

the time of al-Zarqawi’s death on June 7, 2006. His organization was in disarray. It was losing ground, losing battles, and losing recruits. Myths rarely do full, 

if any, justice to facts, yet such founding myths are 

presented in Dabiq. 

Shaykh Abu Mus’ab planned [before his June 7, 2006, 

death] to later execute more complex attacks of a larger 

scale sometimes referred to as operations of ‘tamkin’ 

(consolidation), which were meant to pave the way for 

the claiming of territory [for a State]. All this [eventually?] led to the gradual collapse of any authority in 

the areas the crusaders would refer to as ‘the Sunni 
155

Triangle’. . . The collapse was followed by the mujahidin quickly entering the vacuum left, to announce and 

establish the Islamic State of Iraq, [October 15, 2006] 

under the leadership of Amirul-Mu’minin Abu ‘Umar 

al-Husayni al-Baghdadi [Abu Omar al-Baghdadi] 

. . . a monumental event in the history of the Ummah. 

It was the first state in ‘modern’ times set up exclusively by the mujahidin—the active participants in the 

jihad—in the heart of the Muslim world just a stone’s 

throw away from Makkah, al-Madinah, and Bayt alMaqdis.238

The ISO alleges here that the “State” had arisen as a 

necessity—now that territory had been cleared in “the 

Sunni Triangle.” But there is a problem. If that were 

the case, why would it “enter quickly into the vacuum 

left” if it had, in fact, actually consolidated anything 

like a defended territory, with persons, resources, and 

power? An obvious answer recommends itself; the 

declaration of the State occurred despite the absence 

of these conditions and despite a lack of consultation 

beyond the narrowest groups associated with its own 

self-created Mujahideen Shura Council (MSC), and 

later Hilf al-Mutayyibeen.

Moreover, this event is declared a first in the modern history of the Ummah since it was declared and 

established “exclusively by the mujahidin—the active 

participants in the jihad.” Sunni concepts of state generally regard consultation on a far broader scale—including persons of reputation and authority entrusted 

with the power to loosen and bind (ahl al-hall waal’aqd), 

as well as Shura or an advisory council. It may be that 

these alleged requirements describe the ideal Caliphate more than the real. 239 Nevertheless, the idea that 

“The Islamic State” would be declared “exclusively 

by the mujahidin” (read: members of the Hilf al-Muy-
156

tayybeen) was a startling innovation indeed. It is also 

critical to understand that the title then conferred on 

its emir—“Amirul-Mu’minin Abu ‘Umar al-Husayni 

al-Baghdadi”240—was one reserved throughout Sunni 

history beginning with Sunni Islam’s second caliph 

Umar, to refer to the Caliph of all the Muslims. This 

“monumental event in the history of the Ummah” 

would not, however, be met with anything but perplexity and predictable resistance. Thus, the ongoing 

Fitnah recommences with even more ferocity now that 

a tiny self-chosen takfiri group regards itself in exclusive possession of the exclusive authority to rule what 

it deems “The Islamic State of All Muslims.” 

Even presuming ISO’s own strategy of Khilafa, the 

following objections can be raised. Does the declaration of the ISI make sense at this phase of consolidation (tamkin)? Was not the ISI, having not established 

any recognizable consolidated territory and no means 

of defending it, actually hanging by a mere thread? 

This questionable and imprudent declaration of 

Khilafa is further obfuscated by the ambiguity of the 

expression, “The goal of Khilafah without hesitation [emphasis added].” Does this mean: “Once we 

announce it, then it will exist, and they will come, 

and they will obey!” But should not prudence and 

reality have instead led to a contrary conclusion? For 

example, “Once we have created and defended the 

rudiments of a genuine state, and once others are sufficiently convinced of our right to obedience, then we 

may possibly declare a restricted emirate—though 

there are definite liabilities even to this, but certainly 

not for a very long time should we imagine ourselves 

declaring let alone ruling a Caliphate of the worldwide Ummah!” 
157

A re-sequencing of stages was carried out, in fact 

and in defiance, of ISO’s very own blueprint for Khilafa. The final, Caliphate, stage (Stage 5) was announced 

simultaneously with the consolidation (Stage 4, tamkin) declaration of the ISI, and as we have noted, was 

based in the myth and not reality of territorial consolidation. An emir of an emirate at most, if even this 

was to be granted, was instead declared “AmirulMu’minin Abu ‘Umar al-Husayni al-Baghdadi . . . a 

monumental event in the history of the Ummah.” 

Dabiq’s Missing Phase: The Fitnah. 

As earlier stated, Fitnah was born in the very womb 

of al-Zarqawi’s conception of Jama’ah. Al-Zarqawi’s 

ruthlessness and takfiri terrorism led to his self-declared and self-initiated war on all those whose blood, 

honor, property, and security he deemed it lawful to 

shed, steal, and destroy. With the birth of “The State,” 

a further intensification of fitnah occurred. It was not 

now a question of intra-organizational civil war, but 

a new “either/or” from the “The State’s/Caliphate’s” 

point of view: either repentance, renunciation of all 

other loyalty ties and pledging bay’ah to the new Caliph; or, rebellion and capital punishment by beheading, crucifixion, or other murderous means.

Let us now return to Dabiq’s account and pick up 

the story immediately after the October 15, 2006, declaration of the ISI. We shall break this up into distinct 

milestones: the initial ISI declaration and intensification of Fitnah; the ISI’s exodus following its near defeat; the post-Caliphate Umar regrouping; the Syrian 

civil war as opportunity for rebirth; the Caliphate declared; and finally, the present demand that all pledge 

bay’ah to their Caliph Ibrahim. The listed statements 
158

below represent the present author’s sense for ISO’s 

declared imperative accompanying each milestone. 

1. Curses, Fighting, and Death for Those Who 

Reject Allah’s Chosen!

When the Islamic State of Iraq was announced [October 15, 2006]—after going through these phases of 

war—it had the effect of exposing all the jihad claimants in Iraq, splitting them into two camps. Every 

group and individual with iman [faith] and ikhlas [fidelity, sincerity] quickly pledged allegiance to the Islamic 

State’s leader, for none had ever selflessly taken a step in 

the direction of jihad except with an Islamic state as their 

ultimate goal. Those that resisted the newborn state 

[i.e., did not pledge allegiance] did so for two reasons: 

deviant methodologies and corrupt desires for fame, 

wealth, and power. Consequently, the announcement 

caused some of the hidden deviance to surface. The 

suppressed corruption waiting irritably to arise finally 

did so as well. Some of those carrying corruption in 

their hearts quickly allowed their pride and envy to 

possess them, pushing them to enter into both hidden 

and open alliances with the crusaders, the new apostate regime, and the neighboring tawaghit, against the 

newborn Islamic State, thereby forming the ‘sahwah’ 

(‘awakening’), a term coined by the American pawns 

to beautify their apostasy and treachery. The sahwah 

received financial, political, and ‘scholarly’ support 

from Al-Sa’ud, the Ikhwan, and even America [italics 

added].241

An extreme takfiri logic runs through this account, 

which explains its expansive enemies list. It occurs in 

the phrase “for none had ever selflessly taken a step 

in the direction of jihad except with an Islamic state 

as their ultimate goal.” It is inarguable that all or 

mostly all of the Islamic fighting factions held a commitment to “an Islamic state as their ultimate goal.” 
159

But ISI made “the Islamic State” an immediately imposed reality; and that, by persons mostly unknown 

except to a handful of self-selected insiders. For most, 

the creation of an actual Islamic State required a great 

deal more preparation, considering it was not to be 

imposed by ruthless terrorism from above, but with 

significant support from a considerable section of Ahlus Sunnah. But Dabiq views things otherwise. Those 

unconvinced and resisting the ISI are not legitimately 

disagreeing based on acceptable differences of interpretation (ijtihad); instead, they are accused of moral 

turpitude or viciousness. All who opposed the state 

are dastardly, not just disagreeable. All who fail to 

pledge loyalty shall be killed. One is now not a Sunni 

Muslim respected, admired, and consulted on matters as grave as declaring the rulership over all Muslims. No, one is evil with “corruption in their hearts,” 

motivated by “pride and envy” and their attempts 

“to beautify their apostasy,” and are driven by either 

“deviant methodologies” or “corrupt desires for fame, 

wealth, and power.” 

Is there not a simpler explanation for opposition 

and resistance to the ISI’s declaration of the Islamic 

State? For example, ISI’s violence, coercion, treachery, 

and terror; of its sectarian bloodbath targeting the lay 

Shia; of intolerant and arrogant usurping of leadership prerogatives; of committing forbidden acts, and 

prohibiting commanded acts; of the killing of sons and 

the forced marriage of Sunni daughters; of the killing 

of elders, scholars, women, children, worshippers in 

mosques, passersby on streets; of the killing of nationalist insurgents, Islamist insurgents; or of slaughtering 

innocent hostages like bleating sheep. None of these

reasons is cited in Dabiq for the emergence of revulsion, 

and the eventual rejection and ejection of the ISI from 

the lands of Ahl-us Sunnah. Instead, a likely projection 
160

by ISI onto others has occurred. And if one were to 

impute this projection back onto the projectors—characterize the ISI itself using all of the pejoratives it has 

used to describe others—perhaps one might be closer 

to understanding how mythic projection can, in the 

minds of the projector, trump self-evident facts. 

2. Oh How Allah Tries His True Mujahidin! 

The period from approximately late-2006 to 2010 

was ISI’s self-created nadir. Marginalized, imploding, 

hunted to extinction, evacuated from strongholds owing to its own will to power through terror and violence and ultra-sectarian brutality, this burning ember 

would seek refuge from this storm.242 But for mythic 

thinking, again, reality is otherwise:

Then Allah . . . tried the mujahidin as He had done 

with His slaves before in Makkah (prior to the Hijrah), 

Uhud (when the archer disobediently left their posts), 

Hunayn (when the new Muslims were amazed by 

their own numbers), and the Arabian Peninsula (during the Wars of Apostasy).

This is a test decreed by Allah . . . so He would see the 

patient mujahidin and expel the weak-hearted from 

their ranks, and thereby solidify the newborn Islamic 

State and prepare it for greater responsibilities. As ashShafi’i [i.e., founder of classical Shafi’i school of Sunni 

jurisprudence] . . . once said, ‘One’s authority will not 

be consolidated except after overcoming tribulation. 

[Fitnah]’ . . . During this period, the Islamic State was 

forced to withdraw mostly into the desert regions of 

al-Anbar, where its soldiers regrouped, planned and 

trained. From the desert, they continued to carry out 

attacks against the crusaders and the treacherous 

apostates in coordination with operations, executed 

by the underground units in urban areas.243
161

3. Behold How All Pledged Bay’ah to Our New 

Khalifa!

In Chapter 1, we learned that following the April 

18, 2010, killing of Abu Hamza al-Muhajir and Abu 

Omar al-Baghdadi (aka: Amirul-Mu’minin Abu ‘Umar 

al-Husayni al-Baghdadi), a secretive cabal led by 

former Ba’athist Colonel Haji Bakr lobbied strenuously and also manipulated the vote for Abu Bakr alBaghdadi’s selection as new emir. The vote on the

Shura Council was 9 for, 2 against; and the Sharia 

Council abstained. These are the facts. This lack of 

consensus is passed over in Dabiq and only the final 

result is described:

when Amirul-Mu’minin Abu ‘Umar al-Baghadadi . . . 

gained shahadah alongside Abu Hamzah al-Muhajir 

. . . the Islamic State did not waver, rather its leadership 

unanimously pledged allegiance to Amirul-Mu’minin 

Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi . . . continuing upon the path 

for a single Khilafah that unites the Ummah.

244

4. Behold the Khilafa of Iraq and Al-Sham!

The Syrian opposition inspired by the “Arab 

Spring” began peaceful protests against the 40-year 

rule of the autocratic Assad dynasty beginning February-March 2011. On March 18, 2011, the regime’s 

first shots were fired into crowds of unarmed protesters. Within 5 months, over 2000 had been killed or 

wounded; nevertheless, the protests remained peaceful, gaining inspiration from the quickly unraveling 

regime of Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi.245 By 

summer 2011, a then-unknown organization, Jabhat 

al-Nusrah li-ahl al-Sham min Mujahidi al-Sham fi Sahat 

al-Jihad (Protection Front for the People of the Levant 

by the Mujahadin of the Levant in the Battlefields of 
162

Jihad; heretofore, Jabhat al-Nusrah), had been sent to 

Syria by ISI’s Emir Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. On April 

7, 2013, ISI Emir Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi declared the 

Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (Dawla Islamiya fi 

al-Iraq wa al-Shaam (ISIS/ISIL/Daesh). Like the original ISI declaration, this ISIS declaration ferociously 

recommenced the long-simmering Fitnah between ISI 

and every other group, organization, and tendency. 

In Dabiq’s inaugural issue, a very brief account of this 

period between entry into Syria and the declaration of 

ISIS is offered. 

Then the event of Sham began to unfold [c. FebruaryMarch 2011] and the Islamic State quickly got involved, 

answering the cries of the weak and oppressed Muslims by sending a mission from Iraq [c. Summer-2011], 

to activate its units in Sham and later make the announcement of its official expansion [April 7, 2013]. 

Again, pride, envy, nationalism, and innovation, led to 

events similar to those of Iraq [post-October 15, 2006]. 

New sahwat were formed with the exact same financial, political, and ‘scholarly’ support. They repeated 

the mistakes of their predecessors in Iraq and decided 

to enter into war with the Islamic State, but here Allah . . . blessed the mujahidin in a manner unique to 

the lands of Sham, so that quickly Sahwah treachery 

was exposed and destroyed. Then, by Allah’s grace, 

the mujahidin gained control over territory larger than 

many states claiming ‘legality’ today, lands formerly 

under control of the historical Umawi khulafa’ of 

Sham and ‘Abbasi khulafa’ of Iraq.246

Zarqawism again is here on full display. Again, we 

are treated to the ISO’s sense of entitlement as Allah’s chosen to monopolize religio-political authority. 

Again, it is the near enemy that is the focus of attack: 

those Sunni Muslims considered insufficiently loyal 

and subordinate to its command. 
163

Much had transformed that smoldering ember into 

a terrorist juggernaut, however. Recall the reconstituting of its cadre by highly professional former Ba’athist 

military and intelligence officers now in key leadership roles. Recall its successful suicide operations 

freeing hundreds of high value detainees that would 

later fill its ranks. Also, recall the opportunities that 

were provided by dramatic developments in strategic 

context, including the Syrian uprising and then-Iraqi 

Prime Minister Nouri Kamil Mohammed Hasan alMaliki’s Iranian-backed sectarian persecution of Iraq’s 

highly marginalized Sunnis.247 Also notable is the generalization of the word “Sahwah,”—initially wholly 

referring to the Iraqi Sunni tribal “Awakening” councils—now used to refer to any and all opposition to 

ISO, regardless of context. 

Vitriolic, hyperbolic, deeply disrespectful denunciations by ISO of these various tendencies—in particular of AQO’s senior leadership and its appointed 

emissaries charged with attempting to arbitrate these 

differences on the basis of long-established Sunni juridical precedent—is characteristic of this period.248

However, the ISO’s vitriol goes beyond mere words, 

as senior-level leaders in AQO-related organizations 

were subjected to a murderous assassination campaign. Consider just the most notable examples: the 

January 1, 2014, kidnapping and gruesome torture 

and murder of Dr. Hussein al-Suleiman, a senior commander under Ahrar al-Sham Emir Hassan Abboud; 

the February 23, 2014, assassination of AQO mediator 

Abu Khalid al-Suri; the April 15, 2014, murders of alNusrah Sheikh Abu Muhammad Fatih, his wife, brother, and children; and the September 9, 2014, murders 

of dozens of Ahrar al-Sham Leaders in a mass suicide 

bombing, including Emir Abboud.249 This targeted 

assassination was also accompanied by intra-jihadist 
164

warfare leading to hundreds and eventually thousands killed, and key territorial shifts and displacement.250 This raging fitnah would gather even greater 

intensity with ISIS’s declaration of the Khilafa.

5. The Khalifa Has Returned!

We finally arrive at the time when Dabiq’s inaugural issue appears (July 4, 2014). It is on the heels of the 

ISO’s blitzkrieg, resulting in its conquest of Iraq’s second most populous city, Mosul. With apparently unstoppable momentum, forces that had been hollowed 

out by cronyism and corruption, and completely outgunned, rather than stand and fight, collapsed, cut, 

and run. Sunni populations that were overrun had 

to determine whether Maliki’s vindictive, revengeful 

Shia rule was a lesser or greater evil than these charging fighters apparently committed to defending the 

lives, honor, property, and security of Ahl-us Sunnah. It 

is upon these victories sealed in blood, power, and terror, which in reality involved a systematic campaign 

of subversion, assassination, and counter-intelligence, 

i.e., “shaping operations” and “preparation of the battlefield,” that ISIS would proclaim its final phase, the 

return of Khilafa: 

Thereafter, the hopes of Khilafah became an undeniable reality, one that allowed no room for anyone 

claiming any excuse to resist the authority of the 

imam except to be dealt with by the decisive law of 

Allah. The victories in Ninawa, al-Anbar, Salahuudin, 

al-Khayr, al-Barakah, and elsewhere, all aided the 

declaration made by the Islamic State on the first of 

Ramadan 1435H [June 28, 2014], in which the Khilafah 

was officially announced. This new condition opens 

the path for the complete unification of all Muslim 
165

peoples and lands under the single authority of the 

Khalifah [emphasis in original].251

Predictably, this would further intensify the fitnah, and 

is evidenced by yet another round of ISO’s viciously 

acrimonious charges, and those seeking to rebut them 

but notably resisting the ISO’s takfiri arsenal and demonization techniques.252 It is also here that Dabiq portrays in its pages the fruits of consolidation (tamkin), 

as it chronicles the transition it claims is occurring 

from the ashes of terror, injury, chaos, collapse, and 

mayhem, to the fruit of its own Islamic State.253

6. Long Live Khalifa Ibrahim! Pledge Bay’ah, or 

Death!

There remains only a single act required of every 

Muslim on Earth: an oath of loyalty pledged to their 

new master. This act is also due from all who consider 

themselves fighters in the path of Allah (Mujahidin). 

But to give Caliph Ibrahim his moment in the sun, we 

shall allow Dabiq to present Islam’s new self-appointed master in all of his glory.

It [This new condition] also emphasizes the necessity 

for obeying the Messenger . . . in his order, ‘Whoever 

comes to you while your condition is united behind 

a single man, and intends to break your solidarity or 

disrupt your unity, then kill him.’254 The obligation is 

now clearer than ever before for all Muslims to raise 

their voices and pledge their allegiance to Imam ulMuslimin and Amirul-Mu’minin—the Khalifah—Abu 

Bakr al-Husayni al-Baghdadi (may Allah raise his allies and humiliate his enemies) . . . May Allah protect 

this Khalifah state and continue guiding it until its legions fight the crusader armies who will gather near 

Dabiq.255
166

Appearing beneath this prophecy is a stylized picture of a stupendous army amassed on the plains of 

Dabiq—that promised locale for the End Times mother 

of all battles (Al-Malahim). And on an accompanying 

page, three boys about 12 years old appear wearing 

Maoist-type uniforms with IS patches on their sleeves, 

with their index fingers pointed skyward in yet another IS media operation designed to inspire the love 

of death, martyrdom, and paradise, in defense of 

Allah’s chosen Khilafa. 
167

CHAPTER 3

CONCLUSIONS, IMPLICATIONS, AND 

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR U.S. GOVERNMENT 

POLICY AND STRATEGY

This book concludes by reporting its central findings and discerning their implications for current 

USG counterterrorism policy and strategy.256 For the 

purposes of clarity and brevity, the focus here shall 

be on warranted conclusions based in previously discussed findings, unless deemed necessary or practicable for expository purposes. The present writer’s 

central thesis is first reiterated. We then present chief 

findings vis-à-vis two core areas of greatest present 

interest: doctrine and strategy/terrorist modus operandi. We conclude by deducing their implications for 

USG counterterrorism policy and strategy, and leader 

development and education. 

I. KEY FINDINGS

MACRO-LEVEL CONCLUSION

The present author’s primary thesis presented in 

this book’s Introduction section appears supported by 

the data presented herein. For convenience, this thesis 

is reproduced below:

AQO and ISO claim to represent the true and abiding 

interests of the world’s Sunni Muslims (Ahl-us-Sunnah), estimated to number 1.4 billion persons. It is the 

argument of this book, however, that grounds exist 

for why this need not be the case. AQO and ISO may 

be conceived in the theology they themselves profess, 

as two deviant organizations guilty of committing 
168

major sins and besmirching the Islamic Call.257 I believe 

a more optimistic prognosis for the future destruction 

of each entity is warranted. It will be for the world’s 

Sunni Muslims (Ahl-us Sunnah) to make that determination; to define for themselves where the bounds 

of faith, godly fear and piety (taqwa), and righteous 

conduct begin and end; and who may or may not legitimately claim to speak in their name [emphasis in 

original].258

Our focus here is on substantiating the primary claim 

of greatest interest to delegitimizing AQO and ISO in 

the eyes of not just Muslims and non-Muslims generally, but also deeply observant Islamist, Salafist, and 

Salafi-Jihadi adherents, namely from the previous 

quote: “AQO and ISO may be conceived as . . . two deviant organizations guilty of committing major sins 

and besmirching the Islamic Call [emphasis added].” 

It is essential, we believe, to view AQO and ISO 

as deviant organizations, rather than as some have 

charged, in relation to ISO in particular for example, 

as “non-Muslim” or “having nothing to do with Islam.” That is understandable, but it is an error. It is 

like saying that a human being, guilty of committing 

reprehensible and truly repugnant acts—say viciously 

attacking an innocent bystander, or intentionally murdering or raping or pillaging or violently assaulting 

others—is no longer a human being. They are human 

and that is not at issue. What is at issue is that they 

have egregiously violated basic moral codes that govern human life, society, and interpersonal interaction 

to such an extent that we deem them extremely aberrant, deviant individuals. If religiously conceived, 

these deviant acts are sins. Within Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, and arguably every genuine contemporary faith, acts that intentionally violate the fundamental integrity of innocent human lives and souls 
169

are deemed the greatest of all sins, excepting idolatry. 

If non-religiously conceived, these are deemed egregious moral deviations whose commission justifies 

punishment using our harshest methods. No human 

society could last long that would not view ISO’s acts 

and perpetrators as enemies of a civilized human 

existence. Our sensibilities, customs, and laws—religious and secular—regard such deviant behavior as 

unacceptable. The only question remaining is in what 

proportions justice and mercy shall be applied to their 

punishment. 

A second reason to avoid the label “non-Muslim,” 

no matter how laudable the motive, is that unlike the 

ISO, the United States should never equate sinning, 

no matter how grave, with disbelief. This is the core 

equation underlying virtually every takfiri terrorist 

modus operandi. A sinner is not a disbeliever; however, they are believers in violation of their own moral 

code.259 Even the greatest of sins, excepting disbelief 

itself, does not remove one from a faith community. 

Its secular counterpart is the commission of a grave, 

felonious, and even heinous act. Certain liberties and 

privileges may be revoked; for example, the franchise. 

But even the felon remains a citizen, and that is because he did not forfeit citizenship but only those 

liberties and privileges a citizens enjoys. On the other 

hand, treason is to citizenship what infidelity is to 

faith: the ultimate act of disavowal and that single 

act of disloyalty for which one cannot, and will not, 

be permitted to remain a member of a community—

whether a community of God fearers or of loyal and 

patriotic citizens. 

AQO and ISO stand condemned of extreme deviance from Ahl-us Sunnah’s own self-understanding 

and expectations regarding the rudiments of religiosity, morality, legality, and humanity.260 This is less 
170

true of the ultimate end state they seek—the Righteous Caliphate—though for the vast majority this remains a distant ideal—than for their terrorist methods 

and means. AQO’s and ISO’s most important judge is 

ironically, yet predictably, the Sunni creed and community (Ahl-us Sunnah) they now stand of having 

warred against, and besmirched. Let us now summarize the chief findings supporting this macro-level 

thesis/conclusion. 

BELIEF-SYSTEMS, WORLDVIEWS, DOCTRINES, 

CREEDS

The Al-Qaeda Organization (Tanzim Qa’idat 

al-Jihad). 

The mature AQO doctrine is exemplified in bin 

Ladenism, and is characterized by a unique mixture 

of profound ignorance, delusion, resentment, and 

hubris, which from the early-1990s innovated an unprecedented “Far Enemy” doctrine manifest in an actual declaration of war against Americans, both military and civilian, calling for their murder wherever 

they could be found. Bin Ladenism rests on a deeply 

flawed analogy—that of the United States and the 

former USSR—leading its followers to believe, without evidence, that sustained direct terrorist attacks 

against U.S. citizens and government entities would 

generate economic exhaustion leading either to collapse or at least withdraw from the Arab Middle East. 

This false analogy was rooted in bin Laden’s deeply 

misinformed conception of American society, culture, 

economics, government, and most consequentially, 

the civil society foundations of enduring American 

power. 
171

The AQO’s signature “Far Enemy” doctrine has no 

precedent in Islam. It was never embraced by “Near 

Enemy” advocates: the vast majority of existing Islamist insurgent activities. Attacking the “original 

Kufr” in this way was roundly criticized even by bonafide unrepentant Salafi-Jihadists as illegal, criminal, 

and imprudent. 9/11 was itself AQO’s first and last 

great “one-off” based in treachery, criminality, and the 

USG’s unpreparedness for that plot’s unprecedented 

use of American civil aviation as a weapon of mass 

destruction. Bin Laden was deeply criticized from 

within his own ranks for having caused the practical 

extinction of a decade’s long effort to recruit, train, 

deploy, and create a global Sunni jihadist movement. 

AQO’s most lethal affiliate, AQAP, has amended 

but not ended classical bin Ladenism. There is no discernible difference from classical bin Ladenism as doctrine, and its accompanying “Far Enemy” economic 

attrition conception of collapsing the American economy and forcing its withdrawal from Islamic lands. 

The Islamic State Organization (Tanzim al-Dawla 

al-Islamiyya). 

The ISO doctrine is based in an apocalyptic, ultra-conservative, ultra-sectarian, Salafi-Wahhabi Jihadism. Four doctrines uniquely characterize this 

deviance generally and in relation to AQO’s species 

of Sunni global jihadism: apocalyptic and eschatological beliefs informing its sense of temporality 

and morality; proclaiming the mass annihilation of 

all Shia Muslims, including lay Shia; prioritizing the 

“Nearest” and “Near Enemies,” and postponement 

of jihad against the “original Kufr”; and, its belief 

in its right to monopolize and immediately declare 

the Islamic State/Caliphate. These key elements of 
172

ISO’s worldview and doctrine place it on the remote 

fringes, not just within Sunni Islam generally, but 

also among the vast majority of Sunni global jihadist

organizations.261

STRATEGIES AND TERRORIST MODUS 

OPERANDI. 

The al-Qaeda Organization (Tanzim Qa’idat alJihad).

Bin Ladenism is based in a sequenced strategy that 

eventually culminates in the restoration of a Sunni Caliphate over historic Sunni lands. Strategy begins with 

the formation of a military base organization (Tanzim 

Qa’idat al-Jihad) or “base organization of the jihad.” 

With this, AQO carefully orchestrates simultaneous 

mass-casualty terrorist attacks directed at “the head of 

the snake” or the “base of the tree,” two of bin Laden’s 

favorite metaphors. Though earlier attacks presaged 

this phase, its spectacular debut was the 1998 mass casualty terrorist attacks on the American embassies in 

Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar as-Salaam, Tanzania. Subsequent attacks, culminating in and subsequent to 9/11, 

were also orchestrated.

Before bin Ladenism, the classical Qa’idat al-Jihad 

was conceived as an Islamic foreign legion or “Islamic 

Internationale,” designed to transform local insurgencies into globalized transnational insurgencies. The 

“Crusader-Zionist” enemy had not yet emerged as the 

demonized “other,” and AQO viewed itself as a kind 

of central command and headquarters for recruiting, 

indoctrinating, training, and deploying its own operatives throughout various emergent theaters of jihad. It 

is possible that with the practical demise of bin Ladenism, the AQO original conception will be undergoing 
173

a revival in such places as Syria, Yemen, Libya, and 

Tunisia. 

AQO’s affiliate AQAP, while maintaining deep 

doctrinal affinities to AQO Central, has substantially 

departed in practice from the classic Bin Ladenist, topdown model for carefully planned, long-term, highvisibility, strategically symbolic “Far Enemy” targeting. AQAP’s terrorist modus operandi is based in what 

it calls “lone jihad” or the “lone mujahid” strategy. In 

its essence, it combines media and non-media terrorist 

operations to incite, galvanize, mobilize, train, and deploy individual persons—glorified in its media operations as “lone mujahids” whose martyrdom (Shuhada) 

destines them for the highest reaches of Paradise—to 

commit for what the vast majority of Muslims consider forbidden terrorist acts: sabotage, targeted assassination, mass arson, mass-casualty bombings, 

and a vast array of highly deviant, abominable acts 

generally classified within religious law as major sins 

and crimes, and within secular law, intentional acts of 

malicious, felonious criminal conduct. 

Islamic State Organization (Tanzim al-Dawla 

al-Islamiyya). 

The ISO’s terrorist modus operandi is carefully 

outlined in its inaugural online publication Dabiq, and 

comprises five key stages: 

1. Emigration from a hostile milieu to one where 

sanctuary exists or can be created through terrorist acts (Hijra); 

2. Creation of the nucleus jihadist organization 

(Jama’ah); 

3. Destabilization of the existing “infidel” regime 

through inflicting mass injury (Nikayah) even-
174

tuating in the collapse of existing authority, 

and thereby fomenting chaos, and mayhem 

(Tawahhush); 

4. Creation and consolidation of a territory, 

resources, and base accompanied with the 

immediate declaration of the Islamic State 

(Tamkin); and, 

5. Further consolidation expansion of the Islamic 

State with the immediate declaration of the 

Caliphate (Khilafa). 

This ideal five-stage blueprint for restoring the Caliphate (Khilafa) was not followed in practice, however. The very nature of the ISO as an ultra-conservative, 

ultra-sectarian, Salafi-Wahhabi Jihadi organization 

led it to hereticize (takfir) virtually all other organizations, tendencies, groups, and movements. As a result, 

a stage not specified in their ideal model—the stage 

of Fitnah (conflict, strife)—has accompanied ISO from 

its beginnings in Abu Musab al-Zarqawi through each 

of its metamorphoses. The ISO’s extremism in takfir

is considered extremely deviant within Sunni Islam, 

and also again, among virtually every armed Sunni 

Islamic organization.262 

The ISO’s apocalypticism, anti-Shia extermination, 

“Nearest Enemy” and “Near Enemy,” and “Caliphate Now!” doctrines would be little more than a hindrance were these not combined with two additional 

factors. First, its creation of a fearsome, highly professional, military leadership cadre comprised of former 

Ba’athist military and intelligence officers whose tactics, techniques, and procedures mimic those of totalitarian Soviet and Nazi-era secret police. Second, 

the revengeful anti-Sunni policies pursued by former 

Prime Minister al-Maliki, in the context of a dramatically changed regional dynamic enervated by the 
175

“Arab Spring,” precipitating deep alienation among 

Iraq’s embattled and marginalized Sunnis, and thus 

enhancing the ISO’s short-term credibility as their rescuers and defenders.

177

II. IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. GOVERNMENT 

POLICY AND STRATEGIES

Let us now consider the implications of AQO’s 

and ISO’s history, doctrine, and modus operandi for 

current USG policies and strategies designed to permanently defeat these terrorist entities. As in previous chapters, we shall treat each organization in 

succession.

IMPLICATIONS FOR EXISTING USG POLICY 

AND STRATEGY TO PERMANENTLY DEFEAT 

AQO AND ITS AFFILIATES

The present USG policy is to disrupt, dismantle, 

and ultimately defeat AQO, its affiliates, associated 

movements, and those inspired by its doctrine.263 This 

policy was first declared soon after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, and has been reiterated and sharpened in 

subsequent years.264 The strategy designed to realize that policy has also been clearly established and 

is centered on the achievement of three key strategic 

objectives: attacking and destroying the existing AQO 

network, countering radicalization and recruitment 

to that network, and protecting the U.S. homeland 

against terrorist attacks.265 As earlier stated, the first 

and third of these objectives has been largely attained, 

while the second continues to present formidable 

challenges. Let us briefly describe the implications of 

our chief findings for policy and these three strategic 

objectives, and also describe the chief instruments of 

national power required to realize these.

Existing U.S. policy has been largely effective in 

disrupting, dismantling, and ultimately defeating 
178

the AQO terrorist entity and accomplishing its three 

key strategic objectives. This applies especially to effectively countering the mature Bin Ladenist doctrine 

and strategy of executing highly symbolic, simultaneous mass-casualty terrorist attacks on American soil. 

Let us consider how the chief instruments of national 

power—diplomatic, informational, cyber, economic, 

financial, intelligence, legal, and military (DICEFILM)—have been wielded to accomplish this.266

Following bin Laden’s mid-1990s debut as selfprofessed enemy of the United States—evidenced in 

his 1996 declaration of war, series of high-profile interviews, and formal issuance of the 1998 fatwa—his 

status changed from that of a little-known wealthy 

Saudi associated with the anti-Soviet Afghan jihad, to 

a high-profile clear and present danger to American 

citizens and interests. The 1998 East Africa embassy 

bombings clarified any doubts that USG analysts may 

have had about bin Laden’s intentions and lethality. 

Diplomatic, economic, financial, intelligence, legal, 

and to a much lesser extent military instruments, were 

used from 1998 to the 9/11 attacks to attempt to persuade then ruling emir of the Afghan Taliban Mullah 

Omar, on the basis of extensive and incontrovertible 

evidence, to extradite Osama bin Laden to the United 

States to stand trial for the embassy bombings.267 Mullah Omar’s stubborn refusal to do so—whether on 

grounds of affinity with a brother Muslim, duty owed 

a person granted sanctuary and hospitality under the 

Pashtun code, or idiosyncratic motives—led former 

President George W. Bush to issue his final ultimatum 

in his September 20, 2001, Address to the Joint Session of Congress: that Omar’s failure to extradite bin 

Laden would lead him and the Taliban to share bin 

Laden’s fate. 
179

9/11 dramatically changed the mix of instruments 

of national power that would be used to disrupt, dismantle, and ultimately defeat AQO. While those earlier instruments remained significant, others central 

to an invasion to overthrow the Taliban regime and 

to destroy AQO’s terrorist capabilities were soon in 

play. Counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, and unconventional warfare, using all necessary means, were 

pursued across the relevant theaters of operation. The 

legal instrument (through the United Nations Security 

Council, North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO], 

and U.S. legal codes) was employed to classify and 

thereby outlaw foreign terrorist organizations, foreign 

terrorists, terrorist travel, finances, weapons flows, 

and terrorist sanctuaries. The USG employed diplomatic, economic, and military instruments to create 

international coalitions, create incentives for cooperation and disincentives for non-cooperation, and hunt 

down high value targets in a lethal and systematic 

campaign employing elite Special Operations Command forces and the Intelligence Community (IC). 

On the American home front, the intelligence and 

legal instruments, most notably the Department of 

Justice (DoJ) and its Federal Bureau of Investigation 

(FBI), along with key partners such as the New York 

Police Department (NYPD) and later the Department 

of Homeland Security (DHS), would protect against 

and prepare for possible mass casualty attacks. Hardening civil aviation and transportation more broadly; 

creating tamper-proof identification; developing intelligence assets and informants that could monitor 

potential terrorist organizations; and restricting and 

preventing terrorist travel all had profound effects.268

It is our belief that our findings have few implications for existing USG policy vis-à-vis classic bin 
180

Ladenism. The net result of this sustained assault on 

AQO was the practical decimation of that organization and that classic terrorist modus operandi responsible for organizing and executing bin Ladenism’s 

classic “Far Enemy” spectacular mass-casualty terrorist attacks. What arose in its wake, however—though 

AQO’s classic “Far Enemy” attacks must still be countered269—was an alternative “lone mujahid” terrorist 

modus operandi currently employed by AQO’s most 

lethal affiliate, AQAP. 

As noted earlier, AQAP’s central strategic focus 

at present is inciting and recruiting random “homebased” and “home-grown” persons willing to plan, 

train for, and successfully execute felonious criminal 

terrorist acts on American soil. Delusionally believed 

to affect actual American economic activity or power, 

its principal consequence lay rather in successfully inspiring a paltry number of loners and sometimes clusters to carry out murderous attacks.270

The USG has, over the past 5 years or so, rebalanced its strategy and chosen instruments of national 

power to address this AQAP “lone jihad” strategy. 

This involves a far greater emphasis on intelligence 

and legal instruments. It also has led to the need to 

more forcefully respond to and counter AQAP’s media operations, now deemed a critical medium for 

connecting AQAP media operatives in the cyber and 

electromagnetic spectrums, with potential individual 

recruits apprised of AQAP’s encryption software, 

downloading incitement media, terror craft, and the 

broader doctrinal beliefs espoused. The lethal targeting of senior AQAP communications operatives such 

as Anwar al-Awlaki and Samir Khan is key. The interagency initiative, Center for Strategic Counterterrorist 

Communications (CSCC), begun in 2011, pioneered 

counter-AQO media warfare; and through its “Think 
181

Again Turn Away” campaign, deliberately focused its 

messengers, messages, and media to target key audiences believed to be most susceptible to AQO’s and 

AQAP’s inspirational terrorist media operations. A 

more sustained emphasis on bottom-up buy-in, selfmonitoring and policing, and enhancing community 

trust and resilience, now compliments the cyber, informational, and legal instruments most critical to effective domestic counterterrorist operations.271

It is advisable that the USG continue this present 

line of effort, i.e., encouraging individual behavioral 

dissuasion, discouragement, and disengagement from 

terrorism,272 using these existing instruments of national power. 

IMPLICATIONS FOR EXISTING USG POLICY 

AND STRATEGY TO PERMANENTLY DEFEAT 

THE ISO

The current declared USG policy is to degrade and 

permanently defeat the ISO.273 USG officials believe 

this can only be achieved through accomplishing defined tasks across key lines of effort (LOEs). Secretary 

of Defense Ashton Carter, and former Chairman of the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff, Army General (Retired) Martin E. 

Dempsey, identified nine key LOEs: 

1. Inclusive effective governance;

2. Military-led denial of sanctuary; 

3. Military-led building of partner capacity;

4. Enhancing intelligence collection;

5. Disrupting finances; 

6. Countering messaging;

7. Disrupting the flow of foreign fighters; 

8. Providing humanitarian support to displaced 

and vulnerable persons; and, 
182

9. Disruption of terrorist threats to the homeland.274

General Ret. John Allen, former special Presidential 

Envoy for the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL, identifies five LOEs:

1. Denial of sanctuary and security force assistance; 

2. Disrupting the flow of foreign fighters; 

3. Disrupting local and international financial 

channels; 

4. Providing humanitarian relief and stabilization 

support; and, 

5. Counter-messaging or defeating Daesch as an 

idea.275

Whether described as five or nine LOEs, each proposal 

envisions a holistic long-term Coalition effort characterized by deep awareness of the political essence of 

insurgency and the demand that the military instrument be carefully integrated as one vital but insufficient instrument/means of national power wielded to 

defeat the ISO. Each also envisions a strong and effective role for a counterterrorist communications strategy designed in particular not only to exploit a critical 

requirement/vulnerability of the ISO—foreign fighter 

recruitment—but also for delegitimizing home-based 

terrorist activities. Recent comprehensive reviews of 

USG and Coalition efforts to date have further iterated 

the vital importance of fully sourcing, expediting, and 

more aggressively countering ISO along these LOEs.276

Findings based in the author’s examination of the 

ISOs doctrinal and strategic concepts appear to substantially support current USG policy and strategy, 

though recommendations are suggested by the pres-
183

ent author to address the specific “stateness” dimension of ISO. These LOEs may be neatly categorized 

into three distinct clusters that correspond to the three 

key strategic objectives earlier identified as key to antiAQO strategy: attacking and destroying the terrorist 

network, preventing radicalization (i.e., encouraging 

behavioral disengagement from) and recruitment to 

terrorism, and protecting against and preparing the 

U.S. homeland from terrorist attacks.277 The third strategic objective is straightforward and we here examine the first two in greater detail.

1. Attacking and destroying the ISO: (military): 

military-led denial of sanctuary and building 

partner capacity; (intelligence): enhancing intelligence collection; (financial, legal): disrupting local and international financial channels; 

(legal, cyber, informational): disrupting the 

flow of foreign fighters. 

2. Encouraging behavioral disengagement from 

ISO terrorism: (cyber, informational): countermessaging or defeating ISO as an idea.

3. Preventing against and preparing for ISO terrorist attacks: (intelligence, legal): disruption 

of terrorist threats to the homeland.

Let us examine these first two strategic objectives 

in more detail. The first strategic objective, attacking 

and destroying the ISO, is mostly well-supported by 

its relevant LOEs and those instruments of national 

power required for their realization. For example, denial of sanctuary, disrupting finances,278 and disrupting foreign fighters279 directly addresses the spatial, 

monetary, and kinetic resources essential to recruit-
184

ing, training, fielding, furnishing, and deploying terrorist operatives. The critical roles of U.S. airpower280

and building partner-capacity are key to preventing additional ISO offensive gains, and potentially a 

non-U.S. indigenous capacity for sustained counteroffensive action. Though not mentioned in the military LOEs, one must also include the present activities 

of JSOC and CIA operatives methodically hunting , 

neutralizing, or capturing key leadership and other 

ISO high value targets,281 and meticulously pursuing 

intelligence-driven, high-tempo find, fix, finish, exploit, analyze, and disseminate (F3EAD) operations.282

Reports suggest that from January through early-June 

2016 alone, “more than 120 Islamic State leaders, commanders, propagandists, recruiters and other so-called 

high-value individuals” have been killed.283 Some of 

the most notable include: 

• Tarkhan Tayumurazovich Batirashvili (aka: 

Abu Omar al-Shishani), ISO’s “minister of war” 

(March 2016).284

• Abd al-Rahman Mustafa al-Qaduli (aka: Haji 

Iman), ISO’s second-in-command and major 

operational planner and organizer, and Minister of Finance (March 2016).285

• Abu al-Haijaa al-Tunisi, senior ISO military 

leader in Aleppo area (March 2016).286

• Shaker Wahib al-Fahdawi al-Dulaimi (aka: Abu 

Waheeb), ISO military emir for Anbar province 

(May 2016).287

Several key high value targets have also been killed 

since, among them: 

• Basim Muhammad Ahmad Sultan al-Bajari, 

ISO deputy minister of war (June 25, 2016).288

• Hatim Talib al-Hamduni, ISO military commander (June 25, 2016).289
185

• Saad Emarati, ISO in Afghanistan/Pakistan region, founder and senior military leader (July 

2016).290

• Hafez Sayed, senior ISO commander in Afghanistan (July 26, 2016).291

• Abu Muhammad al-Adnani al-Shami, ISO senior spokesman, propagandist, external operations chief, strategist (August 30, 2016).292

• Abu-Muhammad Furqan, ISO Chief of Media 

Operations (September 7, 2016).293

Moreover, focus has been placed on silently decimating the ranks of nearly 40 “external operations leaders, 

planners, and facilitators” conducting external terrorist operations directed against Coalition and other allied countries,294 and also the JSOC-led capture of key 

operatives and critical intelligence. For example, four 

to seven terabytes of critical data contained on laptop 

computers, cell phones, and other sources detailing 

ISO’s financial, logistical, and leadership operations 

was recovered by a JSOC-led operation designed to 

capture senior ISO financial official Abu Sayyaf. Additional critical information was elicited from the 

3-month interrogation of his wife, Umm Sayyaf.295 The 

capture and interrogation of another ISO senior operative, Sulayman Dawud al-Bakkar (aka: Suleiman 

Daoud al-Afari)—a key operative in ISO’s chemical 

weapons program—has led to far greater knowledge 

of this program, including how the group weaponized 

sulfur mustard and loaded it onto artillery shells, and 

also facilitated target selection used to attack and destroy existing manufacturing sites and tactical units.296

USG shaping operations now in progress in Mosul led 

to intelligence facilitating what is described as “one of 

the largest airstrikes yet on an Islamic State car bomb 
186

factory. . . hitting a sprawling compound south of Mosul.”297 The recent liberation of the key strategic northern Syrian town of Manbij contributed a huge trove of 

vital intelligence that further fed this F3EAD cycle.298

Most recently, in the wake of Secretary of Defense 

Ashton Carter’s specific demands, the USG has tasked 

the U.S. Cyber Command to embark on a systematic 

campaign of publicly acknowledged offensive cyberattacks directed at disrupting, degrading, and dissembling ISO’s command and control.299

The previously mentioned LOEs, however, insufficiently recognize that the ISO is not just a terrorist network or organization with sanctuary, but is endeavoring to build and sustain a state-centered terrorist 

enterprise. Though the ISO is a criminal, exploitative, 

coercive, proto-police-state neither representative nor 

supported by the vast majority of Sunnis who suffer 

its rule, it is in de-facto control of territory, resources, 

persons, substantial infrastructure, and various means 

of extracting monies. It is for this reason that traditional counterterrorism strategies require supplementing. 

Suggestive candidates include unconventional warfare300 developed with a broader policy objective of 

short-term containment and a final objective of permanent defeat and destruction.301

ISO is an occupying power lacking authority, legitimacy, and support from the vast majority of persons residing in its conquered territories. It has much 

in common with a Ba’athist totalitarian police state 

and virtually nothing in common with the sovereign 

that most persons, if able to determine their own 

fate, would choose. Brutal terror, murder, extortion, 

coercion, and assassination do not furnish the foundations of a state bound to last.302 Given these facts, 

which resemble those applicable to Communist and 
187

Fascist-conquered Europe, it is highly probable that 

an unconventional warfare strategy can pay large 

dividends. It is true that resistance to occupation is 

mercilessly punished through exemplary crucifixions 

and beheadings, and so this is a project that requires a 

broadened scope and longer time-frame. Much can be 

done to sever essential logistical links to the occupying 

ISO terrorist State, and many of the LOEs designed to 

repress terrorist networks can be modified to address 

states.303

The present author therefore agrees with those 

analysts who have recently suggested the prudence 

of a short-term containment-to-roll-back strategy to 

address ISO’s expansionist designs.304 

The second strategic objective—encouraging behavioral disengagement from ISO terrorism—exploits 

a key ISO critical vulnerability: the need for a steady 

supply of persons willing to either travel to Syria and 

assist ISIS’s terrorist State, or—as is increasingly likely—to remain in one’s own homeland and mercilessly 

and brutally murder anyone within one’s potential 

reach. This message of: “No More Hijra! Stay Home 

and Mercilessly Slaughter Your Infidel Neighbor!” 

has become far more prevalent following the USG’s 

August 7, 2014, commencement of aerial bombing to 

prevent a potential genocidal slaughter of the Yezidi 

ethno-religious minority, and also an ISO offensive on 

the key provincial city of Arbil.305

ISO’s terrorist media operations, as noted by scores 

of analysts, surpass those of any terrorist organization 

on record.306 Vastly eclipsing classical bin Ladenism 

or AQO’s relatively media-savvy affiliate AQAP, the 

ISO employs cutting edge film and editing techniques 

to produce high-quality, action-packed, dramaticallycompelling videos; operates a virtual social media 
188

army operating across a range of platforms, including 

Twitter and Instagram to broadcast tens of thousands 

of messages and images per day; and has employed a 

cadre of groomers whose sole mission is to target and 

recruit individuals from abroad to either emigrate to 

Syria and remain, or increasingly more likely, to plan 

and execute home-based terrorist attacks.307 

ISO’s juggernaut has finally been facing a far stiffer 

wind, however,308 and its media operations have forced 

several nations and organizations to develop effective 

campaigns designed to counter ISO’s siren song and 

effectively encourage behavioral disengagement from 

ISO’s terrorist enterprise.309 Leaving terrorism behind, 

being based on deeply personal, psychological realities, has now replaced a rationalistically conceived 

“de-radicalization” process as the more effective approach to detaching human lives and souls from ISO’s 

terrorist enterprise. Though it has taken time to adapt, 

a coterie of media operatives is now busy developing 

tactics, techniques, and procedures to counter those 

ISO has to date used with great effect.310 Other efforts 

include targeted removal and exploiting ISO’s online 

presence to develop actionable intelligence on ISO’s 

operatives and even military operations.311

A notable evolution in USG counter-ISO information operations has been effected that substantially 

extends beyond the CSCC’s earlier tactics, techniques, 

and procedures directed exclusively at AQO/AQAP. 

The CSCC shifted from countering AQAP’s “lone mujahid” terrorism to exclusively focusing on the ISO,312

and has used ISO defectors’ compelling testimony313

in a series of videos that employ highly-compelling 

techniques to drive home, rationally and emotionally, several reasons to disengage from terrorism; for 

example: observed hypocrisy, deceit, cruelty, murder, 
189

dishonor, loneliness, broken promises, missed love 

one’s, and wasted and destroyed lives.314 The CSCC’s 

“Think Again Turn Away” campaign, while laudable, 

has recently ceased in its present form, and counterISO information operations reorganized to more effectively pursue and realize the Obama administration’s 

demand for a more nimble, sophisticated, and effective counter-ISO posture in the cyber domain.315

Concluding Observation: What is the Difference 

between “Defeat,” and “Permanent Defeat” of the 

ISO “Idea”? 

All LOEs, except one, have now been examined. 

We have saved the most important for last. For in a 

very real sense it is the beginning and the end of the 

ISO story. This LOE is described earlier by the two 

senior-most USG officials, below the Commander-inChief, charged with overseeing the nation’s armed 

forces. It is inclusive effective governance. It was 

said earlier by the present author when examining the 

ISO’s doctrine that:

The ISO’s apocalypticism, anti-Shia extermination, 

‘Nearest Enemy’ and ‘Near Enemy,’ and “Caliphate 

Now!” doctrines would be little more than hindrance 

were these not combined with two additional factors. 

First, its creation of a fearsome, highly professional, 

military leadership cadre comprised of former Ba’athist 

military and intelligence officers whose tactics, techniques, and procedures mimic those of totalitarian 

Soviet and Nazi-era secret police. Second, the revengeful 

anti-Sunni policies pursued by former Prime Minister alMaliki, in the context of a dramatically changed regional 

dynamic enervated by the ‘Arab Spring,’ precipitating deep 

alienation among Iraq’s embattled and marginalized Sun-
190

nis, and thus enhancing the ISO’s short-term credibility as 

their rescuers and defenders [italics added].

316 

It is this second point that is of grave concern here. If 

it was willing to employ the means required, the USG 

could temporarily defeat ISO within a brief period. 

This can be done; it is not beyond U.S. means. Our 

reluctance to do so is based in a hard-earned wisdom, 

one bathed in the blood and treasure of America, its 

allies, and hundreds of thousands of Iraqis and now 

Syrians. This simple, hard-won truth is that every 

genuine insurgency, in this case the Sunni insurgency, 

is at heart a political struggle. ISO was able to opportunistically and ruthlessly exploit current Sunni 

disenchantment, disfranchisement, and a revengeful 

Iranian-backed al-Maliki regime that broke promises 

and delivered repression, exclusion, and despair. The 

permanent defeat of the ISO idea will only occur when 

Iraqis make the choice to create a new social compact 

in which its Sunni citizens are respected, represented, 

and protected.317
191

III. RECOMMENDATIONS

The following recommendations are suggested to 

further strengthen existing policy, strategy, and professional leader education.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SENIOR MILITARY 

LEADERS, PLANNERS, AND STRATEGISTS

Two classes of recommendations are suggested: one is doctrine-independent, and the second is 

doctrine-dependent.

Doctrine-Independent Recommendations. 

By “doctrine independent,” the recommendations 

are meant to hold regardless of the worldview, creed, 

and doctrine of one’s adversary. It is likely that the 

vast majority of relevant recommendations fall into 

this category. Terrorism, as earlier described, is a 

distinct method. Combating terrorism (CbT), which 

combines counterterrorism (CT) and anti-terrorism 

(AT), demands knowledge of the method of terror, 

regardless of the substantive presuppositions of the 

terrorist doctrine. The author’s Terrorist Quadrangle 

Analysis (TQA) is recommended, however, as a heuristic for conceptualizing and countering the terrorist 

enterprise and modus operandi. It facilitates ready 

visualization of its four key inter-related dimensions, 

and thereby the clarification of critical requirements, 

critical vulnerabilities, and opportunities. 

Irregular warfare (IW), most notably unconventional warfare (UW) and counterinsurgency (COIN), 

regardless of specific adversarial worldview and doctrine, adeptly attack adversarial states and insurgents. 
192

U.S. military leadership has for nearly a decade been 

crystal clear about how to degrade, defeat, and destroy the ISO modus operandi.318 It is not knowledge 

but the mangled, compromised political dynamics of 

the present Iraqi state that have limited its effectiveness. The present book offers no greater clarity than 

that already possessed by the USG’s highly competent 

leadership now possessed of a realistic policy, strategy, and its essential LOEs. 

Doctrine-Dependent Recommendations. 

Islam, a major world religion, is the third of three 

great faiths whose eponymous ancestor Abraham is 

considered the superlative exemplar of one who forsook all, including the unimaginable, his firstborn son, 

to worship God. Islamic orthodoxy presumes man by 

nature is a born monotheist (fitra) endowed by the Creator with the pure knowledge of all worshipful practices demanded of God’s slave. The Arabic word for 

God (or better, “the God”) is “Allah” (al-ilah). “Allah 

is the Greatest” (Allahu-akhbar) is for non-Muslims recognizable only as the battle cry of criminal and sinful 

mass murderers who profess to realize Allah’s Divine 

will by murdering in cold blood. This is a great travesty and predicament now facing potentially billions 

of persons—Muslim and non-Muslim—who must on 

the grounds of Islam itself answer these perpetrators 

and criminal masterminds and assist their utter defeat. Fortunately, in the present author’s view, Islam 

does amply provide without question the answers 

necessary.

This does not demand that one deny that violence 

or religiously-inspired warfare has accompanied Islam’s rise. In earlier writings, the present author has 
193

insisted that a proper and effective answer to countering terrorism conducted in the name of Sunni Islam 

cannot honestly, and should not in practice be based, 

in denying that the military jihad remains for observant orthodox militant Sunni Muslims a superlative 

religious obligation binding until the Day of Final 

Judgment.319 Having conceded this “jihad-realist” 

premise, however, rather than a slippery slope authorizing further AQO and ISO terrorism, one can and 

should be led to the exact opposite conclusion. The 

military jihad, even if it is an offensive jihad carried 

out to raise Allah’s Word supreme, is governed by a 

strict jurisprudence rooted in core religious principles 

and values that amounts to an Islamic variant of international law. The present author has previously illustrated how this jurisprudence of lawful jihad may 

be used to great effect to attack AQO’s terrorist modus 

operandi.320 A brief but pointed critique of ISO has also 

been penned.321 It is highly recommended that senior 

military leaders, planners, and strategists fully comprehend this jurisprudence of lawful military jihad, 

and how key dissident and non-dissident orthodox 

Sunni scholars may be leveraged to categorically condemn and proscribe AQO and ISO terrorism committed in the name of Sunni Islam.322

AQO and ISO are extreme deviant criminal outliers within the Sunni Islamic spectrum. Their marginalization ensures their eventual implosion. The vast 

majority of Sunni Muslims ascribe neither to the ends 

they seek—a supranational Caliphate governed by 

medieval Sharia—nor to the means they use. Permanently prying these parasitic organizations away from 

their healthy hosts is best achieved by strengthening 

the host societies, i.e., creating viable, functional, representative polities capable of protecting populations, 
resolving internal divides, and delivering essential 

services. AQO cannot survive if its claim to defend 

against a supposed “Crusader War Against Islam” 

rings insincere, incredible, and hollow. Its three futures appear to be either evisceration at the hands of 

the USG’s lethal campaign to destroy this entity and its 

leadership; criminal reorientation into “lone mujahid” 

anarchistic-like small-scale terrorist attacks on defenseless populations, Muslim and non-Muslim; and 

what may turn out to be its last lifeline, a long-term 

reinvention of AQO as secretly-embedded insurgents 

within nationalist-territorial Islamist fronts focused 

not on attacking the “Far Enemy,” but on transforming “Near Enemy” regimes into Sharia-based states 

(e.g. Syria, Yemen, Algeria, and Tunisia).323

The ISO based in four signature premises—apocalypticism, genocidal anti-Shi’ism, Caliphalism, and 

“Near Enemy” obsession—provide, despite alarmist interpretations now widely in vogue, a far easier 

target for near-term elimination. ISO is essentially an 

ultra-sectarian mass-murdering terrorist army whose 

wealth, social media sophistication, and recent territorial conquests have led many to mistake a mouse 

for a lion, and a molehill for a mountain. This ferocity, lethality, brutality, coercion, and police-state sophistication of former Ba’athist officers leading an 

apocalyptically-inclined ultra-sectarian extremely deviant organization, has no base and no future in the 

world of actually existing Sunni Islam. Mass murder, 

threatened and actual genocidal intention, criminal 

extortion, ransoming, theft, despotism, tyranny, and 

hubris have led the ISO to become a permanent target of virtually every nation and people who shall 

ensure its relatively swift destruction. ISO is at the 

time of this writing on the strategic defensive.324 ISO 

194
195

defeats in Kobani (January 2015), Shadadi (February 

2015), Tikrit (March 2015), Baiji (October 2015), Ramadi (December 2015),325 Fallujah (June 2016), Manbij, 

Syria (August 2016), Jarablus, Syria (September 2016), 

and Sirte, Libya (August/September 2016),326 coupled 

with the apparent momentum across a range of other 

ISO strongholds, provide key evidence confirming 

ISO’s loss of momentum, territory, and battlefield initiative.327 ISO’s strategic defensive posture is now also 

evident not only in its brutally vicious tactics directed 

at retaining physical terrain and population control,328

but also tactically as it shifts like its predecessor AQI 

when losing ground, toward increased emphasis on 

high-visibility mass-casualty terrorist attacks.329

The permanent destruction of ISO requires, as 

earlier stated, resolution of the intra-Islamic sectarian divide among Sunni and Shia Muslims,330 though 

ISO’s targeting of even lay Shia creates the potential 

for Sunni-Shia cooperation to prevent this murderous 

result. Strategic patience will pay off, and it is highly 

recommended that focus also be placed on preparing 

for and preventing against ISO’s potential to wreak 

massive destruction in the process of its inevitable 

defeat.331

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR LEADER 

DEVELOPMENT AND EDUCATION

The present author presumes that highly competent professionals are already effectively educating 

leaders to engage these two terrorist adversaries. 

However, in conclusion, we here offer a few reminders or perhaps further extrapolations on points earlier 

made. It is highly recommended that leaders acquire 

a deepened knowledge of Islam: its essential religious core; key facts of history and evolution; and a 
clear comprehension of the contemporary spectrum 

of Islamic activism, including the varieties of political Islam—violent and non-violent—that now and 

into the foreseeable future shall also play their role in 

shaping the world’s sociopolitical and sociocultural 

life. Having a deepened knowledge and genuine respect for this Abrahamic-derived faith, one will also 

discover why the vast majority of Muslims can easily 

and justifiably disassociate AQO and ISO terrorism

from this faith. The criminal essence of terrorism—

treachery, deceit, murder, creating insecurity, dread, 

fear, horror, and calamity—is so far from the essential religious core defining Islam that many deny that 

Muslims themselves can actually be behind this madness and murder. Conspiracy theory is rampant, and 

denial that this has anything to do with Islam at all is 

a certain and emphatic conviction, especially in those 

regions suffering its brunt. What is certain is that persons act in the name of Islam, and as earlier stated, it 

is for Sunni Muslims themselves to ultimately determine the legitimate versus illegitimate bounds of this 

world faith. 

Possessed of a deepened knowledge and respect 

for Islam, however, leaders can become natural allies in what can and should be an inter-civilizational, 

long-term alliance to extinguish terrorist enterprises 

as legitimate vehicles for changing lives and social orders. Healthy sociopolitical orders surely doom AQO 

and ISO to inevitable marginalization and implosion. 

Strengthened host societies and competent security 

forces defending legitimate borders, in alliance with 

the world’s civilizations—including most certainly Islam—will lead AQO to occupy only virtual territories 

and ever-shriveling sanctuaries. The only card left to 

play is to poison, polarize, and plot attacks designed 

196
197

to estrange Islam and Muslims from the world, and 

to incessantly parrot their “Crusader War Against Islam” mantra to ever-diminishing target audiences. Islamophobia, ironically, is their only genuine potential 

Western ally, and inter-civilizational dialogue, cooperation, and evolution their only actual genuine enemy. It turns out that “the tyrant,” the “idol worshipper,” and the “Crusader” has not been the West at all, 

but these organizations themselves who have made 

their own desires and “will to power” their object of 

worship, their God; their self-anointing as usurpers 

of all authority, their Idol; and their fabricated defense against a non-existent war against Islam, their 

Crusade. 

AQO and ISO are two extremely deviant Salafijihadi organizations. Fully understanding Sunni Islam 

in all its complexity, variety, and majesty, and how 

these two deviant criminal terrorist entities attach to 

this faith, requires knowledge. Professional educators 

should ensure that this knowledge is being adequately conveyed to those who now, and in the near future, 

shall ally with Sunni Islam against these terrorist entities. 

The war we now wage is not now and has never 

been against Islam. Rather, it is the war first quite accurately declared by former President Bush and more 

recently by former President Obama: it is a war against 

terrorist murderers who act in the name of a faith worthy of great admiration and respect. Detached from 

a faith they have maligned, besmirched, and unfairly 

damaged in the eyes of the world, they shall again 

sooner rather than later become strangers wandering 

without land or followers. It is a fate they have earned 

for themselves, by their own hands. A murderer is not 

a martyr, after all.
198

ENDNOTES

1. Describing each of these terrorist entities as “organizations” 

(Tanzim) is justifiable on the following grounds. First, this is actually the full and proper name chosen by “al-Qaeda” for itself in its 

original documents and nomenclature, despite the much-cited abbreviated form. Second, it is an accurate way to characterize how 

Sunni Muslims, including militant Sunni advocates of jihad who 

dissent from the Islamic State Organization’s (ISO’s) doctrine and 

methods, choose to describe this entity. The Islamic State (IS) is a 

terrorist organization that has declared itself the exclusive caliphate of the world’s Sunni Muslims. Until this self-designation triumphs more generally, its existence as an organization (Tanzim) 

should be recognized, yet owing to the centrality of its state-centered doctrine and methods, it is advisable to retain the concept 

“State” as well. The Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) was self-declared on 

October 15, 2006; the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham/Levant 

(ISIS), was self-declared on April 7, 2013; and the IS was self-declared on June 29, 2014. Each self-declaration was made exclusively by a single terrorist organization and, despite pretensions 

otherwise, has not received recognition beyond a relatively small 

circle of adherents. For this notion that the IS is an organization, 

and not a state, in the writings of a highly-influential Salafi-jihadi, Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, see Pieter Van Ostaeyen, “Abu 

Muhammad al-Maqdisi: The Case of ISIS and the Position of the 

Duty Toward It,” pietervanostaeyen, blog entry, posted May 27, 

2014, available from pietervanostaeyen.com/2014/05/27/abu-muhammad-al-maqdisi-the-case-of-isis-and-the-position-of-the-duty-towardit/, accessed on December 9, 2014; For discussion on the naming 

conventions for this terrorist entity, see Zack Beauchamp, “ISIS, 

Islamic State or ISIL? What to call the group the US is bombing 

in Iraq and Syria,” September 17, 2014, available from www.vox.

com/2014/9/17/6259923/isis-isil-the-islamic-state-daesh-what-is-isiswhy-does-obama-use-isil, accessed on September 19, 2014; Hamid 

Lellou, “Lost in Translation: ISIS’s Intention Was in Their Name, 

But We Missed It,” August 4, 2014, available from smallwarsjournal.com/print/15998, accessed on August 4, 2014.

2. Pew Research Center, “Mapping the Global Muslim 

Population,” October 7, 2009, available from www.pewforum.

org/2009/10/07/mapping-the-global-muslim-population/, accessed on 

October 4, 2013. The global total is estimated at 1.57 billion Mus-
199

lims, with 87-90 percent affiliated as Sunni. The phrase “Defending Ahl-us Sunnah” (People of the Sunnah, or “Right Path”); or 

less frequently, Ahl-us-Sunnah wa’l-Gama’at (People of the Sunnah 

and Community), is frequently encountered in this terrorist literature.

3. For a comprehensive recent analysis, see Roel Meijer, 

ed., Global Salafism: Islam’s New Religious Movement, New York: 

Columbia University Press, 2009.

4. For its classic statement, see Sheikh-ul-Islam Muhammad 

bin Abdul Wahhab, The Book of Monotheism (Kitab at-Tauhid), 

transl. by Compilation and Research Department Dar-us-Salam, 

Riyadh, Saudi Arabia: Dar-us-Salam, 1996. For its incorporation 

into Hanbali law, the predominant school of Sunni jurisprudence 

in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), see Mahmoud Ridha Murad, The Islamic Digest of Aqeedah and Fiqh, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia: 

Darussalam, 1998; Shaykh ‘Abdul-’Aziz bin ‘Abdullah bin Baz, 

Shaykh Muhammad bin Salih Al-’Uthaimin, and Shaykh ‘Abdullah bin ‘Abdur-Rahman Al-Jibreen, along with The Permanent 

Committee and the decisions of the Fiqh Council, Fatawa Islamiyah: Islamic Verdicts, Vol. 1: Creed, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia: Darussalam, 2001. For seminal studies and classic expositions of the 

fundamentals of “Wahhabism,” see David Commins, The Wahhabi 

Mission and Saudi Arabia, London, UK and New York: I.B. Tauris, 

2006 and 2009; Natana J. DeLong-Bas, Wahhabi Islam: From Revival 

and Reform to Global Jihad, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 

2004; Michael Cook, “On the Origins of Wahhabism,” Journal of 

the Royal Asiatic Society, 3rd Series, Vol. 2, No. 2, 1992, pp. 191-202; 

Sheikh Hafiz Wahba, “Wahhabism in Arabia: Past and Present,” 

Journal of the Central Asian Society, Vol. 16, No. 4, 1929, pp. 458-467; 

Phoenix, “A Brief Outline of the Wahabi Movement,” Journal of 

the Royal Central Asian Society, Vol. 17, No. 4, 1930, pp. 401-416; 

Joseph A. Kechichian, “The Role of the Ulema in the Politics of 

an Islamic State: The Case of Saudi Arabia,” International Journal 

of Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 18, No. 1, February 1986, pp. 53-71; 

and Joseph Kostiner, “On Instruments and Their Designers: The 

Ikhwan of Najd and the Emergence of the Saudi State,” Middle 

Eastern Studies, Vol. 21, No. 3, July 1985, pp. 298-323. For key encyclopedia articles on al-Wahhab and key Wahhabi concepts, see 

H. Laoust, “Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab,” in B. Lewis, V. Menage, Ch. 

Pellat, and J. Schacht, eds., Encyclopedia of Islam Vol. 3, 2nd Edition, Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1971, pp. 677-679; D. Gimaret, “Tawhid,” in 
200

P. Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, W. Heinrichs, and G. Lecomte eds., Encyclopedia of Islam Vol. 10, 2nd Edition, Leiden: E.J. Brill, 2000, p. 389; D. Gimaret, “Shirk,” in C. 

Bosworth, E. van Donzel, W. Heinrichs, and G. Lecomte eds., Encyclopedia of Islam Vol. 8, 2nd Edition, Leiden: E. J. Brill 1995, pp. 

484-486; J. Robson, “Bid’a,” in B. Lewis, Ch. Pellat, and J. Schacht, 

eds., Encyclopedia of Islam Vol. 1, 2nd Edition, Leiden: E. J. Brill, 

1960, p. 1199; Editor [n.n.], “Djahilliyya,” in B. Lewis, Ch. Pellat, 

and J. Schacht eds., Encyclopedia of Islam Vol. 2, 2nd Edition, Leiden: 

E. J. Brill 1965, pp. 383-384; W. Ende, “Wahhabiyya,” in Encyclopedia of Islam Vol. 11, 2nd Edition, P. Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C. 

Bosworth, E. van Donzel, and W. Heinrich eds., Leiden: E. J. Brill, 

2002, pp. 39-47; Stephanie Lacroix and Thomas Hegghammer, 

Saudi Arabia Backgrounder: Who are the Islamists? International Crisis Group, Middle East Report No. 31, Amman/Riyadh/Brussels, 

September 21, 2004; International Crisis Group, Can Saudi Arabia 

Reform Itself? International Crisis Group, Middle East Report No. 

28, Cairo/Brussels, July 14, 2004; Thomas Hegghammer, The Failure of Jihad in Saudi Arabia, Occassional Paper Series, Combating 

Terrorism Center at West Point, February 25, 2010; and Joshua 

Teitelbaum, Holier Than Thou: Saudi Arabia’s Islamic Opposition, 

Policy Papers No. 52, Washington, DC: The Washington Institute 

for Near East Policy, 2000, available from www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/PP_52_HOLIER_THAN_THOU.

pdf, accessed on October 2, 2014.

5. Mahmoud Rida Murad, The Islamic Digest of Aqeedah and 

Fiqh, pp. 20-22. 

6. For further clarification of this jihad-realist imperative, see 

Paul Kamolnick, Delegitimizing Al-Qa’ida: A Jihad-Realist Approach, 

Carlisle, Pennsylvania: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army 

War College, 2012, pp. 4-6; and Paul Kamolnick, “The Egyptian 

Islamic Group’s Critique of Al-Qaeda’s Interpretation of Jihad, “ 

Perspectives on Terrorism, Vol. 7, No. 5, October 2013, pp. 93-97, 

available from www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/

view/293/591.

7. See Elaine Pagels, The Origin of Satan: How Christians Demonized Jews, Pagans, and Heretics, New York: Random House, 

1995, esp. chapters 2-3, 6. In a particularly insightful quote Pagels 

remarks: 
201

At first glance these stories of Satan may seem to have little 

in common. Yet they all agree on one thing: that this greatest 

and most dangerous enemy did not originate, as one might expect, as an outsider, an alien, or a stranger. Satan is not a distant 

enemy but the intimate enemy—one’s trusted colleague, close 

associate, brother. He is the kind of person on whose loyalty 

and goodwill the well-being of family and society depend—but 

one who turns unexpectedly jealous and hostile. Whichever 

version of his origin one chooses, then, and there are many, all 

depict Satan as an intimate enemy—the attribute that qualifies 

him so well to express conflict among Jewish groups. Those 

who asked, ‘How could God’s own angel become his enemy?’ 

were thus asking in effect, “How could one of us become one 

of them?” Stories of Satan and other fallen angels proliferated 

in these troubled times, especially within those radical groups 

that had turned against the rest of the Jewish community and, 

consequently, concluded that others had turned against them—

or (as they put it) against God.

8. For pioneering insights by this classical social theorist, see 

Georg Simmel, auth., Kurt H. Wolff and Reinhard Bendix, transl., 

Conflict & The Web of Group Affiliations, New York: The Free Press, 

1955, pp. 45-50. 

9. For important examinations of Wahhabism and its possible 

variations from mainstream to ultra-conservative, see Abdulaziz 

H. al-Fahad, “From Exclusivism to Accommodation: Doctrinal 

and Legal Evolution of Wahhabism,” New York University Law Review, Vol. 79, No. 2, May 2004, pp. 485-519; Hala Fattah, “‘Wahhabi’ Influences, Salafi Responses: Shaikh Mahmud Shukri and the 

Iraqi Salafi Movement, 1745-1930,” Journal of Islamic Studies, Vol. 

14, No. 2, 2003, pp. 127-148; Elizabeth Sirriyeh, “Wahhabis, Unbelievers and the Problems of Exclusivism,” Bulletin, British Society 

for Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 16, No. 2, 1989, pp. 123-132; Shawana A. Aziz (compiled, transl.), “Is Ignorance an Excuse in Matters of Aqeedah [Creed]?” Fatawa by Shaykh Abdul Aziz ibn Baz 

and Shaykh Salih ibn Fawzan al-Fawzan, available from www.

qsep.com/media/172.php, accessed on March 27, 2015; Joas Wagemakers, “The Enduring Legacy of the Second Saudi State: Quietist and Radical Wahhabi Contestations of al-Walā' wa-l-Barā,” 

International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 44, No. 1, February 

2012, pp. 93-110; Madawi al-Rasheed, “Prohibiting Politics: Saudi 

Wahhabi Religious Discourse,” June 4, 2007, available from www.
202

madawialrasheed.org/site/more/112, accessed on March 26, 2015; 

Abu Hashim, “Uncomfortable Contradictions (part 1): The Hidden Problem with Modern Salafism in Relation to Takfir; Part 1 of 

a Series of Translated Extracts from the Durar al-Saniyyah,” available from www.masud.co.uk/ISLAM/misc/uncomfortable-contradictions.htm, accessed on March 26, 2015; Quran Sunnah Educational 

Programs, “Was Shaykh Muhammad ibn ‘Abdul-Wahhab’s call 

based on Takfir?” Fatwa response by Shaykh ‘Abdul ‘Aziz ibn 

‘Abdullah ibn Muhammad al al-Shaykh, available from www.

qsep.com/modules.php?name=ilm&d_op=article&sid=196, accessed 

on March 26, 2015; Munirah al-Hudayb, “Da’ish Urges Saudi 

Supporters to Kill Their Relatives Before Emigrating,” London 

Al-Hayah Online, March 17, 2015, available from www.opensource.

com, accessed on March 23, 2015; Dr. Sharif Hatim al-’Awni, “Hatim al-’Awni: ‘Imitation of the Disbelievers’ Amongst the Ranks 

of the Islamists,” transl. by Namazi, n.d, n.p.; Dr. Ibrahim b. Abd 

Allah al-Duwayyish et al. [48 additional signatories, including Dr. 

Sharif Hatim b. Arif al-’Awni], “Our Statement Concerning the 

Riyadh Bombings,” January 1, 2003, available from en.islamtoday.

net/print/2972, accessed on March 26, 2015; Dr. Sharif Hatim al-

’Awni, “Saudi (‘salafi’) shaykh al sharif Hatim Al-’Awni on the 

Ash’aris,” Statement published October 26, 2013, n.p.; and Cole 

Bunzel in a very informative analytic report comparing ISO and 

Wahhabiyya. See Cole Bunzel, The Kingdom and the Caliphate: Duel 

of the Islamic States, February 2016, available from carnegieendowment.org/2016/02/18/kingdom-and-caliphate-duel-of-islamic-statespub-62810, accessed on August 1, 2016, which identifies four 

key points of ISO’s divergence from a classical unreconstructed 

Saudi-based Wahhabism: [1] ISO’s rejection on grounds of “apostasy” of an alliance with the family dynasty of Al Saud; [2] its 

central aspiration to establish a caliphate; [3] it’s ultra-violence, 

about which Cole writes: 

Violence was by no means absent from the first Saudi-Wahhabi state . . . But the Islamic State’s gut-wrenching displays of 

beheading, immolation, and other forms of extreme violence 

aimed at inspiring fear are no throwback to Wahhabi practices. 

They were introduced by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi . . .

and finally, [4] ISO’s apocalypticism, which lacks a mainstream 

Wahhabi precedent. 
203

10. See Muhammad Haniff Hassan, The Father of Jihad: ‘Abd 

Allah Azzam’s Jihad Ideas and Implications to National Security, London: Imperial College Press, 2014, pp. 99-142, for selective insights. 

For a key recent overview of Azzam’s significance and writings, 

see Thomas Hegghammer, “Introduction: Abdallah Azzam, The 

Imam of Jihad,” in Gilles Kepel and Jean-Pierre Milelli, eds., Pascale Ghazaleh, transl., Al Qaeda in its Own Words, Cambridge, MA: 

Belknap Press, 2010, pp. 81-101. The two seminal Azzam writings 

of greatest interest for present purposes are: Dr. Abdullah Azzam, 

Defense of the Muslim Lands: The First Obligation after Iman [Faith], 

(ca. 1985), available from archive.org/stream/Defense_of_the_Muslim_Lands/Defense_of_the_Muslim_Lands, accessed on November 6, 2014; and, Shaykh ‘Abdullah Azzam, Join the Caravan, (c. 

1987-1988), available from archive.org/stream/JoinTheCaravan/JoinTheCaravan_djvu.txt, accessed on November 6, 2014; see also, Dr. 

Abdallah Azzam, “Al-Qa’ida al-Subah: The Solid Base,” al-Jihad

(magazine), April 1988, available from insidethejihad.com/2014/03/

al-qaida-al-subah-the-solid-base/, accessed on November 10, 2014.

11. Offensive jihad (jihad al-talab) is a collective responsibility 

(fard al-khifaya), that may be discharged by a select number from 

the Ummah who fight on their behalf.

12. The four letters preceding Azzam’s fatwa that consent 

and advise that it be accepted as sound on scholarly grounds, are 

translated in English and can be read at the head of Abdullah Azzam, Defense of the Muslim Lands. 

13. Qutb’s comprehensive vision and foundational “Qutbist” concepts are contained in his book, Sayyid Qutb, Signposts 

[Milestones] on the Road (Ma’alim fi-l-Tariq), Cedar Rapids, IA: The 

Mother Mosque Foundation, 1993 [1964]. 

14. See David Cook, Understanding Jihad, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2005, pp. 153-157. See also in the ISO’s 

“Original Shuhada Series,” an English translation of Abdullah 

Azzam’s, Lovers of [Virgins] Maidens of Paradise [Lovers of the Hur 

al Ayn]. New title provided by ISO, The Martyrs of Afghanistan, 

Azzam Publications [online publisher], available from archive.org/

download/BlackFlagNShuhadaStoriesEbooks/Black%20Flag%20n%20

Shuhada%Stories%20Ebooks.rar, accessed on May 13, 2015. Azzam 

covers a period of anti-Soviet Afghan jihad, from 1979-1989.
204

15. Key references that inform this interpretation of AQO’s 

evolution include: Peter L. Bergen, Holy War, Inc.: Inside the Secret World of Osama bin Laden, New York: Touchstone, 2002 [2001]; 

Peter L. Bergen, The Osama bin Laden I Know, New York: The Free 

Press, 2006; Peter L. Bergen, The Longest War: The Enduring Conflict Between America and al-Qaeda, New York: Free Press, 2011; 

Najwa bin Laden, Omar bin Laden, and Jean Sasson, Growing Up 

bin Laden: Osama’s Wife and Son Take Us Inside Their Secret World, 

New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2009; Steve Coll, The Bin Ladens: An 

Arabian Family in the American Century, New York: The Penguin 

Press, 2008; Michael Scheuer, Osama bin Laden, New York: Oxford University Press, 2011; Abdel Bari Atwan, The Secret History 

of al Qaeda, Updated Ed., Berkeley, CA: University of California 

Press, 2008 [2006]; Montasser al-Zayyat, auth., Ahmed Fekry, 

transl., Sara Nimis, ed., The Road to Al-Qaeda: The Story of BinLaden’s Right-Hand Man, London, UK and Ann Arbor, MI: Pluto 

Press, 2004 [2002]; Camille Tawil, auth., Robin Bray, transl., Brothers in Arms: The Story of Al-Qa’ida and the Arab Jihadists, London, 

UK: Saqi Books, 2010 [2007]; Rohan Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda: 

Global Network of Terror, New York: Berkeley Books, 2003 [2002]; 

Fawaz A. Gerges, The Rise and Fall of Al-Qaeda, Oxford, UK and 

New York: Oxford University Press, 2011; Fawaz A. Gerges, The 

Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 

University Press, 2005; Steve Coll, Ghost Wars: The Secret History 

of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to 

September 10, 2001, New York: Penguin Books, 2004; Lawrence 

Wright, The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11, New 

York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2006; Terry McDermott, Perfect Soldiers: 

The 9/11 Hijackers: Who They Were, Why They Did It, New York: 

HarperCollins, 2005; Thomas Hegghammer, Jihad in Saudi Arabia: 

Violence and Pan-Islamism since 1979, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 

University Press, 2010; National Commission on Terrorist Attacks 

on the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report, Authorized Edition, New York: Norton, 2004, ch. 2, pp. 47-70.

16. “Al Qaeda Founding Minutes,” “TAREEKHOSAMA/50 

Tareekh Osama 122–123,” August 11, 1988, Intelwire.com, accessed 

on April 13, 2011; “Al Qaeda Founding Minutes,” “TAREEKHOSAMA/50 Tareekh Osama 127–127a,” August 20, 1988, 

available from Intelwire.com, accessed on April 13, 2011; “Al-Qaida Bylaws (English Translation),” Harmony Program Doc. No. 

AFGP-2002-600048, Combating Terrorism Center, West Point, 

NY, available from www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/al-qaida-bylaws-english-
205

translation, accessed on May 21, 2013 (full English translation 

of this document was completed April 18, 2002, the original is 

19 pages in Arabic); “Al-Qa’ida Constitutional Charter (English 

Translation),” Harmony Program Doc. No. AFGP-2002-600045, 

Combating Terrorism Center, West Point, NY, available from 

www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/al-qaida-constitutional-charter-english-translation, accessed on May 21, 2013; (Another version is also available from the Conflict Records Research Center (CRRC) Doc. 

No. AQ-PMPR-D-000-105, Conflict Records Research Center, 

Washington, DC); “Employment Contract,” Harmony Program 

Doc. No. AFGT-2002-600175, Combating Terrorism Center, West 

Point, NY, available from https://www.ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/

uploads/2013/10/Employment-Contract-Translation.pdf, accessed on 

August 3, 2016, (full English translation completed March 20, 

2002). A more accurate title than that provided by the Harmony 

Program interpreter is given in another version of this same document. See “An Employment Contract that Describes Al Qaeda Beliefs, Objectives, And Sphere Of Activity, Including Requirements 

For Joining, Regulations, And Instructions,” CRRC Doc. No. AQPMPR-D-072, Conflict Records Research Center, Washington, DC.

17. See for example: United States of America v. Enaam M. Arnaout, United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois, 

Eastern Division, No. 02 CR 892, “Governments Evidentiary Proffer Supporting The Admissibility of Coconspirator Statements 

[Captured Documents],” esp. pp. 19-20, 28-34, available from 

news.findlaw.com/wsj/docs/bif/usarnaout10603prof.pdf, accessed on 

December 12, 2016.

Bin Laden and Azzam went their separate ways in approximately 1988 because Bin Laden wanted to conduct jihad outside of Afghanistan and Azzam was not prepared to do so. After the split, Bin Laden remained aligned with Hekmatyar who 

held views similar to Bin Laden, while Azzam continued with 

MK until he was killed. Hekmatyar provided Bin Laden with 

training camps in geographic areas that Hekmatyar controlled 

(p. 20). 

18. For a comprehensive sociological exposition of the key literature and research on notions of “Church” and “sect” and other 

relevant forms of religious organization, see Keith A. Roberts, 

Religion in Sociological Perspective, 4th ed., Australia: Wadsworth 

Publishing, 2004, ch. 8, pp. 177-198.
206

19. See Rukmini Callimachi and Eric Schmitt, “Iran Released 

Top Members of Al Qaeda in Trade,” The New York Times, September 17, 2015, available from www.nytimes.com/2015/09/18/world/

middleeast/iran-released-top-members-of-al-qaeda-in-a-trade.html, accessed on September 18, 2015. 

20. Hassaan Yusuf, ed., “An Exclusive Interview with Adam 

Yahiye Gadahn,” Resurgence, No. 2, Special Iss., Summer 2015, 

released online c. June 28, 2015, archived copy available from pietervanostaeyen.files/wordpress.com/2015/06/resurgence-special-issuesummer-2015.pdf, accessed on June 29, 2015, p. 14-15. The “Shahada” (or, Witness/Testament to Islam) is considered the essential 

creedal pillar upon which Islam rests. It consists in stating, and 

deeply and sincerely believing as Adam Gadahn asserts, the following: “there is no God worthy of worship but God, and Muhammad is the Messenger of God.” This foundational belief is to 

Islam what “Jesus is Lord” is for a Christian believer. It literally 

means “witness” as in “I witness that . . .” or “I testify that . . .” If 

Allah determines they indeed have earned Paradise, after judging one’s righteous intentions and praiseworthy deeds throughout the course of one’s life, and granting mercy, compassion, and 

clemency as well, He may grant martyrdom (Shahada). 

21. For the fullest examination of these differences in faith 

among theological/juridical schools, see Daniel Lav, Radical Islam and the Revival of Medieval Theology, Cambridge, UK and New 

York: Cambridge University Press, 2012.

22. David C. Gompert and John Gordon, IV, War By Other 

Means: Building Complete and Balanced Capabilities for Counterinsurgency, Rand Counterinsurgency Study, Final Report, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2008, pp. 23-31. 

23. This fatwa and intra-Wahhabi debates over its legitimacy 

is discussed in Abdulaziz H. al-Fahad, “From Exclusivism to Accommodation,” pp. 485-519.

24. See Kamolnick, Delegitimizing Al-Qaeda, pp. 61-64 for bin 

Laden’s legal argument, and the revulsion expressed by one of 

his operatives, Wadih El-Hage, at learning of the massive losses 

of civilian life. These terrorist bombings were conducted on August 7, 1998: the casualties in Nairobi, Kenya, 213 persons killed, 
207

and 4,500 injured; in Dar as Salam, Tanzania, (literally, “House of 

Peace”), 11 dead, and 85 injured; also see United States of America 

v. Usama bin Laden, et al., S(7) 98 Cr. 1023, United States District 

Court, Southern District of New York, NY, March 12, 2001, Superseding Indictment, pp. 43-44.

25. Coll, Ghost Wars; Wright, The Looming Tower.

26. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the United 

States, The 9/11 Commission Report, pp. 250-253, and p. 532 n. 80; 

A recent not-so-implicit critique is found in the inaugural issue of 

Resurgence that included an excerpt from a book by Abu Obaida 

al-Maqdisi (Maqalat fi as Siyasah wal Fikr). Said to be a close confidant of several leading military and Sharia figures in AQO, this 

excerpt is presented under the article’s sub-heading, “Overstretch 

in Special Operations,” (i.e., mass-casualty terrorist operations). 

He states: 

New jihadi groups that strive to gain empowerment on earth 

and establish the rule of Allah on the land, instead of merely 

inflicting losses on the enemy at the tactical level [i.e., 9/11], 

should avoid beginning special operations against the enemy 

until they have guaranteed the basic conditions of their own 

survival. Carrying out special operations is tantamount to entering into an all out war with the enemy in which the weaker 

side (usually the Mujahideen) tends to be unprepared for the 

reaction. The enemy will escalate the conflict in reaction to 

these operations.

Shaykh Abu Obaida al Maqdisi, “Strategic Overreach in Guerrilla 

Warfare,” Resurgence, No. 1, Fall 2014, released online c. October 

2014, archived copy available from https://azelin.files.wordpress.

com/2015/04/resurgence-1.pdf, accessed on August 2, 2016, p. 108. 

27. By that time, for his criminal activities in support of the 

1993 WTC bombing and the attempted 1995 Bojinka Plot to crash 

12 trans-Pacific airliners, Ramzi Yousef (born Abdul Basit Mahmoud Abdul Karim), had begun his life-sentence in solitary confinement, without parole, at the Super Max prison in Florence, 

Colorado. The “blind shaykh,” Omar Ahmad Ali Abdel Rahman, 

convicted for the 1993 WTC bombing, seditious conspiracy to 

blow up several New York City landmarks, and plots to assassinate U.S. politicians (See United States District Court, Southern 
208

District of New York, United States of America v. Omar Ahmad Ali 

Abdel Rahman, et al., S5 93 Cr. 181, 1994), was by then serving his 

own life-sentence, without parole in the Federal Medical Center, 

Butner, part of the Butner Federal Corrections Center, Butner, 

North Carolina.

28. 32 Muslims (26 men, and 6 women) were murdered in the 

9/11 attacks. 28 Muslims died in the Twin Towers of the World 

Trade Center, and 3 were among the passengers on the hijacked 

planes. These three were a husband and a wife, who was at the 

time 7 months pregnant. Their nationalities included: Pakistan, 

Bangladesh, Guiana, Sri Lanka, Gambia, Ivory Coast, Yemen, 

Iran, Ethiopia, Turkey, Trinidad and Tobago, Burma, Albania, 

Greece, and India. According to Kamal Kobeisi:

the most famous Muslim victim is the only Arab among all 9/11 

victims, the Yemeni Abdul Salam Mallahi, who worked at the 

Marriott Hotel in World Trade Center. He was very brave and 

helped people escape the building. His body has never been 

found. The oldest victim was an Iranian woman who was 69 

years old, and the youngest were two 25-year old men, Zohoto 

Ibis, from Turkey, and a Pakistani, Khaled Shahid.

Kamal Kobeisi, “Remembering the Muslims who were killed in 

the 9/11 attacks,” Al Arabiya, September 11, 2011, available from 

english.alarabiya.net/articles/2011/09/11/166286.html, accessed on 

March 5, 2014. Murder left in its wake many family tragedies; see 

also, Rick Hampson, “For families of Muslim 9/11 victims, a new 

pain,” USA Today, September 9, 2010, available from usatoday30.

usatoday.com/news/nation/2010-09-03-1amuslims911_cv_n.htm, accessed on August 2, 2016:

Mehr Tariq’s husband Taiq Amanullah, an assistant vice president at Fiduciary Trust, died in the south tower. She is 49 and 

lives with her two young adult children in California’s Silicon 

Valley, where they moved in 2005 to be near her brothers. . . .

Baraheen Ashrafi’s husband, Mohammed Chowdhury, died 

atop the north tower, where he was a waiter at Windows on 

the World. Ashrafi, 38, lives in Edmond, Okla., where she 

moved with her two children to be near her sister. . . . Ysuff 

Salie’s daughter Rahma, who was seven months pregnant, and 

Rahma’s husband, Michael, were passengers aboard the jet that 

crashed into the north tower. Ysuff, 64, and his wife, Haleema, 

58, live in Newton, Mass., and run two bakery-cafes.
209

29. See especially, Sayf al-’Adl (Muhammad Salah al-Din Zaydan al-Misri), “Letter To My Beloved Brother Mukhtar [Khalid 

Shaykh Muhammad (KSM)],” June 13, 2002, available from www.

ctc.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/Al-Adl-letter-Translation1.

pdf, accessed on March 6, 2014, for a damning critique of Khalid Shaykh Muhammad and Osama bin Laden’s catastrophic act. 

Consider these excerpts that confirm the “lone wolf” nature of the 

9/11 attack. On bin Laden:

The Teacher [Translator: Bin Laden] corresponds directly with 

you [KSM] and that, unfortunately, is his absolute habit that 

he will not abandon. If someone opposes him, he immediately 

puts forward another person to render an opinion in his support, clinging to his opinion and totally disregarding those 

around him, so there is no advice, no nothing. . . . To absolve 

my conscience before Allah, and to announce my innocence in 

front of Allah, I say today [June 13, 2002] we must completely 

halt all external operations until we sit down and consider the 

disaster we caused. . . . The East Asia, Europe, America, Horn of 

Africa, Yemen, Gulf, and Morocco groups have fallen, and Pakistan has almost been drowned in one push. I, not to mention 

the other individuals who have also moved and fallen, have often advised on this matter. Regrettably, my brother, if you look 

back, you will find that you are the person solely responsible 

for all this because you undertook the mission, and during six 

months, we only lost what we built in years. 

See also the following letter from Abu Musab al-Suri and Abu 

Khalid al-Suri, written July 19, 1999, to Ayman al-Zawahiri about 

bin Laden, expressing extreme concern at the latter’s impolite, 

impolitic, and defiant behavior toward then-ruling Mullah Umar, 

emir of the Afghan Taliban. See Alan Cullison, “Al-Qaeda’s Hard 

Drive: A Fortuitous Discovery Reveals Budget Squabbles, Baby 

Pictures, Office Rivalries—and the Path to 9/11,” The Atlantic 

Monthly, September 2004, pp. 59-60:

The results of this crisis can be felt even here in Kabul and other 

places. Talk about closing down the camps has spread. Discontent with the Arabs has become clear. Whispers between the 

Taliban with some of our non-Arab brothers has become customary. In short, our brother Abu Abdullah’s [bin Laden] latest 

troublemaking with the Taliban and the Leader of the Faithful 

jeopardizes the Arabs, and the Arab presence, today in all of 

Afghanistan, for no good reason. It provides a ripe opportunity 
210

for all adversaries including America, the West, the Jews, Saudi 

Arabia, Pakistan, the Mas’ud-Dostum alliance, etc, to serve the 

Arabs a blow that could end up causing their most faithful allies to kick them out . . . Our brother [bin Laden] will help our 

enemies reach their goal free of charge! . . . The strangest thing 

I have heard so far is Abu Abdullah’s saying that he wouldn’t 

listen to the Leader of the Faithful when he asked him to stop 

giving interviews . . . I think our brother [bin Laden] has caught 

the disease of screens, flashes, fans, and applause. . . The only 

solution out of this dilemma is what a number of knowledgeable and experienced people have agreed upon . . . Abu Abdullah [Osama bin Laden] should go to the Leader of the Faithful 

with some of his brothers and tell him that . . . [1] the Leader 

of the Faithful was right when he asked you to refrain from 

interviews, announcements, and media encounters, and [2] that 

you will help the Taliban as much as you can in their battle, 

until they achieve control over Afghanistan. [3] You should 

apologize for any inconvenience or pressure you have caused . 

. . [4] and commit to the wishes and orders of the Leader of the 

Faithful on matters that concern his circumstances here . . . The 

Leader of the Faithful, who should be obeyed where he reigns, 

is Muhammad Omar, not Osama bin Laden. Osama bin Laden 

and his companions are only guests seeking refuge and have to 

adhere to the terms laid out by the person who provided it for 

them. This is legitimate and logical.

30. This latest metamorphosis is more fully explored in 

Chapters 2 and 3.

31. See especially, Robert A. Pape, “The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 97, No. 3, 

August 2003, pp. 343-345. 

32. For a description of these letters, and access to English 

translations, see Will McCants, “Abbottabad Documents,” Jihadica, blog entry, posted May 3, 2012, available from www.jihadica.

com/abbottabad-documents/, for all 17 declassified Special Operations Command (SOCOM) seized documents made available in 

easy to access format, in Arabic and English; (Alternately, see 

Harmony Program, Combating Terrorism Center, West Point, 

NY, available from https://www.ctc.usma.edu/programs-resources/

harmony-program); See also especially, Nelly Lahoud, Stuart Caudill, Liam Collins, Gabriel Koehler-Derrick, Don Rassler, and Muhammad al-’Ubaydi, “Letters from Abbottabad: Bin Ladin Side-
211

lined?” Harmony Program Report, West Point, NY: Combating 

Terrorism Center, U.S. Military Academy, May 3, 2012, available 

from www.ctc.usma.edu, who describe these as consisting of electronic letters or drafts, totaling 175 pages in the original Arabic 

and 197 pages in the English translation, dating from between 

September 2006 and April 2011. See also their Appendix (pp. 54-

59) for a brief summary of the facts surrounding and an interpretation of each letter. 

33. A similar argument is advanced on Sharia grounds of 

those Muslims who deliberately commit intentional homicide. 

See Paul Kamolnick, “Has Adam Gadahn Forsaken the Lawful 

Jihad for Anti-Americanism? A Case Study of Ideological Contradictions,” Perspectives on Terrorism,” Vol. 8, No. 6, December 2014, 

pp. 36-42, available from www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/

pot/article/view/390. 

34. See “Text: President Bush Addresses the Nation,” The 

Washington Post, September 20, 2001, transcript available from 

www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/specials/attacked/transcripts/

bushaddress_092001.html, accessed on May 20, 2014.

35. See “Text: Obama’s Speech in Cairo,” The New York Times,

June 4, 2009, available from www.nytimes.com/2009/06/04/us/

politics/04obama.text.html?_r=0, accessed on August 12, 2013. See 

also more recently, Tanya Somanader, “President Obama on the 

Causes and Antidotes to Violent Extremism,” blog entry, posted 

February 19, 2015, www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2015/02/19/presidentobama-causes-and-antidotes-violent-extremism, accessed on February 

20, 2015.

36. “Tiny fraction, not all Muslims, involved in terrorism, 

says Obama,” The News International, November 23, 2015, available from https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/15796-tiny-fraction-notall-muslims-involved-in-terrorism-says-obama, accessed on August 

2, 2016. 

37. See “Video and Transcript: President Obama: Baltimore 

Mosque Speech, Weds., Feb. 3, 2016,” available from www.shallownation.com/2016/02/03/video-president-obama-baltimore-mosquespeech-weds-feb-3-2016/, accessed on February 4, 2016; Michelle 

Boorstein, “At Baltimore mosque, President Obama encourages 
212

U.S. Muslims: ‘You fit in here’,” The Washington Post, February 

3, 2016, available from www.washingtonpost.com/news/acts-of-faith/

wp/2016/02/03/president-obamas-mosque-visit-will-spotlight-a-newgeneration-of-muslim-americans/, accessed on February 4, 2016; Elahe Izadi, “Obama, Thomas Jefferson and the fascinating history 

of Founding Fathers defending Muslim rights,” The Washington 

Post, February 3, 2016, available from www.washingtonpost.com/

news/the-fix/wp/2015/12/11/how-thomas-jefferson-and-other-founding-fathers-defended-muslim-rights/, accessed on February 4, 2016. 

38. See “A Suggestion to Change the Name of Al-Qa’ida (English Translation),” SOCOM-2012-0000009, Combating Terrorism 

Center, West Point, NY, available from https://www.ctc.usma.edu/

posts/a-suggestion-to-change-the-name-of-al-qaida-english-translation-2. Also, Jason Burke, “Bin Laden wanted to change al-Qaida’s 

bloodied name: Documents obtained in US assassination reveal 

frustrations of al-Qaida leader and desire to win over world’s 

Muslims,” The Guardian, June 24, 2011, available from www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jun/24/bin-laden-documents-alqaida-struggle, accessed on August 12, 2013. President Obama was made 

aware of this later after the Abbottabad raid. It was reported by Jo 

Becker and Scott Shane, “Secret ‘Kill List’ Proves a Test of Obama’s 

Principles and Will,” The New York Times, May 29, 2012, available 

from www.nytimes.com/2012/05/29/world/obamas-leadership-in-waron-al-qaeda.html, accessed on May 29, 2012: 

Mr. Obama was heartened, aides say, by a letter discovered 

in the raid on Osama bin Laden’s compound in Pakistan. It 

complained that the American president had undermined Al 

Qaeda’s support by repeatedly declaring that the United States 

was at war not with Islam, but with the terrorist network. ‘We 

must be doing a pretty good job,’ Mr. Obama told his secretary 

of state.

39. For key insight on why this was predictable, see Charles 

Kurzman, The Missing Martyrs: Why There Are So Few Muslim Terrorists, Oxford, UK and New York: Oxford University Press, 2011, 

ch. 1, pp. 3-24.

40. See “A Suggestion to Change the Name of Al-Qa’ida (English Translation),” SOCOM-2012-0000009.

41. Ibid.
213

42. See esp., “Letter from UBL to ‘Atiyatullah Al-Libi 2 (English Translation),” SOCOM-2012-0000010, Combating Terrorism 

Center, West Point, NY, available from https://www.ctc.usma.edu/

posts/letter-from-ubl-to-atiyatullah-al-libi-2-english-translation-2; see 

also, Lahoud, et al., Letters from Abbottabad: Bin Ladin Sidelined?

p. 3, 48-52.

43. See for example: Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, Jason Fritz, 

Bridget Moreng, and Nathaniel Barr, “SMA Support to SOCCENT: The War between the Islamic State and al-Qaeda: Strategic 

Dimensions of a Patricidal Conflict,” Valens Global International 

Strategies and Securities Study, September 2015, available from 

www.tbo.com/assets/pdf/TB212921.PDF, accessed on September 21, 

2015; also, Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, Bridget Moreng, and Nathaniel Barr, “The Strategic Dimensions of the Competition between the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant and al-Qaeda,” in 

Allison Astorino-Courtois and Sarah Canna, eds., “White Paper 

on SMA Support to SOCCENT: ISIL Influence and Resolve,” September 2015, available from https://info.publicintelligence.net/SOCCENT-ISIL-InfluenceResolve.pdf, accessed on September 24, 2015. 

Though the present author does see merit in viewing AQO’s embedding strategy as a likely evolutionary move, we believe that 

Gartenstein-Ross is incorrect in stating that AQO and ISO as Salafi 

jihadi organizations are virtually identical in creed, doctrine, and 

worldview, or in their words, share “similar ideologies”(p. 3), and 

that the key differences between AQO and ISO are technology 

(the ISO being “more technology savvy”) and temporality (the 

ISO “expects to experience success in a shorter timeframe than alQaeda”). This doctrinal identity assumption leads these authors 

to then analyze competition between them as purely “strategic 

competition” essentially reducible to a two-person game employing unique “Focoist” (ISO) and “Maoist” (AQO) strategies. For 

another example of a strategically-reductionist analysis that fails 

to appreciate the core creedal, theological, and legal fault lines at 

the heart of the ISO/AQO conflict; see also, Daveed GartensteinRoss and Nathaniel Barr, “How al-Qaeda Survived the Islamic 

State Challenge,” August 30, 2016, available from www.hudson.

org/research/12788-how-al-qaeda-survived-the-islamic-state-challenge, 

accessed September 2, 2016. Interested readers are referred to 

chapter one for our primary supporting data. 
214

44. For key statements evidencing the distinctive AQO 

“idea,” see “Al Qaeda Founding Minutes,” “TAREEKHOSAMA/50 Tareekh Osama 122–123”; “Al Qaeda Founding Minutes,” “TAREEKHOSAMA/50 Tareekh Osama 127–127a”; 

“Al-Qaida Bylaws (English Translation),” Harmony Program 

Doc. No. AFGP-2002-600048; “Al-Qa’ida Constitutional Charter (English Translation),” Harmony Program Doc. No. AFGP2002-600045; “Employment Contract,” Harmony Program Doc. 

No. AFGT-2002-600175, (or the alternate translation, “An Employment Contract that Describes Al Qaeda Beliefs, Objectives, 

And Sphere Of Activity, Including Requirements For Joining, 

Regulations, And Instructions,” CRRC Doc. No. AQ-PMPRD-072); “Letter from Usama Bin Laden to ‘Atiyatullah Al-Libi 

(English Translation),” SOCOM-2012-0000003, Combating Terrorism Center, West Point, NY, available from https://www.ctc.

usma.edu/posts/letter-from-usama-bin-laden-to-atiyatullah-al-libienglish-translation-2; “Letter Regarding Al-Qa’ida Strategy (English Translation),” SOCOM-2012-0000017, Combating Terrorism 

Center, West Point, NY, available from https://www.ctc.usma.

edu/posts/letter-regarding-al-qaida-strategy-english-translation-2

(Combating Terrorism Center presumption that author is either 

Osama bin Ladin or Shaykh Mahmud Attiya Abdul Rahman); 

United States of America v. Enaam M. Arnaout, pp. 19-20, 28-34.

45. Fazul Abdallah, “What is Al-Qaeda?” Inspire, Iss. 10, 

Spring 2013, archived copy available from azelin.files.wordpress.

com/2013/03/inspire-magazine-issue-10.pdf. Fazul Abdallah Mohammad’s (d. 2011) extensive involvement in AQO terrorist activities, from the masterminding of the 1998 East Africa Embassy 

bombings, to military commander of the Somalian Al-Shabab, to 

logistical and financial operative assisting the birth of AQAP, can 

be found in an obituary written about him. See “Fazul Abdullah Mohammed obituary,” The Guardian, available from www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jun/12/fazul-abdullah-mohammed-obituary. 

For an excellent, detailed comprehensive analysis of his apologetic 1,156 page autobiography, intended as a corrective to sectarian interpretations of AQO and regarded as the “richest primary 

source available regarding al-Qa’ida” (p. 3), see Nelly Lahoud, Beware of Imitators: Al-Qa’ida through the Lens of its Confidential Secretary, Harmony Program, Combating Terrorism Center, U.S. Military Academy, NY, June 4, 2012, available from www.ctc.usma.edu, 

accessed on June 8, 2012. Referenced on p. 4, Fadil Harun (1972-
215

2011) (aka: Fazul Abdullah Muhammad, full name is Abdallah 

bin Muhammad ‘Ali bin Fadil bin Hussein Al al-Mulla Fadil alQumari) was born in the Comoros Islands off the East African 

coast, of Indian Shi’ite parents. His voluminous autobiography, 

al-Harb ‘ala al-Islam: Qissat Fadil Harun (The War Against Islam: 

The Story of Fadil Harun), was self-released and posted online 

to the jihadi website Shabakat Ansar al-Mujahidin on February 26, 

2009. See especially pp. 41-49, for the detailed examination of Harun’s criticism of those who regard Qa’idat al-Jihad as Salafi-Jihadi, 

Salafi, or especially, takfiri. 

46. For a more comprehensive analysis and evaluation of 

Adam Gadahn, see Paul Kamolnick, “When Muslim Defenders 

Became ‘Blood Spilling’ Crusaders: Adam Gadahn’s Critique of 

the ‘Jihadist’ Subversion of Al-Qaeda’s Media Warfare Strategy,” 

Terrorism and Political Violence, Published Online, June 18, 2015, 

available from dx.doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2015.1043996; Kamolnick, “Has Adam Gadahn Forsaken the Lawful Jihad for AntiAmericanism?” pp. 36-62.

47. Abdallah, “What is Al-Qaeda?” 

48. Hassaan Yusuf, ed., “An Exclusive Interview with Adam 

Yahiye Gadahn.”

49. Ibid., p. 28.

50. Ibid., pp. 28-29. In the interview, Gadahn gives a quote 

taken from a letter from bin Laden to al- Wuhayshi, and cites the 

letter using its official Harmony Document nomenclature “SOCOM-2012-0000016,” for the full text of the letter, refer to “Letter to 

Nasir al-Wuhayshi (English Translation),” SOCOM-2012-0000016, 

Combating Terrorism Center, West Point, NY, available from 

https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/letter-to-nasir-al-wuhayshi-englishtranslation-2. AQAP Emir Nasir al-Wuhayshi was eventually 

killed by a drone strike in early-June 2015. See Thomas Joscelyn, 

“AQAP confirms death of senior leader,” The Long War Journal, 

available from www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2015/06/aqap-confirms-death-of-senior-leader.php, accessed on June 16, 2015.

51. Hassaan Yusuf, ed., “An Exclusive Interview with Adam 

Yahiye Gadahn,” pp. 29-30. 
216

52. Ibid., p. 30.

53. Ibid., p. 30.

54. Ibid., pp. 30-31.

55. Ibid., p. 31.

56. Ibid. 

57. Ibid.

58. Ibid. 

59. Ibid., pp. 89-90.

60. Ibid., p. 31.

61. See for examples: Alastair Crooke, “Islamic State: Rough 

Violence,” n.d. (c. June-July 2014), available from www.spokesmanbooks.com/Spokesman/PDF/Crooke125.pdf, accessed on December 17, 2014; “Portsmouth Muslim leaders condemn Islamic 

State,” BBC News, October 29, 2014, available from www.bbc.

com/news/uk-england-hampshire-29800590, accessed on August 2, 

2016; Salam al-Marayati, “Islam’s theology of life and ISIS’ cult 

of death,” CNN, September 5, 2014, available from religion.blogs.

cnn.com/2014/09/05/islams-theology-of-life-is-stronger-than-isis-cultof-death/, accessed on October 30, 2014; “Muslim clerics denounce 

attacks on Tunisia, Kuwait, France,” Al-Masry Al-Youm Online, 

June 26, 2015, available from www.opensource.gov, accessed on 

June 29, 2015. 

62. The De-Ba’athification policy and the dissolving of the existing security forces were the very first two orders of business under the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). See L. Paul Bremer 

III, “Iraq Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number One, 

De-Ba’athification of Iraqi Society,” Council on Foreign Relations, 

May 16, 2003, available from www.cfr.org/iraq/iraq-coalition-provisional-authority-order-number-one-de-baathification-iraqi-society/

p30235, accessed on September 24, 2014; L. Paul Bremer III, “Iraq 

Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number Two, Dissolution 

of Entities,” Council on Foreign Relations, August 23, 2003, avail-
217

able from www.cfr.org/iraq/iraq-coalition-provisional-authority-ordernumber-two-dissolution-entities/p30236, accessed on September 24, 

2014. For Ahmad Chalabi’s role in helping facilitate a policy of 

revengeful de-Ba’athification, see Adam Roston, The Man Who 

Pushed America to War: The Extraordinary Life, Adventures, and Obsessions of Ahmad Chalabi, New York: Nation Books, 2008, esp. Part 

IV, pp. 173-275. See also critical commentary following Chalabi’s 

death on November 3, 2015, see Al-Araby al-Jadeed, “Iraq’s Ahmad Chalabi, key lobbyist behind 2003 invasion, dies,” November 

3, 2015, available from www.alaraby.co.uk/english/news/2015/11/3/

iraqs-ahmad-chalabi-key-lobbyist-behind-2003-invasion-dies, accessed 

on November 3, 2015, where it is asserted: 

Following the invasion, Chalabi, a secular Shia, was one of the 

main proponents of the ‘de-Ba’athification’ drive to remove 

alleged Saddam supporters from public life, which alienated 

Iraq’s Sunni Arab minority and fueled the revolt against US-led 

occupation forces.

See also, Patrick Wintour and Ewen MacAskill, “UK foreign secretary: US decision on Iraqi army led to rise of Isis,” The Guardian, July 7, 2016, available from https://www.theguardian.com/

world/2016/jul/07/uk-foreign-secretary-us-decision-iraqi-army-riseisis-philip-hammond, accessed on July 8, 2016, for additional testimony on the deeply negative results of these CPA policies. 

63. For early reports, see Joe Klein, “Saddam’s Revenge: The 

secret history of U.S. mistakes, misjudgments and intelligence 

failures that let the Iraqi dictator and his allies launch an insurgency now ripping Iraq apart,” Time, September 26, 2005, pp. 44-

52; Michael Ware, with Sally B. Donnelly, “Chasing the Ghosts: 

With doubts about Iraq growing at home, U.S forces are struggling to put down an elusive and inexhaustible enemy. Michael 

Ware reports on the state of the counterinsurgency from the front 

lines of the biggest battle of the year,” Time, September 26, 2005, 

pp. 33-40; Fred Kaplan, “Who Disbanded the Iraqi Army? And 

why was nobody held accountable?” September 7, 2007, available 

from www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/war_stories/2007/09/

who_disbanded_the_iraqi_army.html, accessed on August 3, 2016.

64. See especially Ahmed S. Hashim, Insurgency and CounterInsurgency in Iraq, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006, for 
218

an early, incisive, and comprehensive critique of the USG’s execution of the post-decapitation phase of the Second Gulf War. 

65. Jeffrey Pool, trans., “Zarqawi’s Pledge of Allegiance to AlQaeda: From Mu’askar al-Battar, Issue 21,” December 16, 2004, Terrorism Monitor, Vol. 2, Issue 24, pp. 4-6.

66. “Translation of al-Qaeda Statement on February 3, 2014, 

Acknowledging ISIS Officially Isn’t Party of AQ,” archived copy 

available from azelin.files.wordpress.com/2014/02/al-qc481_idah22on-the-relationship-of-qc481idat-al-jihc481d-and-the-islamic-stateof-iraq-and-al-shc481m22-en.pdf.

67. See “Letter from Adam Gadahn (English Translation),” 

SOCOM 2012-000004, Combating Terrorism Center, West Point, 

NY, available from https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/letter-from-adam-gadahn-english-translation-2, p. 4. 

68. Yusuf, ed., “An Exclusive Interview with Adam Yahiye 

Gadahn,” pp. 8-92.

69. Mary Anne Weaver, “The Short, Violent Life of Abu 

Musab al-Zarqawi,” The Atlantic, June 8, 2006, www.theatlantic.

com/magazine/archive/2006/07/the-short-violent-life-of-abu-musabal-zarqawi/304983/, accessed on May 23, 2014. 

70. Ibid. Weaver reports that, according to his brother-in-law 

and one of his closest friends, Salah al-Hami, a Jordanian of Palestinian descent:

al-Zarqawi had not been a fighter but had tried his hand at 

being a journalist. Al-Hami was a correspondent for Al-Jihad

magazine, which the mujahideen published in Peshawar. But 

then one day al-Hami stepped on a land mine and lost one of 

his legs.

71. Joas Wagemakers, A Quietist Jihadi: The Ideology and Influence of Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, Cambridge, UK and New York: 

Cambridge University Press, 2012; Lav, Radical Islam and the Revival of Medieval Theology, pp. 129ff; Thomas Hegghammer and Stephane Lacroix, “Rejectionist Islamism in Saudi Arabia: The Story 

of Juhayman al-’Utaybi Revisited,” International Journal of Middle 
219

East Studies, Vol. 39, 2007, pp. 103-122. For an autobiographical 

account, see “Biography and interview with shaykh Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi,” adapted from Al-Nida Magazine, n.d., in 

This is our ‘Aqidah, At-Tibyan Publications, pp. 4-19, https://archive.

org/stream/ThisIsOuraqidah-AbiMuhammadAl-maqdisi/our_aqeedah_djvu.txt, accessed on March 17, 2010. Cited by Steven Brooke, 

“The Preacher and the Jihadi,” in Hillel Fradkin, Husain Haqqani and Eric Brown, eds., Current Trends in Islamist Ideology, Vol. 

III, Washington DC: Hudson Institute, 2006, in note 1, p. 63, in 

original Arabic as: “‘An Encounter Behind the Apostates’ Bars in 

Jordan: an interview with Shaykh Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi,’ 

Nida’ul Islam, conducted in two parts, in the December 1997-January 1998 (#21) and February-March 1998 (#22) issues.”

72. See Hegghammer and Lacroix, “Rejectionist Islamism in 

Saudi Arabia,” pp. 103-122; and Wagemakers, “The Enduring 

Legacy of the Second Saudi State,” pp. 93-110. In “Biography and 

interview with shaykh Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi,” adapted 

from Al-Nida Magazine, p. 4, al-Maqdisi states that he was:

[a]ttracted to the books of Sheikh Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab, his students, sons and grandsons, the Imams of the Najdi 

Da’wa . . . I dedicated myself for quite a long time to the study 

of these books. These books had a tremendous influence on my 

direction later on.

73. Joseph Kostiner, “On Instruments and Their Designers: 

The Ikhwan of Najd and the Emergence of the Saudi State,” Middle 

Eastern Studies, Vol. 21, No. 3, July 1985, pp. 298-323; Federal Research Division, U.S. Library of Congress, Saudi Arabia: a country 

study, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993, 

pp. 235-237, available from https://www.loc.gov/item/93028506/, 

accessed on August 4, 2016.

74. See Abu Hashim, “Uncomfortable Contradictions (part 

1)”; Madawi al-Rasheed, “Prohibiting Politics.”

75. Joas Wagemakers, “A Terrorist Organization that Never 

Was: the Jordanian ‘Bay‘at al-Imam’ Group,” Middle East Institute, 

Vol. 68, No. 1, Winter 2014, pp. 59-75.
220

76. See Y. Yehoshua, “Dispute in Islamist Circles over the Legitimacy of Attacking Muslims, Shi’ites, and Non-combatant NonMuslims in Jihad Operations in Iraq: al-Maqdisi vs. His Disciple 

al-Zarqawi,” The Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI), 

Inquiry and Analysis Series, Report No. 239, September 11, 2005, 

available from www.memri.org/report/en/print1473.htm, accessed 

on May 23, 2014, p. 8; See also, Nibras Kazimi, “A Virulent Ideology in Mutation: Zarqawi Upstages Maqdisi,” Current Trends 

in Islamist Ideology, Vol. 2, 2005, p. 68 for corroboration of Abu 

Abdallah al-Muhajir’s decisive role in overcoming al-Zarqawi’s 

initial reluctance to target lay-Shia, and also, condone so-called 

suicide operations. The following discussion is indebted to several sources: Motaz al-Khateeb, “Daesh’s Intellectual Origins: From 

Jurisprudence to Reality,” Aljazeera Centre For Sudies, January 

18, 2015, available from studies.aljazeera.net/en/dossiers/decipheringdaeshoriginsimpactandfuture/2014/12/2014123981882756.html, accessed on May 1, 2015; Hassan Abu Haniyeh, “Daesh’s Organisational Structure,” Aljazeera Centre For Sudies, December 4, 2014, 

available from studies.aljazeera.net/en/dossiers/decipheringdaeshoriginsimpactandfuture/2014/12/201412395930929444.html, accessed 

on June 26, 2015; Ali Hashem, “Who holds the real power in IS?,” 

Al-Monitor, February 19, 2015, available from www.al-monitor.

com/pulse/originals/2015/02/islamic-state-sharia-council-power.html; 

Ziad al-Zaatari, “Takfiri Literature Makes Headway in Lebanon,” 

Al-Akhbar (English), September 11, 2012, available from english.

al-akhbar.com/content/takfiri-literature-makes-headway-lebanon, accessed on August 4, 2016. This article is an edited translation 

from the Arabic Edition; Mbaye Bashir Lo, “The Rise of the Islamic State and How to Reverse It,” November 7, 2014, available 

from www.smallwarsjournal.com/print/17204, accessed on June 23, 

2015; Anonymous, “Abu Mus’ab al Zarqawi under influence,” 

Alleyesonjihadism (blog); Yusuf, ed., “An Exclusive Interview with 

Adam Yahiye Gadahn,” p. 87; Kazimi, “A Virulent Ideology in 

Mutation,” pp. 59-73.

77. Motaz al-Khateeb, “Daesh’s Intellectual Origins: From Jurisprudence to Reality.”

78. Ibid.; Most unfortunately these lectures have not been 

translated into English. They appear to be available as audio recordings under the heading, “Introduction to the jurisprudence 

of jihad.” The online purveyors describe them: “This lectures on 
221

Introduction to the jurisprudence of jihad in islam by Sheikh Abu 

Abdullah Al-Muhajir [sic]. The lecture place is Afghanistan. The 

number of the lectures is 14.” Available in Arabic as audio files, 

from https://archive.org/details/FIFTH-SERISE-PRESENTAIONOF-FIQH-EL-JIHAD, accessed on January 8, 2015.

79. Ibid.; See also, Ziad al-Zaatari, “Takfiri Literature Makes 

Headway in Lebanon”; Mbaye Bashir Lo, “The Rise of the Islamic 

State and How to Reverse It.”

80. Anonymous, “Abu Mus’ab al Zarqawi under influence: 

one mentor?” Alleyesonjihadism, blog entry, posted May 15, 2012, 

available from alleyesonjihadism.wordpress.com/2012/05/15/abumusab-al-zarqawi, accessed on June 23, 2015. Also, according to the 

blog, Abu Abdallah al-Muhajir also lectured on plans aiming at 

the wealth of Western countries.

81. Ibid.

82. Ibid.

83. See Kazimi, “A Virulent Ideology in Mutation,” pp. 59-73.

84. Ibid. Its original Arabic citation is referenced at note 47 as: 

Abu Musa’ab Al-Zarqawi, “Bayan wa tawdheeh lima athraehu 

Al-Sheikh Al-Maqdisi fir liqa’ihi me’a qanat Aljazeera,” n.d., but 

c. July 8, 2005, since the al-Maqdisi interview was posted July 5, 

2005, and al-Zarqawi’s rebuttal was offered a few days afterward.

85. See Weaver, “The Short, Violent Life of Abu Musab alZarqawi.”

86. Ibid. Weaver states: 

In early 2000, with a dozen or so followers who had arrived 

from Peshawar and Amman, al-Zarqawi set out for the western 

desert encircling Herat. His goal: to build an army that he could 

export to anywhere in the world. Al-Adel paid monthly visits 

to al-Zarqawi’s training camp; later, on his Web site, he would 

write that he was amazed at what he saw there. The number of 

al-Zarqawi’s fighters multiplied from dozens to hundreds during the following year, and by the time the forces evacuated 

their camp, prior to the U.S. air strikes of October 200l, the fighters and their families numbered some 2,000 to 3,000. According 
222

to al-Adel, the wives of al-Zarqawi’s followers served lavish 

Levantine cuisine in the camp.

87. Ibid.

88. Matthew Levitt, “Zarqawi’s Jordanian Agenda,” Terrorism 

Monitor, Vol. 2, No. 24, December 15, 2004, available from www.

jamestown.org, accessed on December 15, 2014. Critical details are 

provided in: The Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI), 

“Al-Qaeda Explains Amman Bombings,” MEMRI, Special Dispatch No. 1043, December 8, 2005, available from memri.org/bin/

opener_latest.cgi?ID=SD104305, accessed on December 8, 2008. 

Five communiques are collected here: November 10 (2 communiques on this date), November 11, November 18, 2005, and April 

2004. Though al-Zarqawi claims that the civilian casualties were 

unintended—the bomb’s severity caused a roof to collapse on 

nearby wedding-goers—the operation is defended, and despite 

bin Laden’s later deep consternation, and lack of any operational 

role, it was conducted in the name of Tanzim Qa’idat al-Jihad fi Bilad al Rafidayn. 

89. Weaver, “The Short Violent Life of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi,” reports that al-Zarqawi’s previous reluctance to pledge 

bay’ah to bin Laden in 2000-2001 was based in a different rationale: 

al-Zarqawi did not support the Afghan Taliban’s war against the 

Northern Alliance, and also “did not believe that either bin Laden 

or the Taliban was serious enough about jihad.”

90. Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, “Zarqawi Letter: February 2004 

Coalition Provisional Authority English translation of terrorist 

Musab al Zarqawi letter obtained by United States Government 

in Iraq,” U.S. Department of State Archive, p. 11; available from 

2001-2009.state.gov/p/nea/rls/31694.htm, accessed on June 21, 2014.

91. Ibid., pp. 12-13.

92. Ibid.

93. See for example: European Council on Foreign Relations, 

“The Gulf and Sectarianism,” November 2013, www.ecfr.eu/page/-

?ECFR91_GULF_ANALYSIS_AW.pdf; David Commins, The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia, New York: I.B. Tauris, 2006, ch. 5-6.
223

94. See Kazimi, “A Virulent Ideology in Mutation,” pp. 59-73; 

Yehoshua, “Dispute in Islamist Circles over the Legitimacy of Attacking Muslims, Shi’ites, and Non-combat Non-Muslims in Jihad 

Operations in Iraq: Al-Maqdisi vs. His Disciple Al-Zarqawi”; Emily Hunt, “Zarqawi’s ‘Total War’ on Iraqi Shiites Exposes a Divide 

among Sunni Jihadists,” Policy Watch No. 1049, November 15, 

2005, www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis; Bernard Haykel, 

“Jihadis and the Shi’a,” in Assaf Moghadam and Brian Fishman, 

eds., Self-Inflicted Wounds: Debates and Divisions within Al-Qa’ida 

and Its Periphery, West Point, NY: Harmony Project, Combating 

Terrorism Center, December 16, 2010, pp. 202-223, available from 

https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/self-inflicted-wounds; Al-Hayat, “Rift 

grows between Jabhat al-Nusra and ISIS,” Al-Monitor, November 

15, 2013, www.al-monitor.com/pulse/security/2013/11/isis-jabhat-nusra-rift-syria-jordan-1.html; Nelly Lahoud, The Jihadis’ Path to SelfDestruction, New York: Columbia University Press, 2010, ch. 5.

95. See Dwight Raymond, Cliff Bernath, Don Braum, and Ken 

Zurcher, Mass Atrocity Prevention and Response Options (MAPRO): 

A Policy Planning Handbook, Carlisle, PA: Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2012, esp. 

pp. 8-16; Gregory H. Stanton, “The 8 Stages of Genocide,” (orig. 

1996/1998), www.genocidewatch.org/images/8stagesBriefingpaper.pdf.

96. Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, “Zarqawi Letter,” pp. 2-6, 9-12; 

For further reading on this topic see also, Aaron Y. Zelin, “The 

Vocabulary of Sectarianism,” Foreign Policy, January 29, 2014, 

available from foreignpolicy.com/2014/01/29/the-vocabulary-of-sectarianism/, accessed on August 4, 2016; Fanar Haddad, “The language of anti-Shiism,” Foreign Policy, August 9, 2013, available 

from foreignpolicy.com/2013/08/09/the-language-of-anti-shiism/, accessed on August 4, 2016; Ibrahim Kalin, “Sectarianism: A Recipe 

for Disaster for Sunnis and Shiites,” June 17, 2014, available from 

www.dailysabah.com/columns/ibrahim-kalin/2014/06/17/sectarianisma-recipe-for-disaster-for-sunnis-and-shiites, accessed on August 4, 

2016.

97. Pool, “Zarqawi’s Pledge of Allegiance to Al-Qaeda,” 

pp. 4-6.

98. Ibid.
224

99. Ibid.

100. For a prescient, brief analysis of “Zarqawism” and “bin 

Ladinism” as two distinct species, immediately following alZarqawi’s death on June 8, 2006, see Mawassi Lahcen, “Moroccan Islamist leader says religious scholars must eliminate ‘Zarqawism’,” Magharebia, June 11, 2006.

101. For a highly incisive analysis of Zarqawism’s likely social-psychological core, see David Frankfurter, “The Construction 

of Evil and the Violence of Purification,” in Mark Juergensmeyer, 

Margo Kitts, and Michael Jerryson, eds., The Oxford Handbook of 

Religion and Violence, Oxford, UK and New York: Oxford University Press, 2013, pp. 521-531. 

102. See “Al-Qa’ida in Iraq Situation Report (English Translation),” IZ-060316-01, Combating Terrorism Center, West Point, 

NY, available from www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/al-qaida-in-iraq-situation-report-english-translation, accessed on May 21, 2013. This document is also discussed in Brian Fishman, “After Zarqawi: The 

Dilemmas and Future of Al Qaeda in Iraq,” The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 29, No. 4, 2006, p. 32, n. 14. This anonymous, undated 

letter is described by translators as “a letter updating a high member in AQI’s council on events in Anbar province.” It is, however, 

clearly addressed to “My Sheikh” [al-Zarqawi] and focuses on 

two subjects: questioning whether targeting the Shia at this moment is prudent, and documenting the brutal, merciless assassination campaign then underway to target Sunni leaders that have 

turned on al-Zarqawi’s organization and joined the political process. This letter must be read to fully understand how the behindthe-scenes liquidation campaign was inaugurated well before its 

recent reincarnation in the ISO.

103. Major Niel Smith, U.S. Army, and Colonel Sean MacFarland, U.S. Army, “Anbar Awakens: The Tipping Point,” Military 

Review, March-April 2008, pp. 41-52.

104. The Middle East Media Research Institute, “Al-Zarqawi’s 

Message to the Fighters of Jihad in Iraq on September 11, 2004,” 

transcript of a speech by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, MEMRI Special Dispatch No. 785, September 15, 2004, available from www.

memri.org/report/en/print1219.htm, accessed on December 17, 2014. 
225

Another example is provided in a section of al-Zarqawi’s bay’ah

to bin Laden (see Pool, “Zarqawi’s Pledge of Allegiance to Al-Qaeda,” pp. 4-6), where he cites the apocalyptic and eschatological 

tradition of the final reign of four kingdoms, the final one restoring the Caliphate: 

Prophethood will remain with you for as long as God wills it to 

remain, then God will raise it up wherever He wills to raise it 

up. Afterward, there will be a caliphate that follows the guidance of Prophethood remaining with you for as long as God 

wills it to remain. Then, He will raise it up whenever He wills to 

raise it up. Afterward, there will be a reign of violently oppressive rule [unjust Muslim kings] and it will remain as long as 

God wills it. Then, there will be a reign of tyrannical rule and it 

will remain for as long as God wills it to remain. Then God will 

raise it up whenever He wills to raise it up. Finally there will be 

a caliphate that follows the guidance of Prophethood.

105. For one of the few scholarly accounts of al-Zarqawi’s 

apocalypticism, see David Cook, “Abu Mus’ab al-Suri and AbuMusa’b al-Zarqawi: The Apocalyptic Theorist and the Apocalyptic Practitioner,” Unpublished Manuscript, 2007, esp. pp. 9-14.

106. See Fishman, “After Zarqawi,” pp. 21-23, for an incisive 

analysis of this theme in al-Zarqawi’s own sojourn.

107. See The Middle East Media Research Institute, “New 

Video by Al-Qaeda Commander in Iraq Abu Mus’ab Al-Zarqawi,” MEMRI Special Dispatch No. 1149, April 26, 2006, available 

from www.memri.org/report/en/0/0/0/0/0/0/1671.htm, accessed on 

December 17, 2014. The video was originally posted to an Islamist 

web forum on April 25, 2006.

108. See The Middle East Media Research Institute, “Islamist Websites Monitor No. 8,” MEMRI Special Dispatch No. 

1324, October 17, 2006, available from www.memri.org/report/

en/0/0/0/0/0/0/1910.htm, accessed on August 4, 2016. The dispatch 

reports that: “The Shura Council of the Jihad Fighters in Iraq Announces the Establishment of an Islamic State. . . . On October 15, 

2006.”

109. “A Full Text of the Proclamation of the ISI Has Been 

Published,” October 16, 2006, available from www.kavkazcenter.

com/eng/content/2006/10/16/5985, accessed on December 12, 2014. 
226

Despite its grammatical challenges, the phraseology used in the 

English translation by these Uzbek translators is maintained 

where possible with very slight alteration indicated in brackets, 

and where it seemed necessary and advisable, though with no 

change in sense.

110. Ibid.

111. Nibras Kazimi, “Al-Muhajir’s Evil Presence,” The New 

York Sun, November 20, 2006, available from www.nysun.com/

opinion/al-muhajirs-evil-presence/43815/, accessed on August 18, 

2014.

112. See “Letter of Advice to UBL (English Translation),” SOCOM-2012-0000018, Combating Terrorism Center, West Point, 

NY, available from https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/letter-of-adviceto-ubl-english-translation-2, p. 8.

113. See Pieter Van Ostaeyen, “Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri—Testimonial to Preserve the Blood of Mujahideen in as-Sham,” pietervanostaeyen, blog entry, posted May 3, 2014, available from 

pietervanostaeyen.wordpress.com/2014/05/03/dr-ayman-az-zawahiri-testimonial-to-preserve-the-blood-of-mujahideen-in-as-sham/, accessed on May 5, 2015; Pieter Van Ostaeyen, “Jabhat an-Nusra 

reacts on ISIS spokesman al-’Adnānī (Part I)—Abū Sulaymān alMuhājir,” pietervanostaeyen, original statement published March 

18, 2014, blog entry, posted March 27, 2014, available from pietervanostaeyen.wordpress.com/2014/03/27/jabhat-an-nusra-reacts-onisis-spokesman-al-adnani-part-i/, accessed on December 8, 2014.

114. Asharq Aawsat, “Who was the real Abu Omar al-Baghdadi,” April 20, 2010, available from english.aawsat.com/2010/04/

article55251030/who-was-the-real-abu-omar-al-baghdadi, accessed on 

October 13, 2015. 

115. They are available in the original Arabic, in Abu Hamza 

al-Muhajir and Abu Omar al-Baghdadi (audio addresses, 2006-

2010, collected and transcribed in), al-Majmu li-qadat Dawlat al-

’Iraq al-Islamiyya Nukhba al-l’lam al-Jihadi, 2010, available from 

archive.org/download/Dwla_Nokhba/mjdawl.doc; See Cole Bunzel, 

“From Paper State to Caliphate: The Ideology of the Islamic 

State,” The Brookings Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic 
227

World, Analysis Paper No. 19, Washington, DC: The Brookings 

Institution, March 2015, available from https://www.brookings.

edu/research/from-paper-state-to-caliphate-the-ideology-of-the-islamicstate/, accessed on August 4, 2016. Bunzel provides a listing of 

“Some of our Fundamentals” from Abu Umar al-Baghdādī, and 

cites the original from March 13, 2007 as “Qul innī ‘alā bayyina min 

Rabbī,” Mu’assasat al-Furqān, which was transcribed in al-Majmū 

‘li-qādat Dawlat al-’Irāq al-Islāmiyya, in 2010 (pp. 38-41). Bunzel’s 

paper notes: “The 38 speeches of the group’s first two senior 

leaders, Abu ‘Umar al-Baghdadi and Abū Hamza al-Mujāhir . . . 

run to nearly 17 hours of audio and occupy more than 200 pages 

transcribed” (p. 4 footnote 3). The present author is indebted to 

those whose labors have made some of these available in English 

translation, in particular Nibras Kazimi, Cole Bunzel, and William McCants. Their efforts are duly noted when referenced in the 

following discussion. 

116. See Bunzel, “From Paper State to Caliphate,” pp. 38-41; 

See also, Nibras Kazimi, “Al-Baghdadi’s Third-Speech—Sounding Worried,” March 14, 2007, available from talismangate.blogspot.

com/2007/03/al-baghdadis-third-speech-sounding.html, accessed on 

October 13, 2014.

117. Kazimi, Ibid.

118. Kazimi, Ibid.

119. Kazimi, Ibid.

120. Kazimi, Ibid. Kazimi provides important insight into the 

meaning of this ruling: 

the position of such non-Muslims within the expanding Islamic 

empire was codified under the second caliph, Omar. [Abu 

Omar] Al-Baghdadi is claiming that whatever protections and 

exceptions that Islam had extended to Dhimmis are void and 

no longer valid, and that the previous agreement with the Caliph Omar must be renegotiated; this sounds like a determination that only a caliph can make but maybe al-Baghdadi sees 

himself in such a role already.

Kazimi’s last point is doubtful, however, since the speech is signed 

“Your brother, Abu Omar al-Husseini al-Qurayshi al-Baghdadi,” 
228

and not your Caliph, or even emir, since its likely audience went 

well beyond his immediate environs.

121. See Lav, Radical Islam and the Revival of Medieval Theology, for the single best volume this author has encountered of the 

theological and ‘theopolitical’ foundations and implications of 

this debate. The issue to which Abu Omar refers is the question of 

what qualifies as faith (Iman), whether faith is something that is or 

is not, or varies in its quantity/quality; what qualifies as infidelity 

(Kufr); and what must be taken into account to fully determine 

another’s potential Kufr. He refers to the two extremes, which all 

proponents of the Ahl-us-Sunnah wa’al Gama’at proclaim represent 

the extremes of excess (Khawarij) and of negligence (or irja) captured in the epithet Murji’ites. 

122. Kazimi, “Al-Baghdadi’s Third-Speech—Sounding 

Worried.”

123. William McCants, The ISIS Apocalypse: The History, Strategy, and Doomsday Vision of the Islamic State, New York: St. Martin’s 

Press, 2015, esp. ch. 5, “Sectarian Apocalypse,” pp. 99-119. 

124. Ibid., p. 32.

125. Ibid., esp. pp. 99-119. 

126. Ibid., p. 142. See also, Brian Fishman, “The First Defector: 

Abu Sulayman al-Utaybi, the Islamic State, and al-Qa’ida,” CTC 

Sentinel, October 2015, available from www.ctc.usma.edu, accessed 

on October 23, 2015.

127. Bill Roggio, “US and Iraqi forces kill Al Masri and 

Baghdadi, al Qaeda in Iraq’s top two leaders,” The Long War 

Journal, April 19, 2010, available in www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2010/04/al_qaeda_in_iraqs_to.php, accessed on August 4, 

2016; Nibras Kazimi, “And so ends the saga of Abu Omar alBaghdadi . . . ,” blog entry, posted April 19, 2010, available from 

talismangate.blogspot.com/2010/04/and-so-ends-saga-of-abu-omar-al.

html, accessed on August 15, 2014; Nibras Kazimi, “CONFIRMED: 

It WAS al-Baghdadi and al-Muhajir,” blog entry, posted April 24, 

2010, available from talismangate.blogspot.com/2010/04/confirmed-itwas-al-baghdadi-and-al.html, accessed on August 15, 2014.
229

128. Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri, “Eulogy for the Two Commanders: Emir of the Believers Abu Omar al-Baghdadi and Minister of 

War Abu Hamza al-Mujhahir, May Allah Have Mercy on Them,” 

May 24, 2010, available from triceratops.bynmawr.edu/dspace/bitstream/handle/10066/8488/ZAW20100524.pdf?sequence=3, accessed 

on December 5, 2014. (A 26-minute, 49-second, video produced 

by as-Sahab.) 

129. See Jessica D. Lewis, Al-Qaeda in Iraq Resurgent: The Breaking the Walls Campaign, Part 1, Middle East Security Report 14, 

Washington, DC, Institute for the Study of War, September 2013, 

available from www.understandingwar.org, accessed on November 

8, 2013; Jessica D. Lewis, “AQI’s ‘Soldiers’ Harvest’ Campaign,” 

Backgrounder, Washington, DC, Institute for the Study of War, 

October 9, 2013, available from www.understandingwar.org, accessed on November 8, 2013; Jessica D. Lewis, Al-Qaeda in Iraq Resurgent, Part II, Middle East Security Report 15, Washington, DC, 

Institute for the Study of War, October 2013, available from www.

understandingwar.org, accessed on November 8, 2013. 

130. Martin Chulov, “Isis: the inside story,” The Guardian, 

December 11, 2014, available from https://www.theguardian.com/

world/2014/dec/11/-sp-isis-the-inside-story, accessed on April 28, 

2015.

131. Nibras Kazimi, “Would-Be Caliph’s Inaugural Address 

to the Islamic ‘Ummah’,” December 23, 2006, available from talismangate.blogspot.no/2006/12/would-be-caliphs-inaugural-address-to.

html, accessed on August 18, 2014. 

132. Bunzel, “From Paper State to Caliphate,” p. 17, claims 

the ISI actually equivocated in its use of titles. The most restrictive 

is that cited earlier, the “Islamic State of Iraq,” others were more 

expansive in implication, for example: “the Islamic State in Iraq” 

(al-Dawla al-Islamiyya fi ‘l-’Iraq), or simply “the Islamic State” (alDawla al-Islamiyya).

133. Amir al-Muminin Abu Bakr al-Hussaini al-Quraishi alBaghdadi, “The Declaration of the Islamic State of Iraq and alSham,” April 7, 2013, archived copy available from azelin.files.

wordpress.com/2013/04/shaykh-abc5ab-bakr-al-e1b8a5ussaync4ab-alqurayshc4ab-al-baghdc48ldc4ab-e2809cannouncement-of-the-islamic-
230

state-of-iraq-and-al-shc48lm22-en.pdf, accessed on December 3, 

2014. (A 21-minute audio uploaded late Monday evening April 

7, 2013.)

134. Alah Yuhasin, “US general rebrands Isis ‘Daesh’ after requests from regional partners: Leader of operations against group 

uses alternative name—a pejorative in Arab that rejects fighters’ 

claims on Islam,” The Guardian, December 19, 2014, available from 

www.theguardian.com/world/2014/dec/19/us-general-rebrands-isis, accessed on December 28, 2014; Pieter Van Ostaeyen, “On the Origin 

of the ‘Name’ DAESH—The Islamic State in Iraq and as-Sham,” 

pietervanostaeyen, blog entry, posted February 18, 2014, available 

from pietervanostaeyen.wordpress.com/2014/02/18/, accessed on December 28, 2014.

135. Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri, Emir of Qa’idat al-Jihad, “Translation of al-Qaeda chief Ayman al-Zawahiri’s letter to the leaders of the two Jihadi groups,” May 23, 2013, available from 

s3.documentcloud/documents/710588/translation-of-al-zawahiris-letter.pdf, accessed on December 1, 2014.

136. Amir ul-Mu’minin Abu Bakr Al-Husayni Al-Qurashi alBaghdadi, “A Message to the Mujahidin and the Muslim Ummah

in the Month of Ramadan,” July 2, 2014, available from triceratops.

brynmawr.edu/dspace/bitstream/handle/10066/14241/ABB20140701.

pdf?sequence=1, accessed on July 3, 2014. According to Hisham alHashimi, the timing of this announcement was driven by other 

leadership elements, overriding Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s hesitance: 

Four men declared him caliph—Abu Mohammed al-Adnani, 

Abu Ibrahim al-Masry, Turki al-Binali and Abu Suleiman alOtaibi [Utaybi]—before his [Utaybi’s] defection. . . . They convinced him to take this step fearing that Zawahiri might precede them; [and that] such a declaration attracts new recruits 

and donations. 

See Hisham al-Hashimi, as quoted in Ali Hashem, “The many 

names of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi,” Al-Monitor, March 23, 2015, 

available from www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/03/isisbaghdadi-islamic-state-caliph-many-names-al-qaeda.html, accessed on 

March 24, 2015.
231

137. Hashem, “The many names of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.” 

138. Unless otherwise indicated, the following sources have 

been used to create the composite portrait of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi: McCants, The ISIS Apocalypse; William McCants, “The Believer: 

How an Introvert became the leader of the Islamic State,” September 1, 2015, available from www.brookings.edu/research/essays/2015/

thebeliever, accessed on September 10, 2015; William McCants, 

“Baghdadi’s Family Tree,” Jihadica, blog entry, posted September 9, 2015, available from www.jihadica.com/baghdadis-familytree/, accessed on September 10, 2015; William McCants, “Don’t 

(Completely) Blame America for Baghdadi,” September 13, 2015, 

available from www.lawfareblog.com/dont-completely-blame-americabaghdadi, accessed on September 15, 2015; Octavian Manea, “Deconstructing ISIS,” Interview with William McCants on The ISIS 

Apocalypse, September 24, 2015, available from smallwarsjournal.

com/print/30741, accessed on September 25, 2015; Hashem, “The 

many names of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi”; Pieter Van Ostaeyen, 

“Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi—A Short Biography of the ISIS Sheikh,” 

pietervanostaeyen, blog entry, posted July 15, 2013, available 

from pietervanostaeyen.wordpress.com/2013/07/15/abu-bakr-al-baghdadi-a-short-biography/, accessed on September 22, 2014 (hagiography, but key data furnished); Abdel Bari Atwan, Islamic State: 

The Digital Caliphate, Oakland, CA: University of California Press, 

2015, pp. 110-121; Michael Weiss and Hassan Hassan, ISIS: Inside 

the Army of Terror, New York: Regan Arts, ch. 8; Jessica Stern and 

J. M. Berger, ISIS: The State of Terror, New York: Harper Collins, 

pp. 33-39. 

139. To maintain chronology I will use the given name most 

appropriate to each phase of his life. For example, he begins as 

“Ibrahim bin Awwad” (Ibrahim, son of Awwad).

140. McCants, “The Believer.”

141. Ibid.

142. Weiss and Hassan, ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror, p. 117.

143. McCants, “The Believer.”

144. Ibid.; see also, McCants, The ISIS Apocalypse, pp. 74-75.
232

145. A coinage I owe to Lav’s truly excellent book, Radical Islam and the Revival of Medieval Theology. 

146. McCants, “The Believer.” 

147. McCants, The ISIS Apocalypse, p. 75.

148. Hashem, “The many names of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.”

149. McCants, “The Believer.” 

150. Weiss and Hassan, ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror, 

pp. 118-119.

151. McCants, “The Believer.” 

152 . McCants, The ISIS Apocalypse, pp. 75-76; Weiss and 

Hassan, ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror, pp. 116-117.

153 . McCants, “Don’t (Completely) Blame America for 

Baghdadi.” 

154 . McCants, “The Believer.”

155 . Bill Roggio, “Al Qaeda in Iraq is ‘broken,’ cut off from 

leadership in Pakistan, says top US general,” The Long War 

Journal, June 5, 2010, available from www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2010/06/al_qaeda_in_iraq_is-3.php, accessed on July 27, 2016. 

Presciently, that top U.S. general, Odierno, would claim at the 

time that AQI:

will attempt to regenerate. . . . I would just say that they will, 

obviously, attempt to reconstitute. . . . The issue is, though, 

they’ve lost a lot of top leadership very quickly, and so they’re 

going to have to develop some new leadership. . . . They want 

complete failure of the government of Iraq. . . . They want to 

establish the caliphate in Iraq. 

Odierno indicates that major intelligence breaks occurred as a 

result of U.S. operations in early-2008 in northern Iraq, and also 

in early-2010 in Mosul. According to Roggio, these latter raids 

“targeted al Qaeda’s leadership, finance, and extortion cells in 
233

the Mosul region [and] proved crucial to denuding the terror network’s top commanders.” Roggio lists the following top leaders 

who were killed or captured between January 5, 2010, and May 

3, 2010: 

• Mahmoud Suleiman, top Anbar province military commander (captured); 

• Ahmad Ali Abbas Dahir al Ubayd, top military commander for northern Iraq (killed); 

• Emir of Mosul, and the emir of eastern Mosul (detained); 

• Bashar Khalaf Husyan Ali al Juburi, emir of Mosul (killed);

• Abu Ahmad al Afri, overall economic security emir 

(killed); 

• Khalid Muhammad Hasan Shallub al Juburi, top emir in 

northern Iraq (killed); 

• Manaf Abdulrehim al Rawi, emir for Baghdad (captured); 

• Abu Khalaf, most senior foreign fighter facilitator (killed); 

• Ali Hussein Alwan al Azawi, responsible for first major 

suicide attack in Baghdad, summer 2003 (detained); and, 

• Abu Na’im al Afri, leader in northern Iraq operations 

(killed). 

156. For Haji Bakr’s significant role in reconstituting the ISI 

along professional military, military intelligence, and Ba’athist 

police-state lines, see Christoph Reuter, “The Terror Strategist: Secret Files Reveal Structure of Islamic State,” April 18, 2015, available from www.spiegel.de/international/world/islamic-state-files-showstructure-of-islamist-terror-group-a-1029274.html, accessed on April 

20, 2015; Kevin Drum, “New Document Cache Shows the Real 

Roots of ISIS are as Much Secular as Religious,” April 21, 2015, 

available from www.motherjones.com/kevin-drum/2015/04/new-document-cache-shows-real-roots-isis-are-much-secular-religious, accessed 

on April 24, 2015; Ben Macintyre, “Isis Owes More to the Kremlin than the Koran,” April 24, 2015, available from www.thetimes.

co.uk/tto/opinion/columnists/article4420853.ece, accessed on April 

24, 2015; Denise Natali, “The Islamic State’s Baathist Roots,” AlMonitor, April 24, 2015, available from www.al-monitor.com/pulse/

originals/2015/04/baathists-behind-the-islamic-state.html, accessed on

April 27, 2015; Aymenn Jawad al-Tamimi, “Islamic State: The Myth 

of a Baathist ‘Hidden Hand’,” IHS Jane’s Terrorism and Insurgency 

Monitor, June 2015, available from www.meforum.org/5312/isisbaathist-hidden-hand, accessed on August 19, 2015. (Al-Tamimi sent 

the present author the previous article since it was not available 
234

online previously.) Samia Nakhoul, “Saddam’s former army is secret of Baghdadi’s success,” Reuters, June 16, 2015, available from 

www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-baghdadi-insight-idUSK

BN0OW1VN20150616, accessed on August 5, 2016; Liz Sly, “The 

hidden hand behind the Islamic State militants? Saddam Hussein’s,” The Washington Post, April 4, 2015, available in https://www.

washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/the-hidden-hand-behind-theislamic-state-militants-saddam-husseins/2015/04/04/aa97676c-cc32-

11e4-8730-4f473416e759_story.html, accessed on August 5, 2016.

For invaluable insider information on Haji Bakr (birth name, 

Samid Abd Muhammad al-Khlifawi), likely provided by a defector or dissenter, but providing deeply revealing facts on the internal history and personal relations among key ISI figures, see 

Yousef Bin Tashfin (Twitter name: @abounour2006), “English 

Translation of @Wikibaghdaddy,” [n.d.] available from https://

justpaste.it/e90q, accessed on September 23, 2014. Yousef provided an English translation of all collected tweets for the following 

days: December 14-15, 17-18, 20, 24, 27, and 29-31, 2014; January 1, 

5, 8, 12, 19, and 24, 2015; Jacob Siegel, “Someone is Spilling ISIS’s 

Secrets on Twitter,” The Daily Beast, June 18, 2014, available from 

www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/06/18/someone-is-spilling-isiss-secrets-on-twitter.html, accessed on September 23, 2014. Siegel’s 

article covers the June 13, 2014 tweets; Quilliam Foundation, 

“Quilliam Exclusive—Alleged Leaks from Islamic State Reveal 

International Network of Bribery,” blog entry, posted November 

14, 2014, available from www.quilliamfoundation.org/blog/quilliamexclusive-alleged-leaks-from-islamic-state-reveal-international-network-of-bribery/, accessed on November 14, 2014. This post covers 

a November 13, 2014 leak on Twitter; For a commentary on the 

leaker and its significance, see Matthew Barber, “New ISIS Leaks 

Reveal Particulars of al-Qaida Strategy,” Syria Comment, January 

12, 2014, available from www.joshualandis.com/blog/new-isis-leaksreveal-particulars-of-al-qaida-strategy/, accessed on September 22, 

2014. This includes extensive extracts from the original tweets 

of December 10, 14, 15, and 17-18, 2014, along with commentary; 

Radwan Mortada, “Al-Qaeda Leaks: Baghdadi and Golani Fight 

over the Levant Emirate,” Al-Akhbar (English), January 10, 2014, 

available from english.al-akhbar.com/content/al-qaeda-leaks-baghdadiand-golani-fight-over-levant-emirate/, accessed on September 23, 

2014; this article is an edited translation from the Arabic Edition; 

Radwan Mortada, “Al-Qaeda Leaks II: Baghdadi Loses His Shadow,” Al-Akhbar (English), January 14, 2014, available from english.al-akhbar.com/node/18219, accessed on September 23, 2014; this 
235

article is an edited translation from the Arabic Edition; Mshari 

al-Zaydi, “Opinion: The Haji Bakr files,” Asharq Al-Awsat (English), January 29, 2014, available from www.aawsat.net/2014/01/

article55328174/opinion-the-haji-bakr-files-2, accessed on October 9, 

2014; Truls Hallberg Tonnessen, “Heirs of Zarqawi or Saddam? 

The Relationship Between al-Qaida in Iraq and the Islamic State,” 

Perspectives on Terrorism, Vol. 9, No. 4, August 2015, pp. 48-61.

Kyle Orton authored three important essays that counsel caution regarding the extreme position being advanced on the basis of the Haji Bakr files confirming a deeply influential role for 

former Ba’athists in leadership positions. His key point is that 

while that is true, they have not been ideological Ba’athists for a 

long time, and are committed to ISO on theological and religious 

grounds, though their military and intelligence bona fides have 

transformed ISO into a formidable terrorist army. See Kyle Orton, 

“Saddam’s Former Loyalists are Leading ISIS—as True Believers,” National Review, July 20, 2015, available from www.nationalreview.com/node/421370/print, accessed on September 18, 2015; 

Kyle Orton, “A Response to Criticism: Why the Ex-Saddamists in 

the Islamic State Matter,” The Syrian Intifada, blog entry, posted 

August 10, 2015, available from https://kyleorton1991.wordpress.

com/2015/08/10/a-response-to-criticism-why-the-ex-saddamists-in-theislamic-state-matter/, accessed on September 18, 2015; Kyle Orton, “How Saddam Hussein Gave Us ISIS,” The New York Times, 

December 23, 2015, available from www.nytimes.com/2015/12/23/

opinion/how-saddam-hussein-gave-us-isis.html?ref=opinion&_r0, accessed on December 23, 2015. His essential thesis is the following: 

After long neglect, the media has finally recognized the role 

of the FREs—former (Saddam) regime elements—within the 

Islamic State (ISIS). But the pendulum has now swung too far: 

Some reports are now claiming that the FREs have transformed 

the leader of the terror army, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, into nothing more than a front man for the Baathists. These suppositions 

are mistaken. Most FREs within ISIS have not been ideologically Baathists for a long time. . . . [T]he ISIS-as-front-for-Ba’athists 

storyline has a very serious timeline problem. One of the infamous FREs within ISIS was Haji Bakr (real name: Samir Abd 

Muhammad al-Khlifawi), a former colonel in Saddam’s army, 

who masterminded ISIS’s expansion into Syria; he was killed 

by Syrian rebels when they rose against ISIS in January 2014. 

What is noteworthy is that al-Khlifawi had joined ISIS in 2003 

when it was a foreign-led organization with al-Zarqawi—the 
236

patron saint of the takfiriyeen (those who regard only Salafipurists as Muslims)—as its emir. A ‘socialist infidel’—as ISIS 

refers to Ba’athists—was not going to pass muster in ISIS at 

that time. Abu Abdulrahman al-Bilawi (real name: Adnan Ismail Najem al-Bilawi), a former captain in Saddam’s army and 

until his death in June 2014 the head of ISIS’s military council 

(believed to be the most important ISIS military institution), 

also joined ISIS in 2003. Abu Ali al-Anbari, the overseer of 

ISIS-held territory in Syria, joined ISIS in 2003 as well. It’s no 

surprise that al-Khlifawi, al-Bilawi, and al-Anbari were already 

Islamic militants in 2003. From the mid-1980s, and with added 

intensity after the formal onset of Saddam’s ‘Faith Campaign’ 

in June 1993, Saddam’s regime Islamized. This was ‘most likely 

a cynical step’ on the part of Saddam, wrote Amatzia Baram, an 

expert on Iraqi Islam with the University of Haifa, but it gave 

Iraq “an extra push in the direction of an authentic Islamization 

process.” In other words, it took on a life of its own. . . . The 

FREs [Former Regime Elements] matter because they highlight 

the hybrid nature of ISIS—its fusion of elements of Ba’athists 

with Salafism—and also how difficult ISIS will be defeat. The 

FREs are the products of a military-intelligence service trained 

by the KGB [former, Soviet Secret Police]. They have brought to 

ISIS unique military and counterintelligence skills, directly in 

battle and in propaganda. Their skills are aiding ISIS’s military 

effort, bringing in fanatical foreigners to use as shock troops, 

and helping ISIS restructure the identities of local populations 

who have joined ISIS only out of necessity or convenience (as a 

means to restore order or against Iran’s proxies, for example).

157. McCants, The ISIS Apocalypse, p. 79.

158. Hassan Abu Haniyeh, “Daesh’s Organizational 

Structure.” 

159. Ibid.

160. For the transformative military relevance of this ISO professional military and security cadre, see Ben Hubbard and Eric 

Schmitt, “Military Skill and Terrorist Technique Fuel Success of 

ISIS,” The New York Times, August 27, 2014, available from www.

nytimes.com/2014/08/28/world/middleeast/army-know-how-seen-asfactor-in-isis-successes.html?_r=0; Alex Bilger, “ISIS Annual Reports Reveal Metrics-Driven Military Command,” Backgrounder, 

Washington, DC, Institute for the Study of War, May 22, 2014, 

available from www.underestandingwar.org, accessed on June 2, 
237

2014; As-Safir, “ISIS gains from Iraqi military defectors,” Al-Monitor, June 11, 2014, available from www.al-monitor.com/pulse/security/2014/06/iraq-isis-control-expansion-experience.html, accessed on 

June 12, 2014.

161. For detailed background on IS leadership, see Staff 

Writer, Al Arabiya News, “Exclusive: Top ISIS leaders revealed,” 

Al Arabiya (English), February 13, 2014, available from english.

alarabiya.net/en/News/2014/02/13/Exclusive-Top-ISIS-leaders-revealed.html, accessed on April 29, 2015; Charles Lister, “Islamic 

State Senior Leadership: Who’s Who,” c. November 2014, available from https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/

en_whos_who.pdf, accessed on January 12, 2015; Ruth Sherlock, 

“Inside the leadership of Islamic State: how the new ‘caliphate’ 

is run,” The Telegraph, July 9, 2014, available from www.telegraph.

co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iraq/10956280/Inside-the-leadership-of-Islamic-State-how-the-new-caliphate-is-run.html, accessed on 

August 5, 2016.

162. McCants, “Baghdadi’s Family Tree.”

163. McCants, The ISIS Apocalypse, pp. 78-79. Soon after bin 

Laden’s death, ISI publicly affirmed its continuing support for 

AQO under its new Emir al-Zawahiri. See Rania El Gamal, rpt., 

Myra MacDonald, ed., “Iraq’s Qaeda pledges support for Zawahiri, vows attacks,” Reuters, May 9, 2011, available from www.reuters.com/article/us-iraq-qaeda-zawahiri-idUSTRE74835A20110509, 

accessed on December 15, 2015. However, the actual renewal of 

a formal bay’ah from Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi to al-Zawahiri remained secret. See Van Ostaeyen, “Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri—Testimonial to Preserve the Blood of Mujahideen in as-Sham”; see 

also, Van Ostaeyen, “Jabhat an-Nusra reacts on ISIS spokesman 

al-’Adnānī (Part I)—Abū Sulaymān al-Muhājir.”

Al-Zawahiri amplifies this assertion in a more recent communique. In it he claims to quote verbatim from an October 23, 2012 

letter he received from al-Baghadi: 

we are a part of you, and we are from you and for you, and we 

owe it to Allah that you are the caretakers of our affairs and 

you have upon us the right of listening and obeying as long as 

we live. . . . Your advice and reminding us what is right upon 

us, and your commands are obligatory upon us, but the issues 
238

may sometimes require some clarification due to us living the 

reality of the events in our field. Therefore, we hope that your 

heart would widen to hear our viewpoint, but the matter after 

that is for you, and we are nothing but arrows in your quiver.

See Thomas Joscelyn, “Zawahiri again addresses jihadist infighting in Syria,” The Long War Journal, May 25, 2014, available from 

www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2014/05/zawahiri_addresses_j.php,

accessed on May 27, 2014. Though AQO had strategically and organizationally sound reasons, i.e., plausible deniability, for hiding this formal bay’ah, this would deeply complicate al-Zawahiri’s 

task of later putting down the ISO rebellion. The ISI spokesman 

al-Adnani later forcefully denied that ISO, indeed ISI itself, had 

at any time been formally subordinate to AQO; see especially, 

Abu Muhammad al-Adnani, trans. by Musa Cerantonio, “Apologies, Amir of al-Qaidah,” Speech by Shaykh Abu Muhammad al 

Adnani ash-Shaami, available from archive.org/stream/ApologiesOhAmir/Apologies%20Oh%20Amir_djvu.txt, accessed on December 

1, 2014.

164. Salvific jihadism and martyrology, to which we shall 

later turn, is one way to attempt to avoid these travails since the 

true Mujahid (fighter on Allah’s path), it is hoped, will be immediately evacuated to Paradise and not only enjoy its magnificence 

in proximity to Allah and its promised fruits, but also to intervene on behalf of loved ones to increase their odds of attaining 

the same.

165. For AQO, the following AQO-affiliated English-language 

online publications were analyzed (as of October 15, 2015): [1] Inspire, Qa’idat al-Jihad in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) Issues, 1-14, 

Summer 2010 to Summer 2015. Archived copies of all issues of 

Inspire are available from jihadology.net/category/inspire-magazine/, 

accessed on September 24, 2015; [2] Resurgence, Qa’idat al-Jihad in 

the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) Issues 1-2, Fall 2014 to Summer 

2015. See Resurgence, Iss. 1, Fall 2014, available from azelin.files.

wordpress.com/2015/04/resurgence-1.pdf, accessed on May 5, 2015; 

Resurgence, Iss. 2, Summer 2015, available from pietervanostaeyen.

files.wordpress.com/2015/06/resurgence-special-issue_summer-2015.

pdf, accessed on June 29, 2015; [3] Al-Risalah (The Letter) Issue 

1, July 2015. See Al Risalah, Iss. 1, July 2015, available from https://

pietervanostaeyen.com/2015/07/05/magazine-by-the-mujahideen-of-
239

shaam-al-risalah-issue-1/, accessed on July 8, 2015. Al Risalah is produced by AQO’s Syrian affiliate, Nusrah Front (Jabhat al-Nusrah

li-ahl al-Sham min Mujahidi al-Sham fi Sahat al-Jihad [Protection 

Front for the People of the Levant by the Mujahadin of the Levant 

in the Battlefields of Jihad]; hereafter, Jabhat al-Nusrah).

166. Abu Saleh, “Insightful Opinions from the Frontlines: Just 

a Thought: How Can They Handle It,” Dabiq, Iss.13, January 19, 

2016 [1437 Rabi’ Al-Akhir], p. 48.

167. Shaykh Muhammad bin Mahmud al Bahteeti (aka: Abu 

Dujana al Pasha), “The Land of the Prophets Awaits You,” Resurgence, Iss. 1, Fall 2014, p. 39. Note: the more common English 

spelling of this author’s name is Muhammad bin Mahmoud Rabie 

al-Bahtiyti (aka: Abu Dujana al-Basha), this book uses the spelling 

provided in the referenced Resurgence issue.

168. Background on Dujana is found in Thomas Joscelyn, “Al 

Qaeda official warns against Islamic State in new speech,” The 

Long War Journal, September 27, 2014, available from www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2014/09/a_senior_al_qaeda_of.php, accessed 

on October 15, 2015. Abu Dujana is Ayman al-Zawahiri’s son-inlaw, and was a long-time Egyptian Islamic Jihad member, who 

has closed ranks with AQO against the ISO’s claim to the Caliphate, extremism in takfir in the Syrian theater, and violation of what 

he deems essential Sharia regulations pertaining to intra-Muslim 

disputes.

169. Al-Risalah, Iss. 1, July 2015; Al-Risalah, Iss. 2, October 

2015, archived copy available from https://pietervanostaeyen.

com/2015/10/26/magazine-by-the-mujahideen-of-shaam-al-risalahissue-2/, accessed on October 26, 2015.

170. An English version of all the listed issues, 1-14 of Dabiq,

is available from www.clarionproject.org/news/islamic-state-isis-isilpropaganda-magazine-dabiq#, accessed on August 11, 2016. Specific 

issues and dates are as follows: Dabiq, Iss. 1, July 5, 2014 [Ramadan 1435]; Dabiq, Iss. 2, July 28, 2014 [Ramadan 1435]; Dabiq, Iss. 

3, August 2014 [Shawwal 1435]; Dabiq, Iss. 4, c. September/October 2014 [Dhul-Hijjah 1435]; Dabiq, Iss. 5, November 22, 2014 

[Muharram 1436]; Dabiq, Iss. 6, c. December/January 2015 [Rabi’ 

al-Awwal 1436]; Dabiq, Iss. 7, February 12, 2015 [Rabi’ al-Ahkir 
240

1436]; Dabiq, Iss. 8, c. March 2015 [Jumada al-Akhirah 1436]; Dabiq, 

Iss. 9, c. May 2015 [1436 Sha’ban]; Dabiq, Iss. 10, c. July 2015 [1436 

Ramadan]; Dabiq, Iss. 11, September 9, 2015 [1436 Dul-Qa’dah]; 

Dabiq, Iss. 12, November 2015 [1437 Safar]; Dabiq, Iss. 13, January 

19, 2016 [1437 Rabi’ Al-Akhir]; Dabiq, Iss. 14, April 2016 [1437 Rajab]. Hereafter all citations to Dabiq articles or graphics refer only 

to issue number without the publication date. To this author’s 

knowledge while AQO dedicates extensive attention in its various online publications Inspire, Resurgence, and Al-Risala to the 

superlative value of jihadist martyrology (as does Azzam and the 

ISO), apocalypticism and eschatology are virtually non-existent. 

Their predominantly inspirational, agitational, and exemplary 

role in strategic communication will be taken up in Chapter 2 of 

this book on strategy.

171. Middle East Media Research Institute, “Al-Zarqawi’s 

Message to the Fighters of Jihad in Iraq on September 11, 2004.” 

The original speech on September 11, 2004 was recorded and 

broadcast by several Islamist websites the next day. For a prescient article noting the possibility for this development, see David Cook, “Iraq as the Focus for Apocalyptic Scenarios,” CTC Sentinel, Vol. 1, No. 11, October 2008, available from www.ctc.usma.

edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/Vol1Iss11-Art8.pdf, accessed on 

April 21, 2015; For a deep scholarly analysis of original sources, 

consult David Cook, Studies in Muslim Apocalyptic, Princeton, NJ: 

Darwin Press, 2002; For his pioneering role in scholarly study 

of what many consider to be merely a “crank fringe,” see David 

Cook, Contemporary Muslim Apocalyptic Literature, Syracuse, NY: 

Syracuse University Press, 2008; David Cook, “Dajjal,” in Kate 

Fleet, F. Kramer, D. Matringe, J. Nawas, E. Rowson, eds., Encyclopedia of Islam, 3rd Edition, Leiden, UK: E. J. Brill, 2007-present, 

available from referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/encyclopaediaof-islam-3/dajjal-COM_25826, accessed on August 2, 2016. Finally, 

see McCants, The ISIS Apocalypse, pp. 161-181, for a brief, but accessible compilation of key excerpts from the classical source literature—the ahadith, or Traditions of the Prophet—covering “The 

Final Days,” “The Victorious Group,” “The Mahdi is Preceded by 

an Islamic State,” and “Twelve Caliphs.”

172. See Sahih-Muslim, Vol. 4, Book 39, [“Kitab al-Fitan wa 

Ashrat as-Sa’ah”] (Book pertaining the turmoil and portents of 

the last hour), No. 6924, p. 1501. In Abdul Hamid Siddiqi, transl., 

Sahih Muslim, Sh. Lahore, Pakistan: Muhammad Ashraf, 2004.
241

173. Dabiq, Iss. 1, p. 26.

174. These all refer to the following: Dabiq, Iss. 2, “The Flood” 

cover art with Noah’s ark, p. 1, and Abū ‘Amr Al-Kinānī, “It’s 

Either the Islamic State or the Flood,” pp. 5-11; Dabiq, Iss. 3, “A 

Call to Hijrah,” cover art, p. 1; this connects Hijrah to al-Sham 

as the land of the final apocalyptic battles. Also “The Islamic 

State before Al-Malhamah (The Immigrants to the Land of Malahim [Final End Times Battles]),” pp. 5-11, and “The Liberation of 

Dabiq,” p.15, which links Dabiq to its apocalyptic and prophesied 

relation to the End Times battles, and also the name of the magazine; Dabiq, Iss. 4, p. 1, cover cites the following 2 articles: see “The 

Revival of Slavery Before the Hour,” pp. 14-17, and “Reflections 

on the Final Crusade,” pp. 32-44, i.e., the Final Crusade, the Final Hour, which includes a section “The Islamic State Founders 

on Signs of the Hour,” that contains quotes from Shaykh Abū 

Mus’ab az-Zarqāwī, Abū Hamzah al-Muhājir, and Abū ‘Umar alBaghdādī; Dabiq, Iss. 5, “YAHYĀ: LESSONS FROM A SHAHĪD,” 

pp. 4-9, which discusses End Times battles and tribulations; Dabiq, 

Iss. 7, “THE SALVATION FROM FITNAH IS KHILĀFAH AND 

JIHĀD,” pp. 44-45, and “The Hour Will Not Be Established until 

Seventy Thousand From the Children of Ishāq Attack Constantinople,” p. 83; Dabiq, Iss. 9, “And Allah is the Best of the Plotters,” 

pp. 50-59, in the concluding section, “An Analysis of a Doomed 

Plot,” pp. 57-59, is End Times based, for example, p. 57: 

In his words [referring to Abū ‘Umar al-Baghdādī’s quoted 

speech referred to above] there is a summary on this final plot 

. . . of the crusaders and their apostate allies before the major 

malhamah [great battles of The End Times].

Next, see “INTERVIEW WITH THE AMĪR OF THE YARMŪK 

CAMP REGION,” pp.66-73, which is also presented within framework of End Times. For example, p. 66:

In light of the victories this month in Wilayat Dimashq (Damascus) as the Islamic State continues to advance towards the 

future stronghold of the believers during the Malahim, Dabiq 

presented a number of questions to the amir of the region encompassing the Yarmuk Camp in the Wilayah.

And a final example in its concluding paragraph pp. 72-73 (see 

pp. 66-73 for entire article): 
242

Our role model and noble Messenger . . . praised Dimashq very 

much, and this was mentioned in a number of authentic narrations. Dimashq is the camp of the Muslims during the great 

battle (al-Malhamah al-Kubra). But every Muslim who cannot 

come and wants to perform jihad and support the Islamic State 

can do so wherever he may be, just as he was ordered by the 

Khalifah in his latest address. A simple supplication from our 

Muslim brothers practicing ribat is in itself support—a great 

support for us. Any advance of the Khilafah against the Nusayriyyah and Rafidah, any manifestation of unity through new 

bay’āt to the Khalifah, and any attack against the supporters of 

the Sahwah—the crusaders and Al Salul—strengthens the mujahidin in Dimashq. May Allah facilitate for the armies of the 

Khilafah to liberate Dimashq.

See Dabiq, Iss. 10, p. 79, for an untitled, very unflattering picture 

of al-Nur Salafi members of the Egyptian Parliament—two were 

asleep, and two were distracted—with a note, “The murtaddin 

of the ‘Nur’ party in the Egyptian parliament,” accompanied by 

an End Times prophecy quote; Dabiq, Iss. 11, “The ‘Mahdī’ of the 

Rāfidah: THE DAJJĀL,” p. 16, with a big picture of former Iranian 

Prime Minister Ahmadenijad with an ultra-orthodox, anti-Zionist 

rabbi sharing space and face-time. The article begins: 

As the Hour approaches, it becomes important to reflect upon 

the fabricated accounts of future events, as they will undoubtedly play a role in actions by various deviant sects. Of these 

accounts is that of the ‘Mahdi’ of the Rafidah who wages war 

against Islam and the Muslims, contrary to the just and rightly 

guided Mahdi of the future described in the Sunnah. The closer 

the Hour approaches, the more the Rafidah fall in line with the 

Jews in preparation for the appearance of this awaited evil leader. Upon reading the Rafidi account of the “Mahdi,” it becomes 

clear that he is none other than the Dajjal.

The article’s concluding paragraph, p. 17: “We seek refuge with 

Allah for Ahlus-Sunnah from the evil of the Dajjal.” Next, see 

“FROM THE BATTLE OF AL-AZHĀB TO THE WAR OF COALITIONS,” Dabiq, Iss. 11, pp. 46-55, whose final paragraph (p. 55) 

ends with an Apocalyptic statement:

Finally, it is not the apostasy and deviance of the weak-hearted 

and the hypocrites that will lead to the truce with the Romans 

before the Hour, rather it is the patience and perseverance of 
243

the mujahidin on their way to further consolidation and greater 

expansion in the face of the international crusade against Islam 

that will achieve such. O Allah, turner of hearts, keep our hearts 

firm upon Your path until the last of us fights under the banner of al-Masih [the Mahdi, Messiah] against ad-Dajjal [AntiChrist].

See also, “THE BEST SHUHADĀ’,” Dabiq, Iss. 13, pp. 20-21, which 

contains an image with the words: “A Word of Truth” on a letter 

resting in a hangman’s noose; and finally, “THE RĀFIDAH: From 

Ibn Saba’ to the Dajjāl,” Dabiq, Iss. 13, esp. pp. 44-45. 

175. The following book series is devoted exclusively to 

prophesies, preparations, and the privileges associated with martyrdom (Shuhada) in these End Times tribulations and battles: 

For the original series of 6, Conquest, End Times battle-type 

works confirmed by prophecy: East, Syria, Arabia, Persia, Rome, 

and Palestine [then Major End Times Signs, Events]: 

Unattributed, Black Flags of the East: The Movements Past. Present. & Future-1979-2012+, n.p., n.d., available from https://archive.

org/details/BlackFlagsFromTheEast, accessed on August 12, 2016; 

Unattributed, Black Flags From Syria: Revolution 2011-2020+, n.p., 

n.d., available from https://archive.org/details/BlackFlagsFromSyria-Ebook, accessed on August 12, 2016; Unattributed, Black Flags 

From Arabia:, n.p., n.d., available from https://archive.org/details/

EbookBlackFlagsFromArabia, accessed on August 12, 2016; Unattributed, Black Flags from Persia . . . which merge the Khorasanis’ with 

the Arabs, n.p., n.d., available from https://archive.org/details/EbookBlackFlagsFromPersia, accessed on August 12, 2016; Unattributed, 

Black Flags from Rome: (Europe)—Armed Gangs & Missiles, available 

from https://archive.org/details/EbookBlackFlagsFromRome, accessed 

on August 12, 2016; Unattributed, Black Flags from Palestine: (Magic, Deception & War), n.p., n.d., available from https://archive.org/

details/EbookBlackFlagsFromPalestine-Final, accessed on August 12, 

2016; Unattributed, How to Survive in the West: A Mujahid Guide 

(2015), n.p.: The Islamic State, 2015, available from www.memrijttm.org/e-book-distributed-via-twitter-how-to-survive-in-the-west-amujahid-guide.html, accessed on August 12, 2016; Hijrah to the Islamic State: What to pack up, who to contact and where to go. Stories and 

more! n.p.: The Islamic State, 2015 available from https://archive.org/

details/GuideBookHijrah2015-ToTheIslamicState, accessed on August 12, 2016; The Shuhada [Martyrs] Book Series is available from
244

Archive.org/download/BlackFlagNShuhadaStoriesEbooks/Black%20

Flag%20n%20Shuhada%Stories%20Ebooks.rar, accessed on August 

12, 2016; The Original Shuhada Series includes: Lover’s of Maidens 

of Paradise [Lover’s of the Hur al Ayn], available from archive.org/

download/BlackFlagNShuhadaStoriesEbooks/Black%20Flag%20n%20

Shuhada%Stories%20Ebooks.rar, accessed on August 12, 2016. This 

is an English translation of Abdullah Azzam’s, The Martyrs of Afghanistan, Azzam Publications, available from archive.org/stream/

MiraclesOfJihadInAfghanistan-AbdullahAzzam/Signs_of_ar-Rahman_

djvu.txt, accessed on August 12, 2016. Azzam covers period 1979-

1989; Unattributed, Miracles in Syria (2012-13), available from 

archive.org/download/BlackFlagNShuhadaStoriesEbooks/Black%20

Flag%20n%20Shuhada%Stories%20Ebooks.rar, accessed on August 

12, 2016; Unattributed, Martyr’s of Syria (2014), [2011-2014] available from archive.org/download/BlackFlagNShuhadaStoriesEbooks/

Black%20Flag%20n%20Shuhada%Stories%20Ebooks.rar, accessed 

on August 12, 2016; Unattributed, The Undead Warriors, [Iraq, 

2003-2006] , available from archive.org/download/BlackFlagNShuhadaStoriesEbooks/Black%20Flag%20n%20Shuhada%Stories%20Ebooks.rar, accessed on August 12, 2016; Unattributed, Revivers of the 

Khilafah (Global Caliphate) [2005-2010], available from archive.org/

download/BlackFlagNShuhadaStoriesEbooks/Black%20Flag%20n%20

Shuhada%Stories%20Ebooks.rar, accessed on August 12, 2016.

176. For a terse presentation of the four essentials of apocalypticism—dualism, pessimism, judgment, and imminence—see 

Bart D. Ehrman, How Jesus Became God: The Exaltation of a Jewish 

Preacher from Galilee, New York: HarperOne, 2014, pp. 99-102. For 

comprehensive scholarly accounts of apocalyptic, see Norman 

Cohn, The Pursuit of the Millenium, rev. and enlarged ed., New 

York: Oxford University Press, 1970 [1957]; Norman Cohn, Chaos, Cosmos, and the World to Come: The Ancient Roots of Apocalyptic Faith, Second edition, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 

1999 [1993]; John R. Hall, Apocalypse: From Antiquity to the Empire 

of Modernity, Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2009; Richard Landes, Heaven on Earth: The Varieties of the Millenial Experience, New York and 

Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2011; Arthur P. Mendel, 

Vision and Violence, Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan 

Press, 1992/1999; Richard Landes, “Millenialism (Millenarianism, 

Chiliasm),” Draft of article for Merriam-Webster Encyclopedia of 

World Religions, 1999, available from www.mille.org/people/rlpages/

millenialism-mw-encyl.html, accessed on April 30, 2015.
245

177. Graeme Wood successfully corroborates this dimension 

in ISO, as well as its strict adherence to key tenets of Salafi-Wahhabi Jihadism. See Graeme Wood, “What ISIS Really Wants: The 

Islamic State is no mere collection of psychopaths. It is a religious 

group with carefully considered beliefs, among them that it is a 

key agent of the coming apocalypse. Here’s what that means for 

its strategy—and for how to stop it,” The Atlantic, March 2015, 

available from www.theatlantic.com/features/archive/2015/02/whatisis-really-wants/384980/, accessed on February 20, 2015. A vigorous debate was spawned by Graeme’s article that centered on his 

primary thesis: 

The reality is that the Islamic State is Islamic. Very Islamic. Yes, 

it has attracted psychopaths and adventure seekers, drawn 

largely from the disaffected populations of the Middle East and 

Europe. But the religion preached by its most ardent followers derives from coherent and even learned interpretations of 

Islam.

By February 20, 2015, 6,543 online comments had been made; by 

May 13, 2015, comments more than doubled to a total of 14,163; 

see also, Graeme Wood, “‘What ISIS Really Wants’: The Response: A survey of reactions to The Atlantic’s cover story—from 

think tanks to jihadist Twitter,” February 24, 2015, available from 

www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/02/what-isis-reallywants-reader-response-atlantic/385710/, accessed on September 15, 

2015. An initial spate of commentary argued for a complete disjuncture between the ISO and Islam, for example: Mehdi Hasan, 

“How Islamic Is the Islamic State? Not at All: What The Atlantic 

got wrong about ISIS,” March 12, 2015, available from www.newrepublic.com/article/121286/how-islamic-islamic-state, accessed on 

September 15, 2015 (originally in New Statesman); Fareed Zakaria, 

“The limits of the ‘Islamic’ label,” The Washington Post, February 

19, 2015, available from https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/

the-limits-of-the-islamic-label/2015/02/19/6571004e-b878-11e4-a200-

c008a01a6692_story.html?utm_term=.f6b14917d392, accessed on 

February 20, 2015; Caner K. Dagli, “The Phony Islam of ISIS,” 

The Atlantic, February 27, 2015, available from www.theatlantic.

com/global/archive/2015/02/the-phony-islam-of-isis/386156, accessed 

on March 2, 2015; J. M. Berger, “Enough about Islam: Why religion is not the most useful way to understand ISIS,” Order From 

Chaos blog entry, posted February 18, 2015, available from https://

www.brookings.edu/2015/02/18/enough-about-islam-why-religion-isnot-the-most-useful-way-to-understand-isis/, accessed on August 12, 
246

2016. However, a more reasoned (in the opinion of the present 

author) position was soon advanced. More carefully developing the theological nuances to which Wood’s principal expert on 

Salafism, Bernard Haykel, had testified, this literature concludes 

that while ISO is an Islam, Islam has a robustness, and possible 

futures, and pasts, that the ISO has failed to convey. Moreover, 

there are good grounds for believing that what 1.6 billion Muslims 

come to regard as an Islam that deserves its place at the historic 

banquet of contemporary value systems will in the end determine what Islam is. For key sources articulating this latter position, see Robert Wright, “The Clash of Civilizations That Isn’t,” 

The New Yorker, February 25, 2015, available from www.newyorker.

com/news/news-desk/clash-civilizations-isnt, accessed on February 

27, 2015; Jack Jenkins, “What The Atlantic Left Out About ISIS 

According To Their Own Expert,” ThinkProgress, February 20, 

2015, available from thinkprogress.org/world/2015/02/20/3625446/atlantic-left-isis-conversation-bernard-haykel/, accessed on September 

16, 2015; Hussein Ibish, “How ‘Islamic’ is the ‘Islamic State?: recent controversies have revived a pointless debate from the Bush 

era’,” March 3, 2015, available from www.opensource.gov, accessed 

on March 3, 2015; Mustafa Akyol, “Is the ‘Islamic State’ Islamic?,” 

February 28, 2015, available from www.opensource.gov, accessed 

on February 28, 2015. 

178. “FROM HIJRAH TO KHILAFAH,” Dabiq, Iss. 1, pp. 35-

41; “The Salvation from Fitnah is Khilafah and Jihad,” Dabiq, Iss. 

7, pp. 44-45; “And as For the Blessings of Your Lord Then Mention It,” Dabiq, Iss. 12, pp. 29-32. 

179. The “stateness” dimension of the Caliphate, distinct from 

its destined existence as eschatological necessity, will be taken up 

in the following chapter on ISO strategy under the heading “Tamkin,” i.e., consolidation and expansion. The “stateness” of Khilafa 

is exemplified in Dabiq, Iss. 9, “Healthcare in the Khilafah,” pp. 

24-26, (with data and pictures on an actually functioning health 

care sector); Dabiq, Iss. 11, p. 3: One page ad for: “The Rise of the 

Khalifah: Return of the Gold Dinar,” movie translated into multiple languages with subtitles.

180. Unattributed, Revivers of the Khilafah (Global Caliphate): 

Stories of Muslim Shuhadaa’ (Martyrs), n.p., 2013 (1434 H), available from https://archive.org/stream/Revivers-of-Global-Khilafah-Shu-
247

hada-stories-2013#page/n0/mode/2up, accessed on August 12, 2016; 

Unattributed, The Revived Caliphate, (2014) /The Islamic State, 

2003-2014+, archive.org/download/BlackFlagNShuhadaStoriesEbooks/

Black%20Flag%20n%20Shuhada%Stories%20Ebooks.rar, accessed

on May 13, 2015; Unattributed, The Islamic State (2015), available from archive.org/download/BlackFlagNShuhadaStoriesEbooks/Black%20Flag%20n%20Shuhada%Stories%20Ebooks.rar, 

accessed on May 13, 2015.

181. Amir ul-Mu’minin Abu Bakr Al-Husayni Al-Qurashi alBaghdadi, “A Message to the Mujahidin and the Muslim Ummah

in the Month of Ramadan.” 

182. Abu Muhammad al-’Adnani al-Shami, “This is The 

Promise of Allah,” June 28, 2014, available from myreader.toilelibre.org/uploads/My_563039f00cb03.pdf, accessed on June 29, 2014.

183. See for example: “Photo Report: On the Destruction of 

Shirk in Wilayat Ninawa,” Dabiq, Iss. 2, pp. 13-17. 

184. See Samir Khan, “RAFIDHA FOCUS: WINTER 2010,” Inspire, Iss. 4, Winter 2010, p. 5. 

185. Bin Mahmud al Bahteeti, “The Land of the Prophets 

Awaits You,” pp. 38-42. 

186. In the second issue of Al-Risalah, Shi’ism is addressed. 

See Al-Risalah, Iss. 2. In the full page illustration, p. 20, Al-Nusrah

Emir Sheikh Abu Muhammad al-Joulani offers a reward for killing Hizb Allah [Party of God] leader Hassan Nasrullah, but also 

states: “even if they [the assassins] be from his people or family 

. . . we will provide security for him and his family, and deliver 

him to wherever he wishes, and I am guarantor of that, Allah willing”; The same reward, and willingness to protect his family and 

kin, is offered for the killing of Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad, in 

the full page illustration, pp. 69-70. Then, see Sheikh Abu Qatada, 

“The Markets of Faith,” pp. 41-44. On p. 41, Sheikh Abu Qatada 

refers to Hassan Nasrullah as: “the evil leader of the Rafidha party in Lebanon,” which he says: “is of course a serious issue, along 

with some people’s adopting attributes of the Rawafidh,” but in 

his brief Sharia lesson, he distinguishes between the “Rawafidh” 

(an extreme disbelieving sect of the Shia), and implicitly other 
248

Shia less extreme. There is nothing in his article, however, that 

calls for killing even the leadership of the Shia since its consequences for Fitnah are greater than its benefits for the jihad. There 

is, in short, no demonization or takfir of the Shia in general, nor the 

Shia laity in particular. 

187. From Abu Omar al-Baghdadi’s 12th Speech, released as 

an audio recording to the Internet September 24, 2008; see Nibras 

Kazimi, “Fascinating: The Jihadists Admit Defeat in Iraq,” May 

15, 2008, available in talismangate.blogspot.com/2008/05/fascinatingjihadists-admit-defeat-in.html, accessed on August 18, 2014.

188. See also, Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, “As For the Foam, it 

Passes Away as Scum,” Speech presented c. between October 

15, 2007, and January 29, 2008, available from https://archive.org/

stream/AsForTheFoamItPassesAwayAsScum/As%20For%20the%20

Foam,%20it%20Passes%20Away%20as%20Scum_djvu.txt, accessed 

on August 10, 2016. 

189. The present author believes that the key source for understanding the deeper theological structure of these debates is, 

as earlier stated, Lav, Radical Islam and the Revival of Medieval Theology. Also of considerable value, are several scholarly contributions by Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi expert: Joas Wagemakers, 

“The Transformation of a Radical Concept: al-wala’ wa-l-bara’ in 

the Ideology of Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi,” in Meijer, ed., Global Salafism, pp. 81-106; Joas Wagemakers, “A Purist Jihadi-Salafi: 

The Ideology of Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi,” British Journal of 

Middle Eastern Studies, August 2009, Vol. 36, No. 2, pp. 281-297; 

Joas Wagemakers, “The Enduring Legacy of the Second Saudi 

State: Quietist and Radical Wahhabi Contestations of al-Walā' 

wa-l-Barā,” International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 44, 

No. 1, February 2012, pp. 93-110; Joas Wagemakers, “‘Seceders’ 

and ‘Postponers’? An Analysis of the ‘Khawarij’ and ‘Murji’a’ 

Labels in Polemical Debates between Quietest and Jihadi-Salafis,” in Jeevan Deol and Zaheer Kazmi, eds., Contextualizing Jihadi 

Thought, London, UK: Hurst and Company, 2012, pp. 145-164; 

Joas Wagemakers, “What’s in a Name? A Jihadi Labels Himself,” 

Jihadica, blog entry, posted September 11, 2012, available from 

www.jihadica.com, accessed on March 27, 2014; Joas Wagemakers, 

“Everything you always wanted to know about al-Maqdisi (but 

were afraid to ask),” Jihadica, blog entry, posted June 25, 2012, 
249

available from www.jihadica.com, accessed on March 27, 2014; Joas 

Wagemakers, “Al-Maqdisi and the Jordanian Jihadi-Salafi Movement,” Jihadica, blog entry, posted December 1, 2012, available 

from www.jihadica.com, accessed on March 27, 2014; Wagemakers, 

A Quietest Jihadi; Joas Wagemakers, “An Inquiry into Ignorance: 

A Jihadi-Salafi Debate on Jahl as an Obstacle to Takfir,” in Nicolet 

Boekhoff-van der Voort, Kees Versteegh, and Joas Wagemakers, 

eds., The Transmission and Dynamics of Textual Sources of Islam: Essays in Honor of Harald Motzki, Leiden: Brill, 2011, pp. 301-327; Joas 

Wagemakers, “Protecting Jihad: The Sharia Council of the Minbar 

al-Tawhid wa-l-Jihad,” Middle East Policy, Vol. 18, No. 2, Summer 

2011, pp. 148-162; Joas Wagemakers, “In Search of “‘Lions and 

Hawks’: Abū Muhammad al-Maqdisī’s Palestinian Identity,” Die 

Welt des Islams, 2013, Vol. 53, Iss. 3-4, pp. 388-415; Wagemakers, 

“A Terrorist Organization that Never Was,” pp. 59-75. Finally, 

for very important insights into the nuanced possibilities leading 

to ultra-extremist and ultra-sectarian futures, see Lahoud, The Jihadis’ Path to Self-Destruction.

The present author has enormously benefited from Nibras 

Kazimi’s truly prescient (though rarely cited), and nuanced understanding of al-Zarqawi, Zarqawism, the Islamic State phenomenon, and later, writing 2 years before the Syrian rebellion began, 

on why the Syrian regime would prove to be—on Salafi and antiShia sectarian grounds—the “perfect enemy.”

For the emergence of Zarqawism, through the April 18, 2010 

killing of Abu Hamza al-Muhajir and Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, see 

Kazimi, “A Virulent Ideology in Mutation,” pp. 59-73; Nibras Kazimi, “Interesting Jihadist Critique of the ‘Islamic State of Iraq’,” 

blog entry, posted on January 11, 2007, available from talismangate.blogspot.com/2007_01_01_archive.html, accessed on August 

15, 2016; Nibras Kazimi, “Al-Qaeda is Losing It,” blog entry, 

posted on February 3, 2007, available from talismangate.blogspot.

com/2007_02_01_archive.html, accessed on August 15, 2016; Nibras Kazimi, “Blackout of the Press,” The New York Sun, February 8, 2007, available from www.nysun.com/opinion/blackout-of-thepress/48291/, accessed on October 13, 2014; Nibras Kazimi, “Oh 

Brother, Where Art Thou?,” blog entry, posted on February 28, 

2007, available from talismangate.blogspot.com/2007_02_01_archive.

html, accessed on August 15, 2016; Nibras Kazimi, “Jihadist Meltdown,” The New York Sun, March 12, 2007, available from www.

nysun.com/opinion/jihadist-meltdown/50244/, accessed on August 

19, 2014; Nibras Kazimi, “Let Beasts Devour Beasts,” The New 
250

York Sun, June 19, 2007, available from www.nysun.com/opinion/letbeasts-devour-beasts/56857/, accessed on August 18, 2014; Nibras 

Kazimi, “The Caliphate Attempted: Zarqawi’s Ideological Heirs, 

Their Choice for a Caliph, and the Collapse of Their Self-Styled 

‘Islamic State of Iraq’,” Current Trends in Islamist Ideology, Vol. 7, 

July 1, 2008, available from www.hudson.org/research/9854-the-caliphate-attempted-zarqawi-s-ideological-heirs-their-choice-for-a-caliphand-the-collapse-of-their-self-styled-islamic-state-of-iraq, accessed on 

September 7, 2016; Kazimi, “And so ends the saga of Abu Omar alBaghdadi . . . “; Kazimi, “CONFIRMED: It WAS al-Baghdadi and 

al-Muhajir.” 

On Zarqawism/Neo-Zarqawism and Syria: Nibras Kazimi, 

Syria Through Jihadist Eyes: A Perfect Enemy, Stanford, CA: Hoover 

University Press, 2010; Nibras Kazimi, “A Perfect Enemy,” [essay 

adapted from Kazimi, Syria Through Jihadist Eyes], Defining Ideas, 

August 17, 2011, available from www.hoover.org/research/perfectenemy, accessed on August 15, 2014; Nibras Kazimi, “Western Inaction, Lebensraum for Jihad,” The Caravan, Iss. 1201, February 

23, 2012, available from www.hoover.org/research/western-inactionlebensraum-jihad, accessed on October 10, 2014.

190. For a highly informative examination of the Kharijites, 

see Lahoud, The Jihadis’ Path to Self-Destruction.

191. For a critical examination of this fallacious reduction 

of Islam’s means of raising the Word of Allah to “jihadism,” see 

Paul Kamolnick, “The Egyptian Islamic Group’s Critique of AlQaeda’s Interpretation of Jihad,” pp. 93-110; Paul Kamolnick, “Al 

Qaeda’s Shari’a Crisis: Sayyid Imam and the Jurisprudence of 

Lawful Military Jihad,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Vol. 36, No. 

5, May 2013, pp. 394-418, available from www.tandfonline.com/doi/

pdf/10.1080/1057610X.2013.775478.

192. To date, the author has applied TQA to examine AQO’s 

media warfare strategy; see Paul Kamolnick, Countering Radicalization and Recruitment to Al Qaeda: Fighting the War of Deeds, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2014, 

for the fuller exposition of the TQA rationale and concept (pp. 

67-69), and its systematic application to analyzing and countering AQO media warfare (pp. 69); For the use of TQA to analyze 

former senior AQO spokesman and media operative Adam Gadahn’s media warfare strategy, see Paul Kamolnick, “When Muslim Defenders Became ‘Blood Spilling’ Crusaders.” 
251

193. A very insightful analysis of a triangular structure that 

links violence or the threat of violence, mass communication, and 

feelings of chronic fear (terror), can be found in Alex P. Schmid, 

“The Response Problem as a Definition Problem,” Terrorism and 

Political Violence, Vol. 4, No. 4, 1992, pp. 7-13, p. 10: Figure 1, “The 

Triangle of Insurgent Terrorism” (original source: Alex P. Schmid 

and J. de Graaf, Violence as Communication: Insurgent Terrorism and 

the Western News Media, Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1982, p. 176); 

and, Alex P. Schmid, “Frameworks for Conceptualizing Terrorism,” Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 16, No. 2, Summer 2004, 

pp. 197-221, esp. “Terrorism as/and Communication,” pp. 205-

210. The key role of mass media in transmitting terrorist signals 

explains how “deeds themselves,” if propagated like waves beyond their initial victims to the ultimate target, also have this effect. It is this mediated function that permits terror to function as 

a tactical and political strategy. See also, Thomas Perry Thornton, 

“Terror as a Weapon of Political Agitation,” in Harry Eckstein, 

ed., Internal War: Problems and Approaches, New York: The Free 

Press, 1964, pp. 71-99; Ronald D. Crelinsten, “Analysing Terrorism and Counter-terrorism: A Communication Model,” Terrorism 

and Political Violence, Vol. 14, No. 2, 2002, pp. 77-122; Andrew H. 

Kydd and Barbara F. Walter, “The Strategies of Terrorism,” International Security, Vol. 31, No. 1, 2006, pp. 49-80; Ariel Merari, 

“Terrorism as a Strategy of Insurgency,” Terrorism and Political 

Violence, Vol. 5, No. 4, 1993, pp. 213-251. For the original formulations of the notion “propaganda of the deed,” see John Most, 

“Advice for Terrorists,” Freiheit, September 13, 1884; “Action as 

Propaganda,” in Walter Laqueur and Yonah Alexander, eds., The 

Terrorism Reader, New York: Penguin, 1987, pp. 100-108, esp. part 

III, “Action as Propaganda,” pp. 105-106. For a comprehensive 

state-of-the-art definition of terrorism, see Alex P. Schmid, “The 

Revised Academic Consensus Definition of Terrorism,” Perspectives in Terrorism, Vol. 6, No. 2, May 2012, pp. 158-159, reprinted 

from: Alex P. Schmid, ed., Handbook of Terrorism Research, London, 

UK: Routledge, 2011, pp. 86-87.

194. The “classical” AQO “Far Enemy” TQA has been sufficiently examined in previous works by the present author to 

which interested readers may refer. See Kamolnick, “Has Adam 

Gadahn Forsaken the Lawful Jihad for Anti-Americanism? See 

also, Kamolnick, Countering Radicalization and Recruitment to Al 

Qaeda: Fighting the War of Deeds. 
252

195. In addition to the documents earlier consulted (See 

Chapter 1, and endnotes 15 and 16), the following commentaries 

are key to understanding AQO’s proximate and ultimate religiopolitical objectives, and terrorist modus operandi: Thomas Hegghammer, Jihad in Saudi Arabia: Violence and Pan-Islamism since 

1979, p. 6 (Table 1); Thomas Hegghammer, “Jihadi-Salafis or Revolutionaries?: On Religion and Politics in the Study of Militant Islamism,” in Meijer, ed., Global Salafism, pp. 244-266, 259 (Table 1); 

Mark E. Stout, Jessica M. Huckabey, John R. Schindler, with Jim 

Lacey, The Terrorist Perspectives Project: Strategic and Operational 

Views of Al Qaida and Associated Movements, Annapolis, MD: Naval 

Institute Press, 2008, p. 139: “Al Qaida’s grand strategy as enunciated from 1996 onward”; David Cook, Understanding Jihad, pp. 

138-141; Thomas Joscelyn, “Global al Qaeda: Affiliates, objectives, 

and future challenges,” Transcript of Thomas Joscelyn’s testimony to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on 

Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade, July 18, 2013, available 

from www.defenddemocracy.org/media-hit/global-al-qaeda-affiliatesobjectives-and-future-challenges/, accessed on August 15, 2016; 

Thomas Joscelyn, “Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan: an 

enduring threat,” May 20, 2014, Transcript of Thomas Joscelyn’s 

testimony to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation and Trade, The Long War 

Journal, available from www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2014/05/

al_qaeda_in_afghanis.php, accessed on August 15, 2016; Yoram 

Schweitzer and Aviv Oreg, “Al-Qaeda’s Odyssey to the Global 

Jihad,” Memorandum No. 134, Tel Aviv: Institute for National Security Studies, March 2014, available from www.inss.org.il/index.

aspx?id=4538&articleid=6866; Lahoud, Beware of Imitators, p. 70.

196. See for example: “Zawahiri’s Letter to Zarqawi (English 

Translation),” Original dated July 9, 2005, Combating Terrorism Center, West Point, NY, p. 10, available from https://www.

ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/Zawahiris-Letter-toZarqawi-Translation.pdf, accessed on May 21, 2013; “Letter to Nasir al-Wuhayshi (English Translation),” SOCOM-2012-0000016, 

p. 18; “Letter from UBL to ‘Atiyatullah Al-Libi 3 (English Translation),” SOCOM-2012-0000015, Combating Terrorism Center, 

West Point, NY, available from https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/

letter-from-ubl-to-atiyatullah-al-libi-3-english-translation-2, p. 5. The 

original letter, dated October 21, 2010, is from Zamarai [Osama 

bin Laden] to Shaykh Mahmud [Atiyya]; Cole Bunzel, “Al Qaeda 

Advises the Syrian Revolution: Shumukh al-Islam’s ‘Comprehen-
253

sive Strategy’ for Syria,” Jihadica, blog entry, posted February 

25, 2013, available from www.jihadica.com, accessed on March 27, 

2014; See the undated, but post-1996 Taliban conquest, “Letter to 

Mullah Muhammed ‘Umar from Bin Laden (English Translation) 

AFGP-2002-600321,” Combating Terrorism Center, West Point, 

NY, available from https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/letter-to-mullahmuhammed-umar-from-bin-laden-english-translation-2, accessed on 

May 21, 2013, [or the alternate translation, “Letter From Usama 

Bin Laden To Mullah Omar Emphasizing Cooperation In Continuing Jihad To Keep Russians And Americans Busy In Order 

To Divert Them Away From Afghanistan,” CRRC Doc. No. AQSHPD-D-000-055, Conflict Records Research Center, Washington, 

DC]; For an incisive insider critique of AQO’s over-reliance on 

the Al Jazeera conduit and its organizational failure to explicitly 

incorporate media warfare into strategy, see “A Memo to Sheikh 

Abu ‘Abdullah (English Translation) AFGP-2002-003251,” Combating Terrorism Center, West Point, NY, available from https://

www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/a-memo-to-sheikh-abu-abdullah-englishtranslation-2, accessed on May 21, 2013. The original memo, written in Kandahar, AFG, was dated Tuesday 18 Rabeei Al Awaal 

1421 AH (c. June 20, 2000) and was from Abu Huthayfa, [or Hadhafah, or Huzayfah] to Sheikh Abu Abdullah.

197. Harold D. Lasswell, Propaganda Technique in the World 

War, New York: Peter Smith, 1938 [1927], ch. 4. 

198. See Ibid., esp. pp. 10, 17, and 195, for a summary of these 

four key strategic objectives—targeting enemies, allies, neutrals, 

and one’s own population—though conceived within the context 

of nation-state warfare, they remain valid for present purposes. 

199. See Kamolnick, Countering Radicalization and Recruitment 

to Al Qaeda, pp. 20-34.

200. Kurzman, The Missing Martyrs, ch. 1. 

201. For background on the origins and nature of Jabhat alNusrah, see Noman Benotman and Roison Blake, “Jabhat al-Nusra 

li-ahl al-Sham min Mujahedi al-Sham fi Sahat al-Jihad: A Strategic 

Briefing,” Quilliam, n.d., available from www.quilliam.org/wp/wpcontent/uploads/publications/free/jabhat-al-nusra-a-strategic-briefing.

pdf, accessed on January 9, 2013; Aron Lund, “Syria’s Salafi Insurgents: The Rise of the Syrian Islamic Front,” Occassional Papers, 
254

No. 17, March 2013, available from www.ui.se/eng/upl/files/86861.

pdf, accessed on December 2, 2014; Jennifer Cafarella, “Jabhat alNusra in Syria: An Islamic Emirate for Al-Qaeda,” Middle East 

Security Report 25, December 2014, available from www.understandingwar.org/jabhat-al-nusra-syria-islamic-emirate-al-qaeda, accessed on June 2, 2015; “Jabhat al-Nusra,” Mapping Militant Organizations, November 12, 2014, available from web.stanford.edu/

group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/493, accessed on July 

15, 2015. 

On July 28, 2016, AQO affiliate Jabhat al-Nusrah officially 

changed its name to Jabhat Fateh al-Sham (Front for the Conquest 

of the Levant). Commentary is deeply divided. Some assert this 

name change is purely cosmetic, no actual evidence of formal disaffiliation has been produced, and that the USG’s recent formal 

proposal to isolate and specifically target Jabhat al-Nusrah, and not 

abandonment of AQO’s “jihadism,” sufficiently explains this latest development. See for example: Thomas Joscelyn, “Analysis: Al 

Nusrah Front rebrands itself as Jabhat Fath Al Sham,” The Long 

War Journal, July 28, 2016, available from www.longwarjournal.

org/archives/2016/07/analysis-al-nusrah-front-rebrands-itself-as-jabhat-fath-al-sham.php, accessed on July 29, 2016; Thomas Joscelyn, 

“Transcript of Abu Muhammad al Julani’s speech,” The Long 

War Journal, July 29, 2016, available from www.longwarjournal.

org/archives/2016/07/transcript-of-abu-muhammad-al-julanis-speech.

php, accessed on July 29, 2016; Charles Lister, “The Nusra Front 

is Dead and Stronger Than Ever Before,” Foreign Policy, July 28, 

2016, available from foreignpolicy.com/2016/07/28/the-nusra-frontis-dead-and-stronger-than-ever-before/, accessed on July 29, 2016; 

Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Thomas Joscelyn, “Rebranding 

Terror: Nusra’s Renaming is Part of al Qaeda’s Plan,” Foreign Affairs, August 28, 2016, available from www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/2016-08-28, accessed on August 29, 2016. Other 

reporting, however, provides evidence indicating that changes 

are not merely cosmetic but involve important strategic compromises now being made to further unify the revolutionary 

anti-Assad Islamist insurgency. These recent changes, then, are 

responses to Jabhat al-Nusrah’s previous unwillingness to openly 

distance themselves from AQO’s “global jihadism” targeting the 

West; genuine intra-Islamist conflicts over Jabhat al-Nusrah’s reluctance to openly identify with a national-Islamist Syrian project; actual splits within Jabhat al-Nusrah between its hardline 

AQO-first wing, and its predominantly Syrian Islamist nationalist 

membership; and also, a defensive measure designed to subvert 
255

recent USG initiatives explicitly and adamantly targeting Jabhat 

al-Nusrah as a designated Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO). 

For some of this reporting and commentary, see Liz Sly and Karen DeYoung, “Syria’s Jabhat al-Nusra splits from al-Qaeda and 

changes its name,” The Washington Post, July 28, 2016; “Al-Qaeda 

tells Syrian branch Nusra Front it can drop links,” Ammun News, 

July 28, 2016, available from www.opensource.gov, accessed on 

July 29, 2016; Unattributed, “‘Ahrar al-Sham’ Official: Outcome 

of Aleppo Battle ‘Will Change the Rules of the Political Game’,” 

Al-Hayah, August 10, 2016, available from www.opensource.gov, accessed on August 11, 2016; Mona Alami, [interview with Iyyad 

al-Sha’ar, commander of the Aharar al-Sham Islamic Movement], 

“Al-Sha’ar: I Hope ‘Fath al-Sham’ Will Act in Way that Confirms 

Its Complete Disengagement from ‘Al-Qa’ida; Al-Sharq al-Awsat 

in Interview with Leader in ‘Ahrar al-Sham’,” Al-Sharq al-Awsat, 

September 12, 2016, available from www.opensource.gov, accessed 

on September 16, 2016; Mona Alami, “Jabhat al-Nusra’s rebranding is more than simple name change,” Al -Monitor, August 5, 

2016, available from www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/08/

jabhat-al-nusra-sever-al-qaeda-focus-local-syria.html, accessed on August 9, 2016; Mu’ayyad Bajis, “Jordanian Abu Julaybib and AbuKadijah Defect from Fath al-Sham,” Arabi 21, August 23, 2016, 

available from www.opensource.gov, accessed on August 26, 2016; 

Alex Crawford, “Rebranded Nusra Front Uniting Syria’s Rebels,” Sky News, August 18, 2016, news.sky.com/story/rebels-unite-infight-against-horsemen-of-syrian-apocalypse-10541843, accessed on 

August 19, 2016. 

202. For an incisive commentary documenting AQO’s 

transformation and re-emphasizing of “Near Enemy” strategic 

conceptions, see Thomas Joscelyn, “Fifteen years after the 9/11 

attacks, al Qaeda fights on,” The Long War Journal, September 

11, 2016, available from www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2016/09/

fifteen-years-after-the-911-attacks-al-qaeda-fights-on.php, accessed 

on September 12, 2016. Joscelyn, an indefatigable documentarian 

of AQO’s “jihadism,” remarks: 

[T]here is another aspect to evaluating the al Qaeda threat that 

is seldom appreciated. It is widely assumed that al Qaeda is 

only interested in attacking the West. This is flat false. Most of 

the organization’s resources are devoted to waging insurgencies in Muslim majority countries. . . . [T]he point is that al Qaeda hasn’t been attempting to hit the West nearly as much as 

some in the West assume.
256

203. For the broader history of AQAP, and its relation to 

AQO, see Gregory D. Johnsen, The Last Refuge: Yemen, Al-Qaeda, 

and America’s War in Arabia, New York and London, UK: W.W. 

Norton, 2013.

204. See for example: Lahoud, et al., Letters from Abbottabad: 

Bin Ladin Sidelined? pp. 29-35. 

205. Ibid., p. 30.

206. See Kamolnick, Countering Radicalization and Recruitment 

to Al Qaeda, pp. 7-17, for a comprehensive evaluation of this policy, its legality, and its consequences for overcoming the formidable barriers created by nations unable or unwilling to prevent 

terrorist entities from planning external operations on their soil. 

207. USG successes in attriting AQO and AQAP leadership 

has been substantial. Consider the following extremely high value leadership targets permanently eliminated from these organizations:

• AQO, Founder, Emir, Osama bin Laden (May 2, 2011); 

• AQO, Deputy-Emir Abu Yahya al-Libi (June 4, 2012); 

• AQO, Atiyah Abd al-Rahman (aka: Atiyatullah al-Libi; 

born, Jamal Ibrahim Ashtiwi al Misrati) (August 22, 2011); 

• AQAP, Samir Ibn Zafar Khan (Founding Editor, Inspire) 

(September 30, 2011); 

• AQAP, Anwar al-Awlaki (Major Anti-American Englishlanguage terror-incitement propagandist, Sharia source)

(September 30, 2011); 

• AQAP, Deputy Emir, Saudi Sa’id al-Shihri, (2013); 

• AQO, Abu Dujana al-Basha, ‘hidden commander’ and 

son-in-law and trusted aid to Ayman al-Zawahiri 

(August 2014); 

• AQO, Adnan Shukrijumah, Major AQ External Ops 

figure (December 2014); 

• AQO, Adam Yahiye Gadahn (January 19, 2015); 

• AQAP, Harith bin Gahazi al-Nadari (aka: Muhammad 

al-Murshidi), leader and member of Sharia committee 

(January 31, 2015); 

• AQAP, Mufti, Saudi Ibrahim al-Rubaysh (c. April 2015); 

• AQAP, Deputy general manager, Nasser bin Ali al Ansi 

(April 2015); 

• AQAP, Emir Nasir al Wuhayshi (early-June 2015); 
257

• AQO, Muhsin al Fadhli, major operative “Khorasan 

Group” in Syria (July 8, 2015); 

• AQO, Sanafi al-Nasr (aka: Abdul Mohsin Abdullah Ibrahim Al Sharikh), a major Senior Leader in AQO and dispatched to Syria as part of external operations-focused 

‘Khorasan’ Group (October 15, 2015); 

• AQAP, Jalal Belaidi, aka Abu Hamza, top commander 

and regional emir; 

• AQO, Al-Shabab, Hassan Ali Dhoore, high level security 

and intelligence operative (April 2016); 

• AQO, long-time veteran and senior member al-Nusrah

Shura Council, Abu Firas al-Suri (April 2016); and, 

• AQO, Khorasan Group, Rifai Ahmed Taha Musa, Signatory to February 1998 ‘fatwa’ (April 2016).

208. Audrey K. Cronin, How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the 

Decline and Demise of Terrorist Campaigns, Princeton, NJ and Oxford, UK: Princeton University Press, 2009/2011, pp. 148-153.

209. See for example: the succinct graphic in Inspire, Iss. 14, 

Summer 2015, p. 43, representing what is described as a “Simple 

Equation”: “America’s Defeat + Da’awah + Defense = Establishing Khilafa.” An explanatory subheading is provided: 

The existence of America, policing the world vanishes [sic] any 

hope for the Mujahideen conquering any part of the earth. . . 

. That is why we have to converge all our efforts in defeating 

America. And place plans and efforts to destroy the American 

Economy, which is the main reason for America’s power and 

dominance.

And at the bottom are eight Terrorist Operations other than media that are suggested as: “THE TYPES OF OPERATIONS THAT 

WILL DEPLETE THE AMERICAN ECONOMY.” They are: 

Operation Hemorrage, 1998 Nairobi and Darasalaam Operation, Boston Marathon, USS Cole Bombing, September 11, 

Umar Farouk—Detroit Operation, Nidal Hassan—Fort Hood 

Operation, Muhahham Youssef Abdulazeez. 

This core AQO “grand strategy” is well represented in various 

issues, see for examples: “Letter from the editor,” Inspire, Iss. 1, 
258

Summer 2010, p. 2, which defines the magazine’s mission; Yahya Ibrahim, “LETTER FROM THE EDITOR,” Inspire, Iss. 7, Fall 

2011, p. 3; Yahya Ibrahim, “THE GREATEST SPECIAL OPERATION OF ALL TIME: THE EXPEDITIONS OF WASHINGTON 

D.C. AND NEW YORK,” Inspire, Iss. 7, Fall 2011, pp. 12-13; Samir 

Khan, “THE MEDIA CONFLICT,” Inspire, Iss. 7, Fall 2011, pp. 

8-11, where a quote from Khan contains basic AQO worldview, 

p. 8:

I remember his advice being spot-on as I stood there nearly 2 

years ago in front of AQAP’s Amir, Shaykh Abu Basir, may 

Allah preserve him. ‘Remember,’ he said as other mujahidin 

were busy working on their computers in the background. ‘The 

media work is half of the jihad.’

Abdallah, [Fadil Harun, c. 2009-2011], “What is Al-Qaeda?” p. 35; 

“Words of Wisdom,” Inspire, Iss. 11, Special Issue, Spring 2013, pp. 

10-11, consisting of quotes from: bin Laden, Sheikh Abu Hamza 

Al-Muhajir (AQI/MSC/ISI), Sheikh Mukhtar Abu Zubeir (Amir 

of Harakatu Shabaab Al-Mujahideen), Sheikh Anwar al-’Alwaki, 

Sheikh Ayman Adh-Dhawahiry [al-Zawahiri] (Amir of Al-Qaeda), Sheikh Abu Abdul Ilaah Ambed (Amir of AQIM Media), 

Sheikh Abu Baseer Al-Wuhayshi (Amir of AQAP), Al Hafidh Abu 

Talh Al-Almani; “Jihadisphere: Reviewing important books and 

articles concerning the Ummah and Jihad,” Review of Sheikh Abdallâh Azzâm, “Defense of Muslim Lands: The First Obligation After 

Iman,” Inspire, Iss. 13, Winter 2014, p. 49; Abu ‘Abdillah Almoravid, “THE BATTLE OF MARATHON: MESSAGE TO THE 99% OF 

THE AMERICAN PEOPLE,” Inspire, Iss. 13, Winter 2014, p. 50; 

Full page illustration, Inspire, Iss. 13, Winter 2014, p. 51, has an 

image of Tzarnaev—next to him, a poem, SHEIKH ABU BISHR 

NASSIRUD DEEN BIN ABDULLAH, “FAREWELL, O HERO!” 

[written to Tzarnaev]; Yahya Ibrahim, “Editor’s Letter,” Inspire, 

Iss. 14, Summer 2015, p. 4, lays out assumptions well in the first 

paragraph: 

Muslims continue to face the results and consequences of 

the fierce crusade aggression against Islam. The aggression 

that clearly manifested itself after the blessed 9/11 attacks. 

Exposing the hidden and true enmity they had towards 

Muslims and Islam. Revealing themselves in different forms 

of aggression: plundering Muslim wealth, occupying their 

lands, imprisoning their men and women, killing their 
259

scholars and the worst of all is the aggression towards the 

very core principles of Islam. . . . We at Inspire, and in the 

cause of the events of 9/11 encourage the Muslims in the West 

to join the Lone Jihad caravan. The caravan that has and will 

always continue to trouble and bring nightmares to the west.

“WORDS OF WISDOM,” Inspire, Iss. 14, Summer 2015, pp. 14-15, 

contains quotes from: Sheikh Anwar Al-’Awlaqi, Yahya Gadahn, 

Sheikh Ayman Adh-Dhawāhiri, Sheikh Abu Mus’ab Az-Zarqawy, Sayyed Qutb, Sheikh Hussam ‘Abdul-Ra’uf, Hamza Usama 

Bin Laden. 

See also, the issues of Inspire, which contain works by AQO 

senior leadership. For example: Osama bin Laden, “THE WAY 

TO SAVE THE EARTH,” Inspire, Iss. 1, Summer 2010, pp. 8-10; 

“RELIVING USAMA’S WORDS,” Inspire, Iss. 4, Winter 2010, 

pp. 18-19, which quotes from Osama bin Ladin, “Address to the 

American People,” Address presented in 2004; “An Address to the 

Revolutionaries,” Inspire, Iss. 6, Summer 2011, pp. 51-53; “Freedom from Blind Following,” Inspire, Iss. 8, Fall 2011, p. 56 (excerpt from bin Laden’s book, Methodological Instructions [Tawjihat 

al-Manhajiyyah]); Ayman al-Zawahiri, “Message to the People of 

Yemen,” Inspire, Iss. 1, Summer 2010, p. 11; “The Open Meeting 

with Shaykh Ayman al-Zawahiri,” Inspire, Iss. 2, Fall 2010, p. 10 

(Palestine focused); “Taken from ‘The Open Meeting with Shaykh 

Ayman al-Zawahiri’,” Inspire, Iss. 2, Fall 2010, p. 32; “Defending 

the Prophet,” Inspire, Iss. 10, Spring 2013, p. 12-13, where he says: 

“America has allowed the production of a film which commits 

blasphemy against the Prophet”; see also, the “Zio-crusade war” 

and “Judaizing of Al-Quds”; “Iman defeats Arrogance,” Inspire, 

Iss. 12, Spring 2014, pp. 10-12, described as the first part of a transcript from a recently released As-Sahab film with same name, a 

speech; “Letter to the American People,” Inspire, Iss. 13, Winter 

2014, pp. 12-14, includes first heading, “Why Do We Fight and 

Resist You?,” and next heading, “To What Do We Call You and 

What Do We Want of You?,” then lists seven demands, and conclusion; Adam Yahiye Gadahn, “Legitimate Demands, Barack’s 

Dilemma,” Inspire, Iss. 2, Fall 2010, pp. 69-70; “Know that Jihad is 

Your Duty,” Inspire, Iss. 4, Winter 2010, p. 17; “INSPIRE EXCLUSIVE: From Adam Gadahn,” Inspire, Iss. 10, Spring 2013, pp. 36-

38. At the bottom of p. 36 it describes Gadahn’s promised contribution: “The following is an extract from the promised interview 

‘The Arab Intifada,’ which we were not able to release for timing 
260

reasons . . .” The excerpt comprises three parts: “To the Governments of the Crusader West”; “To the Mujahideen Around the 

World”; and “Finally, To Those Calling to Islam and Jihad in General, and Those Working on the Internet in Particular.” Gadahn’s 

message to the West (p. 37) is essentially “Get out! Or else!” To 

“the Mujahidin” he offers the Classic AQO Bleed USA, France and 

Britain to economic crisis and near-collapse, and offers a tradeoff—“either the continuation of the Crusade against the Muslims 

and the continuation of their backing of Israel, or the continuation 

of viable governments and basic public services [in the West]” (p. 

38). Again: “[T]he Arab uprisings show that the American empire 

is at an unprecedented stage of weakness and decline” (Ibid.). Our 

strategy? “[L]et’s continue to bleed the head of unbelief dry and 

let’s beware of all attempts to divert us from our strategic objective or draw us into any battles of lower priority, particularly in 

light of the new realities in the region” (Ibid.). And, to “the Callers 

and Media,” he advises to use every method, and every media—

old and new—to reach every segment, in a way they understand:

we should fully acquaint ourselves with both the people to 

whom we are reaching out as well as the methodology and 

cause to which we are inviting them, so that we are able to hone 

our methods, refine our techniques and spread our message in 

an intelligent and educated fashion accessible to all sectors, sections, levels and factions of the Ummah (Ibid.).

Abu Yahya al-Libi, “The Middle Path and the Enemy’s Plot,” Inspire, Iss. 5, Spring 2011, pp. 13-15; “It is either Jihad or Disgrace. 

So Choose,” Iss. 6, pp. 55-56; “Take from their guidance for there 

is no refuge from jihad,” Inspire, Iss. 8, Fall 2011, pp. 54-55 (excerpts from his book, Jihad and the Battle of Misconceptions); “Cowardliness will always be cowardliness even if you consider it to 

be using wisdom,” Inspire, Iss. 9, Winter 2012, p. 49; “The American Army & War Ethics,” Inspire, Iss. 10, Spring 2013, p. 26-27. 

This is stock propaganda extolling the Truth and Allah, and the 

False America and Shaytan. It attempts to Satanize the American 

military over a few select abuses that occurred but were neither 

officially sponsored nor condoned. The spirit: 

This test is the battle between the camp of Tawheed and the 

camp of Kufr; the allies of Allah and the allies of Shaytan. The 

allies of Shaytan have a disease in their hearts. This disease 

manifests itself with their jealously and plotting against those 
261

who believe. With their total hate of Allah’s guidance and His 

laws [p.26].

210. See the following issues of Inspire, which contain excerpts 

from Abū Muş’ab al-Sūrī, The Global Islamic Resistance Call, n.p., 

n.d., in a series. Abū Muş’ab al-Sūrī, “THE JIHĀDĪ EXPERIENCES: [THE SCHOOLS OF JIHĀD],” Inspire, Iss. 1, Summer 2010, 

pp. 48-54, contains excerpts from ch. 8, sec. 4. The following issues 

continue ch. 8, sec. 4, defending the necessity of an individualized 

terrorist modus operandi: 

• Abū Muş’ab al-Sūrī, “THE JIHĀDĪ EXPERIENCES: 

[THE SCHOOLS OF JIHĀD],” Inspire, Iss. 2, Fall 2010, 

pp. 17-21; 

• Abū Muş’ab al-Sūrī, “THE JIHĀDĪ EXPERIENCES: [THE 

SCHOOLS OF JIHĀD],” Inspire, Iss. 4, Winter 2010,

pp. 31-35; 

• Abū Muş’ab al-Sūrī, “THE JIHĀDĪ EXPERIENCES: 

[THE SCHOOLS OF JIHĀD],” Inspire, Iss. 5, Spring 2011, 

pp. 29-32; 

• Abū Muş’ab al-Sūrī, “THE JIHĀDĪ EXPERIENCES: [THE 

SCHOOLS OF JIHĀD],” Inspire, Iss. 6, Summer 2011, 

p. 15; 

• Abū Muş’ab al-Sūrī, “THE JIHĀDĪ EXPERIENCES: 

[THE SCHOOLS OF JIHĀD],” Inspire, Iss. 8, Fall 2011, 

pp. 18-19; 

• Abū Muş’ab al-Sūrī, “THE JIHĀDĪ EXPERIENCES: [THE 

SCHOOLS OF JIHĀD],” Inspire, Iss. 9, Winter 2012, 

pp. 23-24; 

• Abū Muş’ab al-Sūrī, “THE JIHĀDĪ EXPERIENCES: [THE 

SCHOOLS OF JIHĀD],” Inspire, Iss. 10, Spring 2013, 

pp. 22-24; 

• Abū Muş’ab al-Sūrī, “THE JIHĀDĪ EXPERIENCES: [THE 

SCHOOLS OF JIHĀD],” Inspire, Iss. 12, Spring 2014, 

pp. 42-43. 

211. See the following article series: Anwar al-Awlaki, “Why 

Did I Choose Al Qaeda?” in the following issues of Inspire: Iss. 4, 

Winter 2010, pp. 48-50; Iss. 5, Spring 2011, pp. 62-64; Iss. 6, Summer 2011, pp. 32-34; Iss. 8, Fall 2011, pp. 50-53; Iss.9, Winter 2012, 

pp. 42-43; Iss. 10, Spring 2013, pp. 34-35; Iss.11, Spring 2013, p. 27; 

Iss. 12, Spring 2014, pp. 32-33. 
262

212. “Spying: I am a Muslim, Spying is Kufr,” Inspire, Iss. 4, 

Winter 2010, p. 36 (likely related to drone warfare); Anwar alAwlaki, “The Ruling on Dispossessing the Disbelievers wealth in 

Dar al-Harb,” Inspire, Iss. 4, Winter 2010, pp. 55-60; “Targeting 

the Populations of Countries that are at War with the Muslims: 

Coming Soon,” Inspire, Iss. 7, Fall 2011, p. 36 (Advertisement for 

al-Awlaki’s upcoming article). Anwar al-Awlaki, “Targeting the 

Populations of Countries that are at War with the Muslims,” Inspire, Iss. 8, Fall 2011, pp. 40-47; Shaykh Harith al-Nadhari, “The 

Ruling of Burning the Forests in the Lands of the Kuffar Enemies,” 

Inspire, Iss. 9, Winter 2012, pp. 45-48; Sheikh Harith An-Nadhari, 

“Condition for the Word of Tawheed,” Inspire, Iss. 12, Spring 

2014, pp. 34-35; Sheikh Nasr Al-Anisi, “A Message to the American People Regarding the Killing of the Hostage Luke Summers,” 

Inspire, Iss. 13, Winter 2014, pp. 8-9; “Excerpts from Al-Malahem’s 

Q & A Session with Sheikh Nasr Al-Anisi,” Inspire, Iss. 13, Winter 

2014, p. 9 (Includes the question, “What is the role of the lone Mujahideen in repelling this crusade?”); Sheikh Harith An-Nadhari, 

“The Word of Tawheed: Part 2: The Meaning and the Pillars of the 

Word of Tawheed,” Inspire, Iss. 13, Winter 2014, pp. 38-39 (also 

advertises “Next Issue: The Types of Tawheed” [p. 39]); “Q & A 

with Sheikh Anwar al-Awlaki,” Inspire, Iss. 13, Winter 2014, pp. 

52-53 (responses to five emailed questions); Sheikh Harith AnNadhary, “Conditions of the Word of Tawheed,” Inspire, Iss. 14, 

Summer 2015, pp. 24-29.

213. See the ongoing article series, “Open Source Jihad” (OSJ) 

in the following issues of Inspire: Iss. 1, Summer 2010, pp. 31-44; 

Iss. 2, Fall 2010, pp. 51-59; Iss. 4, Winter 2010, pp. 37-43; Iss. 5, 

Spring 2011, pp. 22-25; Iss. 6, Summer 2011, pp. 36-45; Iss. 8, Fall 

2011, pp. 27-39; Iss.9, Winter 2012, pp. 26-40 (includes creedal 

permission to firebomb and start forest fires, etc.); Iss. 10, Spring 

2013, pp. 49-57 (includes torching parked cars, causing road accidents with oil, ambushing, and tire bursters). For their delusional 

reasoning: 

The goal is . . . that if enough Muslims fulfill their obligations to 

Jihad, the Kuffar and their insurance companies will be so sick 

of the terror caused and money wasted by these simple operations that they will press their government to stop the tyranny 

against Muslims. These operations come under the umbrella of 

deterrence operations [p. 55].
263

See also, OSJ Specialist Consultant, “You Ask, We Answer,” Inspire, Iss. 10, Spring 2013, p. 56, who put the question, “Who can 

use OSJ tools and ideas?” and supplies the answer: 

Inspire Magazine seeks to free the oppressed nations from the 

Western Hegemony [sic]. There tools are for muslims [sic] in 

particular, but others could also use them in their war against 

the present oppressors, America and its allies [emphasis in 

original].

“Lone Mujahid Pocketbook: A step to step guide on how to become a successful lone mujahid. Collected from Inspire Magazine 

Issue 1-10’s OSJ [sic],” Inspire, Open Source Jihad Special, No 

Number given, pp. 1-63; Inspire, Iss. 12, Spring 2014, pp. 62-72 

(on car bombs; at pp. 71-72, a large photograph with the heading, 

“The right man in the right place devastates the enemy: Choose 

wisely”); Inspire, Iss. 13, Winter 2014, p. 15, presents a “martyrdom seeker” with New York City in the background, and states: 

“If you Have the Knowledge and Inspiration all That’s Left is to 

Take Action. OSJ: Empowering Muslims”; “Interview with the 

AQ-Chef [bombmaker],” Inspire, Iss. 13, Winter 2014, pp. 20-21; 

“From AQ’s Kitchen: The Hidden Bomb: 1.Breaching Airport Security; 2.Making the Hidden Bomb; 3. Field Tactics,” Inspire, Iss. 

13, Winter 2014, pp. 66-109. This OSJ section is earlier introduced 

by Yahya Ibrahim, “Editor’s Letter,” p. 4, in the following words: 

Hereby, Inspire Magazine is committed to arm Muslim individuals—as well as Muslim groups as is in this issue—in their 

Jihad on America. Previously, we have presented Muslims with 

different weapons, including bombs and tactics. . . . Now we 

are obliged to give your ummah something special. Something 

unique that can easily be prepared at home.

Also, at p. 69, see the following dedication: 

Dedication: To the vanguard of lone jihad; Ramzi Yusuf, ‘Umar 

Farouq, Richard Ried [sic] among other brothers. . . . To he who 

Humiliated American’s [sic] arrogance, the lion behind bars, 

Khalid Sheikh Muhammad. . . . To our amir Dr. Aiman Adwawahir [al-Zawahiri]. . . . To every Muslim concerned with 

supporting the religion.

At the end of this OSJ section an assassination list is supplied, 

which includes the following: 
264

American Economy High Profile Target: We can categorize 

them into two groups . . . Economic Personalities. . . and 

Wealthy Entrepeneurs—These are people who run the American economy. They are considered to be the great economic 

minds. It is not necessary for them to have a large capital [sic]. 

One example is Ben Shalom Bernanke. He is the current Chairman of the Federal Reserve, the central bank of the United 

States, one of the most important influential personalities in the 

stock market and world economy.

(A photo of Bernanke accompanies this section.) Also on Inspire’s

assassins list are: “‘Company Owners’: They have the largest 

capitals [sic], the greatest investors in America. One of them is 

William Henry ‘Bill’ Gates, the current chairman of Microsoft. He 

has a great influence in the American economy” [sic] (also accompanied by a picture of Gates). See also, p. 111: Detailed instructions on how to carry out an assassination of these persons, under 

the heading, “Preparation Steps of the Operation,” where one is 

instructed to wait for a “Chance,” and instructions are offered to 

potential targets on how they may avoid assassination: 

The economists and wealthy people can save themselves and 

their money by following simple conditions: 1. Drawing all 

their money from American banks, and moving them to banks 

that are not related to the American stock market. 2. Investing 

their wealth outside American soil. 3. Declaring via media that 

he is far from American policies towards Muslims and America’s support for Israel. 

See also, Inspire, Iss. 14, Summer 2015, p. 61, appearing just before the official OSJ section, a “Did You Know?” claiming a 95.7% 

success rate of smuggling a water bottle through United States 

Transportation Security Administration (TSA) security measures; 

“Assassination Operations,” Inspire, Iss. 14, Summer 2015, pp. 62-

71, includes the following: “A. Specifying a Target, B. Collecting 

Information, C. Generating a Plan, Preparing for the Operation, 

Executing the Operation”; The AQ-Chef, “Designing a Hand Grenade,” Inspire, Iss. 14, Summer 2015, pp. 72-81; Reconnaissance 

Team, “Assassinations: Field Tactics,” Inspire, Iss. 14, Summer 

2015, pp. 82-87. Presented here are photographs of: “Economic 

Personalities” Bernanke and Robert James Shiller (listing the latter’s accomplishments, and as a co-recipient of 2013 Nobel in 
265

Economic Science); “Wealthy Enterprenuers [sic] and Company 

Owners,” listing multi-billionaires Bill Gates, Warren Buffet, 

Lawrence Joseph (Oracle), Charlie and David Koch, Sam Walton, 

Sheldon Adelson, and Michael Bloomberg. The article repeats 

(see p. 87) the conditions required for removal from their targeted 

assassination list: 

And we repeat what we had mentioned in the previous issue 

to whosover wants to secure himself and wealth [sic], we say. 

. . 1. Drawing all their money from American banks, and moving them to banks that are not related to the American stock 

market. 2. Investing their wealth outside American soil. 3. Declaring via media that he is far from American policies towards 

Muslims and America’s support for Israel.

214. See Inspire, Iss. 1, Summer 2010, pp. 5-29 for statements 

about Nigerian Umar al-Faruq Friday, December 25, 2009, attempted downing of Northwest Airlines flight 253 jet; “Operation Hemmorhage,” Inspire, Iss. 3, November 2010, pp. 3-10, 13-16 

(explosive cartridges sent to Jewish synagogues); “Prepared by 

The External Operations Team: Neurotmesis: Cutting the Nerves 

& Isolating the Head [of the Snake],” Inspire, Iss. 13, front cover, 

Winter 2014, and pp. 60-63: This article declares: 

In short, the program [Neurotmesis] is about targeting different 

modes of transport. These are counted as the security’s Achilles’ heel, e.g. aviation and others. These targets include public 

and private, passenger and freight transport system. 

It continues: “this program is for you, Muslim in the West. We 

single you out because you yearn to act and support, to repel and 

expel aggressors and oppressors” (p. 60). It then outlines a general program, including identifying “main pillars of the American 

power. [sic] American’s war—like any other country or organization—is based on four main pillars: 1. Military technology; 2. Manpower; 3. Media; 4. Economy.” The article concludes by describing “the Military Policy of Al-Qaeda in its War Against America” 

(pp. 62-63) and various direct and indirect economic targets (pp. 

62-64); Sheikh Nasr Al-Anisi [AQAP], “Statement Regarding the 

Blessed Paris Operation: ‘Vengeance for the Prophet’,” Inspire, 

Iss. 14, Summer 2015, pp. 7-9; Ibrahim Hassan Az-A’sir, “Charlie Hebdo: Military Analysis,” Inspire, Iss. 14, Summer 2015, pp. 

38-42; “Timeline: Selected list of operations targeting those who 
266

insult the prophet [sic] and religion of Islam” (10 listed, both successful and unsuccessful attacks), in Inspire, Iss. 14, Summer 2015, 

pp. 48-49 (see also, An-Nadhary and al-Awlaki listed at bottom 

with lift-out quotes); see also, “The Greatest Special Operation of 

all Time: The Expeditions of Washington, D.C. and New York,” 

Inspire, Iss. 7, Fall 2011, Special Issue: 10th Anniversary of 9/11, 

pp. 12-14; “A Decade in Pictures: From 9/11 Till Today,” Inspire, 

Iss. 7, Fall 2011, pp. 16-35, which leads off with this quote, p. 16: 

A great and powerful nation, isolated from the rest of the world 

by two great oceans, America believed it could carry on with an 

imperialistic policy in the Muslim world without suffering the 

consequences. 9/11 proved America wrong. American’s [sic] 

evil has come back to haunt it. Following 9/11, George W. Bush 

promised a war on Islam and Muslims, which he termed the 

‘War on Terror.’ He also forecasted [sic] that this war would 

be a long one. Here we look into the main events and consequences of what is turning out to be an epic conflict between the 

Muslims and the West.

215. See for example: “How to communicate with us” page 

appearing in various issues: Inspire, Iss. 2, Fall 2010, p. 72; Inspire, 

Iss. 3, November 2010, p. 22; Inspire, Iss. 4, Winter 2010, pp. 44-46 

(including here an extensive discussion of operational security); 

Inspire, Iss. 4, Winter 2010, p. 65; Inspire, Iss. 5, Spring 2011, p. 

67 (includes advertisement for digital downloads); Inspire, Iss. 5, 

Spring 2011, p. 69; Inspire, Iss. 6, Summer 2011, p. 60; Inspire, Iss. 7, 

Fall 2011, p. 37; Inspire, Iss. 8, Fall 2011, p. 62; Inspire, Iss. 9, Winter 

2012, p. 61; Inspire, Iss. 10, Spring 2013, p. 60; Inspire, Iss. 11, Special Issue, Spring 2013, p. 38. 

216. The following is the virtual universal set of these themes 

as presented in Inspire. See “O Martyr, You have illuminated,” 

Inspire, Iss. 1, Summer 2010, p. 30; “MY LIFE IN JIHAD: THE 

STORY OF COMMANDER `UTHMAN AL-GHAMIDI,” Inspire, 

Iss. 2, Fall 2010, pp. 11-16; Abu Dujanah al-Khurasani “O HESITANT ONE: IT’S AN OBLIGATION,” Inspire, Iss. 2, Fall 2010, pp. 

65-66 (“author” murdered a CIA team in Khost in blackmail); Inspire, Iss. 2, Fall 2010, pp. 67-68 (re: martyrs); Inspire, Iss. 4, Winter 

2010, p. 25 (re: advertisement, “What Will You Choose,” Jannah 

[Paradise] or Hellish Torment, and at the bottom of the page the 

tag line states: “This ad a product of INDIVIDUAL JIHAD”; Abu 
267

Khowla, “WHICH IS BETTER: MARTYRDOM OR VICTORY?” 

Inspire, Iss. 4, Winter 2010, pp. 26-28; Inspire, Iss. 4, Winter 2010, 

p. 62 (re: Jihadi Cool, Gangsta-type rap poem); Inspire, Iss. 4, Winter 2010, p. 64 (re: Shuhada [martyrdom]-type videos); Inspire, Iss. 

5, Spring 2011, pp. 56-59 (re: Jihad Stories); Inspire, Iss. 5, Spring 

2011, p. 61 (re: Abyan, Yemen In Search of Martyrdom); “Shuhada Exclusive,” Inspire, Iss. 6, Summer 2011, pp. 16-30, with focus 

on Abu Ali Al-Harithi, Ammar al-Wa’ili, and Fawaz al-Ma’ribi. 

Some lift out quotes include: “So why do you continue to rush to 

your homes and not to the palaces of Paradise” (p. 24), and “Before he would set out in any operation, he would raise his hands 

to the heavens and beg Allah for shahada, crying endlessly” (p. 

29); “Progeny of the Exceptional” Inspire, Iss. 6, Summer 2011, p. 

54; Inspire, Iss. 6, Summer 2011, p. 57 (re: a quote from Sahih alBukhari):

All my [Prophet Muhammad] followers will enter Paradise except those who refuse. They [his followers] asked, ‘O Allah’s 

Apostle! Who will refuse?’ He said, ‘Whoever obeys me will 

enter Paradise, and whoever disobeys me is the one who refuses (to enter it).’

Shaykh Ibrahim al-Banna, “The martyrdom of the Commander 

Abu Ayman,” Inspire, Iss. 8, Fall 2011, pp. 12-15; Ayub Sideeq, 

“The unique trait of al-mu’minîn,” Inspire, Iss. 8, Fall 2011, p. 58-

59 (re: The unique trait of the faithful is incitement to martyrdom); 

Inspire, Iss. 8, Fall 2011, pp. 60-61 (re: two pages—one an advertisement for the “Convoy of Martyrs” video, and the second a 

poem, “The hymn of my life”; Inspire, Iss. 9, Winter 2012, pp. 8-21 

(re: the section, “Shuhada’ Special”). This includes an ultra-martyrdom quote from Prophet Muhammad, p. 8, and the following 

articles: Shaykh Harith Al Nadari, “My story with Al Awlaki,” 

pp. 9-13; Abu Yazeed, “Samir Khan: The Face of Joy,” pp. 14-19; 

Um Ahmed, “They Killed Father, They Killed Son,” p. 20, ”The 

Path of Honor,” p. 21 (re: martyrdom-celebrating prose); “OSJ,” 

Inspire, Iss. 9, Winter 2012, p. 28 (re: “The Convoy of Martyrs: Rise 

up and board with us”), located at the beginning of the OSJ section, reads: 

The objective of this workshop is to communicate with those 

seekmartyrdom [sic] operations or those who want to execute a 

slaughter to the enemies of Islam, those who have no means of 

contacting their Mujahideen brothers whatever the reasons, the 
268

aim is to activate them in the midst of the enemy weather [sic] 

the enemy was [sic] the Jews, the Christians or the apostates. 

It is becoming obvious to many that the concept of individual 

jihad which features [sic] have begun to appear recently has 

been called for by the leaders of jihad. it [sic] is briefly that 

one individual only carries out the entire jihadi operation. 

For more information about the concept of individual jihad, 

watch the film entitled ‘You are not held responsible except 

for yourself’ produced by al-Sahab jihadi foundation. [And 

at the very bottom of this one-page introduction, targets are 

identified] . . . “Targets: 1-Personalities who are at war with 

Islam and Muslims; 2-Economic targets belonging to the 

enemy; 3-Military targets belonging to the enemy; 4-Media 

targets belonging to the enemy.

It continues under the heading “Targets according to priority” . . .

“American targets; Israeli targets; French targets; British targets; 

Apostate regimes targets in the Muslims’s lands” (p. 28); Inspire, 

Iss. 9, Winter 2012, (re: quote from the Quran: “The Day their faces will be turned about in the Fire, they will say, ‘How we wish 

we had obeyed Allah and obeyed the Messenger’” [Quran 33:67] 

(p. 44); Abu Muhammad, “Unremorseful Mujahid,” Inspire, Iss. 

9, Winter 2012, p. 59 (re: Umar al-Faruq al-Nigiri); Samir Zafar 

Khan, “The Dust Will Never Settle Down,” Inspire, Iss. 10, Spring 

2013, pp. 12-13 (re: It states: “Written by martyred Brother: Samir 

Zafar Khan (may Alah [sic] accept his martyrdom); Inspire, Iss. 

10, Spring 2013, p. 14 (re: a full-page ad which states, “Yes We 

Can: A Bullet a Day Keeps the Infidel Away; Defend Prophet 

Muhammed peace be upon him.”), Inspire, Iss. 10, Spring 2013, p. 

15 (re: “Wanted Dead or Alive for Crimes Against Islam”; eleven pictures are posted, and two names without pictures in large 

font, for targeted assassination accused of insulting/blaspheming the Prophet); Inspire, Iss. 10, Spring 2013, p. 19 (re: advertisement for “a video coming soon” . . . “He Takes from Among You 

Martyrs, 5.”); Inspire, Iss. 10, Spring 2013, p. 20 (re: quote, Quran 

9:111 [i.e., a key covenant promise of eternal life and abundance 

for killing and being killed in military jihad] centered on page, 

as stand-alone); Inspire, Iss. 10, Spring 2013, p. 21, (re: Abu Ziyad 

Al-Muhajir, “Brother ‘Askar, Abu Yazeed Al-Qatary,” obituary 

on his “martyrdom” in Sana’a); Inspire, Iss. 10, Spring 2013, p. 25 

(re: a photograph of a “mujahid” with gun strapped on shoulder longing to fight with a poem placed in the foreground which 

reads: “Whoever does not die by the sword, will die by other 

means, Various are the means but death is one, Provided there 
269

is no escape from death, it is of weakness that you die in a cowardly manner.”); Taiel Haya, Women of Jihad—Facebook, “My 

Wish: If only I was a mujahid,” Inspire, Iss. 10, Spring 2013, p. 30; 

Umm Yahya, “Women of the Glorious Ummah,” Inspire, Iss. 10, 

Spring 2013, pp. 31-33 (re: After deconstructing the shallowness 

of materialism, instilling guilt, and perplexity about purpose, and 

addressing doubts others raise about female weakness and value, 

the following is stated: 

O sister, you have to wake up the hearts of the men, and 

arouse the determination of the heroes, and say, ‘We refuse 

humiliation and subjection, misery or subservience; and we 

want to be free from having to bow to the cross worshippers. 

You have to push your loved ones to the battlefield’ [emphasis added]. The Lord of the worlds is more deserving that we 

sacrifice what is most beloved to us for His sake, from our lives 

and our wealth. I say to you my Muslim sister, the least that is 

expected from you is when the men leave for Jihad, that you 

stay patient and are pleased with Allah’s orders [p. 32]. 

It continues: 

Our everyday life struggle is nothing compared to the agony 

and pain of our sisters in Palestine, Burma, Syria, Somalia and 

Afghanistan. There is so much more within your reach than the 

narrow path you have carved out for yourself. You are not like 

the others, you are a strong-willed muslimah [Muslim woman] 

who wants to build a nation that says no to oppression. A muslimah who wants to abide by the rules of Allah [p. 33].

Abu ‘Ubaydah Al-Hadramy, “Oh Who Sits Behind,” Inspire, Iss. 

10, Spring 2013, p. 40; Ansar Dine, Salafi Media, “America will 

never Profit from the Assassination of Imam Anwar Awlaki,” 

Inspire, Iss. 10, Spring 2013, p. 41; Yahya Ibrahim, “We Are all 

Usama,” Inspire, Iss. 10, Spring 2013, pp. 42-44 (re: Hagiographic 

account of Osama bin Laden, and editor Yahya Ibrahim’s wishful 

thinking on bin-Laden’s role in current Arab uprisings;. Sheikh 

Harith An-Nadhary, [killed in USG drone strike, January 31, 

2015] “To the Knights of Lone Jihad,” Inspire, Iss. 10, Spring 2013, 

p. 46, (re: Lecture excerpt from his “Mujahideen in the Cities,”) it 

begins: 

You are Lethal! You are Devastating! You are the knight who 

strikes the enemy’s heart, penetrating his armor, exposing his 
270

vulnerabilities. You are the David who cuts down the Goliath. 

This unique heroic act can only be performed by you, with 

steadfast determination, unfaltering courage and rock-solid 

resolution. Few are selected for Allah for this purpose. The following advises [sic] are presented to the knights of lone jihad 

[emphasis added, p. 46].

Sheikh Harith An-Nadhary then lays out six principles: Reliance 

on Allah, Avoidance of Sins, Trust in the Promise and Reward 

of Allah, Perseverance, “‘Have a good omen,’ i.e., Don’t worry, 

you will again be near your target, and Patience,” Inspire, Iss. 10, 

Spring 2013, p. 47 (re: A lone jihad ad; hoodie-clad, dark, overseeing a huge metropolis, with quote from Quran “So fight in the 

cause of Allah, you are not held responsible except for yourself. 

And inspire the believers” [4: 84]); “The Battalion of Terror,” Inspire, Iss. 10, Spring 2013, pp. 58-59 (re: A full-page ad with M-16, 

and suicide belt). It states:

IT IS YOU, YES IT’S YOU AND YOU ALONE—THE TERRORIST NEXT DOOR. SO BE TRUE TO ALLAH, AND BEING 

TRUE TO ALLAH IS TAKING YOUR WEAPON, PRAYING 

YOUR TWO RAKAAT, ASKING ALLAH TO HELP YOU—

GET OUT TO YOUR ENEMY, HE IS JUST NEXT DOOR. 

Among the quotes to follow: “It’s Either Victory or Martyrdom! 

. . . Did you Know that the Oppressed Muslims all Over the World 

are Waiting for You to Act?” pp. 58-59; “Dear American Muslim,” 

Inspire, Iss. 11, Special Issue, Spring 2013, pp. 16-17 (re: includes 

Boston Marathon bombing); Inspire, Iss. 11, Special Issue, Spring 

2013, pp. 18-25 (re: Several short incitement jihad/martyrdom 

pieces and photographs concluding with Boston bomber); Inspire, Iss. 11, Special Issue, Spring 2013, p. 26 (re: Advertisement 

for “Convoy of Martyrs, 2,” a video with English subtitles); Muhammad As-San’ani, “An Eye for an Eye; The Dear Price & The 

Constant Turmoil,” Inspire, Iss. 11, Special Issue, Spring 2013, 

p. 24 (re: adulatory account of the savage beheading of an offduty British soldier by Adebolajo and Adebowale; Boston Marathon bomber Dzhokhar Tsarnaev referenced using agitational 

propaganda (“agitprop”); Tamerlan Tsaraev is shown decked out 

like a gangsta in Paradise; Abu Abdillah, “Cover Story: Who and 

Why,” Inspire, Iss. 11, Special Issue, Spring 2013, pp. 28-37 (re: 

on the Boston Marathon terrorist act, an account using incitement 

agitprop; “The Arson Jihad: lex talionis,” Inspire, Iss. 12, Spring 
271

2014, p. 14; “Sincere advice from a muhajir,” Inspire, Iss. 12, Spring 

2014, p. 15; “City Wolves,” Inspire, Iss. 12, Spring 2014, pp. 30-31; 

Muhannad J. S., “24/7 Terrorism,” Inspire, Iss. 12, Spring 2014, 

pp. 36-40 (re: includes a quote from Rep. Peter T. King in lift out, 

“We have an enemy that is 24/7 trying to find ways to kill us in 

many forms” at pp. 36-37); Abu Nuh, “The Good, the Lamb and 

the Ugly,” Inspire, Iss. 12, Spring 2014, p. 41; Inspire, Iss. 12, Spring 

2014, pp. 50-51 (this includes a photograph of a lone traveler in a 

train and the statement: “For how long will you live in tension? 

Instead of just sitting, having no solution, Simply stand up, pack 

your tools of destruction. Assemble your bomb, ready for detonation.”); “Interview with the AQ-Chef [bombmaker],” Inspire, Iss. 

13, Winter 2014, pp. 20-21 (At page p. 21, after stating “All in 

all, we call Muslims to participate in lone Jihad and make use 

of what the Mujahideen write and advise so that they achieve 

a better result Biidhnillah [emphasis added].”—article includes 

six “lone mujahid” quotes including Michael Adebolajo Mujahid 

(i.e., the British terrorist who attacked Rigby), Tamour AbudlWahhab, Nidal Hassan (Fort Hood terrorist), Ali Muhammad 

Brown, and Faizal Shahzad (attempted but failed detonation of 

New York City Times Square Vehicle Born Improvised Explosive 

Device [VBIED]); Sheikh Abul-Harith Al-Iraqi, “Strike the Sea 

with Your Stick,” Inspire, Iss. 13, Winter 2014, pp. 26-27, the lift 

out paragraph reads: 

Fight in the Way of Allah, even if you have nothing but the 

kitchen of your mom, even if you have nothing but matchsticks, even if you have nothing but a pressure cooker. Know 

that Allah has subdued everything for us. So be determined 

and place your trust in Allah, and have sincerity [emphasis 

added].

Also presents photographs of over one dozen “martyrs”; Commander Shamel Basayev, “Independence and Courage,” Inspire, 

Iss. 13, Winter 2014, p. 30 (Excerpt adapted from the book, “The 

Book of a Mujahid.”); “The Journey of Jihad,” Inspire, Iss. 13, Winter 2014, p. 30 (re: Advertisement for three part documentary); 

Sheikh Ibrahim Al-Banna, “Between yesterday & tomorrow: the 

language America understands,” Inspire, Iss. 13, Winter 2014, 

pp. 32-33; Inspire, Iss. 13, Winter 2014, pp. 34-35 (re: Interview 

with AQAP’s Abu Dahdah and Basil Az-Zahrani, “I talk to Inspire [double entendre intended]”); “Jihad profiles,” Inspire, Iss. 

13, Winter 2014, pp. 40-41 (re: focus on Ramzi Yusuf [real name: 
272

Abdul Basit Mahmoud Abdul Kareem], with pictures and timeline); further states that he is the “First Mujahid to Attack the US 

Homeland” (p. 40); provides a lift out quote at top of page 41 of 

Ramzi Yusuf’s testimony to the court: 

Yes, I am a terrorist, and proud of it as long as it is against the 

U.S. government and against Israel, because you are more than 

terrorists; you are the one [sic] who invented terrorism and using [sic] it every day. You are butchers, liars and hypocrites.”

Also lists eight separate terrorist attacks or attempts, from 1993-

1995; “The Virtues of Inghimaasi: Immersing oneself deep into 

enemy lines to inflict damage or attain Shahada,” Inspire, Iss. 

13, Winter 2014, pp. 42-45, described as “Chapter in the book 

Mashari’ul Ashwaq, by Iman Ibnu Nuhas, translated by Sheikh Anwar Al-’Awlaqi.” Also includes “[five] [e]xamples of Inghimaasi 

operations,” which are listed below along with photographs: the 

2008 Mumbai, India, attack; 2013 Westgate attacks, Nairobi, Kenya; Fort Hood Shooter Nidal Hassan; Yemen Defense Ministry, 

and United Nations Headquarters in Mogadishu. It states: “More 

than 23 apostates & 17 crusaders killed,” and in a lift out quote, 

The Messenger of Allah said: ‘A time will come when the best 

among mankind would be a man holding on to the bridle of 

his horse in the Sake of Allah, [sic] whenever he hears a call to 

battle he mounts his horse and searches for death’ [p. 45].

“It’s Not Necessary,” Inspire, Iss. 13, Winter 2014, p. 53, shows a 

picture of a “lone wolf” standing over a crowded street, with the 

following words written above: 

It’s not necessary to do what Muhammad ‘Atta did, [key 9/11 

terrorist perpetrator] it’s enough to do what Nidal Hassan 

[Fort Hood terrorist] did. It’s not necessary to see victory over 

the enemy, it’s enough to be part of making the victory. It’s 

not necessary to travel to the battlefield, it’s enough to kill the 

enemy back home [emphasis added].

Abu Muhammad as-Sana-ani, “Inspire Exclusive: Inspiration: 

The Story of Abu Rawi As-Sway’ari,” Inspire, Iss. 13, Winter 2014, 

pp. 54-55 (includes a description of “Operation: Martyrdom operation on US drone operations base, Say’un, Hadramat); Muhsin 

Ali, “Facing Fear in Jihad,” Inspire, Iss. 13, Winter 2014, pp. 56-57 
273

(includes sidebar, “10 useless matters [i.e., excuses] that cannot be 

benefited from [sic]”); Inspire, Iss. 13, Winter 2014, pp. 58-59 (includes an advertisement sponsored by “A Lone Jihad,” showing 

a man walking a big city street with huge knife, backpack, and a 

grenade); Khalid As-San’ani, “Suleiman Al-Halaby: 18th Century 

Lone Mujahid Assassin: Suleiman Al-Halabi First Lone Mujahid 

to Attack the French,” Inspire, Iss. 14, Summer 2015, pp. 30-31; 

“Some Things are too Beautiful to be Forgotten: Will We Ever 

Experience Such a Sight Once More?” Inspire, Iss. 14, Summer 

2015, pp. 32-33 (shows a picture of 9/11 WTC towers exploding); 

Qadhi Bishr, “Remembering Boston: Friday lecture,” Inspire, Iss. 

14, Summer 2015, pp. 34-36; Abu Nuh, “A Mountain of Ice,” Inspire, Iss. 14, Summer 2015, p. 37; Inspire, Iss. 14, Summer 2015, pp. 

44-45 (Photograph of al-AQAP Emir al-Wuhayshi killed by USG 

drone strike in June); “Timeline: Selected list of operations targeting those who insult the prophet and religion of Islam,” Inspire, 

Iss. 14, Summer 2015, pp. 48-49 (includes 10 listed [successful and 

unsuccessful] attacks); and, An-Nadhary and al-Awlaki (listed at 

bottom with lift out quotes); Shaykh Batal’i, “If you Return We 

Too Shall Return,” Inspire, Iss. 14, Summer 2015, pp. 52-55.

217. For potential insights on ISO derived from social scientific research on gangs, see Scott H. Decker and David C. Pyrooz, 

“‘I’m down for a Jihad’: How 100 Years of Gang Research can 

inform the Study of Terrorism, Radicalization and Extremism,” 

Perspective on Terrorism, Vol. 9, No. 1, 2015, pp. 104-112, available 

from www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/405.

218. “THE MURTADD BROTHERHOOD,” Dabiq, Iss. 14, 

p. 43.

219. “FROM HIJRAH TO KHILAFAH,” Dabiq, Iss. 1, 

pp. 38-41.

220. Figure 3 adapted from Ibid., p. 38.

221. Ibid., pp. 34-36 (respectively); See also, “THE CONCEPT 

OF IMAMAH (LEADERSHIP): IS FROM THE MILLAH (PATH) 

OF IBRAHIM,” Dabiq, Iss. 1, pp. 20-30 (4-part presentation); The 

requirement of Hijrah and Bay’ah to the Caliph is discussed in 

“FOREWORD,” Dabiq, Iss. 2, pp. 3-4; Abu Muhammad al-’Adnani 

al-Shami, “This is The Promise of Allah,”; Al-Qurashi al-Baghda-
274

di, “A Message to the Mujahidin and the Muslim Ummah in the 

Month of Ramadan.”

222. “FROM HIJRAH TO KHILAFAH,” Dabiq, Iss. 1, p. 38. 

223. Ibid.

224. Ibid., p. 36.

225. Ibid., p. 35.

226. Ibid.

227. Ibid. The use of the term “mujaddid” here is curious. 

It refers not to the Quran but to a hadith in Sunan Abu Dawood, 

Book 37: Kitab al-Malahim [Battles], Hadith Number 4278, available from kalamullah.com/sunan-abu-dawood.html, accessed on October 22, 2015, in which it is declared: “Abu Hurairah narrated 

that the Islamic prophet Muhammad said ‘Allah will raise for 

this community at the end of every hundred years the one who 

will renovate its religion for it’.” According to Islamic tradition, 

this great renewer returns the faith to purity, cleansing it of unacceptable accretions, but arises from among the most prominent 

of Islamic scholars or pious rulers. See the question and answer 

from Islamqa.org, “Concept of a Mujaddid and the past and present ones,” available from islamqa.org/hanafi/darululoomtt/52180, accessed on October 21, 2015. Al-Zarqawi’s organization emerges c. 

2000, and it appears his sycophantic followers have bequeathed 

on him this title, which was reserved in past times for sages and 

pious rulers. 

228. See Ahmed S. Hashim, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency 

in Iraq, chs. 1, 2.

229. “FROM HIJRAH TO KHILAFAH,” Dabiq, Iss. 1, p. 37. 

230. Ibid., pp. 36-37. The “istishhadiyyin” [i.e., those who volunteer to become ‘martyrdom seekers’] are what we now refer 

to as “suicide bombers” or “martyrdom operations.” Recall that 

al-Zarqawi’s encounter with Abu Abdallah al-Muhajir was key 

to his acceptance of these operations on Sharia grounds. See also, 

Hamza Mustafa, “Inghimasis’ . . . Fourth Generation of ISIS’s 
275

Bombers,” Asharq Al-Awsat, July 11, 2016, available from www.

opensource.gov, accessed on July 11, 2016, for a description of this 

ultra-fanatical special unit designed, according to Mustafa, to 

“fight till the last breath before they explode themselves . . . [and 

as] . . . a special faction of ISIS, which pledged victory or death 

and never to be captured or run away.”

231. “FROM HIJRAH TO KHILAFAH,” Dabiq, Iss. 1, p. 37.

232. Ibid.

233. Ibid.

234. Ibid. 

235. See Scott Helfstein, Nassir Abdullah, and Muhammad 

al-Obaidi, Deadly Vanguards: A Study of al-Qa’ida’s Violence Against 

Muslims, Occasional Paper Series, West Point, NY: Combating 

Terrorism Center at West Point, December 1, 2009, pp. 2-3, available from https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/deadly-vanguards-a-studyof-al-qaidas-violence-against-muslims, accessed on January 3, 2010.

236. For examples of the earliest publicity glorifying these terrorist operations, and easily classifiable as pertinent to this phase, 

see ISLAMIC STATE NEWS, Iss. 1, June 1, 2014, available from 

jihadology.net/2014/05/31/al-%e1%b8%a5ayat-media-center-presentsa-new-issue-of-the-islamic-state-of-iraq-and-al-shams-newsletter-islamic-state-news-1/, accessed on August 6, 2014; ISLAMIC STATE 

NEWS, Iss. 2, c. June 2014, available from jihadology.net/2014/06/05/

al-%e1%b8%a5ayat-media-center-presents-a-new-issue-of-the-islamicstate-of-iraq-and-al-shams-newsletter-islamic-state-news-2/, accessed 

August 20, 2014; ISLAMIC STATE REPORT, Iss. 2, c. June 2014, 

available from jihadology.net/2014/06/07/al-%e1%b8%a5ayat-mediacenter-presents-a-new-issue-of-the-islamic-state-of-iraq-and-al-shamsmagazine-islamic-state-report-2/, accessed on July 8, 2014; and, 

ISLAMIC STATE NEWS, Iss. 3, c. June 2014, available from jihadology.net/2014/06/10/al-%e1%b8%a5ayat-media-center-presents-anew-issue-of-the-islamic-state-of-iraq-and-al-shams-newsletter-islamicstate-news-3/, accessed on August 28, 2014. Hereafter all citations 

to the Islamic State News or The Islamic State Reports magazines refer only to issue number without the publication date. This graphic pictorial format accompanied by brief reports on terrorist “ni-
276

kaya” attacks was later incorporated in sections of their flagship 

publication, Dabiq. For evidence in Dabiq, see “ISLAMIC STATE 

NEWS,” Dabiq, Iss. 1, pp. 42-48 (which documents terror attacks 

and alleged acts of “repentance”); “ISLAMIC STATE REPORTS,” 

Dabiq, Iss. 2, pp. 13-17 (discussion of fighting, destruction of 

“Shirk” (i.e., destruction of Shia tombs, shrines, and mosques); 

“ISLAMIC STATE REPORTS,” Dabiq, Iss. 3, pp. 12-22 (documents 

“punishing the Sahwat,” i.e., punishing in practice everyone who 

opposes ISO, does not repent and turn in their weapons; this section includes coverage of terror, destruction, murder, assassination, and the destruction of shrines); “IN THE WORDS OF THE 

ENEMY,” Dabiq, Iss. 3, pp. 35-40; “ISLAMIC STATE REPORTS,” 

Dabiq, Iss. 4, pp. 18-29 (includes reports on various aspects of destabilization and terror, but also descriptions of consolidation 

[tamkin]of the State, e.g. creation of a new province “Wilayat AlFurat” on basis of the alleged elimination of the historic Sykes-Picot border, [pp. 18-19]; the conquest of Al-Faluja [p. 20], a pledge 

from Ansar al-Islam [pp. 21-2], various terrorist operations [23-

26]; and, “A Window into the Islamic State” [pp. 27-29] which focuses on repaired bridges, restored electricity, elderly home care, 

cancer treatment of a child, and services for Muslims, including 

street cleaning [pp. 27-29]); “ISLAMIC STATE REPORTS,” Dabiq, 

Iss. 6, pp. 26-33 (includes training camps, fighting and consolidation, killing of opponents); “MAJOR OPERATIONS IN LIBYA 

AND SINAI,” Dabiq, Iss. 7, pp. 40-41; “SOLDIERS OF TERROR,” 

Dabiq, Iss. 8, pp. 17-19 (documents horrific ISO terror attacks in 

Yemen and Tunisia); “FOREWORD,” Dabiq, Iss. 9, pp. 3-4 (lauds 

Garland, TX, terrorist attack); “For the Sake of Allah FISABILILLAH,” Dabiq, Iss. 9, p. 5 (a terrorist incitement/recruitment advertisement directed at Germany, Britain, France, and Australia); 

Dabiq, Iss. 9, p. 27 (several videos advertised, including presentation in the 4th video of a horrified person displaying an extreme 

fear face, and also includes attack and terror scenes); “HARVESTING THE SAHWAH” and “THE CAPTURE OF THE 4TH 

REGIMENT BASE,” Dabiq, Iss. 9, pp. 28-30; “The Yarmūk Camp,” 

Dabiq, Iss. 9, pp. 34-36 (directed at “the tawaghit [idolaters] of 

[Palestinian] Hamas . . . [who are] appealing to Iran for intervention, while the PLO tawaghit are agreeing to have their militias 

serve as a Nusayri Sahwah”); “Until There Came to Them Clear 

Evidence,” Dabiq, Iss. 9, p. 43 (a one-page gang-like murderdom 

advertisement that portrays a brutal assassin standing above a 

kneeling, submissive hostage—with subtitles in English, French, 
277

Kurdish, Turkish, and German—and providing instructions on 

how to download it); Dabiq, Iss. 9, p. 78 (a one-page advertisement for 10 videos whose covers portray destruction, execution, 

bombings, and extreme fear-faces of victims; mimics format of 

widely-available shooter-videos); “AMERICAN KURDISTAN,” 

Dabiq, Iss. 10, pp. 30-34 (a dehumanized, demonization of Kurds); 

“THE FINAL STATEMENT OF ABŪ SINĀN AN-NAJDĪ,” Dabiq, 

Iss. 11, pp. 34-35 (the Saudi terrorist who carried out a terrorist 

operation on Saudi soil; his “Shahid” [martyrdom] statement 

published here); “SELECTED10,” Dabiq, Iss. 11, p. 15 (a one-page 

advertisement for 10 videos focused on murder, terror, fighting, 

and “repentance”; the 10th video is titled, “There is Life in Retribution,” displays a sheathed sword). 

237. McCants, The ISIS Apocalypse, p. 32.

238. “FROM HIJRAH TO KHILAFAH,” Dabiq, Iss. 1, 

pp. 37-38.

239. For an excellent and incisive examination of the ISI’s Caliphate pretension, and their relation to the history of the Sunni 

Caliphate, see especially: Nibras Kazimi, “The Caliphate Attempted,” p. 1, Kazimi states, for example, “The Islamic State of 

Iraq was to be the first incarnation of the resurrected caliphate, 

and its leader Abu ‘Umar al-Baghdadi was to be the caliph in 

waiting.” For earlier critiques of Caliphalism within Islam, owing to the divergence between its ideal and real existence in Islamic governance, see Abdel Azim Ramadan, “Fundamentalist 

Influence in Egypt: The Strategies of the Muslim Brotherhood 

and the Takfir Groups,” in Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby, 

Fundamentalisms and the State: Remaking Polities, Economies, and 

Militance, Chicago and London, UK: University of Chicago Press, 

1993, p. 153. 

240. There are multiple spellings of this person’s name; however, this book commonly refers to this person as Abu Omar 

al-Baghdadi. In keeping with the quoted material from “FROM 

HIJRAH TO KHILAFAH,” Dabiq, Iss. 1, pp. 34-40, in this section (Phase 4: Consolidation, Remaining, Declaration of the State of 

Islam [Tamkin]) of this book, the spelling is presented as AmirulMu’minin Abu ‘Umar al-Husayni al-Baghdadi.
278

241. “FROM HIJRAH TO KHILAFAH,” Dabiq, Iss. 1, p. 39.

242 . For an excellent report based on captured documents between 2005-2009, see Brian Fishman, Dysfunction and Decline: Lessons Learned from Inside Al Qa’ida in Iraq, March 16, 2009, available 

from www.ctc.usma.edu, accessed on November 8, 2014.

243. “FROM HIJRAH TO KHILAFAH,” Dabiq, Iss. 1, pp. 38-39.

244. Ibid., p. 40.

245. Associated Press (AP), “Syrian protestors taunt Assad, 

saying regime next to unravel,” Al Arabiya News, August 23, 2011, 

available from www.alarabiya.net/articles/2011/08/23/163646.html, 

accessed on August 31, 2016; Roula Hajjar, “Libyan rebels’ advance emboldens Syrian activists: Protesters say uprisings in the 

region are connected and that they will continue their peaceful 

movement against President Bashar Assad,” Los Angeles Times, 

August 22, 2011, available from articles.latimes.com/2011/aug/22/

world/la-fg-libya-syria-20110823, accessed on August 16, 2016.

246. “FROM HIJRAH TO KHILAFAH,” Dabiq, Iss. 1, p. 40.

247. These developments were emerging as a source of great 

concern for scholars then beginning to examine the consequences 

of Syria’s rebellion for re-igniting this Zarqawist ember. See for 

example: Kazimi, “Western Inaction, Lebensraum for Jihad”; Michael R. Gordon and Wesley S. Morgan, “The General’s Gambit: 

Petraeus tried to warn Assad about the foreign fighters in Iraq. 

Now they’re coming for him,” Foreign Policy, October 1, 2012, 

available from foreignpolicy.com/2012/10/01/the-generals-gambit/, 

accessed on August 16, 2016; Murad Batal al-Shishani, “Syria 

Emerges as a New Battlefield for Jordan’s Jihadists,” Terrorism 

Monitor, Vol. 11, No. 1, January 10, 2013, available from www.

jamestown.org, accessed on October 2, 2014; Brian Fishman, “Syria 

Proving More Fertile than Iraq to Al-Qa’ida’s Operations,” CTC 

Sentinel, Vol. 6, No. 11-12, November 2013, pp. 1-6, available from 

www.ctc.usma.edu, accessed on December 2, 2013; Dr. W. Andrew 

Terrill, “Op-Ed: Will the Syrian Civil War Last 10 More Years?” 

December 30, 2013, available from www.strategicstudiesinstitute.

army.mil/index.cfm/articles/Will-the-Syrian-Civil-War-Last-10-MoreYears/2013/12/30, accessed on January 6, 2014. The scholarly analysis of the ISI’s re-emergence within Iraq c. 2012-2013 is also on 
279

display: Bruce Riedel, “Zarqawism Lives: Iraq’s al Qaeda Nightmare Is Back,” Op-Ed, August 12, 2013, available from https://

www.brookings.edu/opinions/zarqawism-lives-iraqs-al-qaeda-nightmare-is-back/, accessed on August 16, 2016. 

248. Fortunately, much of this is now available in English 

translation, and interested readers may experience for themselves 

the documentary evidence of this fitnah, and why it is inconceivable without a fundamental transformation of ISO creed, to imagine any future reconciliation between these two Sunni terrorist 

organizations. To preserve the historical record, and to fully comprehend how this unfolded, we present these in chronological order, alternating between organizations (labeled ISO and AQO) as 

they level charges and respond. 

For Fitnah Speeches/Writings subsequent to his April 7, 2013 

ISIS declaration, but before the official Caliphate speech by ISO 

spokesman al-Adnani June 28, 2014, see: 

• [ISO] April 7, 2013, see al-Quraishi al-Baghdadi, “The 

Declaration of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham,” 

April 7, 2013; 

• [AQO] May 23, 2013, see al-Zawahiri, “Translation of alQaeda chief Ayman al-Zawahiri’s letter to the leaders of 

the two Jihadi groups,” May 23, 2013; 

• [ISO] June 15, 2013, see Abū Bakr al-Hussaynī alBaghdādī, “Remaining in Iraq and al-Shām,” Audio-visual message aired June 15, 2013, original Arabic only, 

available from www.youtube.com/watch?v=AS77jfttxkc, or 

from Aaron Y. Yelin, “New audio-visual message from 

the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Shām’s Abū Bakr alHussaynī al-Baghdādī: ‘Remaining in Iraq and al-Shām’,” 

Jihadology, blog entry, posted June 15, 2013, available 

from jihadology.net/2013/06/15/new-audio-visual-messagefrom-the-islamic-state-of-iraq-and-al-shams-abu-bakr-al-

%E1%B8%A5ussayni-al-baghdadi-remaining-in-iraq-and-alsham/, accessed on June 18, 2013, (7-minute audio message 

that rejects AQO’s Ayman al-Zawahiri’s ‘Ruling’ that ISIS 

be dissolved and that al-Baghdadi return to the Iraqi theater exclusively); 

• [ISO] July 30, 2013, see Abu Muhammad al-’Adnani 

al-Shami, “ISIL Spokesman Responds to Accusations, 

Announces Military Campaign,” July 30, 2013, Audio 

transcript, available from triceratops.brynmawr.edu:8080/

dspace/bitstream/handle/10066/13829/ADN20130730_2.
280

pdf?sequence=1, accessed on December 8, 2014. (From 

al-’Adnani al-Shami speech, “They shall by no means 

harm you but with a slight evil,” released by al-Furqan 

Media Foundation July 30, 2013; translation of the speech 

also available from archive.org/stream/AlAdnaniMayAllahBeWithYouOOppressedState/Al-Adnani-%20They%20

Shall%20by%20no%20means%20Harm%20you_djvu.txt, 

accessed on December 1, 2014; 

• [AQO] September 14, 2013, see Ayman al-Zawahiri, 

“General Guidelines for Jihad,” Written message archived 

online by Aaron Y. Yelin, “As-Sahāb Media presents a 

new release from al-Qā’idah’s Dr. Ayman al-Zawāhirī: 

‘General Guidelines for the Work of aJihādī’,” Jihadology, blog entry, posted September 14, 2013, available 

from https://azelin.files.wordpress.com/2013/09/dr-ayman-ale1ba93awc481hirc4ab-22general-guidelines-for-the-work-ofa-jihc481dc4ab22-en.pdf, accessed on October 10, 2014. (A 

key document identifying AQO’s TQA at this point; also 

creedal, methodological); 

• [AQO] October 8, 2013, see Abdel Moneim al Moshawah, 

“Zawahiri speech, though confused, shows U.S. is still 

main al-Qaeda target,” Perspective, Al Arabiya Institute 

For Studies, October 8, 2013, available from english.alarabiya.net/en/perspective/alarabiya-studies/2013/10/08/Zawahiri-speech-though-confused-shows-U-S-is-still-key-al-Qaedatarget.html, accessed on December 8, 2014; 

• [AQO] January 7, 2014, see Abu Muhammad al-Golani, 

al-Nusrah emir, Audio message posted on Twitter January 7, 2014, (Audio tape only in Arabic. Condemns ISIS 

policy and strategy of weakening war against Assad; calling for truce, prisoner exchange, Sharia adjudication);

• [ISO] c. early to mid-January 2014, see Abu Muhammad al-’Adnani al-Shami, “The Scout Doesn’t Lie to His 

People,” translated, transcribed, and archived online by 

Aaron Y. Yelin, “al-Furqān Media presents a new audio 

message from Islamic State of Iraq and al-Shām’s Shaykh 

Abū Muhammad al ‘Adnānī: ‘The Scout Doesn’t Lie To 

His People’,” Jihadology, blog entry, posted on January 

7, 2014, available from azelin.files.wordpress.com/2014/01/

shaykh-abc5ab-mue1b8a5ammad-al-adnc481nc4ab-22thescout-doesnt-lie-to-his-people22-en.pdf, accessed on August 

31, 2016. A hardcore response explicating ISO’s alterna-
281

tive creed and methods based on power, blood, fear, terror, submission, and an enemies list; responding to the 

previously mentioned speeches, but also references alGolani’s January 7, 2014 audio message; 

• [AQO] January 16, 2014, see Thomas Joscelyn, “Statement 

from Zawahiri’s representative shows Syrian rebel group 

tied to al Qaeda,” The Long War Journal, January 18, 2014, 

available from www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2014/01/

statement_from_zawah.php, accessed on January 20, 2014. 

Provides translated excerpts of Abu Khalid al-Suri’s 

posted Twitter statement criticizing ISIS;

• [ISO]January 19, 2014, see Pieter Van Ostaeyen, “Translation of the new audio-message by Abū Bakr al-Baghdādī,” 

pietervanostaeyen, blog entry, posted January 19, 2014, 

available from pietervanostaeyen.wordpress.com/2014/01/19/

translation-of-the-new-audio-message-by-abu-bakr-al-baghdadi/, accessed on December 8, 2014. (Addresses “fitnah” 

among Syrian rebel groups); 

• [AQO]January 23, 2014, see Ayman al-Zawahiri’s speech, 

in Pieter Van Ostaeyen, “Ayman al-Zawahiri’s Attempt 

to Stop Syria’s Fitna,” pietervanostaeyen, blog entry, 

posted January 26, 2014, available from https://pietervanostaeyen.com/2014/01/26/ayman-az-zawahiris-attempt-to-stopsyrias-fitna/, accessed on August 31, 2016, (Sheikh Ayman 

al-Zawahiri urges Mujahideen of Levant to immediately 

stop infighting);

• [AQO] January 23, 2014, see Scott Lucas, “Syria: Statement of Al Qa’eda Leader al-Zawahiri: An urgent call to 

our people in the Levant,” EA Worldview, January 23, 

2014, available from eaworldview.com/2014/01/syria-statement-al-qaeda-leader-al-zawahiri/, accessed on December 8, 

2014. (English translation by Flashpoint Partners of full 

audio statement); 

• [AQO] January 23, 2014, see Aaron Y. Zelin, “New 

statement from Dr. ‘Abd Allah bin Muhammad alMuhaysinī: “Mubādarah al-Ummah,” Jihadology, 

blog entry, posted January 23, 2014, available from jihadology.net/2014/01/23/new-statement-from-dr-abd-allahbin-mu%E1%B8%A5ammad-al-mu%E1%B8%A5aysinimubadarah-al-ummah/, accessed on December 8, 2014. 

(9-point plan for ending “fitnah,” delivered hours after 

al-Zawahiri’s own address on January 23, 2014; asserts 

“deadline” of 4 days [January 27] for acceptance); 
282

• [ISO] January 27, 2014, see Abu Muhammad al-’Adnani 

al-Shami, “ISIL’s rejection of the Moheisini peace plan,” 

Excerpts of a translation of Statement in Aron Lund, 

Twitter Post, January 27, 2014, available from twitter.com/

aron_1d/status/427857578014437376/photo/1, accessed on 

December 8, 2014; 

• [AQO] January 30, 2014, Associated Press, “Radical 

Preacher Rebukes Extremists in Syria,” Yahoo News, 

available from https://www.yahoo.com/news/radical-preacher-rebukes-extremists-syria-135716934.html?ref=gs, accessed on August 31, 2016. (Abu Qatada quoted, during 

break from trial after extradition from UK to Jordan);

• [AQO] February 3, 2014, see Ayman al-Zawahiri, in Pieter Van Ostaeyen, “al-Qaeda disavows ISIS in Syria,” 

pietervanostaeyen, blog entry, posted February 3, 2014, 

English translation of speech by @IraqiWitness, available 

from https://pietervanostaeyen.com/2014/02/03/al-qaedas-dis

avows-isis-in-syria/, accessed on August 31, 2016. (The formal AQO disavowal of ISO); 

• [ISO] c. February 2014, see the Brotherhood of Iman statement in, Aaron Y. Zelin, “New release from al-Ghurabā’ 

Foundation for Media Production: ‘Brotherhood of Faith 

in Support of the Islamic State’,” blog entry, posted February 17, 2014, available from jihadology.net/2014/02/17/

new-release-from-al-ghuraba-foundation-for-media-production-brotherhood-faith-in-support-of-the-islamic-state/, accessed on August 31, 2016. (ISO militant claim to exclusive authority, power, right); 

• [AQO] February 24, 2014, see Aron Lund, “Syria in 

Crisis: Who and What Was Abu Khalid al-Suri? Part 

I,” DIWAN: Middle East Insights From Carnegie, February 24, 2014, available from carnegieendowment.org/

syriaincrisis/?fa=54618, accessed on May 6, 2015. (Abu 

Khalid al-Suri, a top commander in Ahrar al-Sham, was 

killed by ISO February 23, 2014; a solid background 

article); 

• [AQO] February 25, 2014, see Abu Muhammad al-Golani, al-Nusrah emir, five-day ultimatum to al-Baghdadi 

to agree to terms of formal arbitration, etc. Reports, and 

English-language excerpts from Arabic original available, 

see Associated Press, “Syria al-Qaeda leader gives rivals 

ultimatum,” Al Jazeera, February 25, 2014, available from 
283

www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/02/syria-al-qaedaleader-gives-rivals-ultimatum-2014225173857928923.html, 

accessed on December 8, 2014; Naharnet Newsdesk, “AlNusra Gives ISIL Ultimatum after Commander’s Death,” 

February 25, 2014, available from www.naharnet.com/stories/en/120150, accessed on December 8, 2014; 

• [AQO] March 5, 2014, see Abu ‘Abdullah as-Shami, in 

Pieter Van Ostaeyen, “A Message from Abu ‘Abdullah 

as-Shami, member of Majlis Shura of Jabhat an-Nusra 

and a member of the Sharia Committee,” pietervanostaeyen, original video, March 5, 2014, blog entry, posted 

March 8, 2014, available from https://pietervanostaeyen.

com/2014/03/08/a-message-from-abu-abdullah-as-shami-member-of-majlis-shura-of-jabhat-an-nusra-and-a-member-of-theshariah-committee/, accessed on December 8, 2014. (After 

1 year of hostility, lays out a comprehensive, point-bypoint case against ISO based on creed, method, Sharia, efforts at reconciliation, and also, the alternative principles 

and positive grounds for fighting ISO); 

• [ISO] March 7, 2014, see Shaykh Al-Mujāhid Abū Muhammad Al-‘Adnānī Ash-Shāmī, “Then let us invoke 

the curse of Allah upon the liars,” Speech, Eng. trans. 

by Musa Cerantonio, available from justpaste.it/eo3h, accessed on December 1, 2014, (“rebuts” March 5, 2014 alNusrah allegations); 

• [AQO], March 18, 2014, see Abū Sulaymān al-Muhājir 

statements, in Van Ostaeyen, “Jabhat an-Nusra reacts on 

ISIS spokesman al-’Adnānī (Part I)—Abū Sulaymān alMuhājir”; 

• [AQO], c. b/f March 20, 2014, see Abu Firas as-Suri, in 

Pieter Van Ostaeyen, “Nusra reacts on ISIS spokesman al-

’Adnānī (Part II)—Abu Firās as-Sūrī,” pietervanostaeyen, 

blog entry, posted March 27, 2014, available from https://

pietervanostaeyen.com/2014/03/27/jabhat-an-nusra-reacts-onisis-spokesman-al-adnani-part-ii-abu-firas-as-suri/, accessed 

on December 8, 2014; 

• [AQO] c. late-March 2014, see Shaykh Faruq Abu Hamam 

as-Suri, in Pieter Van Ostaeyen, “Jabhat an-Nusra reacts 

on ISIS spokesman al-’Adnānī (Part III)—Shaykh Fārūq 

Abū Hamām as-Sūrī,” pietervanostaeyen, blog entry, 

posted March 27, 2014, available from https://pietervanostaeyen.com/2014/03/27/jabhat-an-nusra-reacts-on-isis-spokesman-al-adnani-part-iii-shaykh-faruq-abu-hamam-as-suri/; 
284

• [ISO] April 14, 2014, see Abu Muhammad al-’Adnani alShami, “A translation of the speech of Abu Muhammad 

al Adnani, official spokesman of the Islamic State of Iraq 

and Sham,” blog entry, posted April 14, 2014, available 

from ansaaar1.wordpress.com/2014/04/14/a-translation-ofthe-speech-of-abu-mu%E1%B8%A5ammad-al-adnani-officialspokesman-of-the-islamic-state-of-iraq-and-sham/, accessed 

on December 1, 2014; 

• [ISO] April 17, 2014, see Pieter Van Ostaeyen, “Message 

by ISIS Shaykh Abu Muhammad al-’Adnani as-Shami,” 

pietervanostaeyen, original audio message, April 17, 

2014, blog entry, posted April 18, 2014, available from 

https://pietervanostaeyen.com/2014/04/18/message-by-isisshaykh-abu-muhammad-al-adnani-as-shami/, accessed on 

August 31, 2014;

• [AQO] April 21, 2014, see Thomas Joscelyn, “Zawahiri 

discusses infighting in Syria, opposition to Egyptian government,” The Long War Journal, April 21, 2014, available from www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2014/04/zawahiri_discusses_i.php, accessed on April 22, 2014. (Discusses 

and provides excerpts from al-Zawahiri’s newly released 

audio interview with As Sahab, titled “Reality Between 

Pain and Hope); 

• [AQO] c. April 15-18, 2014, see Pieter Van Ostaeyen, “Jabhat an-Nusra: Shaykh Abu Sulayman al-Muhajir about the 

Murder of Shaykh Abu Muhammad Fatih,” pietervanostaeyen, blog entry, posted April 18, 2014, available from 

https://pietervanostaeyen.com/2014/04/18/jabhat-an-nusra

-shaykh-abu-sulayman-al-muhajir-about-the-murder-ofshaykh-abu-muhammad-fatih/, accessed on December 9, 

2014 (a eulogy by Shaykh Abu Sulayman al-Muhajir);

• [AQO] April 18, 2014, see Pieter Van Ostaeyen, “Jabhat 

an-Nusra ~ This is their methodology,” pietervanostaeyen, blog entry, posted April 19, 2014, available from 

https://pietervanostaeyen.com/2014/04/19/jabhat-an-nusrathis-is-their-methodology/, accessed on August 31, 2014.

(Contains the original video message published April 18, 

2014 of Baseerah Media Productions, “This is Their Manhaj: Uncovering the details of the assassination of Amir 

Abu Muhammad Fateh and His Family Members,”and 

the English translation and transcription published April 

19, 2014);
285

• [AQO] April 28, 2014, see Pieter Van Ostaeyen, “A message of Shaykh Abū Qatādat al-Filistīnī—A Letter to the 

People of Jihād,” pietervanostaeyen, blog entry, posted 

April 28, 2014, available from https://pietervanostaeyen.

com/2014/04/28/a-message-of-shaykh-abu-qatadat-al-filistini-a-letter-to-the-people-of-jihad/, accessed on December 

9, 2014. (Abu Qatada al-Filistini accuses ISO of being 

ahderents of a non-Sunni deviant rejectionist sect, the 

Kharijites); 

• [AQO] May 3, 2014, see Pieter Van Ostaeyen, “Dr. Ayman 

al-Zawahiri—Testimonial to Preserve the Blood of Mujahideen in as-Sham,” pietervanostaeyen, May 3, 2014, 

available from https://pietervanostaeyen.com/2014/05/03/drayman-az-zawahiri-testimonial-to-preserve-the-blood-of-mujahideen-in-as-sham/, accessed on August 31, 2016. (Ayman 

al-Zawahiri responding to Dr. Hani al-Sibai’s Islamist 

Sunni scholar’s request that he [al-Zawahir] responds 

specifically to ISO charges; Ayman al-Zawahiri extensively documents his claims in 119 numbered sentences.); 

• [ISO] May 11, 2014, see Pieter Van Ostaeyen, “New audio 

message by ISIS Shaykh Abu Muhammad al-’Adnani asShami – Apologies Amir al-Qa’ida,” pietervanostaeyen, 

blog entry, posted May 12, 2014, available from https://pietervanostaeyen.com/2014/05/12/new-audio-message-by-isisshaykh-abu-muhammad-al-adnani-as-shami-apologies-amiral-qaida/, accessed on August 31, 2016. (Vitriolic response 

to al-Zawahiri’s recent video speech in which he openly 

denies any official bay’ah to AQO. See March 18, 2014 

sworn testimony by al-Muhajir cited earlier for evidence 

that Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi had in fact given Ayman 

al-Zawahiri the full bay’ah).

249. “Ahrar al-Sham leader killed in Syria,” Al Araby al-Jadeed, 

July 15, 2015, available from www.opensource.gov, accessed on July 

16, 2015. 

250. See for example: Ryan Lucas, Associated Press, “Syrian Rebels Clash with Al-Qaida-Linked Fighters,” The World 

Post, January 5, 2014, available from www.huffingtonpost.com/huffwires/20140105/ml--syria/, accessed on August 16, 2016; Reuters, 

“Al-Qaida Affiliate Pulls Out of Northern Syria Strongholds,” 

Voice of America News, January 5, 2014, available from www.
286

voanews.com/articleprintview/1823727.html, accessed on January 6, 

2014; Ryan Lucas, Associated Press, “Nearly 500 dead in Syria 

rebel clashes: Activists,” The Washington Times, January 10, 2014, 

available from www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/jan/10/nearly500-dead-syria-rebel-clashes-activists/, accessed on August 16, 2016; 

Nelly Lahoud and Muhammad al-’Ubaydi, “The War of Jihadists Against Jihadists in Syria,” CTC Sentinel, Vol. 7, No. 3, March 

2014, pp. 1-6, available from www.ctc.usma.edu, accessed on March 

24, 2014.

251. “FROM HIJRAH TO KILAFAH,” Dabiq, Iss. 1, p. 40.

252. See for example:

• [ISO]September 22, 2014, see Abu Muhammad al-’Adnani 

al-Shami, in Pieter Van Ostaeyen, “Abū Muhammad al-

’Adnānī ash-Shāmī—Indeed Your Lord Is Ever Watchful: A new statement by IS spokesman Abū Muhammad 

al-’Adnānī ash-Shāmī, dated September 22 2014,” pietervanostaeyen, blog entry, posted September 25, 2014, 

available from https://pietervanostaeyen.com/2014/09/25/

abu-muhammad-al-adnani-ash-shami-indeed-your-lord-is-ever-watchful/, accessed on August 31,2016; 

• [ISO] October 3, 2014, see Shaykh Turki al-Binali Abu 

Sufyaan as-Sulami, “Stretch Your Hands to Give the 

Bay’ah to al-Baghdadi,” in ansarukhilafah, “Stretch Forth 

Your Hands To Give The Bay’ah To Al-Baghdaadi,” Ansar Al-Kilafah Media, Statement translated by Ubaidullah Ibn Adam Aal-Ebrahim, blog entry, posted December 

21, 2014, available from https://ansarukhilafah.wordpress.

com/2014/12/21/stretch-forth-your-hands-to-give-the-bayahto-al-baghdaadi/, accessed on September 7, 2016; 

• [AQO] November 4, 2014, see Pieter Van Ostaeyen, “English Translation of the Interview with Jabhat an-Nusra 

leader Abu Muhammad al-Julani [sic],” pietervanostaeyen, blog entry, posted November 11, 2014, available from 

https://pietervanostaeyen.com/2014/11/11/english-translation-of-the-interview-with-jabhat-an-nusra-leader-abu-muhammad-al-julani/, accessed on November 24, 2014 (Abu 

Muhammad al-Golani, al-Nusrah emir, audio statement 

originally published November 4, 2014);

• [ISO] November 13, 2014, see Amirul-Mu’minin, the 

Khalifah of the Muslims, Abu Bakr al-Husayni al-Qurashi 
287

al-Baghdadi in, Pieter Van Ostaeyen, “Audio Message by 

Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi—Even if the Disbelievers Despise 

Such,” pietervanostaeyen, original statement published 

November 13, 2014, blog entry, posted November 14, 2014, 

available from https://pietervanostaeyen.com/2014/11/14/audio-message-by-abu-bakr-al-baghdadi-even-if-the-disbelieversdespise-such/, accessed on August 31, 2016;

• [AQO] November 21, 2014, see Thomas Joscelyn, “AQAP 

rejects Islamic State’s ‘caliphate,’ blasts group for sowing 

dissent among jihadists,” The Long War Journal, available from www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2014/11/al_qaeda_in_the_arab_1.php, accessed on November 24, 2014. 

(Covers AQAP senior Sharia official Harith bin Ghazi al 

Nadhari’s November 13, 2014 response to al-Baghdadi’s 

speech; al-Nadhari killed by drone January 31, 2015.)

253. This concept of “consolidation” (Tamkin) is the second 

primary focus—the first is terror and inflicting catastrophic injury—of the short-lived, 10+ page full-color online magazines, 

Islamic State News, and Islamic State Reports. For examples: Islamic 

State News, Iss. 1, pp. 5-6 (Focus on repentant “Sahwat”; “State” 

functions of aid distribution, da’wa, Sharia court, and execution 

of “sorcerer”); Islamic State News, Iss. 2, pp. 1-3, 9, (Major focus 

on trade flourishing, fresh produce [see front cover], implementing the prescribed criminal punishments [hudud], aid, and enforcing participation in prayer.). See also, Islamic State News, Iss. 2, 

p. 5, focus on “TO REPENT . . . OR NOT,” showing photos of 

persons having to dig their own graves before being murdered; 

Islamic State News, Iss. 2, p. 7 (“hunting for sahwat snipers” [i.e., 

abusing the term ‘Sahwat’ to refer to every element that opposes 

this State]); Islamic State Reports, Iss. 2, pp. 1-4 (Focus on “stateness” in economic harvest, and collection of the alms tax [zakat

]; “On the Beat Interview [with Abul-’Abbas Ash Shami, Head 

of the Islamic Police, Wilayat Ar-Raqqah]: ISR examines how the 

Islamic Police safeguards Ar-Raqqa and their importance in State 

Building,” Islamic State Reports, Iss. 2, pp. 5-6; Islamic State News, 

Iss. 3, cover page, pp. 3-6 (implementing Hadd punishments, including amputations, executions; distribution of flyers explaining 

its “aqida” [creed]; provision of security to farmers; “repentance” 

from opponents).

Dabiq’s emphasis on tamkin can be found in the following 

articles and elements: “ISLAMIC STATE REPORTS,” Dabiq, Iss. 

1, pp. 13-18; “THE ISLAMIC STATE: IN THE WORDS OF THE 
288

ENEMY,” Dabiq, Iss. 1, pp. 32-33; “FROM HIJRAH TO KHILAFAH,” Dabiq, Iss. 1 pp. 35-41, and “ISLAMIC STATE NEWS,” 

pp. 42-48 focuses on destruction and “repentance”; “IN THE 

WORDS OF THE ENEMY,” Dabiq, Iss. 2, pp. 31-32; “ISLAMIC 

STATE NEWS,” Dabiq, Iss. 2, pp. 33-43 (“Stateness” demonstrated in now-incorporated “News” Section from previous Islamic 

State News, and Islamic State Reports format with photographs 

and reports from various provinces, e.g. Halab, Kirkuk, Ninawa, 

Ar-Raqqa, Al-Anbar, Salahuddin, Al-Barakah, and Homs, displaying ferocity, momentum, devastation, terror, taking territory, capturing bases, carrying out Hadd punishments including 

beheadings and stonings, distributing “ghanima” (war spoils) to 

orphans, i.e., “CARING FOR THE ORPHANS,” Dabiq, Iss. 2, p. 

38; “FOREWORD,” Dabiq, Iss. 3, pp. 3-4, talks of the gruesome 

beheading of James Foley; “DA’WAH AND HISBAH IN THE ISLAMIC STATE,” Dabiq, Iss. 3, pp. 16-17 (Da’wah [preaching] and 

Hisbah [enforcing religious law]); “IN THE WORDS OF THE ENEMY,” Dabiq, Iss. 3, pp. 35-40; “REFLECTIONS ON THE FINAL 

CRUSADE,” Dabiq, Iss. 4, p. 44. The conclusion of this apocalyptic 

article orders ISO adherents to attack any and every citizen in every Crusader country. Under the heading, “RUSH TO SUPPORT 

YOUR STATE O MUSLIM,” it declares: 

At this point in the crusade against the Islamic State, it is 

very important that attacks take place in every country that 

has entered into the alliance against the Islamic State, especially the US, UK, France, Australia, and Germany. Rather, 

the citizens of crusader nations should be targeted wherever 

they can be found [emphasis added]. Let the muwahhid not be 

affected by ‘analysis paralysis’ and thus abandon every operation only because his was-was [sic] and perfectionism pushes 

him towards an operation that supposedly can never fail—one 

that only exists theoretically on paper. He should be pleased 

to meet his Lord even if with just one dead kafir’s name written in his scroll of deeds [emphasis added], as the Prophet 

. . . said, ‘A kafir and his killer will never gather in Hellfire’ 

[Sahih Muslim]. Every Muslim should get out of his house, 

find a crusader, and kill him. It is important that the killing 

becomes attributed to the Islamic State who have obeyed its 

leadership [emphasis added]. This can easily be done with anonymity. Otherwise, crusader media makes such attacks appear 

to be random killings. . . . ‘Rely on Allah and stab the crusader’ 

should be the battle cry for all Islamic State patrons. Finally, do 

not forget that Allah is with the Muslims and will not abandon 
289

them to His enemies. And the Islamic State will remain until its 

banner flies over Rome.

“IN THE WORDS OF THE ENEMY,” Dabiq, Iss. 4, pp. 45-51, 

(Vicious, horrific murder and propaganda, including murdered 

American-Israeli journalist Steven Sotloff); see also, ISO propagandist John Cantlie, “HARD TALK: THE REAL STORY BEHIND MY VIDEOS”; Dabiq, Iss. 4, pp. 52-55; Dabiq, Iss. 5, cover 

page; “THE FIGHT FOR WILĀYAT AL-ANBĀR,” Dabiq, Iss. 5, 

pp. 10-11 (“Remaining and Expanding”); “FOREWORD,” Dabiq, 

Iss. 5, p. 3, presents “evidence” of ISO’s expansion in the form 

of officially announced bay’ah [loyalty oaths secured] and wilayat [provinces conquered]; “ISLAMIC STATE REPORTS,” Dabiq, 

Iss. 5, pp. 10-33 (Again, provides Islamic State Report-type format 

with photographs and brief text), for examples see the following 

“reports”: “THE FIGHT FOR WILĀYAT AL-ANBĀR,” pp. 10-11; 

“UNIFYING THE RANKS,” pp.12-14, (Claims of bay’ah from various quarters); “THE FIGHT FOR ‘AYN AL-ISLĀM,” pp. 15-17, 

(formerly Ayn al-Arab, or Kobani); “THE CURRENCY OF THE 

KHILAFĀH,” pp. 18-19; “REMAINING AND EXPANDING,” 

pp. 20-33. This includes an extensive quote from former ISI Emir 

Abu Omar al-Baghdadi’s most famous speech “Hasad as-Sinin 

bi Dawlat al-Muwahhidin” (The Harvest of Years in the State of 

Muwahhidin) in Rabi’ al-Awwal 1428 [April 2007]): 

And indeed the Islamic State will remain. It will remain because it was built upon the corpses of martyrs and it quenched 

its thirst with their blood, and by such the market for Jannah 

[paradise] was convened [emphasis added]. It will remain because the success granted by Allah in this jihad is more obvious 

than the sun at the center of the sky. It will remain because it 

did not become contaminated by a prohibited income or distorted methodology. . . . It will remain because kufr in all its 

religions and sects gathered against us, and every treacherous 

person of desire and innovation began to slander and vilify us, 

so we become certain of the truthfulness of the goal and the 

correctness of the path [pp. 32-33]. 

“IN THE WORDS OF THE ENEMY,” Dabiq, Iss. 5, pp. 34-35; 

“FOREWORD,” Dabiq, Iss. 6, pp. 3-5 (in support of lone wolf attack carried out in Sydney and elsewhere, emphasizing its connection to IS); “ISLAMIC STATE REPORTS,” Dabiq, Iss. 6, pp. 26-

33 (“reports” include: training camps, fighting and consolidation, 

and killing of opponents); “THE CAPTURE OF A CRUSADER 
290

PILOT,” Dabiq, Iss. 6 , pp. 34-37 (report is of the Jordanian al-Kasibah [“an apostate pilot flying for the crusader alliance was captured by the Islamic State”] who is “interviewed” as he is subjected 

to manipulation, terror, humiliation; “IN THE WORDS OF THE 

ENEMY,” Dabiq, Iss. 6, pp. 56-57; John Cantlie, “MELTDOWN,” 

Dabiq, Iss. 6 , pp. 58-62 (on meltdown of currency freed from gold 

standard, and minting of ISO tied to gold); “ISLAMIC STATE REPORTS,” Dabiq, Iss. 7, pp. 26-45, “reports” include: (“WILĀYAT 

KHURĀSĀN AND THE BAY’ĀT FROM QAWQĀZ [Caucasus],” 

pp. 33-37; “DOZENS OF ‘NUSRAH’ AND ‘AHRĀR’ FIGHTERS 

REPENT AND JOIN THE ISLAMIC STATE,” pp. 38-39 [with 

heading “ABANDONING FACTIONALISM AND RAISING 

THE BANNER OF THE KHILĀFAH”]); “IN THE WORDS OF 

THE ENEMY,” Dabiq, Iss. 7, pp. 52-53 (with a focus on “The Kafir 

Patrick Cockburn” and others); John Cantlie, “THE ANGER FACTORY,” Dabiq, Iss. 7, pp. 76-82 (justifying the State terrorist attacks 

against the West with anti-Western propaganda advertisement 

for a “New Release . . . From Inside Halab” with John Cantlie as 

a host); Dabiq, Iss. 8, cover page (“Sharia Alone Will Rule Africa” 

[cover art, with monumental feel]); “THE BAY’AH FROM WEST 

AFRICA,” Dabiq, Iss. 8, pp. 14-15, which is announced: 

On the 16th of Jumada al-Ula the mujahid Shaykh Abu Bakr 

Shekau . . . leader of Jama’at Ahlis-Sunnah lid-Da’awah walJihad in West Africa, announced his group’s bay’ah to AmirulMu’minin Ibrahim Ibn Awwad al-Qurashi. The bay’ah came on 

the heels of a widely successful campaign being waged by the 

mujahidin across Nigeria and into neighboring regions, was a 

tremendous cause of celebration for the Muslims and yet another source of gloom for the kuffar. The hearts of the Muslims 

were healed as they [saw] their brothers in West Africa terrorizing the Christians and the Nigerian army of murtaddin.

“THE LIONS OF TOMORROW: THE LION CUBS OF THE 

KHILĀFAH,” Dabiq, Iss. 8, pp. 20-21; “ERASING THE LEGACY 

OF A RUINED NATION,” Dabiq, Iss. 8, pp. 22-24, announced 

thusly: 

Last month, the soldiers of the Khilafah, with sledgehammers 

in hand, revived the Sunnah of their father Ibrahim . . . when 

they laid waste to the shirki legacy of a nation that had long 

passed from the face of the earth. They entered the ruins of the 

ancient Assyrians in Wilayat Ninawa and demolished their 
291

sculptures, and engravings of idols and kings. This caused an 

outcry from the enemies of the Islamic State, who were furious 

at losing a ‘treasured heritage.’ The mujahidin, however, were 

not the least concerned about the feelings and sentiments of the 

kuffar, just as Ibrahim was not concerned about the feelings and 

sentiments of his people when he destroyed their idols [p. 22].

”THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF TWO NEW WILĀYĀT IN IRAQ,” 

Dabiq, Iss. 8, p. 27; “AMONG THE BELIEVERS ARE MEN: 

SHAYKH ABŪ TALHAH,” Dabiq, Iss. 8, p. 31, shows his death 

photo as a “martyr” and provides a brief quote:

After the announcement of the Khurāsāni bay’ah, Shaykh Abū 

Talhah began touring the region in a caravan of the Khīlāfah’s 

soldiers, calling the local tribes to give bay’ah to the Khīlāfah.

Dabiq, Iss. 8, p. 38, (advertisement for “A Message to the People 

of Kurdistan”); “IN THE WORDS OF THE ENEMY,” Dabiq, Iss. 8, 

pp. 57-58; John Cantilie, “PARADIGM SHIFT,” Dabiq, Iss. 8, pp. 

64-67, with lift out quote: 

After all the gnashing of teeth in September, there appears to 

be a grudging acceptance by many Western politicians that the 

Islamic State is different to anything they’ve seen before. Their 

response, by necessity, has to be different too [p. 64]. 

“ISLAMIC STATE REPORTS,” Dabiq, Iss. 9, pp. 24-37, (“reports” 

include: “HEALTHCARE IN THE KHILĀFAH,” pp. 24-26, with 

data and photographs depticting an actually functioning health 

care sector; “SELECTED10,” p. 27, videos advertised, including presence of hisbah, zakah, monitoring and inspection; “ADVANCING EAST AND WEST,” pp. 31-32; “SELECTED10,” p. 33, 

adverstising for 10 more videos including terror-inducing images, 

including extreme fear-face, slaughter, and battle. Second place 

is “The Islamic State Health Service” and in tenth is “The Lion 

Cubs Raised under the Wings of the Khilafah”; “The Yarmūk 

Camp,” pp. 34-36, directed at: “the tawāghīt of Hamas are appealing to Iran for intervention, while PLO tawāghīt are agreeing to have their militias serve as a Nusayrī Sahwah [p.35]”); “IN 

THE WORDS OF THE ENEMY,” Dabiq, Iss. 9, pp. 60-64; Dabiq, 

Iss. 9, p. 65, advertisement for “AlBayan Radio, Broadcast by the 

Islamic State” in multiple languages; “FOREWORD,” Dabiq, Iss. 

10, pp. 3-4, again dedicated to slaughter carried out on Western 
292

soil by “mujahids”; Dabiq, Iss. 10, p. 5, advertisement for “Join 

the Caravan of Islamic State Knights in the Lands of the Crusaders,” with thirteen photos of IS operatives, and evidence of a shift 

from soliciting emigration (Hijrah) to soliciting localized slaughter; “SELECTED10,” Dabiq, Iss. 10, p. 25, videos advertised that 

include terror, murder, repentance, and in the tenth “MEDICAL 

CARE IN THE WILAYAH”; Dabiq, Iss. 10, p. 35, advertisement 

for “HONOR IS IN JIHAD: A MESSAGE FOR THE PEOPLE OF 

THE BALKANS”; “THE QAWQĀZĪ [CAUCASUS] CARAVAN 

GAINS PACE,” Dabiq, Iss. 10, pp. 36-37; Dabiq, Iss. 10, p. 49, advertisement for video “And They Give Zakah,” showing devastating 

scenes on top of the page, but the majority of the page shows an 

ultra-abundant harvest of ultra-wheat with an ultra-devoted person possessing a share in hand, representing the “purification” 

tax owed to the “Khilafah”; “SELECTED10,” Dabiq, Iss. 10, pp. 

65, adverstising for 10 more videos including the recently horrifically drowned prisoners, emphasizing brutality and submission, 

consolidation and expansion, for example: “ONE YEAR OF THE 

KHILAFAH”; “ELIMINATING THE JUDGES,” shows an assassin with a rifle attacking an automobile with inhabitants inside; 

“CELEBRATING THE ONE YEAR MILESTONE OF THE KHILAFAH”; “HARVESTING THE SPIES 2”; THE LIFE OF RIBAT 

IN THE MONTH OF JIHAD”; “AND HE WILL REPLACE THEIR 

FEAR WITH SECURITY 2”; includes one at bottom of page from 

“WILAYAH WEST AFRICA,” entitled “A GLIMPSE AT THE 

COURSE OF BATTLES”; “IN THE WORDS OF THE ENEMY,” 

Dabiq, Iss. 10, pp. 66-69; “INTERVIEW WITH ABŪ SAMĪR ALURDUNĪ,” Dabiq, Iss. 10, pp. 70-76, with AQO’s Ayman al-Zawahiri in backdrop, with lift out quote: 

Allah facilitated for Dabiq to interview the brother Abū Samīr 

al-Urdunī (the Jordanian), a former member of Jawlānī’s [Jabhat 

al-Nusra] shūrā council. He broke off from the Jawlānī front until Allah blessed him by showing him the contradictions in the 

methodology and policies of the Jawlānī front. He also belessed 

him by allowing him to witness the realization of hakimiyyah 

(tawhīd of Allah in judgment) in the land of the Khilāfah. He 

returned to the ranks of the Islamic State and the following is 

the conversation we had with him [p. 70].

“SELECTED10,” Dabiq, Iss. 11, p. 15, advertisement for 10 videos 

focused on murder, terror, fighting, repentance, and curiously 

in the 8th video shows a young, smiling girl’s face exemplifying 

the title, “THE AMBIANCE OF EID AL-FITR IN AR-RAQQAH 
293

CITY,” her face fully unveiled, smiling, and in Western clothes, 

and in the 10th, “THERE IS LIFE IN RETRIBUTION,” showing a 

sheathed sword; “THE DANGER Of Abandoning Dārul-Islām,” 

Dabiq, Iss. 11, p. 22-23, with a horrific use of the picture of the 

drowned toddler Alan Kurdi, and provides the accompanying 

passage: 

The repeated events of Syrians and Libyans dying on the shores 

of Turkey, Libya, and Italy, or even on the highways of Austria, 

is one that should awaken the heart into reflecting upon the 

issue of hijrah.

“A SELECTION OF MILITARY OPERATIONS ACROSS THE ISLAMIC STATE,” Dabiq, Iss. 11, pp. 28-30, “report” includes terror operations, military operations, taking and holding ground, 

and in one picture describes in a subheading: “Imposing the Jizyah [tax imposed on certain qualified categories of vanquished 

non-Muslim groups] on the Christians of al-Qaryatayn after liberating the city [p.30]”and depicts a large gathering of Christians 

shown seated in an auditorium, with an ISO official in fatigues 

at a lectern signing an official document; “SELECTED10,” Dabiq, 

Iss. 11, p. 39, advertisement for 10 videos, including: “THE INGHIMASIYYIN ARE THE PRIDE OF THE UMMAH”; “KILLING 

THE APOSTATES IN REVENGE FOR THE MUWAHHIDIN 2”; 

“THE TRAVELS OF THE MUSLIM”; “THE KNIGHTS OF IFRIQIYYAH” from “WILAYAH WEST IFRIQIYYAH”; “DETERRING 

THE CRIMINALS” etc., depicting terror, submission, death, and 

a video-game like death cult; “IN THE WORDS OF THE ENEMY,” Dabiq, Iss. 11, pp. 56-58; “SELECTED10,” Dabiq, Iss. 11, p. 

59, advertisement for 10 videos again in shooter-type video format with examples of terror, destruction, consolidation, expansion, and Stateness; “INTERVIEW WITH ABUL-MUGHĪRAH 

AL-QAHTĀNĪ: The Delegated Leader for the Libyan Wilāyāt,” 

Dabiq, Iss. 11, pp. 60-63, and involves “Fitnah” with AQO’s groups.

254. Reference here is to Sahih Muslim, but without full citation. This is from Sahih Muslim, No. 1852, and it is considered 

Sahih (sound, reliable). See Abu Amina Elias, “Is it required for 

Muslims to have one ruler?” available from abuaminaelias.com/isit-required-for-muslims-to-have-one-ruler.

255. “FROM HIJRAH TO KILAFAH,” Dabiq, Iss. 1, p. 40.
294

256. Readers interested in examining the primary documents, 

research, and commentary that warrant these conclusions are encouraged to consult the relevant information presented in Chapters 2 and 3 of this book and their corresponding endnotes.

257. The concept of a “deviant organization” is chosen carefully and intends to signify two facts. First, as organizations, they 

are deviant in a statistical sense; they are terrorist outliers operating on the extreme unlawful, criminal fringes far from Sunni 

Muslims generally, let alone other non-terrorist religio-political 

organizations seeking to represent and empower Sunni Muslims 

(Ahl-us Sunnah). Second, these are organizations, and not States, 

regimes, or representative bodies. While they aspire to represent 

the world’s 1.4 billion Sunni Muslims, their very nature as terrorist entities resting on a terrorist modus operandi ensures their 

continuing marginality. The present writer concedes that despite 

its sociological utility, the concept of a “deviant organization” can 

be abused by regime apologists, to de-legitimize and thereby proscribe various types of oppositional politics. 

258. See the Introduction of this book.

259. In an oft-quoted tradition (hadith), the notion that a true 

Muslim is one that regards other Muslims’ lives as sacred, is the 

essence of the matter. Narrated by Abdullah bin ‘Amr, the Prophet [Muhammad] said, “A Muslim is the one who avoids harming 

Muslims with his tongue and hands. And a Muhajir (emigrant) 

is the one who gives up (abandons) all what Allah has forbidden.” Abdullah bin ‘Amr, “The Book of Belief Faith),” in Dr. Muhammad Muhsin Khan, The Translation of the Meanings of Sahih 

Al-Bukhari: Arabic-English, Vol. 1, Book 2, No. 10, Riyadh, Saudi 

Arabia: Darussalam, 1997, p. 59. 

260. A final tally of ISO’s mass murder, crimes against humanity, torture, brutality, and inhumane conduct will one day be 

conducted. Ironically, ISO’s own penchant for fully documenting 

these atrocities will likely serve as exemplary exhibits in future 

proceedings. For a very brief summary of some of these, see Anup 

Kaphle, “The Islamic State’s atrocities,” The Washington Post, February 17, 2015, available from https://www.washingtonpost.com/

apps/g/page/world/the-islamic-states-atrocities/1608/, accessed on 

March 17, 2015; Jon Gambrell, Associated Press (AP), “A history 
295

of the Islamic State group’s atrocities, gains,” The San Diego UnionTribune, February 16, 2015, available from www.sandiegouniontribune.com/news/2015/feb/16/a-history-of-the-islamic-state-groupsatrocities/, accessed on August 31, 2016; Agence France-Presse 

(AFP), “Foreigners executed by IS militants: a factfile,” Yahoo 

News, August 12, 2015, available from news.yahoo.com/foreignersexecuted-militants-factfile-154627843.html, accessed on August 13, 

2015; “Syria: IS murders over 3,000 in year-long ‘caliphate’,” AlAraby al-Jadeed (The New Arab), June 29, 2015, available from 

www.opensource.co, accessed on June 29, 2015; IntelCenter, “Top 

10 Most Deadly Terrorist/Rebel Groups in 2014,” IntelCenter Database, July 25, 2015, available from intelcenter.com/reports/charts/

most-deadly-groups-2014/index.html, accessed on January 12, 2015; 

Rami Abdurrahman (Ossama Suleiman), “Islamic State executes 

2154 people since the declaration of its alleged ‘Caliphate’,” Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, April 28, 2015, available 

from www.syriahr.com/en/?p=18320, accessed on August 31, 2016; 

Sarah Almukhtar and Derek Watkins, “The Deadliest Attacks in 

Baghdad This Year,” The New York Times, July 3, 2016, available 

from www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/05/18/world/middleeast/

baghdad-attacks-isis-map.html?_r=0, accessed on July 6, 2016; Associated Press, “Some of the Most Recent Deadly Attacks Claimed 

by IS,” Daily Mail, July 23, 2016, available from www.dailymail.

co.uk/wires/ap/article-3704877/Some-recent-deadly-attacks-claimedIS.html, accessed on July 25, 2016; Agence France-Presse (AFP), 

“Paris—Islamic State attacks on Western targets,”Agence FrancePresse (AFP), August 8, 2016, available from www.opensource.

gov, accessed on August 9, 2016; Thomas Joscelyn, “Islamic State 

claims more than 700 suicide attacks since beginning of the year,” 

The Long War Journal, available from www.longwarjournal.org/

archives/2016/09/islamic-state-claims-more-than-700-suicide-attackssince-beginning-of-the-year.php, accessed on September 7, 2016; 

Agence France-Presse (AFP), “Paris—Attacks in France since 

Charlie Hebdo slayings,” AFP, July 18, 2016, available from www.

opensource.gov, accessed on July 18, 2016; Erin Miller, “Patterns of 

Islamic State-Related Terrorism, 2002-2015,” START Background 

Report, College Park, MD: National Consortium for the Study of 

Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), August 2016, 

available from www.start.umd.edu/pubs/START_IslamicStateTerrorismPatterns_BackgroundReport_Aug2016.pdf, accessed on August 9, 

2016; Lori Hinnant and Desmond Butler, “IS Buried Thousands 

in 72 Mass Graves, AP Finds,” AP The Big Story, August 30, 
296

2016, available from bigstory.ap.org/article/7b538929486f493da85e8

4d7ee7470a5/buried-thousands-72-mass-graves-ap-finds, accessed on 

August 30, 2016.

261. That the “idea” of the ISO had yet to be understood, and 

required our full attention, was described by Major General Michael Nagata, U.S. Army, Special Operations Command Central 

(SOCCENT), former Director Combined Joint Interagency Task 

Force (CJIATF). See Michael Nagata, “Preface,” in Hriar Cabayan, 

Sarah Canna, eds., “Multi-Method Assessment of ISIL,” NSI White 

Paper, December 2014, pp. 1-2; see also, Eric Schmitt, “In Battle to 

Defang ISIS, U.S. Targets Its Psychology,” The New York Times,

December 28, 2014, available from www.nytimes.com/2014/12/29/

us/politics/in-battle-to-defang-isis-us-targets-its-psychology-.html?_

r=0, accessed on September 14, 2015.

262. See for example: Paul Kamolnick, “On Self-Declared Caliph Ibrahim’s May 2015 Message to Muslims: Key Problems of 

Motivation, Marginalization, Illogic, and Empirical Delusion in 

the Caliphate Project,” Small Wars Journal, June 4, 2015, available 

from smallwarsjournal.com/print/24089, accessed on June 5, 2015. 

263. Office of the Press Secretary, “Remarks of President Barack 

Obama,” May 23, 2013, Washington, DC: The White House, available from www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/05/23/remarkspresident-barack-obama, accessed on May 30, 2013.

264. For earlier formulations, see Barack Obama, 2010 National Security Strategy, Washington, DC: The White House, May 

2010, p. 4, pp. 19-22, available from www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf; Barack Obama, 

National Strategy for Countering Terrorism, Washington, DC: The 

White House, June 2011, p. 1, 3, available from www.whitehouse.

gov/sites/default/files/counterterrorism_strategy.pdf; Office of the 

Secretary of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review 2010, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, February 2010, p. v, 

6, 15, available from www.defense.gov/Portals/1/features/defense

Reviews/QDR/QDR_as_of_29JAN10_1600.pdf; Quadrennial Defense Review Independent Panel, The QDR in Perspective: Meeting 

America’s National Security Needs in the 21st Century, Final Report 

of the Quadrennial Defense Review Independent Panel, Corrected Advance Copy, 2010, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace, p. 26.
297

265. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the 

United States, Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist 

Attacks Upon the United States (aka: The 9/11 Commission Report), 

New York: W.W. Norton, 2004, ch. 12.

266. For background on this acronym and its relation to 

DIME, and DIMEFIL, see Kamolnick, Countering Radicalization 

and Recruitment to Al Qaeda, pp. 75-76.

267. For this incontrovertible evidence, and the United Nations Security Council Resolutions formulated in response, see 

Paul Kamolnick, “Terrorism, Counterterrorism and the Rule of 

Law,” Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 23, 2011, p. 841, Notes 

#19 and #20. For USG diplomatic efforts, beginning with our recognition of the Taliban’s rise in 1994 until the immediate pre-9/11 

attack, see Kamolnick, Countering Radicalization and Recruitment to 

Al-Qaeda, pp. 69-70, especially endnote #173 for an extensive examination of the declassified intelligence cables specifically pertinent to the claim that the USG at Mullah Omar’s initial request, 

had direct communication with then Emir Mullah Omar and his 

representatives. See finally, a telling excerpt from members of the 

Egyptian Islamic Group, translated from Arabic, in their book, 

Islam and the Laws of War, which appeared in serial form in the 

newspaper Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (London), August-September 2006; 

Translated and excerpted in: The Middle East Media Research 

Institute, “Al-Gama’a Al-Islamiyya vs. Al-Qaeda,” MEMRI Special Dispatch No. 1301, available from www.memri.org/report/

en/0/0/0/0/0/804/1887.htm, accessed on January 16, 2013. They 

state in response to bin Laden’s and AQO’s accusation that the 

United States was intent on overthrowing the Taliban as part of its 

declared “War against Islam”: 

The conception that America is waging a Crusade against Muslims is not true. . . in the worst of cases [one can say that] at 

times there have been American policies that have had a religious dimension in opposing some—and not all—of the Islamic 

world’s causes. [The fact that this is not a Crusade] explains 

America’s positive stand in support of the Afghani mujahideen 

in their fight against the Soviet occupation, and [America’s] 

positive stand [against] the ethnic cleansing operation against 

the Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina and in the province 

of Kosovo. Likewise, the conception that America aimed to 

bring down the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and could not 
298

have been deterred from doing so is not true. Reality attests 

to the fact that America attempted to come to terms with the 

Taliban regime in order to realize common strategic goals. . . 

and these attempts to come to an understanding ran up against 

the Al-Qaeda organization’s actions, which were launched 

from Afghanistan and targeted America, and which the Taliban 

authorities did not restrain . . . America at that time was looking for new strategies for a new century, and if the Front [i.e., 

Al-Qaeda] and other interpreters of Islam had adopted serious 

Islamic strategy that would have given consideration to American interests together with Islamic interests, this would have 

prevented the continuation of this war or [at least] would have 

kept it from taking on a comprehensive nature.

268. See Kamolnick, Countering Radicalization and Recruitment 

to Al-Qaeda, for more detailed discussion of these measures.

269. For attriting of AQO’s external operations branch (i.e., 

“the Khorasan Group”) based in Syria, see Bill Roggio and Thomas 

Joscelyn, “US military confirms it killed senior al Qaeda strategist 

Sanafi al Nasr in airstrike in Syria,” The Long War Journal, October 

18, 2015, available from www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2015/10/

us-military-confirms-it-killed-senior-al-qaeda-strategist-sanafi-al-nasrin-airstrike-in-syria.php, accessed on October 20, 2015; Thomas Joscelyn, “Pentagon says al Qaeda veteran killed in ‘kinetic strike’ in 

Syria,” The Long War Journal, July 22, 2015, www.longwarjournal.

org/archives/2015/07/pentagon-says-al-qaeda-veteran-killed-in-kineticstrike-in-syria.php, accessed on July 22, 2015. 

270. See for example: Kamolnick, Countering Radicalization and 

Recruitment to Al-Qaeda, pp. 20-34.

271. See for example: Jessica Rivinius, “Recommendations to 

counter violent extremism: New report offers framework to law 

enforcement, government agencies, community members,” September 28, 2015, available from www.start.umd.edu/news/recommendations-counter-violent-extremism, accessed on September 29, 

2015; Telegraph View (staff), ”Stopping ISI’s Grooming,” June 

15, 2015, The Telegraph, available from www.telegraph.co.uk/news/

uknews/terrorism-in-the-uk/11676316/Stopping-Isils-grooming.html, 

accessed on June 16, 2015.
299

272. Behavioral disengagement from terrorism, not “de-radicalization” or “counter-radicalization,” is a preferable objective 

since radicalism per se, in attitude, beliefs, and ultimate objectives, is not a predictor of terrorist action; and, a great majority of 

terrorist actors have no discernible coherent “radicalization” path 

that may be intercepted. For that reason, cessation from terrorist 

actions, and campaigns focused on the motivational factors most 

associated with that probability, is now considered the relevant 

objective. See for example: Tore Bjorgo and John Horgan, Leaving 

Terrorism Behind: Individual and collective disengagement, London 

and New York: Routledge, 2009; John Horgan and Max Taylor, 

“Disengagement, De-radicalization and the Arc of Terrorism: Future Directions for Research,” in Rik Coolsaet, ed., Jihadi Terrorism and the Radicalisation Challenge: European and American Experiences, 2nd ed., Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2011, ch. 13, pp. 173-225; 

Mary Beth Altier, Christian N. Thoroughgood, and John Horgan, 

“Turning away from terrorism: Lessons from psychology, sociology, and criminology,” Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 51, No. 5, 

2014, pp. 647-661; Kira J. Harris, “Review: Disillusionment with 

Radical Social Groups,” 2010, orig. published in “Proceedings of 

the 1st Australian Counter Terrorism Conference,” Edith Cowan 

University, Perth Western Australia, November 30, 2010, available from ro.ecu.edu.au/act/4.

273. Office of the Press Secretary, “Statement by the President 

on ISIL,” September 10, 2014, Washington, DC: The White House, 

available from www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/10/remarks-president-barack-obama-address-nation, accessed on September 11, 2014; Jim Garamone, “Obama Discusses Anti-ISIL Strategy 

with National Security Team at Pentagon, DoD News, July 6, 2015, 

available from www.defense.gov/news, accessed on July 9, 2015; 

Terri Moon Cronk, “Carter Vows Lasting Defeat of ISIL Forces,” 

DoD News, June 17, 2015, available from www.defense.gov/news, accessed on June 22, 2015; Cheryl Pellerin, “Carter: DoD, Global Coalition Seek ISIL’s Lasting Defeat,” DoD News, July 7, 2015, available from www.defense.gov/news, accessed on July 8, 2015. 

274. Cronk, “Carter Vows Lasting Defeat of ISIL Forces”; 

Jim Garamone, “Success Against ISIL Requires Time, Partners, 

Dempsey Says,” DoD News, June 17, 2015, available from www.

defense.gov/News-Article-View/Article/604837/success-against-isilrequires-time-partners-dempsey-says, accessed on July 28, 2016.
300

275. General John Allen, USMC (Ret.), “Keynote Address 

by General John Allen,” Transcript of Address presented at 

the 12th annual U.S.-Islamic World Forum, at The Brookings 

Doha Center in Doha, Qatar, June 3, 2015, available from www.

brookings.edu/~/media/events/2015/06/01-2015-us-islamic-worldforum/060315brookingsdoha.pdf, accessed on August 19, 2015. 

Though Gen. Allen describes these five lines of effort (LOE), he 

combines categories that are disaggregated by Secretary of Defense Carter and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Dempsey 

into nine LOEs.

276. Cheryl Pellerin, “Carter: Lasting Defeat of ISIL Depends 

on Coalition Strength,” DoD News, January 13, 2016, available 

from www.defense.gov/News-Article-View/Article/642976/carter-lasting-defeat-of-isil-depends-on-coalition-strength, accessed on January 

14, 2016; Andrew Tilghman, “This is the Pentagon’s new strategy 

to defeat ISIS,” Military Times, January 14, 2016, available from 

www.militarytimes.com/story/military/war-on-is/2016/01/14/pentagon-strategy-islamic-state-iraq-syria/78269180/, accessed on January 18, 2016; Dan Lamothe, “The fight against the Islamic State just 

entered a new phase—and it could grow soon,” The Washingon 

Post, January 20, 2016, available from www.washingtonpost.com/

news/checkpoint/wp/2016/01/20/fight-against-the-islamic-state-entersa-new-phase-with-pledge-from-seven-countries/, accessed on January 

21, 2016; Lolita C. Baldor, Associated Press (AP), “US, allies agree 

to intensify fight against Islamic State,” U.S. News & World Report, 

January 20, 2016, available from www.usnews.com/news/politics/

articles/2016-01-20/us-allies-agree-to-intensify-fight-against-islamicstate, accessed on September 2, 2016; Ash Carter, “War Room: Ash 

Carter: It’s Time to Accelerate the ISIL Fight,” January 22, 2016, 

Politico, available from www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/01/

ash-carter-isil-fight-213554, accessed on January 22, 2016; European 

Union External Action, “Statement by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Small Group of the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL/

Da’esh,” Statement of the Small Group Meeting in Rome, February 

2, 2016, available from www.opensource.gov, accessed on February 

4, 2016; see also, U.S. Department of Defense and U.S. Department 

of State, Strategy for the Middle East and to Counter Violent Extremism, Section 1222 Report, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of 

Defense and U.S. Department of State, c. March 24, 2016, [submitted to relevant Congressional committees past the deadline date 

of February 15, 2016], available from https://armedservices.house.

gov/sites/republicans.armedservices.house.gov/files/wysiwyg_uploaded/
301

Section%201222%20Report.pdf, accessed on September 7, 2016; Jim 

Garamone, “Rice Details U.S. Whole-of-Government Approach to 

Defeating ISIL,” DoD News, April 15, 2016, available from www.

defense.gov/News-Article-View/Article/722259/rice-details-us-wholeof-government-approach-to-defeating-isil, accessed on April 18, 2016; 

Jim Garamone, “Carter Details U.S. Strategy to Accelerate ISIL’s 

Defeat,” DoD News, April 28, 2016, available from www.defense.

gov/News-Article-View/Article/745265/carter-details-us-strategy-toaccelerate-isils-defeat, accessed on April 29, 2016. Jim Garamone, 

“ISIL Knows It Will Lose, Already Shifting Strategy, Obama 

Says at Pentagon,” August 4, 2016, available from www.defense.

gov/News/Article/Article/905447/isil-knows-it-will-lose-already-shifting-strategy-obama-says-at-pentagon, accessed on August 8, 2016; 

“Joint Press Conference by Secretary Carter and Gen. Votel on the 

Counter-ISIL Coalition, Joint Base Andrews, Maryland,” News 

Transcript, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, Press 

Operations, July 20, 2016, available from www.defense.gov/News/

Transcripts/Transcript-View/Article/851184/joint-press-conferenceby-secretary-carter-and-gen-votel-on-the-counter-isil-co, accessed on 

July 21, 2016; U.S. Department of State, “Remarks at the Counter-ISIL Ministerial Meeting,” July 21, 2016, available from www.

state.gov/secretary/remarks/2016/07/260362.htm, accessed on July 22, 

2016. 

277. One LOE—providing humanitarian relief and stabilization support—is vital, and should for present purposes be subsumed to strategic objective no. 1. Stabilization operations are a 

crucial third dimension in a full-spectrum model comprising offensive, defensive, and stabilization operations. See Headquarters, 

Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-07, Stability Operations, 

Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2014, available 

from pksoi.army.mil/default/assets/File/fm3_07(1).pdf, accessed October 26, 2015; U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-07, Stability Operations, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 

2011, available from www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_07.pdf, accessed on June 16, 2012. For recognition of the decisive role stabilization operations and genuinely effective inclusive governance 

shall play in determining the long-term success of present USG 

policy and strategy, see Hardin Lang and Muath Al Wari, “After 

Liberation: Assessing Stabilization Efforts in Areas Cleared of the 

Islamic State, Center for American Progress,” Washington, DC: 

Center for American Progress, July 26, 2016, available from https://

www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/report/2016/07/26/141814/
302

after-liberation/, accessed on August 30, 2016; Maj. Gen. Eric T. 

Olson, “When the Islamic State is Gone, What Comes Next?,” 

War on the Rocks, August 9, 2016, available from warontherocks.

com/2016/08/when-the-islamic-state-is-gone-what-comes-next/, accessed on August 9, 2016; James Kitfield, “‘Our Greatest Challenge’: CJCS Gen. Dunford,” Breaking Defense, August 12, 2016, 

available from breakingdefense.com/2016/08/our-greatest-challengecjcs-gen-dunford/, accessed on August 12, 2016; Joe Gerth/ProPublica and Joby Warrick, “Promises unfulfilled: How a State Department plan to stabilize Iraq broke apart,” The Washington Post, 

August 15, 2016, available from https://www.washingtonpost.com/

world/national-security/promises-unfulfilled-how-a-state-departmentplan-to-stabilize-iraq-broke-apart/2016/08/15/82e2324e-5a8c-11e6-

831d-0324760ca856_story.html, accessed on August 16, 2016. See 

also how stabilization operations are discussed as an essential 

dimension of the ongoing campaign to decisively defeat ISO 

in Mosul: Dan Lamothe, “The ‘biggest strategic concern’ about 

Mosul? Putting it back together after ISIS loses,” The Washington Post, July 21, 2016, available from www.washingtonpost.com/

news/checkpoint/wp/2016/07/20/the-biggest-strategic-concern-aboutmosul-putting-it-back-together-after-isis-loses/, accessed on July 21, 

2016; Rick Gladstone, “1.2 Million Iraqis Could Be Uprooted in 

Mosul Battle, U.N. Says,” The New York Times, August 23, 2016, 

available from www.nytimes.com/2016/08/24/world/middleeast/isismosul-iraq.html?_r=0, accessed on August 23, 2016; Gen. David 

Petraeus, “The challenge in Mosul won’t be to defeat the Islamic 

State. It will be what comes after,” The Washington Post, August 

12, 2016, available from https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/

global-opinions/the-challenge-in-mosul-wont-be-to-defeat-the-islamicstate-it-will-be-what-comes-after/2016/08/12/ce972904-5f2a-11e6-af8e54aa2e849447_story.html?utm_term=.bdde7715b689, accessed on 

August 15, 2016.

278. See for example: Mike Richman, “US Sanctions IS Backers, Targets Finances,” Voice of America News, September 29, 2015, 

available from www.voanews.com/articleprintview/2984252.html, accessed on October 1, 2015; “Report: Islamic State Funds Will Dwindle Without New Territory,” Voice of America News, February 27, 

2015, available from www.voanews.com/articleprintview/2661413.

html, accessed on February 27, 2015; Geoff D. Porter, “CTC PERSPECTIVES: THE IMPACT OF CRUDE’S COLLAPSE ON THE 

ISLAMIC STATE,” West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center, 
303

January 13, 2015, available from www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/ctc-perspectives-the-impact-of-crudes-collapse-on-the-islamic-state, accessed 

on January 13, 2015; Matthew Reed, “Tidal Wave II: Understanding The Pentagon’s New Strategy To Cripple ISIS Oil,” The Fuse, 

blog entry, posted November 23, 2015, available from energyfuse.

org/tidal-wave-ii-understanding-the-pentagons-strategy-to-crippleisiss-oil-operations/, accessed on June 3, 2016; Daniel Graeber, “Islamic State losing revenue, IHS finds,” UPI, May 27, 2016, available 

from www.upi.com/Business_News/Energy-Industry/2016/05/27/

Islamic-State-losing-revenue-IHS-finds/9141464351657/, accessed on 

June 2, 2016; Joby Warrick and Liz Sly, “U.S.-led strikes putting a 

financial squeeze on the Islamic State,” The Washington Post, available from www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-ledstrikes-putting-a-financial-squeeze-on-the-islamic-state/2016/04/02/

e739a7be-f848-11e5-a3ce-f06b5ba21f33_story.html, accessed on 

April 4, 2016; Jim Michaels, “Air campaign shifts to ISIL’s cash 

and oil,” USA Today, April 17, 2016, available from www.usatoday.

com/story/news/world/2016/04/17/air-campaign-shifts-isils-cash-andoil/83157118/, accessed on April 18, 2016; “Islamic State: Up to 

$800m of funds ‘destroyed by strikes’,” BBC News, April 26, 2016, 

available from www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-36145301, accessed on April 27, 2016; “US-led coalition strike ‘destroys IS bank 

in Iraq’,” BBC News, January 12, 2016, available from www.bbc.

com/news/world-us-canada-35291574, accessed on August 10, 2016; 

Lisa Ferdinando, “Progress Made in Degrading ISIL Oil Revenues, Official Says,” DoD News, December 15, 2015, available from 

www.defense.gov/News-Article-View/Article/636401/progress-madein-degrading-isil-oil-revenues-official-says, accessed on December 16, 

2015; Tara Copp, “US airstrikes have destroyed Islamic State cash 

worth hundreds of millions,” February 17, 2016, Stars and Stripes, 

available from www.stripes.com/news/us-airstrikes-have-destroyedislamic-state-cash-worth-hundreds-of-millions-1.394612, accessed on 

February 18, 2016. Jim Michaels, “ISIL oil trucks, worth $11 million, destroyed in massive airstrike,” USA Today, August 10, 2016, 

available from www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2016/08/09/

islamic-state-oil-trucks-destroyed-massive-strike/88459864/, accessed 

on August 11, 2016; Reuters, “Kurds Say Islamic State Oil Overseer Killed in Joint Ops with U.S.,” The New York Times, August 

11, 2016, available from www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisiskurds-islamic-state-idUSKCN10M20C, accessed on August 12, 2016; 

Sirwan Kajjo, “As Battlefield Losses Mount, IS Struggles Economically,” Voice of America News, September 3, 2016, available from 
304

www.voanews.com/a/battlefield-losses-hurt-islamic-state-economically/3492185.html, accessed on September 6, 2016. For a comprehensive report identifying the effects of, and ISO’s shifting options to, 

the U.S.-led Coalition on ISO finances, see “ISIS Financing: 2015,” 

CAT Report, Paris, FR: Center for the Analysis of Terrorism, May 

2016, available from cat-int.org/index.php/2016/06/01/ISIS-financing-in-2015-report-and-summary, accessed on June 2, 2016. 

279. See for example: Griff Witte, Sudarsan Raghavan and 

James McAuley, “Flow of foreign fighters plummets as Islamic 

State loses its edge,” The Washington Post, September 9, 2016, available from https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/flow-offoreign-fighters-plummets-as-isis-loses-its-edge/2016/09/09/ed3e0dda751b-11e6-9781-49e591781754_story.html?utm_term=.0244fc74cc34,

accessed on September 12, 2016; “Australia: Islamic State fight: 

France sees sharp fall in number of citizens joining terror group,” 

The Age, September 7, 2016, available from www.opensource.gov, 

accessed on September 7, 2016.

280. See Eric Schmitt, “U.S. Says Its Strikes Are Hitting More 

Significant ISIS Targets,” The New York Times, May 25, 2016, available from www.nytimes.com/2016/05/26/us/politics/us-strikes-isistargets.html, accessed on June 2, 2016; Terri Moon Cronk, “As 

Strikes Weaken ISIL, Work Remains, Air Component Commander Says,” DoD News, May 26, 2016, available from www.defense.

gov/News-Article-View/Article/783138/as-strikes-weaken-isil-workremains-air-component-commander-says, accessed on June 2, 2016; 

Terri Moon Cronk, “Air Power Vital to Counter-ISIL Success, 

Commander Says,” DoD News, February 18, 2016, available from 

www.defense.gov/News-Article-View/Article/658294/air-power-vitalto-counter-isil-success-commander-says, accessed on February 19, 

2016; Cheryl Pellerin, “Inherent Resolve Commander: Strikes, Indigenous Forces Grind Down ISIL,” DoD News, February 1, 2016, 

available from www.defense.gov/News-Article-View/Article/647881/

inherent-resolve-commander-strikes-indigenous-forces-grind-down-isil, 

accessed on February 3, 2016.

281. See Ken Dilanian, “CIA, special ops cooperate to kill extremists in Syria, Iraq,” Military Times, September 28, 2015, available from www.militarytimes.com/story/military/2015/09/28/cia-special-ops-cooperate-kill-extremists-syria-iraq/72969854/, accessed on 

September 6, 2016; Howard Altman, “Obama digs into Special 
305

Ops playbook for Islamic State proposal,” TBO, February 15, 2015, 

available from tbo.com/list/military-news/altman/Obama-digs-intospecial-ops-playbook-for-islamic-state-proposal-20150215, accessed on 

August 10, 2016; Greg Miller, “U.S. launches secret drone campaign to hunt Islamic State leaders in Syria: Confronting the ‘Caliphate’,” The Washington Post, Occasional Series, September 1, 

2015, available from www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-launches-secret-drone-campaign-to-hunt-islamic-state-leadersin-syria/2015/09/01/723b3e04-5033-11e5-933e-7d06c647a395_story.

html, accessed on September 2, 2015; Tyler Rogoway, “Those Old 

OV-10 Broncos Sent To Fight ISIS Were Laser Rocket-Slinging 

Manhunters: Their mission was to find, fix, and finish the enemy—and they did just that,” The Drive, May 17, 2016, available 

from www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/3519/those-old-ov-10-broncossent-to-fight-isis-were-laser-rocket-slinging-manhunters, accessed on 

May 20, 2016; Mary Alice Salinas, “Obama Ramps Up Strategy 

in Fight Against Islamic State, Voice of America News, January 29, 

2016, available from www.voanews.com/articleprintview/3168897.

html, accessed on February 1, 2016; Dan Lamothe, “Elite U.S. 

targeting force has arrived in Iraq to fight the Islamic State,” The 

Washington Post, January 13, 2016, available from www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2016/01/13/elite-u-s-targetingforce-has-arrived-in-iraq-pentagon-chief-tells-soldiers/, accessed on 

January 14, 2016; Stephen Kalin and Maher Chmaytelli, “Special 

forces target Islamic State in Hawija, Iraq official says,” Reuters, 

January 8, 2016, available from www.reuters.com/article/us-mideastcrisis-iraq-raids-idUSKBN0UM0PX20160108, accessed on January 

8, 2016; Helene Cooper and Eric Schmitt, “U.S. Sees Elite Military 

Unite as Key to Bigger Push Against ISIS,” The New York Times,

December 2, 2015, available from www.nytimes.com/2015/12/03/

world/middleeast/us-sees-elite-military-unit-as-key-to-bigger-pushagainst-isis.html, accessed on December 3, 2015; Jeff Seldin, “US 

Prepares to Strike at Heart of Islamic State,” Voice of America News, 

December 1, 2015, available from www.voanews.com/content/us-tosend-spacialized-force-to-iraq-to-fight-islamic-state/3082884.html, accessed on December 2, 2015; Kimberly Dozier, “How Special-Ops 

is Taking ISIS Out,” The Daily Beast, May 28, 2016, available from 

www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2016/05/28/the-gloves-finally-comeoff-in-the-isis-war.html, accessed on June 2, 2016. 

282. See Afghan War News Website, “F3EAD,” (Find, Fix, 

Finish, Exploit, Analyze, and Disseminate [F3EAD]) webpage 
306

available from www.afghanwarnews.info/intelligence/F3EAD.htm, 

accessed on September 2, 2015; Michael T. Flynn, Rich Juergens, 

and Thomas L. Cantrell, “Employing ISR: SOF Best Practices,” 

Joint Forces Quarterly, Iss. 50, 3rd Qtr., 2008, pp. 56-61. 

283. See W. J. Hennigan, “US military says it has killed more 

than 120 Islamic State leaders,” Los Angeles Times, June 10, 2016, 

available from www.latimes.com/world/middleeast/la-fg-isis-airstrikes-20160607-snap-story.html, accessed on June 13, 2016; see 

also, Karen DeYoung, “U.S. eliminates a mid-to high-level ISIS 

figure every 2 days, official says,” The Washington Post, December 

3, 2015, available from www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-eliminates-a-mid—to-high-level-isis-figure-every-2-days-official-says/2015/12/03/6b43ae3c-99ea-11e5-b499-76cbec161973_story.

html, accessed on December 4, 2015; Lisa Ferdinando, “Coalition 

Decimates ISIL Ranks, Leadership, OIR Spokesman Says,” DoD 

News, February 3, 2016, available from www.defense.gov/News-Article-View/Article/649481/coalition-decimates-isil-ranks-leadership-oirspokesman-says, accessed on February 4, 2016.

284. Eric Schmitt and Michael S. Schmidt, “Omar the Chechen, 

a Senior Leader in ISIS, Dies After U.S. Airstrike,” The New York 

Times, March 15, 2016, available from www.nytimes.com/2016/03/15/

world/middleeast/omar-chechen-isis-killed-us-airstrike-syria.html?_

r=0, accessed on March 15, 2016.

285. Richard Engel, Jim Miklaszewski, Courtney Kube, and 

Erik Ortiz, “ISIS’ Finance Minister, Haji Iman, Killed: Defense 

Officials,” March 25, 2016, available from www.nbcnews.com/storyline/isis-terror/isis-s-second-command-killed-raid-sources-n545451, 

accessed on March 25, 2016; Bill Roggio and Thomas Joscelyn, 

“Pentagon announces death of senior Islamic State leader,” 

The Long War Journal, available from www.longwarjournal.org/

archives/2016/03/pentagon-announces-death-of-senior-islamic-stateleader.php, accessed on March 28, 2016.

286. “Drone kills the envoy of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi to Aleppo,” Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, March 31, 2016, available from www.opensource.gov, accessed on March 31, 2016.

287. Bill Roggio, “US kills Islamic State’s military emir for 

Anbar province,” The Long War Journal, May 10, 2016, avail-
307

able from www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2016/05/us-kills-islamic-states-military-emir-for-anbar-province.php, accessed on May 10, 

2016. 

288. Agence France-Presse (AFP), “Airstrike kills two Isis military leaders in Iraq,” The Guardian, July 1, 2016, available from 

www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/01/airstrike-kills-two-isis-military-leaders-in-iraq, accessed on July 6, 2016.

289. Ibid.

290. “Key Islamic State leader Saad Emarati ‘killed in Afghanistan,’” BBC News, July 26, 2016, available from www.bbc.com/

news/world-asia-36892100, accessed on July 27, 2016.

291. “US confirms death of IS leader in Afghanistan—TV,” 

Tolo News, August 13, 2016, available from www.opensource.gov, 

accessed on August 15, 2016.

292. Eric Schmitt and Anne Barnard, “Senior ISIS Strategist 

and Spokesman Is Reported Killed in Syria,” The New York Times, 

August 30, 2016, available from www.nytimes.com/2016/08/31/

world/middleeast/al-adnani-islamic-state-isis-syria.html, accessed on 

August 31, 2016; Thomas Joscelyn, “Islamic State says senior official killed in Aleppo province,” The Long War Journal, August 

30, 2016, available from www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2016/

08/islamic-state-says-senior-official-killed-in-aleppo-syria.php, 

accessed on October 30, 2016. 

293. “Islamic State’s Chief of Media Operations killed in Iraqi 

raid,” ARA News, September 12, 2016, available from aranews.

net/2016/09/islamic-states-chief-media-operations-killed-iraqi-raid/, 

accessed on September 12, 2016.

294. See Kimberly Dozier, “U.S. Special Ops Kill 40 ISIS Operatives Responsible for Attacks From Paris to Egypt,” The Daily Beast, April 28, 2016, available from www.thedailybeast.com/

articles/2016/04/28/u-s-kills-isis-operatives-linked-to-europe-attacks.

html, accessed on September 6, 2016.

295. The mission to capture him alive was unsuccessful: Abu 

Sayyaf was killed resisting his apprehension. This operation 

involved a Delta Force raid involving two dozen commandos 
308

entering Syria from Iraq aboard Black Hawk helicopters and V-22 

Ospreys. See Eric Schmitt, “A Raid on ISIS Yields a Trove of Intelligence,” The New York Times, June 8, 2015, available from www.

nytimes.com/2015/06/09/world/middleeast/us-raid-in-syria-uncoversdetails-on-isis-leadership-and-finances.html?_r=0, accessed on June 

15, 2015. 

296. Helene Cooper and Eric Schmitt, “ISIS Detainee’s Information Led to 2 U.S. Airstrikes, Officials Say,” The New York Times, 

March 9, 2016, available from www.nytimes.com/2016/03/10/world/

middleeast/isis-detainee-mustard-gas.html, accessed on September 

6, 2016; Karen Parish, “Information From Captured ISIL Leader 

Enables Counter-Chemical Strikes,” DoD News, March 10, 2016, 

available from www.defense.gov/News-Article-View/Article/690456/

information-from-captured-isil-leader-enables-counter-chemical-strikes, 

accessed on March 10, 2016.

297. This airstrike is further described as resulting from “the 

culmination of months of intelligence gathering.” See Jim Michaels, “Seen from above, how one of the largest airstrikes against 

ISIS unfolded,” USA Today, August 26, 2016, available from www.

usatoday.com/story/news/world/2016/08/26/united-states-led-coalition-airstrikes-islamic-state-iraq/89409134/, accessed on August 26, 

2016.

298. This trove is described as consisting of “more than 10,000 

ISIL documents and 4.5 terabytes of data.” See Terri Moon Cronk, 

“Coalition Forces Uncover Vital ISIL Intelligence in Key Syrian 

City,” DoD News, July 15, 2016, available from www.defense.gov/

News/Article/Article/841764/coalition-forces-uncover-vital-isil-intelligence-in-key-syrian-city, accessed on July 18, 2016; Terri Moon 

Cronk, “OIR Official: Captured Info Describes ISIL Operations in 

Manbij,” DoD News, July 27, 2016, available from www.defense.gov/

News/Article/Article/873632/oir-official-captured-info-describes-isiloperations-in-manbij, accessed on July 28, 2016; Eric Schmitt, “U.S. 

Secures Vast New Trove of Intelligence on ISIS,” The New York 

Times, July 27, 2016, available from www.nytimes.com/2016/07/28/

world/middleeast/us-intelligence-isis.html, accessed on July 28, 2016.

299. Lisa Ferdinando, “Carter Encourages Cyber Command 

to Intensify Fight Against ISIL,” DoD News, January 27, 2016, 

available from www.defense.gov/News-Article-View/Article/645212/

carter-encourages-cyber-command-to-intensify-fight-against-isil, ac-
309

cessed on January 28, 2016; Loren Thompson, “Pentagon Cyber 

Campaign Against ISIS Signals a New Era of Warfare,” Forbes, 

March 1, 2016, www.forbes.com/sites/lorenthompson/2016/03/01/

pentagon-cyber-campaign-against-isis-signals-a-new-era-inwarfare/#772421f53ee2, accessed on March 2, 2016; Shane Harris 

and Nancy A. Youssef, “U.S. Ratchets Up Cyber Attacks on ISIS,” 

The Daily Beast, April 17, 2016, available from www.thedailybeast.

com/articles/2016/04/17/u-s-ratchets-up-cyber-attacks-on-isis.html, accessed on April 18, 2016; David Sanger, “U.S. Cyberattacks Target 

ISIS in a New U.S. Line of Combat,” The New York Times, April 

24, 2016, available from www.nytimes.com/2016/04/25/us/politics/

us-directs-cyberweapons-at-isis-for-first-time.html, accessed on April 

25, 2016; Sean Lyngaas, “Cybercom touts attacks on ISIS,” FCW 

The Business of Federal Technology, June 22, 2016 available from 

fcw.com/articles/2016/06/22/isis-cyber-command.aspx, accessed on 

June 24, 2016; Ellen Nakashima and Missy Ryan, “U.S. military 

has launched a new digital war against the Islamic State,” The 

Washington Post, July 15, 2016, available from www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-militarys-digital-war-against-theislamic-state-is-off-to-a-slow-start/2016/07/15/76a3fe82-3da3-11e6-

a66f-aa6c1883b6b1_story.html, accessed on July 18, 2016; Warren 

Strobel, “Obama prepares to boost U.S. military’s cyber role: 

sources,” Reuters, available from www.reuters.com/article/us-usacyber-idUSKCN10G254, accessed on August 8, 2016.

300. Unconventional Warfare (UW) is defined by the Department of Defense (DOD) as: 

Activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, 

auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a denied area.

See U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1-02, Department 

of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, November 8, 2010 (as amended through May 15, 2011), available from www.dtic.mil/doctrine/

dod_dictionary/, accessed on August 5, 2014. For the application 

of unconventional warfare (UW) to Mosul, Iraq’s second largest city, see James Denselow, “Mosul—a city on death row,” Al 

Jazeera, December 9, 2014, available from www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/12/mosul-city-death-row-20141275406466428.
310

html, accessed on September 6, 2016; “Iraqi army drops leaflets on 

Mosul about ‘Fallujah liberation’,” Rudaw, July 7, 2016, available 

from www.opensource.gov, accessed on July 7, 2016; Hamza Mustafa, “DA’ISH Faces Internal Uprising, Rebellion in Mosul,” July 

16, 2016, available from www.opensource.gov, accessed on July 22, 

2016; Adam Mahmud, “Resistance Stiffens in Mosul; Clandestine 

Factions Threaten DA’ISH Existence,” August 16, 2016, available 

from www.opensource.gov, accessed on August 23, 2016.

301. For James Jeffrey’s advocacy of a “roll back and destroy” policy, see James Jeffrey, “Leave Root Causes Aside—Destroy the ISIS ‘State’,” The Atlantic, April 29, 2016, available from 

www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/04/destroy-isis-asstate/480531/, accessed on May 2, 2016. This appears to the present 

writer more credible and substantiated than the “contain and be 

patient” approach advocated by Stephen Biddle and Jacob Shapiro; see Stephen Biddle and Jacob Shapiro, “America Can’t Do 

Much About ISIS,” The Atlantic, April 20, 2016, available from 

www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/04/isis-containmentcivil-war/478725/, accessed on May 2, 2016.

302. Matthew Rosenberg, Nicholas Kulish, and Steven Lee 

Myers, “Predatory Islamic State Wrings Money From Those It 

Rules,” The New York Times, November 29, 2015, available from 

www.nytimes.com/2015/11/30/world/middleeast/predatory-islamicstate-wrings-money-from-those-it-rules.html?_r=0, accessed on November 30, 2015. Escaped and disillusioned ISO defectors, and 

other eyewitness accounts, provide particular insight into the mechanics of ISO’s brutally repressive methods and occupation. See 

for example: “He Was an Islamic State Cameraman,” TF1 News, 

June 8, 2015, available from www.opensource.gov, accessed on June 

9, 2015; “Raqqa: Fear and treachery inside Islamic State’s capital,” 

Zaman al-Wasl, June 15, 2015, available from www.opensource.gov, 

accessed on June 15, 2015; Cathy Otten, “Mosul residents feel the 

‘IS’ stranglehold,” DW, June 29, 2015, available from www.opensource.gov, accessed on July 1, 2015; Uwe Buse and Katrin Kuntz, 

“Relentless Terror: The Everyday Horrors of the Islamic State,” 

Speigel, July 1, 2015, available from www.opensource.gov, accessed 

on July 1, 2015; Adil al-Ayid, “In Extreme Secrecy: Controversial 

DA’ISH Defections in Dayr az Zawr,” Orient News, July 19, 2015, 

available from www.opensource.gov, accessed on July 22, 2015; 

Luc Mathieu, “Al-Raqqah: ‘the Atmosphere Has Become Tense, 
311

Paranoia is Growing’,” Liberation, September 17, 2015, available 

from www.opensource.gov, accessed on September 21, 2015; “Migrant Crisis: Felling life under Islamic State in Syria,” BBC News, 

September 24, 2015, available from www.opensource.gov, accessed 

on September 24, 2015; Robert F. Worth, “The Reluctant Jihadi: 

How One Recruit Lost Faith in Isis,” The Guardian, April 12, 2016, 

available from www.opensource.gov, accessed on April 15, 2016; 

Sharon Behn, “Iraqis Fleeing Islamic State Describe Militants’ Tactics,” Voice of America News, April 14, 2016, available from www.

voanews.com/articleprintview/3285169.html, accessed on April 15, 

2016; Richard Engel, Ben Plesser, and Tracy Connor, “NYC Man 

Who Joined Then Escaped ISIS Speaks Out Against ‘Evil’,” NBC 

News, May 19, 2016, available from www.nbcnews.com, accessed 

on May 20, 2016; Louise Callaghan, “Defectors Pour From Crumbling Caliphate,” The Sunday Times, June 12, 2016, available from 

www.opensource.gov, accessed on June 13, 2016; “‘We Feel We Are 

Cursed’: Life under ISIS in Sirte, Libya,” Human Rights Watch, 

May 18, 2016, available from www.hrw.org/node/289875/, accessed 

on May 18, 2016.

303. Important evidence suggests USG efforts along the financial LOE is very effective as a component of UW strategy. See 

for example: Lizzie Dearden, “Isis ‘halves salaries for fighters in 

Raqqa’ as US-led coalition air strikes continue to target oil and revenue streams,” The Independent, January 18, 2016, available from 

www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/isis-halves-salariesfor-fighters-in-raqqa-as-us-led-coalition-air-strikes-continue-to-targetoil-a6818526.html, accessed on January 18, 2016; Hugh Naylor, “Islamic State moneymaking streams take a hit as it loses territory,” 

The Washington Post, December 4, 2015, available from www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/islamic-states-money-makers-takea-hit-as-it-loses-territory/2015/12/03/b08910aa-91f6-11e5-befa-99ceebcbb272_story.html, accessed on December 4, 2015; Jack Moore, 

“ISIS CUTTING BACK AS U.S.-LED COALITION STRIKES 

DEGRADE GROUP’S OIL TRADE,” Newsweek, December 8, 

2015, www.newsweek.com/isis-cutting-back-us-led-coalition-strikesdegrade-groups-oil-trade-402485, accessed on December 10, 2015; 

Lori Hinnant, Zeina Karam, and Susannah George, “Islamic State 

faces budget crunch, cuts salaries and perks,” The Boston Globe, 

February 16, 2016, available from www.bostonglobe.com/news/

world/2016/02/16/islamic-state-faces-budget-crunch-cuts-salariesand-perks/W5xwKU59MkfO8oXcjb3mUO/story.html, accessed on 

February 16, 2016.
312

304. See for example: Audrey Kurth Cronin, “ISIS Is Not a 

Terrorist Group: Why Counterterrorism Won’t Stop the Latest 

Jihadist Threat,” Foreign Affairs, March/April 2015, Vol. 94, No. 

2, pp. 87-98, available from https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/

middle-east/isis-not-terrorist-group, accessed on February 20, 2015; 

Stephen M. Walt, “ISIS as Revolutionary State: New Twist on an 

Old Story,” October 21, 2015, Foreign Affairs, available from www.

foreignaffairs.com/print/1115576, accessed on October 22, 2015; 

Jessica Lewis McFate, “The Islamic State Digs In,” CTC Sentinel, 

Vol. 8, No. 10, October 2015, pp. 1-8. And for a highly insightful 

historical and non-romantic/realist account of state-formation, 

see Charles Tilly, “War Making and State Making as Organized 

Crime,” in Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschmeyer, and Theda 

Skocpol, eds., Bringing the State Back In, Cambridge: Cambridge 

University Press, 1985, pp. 169-187.

305. For the decisive significance of the American air campaign in blunting ISO’s momentum c. June 2014—February 2015, 

see John R. Allen, “General Allen Opening Statement,” Opening 

Statement for the Record presented to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing, “The Fight Against ISIS: Building The 

Coalition And Ensuring Military Effectiveness,” Washington, 

DC: U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, February 25, 

2015, available from www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Gen_Allen_Testimony.pdf, accessed on February 26, 2015. Special Envoy 

General John Allen recalls ISO’s June 2014 blitzkrieg and the U.S. 

decision to act:

In June of last year, ISIL burst into the international scene as a 

genocidal and seemingly unstoppable juggernaut. It conquered 

a city, Mosul, of 1.5 million, then poured South toward Baghdad, taking cities, towns, and villages along the way. Outside 

Tikrit, it rounded up and massacred over 1,000 Iraqi Air Force 

recruits. To the west, it broke through the border town of al 

Qaim, and poured east toward Baghdad. ISIL’s spokesman, 

Abu Mohammed al-Adnani, vowed, “The battle would soon 

rage in Baghdad and [in the holy city of] Karbala.” Shortly 

thereafter, ISIL launched a multiple pronged attack further 

into northern Iraq, massacring minority populations, enslaving 

hundreds of women and girls, surrounding tens of thousands 

of Yazidis at Sinjar mountain, and opening a clear route to Erbil, the region’s capital. Then The United States acted. Since 

our first airstrikes in August, ISIL’s advance has been largely 
313

blunted, and has been driven back from the regional capitals of 

Baghdad and Erbil.

The effects of the U.S. campaign is reflected in ISO’s terrorist media operations. In Dabiq, Iss. 4, the first to to appear subsequent to 

the August 8, 2014 commencement of the U.S. air campaign, toward the end of an apocalyptic article entitled “Reflections of the 

Last Crusade,” the order to attack any and every citizen in every 

Crusader country is given (see p. 44). Under the heading, “Rush 

to Support your State O Muslim,” it declares: 

At this point in the crusade against the Islamic State, it is 

very important that attacks take place in every country that 

has entered into the alliance against the Islamic State, especially the US, UK, France, Australia, and Germany. Rather, 

the citizens of crusader nations should be targeted wherever 

they can be found [emphasis added]. Let the muwahhid not be 

affected by ‘analysis paralysis’ and thus abandon every operation only because his was-was [sic] and perfectionism pushes 

him towards an operation that supposedly can never fail—one 

that only exists theoretically on paper. He should be pleased 

to meet his Lord even if with just one dead kafir’s name written in his scroll of deeds, [emphasis added] as the Prophet 

. . . said, “A kafir and his killer will never gather in Hellfire 

[Sahih Muslim].” Every Muslim should get out of his house, 

find a crusader, and kill him. It is important that the killing 

becomes attributed to the Islamic State who have obeyed its 

leadership [emphasis added]. This can easily be done with 

anonymity. Otherwise, crusader media makes such attacks appear to be random killings. . . . ‘Rely on Allah and stab the 

crusader’ should be the battle cry for all Islamic State patrons. 

Finally, do not forget that Allah is with the Muslims and will 

not abandon them to His enemies. And the Islamic State will 

remain until its banner flies over Rome [emphasis added]. 

See also, Kamolnick, “On Self-Declared Caliph Ibrahim’s May 

2015 Message to Muslims,” for this strategic shift; and finally, 

its most recent explicit iteration in the May 21, 2016 speech by 

ISO spokesman Abu Muhammad al-Adnani, “That They Live 

By Proof,” see the English translation by S.J. Prince, “READ: ISIS 

Spokesman Abu Muhammad al Adnani ‘That They Live By Proof’ 

English Speech Translation,” Heavy, May 23, 2016, available from 

heavy.com/news/2016/05/new-isis-islamic-state-al-furqan-media-audio-message-that-they-live-by-proof-egyptair-flight-ms804-804-mp3-

read-english-translation-text-download/2/, accessed on May 24, 2016.
314

306. This has been noted by numerous analysts. See examples: 

Gabi Siboni, Daniel Cohen, and Tal Koren, “The Islamic State’s 

Strategy in Cyberspace,” Military and Strategic Affairs, Vol. 7, No. 

1, March 2015, pp. 127-143.; Atwan, Islamic State: The Digital Caliphate, pp. 15-31; Stern and Berger, ISIS: The State of Terror, chs. 5-7; 

J.M. Berger, “Tailored Online Interventions: The Islamic State’s 

Recruitment Strategy,” CTC Sentinel, Vol. 8, No. 10, October 2015, 

pp. 19-23; J. M. Berger, “OPINION: MAKING SENSE OF ISIS’S 

USE OF TWITTER,” Newsweek, March 11, 2015, available from 

www.newsweek.com/making-sense-isiss-use-twitter-312983, accessed 

on March 17, 2015; Mark Mazzetti and Michael R. Gordon, “ISIS 

Is Winning the Social Media War, U.S. Concludes,” The New York 

Times, June 12, 2015, available from www.nytimes.com/2015/06/13/

world/middleeast/isis-is-winning-message-war-us-concludes.html?_

r=0, accessed on July 15, 2015. For a recent comprehensive analysis 

of ISO’s media warfare strategy, including messages, media, messengers, and target audience analysis, see Charlie Winter, The Virtual ‘Caliphate’: Understanding Islamic State’s Propaganda Strategy, 

London, UK: The Quilliam Foundation, July 2015, available from 

www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/publications/free/

the-virtual-caliphate-understanding-islamic-states-propaganda-strategy.pdf, accessed on July 7, 2015; Charlie Winter, Documenting the 

Virtual ‘Caliphate’, London, UK: The Quilliam Foundation, October 2015, available from www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/FINAL-documenting-the-virtual-caliphate.pdf,

accessed on October 6, 2015; Ali Fisher, “Swarmcast: How Jihadist Networks Maintain Persistent Online Presence,” Perspectives 

on Terrorism, Vol. 9, No. 3, June 2015, pp. 3-20. For an extensive 

treatment of the broader phenomenon of terrorism in cyberspace, 

see Gabriel Weimann, Terrorism in Cyberspace: The Next Generation, 

New York: Columbia University Press/Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2015 [original 2006, Updated].

307. For an incisive recent expose based on defectors testimony, see Greg Miller and Souad Mekhennet, “Inside the surreal 

world of the Islamic State’s propaganda machine,” The Washington Post, November 20, 2015, available from www.washingtonpost.

com/world/national-security/inside-the-islamic-states-propagandamachine/2015/11/20/051e997a-8ce6-11e5-acff-673ae92ddd2b_story.

html, accessed on November 23, 2015. See also, “He Was an Islamic State Cameraman,” TF1 News; Lizzie Dearden, “Former 

Isis Militant Reveals the Reality of ‘Staged’ Propaganda Videos 
315

and Brutal Life Under the ‘Islamic State’,” The Independent, May 

1, 2016, available from www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/former-isis-militant-harry-sarfo-uk-reveals-reality-of-stagedpropaganda-videos-and-brutal-llife-a698a6982831.html, accessed on 

May 2, 2016.

308. See “Islamic State: Unfriended: There are signs that Islamic State’s propaganda machine is losing its edge,” The Economist, December 12, 2015, available from www.economist.com/

node/21679805/print, accessed on December 15, 2015.

309. For examples: the Joint USG-United Arab Emirates Sawab Center, based in Abu Dhabi, see Anwar Gargash and Richard 

Stengel, “Sawab means the right path, ISIL the wrong one,” The 

National Online, July 9, 2015, available from www.opensource.gov, 

accessed on July 19, 2015; Singapore, see Nur Sayiqin Mohamad 

Salleh, “Helpline to be set up to counter ISIS propaganda,” The 

Straits Times Online, June 10, 2015, available from www.opensource.

gov, accessed on June 11, 2015; France, see Alain Barluet, “CyberWar on ISIL Has Begun,” Le Figaro, September 25, 2015, available from www.opensource.gov, accessed on September 25, 2015, 

and “France unveils anti-jihad campaign with video and web 

site,” Reuters, January 28, 2015, available from www.reuters.com/

assets/print?aid=USKBN0L11VT20150128, accessed on January 29, 

2015; Australia, see Fergus Hanson, “Australia: Countering ISIS 

online,” The Interpreter, April 20, 2015, available from www.opensource.gov, accessed on April 21, 2015. See also, the recently published report, a follow-on product of Australia’s Regional Summit to Counter Violent Extremism held in Sydney, June 2015: Sara 

Zeiger, “Undermining Violent Extremist Narratives in South East 

Asia: A How-To Guide,” Hedayah, August 2016, available from

www.hedayahcenter.org/Admin/Content/File-3182016115528.pdf, 

accessed on September 14, 2016; Malaysia, see Leanne Goh, “PM: 

Take the Fight Against IS Online,” The Star Online, October 1, 

2015, available from www.opensource.gov, accessed on October 1, 

2015; “ASEAN centre to push message: Nothing Islamic about 

IS,” TODAY, July 16, 2016, available from www.opensource.gov, accessed on July 28, 2016; “Malaysia: PM: Obama lauds Malaysia 

for setting up regional hub to curb Islamic State influence,” The 

Malay Mail, September 8, 2016, available from www.opensource.

gov, accessed on September 9, 2016; Al-Azhar in Egypt, see Reham Mokbel, “Al-Azhar goes online to fight extremism,” Al-
316

Monitor, June 26, 2015, available from www.al-monitor.com/pulse/

originals/2015/06/egypt-al-azhar-internet-social-media-religious.html, 

accessed on June 29, 2015; Indonesia, see “Preventing Terrorism 

Not Just About Catching Terrorists,” Kompas, March 24, 2015, 

available from www.opensource.gov, accessed on May 11, 2015. 

For recent Iraqi and joint USG-Iraqi efforts to counter ISO 

media warfare, see “Iraq’s Abadi opens anti-Islamic State world 

conference,” BBC Monitoring, August 10, 2016, available from 

www.opensource.gov, accessed on August 10, 2016; Chad Garland, 

“Marines Arm Iraqis, Kurds with ‘Clever’ Messages to Defeat 

IS,” Stars and Stripes, August 14, 2016, available from www.stripes.

com/news/marines-arm-iraqis-kurds-with-clever-messages-to-defeatis-1.423810, accessed on August 16, 2016.

310. See for example: Christina Nemr, “Countering Islamic 

State Recruitment: You're Doing It Totally Wrong,” War on the 

Rocks, July 14, 2015, available from warontherocks.com/2015/07/

countering-islamic-state-recruitment-youre-doing-it-totally-wrong/, 

accessed on July 15, 2015; Justine Drennan, “Making ‘Countering Violent Extremism’ Sound Sexy,” Foreign Policy, June 4, 2015, 

available from foreignpolicy.com/2015/06/04/making-counteringviolent-extremism-sound-sexy-islamic-state-social-media/, accessed 

on June 5, 2015; “The Guardian view on fighting terror: we must 

win the war for young imaginations,” The Guardian, June 16, 2015, 

available from https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/

jun/16/guardian-view-on-fighting-terror-we-must-win-war-for-youngimaginations, accessed on September 6, 2016; Asawin Suebsaeng, 

“U.S. Turns to ‘Zero Dark Thirty’ Writer for Anti-ISIS Propaganda,” The Daily Beast, September 28, 2015, www.thedailybeast.com/

articles/2015/09/28/u-s-turns-to-zero-dark-thirty-writer-for-anti-isispropaganda.html, accessed on October 1, 2015; Dina Temple-Raston, “How to Take the Internet Back from ISIS,” The New Yorker, 

May 7, 2015, www.newyorker.com/tech/elements/how-to-take-the-internet-back-from-isis, accessed on May 22, 2015; Shannon N. Green 

“Changing the Narrative: Countering Violent Extremist Propaganda,” CSIS Commentary, September 25, 2015, available from 

https://www.csis.org/analysis/changing-narrative-countering-violentextremist-propaganda, accessed on September 6, 2016.

311. Mark Townsend, “How a team of social media experts 

is able to keep track of the UK jihadis,” The Guardian, January 

17, 2015, www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/17/social-media-
317

british-jihadists-islamic-state-facebook-twitter, accessed on January 20, 2015; “Islamic State web accounts to be blocked by new 

police team,” BBC News, June 22, 2015, available from www.bbc.

com/news/world-europe-33220037, accessed on September 6, 2016; 

Brian Ross, James Gordon Meek, and Lee Ferran, “Twitter Escalates its Own ISIS Battle: 2,000 Accounts Suspended Last Week,” 

ABC News, May 2, 2015, available from abcnews.go.com/International/twitter-escalates-isis-skirmish-2000-accounts-suspended-week/

story?id=29335434; Brian Everstine, “Carlisle: Air Force intel uses 

ISIS ‘moron’s’ social media posts to target airstrikes,” Air Force 

Times, June 4, 2015, available from www.airforcetimes.com/story/

military/tech/2015/06/04/air-force-isis-social-media-target/28473723/, 

accessed on October 27, 2015; Vikram Dodd, “Europol web unit 

to hunt extremists behind Isis social media propaganda,” The 

Guardian, June 21, 2015, available from https://www.theguardian.

com/world/2015/jun/21/europol-internet-unit-track-down-extremistsisis-social-media-propaganda, accessed on September 6, 2016; Brandon Bailey and Julie Pace, AP, “U.S. recruits tech leaders to help 

disrupt Islamic State group,” Chicago Tribune, January 7, 2016, 

available from www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/ct-techleaders-disrupt-islamic-state-20160107-story.html, accessed on January 8, 2016. Bradley Klapper, “AP: Islamic State’s Twitter traffic 

drops amid US efforts,” AP The Big Story, July 9, 2016, available from www.bigstory.ap.org/article/21c9eb68e6294bdfa0a099a06

32b8056/ap-exclusive-islamic-states-twitter-traffic-plunges, accessed 

on July 11, 2016; Ellen Nakashima, “Twitter says it shut down 

more than 235,000 accounts promoting terrorism since February,” 

The Washington Post, August 18, 2016, available from www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/twitter-says-it-shut-downmore-than-235000-accounts-promoting-terrorism-since-february/2016

/08/18/7fc5b7b4-653d-11e6-96c0-37533479f3f5_story.html, accessed 

on August 19, 2016. ISO has partially adapted to USG counterISO information operations by shifting to other less-vulnerable, 

encrypted social media applications, especially Telegram. See for 

example: Jake Ryan and Mike Sullivan, “‘Anything Can Work 

If Allah Helps’: Sun Investigation Exposes ISIS’s Sick Car Bomb 

Bid to Strike Heart of UK,” The Sun, July 28, 2016, available from 

www.opensource.gov, accessed on July 28, 2016; Mehdi Jedinia, “IS 

Followers Flock to Telegram After being Driven From Twitter,” 

Voice of America News, August 28, 2016, available from www.

voanews.com/a/western-nations-target-islamic-state-favorite-encrypted-app/3483900.html, accessed on August 29, 2016; Agence France-
318

Presse (AFP), “Paris: French terror investigators grapple with 

Telegram app,” AFP, September 13, 2016, available from www.

opensource.gov, accessed on September 13, 2016; Toby Antony, 

“Sleuths in a Fix Over App-Alling Telegram,” The New Indian Express, July 16, 2016, available from www.opensource.gov, accessed 

on July 13, 2016. For the preeminent role of Telegram as a communications medium used by ISO-inspired Adel Kermiche and 

Abdel Malik Petitjean, who on July 26, 2016, slaughtered the 85-

year old Catholic priest Father Jacques Hamel, see Victor Garcia 

and Jérémie Pham-Lê, “‘You Go Into a Church and Cause a Carnage’: Kermiche’s chilling Recording,” L’Express, July 28, 2016, 

available from www.opensource.gov, accessed on July 29, 2016; Victor Garcia, “Inside Ansar al-Tawhid, Telegram’s and Kermiche’s 

‘Jihad Channel’,” L’Express, August 18, 2016, available from www.

opensource.gov, accessed on August 19, 2016.

312. Greg Miller and Scott Higham, “In a propaganda war 

against ISIS, the U.S. tried to play by the enemy’s rules: Confronting the ‘Caliphate’,” The Washington Post, Occasional 

Series, May 8, 2015, www.washingtonpost.com/world/nationalsecurity/in-a-propaganda-war-us-tried-to-play-by-the-enemysrules/2015/05/08/6eb6b732-e52f-11e4-81ea-0649268f729e_story.html, 

accessed on September 1, 2015.

313. The Center for Strategic Counterterrorist Communications (CSCC) has also made very persuasive use of this recent 

defector anti-ISO messaging, see for example: “Daesh Defectors: 

I Knew It Was Time to Get Out,” YouTube video, available from 

www.youtube.com/watch?v=IL9H4On2egU, accessed on September 6, 2016; “Daesh Defectors: 3 women leave al-Khansaa brigade,” YouTube video, available from https://www.youtube.com/

watch?v=bEd8LojF9gk, accessed on September 28, 2015; “Daesh 

Defectors: ‘This is no Caliphate’,” YouTube video, available from 

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XOdUIjsihiU, accessed on September 6, 2016. For a unique, pivotal report demonstrating the 

unique power and credibility of former ISO defector’s testimonials, see Peter R. Neumann, Victims, Perpetrators, Assets: the Narratives of Islamic State Defectors, ICSR Report, September 2015, 

available from icsr.info/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/ICSR-ReportVictims-Perpertrators-Assets-The-Narratives-of-Islamic-State-Defectors.pdf, accessed on September 22, 2015. For follow-up stories 

based on Neumann’s research, see “More Islamic State defectors 

speaking out—report,” BBC News, September 21, 2015, available 
319

from www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-34313337, accessed on 

September 22, 2015; Kimiko De Freytas-Tamura, “ISIS Defectors Reveal Disillusionment,” The New York Times, September 20, 

2015, available from www.nytimes.com/2015/09/21/world/europe/

isis-defectors-reveal-disillusionment.html, accessed on September 21, 

2015; Sarah Sinno, “The defectors’ handbook to destroying Islamic State,” The Telegraph, September 23, 2015, available from www.

telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/islamic-state/11883028/The-defectorshandbook-to-destroying-Islamic-State.html, accessed on September 6, 

2016; “State Should Use Deserters’ Accounts Against ISIL,” Nederlandse Omroep Stichting (NOS), September 22, 2015, available from 

www.opensource.gov, accessed on September 23, 2015. For a unique 

early Finnish defector whose exit from his self-sought role as a 

key ISO social media disseminator was accompanied by his trenchant theological/legal critique of the ISO’s extreme deviance, 

see Aleksi Teivainen, “‘Isis can’t be defeated by bombs,’ says Finn 

who turned his back on the terrorist group,” Helsinki Times Online, June 10, 2015, available from www.opensource.gov, accessed 

on June 12, 2015. See also, Kevin Sullivan’s five-part series, “Life 

in the Islamic State,” based on interviews with current or former 

residents of ISO territory that provides an overview, and specific 

focus on women, justice, the economy, and education:

• Kevin Sullivan, “Spoils for the rulers, terror for the ruled,” 

The Washington Post, October 1, 2015, available from www.

washingtonpost.com/sf/life-in-the-islamic-state/2015/10/01/

overview/, accessed on September 6, 2016;

• Kevin Sullivan, “Till Martyrdom do Us Part,” The Washington Post, October 1, 2015, available from www.washingtonpost.com/sf/life-in-the-islamic-state/2015/10/01/women/, 

accessed on September 6, 2016;

• Kevin Sullivan, “Life in the Islamic State: A climate of 

fear and violence,” The Washington Post, October 1, 2015, 

available from https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/tablet/wp/2015/10/04/2015/10/04/life-in-the-islamic-state-a-climate-of-fear-and-violence/, accessed on September 6, 2016;

• Kevin Sullivan, “Life in the ‘Islamic State’: Economy 

Where the poor starve and the tax man carries a whip,” 

The Washington Post, October 1, 2015, available from www.

washingtonpost.com/sf/life-in-the-islamic-state/2015/10/01/

economy/, accessed on September 6, 2016;

• Kevin Sullivan, “Life in the ‘Islamic State’: Education For 

boys, God and guns; for girls, God and cooking,” The 
320

Washington Post, October 1, 2015, available from www.

washingtonpost.com/sf/life-in-the-islamic-state/2015/10/01/

education/, accessed on September 6, 2016.

See also, Cameron Sumter, “Disillusioned defectors key to rebutting Islamic State rhetoric,” The Interpreter, blog entry, posted May 

23, 2016, available from www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2016/05/23/

Disillusioned-defectors-key-to-rebutting-Islamic-State-rhetoric.aspx, 

accessed on May 23, 2016. 

314. The ISO’s top-down monopolistic entitlement conception of rulership, use of coercion, and extremely deviant doctrinal positions create a virtual immunity from rationally conceived 

logical and empirical critiques. An admirable recent effort to 

sketch some of the terms of a rationalist juridical critique may 

be found in Dr. Alex P. Schmid, Challenging the Narrative of the 

“Islamic State,” ICCT Research Paper, The Hague: International 

Centre for Counter Terrorism, June 4, 2015, available from https://

www.icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/ICCT-Schmid-Challengingthe-Narrative-of-the-Islamic-State-June2015.pdf, accessed on September 28, 2015. 

315. For the Obama Administration’s critical review, other 

critical commentary, and facts surrounding current proposals 

for reorienting current anti-ISO efforts directed at behavioral 

disengagement from terrorism, see Greg Miller, “Panel casts 

doubt on U.S. propaganda efforts against ISIS,” The Washington 

Post, December 2, 2016, available from www.washingtonpost.com/

world/national-security/panel-casts-doubt-on-us-propaganda-effortsagainst-isis/2015/12/02/ab7f9a14-9851-11e5-94f0-9eeaff906ef3_story.

html, accessed on December 3, 2016; Greg Miller and Karen 

DeYoung, “Obama administration plans shake-up in propaganda 

war against the Islamic State,” The Washington Post, January 8, 2016, 

available from www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/

obama-administration-plans-shake-up-in-propaganda-war-against-theislamic-state/2016/01/08/d482255c-b585-11e5-a842-0feb51d1d124_

story.html, accessed on January 8, 2016; Patrick Tucker, “America’s New Plan to Fight ISIS Online,” Defense One, January 11, 

2016, available from www.defenseone.com/technology/2016/01/

americas-new-plan-fight-isis-online/125043/, accessed on January 12, 

2016; Patrick Tucker, “Inside the New US War with Brand ISIS,” 
321

Defense One, June 9, 2016, available from www.defenseone.com/

technology/2016/06/inside-new-us-war-brand-isis/128938/, accessed 

on June 10, 2016.

Present USG counter-ISO information operations are distributed across four government agencies: the U.S. Department 

of State, Justice, Homeland Security, and Defense. The Department of State, for example, has dismantled the Center for Strategic Counterterrorist Communications, established the Global 

Engagement Center, and along with founding and seeding major 

regional counter-ISO initiatives and identifying and developing 

credible third-party messengers, is actively assisting in the development of themes, messaging, and overall campaign conception. 

The Department of Defense, Central Command (CENTCOM), 

currently conducts offensive cyber operations designed to attack ISO’s command and control, communications, logistics, recruitment, finances, and overall kinetic capacities. CENTCOM is 

also extensively engaged in counter-ISO information operations 

via its Digital Engagement Team (DET)—an 11-person team fluent in Arabic, Urdu, Russian, Farsi, Dari, and Pashto—actively 

countering ISO’s recruitment in cyberspace. Finally, CENTCOM’s 

Web Ops, involving nearly 120 persons and in coordination with 

the State Department, is now systematically countering ISO recruitment in cyberspace using classical methods of counter-propaganda and psychological warfare—newly renamed, Military 

Information Support Operations (MISO). For key background 

on these initiatives, including Homeland Security and the Department of Justice, see Jeff Seldin, “US in ‘Crisis Mode’ in Fight 

Against IS Online Messaging,” Voice of America News, July 6, 2016, 

available from www.voanews.com/a/united-states-crisis-mode-fightislamic-state-online-messaging/3407346.html, accessed on July 7, 

2016; Helene Cooper, “U.S. Drops Snark in Favor of Emotion to 

Undercut Extremists,” The New York Times, July 28, 2016, available 

from www.nytimes.com/2016/07/29/world/middleeast/isis-recruiting.

html, accessed on July 29, 2016; Mark Pomerleau, “DoD, State 

partnering to fight ISIS online,” C4ISRNET, July 11, 2016, available from www.c4isrnet.com/story/military-tech/cyber/2016/07/11/

dod-state-partnering-fight-isis-online/86867566/, accessed on July 13, 

2016; Karen Parrish, “Centcom Counters ISIL Propaganda,” DoD 

News, July 6, 2016, available from www.defense.gov/News/Article/

Article/827761/centcom-counters-isil-propaganda, accessed on July 

7, 2016; Eleanor Mueller, “Islamic State intensifying its battle on 

social media, Congress hears,” The News & Observer, July 6, 2016, 
322

available from www.newsobserver.com/news/politics-government/article88081202.html, accessed on July 7, 2016. 

316. See Chapter 3, section I, Islamic State Organization (Tanzim 

al-Dawla al-Islamiyya), of this book.

317. This essential truth was known and factored into USG 

strategy immediately following ISO’s occupation of Mosul, and 

its resolution critical to whether and when the USG would commence military operations. See for example: Mark Landler and 

Michael R. Gordon, “Obama Pushes Iraqis to Mend Sectarian 

Rifts,” The New York Times, June 15, 2014, available from www.

nytimes.com/2014/06/16/world/middleeast/republicans-press-obamato-move-swiftly-to-halt-extremists-advances-in-iraq.html, accessed on 

June 16, 2014. See also, Ali Mamouri, “Sistani stresses need for 

unity over sectarianism in battle for Iraq,” Al-Monitor, June 16, 

2014, available from www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/06/

iraq-isis-crisis-sistani-avoid-sectarianism.html, accessed on June 17, 

2014. 

The critical importance of the political essence of the Iraqi conflict is the conclusion drawn by scores of articles, a selective sample of which is the following: Garamone, “Success Against ISIL 

Requires Time, Partners, Dempsey Say”; see also, Jim Garamone, 

“Dempsey Discusses Unsettled, Unpredictable World Situation,” 

DoD News, September 22, 2015, available from www.defense.gov/

News-Article-View/Article/618118/dempsey-discusses-unsettled-unpredictable-world-situation, accessed on September 23, 2015; Carla 

Babb, “Top US General: Islamic State Fight ‘Stalemated’,” Voice 

of America News, September 9, 2015, available from www.voanews.

com/a/top-us-general-says-islamic-state-fight-stalemated/2954918.

html, accessed on September 7, 2016; Peter Beinart, “The Surge 

Fallacy: Having misunderstood the Iraq War, U.S. Republicans 

are taking a dangerously hawkish turn on foreign policy,” The Atlantic, September 2015, available from www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/09/the-surge-fallacy/399344/, accessed on August 

11, 2015; Lolita C. Baldor, AP, “Top General: US should consider embedding troops in Iraq,” Business Insider, August 12, 2015, 

available from www.businessinsider.com/ap-top-general-us-shouldconsider-embedding-troops-in-iraq-2015-8, accessed on August 13, 

2015; Anthony H. Cordesman, “The Defeat of Ramadi: A Time 

for Transparency, Integrity, and Change,” May 21, 2015, available 

from https://www.csis.org/analysis/defeat-ramadi-time-transparency-
323

integrity-and-change, accessed on September 7, 2016; Anthony 

H. Cordesman, “Iraqi Stability and the ‘ISIS War’,” August 12, 

2015, available from csis.org/files/publication/150812_Iraq_Stability_and_the_War_on_ISIS.pdf, accessed on August 17, 2015; Anthony H. Cordesman, “Rethinking the Wars Against ISIS and the 

U.S. Strategy for Counter-Terrorism and Counter-Insurgency,” 

September 28, 2015, available from https://www.csis.org/analysis/

rethinking-wars-against-isis-and-us-strategy-counter-terrorism-andcounter-insurgency, accessed on September 7, 2016; Robert C. 

Jones, “Interview: Thinking About ISIS in Strategic Terms,” Small 

Wars Journal, August 9, 2015, available from smallwarsjournal.

com/print/26481, accessed on August 10, 2015; Andrew Watkins, 

“Islamic State Operations and Iraqi Fault Lines,” CTC Sentinel, 

Vol. 8, No. 5, May 2015, pp. 17-20; Vivian Salama and Qassim Abdul-Zahra, AP, June 20, 2015, “Sunni tribes, abandoned by Iraq, 

key to Islamic State fight,” Salon, June 20, 2015, available from 

www.salon.com/2015/06/20/sunni_tribes_abandoned_by_iraq_key_to_

islamic_state_fight/, accessed on September 7, 2016; Paul McCleary 

and Lara Jakes, “U.S. Works to Bring More Sunni Tribal Fighters into Islamic State War,” Foreign Policy, June 10, 2015, available from foreignpolicy.com/2015/06/10, accessed on June 11, 2015; 

David Ignatius, “Baghdad must empower Sunnis or lose Iraq,” 

The Daily Star, May 20, 2015, available from www.opensource.gov, 

accessed on May 21, 2015; Al-Araby al-Jadeed, “Top Iraqi politicians: we created sectarian firestorm,” February 6, 2016, available 

from www.alaraby.co.uk/english/news/2016/2/2/top-iraqi-politicianswe-created-sectarian-firestorm, accessed on February 3, 2016; Olson, “When the Islamic State is Gone, What Comes Next?”; Kitfield, “‘Our Greatest Challenge’: CJCS Gen. Dunford”; Petraeus, 

“The Challenge in Mosul won’t be to defeat the Islamic State. It 

will be what comes after”; “Joint Press Conference by Secretary 

Carter and Gen. Votel on the Counter-ISIL Coalition, Joint Base 

Andrews, Maryland,” U.S. Department of Defense, Press Operations; U.S. Department of State, “Remarks at the Counter-ISIL 

Ministerial Meeting.”

318. General David Petraeus, “Multi-National Force-Iraq 

Commander’s Counterinsurgency Guidance,” Military Review, 

Vol. 88, No. 5, September-October 2008, pp. 2-4. 

319. Kamolnick, Delegitimizing Al-Qaeda.
324

320. Paul Kamolnick, “Al Qaeda’s Shari’a Crisis”; Kamolnick, 

“The Egyptian Islamic Group’s Critique of Al-Qaeda’s Interpretation of Jihad”; Kamolnick, “Has Adam Gadahn Forsaken the 

Lawful Jihad for Anti-Americanism?” 

321. Paul Kamolnick, “On Self-Declared Caliph Ibrahim’s 

May 2015 Message to Muslims”; Paul Kamolnick, “On Self-Declared Caliph Ibrahim’s December 2015 Speech: Further Evidence 

for Critical Vulnerabilities in the Crumbling Caliphate,” Small 

Wars Journal, January 2, 2016, available from smallwarsjournal.

com/print/36330; Paul Kamolnick, “Abu Muhammad al-Adnani’s 

May 21, 2016 Speech: More Evidence for Extreme Marginalization, 

Implosion, and the Islamic State Organization’s Certain Future as 

a Hunted Underground Ultra-Takfiri Terrorist Criminal Entity,” 

Small Wars Journal, July 2, 2016, available from smallwarsjournal.

com/printpdf/46941, accessed on August 1, 2016.

322. Until a comprehensive jihad-realist Sharia critique of ISO 

may be compiled, two important English-language sources may be 

fruitfully consulted. See Shaykh Muhammad al-Yaqoubi, Refuting 

ISIS, 2nd ed., Herndon, Virginia: Sacred Knowledge, 2016; Sheikh 

Muhammad al-Yaqoubi, with 126 original signatories, “Letter to 

Baghdadi,” September 19, 2014, available from www.lettertobaghdadi.com/14/english-v14.pdf, accessed September 26, 2014. The principal deficiency of Sheikh Yaqoubi’s scholarship, in the present 

author’s opinion, is his apologetic account of offensive jihad, and 

idealized version of Sufism as a path to the Divine. Nevertheless, 

these resources martial critical original sources—Quran, ahadith, 

scholarly consensus, in particular—and present a reliable account 

of the Sharia of lawful jihad maintained within the mainstream 

traditions of Sunni Islam. For an excellent scholarly English-language work that presumes a jihad-realist approach yet forcefully 

demonstrates, using classical Islamic sources, the fundamental 

legal distinction between the concepts “jihad” and “terrorism,” 

see ElSayed M. A. Amin, Reclaiming Jihad: A Qur’anic Critique of 

Terrorism, Leicestershire, UK: The Islamic Foundation, 2014. 

323. The Syrian theater provides keen evidence for AQO’s 

strategic acumen, patience, formidable military and political 

prowess, and present embeddedness in the broader anti-Assad Islamist revolutionary insurgency. Given this strategic embeddedness and AQO’s calculated focus on unifying Sharia-based, Sunni 
325

Islamist insurgents, it is proving extremely difficult for the USG 

to strictly disaggregate and specifically target AQO-identified insurgent terrorist actors. See for example: David Ignatius, “A new 

jihadist threat may be on the horizon in Syria,” The Washington 

Post, July 19, 2016, available from www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/a-new-jihadist-threat-rises-in-syria-as-the-islamic-state-recedes/2016/07/19/f9fd6ae6-4df4-11e6-a422-83ab49ed5e6a_

story.html?utm_term=.6a0defc160da, accessed on July 20, 2016; 

Karen DeYoung and Adam Goldman, “Is al-Qaeda’s affiliate in 

Syria no longer a ‘sideshow’?” The Washington Post, July 201, 2016, 

available from www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/isal-qaedas-affiliate-in-syria-no-longer-a-sideshow/2016/07/20/e29f9012-

4e9a-11e6-aa14-e0c1087f7583_story.html, accessed on July 21, 2016; 

Sly and DeYoung, “Syria’s Jabhat al-Nusra splits from al-Qaeda 

and changes its name”; Jamie Dettmer, “Syrian Rebel Alignment 

Likely as al-Qaida Leader Blesses Split,” Voice of America News, 

July 28, 2016, www.voanews.com/articleprintview/3438911.html, accessed on July 29, 2016. For the recently-disclosed USG policy and 

strategy designed to isolate, identify, and target Jabhat al-Nusrah

as an AQO-affiliated FTO, within the framework of a ceasefire 

designed to strengthen a cessation of hostilities, and support a 

political transition, see “A Grand Bargain for Syria,” Stratfor, July 

1, 2016, available from www.stratfor.com/geopolitical-diary/grandbargain-syria, accessed on July 1, 2016; “Terms of Reference for 

the Joint Implementation Group,” The Washington Post, July 13, 

2016 [orig. June 27, 2016], available from https://www.washingtonpost.com/r/2010-2019/WashingtonPost/2016/07/13/Editorial-Opinion/

Graphics/terms_of_reference_for_the_Joint_Implementation_Group.

pdf, accessed on July 20, 2016. Most recently, it appears that the 

USG in the wake of the previously mentioned policy initiative has 

undertaken efforts to further isolate AQO-aligned elements in the 

Syrian Islamist insurgency, and to deter former Jabhat al-Nusrah

elements from further embedding themselves within an Islamist 

united front. See for example: Bradley Klapper and Matthew Lee, 

“Officials outline new details of Syria cease-fire deal,” Associated 

Press (AP), September 13, 2016, available from bigstory.ap.org/arti

cle/3338883a3bf548be9431e03d2236381a/officials-outline-new-detailssyria-cease-fire-deal, accessed on September 14, 2016; Carla Babb 

and Steve Herman, “US, Russia Look at Creating Joint Integration Center on Syria,” Voice of America News, September 13, 2016, 

available from www.voanews.com/a/us-russia-joint-integration-center-syria/3505864.html, accessed on September 14, 2016; “Kerry: 
326

Going after al-Qaeda in Syria ‘not a concession to anybody’,” 

Al-Monitor, Week in Review, September 11, 2016, available from 

www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/09/syria-kerry-nusra-alqaeda-russia-iran-pyd-syria-turkey.html, accessed on September 12, 

2016; Nathir Rida, “Targeting Jaysh al-Fath Military Commander 

After Meeting to Form United Army Under Leadership of Fath alSham; His Killing Represents Targeting of Global Wing Formed 

of Hard-Line Opponents of Disengagement from Al-Qa’ida,” 

Al-Sharq al-Awsat, September 10, 2016, available from www.opensource.gov, accessed on September 16, 2016; Suleiman Al-Khalidi, 

“Air strike kills top commander of former Nusra group in Syria,” 

Reuters, September 8, 2016, available from www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-militants-idUSKCN11E2YD, accessed on 

September 9, 2016; “Ahrar al-Sham: Merger with Fath al-Sham is 

Suspended Until Further Notice!” Al-Watan, September 11, 2016, 

available from www.opensource.gov, accessed on September 13, 

2016.

For a cogent, Syrian Sunni salafi nationalist-Islamist description of the actual Syrian Islamist spectrum, and the dangers of the 

USG confounding Islamism—even if conservative salafist variants seeking the rule of Sharia and an Islamic state, with globally-focused anti-Western terrorist elements, see Labib Al Nahhas 

[head of foreign political relations, Ahrar al-Sham], “The deadly 

consequences of mislabeling Syria’s revolutionaries,” Op-Ed, The 

Washington Post, July 10, 2016, available from www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-deadly-consequences-of-mislabeling-syrias-revolutionaries/2015/07/10/6dec139e-266e-11e5-aae2-6c4f59b050aa_story.

html?utm_term=.f9ffcbed5d47, accessed on July 15, 2016. 

324. See for example: Paul McCleary, Dan De Luce, and C.K. 

Hickey, “Mapped: The Islamic State Isn’t Doing as Well as You 

Think,” Foreign Policy News: The Cable, December 30, 2015, 

available from foreignpolicy.com/2015/12/30/mapped-the-islamicstate-isnt-doing-as-well-as-you-think/, accessed on Setember 7, 2016; 

Jim Michaels, “ISIL loses 45% of territory in Iraq, 20% in Syria,” 

USA Today, May 18, 2016, available from www.usatoday.com/

story/news/world/2016/05/17/exclusive-isil-loses-45-territory-iraq20-syria/84499682/, accessed on May 20, 2016; Jeff Seldin, “Islamic 

State Caliphate Crunched by US-Backed Forces,” Voice of America 

News, January 29, 2016, www.voanews.com/a/islamic-state-caliphateterritory-us-backed-forces/3168752.html, accessed on September 

6, 2016; Ishaan Tharoor, “The Islamic State has lost more than a 
327

fifth of its territory, says report,” The Washington Post, March 16, 

2016, available from www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/

wp/2016/03/16/the-islamic-state-has-lost-more-than-a-fifth-of-its-territory-says-report/, accessed on March 17, 2016; Liz Sly, “In Syria 

and Iraq, the Islamic State is in retreat on multiple fronts,” The 

Washington Post, March 24, 2016, available from www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/in-syria-and-iraq-the-islamic-state-isin-retreat-on-multiple-fronts/2016/03/24/a0e33774-f101-11e5-a2a3-

d4e9697917d1_story.html, accessed on March 25, 2016; “IS loses 

12% of territory since January—IHS,” BBC News, July 11, 2016, 

available from www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-36762874, accessed on July 11, 2016; AP, “Isis ranks dwindle to 15,000 amid 

‘retreat on all fronts’, claims Pentagon,” The Guardian, August 10, 

2016, available from www.theguardian.com/world/2016/aug/11/isisranks-dwindle-to-15000-amid-retreat-on-all-fronts-claims-pentagon, 

accessed on August 11, 2016; Balint Szlanko, “IS struggles to retain grip as it loses ground in Iraq,” AP The Big Story, August 

23, 2016, available from bigstory.ap.org/article/30cd6162cb41452e9

2d35feb37309cc5/struggles-retain-grip-it-loses-ground-iraq, accessed 

on August 24, 2016; W.J. Hennigan and Brian Bennett, “U.S. intelligence sees Islamic State as weakened after series of defeats,” 

The Los Angeles Times, August 27, 2016, available from www.latimes.com/world/middleeast/la-fg-isis-intel-20160825-snap-story.html, 

accessed on August 20, 2016. 

325. For excellent background on the battle to retake Ramadi 

from ISO written at the commencement in May 2015, of operations, including a somber and prescient account of the political 

essence of the Sunni-Shia divide, see U.S. Department of State, 

“Background Briefing on Iraq,” Special Briefing, Washington, DC: 

Office of the Spokesperson, Senior State Department Official, May 

20, 2015, available from www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2015/05/242665.

htm, accessed on May 22, 2015. For key assessments following 

ISO strategic defeat, see Helene Cooper, “As U.S. Hails Iraqi Success in Ramadi, Focus Turns to Next Move in ISIS Fight,” The 

New York Times, December 29, 2015, available from www.nytimes.

com/2015/12/30/world/middleeast/isis-ramadi-iraq.html, accessed on 

December 30, 2015; Jean Marc Mojon, AFP, “Sunni tribal fighters 

deployed in reconquered Ramadi areas,” Yahoo News, December 

29, 2015, available from www.yahoo.com/news/sunni-tribal-fightersdeployed-reconquered-ramadi-areas-141209437.html?ref=gs, accessed 

on December 30, 2015; For an in-depth account by a journalist 
328

embedded with U.S. Special Forces, see Jane Arraf, “How Iraqi 

Forces Drove ISIS From Ramadi,” Newsweek, February 25, 2016, 

available from www.newsweek.com/2016/03/04/iraqi-forces-fightingisis-ramadi-fallujah-mosul-430042.html/, accessed on February 26, 

2016. The pernicious role of Iranian proxies should not be underestimated, and the merest sample of what is actually an avalanche 

of persistently sectarian information operations designed to minimize the role of Sunni’s in the liberation and reoccupation of Ramadi, may be sampled here: Fars News Agency, December 30, 

2015, available from www.opensource.gov, accessed on December 

31, 2015. The first two sentences read: 

Desperation can make the War Party in Washington do surprising things, and that’s exactly what they are doing now as 

regards the recapture of the Anbar Province city of Ramadi by 

Iraqi forces. Feeling desperate and lost, they are using Ramadi 

capture [sic] as ‘vindication’ and proof that they will eventually 

win the war on ISIL—the monster they helped create.

326. ISO’s complete defeat in Sirte is in progress at the time 

of this writing. See Carla Babb, “Pentagon: IS Down to 3 Neighborhoods in Former Libyan Stronghold,” Voice of America News, 

September 1, 2016, available from www.voanews.com/a/pentagonislamic-state-down-three-neighborhoods-sirte- libya/3490285.html, accessed on September 2, 2016; Paul Shinkman, “Nowhere to Run 

for ISIS in Libya,” U.S. News and World Report, September 1, 2016, 

available from www.usnews.com/news/articles/2016-09-01/pentagonnowhere-to-run-for-isis-in-libya, accessed on September 2, 2016.

327. Shaping operations for the battle to liberate Mosul, occupied by ISO since June 2014, are at the time of this writing full-on 

and an expedited time-table to launch a full-scale counter-offensive is in evidence. For facts related to these shaping operations, 

see Missy Ryan, “This is the general set to oversee the biggest 

battle yet against the Islamic State,” The Washington Post, July 8, 

2016, available from www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/

wp/2016/07/08/this-is-the-general-set-to-oversee-the-biggest-battle-yetagainst-the-islamic-state/, accessed on July 8, 2016; Dan Lamothe 

and Loveday Morris, “Pentagon will send hundreds of more 

troops to Iraq following seizure of key airfield,” The Washington 

Post, July 11, 2016, available from www.washingtonpost.com/news/

checkpoint/wp/2016/07/11/seizure-of-key-air-base-near-mosul-raises-
prospect-of-u-s-escalation-against-isis/, accessed on July 11, 2016; 

Jeff Seldin, “Retaking Mosul is ‘Now Upon Us’ top US Official 

Declares,” Voice of America News, July 19, 2016, available from 

www.voanews.com/a/retaking-mosul-upon-us-united-states-officialdeclares/3426634.html, accessed on July 20, 2016; Richard Sisk, “US 

Troops Move Down to Battalion Level with Iraqis,” Military.com, 

available from www.military.com/daily-news/2016/07/27/us-troopsmove-down-to-battalion-level-with-iraqis.html, accessed on July 28, 

2016; Corey Dickstein, “101st Airborne soldiers tapped to fight 

Islamic State group,” Stars and Stripes, August 5, 2016, available 

from www.stripes.com/news/101st-airborne-soldiers-tapped-to-fightislamic-state-group-1.422639, accessed on August 8, 2016; Mike Giglio, “Inside the Real US Ground War on ISIS,” BuzzFeed News 

Middle East, August 16, 2016, available from www.buzzfeed.com/

mikegiglio/inside-the-real-us-ground-war-on-isis?utm_term=.ttBgk0lY0#.dpO4OoR5o, accessed on August 18, 2016; Hope Hodge 

Seck, “Marines Collect Intel, Pinpoint ISIS Targets as Mosul Fight 

Draws Near,” Military.com, available from www.military.com/

daily-news/2016/09/02/marines-collect-intel-pinpoint-isis-targets-mosul-fight-near.html, accessed on September 6, 2016; Stephen Kalin, 

“Iraq gears up for late-year push to retake Mosul from Islamic 

State,” Reuters, September 9, 2016, available from www.reuters.

com/article/us-mideast-crisis-iraq-mosul-insight-idUSKCN11E2DE, 

accessed on September 9, 2016; Orla Guerin, “Is Mosul heading 

for a last ‘apocalyptic’ IS stand?,” BBC News, September 14, 2016, 

available from www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-37353081, accessed on September 14, 2016. The centrality of stabilization operations and humanitarian intervention in this upcoming battle 

has received considerable attention. See for example: “IS conflict: UN warns of ‘huge impact’ of Mosul assault,” BBC News, 

August 23, 2016, available from www.bbc.com/news/world-middleeast-37164630, accessed on August 23, 2016; Rick Gladstone, “1.2 

Million Iraqis Could Be Uprooted in Mosul Battle, U.N. Says,” 

The New York Times, August 23, 2016, available from www.nytimes.com/2016/08/24/world/middleeast/isis-mosul-iraq.html?_r=0,

accessed on August 23, 2016.

328. ISO’s willingness to deploy snipers to murder noncombatant civilians as they flee, and coerce and exploit them for 

battle cover as “human shields” is also critical, see for example: 

“IS conflict: 50,000 Iraqi civilians ‘at great risk’ in Falluja,” BBC 

News, May 24, 2016, available from www.bbc.com/news/world-mid329
dle-east-36367561, accessed on May 25, 2016; “Iraqi civilians ‘shot 

by ISIL’ while fleeing Fallujah,” Al Jazeera, June 6, 2016, available 

from www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/06/iraq-civilians-shot-isil-fleeingfallujah-160606070833953.html, accessed on September 7, 2016; 

AFP, “Civilians face Islamic State sniper fire trying to flee Iraq’s 

besieged Fallujah, residents say,” Australian Broadcasting Corporation, June 6, 2016, available from www.abc.net.au/news/2016-06-07/

civilians-die-trying-to-flee-iraq’s-besieged-fallujah/7483576, accessed 

on September 7, 2016; Sharon Behn, “‘We Lived Like Animals’ 

Under IS Rule in Fallujah,” Voice of America News, May 30, 2016, 

available from www.voanews.com/a/we-live-like-animals-under-isrule-in-fallujah/3351785.html, accessed on June 2, 2016; Tom Miles, 

“Islamic State captures up to 3,000 fleeing Iraqis: UNHCR,” Reuters, August 5, 2016, available from www.reuters.com/article/

us-mideast-crisis-iraq-capture-idUSKCN10G0PT, accessed on August 5, 2016; “ISIL Releases Hundreds of Civilians Captured in 

Manbij to Use as Human Shields; Washington Affirms that the 

Syrian Democratic Forces Took Control of the City Center,” Ra’y 

al-Yawm, with Agence France-Presse (AFP) and Andolu Agency, 

August 13, 2016, available from www.opensource.gov, accessed on 

August 15, 2016; Bara’ al-Shammari, “DA’ISH Executes 62 Civilians in Northern Iraq,” Al-’Arabi al-Jadid, August 6, 2016, available 

from www.opensource.gov, accessed on August 8, 2016.

329. Richard Barrett, “The Islamic State Goes Global,” CTC 

Sentinel, Vol. 8, No. 11, November/December 2015, pp. 1-4; Anthony H. Cordesman, “U.S. Strategy and the War in Iraq and 

Syria,” CSIS Commentary, May 13, 2016, available from https://

www.csis.org/analysis/us-strategy-and-war-iraq-and-syria, accessed 

on September 6, 2016; Terri Moon Cronk, “OIR Spokesman: Attacks in Baghdad Show ISIL Reverting to ‘Terrorist Roots’,” DoD 

News, May 18, 2016, available from www.defense.gov/News-ArticleView/Article/775516/oir-spokesman-attacks-in-baghdad-show-isil-reverting-to-terrorist-roots, accessed on May 20, 2016; Taylor Luck, 

“ISIS, losing territory in Syria, signals strategic shift,” The Christian Science Monitor, May 27, 2016, available from www.csmonitor.

com/World/Middle-East/2016/0527/ISIS-losing-territory-in-Syriasignals-strategic-shift, accessed on June 2, 2016; “IS conflict: Dozens killed in Baghdad car bombings,” May 11, 2016, BBC News, 

available from www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-36265245, accessed on May 11, 2016; Christoph Reuter, “Islamic State Adopts 

a New Strategy in Europe,” Speigel, March 29, 2016, available 

330
331

from www.opensource.gov, accessed on March 30, 2016; The Editorial Board, “Fighting ISIS as It Shifts Tactics,” The New York Times, 

July 5, 2016, available from www.nytimes.com/2016/07/06/opinion/

fighting-isis-as-it-shifts-tactics.html, accessed on July 6, 2016; Roy 

Gutman, “Islamic State shifts strategy from building territory to 

spreading terror worldwide,” The Los Angeles Times, July 5, 2016, 

available from www.latimes.com/world/la-fg-islamic-state-attacks20160704-snap-story.html, accessed on July 6, 2016; Joby Warrick 

and Souad Mekhennet, “Inside ISIS: Quietly preparing for the loss 

of the ‘caliphate’,” The Washington Post, July 12, 2016, available 

from www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/inside-isisquietly-preparing-for-the-loss-of-the-caliphate/2016/07/12/9a1a8a02-4

54b-11e6-8856-f26de2537a9d_story.html, accessed on July 13, 2016; 

Joseph Goldstein, “Defeat of ISIS Could Send ‘Terrorist Diaspora’ to West, F.B.I. Chief Says,” The New York Times, July 27, 2016, 

available from www.nytimes.com/2016/07/28/world/isis-attacks.html, 

accessed on July 28, 2016; “EU police agency warns of extremist threats to Europe,” U.S. News and World Report, July 20, 2016, 

available from www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2016-07-20/eupolice-agency-warns-of-extremist-threats-to-europe, accessed on July 

20, 2016; Barak Mendelsohn, “ISIS’ Lone-Wolf Strategy: And How 

the West Should Respond, Foreign Affairs, August 25, 2016, available from www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2016-08-25/isis-lone-wolfstrategy, accessed on August 29, 2016; Marcel Furstenau, “German 

Intelligence Agency Says Terror Perpetrators Are ‘Controlled 

From Afar’,” Deutsche Welle (DW), September 14, 2016, available 

from www.opensource.gov, accessed on September 15, 2016. This 

relation between the strategic defensive and a tactical reorientation to individualized mass casualty terrorist operations greatly 

resembles ISO’s earlier shift in Iraq when in response to its decisive losses of terrain, population, and freedom of maneuver, its 

then-emir called for the brutal unleashing of mass casualty terrorist operations. Abu Omar al-Baghdadi would demand sometime 

between October 15, 2007, and January 29, 2008, (see Abu Omar 

al-Baghdadi, “As For the Foam, it Passes Away as Scum”):

The bedrock of this expedition [i.e., the new campaign of mass 

terrorist bombing] is explosives, and its materials IED’s and 

VBIED’s. Its targets is agents from the apostates and the ‘uprisings’ [Sahwat]. . . . In this expedition, I call upon every mujahid 

in Mesopotamia who hope in meeting Allah and the Afterlife . 

. . the soldiers of the Islamic State. I call upon every soldier to 

blow up at least 3 IED’s before the end of the expedition, start-
ing with hand grenades, to nocturnal and diurnal booby traps, 

ending with the best of works, the mightiest and most valuable: 

martyrdom operations. Whoever has thought about performing one before or has already made the intention to do so, let 

him be keen on doing it during these days. As for those who are 

unsure or were just awaiting the call of those who they think to 

people of authority or leaders in Jihad, here we are encouraging 

him, calling upon him, and selecting him specifically to do so. 

So take the initiative, O beloved servant of Allah, and carry out 

martyrdom operations, for they are, by Allah, the most painful 

and effective. By them you rip out their hearts, terrify them, and 

destroy their hopes and put an end to their lineage.

330. See the following for documented criminal and murderous attacks directed against Sunni civilians by select Shia militia elements: For evidence of Shia atrocities committed against 

Sunni’s upon recapturing the city of Tikrit, see Human Rights 

Watch, Ruinous Aftermath: Militia Abuses Following Iraq’s Recapture of Tikrit, NY: Human Right’s Watch, September 2015, available from www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/iraq0915_4up_0.

pdf, accessed on September 22, 2015; Al-Araby al-Jadeed, “Iraq; pro 

government militias violated ‘laws of war’,” September 21, 2015, 

available from www.opensource.gov, accessed on September 22, 

2015. For official denials, see Baghdad Prime Minister’s Office, 

“Iraqi Prime Minister’s Office Responds to Human Rights Watch 

Report on Iraq’s Tikrit Incidents,” September 22, 2015, available 

from www.opensource.gov, accessed on September 23, 2015. For 

further evidence of Sunni marginalization and legitimate grievances, see Ma’d Fayyad, “Senior Iraqi Official: The Officials in 

Charge of Decision-making do not Believe in National Reconciliation; He said that Al-Abadi’s Policy is not Different from his 

Predecessor’s in Marginalizing the Sunnis and the Kurds,” AlSharq al-Awsat, June 14, 2015, available from www.opensource.gov, 

accessed on June 18, 2015; Ned Parker, Babak Dehghanpisheh, 

and Isabel Coles, “Special Report: How Iran’s military chiefs operate in Iraq,” Reuters, February 24, 2015, available from www.

reuters.com/assets/print?aid=USKBN0LS0VD20150224, accessed on 

February 25, 2015. See for example: Fali Hassan and Tim Arango, “Iraqi Forces Try to Retake Falluja From ISIS,” The New York 

Times, May 23, 2016, available from www.nytimes.com/2016/05/24/

world/middleeast/iraq-falluja-isis.html?ref=world, accessed on May 

23, 2016; Emily Anagnostos and Patrick Martin, “Fallujah Control 

of Terrain Map: May 31, 2016,” Backgrounder, Washington, DC: 

332
333

Institute for the Study of War, May 31, 2016, available from www.

understandingwar.org/backgrounder/fallujah-control-terrain-mapmay-31-2016, accessed on June 2, 2016; Dan De Luce and Henry 

Johnson, “Can the U.S. Control the [Shia] Militias in the Fight for 

Fallujah?,” Foreign Policy, June 9, 2016, available from foreignpolicy.com/2016/06/09/can-the-u-s-control-irans-militias-in-the-fight-forfallujah-shiite-iraq-isis/, accessed on June 10, 2016; “Iraqi premier 

admits ‘excesses’ by security in Fallujah battle,” Al Iraqiyah Television, June 4, 2016, available from www.opensource.gov, accessed on 

June 6, 2016. Iraq’s highest Shia religious authority, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani’s recommendations revealed during Friday 

that prayers were explicit about the need to ensure strict compliance with humanitarian standards during this recapturing of 

Fallujah. See for example: BBC Monitoring, “Iraq’s Sistani urges 

anti-IS fighters not to harm people,” Al Iraqiyah Television, June 

17, 2016, available from www.opensource.gov, accessed on June 17, 

2016. See also, more recently: Sharon Behn and Jeff Seldin, “Sectarian Abuses in Iraq Help Ensure IS Survival,” Voice of America 

News, August 24, 2016, available from www.voanews.com/a/sectarian-abuses-iraq-ensure-islamic-state-survival/3478470.html, accessed 

on August 26, 2016; Ned Parker and Jonathan Landay, “Special 

Report: Massacre reports show U.S. inability to curb Iraq militias,” Reuters, August 23, 2016, available from www.reuters.com/

article/us-iraq-massacres-falluja-special-report-idUSKCN10Y1VD, accessed on August 24, 2016; Julian Pecquet, “Rise of Iran-backed 

militias jeopardizes US aid to Iraq,” Al Monitor, September 14, 

2016, available from www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/09/

rise-iran-backed-militias-pmu-iraq-threat-us-aid.html, accessed on 

September 14, 2016.

331. See Paul Kamolnick, “Baghadadi’s Bunker: Five Essential 

Tasks for Which the World Should Now Prepare,” Small Wars 

Journal, November 19, 2015, available from smallwarsjournal.com/

print/34123, accessed on November 19, 2015, for a brief examination of these five essentials: securing WMD; preventing mass 

murder and genocide; defending wholesale destruction of the 

cultural treasures of the ancient Near East; rescuing, rehabilitating, and reintegrating former residents of the ‘caliphate’; and, 

pursuing reconciliation and peace-keeping in post-ISO occupied 

lands. See Missy Ryan and Greg Jaffe, “As ISIS closed in, a race 

to remove chemical-weapon precursors in Libya,” The Washington Post, September 13, 2016, available from www.washingtonpost.
com/world/national-security/as-isis-closed-in-a-race-to-remove-chemical-weapon-precursors-in-libya/2016/09/13/85094326-78f7-11e6-

beac-57a4a412e93a_story.html; and Agence France-Presse (AFP) 

“Coalition planes destroy IS chemical factory in Mosul,” AFP, 

September 13, 2016, available from www.yahoo.com/news/coalition-planes-destroy-chemical-factory-near-mosul-181635867.html, for 

recent USG and anti-ISO Coalition successes in securing precursor chemicals for weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in Libya, 

and destruction of chemical weapons manufacturing facilities in 

Mosul, Iraq.

334
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General William E. Rapp

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

and

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE PRESS

Director

Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Research

Dr. Steven K. Metz

Author

Dr. Paul Kamolnick

Editor for Production

Dr. James G. Pierce

Publications Assistant

Ms. Denise J. Kersting

*****

Composition

Mrs. Jennifer E. Nevil

FOR THIS AND OTHER PUBLICATIONS, VISIT US AT

http://www.carlisle.army.mil/

This Publication SSI Website USAWC Website