This memorandum opinion was not selected for pub lication in the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Please see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated errors or other deviations from the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does not include the filing date. IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 1 WILMINGTON SAVINGS FUND SOCIETY, 2 FSB, d/b/a CHRISTIANA TRUST, NOT 3 INDIVIDUALLY BUT AS TRUSTEE FOR 4 THE PRETIUM MORTGAGE ACQUISITION 5 TRUST, 6 Plaintiff-Appellee, 7

v. No. A-1-CA-36787 8 LEANNAH M. SAUCEDA and 9 LORENZO J. SAUCEDA, 10 Defendants-Appellants. 11 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF VALENCIA COUNTY 12 James Lawrence Sanchez, District Judge 13 Joshua T. Chappell 14 Albuquerque, NM 15 for Appellee 16 Leannah M. Sauceda 17 Lorenzo M. Sauceda 18 Belen, NM 19 Pro Se Appellants 20 MEMORANDUM OPINION 212 ZAMORA, Judge. 1 {1} Defendants appeal from a district court order granting summary judgment in 2 favor of Plaintiff’s foreclosure complaint. We issued a calendar notice proposing to 3 affirm. Defendants have re sponded with a memorandum in opposition. We affirm. 4 {2} For purposes of consistency, we will continue to address Defendants’ issues in 5 the order presented set forth in the docketing statement. 6 {3} Issues 1-3: Defendants continue tochallenge the district court’s grant of 7 summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff on its complaint for foreclosure. “Summary 8 judgment is appropriate where there are no genuine issues of material fact and the 9 movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Self v. United Parcel Serv., Inc. , 10 1998-NMSC-046, ¶ 6, 126 N.M. 396, 970 P.2d 582. “We review these legal questions 11 de novo.” Id. “The movant need only make a prima facie showing that he is entitled 12 to summary judgment. Upon the movant making a prima facie showing, the burden 13 shifts to the party opposing the motion to demonstrate the ex istence of specific 14 evidentiary facts which would require trial on the merits.” Roth v. Thompson , 1992- 15 NMSC-011, ¶ 17, 113 N.M. 331, 825 P.2d 1241 (citation omitted). 16 {4} Defendants challenge Plaintiff’s standing to enforce the note. An entity wishing 17 to foreclose on a mortgage must establish that, at the time the foreclosure action is 18 filed, the entity had the right to enforce the promissory note underlying the mortgage, 193 as well as ownership of the mortgage lien on the property. See Deutsche Bank Nat’l 1 Trust Co. v. Johnston , 2016-NMSC-013, ¶ 23, 369 P.3d 1046. One way to show the 2 right to enforce the promissory note is to attach a copy of the note, bearing appropriate 3 indorsements, to the complaint. Id. 4 {5} In this case, Plaintiff’s predecessor-i n-interest established that it was in 5 possession of the original note at the time it commenced the suit and that it was 6 entitled to enforce the note, which was i ndorsed in blank. [RP 6, 318] Both the 7 referenced note and the mortgage were attach ed to the complaint. [RP 6, 9] As such, 8 we conclude that Plaintiff, as the assign ee and holder of the note, established that it 9 had standing. See Bank of New York v. Romero , 2014-NMSC-007, ¶ 26, 320 P.3d 1 10 (“[The] blank indorsement . . . establishe d the [b]ank as a holder because the [b]ank 11 [was] in possession of bearer paper[.]”); see alsoNMSA 1978, § 55-3-104(a) (1992) 12 (stating that a promissory note can be en forced by the holder of the instrument); 13 NMSA 1978, § 55-1-201(b)(21)(A) (2005) (stating that the holder of the instrument 14 is “the person in possession of a negotiable in strument that is payable either to bearer 15 [in blank] or to an identified person that is the person in possession”). 16 {6} Issue 4: Defendants have claimed that Lu cy Babik lacked personal knowledge 17 for purposes of establishing that Plaintiff and/or its predecessor-in-interest were 18 holders of the note during the course of thes e proceedings. Our review of her affidavit 194 [RP 180-83] indicates otherwise, and De fendants’ unsupported assertion to the 1 contrary is insufficient for purposes of defeating summary judgment. See Pedigo v. 2 Valley Mobile Homes, Inc ., 1982-NMCA-066, ¶ 7, 97 N.M. 795, 643 P.2d 1247 3 (noting that “factually unsupported opinion testimony” is “not sufficient to defeat a 4 motion for summary judgment”). 5 {7} Issue 5: Defendants continue to argue [M IO 3] that Mortgage Electronic 6 Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS) lackedauthority to convey title to Plaintiff 7 because it was a mere nominal possessor of the mortgage. Both our Supreme Court 8 and this Court have already expressly ruled that MERS, as nominee for a lender, can 9 assign the mortgage on behalf of such lender. See Bank of New York , 2014-NMSC10 007, ¶ 35 (stating that “[a]s a nominee for [the original lender] on the mortgage 11 contract, MERS could assign the mortgage”); Flagstar Bank, FSB v. Licha , 2015- 12 NMCA-086, ¶ 17, 356 P.3d 1102 (reiterating that “where MERS’ role was that of a 13 nominee for [the l]ender and [the l]ender' s successors and assigns , MERS could assign 14 the mortgage” (alterations, internal quot ation marks, and citation omitted)), abrogated 15 as recognized by PNC Mortg. v. Romero , 2016-NMCA-064, 377 P.3d 461. 16 {8} For the reasons stated above, we affirm. 17 {9} IT IS SO ORDERED. 18

195 M. MONICA ZAMORA, Judge 1 WE CONCUR: 2

3 MICHAEL E. VIGIL, Judge 4

5 HENRY M. BOHNHOFF, Judge 6