[Cite as U.S. Bank Natl. Assn. v. White, 2021-Ohio-2017.]

Atty. Stefanie Deka, McGlinchey Stafford, 3401 Tuttle Road, Suite 200, Cleveland, Ohio 

44122, for Plaintiff-Appellee and 

Atty. James Vitullo, 5232 Nashua Drive, Austintown, Ohio 44515, for DefendantsAppellants. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

SEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

MAHONING COUNTY

U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, AS TRUSTEE, SUCCESSOR IN 

INTEREST TO BANK OF AMERICA NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, AS 

TRUSTEE, SUCCESSOR BY MERGER TO LASALLE BANK NATIONAL 

ASSOCIATION, AS TRUSTEE FOR RESIDENTIAL ASSET MORTGAGE 

PRODUCTS, INC., MORTGAGE ASSET-BACKED PASS-THROUGH 

CERTIFICATES, SERIES 2007-RP1, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

JOHN W. WHITE ET AL., 

Defendants-Appellant.

 

OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY 

Case No. 20 MA 0035 

 

Civil Appeal from the 

Court of Common of Mahoning County, Ohio 

Case No. 2018 CV 02867 

BEFORE: 

David A. D’Apolito, Cheryl L. Waite, Carol Ann Robb, Judges. 

JUDGMENT: 

Affirmed. 
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Case No. 20 MA 0035

Dated: June 11, 2021 

D’Apolito, J. 

{¶1} Appellant, John White, appeals from the February 24, 2020 judgment of the 

Mahoning County Court of Common Pleas granting Appellee’s, U.S. Bank National 

Association, as Trustee, Successor in Interest to Bank of America National Association, 

as Trustee, Successor by Merger to LaSalle Bank National Association, as Trustee for 

Residential Asset Mortgage Products, Inc., Mortgage Asset-Backed Pass-Through 

Certificates, Series 2007-RP1 (“U.S. Bank”), motion for summary judgment on its 

foreclosure complaint. On appeal, Appellant asserts the trial court erred in granting U.S. 

Bank’s motion for summary judgment. Appellant specifically alleges that the trial court’s 

judgment is not a final appealable order and that equity bars U.S. Bank’s foreclosure. 

Finding no reversible error, we affirm. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

{¶2} On February 14, 2002, Thomas Ramsey executed an adjustable rate note 

payable to Mortgage Express, Inc. in the amount of $17,500 (“Note”). (Exhibit A). The 

Note was secured by a mortgage between Mortgage Express, Inc. and Thomas and 

Norma Ramsey, husband and wife (“Mortgage”)1. (Exhibit B). The Mortgage was 

recorded on February 19, 2002 as Official Records Volume 5189, Page 474, Document 

No. 200200006928, Mahoning County, Ohio records. The Mortgage is a lien on the real 

property which is located at 32 North Schenley Avenue, Youngstown, Ohio 44509 

(“Property”). The Mortgage was assigned to U.S. Bank. (Exhibit E). 

{¶3} Thomas Ramsey quit claimed his interest in the Property to David 

Ferguson. David Ferguson later quit claimed his interest in the property to Appellant. 

Thomas and Norma Ramsey never paid off the Mortgage before transferring the Property. 

Thus, both transfers were subject to the Mortgage. Record title to the Property vested in 

Appellant, a single man. (Exhibit F). The Loan is in default. 

 

1 The Note and Mortgage are collectively referred to as the (“Loan”). 
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Case No. 20 MA 0035

{¶4} On December 5, 2018, U.S. Bank filed a complaint for foreclosure against 

Appellant, Thomas Ramsey (deceased), Jane Doe (unknown spouse, if any, of 

Appellant), and Mahoning County Treasurer.2 At the time the complaint was filed, 

Thomas and Norma Ramsey were both deceased.3 Appellant was named in the 

foreclosure solely as a title holder due to his interest in the Property taken subject to the 

Mortgage. Appellant filed an answer to the complaint. 

{¶5} On December 24, 2019, U.S. Bank filed a motion for summary judgment 

pursuant to Civ.R. 56. 

{¶6} Appellant filed a response in opposition. Appellant argued that he received 

reinstatement quotes from U.S. Bank which were inconsistent with each other and that 

equity barred the complaint. (Exhibit A, $1,945.51); (Exhibit B, $6,449.25); (Exhibit C, 

$13,294.57). Appellant also claimed that Thomas and Norma Ramsey, and their estates, 

were all necessary parties to the complaint and that without them, U.S. Bank’s foreclosure 

decree cannot be a final appealable order. 

{¶7} U.S. Bank filed a reply asserting that it had met its summary judgment 

burden proving its right to foreclose on the Mortgage and that Appellant failed to meet his 

reciprocal burden. U.S. Bank explained that the three reinstatement quotes were 

authorized under the Mortgage. U.S. Bank further addressed that Appellant was not a 

borrower under the Ramsey Loan which limited his opportunities to reinstate, negated 

any alleged contractual duty owed by U.S. Bank to Appellant, and could not therefore 

form the basis for Appellant’s claims that equity barred the foreclosure. 

{¶8} Appellant filed a sur-reply in which he again alleged that U.S. Bank did not 

name the correct parties in its foreclosure complaint. 

{¶9} U.S. Bank filed a sur-reply reiterating its position that Norma Ramsey, and 

Norma and Thomas Ramsey’s estates, were not necessary parties to the foreclosure 

because the complaint did not seek to hold either estate liable for the debt due on the 

 

2 U.S. Bank alleges that because the Note has been accelerated and is in default, it is entitled to recover 

$9,703.31 plus interest from the sale of the Property. U.S. Bank also alleges that because the Mortgage 

was given to secure the Note, it is entitled to foreclose the Mortgage due to default. Thomas Ramsey and 

Jane Doe were later dismissed from the action. 

3 Norma Ramsey was not named in the complaint. U.S. Bank is not seeking a personal judgment against 

Thomas Ramsey but is seeking instead to enforce its security interest. On December 12, 2018, U.S. Bank 

filed suggestions of death as to both Thomas and Norma Ramsey. 
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Case No. 20 MA 0035

Loan but rather it only sought to foreclose on the Mortgage; Norma Ramsey did not sign 

the Note and thus her estate could not be held personally liable for the debt; and Norma 

Ramsey did not have any interest in the Property that survived her death leaving nothing 

for an estate to receive. 

{¶10} On February 24, 2020, the trial court granted U.S. Bank’s motion for 

summary judgment. Appellant filed a timely appeal and raises two assignments of error. 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

An appellate court conducts a de novo review of a trial court’s decision to 

grant summary judgment, using the same standards as the trial court set 

forth in Civ.R. 56(C). Grafton v. Ohio Edison Co., 77 Ohio St.3d 102, 105, 

671 N.E.2d 241 (1996). Before summary judgment can be granted, the trial 

court must determine that: (1) no genuine issue as to any material fact 

remains to be litigated, (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 

matter of law, (3) it appears from the evidence that reasonable minds can 

come to but one conclusion, and viewing the evidence most favorably in 

favor of the party against whom the motion for summary judgment is made, 

the conclusion is adverse to that party. Temple v. Wean United, Inc., 50 

Ohio St.2d 317, 327, 364 N.E.2d 267 (1977). Whether a fact is “material” 

depends on the substantive law of the claim being litigated. Hoyt, Inc. v. 

Gordon & Assoc., Inc., 104 Ohio App.3d 598, 603, 662 N.E.2d 1088 (8th 

Dist.1995). 

“(T)he moving party bears the initial responsibility of informing the trial court 

of the basis for the motion, and identifying those portions of the record which 

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of fact on a material element 

of the nonmoving party’s claim.” (Emphasis deleted.) Dresher v. Burt, 75 

Ohio St.3d 280, 296, 662 N.E.2d 264 (1996). If the moving party carries its 

burden, the nonmoving party has a reciprocal burden of setting forth specific 

facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. at 293, 662 N.E.2d 

264. In other words, when presented with a properly supported motion for 
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Case No. 20 MA 0035

summary judgment, the nonmoving party must produce some evidence to 

suggest that a reasonable factfinder could rule in that party’s favor. Brewer 

v. Cleveland Bd. of Edn., 122 Ohio App.3d 378, 386, 701 N.E.2d 1023 (8th 

Dist.1997). 

The evidentiary materials to support a motion for summary judgment are 

listed in Civ.R. 56(C) and include the pleadings, depositions, answers to 

interrogatories, written admissions, affidavits, transcripts of evidence, and 

written stipulations of fact that have been filed in the case. In resolving the 

motion, the court views the evidence in a light most favorable to the 

nonmoving party. Temple, 50 Ohio St.2d at 327, 364 N.E.2d 267.

Doe v. Skaggs, 7th Dist. Belmont No. 18 BE 0005, 2018-Ohio-5402, ¶ 10-12. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 1 

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT ISSUED ITS FINAL JUDGMENT 

ENTRY OF FORECLOSURE BECAUSE THE ENTRY DID NOT 

DETERMINE THE EXTENT OF EACH LIENHOLDER’S INTEREST, DID 

NOT SET FORTH THE PRIORITY OF LIENS, AND DID NOT DETERMINE 

THE OTHER RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF EACH PARTY IN 

THE ACTION. 

{¶11} In his first assignment of error, Appellant argues that Thomas and Norma 

Ramsey, and their estates, were necessary parties to the foreclosure complaint and 

judgment entry. Appellant asserts that although he is a named party, his interest in the 

Property is not mentioned in the judgment entry of foreclosure. As such, Appellant 

contends there is no final appealable order. 

{¶12} The trial court issued the judgment entry granting U.S. Bank’s motion for 

summary judgment in its foreclosure complaint on February 24, 2020. The judgment 

entry constitutes a final appealable order as it “determines the extent of each lienholder’s 

interest, sets forth the priority of the liens, and determines the other rights and 

responsibilities of each party in the action.” CitiMortgage, Inc. v. Roznowski, 139 Ohio 
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Case No. 20 MA 0035

St.3d 299, 2014-Ohio-1984, ¶ 39. Regarding Appellant, the judgment entry states, “the 

equity of redemption of the defendant title holders in the Property shall be foreclosed and 

the Property shall be sold free of the interests of all parties to this action.” (2/24/2020 

Judgment Entry, p. 3). Because Appellant is a defendant title holder, his interest was 

acknowledged and determined.4 

{¶13} The death of a party raises different jurisdictional concerns which are 

addressed in Civ.R. 25. Upon the death of a party, a suggestion of death shall be filed. 

Civ.R. 25(E). Following such filing, the court shall order substitution of proper parties 

upon a motion. Civ.R. 25(A)(1). However, “[u]nless the motion for substitution is made 

not later than ninety days after the death is suggested upon the record by service of a 

statement of the fact of the death * * *, the action shall be dismissed as to the deceased 

party.” Id. 

{¶14} Pursuant to Civ.R. 25, “[b]y virtue of a party’s death, a court loses personal 

jurisdiction over that party.” Smith v. Bond, 7th Dist. Belmont No. 13 BE 27, 2015-Ohio2585, ¶ 8, citing Lierenz v. Bowen, 6th Dist. Erie No. E-90-13, 1991 WL 38039, *3. “Thus, 

the effect of a filed suggestion of death is that personal jurisdiction over that party is 

temporarily abated and the court is without authority to take any action with respect to the 

party-decedent’s interest * * *.” Id. 

{¶15} Although Thomas Ramsey signed the Note and Thomas and Norma 

Ramsey signed the Mortgage, they were not required parties to the foreclosure complaint 

or judgment entry because they were both deceased at the time the complaint was filed. 

Although Thomas Ramsey (deceased) was a named party to the complaint, he was 

removed pursuant to Civ.R. 25 and thus properly dismissed from the foreclosure in the 

judgment entry after U.S. Bank filed a suggestion of death pursuant to Civ.R. 25(E). As 

stated, a suggestion of death was also filed for Norma Ramsey, who was not a named 

party to the complaint. 

{¶16} Likewise, the estates of Thomas and Norma Ramsey were not necessary 

parties to the foreclosure because U.S. Bank’s complaint did not seek to hold either estate 

 

4 Unlike the facts contained in Second Nat. Bank of Warren v. Walling, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 01-C.A.-62, 

2002-Ohio-3852, cited by Appellant in his brief, Appellant’s interest here is not a “fundamental issue in the 

foreclosure sale.” 
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Case No. 20 MA 0035

liable for the debt due on the Note, Norma Ramsey did not sign the Note and thus her 

estate could not be held personally liable for the debt on the Note, and Norma Ramsey 

released her only interest in the Property by signing the Mortgage. 

{¶17} The complaint and judgment entry reveal that U.S. Bank is only seeking to 

foreclose the Mortgage and is not seeking the debt due on the Note from any named 

party. See Fifth Third Mtge. Co. v. Perry, 4th Dist. Pickaway No. 12CA13, 2013-Ohio3308, ¶ 44, citing Chaco Credit Union, Inc. v. Perry, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2011-05-089, 

2012-Ohio-1123, ¶ 12 (“it is only when the mortgagee seeks a money judgment that the 

estate must be made a party to the action”). Because Norma Ramsey did not sign the 

Note, she was not personally liable for the debt. See Mid America Mtge., Inc. v. Scott, 

8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 106099, 2018-Ohio-1403, ¶ 12 (“a nonborrowing, co-mortgagor 

is not liable for the debt under the note”). In addition, Norma Ramsey’s dower interest in 

the Property was released when she signed the Mortgage. Id. at ¶ 18, quoting GE Credit 

Union v. Medow, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-150618, 2016-Ohio-3266, ¶ 10 (“when a 

married person conveys a mortgage or interest in property that is held in the name of that 

spouse only, the mortgage will not be effective against the non-title holding spouse’s 

dower interest unless that spouse has also signed the mortgage or document conveying 

the interest”). 

{¶18} Because Thomas and Norma Ramsey, and their estates, were not 

necessary parties to the foreclosure complaint, there was no need for them to be named 

as necessary parties and account for either in the judgment entry. See Roznowski, supra, 

at ¶ 39. Because Appellant is named in the complaint and his interest is included in the 

judgment entry, the judgment entry is a final appealable order. Id. Upon consideration, 

the trial court properly granted U.S. Bank’s motion for summary judgment. 

{¶19} Appellant’s first assignment of error is without merit. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 2 

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO CONSIDER THE 

EQUITIES TO DETERMINE IF FORECLOSURE IS THE APPROPRIATE 

REMEDY. 
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Case No. 20 MA 0035

{¶20} In his second assignment of error, Appellant argues the trial court erred in 

failing to consider the equities to determine if foreclosure is the appropriate remedy. 

Appellant posits that U.S. Bank improperly increased the reinstatement quotes after he 

declined to tender any reinstatement funds. Although Appellant admits that he did not 

have the funds to reinstate the Loan, he contends that his perceived inaccuracies in the 

three reinstatement quotes, which listed Thomas Ramsey as “Borrower” and dated 

February 7, 2019, July 12, 2019, and February 19, 2019, warranted denial of U.S. Bank’s 

motion for summary judgment. (Exhibit A, $1,945.51); (Exhibit B, $6,449.25); (Exhibit C, 

$13,294.57). 

{¶21} “[F]oreclosure involves a two-step process where, in addition to 

establishing the existence of default, the trial court must then consider 

whether foreclosure is an equitable remedy.” Bank of New York v. Nutter, 9th Dist. 

Medina No. 19CA0063-M, 2020-Ohio-6988, ¶ 26. 

A foreclosure action is equitable in nature. City Loan & Savings v. 

Howard (1984), 16 Ohio App.3d 185, 186, 475 N.E.2d 

154. Equitable actions are generally viewed 

for abuse of discretion. Sandusky Properties v. Aveni (1984), 15 Ohio 

St.3d 273, 275, 473 N.E.2d 798. The term “abuse of discretion” connotes 

more than an error of law or of judgment; it implies an unreasonable, 

arbitrary or unconscionable attitude. Natl. City Bank v. Beyer (2000), 89 

Ohio St.3d 152, 159, 729 N.E.2d 711. “Arbitrary” means “without adequate 

determining principle”; “unreasonable” means “irrational” Cedar Bay Const., 

Inc. v. City of Fremont (1990), 50 Ohio St.3d 19, 22, 552 N.E.2d 202. 

Buckeye Retirement Co., LLC v. Walling, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 05 MA 119, 2006-Ohio7059, ¶ 16. 

{¶22} When transferring mortgaged real estate, the transferee can either assume 

the mortgage or take the property subject to the mortgage. See James B. Nutter & Co. 

v. Estate of Neifer, 3rd Dist. Hancock No. 5-16-20, 2016-Ohio-7641, ¶ 7. If a transferee 

assumes the mortgage, he or she accepts liability for the debt obligation of the original 

debtor. Kocsorak v. Cleveland Trust Co., 151 Ohio St. 212, 219 (1949). 
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Case No. 20 MA 0035

{¶23} In this case, Appellant did not assume the Mortgage. Rather, Appellant took 

legal title to the Property subject to the Mortgage via a quit claim deed. Appellant did not 

assume the debt and is not a borrower under the Loan. As such, Appellant’s interest in 

the Property is possessory only and second in priority to U.S. Bank’s Mortgage interest. 

Thus, Appellant, as a non-borrower, was not entitled to reinstatement of Thomas and 

Norma Ramsey’s Loan and U.S. Bank was under no contractual duty to offer Appellant 

reinstatement. See Wilborn v. Bank One Corp., 121 Ohio St.3d 546, 2009-Ohio-306, ¶ 

19 (a mortgage-reinstatement provision in a residential mortgage contract creates an 

obligation upon the defaulting borrower’s voluntary exercise of the contractual right to 

reinstate the mortgage loan). 

{¶24} A borrower’s right to reinstate after acceleration is provided for in Section 

19 of the Mortgage. (Exhibit B, p. 10-11). Neither Section 19 nor any other sections of 

the Mortgage or Note require a lender to offer loss mitigation, default assistance, or 

reinstatement to a non-borrower. Rather, the terms of the Mortgage expressly prohibit a 

transfer of any legal or beneficial interest in the Property without the lender’s prior written 

consent. (Exhibit B, Section 18, p. 10). 

{¶25} Appellant admits that he did not have the reinstatement funds available. 

This is not a scenario where Appellant tried to reinstate but was rejected by U.S. Bank.5 

Rather, Appellant never reinstated the Loan and, in fact, had no contractual right to 

reinstate. Even assuming arguendo that he did, U.S. Bank presented Civ.R. 56 evidence 

that the reinstatement figures were correct. Appellant’s contrary evidence was insufficient 

to meet his evidentiary burden warranting summary judgment for U.S. Bank. 

{¶26} Appellant asserts that U.S. Bank improperly increased amounts in the 

reinstatement quotes each month. However, the reinstatement quotes all expressly state 

that the reinstatement amount is subject to change. Specifically, the reinstatement quotes 

have provisions providing, “Your Quote Might Change,” along with reasons and 

 

5 Appellant’s reliance on PHH Mtge. Corp. v. Barker, 190 Ohio App.3d 71, 2010-Ohio-5061 (3rd Dist.) is 

misplaced because unlike the Barkers, who attempted to work with the lender to bring their loan current, 

Appellant in the case at bar never tried to bring the Loan current by tendering any payments. Appellant 

also relies on Crick v. Starr, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 08 MA 173, 2009-Ohio-6754, for the proposition that 

the doctrine of unclean hands bars U.S. Bank’s foreclosure judgment. Appellant, however, never raised 

the unclean hands doctrine as an affirmative defense in his answer and thus it is waived on appeal. 

Beneficial Fin. 1, Inc. v. Edwards, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 13 MA 106, 2014-Ohio-5514, ¶ 17. 
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Case No. 20 MA 0035

explanations for an increase. (Exhibits A, B, and C). Any increased amounts are 

permitted by the terms of the Loan and is itemized in each reinstatement quote. (Id.) 

Every fee or cost alleged as improper by Appellant is permitted by Sections 9 and 19 of 

the Mortgage. See (Exhibit B, Section 9, p. 7, which permits the lender to “do and pay 

for whatever is reasonable or appropriate to protect Lender’s interest in the Property and 

rights under this Security Instrument” and these amounts “shall become additional debt 

of Borrower”); (Exhibit B, Section 19, p. 10, which allows for the lender to collect the sums 

it expended under Section 9 as well as “reasonable attorneys’ fees, property inspection 

and valuation fees, and other fees incurred for the purpose of protecting Lender’s interest 

in the Property”). There is no dispute that the amounts in the reinstatement quotes were 

collectible. 

{¶27} Based on the facts presented, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 

determining that equity did not bar U.S. Bank’s foreclosure judgment against Appellant. 

The trial court properly granted U.S. Bank’s motion for summary judgment. 

{¶28} Appellant’s second assignment of error is without merit. 

CONCLUSION 

{¶29} For the foregoing reasons, Appellant’s assignments of error are not welltaken. The judgment of the Mahoning County Court of Common Pleas granting U.S. 

Bank’s motion for summary judgment on its foreclosure complaint is affirmed.

Waite, J., concurs. 

Robb, J., concurs. 
[Cite as U.S. Bank Natl. Assn. v. White, 2021-Ohio-2017.]

 

 

For the reasons stated in the Opinion rendered herein, the assignments of error 

are overruled and it is the final judgment and order of this Court that the judgment of 

the Court of Common Pleas of Mahoning County, Ohio, is affirmed. Costs to be taxed 

against the Appellant. 

A certified copy of this opinion and judgment entry shall constitute the mandate 

in this case pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. It is ordered that 

a certified copy be sent by the clerk to the trial court to carry this judgment into 

execution. 

 

 

NOTICE TO COUNSEL 

This document constitutes a final judgment entry.