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i 

24–679 2017

[H.A.S.C. No. 115–7] 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INSPECTOR 

GENERAL REPORT ‘‘INVESTIGATION ON 

ALLEGATIONS RELATING TO USCENTCOM 

INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTS’’ 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT 

AND INVESTIGATIONS 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

FEBRUARY 28, 2017 
(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS 

VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri, Chairwoman 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

MATT GAETZ, Florida 

JIM BANKS, Indiana 

LIZ CHENEY, Wyoming 

AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia 

SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts 

TOM O’HALLERAN, Arizona 

THOMAS R. SUOZZI, New York 

(Vacancy) 

CHRISTOPHER BRIGHT, Professional Staff Member 

BARRON YOUNGSMITH, Counsel 

ANNA WATERFIELD, Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Hartzler, Hon. Vicky, a Representative from Missouri, Chairwoman, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations ............................................................. 1 

Moulton, Hon. Seth, a Representative from Massachusetts, Ranking Member, 

Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations ................................................ 2 

WITNESSES 

Fine, Hon. Glenn A., Acting Inspector General, Department of Defense ........... 3 

Grimes, Jacques T., Director, Defense Analysis, Office of the Under Secretary 

of Defense for Intelligence ................................................................................... 10 

Marrs, Maj Gen James, USAF, Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff ................. 8 

Quantock, MG Mark R., USA, Director of Intelligence, U.S. Central Command ..................................................................................................................... 9 

Wiley, Neil R., Director, Defense Analysis, Defense Intelligence Agency ........... 11 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Fine, Hon. Glenn A. .......................................................................................... 25 

Grimes, Jacques T., joint with Mr. Neil R. Wiley, Maj Gen James Marrs, 

and MG Mark R. Quantock .......................................................................... 36 

Hartzler, Hon. Vicky ........................................................................................ 21 

Moulton, Hon. Seth .......................................................................................... 23 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted post hearing.] 

(1) 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT ‘‘INVESTIGATION ON ALLEGATIONS RELATING 

TO USCENTCOM INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTS’’ 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS, Washington, DC, Tuesday, February 28, 2017. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:32 p.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Vicky Hartzler (chairwoman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. VICKY HARTZLER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSOURI, CHAIRWOMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Welcome. Good afternoon. I am delighted to convene the first Oversight Investigation Subcommittee hearing for 

the 115th Congress. 

Before I turn to the topic of today’s hearing and introduce our 

witnesses, I want to welcome our new ranking member and the 

others who are joining the subcommittee for the first time, who will 

be coming shortly, we are sure. 

In recent years, this subcommittee has been engaged in a wide 

variety of important national security topics. I am eager to work 

with all of you to ensure we continue to exercise our constitutional 

responsibilities to help to oversee the Department of Defense 

[DOD]. 

I am happy to have Mr. Moulton as the subcommittee’s ranking 

member, and I look forward to his important contributions to our 

work. 

I am also pleased that we are joined this year by Mr. Gaetz, Mr. 

Banks, Ms. Cheney, Mr. O’Halleran, and Mr. Suozzi. They are new 

to this committee. And our returning members are Mr. Conaway 

and Mr. Scott. So I look forward to their keen insights. 

Now, for today’s hearing, we are also joined by or probably will 

be joined by one or more committee members who are not members 

of the subcommittee. And for any members of the full committee 

who are not permanent members of the subcommittee who are or 

will be attending, I ask unanimous consent that they be permitted 

to participate in this hearing with the understanding that all sitting subcommittee members will be recognized for questions prior 

to those not assigned to this subcommittee. 

Without objection, so ordered. 

Today’s hearing topic is especially timely. Three weeks ago, the 

Department of Defense Inspector General [IG] released a report 

about allegations that leadership within U.S. Central Command 
2 

[CENTCOM] improperly manipulated intelligence products that led 

to an inaccurate understanding of the U.S. campaign against ISIS 

[Islamic State of Iraq and Syria]. 

As a consequence, 30 professionals in the Inspector General’s Office undertook an inquiry into this matter. They conducted 152 

interviews at CENTCOM and reviewed thousands of pages of materials over the course of many months. Although the report did not 

find systemic or intentional distortion of intelligence or evidence of 

misconduct, the IG did conclude that CENTCOM intelligence products could have and should have been better. 

The report also found a very challenging command climate at 

CENTCOM and identified several process and procedural issues 

which the IG believed impeded the intelligence analysis process. 

The inspector general proffered 29 specific recommendations for 

improvements and discussed the need to implement corrective action. 

I look forward to hearing from our witnesses and learning about 

the changes that have been made in response to the report and the 

progress we can expect. I look forward to discussing these issues 

with the two panels today. 

Before I introduce our first witness, I turn to the Oversight and 

Investigations Subcommittee ranking member for any opening remarks that he would like to make. 

[The prepared statement of Mrs. Hartzler can be found in the 

Appendix on page 21.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. SETH MOULTON, A REPRESENTATIVE 

FROM MASSACHUSETTS, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS 

Mr. MOULTON. Thank you, Chairwoman Hartzler. It is an honor 

to be here, and I very much look forward to our work together. So 

thank you so much for welcoming me. 

And I would like to just take a quick moment to also recognize 

a couple new Democratic members on the Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee: Tom O’Halleran of Arizona and Tom Suozzi of 

New York. So we are bringing you two Toms in addition to myself. 

I came to Washington promising to work across the aisle and to 

make sure that we in Congress never flinch when it comes to asking the difficult questions about what it takes to ensure our national security. I believe we will do an excellent job working together in that spirit and in the bipartisan tradition of this committee. 

In the United States, our policymakers and service members rely 

on intelligence analysis to make critical strategic, operational, and 

tactical decisions every day, some life or death. So it is imperative 

that we have adequate safeguards in place to ensure they receive 

objective, empirically based reporting on which is ground truth. 

For that reason, when allegations arose last year about manipulation of intelligence at United States Central Command, Congress 

encouraged the DOD Inspector General to conduct a thorough investigation and report back with recommendations. The inspector 

general conducted an exhaustive investigation involving 152 interviews of 120 witnesses, reviews of millions of emails, 425,000 documents, and 140 finished intelligence products. 
3 

In its final report, they did not find evidence that intelligence 

was falsified or intentionally distorted or that intelligence processes 

resulted in false narrative or systemic distortion; however, the IG 

did find evidence of issues that are concerning to the committee, 

including some that the chairwoman already mentioned. 

These include a poor command climate, low morale, and ineffective communication and guidance that produced a perception 

among analysts that the integrity of the process was questionable. 

These findings demonstrate how it is paramount that we ensure 

the climate at CENTCOM is improved and that better safeguards 

are in place. 

I believe these are exactly the types of issues that require serious 

scrutiny from the Oversight Committee, and I would like to thank 

the chairwoman again for her leadership and her interest in delving into this important topic today. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Moulton can be found in the Appendix on page 23.] 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Thank you, Mr. Moulton. Appreciate your comments. 

So I am pleased to recognize the witness on our first panel, the 

Honorable Glenn Fine, Acting Inspector General for the Department of Defense. So thank you for being here today and we welcome your opening statement. 

STATEMENT OF HON. GLENN A. FINE, ACTING INSPECTOR 

GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

Mr. FINE. Good afternoon, Chairwoman Hartzler, Ranking Member Moulton, and members of the subcommittee. Thank you for inviting me to appear before you today to discuss the investigation 

by the Department of Defense Office of Inspector General into allegations that senior officials at CENTCOM falsified, distorted, delayed, or suppressed intelligence products related to its efforts to 

degrade and destroy ISIL [Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant]. 

These were very serious and troubling allegations, and we devoted significant resources to investigating them. We assembled a 

multidisciplinary team of more than 30 DOD OIG employees to 

handle the investigation. Our team did conduct over 150 interviews 

of 120 witnesses, both inside and outside of CENTCOM. 

We examined in detail the specific intelligence products that 

were raised by the complainants and witnesses. In addition, we collected and reviewed a massive amount of draft and final intelligence products and emails produced by CENTCOM. We also interviewed intelligence officials in the DOD and the intelligence 

community for their assessments of CENTCOM’s intelligence products. 

We did not stop there. We conducted an analytical review of a 

random sample of 140 CENTCOM intelligence products to determine whether there were significant changes related to the edits of 

these products and whether such changes indicated any trend or 

pattern of distortion with regard to the portrayal of ISIS and the 

Iraqi Security Forces as stronger or weaker. We also interviewed 

witnesses about the command climate in CENTCOM’s intelligence 

directorate, and we reviewed command climate surveys. 
4 

Finally, we examined in detail the management processes for 

producing intelligence products in CENTCOM to determine if there 

were deficiencies or weaknesses in need of improvement. 

Our full findings and conclusions are contained in a 542-page 

classified report of investigation, which we have provided to this 

and other congressional committees. In addition, we prepared a 

190-page unclassified report of investigation, which we publicly released. 

In short, our investigation did not substantiate the most serious 

allegation that intelligence was falsified. Similarly, we did not find 

systematic or intentional distortion of intelligence by CENTCOM’s 

senior leaders or that the leaders suppressed or delayed intelligence products. 

However, we did find a troubling and widespread perception 

among many intelligence analysts that their leaders were attempting to distort the intelligence products. We also identified specific 

weaknesses and flaws in the CENTCOM management processes for 

creating intelligence products. 

We believe these deficiencies, such as ineffective communication 

and guidance, lack of adequate feedback, uncertainty about various 

policies, and the ambiguous status of DIA [Defense Intelligence 

Agency] analysts assigned to CENTCOM hindered the effectiveness 

and efficiency of CENTCOM intelligence processes and it affected 

the morale of the analytical workforce. 

We concluded that these practices related to intelligence products 

in CENTCOM could have and should have been better and that 

further improvements can be made. We therefore made 29 recommendations that relate to the issues we investigated. 

Some of the most important recommendations were that 

CENTCOM should improve feedback, communication, and guidance 

between its leaders and the intelligence workforce. CENTCOM 

should update and maintain its standard operating procedures related to intelligence production. 

The relationship, reporting responsibilities, and intelligence requirements that apply to DIA analysts should be detailed and clarified in writing, and CENTCOM leaders should require that intelligence products consider analysis of alternatives. 

We also recommended that senior leaders in the responsible organizations review the report with regard to the overall performance of the individuals described. We believe that all 29 recommendations are important and that they provide a useful roadmap for improving intelligence processes, not only in CENTCOM 

but throughout other combatant commands in the DOD. 

We also note that many of our recommendations are consistent 

with what the House of Representatives task force recommended. 

We therefore urge the DOD, DIA, and CENTCOM to take these 

recommendations seriously and to fully implement corrective action 

in response to the recommendations or to explain in detail why 

such corrective action is not necessary or warranted. 

We believe that such actions can further improve intelligence 

processes and reduce the risk that allegations such as the ones at 

issue in this report will arise in the future. 
5 

Thank you for the opportunity to discuss our investigation with 

the subcommittee. That concludes my statements, and I would be 

glad to answer any questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Fine can be found in the Appendix on page 25.] 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Thank you very much, Mr. Fine. I appreciate 

your very good work. 

This is the unclassified version, and then with another 500-page 

classified, you really have put a lot of effort into this. And there 

is a lot of things in here that we can learn from, and I guess that 

is my first question, because I have seen in other instances of the 

excellent work that is done by the DOD IG or the SIGAR [Special 

Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction] offices, but the 

story seems to never continue after the report is issued. 

So can you please tell me your responsibilities after you released 

your report, and is there anyone that ensures your recommendations are implemented? 

Mr. FINE. Yes. We typically take follow-up action to inquire from 

the responsible organizations what they intend to do with regard 

to our recommendations. We want specific details about whether 

they agree or disagree and whether they concur with the recommendations or whether they intend to implement other things to 

address the intent of the recommendations. 

We then follow up with them. We ask them for documents and 

verification that they have actually implemented those recommendations, and in many cases, we often go back and test to verify that 

they have actually done that. These are important recommendations. We intend to do that. We intend to follow up with them and 

we intend to ensure that they take corrective action or explain why 

they don’t intend to. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. So is the follow-up actions, is that made public 

too? 

Mr. FINE. Sometimes it is. It depends if we do a follow-up report. 

We do make public our follow-up actions. Often we provide in our 

semiannual reports the status of unimplemented recommendations, 

so we do that as well. And sometimes—and we are happy to provide the committee with information on the status of those recommendations as time goes on as well. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. That sounds good. So this report you issued was 

January 31, 2017. Is that right? 

Mr. FINE. Yes. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. So when will you go back and check and see that 

they are following up on the recommendations? About what is the 

timeframe? 

Mr. FINE. We normally give them a little time. I would say they 

average about 60 days or so for them to determine what they intend to do, and then we periodically follow up after that as well, 

periodic time periods, depending on the recommendation itself. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. So how has CENTCOM and other agencies responded to the report recommendations, and do you assess that 

they are willing or reluctant to pursue the changes that you suggest? 

Mr. FINE. Well, when we issued the report, they indicated they 

thought it was a thorough report, and they thought that particu-
6 

larly DIA, for example, said that this made useful recommendations, thoughtful recommendations. They have not responded specifically to each recommendations, and we want that, and we intend to follow up with them. 

But in general, the reaction has been generally positive, but the 

proof is in the pudding. We want to see exactly what they intend 

to do with regard to each specific recommendation. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. I think it is very important to pursue the followup, and I look forward to your continued look at this and what you 

find out. 

So I turn to the ranking member for questions. 

Mr. MOULTON. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. 

First of all, Mr. Fine, I share Chairwoman Hartzler’s views of the 

quality of your report, the importance of it, and it gives us a lot 

of confidence to know that such good work is being done. I also 

share her concerns that the recommendations actually be implemented, and so that is very important. 

Sort of looking even further into the future, if there were, here 

or elsewhere, an active attempt to manipulate intelligence analysis 

sometime in the future, do we have adequate protections in place 

to guard against that from ever occurring? 

Mr. FINE. I think we do. I think that there is the opportunity to 

make those complaints known and that there are entities within 

the Department of Defense that will look into that, including us. 

As you saw, we took these allegations very seriously and conducted 

an exhaustive investigation. 

We do think that there can be additional actions that can be 

taken, including clarifying the relationship of the analysts at 

CENTCOM to DIA, improving the training, and guidance, and 

oversight, increasing standardized operating procedures, and also a 

recommendation to explain and identify the function of the ombudsperson who can be an outlet for these kinds of concerns, if analysts have them. 

So I do think there is that opportunity, but there can be improvements made to those processes. 

Mr. MOULTON. This issue with the ambiguity of the DIA analysts’ roles at CENTCOM seems to be one of the specific examples 

you cite as a real issue here. Can you just give us an example or 

a little bit more clarity into exactly how that played out. 

Mr. FINE. It played out by some of the analysts not knowing 

what analytical standards applied to them, whether ICD [Intelligence Community Directive] 203, 206, 208 applied to them; not 

knowing who exactly they worked for; not knowing various, you 

know, operating procedures and what their reports were—and 

what the intent of their reports were. I think it needs to be clarified exactly what kind of training they receive, who they are working for, what kind of certifications they need to have, and what 

their exact relationship is to the combatant command, as well to 

DIA. 

We found some ambiguity about that, not only among the analysts but the senior leaders we talked to as well, not even knowing 

for sure whether the intelligence community directives applied to 

them. So that is concerning to us, and there needs to be more clar-
7 

ity in writing and documented, including the standard operating 

procedures that they have; that needs to be clarified. 

Mr. MOULTON. So there clearly are some process improvements 

that need to be made, but part of this is also just command climate. And you addressed that in your report as well. Has the IG 

received any similar complaints of command climate issue or poor 

process issues at other COCOM [combatant command] J–2s [intelligence directorates]? 

Mr. FINE. I can’t say whether we have never received any other 

complaints, but we have never received anything like this in terms 

of the intensity and the number and the concern that we have had. 

So this was unusual. It was very unusual. 

Mr. MOULTON. And Mr. Fine, my final question is, do you have 

any plans to share the recommendations of your findings with 

other COCOM J–2s so that this kind of thing does not happen elsewhere in the future? 

Mr. FINE. Well, we have made the recommendations known, publicly released them, gave them to the Department, gave them to the 

DIA. I think the DIA, as well as the Department itself, ought to 

make sure that others are aware of this, and they can provide, as 

I say in my opening statement, a useful roadmap for others as well. 

I think that is one of the important things that needs to be done, 

not solely for folks here on CENTCOM, but to have others look at 

this as well to see whether there are process improvements that 

they need to make in other combatant commands as well, as well 

as throughout the DOD and the DIA. 

Mr. MOULTON. Thank you again for your work. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Thank you very much. 

We are voting right now, so we are getting ready to recess here, 

but just based on the former conversation, I just want to let everybody know there is a second panel. And we do have representatives 

of the DIA and CENTCOM and the Office of Under Secretary of 

the Defense, Intelligence, and the Joint Staff that will be testifying 

next. 

So I hope everyone will be able to come back, and we will finish 

our questioning with Mr. Fine, but then we will get their response 

as well. So I call a recess until after votes. Thank you. 

[Recess.] 

Mrs. HARTZLER. We will reconvene. We appreciate your patience 

while we were voting, but thank you very much for waiting. I know 

there may be some other members here, but I did have another 

question for you before our second panel. 

In your opening statement, you said that you did find that they 

distorted the products, that they didn’t falsify but you used the 

word that they distorted, or did I misunderstand you? 

Mr. FINE. Yeah, we found that they did not systematically distort 

or intentionally distort the products or suppress or delay. We did 

find a perception of that and we found processes that needed improvement, but we did not find systematic or intentional distortion. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. And when you were conducting this investigation, where did the burden of proof lie? Did the CENTCOM leadership need to show they didn’t manipulate the intelligence, or did 

the whistleblowers need to show the CENTCOM leadership did manipulate it? 
8 

Mr. FINE. We didn’t have a burden of proof. We didn’t apply that 

burden of proof. We just wanted to see what the facts showed and 

what the evidence showed, and then we reached our conclusions 

based upon that. 

So if we would have found that there was distortion, we would 

have said that, but we didn’t find that. So we tried to do a thorough and objective review and come to the conclusions that we 

thought were warranted. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Okay. Very good. 

Do you have any further questions, Mr. Moulton? 

Mr. MOULTON. No, Madam Chairwoman. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Okay. I think there was some members that had 

some questions, but they are not back yet, and we have had our 

second panel waiting very long, so I think we will conclude this 

first section. 

But thank you very much, Mr. Fine, for your fine work—no pun 

intended—and we look forward to following up with you and seeing 

what you find in the future as far as how well the departments follow your recommendations. So thank you very much. 

Mr. FINE. Thank you. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. We will welcome our second panel, and thank 

you for your patience in waiting. We very much appreciate your involvement in our hearing, and I look forward to hearing what you 

have to share. 

For our second panel, we have Major General James Marrs, he 

is Director of Intelligence for the Joint Staff; Major General Mark 

Quantock, Director of Intelligence for U.S. Central Command; Mr. 

Jacques Grimes, Director of Defense Analysis for the Office of the 

Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence; and Mr. Neil Wiley, 

Director of Analysis for the Defense Intelligence Agency. 

So I understand the Department of Defense has submitted a single written statement, but I will turn to each of you for any opening remarks that you wish to make, so General Marrs. 

[The joint prepared statement of General Marrs, General Quantock, Mr. Grimes, and Mr. Wiley can be found in the Appendix on 

page 36.] 

STATEMENT OF MAJ GEN JAMES MARRS, USAF, DIRECTOR 

FOR INTELLIGENCE, JOINT STAFF 

General MARRS. Thank you Chairwoman Hartzler, Ranking 

Member Moulton, and members of the committee. I appreciate the 

opportunity to offer testimony on the Department of Defense Inspector General report ‘‘Investigation on Allegations Relating to 

USCENTCOM Intelligence Products.’’ 

I am pleased to be here today with my other colleagues at the 

table to share my perspective, both as a producer of intelligence 

and as a representative of the combatant command J–2s. Other 

than CENTCOM, of course, who is most ably represented by Major 

General Mark Quantock to my left. 

I echo my colleagues’ sentiments, and you will hear more of that 

shortly, regarding the important work done by the DOD IG and the 

House Joint Task Force. Both reports remind us of the vital and 

complex responsibilities entrusted to intelligence professionals 

within our joint force. Continual improvements in analytic stand-
9 

ards and processes are necessary to ensure intelligence products 

continue to be of the highest quality, objectivity, and integrity. 

Let me comment first on the Joint Staff J–2, a unique team that 

is both part of the Joint Staff and the Defense Intelligence Agency. 

Our J–2 mission is to provide the chairman, the Secretary of Defense, and senior joint force leadership with decision-quality intelligence that is relevant, accurate, and unbiased. 

Doing that work well depends on a high-quality team of intelligence professionals, and within the context of today’s hearing, emphasis on two key ingredients: First is a workforce steeped in the 

elements of good analytic tradecraft. The programs and processes 

that will be outlined by Mr. Grimes and Mr. Wiley serve as the 

foundation of that tradecraft. We build upon that in the Joint Staff 

J–2 with our own local training and collaborative relationships to 

ensure the best application to our mission. 

The second ingredient is the responsibility I, and my leadership 

team, have every day to create an environment where even in the 

most pressure-packed situations, dissent and candor are encouraged as we shape our intelligence assessments. 

While I, as the J–2, am ultimately responsible for the quality of 

those assessments, this is a team sport of the highest stakes for 

our national security and one that only works at its best when communication and collaboration are strong. 

As for my J–2 colleagues across the combatant commands, they 

and their teams face a very similar mission and set of challenges 

as they support their four-star commanders and combatant command joint force. They are very aware of today’s hearing and the 

important work done by the DOD IG and the House Joint Task 

Force and are looking at this as a near-term opportunity to focus 

on the aspects of our tradecraft and operating environment that 

are vital to mission success. 

I look forward to your questions. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Thank you. 

General Quantock. 

STATEMENT OF MG MARK R. QUANTOCK, USA, DIRECTOR OF 

INTELLIGENCE, U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND 

General QUANTOCK. Yes, ma’am. Chairwoman Hartzler, Ranking 

Member Moulton, and members of the committee, thank you for 

the invitation —— 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Is your microphone on? 

General QUANTOCK. Yes, it is. Okay. Now. I am sorry. 

Chairwoman Hartzler, Ranking Member Moulton, and members 

of the committee, thank you very much for the invitation to offer 

testimony on the IG report. 

First, I would like to acknowledge the breadth of the investigation and appreciate the efforts of both the IG and the Joint Task 

Force on CENTCOM Intelligence Analysis. The IG report provided 

thoughtful recommendations on ways to make improvements within the command, and we are taking those on as well as those from 

the Joint Task Force [JTF]. 

Of the 29 DOD IG recommendations, and the 4 from the JTF report, I view CENTCOM J–2—and that would be me—as the lead 
10 

for implementation, certainly for CENTCOM. We have developed 

an aggressive action plan, which we are currently executing. 

To be clear, some of these actions are new initiatives, but many 

are actions that have already been implemented, indeed were implemented many months ago. But as with any action that involves 

leadership, communications, or training, the initial implementation 

is the easy part. Sustainment over time is the real challenge, a 

challenge that we readily accept at CENTCOM. 

We look forward to working with USDI [Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence] and DIA in developing and implementing 

tradecraft and production standards to ensure our commanders and 

the Nation’s policymakers receive the very best intelligence support. 

Thank you. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Thank you, General. 

Mr. Grimes. 

STATEMENT OF JACQUES T. GRIMES, DIRECTOR, DEFENSE 

ANALYSIS, OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

FOR INTELLIGENCE 

Mr. GRIMES. Good afternoon, Chairwoman Hartzler, Ranking 

Member Moulton, and members of the committee. Thank you for 

the invitation to offer the testimony of the Department of Defense 

on the inspector general report, ‘‘Investigation on Allegations Relating to USCENTCOM Products.’’ 

I am Jacques Grimes, Director of Defense Analysis and Partner 

Engagement, and I represent the Under Secretary of Defense for 

Intelligence. My role is to oversee defense analysis and to set a policy foundation that empowers defense analytic components to 

produce high-quality, relevant, effective analysis. 

The Department is indeed impressed with the inspector general’s 

investigation, and we appreciate the opportunity that it gives us to 

discuss the steps we are taking to improve intelligence analysis 

across the defense intelligence enterprise. 

We in the Department hold ourselves to the highest standards, 

and we take great pride in the exceptional intelligence professionals who support the full spectrum of DOD intelligence customers from the President of the United States to the soldier in the 

field. Every day, thousands of our intelligence professionals across 

the globe tirelessly provide insight and analysis without politicization. 

Our commitment is and always will be to provide unvarnished 

intelligence and key assessments into the myriad of challenges facing our country every day. But we recognize that we can be better, 

and we are getting better. We are studying the inspector general’s 

recommendations closely, and we are identifying specific actions 

that we can take now to address them. 

We will use the recommendations in concert with our already ongoing actions to build a strong foundation for high-quality objective 

defense intelligence analysis. For example, in November 2016, the 

Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence signed out a new policy 

titled ‘‘Management and Oversight of DOD All-Source Analysis,’’ 

which assigns the role of the functional manager for DOD allsource analysis to the Defense Intelligence Agency and extends in-
11 

telligence community analytic standards to all DOD intelligence 

analytic organizations, including the combatant commands. 

I co-chair, along with my colleague from the Defense Intelligence 

Agency, the Defense Analytic Tradecraft Council, which serves as 

a forum for advancing analytic integrity and tradecraft standards 

across the defense intelligence enterprise. 

The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence also sponsored 

the first ever analytic objectivity symposium in September 2016 

that brought together expert speakers from academia, finance, accounting, medical research, and law enforcement to discuss measures for reducing bias and politicization in analysis. 

While these steps were initiated without specific reference to the 

inspector general’s investigation at CENTCOM, they align with 

many of the IG’s recommendations. The steps we are taking have 

already established a firm foundation for DOD intelligence analysis. We very much look forward to continuing along this path to 

ensure that DOD analysis meets the highest standards of quality, 

objectivity, and integrity. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Very good. Thank you. 

Mr. Wiley. 

STATEMENT OF NEIL R. WILEY, DIRECTOR, DEFENSE 

ANALYSIS, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 

Mr. WILEY. Chairwoman Hartzler, Ranking Member Moulton, 

and members of the committee, I would like to join my colleagues 

in thanking you for the invitation to offer testimony on the DOD 

IG report. 

As the DIA director for analysis and the DOD functional manager for all-source analysis, I am responsible for the alignment, 

quality, and integrity of the analytic output at DIA to service intelligence centers in the combatant commands. We appreciate the 

DOD IG’s thorough investigation and note that the investigation 

found no lack of integrity or lack of probity in the intelligence process. 

We in the analytic profession hold ourselves to a high standard, 

and when concerns are raised, it makes us all examine what we 

could do better going forward. At DIA, across the defense all-source 

analysis enterprise, and in partnership with USDI, we have been 

aggressively investing in initiatives to strengthen analytic tradecraft and analytic processes. 

While many of these efforts were initiated independently from 

and prior to the IG report, they align well with many of the recommendations contained therein. We have established the Defense 

Analytic Tradecraft Council to coordinate and implement analytic 

tradecraft and process improvements across the enterprise. 

Most noteworthy thus far have been the implementation of an 

enterprise-wide analytic ombudsman program and a common process for analytic product evaluations. We have expanded professional and analyst career education through the addition of a 10- 

day course for DIA analysts, offered both in the National Capital 

Region and at the combatant commands, stressing and exercising 

Intelligence Community Directive 203 tradecraft standards in analytic design. 
12 

We also believe that rigorous certification is an essential component of a professional workforce and continue to implement and enhance the certified defense all-source analysis program to demonstrate attainment in analytic competence. 

We have already made considerable strides in implementing common analytic standards and practices across the enterprise, but the 

business of intelligence analysis is one of constant improvement. 

With our partners in USDI and across the enterprise, we will continue to develop, codify, and share best practices in intelligence 

tradecraft, process, and training. 

Our ultimate mission is to provide our warfighters and policymakers with defense all-source analysis of the highest insight, 

quality, and integrity. They deserve no less. 

Thank you. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Thank you. I am encouraged by your testimony. 

It sounds like already that you have made a lot of changes, and it 

can be defense-wide, the lessons learned from this incident. You 

talk about, Mr. Wiley, analytic ombudsman, common analytic 

standards for intelligence all across the DOD, career education. 

Mr. Grimes, you talked about the development of a council, 

standards, defense analytics, and a symposium that was held 

where experts looked at ways to measure. So I am very encouraged 

by this. 

And, General Quantock, my question is that the inspector general identified several issues having to do with poor work environment and climate at CENTCOM during a crisis period. So can you 

describe the specific actions that have been taken to improve the 

common climate at CENTCOM. 

General QUANTOCK. Yes, ma’am. Thank you for the question. 

We have endeavored over the past really 18 months to continue 

to improve the climate in specifically in the CENTCOM J–2. And 

I think, just in terms of the numbers, that has beared out. So in 

the IG investigation, the way we have monitored this is through 

the use of several surveys. 

So the one that was called out in the IG report was the analytic 

integrity and standard survey, which did have an anomalous in the 

15 percentage. It was much higher than other COCOMs. Since that 

time, and we just received the calendar year 2016, where it went 

from a 41 percent, essentially dissatisfaction, down to 22 percent. 

That is an enormous increase. 

And when you look at that, you contrast that, and so in 2015, 

it was 41 percent and then compared to a combatant command average of 23 percent. This past year, it has gone down to 22 percent 

as opposed to 25 percent for the COCOM average. We are actually 

under the COCOM average, which is a pretty marked increase. 

And that is really through a lot of programs that we have instituted, and this was really actually well before I got there and General Votel got there. So when it was recognized by the previous 

J–2 command team that there—there were challenges. They did 

start to institute things like, you know, townhalls and interfacing 

with the analysts, and we have certainly continued that. 

So to be very specific, some of the things that are not new that 

they instituted that got the ball moving in the right direction were 

monthly townhalls. We have what is called a daily IFC, or Intel 
13 

Fusion Center closeout, where the J–2 or the vice J–2 sits with all 

the analysts that are working the problems. It is usually anywhere 

between 25 and 50 of them. And we have a discussion of what has 

occurred that day in the fight, in the fights that we have at 

CENTCOM. 

Our vice J–2 has normal office hours where he will take—a couple times a week he’ll go down to an office and events, which is the 

location where the bulk of our analysts are, and he will spend an 

hour and a half there and just interfacing with analysts or anyone 

in the J–2 that has an issue they want to talk to or bend the 

J–2’s ear on. 

We have had an open-door policy for some time. And the command climate that we also work very hard on is—and General 

Votel has been an enormous advocate for this, is he spends a lot 

of time with our analysts. He receives intelligence first thing in the 

morning through his read book. 

And what I will send in with that read book is a young analyst. 

And so it is a one-on-one between a four-star and a young analyst, 

and they get to answer the questions. And they do a magnificent 

job. I will tell you, I am very proud of the workforce that we have. 

They are magnificent professionals. 

And when he has a question, they will take that back to the 

JIOC [joint intelligence operations center], to the JIC [joint intelligence center], and they will work that question, and it will be an 

email from that young analyst to the four-star. And, you know, 

those of us on the chain of command also get cc’d so we know what 

the boss knows, but that has been very, very positive. 

What is new in terms of—since the new team has rolled in, is 

we do—it is normal leadership things where you have got outreach 

to the full team, not just the analysts but the full J–2 team, which 

is biweekly I will put out an update to the team in terms of what 

is kind of happening within the command. 

We have—the CENTCOM commander, General Votel, has daily 

addresses over the PA [public address] system where he tells about 

his travels and what is going on within the command. Very, very 

well received by the command. 

We have introduced walkabouts, where I will just frankly, again, 

just do normal leadership stuff of getting out there and mixing it 

up with our troops. I learn something every time I do that, and as 

I mentioned, it is a world-class workforce. 

Thank you. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Very good. Thank you. Ranking Member Moulton, do you have some questions? 

Mr. MOULTON. Yes, Madam Chairwoman. Thank you very much. 

This is a question for General Quantock. One of the key findings 

in the DOD IG’s report was that the leadership did not ensure 

operational reporting was necessarily from commanders on the 

ground was appropriately separated from analytical assessments. I 

am an operational guy myself. I think highly of commanders’ views 

on the ground, but obviously they have a certain place in intelligence analysis. Can you talk about what you are doing to correct 

that particular issue? 

General QUANTOCK. So I will tell you that in the intelligence 

field we need to take all the information in, always. We have to ac-
14 

knowledge that operational information, like other information, has 

its own biases, and we have to acknowledge that and incorporate 

that into our assessments. 

But properly if we have got, for example, when Mosul fell and 

before OIR [Operation Inherent Resolve] stood up, we had intelligence analysts, the intel guys normally do red. They do the 

threat. And so we were actually trying to report on friendly forces, 

and the team was working that. When we started to have friendly 

forces, U.S. forces come on the battlefield and start to make assessments about what was going on the battlefield, we have to take 

that in. That is right. It is appropriate, it is in accordance with ICD 

203. It is just the right thing to do. 

And so, we have encouraged the use of all forms of information 

and intelligence, signals intelligence, human intelligence, open 

source intelligence, anything we can get. We just again have to 

weigh and acknowledge that there are biases and be aware of 

those. 

Mr. MOULTON. And my understanding is that the issue was not 

that you weren’t incorporating these different sources of intelligence, but that the biases weren’t recognized. Is that correct? 

General QUANTOCK. Well, I wasn’t there in terms of the specifics 

of what was, how it was characterized, but looking forward, certainly that is one of the things that we are most cognizant of. 

Mr. MOULTON. Great. Thank you very much. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Thank you so much. We have Representative 

Cheney. 

Ms. CHENEY. Thank you very much, Madam Chairwoman. And 

thank you very much all of you for your service and for being here 

today. 

I wanted to just see if we could get a little more details about 

the mention sort of repeatedly about analytic standards and the 

lack of understanding on the part of some of the analysts about 

what standards were really applicable to them, and how has that 

changed, and specifically, how do the standards themselves, how 

are they implemented? 

And then secondly, give a little bit of specifics about the DIA engagement. I know one of the things that we have urged is that DIA 

really accept its responsibility as sort of overseer of the whole defense intelligence enterprise. And I would be interested to know 

specifically how that is manifesting itself on a day-to-day basis. 

General QUANTOCK. If I may take it first, and then I will hand 

it over to my teammates. In terms of standards, because it was 

brought up I know in the testimony from the IG in terms of who 

do folks work for. I have made it very clear, and I know that DIA 

is supporting me on this, and we have had actually a session with 

other J–2s to make sure we are all in alignment with this. 

But analysts that are from DIA that work in combatant commands, work for the combatant commander. They work for the 

J–2. What J–2s need to be cognizant of is the requirements that 

those analysts have for their professional development in terms of 

training and in terms of their advancement. And they have to 

make sure that that training and those experiences and exposures 

that they need are taken into account. 
15 

And so in my townhalls with my folks, I have told them, I said, 

listen, let’s make sure you understand it, that we work for the combatant command. It is no different, quite frankly, in terms of these 

loyalties is to say, hey, do I work for the Army or do I work for 

the combatant command? Well, the reality is I work for both, but 

I take my instructions from the tower, and the tower is at MacDill 

Air Force Base with General Votel. 

But like every service, I have to be aware of the requirements 

that the Army has of me, whether it is for firing a weapon or doing 

PT [physical training] test or whatever the standards I have to do. 

So it is really that both worlds. And that is really, it talks to, you 

know, what folks have to have. The saying I have with this whole 

thing is we did not have an intelligence integrity issue. We had 

communications, leadership, and training issues. That is exactly 

what the IG found in their 29 recommendations, and that is exactly 

what we are getting after. 

And part of our action plan, I have gone through it in depth, 

when you look at those 29 recommendations, you can put a training, a leadership, or a communications issue by every one of those 

recommendations. And so I acknowledge that, and we are getting 

after that, ma’am. 

Mr. WILEY. So if I may take the questions on DIA and commonality and standards, so intelligence community directive analytic standards do apply to combatant commands. That was reinforced recently by Under Secretary of Defense instruction in November that establishes that ICD standards do apply across the defense all-source analytic enterprise, so it is very clear that they do 

apply at the combatant commands. 

In terms of DIA’s role in all-source analysis in the enterprise, I 

think I would characterize it in that we are interested in consistency, integrity, and probity of the analytic process, rather than interested in the actual analytic outcome. So in other words, the analytic line taken by the elements within the enterprise are the responsibility of the elements within the enterprise, the combatant 

command, JIOC, service intelligence centers, the applicants within 

DIA. 

The process by which they arrive at that analysis needs to have 

integrity, and we get that through common standards, common 

practices, and common execution. So with USDI and the rest of the 

enterprise, what we are focusing on now is establishing that common understanding of what standards are, what tradecraft practices are, and what the institutions and mechanisms for doing that 

are. 

So we mentioned earlier the Defense Analytic Tradecraft Council, 

that is the principal vehicle to bring all 16 members of the defense 

intelligence enterprise together to discussion tradecraft standards, 

establish consistent tradecraft standards, and then communicate 

those tradecraft standards. We also use that as the vehicle for establishing the ombudsman of the product review process. 

Ms. CHENEY. Let me just ask, so is that a process that has just 

begun now as a result of what has happened and as a result of 

these reports, and was it the case that there wasn’t sort of a consistent set of standards previously? 
16 

Mr. WILEY. Yes. The Defense Analytic Tradecraft Council was revitalized. It was established some years back, but it had essentially 

lain dormant, so it was revitalized as a result of this situation, and 

we reestablished it to invigorate commonality and standards. And, 

again, that is what we recognized was necessary, was a vehicle to 

achieve greater consistency across the enterprise. 

Mr. GRIMES. I just want to add that perhaps the chapeau, if you 

will, of the USDI’s role in all of this, we develop policy, we conduct 

oversight, and we are advocates for defense analysis programs to 

include playing an integrator function across the defense intelligence enterprise. We have laid out four basic actions that we have 

taken already. 

First, the oversight and management of DOD all-source analysis 

in a DOD instruction. That applies to the entire defense intelligence enterprise and lays out the role of the functional manager 

for analysis, calls for a board of governors, a governance, if you 

will, structure for the defense intelligence enterprise. 

And we have three memos that the Under Secretary of Defense 

for Intelligence put out to the enterprise laying out six functional 

areas that are critical to defense analysis. 

And then finally, an all-source analysis certification program for 

certified analysts and how they can become certified across the enterprise. 

Ms. CHENEY. Thank you. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Thank you, Representative. And I am very encouraged by the testimony that we received today. 

You clearly have taken this report very seriously and taken a lot 

of positive steps that will benefit not only CENTCOM, but it 

sounds like across all the combatant commands. 

And so this committee is dedicated to making sure that our warfighter has the best intelligence possible and the most positive environment possible for those who are committing their lives to this 

very important mission. 

So we look forward to working with the inspector general as he 

continues to follow up with you in the months ahead, but keep up 

the great work. We appreciate what you are doing, and this hearing is now adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 5:02 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 
A P P E N D I X 

FEBRUARY 28, 2017 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

FEBRUARY 28, 2017 

(21) 

Opening Remarks of Chairwoman Vicky Hartzler 

Subcommittee on Oversight & Investigations Hearing 

Hearing on 

Department of Defense Inspector General Report "Investigation on 

Allegations Relating to USCENTCOM Intelligence Products" 

February 28, 2017 

Good afternoon and welcome. 

I am delighted to convene the first Oversight and Investigations 

subcommittee hearing for the one-hundred and fifteenth Congress. 

Before I tum to the topic oftoday's hearing and introduce our 

witnesses, I want to welcome our new Ranking Member and the others who 

are joining the subcommittee for the first time. 

In recent years, this subcommittee has been engaged in a wide variety 

of important national security topics. I am eager to work with all of you to 

ensure we continue to exercise our Constitutional responsibilities to help to 

oversee the Department of Defense. 

I am happy to have Mr. Moulton as the subcommittee's Ranking 

Member. I look forward to his important contributions to our work. 

I am also pleased that we are joined by Mr. Gaetz, Mr. Banks, Ms. 

Cheney, Mr. O'Halleran, and Mr. Suozzi. 

Welcome to the subcommittee. 

Our returning members are Mr. Conaway and Mr. Scott. It is great to 

have you with us again. I know we will continue to benefit from your keen 

insights. 

For today's hearing we are also joined by (or will be joined by) one or 

more committee members who are not members of this subcommittee. 

Welcome. 

For any members of the full committee who are not permanent members of 

the subcommittee who are, or will be attending, I ask unanimous consent that 

they be permitted to participate in this hearing with the understanding that all 

sitting subcommittee members will be recognized for questions prior to those 

not assigned to the subcommittee. 

Without objection, so ordered. 

Today's hearing topic is especially timely. 

Three weeks ago, the Department of Defense Inspector General 

released a report about allegations that leadership within U.S. Central 

Command improperly manipulated intelligence products that Jed to an 

inaccurate understanding of the U.S. campaign against ISIS. 

As a consequence, 30 professionals in the Inspector General's office 

undertook an inquiry into this matter. They conducted 152 interviews at 
22 

CENTCOM and reviewed thousands of pages of materials over the course of 

many months. 

Although the report did not find systematic or intentional distortion of 

intelligence or evidence of misconduct, the IG did conclude that CENTCOM 

intelligence products "could have, and should have been better." 

The report also found a very challenging command climate at 

CENTCOM and identified several process and procedural issues which the IG 

believed impeded the intelligence analysis process. 

The Inspector General proffered 29 specific recommendations for 

improvements, and discussed the need to implement corrective action. 

I look forward to hearing from our witnesses and learning about the 

changes that have been made in response to the report, and the progress we 

can expect. I look forward to discussing these issues with the two panels 

today. 

Before I introduce our first witness, I tum to the Oversight and 

Investigations Subcommittee Ranking Member for any opening remarks he 

would like to make. 
23 

Ranking Member Seth Moulton Remarks 

Hearing on Department of Defense Inspector General Report 

"Investigation on Allegations Relating to USCENTCOM Intelligence 

Products" 

February 28, 2017 

Thank you, Chairwoman Hartzler. This is my first hearing as Ranking 

Member of the Subcommittee, and I'd like to begin by saying I look forward 

to working with you and the other Members of this panel. I came to 

Washington promising to work across the aisle, and to make sure that we in 

Congress never flinch when it comes to asking the difficult questions about 

what it takes to ensure our national security. I believe we'll do an excellent 

job working together in that spirit and bipartisan tradition of this committee. 

I'd also like to recognize two new Democratic Members of the 

Oversight & Investigations Subcommittee-also new members of CongressTom O'Halleran of Arizona and Tom Suozzi of New York. I look forward to 

working with both of you. 

In the United States, our policymakers and service members rely on 

intelligence analysis to make critical strategic, operational, and tactical 

decisions every day-some life or death-so it is imperative that we have 

adequate safeguards in place to ensure they receive objective, empiricallybased reporting on which to ground their choices. 

For that reason, when allegations arose last year about manipulation of 

intelligence at the United States Central Command (CENTCOM), Congress 

encouraged the DOD Inspector General to conduct a thorough investigation 

and report back with recommendations. 

The Inspector General conducted an exhaustive investigation involving 

152 interviews of 120 witnesses, reviews of millions ofemails, 425,000 

documents, and 140 finished intelligence products. 

Its final report did not find evidence that intelligence was falsified or 

intentionally distorted, or that intelligence processes resulted in a false 

narrative or systematic distortion. 

However, the IG did find evidence of issues that are concerning to the 

committee. These include a poor command climate, low morale, and 

ineffective communication and guidance that produced a perception among 

analysts that the integrity of the process was questionable. These findings 

demonstrate how it is paramount that we ensure the climate at CENTCOM is 

improved and better safeguards are in place. 

My questions to you are: First, how have we remedied, and what 

additional actions must be taken to remedy, the institutional and command 

climate issues that led to these allegations? 
24 

Second, going forward, if there were an active attempt to manipulate 

intelligence analysis, do we have adequate protections in place to guard 

against intelligence manipulation? 

It doesn't take too much imagination to understand the danger of 

injecting bias-or worse-into the system. When we see officials at the 

highest levels of government visiting CIA headquarters and asking how 

intelligence professionals voted, thus threatening to politicize the process; or 

when we see requests that senior intelligence officials weigh in on 

intelligence matters in order to shape stories in the media for political 

purposes, it should cause serious concern. In other words, do we have 

adequate safeguards in place to protect the objective integrity of the 

intelligence process when an administration seeks to inject politics or comes 

calling for alternative facts? 

I look forward to your answers, and as Sherman Kent, the father of 

intelligence analysis, liked to say, "the truth shall set you free." 
25 

U.S. Department of Defense 

Statement of Glenn A. Fine 

Acting Inspector General 

Department of Defense 

on 

Testifying before the 

House Armed Services Committee 

Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations 

February 28, 2017 

For Release on Delivery, Expected at 3:30p.m. 
26 

1 

Good afternoon Madam Chairwoman Hartzler, Ranking Member Moulton, and Members 

of the Committee. 

Thank you for inviting me to appear before you today to discuss the investigation by the 

Department of Defense Office of Inspector General (DoD OIG) into allegations that senior 

officials at U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) falsified, distorted, delayed, or suppressed 

intelligence products related to its etlorts to degrade and destroy the Islamic State of Iraq and the 

Levant (ISIL) 1

• The allegations, in essence, were that the intelligence was altered or suppressed 

to present a more optimistic portrayal of the success ofUSCENTCOM's efforts against ISIL. 

These were very serious and troubling allegations, and we devoted significant resources 

to investigating them. We assembled a multi-disciplinary team of more than 30 DoD OIG 

employees, including administrative investigators, intelligence analysts, Defense Criminal 

Investigative Service (DC!S) digital forensics specialists, auditors, attorneys, and statisticians to 

investigate these allegations. This was one of the most extensive investigations in the DoD 

OIG's history. 

Our team conducted over 150 interviews of 120 witnesses, both inside and outside of 

USCENTCOM. In addition, we collected and reviewed a massive amount of draft and final 

intelligence products produced by USCENTCOM's Intelligence Directorate (the CCJ2). We 

also collected and reviewed USCENTCOM emails, and we examined in detail the specific 

examples of alleged falsification, distortion, suppression, or delay raised by the complainants and 

witnesses. 

We also interviewed intelligence officials in the DoD and the Intelligence Community for 

their assessments of USCENTCOM' s intelligence products. 

We did not stop there. We conducted a systematic analysis regarding the direction of 

edits that were made within the CCJ2 on counter-ISIL intelligence products. In this analysis, we 

reviewed a statistically random sample ofCCJ2 products, examining each individual edit 

between the initial and final versions of these products. We sought to detennine systematically 

whether there were any trends in the direction of those edits that made ISIL look less successful 

and the Iraqi Security Forces (!SF) more successful, as raised in the allegations. 

We also interviewed witnesses about the command climate in CCJ2, and we reviewed 

command climate surveys. 

Finally, we examined in detail the management processes for producing intelligence 

products in the CCJ2 to determine if there were deficiencies or weaknesses in need of 

improvement. 

Our full findings and conclusions are contained in a 542-page report of investigation 

classified at the SECRET level. We have provided that classified report to the relevant 

organizations in the DoD, as well as this committee and other congressional committees with 

1 The term "ISIL" is used in this statement as well as the DoD OIG report which was issued prior to the Feb. 13, 

2017 Memorandum from Secretary of Defense Mattis directing the use of the term ISIS instead of ISIL. 
27 

jurisdiction over the DoD or the Intelligence Community. In addition, we prepared a 190-page 

unclassified report of investigation, which we publicly released on February I, 20 I 7. 

2 

In short, our investigation did not substantiate the most serious allegation that intelligence 

was falsified. Similarly, we did not find systematic or intentional distortion of intelligence by 

USCENTCOM senior leaders, or that the leaders suppressed or delayed intelligence products. 

However, we did find a troubling and widespread perception among many intelligence 

analysts who worked on USCENTCOM Operation Inherent Resolve (OTR) intelligence products 

that CCJ2 leaders were attempting to distort those intelligence products. 

We also identified specific weaknesses and flaws in the CCJ2 management processes for 

creating intelligence products. We believe these deficiencies in the processes, such as ineffective 

communication and guidance, lack of adequate feedback, ambiguity and uncertainty about 

certain CCJ2 policies, and the ambiguous status of Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) analysts 

assigned to USCENTCOM, hindered the effectiveness and efficiency of the CCJ2 and affected 

the morale of the analytic workforce. 

We concluded that the intelligence practices related to OIR intelligence products in the 

CCJ2 could have, and should have, been better, and that further improvements can be made. We 

therefore made 28 recommendations for improvements in the intelligence processes that relate to 

the issues we investigated, which we believe will help address the issues that led to the 

allegations. We made one additional recommendation that senior leaders in the DoD review this 

report with regard to the overall performance of the individuals described in this report. 

In the following sections of this statement, I will summarize in more detail the 

methodology of our investigation and our findings. 

l. Summary of the allegations and the methodology of the investigation 

The DoD OIG initiated this investigation to address complaints that senior intelligence 

of1icials -- Major General (MG) Steven Grove, U.S. Army, Director of Intelligence (the J2), 

USCENTCOM; Mr. Gregory Ryckman, Senior Executive Service, Vice Director oflntelligence, 

USCENTCOM; and Mr. William E. "Buddy" Rizzio, Defense Intelligence Senior Leader, Joint 

Intelligence Center, USCENTCOM (JJCCENT)- allegedly falsified, distorted, suppressed, or 

delayed USCENTCOM intelligence products. 

Two complainants, whom we call Complainant I and Complainant 2 in our report, 

originally raised the allegations. In addition to their original allegations, we also considered 

other allegations and issues they and others raised during the course of our investigation. In 

general, the allegations related to USCENTCOM intelligence products and processes associated 

with the counter-!SIL campaign, from May 2014, when Mr. Ryckman arrived at USCENTCOM 

(MG Grove arrived shortly thereafter in June 2014), to the initiation of our investigation in 

September 2015. 

Specifically, the first complainant alleged in a letter dated May 28, 2015, to the DIA 

Inspector General, that CCJ2 senior intelligence leaders imposed a "false narrative" on analysts 

and analytic leaders that Iraqi forces, with U.S. help, were performing well on the battlefield, 

while ISIL was struggling. The complainant asserted that the senior leaders imposed this 
28 

3 

narrative through many changes, small and large, on a daily basis, the cumulative effect of which 

was creation of a false narrative. The complainant also alleged that the JICCENT, which is part 

of the CCJ2, was eventually reorganized to create a layer of managers willing to enforce the false 

narrative, "relieving senior leaders of the entire workload of falsifying intelligence, and more 

broadly socializing the unethical behavior." 

The second complainant also alleged that the top two CCJ2 senior intelligence oHicials 

MG Grove and Mr. Ryckman- routinely and intentionally re-wrote and suppressed intelligence 

products to conform with a "preconceived narrative," intentionally withheld information from 

the DIA, and engaged in "toot-dragging and delay tactics during coordination of DIA HQ's 

[Headquarters] intelligence products" in an effort to "undem1ine DIA's intelligence production." 

We interviewed the two complainants several times to clarify their allegations, to request 

documents and examples in support of the allegations, and to ask them tor the names of others 

who they believed had direct knowledge of the facts relating to their allegations. As a result of 

those interviews and our review of what was provided, in September 2015 we initiated a fullscale investigation of these allegations. 

At the outset of our investigation, we invited the Intelligence Community Inspector 

General (JCIG) to participate in our investigation, but that office declined. However, our 

investigative team met with ICIG officials, who reviewed and concurred with our methodology 

and investigative plan. 

To investigate the allegations raised by the complainants, as well as those raised by 

others, we took various steps, including; 

o interviewing 120 witnesses (some several times) regarding the allegations; 

o seeking documents and examples fi:om the witnesses regarding the allegations; 

o conducting detailed reviews of the specific examples that the witnesses raised; 

o obtaining, on our own, USCENTCOM intelligence products relating to the 

allegations that were produced during the period covered by our investigation; 

o interviewing witnesses outside ofUSCENTCOM regarding their assessment of 

the intelligence products; 

o conducting an analytical review of a statistical, random sample of intelligence 

products to detetmine whether the edits made presented a rosier picture of 

USCENTCOM's operations; 

o reviewing the command climate in CCJ2, to include reviewing surveys conducted 

of CCJ2 analysts; and 

o assessing the CCJ2 management processes related to the production and editing of 

intelligence products and whether there were deficiencies in the processes or areas 

that could be improved. 

In total, we collected over 15 terabytes of unclassified, secret, and top secret data from 

CCJ2, which represented over 17 million documents and files, approximately 2 million of 

which were emails. We used search terms and phrases to search the data and emails for 

evidence relevant to the allegations, and we identified more than 425,000 documents and Iiles 

for initial review. We reviewed all of those 425,000 documents and files, and we identified 

thousands of emails and documents for closer scrutiny and evaluation related to the allegations. 
29 

We incorporated relevant documents, em ails, and evidence specific to each allegation 

throughout our report. 

4 

We also examined in detail the specific examples of alleged falsification, distortion, 

suppression, or delay that were raised by the complainants and witnesses. Specific examples of 

the allegations raised by the complainants and witnesses, and which we discuss in the report, 

include the alleged banning of certain words in intelligence products, the changing of an 

intelligence product relating to the attack at the AI Asad Air Base in Iraq, a change to the Watch 

Condition (WATCHCON) level for Iraq during May and June of2014, changes in the ISIL 

Assessment Tool and the .12 Weekly update, and changes in the policy on coordination and 

collaboration with analysts from throughout the Intelligence Community. In addition, other 

allegations arose during the course of our investigation, which we investigated, such as whether 

USCENTCOM emails were deleted; whether CCJ2 employees or managers were urged to leave; 

whether the Director of National Intelligence, James R. Clapper, attempted to influence 

USCENTCOM intelligence products; and whether anyone in the CCJ2 attempted to intimidate 

witnesses in this investigation. 

In total, we investigated more than 25 specific allegations. Each required an 

investigation in and of itself We discuss each of those examples in separate sections of the 

report. 

In addition, we interviewed other officials in the DoD and the Intelligence Community 

regarding their views on USCENTCOM's intelligence products related to the counter-ISIL 

campaign. We believe an important factor to consider was whether other intelligence officials 

outside USCENTCOM, who often had access to similar information that formed the basis for 

CCJ2 intelligence products, believed those CCJ2 intelligence products were distorted. While 

those officials did not conduct a systemic comparison of the intelligence products, their 

perspective provides insight on whether USCENTCOM's intelligence products were markedly 

different in tone or outlook from other intelligence products their organizations produced on 

similar subjects. We therefore sought the view of those officials, who worked in the Office of 

the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), the DIA, the Joint Staff, and elsewhere. 

As noted above, we also conducted an analytical review of a random sample of 

USCENTCOM intelligence products. The overall purpose of this review was to dete1mine 

whether there were any significant changes related to edits of these products, and whether such 

changes indicated any trend or pattern of distortion with regard to the portrayal of lSlL and the 

!SF as stronger or weaker, as alleged by the complainants and some witnesses. To conduct this 

review, we examined a stratified random sample of 140 USCENTCOM tina! intelligence 

products related to the counter-ISIL efforts that the CCJ2 produced from May I, 2014, through 

September 30,2015. 

II. Findings of the investigation 

In sum, we did not substantiate the most serious allegation, which was that intelligence 

was falsified. Only a few witnesses described intelligence assessments as false, and they did not 

provide specific examples that supported the allegation. They did not point out, and we did not 

find, specific intelligence products that contained false untrue facts or analysis. We also did 

not find sufficient evidence to conclude that the CCJ2 or its leaders attempted to change 
30 

intelligence to make it factually untrue. Nor did we find that the senior leaders presented, or 

allowed to be presented, any intelligence assessments that they did not believe were accurate. 

5 

The more difficult matter to investigate was the allegation that CCJ2 intelligence was 

distorted- or skewed- to portray counter-JSIL operations in a rosier light, or to show that !SF 

was stronger and ISJL weaker than the intelligence warranted. We found much greater 

difference of testimony on this allegation. In our investigation we found a strong perception 

among many intelligence analysts who worked on USCENTCOM OIR intelligence products that 

CCJ2 leaders were attempting to distort the intelligence products, either through excessive 

editing, imposition of a narrative, requiring a higher burden of proof for "bad news," or 

demanding additional sourcing requirements if the intelligence indicated that JSJL was doing 

well or !SF was struggling. 

However, when we analyzed the full scope of the testimony, both by USCENTCOM 

analysts and leaders, and by other intelligence officials outside l..JSCENTCOM; reviewed the 

specific examples provided by the complainants and the witnesses regarding alleged distortion; 

searched over 17 million documents and files, including approximately 2 million emails for 

evidence of distortion; and conducted our own analytic assessment of a sample of intelligence 

products, we did not substantiate that CCJ2 leaders intended to distort intelligence products or 

that their changes to intelligence products resulted in a false narrative or systematic distortion of 

intelligence. Similarly, we did not find sufficient evidence to substantiate the allegations that 

CCJ2 leadership suppressed intelligence, or that they attempted to delay intelligence products for 

improper purposes. 

With regard to the specific examples of distortion to which the complainants and other 

witnesses pointed, we did not find that they demonstrated any systematic or intentional distortion 

of intelligence. 

For example, some witnesses stated that the editing process included the "banning of 

many words" that accurately described the intelligence. They alleged that certain terminology 

was used in order to convey a more positive narrative regarding the progress of the counter-ISIL 

campaign. Some witnesses told us that certain words would consistently be changed during the 

editing process to words that they believed "softened the tone" of poor performance by the !SF. 

However, other witnesses told us that words were not changed to soften the tone of poor 

performance by the !SF. They said that the CCJ2 senior intelligence leaders wanted to use 

terminology consistent with military doctrine to characterize the !SF's actions, that they wanted 

to avoid emotional language in intelligence products, and that they wanted to use terminology 

that the commander and operators understood. We found no written list of banned words. We 

also found that some of the allegedly banned words were included in final intelligence products. 

As another example of alleged distortion, one of the complainants pointed to the CCJ2 

leadership's decision not to change the WATCHCON level (a numerical system that categorizes 

intelligence concerns) in May 2014, as several analysts recommended, and that Mosul fell in 

June 2014 before the WATCHCON was eventually changed, after MG Grove's arrival. We do 

not believe that this provides evidence of an intent to distort intelligence or present a rosier 

intelligence picture. The decision not to change the W A TCHCON, but to continue to assess the 

environment, was a reasonable, good-faith decision by CCJ2 leadership at the time, and does not 
31 

6 

indicate any intent to present a rosier picture of the fight against ISIL. However, the CCJ2 

leadership's decision not to raise theW A TCHCON level when analysts recommended it be 

changed, but instead to raise it after the fall of Mosul, contributed to the early perception that the 

leadership did not trust the analysts and wanted to control the "narrative." 

Similarly, the allegation raised in the complaints that changes to the format of 

intelligence products were implemented to ensure that a narrative was imposed on the analysts 

also was not supported. When we interviewed the CCJ2 leaders, and others, about their reasons 

for the changes- such as the reason to reduce the size of the Intelligence Summary (INTSUM) 

and tum it into a more summarized, executive-level product- the decision seemed to be a 

reasonable management decision. However, while the change appeared to be reasonable, CCJ2 

leadership provided inadequate explanation and communication to the workforce about the 

rationale for the change, which contributed to the perception that the changes were being 

imposed to enforce a narrative that ISIL was weak and the ISF was strong. 

In addition, MG Grove changed how coordination and collaboration among analysts 

occurred, but we found that the change was not explained clearly. There is a distinction between 

collaboration (discussions among analysts on evidence and analysis), which was still permitted, 

and coordination (USCENTCOM's ofticial concurrence to another organization's intelligence 

product), which was restricted. In our view, it was not unreasonable for CCJ2 leadership to want 

to ensure that the official USCENTCOM position on intelligence products was reviewed by 

leadership. On the other hand, it would have been unreasonable and counter to effective 

intelligence practices to restrict collaboration between analysts. After our interviews, we found 

that CCJ2 leadership did not intend to restrict collaboration. However, CCJ2 leaders at various 

levels did not clearly articulate this policy change, either orally or in writing, which resulted in 

widespread confusion about whether collaboration was still permitted. 

We also did not find evidence that the JICCENT reorganizations were designed for any 

improper purpose. Rather, they were legitimate management decisions to address the crisis 

production and to improve the quality of the intelligence products. The changes did impose 

more oversight, review, and editing of CCJ2 intelligence products, which many analysts did not 

like. This was a change for the analysts, whose work in the past underwent less scrutiny and 

editing. Some witnesses told us that the editing and scrutiny was necessary and productive. 

Others thought it was unnecessary and did not improve the products. However, these changes 

appeared to be justifiable management actions, intended to improve products in a crisis 

environment. Once again, the rationale for these changes was not adequately communicated to 

the workforce. 

We discuss in detail in our classified repmt the results of our investigation of these and 

other allegations of falsification, distortion, or suppression. 

As noted above, we also conducted an analytical assessment of a random sample of 

USCENTCOM intelligence products. This assessment provided mixed results. For the 

individual edits, we did not find a statistically significant difference across the entire time period 

tor ISIL and !SF individual tone changes. However, in one time period, from October 2014 to 

January 2015, the raw numbers in the sample product review show a greater number of ISILweaker tone changes and fewer number of ISIL-stronger tone changes. We believe the greater 
32 

number of!SIL-weaker tone changes may have contributed to some analysts' perception of 

distortion. 

7 

With respect to the testimony of other intelligence officials regarding the USCENTCOM 

products, the testimony of those officials was also mixed. Some saw USCENTCOM's products 

as consistent with those from the Intelligence Community. Others thought that USCENTCOM's 

intelligence products were somewhat more optimistic than their products. None thought that 

USCENTCOM's products were inaccurate or unreasonable. Also, none of these witnesses 

asserted that they perceived a deliberate or systematic attempt by USCENTCOM to distort 

intelligence. 

Yet, while we did not find evidence to support a finding of systematic or intentional 

distortion of intelligence, we found it very troubling that so many USCENTCOM analysts 

believed their leaders distorted intelligence or imposed a narrative on their intelligence products. 

Almost half of the intelligence analysts that we interviewed in the JICCENT and who provided 

an opinion on this question believed that intelligence was being skewed in some way, either by 

imposing a narrative, requiring a higher burden ofproofifthe intelligence provided bad news, or 

requiring additional sourcing. These numbers were also consistent with the survey that the 

ODNI conducted in 2015. We believe that the widespread perception alone indicated a 

significant problem, which we found the CCJ2 leaders failed to adequately address in a timely 

way. 

Our investigation identified multiple causes for this widespread perception of distortion 

and the lack of trust in the CCJ2 leadership among analysts who worked on OIR products. First, 

the operational tempo of intelligence production was high, and stressful, even before MG Grove 

and Mr. Ryckman assumed their leadership positions in 2014. The pace was fast, the workload 

was unrelenting, and the diversity of important intelligence matters within USCENTCOM's area 

of responsibility was vast. As a result, workforce morale was low when MG Grove and 

Mr. Ryckman arrived. Soon thereafter, the pace increased as the crisis production began with the 

onset of the counter-ISIL campaign (OIR), and intelligence products were modified to create 

more tactically oriented products on an around-the-clock basis. 

Also contributing to the tension was the atypical requirement for the CCJ2 to report not 

simply on lSIL's operations, but also on the operations of friendly forces the !SF. The CCJ2's 

responsibility for reporting on the !SF often required the CCJ2 to make assessments that related 

to the success of the USCENTCOM commanders and troops who were training, advising, and 

assisting the !SF in the counter-ISIL campaign. Resolving the intelligence inputs and the inputs 

of operators on the ground was sensitive and at times led to friction with the operational 

commanders. This created a difticult dynamic when the operations side of USCENTCOM had 

divergent views from the intelligence analysts regarding what was happening on the ground. 

In addition, we found that MG Grove and Mr. Ryckman's management style differed 

significantly from prior CCJ2 senior intelligence leaders. MG Grove and Mr. Ryckman were 

much more involved in the product approval process, which was their prerogative. They often 

believed that the products were not well written, fully explained, adequately suppmted, or 

inclusive of all inputs, including the operators' perspectives. Their scrutiny created further 

distrust and friction with the analytic workforce and likely contributed to the perception of an 

imposed narrative. 
33 

8 

Coupled with these changes and differing requirements, we found a notable lack of 

communication from CCJ2 leaders at multiple levels explaining the changes, providing guidance 

on what they sought, giving feedback on the edits they were making, or communicating their 

expectations to the analytic workforce. We believe this failure was a significant cause of the 

analysts' belief in distortion, and a significant reason that allegations were made. 

Overall, we were struck by the inadequate efforts, especially during the first 6 months of 

the counter-IS II" campaign, and continuing until the allegations of distortion became public and 

the initiation of this investigation, by CCJ2 senior leaders to communicate with the workforce 

and to address the serious concerns among intelligence analysts about distortion of their 

products. 

As reflected in surveys and witnesses' testimony, the command climate deteriorated after 

MG Grove and Mr. Ryckman first arrived at the CCJ2. However, it is important to note that it 

has improved since the lowest point in 2014. MG Grove and Mr. Ryckman eventually took 

some positive steps to address command climate issues within the CCJ2, which resulted in 

improvements in the 2015 and 2016 survey results. Yet, we believe that additional 

improvements can be made in the CCJ2, and we provide specific recommendations regarding 

such steps. 

III. Recommendations resulting from investigation 

During our investigation, we identified various weaknesses and flaws in the process that 

we believe contributed to the allegations, as well as the widespread perception that CCJ2 senior 

intelligence leaders were distorting intelligence to present a more positive view of the success of 

the ISF and a more negative view of the success ofiSIL. We also believe these management 

deficiencies hindered the effectiveness and et1iciency of the CCJ2 and JICCENT, as well as the 

morale of the analytic workforce. 

Our review concluded that more effective communication and feedback throughout the 

organization, improved written policies and guidance, and better application of analytical 

tradecraft, such as Intelligence Community Directive (I CD) 203 's standard of incorporating 

analysis of alternatives, could have mitigated some of the conJlict and concern about CCJ2 and 

JICCENT intelligence products and analysis, as well as improved the intelligence production 

process. In our report, we discuss 29 recommendations in the following sections: 

1. Communication and Feedback, 

2. Organizational Change and Priorities, 

3. Inconsistency and Ambiguity in the Production and Analytical Review Process, 

4. Friendly force Assessment, and 

5. Balance of the Intelligence Effort. 

Some of the most important recommendations include that: 

• USCENTCOM improve feedback, communication, and guidance between CCJ2 

leaders and their workforce (Recommendations #I and #2); 
34 

• USCENTCOM update and maintain its JlCCENT standard operating procedures, 

including the employment of the Intelligence Fusion Center (Recommendation 

#5); 

• The relationship, reporting responsibilities, and intelligence requirements that 

apply to DIA analysts detailed to combatant commands should be clarified, in 

writing, so that DIA employees and their supervisors clearly understand their 

roles and responsibilities (Recommendation# 11 ); 

• CCJ2 and JICCENT leaders should provide clearer guidance and feedback to the 

analysts on how intelligence products are reviewed and considered above the 

JICCENT level. JICCENT should incorporate additional training to address any 

trends or systemic deficiencies identified in intelligence products 

(Recommendation # 16); 

• USD(l) supervise DIA's training and certification ofDIA analysts assigned to 

USCENTOM (Recommendation # 17); 

9 

• USCENTCOM intelligence leaders should avoid stating or implying any blanket 

policy that eliminates or reduces sources of intelligence, especially in crisis 

situations where there may be poor clarity and limited sources. (Recommendation 

#22); 

• CCJ2 leaders should require that intelligence analysis include analysis of 

alternatives. Consider requiring multiple courses of action, when feasible, to 

encourage comparison and evaluation of reports (Recommendation# 26). 

We also recommend that senior leaders in the responsible organization review this report 

with regard to the overall performance of the individuals described in this report. 

We believe that all29 recommendations are important, and that they provide a useful 

roadmap for improving intelligence processes, not only in USCENTCOM, but throughout other 

Combatant Commands and the DoD. We also note that many of our recommendations are 

consistent with what the U.S. House of Representatives Task Force found. 

We therefore urge the DoD, DIA, and USCENTCOM to take these recommendations 

seriously and to fully implement cotTective action in response to the recommendations, or to 

explain in detail why such corrective action is not necessary or warranted. We believe that such 

actions can further improve intelligence processes and reduce the risk that allegations such as the 

ones at issue in this report will arise in the future. 

Thank you for the opportunity to discuss our investigation with the Subcommittee. This 

concludes my statement and I would be glad to answer any questions you may have. 
35 

Glenn A. Fine 

Acting Inspector General 

U.S. Department of Defense 

On January 10, 2016, Glenn A. Fine became the Acting Inspector General for the U.S. 

Department of Defense. Mr. Fine was named as the Department of Defense Principal 

Deputy Inspector General on June 1, 2015. Prior to joining the Department of Defense 

Office of Inspector General, he was a partner at Dechert LLP in the White Collar and 

Securities Litigation Practice. 

Mr. Fine previously served as Inspector General of the Department of Justice (DOJ) from 

2000 to 2011. He also served as Special Counsel to the DOJ Inspector General and as 

Director of the Special Investigations and Review Unit (1995 to 2000). 

Mr. Fine earned a Bachelor of Arts degree in economics from Harvard College and his 

Juris Doctorate from Harvard Law School, graduating magna cum laude both times. He 

also obtained bachelor's and master's degrees from Oxford University where he was a 

Rhodes Scholar. 

While at Harvard, Mr. Fine served as co-captain of the Harvard varsity basketball team and 

was later a I Oth-round draft pick by the San Antonio Spurs. 
36 

Joint Statement for the Record 

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence 

Defense Intelligence Agency 

.Joint Staff Director for Intelligence 

U.S. Central Command Director for Intelligence 

HASC Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee 

Hearing on the Department of Defense Inspector General Report: "Investigation on 

Allegations Relating to USCENTCOM Intelligence Products" 

28 February 2017 

Chairwoman Hartzler, Ranking Member Moulton, and Members ofthe Committee, thank 

you for the invitation to offer the testimony of the Department of Defense (DoD) on the DoD 

Inspector General (!G) Report "Investigation Allegations Relating to USCENTCOM Intelligence 

Products." The Department appreciates the extensive DoD JG report, and we are integrating its 

recommendations into our continuous efforts to improve intelligence analysis across tbe Defense 

Intelligence Enterprise. 

It's great to be here with Neil Wiley, Director for Analysis, Defense Intelligence Agency. 

Mr. Wiley serves as the Functional Manager for DoD All-Source Analysis on behalf of the DIA 

Director. Also with me are the Joint Staff Director for Intelligence, Maj Gen James Marrs, who 

serves as a focal point for intelligence activities at the Combatant Commands; and the 

USCENTCOM J-2 MG Mark Quantock, who leads USCENTCOM's analytic workforce. 

As senior leaders for defense intelligence, we hold ourselves to the highest standards, and 

take great pride in the exceptional intelligence professionals who support the full spectrum of 

DoD intelligence customers, from the President to the Soldier in the field. Every day, thousands 

of defense intelligence professionals across the globe tirelessly work to provide insight and 
37 

analysis without politicization. Our commitment is, and always will be, to provide unvarnished 

intelligence and key assessments into the myriad of issues facing our country each day. 

The Department has already taken a number of policy, governance, and oversight steps 

over the past several years to create a stronger foundation for objective, high quality defense 

intelligence analysis. While these steps were initiated without specific reference to the IG 

investigation at USCENTCOM, and some predate that investigation, our actions align with many 

of the IG's recommendations. 

• Analytic quality and objectivity arc priorities for the Department. In a May 2016 memo 

to Defense Intelligence components, the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence 

(USD(I)) stated that improvements in tradecraft and adherence to analytic integrity 

standards were key to strengthening defense intelligence analysis. 

• The lJSD(I) also sponsored the tirst ever Analytic Objectivity Symposium in September 

2016 bringing together diverse communities responsible for producing objective, 

defensible, and useful analysis in finance and accounting, medical and academic research, 

law enforcement, and intelligence. The expert speakers at the symposium agreed that a 

combination of analyst training, clear tradecraft standards, application of structured 

analytic techniques, and supervisory and oversight measures can reduce the incidence of 

bias and politicization in analysis and yield high quality analytic products. The Office of 

the USD(I) has made the symposium proceedings widely available and will follow up 

with additional public events to provide DoD intelligence analysts access to a wide range 

of resources and ideas. 

• In November 2016, the USD(l) signed a new policy titled "Management and Oversight of 

DoD All-Source Analysis," that provides for the first time a framework for DoD 
38 

intelligence analysis. This policy extends Intelligence Community analytic standards to 

all DoD intelligence analytic organizations, including those within the Combatant 

Commands. The policy establishes training, education, and certification programs for 

defense intelligence all-source analysis; these programs are keystones for improving 

analytic tradecraft and helping to ensure analysis is objective. 

• Further, the policy institutionalizes the role of a Functional Manager for DoD All-Source 

Analysis (FMIA) and assigns that role to the Director ofDIA. Overall, the FMIA, in 

collaboration with the USD(l) and DoD intelligence analytic organizations, will promote 

an analytic environment of data sharing and trust. 

• The FM/A plays a significant role in DoD training and certification programs two key 

areas that help ensure that analysis is free from bias. Accordingly, DIA has developed a 

Professional Analyst Career Education (PACE) program to train DIA analysts and 

managers of analysts, whether they serve at DIA headquarters or a combatant command, 

to a consistent tradecraft standard, including analytic objectivity. DIA also offers the 

Defense Intelligence Enterprise numerous courses on providing manager feedback to 

analysts. DlA is also managing the Certified All-Source Analyst (CDASA) progratn, a 

three-tiered credentialing program that recognizes DoD personnel who have 

demonstrated, through experience and analytic knowledge, a level of competence 

consistent with the baseline of the analytic profession. More than 600 DoD analysts ftom 

DlA, Combatant Commands, and Services have achieved the CDASA Tier I 

certification. An exatn for Tier 2 certification is being developed for mid-level analysts, 

and the Tier 3 certification is in planning for advanced analysts. CDASA 

professionalizes, unifies, and integrates defense intelligence all-source analysis by 
39 

validating individuals who consistently meet and sustain common standards for 

competency in knowledge, skills, and practice. 

• The FM/ A and OUSD(I) jointly chair the Defense Analytic Tradecraft Council (DA TC), 

which serves as a forum for advancing analytic integrity and tradecraft standards across 

the Department. The DA TC has already provided guidance and best practices for DoD 

intelligence analytic organizations to establish both an analytic ombudsman program--

with the goal of developing a corps of senior analytic personnel to serve as analytic 

ombudsmen equipped to monitor and react confidentially and appropriately to any real or 

perceived instance of analytic manipulation-and a periodic analytic product review 

program, which evaluates finished analytic products based on Intelligence Community 

analytic tradecraft standards. 

• OUSD(l) has been working closely with ODNI to elevate ODNI's annual Analytic 

Objectivity and Process Survey more broadly throughout the Defense Intelligence 

Enterprise. OUSD(I) has encouraged Combatant Commands, in particular, to have their 

analysts respond to ensure we are collecting the most comprehensive data possible on 

current perceptions and concerns related to analytic objectivity. 

• Finally, OUSD(I) is developing an analytic oversight program that will include site visits 

to the Combatant Commands, Service Intelligence Centers, counterintelligence analytic 

components, and combat support agencies to gauge the health of the defense intelligence 

analytic community. The assessment criteria are drawn from the new DoD all-source 

analysis policy and from OUSD(I) emphasis areas articulated in the May 2016 memo to 

the DoD intelligence analytic organizations to maximize the effectiveness and efficiency 

of defense analytic operations while implementing rigorous risk management processes. 
40 

• USCENTCOM has developed and is executing an aggressive action plan to make 

improvements and address the recommendations from the DoD IG and the Joint Task 

Force. 

The Department's actions have already established a finn foundation for DoD 

intelligence analysis. We look forward to continuing along this path to ensure that DoD analysis 

meets the highest standards of quality and objectivity. 
41 

Jacques T. Grimes 

Director, Defense Analysis and Partner Engagement 

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence 

Mr. Grimes assumed duties as USD(I)'s Director for Defense Analysis and Partner 

Engagement (DAPE) on January 4, 2016. He provides direction and oversight of the 

department's Intelligence Analysis Enterprise and its US Government and international 

partnerships. The scope of his duties include working with other OSD and Intelligence 

Community (lC) offices, the Combat Support Agencies, the Military Services, Combatant 

Commands, Allied governments and the Notih Atlantic Treaty Organization to enhance 

military intelligence sharing and to make the Intelligence Analysis Enterprise as effective 

as possible. 

Mr. Grimes previously served as USD(I)'s Director for HUMlNT and Sensitive Activities 

where he developed and oversaw policy, advocated for and enabled Defense HUMIN I & 

Sensitive Activities while advising the USD(I) on l-IUMINT, Cover and National sensitive 

programs. Prior to that, he served as the Deputy Director, Defense Combating Terrorism 

Center (DCTC), Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). DCTC is a joint, cross- functional 

Department of Defense (DoD) CT organization, focused on te1Torism-related warning, 

support to collection and military operations, and decision-making. As Chief, Oftice of 

Operations Integration (DXI), Defense Cl & HUMINT Center, Mr. Grimes integrated, 

synchronized and deconflicted DoD counterintelligence and l-IUMINT. He was appointed 

Assistant Deputy Director for National Intelligence for l-IUMINT in the Office of the 

Director ofNationallntelligence (ODNI) where he worked closely with the National 

HUMINT Manager, NCS, and USD(l) to identify and exploit opportunities for integration, 

meaningful end-to-end performance measurements ofHUMINT outcomes, and to realign 

resources to boost overall strength and efficiencies of the National HUMINT Enterprise. 

Mr. Grimes also served as the Chief: Oftice ofHUMlNT Campaigns and HUMJNT 

Targeting in the Directorate for Human Intelligence at DJA . 

A dependent of a Foreign Service Officer, Mr. Grimes began his federal service in 1981 as 

a foreign Export Controls Coordinator with the Office of Strategic Trade ControlsCOCOM, U.S. Mission to the Office of Economic Coordination and Development. He 

joined the U.S. Army's Military Intelligence Excepted Career Program in 1986 and was 

assigned as an Intelligence Officer in controlled HUMINT collection in Frankfurt, 

Germany, and later as Senior Intelligence Officer in Karlsruhe, Germany. Mr. Grimes 

returned to CONUS in 1992 where he served in various positions of increasing 

responsibility within DJA's Directorate tor Human Intelligence, to include deployments to 

the Balkans in support of a Special Access Program during Operation JOINT 

ENDEAVOR and to the Iraq Survey Group, Baghdad, serving as Chief of Operations and 

Analysis in support of the DCI's Special Advisor on Weapons of Mass Destruction. Mr. 

Grimes has worked and resided in various overseas posts including Panama, Scotland, 

Malta, Trinidad, Tobago, France, Belgium, Zaire, Tunisia, Denmark, and BosniaHerzegovina. 

A graduate of St. John's University, Mr. Grimes holds a B.A. in Political Science and 

Linguistics. He studied Romance Languages and Linguistics as a graduate student at 

Columbia University, New York, and speaks Huent French and German, limited Arabic, 

Spanish and Italian. Mr. Grimes is also a graduate of the Military Operations Training 

Course, the Military Operations Seminar, Harvard University's JFK School of 

Government, and a myriad of management training courses within the lC. 
42 

Mr. Grimes is the recipient of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Meritorious 

Civilian Service Award, the Director DIA Intelligence Award, the National Intelligence 

Superior Service Medal, the Ellis Award for Excellence in HUMJNT Collaboration, and 

the Presidential Rank Award. 

I Ie is married with four children and resides in Northern Virginia. 

January 2017 
43 

Neil R. Wiley 

Director for Analysis 

Defense Intelligence Agency 

Mr. Neil Wiley has over 30 years of experience in the national security arena both as a 

naval officer and as a civilian intelligence professional. He was appointed Director for 

Analysis (DI) in August 2015 and leads DIA' s all-source analytic effort across the 

regional, functional and S&TI portfolios, producing Defense Intelligence in support of 

policymakers, military planners and warfighters, and defense acquisition. As Dl, he also 

serves as Functional Manager for all-source analysis for the Defense Intelligence 

Enterprise, responsible for the alignment, quality, and integrity of the analytic output of 

DIA, the service intelligence centers, and the combatant commands. Mr. Wiley also serves 

as the Analysis Career Field (ACF) Manager responsible for overseeing the career 

development of DLA intelligence analysts. 

Prior to his current posting, Mr. Wiley served as the Principal Deputy Director for 

Analysis. He has also served as Chief of DlA's Technology and Long-Range Analysis 

Office, responsible for analysis of emerging defense technologies and forecasting future 

global trajectories and long-term adversary force structures and military capabilities in 

support of Defense Department acquisition and force shaping. He also served as Chief, 

DIA Military Forces Analysis Office, responsible for producing and maintaining 

foundational military order of battle on behalf of the Defense Intelligence Enterprise in 

support ofwarfighters, planners and policymakers, and as Defense Intelligence Integration 

Officer (DIIO) for Military Issues. Prior to that, Mr. Wiley served at the United States 

European Command's Joint Analysis Center from 2003 through 2012 in various capacities 

including Maritime Intelligence Branch Chief, Warfare Support Division Chief, Deputy 

Senior Defense Intelligence Analyst and Deputy Director of Intelligence. 

Mr. Wiley served in the United States Navy from 1983 through 2003, initially as a Surface 

Line Officer and, latterly, as an Intelligence Officer. During his naval career, Mr. Wiley 

served operational tours in USS BRISCOE (DO 977), USS THEODORE ROOSEVELT 

(CVN 71) and USS AMERICA (CV 66). Additionally, he served as a tactics instructor, 

Senior Intelligence Officer for a National Emergency Airborne Command Post (NEACP) 

Operations Team, and Operations Officer for the USEUCOM Joint Analysis Center. Mr. 

Wiley's last assignment in uniform was as US Liaison Officer to the United Kingdom's 

Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) from 2000 through 2003. 

Awards and honors include a number of military awards and decorations, the DIA 

Exceptional Civilian Service Medal and creation as an Honorary Officer of the Most 

Excellent Order of the British Empire (OBE) for service as US Liaison Officer to PJHQ. 

Born and raised in Baltimore, Maryland, Mr. Wiley attended the University of Maryland, 

where he earned degrees in Biological Sciences and Ancient History and Classical 

Languages. Mr. Wiley is married to the former Alison Michelli, a writer. They reside in 

Charlottesville, Virginia with their son and a black Labrador named Hannibal. 

February 2017 
44 

Major General James Marrs 

Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff, J-2 

Major General James R. Marrs is the Director for Intelligence, Joint Stall the Pentagon, 

Washington, D.C. He serves as the principal intelligence adviser to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs 

of Staff, and is responsible for all aspects of the management and execution of the Joint Staff's 

intelligence support to the Chainnan and the Secretary of Defense. He leads a team of 

professionals providing current and crisis intelligence, warning, and intelligence insights and 

advice to operations, policy and plans, and acquisition. 

Major General Marrs was commissioned in 1987 as a distinguished honors graduate of the U.S. 

Air Force Academy. His career includes a variety of duties spanning operations, strategy, 

policy, and plans. His deployments include participation in operations Desert Shield, Desert 

Storm, Southern Watch, and Enduring Freedom, and he has commanded at the squadron, 

group, center, and wing levels. 

Major General Marrs is a graduate of the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard 

University and the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies. He also served as a special 

adviser to the Vice President ofthe United States, where he provided advice and expe1iise on a 

range of national security issues. Prior to his current assignment, General Marrs served as the 

Director for Intelligence, U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) at Fort George G. Meade, 

Maryland. 

EDUCATION 

1987 Bachelor of Science, [ntemational Affairs, U.S. Air Force Academy, Colorado Springs, Colo. 

1989 Master oF Public Policy, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 

Cambridge, Mass. 

1993 Squadron Officer School, Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala. 

1998 Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB, Ala. 

1999 Master of Airpower Art and Science, School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, Maxwell AFB, 

Ala. 2003 Senior Service School, National Defense Fellow, Institute tor Defense Analyses, Alexandria, 

Va. 2006 National Security Management Course, Maxwell School, Syracuse University, Syracuse, N.Y. 

2007 Executive Leadership Seminar, Kenan-Flagler Business School, University of North Carolina at 

Chapel Hill 

2009 Joint Forces Staff College, Norfolk, Va. 

2010 Senior Executive Fellows Program, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 

Cambridge, Mass. 

2014 Senior Joint Information Operations Applications Course, Maxwell AFB, Ala. 

ASSIGNMENTS 

L June 1987- July 1989, Student, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass. 

2. July 1989-January 1990, Student, Intelligence Officer Technical Training, Goodfellow AFB, Tex. 

3. January 1990- November 1992, Intelligence Requirements Officer, Air Force Electronic Warfare 

Center, Kelly AFB, Tex. 

4. November 1992- May 1993, Chief: Center C41 Systems, Air Force Electronic Warfare Center, Kelly 

AFB, Tex. 

5. May 1993- August 1993, Chief, Command and Control Warfare Tactical Analysis Branch, Air 

Force Electronic Warfare Center, Kelly AFB, Tex. 

6. August 1993 March 1994, Command Staff Analyst, Commander's Action Group, Headquarters Air 

Intelligence Agency, Kelly AFB, Tex. th 

7. March 1994-August 1997, Operations Officer, l8lntelligence Squadron, Schriever AFB, Colo. 

8. August 1997 July 1998, Student, Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB, Ala. 

9. July 1998-June 1999, Student, School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, Maxwell AFB, Ala. 
45 

10. June 1999 August2000, Chief, Air and Space Strategy Branch, Directorate of Strategic Planning, 

Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Programs, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C. 

11. August 2000 February 2001, Chief, Information Operations, and Speechwriter for the Vice Chief 

of Staff of the Air Force, Chief of Staff of the Air Force Operations Group, Headquarters U.S. Air 

Force, Washington, D.C. th 

12. February 2001 -June 200 I, Director of Operations, 70 Intelligence Wing, Fort George G. Meade, 

Md. 

13. June 2001- August 2002, Commander, 9lst Intelligence Squadron, Fort George G. Meade, Md. 

14. August 2002- April2003, National Defense Fellow, Institute for Defense Analyses, Alexandria, 

Va. 

15. April2003- June 2005, Special Adviser to the Vice President, National Security Affairs, the White 

House, Washington, D.C. 

16. July 2005- June 2007, Commander, National Security Agency/Central Security Service Texas, and 

543rd Intelligence Group, Lackland AFB, Tex. 

17. June 2007- April 2009, Commander, 480th Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Wing, 

Langley AFB, Va. 

18. April 2009- June 2009, Student, Joint Forces Staff College, Norfolk, Va. 

19. June 2009- July 2010, Senior Air Force Planner and Chief, Joint Chiefs of Staff and National 

Security Council Matters Division, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C. 

20. July 2010- July 2011, Senior Military Assistant, Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, 

Washington, D.C. 

21. August 2011 July 2012, Deputy to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Headquarters 

International Security Assistance Force, Kabul, Afghanistan and Deputy Director of Intelligence, 

United States Forces-Afghanistan 

22. July 2012 February 2014, Vice Director for Intelligence, Joint Chiefs ofStaffJ2 and Director, 

Afghanistan-Pakistan Task Force (APTF), the Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 

23. March 2014 -June 2015, Director ofintelligence, U.S. Cyber Command, Fort George G. Meade, 

Md. 

24. June 2015 -present, Director for Intelligence, Joint Chiefs of Staff J2, the Pentagon, Washington, 

D.C. 

SUMMARY OF JOINT ASSIGNMENTS 

I. April 2003 -June 2005, Special Adviser to the Vice President, National Security Affairs, the White 

House, Washington, D.C., as a Lieutenant Colonel and Colonel 

2. June 2009- July 20 I 0, Senior Air Force Planner and Chief, Joint Chiefs of Staff and National 

Security Council Matters Division, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C., as a Colonel 

3. July 20 I 0-July 20 II, Senior Military Assistant, Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, 

Washington, D.C., as a Colonel and Brigadier General 

4. August 20 II -July 2012, Deputy to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Headquarters 

International Security Assistance Force, Kabul, Afghanistan and Deputy Director for Intelligence, 

United States Forces-Afghanistan, as a Brigadier General 

5. July 2012 February 2014, Vice Director for Intelligence, Joint Chiefs ofStaffJ2 and Director, 

Afghanistan-Pakistan Task Force (APTF), the Pentagon, Washington, D.C., as a Brigadier General 

6. March 2014- June 2015, Director oflntelligence, U.S. Cyber Command, Fort George G. Meade, 

Md., as a Brigadier General and Major General 

7. June 2015- present, Director for Intelligence, Joint Chiefs of Staff J2, the Pentagon, Washington, 

D.C. 

MAJOR AWARDS AND DECORATIONS 

Defense Superior Service Medal with four oak leaf clusters Legion of Merit 

Meritorious Service Medal with three oak leaf clusters 

Air Force Commendation Medal 

Air Force Achievement Medal 
46 

EFFECTIVE DATES OF PROMOTION 

Second Lieutenant- May 27, 1987 

First Lieutenant- May 27, 1989 

Captain-May27, 1991 

Major Sept. I, 1997 

Lieutenant Colonel- May I, 2000 

Colonel- Aug. I, 2004 

Brigadier General- Apr. !, 2011 

Major General- Aug. 2, 2014 

July 2015 
47 

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