U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Publishing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001

24–523 PDF 2017

S. HRG. 114–576 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE POLICY AND 

PROGRAMS TO COUNTER THREATS TO THE 

UNITED STATES FROM TERRORISM AND 

IRREGULAR WARFARE 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS AND 

CAPABILITIES 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

APRIL 21, 2015 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov/ 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona, Chairman 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma 

JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama 

ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi 

KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire 

DEB FISCHER, Nebraska 

TOM COTTON, Arkansas 

MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota 

JONI ERNST, Iowa 

THOM TILLIS, North Carolina 

DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska 

MIKE LEE, Utah 

LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina 

TED CRUZ, Texas 

JACK REED, Rhode Island 

BILL NELSON, Florida 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri 

JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York 

RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut 

JOE DONNELLY, Indiana 

MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii 

TIM KAINE, Virginia 

ANGUS S. KING, JR., Maine 

MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico 

CHRISTIAN D. BROSE, Staff Director 

ELIZABETH L. KING, Minority Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES

DEB FISCHER, NEBRASKA, Chairman 

KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire 

TOM COTTON, Arkansas 

JONI ERNST, Iowa 

THOM TILLIS, North Carolina 

LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina 

TED CRUZ, Texas 

BILL NELSON, Florida 

JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York 

JOE DONNELLY, Indiana 

TIM KAINE, Virginia 

(II)

C O N T E N T S 

APRIL 21, 2015

Page 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE POLICY AND PROGRAMS TO COUNTER THREATS TO

THE UNITED STATES FROM TERRORISM AND IRREGULAR WARFARE ................... 1 

Lumpkin, Honorable Michael D., Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special 

Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict .............................................................. 2 

Howell, Brig. Gen. Scott A., Howell, USAF, Deputy Director for Special Operations and Counterterrorism (J37), Joint Staff ................................................. 6 

(III)

(1) 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE POLICY AND 

PROGRAMS TO COUNTER THREATS TO THE 

UNITED STATES FROM TERRORISM AND 

IRREGULAR WARFARE 

TUESDAY, APRIL 21, 2015 

U.S. SENATE,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING

THREATS AND CAPABILITIES, 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:39 p.m. in room 

SR–222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Deb Fischer 

(chairwoman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Committee members present: Senators Fischer, Cotton, Ernst, 

Tillis, Nelson, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Donnelly, and Kaine. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR DEB FISCHER, 

CHAIRWOMAN 

Senator FISCHER. The hearing will come to order. 

I’d like to welcome everyone to the hearing today. Senator Nelson 

is on his way, but we’re going to start the hearing. 

This subcommittee meets today to receive testimony on the Department of Defense’s counterterrorism activities and policy. 

And I’d like to welcome our witnesses. Before us today, we have 

Michael Lumpkin, the Assistant Secretary for Special Operations 

and Low Intensity Conflict, and Brigadier General Scott Howell, 

the Deputy Director for Special Operations and Counterterrorism 

on the Joint Staff. 

Welcome, gentlemen, and I thank you both for your service. 

Following their brief opening statements, we will have a 5- 

minute round of questions for each member, and then we will proceed to a closed session. 

I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today about how the 

Department is keeping pace with an increasingly unstable global 

threat picture. In the last year, ISIL has taken Mosul and expanded its control in Syria; Libya has descended further in the 

chaos; Yemen’s government has collapsed; and al-Shabaab continues to conduct high-profile attacks in Somalia and Kenya. Those 

who seek to attack our Nation are taking advantage of this rising 

tide of instability, and the lack of credible local partners casts 

doubt on whether the President’s strategy of taking out terrorists 

who threaten us while supporting partners on the front lines can 

even be applied today. I hope the witnesses will help this comVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:21 May 11, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\24523.TXT WILDA
2 

mittee understand how the U.S. policy has adapted to this new 

landscape and what new approaches are being utilized to protect 

U.S. interests. 

I also hope to hear more from our witnesses on the amount of 

risk our current strategy is accepting. General Votel has characterized it as moderate, but I hope our witnesses can add further detail 

and explain how this risk is distributed. My concern is that, if we 

are only responding to the highest-priority verified threats against 

our country, we will be unable to proactively deal with smaller 

problems before they become serious threats. Accepting such risk 

seems, at best, to be a temporary strategy, since small problems 

will inevitably accumulate and grow. 

I would ask unanimous consent that we enter Senator Nelson’s, 

the Ranking Member, comments—opening statement into the 

record. 

Senator FISCHER. And, with that, I would ask our panel to please 

give us their opening statements. 

Secretary. 

STATEMENT OF HONORABLE MICHAEL D. LUMPKIN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS 

AND LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT 

Mr. LUMPKIN. Thank you, Chairman Fischer, Ranking Member 

Nelson, and distinguished members of the subcommittee. Thank 

you for this opportunity to appear before you today. 

I am joined at the table by Brigadier General Scott Howell, the 

Deputy Director for Special Operations on the Joint Staff. And Mr. 

Steve Vanech, the acting Director for National Counterterrorism 

Center’s Director of Intelligence, will join us for the closed session. 

As I speak, U.S. Special Operations Force, also known as 

USSOF, are deployed globally to support our mission to defend 

America, our allies, our partners, and from the threats posed by 

terrorist organizations. In today’s environment, USSOF successfully take direct action against multiple terrorist organizations, in 

addition to building the capacity of our partners. USSOF provide 

a vital but small component of our comprehensive approach to 

counterterrorism. These efforts take time to mature, but our operations are having positive effects. 

As you are keenly aware, our Special Operations Forces are 

unique assets. These assets are only effective when the Department has the authority to employ them properly. While the 2001 

Authorized Use of Military Force, also known as AUMF, and the 

2002 Iraq AUMF provide statutory authority for our current operations, I fully support the President’s proposed AUMF to counter 

the Islamic State of Iraq in Levant, or ISIL. This proposed legislation provides the adequate flexibility to counter ISIL today while 

signaling to our friends and our enemies that we are serious about 

addressing future permutations of this expanding threat. I urge 

you to favorably consider it. 

I will now provide general comments on our counterterrorism efforts. My colleagues and I will present additional details during the 

closed session. 

Since August 2004, USSOF has aggressively pursued ISIL in 

Iraq and Syria. USSOF have deployed more than 3,000 personnel 

3 

to the region and conducted more than 10,000 hours of intelligence, 

surveillance, and reconnaissance operations. USSOF have enabled 

thousands of strikes against ISIL’s leadership and forces, weakened 

its ability to exert external territorial control, and challenged the 

foundation of its expansionalist propaganda. 

As part of our broader effort to assist the Iraqi Security Forces, 

USSOF are coordinating with the central government in Baghdad 

to provide training, equipment, and assistance to the Kurdish 

Peshmerga. USSOF will also provide training and assistance to select members of the moderate Syrian opposition. 

While we work to destroy ISIL in Syria and Iraq, the group is 

taking steps to expand its reach into Africa and Southeast Asia. 

Recent killings of civilians in Afghanistan, Libya, Yemen, Tunisia, 

and groups loyal to ISIL highlight the expanding nature of the 

threat. 

In West Africa, USSOF are partnering with local and European 

allies to degrade Boko Haram, which recently pledged allegiance to 

ISIL. With a relatively modest investment of personnel and resources, USSOF and our allies are exerting significant pressure on 

Boko Haram and its facilitation network. 

I am deeply concerned that the lack of unity of government and 

deteriorating situation in Libya has created a safe haven for militias and terrorist organization. ISIL’s increased popularity and 

presence in Libya highlight the need to quickly achieve a lasting 

political solution. As I mentioned earlier, the President’s draft 

AUMF would provide appropriate flexibility to confront ISIL’s affiliates, where conditions merit. 

SOF are also working in multiple countries to eliminate the 

threat posed by al-Qaeda. In Afghanistan, USSOF, in partnership 

with the Afghans, continue to pressure al-Qaeda, the Haqqani Network and others that pose threat to U.S. and coalition interests. 

USSOF provide critical support to train, advise, assist the Afghans, 

in addition to conducting targeted counterterrorism operations. 

Across Africa, USSOF are partnering with local and regional 

forces and our European allies to degrade terrorist groups, such as 

the Somali-based al-Shabaab and al-Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb. These efforts have had significant disruptive effects on these organizations. In addition, USSOF are supporting 

other U.S. Government efforts to improve governance and promote 

security across the continent. 

In Yemen, I am troubled by the ongoing military aggression perpetuated by the Houthis and the resulting widespread unstable security conditions. Before the Houthis’ destabilizing military actions 

against the legitimate Government of Yemen, USSOF provided 

critical support to the Yemeni security forces to develop their ability to counter the threat of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. 

USSOF will continue to contribute to the broader U.S. Government 

efforts to restore stability in Yemen and degrade AQAP. 

And in Syria, USSOF are conducting strikes against key members of al-Qaeda’s Syria-based affiliate. 

SOF are taking steps to understand and address multiple global 

threats, including terrorist networks, the flow of foreign fighters, 

the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and malign activities undertaken or sponsored by other states. USSOF are deployed 

4 

around the world, and are working closely with our allies and partners to leverage our respective strengths and capabilities against 

these common threats. USSOF represent relatively small slice of 

the U.S. Government’s efforts against these threats; however, they 

are achieving meaningful and positive effects. 

I look forward to providing details in answering any questions 

you may have. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Lumpkin follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY HONORABLE MICHAEL LUMPKIN

INTRODUCTION

Chairman Fischer, Ranking Member Nelson, and distinguished members of the 

subcommittee, thank you for this opportunity to appear before you today. As I 

speak, U.S. Special Operations Forces—known as USSOF—are deployed across the 

globe in support of our broader Counterterrorism Mission to defend America, our 

friends, and our partners, from the threat posed by extremist terrorist organizations. The current security environment is rapidly evolving with new threats and 

challenging dynamics. In this complex environment, U.S. SOF continue to successfully undertake operations against terrorist organizations. Many of those forces are 

also doing critical work associated with building the capacity of our partners to conduct their own operations. Of critical importance, but often less visible, the relationships that U.S. SOF develop with partners through persistent engagement over 

many years are among the most valuable counter-terrorism tools available to the 

United States. 

Additionally, some SOF are poised to take direct action, including strikes against 

high-value targets, when required. I will provide an overview here and provide you 

with details on that specific element of SOF efforts, and answer any questions you 

may have in our closed session. I look forward to describing for you some of the actions conducted recently and answering your questions, both here and in the closed 

session. But before I do, I want to stress that direct action counterterrorism operations are only a small part of a larger U.S. counterterrorism effort. As I mentioned 

earlier, beyond direct action, we put great effort into building partner capacity. 

These efforts are a vital component of the whole-of-government approach to counterterrorism, complementing the work of the State Department, the Justice Department, Treasury, Homeland Security, and our Intelligence Community, just to name 

a few. These efforts take time to mature, but our strategy is having positive impacts. 

One example of our successful whole-of-government approach is Colombia. In just 

over a decade, and thanks in large part to U.S. Government assistance and engagement, Colombia has been transformed from a near-failed state into a major regional 

player with significant political influence, the continent’s most professional security 

forces, and a dynamic economy. Colombia has set the standard for law enforcement 

and counter-narcotics cooperation. Colombia now exports their security expertise to 

other countries. The number and effectiveness of Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia and National Liberation Army guerrillas have been dramatically reduced. 

These developments are making possible President Santos’ deliberate steps to 

achieve a negotiated peace. Efforts to reach a peace agreement are ongoing, and continued robust U.S. Government engagement is necessary to ensure that lasting success is achieved. Colombia’s case highlights what targeted SOF employment, intelligence, and sustained U.S. Government engagement can accomplish. 

As you are keenly aware, our Special Operations Forces are unique assets. They 

benefit from a very rigorous selection process, realistic training, as well as specialized education and equipment. These assets are only effective when the Department 

of Defense has the authority to employ them properly. While the 2001 Authorization 

for Use of Military Force (AUMF) and the 2002 Iraq AUMF provide statutory authority for the current operations I am going to discuss with you in our closed session, I fully support the President’s proposed AUMF to counter the Islamic State 

of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). This proposed legislation provides adequate agility 

to conduct operations necessary to counter ISIL today, while signaling to our friends 

and enemies that we are serious about addressing future permutations of this very 

real threat. I urge you to favorably consider it. 

I will now take a brief moment to address the counterterrorism situation in several regions around the world. 

5 

COUNTERTERRORISM IN IRAQ AND SYRIA

Since August 2014, U.S. SOF have aggressively pursued ISIL and al-Qaeda-associated forces operating in Iraq and Syria. U.S. SOF have deployed more than 3,000 

personnel to the region and conducted more than 10,000 hours of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance missions, which have enabled thousands of strikes 

against ISIL and al-Qaeda forces in Iraq and Syria. 

In Syria, U.S. SOF have taken a simultaneously top-down and bottom-up approach. That is, they are focused on concurrently destroying ISIL’s leadership and 

forces, in order to weaken ISIL’s ability to exert territorial control, and to challenge 

the foundation of its expansionist narrative. Operations against ISIL in Northern 

Syria are focused on ISIL’s network along the border with Turkey. These operations 

are now expanding beyond the towns immediately around Kobani. In addition, U.S. 

SOF continue to conduct operations against key members of al-Qaeda’s Syria-based 

affiliate. 

In Iraq, U.S. SOF are engaged in multiple operations to degrade ISIL, while increasing our partner’s capabilities. U.S. SOF in Northern Iraq, in coordination with 

the central government in Baghdad, have worked with Kurdish Peshmerga forces 

to great effect. With U.S. SOF-provided training, equipment, and assistance, 

Peshmerga forces have conducted multiple, complex operations against ISIL in Iraq. 

These U.S. SOF-led efforts are only a small component of the U.S. Government’s 

broader strategy to train, equip, and advise Iraqi Security Forces. 

COUNTERTERRORISM IN YEMEN

In Yemen, I remain deeply troubled by the ongoing military aggression perpetuated by the Houthis and the resulting wide-spread, unstable security conditions. 

Before the Houthis’ destabilizing military actions against the legitimate government 

of Yemen, U.S. SOF provided critical support to Yemen’s security forces to develop 

their ability to counter the threat of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). 

AQAP remains al-Qaeda’s most dangerous regional affiliate, and I am concerned by 

its ability to exploit the current security vacuum in Yemen. U.S. SOF will continue 

to contribute to the broader U.S. Government’s efforts to develop opportunities to 

restore stability in Yemen and degrade AQAP’s operational capabilities. 

COUNTERTERRORISM IN AFGHANISTAN

In Afghanistan, U.S. SOF efforts are critical to U.S. Government efforts of solidifying the security gains made over the last decade, and contributing to robust, enduring counterterrorism partnerships. Preventing al-Qaeda from regenerating in Afghanistan, monitoring potential emerging threats, and preventing attacks on our 

forces remain our top priorities. 

U.S. SOF, in partnership with the Afghans, continue to pressure al-Qaeda and 

other groups, such as the Haqqani network, that pose a threat to U.S. and Coalition 

personnel serving in Afghanistan. U.S. SOF provide critical support to train, advise, 

and assist the Afghans, in addition to conducting counterterrorism operations 

against the remnants of al-Qaeda. U.S. SOF are building the capacity of the Afghan 

National Security and Defense Forces, particularly Afghan SOF, so they can serve 

as the legitimate and capable first line of defense against terrorists seeking to destabilize Afghanistan. 

COUNTERTERRORISM IN AFRICA

In Africa, the threat environment is varied and evolving with terrorist organizations, such as al-Shabaab and Boko Haram, able to exploit corruption, instability, 

and popular grievances in order to mobilize support, establish sanctuaries, and 

carry out attacks. In coordination with broader U.S. Government efforts in Africa, 

U.S. SOF are deployed across the continent and are working closely with partners 

to disrupt these threats and support efforts to improve security and stability. U.S. 

SOF have been cultivating relationships with our local partners in this region for 

years. We are now starting to see the returns on those early investments, but it is 

critical that we continue to sufficiently resource these operations. 

The recent, high-profile attacks by al-Shabaab in Garissa, Kenya and against the 

Higher Education Ministry in Somalia serve as reminders of the serious threat 

posed by this group. U.S. SOF are partnering with African Union forces operating 

in Somalia, in addition to undertaking unilateral operations against al-Shabaab 

high-value targets who are part of al-Qaeda. These efforts have had a significant 

impact on al-Shabaab’s leadership and have forced it to shift personnel and resources out of traditional safe havens along the Somali coast. The coast had been 

the main source of revenue for the organization, and finances are the lifeblood of 

6 

terrorist organizations. U.S. SOF continue to work with our regional partners on the 

ground to maintain military pressure on al-Shabaab and support other U.S. Government efforts to improve governance and sustain security gains in Somalia. 

In West Africa, U.S. SOF are partnering with local and European allies to degrade Boko Haram. With a relatively modest investment of personnel and resources, 

U.S. SOF have been able to support our allies who are exerting significant pressure 

on extremists and the facilitation networks that support them. Although Boko 

Haram continues to pose a significant threat to the Lake Chad Basin region, our 

local partners are now in a better position to conduct offensive operations against 

Boko Haram, while safeguarding their respective populations. 

Across the Trans-Sahel region, U.S. SOF are partnering with local and European 

allies to degrade al-Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb. Taking advantage 

of multiple programs and authorities, U.S. SOF are supporting our allies to significantly degrade the ability of these groups to operate in the Mali-Niger-Algeria triborder region. The relationship and cooperation between U.S. SOF and French 

forces has been particularly important as we work collaboratively to meet shared 

counterterrorism objectives. 

COUNTERTERRORISM IN LIBYA

As with Yemen, I am deeply concerned about the political and security situation 

in Libya. The lack of a unity government that is representative of all of Libya’s people has created an environment where militias and terrorist organizations can take 

hold. ISIL’s increased popularity and presence in Libya highlight the need to quickly 

achieve a lasting political solution. As I mentioned earlier, the President’s draft 

AUMF would provide the appropriate flexibility to confront ISIL elements and 

threats where conditions merit. 

GLOBAL THREATS

We are also taking steps to understand and address multiple global threats, including: the challenges associated with the flow of foreign terrorist fighters, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and malign activities undertaken or sponsored by other states. Although these threats cross multiple geographic combatant 

command boundaries, U.S. SOF are well-postured to mitigate them. U.S. SOF are 

deployed around the world and are working closely with our allies and partners to 

leverage our respective strengths and capabilities against these common threats. 

These long-term partnerships are critical, given that these transnational challenges 

will take years to effectively address. 

CONCLUSION

Forward deployed U.S. SOF personnel are leveraging unique capabilities and 

working with partners to address some of the most significant and complex threats 

that face our country, our allies, and our partners. U.S. SOF represents a relatively 

small slice of the U.S. Government’s efforts against these threats, however, they are 

achieving significant and meaningful positive effects. I look forward to detailing for 

you some of our recent activities and answering your questions. Thank you. 

Senator FISCHER. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 

General. 

STATEMENT OF BRIG. GEN. SCOTT A. HOWELL, USAF, DEPUTY 

DIRECTOR FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND COUNTERTERRORISM (J37), JOINT STAFF 

General HOWELL. Chairman Fischer, Ranking Member Nelson, 

distinguished members of the subcommittee, appreciate the opportunity to come appear before you today to discuss these important 

topics. 

I do not have a prepared opening statement, but look forward to 

the discussion and your questions. 

Senator FISCHER. Thank you, sir. 

With that, I will begin the questioning. We will have our 5- 

minute rounds. 

And, Mr. Secretary, as I mentioned in my opening statement, 

General Votel has stated that he’s able to meet the current threats 

7 

with moderate risk. Can you elaborate on what a moderate risk is 

and if we’re only going to be dealing with, I guess, verifiable 

threats to the homeland? 

Mr. LUMPKIN. I think the—what General Votel was speaking of 

when he was reflecting the moderateness of the risk is that, because of the size of the force and the scope of the problem, we have 

to work with our limited means to do what we possibly can. And 

those things that are imminently threat to U.S. interests are—and 

U.S. lives—are what we at the Department are focused on. 

Again, we are just a part of the larger U.S. counterterrorism effort that involves State, it’s involved—Department of State, 

USAID—in these efforts to restore governance, because these terrorist organizations take root and take hold in areas where there’s 

a—not a strong central government and they have maneuver room 

to grow and to metastasize. 

So, again, I think what he was speaking of specifically is that 

section of what we’re able to do within our—within the toolbag of 

the Department of Defense. 

Senator FISCHER. Would you say our focus now, then, is on Syria 

and Iraq? And at what point do we, I guess, not play defense and 

we start looking more at offense? Do we wait until something gets 

out of control? Does it have to boil over? When do we commit resources in places like Yemen and Libya? 

Mr. LUMPKIN. That’s a great question. Thank you very much. 

I think the key is—and I think that’s one of the reasons why the 

President submitted the Authorized Use of Military Force against 

ISIL that was not geographically bounded. It allowed—it was 

against the organization of ISIL, as we see it metastasizing in 

these areas that lack governance, these places like Libya. We have 

seen, you know, ISIL expanding across northern Africa into other 

places into the Middle East. So, I think this was a—an initiative 

to have the flexibility, should they metastasize to prove a threat 

against the United States, that we could effectively respond. 

Senator FISCHER. You don’t feel that you have the authority or 

the flexibility now to counter threats in places like Libya or 

Yemen? 

Mr. LUMPKIN. I believe that if we—I mean, I would have to defer 

to the lawyers and the—how they see the current authorities and 

how they’re interpreted. But, I know that there are limitations to 

what we can do, going back, the AUMF of 2001 has very—has 

been—has strict adherence guidelines, and we have to make sure 

we’re fully compliant. And again, I think that the President’s intent 

of submitting the AUMF for—against ISIL was to—as we look at 

the current problem in Iraq and Syria, but also to see, as they are 

metastasizing, make sure we have the agility to do what’s necessary before they get out of hand. 

Senator FISCHER. Do you try to look at policy, and what the policy should be, what the strategy should be, where we need to commit our forces, before you look at what the resources are? I mean, 

this committee—this subcommittee and the full committee hear 

constantly about sequestration and the challenges that that has 

put on our military. But, shouldn’t it be policy that’s driving decisions that are made, and not looking at the limits that we may or 

may not be facing with resources? 

8 

Mr. LUMPKIN. With regard to DOD’s counterterrorism policy, yes. 

And that’s why we have a strategy that dovetails section 1208 

strategies that the Congress has been very supportive of, as well 

as section 2282, global train-and-equip strategies, to make sure we 

can build our partner capacity to make sure that we have those— 

our—those partners that we can with—by, with, and through to 

achieve the outcomes that we’re looking for. So, yes, we have a— 

what I would say, a coherent strategy. But, again, a small slice of 

the larger U.S. Government strategy. 

Senator FISCHER. And how do you judge when a moderate risk 

becomes a high risk? 

Mr. LUMPKIN. We continually evaluate, every day, to see, as 

things change and they shift, the speed with which the enemy can 

move, based on the lack of governance and security vacuums in numerous countries, can—forces us to monitor all the time. 

Senator FISCHER. Well, thank you, Mr. Secretary. 

Mr. LUMPKIN. Yes, ma’am. 

Senator FISCHER. Next, I would call on my Ranking Member, 

Senator Nelson. 

Senator NELSON. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

And I will hold most of my questions for the classified session. 

But, let me just ask you. Last year, Congress provided DOD with 

a CT-focused transfer fund of 1.3 billion. But, that hasn’t been 

spent. So, why not? And which one of your deputies is charged with 

executing this program? 

Mr. LUMPKIN. Thank you for that question, Senator. 

I received oversight responsibility of the Global Counterterrorism 

Partnership Fund within the Department about 30 days ago. Since 

that time, we—of the $1.3 billion, about 220 million of it has been 

obligated, to date. We’re—I fully expect to obligate about another 

$270 million, here, shortly. 

One of the things we have to make sure as we’re building this 

program, which the Congress was so supportive on, is to make sure 

we have the right governance in place to provide—that we’re putting—effectively managing the monies and managing the resources 

so that we have measures of effectiveness with the program as we 

build it. 

So, what we want to make sure we’re not doing is, we’re not just 

throwing money against the problem, and make sure that we—it’s 

part of a larger strategy, and that we put it in places where the 

respective nations can absorb the material that we’re putting into 

their respective countries. 

Senator NELSON. Which deputy? 

Mr. LUMPKIN. That—it’s me that’s doing it. I’m—— 

Senator NELSON. Okay. 

Mr. LUMPKIN.—principally responsible. 

Senator NELSON. All right. Good. 

Now, this committee has also received a lot of complaints from 

the combatant commanders—as a matter of fact, every one of 

them—about the patchwork of security assistance authorities that 

is available to them to build partner capacity. So, why is this? Especially since the Office of the Secretary of Defense has made the 

situation additionally complicated by sprinkling these programs 

across a bunch of offices. What’s going on? 

9 

Mr. LUMPKIN. Senator, I can speak to those programs that I 

manage, specifically, which are the section 2282, section 1208, as 

well as the Global Security Contingency Fund. And the—those— 

that’s—those fall largely outside of the traditional foreign military 

sales programs, but they are focused on equipping and training our 

foreign partners to make sure that they have the capacity to execute missions in support of our interests and their interests. 

I—those particular ones that I’m responsible for, I believe are 

well synchronized, and I’d look forward to briefing you on how 

those are synchronized, where we would have more time to spend 

on it. 

But, I’ll take—I mean, I can take that question back, from the 

whole of Department of Defense. I’ll that one for the record, sir. 

Senator NELSON. General Votel told us that a campaign plan for 

global special operations—when he was here last month. What is 

the purpose of this new campaign plan? 

Mr. LUMPKIN. The campaign plan, which is still in staffing, so it 

is not an approved campaign plan, is to ensure that SOCOM has 

the ability to fully synchronize its efforts across the geographic 

combatant commands, to ensure that there are no gaps in seams 

where our enemies can hide. So, SOCOM is focused largely on the 

counterterrorism issue, is—wants to make sure that we have all 

the bases covered, so it’s just kind of just to level the bubbles 

across the entire defense enterprise, to make sure that everybody’s 

singing off the same sheet of music. 

Senator NELSON. For the record, do you want to comment on the 

effects of sequestration and your concerns about the cuts to the 

service-provided enablers? 

Mr. LUMPKIN. Yes, sir, I would. 

Sequestration in the Budget Control Act has—will have negative 

impacts, as structured, for U.S. Special Operations Command. I 

think the largest challenges that we’ll see is those service-supported enablers from combat support, combat service support. ISR, 

the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities that 

support special operations every day, are going to—as well as the 

force modernization for, particularly, special operations aircraft. As 

you’re aware, the services provide the aircraft. We make those special-operations-peculiar modifications. As they have a reduction in 

funds, those aircraft will come to us at a slower rate, which will 

hurt our modernization ability within the force. 

So, I think that we—it will have not only short-term impacts, but 

I think you’re looking at long-term impacts on modernizing and 

maintaining a healthy special-operations capability in the out 

years. 

Senator FISCHER. Thank you, Senator Nelson. 

Senator Cotton. 

Senator COTTON. Thank you, gentlemen, both, for your service to 

our country. 

Secretary Lumpkin, a little over a year ago, Vladimir Putin, in 

Russia, invaded and took Crimea from the Ukraine. That started 

out with what I think most would characterize as a successful unconventional or irregular warfare campaign involving the so-called 

‘‘little green men.’’ Would that be your assessment of the way the 

invasion of Crimea began? 

10 

Mr. LUMPKIN. I believe that his incursion into Ukraine definitely 

used unconventional tactics. 

Senator COTTON. Okay. Given what we’ve started to see in the 

Baltics in recent months, between aggressive behavior from Russian bombers or submarines, the alleged kidnapping of an Estonian 

security officer from eastern Estonia, which has a large Russian 

ethnic minority, as does eastern Latvia, what is the Department’s 

plans and position for that kind of irregular campaign if it were to 

begin to be conducted by Russia in Estonia and Latvia? 

Mr. LUMPKIN. That’s one we should discuss in a closed session, 

if you don’t mind, sir. 

Senator COTTON. Okay, sure. 

I want to ask about the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. 

There are three provisions of that Act that are expiring in about 

6 weeks, the so-called ‘‘lone wolf,’’ roving wiretap, and business 

record provisions. Do you have a perspective on the impact that it 

would have on the men and women in your charge if those provisions are not reauthorized and the programs they support continue? 

Mr. LUMPKIN. Sir, I’ll be honest that that’s a little out of my 

lane, as far as the intelligence-gathering piece of it. So, I would 

be—wouldn’t want to speculate. 

Senator COTTON. Okay. 

General Howell, do you have perspective on that? 

General HOWELL. No, sir, I don’t. I’d have to defer to our Intelligence Community colleagues to provide assessment. 

Senator COTTON. Okay. 

I think I’ll yield back the balance of my time, in the interest of 

getting on to the closed session. 

Senator FISCHER. Thank you. 

Senator Shaheen. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. 

And, to Secretary Lumpkin and General Howell, thank you both 

for being here. 

I want to go back to—and follow up a little bit on Senator Nelson’s question about the impact of sequestration on the Special 

Forces, because—I was very impressed, Secretary Lumpkin, with 

your comment in your statement that humans are more important 

than hardware. And I do believe that to be true. And I believe that 

that—if we look at conflict over our history, that that’s been a critical element of our success, has been the importance of individual 

leaders and the commitment that our men and women in uniform 

have made. 

So, as we look at the impact of sequestration, you’ve talked about 

a number of things that would be affected by service-provided capabilities, but can you talk directly about the impact on the men and 

women who are serving in our Special Operations? There’s an impact with respect to their deployments. And what does that do to 

morale? What does it do to the men and women on the ground? 

And can you talk in language that the average person out there 

can understand so that they really appreciate what’s happening to 

the men and women who are serving? 

Mr. LUMPKIN. Well, I think, first, from an operational standpoint, 

is—if we reduce ISR—this is the intelligence, surveillance, and reVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:21 May 11, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00014 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\24523.TXT WILDA
11 

connaissance capability—to our deploying forces, we inherently put 

our troops at greater risk. We have less fidelity on what’s happening. We have—we take greater risk in every operation. So, 

you’re—you increase the risk to lives, at the very front end, when 

you have reduced capability. 

I think you also have—from the human aspect, day to day, is— 

we make decisions, especially—whether—some of our units are 

very reliant on the overseas contingency operations funds. And it’s 

very difficult for them to plan and not anticipate what the future 

can be, whether it’s a program they’re working or it’s that their 

very job may exist in the future, just for the nature of—we don’t— 

because that’s 1-year money, as you’re aware, and it’s not part of 

base budget. So, I think that people are looking for certainty and 

what’s in their future. And I think that’s key. Because spending 

years in a precarious situation of uncertainty is stressful, in itself. 

We also have a challenge of that we frequently cut, when times 

get tough, are those out-year expenses. And those are research and 

development, and those are education, which are absolutely key. 

And we have to make sure that, whatever the outcome of a Budget 

Control Act scenario in fiscal year 2016, that we continue to invest 

in our people, educationwise, and as well as the research and development to make sure we keep them safe and have sound operational capabilities in the future, to give to Congress and the President, options as we move forward. 

And then it goes everything that trickles down to preserving the 

force, as far as health, welfare, holistic taking care of our troops, 

whether it’s pay, allowances, things of that nature, that gives us 

the military capability that we have today. 

So, I mean, this goes from the very, you know, operational aspects in the field to what life—how you live life every day when 

you go to your housing on base or anywhere else. So, this is—the 

impacts are very crosscutting and very deep, maybe not so much 

in itself at the front end, but as you—as it trickles down. And when 

you add them all together, they are significant. 

Senator SHAHEEN. And Chair Fischer was getting at the question 

of, What’s—what drives—to what extent is policy driven by resources? And isn’t it true that, despite everybody’s best intent, that 

if sequestration kicks in again, that, in fact, resources are going to 

have an impact on our policy and our planning? 

Mr. LUMPKIN. Absolutely. It does. I mean—though the reality is, 

you can—I mean, whether it’s your—how you manage your household—you make decisions on how much money you’ve got coming 

in as income, and it’s no different from the Department of Defense. 

We make decisions based on resources that are available. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. 

Senator FISCHER. Senator Ernst. 

Senator ERNST. Thank you. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. 

Thank you, gentlemen, for being here today. I do appreciate the 

testimony and your service, as well. Thank you very much. 

Last month, I had sent a letter to President Obama regarding 

my concern about Iranian-supported and -controlled Iraqi Shiite 

militia, and the long-term threat that they have posed to our country and to a free Iraq. And, as both of you know, throughout the 

war, we have lost a lot of wonderful Americans to those that are 

12 

involved with Iraqi Shiite militia. And I believe that we can’t forget 

their sacrifices against this type of enemy, and that Iran’s longterm—Iran’s long-term objective is to defeat both the United States 

and Iraqi interests in Iraq. My opinion. 

So, with respect to your near- and long-term assessment, what 

are the most—both the most likely and the most dangerous—not 

necessarily courses of actions, but the implications for Iraq, particularly for the Iraqi Kurds and the Sunnis, if Iranian-controlled 

Shiite militias and their groups continue at the forefront of taking 

back territory in Iraq? So, again, focusing on Iran and those Shiite 

militias that are backed by Iran, and the implications to both our 

interests and Iraq. 

Mr. LUMPKIN. Thank you. 

I think that Mr. Steven Vanech will be in the closed session, 

could give you a much more satisfying answer for what—— 

Senator ERNST. Okay. 

Mr. LUMPKIN.—you’re looking for. 

Senator ERNST. Okay, thank you. 

General, the same, also? Okay, thank you very much. 

And then, just a yes-or-no question in regards to this type of situation. U.S. equipment that has been provided to Iraqi Shiite militias, that equipment that has been provided to the Iraqi government, has it been obtained by Iranian-controlled militias? Just simple yes or no. 

Mr. LUMPKIN. Again, that would be—I would go to Mr. Steven 

Vanech in the closed session for that. 

Senator ERNST. Okay. Okay. I think most of my questions will 

need to be asked in a closed session. 

So, gentlemen, thank you very much. And I look forward to that 

opportunity. 

Thank you. 

Senator FISCHER. Senator Gillibrand. 

Senator GILLIBRAND. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. thank 

you for hosting this hearing, to you and the ranking member. 

I just got back from a CODEL to Tunisia, Chad, Kenya, Senegal, 

and Djibouti to talk about antiterrorism, to talk about growing terror threats from al-Shabaab, from ISIL, from Boko Haram. And 

every single military leader we talked to very specifically said 

counterterrorism can only be addressed partly through military action, that, in fact, to be effective, you had to combine that with 

work by the State Department, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), a more holistic strategy on the ground, economic development, a range of issues. Do you share that view? 

Mr. LUMPKIN. Yes, I do. The key is, is that, as long as there is 

a lack of strong governance in a region, extremists will take advantage of that. They’ll co-op the people, and they will grow, and they 

will ultimately be a threat regionally to the burgeoning governments, but the regional and largely—ultimately, probably internationally. So, I absolutely agree with that. 

Senator GILLIBRAND. General? 

General HOWELL. I share the view, as well. 

Senator GILLIBRAND. So, in closed session, I’ll ask you more specific questions about what type of strategies might be effective. 

But, top line, every leader we talked to, both U.S. and the foreign 

13 

leaders, they did—very grateful for the work the United States was 

doing. They overwhelmingly were grateful for all the training that 

was taking place on the ground. They were very grateful for intelligence-sharing. Several governments wanted helicopters sooner 

than later. But, they were grateful. And they saw how things were 

working effectively, in terms of training their personnel to respond, 

particularly in Chad, for example. They were doing very effective 

work against—in Nigeria, more so than the Nigerian government 

was doing. We saw the same in Kenya, where they were obviously 

doing far more effective measures than the Somalians were able to 

do. So, do you think that we have sufficient Intelligence Surveillance Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities to support the counterintelligence efforts in Africa? Do you feel like we have enough components and investment to do what we would like to do in those 

places? 

Mr. LUMPKIN. Before I turn it over to General Howell, I will tell 

you that our shortage of the ISR is not limited to Africa. We don’t 

have enough ISR, period. We work the best we can to do with what 

we got. And that’s exactly what we do. 

So, as we look at the future and we look at dwindling budgets, 

we see the number of what we call ‘‘orbits,’’ the number of airframes in the air, is decreasing, not increasing as the global threats 

are increasing so that—— 

Senator GILLIBRAND. So—but, can I request, then, a more formal 

request about what you actually need to meet the needs and goals 

you have in counterterrorism, in terms of ISR? Because I want to 

be able to prioritize that in budget debates and also when we write 

the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), that we need 

more resources in this particular area, because some things are 

going to be cut, but some things are plussed-up because of the 

need. So, I’d like more specific requests on that. 

Mr. LUMPKIN. Will do. 

Senator GILLIBRAND. By region. 

Mr. LUMPKIN. Thank you. 

Senator GILLIBRAND. And by terror threat. 

General? 

General HOWELL. Nothing to add to Mr. Lumpkin’s comments. 

Senator GILLIBRAND. Okay. 

The rest of my questions will be in—I will submit for the record 

for a different setting. 

Senator GILLIBRAND. Now I want to turn to the issue of integration. I’ve read a lot about the Cultural Support Teams, how Special 

Ops have very effectively used them in Afghanistan. For example, 

they would use the Cultural Support Teams to be able to go into 

a village to actually inspect the women to make sure they weren’t 

hiding weapons, to question the women and children to find out if 

any terrorists were among them, and to very, very positive effects 

on the missions that certainly were being run by Army Rangers 

and Navy SEAL teams. Can you talk about the benefits of this program? And is SOCOM taking into full account the range of benefits 

that would come from female participation in Special Ops in its 

analysis of combat integration? 

Mr. LUMPKIN. I’ll just—I share your comment from the Cultural 

Support Teams that are in Afghanistan, having served over there. 

14 

I think those ladies were reaching part of the population that the 

males were not reaching—in day-to-day conversation in the villages, sharing some of their concerns, developing relationships, 

which made our force more effective. So, I think we’re constantly 

looking for new ways to find out how both males and females can 

make our force better. 

Senator GILLIBRAND. And will you use the practical benefits that 

you’ve seen on the ground as part of your commitment to force integration? I mean, I just read that the Army Rangers, a large number of the females who were just trained in the latest group, passed 

through the training. 

Mr. LUMPKIN. I believe you’re talking about the women in service 

review and the integration of women in U.S. Special Operations 

Command. As you’re aware, U.S. Special Operations Command, 

like the service, is doing a study, and they’re working through to 

give a recommendation, not later than—I believe that the decision 

will be made by 1 January 2016. But, they’re working through all 

of those pieces to make sure—everything from that we have standards that are gender neutral, that we have—and we maximize the 

opportunity for full integration within the Special Operations enterprise. 

Senator GILLIBRAND. Thank you. 

Senator FISCHER. Senator Kaine. 

Senator KAINE. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. 

The news is reporting today that Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi has been 

seriously injured, possibly in March, and is now maybe not in operational command of ISIL. There has been earlier reports of this. I 

think there was one in November. There was one in March. The 

November one may have turned out to be incorrect. What can you 

tell us about al Baghdadi’s condition and the effect that that would 

have on ISIL’s effectiveness? 

Mr. LUMPKIN. Thank you, sir. I saw the report, as well, earlier 

today. And again, not the first time we’ve had this. But, I think 

that talking about the impacts is probably a closed-session issue. 

Senator KAINE. Okay. So, you would not have a—I mean, in here, 

not have anything to add, beyond what the report might be today, 

but we can go into the impacts at the later session. 

Mr. LUMPKIN. Yeah, I have nothing to add to that report. 

Senator KAINE. Okay. 

Just a couple of questions to understand how a piece of the Special Forces mission works. As I’ve traveled as an Armed Services 

member, one of the things I’ve really seen is how well Special 

Forces do in training foreign militaries, and how much in demand 

that kind of training assistance is. 

And I also know that the Marines have the Special Purpose 

MAGTAV that’s doing training. They’ve got a unit in Africa. And 

then, the State Partnership Program, which the National Guard 

has, also works on training of foreign militaries. I mean, this is 

great, because it—as far as a expenditure of dollars in the grand 

Pentagon budget, it’s not a massive item, but it builds up goodwill. 

And when countries really need it, they need it. 

Talk a little bit about how that—the training is tiered. And is it 

the COCOM that decides this kind of assistance would need Special Operations to do the—SOF to do the training, this kind 

15 

would—the State Partnership Program would do it, or this time the 

Marines could do it? How does that get done? Is it organized at the 

COCOM level or is it done differently? 

Mr. LUMPKIN. It’s largely organized by the—within the combatant commands, and they look at—across their theaters on where 

the capacity needs to be built. And so, we work in—within the Office of Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff, work in conjunction 

with the COCOMs to look at the resources that are available and 

put the right amount of resources in the right place at the right 

time. 

There are some natural things, where Special Operations will 

generally train Special Operations. But, they can train other units, 

as well, whether it’s law enforcement or military. We also have the 

more enduring partnerships that go on, are—the State Partnership 

Program is where you have this habitual relationship between a 

foreign nation and, you know, a respective state in this country. So, 

you end up with a very habitual relationship, more conventional in 

nature, that exists. But, all of these are synchronized across in— 

which authority are we using? Are we going to use a counternarcotics authority? Are we going to do a joint combined exercise 

for training authority, which—where we get 51 percent of the 

training? Are we going to use some other mechanism? So, we try 

to take all these different authorities that we have to maximize the 

engagement with the respective nation to make sure we bring up 

their capacity. And we’ll overlay—on the counterterrorism front, 

we’ll overlay the 2282, which is the global train-and-equip authority, and to make sure that they have the resources necessary, material resources—to make sure that they have the—whether it’s 

guns, planes, trucks, or whatever they need—to make sure that 

they can execute those missions that we train them to in—with 

those other authorities that are out there. 

Senator KAINE. My intuition would tell me that the demand for 

this kind of training from United States is probably increasing 

pretty significantly. 

Mr. LUMPKIN. It is increasing. What we do with—anytime we do 

any of these training-type events, though, we—you know, of course, 

we’ve—we do vetting for human rights, and we do things—and so, 

the—you end up with their—as we work through this, is that—especially in areas where there is a lack of governance, it gets very 

difficult to find forces to work with that we can adequately and effectively vet to make sure that they—we can put the resources of 

both training and material in the country. 

Senator KAINE. Am I right that, sort of as a part of the big DOD 

budget, these training activities are not a—you know, a massive 

percentage of the DOD budget? 

Mr. LUMPKIN. You are absolutely correct. 

Senator KAINE. And, when you do them, you build relationships, 

and some of the people you’re training might be the Defense Minister in 10 years, or maybe the President in 15 or 20 years. And 

that’s all part of the thinking about why it’s good for us to be that 

partner for these foreign militaries? 

Mr. LUMPKIN. Absolutely. When—recently when—as the Assistant Secretary, I was down in Peru, and I was meeting with people 

16 

that I had gone to SEAL training, you know, 25 years ago, when 

I was an Active Duty Navy SEAL. 

And the other piece that’s so significant and important about 

these military-to-military relationships is, when political relationships become strained, which happens between sovereign nations— 

it’s just part of the international community—is that the militaryto-military relationship is kind of the glue that holds things together, that I can pick up the phone and call somebody, and we can 

have—build a rapport at our level to make sure that things don’t 

go sideways on us, and we end up with a situation that’s much 

more difficult. 

Senator KAINE. Great. 

I’m over time. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. 

Senator FISCHER. Thank you. 

My thanks to my colleagues. My thanks to you, gentlemen, for 

this open session. 

We will now adjourn for the closed session. 

Thank you. 

[Whereupon, at 3:18 p.m., the committee adjourned.] 

Æ