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Filed 12/4/14 B.J. v. C.F. CA4/2 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS 

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

DIVISION TWO 

B.J., 

 Plaintiff and Respondent, 

v. 

C.F., 

 Defendant and Appellant. 

 E058760 

 (Super.Ct.No. IND1201412) 

 OPINION 

 APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Gregory J. Olson, 

Temporary Judge. (Pursuant to Cal. Const., art. VI, § 21.) Affirmed. 

 C.F., in pro. per., for Defendant and Appellant. 

 No Appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent. 

 Defendant and appellant C.F. (father) and plaintiff and respondent B.J. (mother) 

are the parents of P. (born in 2005) and A. (born in 2006). Since 2008, father has been 

incarcerated. On August 3, 2012, mother petitioned the court to establish the parental 

relationship between the children and father, to obtain sole legal and physical custody of 

the children, and to deny visitation with father. On January 30, 2013, father filed his own 
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petition regarding child custody and visitation. The trial court granted mother’s petition 

on March 11, 2013, and denied father’s on April 11, 2013. Father appeals from both 

orders. 

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND AND FACTS 

 In April 2008, mother obtained a restraining order against father, along with a novisitation order. That same year, father was incarcerated for committing a Penal Code 

section 288a offense involving mother’s daughter. Nonetheless, mother periodically 

allowed the children to visit their father. 

 On August 3, 2012, mother petitioned the court to establish paternity and to 

modify child custody and visitation. On November 19, 2012, a hearing was held, and 

mother informed the court that father was incarcerated and had attempted to file an 

objection to the petition. Sole legal and physical custody was temporarily awarded to 

mother, with no visitation for father; however, the court ordered both parents “to attend 

Child Custody Recommending Counseling” (mediation) on January 4, 2013. The 

mediation was not held due to father’s nonappearance, and on January 18, 2013, the court 

again ordered both parents to attend mediation, with father authorized to appear 

telephonically. 

 On January 30, 2013, father filed his petition for modification of child custody and 

visitation. He was incarcerated and requested two monitored telephone calls per month. 

On February 7, 2013, the case was assigned to child custody recommending counselor, 

Marlo Guzman, who held the mediation on February 15, 2013. 
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 Mother’s petition was heard on March 11, 2013. The court found father to be the 

natural father of the children, granted mother sole legal and physical custody, and denied 

father’s oral motion for supervised telephonic contact. On April 11, 2013, the trial court 

denied father’s petition for modification of child custody and visitation. 

II. DISCUSSION 

A. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion or Violate Father’s Due 

Process Rights When It Denied Him Custody and Visitation. 

 In two separate, but similar, arguments, father challenges the trial court’s decision 

to grant custody to mother and deny him visitation. Because these arguments are closely 

related, we combine them into one discussion. 

 1. Standard of Review. 

 The standard of appellate review of a custody and visitation order is deferential 

abuse of discretion. (In re Marriage of Burgess (1996) 13 Cal.4th 25, 32.) Under this 

test, we must uphold the trial court’s ruling if it is correct on any basis, regardless of 

whether such basis was actually invoked. (Ibid.) The trial court, having heard the 

evidence and having observed the demeanor, attitude, and veracity of the witnesses, is 

best qualified to determine the factual issues presented at trial. (In re Marriage of Lewin

(1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 1482, 1492.) 

 2. Contentions and Analysis. 

 In challenging the trial court’s custody and visitation order, father primarily 

focuses on Ms. Guzman’s recommendation. First, he complains that she failed to 

interview him separately from mother prior to mediation. Next, he complains that he was 
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not allowed the opportunity to fill out the mandatory parent orientation questionnaire. 

Further, he contends the recommendation was inaccurate as to the date of his last contact 

with the children. 

 Despite father’s claim, there is nothing in the record before this court that suggests 

any nefarious reason why the parents were not interviewed separately or for father being 

denied the opportunity to fill out the questionnaire. As for any inaccuracy regarding his 

last visitation with the children, father informed the court of the correct date during the 

hearing. More importantly, at both the trial level and on appeal, father has not offered 

any evidence of specific information he possessed which might have been revealed in an 

interview or questionnaire that would have supported a different recommendation from 

Ms. Guzman. 

 Next, father claims that he was prejudiced at the mediation because mother 

accused him of lying, and when he expressed his belief that Ms. Guzman was biased in 

favor of mother, Ms. Guzman terminated the session. Father faults Ms. Guzman for (1) 

failing to reduce the acrimony between the parties; (2) failing to develop an agreement 

which would have allowed the children to continue close contact with father; (3) failing 

to effect a settlement on a visitation plan that was in the best interests of the children; and 

(4) failing to comply with Family Code sections 3161 and 3162. Father objected to Ms. 

Guzman’s recommendation; however, the court impliedly overruled his objection. 

 Finally, father argues that the fact that a stepfather abused his stepdaughter is 

insufficient to show that his sons would be at risk of sexual abuse, and thus, a “blanket no 

contact order was an abuse of discretion.” Although father does not accuse the trial court 
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of relying on his criminal background, he acknowledges that he was accused of, and pled 

guilty to, lewd and lascivious conduct on a minor. He notes that mother’s daughter made 

the accusation, that there was no finding of penetration or force, and that he was highly 

intoxicated when arrested. Father assumes the trial court relied on his criminal 

background in making its decision. 

 With Ms. Guzman’s alleged faulty recommendation and father’s criminal 

background in mind, father contends the trial court abused its discretion in making its 

custody/visitation determination. However, he offers no support for his argument. 

Rather, father cites to case law which has no application to the facts of his case. “An 

appellant must provide an argument and legal authority to support his contentions. This 

burden requires more than a mere assertion that the judgment is wrong. . . . It is not our 

place to construct theories or arguments to undermine the judgment and defeat the 

presumption of correctness. When an appellant fails to raise a point, or asserts it but fails 

to support it with reasoned argument and citations to authority, we treat the point as 

waived. [Citation.]” (Benach v. County of Los Angeles (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 836, 

852, fn. omitted.) 

 Even if we consider the merits of the issue, we conclude the trial court’s decision 

is supported by the evidence (Ms. Guzman’s recommendation and the testimony of both 

parents) and not beyond the bounds of reason. (In re Marriage of Loyd (2003) 106 

Cal.App.4th 754, 759.) In making its decision, the trial court observed, “Apparently, 

there was a problem when you did have contact [with the children] in 2011. Based on 

that, I’m not going to order phone call communication at this time. Obviously, when you 
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get out of prison, you can come back to court, show the [c]ourt that things have changed, 

what you’ve done, and we can look at it again, but I’m going to follow the 

recommendation at this time.” 

 B. Father Was Not Denied Any Due Process Right to Counsel 

 According to father, the trial court’s denial of his request for appointment of 

counsel violated his due process rights. However, in support of this claim, father cites to 

case law solely concerning a parent’s right to counsel in dependency cases. This is not a 

dependency case; rather, this is a family law case. Father has not cited to, nor are we 

aware of, any legal authority that grants parents a due process right to counsel in a family 

law action involving custody and visitation issues. Absent such authority, the trial court 

correctly denied father’s request. 

 C. The Record Is Inadequate to Show the Court Imposed Court Fees After 

Waiving Them 

 Father contends the trial court erred in imposing court fees after it granted a fee 

waiver to him. Father has the burden of overcoming the presumption of correctness. In 

order to do so, he must provide the court with an adequate record that demonstrates what 

the trial court did and the alleged error. His failure to provide an adequate record on a 

particular issue requires that the issue be resolved against him. (Maria P. v. Riles (1987) 

43 Cal.3d 1281, 1295.) Here, the record is insufficient to show that father was charged 

and paid court fees after the court granted his request for waiver. 
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 D. The Trial Court Did Not Violate Father’s Due Process Rights by Failing 

to Order a Court Evaluator. 

 Father challenges the denial of a child custody evaluation on July 1, 2013, while 

this case was pending on appeal. However, the denial was made after the orders that 

father appeals from, and thus are outside the scope of our review. 

III. DISPOSITION 

 The orders are affirmed. The parties shall each bear their own costs on appeal.1

 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS 

 HOLLENHORST 

 J. 

We concur: 

 RAMIREZ 

 P.J. 

 RICHLI 

 J. 

 1 Although mother has prevailed on the merits in this appeal, she did so despite 

failing to file a respondent’s brief. We decline, therefore, to award her costs. (California 

Rules of Court, rule 8.278, subd. (a)(5).)