IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA

STATE OF ARIZONA EX REL. SHEILA SULLIVAN POLK, YAVAPAI COUNTY 

ATTORNEY,

Petitioner,

v.

THE HONORABLE JENNIFER B. CAMPBELL, JUDGE OF SUPERIOR COURT OF 

THE STATE OF ARIZONA, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF YAVAPAI,

Respondent Judge,

FRANCIS FREDERICK KRAPS,

Real Party in Interest.

No. CR-15-0303-PR

Filed May 19, 2016

Special Action from the Superior Court in Yavapai County

The Honorable Jennifer B. Campbell, Judge

No. CR 201400413

REVERSED

Opinion of the Court of Appeals, Division One

238 Ariz. 109, 357 P.3d 144 (App. 2015)

VACATED

COUNSEL:

Sheila Sullivan Polk, Yavapai County Attorney, Dennis M. McGrane 

(argued), Chief Deputy County Attorney, Bill R. Hughes, Deputy County 

Attorney, Prescott, Attorneys for State of Arizona

John M. Sears (argued), Law Offices of John M. Sears, P.C., Prescott, 

Attorneys for Francis Frederick Kraps
STATE EX REL. POLK V. CAMPBELL (KRAPS)

Opinion of the Court

2

JUSTICE TIMMER authored the opinion of the Court, in which CHIEF 

JUSTICE BALES, VICE CHIEF JUSTICE PELANDER, JUSTICE BOLICK 

and JUDGE ESPINOSAjoined. 

JUSTICE TIMMER, opinion of the Court:

¶1 Under A.R.S. § 13-3212, enhanced and consecutive sentencing

provisions apply when a defendant is convicted of engaging in child 

prostitution knowing that the person is a minor aged fifteen, sixteen, or 

seventeen. We today hold that these provisions also apply when the 

“minor” is actually an undercover peace officer.

I. BACKGROUND

¶2 The State indicted Francis Kraps on two counts of child 

prostitution in violation of A.R.S. § 13-3212(B)(2).

1 During a pre-trial 

hearing, the superior court advised Kraps that if he was convicted, the court 

was required to impose an enhanced sentence between seven and twentyone years’ imprisonment for each count without the possibility of early 

release, and that the sentences would be served consecutively. See 

A.R.S. §§ 13-3212(D), (G). Kraps moved for reconsideration, asserting that 

because the “minors” involved were actually undercover police officers 

posing as sixteen-year-old girls, these sentencing provisions did not apply. 

The court agreed, ruling that “engaging in any form of child prostitution is 

a Class 2 felony,” but that the enhanced sentencing and consecutive 

sentencing provisions apply only when actual minors are involved. At the 

State’s request, the court stayed the case to permit special action review.

¶3 The court of appeals reversed the trial court’s ruling, holding

that the enhanced sentencing provisions in § 13-3212(G) apply when an 

undercover police officer poses as a minor aged fifteen, sixteen, or 

 



Justice Robert M. Brutinel has recused himself from this case. Pursuant to 

article 6, section 3 of the Arizona Constitution, the Honorable Philip 

Espinosa, Judge of the Arizona Court of Appeals, Division Two, was 

designated to sit in this matter.

1 Unless otherwise noted, we cite the version of statutes in effect in April 

2014, when Kraps allegedly committed the offenses.
STATE EX REL. POLK V. CAMPBELL (KRAPS)

Opinion of the Court

3

seventeen. State ex rel. Polk v. Campbell, 238 Ariz. 109, 110 ¶ 1, 357 P.3d 144, 

145 (App. 2015). The court did not address consecutive sentencing under § 

13-3212(D). We granted Kraps’s petition for review because it presents a 

recurring legal question of statewide importance. We have jurisdiction 

pursuant to article 6, section 5 of the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. § 12–

120.24.

II. DISCUSSION

¶4 Because the interpretation of § 13-3212 is an issue of law, we 

review the trial court’s ruling de novo. Cf. Ariz. Citizens Clean Elections 

Comm’n v. Brain, 234 Ariz. 322, 325 ¶ 11, 322 P.3d 139, 142 (2014).

¶5 Our objective in interpreting statutes is to give effect to the 

legislature’s intent. Baker v. Univ. Physicians Healthcare, 231 Ariz. 379, 383

¶ 8, 296 P.3d 42, 46 (2013). If the statutory language is unambiguous, we 

apply it as written without further analysis. Cf. Deer Valley Unified Sch. Dist. 

No. 97 v. Houser, 214 Ariz. 293, 296 ¶ 8, 152 P.3d 490, 493 (2007). If, however, 

the statute is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation, we 

consider secondary principles of statutory interpretation, such as “the 

context of the statute, the language used, the subject matter, its historical 

background, its effects and consequences, and its spirit and purpose.” Ariz. 

Citizens Clean Elections Comm’n, 234 Ariz. at 325 ¶ 11, 322 P.3d at 142 

(quoting Wyatt v. Wehmueller, 167 Ariz. 281, 284, 806 P.2d 870, 873 (1991)).

¶6 A person commits child prostitution by causing or enabling a 

minor to engage in prostitution, § 13-3212(A), or by engaging in 

prostitution with a minor, § 13-3212(B). Kraps is charged with committing 

child prostitution in violation of § 13-3212(B)(2), which provides that “[a] 

person who is at least eighteen years of age commits child prostitution by 

knowingly . . . [e]ngaging in prostitution with a minor who the person 

knows is fifteen, sixteen or seventeen years of age.” Although the 

undercover police officers involved here were over age eighteen, “[i]t is not 

a defense to a prosecution” under subsection (B)(2) “that the other person 

is a peace officer posing as a minor or a person assisting a peace officer 

posing as a minor.” A.R.S. § 13-3212(C). Kraps does not contest that the 

State’s allegations support the charges under § 13-3212(B)(2).
STATE EX REL. POLK V. CAMPBELL (KRAPS)

Opinion of the Court

4

¶7 The parties’ dispute instead concerns these sentencing 

provisions set forth in § 13-3212:

D. Notwithstanding any other law, a sentence imposed on a 

person for a violation of subsection A or subsection B, 

paragraph 2 of this section involving a minor who is fifteen, 

sixteen or seventeen years of age shall be consecutive to any 

other sentence imposed on the person at any time.

. . . .

G. If the minor is fifteen, sixteen or seventeen years of age, 

child prostitution pursuant to subsection A and subsection B, 

paragraph 2 of this section is a class 2 felony, the person 

convicted shall be sentenced pursuant to this section and the 

person is not eligible for suspension of sentence, probation, 

pardon or release from confinement on any basis except as 

specifically authorized by § 31–233, subsection A or B until 

the sentence imposed by the court has been served or 

commuted. . . . [providing range of sentences for first-time 

and repeat offenders].

¶8 Both parties argue that the plain meaning of these 

provisions supports their views. Kraps asserts that “minor” 

commonly means a person under age eighteen, and subsections (D) 

and (G) therefore do not apply when an adult police officer poses as 

a minor. The State counters that because a defendant can be 

convicted under § 13-3212(B)(2) when the “minor” is actually an 

undercover peace officer, the term “minor” in subsections (D) and 

(G) means a person under age eighteen or a peace officer, or someone 

assisting a peace officer, posing as a minor. Both interpretations are 

reasonable, and we therefore consider secondary principles of 

interpretation as well as the statutory language to identify legislative 

intent.

¶9 Unless a statute’s context requires another definition, 

“minor” “means a person under the age of eighteen years.” A.R.S. 

§ 1-215(22). Considering § 13-3212’s history and reading the statute
STATE EX REL. POLK V. CAMPBELL (KRAPS)

Opinion of the Court

5

in its entirety convinces us that the legislature intended to use a 

different definition of “minor” in § 13-3212(D) and (G).

¶10 Before 2010, § 13-3212(A) provided that a person 

commits child prostitution, among other ways, by “[e]ngaging in 

prostitution with a minor,” and designated child prostitution a class 

2 felony. A.R.S. § 13-3212(A)(8), (D) (2010). In 2010, the legislature 

deleted the above-quoted language and substituted subsection (B), 

which delineates three ways a person engages in child prostitution:

B. A person who is at least eighteen years of age 

commits child prostitution by knowingly:

1. Engaging in prostitution with a minor under fifteen 

years of age.

2. Engaging in prostitution with a minor who the 

person knows is fifteen, sixteen or seventeen years of 

age.

3. Engaging in prostitution with a minor who is fifteen, 

sixteen, or seventeen years of age.

Id. (Supp. 2010); 2010 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 255, § 6 (2d Reg. Sess.). 

The legislature also enacted separate sentencing provisions, and 

specified different felony classifications, that depended on how the 

offender committed child prostitution and whether the minor 

involved was older or younger than fifteen. A.R.S. § 13-3212(D)–(G) 

(Supp. 2010). It provided harsher sentences and more serious felony 

classifications for offenders convicted of violating subsections (A),

(B)(1), and (B)(2) than for those persons convicted of violating 

subsection (B)(3). Id. Notably, the legislature simultaneously 

enacted subsection (C) to permit convictions under subsections (A), 

(B)(1), and (B)(2) when the “minor” involved was actually a peace 

officer posing as a minor or a person assisting a peace officer by 

posing as a minor. Id. (Supp. 2010). In 2011, the legislature enacted

subsection (D) to require consecutive sentences for convictions 

under subsections (A) and (B)(2) involving a minor aged fifteen, 

sixteen, or seventeen. Id. (Supp. 2011).

¶11 The 2010 and 2011 amendments to § 13-3212 

demonstrate that the legislature intended to punish most harshly 
STATE EX REL. POLK V. CAMPBELL (KRAPS)

Opinion of the Court

6

offenders who engage in prostitution with a minor under age fifteen, 

regardless of the offender’s knowledge of the minor’s age, and those 

who engage in prostitution with a minor who the offender knows or 

believes is fifteen, sixteen, or seventeen years old. Because the 

legislature simultaneously provided that it is no defense to these 

offenses that the “minor” is a peace officer posing as a minor, and it

did not separately provide a sentencing provision or a felony 

classification for a person convicted of engaging in child prostitution 

with an undercover officer, it follows that the legislature intended

that the sentencing provisions set forth in subsections (D) and (G) 

apply to such offenders. Indeed, the 2010 Arizona Bill Summary 

transmitted to the Governor applied what is now subsection (G) to 

the (B)(2) offense, without exception, by characterizing the offense as 

“a Class 2 felony punishable by a presumptive 10.5 year prison term 

for a first offense.”

¶12 In arguing that the sentencing enhancements should 

not apply in cases in which undercover officers have posed as 

minors, Kraps urges us to “apply the ordinary rules of grammar” to 

“shift the first dependent clause of subsection (G) to where it 

logically and grammatically belongs, and to insert the connector 

‘and.’” So reconstructed, the statute would provide a class 2 felony 

designation for all (B)(2) offenses before requiring enhanced 

sentences for offenses involving minors aged fifteen, sixteen, or 

seventeen. This would cause the provision to read: “Child 

prostitution pursuant to subsection A and B, paragraph 2 of this 

section is a class 2 felony, and, if the minor is fifteen, sixteen or 

seventeen years of age, [the enhancements apply].” We decline to 

effectively, if not actually, rewrite § 13-3212(G), as that is the 

legislature’s prerogative, not ours. Cf. Lewis v. Debord, 238 Ariz. 28, 

31 ¶ 11, 356 P.3d 314, 317 (2015) (“It is not the function of the courts 

to rewrite statutes.”).

¶13 The legislature’s intention to apply subsection (G) to 

offenders whose convictions arise from police “sting” operations is 

additionally evidenced by considering the consequences of not 

doing so. Subsection (G) provides that child prostitution committed 

pursuant to subsection (B)(2) is a class 2 felony and prescribes 

punishment. Section 13-3212 nowhere identifies a different sentence 
STATE EX REL. POLK V. CAMPBELL (KRAPS)

Opinion of the Court

7

for violations of (B)(2) involving adult peace officers posing as 

minors. It is implausible to infer that the legislature intended to 

exclude such violations from (G) while not otherwise identifying 

their punishment, particularly when the legislature was careful to 

specify in § 13-3212 the penalties for child prostitution depending on 

the manner in which it was committed. Cf. A.R.S. § 13-602(A)–(C) 

(stating that the legislature designates Title 13 offenses as either a 

felony, a misdemeanor, or a petty offense).

¶14 To further support his interpretation of subsection (G), 

Kraps asks us to follow the court of appeals’ decisions in State v. 

Regenold, 227 Ariz. 224, 255 P.3d 1028 (App. 2011) and State v. 

Villegas, 227 Ariz. 344, 258 P.3d 162 (App. 2011), which interpreted 

different versions of the sentencing provision in § 13-3554, the child 

luring statute. Under both versions, § 13-3554(C) provided that 

“[l]uring a minor for sexual exploitation is a class 3 felony, and if the 

minor is under fifteen years of age it is punishable” under the 

Dangerous Crimes Against Children Act (“DCACA”), which is now 

codified at § 13-705. Under the statute in effect in Regenold, it was 

not a defense that the other person was a peace officer posing as a 

minor. A.R.S. § 13-3554(B) (Supp. 2007). Under the version in effect 

in Villegas, it was not a defense that the other person was not actually 

a minor. A.R.S. § 13-3554(B). Nevertheless, Regenold and Villegas 

held that the DCACA’s enhanced sentencing provisions do not 

apply unless the luring victim is a person who is actually under age 

fifteen. Regenold, 227 Ariz. at 225 ¶ 1, 255 P.3d at 1029; Villegas, 227 

Ariz. at 345 ¶ 3, 258 P.3d at 163.

¶15 Even assuming Regenold and Villegas were correctly 

decided, we are not persuaded to reach a similar conclusion here

because the luring and child prostitution statutes are materially 

different. First, unlike § 13-3212(G), § 13-3554(C) provides a felony 

classification for all luring offenses before requiring enhanced 

sentences for offenses committed against minors under fifteen.

Thus, luring an undercover peace officer posing as a minor is not 

rendered an unclassified offense without punishment under the 

court of appeals’ interpretation. Second, the decisions relied on the 

meaning of “minor” in the DCACA, which is not triggered by § 13-

3212(G). See Regenold, 227 Ariz. at 226 ¶¶ 5–6, 255 P.3d at 1030 
STATE EX REL. POLK V. CAMPBELL (KRAPS)

Opinion of the Court

8

(reasoning that the reference to the DCACA showed the legislature’s 

intent that the minor in the sentencing provision refers to an actual 

child); Villegas, 227 Ariz. at 345 ¶ 3, 258 P.3d at 163 (“[A] dangerous 

crime against a child is a crime against a child qua child”) (quoting 

State v. Williams, 175 Ariz. 98, 101, 854 P.2d 131, 134 (1993)).

¶16 Kraps also argues that the interpretation of § 13-

3212(G) we adopt is absurd because a (B)(2) offender who engaged 

in prostitution with an officer posing as a fifteen, sixteen, or 

seventeen year old would receive a harsher sentence than a (B)(1) 

offender who engaged in prostitution with an officer posing as a 

minor under fifteen years of age. We disagree. Subsection (F) 

provides that a (B)(1) offense is a class 2 felony and is punishable 

under the DCACA, which provides harsher sentences than those in 

subsection (G). Compare A.R.S. § 13-705(C) with § 13-3212(G). 

Kraps’s interpretation of subsection (F) as applying only when actual 

minors are involved depends on the analysis in Regenold and Villegas, 

which we find distinguishable.

¶17 We hold that “minor,” as used in A.R.S. § 13-3212(D) 

and (G) means a person who is fifteen, sixteen, or seventeen years of 

age, a peace officer posing as a minor aged fifteen to seventeen years, 

or someone assisting a peace officer by posing as a minor aged fifteen 

to seventeen years. Given the importance of providing clear notice 

of the consequences for criminal conduct, we urge the legislature to 

be as explicit as possible in specifying criminal penalties. Cf. A.R.S. 

§ 13-101(2)(declaring the public policy of this state is “[t]o give fair 

warning of the nature of the conduct proscribed and of the sentences 

authorized upon conviction.”).

CONCLUSION

¶18 We vacate the court of appeals’ opinion and reverse 

the trial court’s order.