### T E X A S C O U R T O F A P P E A L S , T H I R D D I S T R I C T , A T A U S T I N

NO. 03-14-00784- CV

T. M. and J. R., App ellants

v. Texas Depart m ent of Fam ily and P rote ctive Service s, Appellee

F ROM TH E DISTRI CT COURT O F B ELL COUNTY , 146 TH JUDICI AL DISTRICT NO. 262 , 252 -B , H ONO RAB LE JACK WELDO N JO NES, JUDGE P RESIDING

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N Appellants T.M. (F ather ) and J .R. (Mother) appea l from the trial court’s order terminating their pare ntal rig hts to their minor child, J .M. Fa ther and Mother eac h contend that the 1

ev idence is fac tually insufficient to support the termination of their pare ntal rig hts. Mother als o contends that the trial court wrongfully admitted evidenc e reg arding adver tisements for “esc ort” service s that Mother place d. We will aff irm the trial court’s order terminating their pare ntal rig hts.

To protec t the privac y o f t h e parties, we ref er to the child, her pare nts, and other family 1 members by

their initials or by

their re lationship to J .M. See Tex. Fam. Code § 109.002(d)

.BACK GR OUND 2 The Texas Depa

rtment of Family and Protective Service s (the Depa rtment) beca

me involved in this case in Febr uary 2013, when J.M. was four months old, a fter rec eiving a repor t of a phy sical alter cation betwe en Mother a nd her ow n mother, C.G. An investig ator wor king f or the Depa rtment testified at trial that Mother and C.G. wer e both tested for drug s afte r the alterc ation and that C.G. tested posi t i v e fo r m ethamphetamine and Mother tested positive for both coca ine and methamphetamine. The Depa rtment subsequently remove d J .M. from Mother and place d her with

a foster family

. I n its petiti on in a suit a ffe cting the pare nt-child rela tionship, the Depa rtment also reque sted the termination of the ri gh t s o f J .M.’s pare nts if reunific ation with them could not be achie ved. I n Aug ust 2013, a pater nity test reve aled that J.M. was Fa ther’s c hild. I n Fe b ruary 2014, office rs with the Killeen Police Depa rtment arr ested Fa ther an d Mother at the Hig h Five I nn. Acc ording to an office r who testified at trial, Fa ther and Mother wer e appre hended in a room containing cra ck coca ine, m et h am p hetamine, and “spice ,” or sy nthetic marihuana

. The office r also testified that there was a di gi t al s ca l e near the drug s, which led the office r to believe that Fa

ther and Mother wer e weig hing the drug s to sell them. Offic ers furt her testified that Fa ther pushed an office r befor e being handcuf fed and that Mother repe atedly scre amed

The fac ts r ecited in this opinion are taken from evidenc e prese nted at trial. Although we 2 have considere d the entire rec ord, beca use this is a memorandum opinion aff irming the trial court’s termination order , we do not exhaustively detail the evidenc e. See T ex . R

. Ap p . P. 47.4 (“I f the issues are settled, the cour t should wr ite a brie f memora ndum opinion no longer

than nec essar

y to advise the parties of the court’s decision and the basic rea sons for it.”); In re A.B. , 437 S.W .3d 498, 507 (Tex. 2 0 1 4 ) (h o l d i ng courts of appea ls need not detail the evidenc e when aff irming jury ’s termination finding s). 2that she and Fa ther wer e “hig h on spice.” Offic ers testified that Mother foug ht the office rs and bit

one of the m before finally being subdued. At trial, the jury deter

mined th a t th e p a r e n t- c h il d r e la

ti o n s h ip betwee n J .M. and Fa ther and Mother should be t er m i n at ed and that the Depa rtment should be appointed J .M.’s manag ing

conser vator. The trial court signe d a decr ee of termination consistent with the jury ’s finding s. The trial court later denied both F ather ’s and Mother’s motions for new trial, and this a ppeal followed.

DISCUSSIO N

Stan dard of rev iew

To terminate the pare nt-child rela tionship, a court must find by clea r and convincing evidenc e that: (1) the pare nt has committed one of the enumer ated statutory g rounds for termination and (2) it is in the child’s best interest to terminate the pare nt’s rig hts. Tex. Fam. Code § 161.001. I n this appea l, Fa ther has challeng ed the fac tual sufficie ncy of b o t h t he jury ’s statutory -g round finding and the best-intere st finding , and Mother has challeng ed the fac tual sufficie ncy of the bestinterest finding

. “The distinction betwee n leg al and fac tual sufficie ncy when the burden of proof is clea r and convincing evidenc e may be a fine one in some case s, but there is a distinction in how the evidenc e is revie wed.” In re J.F.C. , 96 S.W .3d 256, 266 (Tex. 2002). When revie wing the fac tual sufficie ncy

of the e vidence in a par ental ter mination case, we vi ew all of t he evidence in a neutr al light and deter

mine whether a rea sonable fac t-finder could form a firm belief or conviction that a g iven finding was true. In re C.H. , 89 S.W .3d 17, 18–19 (Te x . 2 0 0 2 ). W e assume that the jury resolved disputed f

acts in f avor of its finding if a re asonable person c ould do so, and we disre g ard evidenc e that a rea sonable fac t-finder could have disbelieved or found incre dible. J.F.C. , 96 S.W .3d 3at 266. E v i d ence is fac tually insufficient only if a rea sonable fac t-finder could not have resolved

the di sputed evidenc e in fa vor of its finding and if that disput ed evidence is so signific ant t hat t he jury could not rea sonably

have f ormed a firm belief

or convic tion that its finding was true

. Id. Sufficient evidenc e of only one statutory g round is nece ssary to support a judgme nt in a pare ntal-rig hts-termination case . See In re A.V. , 113 S.W .3d 355, 362 (Tex. 2003). There fore , when, as here , multipl e statutory g round s fo r t er m i nation are alleg ed and the trial court issues a broad- form question asking the jury whether the pare nt-child rela tionship should be terminated, we must uphold the jury ’s fi n d i n g if any of the statutory g rounds alleg ed supports it. See Spurck v. Texas Dep’ t of

Family & Protective Servs. , 396 S.W .3d 205, 221 (Tex. App.—Austin 2013, no pet.) (citing In re B.K.D. , 131 S.W .3d 10, 16 (Tex. A pp.—For t Worth 2003, pet. denied) (per curia m)).

Fath er: statutory groun ds for term inati on

I n his first issue on appea l, Fa ther contends that the evidenc e is fac tually insufficient to support termination on any of the statutory g rounds alleg ed by the Depa rtment. The Depa

rtment alleg ed three statutory g rounds supporting termination of Fa ther’s pare ntal rig hts. These alleg ations

corr esponded to Texas Family Code section 161.001(1), subsections (D), (E), and (O)

. W e will focus our analy sis on the g round stated in part of subsection (E), which provides that pare ntal rig hts may be terminated if the pare nt “eng ag ed in conduct

. . . which endang ers the phy sical or emotional well-be ing of the child.” Tex. F am. Code § 161.001(1)( E); see Spurck , 396 S.W .3d at 221 (“O nly

one statutory g round is nece ssary to support a judgme nt in a pare ntal-rig hts-termination case .”); see also N.A.B. v. Texas Dep’ t of Family & Protective Servs. , No. 03-14-00377- CV, 2014 WL 6845179,

4at *2 (Tex. App.—Austin Nov. 26, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.) (foc using analy sis on subsection (E)

when tria l court submitted three statutory g rounds to jury

). To constitute endang erme nt unde r subsection (E), the pare nt’s conduct need not be d i re cted at the child. In re E.N.C. , 384 S.W .3d 796, 803 (Tex. 2012). Conduct may en d an ger a child even if i t does not cause the child to suffe r actua l injury

. In re M.C. , 917 S.W .2d 268, 269 (Tex. 1996) (per curia m) (quoting Texas Dep’ t of Human Servs. v. Boyd , 727 S.W .2d 531, 533 (Tex. 1987)). The conduct may also include actions the pare nt took befor e the child’s birth. In re J.O.A. , 283 S.W .3d 336, 345 (Tex. 2009).

I t is well-e stablished that a pare nt’s illega l drug use m ay constitute endang erme nt. See id. (“[A] pare nt’s use of narc otics and its eff ect on his or her ability to pare nt may qualify as an endang ering course of conduct.” ); W alker v. Texas Dep’ t of

Family & Protective Servs. , 312 S.W .3d 608, 617 (Tex. App.—Houston [1s t Dist.] 2009, pet. denied) (“B eca use it exposes the child to the possibili ty that the pare nt may be impaired or imprisoned, illega l drug use may support termination

u n d e r [s u b s e c ti o n ( E ) ]. ” ) ; I

n r e S

. N. , 2 7 2 S. W. 3 d 4 5 , 5 2 ( T e x. A p p . — Wa c o 2 0 0 8 , n o p e t. ) ( “ E v id e n c e of illega l drug use or alcohol abuse by a pare n t i s often cited as conduct which will support an affi rm ative finding that the pare nt has eng ag ed in a course of conduct which has the eff ect of

e n d a n g e r in g th e c h il d

. ” ) ; V

a s q u e z v . Te x a s D e p ’ t o f P r o te c ti v e & R e

g u la to r y S e r v s . , 1 9 0 S. W. 3 d 1 8 9 , 196 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. denied) (over ruling fac tual sufficie ncy challeng e to termination under su b s ec t i o n (E ) althoug h there was no direc t evidenc e that pare nt’s drug use injured ch i l d ); s ee also N.A.B. , 2014 WL 6845179, at *2 (stating pare nt’s use of narc otics may qualify as enda ng ering course of conduc t).

5Domestic violence may also constitute endang erme nt, even if the v i o lence is not

d ir e c te d a t th e c h il d

. S

e e I n r e C. J

. O

. , 3 2 5 S. W. 3 d 2 6 1 , 2 6 5 ( T e x. A p p . — E a s tl a

n d 2 0 1 0 , p e t. d e n ie d ) (“D omestic violence may be conside red e vidence of enda ng erme nt. I f a pa

rent a buses or ne g lects the other pare nt or other children, that conduct can be used to support a find i n g o f en d an germe nt

even ag ainst a child who wa s n o t y et born at the time of the conduct.” ) (citation omitted); In re J.I.T.P. , 99 S.W .3d 841, 845 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 2003, no pet.) (“A pare nt’s abusive

or violent conduct can produce a home environment that endang ers a child’s well-be ing. Domestic violence, want of self control, and propensity for violence may be considere d as evidenc e of endang erme nt.”) (c itation omit ted); see also N.A.B. , 2014 WL 6845179, at *2.

Finally , a pare nt’s criminal activity or incar cer at io n c an also constitute endang erme nt under subsection (E), espec ially if the pare nt has multipl e convictions or eng ag es in criminal activity

w h il e k n o w in g th a

t h is o r h e r p a

r e n ta l r ig h ts a r e in je o p a

r d y . S e e B o y d , 7 2 7 S. W. 2 d a

t 5 3 4 ( “ We h o ld that if the evidenc e, including the imprisonment, shows a course of conduct which has the eff ect of endang ering the phy sical or emotional well-be ing of the ch i l d , a finding under [predece ssor to subsection (E)] is supportable.” ); In re C.A.B. , 289 S.W .3d 8 7 4 , 8 8 5 (Tex

. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 2009, no pet.) (“[Mother] knew her pare ntal ri gh t s wer e in jeopar dy , y et she continued to eng ag e in criminal activity that resulted in being jailed.”) ; In re S.M.L. , 171 S.W .3d 472, 479 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 2005, no pet.) (“When pare nts are i n ca rc er ated, they are absent from the child’s daily life and are unable to pr ovide support, and when pare nts like a ppellant repe atedly commit criminal acts that subject them to the possibili ty of incar cer ation, that can neg atively impact

a child’s living environment an d em o t i o n al well-be ing.” ); In re AW T , 61 S.W .3d 87, 89 (Tex. App.—Amar illo 2001, no pet.) (per curia m) (“A uthority holds that i n t enti onal criminal activity 6which exposed the par en t t o i n ca rce ration is rele vant evidenc e tending to establish a course of

conduct e ndang ering the emotional and phy sical we ll being of the child.”)

. We rec og nize that when Fa ther lea rned that J .M. might be his child, he volunt arily

su b mi tt e d to p a

te r n it y te s ti n g . T h e ju

r y h e a r d e v id e n c e th a

t w h e n th e r e s u lt s e s ta

b li s h e d h is p a

te r n it y , Fa ther desired to be a part of J .M.’s life, visited J .M., and was respe ctful to J .M.’s g uardia n ad litem. I n addition, Mother testified that Fa ther threa tened to leave Mother beca use of Mother’s continued d r u g u s e . We a ls o a g

r e e w it h F a th e r ’ s c o n te n ti o n th a

t th e ma jo r it y o f th e e v id e n c e th a

t th e D e p a r tm e n t prese nted at trial was rele vant to the termination of Mother’s pare ntal rig hts, not to the termination of F ather ’s rig hts.

Neve rtheless, at trial, the Depa rtment did p re s ent undisputed evidenc e that Fa ther had bee n convicted of

the following offe nses: 3

• assault with bodily injury to a fa mily

member ( 2010) 4

• assault with bodily injury to a fa mily

member ( 2011)

• possession of marihuana (on a military

base) (2011)

• assault with family violence ( 2012)

• esca

pe fr om custody

(2012).

I n addition, the jury hear d evidenc e that afte r Fa ther lear ned that J .M. was his child, he was convicted of resisting arr est and possession of a controlled substance of four g rams or more but less than 200 g rams beca use of his involvement in the Hig h Five I nn incident. At the termination The y ear s listed are the y ear s when the of fense s occur

red. 3 The Depa

rtment also prese nted evidenc e that Fa ther violated the conditions of the defe rre d 4 adjudication h e re ce i v ed for the 2010 offe nse by testing positive for marihuana , driving while i n t o x i ca t ed, driving while license invalid, flee ing the scene , and admitting to using marihuana , alcohol, and “ [e] cstasy .” 7trial, Fa ther testified that he did not know there wer e any drug s in the room. Howeve r, the jury was

fre e to believe that Fa ther wa s justly convicted of these offe nses. See In re A.B. , 437 S.W .3d 498, 503 (Tex. 2014) (“[T]he court of appea ls must never theless s t i l l p rovide due defe renc e to the decisions of the fac tfinder, who, having full opportunity to observe witness testimony first-hand, is the sole ar

biter whe n assessing the cr edibility and deme anor of

witnesses.”)

. I n light of the entire rec ord, we deter mine that the jury could have rea sonably formed

a f ir m b e li e f th a

t F a th e r “ e n g a g e d in c o n d

u c t

. . . w h ic h e n d a

n g e r s th e p h

y s ic a l o r e mo ti o n a l w e ll

- b e in g of the child.” Tex. Fam. Code § 161.001(1)( E). Fa ther’s “patter n of crime, imprisonment, drug use, and violence ag ainst fa m ily members demonstrates a delibera te course of conduct from which a

rea sonable trier of fac t c ould ha ve found that [Father] endang ere d [J .M.’s] emotional and phy sical well-be ing.” See W

alker , 312 S.W .3d at 618; see also R.Z. v. Tex as Dep’t of F amily & Protective Servs. , No. 03-14-00412- CV, 2014 WL 5653272, at *6 (Tex. App.—Austin Oct. 29, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“H ere , the jury could have cre dited the evidenc e of illega l drug use, domestic violence, and criminal activity by [m other] both befor e and af t er [child] was remove d to find that [m other] eng ag ed in a conscious course of conduct that endang ere d her child.”). There fore , we conclude that the evidenc e is fac tually sufficie nt t o s u p p o rt the termination of Fa ther’s pare ntal rig hts under subsection (E) . Acc ording ly , we ove rrule F ather ’s first issue.

Fath er: be

st in terest of the child I n h i s s econd issue, Fa ther contends that the evidenc e is fac tually insufficient t o support the jury ’s deter

mination that it is in J .M.’s best interest to terminate Fa ther’s pare ntal rig hts.

8I n a par ental-r ights-te rmination case , the best intere st of the child is assessed using

a non-exhau s t i v e l i s t o f fac tors. See In re R.R. , 209 S.W .3d 112, 116 (Tex. 2006) (per curia m). These fac tors include (1) the child’ s wi s h es , (2 ) her emotional and phy sical needs now and in the future, (3) emotional or phy sical dang er to the child now and in the future, (4) the pare nting abilities of t he parties seeking custo d y , (5 ) progr ams available to help t hose parties, (6) plans for the child by the parties seeking custody , (7) the stability of the proposed place ment, (8) the acts or omissions of the pare nt which indicate that the exis ting paren t -c h i l d re lationship is not proper , and (9) any

excuses for the acts or omissions of the pare nt. See Holley v. Adams , 544 S.W .2d 3 6 7 , 3 7 1

– 7 2 (Tex. 1976)

. The Depa

rtment need not prove a ll nine Holley fac tors as a “ condition pr ece dent” to termination, and the absenc e of some fac tors does not bar the fac tfinder from finding that termination is in the child’s best interest. C.H. , 89 S.W .3d at 27. Whil e no one fac tor is controlling , the analy sis of a single fac tor may be adequate in a particular sit uation to s u p p o rt a finding t hat t ermination i s in the child’s best interest. In re J.O.C. , 47 S.W .3d 108, 1 1 5 (Tex. App.—Waco 2001, no pet.), disapproved on other grounds , J.F.C. , 96 S.W .3d at 267 n.39.

Fa ther’s convictions and histor y o f d ru g use, discussed above, are rele vant to

sever al Holley fac tors. See Smith v. Texas Dep’ t of Protective & Regulatory Servs. , 160 S.W .3d 673, 6 7 9 (Tex. App.—Austin 2005, no pet.) (“A lthough proving g rounds for termination und er section 161.001(1) does not relieve the Depa rtment of proving termination is in the best interest of the child under section 161.001(2), the same evidenc e may be probative of both issues.”). Fa ther’s criminal activity calls into question his pare nting abilities and constitutes ac t s i n d i cating that his p a r e n t- c h il d r e la

ti o n s h ip w it

h J. M

. is n o t p r o p e r . F a

th e r ’ s c r im e s w e r e n o t is o la te d in c id e n ts o c c u

r r in g in the distant past—his convictions occur red within the last five y ear s befor e trial and are evidenc e 9o f a pattern of behavior inconsistent with providing a safe environment for a child. S ee W a l ke r , 3 12 S.W .3d at 618 (jury could find that fathe r’s pattern of crime, imprisonment, dru g u s e, an d violence endang ere d child). Moreove r, at the time Fa ther was arr ested at the Hig h Five I nn, he had only rec ently been rele ased from federal prison. Although Fa ther prese nted evidenc e that he completed a “Men’ s L ife-Skills Course” and an “Ang er Manag ement class” while incar cer ated and has since obtained employ ment and housing, “in considering the best interest of the child, evidenc e of a rec ent turn-aro u n d in behavior by the pare nt does not totally offse t evidenc e of a pattern of instabilit y and har mful behavior in the pa st.” Smith , 160 S.W .3d at 681. I n contra st to the uncerta in and potentially dang erous living environment indica ted by Fa ther’s pattern of criminal behavior , the Depa rtment prese nted evidenc e that the foster pare nts wi t h wh om J .M. was living at the time of trial provided a stable environment. The ju ry h ea rd evidenc e that J .M. has lived with her fost er p ar en t s almost her entire life, that her foster pare nts intend to adopt J .M., and that the foster pare nts’ other children are doing well. I t is true that Fa ther did not reque st custody of J .M. at trial; instead, Fa ther only soug ht to maintain pare ntal rig hts in the hope of one day obtaining custody

. Howeve r, in deter mining the best interest of J .M., the jury was entitled to consider that keeping J .M. in foster car e temporar ily , instead of allowing the foster pare nts to adopt her, w ould leave J.M. “in limbo” with an uncer tain future. See id. at 683. I n light of the entire rec ord, we deter mine that the jury could have rea sonably formed

a firm belief that it is in J .M.’s bes t interest to terminate Fa ther’s pare ntal rig hts. We there fore conclude that fac tually sufficie nt e vidence exis ts to support the jury ’s best-intere st f inding and the termination of F ather ’s rig hts. Accor dingly , we ove rrule F ather ’s sec ond issue.

10Mother: adm ission of ev idence of escort serv ices I n her first issue, Mother contends that the trial court wrong fully admitted evidenc e reg arding adver

tisements Mother placed offering esco rt s ervices. At trial, Mother objected t o the admission of these ads on the g round that they wer e not rele vant beca use they d id not show that Mother endang er ed h er child in any way . Mother also arg ued that the evidenc e was more inflammatory and prejudicia l than probative. See Tex. R. Evid. 403. On appea l, Mother additionally arg ues that the ads are not rele vant b ec au se the Depa rtment did not prove at trial that Mother violated her family service plan or any laws by placing the ads. We revie w a trial court’s ruling on the admis sion of evidence for a n ab u s e of di scre tion. R.Z. , 2014 WL 5653272, at *3 (citing In re J.P.B. , 180 S.W .3d 570, 575 (Tex. 2005)).

This Court addre ssed a simil ar question i n R

. Z

. , wher e the mother challeng ed the trial court’ s decision to a dmit evide nce that she had posted adver tisements f

or escor t se rvice s on a website. See id. at *3–4. I n that case , this Court upheld the admission of the ads, rea soning that they

wer e rele vant to se vera l Holley fac tors and noting that Rule 403 is “an extraordinary reme dy ,” and “the best interest of the child must be the court’s primary consideration in a suit aff ecting the pare nt-child rela

tionship.” Id. at *4 (interna l quotation marks omitted). We likewise conclude that the evidenc e Mother complains of was rele vant to a deter mination of the chil d ’s best interest and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by declining to exclude the evidenc e under Rule 403. Even if we assume without deciding that it was leg al for Mother to post the ads for escor t service s, the ads wer e clea

rly of a sexual natur e, and Mother testified that she had ear ned money from providing the service s adver tised. The jury could have conclude d that providing escor t service s,

11even if leg al, constituted conduct that could pose em o t i o nal or phy sical dang er to her child.

Acc ording ly , we ove rrule Mothe r’s fir st issue. Mother: best interest of the child

I n her second issue, Mothe r co n t en ds that the evidenc e is fac tually insufficient to support the jury ’s deter

mination that it is in J .M.’s best interest to terminate Mother’s pare ntal rig hts. I n analy zing the fac tual sufficie ncy of the evidenc e, we consider the Holley fac tors discussed above. See R .R. , 209 S.W .3d at 116.

At trial, the Department presented undisput ed evidence that Mother was convicted of the following offe nses: 5

• Possession of a controlled substanc e (le ss than 1 g ram) ( 2005)

• Assault with bodily injury (2005)

• Possession of coca ine (4 to 200 g rams) ( 2006)

• Acc ident involving dama g e to vehicle (2010) 6

• Fa ilure to identify (2011)

• Fa ilure to identify (2012)

• Possession of a controlled substanc e (4 to 200 g rams) ( 2014) 7

• Possession of controlled substance (less than 2 oz.) (2014)

• Resisting ar

rest (2014)

• Assault on a public ser vant (2014).

The y ear s listed are the y ear s when the of fense s occur

red. 5 Mother testified that she did not have a driver’ s license when she was in the acc ident that 6 led to this conviction. Mother furthe r testified that she ha s never had a dr iver’s lice nse. The four offe nses from 2014 wer e related to Mother’ s involvement in the Hig h Five I nn 7 incident. 12I n addition, Mother testified that she was 30 y ear s old at the time of trial and that she had spent eig ht

or nine y ear s of her life incar cer ated. I ndeed, Mother was incar cer ated at the time of trial. Although Mother off

ere d testimony

attempting to minimiz e her wrong doing w ith respec t to severa l of these offe nses, the jury could have reje cted her version of events. See A.B. , 437 S.W .3d at 503 (fa ct-finde r is sole arbiter of

witness cre dibilit y

). Mother testi fied to extensive drug use spanning many y ea rs . She testified t hat s he beg an using marihuana when she was 15 y ear s old. Mother further testified that she used “coke ” when preg nant with J .M., althoug h she stated that once she found out she was preg nant she stopped taking drug s for the dur ation of her preg nancy . She also admitted to using “ meth,” “e cstasy ,” and “spice .” The Depa

rtment prese nted evidenc e that Mother tested positive fo r both coca ine and methamphetamine a fter the alterc ation with C.G. that led to J .M.’s remova l.

At trial, the De partment called Dr. Michae l Campbell, a psy cholog ist who testified that Mother suffe rs from a number of disorders an d that Mother’s dy sfunctional childhood and

err atic employ

ment would make it difficult for M o t h er t o b e a good parent t o J .M. Dr. Campbell

o p i n ed t h at returning J .M. to Mother at that time or i n the near future would not be in J .M.’s b es t interest. Mother testified that she had never befor e been diag nosed with some of the disorders Dr. Campbell discussed but did te stify that she had previously been diag nosed with post-traumatic stress disorder , depre ssion, and bipolar disorder (which Mother

descr ibed as “ mood swings” ). As discussed above, the Depa rtment also prese nted evidenc e that Mother had posted adver tisements for escor

t service s and that Mother had made money by p ro v i ding such service s. See R.Z. , 2014 WL 5653272, at *4. I n addition, the jury hear d evidenc e of the alterc ation betwee n

13Mother and C.G., which alleg edly occur red in front of J .M. and J .M.’s older sibling. Acc ording to Mother, C .G. bega

n the altercation by acc using Mother of t aking J .M. around a pedoph i l e (which Mother denie d).

We rec og nize that the evidenc e prese nted at tri al showed that Mother has fac ed

enormous obstacles in her life, including sexual abuse when she was a child. Neve rtheless, in light of the entire rec ord, we conclude that the evidenc e of Mother’s history of cri m i n al activity , drug
use, incar cer ation, mental health issues, and err atic employ ment was sufficie nt to allow the jury to

rea sonably form a firm belief that it is in J .M.’s best interest to te rminate Mother’s pare ntal rig hts. Be cause the evidenc e is fac tually sufficie nt to support the jury ’s fi n d i ng , we overr ule Mother’s second issue.

CONCLUSION

Having overr

uled eac h of Fa t h er ’s and Mother’s issues, we aff irm the order of the trial court ter

minating their

pare ntal rig hts.

__________________________________________

Scott K. Field, Just ice Be fore Chief J ustice Rose, Jus tices Goodwin a nd Field Affir med Filed: May

21, 2015

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