J-S30035-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

MARKEL DAVIS 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 2234 EDA 2021

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered October 4, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0014344-2013

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY SULLIVAN, J.: FILED APRIL 30, 2024

Markel Davis (“Davis”) appeals from the order dismissing his petition for 

relief pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”).1 We affirm.

The PCRA court summarized the factual background of this appeal as 

follows:

On September 9, 2013, at approximately 8 P.M., Rico Lofton[ 

(“the victim”)] . . . was watching the Eagles game at his 

girlfriend’s house at 3018 Mifflin Street in Philadelphia. Upon 

hearing an argument in the street, the victim walked outside to 

see his girlfriend’s fifteen-year-old brother, Carlos, arguing with 

[Davis] and his co-defendant, Nafeese Turner [(“Turner”) 

(collectively, the “defendants”)]. The victim approached the 

defendants and discovered that they had provided Carlos with 

heroin and crack-cocaine to sell. The victim then took the drugs 

from Carlos’s waistband and told the [defendants] that they would 

not get the drugs back. Turner responded, “who the F do you 

think you are,” and thereafter the victim, [Davis], and Turner 

began arguing for approximately five minutes. 

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1 See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. 
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During said argument, the streetlights were on and [Davis] 

and Turner were standing side-by-side, approximately four feet 

away from the victim. [Davis] was wearing a black hoodie with a 

picture on the front and back[,] and Turner was wearing a plain 

black hoodie—neither [Davis’s] nor Turner’s faces were covered. 

[Davis] demanded of the victim, “[W]e want our shit back,” to 

which the victim responded, “[Y]ou ain’t getting your shit back.” 

The victim subsequently told [defendants] that he was going to 

flush the drugs down the toilet. [Davis] then threatened, “[O]h, 

we got something for you[,]” and Turner added[,] “[S]ay no 

more.”

Once the argument ended, [defendants] rode away, sideby-side, on their bicycles. The victim watched the two men ride 

away for a short time and then turned to walk towards Carlos. As 

the victim walked towards Carlos, he heard several gunshots and 

turned around to see a flash coming from [Davis’s] direction. No 

one else was in the area near [Davis] and Turner when the shots 

were fired. One of the gunshots hit the victim in his right front 

bicep, and the bullet exited through the rear of the bicep. 

The night of the shooting was not the only time that the 

victim had met [Davis] and Turner regarding Carlos’s drug 

dealing. Approximately two weeks prior to the shooting, the 

victim’s girlfriend’s mother asked the victim to talk to Carlos 

because Carlos had been selling drugs. At that time, the victim 

had experience selling narcotics, as he had previously pled guilty 

to dealing drugs in South Philadelphia on two separate occasions. 

When the victim confronted Carlos, he learned that Carlos 

possessed some crack-cocaine, which he received from two men 

whom Carlos called “Duda” (Turner) and “Markel” ([Davis]). 

[Following these conversations, and prior to the shooting at issue 

in this case, t]he victim . . . met with [Davis] and Turner to discuss 

Carlos’s drug dealing. Said meeting occurred during the day, with 

[Davis] and Turner standing side-by-side, faces uncovered, 

approximately four feet away from the victim. The victim asked 

[defendants] to leave Carlos alone, insisting that Carlos was too 

young to deal drugs and that Carlos must give the cocaine back 

to [defendants]. [Davis] responded that he respected the victim’s 

request, and the victim, [Davis], and Turner then “fist [b]umped”

and parted ways. 

After being shot, the victim returned to his girlfriend’s house 

at 3018 Mifflin Street, leaving a trail of blood on the floor of the 

house, as well as on his shoes. Shortly thereafter, Officers Robert 
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Ellis and Cyrus Pollard of the Philadelphia Department responded 

to the scene. Office[r] Ellis entered the house and saw the victim 

bent over, holding his arm, screaming and crying in pain. The 

victim stated to Officer Ellis that he was shot, and Officers Ellis 

and Pollard then drove the victim to the emergency room at the 

Hospital of the University of Pennsylvania in their police vehicle. 

During this car ride, Officer Pollard obtained a flash description of 

the shooters, indicating that the shooters were two black males 

wearing dark clothing, one of whom was approximately 5’10”, 180 

pounds, with a full beard. 

Once at the hospital, Officer Pollard escorted the victim to 

the emergency room for treatment. During treatment, a package 

of drugs fell out of the victim’s pocket. The package contained 

nine ziplock baggies of heroin, each stamped with the letters

“mpire,” and three yellow-tinted ziplock baggies containing crackcocaine. The victim was then arrested for possession of said 

narcotics but was not questioned about the shooting that evening, 

as he was under medication. 

At the hospital the following evening, Detective John 

Landis—an eleven[-]year veteran detective of the Philadelphia 

Police Department with nineteen years of service with the

department—interviewed the victim about the shooting. Before 

speaking to the victim about the shooting, Detective Landis 

showed him two sets of photo arrays. According to Detective 

Landis, the victim, without hesitation, identified [Davis] as one of 

the shooters. During his interview with Detective Landis, the 

victim specifically stated that [Davis] was “the guy who shot [him] 

last night.” The victim told Detective Landis that he recognized 

[Davis] because he had a gap in his teeth and that he knew 

[Davis] “had the gun because of the writing on the hoodie when 

[Davis] was firing at [him].”

[2]

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2 At trial, Davis’s counsel (“trial counsel”) argued the victim was unreliable 

and highlighted inconsistencies in the evidence surrounding the victim’s 

identification of Davis as the person who shot him. See N.T., 5/9/14, at 91-

95. Those inconsistencies included the victim’s denial of his prior testimony 

that Davis and Turner walked, rather than rode bicycles, away before the 

shooting; whether the victim told officers whether the suspects had a beards; 

how long it took for the victim to identify Davis from the photo array; whether 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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PCRA Court Opinion, 3/11/24, at 1-4 (citations to the record and footnote 

omitted; some formatting altered). Approximately four days after the 

shooting, in the morning of September 13, 2013, police arrested Davis at his 

home and recovered a black hoodie with a picture and writing on the front and 

back.

A jury convicted Davis of aggravated assault and related offenses, and 

the court sentenced him to an aggregate term of twelve to twenty-four years 

of incarceration. This Court affirmed the judgment of sentence, and our 

Supreme Court denied allowance of appeal. Commonwealth v. Davis, 153 

A.3d 1103, 2016 WL 3198210 (Pa. Super. 2016) (unpublished memorandum), 

appeal denied, 168 A.3d 1268 (Pa. 2017).

3

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the victim stated the black hoodie had orange writing on it; and the fact that 

Davis did not have a gap in his teeth. See N.T., 5/8/14, at 97-98, 189. 

Based on the inconsistencies highlighted at trial, trial counsel requested an 

instruction that the jury receive the victim’s identification with caution 

pursuant to former Pennsylvania Standard Suggested (Criminal) Jury 

Instruction (“Pa.SSJI”) 4.07B and Commonwealth v. Kloiber, 106 A.2d 820 

(Pa. 1954) (a “Kloiber instruction”). See N.T., 5/19/14, at 42-45. The trial 

court refused the defense’s request and elected to issue an instruction based 

on former Pa.SSJI 4.07A. See id. Trial counsel did not object. See id. 

3

In his direct appeal, Davis repeatedly challenged the reliability of the victim’s 

identification testimony claiming that the evidence was insufficient to support 

his convictions and the trial court erred in denying a motion to suppress the 

victim’s identification. See Davis, 2016 WL 3198210, at *8-12. When 

affirming, this Court concluded that the record did not support Davis’s

contention that the circumstances of the crime were such that the victim was 

unable to make a reliable identification of Davis for lack of opportunity. See 

id. at *12. This Court did not address Davis’s issue concerning a Kloiber 

instruction because it was waived. See id. at *13. 
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Davis filed a timely pro se PCRA petition. The PCRA court appointed 

counsel (“PCRA counsel”), who filed an amended and a second amended 

petition. Davis raised three ineffective assistance of counsel claims asserting 

that trial counsel failed to: (1) object to the trial court’s denial of a request for 

a Kloiber instruction; (2) highlight mitigating factors at sentencing; and (3) 

seek DNA and gunshot residue testing on the black hoodie found at Davis’s 

residence. See Second Amended PCRA Petition, 3/6/19, unnumbered at 3. 

The Commonwealth filed a motion to dismiss, and Davis filed a response.4In 

June 2021, the PCRA court issued a Pa.R.A.P. 907 notice of its intent to dismiss 

the PCRA petition as meritless. Davis did not respond. The court dismissed 

the PCRA petition in October 2021. Davis timely appealed, but did not comply 

with the court’s order to submit a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement. 

A series of delays ensued over the next two years. This included: the 

dismissal of Davis’s appeal for the failure to file a docketing statement in 2022; 

the reinstatement of the appeal; remands to determine whether PCRA counsel 

had abandoned Davis; the filing of briefs in 2023; and a remand for the filing 

of a Rule 1925(b) statement nunc pro tunc and a Rule 1925(a) opinion. In 

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4

In its motion to dismiss, the Commonwealth asserted that the hoodie had 

been destroyed in 2017 or 2018 because it was no longer necessary for 

prosecution. See Motion to Dismiss, 5/29/20, at 11 and Exhibit A. Although 

Davis filed a response, he did not acknowledge the destruction of the hoodie

or otherwise seek leave to amend his petition to address the destruction of 

the hoodie. See Response to Motion to Dismiss, 3/18/21, at 3-4, 8-10. On 

appeal, Davis now discusses the destruction of the hoodie in terms of 

spoliation. See Davis’s Brief at 11-12. Because Davis did not raise any issues 

concerning the destruction of the hoodie in the PCRA court, we will not address 

them on appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a). 
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December 2023, PCRA counsel filed a Rule 1925(b) statement. The PCRA 

court filed a responsive Rule 1925(a) opinion.

Davis raises the following issues for our review:

1. Whether trial counsel committed ineffective assistance of 

counsel by failing to object to the trial court’s decision to not give 

a Kloiber charge to the jury and . . . agree[ing] to the charge that 

was given.

2. Whether trial counsel committed ineffective assistance of 

counsel by failing to emphasize [Davis’s] lack of mental ability and 

his proclivity to be a follower during his sentencing hearing.

3. Whether trial counsel committed ineffective assistance of 

counsel by failing to request a DNA test or a [gunshot residue] . . 

. test upon a black hoodie that the Commonwealth seized from 

[Davis’s] residence and then offered testimony about at trial.

Davis’s Brief at 3 (some capitalization omitted). 

Our standard of review of review is well settled:

Appellate review of a PCRA court’s dismissal of a PCRA petition is 

limited to the examination of whether the PCRA court’s 

determination is supported by the record and free of legal error.

The PCRA court’s findings will not be disturbed unless there is no 

support for the findings in the certified record. This Court grants 

great deference to the findings of the PCRA court, and we will not 

disturb those findings merely because the record could support a 

contrary holding. In contrast, we review the PCRA court’s legal 

conclusions de novo.

Commonwealth v. Maxwell, 232 A.3d 739, 744 (Pa. Super. 2020) (en banc) 

(internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Further, a “PCRA court’s 

credibility findings are to be accorded great deference, and where supported 

by the record, such determinations are binding on a reviewing court.”

Commonwealth v. Williams, 141 A.3d 440, 452 (Pa. 2016) (internal citation 

and quotation marks omitted).
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With respect to claims of ineffective assistance of counsel,

counsel is presumed to have been effective and [ ] the petitioner 

bears the burden of proving counsel’s alleged ineffectiveness. To 

overcome this presumption, a petitioner must establish that: (1) 

the underlying substantive claim has arguable merit; (2) counsel 

did not have a reasonable basis for his or her act or omission; and 

(3) the petitioner suffered prejudice as a result of counsel’s 

deficient performance, that is, a reasonable probability that but 

for counsel’s act or omission, the outcome of the proceeding would 

have been different. A PCRA petitioner must address each of 

these prongs on appeal. A petitioner’s failure to satisfy any prong 

of this test is fatal to the claim.

Commonwealth v. Wholaver, 177 A.3d 136, 144 (Pa. 2018) (internal 

citations and quotation marks omitted). “Counsel cannot be found ineffective 

for failing to pursue a baseless or meritless claim.” Commonwealth v. 

Taylor, 933 A.2d 1035, 1042 (Pa. Super. 2007) (internal citation and 

quotation marks omitted). The PCRA court may dismiss a petition without a 

hearing when the court can determine from the record that there are no 

genuine issues of material fact. See Commonwealth v. Jones, 942 A.2d 

903, 906 (Pa. Super. 2008). 

In his first issue, Davis asserts trial counsel was ineffective for failing to

challenge the trial court’s refusal to issue a requested Kloiber instruction. 

The following principles govern our review of this issue. “Defendants 

are generally entitled to instructions that they have requested and that are 

supported by the evidence.” Commonwealth v. Hairston, 84 A.3d 657, 668 

(Pa. 2014) (internal citations omitted).

With respect to a Kloiber instruction, 
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a charge that a witness’s identification should be viewed with 

caution is required where the eyewitness: (1) did not have an 

opportunity to clearly view the defendant; (2) equivocated on the 

identification of the defendant; or (3) had a problem making an 

identification in the past. Where an eyewitness has had protracted 

and unobstructed views of the defendant and consistently 

identified the defendant throughout the investigation and at trial, 

there is no need for a Kloiber instruction. When the witness 

already knows the defendant, this prior familiarity creates an 

independent basis for the witness’s in-court identification of the 

defendant . . ..

Commonwealth v. Ali, 10 A.3d 282, 303 (Pa. 2010) (internal citations and 

quotation marks omitted).

Davis asserts that the victim “failed to provide the kind of evidentiary 

specificity that was good enough to convict [him] . . ..” Davis’s Brief at 8. 

Davis notes that trial counsel did request a Kloiber instruction, the trial court 

denied the request, and trial counsel then accepted the trial court’s reading of 

an alternate instruction concerning identification testimony. See id. at 9. He 

concludes that trial counsel was ineffective for accepting the trial court’s 

decision not to issue a Kloiber instruction and failing to the object to the jury 

charge as given by the trial court. See id.

The PCRA court concluded this issue was meritless. The court noted 

that the evidence demonstrated that the victim had the opportunity to identify 

Davis, consistently identified Davis as the person who shot him, never 

identified another person, and unequivocally identified Davis at trial. See

PCRA Court Opinion, 3/11/24, at 9-10. The court concluded there was no basis 
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for trial counsel to have requested, or for the court to issue, a Kloiber

instruction. See id. at 9-10.5 

The PCRA court’s findings are supported by the record and its 

conclusions are free of legal error. The record demonstrates the victim was 

familiar with Davis and, at the time of the shooting, there were no 

impediments to the victim’s ability and opportunity to observe and identify. 

Specifically, the victim previously encountered Davis and codefendant Turner 

two weeks before the shooting. See N.T., 5/8/14, at 27-33. The previous

encounter took place in the daytime, and the victim and Davis stood close to 

each other as they talked. See id. at 30-31. Nothing impeded the victim’s 

view of Davis’s face on that occasion. See id. at 31. The victim again

confronted Davis and Turner immediately before the shooting. See id. at 35. 

While this encounter took place in the evening, streetlamps lit the area. See 

id. at 35, 40. The victim and Davis stood close to each other, and nothing 

impeded his view of Davis’s face, or his clothing. See id. at 39, 42. During 

the shooting, the victim testified that he saw a flash coming from Davis’s 

direction. See id. at 44. The victim unequivocally identified Davis as the 

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5 The PCRA court also noted that, in Davis’s direct appeal, this Court rejected 

Davis’s assertion that the victim lacked an opportunity to make a reliable 

identification. See PCRA Court Opinion, 3/11/24, at 9. In the direct appeal, 

we reviewed the denial of Davis’s motion to suppress the victim’s 

identification, and our scope of review was limited to the suppression record. 

See Davis, 2016 WL 3198210, at *11. Here, Davis’s ineffectiveness claim 

based on Kloiber requires a review of the trial record. See Hairston, 84 

A.3d at 668. 
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person he encountered two weeks before the shooting, on the night of the 

shooting, and as the person who shot him. See id. at 29, 34.

A review of trial counsel’s request for a Kloiber instruction lends no 

additional support to Davis’s claim. Trial counsel requested the Kloiber

instruction because there was evidence that the victim: gave inconsistent 

statements about whether Davis was riding a bicycle or walking away from 

the victim when the shooting happened; was facing away from Davis when he 

was shot; looked at the photo array for fifteen minutes before first identifying 

Davis; identified Davis from a picture that did not match an officer’s testimony 

that the victim described the suspects as having beards; and relayed physical 

descriptions of Davis that was inconsistent with his appearance, including the

statement that the person who shot him had a gap in his teeth. See N.T., 

5/9/14, at 45. Although these factors went to the credibility and weight of 

the victim’s identification, they did not establish the need for a Kloiber

instruction, which focuses on a witness’s ability to make the identification. 

See Commonwealth v. Brown, 196 A.3d 130, 164 (Pa. 2018) (noting that 

a Kloiber instruction is not required where a witness was uncertain about or 

inconsistent with certain details of the crime); Commonwealth v. Reid, 99 

A.3d 427, 449 (Pa. 2014) (noting that the need for a Kloiber instruction

focuses on the ability of a witness to identify the defendant). The trial court, 

therefore, properly refused to issue a Kloiber instruction, and a further 

objection to the jury charge would have been futile. Thus, we conclude that

the PCRA court properly dismissed Davis’s claim that trial counsel should have 
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objected to the absence of a Kloiber instruction. See Taylor, 933 A.2d at 

1042 (“Counsel cannot be found ineffective for failing to pursue a baseless or 

meritless claim”). 

In his second issue, Davis asserts trial counsel was ineffective for failing

to emphasize mitigating factors at the sentencing hearing. 

A claim of ineffectiveness concerning a discretionary aspect of

sentencing requires a petitioner to plead and prove prejudice. See 

Commonwealth v. Presley, 193 A.3d 436, 445 (Pa. Super. 2018). 

Specifically, the petitioner must plead facts demonstrating there was a 

reasonable likelihood that he would have obtained a more favorable result at 

sentencing. See id.

Davis contends that trial counsel failed to present evidence about his 

“mental disabilities” and that he was “a follower.” Davis’s Brief at 9. He 

contends this information was crucial to show that he was not someone who 

would initiate a criminal act and he only shot the victim on the orders of his 

codefendant, Turner. See id. at 9-10. He argues this information would also 

show that he was less culpable than Turner. See id. at 9. 

The PCRA court concluded Davis failed to establish prejudice. See PCRA 

Court Opinion, 3/11/24, at 11. The court noted that it had ordered a 

presentence investigation report and a mental health evaluation, both of which 

it considered at the sentencing. See id. The court asserts it properly 

considered and weighed Davis’s mental capacity and intellectual ability when 

imposing sentence. See id. 
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We initially note Davis did not point the PCRA court or this Court to any

evidence or portion of the record that described the nature of Davis’s mental 

disabilities and his proclivity to be a follower.

6 To the extent Davis is referring 

to information contained in either the presentence investigation or mental 

health reports prepared for sentencing, he failed to include either report as 

part of the certified record in this appeal. Therefore, Davis’s claim of 

ineffectiveness was boilerplate and undeveloped, and the PCRA court properly 

dismissed it on that basis. See Commonwealth v. Hall, 872 A.2d 1177, 

1188 (Pa. 2005); see also PCRA Court Opinion, 3/11/24, at 8.

In any event, this Court presumes that a sentencing court considers and 

weighs all relevant mitigating factors when the court has received a 

presentence investigation report. See Commonwealth v. Sexton, 222 A.3d 

405, 422 (Pa. Super. 2019). As noted by the PCRA court, the record 

establishes that the court considered the presentence investigation and 

mental health reports before sentencing Davis. Specifically, at sentencing, 

the court heard arguments and evidence from Davis and the Commonwealth. 

The court then returned from a recess and noted it had considered the 

presentence investigation and mental health reports, as well as the evidence 

____________________________________________

6 Moreover, although Davis suggests that he was less culpable than Turner, 

he provides no information about the sentence Turner received. We take 

notice that Turner received a lower aggregate sentence than Davis. Cf. 

Commonwealth v. Turner, 153 A.3d 1103, 2016 WL 3198231, at *5 (Pa. 

Super. 2016) (unpublished memorandum) (indicating that the trial court 

sentenced Turner to an aggregate term of eight to sixteen years of 

imprisonment).
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and arguments presented by the parties. See N.T., 8/8/14, at 47. Before 

imposing sentence, the court noted that it considered Davis’s criminal history, 

the sentencing guidelines, the need to protect the community, the impact on

the victim, and stated, “[O]bviously, [this case is] a serious matter[,] and 

your rehabilitative needs . . . are also serious.” See id. Thus, to the extent

the PCRA court considered the merits of this claim and found no prejudice, the 

record supported the court’s finding that it had and considered all relevant 

mitigation evidence. Davis offers no basis for finding an abuse of discretion 

or an error of law. Thus, we affirm the PCRA court’s decision to dismiss this 

claim. See Maxwell, 232 A.3d at 744; Jones, 942 A.2d at 906. 

In his third issue, Davis contends that trial counsel was ineffective for 

failing to submit for DNA or gunshot residue testing the black hoodie that

police recovered from his residence at the time of his arrest. Davis’s Brief at 

10. He assert such testing was important to determine the accuracy of the 

victim’s identification testimony. See id. at 11.

The PCRA court explained that there was no reasonable probability that 

the outcome of trial would have been different had counsel requested testing. 

See PCRA Court Opinion, 3/11/24, at 12. The court noted that the victim 

clearly identified Davis and the hoodie at trial, and the hoodie was recovered 

from Davis’s home during his arrest. See id. The court added that Davis did

not provide any legal or factual averments as to how trial counsel’s decision 

was unreasonable. See id.
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We affirm on a slightly different basis. With respect to the results of 

DNA testing, this Court has emphasized that “an absence of evidence is not 

evidence of absence.” Commonwealth v. Murchison, 294 A.3d 1251, 1262 

(Pa. Super. 2023) (en banc). A negative test result does not necessary 

establish actual innocence in the context of a request for testing, see id., nor

a reasonable possibility that the verdict would have been different in the 

context of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. 

Here, the record evidence linking Davis to the hoodie was 

uncontroverted. The victim gave a description of the hoodie to police, police 

recovered the hoodie from Davis’s residence four days after the shooting, and 

at trial, the victim positively identified the hoodie as the one worn by Davis on 

the night of the shooting. See N.T., 5/8/14, at 42, 70-71, 177, 193.

Furthermore, Davis has not established that pretrial testing on the hoodie, 

even if negative for his DNA and gunshot residue, would have had any

meaningful probative or exculpatory value. He did not allege that the hoodie 

remained in a substantially similar condition as it was four days earlier, on the 

night of the shooting, nor did he allege that pretrial testing would have yielded 

a competent result that could be related back to the night of the shooting. 

Even if negative results returned for DNA and gunshot residue, and were 

admitted at trial, the Commonwealth would have been free to discredit that 

evidence based on the time between the shooting and the recovery of the 

hoodie. Based on this record, we conclude that Davis’s allegation was far to 
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speculative as to establish prejudice resulting from trial counsel’s failure to 

submit the hoodie for DNA and gunshot residue testing.

The record also supports the PCRA court’s conclusion that Davis failed 

to rebut the presumption that trial counsel was effective. DNA and gunshot 

residue was not an issue at trial, and the absence of Davis’s DNA and gunshot 

residue, as noted above, would carry little weight given the four days between 

the shooting and the recovery of the hoodie. If a test revealed the presence 

of gunshot residue, however, it would have bolstered the victim’s testimony

and complicated the defense’s otherwise consistent attempt to impeach the 

victim’s credibility on other grounds. Thus, testing would not have conferred 

a substantially better chance of a favorable outcome for the defense. See

Commonwealth v. Collins, 957 A.2d 237, 244 (Pa. 2008) (noting that a

finding that a trial strategy lacked a reasonable basis is not warranted unless 

it can be concluded that the alternative not chosen offered a potential for 

success substantially greater than the course actually pursued). 

For these reasons, we agree with the PCRA court that Davis did not 

plead or establish prejudice or the lack of a reasonable basis attendant his 

ineffective assistance of counsel claim concerning the failure to request DNA 

and gunshot residue tests of the hoodie. Therefore, Davis’s third issue fails. 

See Maxwell, 232 A.3d at 744; Jones, 942 A.2d at 906.

In sum, our review reveals no basis to conclude that Davis’s PCRA 

petition raised any genuine issues. Because the record supports the PCRA 

court’s findings and its legal conclusions were not erroneous, we affirm the 
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court’s decision to dismiss Davis’s petition without a hearing. See Maxwell, 

232 A.3d at 744; Jones, 942 A.2d at 906.

Order affirmed.

Date: 4/30/2024