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UNITED STATES STRATEGY AND POLICY IN THE 

MIDDLE EAST 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

JANUARY 20, 2016 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov/ 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona, Chairman 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma 

JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama 

ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi 

KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire 

DEB FISCHER, Nebraska 

TOM COTTON, Arkansas 

MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota 

JONI ERNST, Iowa 

THOM TILLIS, North Carolina 

DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska 

MIKE LEE, Utah 

LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina 

TED CRUZ, Texas 

JACK REED, Rhode Island 

BILL NELSON, Florida 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri 

JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York 

RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut 

JOE DONNELLY, Indiana 

MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii 

TIM KAINE, Virginia 

ANGUS S. KING, JR., Maine 

MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico 

CHRISTIAN D. BROSE, Staff Director 

ELIZABETH L. KING, Minority Staff Director 

(II)

C O N T E N T S 

JANUARY 20, 2016 

Page 

UNITED STATES STRATEGY AND POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST .............................. 1 

Keane, General John M., USA (Ret.), Chairman, Institute for the Study 

of War, and Former Vice Chief of Staff of the Army ........................................ 5 

Crocker, Honorable Ryan C., Dean and Executive Professor, The George Bush 

School of Government and Public Service, Texas A & M University, and 

Former United States Ambassador to Afghanistan .......................................... 14 

Gordon, Honorable Philip H., Senior Fellow, The Council on Foreign Relations, and Former Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian 

Affairs .................................................................................................................... 18 

Questions for the Record ......................................................................................... 52 

(III)

(1) 

UNITED STATES STRATEGY AND POLICY IN 

THE MIDDLE EAST 

WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 20, 2016 

U.S. SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, 

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:35 a.m. in Room 

SH–216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator John McCain (chairman) presiding. 

Committee members present: Senators McCain, Inhofe, Sessions, 

Ayotte, Fischer, Cotton, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, Reed, Nelson, 

McCaskill, Manchin, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Donnelly, 

Hirono, Kaine, King, and Heinrich. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN, CHAIRMAN 

Chairman MCCAIN. Good morning. The Senate Armed Services 

Committee meets this morning to continue our focus on United 

States policy and strategy in the Middle East. 

I want to begin by saying that we all welcome the news this 

weekend that four Americans who had been unjustly held captive 

in Iran were finally released. There will be plenty of time to examine the circumstances of their original detention and ultimate release, but four Americans being united with their families is good 

news. Now the United States must continue to press for the release 

of those Americans still missing or imprisoned in Iran, including 

Robert Levinson; and we must push for the release of thousands 

of Iranian political prisoners jailed by the Iranian regime, which 

continues to suppress dissent and undermine human rights. 

A previous generation of American leaders once remembered that 

they were, quote, ‘‘present at the creation’’ of the rules-based international order that has been the source of unprecedented security 

and prosperity for the United States and the world. If present 

trends continue, we may well remember that we were present at 

the unraveling of this international order. While signs of this unraveling can be seen in Europe and Asia, it is most visible and 

most dangerous in the Middle East. 

All across the region, we see a dangerous breakdown of state authority and the balance of power. As Henry Kissinger testified before this committee, there is a struggle for power within states, a 

conflict between states, a conflict between ethnic and religious 

groups, and an assault on the international system. As General 

Petraeus also told us last year, almost every Middle Eastern country is now a battleground or a combatant in one or more wars. 

2 

For the past 7 years, the Obama administration has sought to 

scale back America’s involvement and commitment to the region, 

assuming that a post-American Middle East would be good for the 

region and for us, and that regional powers would step up to police 

the region themselves. The results of this massive gamble should 

now be clear to us all. No new order has emerged in the Middle 

East. Only chaos. A power vacuum has opened up in the absence 

of America and has been filled by the most extreme and anti-American of forces, Sunni terrorist groups such as ISIL [the Islamic 

State of Iraq and the Levant] and al Qaeda, or Shiite extremists 

such as the Islamic Republic of Iran and its proxies, and the imperial ambitions of Vladimir Putin. These challenges were always 

going to be present and difficult, but it did not have to be this way, 

this dangerous. Instead of acknowledging its failures and changing 

course, as previous administrations of both parties have done, the 

administration has all too often doubled down on its reactive, incremental, and inadequate policies. Now more than a year into the 

campaign to roll back and destroy ISIL, it is impossible to assert 

that ISIL is losing or that we are winning. To be sure, there has 

been some tactical progress, including the recent recapture of 

Ramadi. This is a testament to our civilian and military leaders, 

but serious challenges remain. 

ISIL has lost some territory on the margin, but has consolidated 

power in its core territories in both Iraq and Syria. It maintains 

control of key Iraq cities, like Mosul and Fallujah. Our military 

commanders estimate that this key terrain will not be retaken this 

year. 

The U.N. reports that, since ISIL’s invasion of Iraq in 2014, 

nearly 20,000 Iraq civilians have been killed, nearly 3,500 people, 

predominantly women and children, are estimated to be ISIL’s 

slaves in Iraq. As sectarian divisions worsen in Iraq, it is no surprise that the training of Iraq security forces has been slow and the 

building of support for Sunni tribal forces even slower. 

In Syria, there is no plausible strategy to achieve ISIL’s defeat 

on a timeline that won’t result in the tragic deaths of tens of thousands of Syrians. There is still no ground force that is both willing 

and able to retake Raqqa, nor is there a realistic prospect of one 

emerging soon. 

In the absence of a realistic strategy to create the conditions for 

the achievement of United States goals, the administration has instead fallen back on hope, the hope that diplomacy, without sufficient leverage, can convince Russia and Iran to abandon Bashar 

Assad and join the fight against ISIL. We read, just this morning, 

that Russia’s air campaign continues to target moderate opposition 

groups and may be gaining traction in stabilizing the Assad regime. Meanwhile, ISIL continues to metastasize across the region 

in places like Afghanistan, Libya, Lebanon, Yemen, and Egypt. Its 

attacks are now global, as we saw in Paris, San Bernardino, and 

most recently in Istanbul. These attacks should be a wake-up call 

that ISIL’s threat to our homeland is real, direct, and growing, and 

that we need a strategy to destroy ISIL, not ultimately, but as 

quickly as possible. The administration cannot continue to assume 

that time is on our side. 

3 

One element of the administration’s Middle East policy that has 

been clear from the beginning is its policy toward Iran. Instead of 

negotiating a deal to force Iran to give up its nuclear program, the 

administration signed a deal that would, as Dr. Kissinger said, 

merely move from preventing proliferation to managing it. Despite 

all the talk of how this nuclear deal has opened a window for a new 

relationship with Iran, the Islamic Republic’s behavior has not 

changed. Indeed, rather than empowering Iranian moderates, as 

the administration claimed, the nuclear deal appears to be doing 

the opposite: emboldening hardliners. Iran has now conducted two 

advanced missile tests since October, in violation of U.N. Security 

Council resolutions. It fired rockets within 1,500 yards of a U.S. 

aircraft carrier. Iran seized two United States Navy vessels 

transiting the Persian Gulf, illegally detained 10 American soldier—sailors, and propagandized the entire incident, in total violation of international law and centuries of maritime tradition. I 

must add, as a former Navy person and from a Navy family of generations, that’s the most humiliating thing that I have seen that 

American sailors, members of the United States Navy, has been 

subjected to in my or their lifetime. I am sure that the Iranians 

used those pictures of American servicemen and a -woman on their 

knees much to their great success throughout the world as well as 

the region. 

Shortly after the result—release of four American hostages in 

Iran, we learned that three Americans were kidnapped in Baghdad, apparently by an Iranian-backed Shiite militia. I have no 

doubt that the Obama administration has pursued a new relationship with Iran because it believed doing so would diminish sectarian tensions in the region, but the reality is that the administration’s overtures to Iran have only exacerbated these tensions and 

deepened feelings of suspicion and alienation among our traditional 

Sunni partners and our allies such as Israel and Turkey. This dynamic has only grown worse because the administration has been 

so slow to offer support to those allies and partners, as we have 

recently seen with delayed fighter aircraft sales to Qatar and Kuwait. For decades, America’s role in the Middle East has been to 

suppress security competition between states with long histories of 

mistrust and to prevent that competition from breaking down into 

open war. This is the responsibility that we are now advocating, 

and we’re paying a very heavy price for doing so that is only growing. 

I hope that our witnesses today can help us better understand 

the costs of our current course and contemplate a better alternative. 

Senator Reed. 

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED 

Senator REED. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let 

me join you in welcoming our witnesses. They have an extraordinary wealth of experience and distinguished service to the Nation 

in different capacities. 

Gentlemen, thank you for your service, and we look forward to 

your testimony. 

4 

This past weekend, we saw a number of significant developments 

in the Middle East, most notably implementation day of the Joint 

Comprehensive Plan of Action, or the JCPOA, an exchange of prisoners between the United States and Iran, and the settlement of 

a 35-year-old legal dispute between the United States and Iran. Individually, these are notable developments, but, combined, they 

have the potential—and let me emphasize ‘‘potential’’—to represent 

an inflection point and an opportunity to shift the course of United 

States and Iranian relations. The President stated this weekend, 

the opportunity for these kind of changes are rare, indeed. 

While I share the President’s hope for new opportunities, I also 

share concerns about Iran’s destabilizing actions in the Middle 

East. In order for improved relations to materialize, Iran will need 

to faithfully implement the terms of the JCPOA, change its course 

in its destabilizing actions in Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq, and its provocative actions with respect to its missile program. I hope the witnesses will provide their assessment of these events and what opportunities and cautionary notes they would present for consideration to the committee. 

I recently returned from a visit to Iraq, where I had the opportunity to meet with some of the country’s political leadership, our 

Nation’s diplomatic representatives, and our military commanders 

on the ground. My visit came on the heels of the successful operation by Iraq’s security forces to take and retake Ramadi. This success, which was enabled by coalition airpower, gave a significant 

confidence boost to the Iraqi Security Forces, and I hope this momentum will continue. 

In Syria, as a result of the violent agendas of both the Assad regime and ISIL, the humanitarian situation is increasingly dire, and 

the human cost of this conflict is staggering. With regard to ISIL, 

our military has embarked on a campaign to ensure that ISIL is 

under increasing pressure. The deployment of additional Special 

Operations Forces and other critical enabling capabilities are important developments. With respect to the overall conflict in Syria, 

Secretary Kerry is pursuing an ambitious agenda to facilitate a 

diplomatic pathway to end the conflict, and should be recognized 

for his persistence. I look forward to hearing the views or our witnesses on their assessment of whether the current peace talks 

might bear fruit. 

One other issue that struck me during my visit to the region was 

our Government’s efforts to counter ISIL in the information environment. This is an area where the administration is appropriately 

and necessarily trying to breathe new life into interagency efforts 

on this front through the creation of the Global Engagement Center. This is a well-intended effort, but we must ensure that it is 

adequately resourced and empower it with necessary authorities if 

it is to be successful. I look forward to hearing from our witnesses 

on what they hope to see from this Center; more importantly, how 

we can effectively begin, I think, to win the information war which 

ISIL has been so effective at. 

Given that Ambassador Crocker is here, I’m going to also take 

the opportunity to briefly mention Afghanistan, which I also had 

the opportunity to visit. The security situation is challenging, but 

Afghan National Security Forces remain coherent and responsive 

5 

through the first year in which they had sole responsibility for conventional ground combat operations. Further complicating the security situation has been the emergence of the so-called Islamic State 

in the Khorasan Province, or ISKP. The chairman referred to that. 

Given the increasing threat posed by ISKP to the United States 

and regional security, I support the reported recent approval by the 

White House of targeted strikes against the group. Ensuring our 

commanders on the ground have the proper authorities will be critical to the future success of our broader efforts to support the Afghan National Security Forces. 

From the political standpoint, the National Unity Government, 

led by President Ghani and CEO [Chief Executive Officer] 

Abdullah, has held together through a difficult year, providing an 

opportunity for progress on key reform issues, including governance 

and corruption. An evaluation of lessons learned for the past year 

may yield new ways in which the United States and our coalition 

partners can improve our support to security operations and political progress by the Afghans, going forward. Again, I’d be interested, particularly from Ambassador Crocker, on what we should 

do and must do in this area. 

Thank you, gentlemen, and I look forward to your testimony. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Welcome, General Keane, Chairman of the 

Institute for the Study of War, and former Vice Chief of Staff for 

the Army; and The Honorable Ryan C. Crocker, Dean and Executive Professor of the George Bush School of Government and Public 

Service, Texas A & M University, former United States Ambassador 

to too many countries to name; and The Honorable Philip H. Gordon, Senior Fellow of the Council on Foreign Relations, and former 

Special Assistant to the President, and White House Middle East 

Coordinator. 

General Keane, due to your advanced age, we will begin with 

you. 

[Laughter.] 

General KEANE. Okay. 

STATEMENT OF GENERAL JOHN M. KEANE, USA (RET.), CHAIRMAN, INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF WAR, AND FORMER 

VICE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMY 

General KEANE. Thank you, Chairman McCain, Ranking Member 

Reed, distinguished members of the committee. I’m honored to be 

back to provide testimony again on the challenges of the Middle 

East. 

This committee’s persistence in keeping us focused on the unparalleled upheaval in the Middle East is commendable. Thank you for 

your hard work and much welcome reforms that are included in 

the National Defense Authorization Act. 

I am honored to be a part of this distinguished panel with The 

Honorable Phil Gordon, and particularly to be reunited with Ambassador Crocker, who remains today America’s most successful 

and preeminent diplomat, whose extensive service throughout the 

Middle East is legendary. I was privileged to work with Ambassador Crocker during the Iraq and Afghanistan surges while I was 

assisting General Petraeus. 

6 

In previous testimonies before this committee, I provided details 

on how to defeat ISIS [the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria] in Iraq 

and Syria, and also on Russia’s involvement in Syria. Today, my 

focus is yours and what you’ve asked us to do, and that is to deal 

with overall U.S. policy and strategy in the region. I’ve brought 

along a couple of maps for you to look at. I think they’ll put them 

up on boards when we reference them, and they—you should have 

them at your seat, as well. 

The Middle East has experienced one of the most tumultuous periods in its history, with the old order challenged by the aspirational goals of the Arab Spring, radicalized Islamists taking advantage of the political and social upheaval, and the Islamic State of 

Iran using proxies to achieve regional influence and control. Some 

issues in the Middle East have been simmering for some time and 

certainly are underlying factors, such as historical sectarianism, repressive regimes, political and social injustice, and the lack of economic opportunity, exacerbated now by the price of oil. One cannot 

simply blame these larger forces operating in the region and absolve the United States of specific policy decisions that has had unintended adverse consequences. Let’s just go name a few: 

Egypt. In 2010, the Arab Spring begins, and, in looking back, 

while most Arab countries were in some form of pre-revolutionary 

phase, it was a strategic surprise. The United States, in the face 

of major civil unrest in Cairo, abandons Mubarak, a multi-decade 

ally of the United States and an ally of the Arab states in the region. The result is, the Muslim Brotherhood, who are elected, 

moved quickly without any United States opposition, to transition 

Egypt, a seculist state, to an Islamic state. Iran supports the Muslim Brotherhood. The Muslim Brotherhood, as we know, quickly 

lose support of the people and are deposed in a military coup. 

Libya. In 2011, after Qadhafi is deposed and killed, a newly 

elected moderate Islamic regime requests support to train a national security force to repress the radical militants. The United 

States refuses. Some of the same militants, Ansar al Sharia, burn 

down the United States Consulate, kill the Ambassador and three 

others, force the evacuation of a covert CIA [Central Intelligence 

Agency] base, and, the following year, force a United States retreat 

from Libya, with the closing of the United States Embassy. Libya 

is now a failed state, a breeding ground for radical Islamists, and 

the largest ISIS presence outside of Syria and Iraq. 

Iraq. Whether the 2003 invasion was misguided or righteous, it 

ushered in the first Arab democracy in the Middle East while also 

giving rise to al Qaeda in Iraq, who was defeated in 2008. In 2009, 

the new United States administration began to distance itself politically from Iraq, providing the entree for greater Iranian influence and culminating in a total military pullout from Iraq in 2010. 

Prime Minister Maliki immediately begins a purge of political opponents and military leaders, and al Qaeda reemerges that same 

year. 

Syria. Syria’s civil war, growing out of the Arab Spring in 2011, 

is stalemated because the rebels’ initial gains are thwarted by Iranian proxies, the Hezbollah, and Iraqi Shiite militias, plus the 

Quds Force, and much needed supplies and equipment from Russia 

and Iran. The rebels, in 2011 and 2012, seek assistance from the 

7 

United States, which is recommended by Secretaries Clinton and 

Panetta, General Dempsey, and Director Petraeus. The United 

States refuses. Al-Qaeda in Iraq is incentivized by the protracted 

civil war in Syria, moves out of Iraq with several hundred Iraqi 

fighters, establishing a sanctuary in the northeastern Syria, and 

grows a terrorist army of some 30,000 to 40,000. This strategic decision that Baghdadi made is transformational for him, and was 

the most critical decision he has made since he’s been the leader 

of al Qaeda in Iraq and now ISIS and the Islamic State. Two years 

later, ISIS invades Iraq and expands its territory in Syria. ISIS, as 

we know it today, would not exist without the opportunity that 

Syria provided. In 2013, the chemical weapons redline is crossed. 

The United States does not respond as promised. Arab allies are 

dismayed and disillusioned. Assad continues to conduct, as we all 

are painfully aware, a comprehensive depopulation campaign killing 250,000 civilians, displacing 11 million people, forming them 

outside the region, resulting in thousands of Syrians joining tidal 

waves of others in the region to migrate to Europe. 

In Yemen, Iranian-backed Houthis, in 2014, force the United 

States-backed Yemen Government to topple, and the much-touted 

United States counterterrorism operation is in full retreat, with the 

closing of U.S. military operations and the United States Embassy 

in Yemen. 

This is an extraordinary chronology of events, where United 

States policy, while not necessarily the primary cause of these disturbing events, was at least a factor in further destabilizing the 

Middle East and losing the confidence and trust of our allies in the 

region, so much so that Russia is seeking to replace the United 

States as the most influential out-of-region nation. Many of our allies are listening. 

However, the most critical policy failures are essentially strategic, and therefore have the most profound impact. Simply stated, 

they are the United States and allies’ strategic failure to organize, 

plan, and defeat radical Islam and to successfully counter Iranian 

regional hegemony. 

As to radical Islam, 23 years after the first World Trade Center 

bombing, and 14-plus years after 9/11, we still have no comprehensive strategy to defeat radical Islam. Radical Islam is morphing 

into a global jihad with the expansion of al Qaeda and the extraordinary success of ISIS, which has rapidly become the most successful terrorist organization in history, still growing at one and a half 

to 2,000 per month and expanding into affiliate organizations 

throughout the Middle East, Africa, South and Southeast Asia, and 

developing a worldwide following, where believers are willing to 

kill their fellow citizens, foment terror and unrest, and mobilize— 

excuse me—and polarize the population between Muslim and nonMuslims. See the map, provided by the Institute for the Study of 

War, which depicts ISIS’s desire to expand into affiliates in the 

near abroad, in orange; and the far abroad, in yellow; with the 

number of current affiliates, as represented by the black stars; and 

affiliates that are in process of approval, in blue stars. Most of the 

far abroad will not have affiliates, but, rather, radicalized followers 

who are inspired by ISIS to act, either as individuals or small cells. 

8 

The United States strategic failure derives not from—derives 

from not understanding the nature of the conflict. The Bush war 

on terror and the Obama counterterrorism war are simply tactics. 

The battle is within Islam itself, where, in the Arab world, this battle is intersecting with authoritarian regimes’ and family monarchies’ failure to politically reform and to adjust to the needs of their 

societies. Therefore, we are fighting a political and religious ideology which draws its origin from the very strict interpretation of 

the Qur’an and Hadith as well as the intolerance of Wahhabism 

and Salafism. Political leaders such as al Sisi and King Abdullah 

have referred to it as a religious revolution. Yet, the current United 

States administration fails to define radical Islam, or explain it, 

nor understand it. How can we possibly defeat radical Islam if we 

don’t understand it? Knowing the kind of war you are fighting is 

the first priority of a national or military leader. Given this purposeful misunderstanding, or self-deception at best, by not acknowledging this narrowly focused Islamic ideology, it creates an 

unnecessary condition where all Muslims are brought under suspicion. Law-abiding, faith-based, traditional or modern Muslims, 

who would do no harm to their fellow man and resent any association with radical Islam, deserve better treatment than that. 

This is a 21st-century generational ideological struggle similar to 

the 20th-century multigenerational struggle with communist ideology. The 9/11 Commission recommended a global alliance to design a strategy and to work together to defeat radical Islam. King 

Salman of Saudi Arabia is organizing a 34-member alliance to combat radical Islam, and it remains to be seen if it amounts to anything substantive. I do know it begs for the United States to play 

a leadership role. The next President of the United States will likely defeat ISIS in Iraq and Syria, having provided the required resources and leadership necessary to do the job. ISIS and radical 

Islam is a global movement. It is not a question of whether we 

want to combat radical Islam; it’s unavoidable. The only question 

is how. 

While I believe global alliance members should design a strategy, 

and not the United States, there are some elements that are obvious and critical. National leaders and Muslim clerics must undermine the political and religious ideology with not just what is 

wrong, but what is the right thinking and ideology. Arab Muslim 

countries must change the levels of intolerance and the influence 

of Wahhabism. Political reform and social justice are essential. Financial and economic support must be countered. Countries permitting such behavior by their citizens should be held accountable. Intelligence, technology, and selected equipment should be shared. 

Partnering for training and military education is essential to raise 

the level of operational competence. There is no substitute for an 

effective ground force supported by airpower. Airpower is an enabler, it is not a defeat mechanism. 

This is about alliance members providing the predominant military response. It’s not the United States military. The United 

States military would provide a certain level of support. 

Enemy combatants should be pursued aggressively and ruthlessly. Destroy and defeat radical Islamic sanctuaries. Sanctuaries 

or safe havens, by themselves, protract the conflict and drive up 

9 

the casualties. Syria is a sanctuary. Libya is rapidly becoming one. 

Pakistan, for 14 years, has provided two sanctuaries for the 

Taliban and has unnecessarily protracted that war. 

As to Iran, in 1980 Iran declared the United States as a strategic 

enemy, with its stated goal to drive the United States out of the 

region, achieve regional hegemony, and destroy the state of Israel. 

It uses proxies primarily as the world’s number-one state sponsoring of terrorism and to fight proxy wars. Beginning in the early 

1980s, it began jihad against the United States by bombing the marine barracks, the United States Embassy, and the annex in Lebanon, something our Ambassador is intimately familiar with, the 

United States Embassy in Kuwait, the Air Force barracks, Khobar 

Towers, in Saudi Arabia, and attacking the United States military 

in Iraq using Shiite militias trained in Iran with advanced IEDs 

developed by Iranian Quds Force engineers. 

During the ’80s, Iran began an aggressive kidnapping and assassination campaign, which resulted in numerous American hostages 

and the death of CIA Station Chief Buckley. A policy of hostagetaking for political gain continues to this day, as we are very much 

aware of. 

To date, the result is, United States troops left Lebanon, Saudi 

Arabia, and initially Iraq, while Iran, as you can see on the next 

map, The Changing Middle East map, in red, has direct influence 

and some control over Lebanon, Gaza, Syria, Arak, and Yemen, 

while strategically desiring to influence not only the major shipping 

in the Gulf, but the shipping entering and departing the Suez 

Canal. 

Let me just add, editorially. When you talk to a leader in the 

Middle East, an Arab Sunni leader, this is what they think of when 

they think of Iran, this is how they see Iran and what it’s doing, 

in terms of their future security and stability. 

Is there any doubt that Iran is on the march and is systemically 

moving toward their regional hegemonic objectives? Some suggest 

that Iran is agreeing to a delay in acquiring a threshold capability 

toward a nuclear weapon is a transforming event that may lead to 

Iran joining the community of nations seeking stability and security. Given a return of $100 billion in sanction relief funds and a 

proven track record of belligerence and armed violence to pursue 

its goal, a tough-minded skepticism is in order to force compliance 

on the nuclear deal, as Senator Reed mentioned, and finally, once 

and for all, the first development of a regional strategy to counter 

Iran. A remarkable fact is that, since the killing of Americans and 

hostages taken by Iran and its proxy wars began in the 1980s, no 

American President, Democrat or Republican, has ever countered 

Iran’s regional strategy. No more than ever with Iran developing— 

excuse me—now more than ever, with Iran developing a ballistic 

missile capability and likely to cheat on the conditions of the nuclear deal, because it can, it is an imperative to join with Israel, 

our Arab and European allies, to counter Iran’s strategy of regional 

hegemony. A part of that strategy’s concrete steps should be taken: 

In Syria, to reverse the decision that Assad can stay, which guarantees there will never be a negotiated peace, a concession Secretary Kerry made, I believe, to the Russians just to get them to 

participate; establish safe zones and no-fly zones in Syria to change 

10 

the momentum against the Assad regime and protect the Syrian 

people; move eventually to a transition government; and, eventually, independently observe national elections. 

In Iraq, establish a key political objective to reduce Iranian influence and to gain Prime Minister Abadi’s strong political, military, 

and economic support for the Sunni tribes and the Kurds; dispatch 

Ambassador Crocker to Iraq to once again assist an Iraq Government—sorry, Ambassador—in achieving political unity, something 

I’ve been saying publicly since the 2014 invasion. 

In Yemen, assist the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf 

states in pushing back against the Houthis with intelligence, targeting and striking targets if necessary. Ballistic missile testing, 

malign proxy regional behavior, hostage-taking, and, of course, any 

nuclear-deal violation should all be met with tough, unrelenting 

economic sanctions. Failure to counter Iran’s malign influence has 

encouraged their aggressive and destructive behavior for 36 years. 

In conclusion, first and foremost, the United States should return 

to its historic role of the major out-of-region power helping our allies to secure a stable and prosperous Middle East. The United 

States major policy challenges in the Middle East surround the development of comprehensive strategies to defeat radical Islam and 

to counter Iranian aggression and malign behavior. If these competencies are not addressed, the Middle East will continue to be in 

freefall as the Middle East problems becomes the world’s problems 

in confronting global jihad. 

The potential of Middle East war between the Kingdom of Saudi 

Arabia and Iran, and supported by their allies, is real, and a nuclear Middle East proliferation leading to the horror of the world’s 

first nuclear exchange is real, which is Secretary Kissinger’s major 

concern as a result of the nuclear deal. The risk has always been 

high in the Middle East, and the challenge is certainly complex, 

but now inadequate strategies and misguided policies are driving 

up that risk exponentially. 

Thank you, and I appreciate you giving me an extra few minutes 

to explain that. I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of General Keane follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY GENERAL JOHN M. KEANE

Thank you Chairman McCain, ranking member Reed, distinguished members of 

the committee, am honored to be back to provide testimony again on the challenges 

of the Middle East. This committee’s persistence in keeping its focus on the unparalleled upheaval in the Middle East is commendable. I am honored to be part of this 

distinguished panel, particularly, to be reunited with Ambassador Crocker who remains today America’s most successful and preeminent diplomat whose extensive 

service throughout the Middle East is legendary. I was privileged to work with Ambassador Crocker during the Iraq and Afghanistan surges while I was assisting 

General Petraeus. I have provided two maps which I will reference in testimony. 

The Middle East is experiencing one of the most tumultuous periods in its history 

with the old order challenged by the aspirational goals of the Arab Spring, 

radicalized Islamists taking advantage of the political and social upheaval and the 

Islamic state of Iran using proxies to achieve regional influence and control. Some 

issues in the Middle East have been simmering for some time and are certainly underlying factors; such as historical sectarianism, repressive regimes, political and social injustice and the lack of economic opportunity. One cannot simply blame these 

‘‘larger forces operating in the region’’ and absolve the U.S. of specific policy decisions that has unintended adverse consequences: 

• EGYPT: In 2010 the Arab Spring begins, and in looking back while most Arab 

countries were in some form of a pre-revolutionary phase, it is a strategic surVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:03 May 30, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00014 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\24849.TXT WILDA
11 

prise. The United States, in the face of major civil unrest in Cairo abandons 

Mubarak, a multi decade ally of the United States and an ally of the Arab 

states in the region. The result is the Muslim Brotherhood who are elected, 

move quickly without any United States opposition to transition Egypt, a secular state, to an Islamic state. Iran supports the Muslim Brotherhood. The 

Muslim Brotherhood, as we know, loses support of the people and are deposed 

in a military coup. 

• LIBYA: In 2011 after Qadaffi is deposed and killed, a newly elected moderate 

Islamic regime requests support to train a national security force to repress the 

radical militants. The U.S. refuses. Some of the same militants, Ansar al Sharia 

burn down the United States consulate, kill the U.S. Ambassador and 3 others, 

force the evacuation of a covert CIA base and the following year force a United 

States retreat from Libya with the closing of the United States Embassy. Libya 

is now a failed state, a breeding ground for radical Islamists and the largest 

ISIS presence outside of Syria and Iraq. 

• IRAQ: Whether the 2003 invasion was misguided or righteous, it ushered in the 

first Arab democracy in the Middle East, while also giving rise to al Qaeda in 

Iraq, who was defeated in 2008. In 2009 the new United States administration 

began to distance itself politically from Iraq, providing the entre ́e for greater 

Iranian influence and culminating in a total military pullout from Iraq in 2011. 

PM Maliki immediately begins a purge of political opponents and military leaders and al Qaeda reemerges that same year. 

• SYRIA: Syria’s civil war growing out of the Arab Spring in 2011 is stalemated 

because the rebels initial gains are thwarted by Iranian proxies, the Hezbollah 

and Iraqi Shia militias plus the Quods force and much needed supplies and 

equipment from Russia and Iran. The rebels in 2011 and 2012 seek assistance 

from the U.S. which is recommended by Secretaries Clinton and Panetta, General Dempsey and Director Petraeus. The U.S. refuses. AQ in Iraq is 

incentivized by the protracted civil war in Syria, moves out of Iraq with several 

hundred Iraqi fighters, establishes a sanctuary in north eastern Syria , and 

grows a terrorist army of some 30 to 40K. Two years later ISIS invades Iraq 

and expands its territory in Syria. ISIS as we know it today would not exist 

without the opportunity that Syria provided. In 2013 the CW redline is crossed, 

the U.S. does not respond as promised. Arab allies are dismayed. Assad continues to conduct a comprehensive depopulation campaign, killing 250k plus civilians, displacing 11 million people, 4 million outside of Syria, resulting in 

thousands of Syrians joining tidal waves of others in the region to migrate to 

Europe. 

• YEMEN: Iranian backed Houthis in 2014 force the United States backed Yemen 

Government to topple and the much touted United States counter terrorism operation is in full retreat with the closing of U.S. military operations and the 

United States Embassy in Yemen. 

This is an extraordinary chronology of events where U.S. policy, while not necessarily the primary cause of these disturbing events, was at least a factor in further destabilizing the Middle East, and losing the confidence and trust of our allies 

in the region. However, the most critical policy failures are essentially strategic and 

therefore have the most profound impact. Simply stated, they are the United States 

and allies strategic failure to defeat radical Islam and to successfullycounter Iranian 

regional hegemony. 

1. RADICAL ISLAM

Twenty three years after the first World Trade Center bombing and fourteen plus 

years after 9/11 we still have no comprehensive strategy to defeat radical Islam. 

Radical Islam is morphing into a global Jihad with the expansion of al Qaeda and 

the extraordinary success of ISIS which has rapidly become the most successful terrorist organization in history still growing at 1.5 to 2K per month and expanding 

into affiliate organizations throughout the Middle East, Africa, South and South 

East Asia and developing a worldwide following where believers are willing to kill 

their fellow citizens, foment terror and unrest and polarize the population between 

Muslims and non Muslims. See the map provided by the Institute for the Study of 

War which depicts ISIS’s desire to expand into affiliates in the ‘‘near abroad’’ in orange and the ‘‘far abroad’’ in yellow with the number of current affiliates as represented by the black stars and affiliates that are in process of approval in blue 

stars. Most of the ‘‘far abroad’’ will not have affiliates but rather radicalized followers who are inspired by ISIS to act either as individuals or small cells. 

U.S. strategic failure derives from not understanding the nature of the conflict. 

The Bush war on terror and the Obama counter terrorism war are simply tactics. 

12 

The battle is within Islam itself where in the Arab world this battle is intersecting 

with authoritarian regimes and family monarchies failure to politically reform and 

to adjust to the needs of their societies. Therefore, we are fighting a political and 

religious ideology which draws its origin from the very strict interpretation of the 

Quran and Hadith as well as the intolerance of Wahhabism and Salafism . Political 

leaders such as al Sisi and King Abdullah have referred to it as a ‘‘religious revolution.’’ Yet the current United States administration fails to define radical Islam, or 

explain it nor understand it. How can we possibly defeat radical Islam if we don’t 

understand it? Knowing the kind of war you are fighting is the first priority of a 

national or military leader. Given this purposeful misunderstanding or self deception at best by not acknowledging this narrowly focused Islamic ideology it creates 

an unnecessary condition where all Muslims are brought under suspicion. Law abiding, faith based, traditional or modern Muslims who would do no harm to their fellow man and resent any association with radical Islam, deserve better treatment 

than that. 

This is a 21st century generational, ideological struggle similar to the 20th century multi generational struggle with communist ideology. The 9/11 Commission 

recommended a global alliance to design a strategy and to work together to defeat 

radical Islam. King Salman of Saudi Arabia is organizing a 34 member alliance to 

combat radical Islam and it remains to be seen if it amounts to anything substantive. I do know it begs for the U.S. to play a leadership role. The next President 

of the United States will likely defeat ISIS in Iraq and Syria but ISIS and radical 

Islam is a global movement. It is not a question of whether we want to fight radical 

Islam. It’s unavoidable. The only question is how? 

While I believe global alliance members should design a strategy and not the U.S., 

there are some elements that are obvious and critical: 

• National leaders and Muslim clerics must undermine the political and religious 

ideology with not just what is wrong but what is the right thinking and ideology. 

• Arab Muslim countries must change the levels of intolerance and the influence 

of Wahhabism. 

• Financial and economic support must be countered and countries permitting 

such behavior by their citizens should be held accountable. 

• Intelligence, technology, and selected equipment should be shared. 

• Partnering for training and military education is essential to raise the level of 

operational competence. There is no substitute for an effective ground force supported by air power. Air power is an enabler not a defeat mechanism. 

• Enemy combatants should be pursued aggressively and ruthlessly. 

• Destroy and defeat radical Islamist sanctuaries. Sanctuaries or safe havens by 

themselves protract the conflict and drive up the casualties. Syria is a sanctuary, Libya is rapidly becoming one and Pakistan for 14 years has provided 

two sanctuaries for the Taliban. 

2. IRAN

In 1980 Iran declared the United States as a strategic enemy and its goal is to 

drive the United States out of the region, achieve regional hegemony and destroy 

the state of Israel. It uses proxies, primarily, as the world’s number one state sponsoring terrorism and to fight proxy wars. Beginning in the early 1980’s it began 

jihad against the United States by bombing the Marine barracks, the United States 

Embassy and the Annex in Lebanon, the United States Embassy in Kuwait, the AF 

barracks, Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia and attacking the United States military 

in Iraq using Shia militias trained in Iran with advanced IEDs developed by Iranian 

engineers. During the 80’s Iran began an aggressive kidnapping and assassination 

campaign which resulted in the death of CIA station chief Buckley and numerous 

American hostages. A policy of hostage taking for political gain continues to this 

day. 

To date, the result is, United States troops left Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and initially Iraq while Iran as you can see on the ‘‘Changing Middle East Map’’ in red 

has direct influence and some control over Lebanon, Gaza, Syria, Iraq and Yemen 

while strategically desiring to influence not only the major shipping in the Gulf but 

the shipping entering and departing the Suez Canal. Is there any doubt that Iran, 

is on the march and is systematically moving toward their regional hegemonic objective? Some suggest that Iran in agreeing to a delay in acquiring a threshold capability toward a nuclear weapon is a transforming event that may lead to Iran joining the community of nations seeking stability and security. Given a return of 100B 

in sanction relief funds and a proven track record of belligerence and armed violence 

to pursue its goals, a tough minded skepticism is in order, to force compliance on 

13 

the nuclear deal and finally, once and for all, the first development of a regional 

strategy to counter Iran. A remarkable fact is that since the killing of Americans 

and hostage taking by Iran and its proxies began, in the 1980’s, no American president, Democrat or Republican, has ever countered Iran’s regional strategy. Now 

more than ever with Iran developing a ballistic missile capability and likely to cheat 

on the conditions of the nuclear deal, because it can, it is an imperative to join with 

Israel, our Arab and European allies, to counter Iran’s strategy of regional hegemony. 

As part of that strategy concrete steps should be taken: 

1) In Syria to reverse the decision that Assad can stay, which guarantees there 

will never be a negotiated peace. Establish safe zones and no fly zones in Syria 

to change the momentum against the Assad regime and protect the Syrian people. Move to a transition government and eventual independently observed national elections. 

2) In Iraq establish a key political objective to reduce Iranian influence and to 

gain PM Abadi’s strong political, military and economic support for the Sunni 

tribes and the Kurds. Dispatch Ambassador Crocker to Iraq to once again assist an Iraq Government in achieving political unity. 

3) In Yemen assist KSA and the Gulf states in pushing back against the Houthis 

with intelligence, targeting and striking targets if necessary. 

4) Ballistic missile testing, malign proxy regional behavior, hostage taking, and, 

of course, any nuclear deal violation should all be met with tough, unrelenting 

economic sanctions. 

Failure to counter Iran’s malign influence has encouraged their aggressive and destructive behavior for 36 years. 

In conclusion the United States major policy challenges in the Middle East surround the development of comprehensive strategies to defeat radical Islam and to 

counter Iranian aggression and malign behavior. If these competencies are not addressed the Middle East will continue to be in freefall as the Middle East problems 

become the world’s problems in confronting global jihad, a conventional Middle East 

war between KSA and Iran supported by their allies and nuclear Middle East proliferation leading to the horror of the world’s first nuclear exchange. The risk has 

always been high in the Middle East and the challenges certainly complex but now 

inadequate strategies and misguided policies are driving up that risk exponentially. 

Thank you and I look forward to your questions. 


16-01_Keane_Maps_1.eps
14 

Chairman MCCAIN. Thank you. 

Ambassador Crocker. 

STATEMENT OF HONORABLE RYAN C. CROCKER, DEAN AND 

EXECUTIVE PROFESSOR, THE GEORGE BUSH SCHOOL OF 

GOVERNMENT AND PUBLIC SERVICE, TEXAS A &M UNIVERSITY, AND FORMER UNITED STATES AMBASSADOR TO 

AFGHANISTAN 

Ambassador CROCKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Reed, 

members of the committee. It’s an honor to be with you this morning. 

You have my written testimony, I believe, Mr. Chairman. I will 

just make a few brief remarks now so we can get on with the questions. 

I would start where General Keane left off. In a region experiencing unprecedented tumult in its 100-year modern history, there 

is an urgent need for a reassertion of U.S. engagement and leadership. I’ll have some specifics. 

I was just in the Middle East last month, and talking to some 

long-time friends in Lebanon, with Saudis, with some Syrians. 

There is a perception that the United States is not engaged, is absent, and that malign forces are, therefore, having a field day out 

there. Our friends are uncertain and scared. Our adversaries are 

gaining ground. We need to make this clear, that what happens in 

the Middle East is of vital national importance to us. It is, sir. At 

a time when states are failing and nonstate actors are rising, it’s 

become all too clear that, as my good friend and former wingman 

Dave Petraeus has said, ‘‘What happens in the Middle East does 

not stay in the Middle East.’’ That was the lesson of Paris. So, we 

have an urgent national security imperative, here. 


16-01_Keane_Maps_2.eps
15 

Let me just say, briefly, on Iran, since that obviously is the issue 

of the hour around town, there are some pretty momentous developments. They’re important. I think the implementation of the 

JCPOA is important for regional security and global security. We 

are going to have to be very vigilant to see that Iran follows 

through. We’re delighted, as you said, Mr. Chairman, that our hostages have come home. As I look at this over the sweep of recent 

history, these are transactions, they’re not transformations. I’m reminded of our arms control agreements with the Soviets in the 

’80s. They made the world a safer place, with a nuclear power, not 

just an aspirant nuclear power, but they didn’t transform anything. 

The Cold War continued. We continued to stand against the evil 

empire, in spite of some important arms control transactions. 

I was in Lebanon when some of our hostages were taken, and I 

was in Lebanon when they came home. I loaded the remains of my 

former colleague, Bill Buckley, on a helicopter in Beirut on Christmas Eve. The Syrians were instrumental in that. The Syrians were 

also instrumental in holding those hostages, as was Iran and 

Hezbollah. So, their release didn’t transform anything, didn’t transform our relationship with Syria. Syria remained on our list of 

state sponsors of terrorism, as it should have. 

So, while what has happened in this past week, I think, is important, it is transactional. 

A broader point is that we are witnessing, in the midst of these 

hot conflicts, a Middle Eastern Cold War. The primary protagonists 

are Iran and Saudi Arabia. Iran is on the move, the radical Shiite 

militias it sponsors in Iraq, Hezbollah, working with the Revolutionary Guard, to support Assad in Syria. We need to stand clearly, 

not in the middle of this Cold War, we need to stand on one side 

of it. That, in my view, is with our traditional allies, Saudi Arabia 

and the other Gulf states, with Turkey, with Israel, with Egypt. We 

have differences with some of them, particularly with Saudi Arabia 

over Yemen, I think, but we have to take a stand here, Mr. Chairman. The Russians have taken a stand. They’re all-in with Iran 

and with Bashar Assad. I think we all know they’re not there to 

fight Islamic State. They don’t care about Islamic State, nor does 

Iran. They care about shoring up Assad. So, that axis—Damascus, 

Tehran, Moscow—is perceived in the region as an anti-Sunni Arab 

axis. The more we don’t take sides, the more we try to work with 

the Russians or the Iranians, the more that perception takes hold 

among the Sunni Arabs, the considerable majority of the population of that volatile region, and the more Islamic State can make 

hay out of it. 

So, I could go on at great lengths, but I won’t. I would mention 

several specific steps I think we need to take: 

I would agree completely with General Keane on the importance 

of establishing a no-fly zone and safe zones. That’s gotten infinitely 

harder now that the Russians are there. I still would like to see 

us pursue it. I would imagine this committee is heavily engaged 

with the administration on looking at its feasibility. It’s important—like many military actions, it’s important politically. It would 

signal to Sunni Arabs in Syria and beyond that we stand with 

them against the butchery of Bashar al Assad. He’s killing far 

more of his own citizens, far more, than Islamic State is, and it’s 

16 

no surprise that moderate Sunni resistance groups in Syria are far 

more focused on Assad than they are on Islamic State. So, taking 

a stand against Assad, not to drive him from power—General 

Keane and I may differ slightly on this—but, to weaken him and 

to change the calculations in Damascus, in Tehran, and in Moscow 

as to what prolonging this conflict will achieve. Then, but only 

then, might we get to the table. We are not going to get to the table 

under these current conditions. I’ve talked to Iranians, I’ve talked 

to Russians in the Middle East. They’re on a roll. They’re not interested in trying to negotiate a transitional regime. So, we’ve got to 

change the facts on the ground. This would be one way to do it. 

There are several other things we could do to indicate we’re serious. We have an anti-ISIS envoy, with whom I worked in Iraq. He 

should be a presidential envoy, he should speak for this administration, not for the Department of State. We should reinstitute the 

Deputy National Security Advisor, that General Doug Lute so ably 

filled during my time in Iraq, to coordinate an interagency effort 

against Islamic State. From a political perspective, I would argue 

we should—I know General Petraeus has made this point—we 

should move our headquarters from Kuwait to Baghdad. It made 

a heck of a lot of difference to me to have my military counterpart 

in the next room and not in the next country. These are small 

steps, some of them, but symbolically important, showing that we 

are in this fight, we are serious about it, we are going to work with 

our allies to develop the kind of comprehensive strategy that General Keane indicates is so important. 

So, I hope very much that, in the wake of the events of the last 

week, we will take a deep breath, understand where our long-term 

strategic interests are in the region, realize that the relationship 

with Iran is transactional. They are pursuing their agenda with 

full force. We need to define and pursue ours with equal force with 

our allies. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Crocker follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR RYAN C. CROCKER

Mr. Chairman, Senator Reed, Members of the Committee, I am honored to have 

the opportunity today to discuss United States policy and regional dynamics in the 

Middle East. I am especially pleased to do so in the company of such distinguished 

Americans as General Keane and Secretary Gordon. The modern Middle East took 

shape in the aftermath of World War I, some one hundred years ago. The region 

has seen much tumult over the past century, but there has never been a time of 

such turbulence and upheaval as we are witnessing now. Almost every state in the 

region has been touched with conflict. Syria, Libya, and Yemen are completely failed 

states. Iraq is on the edge if not over it, and Afghanistan is threatened. As bad as 

things are today, the trend lines all point down—it will be worse tomorrow. 

As states fail, non-state actors emerge. Islamic State and the various franchises 

of al Qaida are present through much of the region and beyond—Boko Haram and 

al Shabab in Africa, affiliates in Indonesia and elsewhere. Violent Shia militias are 

operating in Iraq and in Syria. Unlike Sunni terror groups, the Shia have a state 

sponsor—Iran. 

These developments have implications for global as well as regional security. As 

my friend and former wingman Dave Petraeus has said, what happens in the Middle East does not stay in the Middle East. Islamic State terror attacks in November 

in Paris are a horrific illustration. The worst refugee crisis since World War II affects more than the millions of refugees themselves. It has weakened the leader of 

one of our best NATO allies, Germany. 

17 

The committee’s invitation to testify noted a number of important topics. I will 

try to provide some perspectives on them. 

IRAN: This past week has been an extraordinary one for the United States and 

Iran. We witnessed the capture and release of American sailors, the implementation 

of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), and an exchange of prisoners. 

There is speculation that after more than 35 years of hostility, our two countries 

might be moving toward a rapprochement that could reshape the Middle East. We 

are not. 

I support the JCPOA. It is not a perfect agreement, but a good one. The first steps 

have been taken; now we must turn to rigorous verification of continued Iranian 

compliance. At the same time, we need to bear in mind that it is a multilateral arms 

control agreement, not a treaty of friendship. I am reminded of the arms control 

agreements we negotiated with the Soviets in the 1980s. They made the world a 

safer place, but they had no impact on the broader confrontation between the free 

world and the Soviet Union—the evil empire. 

Similarly, we welcome the release of the American hostages and their return to 

their families. They never should have been held in the first place. In the early 

1990s, I was the American ambassador to Lebanon when our hostages there came 

home. The Syrian Government played a significant role in their release, for which 

it was thanked. However, the Syrian Government, along with Iran and Hizballah, 

also had a significant role in their detention, and the releases did not transform the 

relationship. Syria remained on the list of state sponsors of terror. 

This is a transactional relationship, not a transformational one. As a former diplomat, I think it’s good to have a number to call at critical moments. we have to 

be clear eyed about Iran’s role in the region. 

We must vigorously confront malign Iranian activity in the region. In Iraq, Iranian support for vicious Shia militias, some of them commanded by individuals implicated in the murder of American servicemen, has weakened Prime Minister Abadi 

and deepened sectarian divisions. This has allowed Islamic State to take root and 

brought the Iraqi state to the point of failure. In Syria, Iran’s Revolutionary Guards 

are fighting alongside Hizballah and Assad’s forces as they murder Syrian civilians 

under Russian air cover and force millions from their homes. Nor should we think 

of Iran as an ally against Islamic State. Iran and its proxies along with Russia are 

in Syria to bolster Assad, not fight Islamic State. They are in Iraq to weaken the 

state and assert their own direct and indirect control. Islamic State is an excuse 

for the Iranians, not an enemy. 

There is a deeper issue at stake here. Overarching the many hot wars in the region is a Middle East cold war that pits Iran against Saudi Arabia. It is denominated in sectarian terms, Sunni versus Shia, but is also Arab versus Persian. I was 

recently in the Middle East and was struck by the extent to which many Arab 

friends perceive not only a Damascus—Tehran—Moscow axis that is anti-Sunni and 

anti-Arab, but also that the United States has tilted away from its traditional Arab 

allies in favor of Iran. We are absent in Iraq. We deconflict air space in Syria with 

the Russians. We bomb Islamic State targets in Sunni areas while doing nothing 

to prevent Assad from using his bombs to kill Sunni civilians. Perceptions are their 

own reality, and these perceptions are becoming dangerous for our broader interests. 

So in a chaotic Middle East that Iran has done much to make so, this is a time 

to make clear that we stand with our friends—Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States, 

Israel, Turkey, Jordan, and Egypt. All have important concerns over Iran and its 

behavior. We have differences with some, especially over Yemen, but this is a moment to forge a common cause. Iran has been pushing very hard in the region to 

advance its violent agenda. We need to push back. We have managed some important transactions with Iran, but it is not a transformation. 

ISLAMIC STATE, SYRIA AND IRAQ: Over 18 months after Islamic State fighters 

swept through much of Iraq and 15 months after the United States and others 

began launching airstrikes against them, Islamic State is certainly not defeated. It 

is barely degraded. It has lost some ground in Iraq but gained in Syria, including 

the city of Palmyra. 50 Special Operations advisors working with predominantly 

Kurdish forces will not turn the tide. 

So what do we do? First, we must significantly ramp up coalition airstrikes 

against Islamic State. Recent targeting of Islamic State oil network is a good step, 

and it should be expanded. Simply put, we need to be all in with an air campaign 

that goes after their command and control and ability to conduct offensive operations. In short, to actually degrade the organization. To ultimately defeat Islamic 

State and end this terrible conflict, we need to change the political context and to 

understand that for many Syrian Sunnis, Assad is a far worse enemy than Islamic 

State. In Syria, I have argued for a no-fly zone in the north and south. It would 

18 

be a clear message that we stand with Syrian civilians against the savage bombings 

by Assad of his own population and against those who back him in Moscow and 

Tehran. Depriving Assad of the ability to murder his own people from the air would 

not mean his defeat, but it could change his calculations as well as those of Russia 

and Iran, finally enabling a political process. It is an axiom that there is no military 

solution to the Syrian conflict. Military actions can shape the political environment. 

The Russian intervention did so negatively. A no-fly zone could reshape the context 

more favorably. According to the Institute for the Study of War, zones could be enforced without putting United States aircraft in Syrian airspace by a combination 

of Patriot and Cruise missiles and aircraft operating in Turkish and Jordanian airspace. With cooperation from these countries, no-fly zones could cover safe zones for 

civilians and serve as areas where face-to-face coordination with non-jihad opposition elements would be possible. Other measures would be to make the anti-Islamic 

State envoy a presidential envoy. This would demonstrate a seriousness of purpose 

on the part of the White House and give the envoy authorities he currently lacks. 

Reestablishing a deputy national security advisor to coordinate the anti-Islamic 

State campaign in Washington would serve the same end. 

I applaud the UN led effort to launch a political dialogue among Syrian factions. 

It will go nowhere as long as Assad and his outside backers think he is winning. 

For there to be any chance of a serious negotiation, conditions on the ground must 

shift. 

IRAQ: When I left Iraq in 2009, I could never have imagined how it looks today, 

even in my worst nightmares. During three decades in the Middle East, I learned 

two things. The first is be careful what you get into. Military interventions set in 

motion consequences to the 30th and 40th order that can’t be predicted, let alone 

planned for. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the rise of militant Islam, the 

Israeli invasion of Lebanon and the rise of Hizballah, the American invasion of Iraq 

and the birth of al Qaida in Iraq. The second thing I learned is to be just as careful 

over what you get out of. Disengagement can have consequences as great or greater 

than those of the original intervention. In Iraq, we were not careful about either. 

Withdrawal of our forces and a virtual end to sustained political engagement in Iraq 

after 2010 did not end the war. It simply left the field to our enemies: Iran, its 

proxy Shia militias, and Islamic State. It is the coalition from hell: Iran and Islamic 

State do not seek each other’s destruction; both seek the disintegration of a unitary 

Iraqi state into a Jihadistan, run by Islamic State, an Iranian dominated Shiastan, 

and a Kurdistan heavily influenced by Iran. This is a threat to U.S. national security. 

In Iraq as in Syria, there is no military solution to Islamic State threat. The political chasm between Sunni and Shia have given Islamic State the space to fester. 

Iran has worked to sharpen those divides; and virtual United States absence over 

the last four years has given Iran, its proxies, and Islamic State the scope to act, 

and they have. The U.S. needs to reengage, not with military force but with sustained, high-level diplomacy led by the President and the Secretary of State. For 

many reasons, Iraqi leaders find it extraordinarily difficult to make the political 

compromises necessary to foster a broad sense of inclusion among all of Iraq’s communities. Iraqis cannot make the necessary deals on their own, but the United 

States can serve as an effective broker. We have done it before. Only when Iraqi 

Sunnis feel they have a secure and equitable place in the Iraqi state will the ultimate defeat of Islamic State be possible. 

It is perhaps no coincidence that the most chaotic period in the history of the 

modern Middle East is also a time of the greatest United States disengagement 

since we stepped onto the regional stage after World War II. We certainly cannot 

fix all the problems of the Middle East. United States leadership can make a difference. Our friends in the area are looking for us to lead and bear the consequences 

of our perceived lack of involvement. Without a larger U.S. role, an already impossible situation will only get worse. It will come home to us. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Thank you. 

Mr. Gordon, welcome. 

STATEMENT OF HONORABLE PHILIP H. GORDON, SENIOR FELLOW, THE COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, AND FORMER 

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EUROPEAN AND 

EURASIAN AFFAIRS 

Mr. GORDON. Thanks very much, Senator, Ranking Member 

Reed, and all of you, for having me back before the committee. I’m 

19 

honored to be here, and honored to testify along with my two distinguished colleagues. 

Senator, given the vastness of the topic, I submitted a few articles in more detail. I’d like to ask that they be put in the 

record—— 

Chairman MCCAIN. Without objection. 

Mr. GORDON.—thank you very much—so I can just use my time 

here to make three broad points about the region. 

The first is that the Middle East today—maybe it goes without 

saying—is going through a period of powerful tectonic change that 

the United States did not create and cannot fully control. In the 

wake of the Arab Spring in 2011, the state institutions have crumbled in Syria, Libya, Yemen, and elsewhere. I think if we’re honest, 

we have to acknowledge that those institutions are unlikely to 

put—be put back together anytime soon. On top of that, you have 

sectarian tensions that are rising across the region. Obviously, this 

issue has persisted for decades or centuries. It got a boost by the 

Iranian Revolution in 1979. It got a further boost by the 2003 Iraq 

War, which gave Iran much more say in Iraq, and has prompted 

a Sunni response. Even in the past years, I think, even more than 

those two developments, the result of the Arab Spring, where the 

question of state institutions and control is up in the air, has created space for even more sectarian tensions. Just last week, obviously, we saw those tensions inflamed further with the Saudi execution of a prominent Shiite cleric, and Iran’s violent response. 

So, the Saudi-Iranian rivalry is a geopolitical conflict that is on 

top of a sectarian conflict. As long as it persists, the biggest conflicts in the region—in Iraq, in Syria, and Yemen—that have a sectarian content will be enormously difficult to resolve. 

We should also remember, on top of that, that the Sunni population across the Middle East is, itself, deeply divided. Sunni terrorist groups, such as al Qaeda and ISIS, of course, are Sunnis 

aligned against Sunni regimes; and the Sunni regimes, themselves, 

are deeply divided between those who embrace political Islam, such 

as Turkey and Qatar, and those that are threatened by it, including Saudi Arabia, Jordan, United Arab Emirates, and Egypt under 

President al Sisi, as Egypt is—itself, is divided down the middle on 

this topic. 

So, even though most Sunni majority states stand together when 

it comes to sectarian conflicts, like Iraq and Syria and Yemen, 

where the Sunni states are all aligned together, when you face conflicts in places without a sectarian dimension, like in Libya or 

Egypt, the Sunni states divide among themselves, and you get Turkey and Qatar on one side, and the others on the other. 

Now, I mention all of these points and complexities at the beginning, not to suggest that the region is so complex and unstable that 

there is nothing we can do, but to underscore the enormity of the 

challenge we face and, frankly, the need for humility as we consider our policy options. We should be extraordinarily careful about 

assuming there are quick fixes to any of these regions’ problems 

and very cognizant of the potential for unintended consequences of 

the actions that we take. I hope—and I expect we’ll talk more fully 

about that during the hearing. 

20 

My second main point is that, in the context of this immense regional turmoil, the implementation of the Iran nuclear agreement 

last week buys valuable time and presents a real opportunity if we 

use that time wisely. As everybody here knows, when the United 

States initiated the talks with Iran in early 2013, Iran was essentially on the threshold of a nuclear weapons capability. Now, with 

the mothballing of two-thirds of its centrifuges, the shipping out of 

97 percent of its low-enriched uranium stockpile, the ending of its 

production of 20-percent uranium, the wholesale redesign of the 

heavy water reactor at Arak, which would have, by now, been capable of producing enough weapons-grade plutonium for one or two 

bombs per year, and the setting of an intrusive inspections regime, 

we are no longer faced with the terrible choice between using military force to set back the program for a couple of years, less time 

than it has now been set back by the agreement, or effectively acquiescing to its further development. 

None of this is to say, let me be clear, that the nuclear deal 

somehow solves the Iran problem. Even proponents of the JCPOA, 

of which I am one, should admit that, in some ways, it makes the 

problem worse. We’ve heard some of the consequences referred to 

here, including the concerns about the long term and the concerns 

of some of the key players in our friends in the region. Those are 

real, and I think we should acknowledge them. An Iran that gains 

access to more than $50 billion of its frozen assets abroad and 

starts to increase oil sales will be an Iran that can devote more resources to nefarious activities in the region. I think the right response to these realities is not to deny them, and it’s not to scrap 

the nuclear deal, because doing so would isolate the United States, 

impede our ability to impose effective sanctions, and, frankly, leave 

us with no good options for stopping the Iranian nuclear program. 

Think about North Korea, which was in the news just the other 

day, the other week, for its testing of a nuclear weapon. Think 

about that situation, where we, indeed, isolated, sanctioned, contained, but the result is not a non-nuclear North Korea; it’s a crazy 

dictatorship with its hands on numerous nuclear weapons and a 

real paucity of potential U.S. responses. That’s why I think we’re 

in a better position with the JCOP—JCPOA in Iran. 

The alternative, again, is not to deny these problems, but instead 

to rigorously enforce the deal, to use all of the tools at our disposal 

to confront and contain Iran in the region, and to use the valuable 

time that it buys us to cautiously explore whether a better relationship with Iran is possible in the long term. Again, I hope that’s 

something we can discuss during this hearing. 

My third and final point concerns the war in Syria. My bottom 

line is that we have an enormous national interest in prioritizing 

the de-escalation of this conflict, even over other important objectives. You really need to think through the strategic consequences 

of the status quo. The conflict in Syria is killing or maiming hundreds of thousands of people, innocents, forcing millions of Syrians 

to flee their homes, destabilizing neighboring states—Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, Turkey—radicalizing an entire generation of young Muslims, provoking a far-right backlash in Europe and problems within 

the European Union, fostering religious intolerance in the United 

States and beyond. Given these enormous strategic costs, I think 

21 

you could say that almost any peace in Syria at present would be 

better than the current war. 

To reach this objective, I believe it is necessary to decouple our 

attempts to reach a comprehensive political settlement in Syria, 

one that includes Assad’s immediate departure, from our objective 

of negotiating a nationwide cease-fire. While we all like to see the 

immediate departure of Assad and his cronies, who should face justice for their atrocities, and we’d like to see the installation of an 

inclusive moderate regime, there is almost no prospect for nearterm agreement on a—new detailed institutional arrangements in 

Syria, let alone on new leadership. I think we have to be honest 

about that. The delay just—or the probable delay this week in the 

Syrian talks that were scheduled for the 25th of this month is, 

thus, disappointing, but, I think, not surprising. 

Now, I know some argue—and we’ve heard previews of that 

today, and I suspect we’ll discuss it—that we can produce the political transition in Syria that we seek by providing more military 

support to the opposition, or even by intervening military, ourselves. However, given the strong commitments by Russia and Iran 

to support the regime, which also maintains significant support 

among Syria’s minorities and even in the majority Sunnis, I think 

that such an escalation would lead not to the regime’s capitulation 

that we want to see, but rather to a new counter-escalation, which, 

after all, has been the pattern for nearly 5 years. We shouldn’t underestimate the degree of force it would take to displace the regime. Again, that’s what we’re talking about. We’re not talking 

about modest concessions by the regime; we’re talking about it 

agreeing to disappear. I don’t think we should underestimate what 

it would take to do so or the unintended—potential unintended 

consequences of doing so. 

As an alternative, I’ve put forward a plan, along with two colleagues in the RAND Corporation—Jim Dobbins and Jeff Martini— 

it’s one of the publications I submitted for the record—to seek a nationwide cease-fire in place that would defer the ultimate disposition of political power in Syria, including the question of Assad’s 

fate, and include the creation of regional safe zones, based roughly 

on current areas of control within the country, the resumption of 

humanitarian deliveries, prisoner releases, and the collective focus 

on destroying ISIS. 

I will be the first to admit that even this outcome would be enormously difficult to achieve and would not be without downsides and 

risks. I think that applies to any proposal for the Syrian conflict. 

I do believe it is a more realistic goal than the current one of a 

comprehensive political agreement. I think it’s far better than the 

status quo. I think it’s more practical than any of the available alternatives. I fear that if we just persist with the status quo, we 

could have—be having a hearing in 1 year, 2 years, or 4 years, and 

be talking about even greater strategic consequences of this conflict. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to discussing these questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Gordon follows:] 

22 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY PHILIP H. GORDON

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Reed, Members of the Committee, 

Thank you for the opportunity to testify before the Committee today about United 

States strategy and policy in the greater Middle East. I shared in advance with the 

Committee several recent articles that address some of these issues in some detail 

and respectfully request that they be submitted for the record. In my opening statement I would simply like to make three broad points about the region. 

First, the Middle East today is going through a period of powerful, tectonic change 

that the United States did not create and cannot fully control. In the wake of the 

‘‘Arab Spring’’ in 2011, state institutions have crumbled in Syria, Libya, Yemen, and 

elsewhere, and those institutions will not be put back together again. In addition, 

sectarian tensions across the region are now deeper than they have been for decades. Just last month, these tensions were enflamed by Saudi Arabia’s execution of 

a prominent Shiite cleric and Iran’s violent response. The Saudi-Iranian rivalry is 

a geopolitical conflict on top of a sectarian conflict, and as long as it persists, the 

biggest conflicts in the region—In Syria, Iraq, and Yemen—will be enormously difficult to resolve. We should also remember that the Sunni population across the 

Middle East is itself deeply divided. Sunni terrorist groups such as al Qaeda and 

ISIS are aligned against Sunni regimes, and the Sunni regimes themselves are 

deeply divided between those who embrace political Islam such as Turkey and 

Qatar, and those threatened by it, such as Saudi Arabia, Jordan, the United Arab 

Emirates, and Egypt under President al Sisi. Thus even though most Sunni majority states stand together in sectarian conflicts such as Iraq, Syria, and Yemen, they 

are at loggerheads in Sunni-majority countries such as Libya and Egypt. 

I mention all these points at the start not to suggest that the region is so complex 

and unstable that there is nothing we can do, but to underscore the enormity of the 

challenge we face and the need for humility as we consider our policy options. We 

should be extraordinarily careful about assuming there are any quick fixes to the 

region’s problems, and very cognizant of the potential for unintended consequences 

of any actions that we do take. 

My second main point is that in this context of regional turmoil, the implementation of the Iran nuclear deal last week buys valuable time and presents a real opportunity if that time is used wisely. 

When the United States initiated the secret nuclear talks with Iran in early 2013, 

Iran was essentially on the threshold of a nuclear weapons capability. Now, with 

the mothballing of two-thirds of its centrifuges, the shipping out of 97 percent of 

its low-enriched uranium stockpile, the wholesale redesign of its heavy-water reactor (that could have produced enough weapon-grade plutonium for one to two bombs 

per year), and the setting-up of an unprecedented inspections regime, we are no 

longer faced with the terrible choice between using military force to set back the 

program for a couple of years or effectively acquiescing to its further development. 

This is certainly not to say that the nuclear deal somehow ‘‘solves’’ the Iran problem, and even proponents should admit that in some ways it makes that problem 

worse. An Iran that gains access to more than $50 billion of its frozen assets abroad 

and starts to increase oil sales will be an Iran that can devote more resources to 

nefarious activities in the region. The right response to this reality is not to scrap 

the nuclear deal—which would only isolate the United States, impede our ability to 

apply effective sanctions, and leave us with no good options for stopping the Iranian 

nuclear program (much like the situation with North Korea)—but instead to rigorously enforce that deal, use all the tools at our disposal to confront and contain Iran 

in the region, and use the valuable time bought by the nuclear deal to cautiously 

explore whether a better relationship with Iran is possible over the longer term. 

My third and final point concerns the war in Syria. The bottom line is that we 

have an enormous national interest in prioritizing a de-escalation of the conflict. 

The conflict in Syria is killing or maiming hundreds of thousands of innocents, forcing millions of Syrians to flee their homes, destabilizing neighboring states, 

radicalizing an entire generation of young Muslims, provoking a far-right backlash 

in Europe, and fostering religious intolerance in the United States and elsewhere. 

Given these enormous costs, almost any peace in Syria would be better than the 

current war. 

To reach this objective, I believe it is necessary to de-couple our attempts to reach 

a comprehensive political settlement in Syria—one that includes Assad’s departure—from our objective of negotiating a nation-wide ceasefire. While we would all 

like to see the immediate departure of Assad and his cronies, who should face justice for their atrocities, and the installation of an inclusive, moderate regime, there 

is almost no prospect for near-term agreement on new detailed institutional arVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:03 May 30, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00026 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\24849.TXT WILDA
23 

rangements in Syria, let alone new leadership. The cancellation of the planned Syria 

talks later this week was thus disappointing, but not surprising. 

I know many, including some members of this committee, argue that we can 

produce that political transition in Syria by providing more military support to the 

opposition, or even by intervening militarily ourselves. However, given the strong 

commitments by Russia and Iran to support the regime, which also maintains significant support among Syria’s minorities and even many majority Sunnis, I fear 

such an escalation would not lead to the regime’s capitulation but rather a new 

counter-escalation, which, after all, has been the pattern for the past nearly five 

years. 

As an alternative, I have put forward a plan along with two colleagues from the 

RAND Corporation, Jim Dobbins and Jeff Martini, to seek a negotiated, nation-wide 

ceasefire-in-place that would include deferring the ultimate disposition of political 

power in Syria, including the question of Assad’s fate, and the creation of regional 

safe zones based roughly on current areas of control within the country, the resumption of humanitarian deliveries, prisoner releases, and a collective focus on destroying ISIS. I’ll be the first to admit that even this outcome would be enormously difficult to negotiate and not without downsides and risks. I believe it is far more realistic than the current objective of a comprehensive political agreement, far better 

than the status quo, and more practical than any of the available alternatives. 

Thank you for the opportunity to share these ideas with you and I look forward 

to the discussion. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Well, thank you very much. 

I want to thank the witnesses, all the witnesses, because—and 

I wish that—I wish the American people and all Members of Congress could have heard that testimony and the discussion that 

we’re about to have. Obviously, it is a transcendent and now direct 

threat to the United States of America, as evidenced in San 

Bernardino and other places. I think there’s—it’s a very complex 

situation and one that requires a lot of understanding. I respect the 

views of all the witnesses. 

Ambassador Crocker, I especially am grateful for your incredible 

service, as well as other witnesses, but I will never forget your testimony before this committee, with General Petraeus, at a very crucial time in American history. 

On the issue of how we take care of ISIS, before I get into Syria, 

there are many of us that have been advocating for a long time an 

additional several thousand in Syria—in Iraq to retake Mosul, beat 

back ISIS, and—including elements of airpower. In addition to 

that, the force of—mainly composed of Sunni Arab countries, including Turkey and Saudi Arabia and others, with the avowed intention not just of defeating ISIS, but also replacing Bashar Assad, 

we have proven to anyone’s satisfaction that if the object is only 

ISIS, you’re not going to find more than 4 or 5 young men who are 

willing to fight. That was the testimony before this committee. 

There is question—I think it was all members—what’s our priority, 

and should we try to assemble that force to go to Raqqa and take 

it out? I think it’s pretty obvious that, in Raqqa today, they are developing chemical weapons, that we’ve seen films that they’ve published of bomb factories. They are directing acts of terror throughout the world using the Internet. As long as Raqqa remains in ISIS 

hands, then we—they are going to be able to foster terrorism 

throughout the entire world. At the same time, we’re seeing a situation evolved—and I mentioned in my opening statement this 

morning—that Russian airpower is having an effect of reducing 

any capability we might have to prevail on the battlefield, thereby 

hardening the position of Bashar Assad in power, who is the godfather of ISIS. The—it’s a very complex situation that’s evolved 

24 

over the years. Maybe the witnesses can help us out—sort out this 

Gordian—cut this Gordian Knot that seems to plague our decision 

makers. Maybe beginning with you, Ambassador Crocker. 

Ambassador CROCKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You have outlined, indeed, the complexity of what is truly a problem from hell. 

We have never really seen the formation of a collective Arab combat force. Arab armies have fought against Israel—1948, 1967. 

Didn’t go well. There was an effort to create an Arab deterrent 

force in Lebanon in the 1970s, during that civil war, that quickly 

became a purely Syrian force; the other states withdrew their contingents. So, I am—my expectations are under control, let me put 

it that way, that it would be possible to build and field such a force, 

certainly not without very substantial U.S. engagement. I think 

that that would be key. Then we’d have to ask ourselves, since Islamic State has said repeatedly in its propaganda, ‘‘The Crusaders 

will come, and we will destroy them,’’ whether that would be a further rallying cry for them and their recruiting. We would have to 

think that through, which is why I started with something incredibly difficult, but maybe a bit easier: the notion of a no-fly zone. 

General Keane may want to speak to the feasibility of that. I mean, 

I’m just a civilian; I don’t know. 

In terms of shifting the dynamic, not eliminating the regime, but 

weakening it, stopping a humanitarian slaughter, and signaling to 

Sunnis in Syria, as well as outside, that we stand with them—because right now I don’t think they’re persuaded. To get support, in 

Syria or in the region, for an effort against ISIS, we’re going to 

have to deal with what is the number-one threat, which, in Syria 

for the Sunnis, is Assad, and, in the region, it’s Iran, backed by 

Russia. So, we’re going to have to stand up to those forces, and 

show we mean it, before I think we’re going to get any serious traction for a serious Sunni effort in Sunni or, for that matter, in Iraq. 

I see my time is up. 

Chairman MCCAIN. The Russians? 

Ambassador CROCKER. Yes, sir. The Russians are in Syria for one 

reason only; that is to support Bashar al Assad. They talk the talk 

about confronting Islamic State. We all see the reports of who 

they’re actually hitting. Islamic State doesn’t really threaten 

Assad. I think they have almost a tacit understanding to pretty 

much leave each other alone. It’s the groups that we would like to 

support, should support, that are really locked in with Assad, who 

are bearing the brunt of Russian airpower. So, they’re all-in on 

this, they’re all-in against us. We’re not doing anything to demonstrate to anyone that we’re pushing back. 

General KEANE. Yes. Well, those are great questions, Senator, 

and I agree with much of what the Ambassador said. 

Let’s start with Syria and then come—go to Iraq, because Syria 

is ISIS center of gravity. What they’re doing in Iraq is occupying 

Sunni lands. In Syria, is—it’s from Syria that they’ve expanded 

into those affiliates I’ve described on those maps, and it’s from 

Syria that they’re creating a worldwide following to kill their fellow 

citizens to foment disagreement between Muslim and non-Muslim 

populations. 

So, Syria truly matters and, in military terms, they’re the center 

of gravity, but it’s also a much more complex problem. When you 

25 

talk to leaders, Sunni leaders, unequivocally they will tell you that 

Iran is their number-one problem. That is their issue. That’s why 

that—I put that map up there, because sometimes a visual picture 

tells an incredible story of what’s—their concern is. That is their 

number-one existential threat to the stability and security of their 

nation. ISIS is a threat, make no mistake about it; but, it is second. 

So, when you enter into a discussion with them about, ‘‘We want 

to do something about ISIS in Syria, and we’re going to need your 

forces to do it,’’ they said what they will do is defer that and come 

back with, ‘‘We have to do something about Assad first. We have 

to get—do something about Assad.’’ Assad is being propped up by 

the Iranians, and it’s a client state of Iran, which ties to their overall stability and security concern. 

That is why the Ambassador and I both agree that, while there 

are no per se military solutions to Syria, military solutions do— 

military action does play a role in getting political solutions. It always has, since the beginning of time. Our thought is that it’s reasonable to establish safe zones and no-fly zones to turn the momentum against the regime. 

Now, listen. The regime is, by no means, 10 foot tall. This is an 

organization that used to be 220,000. It’s about 100,000, with a 

high desertion rate, low morale. The equipment isn’t working very 

well. They’ve had—they’ve been narrowed down to—21 percent of 

Syria is what they control. After a 4-year civil war—the initial 

year, they nearly lost the war to the rebels. If you remember that. 

So, that’s what brought all the Iranians in, and the 5,000 

Hezbollah, over 8,000 Iraq Shiite militia, the Quds Force, Qasem 

Soleimani on the ground, because they were about to lose the state. 

That was 4 years ago. Turn back to last year. Unbeknownst to 

many—we were tracking this daily at ISW—the rebel forces—and, 

admittedly, Jabhat al Nusra is powerful in this—but, so is the CIAtrained rebel force that we can’t talk about, in terms of numbers 

and all the equipment that they have, but that also was a powerful 

player on the battlefield. They put this regime in a precarious situation, so much so that the Iranians made multiple visits to the 

Russians to convince them, while a nuclear deal is ongoing, that, 

‘‘We have got to take some action.’’ I think they waited until that 

nuclear deal was almost finalized, and the Russians put their base 

into Syria this summer, for one reason only, because even the 

Alawite enclave at Latakia provinces was being threatened, and 

that would force the collapse of the regime. 

So, here’s the rebel forces, 4 years later, actually putting that 

kind of pressure on the regime. The Russians thought this was 

going to be easy. It hasn’t been. They began striking, September 

30th. Months later, they’ve been making some progress. They will 

eventually wear down these rebels, and they will be an enclave established and a security buffer for the regime. There is no intention, and not possible, for the Syrian military, assisted by Russians 

and the Iranians, to reclaim Syria. That is not happening. All they 

can get is a security buffer for themselves. That is it. They may go 

to Palmyra, which will take considerable force generation to do 

that, to open up the lines of communication there, and also because 

of the significance that Palmyra has in world opinion, but that’s it. 

26 

So, military action in turning momentum against this regime 

still—fortunately, still has a practicality of its own if you shut 

down airpower and establish no-fly zones. That then can move to 

some kind of transition of power. I’m not saying Assad’s got to go 

tomorrow. We have to not give up on the plan that Assad must go, 

because there’s no way that the rebels are going to stop fighting 

until you get some promise that this regime is going to go, after 

250,000 dead and many of their families displaced. These are pretty tough fighters, and they’re not giving up on what they’ve been 

trying to achieve for 4 years. 

In Iraq—Iraq, a different situation, but the political component 

in Iraq is paramount importance. We need to have—we need to 

deter the influence that the Iranians have with this—with Prime 

Minister Abadi. I say Ambassador Crocker is the answer. He says 

other people are the answer, but—we’re after the same goal. The 

goal is political unity. 

I’m frustrated, here, because we spent so much time on this nuclear deal, we should have been in and out of Baghdad with high 

government officials, Secretary of State on the ground routinely 

working with this new administration to achieve the political unity 

that the United States said was their political objective. We’re not 

even close to achieving it. The Kurds are still looking for money, 

and they’re still looking for the weapons that they need. We’re not 

even close on the tribal force that we need from the Sunnis. ISIS 

is occupying Sunni lands exclusively. The Kurds have been able to 

retake their territory back. Therefore, you need, common sense 

tells you, Sunni tribal force to be able to hold the territory even if 

the Iraqi army was able to reclaim it. Without that, it’s not going 

to happen. 

So, that—and that’s why I’ve said you’ve got to put more advisors, more trainers in there; you have to have air controllers on the 

ground; you’ve got to up our ante considerably to convince the 

Sunnis that we’re serious about this and move the political situation in that direction, as well. Then you start to get some answers, 

in terms of how you’re really going to take Mosul. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Mr. Gordon. 

Mr. GORDON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I agree with the others, 

that you summarized the challenges and complexities very well. A 

lot has been said, but maybe I’ll just pick up on two or three of 

the points. 

Your first point, Mr. Chairman, about 1,000 more troops for Iraq 

or what else we could do, I think there are serious legitimate military things that we can and should be looking at to strengthen our 

ability to deal with ISIS in Iraq. There are—they usually come in 

the categories of more joint tactical air controllers, spotters, more 

accompany missions with the Iraqis, more Special Operations 

Forces. I—— 

Chairman MCCAIN. Even Apache. 

Ambassador CROCKER. Apaches, absolutely. The question in each 

of those is just the balance of benefit versus risk. There are risks, 

and there are risks of Americans dying on the battlefield or being 

captured. I think if the military advisors on the ground think that 

there would be a significant benefit from those additions, they 

should absolutely be made, because, as you, I think, suggested, reVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:03 May 30, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00030 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\24849.TXT WILDA
27 

taking Mosul, or some big accomplishment like that, would do a lot. 

Someone asked earlier about the propaganda campaign and the 

messaging—a visible defeat for ISIS on the ground, like in Ramadi 

but followed by Mosul, would be important. I think that cost-benefit should absolutely be assessed, and potentially revised. 

On the question of Raqqa, and taking Raqqa and taking territory 

directly by the United States, there—again, I think it goes without 

saying that we have the military power to do that alone, if necessary. The question there is, Would the benefit of doing so outweigh the costs and consequences? Here’s one of the sort of unintended-consequences areas that I was referring to. You know, one 

is, of course, the whack-a-mole problem, where you could take ISIS 

control of Raqqa, but if the same fighters and commanders and terrorists move to Deir al Zor or Mosul or Aleppo, then you’ve sort of 

displaced the problem and you’ve got 10-, 20-, 30,000 American 

troops on the ground as a recruiting poster for ISIS without really 

having dealt with the problem. I am at least as skeptical as Ambassador Crocker about the prospects of an Arab force doing this 

for us. It has been on the table for some time, and we actually tried 

to work with the Saudis and others to create it. Let’s just say 

they’re a long way from being able to deliver. I mean, look at the 

situation in Yemen, where you actually do have a coalition of more 

than 10 Muslim countries, Arab countries led by the Saudis, willing to support and fight with the Saudis, but no ground force, no 

ability or political willingness to deploy that ground force in 

Yemen—and that is, you know, just Yemen—let alone an ability of 

these forces to go into Syria or Iraq. So, I think we should be really 

cautious in assuming that we don’t have to do it, we’ll get some 

Arab force to do it for us. 

Finally, but maybe most centrally, because I think most of us 

agree that Syria is at the heart of all of these questions, I am more 

skeptical than others that modest military steps will lead to the political settlement that we would all like to see. Whether it’s more 

Special Forces or a no-fly zone, again, politically, I think we have 

to recall, we are not talking about a compromise from the regime, 

we’re not talking about a goal of getting it, quote/unquote, ‘‘to the 

table.’’ We’re talking about getting rid of it and raising all sorts of 

questions, among those who support it, about their future livelihood. So, I think we should not underestimate what it would take, 

or assume that a modest amount of greater support to the opposition—again, the reason I think we know that is, it’s what we’ve 

been doing for almost 5 years. There have been significant amounts 

of arms and support that have gone to the opposition, and the result has been a doubling down by Iran and Russia. We should acknowledge that to deal with it, we would have to directly confront 

them and apply, I think, a lot more military force than has really 

been considered. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Reed. 

Senator REED. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, gentlemen. 

Let me, first, start with Ambassador Crocker and thank you 

again for your extraordinary service in so many different ways. The 

issue of a no-fly zone implies, at least to me, the cooperation of an 

adjacent country. There are only really two: Jordan and Turkey. 

28 

The impression I have—and it’s just an impression—is that the 

Jordanians feel they have a sort of de facto no-fly zone because 

they’ve worked out an arrangement in the south that their border 

is not subject to aerial attack, more or less. The Turks, though, are 

the most problematic. In fact, their behavior sometime is totally 

unpredictable in what they’ve done in Iraq with sending troops 

there, and what they’ve done in terms of helping or not helping us 

to close the last 50 or 60 kilometers on their border. So, can you— 

what is the feasibility of a no-fly zone if you get limited or 

unenthusiastic buy-in by the Turks, as it seems to be the case right 

now? 

Ambassador CROCKER. It’s a great point, Senator. No-fly zones 

north or south, or both, would have to have the full support of Jordan in the south, Turkey in the north. Not going to work, otherwise. Again, General Keane is far more competent than I to speak 

of it. We would—we’d have to enforce a no-fly zone in the air from 

Turkish airspace, and probably from Patriot missile batteries in 

Turkey. So, they’d have to do it. 

Now, the Turks have said, and have—they’ve been saying, for 

some time now, that they favor a no-fly zone and a safe zone. I certainly would like to call that bluff, if indeed it’s a bluff. They have 

said publicly, recently, that they would like to work with us on support for non-ISIS Arab fighters to take care of that gap. I’d like to 

explore with them putting the two together, doing both. 

Again, do I think this is easy? Obviously not. I’m not even sure 

it’s possible. As we look at a horrific landscape out there and the 

politics inside Syria and in the region that make it highly unlikely 

there is going to be any sustained effort by anyone against Islamic 

State under the current dynamics, I think we have to seriously look 

at it. 

Senator REED. Mr. Gordon, your comments before I call on General Keane. 

Mr. GORDON. Yeah. I think—I mean, first of all, the humanitarian situation is such that we should constantly review whether 

there’s anything we can do to stop the airpower being used. So, it 

should absolutely be on the table, and has been on the table, and 

we’ve looked at it, when I was still in the administration, constantly. Beyond that, I would say three things: 

First, you would have to think about where you’re doing the nofly zone. Often, people who support it limit it to just the sort of 

northeast of the country or maybe a sliver on the north, a sliver 

in the south, to avoid coming into direct conflict with the regime 

and the Russians and the air defenses. If you only put it in areas 

where the regime is not really flying anyway, it would obviously 

have limited effect. Obviously, it doesn’t work against ISIS, because ISIS doesn’t have airpower, and the regime is not significantly flying in those parts of the countries. To really have a significant effect on refugees and humanitarian, you’d have to put it 

much further west, including over places like Aleppo, and then you 

get into—if you’re going to do that, then you have to possibly take 

out air defenses. You have what is now really a huge problem with 

the Russians. That, in turn, has—to get to your specific question 

about Turkey—been the problem with the Turks. Because, again, 

when I was still in the administration, we spoke extensively with 

29 

Turkey and tried to figure out a way to do it together. Their insistence was that it cover Aleppo and beyond, which—and, not surprisingly, because they actually had an interest in us getting into a direct military conflict with the regime. The slippery slope that many 

here were concerned about was their objective, in some ways, that 

we would have to take out air defenses, they might challenge it, 

that would make the regime weaker, and then we would be in conflict with the regime. 

Last point, because I think it’s essential, is, What are we trying 

to accomplish with it? I am skeptical—again, I—if there’s a way to 

do it that protects people and helps the humanitarian situation, 

great—I am skeptical that it really gives us leverage that leads to 

Assad’s departure. If that’s the goal, it seems to me unlikely that, 

even if we did it, the Russians and the Iranians would somehow 

come around to the view that maybe they should get rid of Assad 

after all. 

Senator REED. Amen. 

Chairman MCCAIN. You’d think that after 250,000 killed, Mr. 

Gordon, that you would—might consider it seriously. 

Senator Sessions. 

Senator SESSIONS. Well, on the no-fly zone, Ambassador Crocker, 

you indicated that we don’t focus—I mean, we need to consider the 

political ramifications. What’s happening to Europe as a result of 

refugee flows is just incredible. Three senior European officials told 

me the European Union is threatened by this, the very existence 

of it. Would you agree that it has the—I think perhaps the military 

is a little less focused because they’re not recognizing the enormity 

of the political danger. 

Ambassador CROCKER. It’s a great point, Senator. The—what 

we’re watching with the refugee flows is worse than at any time 

since World War II. Far worse. It isn’t a regional problem, it isn’t 

a European problem; it’s a global problem. It’s falling on the region—obviously, the Syrians, themselves, but Turkey, Lebanon, 

and Jordan with enormous refugee populations, and, as you say, in 

Europe, where the European Union, as a political construct—not 

an economic, but a political construct—is threatened. We have 

seen, in Germany, which I consider one of our strongest NATO allies under Angela Merkel, she is now—she has now been weakened 

by this, by trying to do the right thing. So, taking steps in Syria 

that can save lives and reduce the flows of people out of Syria, I 

think, is—it’s an imperative. It’s a humanitarian issue, but it’s also 

a political issue. So, it’s using military assets for political and humanitarian purposes. 

I just—I wish we could get on with it. There are obviously very 

complex questions as to how far you have to go to make a difference. I’m all for taking out his air defenses. You know, this is 

not going to take us to total war. If that’s what is required, you 

know, we should look at it. Again, I’m in that delightful position 

of total irresponsibility, since I represent nothing but myself, but 

I think these are questions for the administration, for Congress, 

and particularly for this committee to look very, very seriously at. 

Senator SESSIONS. General Keane, I have felt the difference in 

North Korea after they got a nuclear weapon than before. I mean, 

they were in a position where they could be defeated. Now they’re 

30 

in a position to lob bombs into Seoul, at least, if not the United 

States. So, isn’t it difficult to under-—to over-estimate the danger 

to the region of a nuclear-armed Iran? Isn’t that an enormous 

event, if Iran gets nuclear weapons? 

General KEANE. Yeah. Absolutely, because—listen, it’ll lead to 

the nuclear proliferation in the Middle East. I mean, the Middle 

East will just go nuclear. I’d take heed of Secretary Kissinger’s 

warning that he believes Iran with a nuclear weapon is the most 

calamitous event in his lifetime, in terms of its threat to global security, because it would likely lead to the first nuclear exchange 

ever. 

Senator SESSIONS. I think it’s just—it’s enormous. 

General KEANE. Certainly. That’s—and I think there’s common 

ground on that. I mean, nobody wants to have Iran acquire a nuclear weapon, with the issues we’ve all been arguing over. What’s 

the best method to stop that from happening? 

Senator SESSIONS. Secretary Kissinger indicated that if they’re 

within months of it, that that creates instability in its own—— 

Ambassador Crocker, let me just ask you something that you 

raised that’s hugely important. Maybe I’ll just ask you to explain 

a little more about it. You say we need to take sides, and—we need 

to take sides with our traditional allies; basically, the Sunni states. 

There are those who believe Iran can somehow be brought in from 

the cold. It’s a revolutionary regime. If we could just get the Shiite 

Persians to moderate, the world would be better and we could 

transform the Middle East. How do you evaluate that situation, 

please? 

Ambassador CROCKER. Senator, it is both a series of hot wars 

and a cold war. The Iranians have taken sides with the Russians 

and with Assad in Syria. That is not the side we want to be on. 

They’ve taken sides in Iraq, with the Shiite militias, who, as we 

sadly remember, just like ISIS, kidnapped and executed Americans, 2007. These are the guys the Iranians are supporting. So, 

they’ve taken a side. The Russians in Syria have taken a side. We 

need to be clear that we stand against this and that we stand with 

our allies. 

You know, Saudi Arabia, yes, we have differences. There’s no 

doubt. Saudi Arabia has been kind of the bedrock of our regional 

security policy since FDR met Ibn Saud on the deck of the Quincy 

in 1945. This is unraveling. This—the Saudis went into Yemen 

without consulting with us. They us a little bit in advance, but they 

didn’t consult on it. From my generation of Near East hands, that’s 

unthinkable. So, we have got to shore up those relationships. You 

start with your traditional friends, then you move to your adversaries, not the other way around. 

I hope that gets at your—— 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you. It’s an important question. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Manchin. 

Senator MANCHIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank all of you. You bring a tremendous amount of experience 

and wisdom to the table, and we really appreciate that. I think it 

seems like the more we hear, the more confused it becomes in how 

we—of how we approach this. 

31 

I’m concern about, basically, since 9/11, you know, and that’s basically the start of what most people think, in America, started our 

engagement over in that area. Now, I’m sure it started many, 

many, many, many years before that, and this thing has been 

brewing for quite some time. With that being said, 9/11 seems to 

be the start of it. 

So, all three of you being afforded the hindsight and being 20/ 

20, what the greatest mistake that we have made, as a country, 

since 9/11? Just as quickly as you can. Because my concern that 

we have now is that—is—Mr. Gordon, you had said that, you know, 

with even our allies—and I think as Ambassador Crocker had said, 

that they’re not willing to fight on the ground, they’re not willing 

to take the fight on the ground, so if we don’t do it, doesn’t look 

like it’s going to be done. We’ve proven it. We’ve been there, and 

it didn’t seem to stabilize that area, because, as soon as we pulled 

out, it was falling apart. So, if you could just give me an oversight, 

very quickly, on the greatest mistake and the simplest direction 

forward that we could not repeat that mistake again. 

General KEANE. Well, I had it in my testimony—I mean, I fundamentally believe that the singular strategic mistake that we’ve 

made is not to develop a strategy dealing with radical Islam, and 

not just focus on one particular group, and embrace the intellectual 

challenge that this ideology presents to us, embrace it politically, 

but brace it in terms of what we need to do financially and economically, and what we must do militarily, and bring people together, nations together, to have a common invested interest in 

this, and deal with it. 

There’s going to be something after ISIS. We will defeat ISIS. 

There is going to be something after ISIS that will threaten our national interests in the Middle East or someplace else that’s going 

to get us involved and concerned, and we’re going to have meetings 

about it, and people will follow me in here in telling you how to 

deal with that problem. That is the singular problem I see, that we 

have not faced up to the—this issue, strategically, to deal with radical Islam, itself, and stop—while we have to stop and defeat ISIS, 

as we had to stop and defeat the al Qaeda senior leadership in 

Pakistan, until we deal with a comprehensive strategy, we’re going 

to find ourselves in the same situation we are now with ISIS. This 

is a generational problem. We have to understand it for that and 

take a page out of the 20th century in how we dealt with communist ideology, form a NATO and SEATO common political and 

military alliances to come together to deal with a common problem. 

Senator MANCHIN. Ambassador Crocker. 

Ambassador CROCKER. Senator, that is a profound question. I’ve 

thought a lot about it. I opened our Embassy in Afghanistan shortly after the fall of the Taliban. The force on the ground then was 

5th Special Forces Group, the CIA, and one Marine Expeditionary 

Unit. That was it. 

Senator MANCHIN. That was after 9—that was—— 

Ambassador CROCKER. After 9/11. 

Senator MANCHIN. Yeah. 

Ambassador CROCKER. The Pentagon at that time was absolutely 

opposed to introducing any more forces to help Karzai secure cities 

outside of Kabul. I think the biggest mistake we made is not unVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:03 May 30, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00035 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\24849.TXT WILDA
32 

derstanding the reach of time and the resilience of those who are 

our adversaries. I had my first—— 

Senator MANCHIN. You would think, by just watching happened 

with Russia being there for 10 years, we would have had some insight of the resilience these people have. 

Ambassador CROCKER. Which may have been behind the thinking of the Pentagon at the time—— 

Senator MANCHIN. Gotcha. 

Ambassador CROCKER.—for not wanting—— 

Senator MANCHIN. Gotcha. 

Ambassador CROCKER.—additional forces. 

So, we kept our force footprint down. Of course, our resilient 

enemy came at us, as it subsequently did in Iraq—different enemy, 

but same league. So, it’s a way the same. There aren’t any easy answers. It’s hard to say—I mean, I will not go to the extreme position of saying that the overthrow of the Taliban and the expulsion 

of al Qaeda was a mistake. I—as an American, I cannot bring myself to say that. 

Senator MANCHIN. Declaring war in Iraq? 

Ambassador CROCKER. I’m coming to the mistakes. 

Afghanistan is worth spending some time on, because—hard to 

argue that we shouldn’t have taken military action after what 

came to us out of Afghanistan. The mistake, if there was one, was 

not understanding that you can’t kill them all and that the effort 

to create a strong, stable state in Afghanistan probably wasn’t 

going to happen. So, then what? In Iraq, it was—— 

Listen, Senator, I learned maybe two things during almost 4 

years in the Middle East. I thought one lesson every couple of decades was a pace I could sustain. It’s—so, the first lesson is: Be 

careful what you get into in the Middle East. The first time I 

learned that lesson was in Lebanon, 1982, Israeli invasion. We all 

thought it was a good idea, get rid of the PLO [Palestinian Liberation Organization]. Well, we got rid of the PLO, and we got 

Hezbollah. We got a chain of events that led to the bombing of my 

Embassy, with me in it, and the bombing of the Marine barracks. 

Be careful what you get into. 

The second thing I learned is: Be just as careful what you propose to get out of, that disengagement can have consequences as 

great or greater as engagement. I would suggest to you, we didn’t 

follow those lessons at all well, either of them, in Iraq. 

Senator MANCHIN. Mr. Chairman, can Mr. Gordon just give us 

his—what he thinks the greatest mistake—— 

Mr. Gordon. 

Thank you. Thank you, Ambassador. 

Mr. GORDON. Yeah, I agree, it’s a profound question, a hard 

question. I’d say, with the greatest respect, it may not even be a 

helpful question, because we should be reluctant, because of these 

complexities, to identify single things. I think many would argue, 

if you had to identify a single thing, that it would be the Iraq War, 

not just because of the financial and human costs, but because it 

tipped the strategic balance in the region and put Iran in charge 

in Iraq. It led to Sunni disempowerment, which is partly fueling al 

Qaeda in Iraq and then ISIS. It made the United States public 

wary of our engagement in the Middle East, and arguably even 

33 

over-wary, so we’re not willing to do things that, arguably, we 

should. I don’t—I think we have to acknowledge that for every, you 

know, mistake of action, there would have costs of inaction, too. So, 

even I’m not willing to say that that’s the greatest single mistake, 

because, had we not done it, we might be sitting here talking about 

the mistake of leading—leaving Saddam Hussein in power. So, 

that’s why I’m reluctant to—— 

Senator MANCHIN. Sure. 

Mr. GORDON.—identify single things. 

I’ve pointed out elsewhere that, you know, when you think back 

about the region, in Iraq, we intervened and occupied, and it 

turned out very badly. In Libya, we intervened, but didn’t occupy, 

and it has turned out very badly. In Syria, we neither intervened 

nor occupied, and it has turned out very badly. I think the lesson 

of that is just overall caution that there is some single answer or 

model for how we should deal with these problems, again, has been 

said, so I would—I would say there’s not a single mistake, just as 

there’s not a single answer for what we should do, going forward. 

Senator MANCHIN. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Ayotte. 

Senator AYOTTE. Thank you, Chairman. 

I want to thank all of you for being here. 

General Keane, I wanted to ask you—and certainly we’ve seen 

Iran twice test ballistic missiles this fall, and we know that, recently, the administration has issued some minimal sanctions, 

frankly, recently, after the hostage release, to address those ballistic missile tests. Do you think that their response to these testing of the ballistic missiles, post the inking of this agreement, obviously in clear violation of existing U.N. resolutions, is sufficient? 

What does this—as I hear all of you say, that, no matter where you 

stand on the Iran agreement, we’ve got to be quite vigilant, going 

forward—and what do you make of this? 

General KEANE. Well, to directly answer your question, I think 

that’s a totally inadequate response. These are essentially U.S. unilateral sanctions that we’re imposing. This is a violation of U.N. 

resolution. The United States should lead an effort in the Security 

Council to impose tough economic sanctions on that and set that 

as a bar, certainly, because the Iranians have already told us that 

they’re going to continue to test ballistic missiles. Now, these are 

medium-range ballistic missiles. They’re eventually going to be 

testing long-range ballistic missiles that’ll reach all of Europe. 

Then the Iranians are totally capable of moving to intercontinental 

ballistic missiles. So, if—here’s the 36-year pattern of not doing 

anything, and look where we are with the Iranians. 

So, I’m—I am of a mind that we have to have tough-minded economic sanctions. They have worked. It is what brought the Iranians to the negotiating table over the nuclear deal, primarily, in 

my judgment. So, yes. I think every time they take a hostage, there 

should be some kind of a sanction. We have refused to do that. 

The—we are incentivizing hostage-taking. As the Ambassador 

painfully is aware of, they have been taking hostages since the 

1980s. This is a cottage industry for them. They take hostages, we 

scream and holler about it. We eventually get our hostages back. 

34 

Tragically, they killed CIA Station Chief Buckley. The reality is, 

we’ve not stood up to it. That gets their attention. 

So, I think, yes, we have to take a stand by this and demonstrate 

to the Iranians and to our allies in the region that, despite the nuclear deal we’ve made with the Iranians, we are not giving up on 

standing up against their malign behavior in the region and as it 

impacts our interests and the stability and security of the region. 

Now, we’re going to be there. When we don’t do that, and we just 

do what we did, these unilateral in—sanctions for missile testing, 

that is inviting more missile testing. 

Senator AYOTTE. Can I also ask—Ambassador Crocker, I was 

very curious about your statement, which I thought was very direct, in answer to Senator Sessions, about, Where does the United 

States stand? As we look at allies like Saudi Arabia, that right now 

we are giving them the impression that we aren’t standing with 

them. In fact, we’ve seen, obviously, that Iran and Russia, you very 

clearly laid out, have taken a side, here, and it’s a side against our 

interests, ultimately, and against peace and stability in the region, 

which is in, of course, all of our interests. I wanted to ask you. in 

terms of what we should be doing, I see this as connected. So, when 

the Iranians act badly and we don’t respond, I think this also gives 

a message to some of our allies that are concerned about Iran’s 

hegemonic behavior in the region. What would you like to see us 

do with regard to our allies? How do we turn this around right now 

to make sure that our allies, who we need at this moment to address the ISIS threat and also threats that can flow from Iran from 

their malign behavior, going forward? 

Ambassador CROCKER. Thank you, Senator. 

First, make it clear that we are going to stand against malign 

Iranian activity. I gave a suggestion on what we might look at 

doing in Syria. In Iraq, I would like to see—not Ryan Crocker, but 

John Kerry go out and—anybody but me—go out and spend a prolonged period of time out there. 

Senator AYOTTE. Don’t ask us, because we’re going to want to 

send you. 

[Laughter.] 

Ambassador CROCKER. You know, Condi Rice did this when I was 

out there. In this administration, I think there have been two Secretary of State visits in 7 years to Iraq, one by Secretary Clinton 

and one by Secretary Kerry. I think that’s right. I’m not sure. 

Senator AYOTTE. Well, that’s telling. That’s telling. 

Ambassador CROCKER. In—and so, the space we vacated, the Iranians filled. They’re—they are not seeking a unified Iraqi state 

that is friendly with Iran. They are seeking, basically, the destruction of an Iraqi state, its division into a Kurdistan, where they 

would have heavy influence, a Shi’astan, with most of the oil that 

they would effectively control, and a Jihadistan that the Islamic 

State can have, and who cares? 

So, I would start making a major diplomatic push. There is a 

Prime Minister we can work with. He hasn’t had many options, beyond Tehran. I’d like to see us give him one. Those would be a couple of things. 

35 

When the Secretary needed a break from Baghdad, he could 

move around to Oman, to Tel Aviv, to Ankara, to Cairo, to Riyadh, 

repeat as necessary. It will be necessary. 

Your business on this Hill, and the business I left, has one thing 

at the center of both: It’s about relationships. I am concerned that 

we have let our relationships atrophy with our friends in the region. We need to take some specific actions to show our resolve. We 

also need to just take them seriously and engage with them. 

Finally, I would say, with respect to the ballistic missile tests, I 

would agree with General Keane. I—and maybe we’re doing this— 

that we are active in the United Nations with the Security Council. 

Probably a good time to be a little bit quiet on it until we can do 

the prep work, but I think we should make the same effort there 

that we did on the nuclear issue. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator King. 

Senator KING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

First, General Keane, I agree with you completely that a comprehensive strategy that involves everything from military force to 

information to ideology to ideas is needed to deal with the threat 

of ISIS, which is the longrun threat. So, I appreciate your testimony on that. I think that’s exactly right. 

Just a small question. Ambassador Crocker, you noted you 

thought Prime Minister Merkel was suffering politically for, quote, 

‘‘doing the right thing’’ about taking in Syrian refugees. I presume 

you think that this country has some responsibility to take in Syrian refugees? 

Ambassador CROCKER. Yes, sir, I do. More profoundly, I believe 

this country has an obligation to lead on a global crisis, not to let 

the European—or, leave it to the Europeans, who—— 

Senator KING. You’re talking now about the refugee crisis. 

Ambassador CROCKER. The refugee crisis. The—we have a broad 

responsibility, I believe, as America, as a global leader, to lead on 

a global crisis, to help the Europeans sort out what they’re doing 

with these people, to support, as fully and actively as we can, the 

Turks, the Lebanese, and the Jordanians. 

Senator KING. It would be very difficult for us—— 

Ambassador CROCKER. Part of that—oh, sorry, Senator. 

Senator KING. No, you go ahead. 

Ambassador CROCKER. Part of that—you know, we’re not going 

to be able to lead effectively if we don’t walk the walk. 

Senator KING. That was going to be my question. 

Ambassador CROCKER. That—and in my view, that means taking 

in a significant number of refugees. They’re not going to take us 

very seriously in Europe. Angela Merkel’s got a million, and we’ve 

got 2100. That doesn’t mean we’ve got to—I mean, I’m all for the 

vetting process. It’s essential. I’d just like to see it made more of 

a priority to be able to move refugees faster. Again, this crisis isn’t 

going to get any better. With the kind of fractionated approach of 

dealing with it that has emerged without a single State stepping 

forward and saying, ‘‘Let’s everybody get together and figure out 

how we’re going to deal with it,’’ I’m just afraid we’re going to see 

more and more of this. 

Senator KING. I thank you for your testimony. I’m sitting in a 

Senate seat that was occupied by Edmund Muskie, whose father 

36 

was an immigrant from Poland, and George Mitchell, whose mother was an immigrant from Lebanon. 

General Keane, the central question about Syria, you touched 

upon, and we’ve sort of talked around it. Where does the ground 

force come from? I think I heard agreement that it shouldn’t be us, 

because that’s a recruiting poster, that’s what ISIS wants, that 

would be a gift. Then we’re hearing that the Muslim countries don’t 

seem to want to step forward with ground troops. Where do we— 

that’s—this has been the problem with the strategy for 3 years— 

where do the ground troops come from in Syria to confront ISIS? 

General KEANE. You know, ISIS in Syria, much as ISIS in Iraq, 

is occupying Sunni land. The bit of land that they were dealing 

with the Kurds on, the Kurds have effectively reclaimed in Syria, 

as well as in Iraq. By the way, we should use that as evidence that 

ISIS certainly isn’t 10 foot tall. 

Senator KING. Right. 

General KEANE. We put together a fairly decent representative 

ground force, supported by some effective airpower, we can defeat 

ISIS. So—— 

Senator KING. The same thing happened in Ramadi. 

General KEANE. Yeah. The problem we have is that the ground 

force is fighting Assad. That is essentially—the largest force that’s 

fighting Assad are Sunni Syrian Arabs. 

Senator KING. Therefore, getting rid of Assad should be a priority—— 

General KEANE. That—— 

Senator KING.—in order to turn that force—— 

General KEANE. That is what we are—— 

Senator KING.—on ISIS. 

General KEANE. That is what the Ambassador and I have been 

saying, that Assad remains a priority for—certainly to get off the 

status quo and this humanitarian catastrophe that we’re facing, 

which is contributing to migration challenges, but it also enables 

ISIS to thrive, because the Sunni Arabs are not going to cross that 

border while—and fight ISIS while the Iranians are propping up 

the Assad regime. It is—— 

Senator KING. If Assad—— 

General KEANE.—just not going to happen, 

Senator KING. If Assad went, you’d have—the Syrian army plus 

the moderate opposition would then be able to focus on ISIS. The— 

but, the—now—and I’m not being argumentative here, that you all 

have—or at least you two have endorsed a no-fly zone. That was 

a lot easier when it was just the Syrian air force. We’re—the testimony is, How do we—we talk about a no-fly zone. You’re talking 

about shooting down Russian airplanes. 

General KEANE. Well, you know, this is a problem we’ve always 

had, from the Cold War to the present. Because the Russians have 

a capability and we have a capability, and if we fear their use if 

that capability and paralyzes us from taking action, then we’re taking a knee. I don’t think we need to do it. I’ll be quite frank about 

it. I would have demonstrated America’s resolve right from the beginning. When they first bombed Syrian moderates that we 

trained, we should have cratered that runway and send a strong 

signal—not kill a single Russian, but cratered that runway and 

37 

say, ‘‘You do that again, then more than that runway is going to 

go away.’’ 

These—this is something we learned in the Cold War. The Russians have stepped up. They have brought to the table a very limited Russian capability. They haven’t been out of the region in 35 

years, since they went to Afghanistan. That was a failed military 

operation, as we’re all aware of. They are an inferior military, by 

comparison to the United States. They know that. They know it. 

They have selected capability that is very good. I think if we establish a no-fly zone, I don’t—and we’re going to put people in there 

to protect them—I don’t really see the Russians coming in to bomb 

it. They would be a pariah on the world stage for doing something 

like that. The more likely attempt at protecting a safe zone would 

be from infiltration, suicide bombers or something like that, where 

you would need some kind of ground force to protect it, or firing 

a missile or a rocket at it, which means you’ll—you have to bring 

up from Jordan and Turkey missile defense systems that could 

help protect the no-fly zone. So, I don’t think the—— 

Senator KING. We wouldn’t necessarily—— 

General KEANE.—the fear of Russian intervention in a no-fly 

zone should paralyze us from establishing that very thing. 

Senator KING. Well, I share your analysis. So, going back to the 

Soviet Union, the best analogy I ever heard was that they’re like 

a hotel thief; they try all the doors until they find one that’s open. 

[Laughter.] 

General KEANE. I haven’t heard that one. 

Senator KING. That’s essentially what you’re suggesting here. By 

not showing any level of resistance, then they’re going to maintain 

their presence. Of course, the danger is some kind of counter-escalation. I think, Mr. Crocker, something I wrote down, ‘‘Be careful 

what you get into.’’ That’s always a good piece of advice. 

Thank you, gentlemen. Very important testimony. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Cotton. 

Senator COTTON. General Keane, if I could continue on this 

point. Russia began significant operations in Syria in late September. They had multiple incursions into Turkish airspace September, October, and early November. Then, in late November, 

Turkey shot down one of their—one of Russia’s aircraft. Do you 

know how many times Russia has invaded Turkish airspace since 

that shootdown? 

General KEANE. I have no idea. I suspect they have not. 

Senator COTTON. What do you think that says about the connection between those two events and their willingness to respect a 

demonstration of force in enforcing airspace rights? 

General KEANE. Yes. I mean, the pattern of the Russians is exactly what we see in that situation. Turkey was protecting their 

sovereign airspace. They took what they thought was reasonable 

action to do that. The Russians have stayed away from it. I think 

that would be the same situation dealing with a no-fly zone. 

Listen, they—the Russians, at the end of the day, are not fools. 

They’re practical. They’re in Syria for one reason only, to prop up 

the Assad regime. They have a very limited military objective. That 

is their goal. They—I cannot see them extending that to bomb a 

place where we’re trying to protect innocent people. 

38 

Senator COTTON. Ambassador Crocker, would you agree with 

that assessment? 

Ambassador CROCKER. I would, sir, and I’d extend it, of course, 

to Iran, that they, Russia and Iran, in alliance, are going to push, 

in Syria and elsewhere, at least in the case of Iran, until somebody, 

like us, pushes back. 

Senator COTTON. If we could stick with Turkey for a moment, 

since they are, in many ways, the lynchpin of both the—what’s 

happening in Syria and our efforts there, as well as the refugee 

flows. At this moment, based on their past conduct, how would you 

assess that the Turkish Government prioritizes the various fights 

they are engaged in—the Kurds, the Assad regime, and the Islamic 

State? 

Ambassador CROCKER. That’s a great question, Senator, because 

it highlights something that we’ve been talking about this morning. 

We want the non-jihadi Syrian groups to fight Islamic State. Their 

archenemy isn’t the Islamic State, it’s Assad. We want the Arab 

states to come in to fight Islamic State. That’s not their biggest 

issue. It’s Iran. The same thing applies with Turkey. Islamic State 

is clearly a threat to them, and they know it. We’ve seen the attacks into Syria. In Ankara’s calculus, the Kurds are a much greater threat. So, we’ve got the dilemma that the most effective on-theground force we have found in Syria is the one that the Turks fear 

the most, particularly since the Syrian Kurdish groups, the YPG, 

are affiliated with the PKK. You know, thousands have died in that 

conflict inside of Turkey, both Kurds and Turks. So, this is the 

problem from hell at every dimension. It isn’t going to get better 

on its own. A startling revelation, I know. It’s going to take that 

kind of sustained dialogue and engagement with all of our traditional allies in that area. We just need to be having that conversation. 

Senator COTTON. Continuing on priorities, which Sunni Arab 

state views the Islamic State as a graver threat than it views Iran 

and Shiite aggression in the region? 

Ambassador CROCKER. I am not totally current on this. I would 

say, based on my last interactions—and, of course, King Abdullah 

was just here; some of you may have had that conversation with 

him—I think King Abdullah would put Islamic State up there 

ahead of Iran. The Arabian Peninsula states—no, it would be Iran. 

We’ve—didn’t get much notice, but the Kuwaitis made some arrests, in the last week or so, of individuals accused in a massive 

terror plot involving literally tons of explosives that they traced to 

Iran. So, for them, it’s an existential threat. 

In Iraq, he is in no position to say so, but I would bet that, sandwiched between ISIS and Iran, the Iraqi leadership would probably 

put them on pretty much a par. 

Senator COTTON. Well, my time is expired, but, Mr. Gordon, I 

infer from your head-nodding that you largely agree with Ambassador Crocker’s assessment? Do you care to add any perspective? 

Mr. GORDON. I agree with his assessment. I think the United 

Arab Emirates, Jordan, Egypt, and Iraq would all say ISIS is a 

greater threat. Saudi Arabia would be focused on Iran. 

Senator COTTON. Okay. 

Thank you all, gentlemen. 

39 

Chairman MCCAIN. The dilemma is to reconcile those priorities. 

Senator Heinrich. 

Senator HEINRICH. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

I want to continue on this issue of, sort of, priority and scale, because we’ve heard a lot today about the threat of Iran and its influence in the region, the threat of Assad in Syria. On a scale, we’ve 

heard a lot less about ISIS. 

Secretary Gordon, I wanted to ask you, How would you prioritize 

or rank and scale those three threats in the region, in terms of our 

greatest—the greatest threats to our current interests and security? 

Mr. GORDON. To the three, Iran, ISIS, and—what was the third? 

Senator HEINRICH. Just Assad in Syria. 

Mr. GORDON. Yeah, which you could couple with Iran, in many 

ways. You know, I don’t like the choice, because we should acknowledge that we have major problems with Iran, which—— 

Senator HEINRICH. Right. 

Mr. GORDON.—threatens our interests, and we have an interest 

in containing Iran. We also have a strategic interest in defeating 

and destroying ISIS. So, I don’t like the choice, which somehow implies—— 

Senator HEINRICH. Obviously, they’re all related. So, I’m not asking for, necessarily, a one-two-three, but a—How do we prioritize 

our resources to address these three threats? 

Mr. GORDON. I think we have to do them all at the same time. 

The question of Syria, I already made clear that I think our 

prioritization needs to be de-escalating the conflict more than displacing Assad. Would I like to get rid of Assad tomorrow? Absolutely. I wouldn’t like to, if the cost of that was an even greater 

all-out war among all of the different groups in Syria. I fear that 

the most likely result of immediate steps to get rid of Assad now 

would not result in moderates ruling Syria in an inclusive way and 

turning on ISIS, which we’d love to see, but, rather, an all-out battle for Damascus, hundreds of thousands, or possibly millions, more 

refugees of all those who are afraid of living in that battle between 

ISIS, Nusra, and dozens of other groups. So, for that reason, my 

priority on that issue would be de-escalating the war rather than 

getting rid of Assad. 

Another important priorities question is undermining Russia in 

Iran, vis-a-vis stopping the war. Is it in our interests to contain 

and undermine Russia in Iran? Absolutely. We could put that on 

the top of our list and do whatever it takes to do that. I think the 

costs and consequences of that—the ongoing Syrian civil war, the 

lack of a nuclear agreement with Iran—would outweigh those. So, 

that’s the—I mean, that is a nice summary for this—— 

Senator HEINRICH. Well, that’s—— 

Mr. GORDON.—entire hearing—— 

Senator HEINRICH. That’s actually helpful. 

Mr. GORDON.—the need for discipline in prioritizing, because we 

have a lot of goals. 

Senator HEINRICH. In relations to that, one of the challenges we 

have, especially with regard to the ISIS piece of this, is that, while 

we all recognize that Turkey can play a very strong and sort of 

geostrategic role in all of this, their approach has been oftentimes 

40 

ambiguous. How do we leverage greater focus on ISIS from Turkey, 

given their concerns about the Kurds and other priorities? What do 

you think, Secretary Gordon, Prime Minister Erdogan’s strategic 

goals and objectives are, truly, in this current engagement? 

Mr. GORDON. That’s another great question. Ambassador Crocker 

alluded to this. The problem—you know, we all have lots of different adversaries in the region, and we prioritize them differently. 

Turkey’s and ours, on the questions we’ve been discussing—Turkey, I would say, prioritizes the war with the Kurds, because they 

are internally threatened and, as was said, have lost 30,000 people 

in a conflict over three decades. Next is Assad. Then after that is 

ISIS, which they don’t like, but they have a strategic interest in 

avoiding a conflict with, so they’ve been reluctant to really poke too 

much. I would say ours are the opposite. We would put ISIS on the 

top of those three—— 

Senator HEINRICH. Right. 

Mr. GORDON.—Assad next, and the Kurds are not only lower 

down, they’re actually a partner. 

Senator HEINRICH. Yeah. 

Mr. GORDON. I would note that, in the past week alone, we have 

seen Turkey oppose Kurdish representation in the opposition group 

that is meant to meet to try to de-escalate these talks, which is 

hard to—you know, it’s hard to imagine excluding the Kurds from 

the opposition, and Turkey taking military action against the PYG, 

which is one of our strongest forces in fighting ISIS. So, that really 

underscores the difference that we have with Turkey on some of 

these. You asked—— 

Senator HEINRICH. That’s—— 

Mr. GORDON.—you know, how to deal with it. I think you used 

the word ‘‘leverage.’’ Look, Turkey is still an ally and a partner, 

and we need to have an absolutely frank conversation. Because we 

have different priorities, only a sort of tradeoff on these issues can 

get us on the same page. 

Senator HEINRICH. Ambassador Crocker, while I have a couple of 

seconds left, you pointed out that in—Germany has a million-plus 

refugees. I think Jordan has a million-two, something like that. 

The U.S. is willing to take 2100. Do you have an opinion on the 

House-passed bill, the American Security Against Foreign Enemies, 

or SAFE, Act and its potential impact on being able to deal with 

refugees from Iraq and Syria? 

Ambassador CROCKER. I appreciate the fears in this country in 

the wake of Paris, and particularly San Bernardino. These are real 

fears. I just think the legislation is aiming in the wrong direction. 

You know, the refugees are not the source of the problem or of 

terror. They’re the victims of it. It’s also very important, again, to 

keep a regional perspective. I follow Islamic State media as closely 

as I can, and it was very interesting. Back in September, when 

Chancellor Merkel made the statement that refugees were welcome 

in Germany, the Islamic State social media went nuts, ‘‘Don’t believe it. It’s a trap. They’re trying to lure you in so they can imprison you, or worse.’’ On it went. It defeats a key part of the Islamic State narrative if the West, including the United States, is 

seen as welcoming of the refugees that they are helping to create, 

that we are the protectors of Muslims, not them, that they are the 

41 

tormenter, we are the protector. That’s the narrative we want to 

get out there. I just hope we do it. Again, I understand what the 

legislation is intending to do. I think it’s—it’s actually counterproductive. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Hirono. 

Senator HIRONO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Ambassador Crocker, you noted that we need to stand with the 

Sunnis, because of, you know, others—Iran has taken a position. 

So, what does this mean? What concrete steps do we take to reaffirm our relationship, for example, with Saudi Arabia and with 

Turkey? Because there are internal issues going on within both of 

these countries that make it difficult, not to mention, for example, 

in Turkey, that they are very concerned that we are depending on 

Kurds to fight in Syria, and that is the biggest concern that President Erdogan has, apparently, in Turkey. Then, in Saudi Arabia, 

there are succession issues and some internal posturing that’s 

going on there. So, how do we, with these two very important allies—how do we shore up our relationships with them and let them 

know that we stand with them? What concrete steps would you 

suggest? 

Ambassador CROCKER. Well, two sets of issues, Senator. First, 

taking actions that demonstrate that we are on the same side of 

issues critical to them, as well as us. That is why I have been saying it’s important to take a stand against what Iraq—Iran is doing 

in the region, both in Syria and Iraq, in particular. They’re slightly 

different cases. To show the Saudis and others that, yeah, we’re serious about the same things they’re serious about. 

With Erdogan in—Turkey is a—you know, a NATO ally. It’s in 

a special category. They stood with us in Korea. We should be having the kind of high-level sustained dialogue that befits a critical 

treaty alliance, to listen to them, to understand their concerns, to 

see how the region looks to Erdogan in some detail and depth. It 

starts with that kind of engagement. 

We also need to be careful, I think, in understanding the very 

real limits on how helpful the Kurds can be. When you get outside 

of areas of their traditional influence—and we saw this when they 

led the effort to retake the Sinjar region in northern Iraq from Islamic State—some real frictions developed, because that is not a 

traditionally Kurdish area. So, in addition to Turkish fears, trying 

to push the Kurds into, say, Arab areas—not a good idea. So, just 

kind of understanding the dynamics, and then having that strategic dialogue. 

I’d just say one final point on Saudi Arabia, Senator. I’ve followed Saudi affairs for a long time. I’m never going to figure out 

how their internal political dynamics work. What I do know is, you 

know, for most of the last four decades, the West—elements in the 

West have been predicting the collapse of the House of Saud. It’s 

still there. I think it’s going to be there for a good, long time. Let 

them worry about how their internal politics are organized, and 

let’s just deal with them as a government. 

Senator HIRONO. Well, with the Saudis, there’s a potential for a 

young 30-year-old to take over the leadership there. So, the Middle 

East is fraught with peril. 

42 

Mr. Gordon, you said that de-escalating the conflict in Syria is 

the more immediate concern than getting rid of Assad. Isn’t that 

the path that the U.S. is taking right now? De-escalating the conflict there? 

Mr. GORDON. I think the U.S. is interested in de-escalating the 

conflict and is trying to find some middle ground between what 

might have been an ideal objective or an initial objective of complete regime change in Syria and living with Assad. So, looking 

for—— 

Senator HIRONO. For the moment. I mean, it’s not a long-term 

desirable—— 

Mr. GORDON. That’s right. That’s why they’re looking at: Could 

you have a certain amount of time that he can stay? Or, could you 

reduce his powers in the meantime? I think all of these things are 

important to explore diplomatically. I just fear that the insistence 

on immediate departure without a means to bring it about just perpetuates the war. 

Senator HIRONO. Well, I—— 

Mr. GORDON. While it wouldn’t be ideal to have a cease-fire in 

place, and many have questioned whether the opposition would 

ever accept it, all of which are legitimate, if you could offer them 

what has never really been offered at all in the—in 5 years, which 

is control over the areas that they control, an end of the offensive 

operation and barrel bombs, humanitarian assistance, prisoner releases, and a path and process to deal with Syria more generally, 

I think it would be an awful lot better than where we are right 

now. 

Senator HIRONO. My understanding of our posture in Syria is 

that, in fact, we are not insisting that Assad go right away, because 

we recognize, as Ambassador Crocker has said, ‘‘Be careful what,’’ 

you know, ‘‘you get into and what you get out of.’’ So, I do not think 

that that is, in fact, what we’re doing. I think what we’re doing is 

to try to figure out a way to achieve a cease-fire there. That would 

have—go a long way to addressing the humanitarian crisis that is 

happening in Syria. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Kaine is sitting down. 

You know, where is our moral compass? Where are we satisfied 

to leave someone in power that has killed 250,000 men, women, 

and children, and sent millions into refugee status? Ambassador 

Crocker addressed the result of this failure, ‘‘So, let’s leave him in 

power for a while and let’s live with Bashar Assad for’’—so, what? 

So, he can kill more people? So he can starve them, so he can 

slaughter them with poison gas? Is that the moral compass that 

the United States has followed? I don’t think so. I think the greatest example of sticking to your moral compass is the Reagan administration. For us to sit by and say, ‘‘Well, maybe Bashar Assad 

can stay for a while. Maybe we can’’—we’re—the—it’s immoral. If 

we lose our moral compass, then we’re just like every other nation 

in history. 

Senator Kaine. 

Senator KAINE. Thank you, Mr. Chair. You know I strongly support your—have long supported your proposals with respect to the 

43 

humanitarian or no-fly zone in northern Syria. You were prescient 

in calling for that. 

A couple of questions for the witnesses. I apologize for stepping 

out. We’re having a Foreign Relations Committee hearing on exactly the same topic, and we’ve been going back and forth. 

Who’s a bigger enemy to the United States, ISIL or Syrian refugees? 

General KEANE. What was the second part of that? 

Senator KAINE. Who is a bigger enemy to the United States, ISIL 

or Syrian refugees? 

General KEANE. Well, clearly ISIL is a bigger enemy. I certainly 

don’t think Syrian refugees are an enemy, period. 

Senator KAINE. Other witnesses? 

Mr. GORDON. Agree. 

Ambassador CROCKER. Yes, sir. We had a—something of a conversation on that before you came back in. I agree completely. 

Senator KAINE. The reason I ask is, we’re debating a bill this 

afternoon, and the title of the bill is Securing America Against Foreign Enemies Act of 2015. The enemies referred to in the bill are 

refugees from Syria and Iraq. We haven’t had a debate or a vote 

about ISIL. 

The President sent a draft AUMF [Authorized Use of Military 

Force] authorization to Congress in the Middle of February. Now, 

I’ve not been hesitant to be critical of the administration. I think 

they should have sent it earlier. I’m not that wild about the content 

of it. They asked Congress for an AUMF draft in February. Each 

of you has had long experience. Are you—not only have we not 

voted on it, there has not been a debate or a vote in committee or 

on the floor in either house on the question of either the President’s authorization or an alternate authorization in 11 months 

since the President sent it. Are you aware of any other time in our 

history where the President asked Congress for a war authorization, sent a proposed authorization to Congress, but that it was not 

even taken up for debate in committee or on the floor of either 

house? 

General KEANE. I’m not aware of any that—any precedent like 

that. I provided testimony on this very subject, AUMF, and I certainly—I believe it should be taken and should be debated, and it 

should be voted on. I think it was very appropriate for the President to send it. 

Senator KAINE [presiding]. Other thoughts? 

Ambassador CROCKER. Yeah. It’s an important question. I 

would—you know, as a civilian, I would look at it in practical 

terms. Are there contingencies out there to which we could not respond militarily because the existing AUMF is not adequate? If the 

answer to that is yes, then I—just speaking as a citizen, I would 

find it incredible that Congress has not acted on it in almost a 

year. 

Mr. GORDON. I’m also not aware of any such precedents. I agree 

with you that it’s a problem. I think we have a legal basis for what 

we are doing. I don’t know of anything we’d immediately like to do 

that we can’t do because we don’t have it. I also think that the 

basis on which we are acting is mushy and far removed from what 

are trying to do. You know, we were talking here about slippery 

44 

slopes or military slippery slopes. This is a sort of legal slippery 

slope, where you just get in the habit of not having a specific authorization, and then you’re years away from the specific authorization you have. I don’t think that’s a habit the United States should 

want to develop. 

Senator KAINE. Ambassador Crocker, I wanted to ask one last 

question about an item in your testimony. I’m really grappling with 

something. I’m only trying to answer this for myself. You were real 

candid that in this Iran-Saudi Arabia tension which has now really 

accelerated—it’s longstanding in origin, accelerated—that we really 

need to pick a side. What I’ve been worried about is, Is there a— 

are there unfortunate consequences of picking a side that we may 

not want? So, one analysis of this conflict is, it’s a Sunni-Shiite divide. I think we would all agree, the U.S. doesn’t have a side in 

a theological debate about which strand of Islam we prefer. That’s 

not something we would pick a side in. It’s a nation-state battle between Saudi Arabia and Iran. There may be a cultural Arab-Persian component to it. There’s certainly a worry about Iran’s economic competitiveness and their military activity. There may be a 

little Revolutionary Guard against monarchy component. So, 

there’s a lot of layers to this. 

How do we pick a side without just kind of making it look, to 

the—to that region of the world, that we’re just sort of planting our 

feet on the Sunni side of a Sunni-Shiite sectarian fight? 

Ambassador CROCKER. Yeah, it’s a great question. We should not 

be in the position of having to pick a side, in my view, Senator, in 

that area. We should be leading. We should be deciding what the 

strategic agenda is, and then lining up support for it where it’s 

most appropriate. Unfortunately, now we’re playing catchup. The 

sides have been formed. We’re very late to a very critical game, and 

are in that sad position of having, effectively, to choose a side. 

When we do—and I hope we do—then we need to work to start 

shaping that side, because there are some things going on there 

now that are not good for our allies or for the region as a whole 

or for our long-term interests. Just sitting on the sidelines doesn’t 

really let you affect how the team’s going to play. 

Senator KAINE. Dr. Gordon? 

Mr. GORDON. Maybe just to referred on this. Let’s be clear, I 

think. We do pick a side. I mean, nobody should misunderstand. 

We do have allies and partners. You know, with Iran, even after 

the nuclear deal, we will have unilateral United States sanctions 

on Iran, we’ll confront Iran, in terms of terrorism, human rights, 

other issues. We won’t have diplomatic relations with Iran. Whereas, with the other side, we have extensive relationships, bases, 

ships, missile defense cooperation, sell billions of dollars worth of 

weapons, have strategic partnerships. So, I think, you know, the 

starting point should be to understand that we have partners and 

we have an adversary. So, that’s clear. 

The question is—and I do agree with my colleagues that, notwithstanding everything I just said, we have a perception problem, 

and we have to deal with it. We should. Nobody should misunderstand that we’re somehow right in the middle between Iran and 

our Gulf partners. 

45 

The question is, does picking a side take you all the way to doing 

things that might not be in your interest, like not having a nuclear 

deal with Iran or going directly to war in Syria? I think there’s limits to the degree that we take sides. We have our own national interests, and that has to be a part of our frank dialogue with our 

friends and partners. 

Senator KAINE. General Keane? 

General KEANE. Yeah. I think the model of the Soviet Union is 

a good one. We clearly took a side and—because we felt it was an 

existential threat to the country. Here, we believe, I think, Iran’s 

geopolitical strategy to dominate the region is not in the United 

States national interests, nor in our allies’ interest. So, clearly 

we’re lined up against that. I don’t think we’ve done enough to 

counter this malign behavior. At the same time, in dealing with the 

Soviet Union, we obviously formed political and military alliances 

against it, but it never stopped us from seeking opportunities to 

work with the Soviet Union for common purpose and common interest. 

I think when you do—when you operate from a position of 

strength like that, it actually enables you to get more done with 

your adversary. I think that’s what Ambassador Crocker and I are 

arguing for, that this train has already left the station and we have 

disengaged from the region, and, without our involvement in it, 

this could get to be a very dangerous situation between Saudi Arabia and the Iranians and their supporters. We have to get back in 

it, and we have to rally our allies, and we have to have clear political and diplomatic objectives of what we’re trying to achieve to 

counter the Iranian advance in the region. 

Senator KAINE. Thank you for your service and testimony. 

Senator Shaheen. 

Senator SHAHEEN [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Kaine. 

Senator Kaine and I were running back and forth between the 

Foreign Relations Committee upstairs, so thank you for holding on 

until I could get down here. 

First of all, let me thank all three of you, both for being here this 

morning and for your service to the country. It truly is impressive. 

Your willingness to continue to engage is also impressive. 

I wanted to just follow up on some of the specifics that you raised 

in your testimony. Ambassador Crocker, one of the things you 

said—and I may not be putting this exactly accurately, but I think 

what I understood you to say is that the more we appear to take 

sides with Russia and Iran, the more difficult it becomes to get a 

resolution with those people who have been our friends in the Middle East. Did I understand that correctly? I ask you this because 

it seems to me, as I look at Syria, that if we’re going to get any 

kind of a political solution, that Iran and Russia have got to be at 

the table. Do you disagree with that? 

Ambassador CROCKER. I think they do have to be at the table. 

My concern is that, with the current dynamic in Syria, where Russia and Iran both feel—they’re on a roll, here—that their intervention is being quite successful in propping up Assad, that not only 

will we not have a successful negotiation, we’re not even going to 

get to the table. That’s what I think we’re seeing now with—as 

these talks scheduled for next week sort of slip away from us. So, 

46 

yeah, there has to be a negotiated end to this conflict. My belief 

is, for that negotiation to succeed or even take place, we’ve got to 

change some of the dynamics on the ground, both to back up Assad, 

Iran, and Russia, to reinforce our Sunni friends inside Syria, and 

to send a signal to the larger region. So, absolutely there has to be 

a negotiation, but we just don’t have the terms for it now. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Well, I don’t—I agree, basically, with what all 

of you have said with respect to the need to intervene more to try 

and force the forces supporting Assad to the table to come up with 

some resolution. The question that I still have is based on what 

each of you had to say. It’s still not clear to me how we do that, 

because the—I like the idea of the no-fly zone. I think that sounds 

like one of the positive things that we could do. On the other hand, 

we’ve had testimony from members of our military, some of our 

military leaders, that that would require a significant military 

presence, we would take casualties, we would have a difficult time 

destroying Syria’s air defense system. I’ve also heard from representatives of the refugee community who say it would put a target on refugees, because it would be a place where they would be 

forced to go because they felt like they were safe, and then they 

would become targets of ISIS. So, I’m not quite sure how that 

works without a significant military presence. I do think, you 

know, the involvement of Special Operations Forces—I mean, that 

seems to me one of the things that we’re—we’ve been trying to do 

more of. I think there’s—I certainly believe that there’s been some 

success with that and with air defenses. 

Again, it’s just not clear to me how we accomplish the successes 

that each of you talk about, in reality, without putting back on the 

ground the kind of military force that we had in Iraq and Afghanistan, and we are now seeing the impact of withdrawing those 

forces. So, enlighten me, if you would. 

General Keane, I’ll ask you to go first. 

General KEANE. Sure. Well, I think you’re talking about two 

things, Assad and Syria, and the military and political dimension 

of that, and also ISIS. I think, to a—to some degree—I mean, Syria 

gives you a headache just thinking through it. Reasonable people 

can disagree, certainly, on what to do about it. They certainly do. 

In my judgment—and we’ve been discussing this on and off most 

of the morning—the political dimension in Syria is critical. We 

have to change the momentum against the regime to be able to get 

a political solution. The Russians are there and the Iranians are 

there to prop up and preserve this regime and their own national 

interests. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Right. I heard most of—— 

General KEANE. So—— 

Senator SHAHEEN.—the testimony—— 

General KEANE. So, that—— 

Senator SHAHEEN.—this morning. 

General KEANE.—that is critical. The no-fly zone, I disagree with 

my military colleagues, who may have made it appear too difficult 

to achieve. I don’t think, for a minute, that we’re going to have an 

issue with Syrian air defense systems, which, if we did, we would 

destroy them all, quite frankly. They know that. I also don’t—— 

Senator SHAHEEN. Well—— 

47 

General KEANE.—I don’t believe—— 

Senator SHAHEEN.—let me just—I don’t want to be argumentative, but—and I’m out of time, so I will just make a final point, 

because you raised that. Maybe circumstances have changed. We’ve 

had direct testimony from military leadership expressing concern 

about the losses that would be incurred if we had to go in, from 

the Syrian’s air defenses. So, maybe the situation has changed. 

Can you speak to that? 

General KEANE. No. I mean, that’s their job, to lay out the level 

of risk that’s associated with any option that takes place. There is 

a level of risk. That doesn’t mean we don’t do it. There’s always potential for casualties. That’s the reality of it. I’ve also spent a lot 

of time on this issue. I’m very convinced that we can establish a 

no-fly zone with minimum interference from the Syrians, to be 

sure. Listen, it—if we’re going to put innocent people in there, I 

don’t see the Russians or the Syrians bombing that, frankly, and 

certainly not the Russians. The Syrians have bombed their own 

people in the past, but they would pay a price for it. 

Secondly, I think the threat would come largely from the ground. 

That would be in the case of suicide bombers and others. So, you 

have to have some kind of international force on the ground to protect that site. 

I think we’ve got a history with no-fly zones in the past. We’ve 

done them successfully. I think we could do it here. It would have 

been better to do it a long time ago, certainly, as it would have 

been better to deal with the Syrian Arabs, in terms of helping them 

a long time ago. Still, it is still a realistic option that should be on 

the table for implementation to help us move towards a political solution. 

Mr. GORDON. Senator, could I add a word on this? 

I just think it’s important to remember that it’s all about the political objective. If the political objective remains that the regime 

is giving up power, I think changing the balance on the ground 

modestly, or even putting in a no-fly zone, is unlikely to bring 

about that objective. If you think about precedents, there’s not a lot 

of precedent for this type of operation, where you gradually increase support for some armed opposition, and then the regime decides to hand over power, certainly not when it’s backed by major 

powers like Iran and Russia. 

Think about Libya, which had nowhere near the strength of 

Syria and wasn’t backed by anyone. We started with a no-fly zone. 

A number of allies were providing arms to the opposition. It didn’t 

end with a peaceful transition of power and the regime giving up 

its leader; it ended with the death of Qadhafi and everything we’ve 

seen since. 

Other precedents, like Kosovo, we weren’t even asking for the regime to give up power; we were just asking to get security forces 

out of part of the country. We had a 78-day NATO bombing campaign with tens of thousands of sorties and the threat of a ground 

invasion before they did that. Iraq, we had no-fly zones for years, 

and it didn’t bring about the political settlement. 

So, again, there may be other reasons to do these things, but I’d 

be awfully careful about thinking that those steps will lead to the 

political transition that we’re trying to bring about. 

48 

Senator SHAHEEN. Well, thank you all again. 

Thank you very much, Ambassador Crocker, for your statements 

with respect to refugees. I think—I appreciate your willingness to 

speak out on that. 

Senator Gillibrand. 

Senator GILLIBRAND [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Shaheen. 

I’m going to continue your line of questioning. 

So, I hear, from at least the answers that you gave to Senator 

Shaheen about some of the difficulties of a response, but, given 

that Turkey has the second-largest standing military in NATO, 

with almost 700,000 Active personnel and 400,000 Reserves, Saudi 

Arabia is the most powerful army of the—of any Arab nation, with 

only—with over 200,000 Active troops, 1200 tanks, 700 aircraft. 

Jordan has 90,000 Active troops, 60,000 Reserves. However, up 

until this point, Iran has been the most active regional power in 

supporting ground troops fighting ISIL. So, what can we do, and 

what should we do, to engage our allies to bear a larger burden in 

the fight against ISIL? What can we do to encourage them to actually participate on the ground? 

Ambassador CROCKER. Senator, the first thing we need to do is 

indicate that we are allies, and, as such, take their strategic and 

security concerns seriously. For Saudi Arabia, ISIL isn’t the primary threat. It’s Iran. For Turkey, ISIL isn’t the primary threat. 

It’s the Kurds, our allies. 

Senator SHAHEEN. They’ll say, ‘‘not all the Kurds.’’ We just met 

with Erdogan, and he said, ‘‘We have lots of Kurds that are our 

friends. In fact, the Kurds voted for me.’’ So, he will take the Kurds 

as not a monolith and say, ‘‘We get along with these Kurds. We 

just don’t get along with the PKK.’’ He’ll be very assertive about 

that. 

Ambassador CROCKER. Right. The Kurds in question, Senator, 

are the YPG in Rojava, in northern Syria, and they are affiliated 

with the PKK. So, it is a problem. That’s why I have advocated a 

reinvigorated U.S. engagement with traditional allies and partners. 

We have differences, clearly, with Ankara. We have differences 

with Riyadh. What I’m concerned about is that we’re not talking 

about the differences as friends and allies with the view to developing common ground, common understandings, and a common 

strategy. Because, without that, any notion of regional forces intervening in Syria against Islamic State is just fanciful. They are not 

going to do it. 

So, you’re recommending more engagement. Frankly, when we 

took a CODEL of eight Senators, and that’s what we heard, meeting with the Saudi defense forces who do antiterrorism. They were 

grateful for all of our intelligence efforts. They wanted to amplify 

everything we’re doing together. From some of the more anecdotal 

conversations, they’re looking for more engagement, not less. The 

same thing true with Turkey. Erdogan wants to increase trade. 

He’s taken 2 million refugees. He wants the United States to engage on a far more aggressive level. So, they seem to be asking, at 

least of eight Senators that come to visit them, ‘‘What’s happening 

with regard to U.S. policy? What are we not doing that we should 

be doing?’’ 

49 

Ambassador CROCKER. I understand all too well the pressures on 

any administration, and particularly its senior members—the 

President, the Secretary of State, and so forth. I think, at that 

level, we’ve just got to be more involved in the region. A lot of this 

can be done by telephone calls. There’s nothing like a Secretary of 

State visit. Earlier in the hearing, I—— 

Chairman MCCAIN [presiding]. As opposed to a congressional 

visit. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Yeah. We’re just eight Senators—— 

Ambassador CROCKER. I was—— 

Senator SHAHEEN.—from all over the country. 

[Laughter.] 

Ambassador CROCKER. I was going to say, Mr. Chairman—— 

Senator SHAHEEN. Chickenfeed. 

[Laughter.] 

Ambassador CROCKER.—particularly—CODELs are really important. You know, I know they’re—it’s as—it’s probably as hard for 

you, as members of the administration, to get away. Having hosted 

many of them over the years, particularly in Iraq, where I saw a 

whole lot of the Chairman, that’s just crucial. 

Senator SHAHEEN. So, you recommend the Secretary of State go 

to the region and engage more aggressively. 

Ambassador CROCKER. Yes, ma’am, I do. I had said earlier that— 

you know, the Iranians have kind of filled the vacuum in Iraq, and 

it is a very, very bad situation. I would like to see the Secretary 

go camp out there. When he needed a break, he could go to Riyadh 

and Tel Aviv and Cairo and Ankara. We just—we’ve got to ramp 

this up, because this is—as bad as this situation is now—I’ll try to 

say something uplifting—we’re going to look back on this day with 

fondness and nostalgia, because, the way things are tracking, it’s 

going to be a whole lot worse in a couple of months. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Well, Mr. Gordon, you said, in fact, that we 

should be not dealing with the symptoms of ISIL, but be going 

straight to the cause of ISIL. I’d be interested—I’m past my time, 

so maybe you could submit it to the record—but, how can the 

United States have an impact on the causes? Obviously, it’s not 

just a military effort, it’s diplomatic, as well. What is the message 

or the approach you think that actually could resonate? 

Mr. GORDON. Senator, that would, indeed, be a longer answer 

than we have time for, so I’ll just give a brief one. By ‘‘focus on the 

causes more than the symptoms,’’ what I meant was that we can 

and should and need to do all of the things people normally talk 

about in a comprehensive ISIS strategy on foreign fighters and finances and the borders and the opposition and direct U.S. action. 

All of those things can and need to be done. To really zero in on 

it, so long as the 20 million Sunnis who live between Damascus 

and Baghdad are feeling disadvantaged, repressed, and killed by 

Iranian-backed Shiite dictators, we’re going to be facing this problem, and they’re going to be radicalized, both in the region and beyond. 

So, again, it’s a longer conversation of how we do that in Iraq. 

I think, among us, we have a consensus that there needs to be 

more done politically for the Sunnis of Iraq to empower them and 

make them feel they’re actually part of the country. 

50 

In Syria, the ideas I’ve presented de-escalating the war, it is true 

that Assad is a magnet in the cause of ISIS. It’s even more true 

that the war, and the daily bombing and killing of Sunnis in Syria, 

is a cause of ISIS. 

If we could empower the Sunnis in Iraq and de-escalate the war 

in Syria, I think we’d make more of a contribution to this conflict 

than any incremental number of forward air controllers or Special 

Forces. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Blumenthal. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for 

continuing this series of very significant and illuminating hearings. 

I want to thank all three of our witnesses. 

Particularly, Ambassador Crocker, thank you for hosting us 

when you have in Afghanistan, and for your insights and advice to 

this committee and to me afterward. 

I know a lot of ground has been covered. I’ve been in and out of 

the hearing, and had an opportunity to follow it, as well, remotely. 

I want to focus, for the moment, on the refugee issue, and most 

particularly on trafficking of survivors, refugees, particularly 

women and children. I met recently with a young Yazidi trafficking 

survivor who told me about her escape, very courageous escape 

from systematic rape and brutality that Yazidi women and children 

have endured at the hands of ISIL. It has been—the situation has 

been detailed by a number of the media, as well. Rape has been 

increasingly used as a tool of terrorism to destabilize communities 

and exert control over women and girls and communities there, 

and, in the case of ISIL, purposely to hold thousands of Yazidi’s 

men, women, children in captivity. So, I think we should try to find 

a way to expand and intensify our efforts to assist these victims. 

Let me begin, Mr. Gordon, by asking you what role the United 

States and its coalition partners should have in securing the safe 

release of these women and children still held by ISIL, and how— 

maybe open it to the other witnesses, as well—how CENTCOM can 

ensure that the partner training exercises being conducted in Iraq 

are taking an interagency approach to this issue. 

Mr. GORDON. Senator, thank you. I couldn’t—it is impossible to 

overstate the humanitarian and strategic consequences of the refugee crisis. You mentioned it in a humanitarian standpoint. There 

are more than 10 million displaced. Strategically, it really does 

threaten the neighbors. I think some of us may be surprised that 

a country like Lebanon is still functioning, notwithstanding the fact 

that I think a quarter of its population are now Syrian refugees— 

Syria, Jordan. We’ve talked about how it spills over to the United 

States and the European Union, as well. 

We are already doing a lot. I think the United States has been a leader. I think we’ve provided more than $4 billion. As you know, 

and, I think, are implying, that’s not even close to what is necessary. So, we need to do even more. We need to lead. 

I think one of the arguments for America’s embrace and willingness to take refugees is not just the humanitarian one, which is 

enormous; otherwise, leaving them to their fates in the region or 

to a squalid refugee camp. Showing as—America as a welcoming 

51 

country and not anti-Muslim, I think, is a—is the big tool in this 

overall struggle, beyond what we can do to the individuals. 

Then, finally, comes back to the political points that we’re all 

talking about. Whatever we can do for individual refugees is obviously hugely important, but we need to stop the flow, the sources 

of this problem that we just discussed, response to Senator 

Gillibrand’s question. I fear, too, that if we don’t deal with those 

causes, we’re going to have a hearing 2 or 3 years from now on this 

same problem, and it’s going to be many times bigger than it is 

now. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Ambassador Crocker? 

Ambassador CROCKER. Thank you, Senator. 

Of course, the community you’re talking about are neither Muslim nor refugees. They would love to be refugees, because, however 

bad that was, at least they’d be out of the hands of Islamic State. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. They’re, right now, captives. 

Ambassador CROCKER. They are captives. They are slaves. They 

are sex slaves. 

It is a reminder that Islamic State is evil. As long as it exists, 

as long as it holds ground, it will use it for evil purposes. Whether 

that is attacks into Paris, planning attacks into the United States, 

enslavement of innocents, executions of others, they will do it. I’m 

grateful to you for recalling that there is a—there is such a thing 

in this world as evil. Assad is evil. ISIS is evil. As the Chairman 

has said in a different context earlier, we need to keep a moral 

compass on these things. We’re America. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thank you. 

Chairman MCCAIN. I thank the witnesses. This has been extremely helpful, I am sure, to all of us and those who are observing 

on C–SPAN. I don’t think we could have had three finer members 

of the—of a group of people who have served their country with 

honor and distinction. We were proud to have all three of you before the committee today. 

Jack, do you want to—— 

Senator REED. Just to comment you, Mr. Chairman, for holding 

a very timely and very important hearing, and to thank the witnesses again for their service and for their thoughtful, thoughtful 

comments. Thank you. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:11 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR KELLY AYOTTE

IRANIAN REGIME AND THE JCPOA

Senator AYOTTE. In your prepared statement, you stated that you do not believe 

the United States and Iran are moving toward rapprochement. 

1. Why do you believe that? 

Ambassador CROCKER. [Deleted.] 

Senator AYOTTE. You say that the relationship with Iran is ‘‘a transactional relationship, not a transformational one.’’ 

2. Do you see any evidence that the nature of the Iranian Regime is likely to 

change in the next decade or two? 

52 

Ambassador CROCKER. [Deleted.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JEANNE SHAHEEN

AFGHAN SPECIAL IMMIGRANT VISA PROGRAM

Senator SHAHEEN. Last year during a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing 

you expressed strong support for the Afghan Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) program. 

In the fiscal year 2016 National Defense Authorization Act, I included a provision 

to increase the number of SIVs by 3,000. 

3. Do you still support this program and do you believe Congress should authorize 

additional SIVs in fiscal year 2017, as necessary to ensure there are visas available 

for qualified applicants? 

Ambassador CROCKER. [Deleted.] 

Æ