This memorandum opinion was not selected for publi cation in the New Mexico Reports. Please see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated errors or other deviations from the official paper version file d by the Court of Appeals and does not include the filing date. IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 1 STATE OF NEW MEXICO, 2 Plaintiff-Appellee, 3

v. NO. 30,959 4 EDWARD SOTO, 5 Defendant-Appellant. 6 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF LEA COUNTY 7 Gary L. Clingman, District Judge 8 Gary K. King, Attorney General 9 Santa Fe, NM 10 Jacqueline R. Medina, Assistant Attorney General 11 Albuquerque, NM 12 for Appellee 13 Jacqueline Cooper, Ch ief Public Defender 14 J.K. Theodosia Johnson, Assi stant Appellate Defender 15 Santa Fe, NM 16 for Appellant 17

MEMORANDUM OPINION 182 CASTILLO, Chief Judge. 1 Police seized drug paraphernalia and weapons after searching a residence. 2 These items formed the basis for the instant criminal proceedings. Defendant moved 3 to suppress, challenging the validity of the search. The district court denied the 4 motion. For the reasons that follow, we affirm. 5 BACKGROUND 6 On September 26, 2009, Defendant was staying in a residence leased by 7 Michelle Johnson and Robert DeLeon. S hortly after midnight Officer Blevins and 8 Sergeant Cunningham approached the residence and obtained the lessees’ permission 9 to conduct a search. 10 For the purposes of the present appeal , only a portion of the residence is of 11 significance. The officers described the ar ea in question as a large common room, into 12 which one stepped immediately upon entering the residence. This common room was 13 comprised of two adjacent areas, which might be loosely described as the northern and 14 southern living rooms. Defendant had beensleeping on a mattress on the floor in the 15 northern living room. The area had not beensegregated in any way from the rest of 16 the common living space. A couch, desk, and computer were also located in the 17 immediate vicinity. Despite Defendant’s presence, his consent to search the area was 18 not sought. 193 Ultimately, the search of the living room and adjacent closet yielded drug 1 paraphernalia and firearms. Defendant admitted that one or more of the items seized 2 were his. 3 Below, Defendant moved to suppress on grounds that the warrantless search of 4 the residence was unconstitutional. The distri ct court denied the motion. This appeal 5 followed. 6 STANDARD OF REVIEW 7 When reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, “[w]e view the facts in the 8 manner most favorable to the prevailing party and defer to the district court’s findings 9 of fact if substantial evidence exists to support those findings.” State v. Urioste , 10 2002-NMSC-023, ¶ 6, 132 N.M. 592, 52 P.3d 964. “All reasonable inferences in 11 support of the district court’s decision w ill be indulged in, and all inferences or 12 evidence to the contrary will be disregarded.” State v. Jason L. , 2000-NMSC-018, ¶ 13 10, 129 N.M. 119, 2 P.3d 856 (alterations omitted) (internal quotation marks and 14 citation omitted). “Whether a search or se izure is reasonable is a mixed question of 15 fact and law” that we review de novo. State v. Ulibarri , 2010-NMCA-084, ¶ 7, 148 16 N.M. 576, 240 P.3d 1050. 17 DISCUSSION 18 Standing 194 The threshold question raised by the St ate is whether Defendant has standing 1 to challenge the constitutionality of the s earch. Defendant’s standing depends on 2 whether he has a reasonable expectati on of privacy in the place searched. State v. 3 Zamora , 2005-NMCA-039, ¶ 10, 137 N.M. 301, 110 P.3d 517. 4 This Court has previously recognized that an individual’s status as a permissive 5 overnight houseguest is generally sufficient to confer standing. See id. ¶¶ 10-14 6 (discussing authorities including Minnesota v. Olson , 495 U.S. 91 (1990)). In an 7 apparent effort to distinguish this case, the State suggests that the evidence failed to 8 establish that Defendant was an overnight guest. 9 Defendant’s status as an overnight guest was not the subject of direct testimony 10 below. However, Johnson told the officers th at some people had been staying at the 11 house for a few days. Although she did not specifically identify him by name, 12 Defendant and his girlfriend appear to be the only people to whom Johnson could 13 reasonably have been referring. The circum stantial evidence is al so compelling. The 14 search was conducted shortly after midnight , and when Officer Blevins entered the 15 residence, Defendant was lying on a makeshift bed on the floor in what appeared to 16 be the living room of the home. In our es timation, Defendant’s status as an overnight 17 guest was the only reasonable inference to be drawn from this uncontradicted 18 evidence. See generally Jason L. , 2000-NMSC-018, ¶ 11 (observing that, although 195 a reviewing court generally indulges all reasonable inferences in support of a ruling 1 on a motion to suppress, we neverthele ss presume the district court believed 2 uncontradicted evidence); Zamora , 2005-NMCA-039, ¶ 8 (quoting Jason L. for the 3 same proposition). We therefore decline th e State’s invitation to affirm for want of 4 standing. 5 Consent 6 Defendant contends that th e warrantless search of the residence and the ensuing 7 seizure of evidence was invalid. 8 A warrantless search of a home is “p resumptively unreasonable, subject only 9 to a few specific, narrowly defined exceptions.” State v. Ryon , 2005-NMSC-005, 10 ¶ 23, 137 N.M. 174, 108 P.3d 1032. “One of the settled exceptions to the warrant 11 requirement is consent.” State v. Flores , 2008-NMCA-074, ¶ 12, 144 N.M. 217, 185 12 P.3d 1067. 13 In this case the State relies on cons ent obtained from Johnson and DeLeon, one 14 or both of whom leased the house and reside d there. To the extent that they had 15 common authority over the area in question, th eir consent is sufficient to validate the 16 search. See State v. Duffy , 1998-NMSC-014, ¶ 66, 126 N.M. 132, 967 P.2d 807 (“An 17 individual has authority to consent to the search of a dwelling if that person actually 18 possesses the property or has common authoritywith others who are in possession.”), 196 modified on other grounds by State v. Gallegos , 2007-NMSC-007, 141 N.M. 185, 152 1 P.3d 828. “In this context, common authority is defined as mutual use of the property 2 by persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes.” State v. Ryan , 3 2006-NMCA-044, ¶ 29, 139 N.M. 354, 132 P. 3d 1040 (internal quotation marks and 4 citation omitted). 5 As previously mentioned, the specific area at issue in th is case comprised a 6 portion of a common room into which one stepped immediately upon entering the 7 residence. There was no door, wall, or other partition separating this area from the 8 rest of the living room. The area contained typical living room furnishings such as a 9 couch, desk, and computer. Neither Defendant nor any other witness testified that the 10 area was reserved for Defendant’s exclus ive use. We conclude that under such 11 circumstances, the district court could reasonably have inferred that Johnson and 12 DeLeon, as lessees and resi dents, had joint access or control for most purposes over 13 this common area, such that their consent validated the search. See State v. Diaz , 14 1996-NMCA-104, ¶ 16, 122 N.M. 384, 925 P.2d 4 (observing that co-occupants share 15 common authority to consent to search common areas of a residence); see generally 16 State v. Lopez , 2005-NMSC-018, ¶ 9, 138 N.M. 9, 116 P.3d 80 (“[W]e must draw all 17 reasonable inferences in support of the district court’s denial of [the d]efendant’s 18 motion to suppress and defer to the districtcourt’s determination of the facts.”). 197 In an effort to avoid the foregoing resu lt, Defendant attempts to analogize this 1 case to Diaz , arguing that he had a “superior privacyright” in the area. However, the 2 area at issue in Diaz was a discrete space separated from the rest of the home by walls 3 and a doorway, which was specifically and exclusively utilized by the homeowner’s 4 adult son as his bedroom. 1996-NMCA-104, ¶¶ 5, 15. Under the circumstances, the 5 son “had far greater access and control and a superior privacy interest,” id. ¶ 16, such 6 that the homeowner did not have common authority over the bedroom. In this case, 7 by contrast, the area in which Defendant was sleeping was not partitioned from the 8 rest of the home in any way. Nor did the evidence establish that the area was set aside 9 for Defendant’s private use. To the contrary, as previously stat ed it appears to have 10 constituted a common area. As Diaz itself reflects, co-occupants may reasonably be 11 said to assume the risk that others might consent to the search of such common areas. 12 Id. We therefore reject Defendant’s claim to a superior privacy interest in the area. 13 We also understand Defendant to suggest that the doctrine of common authority 14 should be deemed inapplicable to the extent that a search of Defendant’s personal 15 belongings or possessions is atissue. However, this case involves the search of a 16 residence, which yielded certain incriminating pers onal possessions. We find no 17 indication that a search of Defendant’s personal belongings or possessions occurred. 18 We therefore remain of the opinion that th e doctrine of common authority is both fully 198 applicable and ultimately determinative. 1

CONCLUSION 2 For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that Defendant’s motion to suppress 3 was properly denied. We therefore affirm. 4 IT IS SO ORDERED. 5

__________________________________ 6 CELIA FOY CASTILLO, Chief Judge 7

WE CONCUR: 8

__________________________________ 9 JAMES J. WECHSLER, Judge 10

__________________________________ 11 JONATHAN B. SUTIN, Judge 12