Inspection Report 

Work Order Estimate and Cost Issues for 

Site Support Services at Los Alamos 

National Laboratory 

DOE/IG-0780 October 2007 

U.S. Department of Energy 

Office of Inspector General 

Office of Inspections and Special Inquiries 



WORK ORDER ESTIMATE AND COST ISSUES FOR SITE 

SUPPORT SERVICES AT LOS ALAMOS NATIONAL 

LABORATORY 

 

TABLE OF 

CONTENTS 

OVERVIEW

Introduction and Objectives 1 

Observations and Conclusions 2 

DETAILS OF FINDINGS 

Estimated Cost 4 

Labor and Material Charges 5 

Internal Controls 7 

Performance Evaluations 8 

Performance Measures and Award Fee 9 

RECOMMENDATIONS 11 

MANAGEMENT COMMENTS 11 

INSPECTOR COMMENTS 12 

APPENDICES

A. Scope and Methodology 13 

B. Management Comments 14 
Overview 

 

Page 1 Work Order Estimate and Cost 

 Issues for Site Support Services at 

Los Alamos National Laboratory 

INTRODUCTION The Department of Energy’s (DOE’s) Los Alamos National 

AND OBJECTIVES Laboratory (LANL) is one of the largest multidisciplinary science 

institutions in the world. LANL enhances global security by 

ensuring the safety and reliability of the U.S. nuclear weapons 

stockpile; developing technical solutions to reduce the threat of 

weapons of mass destruction; and solving problems related to 

energy, environment, infrastructure, health, and national security. 

LANL is managed for the Department’s National Nuclear Security 

Administration by Los Alamos National Security, LLC, which 

assumed full contract responsibilities on June 1, 2006. 

Since February 2003, site support services at LANL, including 

maintenance and repairs, have been provided by KSL Services Joint 

Venture (KSL), which was formed by Kellogg Brown and Root Inc., 

Shaw Infrastructure Inc., and Los Alamos Technical Associates Inc. 

KSL continues to provide these services under the new management 

contract. The total estimated contract value over 5 years is 

$785,457,000. This is a cost-plus-award-fee contract that provides an 

incentive, in the form of an available award fee, to encourage and 

reward improved performance and increased efficiency in the 

achievement of the contract objectives. KSL’s performance is 

evaluated semi-annually against performance objectives, 

expectations, and associated weighting factors. 

The contract states that KSL is to “achieve high levels of compliance 

with industry standards and Laboratory and DOE requirements in the 

performance of work.” It also requires KSL to exercise discipline and 

rigor in corrective and preventive maintenance to ensure the scope of 

work is clear, that pertinent project data is current and available, and 

that appropriate levels of project controls and management are 

provided for the delivery of work on schedule and within budget. In 

addition, KSL is to provide cost estimating accuracy that is consistent 

with acceptable, recognized industry standards. 

Funds are obligated to the contract through work orders issued to 

KSL. The work orders can have multiple tasks and become part of 

a work package that is assembled for each work activity. The 

work package is a compilation of all documents required to define 

the work, identify and analyze hazards, develop and implement 

controls, perform the work, and ensure performance. Work orders 

are entered into LANL’s work control system, PassPort, which is 

the institutional computerized maintenance management system 

tool that is used to manage all support services subcontractor work. 
 

Page 2 Observations and Conclusions 

The Office of Inspector General received multiple complaints 

alleging irregularities by KSL in cost estimating and charging of work 

orders. It was alleged that actual costs frequently exceeded estimated 

costs and that KSL often mischarged labor and materials. As a result, 

we initiated an inspection to: (1) evaluate the extent to which KSL 

costs exceeded work order estimates; and (2) determine whether labor 

and materials were being inappropriately charged to work orders. 

OBSERVATIONS AND Our work substantiated the allegations. The review of 94,561 

CONCLUSIONS estimates of work order tasks from January 2005 through April 2007 

revealed a systemic problem in that KSL actual costs frequently 

exceeded estimates, often by significant amounts. This can 

negatively impact the ability of KSL and LANL facility personnel to 

effectively manage the cost of work performed and the allocation of 

labor and material charges. Specifically, we found that: 

• Inconsistent with applicable performance standards, from 

January 2005 through April 2007 actual cost exceeded 

estimated cost for work order tasks by more than 20 percent in 

71,025 out of 94,561 cases, or 75 percent of the time. In the 

most extreme cases, estimates of $.01 were being input to 

PassPort, apparently as “place holders.” This resulted in actual 

costs that grossly exceeded estimates. In one such case, the 

actual cost was $101,978.08. 

In addition, we found problems with labor and material charges by 

KSL. Many LANL officials told us of instances where KSL had 

charged LANL work orders with labor and materials that were 

questionable, inappropriate, excessive, or unsupported based on 

their knowledge of the work performed. We found specific 

examples to support these claims, such as: 

• Charges of $10,191 for more than twice the amount of 

electrical wire needed for the work performed; 

• A work order for cement masons to repair concrete steps where 

a nuclear safety engineer charged 35 hours after the work was 

completed. The engineer’s labor charges of $4,900 were 

almost 11⁄2 times the total labor estimate of $3,444 and more 

than tripled what had been, up to that time, a job cost of 

$2,115.60; and, 

• Five work orders for fire alarm communication upgrades where 

employees charged time even though they did not work on the 

projects. These labor charges totaled approximately $9,780. 
 

Page 3 Observations and Conclusions 

We also found internal control weaknesses associated with PassPort, 

which may have contributed to problems with work order charges 

and costs. For example, PassPort allowed unapproved charges to be 

applied against work orders without the knowledge of LANL facility 

personnel. These were in the form of “Other Costs” charges, which 

we were told were originally intended to allow KSL to recover 

certain unanticipated costs up to $20,000 per year. However, these 

“Other Costs” reached nearly $41 million in 2006 and were already 

over $14 million by the end of May 2007. Also, PassPort did not 

have adequate controls to help ensure the quality of an estimate prior 

to activation of a work order, e.g., an estimate could be $0.01. 

Further, financial limits or monetary ranges were not established in 

PassPort to control work order charges or alert LANL facility 

personnel to problems such as actual costs exceeding estimates. 

We observed that various issues concerning KSL estimates and work 

order costs had been raised previously during LANL reviews of KSL 

performance. These performance evaluations identified widespread 

and systemic failures in the fidelity of KSL’s financial management 

and controls, including labor charges. In addition, these evaluations 

found that cost performance was not always accurately portrayed. 

We also examined (1) the measurements used to assess KSL’s 

performance with respect to work order cost estimates and labor and 

material charges and (2) KSL’s award fee. We believe LANL could 

do more to define the standards against which KSL’s performance is 

being judged and the resultant impact performance will have on KSL’s 

award fee. We determined that, prior to the performance period 

October 1, 2006, to June 30, 2007, KSL’s cost estimating performance 

was combined with other performance elements. For the period 

beginning October 1, 2006, the quality of KSL’s estimates was made a 

separate performance element. We could not identify any performance 

measure specifically addressing the appropriateness, accuracy, and 

support for labor and materials charged to work orders. We reviewed 

the award fees that KSL has earned since April 2003 and determined 

that KSL has never earned the entire available award fee. For 

example, for the period October 1, 2005, through March 31, 2006, 

KSL received $2,815,886 out of an available pool of $3,027,834. 

However, it was unclear what direct impact KSL’s performance issues 

in the areas of estimating and work order charges have had on the 

award fee determinations. 
Details of Findings 

 

Page 4 Details of Findings 

ESTIMATED COST Our review of 94,561 estimates of work order tasks from 

January 2005 through April 2007 revealed a systemic problem 

where actual costs frequently exceeded estimates, often by 

significant amounts. This can negatively impact the ability of KSL 

and LANL facility personnel to effectively manage the cost of 

work performed and the allocation of labor and material charges. 

KSL’s original Performance Evaluation Plan dated January 8, 2003, 

under “Maintenance and Operations” and “Engineering and 

Construction,” required KSL to “Provide estimating accuracy that is 

consistent with acceptable, recognized industry standards for 

productivity and deliver projects within 10% of the estimated cost.” 

Since January 2003, the Performance Evaluation Plan has been 

modified several times, with the performance measures for the 

accuracy of estimates evolving from the standard of delivering projects 

within 10 percent of the estimated cost to a less stringent standard of 

completing work order tasks within 20 percent of the estimated cost. 

For the projects we reviewed, we found that actual costs exceed the 

estimates of work order tasks by more than 20 percent in 71,025 

out of 94,561 cases, or 75 percent of the time. As noted, in some 

cases, estimates of $.01 were being input to PassPort, apparently as 

“place holders,” resulting in actual costs that grossly exceeded 

estimates. For example, in one such case, the actual cost was 

$101,978.08. For each year in our sample (2005, 2006, and 

through April 2007), the percentages of actual costs exceeding 

estimates remained fairly constant. 

The Laboratory has 10 Facility Operations Directors (FODs) who 

regularly interface with KSL during the performance of 

maintenance and repair activities in their facilities. Eight of the 10 

FODs expressed concerns to us about KSL estimates, making 

statements such as: “estimates are overrun a fair amount of the 

time” or “estimates are overrun consistently.” 

In 2005, “Key Performance Indicators” were developed for cost 

compliance associated with “Preventative Maintenance,” “Small 

Jobs,” and “Projects.” A specific color coded system was used to 

evaluate KSL’s performance, with “green” being used to show 

passing, “yellow” to show need for improvement, and “red” to 

show failure. For example, under “Preventative Maintenance” 

tasks, KSL could achieve a “green” rating if the actual cost came 

within +/- 20 percent of the estimate more than 40 percent of the 

time, a “yellow” rating if the actual cost came within +/- 20 

percent of the estimate from 30 through 40 percent of the time, and 
 

Page 5 Details of Findings 

a “red” rating if the actual cost came within +/- 20 percent of the 

estimate less than 30 percent of the time. Higher percentages were 

established for “Small Jobs,” and “Projects.” When we asked 

LANL officials why the standard for passing was set so low, we 

were told that KSL estimates had been such a problem that “we 

needed to start somewhere.” In fact, the evaluation comments 

under both “Small Jobs” and “Projects” stated that LANL “May 

re-evaluate scoring criteria to ‘raise the bar’ once systemic 

improvements have been made to improve process and 

estimating.” KSL scored “red” 90 percent of time for the 

11-month period from November 2004 to September 2005 for 

“Preventative Maintenance,” “Small Jobs,” and “Projects.” In 

addition, KSL scored “red” 74 percent of the time when its 

performance was measured at each of the nine Facility 

Management Units in effect at that time. 

Effective December 1, 2006, LANL issued a new administrative 

procedure for KSL work performance that identifies new controls to 

address estimates and cost overruns. The procedure states that for 

all work valued at greater than $10,000, when tasks reach 85 

percent of the cost estimate, KSL is to calculate the projected “final 

cost.” If the projected cost is less than 120 percent of the estimate, 

then work continues, but if the projected final cost exceeds 120 

percent of the estimate, then KSL is to cease work and develop a 

formal revised cost estimate. This revised estimate is to be 

approved by the LANL maintenance manager, and the originator is 

to be notified of the new costs. We were told, however, that as of 

May 1, 2007, the new procedure had not been widely implemented. 

LABOR AND MATERIAL We found problems with labor and material charges by KSL. 

CHARGES A number of LANL officials, including several FODs, told us of 

cases where KSL had charged their work orders with labor and 

materials that were questionable, inappropriate, excessive, or 

unsupported based on their knowledge of the work performed. For 

example, we were told of inappropriate charges that were the result 

of timekeeping errors, work orders being charged by people who 

did not work on them, unapproved overtime charges, and charges 

to closed work orders. One LANL facility official indicated that 

when KSL workers have no work to do, they are being subsidized, 

and work order “padding” is common. We found specific 

examples to support the above claims. 

At one facility, a 2006 electrical upgrade work order with a final 

PassPort cost of $140,151 had multiple problems. The total 

PassPort estimate for this project was $133,574; however, there 
 

Page 6 Details of Findings 

was no cost entered for materials and supplies, and only $9,282 

was entered for labor. The other $124,292 was shown as 

“miscellaneous.” Actual labor totaled $129,579 and actual 

materials totaled $10,157. At a point in time when the LANL 

project coordinator had only authorized KSL to spend up to 

$123,812, KSL’s actual charges rose to $154,170. The LANL 

project coordinator found the financial condition of the project to 

be “very disturbing” and performed an analysis of the $30,358 cost 

overrun. The project coordinator found that the amount of wire 

charged to the project was more than twice what was required to 

perform the work, with an original wire estimate of $4,529 and an 

actual wire charge of $10,191. The project coordinator also 

questioned labor costs, stating that “We had a report from the 

customer that the crafts were witnessed sleeping in trucks,” and 

that “laborers were consistently pulled from the project to support 

material transfers.” The project coordinator also stated that “I have 

$752.58 in labor charges after we pulled off the job . . . that I 

would like to have backed out of the work order.” The project 

coordinator stated that no further work was to have taken place, 

“yet these charges have mysteriously appeared for work not being 

performed.” Subsequently, the project coordinator questioned 

these costs, and KSL backed out $12,696.69 from the work order 

charges as “cost transfers” and “material mischarges.”

In addition, we identified five work orders for fire alarm 

communication upgrades where a LANL facility official 

discovered inappropriate labor charges. For example, schedulers, 

electricians, and technical staff who did not work on the fire alarm 

upgrade charged time on these work orders. Inappropriate labor 

charges were determined to total approximately $9,780. A LANL 

facility official alerted KSL to these charges, and KSL backed 

them out. 

On a work order for patching cracks on a loading dock, we determined 

that a foreman charged three hours to this work order more than four 

months prior to the job being worked. On a work order for repairing 

steam and condensate leaks, we determined that a laborer charged six 

hours on a day when no one else was present, even though a laborer 

would not work alone. On a work order for cement masons to repair 

concrete steps, we determined a nuclear safety engineer charged 

35 hours after the work was completed. In this case, the engineer’s 

labor charges of $4,900 were almost 11⁄2 times the total labor estimate 

of $3,444 and more than tripled what had been, up to that time, a job 

cost of $2,115.60. KSL management acknowledged that, in all cases, 

these charges were not appropriate. We were told that some of these 
 

Page 7 Details of Findings 

charges could have been the result of timekeeping errors. We 

requested the time sheets for the three individuals involved. KSL only 

provided the timesheet for the foreman. We determined that the 

inappropriate charges were due to a timekeeping error. 

In a final example, a KSL employee charged 8 hours to a work 

order that the employee only worked on for approximately 15 

minutes. The KSL employee was tasked to re-glue carpet tiles that 

started to bend up. The employee completed the task in about 15 

minutes and then did nothing the rest of the morning from 8:15 am 

until noon. The employee then attended a one-hour training class 

between 12:45 pm and 1:45 pm and then did nothing between 2:00 

pm and 4:00 pm. The employee told us that he was directed by 

KSL management to charge to an incorrect work order. We asked 

KSL management about this statement, and KSL management 

denied it. The employee no longer works for KSL. 

INTERNAL CONTROLS We also found internal control weaknesses associated with 

PassPort, which may have contributed to the problems with work 

order charges and costs. For example, PassPort: 

• Allowed KSL to charge certain unapproved “Other Costs,” 

such as materials that did not go through the LANL 

procurement system for approval, without the knowledge of 

LANL facility personnel. We were told that this feature was 

incorporated into PassPort with the intent of allowing KSL to 

recover certain minimal unanticipated costs. While the use of 

this feature was not capped at any particular dollar amount, we 

were told the original intent was to use this feature up to 

$20,000 per year. However, these “Other Costs” reached 

approximately $41 million in 2006 and were already over $14 

million by the end of May 2007; 

• Did not have adequate controls to help ensure the quality of an 

estimate prior to activation of a work order in the system, e.g., 

an estimate could be as low as $0.01 and there was no 

requirement to estimate materials; 

• Allowed KSL to charge to work orders as soon as they were 

created in the database even though the project may not have 

been ready for the commencement of work activities; 

• Did not contain controls to limit charging to only those tasks 

within a given work order that had been approved for work 

activities; 
 

Page 8 Details of Findings 

• Did not contain monetary ranges that could be used to notify 

LANL facility personnel when KSL charges were approaching 

the estimated cost; 

• Did not place controls on KSL to prevent charges that 

exceeded the estimated cost; and, 

• Did not prevent charging to closed work orders. 

PassPort has the capacity to accept monetary ranges on all work 

orders to limit work order charges and to alert LANL when potential 

problems arise. However these capabilities had not been utilized. 

We were told by a LANL official that PassPort is a “wide open 

system without controls.” Since PassPort interfaces with LANL 

financial systems and results in the debiting of numerous LANL 

accounts, we believe stricter internal controls are essential to ensure 

the integrity of the work order process. 

PERFORMANCE We observed that various issues concerning KSL estimates and 

EVALUATIONS work order costs had been raised previously during LANL reviews of 

KSL performance. Performance evaluations dating back to 2003 

found widespread and systemic failures in the fidelity of KSL’s 

financial management and controls, including the perceived lack of 

control relative to labor charges. In addition, these evaluations found 

that cost performance was not always accurately portrayed. It was 

noted that KSL was “driving clients to authorize increases in costs in 

order to complete work that appeared to be driven by inefficiency or 

poor execution, creating distrust among LANL users.” The 

performance evaluations identified numerous work management 

problems, to include concerns that there was little evidence of 

accountability for: (1) accuracy of estimates on work orders; 

(2) overrunning estimates on work orders; or (3) work order charges. 

Specifically, a performance evaluation dated November 20, 2003, 

stated that KSL did not direct enough attention to getting quality 

work done on time and on cost target and that KSL had not 

demonstrated any significant improvement in maintenance cost or 

performance over the previous site support services contractor. In 

addition, this evaluation stated that KSL’s budget overrun was 

extremely disappointing. 

Performance evaluations dated May 13, 2004, and December 9, 

2004, stated that there was still considerable room for 

improvement in the estimating, scheduling, and statusing of work 
 

Page 9 Details of Findings 

in PassPort. These evaluations noted insufficient attention being 

paid by KSL to effectively accomplish work in the field and 

manage the accuracy of the data in PassPort. They noted that work 

orders were continuously being overrun with no prior notice to the 

customer and that the accuracy and timeliness of work order 

charges remained a concern. 

An August 5, 2005, performance evaluation stated that KSL had 

been slow to align department budgets and the Annual Management 

Plan with the approved budget and struggled in dealing with 

seemingly simple financial queries. This evaluation found that 

planning and general management and administrative costs charged 

to work orders had grown significantly and that KSL costs 

associated with oversight of outsourced services had been very high. 

Finally, a performance evaluation dated June 22, 2006, stated that 

KSL had launched key initiatives that had not improved 

performance in the field. The evaluation stated that KSL had not 

had a meaningful overhead cost report in months and that business 

volume by department was unknown. The evaluation stated that it 

was still unclear if KSL was performing within approved budget 

and that repeated requests to align cost reports with the approved 

budget had gone unanswered. The evaluation stated that LANL 

expected greater attention to estimating and a higher level of 

maturity 31⁄2 years into a 5-year contract. 

PERFORMANCE We also examined (1) the measurements used to assess KSL’s 

MEASURES AND performance with respect to work order cost estimates and labor 

AWARD FEE and material charges and (2) KSL’s award fee. We believe LANL 

could do more to define the standards against which KSL’s 

performance is being judged and the resultant impact performance 

will have on KSL’s award fee. We examined the measurements 

used to assess KSL’s performance with respect to work order 

estimates and labor and material charges. As stated previously, KSL 

has a cost-plus-award-fee contract. The original Performance 

Evaluation Plan required that projects be delivered within 10 percent 

of the estimated cost. However, there have been several revisions to 

the Plan. Prior to the performance period of October 1, 2006, 

through June 30, 2007, KSL’s performance with respect to estimates 

was combined with other performance elements. For the period 

beginning October 1, 2006, the quality of KSL’s estimates was made 

a separate sub-element under the performance measure for “Value of 

Work Performed,” and the goal was that KSL’s estimates were 

expected to be within 20 percent of actual cost. We did not identify 

any specific performance measure addressing the appropriateness, 
 

Page 10 Details of Findings 

accuracy, and support for labor and materials charged to work 

orders. 

We reviewed the award fees that KSL has earned since April 2003 

and determined that KSL has never earned the entire available 

award fee. However, it was unclear what direct impact KSL’s 

performance issues in the areas of estimating and work order 

charges have had on the award fee determinations. For example, 

for the evaluation period of October 1, 2005, through March 31, 

2006, KSL received $2,815,886 out of an available pool of 

$3,027,834. The following scores and comments were recorded, 

but the direct impact on the award fee was not specified: 

• Corrective Maintenance was required to be completed within 

20 percent of the estimate. While LANL scored KSL at 85.6 

percent for this element, it was noted in the evaluation that 

“KSL has requested that a significant number of work orders 

be exempt from this measure for a variety of reasons, some 

justified, others not so obvious.” 

• Engineering and Construction projects established as a goal 

that no line items have estimated man-hours greater than 130 

percent of the industry standard unit man-hour productivity 

factor. While LANL scored KSL at 80 percent for “Estimating 

Performance,” it was noted that estimating performance missed 

the mark in several areas, to include failure to quantify units 

while simply allocating man-hours based on the estimator’s 

experience, adding time (in some cases x 4) to the industry 

standard productivity factors to account for the inability to 

perform to industry standard factors, and the addition of field 

supervision that should have already been included in industry 

productivity standards. Of particular note, the evaluation stated 

that “If similar discrepancies arise in future evaluations, KSL 

will receive a score of zero for the estimating measure and the 

available fee . . . will be limited to the fee assigned to the 

individual measures times the percentage of estimates that pass 

review.” 
 

Page 11 Recommendations 

Management Comments 

RECOMMENDATIONS We recommend that the Manager, Los Alamos Site Office, ensures 

that LANL provides immediate attention to and continued 

oversight of KSL work package estimating and labor charging 

activities and ensures that: 

1. All KSL estimates are fair and defensible, costs are identified 

for materials when materials are required for the performance 

of the work, and contractual requirements for accuracy are met. 

2. Only actual labor and material costs are charged to a work order 

and that those charges are made to the correct work order. 

In addition, we recommend that the Manager, Los Alamos Site 

Office, directs LANL to do an immediate review of: 

3. “Other Costs” to determine why these costs have exceeded the 

intent of this PassPort feature and to ensure that only 

appropriate and approved “Other Costs” have been charged. 

4. The structure of PassPort and implement stricter internal 

controls to ensure the integrity of the work order process. 

We also recommend that the Manager, Los Alamos Site Office, 

directs LANL to: 

5. Continue to have a separate performance measure for the quality of 

KSL’s work order cost estimates and establish a performance 

measure for the appropriateness, accuracy, and support for labor 

and materials charged to work orders. Further, there should be a 

clear link between each performance measure and KSL’s award fee. 

Further, we were advised that LANL is currently conducting a “cost 

incurred” audit of KSL. Given the nature of the issues in our report, 

we believe a “floor” audit of KSL would also be beneficial. Therefore, 

we recommend that the Manager, Los Alamos Site Office, direct 

LANL to: 

6. Conduct a floor audit of KSL. 

MANAGEMENT In comments on a draft of this report, which are included in their 

COMMENTS entirety at Appendix B, the National Nuclear Security 

Administration (NNSA) stated that it generally agreed with the 

report. NNSA stated that many of the issues noted by the Office of 

Inspector General (OIG) were corrected prior to the OIG’s field 
 

Page 12 Inspector Comments 

work. NNSA also stated that actions being taken by the 

Laboratory because of its own internal audit are the genesis of 

corrective actions, along with validation of issues raised by the 

OIG. In addition, NNSA stated that numerous problems, both 

related and unrelated to issues noted in the report, prompted the 

Laboratory to remove work control functions (including most job 

estimating) from KSL’s subcontract in late April of this year. 

Regarding the report recommendations, NNSA stated that it will 

prepare a Management Decision to formalize corrective actions 

related to this report and ensure that all issues are being 

appropriately addressed. 

INSPECTOR While noting NNSA’s general agreement with our report, we 

COMMENTS disagree with NNSA’s assertion that many of the issues we 

identified were corrected prior to our field work. Although LANL 

had initiated some corrective actions, significant problems 

continued to exist at the time of our field work. Regarding 

NNSA’s statement that LANL removed most job estimating from 

KSL’s subcontract in April 2007, it is our understanding that KSL 

still performs estimating for corrective maintenance and small 

projects, which, based upon our review of past work order tasks, 

comprise a significant portion of KSL’s workload. 

Upon receipt of NNSA’s Management Decision, we will assess 

whether the identified corrective actions are responsive to our 

report recommendations. 
Appendix A 

 

Page 13 Scope and Methodology 

SCOPE AND We conducted the majority of our field work from July 2006 

METHODOLOGY through April 2007. Our review included interviews with DOE 

officials from the Los Alamos Site Office, officials from LANL, 

and subcontractor employees. We also reviewed applicable 

policies and procedures regarding integrated work management 

and cost estimation at LANL, as well as work order estimates for 

the period January 2005 through April 2007. 

Pursuant to the “Government Performance and Results Act of 

1993,” we reviewed LANL’s performance measurement processes 

as they relate to work order estimates and cost charges. 

This inspection was conducted in accordance with the “Quality 

Standards for Inspections” issued by the President’s Council on 

Integrity and Efficiency. 
Appendix B 

 

Page 14 Management Comments 
Appendix B (continued) 

 

Page 15 Management Comments 
IG Report No. DOE/IG-0780 

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