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U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE BALTIC STATES

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE, EURASIA, AND 

EMERGING THREATS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

MARCH 22, 2017

Serial No. 115–11

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

PAUL COOK, California 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

DANIEL M. DONOVAN, JR., New York 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., 

Wisconsin 

ANN WAGNER, Missouri 

BRIAN J. MAST, Florida 

FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida 

BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania 

THOMAS A. GARRETT, JR., Virginia 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID N. CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

AMI BERA, California 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania 

DINA TITUS, Nevada 

NORMA J. TORRES, California 

BRADLEY SCOTT SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

THOMAS R. SUOZZI, New York 

ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York 

TED LIEU, California

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE, EURASIA, AND EMERGING THREATS

DANA ROHRABACHER, California, Chairman 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

TED POE, Texas 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., 

Wisconsin 

FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida 

BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID N. CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Mr. Paul A. Goble, principal professor, The Institute of World Politics ............. 7

Ms. Lisa Sawyer Samp, senior fellow, International Security Program, Center 

for Strategic and International Studies ............................................................. 13

Mr. Matthew Rojansky, director, Kennan Institute, Woodrow Wilson Center ... 23

Mr. Edward Lucas, senior vice president, Center for European Policy Analysis ......................................................................................................................... 39

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

Mr. Paul A. Goble: Prepared statement ................................................................. 9

Ms. Lisa Sawyer Samp: Prepared statement ........................................................ 15

Mr. Matthew Rojansky: Prepared statement ........................................................ 26

Mr. Edward Lucas: Prepared statement ................................................................ 42

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 64

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 65

The Honorable Robin L. Kelly, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Illinois: Prepared statement ............................................................................ 66

Ms. Lisa Sawyer Samp: Material submitted for the record ................................. 68

Mr. Matthew Rojansky: Material submitted for the record ................................. 69

Questions submitted for the record by the Honorable Robin L. Kelly and 

written responses from: 

Mr. Edward Lucas ................................................................................................ 71

Ms. Lisa Sawyer Samp ........................................................................................ 72

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U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE BALTIC STATES 

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 22, 2017

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE, EURASIA, AND EMERGING THREATS,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:08 p.m., in room 

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Dana Rohrabacher 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Good afternoon. I call the subcommittee to 

order. 

Today’s hearing is focused on the Baltic region, U.S. policy to the 

countries of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. 

My colleagues in Congress, other opinion makers, and policy deciders often refer to the danger or conflict of this region. The reality 

of what has been happening or not happening in this corner of the 

world deserves a closer and, yes, a more comprehensive examination. And that is what this hearing is all about. 

Our relationship with the Baltic people and governments has 

probably lasted 100 years. We have stood by those populations 

through the Soviet period in our firm support for the rights of Baltic people to freely choose their own governance and not have it 

dictated to them by the Nazis, the Communists, or anybody else. 

Those who know me know how strongly I believe in self-determination. I am proud that American support helped these three 

Baltic countries reestablish their independence as communism collapsed in the Soviet Union. We stood by Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania in the past, and they can be confident that we will remain 

the case in the future. 

The citizens of the Baltics, like citizens in the Eastern Europe, 

are not pieces on a board for foreign policy powers to manipulate 

and to control. They are fully and equally sovereign nations. 

Within that context, the Baltic nations were permitted to join 

NATO, which, as a consequence, has put troops that are a part of 

a hostile military alliance positioned right on Russia’s border, a potential threat from Russia’s perspective. Whatever you think about 

Russia today, it behooves us to act responsibly and to recognize 

that Russia too is a powerful nation, whose leaders make decisions 

based on their country’s security and national interests. We do 

that, as well as every other major power. 

However, the question today remains: Has Russia stepped over 

the bounds of acceptable behavior or has the U.S. been overreacting? 

2

Since 2014, there have been numerous NATO exercises in the 

Baltics. And when we say that, that means we have had numerous 

NATO military exercises within a relatively short distance from St. 

Petersburg and Moscow and directly on the Russian border. Some 

of our witnesses today will help explain what is happening and 

what’s been happening there in the Baltics and why. Knowing the 

facts of what is happening certainly will help us determine what 

America’s policy toward this region should be, and what should our 

policy be toward Russia as well. But establishing the prerequisites 

for a peaceful world must remain a priority for us and for the Russians and for the people in the Baltics. 

One thought. We here should do our best not to confuse a strong 

U.S. policy with a confrontational policy. What is the goal of peace 

through strength? It is not just strength. It is peace, and that we 

should never lose that perspective. 

I welcome our witnesses this afternoon. 

Without objection, your full written statements will be made part 

of the record. 

So if you could, we would like to ask you to make a 5-minute 

presentation, and then we will move on to questions and dialogue 

with the panel and with the members. 

I would like to focus on a few key questions. I would like to know 

about the specific acts that Russia is accused of doing in the Baltics. I don’t want intentions. What are the specific acts that we 

should be most concerned about? And is our response to these specific acts reasonable or is it belligerent? 

With that said, would ask my ranking member, Mr. Meeks, to 

move forward with his opening statement. 

Mr. MEEKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for calling 

today’s hearing on U.S. policy regarding the Baltics. It is a region 

we do not always get to examine in detail, but do not often see in 

the news either. 

Before my remarks, I would like to take a moment, though, to 

remember the attacks in Brussels just 1 year ago. And, today, we 

see a similar democracy being attacked again in London. It is a reminder that democracy is continuous, it is daily, and it is difficult. 

And we mourn those that may have lost their lives in the attack 

in London today. 

The Baltics hold a special place in modern history. I admire their 

citizens for their peaceful, brave resistance to the Soviet regime 

during the nonviolent Singing Revolution. Soviet repression was 

not able to crush their cultures, their people, or their thirst for 

freedom. A beautiful story that one—and one that resonates here 

in the United States Congress. 

The U.S. never recognized the Soviet occupation by force, and 

upon deliberation, they continued normal diplomatic relations. The 

same international laws compel us to never—today, to never recognize the Kremlin’s attempt to annex Crimea. 

In 1991, newly independent Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and—

had to mature quickly in a dangerous post-Communist space where 

corruption, economic malice, and ethnic divisions were always a 

threat. The scars from the transformation can be seen and manipulated by outside actors today. Nevertheless, they are free. They reformed. They are banging on the doors to Europe saying, don’t forVerDate 0ct 09 2002 12:52 Apr 24, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 Z:\WORK\_EEET\032217\24752 SHIRL
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get us. They are persistent. They joined NATO and the EU in 2004, 

and continue to play integral roles in both. 

Estonia takes over the presidency of the council in July, and I 

look forward to learning more about their stories on the ground 

soon. 

I am also a senior member of the Financial Services Committee 

and remember seeing the Baltic States suffer immensely during 

the financial crisis in 2008. Latvia saw its GDP shrink over 25 percent in less than a year, for example. The final result, a success 

story. Internal devaluation, belt tightening within an agreement 

between society and the government helped the small open economies turn the corner and enjoy sustained growth. It was not easy, 

but the results are a best practice example for dealing with the 

euro crisis. 

The Baltic States are also leaders in the internet age. I admire 

the Estonia movement, the dedicated push to bring the country to 

the forefront in e-commerce and e-democracy, where citizens can 

vote and register businesses online. I believe we have a few e-residents in the crowd today. 

However, this makes Estonia vulnerable to cyber attacks, which 

they have experienced, most notably in 2008. The result: Estonia 

is now home to the NATO Cyber Centre of Excellence, where all 

NATO member states can share and sharpen their skills in today’s 

wide world. 

The region is also a leader in the push toward energy transformation and independence. Seeing and feeling the way the Russian Government uses energy as a political tool is a direct threat 

to the economies and populations in the Baltic States. A striking 

example is Lithuanian LNG terminal independence, which is only 

a part of a puzzle linking the region with a competitive supply of 

energy. Projects like this help Lithuania and Europe, both, from an 

energy and supply side and, importantly, from a security angle. 

Finally, the success of the three states is an important symbol 

for those who need a united and free Europe. With NATO support, 

it is an important symbol for the region as an example of what can 

be achieved with membership in the transatlantic organizations 

that the guarantee of justice and the rule of law. Yet as the Baltic 

States continue to integrate and flourish as democracies, they are 

under threat. I do not believe that Russian tanks will roll across 

their borders, but the threat from the Kremlin is often subtle, often 

denied, in fact—or a post-fact world, but just as real and just as 

powerful. Their tools corrupt our information sphere, our economies, and use cynicism only to protect kleptocracies in Moscow. 

I believe we have an excellent panel here to examine these 

threats and discuss the best responses. I believe we must support 

the free press, much like we recently examined with Chairman 

Royce of the full committee level. And I also would like to examine 

the role, both symbolic and economic, of personal sanctions, specifically, the Magnitsky Act, which goes after corrupt individuals, not 

the Russian people. 

I am also an adamant supporter of NATO and the EU’s role in 

values-based transatlantic relationship and how economies and 

people are better off with it. 

4

To conclude, I would like to submit two excellent reads for the 

record that shaped what I am talking about today. President Reagan’s Proclamation 4948, which created Baltic Freedom Day, and 

President Obama’s speech in Tallinn in 2014. These documents 

show the continued bipartisan support for the Baltic States and the 

freedom and democracies that they bravely fought to establish. 

I yield back. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, thank you. And I sure appreciate you 

putting some of my writing into the work. 

And then we have Mr. Fitzpatrick from Pennsylvania——

Mr. FITZPATRICK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER [continuing]. For 2 minutes. 

Mr. FITZPATRICK. Yes, sir. 

The fall of the USSR in 1991 ushered in a new era of freedom 

for many former Soviet Republics who had struggled for decades to 

maintain and express their national identities. The Baltic States of 

Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia are prime examples of the demise 

of the Soviet Union and how the demise of the Soviet Union led to 

a freer and more independent Europe. 

After gaining their independence in the summer of 1991, the Baltic States began to craft their own economies, their own militaries, 

and even more importantly, their own identities. This is something 

that we as Americans should all appreciate. 

The Baltic States also desire to become part of the integrated 

global community by becoming both members of NATO as well as 

the European Union. However, in recent years, the Russian bear 

has once again reared its ugly head. We first saw this in 2008 

when the Russian army invaded its fiercely independent southern 

neighbor, Georgia. In a quick but brutal war, the Russians showed 

what lengths they were willing to go in order to exert their dominance over their newly independent neighbors. 

Likewise, in 2014, Vladimir Putin covertly moved Russian military forces into the Crimean region, quickly seizing it. Subsequent 

that year, the Russian-backed insurgency began to take hold of the 

eastern Donbass region in the Ukraine, culminating in the shootdown of a Malaysian Airlines flight under very suspicious circumstances, this all being done with limited intervention from previous administrations; 

As we look forward, it is imperative that we maintain our relationship with critical allies in the Baltic States. We must reassert 

America’s commitment to prevent the rise of another Soviet block 

where a country’s leaders are beholding to Moscow and not their 

own people. 

I yield back. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. And now Brad. 

All right, Brad, you are first. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Okay. I want to associate myself with the comments of the ranking member recognizing the people of Belgium 

and the people of the United Kingdom and what they have suffered, and his praise for the Baltic States. 

The foreign policy establishment has spoken. Everything that 

Putin does is wrong and, therefore, anything done by anyone in 

conflict with Putin must be right. I will spend a few minutes quesVerDate 0ct 09 2002 12:52 Apr 24, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 Z:\WORK\_EEET\032217\24752 SHIRL
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tioning that second assumption. The Baltic States are, indeed, 

praiseworthy, but they can and should do better. 

I have been in this room for 20 years, and for most of that time, 

the foreign policy establishment said anyone who focused on burden sharing was ignorant or worse. Now, they have caved in on 

that and, instead, clung to this 2 percent standard. It should be a 

4 percent standard. America spends over 4 percent of our GDP on 

our military. The foreign policy establishment deliberately understates that by ignoring the cost of the veterans benefits which, 

after all, are compensation we provide our soldiers and sailors. 

Unfortunately, only one of the Baltic States even meets the 2 

percent requirement, and the others—one other is saying they will 

get to it eventually, but that leaves their armaments way too low 

a level because, for decades, they have been underspending. Baltic 

States should at least match our 4 percent level and make up for 

the armaments they don’t have because they’ve deliberately 

underspent for decades. 

NATO is important. Only one NATO country has been attacked 

during NATO, and that is the United States. We had support in 

Afghanistan. The support from the Baltic States was there, but incredibly modest. In contrast, the Baltic States have asked us for an 

incredibly robust response to the national security threats that 

they face, including, as the chairman points out, deploying American soldiers by the thousands on the Russian border. 

In the United Nations, I have been disappointed with the Baltic 

States support for us, voting against us again and again and again 

in the general assembly, though I support the recent support of two 

of the Baltic States in one UNESCO vote. 

And, finally, we need to urge the Baltic States to treat the Russian minorities with as much respect as possible and more respect 

than maybe popular in their own political—among their own people, especially the Estonian issue with so many citizens of Estonia 

or residents of Estonia not be—having Estonian passports, not 

being recognized as citizens. I would hope that there would be a 

system that would allow dual citizenship and allow these folks to 

have whatever rights Russia chooses to grant them, but to have all 

the rights of Estonian citizens. 

There are many arguments on both sides as to how the Russianspeaking minority should be treated, but since this could be a 

flashpoint for a major war, I would hope the Baltic States would 

err on the side of treating their Russian-speaking minority well. 

And I yield back. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you, Mr. Sherman. 

And now, Mr. Cicilline. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you, Chairman Rohrabacher and Ranking 

Member Meeks for calling this hearing today and to the witnesses 

for being here to discuss a region that is vital to America’s strategic 

national security interests. 

Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia are located at Russia’s doorstep 

and, in many ways, are at the forefront in the increasing tensions 

in Eastern Europe. Each of these states serves as an example of 

the ability of the people to rise out of the chaos of the fall of the 

Soviet Union, embrace democracy and free markets, and thrive. 

6

Formerly members of the Warsaw Pact, as part of the Soviet 

Union today, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are vital members of 

NATO. And perhaps no countries face a graver challenge from the 

renewed aggression of Putin’s Russia. The invasions of Georgia and 

Ukraine have caused many within the Baltics to fear for their own 

sovereignty as Putin attempts to delegitimize states that have a 

large Russian-speaking population. And that is why it is so important that the United States not waiver in our commitment to the 

NATO alliance and to our Baltic friends to ensure that the ties we 

have forged remain strong in the face of increased pressure. 

I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today. And I want 

to apologize in advance, we have a Judiciary Committee markup, 

so I will be in and out. But I’m anxious to hear what we can do 

to reinforce and strengthen our NATO commitments and to continue the strong relationships the United States has built with our 

Baltic friends. I thank you. 

And I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, thank you very much. 

And I would like to thank the witnesses for joining us today. I 

will introduce all of you, and then we will proceed. 

First, we have Paul Goble, who is a long-time expert in minority 

nationalities and the former Soviet Union. He has had a distinguished career working at various times for the United States Government, the State Department, as well as Radio Free Europe. He 

has been honored by the governments of all three Baltic republics 

for his efforts to promote their independence. 

Lisa Sawyer Samp or Sap? 

Ms. SAMP. Samp. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Samp. Okay. A senior fellow in the Internation Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. She is an expert on NATO and European defense 

strategies. And before joining CSIS, she was in a previous role as 

director for NATO and European Strategic Affairs on the National 

Security Council staff. 

We have Matthew Rojansky. He is the director of the Kennan Institute at the Woodrow Wilson Center. He is a leading expert on 

U.S.-Russian relations and an adjunct professor at Johns Hopkins. 

He serves as U.S. executive secretary for the Dartmouth Conference which is a two-track of the Russian-U.S. conflict resolution 

initiative. I hope I got that exactly right, but you get the picture. 

Mr. Edward Lucas is a senior editor for The Economist. And I 

might add, I read that magazine all the time. I think it is, frankly, 

the only magazine I do read all the time. He is a senior vice president at the Center for European Policy Analysis. He has been observing and writing about developments in Eastern Europe and 

that part of the world for over 20 years. 

So we are very pleased to have you and grateful to have you with 

us. So, as I say, if you could proceed with 5-minute opening statements or you could add to that, just for the record, and then we 

will proceed with questions from the members. 

Mr. Goble. 

7

STATEMENT OF MR. PAUL A. GOBLE, PRINCIPAL PROFESSOR, 

THE INSTITUTE OF WORLD POLITICS 

Mr. GOBLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for calling this 

hearing on this most important topic and for giving me an opportunity to appear. 

I would like to dedicate my remarks to the late Aleksander 

Einseln, the Estonian-American colonel, who died about 10 days 

ago, who went to Estonia and became the commander of the Estonian Defence Forces and played a key role in transforming those 

forces into ones that could be integrated into the Western alliance. 

It is an ancient observation that old generals always prepare to 

fight the last war, but we don’t always think about what that 

means. It often means that they look for the same kind of threat 

that happened in the past and try to counter it, or not seeing it, 

decide there isn’t any threat at all, and that they fail to prepare 

for combating new threats, because the means they have adopted 

in the past to counter the threats of the past are no longer the ones 

that are most important. 

I do not believe, as long as Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are 

a members of the western alliance, that any Russian Government 

will send its tanks over the eastern borders of those countries. I 

think that is almost unthinkable because I think it is almost certainly suicidal. 

Having said that, however, I believe there is a very real Russian 

threat that flows both from the purposes that Mr. Putin has announced for his government going back more than a decade and the 

means he has chosen to use to pursue those purposes. 

On the one hand, Mr. Putin has clearly signaled that the three—

that his foreign policy is driven by a desire to challenge the three 

bedrock principles of the international system that the United 

States took the lead in forming in the 20th century. First, the 1919 

settlement that declared that the Arab empires is over. He wants 

to restore one. Second, the settlement of 1945, which held that citizenship is more important than ethnicity. That is what we fought 

World War II about when the Germans thought that ethnicity was 

more important than citizenship. And 1991, when the international 

community accepted the demise of the USSR as something that 

was irreversible. 

But the other aspect of the Russian threat is also serious, and 

that is that Mr. Putin has chosen to use the strategies of subversion rather than the strategies of open force. Far more often we 

have seen actions by the Russian Government that are those of intelligence services rather than those of defense ministries. What 

that means is if you are looking for actions by the military, you 

won’t find them, but if you are looking at what goes on in banks, 

in government offices, in propaganda outlets, they are very much 

there. 

Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have particular reasons for being 

concerned about both Mr. Putin’s goals—if any of those are realized, they would be at risk—and his tactical approach because of 

their size and their propinquity to Russia. We in the United States 

tend to forget how small the Baltic countries are, how much they 

suffered under various aspects of Russian rule, and how much they 

have depended on the United States. 

8

For Putin, those three realities have a contradictory message. On 

the one hand, they mean that Mr. Putin is certainly aware that 

any military move against the Baltic countries would be resisted by 

the United States as part of its NATO alliance and, second, it 

means that Mr. Putin has an interest in challenging the West precisely there as a way of indicating that the West is more of a paper 

tiger than the West believes. 

I believe that what we need to do in order to promote Baltic security has less to do with the expansion of NATO presence there, although I welcome that presence, than it does with doing other 

things. And I would like to suggest three of what would be a very 

large list. 

First, as several of the members have pointed out, we need to encourage all three countries to complete the integration of ethnic minorities in their countries, that the progress that has been made 

is truly amazing. Indeed, last week, it was announced that there 

are 4,000 ethnic Russians in Estonia who now declare that Estonian is their native language, which is—would have been unthinkable a decade ago. That is an impressive achievement. Second, we 

need to promote transparency of all economic and political activities, banking, the communication sector. And, third, we need to involve Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians in as many conversations 

as possible with Russian counterparts. 

There are people in the West who are not interested in pushing 

that, who prefer to see the question of Russian power as being one 

that there is only a military response to. But, in fact, it is in these 

other areas that the fight is going to be won or lost, and, therefore, 

we should be spending far more time developing strategies in those 

areas than in others. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Goble follows:]

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Mr. ROHRABACHER. Ms. Samp, you may go right ahead. 

STATEMENT OF MS. LISA SAWYER SAMP, SENIOR FELLOW, 

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY PROGRAM, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 

Ms. SAMP. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Meeks, and distinguished members of the subcommittee, good afternoon. 

I would like to make just two points regarding the current security situation in the Baltic States. My first point is foundational to 

this discussion. Russia is a threat. Russia is a threat to the Baltic 

States and, more broadly, to the post-World War II international 

order. 

In the Baltics, Russia has conducted cyber attacks, crossborder 

kidnappings, and unannounced snap exercises with up to 80,000 

troops just across the border. It has also violated their sovereign 

airspace, issued hostile statements, and filled their airwaves with 

propaganda. 

For an accurate threat picture, though, this behavior must be 

considered in the context of what Moscow has done and is doing 

beyond the Baltics. In addition to meddling in foreign elections, violating arms control agreements, and nuclear saber rattlings, 

Putin’s bullying has escalated to the use of military force in Georgia, Ukraine, and Syria. 

In Ukraine, he has annexed Crimea and continues to sow instability and violence in the country’s east. Thousands have died and 

over a million have been displayed. Let us also please not forget 

about the 298 civilians who were killed when a Russian-provided 

missile brought down a civilian airliner, or about the thousands of 

civilians killed by indiscriminate Russian bombs in Syria. 

Russia’s actions reflect an effective blending of both conventional 

and unconventional tactics. These tactics are designed to circumvent U.S. and NATO redlines, confuse traditional response options, and use the virtues of the West against it. 

Putin likely doesn’t want a war with the West, but he is finding 

he can get a lot done without one. For that reason, he has no intention of stopping now. He is becoming more emboldened over time 

and growing increasingly comfortable taking risks. What was once 

primarily an eastern-flank challenge is now hitting closer to home. 

Moscow may no longer be motivated by a Communist ideology that 

sees it trying to overthrow democracies and replace them with dictatorships. But that does not mean Russia isn’t still a threat to our 

democracy and our institutions. 

The difference today is that instead of offering an alternative, 

Russia is satisfied to create chaos and sow instability. It wants to 

knock the United States down a peg and break Western unity so 

we can’t call shots Russia doesn’t like or hold it accountable to the 

rule of law. 

The system, though, that Russia is seeking to undermine has 

served the United States well over the past 70 years. And without 

it, the world would undoubtedly be poorer, less free, and less safe. 

Russia may just be looking out for what it considers to be in its 

national interests, but then we need to do the same, and that entails pushing back to protect ourselves, our allies, and the international order. 

14

This brings me to my second point, which is that the steps taken 

by the United States and NATO to bolster security in the region 

are prudent and are what is minimally required. They are neither 

hostile nor provocative. 

While Russia has not resorted to military force in the Baltics, 

and while its ever doing remains extremely unlikely, the possibility 

cannot be discounted completely. To manage this risk, the United 

States and NATO have taken steps, as described in my written testimony, to establish a credible deterrence. Far from being provocative, these steps are designed to prevent war and to make clear the 

costs that would be entailed with any aggression. It may, in fact, 

be more provocative to do nothing. To invite Russian opportunism 

by baiting it would weak defenses. 

While it is important to debate what constitutes credible deterrence and what amounts to unhelpful provocation, one can also err 

in being too cautious, lending credence to Russia’s reflexive protests and false indignation. I would argue there exists a wide gulf 

between the steps that have been taken to date and the steps that 

could be taken in the future to increase the West’s leverage without 

sparking a conflict or even coming close. 

Step back and recall, for example, that despite recent troop increases, the U.S. combat presence in Europe remains a full brigade-strength below what it was in 2012, prior to renewed tensions 

with Russia, and that NATO’s largest exercise conducted since the 

end of the Cold War included about 30,000 troops. By contrast, 

Russia’s Zapad exercise planned for later this year may reach up 

to 200,000. Thus, the idea that holding relatively moderately sized 

exercises on alliance territory constitutes provocation seems wildly 

unfair. 

NATO is also not the ones flying with its transponders off, failing 

to announce exercises in accordance with the Vienna document, 

and buzzing ships in the Black and Baltic Seas. While it is also fair 

to consider the West’s role in contributing to the current standoff 

with Russia, suggesting moral equivalencies or assigning blame 

does not solve the current problem. It neither changes how the 

West or Russia view their security interests nor makes what we 

seek to preserve any less valid. 

To conclude, none of this means we cannot still cooperate with 

Russia where it is in our interest, but rushing to make deals with 

Moscow to secure what would amount to short-term gains may well 

end up sacrificing more fundamental goals. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Samp follows:]

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Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much. 

And, Mr. Rojansky. 

STATEMENT OF MR. MATTHEW ROJANSKY, DIRECTOR, 

KENNAN INSTITUTE, WOODROW WILSON CENTER 

Mr. ROJANSKY. Yes. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. But you need to turn your mike on. 

Mr. ROJANSKY. Right. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Mr. 

Meeks. I am enormously grateful to have this opportunity. And I 

have got to do this, the disclaimer: Personal views only, not those 

of the Wilson Center, which, of course, is a congressionally chartered memorial to President Wilson. So we are very grateful that 

we can fulfill our public interest mission and participate in here. 

You know, I think—I understood your question, Mr. Chairman, 

about Russia’s specific acts rather than just sort of vague general 

ideas of a threat and the reasonableness of American response as 

soliciting an analysis of how the Russians are thinking and why. 

What do they intend, and is there evidence for their intent? 

And so I would like to tackle that problem as directly as I can, 

and I break it down into three parts. Any time that I think about 

a threat, I try to break it down into motive, capability, and opportunity. So those are the three parts I want to tackle in that order. 

In terms of motive, let’s look at what Russia’s actions have been 

against other states to try to discern a motive, vis-a-vis, in particular, its neighborhood or what Russians call the near abroad. 

Generally speaking, Russians do not view other countries in the 

near abroad as fully sovereign. Certainly, not in the way they see 

themselves or the United States. Obviously, we know that President Medvedev talked about a sphere of privileged influence; the 

Russians have supported separatists in Moldova, in Georgia; they 

have invaded Ukraine. This is well known. 

In terms of specific actions against the Baltic States, famously in 

2007, around the Bronze Soldier conflict, they intervened with 

cyber attacks against Estonia. In 2014, they abducted Eston 

Kohver, an Estonian security agent from the border, essentially 

kidnapped him. In Latvia, they have mobilized ethnic Russian voters, stirred up antigovernment sentiment in Latgallia. In Lithuania, they have mounted an information war disparaging living 

standards for Lithuanians and encouraging them to move to 

Kaliningrad, a neighboring exclave of Russia. And, of course, 

there’s been sophisticated social media campaigns backing all of 

these things up. 

Now, what do Russians want in the Baltic States? Basic motivation. Certainly, they fear the American presence there, what it may 

lead to, but they like to maintain, basically, stable political and 

economic ties. Now, much is made of the Russian-speaking population. It is a tricky issue. Who is an ethnic Russian? Who is a Russian speaker? In terms of percentages, we may be dealing with 

somewhere between 30 and 36 percent in Latvia, 25 to 28 percent 

in Estonia, 5 to 8 percent in Lithuania, depending on how you define those numbers. Sometimes they are concentrated, like in 

Narva and eastern Estonia; sometimes they are very well integrated, like in the city of Riga, the capital of Latvia. 

24

Now, Putin talks about the Russian world within which these 

people would certainly be included as being a major priority for 

Russian foreign policy and being the largest diaspora in Europe. He 

claims 25 million Russians left outside the borders of The Russian 

Federation. 

And in 2014, in a speech in Riga, Russia’s commissioner for 

human rights, Konstantin Dolgov, said: It has to be stated with 

sadness that a huge number of our compatriots abroad, whole segments of the Russian world, continue to face serious problems securing their rights and lawful interests. We will not tolerate the 

creeping offensive against the Russian language that we are seeing 

in the Baltics. 

So does Russia intend to use force in the Baltics? Interestingly, 

most Russian sources say, no, they don’t. Dmitri Trenin says Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland are safe, even if they don’t feel 

that way. The Kremlin has no interest in risking nuclear war by 

attacking a member state, and the sphere of Russian control to 

which Putin aspires certainly excludes these countries. 

Now, Russians would have plenty of reasons to make these 

claims, but it may be that they have other motives and intentions 

in being threatening toward the Baltic States, like signaling to 

other post-Soviet countries. In particular, Belarus, Kazakhstan, 

part of the Eurasian core countries on Russia’s borders. And most 

military deployments, if you look at Russian military deployments, 

are about exerting control and dominance over Ukraine. 

Capability—I will keep this very short. Russia’s military capability is stronger than it was, for sure. It comes nowhere close to 

what the United States can feel, much less the NATO alliance. And 

one of the challenges in assessing Russia’s actual capability is the 

bread-and-toast problem, vis-a-vis, Russian troops that are simply 

always going to be in and around St. Petersburg and Kaliningrad 

versus troops that are there for the specific reason of sort of either 

masking or preparing for an attack on the Baltic States. 

But there are other capabilities of concern, nonmilitary capabilities. And, again, this comes back to the issue of Russian speakers. 

Russian television has been called a couch potato’s dream, an attractive, even mesmerizing mix of frothy morning shows, high-decibel discussion shows, tear jerker serials and song contests peppered with news bulletins and current events shows that tow the 

Kremlin line. So you get the idea that Russian broadcasting creates 

a very sophisticated media milieu within which people are persuaded by the Russian world view. 

But be careful not to generalize here. At the end of the day, Russian speakers, ethnic Russians in the Baltic States, they are people. Many of them don’t necessarily like Mr. Putin, many of them 

have no desire to abandon their EU citizenship, which they have, 

thanks to being citizens of the Baltic States, and many of them 

tune out from politics altogether. 

The last point—and I will end quickly here—on opportunity 

there is both good news and bad news. The good news is that Mr. 

Goble is exactly right. The Russians do not seek to provoke a conflict with the nuclear armed alliance in NATO, and as long as the 

Baltic States are NATO members, that is going to be the case. The 

bad news is that a crisis is still absolutely possible. A crisis is posVerDate 0ct 09 2002 12:52 Apr 24, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00028 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 Z:\WORK\_EEET\032217\24752 SHIRL
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sible. Either imagine a scenario within which this ethic Russian or 

Russian language issue is provoked, even completely made up and 

then blown out of proportion by Russian media, there is a firm response from local authorities, and that results in a crisis. And the 

other possible crisis here is a military crisis. This so-called heavy 

metal diplomacy, a Russian aircraft coming close to an American 

ship or another NATO flag vessel. 

So definitely, in terms of motive, capability, and opportunity, we 

are looking at a real threat, a real set of concerns, but it is important to see it in context. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Rojansky follows:]

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Mr. ROHRABACHER. In context. That is good. We will be discussing that as we get into the questions and answers. 

And, finally, Mr. Lucas, you may proceed. 

STATEMENT OF MR. EDWARD LUCAS, SENIOR VICE 

PRESIDENT, CENTER FOR EUROPEAN POLICY ANALYSIS 

Mr. LUCAS. Chairman Rohrabacher, Ranking Member Meeks, 

and distinguished members, it is an honor and privilege to come 

here and give testimony to this committee on this vitally important 

subject. 

I have been dealing with this issue since the early 1980s. My 

message is very straightforward and is contained in my written 

testimony. I will now go on to answer some of the questions that 

have come up in the discussion already. 

Russia is a revisionist power. It doesn’t like the way the world 

is at the moment. It wants to change it. It has the means to do 

this if we don’t keep ourselves united and strong. So far, it is doing 

really well, much better than many people would have suspected. 

If you had been thinking 10, 15 years ago that we would be discussing a threat from Russia of the kind we are discussing now, 

people would have thought that was crazy. It is going to get worse 

before it gets better. 

You mentioned in your opening remarks, Mr. Chairman, that we 

created a hostile military alliance stretching to Russia’s border and 

put troops there, and the Russians don’t like that. I think it is 

worth reminding ourselves why they are there. Why did this 

change? Why has this happened? And, of course, during the 1990s, 

we didn’t have NATO membership for the Baltic States, and we expanded it for a reason. We expanded it because these countries 

were scared, and there was enough going on that they were right 

to be scared. After 2004, many people said, that is it, job done. Russia will not touch a NATO member, and there is no reason to worry 

about it anymore. We had no plans, no contingency plans for defending the Baltic States. We had no troop deployments there. We 

had no exercises there. 

That would have been a stable situation, but Russia provoked, 

undermined, and subverted the Baltic States, notably in the Bronze 

Soldier attack, but in many other things as well. And so after 2008, 

the war in Georgia, President Obama said we need contingency 

plans. We developed a plan, and then we increased them. There 

was a huge jolt which came with the 2009 Zapad exercises, which 

practiced the invasion and occupation of the Baltic States and finished off with a dummy nuclear attack on Warsaw. That was a real 

wake-up call to the West. 

Russia tends to do the things that it rehearses, and everything 

we have done, in a much smaller scale, since then, I think has been 

a response to Russia raising the ante. Russia is testing our will in 

the Baltic States. And the best way of guaranteeing that we keep 

the peace that we have is by responding to that with calmness and 

firmness. 

You asked for specific examples. Well, I think the military exercise and, particularly, terrifying snap exercises, which happen at no 

notice and involve large numbers of troops hurdling toward the 

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haps the biggest example, I would also mention the role of money 

in Baltic politics. And if you read the reports of the Estonian and 

Lithuanian security agencies, which are available on the internet, 

they list in chilling detail the things that Russia is doing inside 

those countries. 

I would also like to respond to the idea that it is a big ask from 

the Baltic States. They want a lot from America. Well, that is true. 

But you are not just defending them, you are defending the whole 

international order. And if you are worried about America’s leadership in the world and you are worried about America’s leadership 

in Asia and you are worried about whether your allies take you seriously, well, the Baltics is high noon. That is where it starts. If 

you can’t defend the Baltic States, your treaty allies, then you have 

no credibility in other parts of the world. So you are defending the 

whole rules-based order, not just the Baltic States. 

And, finally, I would just point out that the Baltic States are not 

just consumers of security; they are also providers. They were 

warning us about this 20 years ago when we weren’t listening. 

They see things that we don’t see. They can go to places that we 

don’t go. They understand things that we don’t understand. And 

we, in my country in Britain, your country in the United States, 

and other NATO allies, we are eagerly and greedily lapping up 

some of this expertise, some of these capabilities they have in 

cyber, in intelligence, and other things, which fill gaps, stuff that 

we neglected, capabilities that we got rid of in the past 20 or 30 

years because we thought we would never need them again. So 

they contribute a lot to us. 

What should we do? Well, first of all, we have got to understand 

that Russia is trying to change the rules and be clear that we want 

to defend that rules-based order. It is worth it. It brings peace, it 

brings prosperity, it brings freedom. It really matters. 

We need to raise the cost to Mr. Putin of his attacks, and I 

strongly endorse the point about raising visa sanctions on the Russian elite. We have no quarrel with the people of Russia. They suffer from this regime just as much as anybody else does, if not more. 

But we should say to those top 1,000, 10,000 people in Russia, if 

you preach anti-Westernism, if you say that the West is decadent, 

the fount of all evil, imperialist, horrible, backward, and so on, 

well, you can’t then expect to launder money in the West. You can’t 

expect to send your kids here to be educated. You can’t send your 

families here for medical treatment. You can’t come here on holiday. We can do that. That is not a quarrel with the Russian people. 

That is targeting the sanctions on the elite. 

And, finally, I think we just need to do a bit more on deterrence. 

What NATO has done in the Baltics is very small. It is 1/10th, 1/

20th of what Russia has done. It is already a game-changer. But 

just having a few more American soldiers in the Baltics would 

make a very big difference, because Russia takes you really seriously. 

And I will finish off by saying, we should look at the Baltic 

States like West Berlin. There are many things in West Berlin we 

didn’t like during the Cold War. I know you, Chairman Rohrabacher, were a regular visitor there, and it was tremendously important symbolically for us. We didn’t try and defend West Berlin 

41

militarily as West Berlin. We didn’t put a Maginot line on West 

Berlin, anymore we should put a Maginot line down the Baltics. 

We said, this is where it stops. This is the furthest outpost of the 

West. And by defending West Berlin, we defend every member of 

the Western alliance, and we should look at the Baltic States in the 

same way. 

Thank you, sir. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Lucas follows:]

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Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, thank you very much. 

And I see we are on our own. 

Mr. MEEKS. Me and you, baby. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. And me and you, baby. 

Let me start out by saying that I apologize that this is not a balanced panel. You all have basically the same message, and we 

should have had at least one person to present the other perspective, and we did not. And I am concerned about that. 

Well, I am here. There is only so much as to what I can do on 

my own. Okay. 

Let me first apologize about that, because I don’t believe this is 

a balanced panel. I mean, I just have to say, you all are intellectuals. You all are good sources of information, but we need to juxtapose your arguments with someone else, and we didn’t do it, and 

so we failed. 

And maybe we will have another hearing where the points that 

you have made, you could have two or three here, and maybe someone on the other side who could refute some of the points that have 

been made. 

So with that said, let me just go into some questions that will 

be provocative questions, anyway. 

I did ask for a specific military aggression and acts. I didn’t seem 

to get any, frankly. I hear about the amassing of 300,000 troops in 

Russian territory, in Russia, is an act of an aggression against 

their neighboring countries. But amassing NATO troops and tanks 

in their neighboring countries, on their border is not an aggression. 

Talk about a double standard. I would think that that is a major 

double standard. 

I will have to say that when my friend, my fellow journalist, a 

former journalist as I am, that I believe that the idea of declaring 

the Baltics like to be similar to Berlin demonstrates a basic 

perceptional problem of why we are heading in the wrong direction. 

The Cold War is over. As long as we are thinking about Russia as 

it was during that time period, and others, and Berlin, West Berlin, as being threatened, as it was at that time, in a government 

that was controlled by the Communist Party, that was an ideological-based party that wanted to create Marxist, atheist dictatorships throughout the world, replace democracies with Marxist dictatorships. That is not the world we live in today, and it is not the 

Russia. Russia is different than what it was. 

Now, how different? Let me just ask for some specific things in 

the Baltics. I know there was a cyber attack, which someone 

brought up; I would like to ask about that cyber attack in Estonia, 

if you know about this. I am sure you all should. There was a cyber 

attack when the Russians and the Estonians got into a personality 

match when the Estonians said, we are going to take down the 

statue that is dedicated to the Russian soldiers who gave their lives 

in liberating the Baltics from the Nazis. And at that point, there 

was a massive cyber attack, which really was very extensive, and 

it was a heavy duty attack by Russia on Estonia. 

How long ago did that happen? When was it? What year was 

that? When was it? 

Mr. LUCAS. 2007, sir. 

55

Mr. ROHRABACHER. 2007. And since that time, have there been 

any attacks of that magnitude in the Baltics? Any other attacks 

since 2007? 

Now, I will tell you, we have heard over and over and over again 

about the incredible cyber attacks, and that was 2007. I am not excusing the fact somebody is insulting. France insulted us a number 

of times, and we didn’t get so angry at them that we punished 

them. There are all sorts of stories about that. 

We are talking that their 300,000 troops are a threat, but our 

NATO 30,000 aren’t. Is the panel aware that we are part of those 

NATO exercises and there has been a number of them now. Part 

of that has been B-52 flights headed from England and then turning around at the Russian border? Does anyone here not considered 

that a provocative act? 

Ms. SAMP. I do not. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. You do not. Okay. So you think a nuclear 

weapons delivery system aimed at the heart of Russia and then 

turning around right on the border is not hostile and provocative? 

Ms. SAMP. It might be if they weren’t doing the same thing to 

us. They are flying bear and blackjack bombers off the coast of 

Alaska around the outer edges of Europe. So the flights are a 

wash——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. It is not the same. Let me just note. What 

you are saying is ridiculous. It is not the same as aiming a flight 

of bombers into the capital areas, meaning St. Petersburg in Moscow, versus flying along a coast. Everybody has a right to fly along 

someone’s coast. Now, let me ask you this: Are there also ships as 

part of those exercises that we had or do we have any nuclear 

weapons capability of carrying ships that were part of that? Any 

of you know that? Well, yes, there were. 

Tell me, if we actually are bringing nuclear weapons delivery 

systems to the Russian border, you don’t believe that is provocative. Does anyone else here agree with that? 

Yes, go right ahead. 

Mr. LUCAS. Sir, can I respond to that? I think one has to look 

at this in over a period of, say, 10 years, say we start in 2004, 

when we have expanded NATO and we have built quite good relations with Russia through the NATO-Russia Founding Act and the 

NATO-Russia Council. Things have deteriorated since then. But in 

each case, the deterioration started with actions on the Russian 

side, and we followed by much smaller actions on ours. 

Now, you mentioned nuclear weapons, and it is an extremely important point. Russia has a very large arsenal of so-called tactical 

nuclear weapons, and these are integrated into its military doctrine 

and integrated into its exercises. And they practice getting these 

nuclear artillery shells, depth charges, short-range weapons out of 

the bunkers onto delivery systems. And they do this again and 

again and again. 

We in the West have almost given up on tactical nuclear arms. 

We have very few. Those that we have are kept a very long way 

away from the Baltic States, chiefly in bunkers in the Netherlands. 

Our exercises do not involve their use. 

It is a specific part of Russian military doctrine to do what they 

call escalate to de-escalate, which means if they think they are losVerDate 0ct 09 2002 12:52 Apr 24, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00059 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 Z:\WORK\_EEET\032217\24752 SHIRL
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ing a conventional war, they will go nuclear. They make no secret 

about that. And they talk about these nuclear weapons all the time 

in a way that the neighbors find terrifying, not just the NATO 

members. They say this to the Finns and to the Swedes. 

You mentioned B-52 flights. I don’t know if you are aware of 

what happened on Good Friday 2014, I think it was, when a Russian flight carried out a dummy attack on Stockholm and on another very important military target in Sweden at a time when the 

Swedish Air Force had taken the weekend off because it was 

Easter. They had to scramble Danish fighters from Lithuania to 

intercept these Russians. 

In my country——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. So the Russian——

Mr. LUCAS. May I just finish? 

Mr. ROHRABACHER [continuing]. In the incident you are describing, did they actually penetrate——

Mr. LUCAS. No. They turned around at the last minute. And we 

also had a similar event in—and if you penetrate someone——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. So they turned around at the last moment. 

You remember that, and you condemn that, but you don’t condemn 

U.S. B-52 bombers and nuclear weapons carrying ships going right 

to the Russian border? 

Mr. LUCAS. Understand that the Russians are trying to make us 

think that we have no nuclear deterrence. And they have said, and 

they say privately and publicly, they don’t believe that NATO deterrence works. And so long as NATO is a nuclear alliance, we 

have to show that we are nuclear capable. Now, we have many 

gaps on the escalation——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Sir, I just have to tell you that I believe it 

demonstrates a double standard that will give the Russians a message that we are judging our behavior differently than we are judging yours. 

Mr. LUCAS. Can I respond to that, sir? 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Yes. Okay. I am sorry we don’t have other 

witnesses here to make these points, and I am going to have to 

give it to him. But I will let you answer that, and then we have 

to go on——

Mr. LUCAS. I just want to respond to your point about West Berlin, sir. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Yes. 

Mr. LUCAS. You said the Cold War is over. It is true, the old Cold 

War is over. But as I said in my opening remarks, Russia is trying 

to change the rules. Russia doesn’t like the way the world operates 

at the moment. It doesn’t like American leadership. It doesn’t like 

the Atlantic alliance. It doesn’t like multilateral rules-based organizations by the EU, and that is a threat. It is not the same as the 

Soviet Union. It is much weaker. But the symbolic bastion of the 

West is the Baltic States, because they are militarily vulnerable. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. 

Mr. LUCAS. And in that sense, I think it is very similar to West 

Berlin. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, let me just note that Great Britain 

seems not to like the EU either. Do they? Great Britain decided 

they might not like that as well. 

57

And, yeah, the institutions that were created during the Cold 

War are beginning to, not evaporate, but to readjust, and some of 

them will disappear, some of them will remain strong, but this isn’t 

the Cold War. 

Let me just remind you, you are looking at the ultimate cold warrior here. I mean, this is not some guy who, you know, did not believe we should confront the Soviet Union. And I was deeply involved with that for 20 years of my life, actually, 30 years of my 

life. 

Well, anyway, we will have a second round of questions, even 

though it is just the two of us. 

Mr. ROJANSKY. Mr. Chairman, would it be possible before you 

move on to just add something on the——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. With permission from my——

Mr. MEEKS. Yeah. I was going to give you—okay. 

Mr. ROJANSKY. I appreciate that. I just feel badly, because I 

think I was invited to try to elucidate Russian thinking and the 

conclusion of much of my research into Russian analysis and the 

statements of Russian leaders and the disposition of Russian forces 

has been that while there are real causes for concern—and that is 

why I broke it into that three-part analysis of motive, capability, 

and opportunity—that, nonetheless, we are not facing an acute, immediate Russian military threat to the Baltic States. And there are 

two principal reasons for that on the military side, speaking about 

nuclear deterrence. 

One is that nuclear deterrence works. And the Russian sources 

I looked at were very clear that that is a big part of the reason why 

they wouldn’t, under any circumstances, so assume plenty of other 

motives, potentially, to intervene in the Baltic States. The fact that 

you are talking about intervening against members of a nuclear 

armed alliance makes that—I mean, the Russian sources are very 

clear, they have no desire to provoke that, and there are certainly 

plenty of others targets that would be more desirable. 

The second issue, and I made this point very quickly before, and 

I do encourage you to take a look at my written remarks as well, 

is this issue of disposition of location, that even if kind of politically 

and psychologically the Baltic States may have a similar resonance 

to West Berlin today, they are in a different spot on the map. They 

are just a couple of 100 kilometers away from St. Petersburg. They 

are, in the case of Lithuania, actually bordering on Kaliningrad on 

a heavily militarized Russian exclave. 

And so what that means is, there is a certain amount of Russian 

military activity we are just going to see. We are going to keep seeing it, and it is sort of normal that we would see it, because that 

is where Russia’s population is and that is where their assets are. 

So I think that is why in terms of context, I think it is very important that we interpret Russia’s actions and threats, not with 

charity, but in the context in which they are actually taking place 

and not in a sort of fear-laden fever dream kind of politicized context. That would be my only——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. And, Mr. Meeks. Thank you very much for 

that. 

Mr. MEEKS. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. And let me say, Mr. Chairman, I am sure the committee would love to have maybe General 

58

Flynn or Paul Manafort come to testify, because they will have the 

opposite—you know, they will—hear their point of view. They may 

be great witnesses. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. Go right ahead. 

Mr. MEEKS. Well, let me jump into this, because—and maybe I 

will ask Ms. Stamp, because we started and we were talking about 

that, because over the past 2 decades, since the end of the Cold 

War, you know, we talk about what we are doing or what—NATO 

is there, but the Russians have also engaged in exercises and have 

often quadrupled, is that not correct, the size of the NATO forces 

in the region? In fact, a lot of the Russian exercises have—you 

know, you have seen over 100,000 troops. And NATO, our Baltic 

allies have been—you know, they have been talking and telling us 

this for years, that it is not just something happening on one side, 

but there is a threat that they see right across the border, 100,000 

troops unannounced. You know, they do this unannounced. 

So my first question is, actually, has the U.S. military presence 

in Europe increased or decreased since the end of the Cold War? 

Two, is the post-Wales response enough? And what happens or 

what do you see with reference to the comparison of the exercises 

that the Russians have been going on for the last few years? 

Ms. SAMP. Sir, thank you for that question. I would describe the 

scale of Russian activities as an order of magnitude greater, that 

is ten times greater than anything that NATO and the U.S. is 

doing. The size of the U.S. presence in Europe since the end of the 

Cold War has decreased dramatically. At its height, it was about 

350,000 troops. That would have been in the late 1980s. We are 

now at about 62,000 troops. With the rotational forces that we have 

put in since 2014, that number has risen by about 6,000 rotational, 

nonpermanent forces. 

And is it enough? I would argue there is more to do. I think we 

should seriously consider having at least as many troops in Europe 

now as we did in 2012. 

Mr. MEEKS. Does anybody disagree, agree? Mr. Goble? 

Mr. GOBLE. I would—Congressman, I would like to come at this 

in a slightly different way that I think speaks to that. I think we 

are wrong to both operate on a model that the Cold War has been 

restored and that the Cold War is over. The one implies that we 

are going back to a status quo ante of 1991, and therefore, we need 

to respond as we did then. The other is to imply that when you 

don’t have a Cold War, the only possible default setting is cooperation, peace, happiness, and niceness with people. History suggests 

otherwise. There are competitions between countries. 

I have tried to say in my testimony, perhaps not very well, I 

tried—it is clear in my written remarks, I think this is—that we 

need to address what Russia is doing less in terms of a military 

threat than in terms of the other kinds of threats it poses: Using 

subversive measures, using massive amounts of money. I would be 

far happier to learn that we were investing in more cyber attacks—

counter cyber attack centers, that we were investing in more transparency in banking systems, especially, I would say, in the three 

Baltic countries, in Latvia, where the banks have been used as a 

major money laundering enterprise for Russian oligarchs, than to 

59

talk immediately about more troops anywhere. That is what I believe. 

Mr. MEEKS. Let me ask this question, because I think in your 

written testimony, you do talk about the fact that you think the 

lines of communication between the Kremlin and the Baltic States 

should increase or they should be there. 

Mr. GOBLE. Absolutely. 

Mr. MEEKS. Now, given the subversions that you are saying is 

taking place, and given that, you know, we are seeing it and feeling 

it, you know, from the hearings we just had right here in the 

United States——

Mr. GOBLE. Right. 

Mr. MEEKS [continuing]. As to some things with reference to 

Russia trying to get involved in our politics and democracy, do you 

think that, you know, that the suppression that Mr. Putin obviously has at home against the media, et cetera, and then the subversion that he is trying to do in other countries, will that ever 

change under Mr. Putin’s leadership? 

Mr. GOBLE. Congressman, the good news is Vladimir Putin will 

not live forever. That is the really best news I can tell you from 

this region. Moreover, Mr. Putin has changed his own approach domestically and in foreign policy terms several times since he came 

to—he was installed in power at the end of 1999. 

Encouraging conversations has at least three effects, all of which 

are positive: First, if the Baltic countries show themselves willing 

to have such conversations and the Russians refuse to do so, the 

onus of not talking is clearly demonstrated; second, the notion that 

people in the Baltic countries are interested in talking—in having 

conversations with their Russian counterparts can be an important 

conduit of information and influence into the Russian Federation; 

and third, and this week—you know, this is something when I was 

working on Baltic affairs at the State Department 25 years ago, 

while the President of Estonia at one point famously said he would 

rather have Canada for a neighbor and that he wished there was 

a very large ocean between himself and the Russian Federation, 

the reality is that Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are going to be 

Russia’s neighbors for a very long time. 

Now, one would like that relationship to be such that Estonians, 

Latvians, and Lithuanians will make the choices about what they 

will do rather than those choices being made in Moscow. And that 

is what this is about. But the best way to do that, in my mind, as 

I said in my written testimony, is for us to be promoting those 

kinds of transparency changes domestically that limit the ability of 

Moscow to engage in the subversive activities which it has been 

doing consistently since 1991. 

Mr. MEEKS. Let me do this. We have a vote that is up, and I 

know my colleague may have a question. And I did want to ask Mr. 

Lucas one other question. I think that the chairman had made a 

statement, and it is important for me to know also. 

The benefits, you know, can you tell us a little bit what the benefits have been for the Baltic States to continue to be in the EU 

membership? And has the EU supported their liberty and independence in face of the aggression of Russia? And is there any difference—you know, and I think you being—you know, Mr. RohrVerDate 0ct 09 2002 12:52 Apr 24, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00063 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 Z:\WORK\_EEET\032217\24752 SHIRL
60

abacher indicated because of your accent, of course, and England, 

is there any difference of what you see the difference now with 

Brexit and NATO and the EU, and your opinion on that? 

Mr. LUCAS. Thank you for the question. I am strongly against 

Brexit and I think it was a bad mistake by my country, but the 

position of the Baltic States is very different. There is overwhelming support for the EU in all three countries, and the benefits have been colossal, chiefly in the integration into decisionmaking, because in this rules-based format, small countries get a 

voice. This is not the Europe of the 19th century where the big 

countries do the deals that they can and the small countries accept 

the outcomes that they must. 

We have people in the Baltic States in really senior positions, 

and making a difference, in the EU’s decisionmaking. Very large 

sums of money have flown into the Baltic States, and the infrastructure has been transformed by EU money. The people in the 

Baltic States have the right to live and work and travel all through 

the European Union as European EU citizens. This is extremely 

popular in the Baltic States. And I think one shouldn’t read too 

into British thing wnhich is very specific and very, very different. 

I just wanted to relate to one other point. You were asking about 

why there are no examples of military aggression in the Baltic 

States. Well, that is because NATO works, Chairman Rohrabacher. 

And if there had been military aggression in the Baltic States since 

2004, we would have responded in military terms and——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Excuse me. Can you repeat that? 

Mr. LUCAS. Sir, I was just saying you were asking why there 

were no examples of military aggression in the Baltic States. That 

is because NATO works. You know, Russia tries other stuff, and 

my fellow panelists referred to some of the examples, and I could 

give many more. But we have drawn a red line in the Baltics, and 

that is a good thing, and everybody is therefore better off as a result, not least the Russians. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much. 

We didn’t have a big enough panel here. We didn’t have anybody 

on the panel here to offer the other arguments. I am just going to 

have a very short closing statement and then I am going to have 

to run off and vote. We have a vote on right now. I am sorry we 

couldn’t let this go on for another 1⁄2 hour and have a better exchange. 

Look, I fought in Afghanistan against Russian troops. All right? 

I was a speech writer for President Reagan for 71⁄2 years. One of 

the things my friend quoted was something I had worked on with 

President Reagan. 

Let me note, I just think there is a mind-set, and it is represented right here on the panel. I am sorry, I am going to be very 

frank with you, that we are dealing with the Soviet Union now, except maybe for the gentleman on the end, but this is not the threat 

that we faced. If the Russians were doing to us, what we are doing 

to them. Our manned bombers heading straight into Moscow and 

St. Petersburg. No, it is not justified. It is provocative and it is hostile. 

And the fact is that our Baltic friends, they don’t even feel 

threatened enough to spend money for their own defense. So what 

61

does that tell you? That tells you that we have got people here, as 

well as there, that have a motive, in that they hate the Russians. 

All right? Not all the Baltic people hate the Russians, but there is 

hatred there for a just reason. 

While the Russians controlled the Baltics, they murdered millions of people. And Russians were in Eastern Europe, and they 

murdered millions of people. And, yes, that is because they were 

there when it was communism. It was communism that motivated 

that occupation. It was communism that motivated Russians to go 

in different places in the world to try to supplant democratic governments with atheist dictatorships. It was communism; it wasn’t 

the Russian people. And I will just have to say that the current 

Russian Government is flawed dramatically, we all know that, but 

it is not the Communist government that existed before. 

Just this thing, I guess there was no other major cyber attacks 

that basically were able to cripple a country, except for the one in 

Estonia. I asked that. So I guess, as far back as 2007, we are going 

to start using that as an example of hostility today. The people in 

the Baltics don’t think they are under military threat, because they 

don’t even spend their own allocation for their own defense. 

And, finally, let me just say that when I look at Russia, I would 

hope that we do not judge other countries differently than we judge 

our own. And I will have to say that the United States has military 

forces all over the world today, and in some cases we are places 

that we shouldn’t be. And sometimes it is greatly important for our 

national security, but the idea that when a Russian spy ship comes 

down our coast, that we all go crazy about it and start saying this 

is provocative, which is what I heard in the news, but it doesn’t 

make any difference about us having our warships, some of which 

can carry nuclear warheads, right up next to the Russian coast. 

These double standards, we got. All I am saying is let’s build a 

more peaceful world by at least dealing with the people who control 

Russia today, and try to reach an understanding, what is in your 

interest and what is in our interest. And today, we are acting in 

a very belligerent way as if, no, no, you don’t have the right to do 

things in your own interest and to have a military exercise in your 

own country. We are comparing us having nuclear weapons delivery systems and thousands of troops right on the Russian border, 

we are saying, well, no, that is not aggression, but 300,000 troops 

inside Russia itself, its own country, that is aggression? This is 

nonsense, and we have got to, if we are going to have peace in this 

world, be realistic and we have to say to ourselves, how do we do 

this? 

And it is not giving up territory. Nobody is talking about giving 

up the Baltics. But let’s not say over and over again, which I have 

heard, the Russian aggression in the Baltics. I have heard that expression, military aggression in the Baltics, dozens, if not 30 or 40 

times used to justify a hostile foreign policy toward Russia. And I 

will tell you, nothing that I have heard today justifies that phrase 

being used: Russian military aggression in the Baltics. 

So with that said, I want to thank our panel. I am sorry that I 

was able to do this tirade at the end. I really wanted it to be an 

exchange where you could refute me, and back and forth, because 

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that is what we are supposed to have here, but I have to go vote 

and my friend has to go vote as well. 

I want to thank you very much. And thank you for putting up 

with me venting at the very last minute without your chance to retort. But if you would like to put in the record a retort, we will do 

it. Okay? Thank you all very much. 

[Whereupon, at 3:20 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY THE HONORABLE DANA ROHRABACHER, A

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