J-A02009-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

AARON ERNEST JOHNSON 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 67 WDA 2022

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered August 26, 2020

In the Court of Common Pleas of Clarion County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-16-CR-0000168-2019

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

AARON ERNEST JOHNSON 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 68 WDA 2022

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered August 26, 2020

In the Court of Common Pleas of Clarion County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-16-CR-0000169-2019

BEFORE: BOWES, J., MURRAY, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED: JUNE 6, 2023

Aaron Ernest Johnson appeals from his aggregate judgment of sentence 

of thirty-eight years and four months to seventy-six years and eight months 

of incarceration imposed after a jury convicted him of, inter alia, drug delivery

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*

 Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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resulting in death, corrupt organizations, and conspiracy—delivery of a 

controlled substance. We affirm. 

We glean the following factual history of this case from the certified 

record.1 William Stout (“Decedent”) suffered from a heroin addiction. Sadly, 

but all too unsurprisingly, his addiction led to criminal activity and 

incarceration followed by struggles with recovery. In 2018, Decedent was on 

state parole. After Tanya Brooks, his paramour and one-time fiancé, gave 

him an ultimatum about staying clean, Decedent moved into an apartment 

above the stand-alone garage at the home of Ms. Brooks’s parents. As 

Ms. Brooks lived with her parents, this proximity was designed to allow the 

couple to “reestablish trust and boundaries.” N.T. Trial, 7/29/20, at 61. 

Decedent’s normal routine was to go to his job at Commodore Homes, return

to the apartment, eat, shower, and then spend the evening on the couch 

____________________________________________

1 We note with displeasure that the factual recitation in Appellant’s brief is

blatantly biased and rife with argument in contravention of Pa.R.A.P. 2117(b) 

(“The statement of the case shall not contain any argument. It is the 

responsibility of appellant to present in the statement of the case a balanced 

presentation of the history of the proceedings and the respective contentions 

of the parties.”). Counsel’s duty to zealously represent his client does not 

supersede his obligation to abide by procedural rules. While we decline to 

penalize Appellant for counsel’s failure to comply with Rule 2117, we admonish 

counsel that overzealous advocacy risks prejudicing a client rather than

advancing his interests. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Rodgers, 605 A.2d 

1228, 1233 (Pa.Super. 1992) (declining to punish the appellant for counsel’s 

“blatantly partisan” statement of the case, but observing that, “[w]hen the 

circumstances warrant it, we will not hesitate either to quash an appeal or to 

remand for preparation of a new brief”). 
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watching television or to come into the house to see what the family was 

doing. Id. at 69-70. 

On the morning of November 19, 2018, Decedent called his co-worker,

Spencer Rudolph, at 6:39 a.m. before clocking in at work at 6:53 a.m. Id. at 

179. Rudolph, who had clocked in at 6:46, met Decedent in the workplace 

bathroom before their 7:00 shifts and sold Decedent five stamp bags of 

heroin. Id. at 184. Decedent clocked out of work at 4:37 p.m. and parked 

his truck outside his apartment. Id. at 68-71, 178. At approximately 5:15, 

Decedent came into the house to speak with Ms. Brooks about Thanksgiving, 

exhibiting no signs of being under the influence of drugs. Id. at 70, 84. Since

she was rushing to get her son to basketball practice, she told Decedent that 

she would stop by the apartment later to talk about it. Id. at 66. As she was 

leaving, Ms. Brooks saw Decedent’s parked truck outside and could see him 

sitting on the couch through the open shade of his apartment’s window. 

When Ms. Brooks did not feel well that evening, she texted Decedent at 

9:32 p.m. to let him know that she was not going to come visit him after all. 

Decedent did not respond to that message or two others she sent between 

then and 11:27 p.m. Ms. Brooks looked out her window several times that 

night and saw that the light was still on, but did not see Decedent in the 

window, so she supposed he fell asleep on the couch. Id. at 72-75. Neither 

Ms. Brooks nor her father saw anyone come or go from Decedent’s apartment 

that night. Id. at 75, 97-98.
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The next morning, Decedent’s truck was still parked in his spot when he 

should have been at work. Ms. Brooks went upstairs to the apartment where 

the shade was still open, the television was on, and water was running in the 

bathtub.

2

 Upon entering the bathroom, she discovered Decedent naked in the 

bathtub. He was dead. Id. at 78. The police were summoned and found no 

obvious cause of death and no drugs in the apartment aside from a 

prescription for Gabapentin. Id. at 133. Nor were any text or voicemail

messages concerning drugs found on his phone. Id. at 165. Accordingly, the 

police did not begin a criminal investigation until a toxicology report revealed 

on January 28, 2019, that Decedent had died from a fentanyl overdose.3 Id. 

at 107-09, 162-63. 

Clarion County Police Chief William Peck, who was in charge of the local 

drug task force, reexamined Decedent’s contacts in his cell phone. The name 

“Spencer,” which the phone indicated Decedent had called the day before he 

was found dead, overlapped with a tip Chief Peck had received a few days 

prior. Chief Peck had noted Rudolph’s name and number on a scrap of paper 

as an individual reportedly selling heroin in Shippenville. Id. at 166-67. Chief 

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2 Water bills for the apartment during Decedent’s residence revealed typical 

usage of around 1,000 to 1,200 gallons per month. During the billing period 

that had just begun on November 14, 2018, the usage was 3,000 gallons. The 

next bill was zero. See N.T. Trial, 7/29/20, at 264-65. 

3 Decedent had not filled any prescriptions for fentanyl in 2018. See N.T. 

Trial, 7/30/20, at 71. 
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Peck thus focused the investigation on Rudolph, engaging in surveillance, 

conducting a controlled buy, and ultimately executing a search warrant at 

Rudolph’s residence on February 13, 2019. Id. at 169. 

At a subsequent interview, Rudolph, himself addicted to opiates,

ultimately admitted to selling the heroin to Decedent on Monday, 

November 19, 2018. Id. at 184; N.T. Trial, 7/30/20, at 89. Rudolph indicated 

that he had obtained the plain, unmarked stamp bags that he sold to Decedent

from Joseph Hoffman in Brockway, Jefferson County, two days prior, on 

Saturday, November 17, 2018. See N.T. Trial, 7/29/20, at 185. Video 

footage later obtained from the Sheetz in Brockway confirmed this exchange. 

Id. at 186-92. Rudolph stated, and Decedent’s phone log corroborated, that 

he had called Decedent on his way back to Clarion County with the drugs. Id. 

at 193-94. 

Rudolph further explained that, when Hoffman himself had been 

arrested and jailed, Hoffman’s supplier, William Fourness of Elk County,

contacted Rudolph to suggest that Rudolph begin obtaining the drugs directly 

from Fourness. Id. at 175, 205. Rudolph, representing that he could obtain 

more heroin from Fourness, agreed to assist the police in setting up a “buybust” using Rudolph’s phone, which resulted in the procurement of heroin 

containing fentanyl. Id. at 199-209. Chief Peck learned that the Pennsylvania 

State Police had also obtained fentanyl-laced heroin from Fourness in a 

controlled buy that occurred on November 20, 2018. Id. at 209.
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When interviewed by Chief Peck, Fourness identified Appellant as his 

heroin supplier. Id. at 210-13. Fourness became connected with Appellant 

in the late summer of 2018. While Fourness briefly used a different dealer in 

October, by November Appellant was his exclusive source of heroin. See N.T. 

Trial, 7/30/20, at 113, 141-43. Fourness indicated that the exclusivity was 

reciprocal: “Me and my wife and [Appellant] all came to an agreement that 

as long as I maintain my business as I did and continue to bring [Appellant] 

money as I did, that he would not give [to] anybody besides us.” Id. at 155.

The criminal enterprise was as follows. While Fourness sometimes 

personally met with Appellant to obtain the drugs, in most instances he 

arranged for others to retrieve the contraband from Appellant in Monroeville, 

outside Pittsburgh in Allegheny County. Id. at 114. Fourness utilized the 

services of drug users who were willing to work for drugs and a small amount 

of cash. He would also supply them drugs on consignment to sell to third 

parties and return a percentage of the proceeds. Id. at 118-20. 

Fourness did not want his dealers to know how to contact Appellant 

directly, as they might decide to cut out Fourness as the middleman. Id. at 

118. Instead, only he would call, text, or Facetime Appellant to arrange the 

place for the delivery. Once Fourness’s runners were at the set location, 

Fourness would advise Appellant they were there and what they were driving. 

Id. at 116. Sometimes the runners would pay Appellant for the drugs, other 
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times Fourness would wire the money to Appellant through Western Union.4 

Id. at 125. Hoffman was Fourness’s initial choice to meet with Appellant in 

Monroeville, doing so on about a dozen occasions before Hoffman was 

arrested. After Hoffman was arrested, a mutual friend suggested Rudolph as 

a replacement, who made the trip approximately six times. Id. at 121-22. 

When Rudolph was unavailable, he utilized Ryan Gleixner “to help me continue 

my day-to-day operations.” Id. at 124. 

Chief Peck also went to the Elk County Jail to interview Hoffman. See 

N.T. Trial, 7/29/20, at 216. Hoffman confirmed Fourness’s description of the 

workings of the operation. Namely, the arrangement was that Fourness would 

send him to meet Appellant, whom he knew only as “Smooth,” in Monroeville. 

Hoffman would then drive the drugs back to Fourness in Elk County. See id. 

at 216-17; N.T. Trial, 7/30/20, at 168-71. 

Hoffman had been arrested on November 24, 2018, when he was found 

unconscious in his car while it was parked in a public parking lot, still running. 

See N.T. Trial, 7/30/20, at 168-71. Hoffman’s car contained packets of 

fentanyl that Hoffman had obtained for Fourness from Appellant at a Sheetz 

in Monroeville on November 21, 2018. Id. at 174-76. Police were able to 

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4 The police subpoenaed Western Union and obtained a record of a $4,000 

transfer from Fourness at a Rite Aid store in Elk County to Appellant at a 

Giant Eagle store in Allegheny County in January 2019. The documentation 

supplied Appellant’s full name, date of birth, and driver’s license number. See 

N.T. Trial, 7/29/20, at 209-15; Commonwealth’s Exhibit 27. 
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retrieve footage from security cameras to confirm this meeting. Id. at 170-

71. Hoffman further indicated that, on November 17, 2018, he had procured 

heroin from Appellant and sold it to Rudolph.

5

 Id. at 182. 

Gleixner also confirmed his role in the operation, i.e., getting money 

from Fourness to buy drugs from Appellant in Monroeville, usually at the 

Sheetz, taking them back to Fourness, and being permitted to keep some for 

his own use.6 Id. at 203-04. One time, Appellant met Gleixner at the Sheetz 

but had him follow Appellant back to his house a few miles away to retrieve 

the drugs from the basement. Id. at 206. Ultimately, Gleixner cooperated 

with the police by directing Chief Peck and a state trooper to Appellant’s house 

at 331 Noel Drive. Id. at 210; N.T. Trial. 7/29/20, at 230.

Chief Peck worked with the Monroeville police to conduct surveillance of 

that residence in the beginning of March 2019. Appellant utilized two vehicles 

to come and go from the residence, a Jeep that was registered to Appellant, 

depicted in the Sheetz video, and was described by the runners, and also a 

black BMW. See N.T. Trial, 7/31/20, at 22. Appellant was observed coming 

and going to 331 Noel Drive but spent nights at a halfway house. See N.T. 

Trial. 7/29/20, at 234-37. An examination of the residence’s curbside trash 

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5 The video footage from that date was not available.

6 Gleixner indicated that he suffered from severe neuropathy and turned to 

illegal narcotics when his providers cut back on his pain medication. See N.T. 

Trial, 7/30/20, at 209. 
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revealed evidence of drug packaging, and a stop of a third party’s vehicle that 

had just left the residence resulted in the seizure of a stamp bag of suspected 

contraband. See N.T. Trial, 7/31/20, at 6, 12. Armed with this information, 

Chief Peck and a state trooper decided to apply for a search warrant for 331 

Noel Drive. Chief Peck issued instructions that if Appellant left the residence 

in the meantime, he was to be detained. See N.T. Trial, 7/29/20, at 239. 

Timothy Smith was another third party who purchased stamp bags for 

his personal use from Appellant in Monroeville, including on March 12, 2019. 

See N.T. Trial, 7/30/20, at 224-28. On that date, Appellant asked Mr. Smith 

if he could give him a ride, and Mr. Smith obliged. Id. at 227-28. Mr. Smith

pulled up in front of 331 Noel Drive in his Toyota, Appellant got into the front 

passenger seat, and before they travelled very far, multiple police cars 

stopped them and arrested Appellant. Id. The police recovered a bag of 

heroin from the floor of Mr. Smith’s vehicle between Appellant’s feet. See

N.T. Preliminary Hearing, 4/9/19, at 43-44, 57.

Chief Peck then participated in executing the search warrant of the 

residence. Police found indicia that Appellant resided at 331 Noel Drive, 

including mail addressed to him there and a photograph of him and his 

girlfriend, Wakita Owens. See N.T. Trial, 7/29/20, at 245. Ms. Owens showed 

Chief Peck a link to an article about Fourness’s arrest in the buy-bust that 

Appellant had sent to her through Facebook Messenger with the comment: 

“This is my people that got set up[.]” Id. at 247; Commonwealth’s Exhibit 
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50. Among the items seized were a money counter, cutting agents, packaging 

materials for stamp bags, and drugs, including fentanyl, in the basement, an 

office, and a bedroom. Id. at 241-44; N.T. Trial, 7/31/20, at 32-33. All told, 

there was enough drugs for 900 stamp bags. See N.T. Trial, 7/31/20, at 34. 

Both of the above-captioned cases were then filed in Clarion County. At 

CP-16-CR-0000168-2019 (“Case 168”), Appellant was charged with, inter alia, 

drug delivery resulting in death, corrupt organizations, conspiracy—corrupt 

organizations, criminal use of communications facility, and multiple counts of 

delivery of a controlled substance occurring in November 2018. At CP-16-CR0000169-2019 (“Case 169”), Appellant was charged with multiple counts of 

possession with intent to deliver (“PWID”), possession of drug paraphernalia, 

driving with a suspended license, and conspiracy—PWID with Ms. Owens as 

the alleged coconspirator, in connection with the events of March 2019. 

Appellant was initially represented by the Clarion County Public 

Defender’s office, but counsel withdrew due to a conflict of interest and 

Michael Marshall, Esquire, was appointed in his stead. On June 21, 2019, 

Attorney Marshall filed a pretrial motion in Case 169, seeking: (1) to dismiss 

the charges for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because none of the March 

2019 acts that formed the basis for the charges occurred in Clarion County; 

and (2) to suppress all of the evidence obtained from the warrantless stop and 

search of Smith’s Toyota, as well as from the execution of the warrant at 331 

Noel Drive. See Pretrial Motion, 6/21/19, at ¶¶ 6-9, 12-14. By order of
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June 25, 2019, the trial court scheduled a hearing on the omnibus pretrial 

motion to take place on Monday, August 12, 2019. The date of the hearing 

was confirmed at a July 10, 2019 conference. See Criminal Conference 

Report, 7/12/19.

On August 5, 2019, private counsel Eric A. Jobe, Esquire, filed a praecipe 

to enter his appearance on Appellant’s behalf. In the late afternoon of Friday, 

August 9, 2019, Attorney Jobe filed a motion to continue Monday’s pretrial 

motion hearing, indicating that he had not had time to draft a suppression 

motion and would not be able to attend the scheduled hearing because he was 

in the midst of a trial in federal court. See Motion to Continue, 8/9/19, at 1. 

The trial court promptly entered an order denying the motion and indicating 

that the hearing would proceed as scheduled with Attorney Marshall, who had 

not withdrawn as counsel. See Order, 8/9/19.

At the outset of the hearing, the court discussed the issues raised in the 

motion and entertained argument from Attorney Marshall and the 

Commonwealth on the jurisdiction issue. See N.T. Pretrial Motion, 8/12/19,

3-15. Appellant then addressed the court directly to complain that there were 

additional issues he wished to raise concerning police misconduct that were 

not included in the omnibus pretrial motion.

7

 Id. at 15-16. The trial court 

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7 Although at the pretrial motion hearing and a subsequent hearing Appellant 

indicated that he had “tons” of other issues that he wanted to pursue, the only 

additional one he identified was that Chief Peck lied when he stated that he 

had seen drug sales. See N.T. Rule 600 Hearing, 11/4/19, at 12-13.
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observed that the hearing had been scheduled since June, there were 

deadlines for motions, and Appellant’s private counsel could not “come in at 

the last minute and say that I need a continuance.” Id. at 16. Appellant 

indicated that he merely wanted “to make a record, so this stuff will be heard 

someday.” Id. The court responded, “Maybe it will. Maybe it won’t.” Id. It 

gave Appellant the option of proceeding that day with the issues raised in 

Attorney Marshall’s motion or dismissing the motion without guaranteeing that 

Attorney Jobe would be permitted to file another one. Id. at 16-17. The 

court stated that it was “not forcing [Appellant] to go forward with a hearing 

today,” but needed to know whether they would proceed to take evidence 

concerning the legality of the vehicle stop. Id. at 17. When Appellant, after 

consulting with Attorney Marshall, refused to decide either way, Attorney 

Marshall opted to proceed with the motion, not seeing “any benefit to him 

having that dismissed just because of the circumstances.” Id. at 18. 

Thereafter, Chief Peck testified that he arrested Appellant without a 

warrant pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 502(2)(b) based upon probable cause that 

Appellant committed the felonies alleged in Case 168 related to Decedent’s 

death, probable cause that he had developed in February 2019 before coming 

to surveil Appellant in Monroeville.

8

 Id. at 24-27. Chief Peck acknowledged 

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8 That provision of Rule 502 states as follows: “Criminal proceedings in court 

cases shall be instituted by: . . . an arrest without a warrant: . . . upon 

probable cause when the offense is a felony or murder[.]” Pa.R.Crim.P. 

502(2)(b).
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that he had no information that the charges in Case 169 were connected to 

Clarion County. Id. at 33-34. The Commonwealth offered into evidence the 

affidavit of probable cause supporting the search warrant for 331 Noel Drive 

and the transcript of the preliminary hearing, both of which were admitted 

with no objection. Id. at 5, 10 (Commonwealth’s Exhibits 1 and 2). At the 

conclusion of the hearing, the trial court entered an order allowing 

Attorney Marshall to withdraw. 

The trial court denied Appellant’s pretrial motion by opinion and order 

of August 28, 2019. The cases proceeded with Attorney Jobe representing 

Appellant, pursuing multiple unsuccessful motions to dismiss pursuant to 

Pa.R.Crim.P. 600 that Appellant initially filed pro se. The trial court granted 

the Commonwealth’s request to join for trial Cases 168 and 169 with those of 

co-defendant Rudolph, and a trial ultimately began at the end of July 2020. 

At trial, the Commonwealth presented the evidence summarized above, 

largely through the testimony of Chief Peck, Fourness, Hoffman, Gleixner, and 

Ms. Brooks. Neither Rudoph nor Appellant opted to testify. At the conclusion 

of the four-day trial, the jury found Appellant guilty of the following offenses: 

drug delivery resulting in death; corrupt organizations; conspiracy-corrupt 

organizations; criminal use of a communication facility; seven counts of 

delivery of a controlled substance, one each for Fourness, Hoffman, Rudolph, 

and Gleixner, and three in March 2019; three counts of PWID related to the 

traffic stop and search of 331 Noel Drive; three counts of possession of a 
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controlled substance or paraphernalia in March 2019; and three counts of 

conspiracy to deliver a controlled substance, each involving Fourness and a 

different runner.9 On August 26, 2020, Appellant was sentenced to the 

aggregate term indicated above.10 

Attorney Jobe filed no post-sentence motion but did file a timely notice 

of appeal. However, that appeal was dismissed after Attorney Jobe failed to 

obtain the necessary transcripts or file a docketing statement. Appellant filed 

pro se letters that the court deemed to be a timely motion for relief pursuant 

to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”). Upon determining that Appellant 

was indigent, it granted him in forma pauperis status and appointed PCRA 

counsel. See Order, 2/3/21. Counsel obtained the transcripts and filed an 

amended PCRA petition which resulted in the PCRA court’s December 7, 2021 

order granting Appellant the right to file a direct appeal nunc pro tunc. 

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9 At various points, the Commonwealth nolle prossed the charges of 

involuntary manslaughter, conspiracy with Ms. Owens, and driving with a 

suspended license. 

10 Rudolph was also convicted of many of the same offenses as Appellant, 

including drug delivery resulting in death, corrupt organizations, and 

conspiracy, and sentenced to an aggregate 169 to 392 months of 

imprisonment. However, this Court vacated Rudolph’s judgment of sentence 

on September 13, 2022, upon determining that the trial court erred in denying 

Rudolph’s suppression motion based upon the Commonwealth’s failure to 

disprove Rudolph’s claim that the warrant to search his residence was 

executed in violation of the knock-and-announce rule. See Commonwealth 

v. Rudolph, 285 A.3d 926 (Pa.Super. 2022) (non-precedential decision). 
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Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal nunc pro tunc and both he and 

the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.11 Appellant presents the 

following questions, which we have re-ordered for ease of discussion:

1. Was the evidence insufficient to support his conviction for 

drug delivery resulting in death because the prosecution 

failed to establish the required element that [Appellant] 

distributed the controlled substance that resulted in death?

2. Was the evidence insufficient to support his convictions for 

corrupt organizations and a related conspiracy charge 

because the prosecution failed to establish the required 

element that [Appellant] was involved in an “enterprise”?

3. Did the trial court err when it failed to dismiss the charges 

at trial court docket number 169 because Clarion County 

was not the proper venue for the trial?

4. Did the trial court err and violate [Appellant]’s Sixth 

Amendment right to counsel of his own choosing when it 

forced [Appellant] to proceed at the omnibus hearing with 

court-appointed counsel after [Appellant] privately retained 

separate counsel?

5. Did the trial court err when it failed to grant suppression of 

the evidence stemming from the warrantless car search 

because no exigency existed, and, as such, the search 

violated [Appellant]’s state constitutional rights?

Appellant’s brief at 3-4 (cleaned up).

We begin with Appellant’s two challenges to the sufficiency of the 

evidence, “as success on that basis will result in discharge instead of retrial.” 

Commonwealth v. Jordan, 212 A.3d 91, 94 (Pa.Super. 2019). Our standard 

of review for these claims is as follows:

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11 Appellant continues to be represented by PCRA counsel in this appeal. 
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The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence 

is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light 

most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence 

to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the crime beyond 

a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test, we may not weigh 

the evidence and substitute our judgment for a fact-finder. In 

addition, we note that the facts and circumstances 

established by the Commonwealth need not preclude every 

possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a 

defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless 

the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter 

of law no probability of fact may be drawn from the 

combined circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its 

burden of proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable 

doubt by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in 

applying the above test, the entire record must be evaluated and 

all evidence received must be considered. Finally, the trier of fact, 

while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the weight of 

the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part or none of the

evidence.

Commonwealth v. Haahs, 289 A.3d 100, 104 n.2 (Pa.Super. 2022) (cleaned 

up, emphases added).

Appellant first claims that the evidence was insufficient to support his 

conviction for drug delivery resulting in death. The statute at issue defines

the offense as follows: 

A person commits a felony of the first degree if the person 

intentionally administers, dispenses, delivers, gives, prescribes, 

sells or distributes any controlled substance or counterfeit 

controlled substance in violation of [§] (a)(14) or (30) of . . . The 

Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act,[12] and 

another person dies as a result of using the substance.

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12 Section (a)(14) of the Act regulates the dispensation of drugs by medical 

providers. See 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(14). Section (a)(30) prohibits, with 

exceptions not implicated here, “the manufacture, delivery, or possession with 

intent to manufacture or deliver, a controlled substance by a person not 
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18 Pa.C.S. § 2506(a). Hence, the Commonwealth satisfied its evidentiary 

burden if it proved beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) Appellant delivered, 

sold, or distributed a controlled substance to a person; (2) the delivery, sale, 

or distribution to a person was intentional; and (3) that the delivery, sale, or 

distribution violated the relevant provisions of the Controlled Substance Act; 

and (4) that another person died as a result. See Commonwealth v. Peck, 

242 A.3d 1274, 1280–81 (Pa. 2020). 

The statute does not require that the delivery, sale, et cetera of the drug 

occurred with the intention to cause a person to die, or that the person the 

defendant delivered the drugs to be the same person whose death resulted. 

See Commonwealth v. Carr, 227 A.3d 11, 16 (Pa.Super. 2020) (indicating 

that the statute does not require that the defendant intended to cause the 

death of another); Commonwealth v. Storey, 167 A.3d 750, 757 (Pa.Super. 

2017) (“Section 2506(a)] does not require the death of the person to whom 

the defendant originally sold the illegal substance.”). Rather, it is a question 

of “but for” causation, with the caveat that the result must not have been “so 

extraordinarily remote or attenuated that it would be unfair to hold the 

defendant criminally responsible.” Commonwealth v. Kakhankham, 132 

A.3d 986, 993 (Pa.Super. 2015) (cleaned up). 

____________________________________________

registered under this act, or a practitioner not registered or licensed by the 

appropriate State board, or knowingly creating, delivering or possessing with 

intent to deliver, a counterfeit controlled substance.” 35 P.S. § 780-

113(a)(30). 
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Appellant does not dispute that the Commonwealth sufficiently proved 

that he intentionally delivered fentanyl to a person in violation of the Act. 

Rather, Appellant maintains that the Commonwealth’s evidence did not 

establish the fourth element, namely that Decedent died as a result of using 

the fentanyl that Appellant supplied. Specifically, Appellant argues that there 

was no evidence that he ever interacted with Decedent and, given the absence 

of drug packaging or paraphernalia, there was no evidence that Decedent 

ingested fentanyl from a stamp bag, let alone one that Appellant supplied to 

Hoffman three days prior to the death. See Appellant’s brief at 49-50. 

Further, Appellant contends that the Commonwealth failed to account for 

Decedent’s actions during the time between leaving work on the afternoon of 

November 19 and the discovery of his body on the morning of November 20, 

such that it is pure speculation that Decedent did not acquire and use fentanyl 

from another source. Id. at 51. Appellant asserts that the evidence was such 

that Appellant’s guilt was just as likely as his innocence and, therefore, the 

verdict cannot stand. Id. at 55. 

We disagree. Here, the jury’s verdict was founded not upon mere 

speculation, but upon logical inferences. “The difference between an inference 

and a speculation is that an inference is a reasoned deduction from the 

evidence, a speculation is a guess.” Commonwealth v. Konz, 402 A.2d 692, 

700 (Pa.Super. 1979) (Spaeth, J. dissenting), rev’d, 450 A.2d 638 (Pa. 1982). 

See also Commonwealth v. Jackson, 955 A.2d 441, 444 (Pa.Super. 2008)
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(“[R]easonable inferences are predicated on proven facts and circumstances, 

not on suspicion or surmise.”). The jury heard that Rudolph specifically 

indicated that the drugs he sold Decedent were a portion of the ones he bought 

from Hoffman on November 17, 2018. See N.T. Trial, 7/29/20, at 185. Video 

footage and Hoffman’s own testimony corroborated the November 17 

exchange. Id. at 186-92; N.T. Trial, 7/30/20, at 182. Hoffman further 

indicated that he had obtained the heroin/fentanyl in question from Appellant. 

See N.T. Trial, 7/30/20, at 182. Hence, there was direct evidence that drugs 

delivered by Appellant ended up in Decedent’s hands.

The fact that Appellant’s drugs sold by Rudolph to Decedent were the

cause of death is established by logical deductions from the Commonwealth’s 

circumstantial evidence. First, Decedent purchased the drugs at work before 

he began his shift. He then completed his shift, and arrived at the Brooks 

residence half an hour or less after clocking out, exhibiting none of the known 

signs of impairment. See N.T. Trial, 7/29/20, at 70, 84, 178. Second, 

Decedent, on notice that his relationship with Ms. Brooks would end if he 

continued to use drugs, and expecting her to visit him later that evening, had 

the motive to remove any sign of drug packaging and to be sober by later that 

night. Id. at 61, 66. Third, there was no indication of anyone coming or going 

to Decedent’s apartment that afternoon, evening, or night. Id. at 758, 97-

98. Fourth, Decedent’s normal routine upon returning from work was to eat 

and then shower before watching television. Id. at 69-70. Fifth, the state 
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and location of Decedent’s body and the use of three months’ worth of water 

in a six-day period both suggest that Decedent ingested a lethal dose of 

fentanyl earlier rather than later on the evening of November 19. Id. at 117, 

264. Finally, Hoffman, an experienced user, himself was incapacitated, the 

day after Decedent was found dead, by stamp bags purchased from Appellant

that Hoffman believed to have a higher fentanyl content than usual. See N.T. 

Trial, 7/30/20, at 168-71, 180.

From this, a jury could logically conclude beyond a reasonable doubt 

that Appellant brought at least some of the stamp bags he purchased at work 

back to his apartment, ingested them, and eliminated the packaging in some 

manner, such as by flushing it down the toilet, to hide his drug usage from 

Ms. Brooks. Decedent then intended to go about his normal routine of 

showering before settling in on the couch, but was overtaken by the powerful 

drug instead, with the bath water continuing to run all night. In this way, the 

conclusion that Decedent died as a result of the heroin laced with a largerthan-typical amount of fentanyl that Appellant supplied to Rudolph through 

Hoffman was not a guess among equally plausible explanations. The verdict 

was based upon reasonable inferences, not pure speculation. Consequently, 

we conclude that the guilty verdict for drug delivery resulting in death was 

supported by sufficient evidence. 

Appellant also claims that the Commonwealth’s evidence was 

insufficient to sustain his conviction for corrupt organizations. Appellant was 
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convicted pursuant to the following provision of the corrupt organizations 

statute: “It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with 

any enterprise to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct 

of such enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity.” 18 

Pa.C.S. § 911(b)(3). The statute defines racketeering activity as, inter alia, 

“[a]n offense indictable under . . . The Controlled Substance, Drug, Device 

and Cosmetic Act (relating to the sale and dispensing of narcotic drugs)” or a 

conspiracy to commit such offense. 18 Pa.C.S. § 911(h)(1)(ii)-(iii). A pattern 

of such activity is “a course of conduct requiring two or more acts of 

racketeering activity one of which occurred after the effective date of this 

section.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 911(h)(4).

Appellant does not dispute the Commonwealth’s proof that he engaged 

in a pattern of racketeering activity. The only element with which Appellant 

takes issue is that he was employed or associated with an enterprise. 

“Enterprise” for purposes of § 911 means “any individual, partnership, 

corporation, association or other legal entity, and any union or group of 

individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity, engaged in commerce 

and includes legitimate as well as illegitimate entities and governmental 

entities.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 911(h)(3). 

We conclude that the Commonwealth produced adequate evidence to 

prove that Appellant was part of an enterprise. Fourness testified that he and 

his wife reached an agreement with Appellant that they would acquire drugs 
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only from him, and Appellant agreed to sell only to the Fournesses. See N.T. 

Trial, 7/30/20, at 155. Exchanges between Appellant and Fourness or one of 

his runners occurred dozens of times between late 2018 and early 2019. Id. 

at 121-25. Fourness identified recognizable packaging for some of the drugs, 

such as a “Kill Bill” stamp. Id. at 127. The individuals in the organization had 

defined roles and took measures to ensure the continuing viability of the “dayto-day operations,” such as utilizing replacement runners and street-level 

dealers when others were unavailable and utilizing Facetime for last-minute 

delivery arrangements to verify the identify of those involved. Id. at 116, 

123. 

This was no mere one-off conspiracy, but a continuing association in fact

that only ceased when too many members were taken down within a short 

timeframe. Thus, Appellant’s corrupt organizations conviction is founded on 

sufficient evidence. Accord Commonwealth v. Hill, 210 A.3d 1104, 1114 

(Pa.Super. 2019) (indicating that there was no viable challenge to the 

existence of an enterprise where “the evidence demonstrate[d] that [the 

defendant] and . . . straw purchasers formed an association in fact to carry 

out illegal purchases of firearms”). Appellant’s second sufficiency challenge 

fails.
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We next consider Appellant’s claim that Clarion County was not a proper 

venue for Case 169.13 Our Supreme Court has specified that appellate review 

of a venue ruling examines “whether the trial court’s factual findings are 

supported by the record and its conclusions of law are free of legal error.” 

Commonwealth v. Gross, 101 A.3d 28, 33-34 (Pa. 2014). The trial court’s 

task, when venue is challenged by a defendant, is to determine whether the 

Commonwealth established the propriety of venue by a preponderance of the 

evidence. Id. 

Venue for criminal cases “belongs in the place where the crime 

occurred.” Id. at 33 (cleaned up). In other words, that it is a location “with 

which the defendant may be criminally associated, either directly, jointly, or 

vicariously.” Id. The Rules of Criminal Procedure speak to venue, in relevant 

part, as follows:

(A) Venue. All criminal proceedings in summary and court cases 

shall be brought before the issuing authority for the magisterial 

district in which the offense is alleged to have occurred or before 

an issuing authority on temporary assignment to serve such 

magisterial district, subject, however, to the following exceptions:

. . . .

(3) When charges arising from the same criminal 

episode occur in more than one judicial district, the 

criminal proceeding on all the charges may be brought 

____________________________________________

13 Although Appellant’s pretrial motion referenced jurisdiction, the propriety 

of venue in Clarion County, rather than that court’s jurisdiction, was 

implicated. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Bethea, 828 A.2d 1066, 1074 

(Pa. 2003) (“[A]ll courts of common pleas have statewide subject matter 

jurisdiction in cases arising under the Crimes Code.”). 
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before one issuing authority in a magisterial district 

within any of the judicial districts in which the charges 

arising from the same criminal episode occurred.

Pa.R.Crim.P. 130.

Hence, “a condition precedent to the exercise by a single county to 

jurisdiction in a case involving multiple offenses in various counties is [that] 

the offense must constitute a single criminal episode.” Commonwealth v. 

Witmayer, 144 A.3d 939, 946 (Pa.Super. 2016) (cleaned up). “Where a 

number of charges are logically or temporally related and share common 

issues of law and fact, a single criminal episode exists.” Commonwealth v. 

Kohler, 811 A.2d 1046, 1050 (Pa.Super. 2002) (cleaned up). We have 

expounded on these aspects of a single criminal episode as follows:

[To ascertain] whether a number of statutory offenses are 

logically related to one another, the court should initially inquire 

as to whether there is a substantial duplication of factual, and/or 

legal issues presented by the offenses. The mere fact that the 

additional statutory offenses involve additional issues of law or 

fact is not sufficient to create a separate criminal episode since 

the logical relationship test does not require an absolute identity 

of factual backgrounds.

The temporal relationship between criminal acts will be a 

factor which frequently determines whether the acts are logically 

related. However, the definition of a single criminal episode 

should not be limited to acts which are immediately connected in 

time. Transaction is a word of flexible meaning. It may 

comprehend a series of many occurrences, depending not so 

much upon the immediateness of their connection as upon their 

logical relationship.

Witmayer, supra at 946–47 (cleaned up). 
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In denying Appellant’s pretrial motion, the trial court held that the 

charges in Case 169 based upon possession and delivery of drugs in Allegheny 

County were part of the same criminal episode as the charges in Case 168 

concerning the drug delivery that resulted in Decedent’s death. Specifically, 

the court cited the close temporal proximity of the events at issue, as well as 

the identity of controlled substances and location of Appellant’s drug deliveries 

to the various individuals. See Order, 8/28/19, at unnumbered 2-3.

Appellant argues that this was error because the two cases have “no 

shared identity of factual backgrounds,” as no person in the corrupt 

organization at issue in Case 168 “had any involvement with the criminal 

activity alleged” in Case 169. See Appellant’s brief at 37. Appellant further 

contends that there was no temporal relation between the cases, as the 

allegations in Case 168 “primarily occurred in November 2018 and ended on 

or before February 2019,” while the activity at issue in Case 169 “did not occur 

until March 2019.” Id. at 38. 

We agree with the trial court that the events in the two cases are 

sufficiently logically and temporally related to constitute a single criminal 

episode. During the time period at issue in both cases, Appellant operated a 

continuous drug distribution operation out of 331 Noel Drive in Monroeville, 

Allegheny County. As detailed in our discussion above, Appellant furthered 

this operation through his association with the Fournesses until that fell apart 

in February 2019, but continued selling the same drugs using the same 
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packaging from the same location in the following weeks. The March 2019 

deliveries were not a second, different criminal episode, but a continuation of 

what Appellant had been doing all along. Compare Commonwealth v. 

Hunter, 768 A.2d 1136, 1141 (Pa.Super. 2001) (holding trial of corrupt 

organizations trial in county where homicide allegedly occurred was proper 

because all the activities were connected to the drug dealing operation), with 

Commonwealth v. Callen, 198 A.3d 1149, 1161 (Pa.Super. 2018) (holding 

the abuse of children in one county through association with their stepfather 

was not part of the same criminal episode as the abuse of another girl eight 

years later in a different county facilitated by the defendant’s role as a 

gymnastics teacher). No relief is due.14 

____________________________________________

14 Even if the cases did not involve a single criminal episode such that it was 

error for the trial court to decline to transfer Case 169 to Allegheny County, 

we are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the error was harmless. In 

granting the Commonwealth’s motion to join Cases 168 and 169 for trial, the 

trial court ruled that the evidence of each was admissible in the trial of the 

other. See Trial Court Opinion, 2/3/20, at 5-8 (explaining that joinder of 

Cases 168 and 169 was proper because, inter alia, they “require overlapping 

facts and evidence to be presented to prove both at trial”). Appellant does 

not challenge that ruling on appeal, and we discern no error in it. 

Furthermore, nothing in the certified record evinces impermissible forum 

shopping on the part of the prosecution, but instead mere efficiency given that 

the charges all involved Appellant’s drug dealing operation that was 

discovered by a single investigation originating in Clarion County. Compare

N.T. Pretrial Motion, 8/12/19, at 37 (Commonwealth detailing that both cases 

pertain to the same ongoing activity and investigation such that judicial 

economy is served by trying them together), with Commonwealth v. 

Callen, 198 A.3d 1149, 1163 (Pa.Super. 2018) (finding error was not 

harmless where there appeared to be “the distinct possibility” that “the 

Commonwealth was engaging in an act of impermissible forum shopping”). 
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Next, Appellant claims that the trial court committed reversible error in 

refusing to continue the hearing on his omnibus pretrial motion. “Whether a 

continuance should be granted in order for the defendant to secure counsel of 

his choosing is a matter within the discretion of the trial judge, and no 

prophylactic rule exists for determining when a denial of a continuance 

amounts to a violation of due process.” Commonwealth v. Gray, 608 A.2d 

534, 547 (Pa.Super. 1992). As such, “a trial court’s decision to deny a request 

for a continuance will be reversed only upon a showing of an abuse of 

discretion.” Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 230 A.3d 480, 484 (Pa.Super. 

2020) (cleaned up). It is well-settled that “an abuse of discretion is not merely 

an error of judgment. Rather, discretion is abused when the law is overridden 

or misapplied, or the judgment exercised is manifestly unreasonable, or the 

result of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will, as shown by the evidence or the 

record.” Id. (cleaned up). 

This Court will not find an abuse of discretion if the denial of the 

continuance request did not prejudice the appellant. In order to

demonstrate prejudice, the appellant must be able to show 

specifically in what manner he was unable to prepare his defense 

or how he would have prepared differently had he been given 

more time.

Commonwealth v. Broitman, 217 A.3d 297, 299-300 (Pa.Super. 2019) 

(cleaned up).

____________________________________________

With nothing in the certified record even suggesting that the result in either 

case would have differed had they been tried separately in different counties, 

we conclude that Appellant’s venue issue merits no relief.
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The Rules of Criminal Procedure provide as follows, in pertinent part, 

regarding continuance requests:

(A) The court or issuing authority may, in the interests of justice, 

grant a continuance, on its own motion, or on the motion of either 

party.

. . . .

(C) When the matter is in the court of common pleas, the judge 

shall on the record identify the moving party and state of record 

the reasons for granting or denying the continuance. The judge 

also shall indicate on the record to which party the period of delay 

caused by the continuance shall be attributed and whether the 

time will be included in or excluded from the computation of the 

time within which trial must commence in accordance with Rule 

600.

(D) A motion for continuance on behalf of the defendant shall be 

made not later than 48 hours before the time set for the 

proceeding. A later motion shall be entertained only when the 

opportunity therefor did not previously exist, or the defendant was 

not aware of the grounds for the motion, or the interests of justice 

require it.

Pa.R.Crim.P. 106.

Here, Appellant sought a continuance in order to proceed with retained 

counsel rather than his court-appointed attorney. “Both the Sixth Amendment 

to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania 

Constitution guarantee a defendant’s right to counsel.” Broitman, supra at

300. “In addition to guaranteeing representation for the indigent, these 

constitutional rights entitle an accused to choose at his own cost and expense 

any lawyer he may desire.” Id. (cleaned up). However, it is not an absolute 

right. See, e.g., Hernandez, supra at 484. Our Supreme Court explained:
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[T]he right of the accused to choose his own counsel, as well as 

the lawyer’s right to choose his clients, must be weighed against 

and may be reasonably restricted by the state’s interest in the 

swift and efficient administration of criminal justice. Thus, this 

Court has explained that while defendants are entitled to choose 

their own counsel, they should not be permitted to unreasonably 

clog the machinery of justice or hamper and delay the state’s 

efforts to effectively administer justice. At the same time, 

however, we have explained that a myopic insistence upon 

expeditiousness in the face of a justifiable request for delay can 

render the right to defend with counsel an empty formality.

Commonwealth v. McAleer, 748 A.2d 670, 673–74 (Pa. 2000) (cleaned up). 

In the case sub judice, the trial court observed that Appellant knew of 

the hearing since June 2019, but waited until August to retain counsel, who 

then filed a last-minute continuance request in the late afternoon of the Friday 

before the Monday morning hearing.15 See Trial Court Opinion, 5/12/22, at 

unnumbered 3. The court also noted that Appellant had able representation 

at the hearing by Attorney Marshall, who had filed the motion at issue and 

was still counsel of record. Id. at unnumbered 2. Furthermore, the court did 

not mandate that Appellant proceed at the hearing with Attorney Marshall, but 

instead gave Appellant the option to have Attorney Marshall’s timely omnibus 

____________________________________________

15 The motion, time stamped 3:41 p.m. on Friday was filed more than fortyeight hours before the 9:00 a.m. Monday hearing, but nearly all of the time 

between was outside of normal business hours. While the filing may not be

late according to the letter of Rule 106(D), it certainly violates its spirit. 
J-A02009-23

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pretrial motion dismissed, albeit without guaranteeing that Attorney Jobe 

would be able to file a timely motion of his own.16 Id. at unnumbered 2-3. 

Appellant argues that, in declining “to probe the reasons for 

[Appellant’s] dissatisfaction with court-appointed counsel,” the fact that this 

was the first continuance request and that there was a lack of any prejudice 

to the Commonwealth rendered the trial court’s refusal to allow him to be 

represented by Attorney Jobe in litigating pretrial motions a deprivation of his 

constitutional right to counsel, amounting to a structural error mandating a 

new trial.

17

 See Appellant’s brief at 26, 28. Appellant maintains that this 

____________________________________________

16 Appellant asserts that the trial court indicated that it “would not permit 

[Appellant’s] privately-retained counsel to file pretrial motions in the future.” 

Appellant’s brief at 28. That is not accurate. What the court said is, “I am 

not saying that your attorney is going to be able to file another motion.” N.T. 

Pretrial Motion, 8/12/19, at 16. The court left open the possibility that “this 

stuff” that Appellant wished to raise with Attorney Jobe would be considered 

at a later date. Id. (“Maybe it will. Maybe it won’t.”). 

17 Appellant relies on United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140 

(2006), for the proposition that the error alleged in this appeal is structural. 

In Gonzalez-Lopez, the trial court erroneously deprived the defendant of 

counsel of his choice by improperly denying the attorney’s admission pro hac

vice and precluded the defendant from even consulting or meeting with the 

attorney throughout the trial. The U.S. Supreme Court determined that this 

conceded trial court error pervaded the entire trial and was indeed structural 

error, but it plainly stated: “This is not a case about a court’s power to enforce 

rules or adhere to practices that determine which attorneys may appear before 

it, or to make scheduling and other decisions that effectively exclude 

a defendant’s first choice of counsel.” Id. at 152 (emphasis added). As 

this case involves a scheduling decision that impacted only a pretrial hearing, 

after which Appellant was represented by counsel of choice for additional 

pretrial motions, trial, and sentencing, Gonzalez-Lopez is not on point. 

Rather, we consider the prejudice analysis applicable to denials of continuance 
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Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Prysock, 972 A.2d 539, 545 

(Pa.Super. 2009), “controls the outcome of this case because the facts in 

Prysock are materially similar to those present here.” Appellant’s brief at 28. 

In Prysock, appointed counsel informed the court just prior to jury 

selection that the defendant was dissatisfied and wished to hire private 

counsel. The court refused the request and proceeded with the defendant 

objecting and asking for private counsel “because counsel would not allow him 

to have the final say in jury selection.” Prysock, supra at 540. The next 

day, private counsel attempted to enter his appearance but, unaware that half 

of the jury had already been selected, indicated that he was not prepared to 

go to trial that day. The court denied the request and trial proceeded with 

appointed counsel over the defendant’s objections. “On several subsequent 

occasions during trial, [the defendant] stated his dissatisfaction with 

[appointed counsel’s] representation, and the trial court was forced to 

intervene to resolve problems between [the two].” Id. at 541. This Court, 

determining that the defendant’s “difficulties with appointed counsel pervaded 

every aspect of the trial,” held that the denial of the continuance was 

reversible error that warranted a new trial. Id. at 545.

We find Prysock materially dissimilar to the circumstances of the 

instant case. Here, Attorney Jobe’s eleventh-hour motion, filed a week after 

____________________________________________

requests noted above. See Commonwealth v. Broitman, 217 A.3d 297, 

299-300 (Pa.Super. 2019).
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he entered his appearance, implicated not trial, but one pretrial hearing. 

There is nothing in the certified record that reflects that Appellant had 

“irreconcilable differences with his appointed counsel” that pervaded that 

hearing, let alone the entire trial, or that he “received less than competent 

representation” in litigating the motion. Commonwealth v. Brooks, 104 

A.3d 466, 477 (Pa. 2014). Indeed, as we noted above, Appellant was unable 

to identify any issue appropriate for a pretrial motion that Attorney Marshall 

failed to raise when questioned on the record about Attorney Marshall’s motion 

at a subsequent pretrial hearing at which Appellant was represented by 

Attorney Jobe. See N.T. Rule 600 Hearing, 11/4/19, at 12-13. Further, as 

the Commonwealth aptly notes, while Attorney Jobe filed and litigated other 

motions prior to trial, he “did not file any motion to reconsider or additional 

[omnibus pretrial motions] in the next year leading up to trial.” 

Commonwealth’s brief at 18-19 (cleaned up). 

Additionally, the facts that the trial court denied the written continuance 

request before hearing from the parties and did not probe into the 

Commonwealth’s position on the continuance are not determinative. Our 

Supreme Court has indicated that neither the Commonwealth’s lack of 

opposition to a continuance nor the trial court’s failure “to assume that the 

request must be granted, and then probe the party (here, a defendant 

represented by counsel) for support for the request, or to find weaknesses in 

the request” evinces an abuse of discretion. See Brooks, supra at 477. 
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While this Court may have ruled differently on the request, the certified 

record does not support a finding that the trial court’s denial of the

continuance was manifestly unreasonable “or the result of partiality, 

prejudice, bias, or ill-will[.]” Hernandez, supra at 484 (cleaned up). As 

such, we must conclude that the trial court’s decision was a proper exercise 

of its discretion. See Commonwealth v. Thomas, 879 A.2d 246, 262

(Pa.Super. 2005) (affirming denial of a continuance of a long-scheduled 

hearing where the defendant “did not exercise his right to cho[o]se counsel at 

a reasonable time nor in a reasonable manner”). Moreover, the certified 

record before us contains no indication that Appellant was prejudiced by the 

denial of the continuance. Consequently, no relief is due.

Appellant’s final issue challenges the trial court’s denial of his 

suppression motion. Accordingly, we are governed by the following legal 

principles:

In reviewing appeals from an order denying suppression, our 

standard of review is limited to determining whether the trial 

court’s factual findings are supported by the record and whether 

its legal conclusions drawn from those facts are correct. When 

reviewing the rulings of a trial court, the appellate court considers 

only the evidence of the prosecution and so much of the evidence 

for the defense as remains uncontradicted when read in the 

context of the record as a whole. When the record supports the

findings of the trial court, we are bound by those facts and may 

reverse only if the legal conclusions drawn therefrom are in error. 

Our scope of review is limited to the evidence presented at the 

suppression hearing.

Commonwealth v. Bellamy, 252 A.3d 656, 663 (Pa.Super. 2021) (cleaned 

up). 
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“The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, 

Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution both protect against unreasonable 

searches and seizures. A search conducted without a warrant is 

constitutionally impermissible unless an established exception applies.” 

Commonwealth v. Randolph, 151 A.3d 170, 176-77 (Pa.Super. 2016) 

(cleaned up). Exigent circumstances are among the recognized exceptions. 

See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Alexander, 243 A.3d 177, 208 (Pa. 2020) 

(“[I]n some circumstances the exigencies of the situation make the needs of 

law enforcement so compelling that the warrantless search is objectively 

reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.” (cleaned up)). 

However, it is well-settled that governmental “intrusion into a particular 

area, whether in an automobile or elsewhere, cannot result in a 

[constitutional] violation unless the area is one in which there is a 

constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy.” 

Commonwealth v. Shabezz, 166 A.3d 278, 288 (Pa. 2017) (cleaned up). 

Stated differently, “under Article I, Section 8, no less than under the Fourth 

Amendment, a defendant cannot prevail upon a suppression motion unless he 

demonstrates that the challenged police conduct violated his own, personal 

privacy interests.” Commonwealth v. Millner, 888 A.2d 680, 692 (Pa. 

2005). To establish the requisite expectation, “a defendant first must 

manifest a subjective expectation of privacy in the object of the challenged 
J-A02009-23

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search, and then demonstrate that society is willing to recognize that 

expectation as reasonable.” Shabezz, supra at 288 (cleaned up). 

Appellant repeatedly indicates in his appellate brief that he was arrested 

on March 12, 2019, when the Monroeville police stopped his car and seized 

heroin from it without a warrant. See Appellant’s brief at 41-42. On this 

basis, he maintains that the seizure was unlawful because “at the suppression 

hearing, no evidence was offered to establish the existence of an exigency” or 

other exception to the warrant requirement. Id.

However, the Commonwealth aptly corrects Appellant’s misstatements, 

observing that Appellant was not stopped in either of the two vehicles 

connected with him, but was merely a passenger in Mr. Smith’s Toyota

that Mr. Smith was driving. See Commonwealth’s brief at 21. See also N.T. 

Preliminary Hearing, 4/9/19, at 43-44, 57 (indicating that the vehicle in 

question was Mr. Smith’s Toyota and Appellant was riding in the front 

passenger seat). The Commonwealth asserts that Appellant proffered no 

evidence to suggest “that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the 

floorboards of a vehicle” in which he was a mere passenger and had no 

ownership interest. Id. at 22. 

Our review of the certified record confirms that no evidence proffered at 

the suppression hearing suggested that Appellant had an expectation of 

privacy in Mr. Smith’s vehicle. Therefore, Appellant failed to demonstrate that 

the search of the vehicle following his lawful warrantless arrest required the 
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evidence obtained therefrom to be suppressed. See, e.g., Millner, supra at 

692 (reversing grant of suppression where the defendant “produced no 

evidence that he owned the vehicle, nor did he produce evidence which 

remotely suggested that he had any other connection to the vehicle which 

could form the basis for so much as a subjective expectation of privacy,” nor 

was there anything “in the Commonwealth’s evidence upon which [the 

defendant] could rely to prove that he had an expectation of privacy in the 

[vehicle] in question”); Commonwealth v. Burton, 973 A.2d 428, 436 

(Pa.Super. 2009) (en banc) (rejecting challenge to suppression denial where

the defendant “failed to demonstrate that he had a reasonably cognizable 

expectation of privacy in a vehicle that he did not own, that was not registered 

to him, and for which he has not shown authority to operate”).

For the foregoing reasons, none of Appellant’s issues warrants relief 

from this Court. Thus, we affirm his judgment of sentence.

Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

Judge Murray joins this Memorandum.

Judge Pellegrini files a Concurring & Dissenting Memorandum.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 6/6/2023