Joint Special Operations University

7701 Tampa Point Boulevard

MacDill AFB, FL 33621

https://jsou.libguides.com/jsoupublications

JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS UNIVERSITY

As part one of a three-part series on special operations theory, Dr. Richard Rubright articulates what he calls “a unified theory of special operations.” His theory is simply expressed in ten words: “Special Operations are 

extraordinary operations to achieve a specific effect.” This single sentence 

is a gateway to a rich discussion which will force readers to think critically 

about special operations and the role that they should serve in the pursuit of strategic objectives. No matter which side of the argument you 

take up, Dr. Rubright’s monograph is an excellent start towards forming 

an academic position on special operations theory. These three volumes 

provide an opportunity for the reader to challenge their own preexisting 

positions, incorporate fresh perspectives, and perhaps think differently 

about what is necessary and sufficient for a special operations theory. 

ISBN 978-1-941715-16-1

A Unified Theory for 

Special Operations

Richard W. Rubright, Ph.D.

JSOU Report 17-1

JSOU Report 17-1 A Unified Theory for Special Operations Rubright 

Volume One of a Three-Part Theory Series

Smokejumper recruits jog during training at the North Cascades 

Smokejumper Base located in Winthrop, Washington, in June 2016. 

Photo by David Ryder/Polaris/Newscom. 
Joint Special Operations University

and the Center for Special Operations Studies and Research

The Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) provides its publications 

to contribute toward expanding the body of knowledge about joint special 

operations. JSOU publications advance the insights and recommendations 

of national security professionals and the Special Operations Forces (SOF) 

students and leaders for consideration by the SOF community and defense 

leadership. 

JSOU is the educational component of the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), MacDill Air Force Base, Florida. The JSOU 

mission is to educate SOF executive, senior, and intermediate leaders and 

selected other national and international security decision makers, both 

military and civilian, through teaching, outreach, and research in the 

science and art of joint special operations. JSOU provides education to the 

men and women of SOF and to those who enable the SOF mission in a joint 

and interagency environment. 

JSOU conducts research through its Center for Special Operations 

Studies and Research (CSOSR) where effort centers upon the USSOCOM 

mission: 

USSOCOM mission. USSOCOM synchronizes the planning of Special 

Operations and provides Special Operations Forces to support persistent, 

networked, and distributed Geographic Combatant Command operations 

in order to protect and advance our Nation’s interests.

Press publications are available for download from the JSOU Library 

web page located at https://jsou.libguides.com/jsoupublications.

Roby C. Barrett

Ph.D., Middle Eastern & South Asian History 

Public Policy Center Middle East Institute and 

JSOU Senior Fellow

James J.F. Forest 

Ph.D., Higher Education Administration

Associate Professor, School of Criminology and 

Justice Studies, University of Massachusetts 

Lowell and JSOU Senior Fellow

Mario Forestier

Chief Warrant Officer, U.S. Army, Ret.

Director, Joint Special Operations Command 

Center for Counterterrorism Studies

Thomas H. Henriksen

Ph.D., History, Hoover Institution 

Stanford University and JSOU Senior Fellow

Bernd Horn

Colonel, Canadian Dept. of National Defence, Ret.

Ph.D., War Studies

Director, CANSOFCOM Education and 

Research Centre

Russell D. Howard

Brigadier General, U.S. Army, Ret.

John D. Jogerst

Colonel, U.S. Air Force, Ret.

James Kiras

Ph.D., History, School of Advanced Air and Space 

Studies, Air University and JSOU Associate Fellow

William W. Mendel

Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret. 

JSOU Senior Fellow

Alvaro de Souza Pinheiro

Major General, Brazilian Army, Ret.

JSOU Associate Fellow

James F. Powers, Jr.

Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret.

JSOU Senior Fellow 

Bryan C. Price

Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army

Ph.D., Political Science

Director, Combating Terrorism Center at 

West Point

Richard H. Shultz, Jr.

Ph.D., Political Science

Director, International Security 

Studies Program, The Fletcher School, 

Tufts University and JSOU Senior Fellow

Robert G. Spulak, Jr.

Ph.D., Physics/Nuclear Engineering

Sandia National Laboratories 

and JSOU Associate Fellow 

Jessica Glicken Turnley

Ph.D., Cultural Anthropology

Galisteo Consulting Group 

and JSOU Senior Fellow 

Rich Yarger

Ph.D., History 

JSOU Senior Fellow

Joint Special Operations University

Brian A. Maher, Ed.D., SES, President

Francis X. Reidy, Interim Director, Center for Special Operations Studies and Research

Robert Nalepa, Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Air Force, Ret., Editor in Chief

Lisa Sheldon, B.A., Advertising, JSOU Press Editor

Cindy Snyder, B.A., Mass Communications/Journalism, Assistant JSOU Press Editor

Resident Senior Fellows

Peter McCabe, Ph.D., Political Science, Colonel, U.S. Air Force, Ret.

Will Irwin, MMAS, Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret.

Paul Lieber, Ph.D., Mass Communication & Public Affairs

David Ellis, Ph.D., International Relations, Comparative Politics

Editorial Advisory Board
JSOU Report 17-1

The JSOU Press

MacDill Air Force Base, Florida

2017

A Unified Theory 

for Special Operations

Richard W. Rubright, Ph.D. 
Comments about this publication are invited and should be forwarded to the 

Director of the Center for Special Operations Studies and Research, Joint Special Operations University, 7701 Tampa Point Blvd., MacDill AFB, FL 33621.

*******

The JSOU Center for Special Operations Studies and Research (CSOSR) is currently 

accepting written works relevant to special operations for potential publication. For 

more information, please contact the CSOSR Director at jsou_research@socom.mil. 

Thank you for your interest in the JSOU Press. 

*******

This work was cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.

Printed in May 2017.

ISBN 978-1-941715-16-1
The views expressed in this publication are entirely those of the 

author and do not necessarily reflect the views, policy, or position 

of the United States Government, Department of Defense, United 

States Special Operations Command, or the Joint Special Operations 

University.

Authors are granted academic freedom provided their work does not 

disclose classified information, jeopardize operations security, or 

misrepresent official U.S. policy. Such academic freedom empowers 

authors to offer new and sometimes controversial perspectives in the 

interest of furthering debate on key issues.
Recent Publications of the JSOU Press

IS and Cultural Genocide: Antiquities Trafficking in the Terrorist State, JSOU 

Report 16-11, Russell D. Howard, Marc D. Elliott, and Jonathan R. Prohov

Cultural Intelligence for Special Forces Personnel, JSOU Report 16-10, 

Russell D. Howard, Greta Hanson, and Carly Laywell

Training Surrogate Forces in International Humanitarian Law: Lessons from Peru, 

Colombia, El Salvador, and Iraq, JSOU Report 16-9, Patrick Paterson

Assessing Special Operations Forces Language, Region, and Culture Needs—

Leveraging Digital and LRC Learning to Reroute the “Roadmap” from Human 

Terrain to Human Domain, JSOU Report 16-8, Robert R. Greene Sands

The Asia Pivot: Implications for U.S. Special Operations Forces, JSOU Report 16-7,

Russell D. Howard and John P. Duvall, Jr.

Military Innovation in War: It Takes a Learning Organization. A Case Study of 

Task Force 714 in Iraq, JSOU Report 16-6, Richard Shultz

On the cover. Frederick Funston was considered a national hero following the 

Philippine Insurrection after the Spanish American War. He was the recipient of the 

Congressional Medal of Honor, and arguably executed the most successful special 

operation in U.S. history. Photo by U.S. Army Center Of Military History.

Back cover. Smokejumper recruits jog during training at the North Cascades Smokejumper Base located in Winthrop, Washington, in June 2016. Smokejumpers, considered the most elite group of wildland firefighters, parachute into remote areas in 

order to battle wildfires that are difficult to access by other means. Photo by David 

Ryder/Polaris/Newscom.
v

Contents

Foreword .......................................................................................................... vii

About the Author ..........................................................................ix

Acknowledgements ......................................................................xi

Introduction................................................................................... 1

Part I: A Unified Theory of Special Operations .............................. 3

Part II: Implications of a Unified Theory of 

Special Operations ..................................................................... 39

Acronym List .............................................................................. 57

Endnotes...................................................................................... 59

vii

Foreword

In April 2017, the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) will 

celebrate its 30th anniversary as a combatant command. Throughout history, but certainly since USSOCOM’s formation, researchers and doctrine 

writers have argued for and against a specific theory of special operations. 

Advocates argue that theory can be essential in determining and explaining the appropriate roles and missions for Special Operations Forces (SOF) 

and for building and sustaining the forces assigned to USSOCOM. They 

argue that a theory should explain the strategic utility of SOF, bolster the 

strategic art within SOF, and inform doctrine. Those opposed to a specific 

theory argue that existing military theories are necessary and sufficient for 

special operations. They acknowledge that special operations have a strategic 

value and can generate strategic effects, but insist such characteristics are 

inadequate for a distinct theory. They also worry that a formalized theory 

may be coopted to serve an institutional objective or otherwise substitute for 

deep, critical thinking that is a hallmark of special operations. 

The Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) has dedicated three 

monographs to the discussion of special operations theory and two events 

intended to bring the discussion to an academic culminating point. JSOU 

Press monographs by Dr. Robert Spulak and Dr. Rich Yarger supplemented 

seminal works on the subject by Navy Admiral William McRaven and Dr. 

James Kiras. In 2011, JSOU hosted a SOF-Power Workshop: A Way Forward 

for Special Operations Theory and Strategic Art. Attendees concluded that a 

healthy strategic culture and the practice of a special operations strategic art 

required the development of a suitable, feasible, and acceptable special operations theory. However, the topic languished as overseas operations, cyber 

power, and countering weapons of mass destruction dominated USSOCOM 

attention. 

Despite these myriad of issues, JSOU chose to engage once more in the 

discussion in August 2016 when it hosted a symposium titled, Special Operations Theory. The symposium addressed the full landscape of opinion for and 

against formation of a special operations theory. Event organizers from the 

JSOU Center for Special Operations Studies and Research proposed publication of two studies and a compendium of chapters relevant to the discussion. 
JSOU professors Dr. Richard Rubright and Dr. Tom Searle agreed to offer 

two studies to further stimulate thinking after the symposium and Dr. Pete 

McCabe, a JSOU resident senior fellow, was designated the lead for a compendium of shorter works to bring the conversation to an academic conclusion. 

In this monograph (volume 1 of 3), Dr. Richard Rubright articulates 

what he calls “a unified theory of special operations.” His theory is simply 

expressed in ten words: “Special Operations are extraordinary operations to 

achieve a specific effect.” This single sentence is a gateway to a rich discussion 

which will force readers to think critically about special operations and the 

role they should serve in the pursuit of strategic objectives. He is intentionally provocative to make readers assess their understanding of existing concepts like special operations power and the human domain. No matter which 

side of the argument you take up, Dr. Rubright’s monograph is an excellent 

start towards forming an academic position on special operations theory. 

Readers are encouraged to examine all three volumes (Dr. Rubright, Dr. 

Searle, and the compendium edited by Dr. McCabe) with an open mind. As 

a former SOF senior leader observed during the August symposium, “one 

of the beautiful things about SOF is the ability to change our minds, take 

a different turn, figure out a different approach, [and] solve a problem that 

arises that we didn’t think about because of an innate cognitive agility.” These 

three volumes provide an opportunity for the reader to challenge their own 

pre-existing positions, incorporate fresh perspectives, and perhaps think differently about what is necessary and sufficient for a special operations theory.

Francis X. Reidy

Interim Director, Center for Special Operations Studies and Research
ix

About the Author 

Dr. Richard Rubright served in the 19th and 20th Special Forces Groups 

prior to separation due to a parachute injury. He joined the Joint 

Special Operations University in May 2012, is a professor in the College of 

Special Operations, and a former senior fellow in the department of strategic 

studies.

Dr. Rubright has worked as a research analyst 

on alternative force structures, deterrence, national 

security issues, and force protection through technical 

means. He has a continued interest in strategic culture, strategic futures and international politics. His 

research and work has taken him to Yemen where he 

spent a year working on data collection and analysis, 

as well as combat patrols in Iraq to conduct primary 

field research. He is a member of Mensa.

Dr. Rubright holds a bachelor’s degree in political science with a certificate in international relations from the University of Utah, a bachelor’s in 

history with a minor in Middle East studies from the University of Utah, a 

master’s in international politics from the University of Glasgow, Scotland, 

and a doctorate in strategic studies/international relations from the University of Reading, UK. Dr. Rubright’s latest book, The Role and Limitations of 

Technology in U.S. Counterinsurgency Warfare, is available from the University of Nebraska Press. 

xi

Acknowledgements 

I would like to thank Professor Emeritus Colin Gray for his challenging of 

my logic, my tolerant wife who let me talk at her, and JSOU-P for providing me the time and funds to complete this work. 

1

Rubright: A Unified Theory for Special Operations

Introduction

Without hoopla or fanfare, a patent clerk from Bern, Switzerland, 

had completely overturned the traditional notions of space and time 

and replaced them with a new conception whose properties fly in the 

face of everything we are familiar with from common experience.1

This monograph proposes a unified theory of special operations. This is 

to say a theory that is holistic in nature, timeless, focused solely upon 

special operations, and serves as an umbrella framework for other theories 

about special operations and Special Operations Forces (SOF). The work 

serves to provide U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and the 

special operations community an explanation of the phenomena of special 

operations, which may serve as a tool for policymakers and special operations professionals. This theory is complementary to most other writings on 

special operations theory, seeking to provide a meta-narrative in the macro 

and a supporting framework to said theorists in the micro. To date there has 

been no single theory of special operations, which is a fundamental gap in 

military theory that this monograph seeks to rectify. The methodology of 

this work relies heavily on the definitions of words (lexical semantics). When 

the work is read in its entirety, the word choices and the implications should 

be apparent and offer an understanding of the theory through its rigor. 

However, it is not meant to simply be a detached theory without relevance. 

To that end, it is broken up into two sections: the first section explains the 

theory and the semantic implications; the second part of this work addresses 

the ‘so what’ of the theory.

3

Rubright: A Unified Theory for Special Operations

Part I: A Unified Theory of Special 

Operations 

What follows is a lexically semantic argument and framework for a 

unified theory of special operations. While most of the work is in reference to U.S. military special operations, given the audience of this publication, this is simply out of convenience for most readers. The theory rests upon 

the foundation of words and their meanings. To some readers this may seem 

academically pedantic and perhaps difficult to translate into a meaningful, 

consequential topic for themselves. The theory is broad by intention so that 

it covers all of special operations and is applicable through time; in essence, 

unbound and serving solely as an explanatory tool for the phenomenon of 

special operations. The unified theory also serves as an umbrella framework 

under which other theories can exist and be linked. Specifically, it does not 

contravene previous work done on a more micro scale, such as retired Navy 

Admiral William McRaven’s theory dealing with direct action in special 

operations2 or Robert Spulak’s theory of SOF.3 Larger scale theories, such 

as the work of Christopher Marsh, Mike Kenny, and Nathanael Joslyn on 

the theoretical underpinnings of special warfare and surgical strike, are also 

compatible.4 The theory is by no means the last word on the subject, but in 

the author’s opinion, it is the primer, or umbrella, under which a coherent 

body of theory can develop that will continually refine the knowledge of 

special operations, the communities, and their respective tasks. 

A logical set of questions should start with why there needs to be a unified 

theory of special operations, followed closely by what such a theory would 

provide. The answer to both questions is one of perspective. To quote Carl 

Von Clausewitz: “Theory must be of the nature of observation, not of doctrine. The second opening for the possibility of a theory lies in the point of 

view that it does not necessarily require to be a direction for action.”5 Theory 

is a foundation that explains a phenomenon to enable a more effective or efficient use of the perspective; not the action that follows the perspective. Ergo, 

the value of the theory is inherently bound to the perspective of the user. 

The perspectives may be very different for the practitioner of the military 

profession and the policymaker responsible for the policy object for which 
4

JSOU Report 17-1

that military is used. Yet, both can benefit from the better explanation of 

the phenomenon. 

For the special operations professional, the policymakers who wish to 

employ special operations capabilities and the general public who simply 

wish to know more about the actions of their military, the first question 

represents different answers. For the special operations professional, the 

answer may be to perform their chosen line of work at a higher level of 

understanding, or perhaps a higher degree of competency. For the policymaker, the question could further comprehension of the best structure and 

utilization of special operations and the forces used to execute them. It could 

also illuminate the need for special operations with an appropriate degree 

and scope for funding which the special operations community needs to be 

effective. For the interested citizen, it may be nothing more than curiosity 

or perhaps due diligence in understanding what their military does and for 

what reason. The second question of what a unified theory of special operations provides is a direct correlation of the concerns and interests just listed. 

In short, it provides knowledge of a facet and function of an increasingly 

important part of the U.S. and allied militaries, and addresses a form of 

conflict that will become the norm rather than the exception. 

The purpose of a unified theory of special operations is manifold. The 

knowledge and understanding should provide contextualization of special operations missions. This work does not seek to use the unified theory 

to advocate for anything. To again use Clausewitz, theory about tactics is 

easier than theory about strategy.6 While Clausewitz’s true contribution is 

not about strategy, but rather a theory about war, he holds a rightful place 

as one of the truly great theorists. However, this theory is a step down, subordinated as a function in war, yet also as a unified theory, larger than war 

as it is unified in nature, crossing beyond just military special operations 

communities. For simplicity’s sake, the author will use the term “special 

operations community” and sometimes “SOF” for reasons that will become 

apparent shortly. This is a semantic designation, and one used for a specific 

purpose; but the two should not be confused as being a single entity. Special 

operations communities stretch far beyond just the military, but for clarity 

and distinction, SOF is used in this work to denote military special operations communities. 

For those who doubt the importance of lexical semantics, the meaning 

of words, which the theory rests upon, let the following question be posed: 
5

Rubright: A Unified Theory for Special Operations

What then is the difference between special and elite? Arguably nothing if 

we want to go by informal and general usage of the two rather than utilize 

rigorous definitions. But, if semantics held no meaning and words did not 

matter (especially in the rigor of theory), it would be possible to refer to 

special operations units as special needs units—they have special needs for 

specific gear, special needs for specific training, and special needs for physical 

fitness.7 For the reader who is asking if the semantics are really important, 

would the designation of their unit being changed from special operations 

to special needs hold no meaning? 

The theory to be articulated is meant to bring special operations communities and their actions under a single framework of understanding. The 

goal in doing so is to provide a theory that is elegantly simple rather than 

convoluted. As a sound theory, it should be universally applicable across 

time and culture. It must have a degree of rigor 

in its inception to survive challenges and, if valid, 

win acceptance through general consensus of the 

epistemic community concerned with special 

operations. This is not to say the theory will be 

universally applauded; it will not be. However, 

at the end of the work, if the reader can find no flaw in the argument and 

supporting foundations, a feeling of unease is not only quite understandable, 

but also is quite inconsequential.

This author calls the theory a unified theory of special operations because 

it brings together separate issues with which the special operations community is concerned. Within the U.S. military special operations community, 

these include the notion of special operations power, the human domain, 

surgical strike, special warfare, and recognized need for future special 

operations to include a whole-of-government (special operations conducted 

with other governmental and nongovernmental organizations) approach 

to tackling the complex and dynamic challenges of the present and future. 

This work will address each of these concepts separately as part of the unified theory, but the intent is to bring all of these concepts under one grand 

umbrella to present a single contextualization of special operations. To date 

there has never been a unified theory of special operations, although notable 

writers such as Admiral McRaven, Robert Spulak, Rich Yarger, James Kiras, 

and Christopher Marsh have all made contributions in their works to the 

thinking of special operations theory. This work does not seek to supplant 

As a sound theory, it 

should be universally 

applicable across time 

and culture.
6

JSOU Report 17-1

their efforts. Rather, it approaches the issue from a holistic perspective in 

order to unify the different themes and concerns of the special operations 

communities. The theory works with the other thinkers because it seeks to 

unify them in the macro while complementing them in the micro. 

Without rehashing the finer points of the works of the above theorists, 

Admiral McRaven’s work focused specifically on direct action through a lens 

of six principles, but this makes his focus very narrow. Spulak examines special operations through the attributes of SOF as mitigators of Clausewitzian 

friction. While he wrongly connects special operations to SOF, his contribution as a theorist provides sound, classically informed coherence to what 

makes SOF elite. Yarger sets a contextual definition of historical American 

special operations and their attributes, yet does not make the leap to an identifiable theory. Kiras and Marsh have argued that there can be no theory of 

special operations, and the general categories of surgical strike and special 

warfare are as close as one can get to a comprehensive theory. All of these 

authors make valuable contributions to thought on the subject of a special 

operations theory. Yet, they all fall short of a holistic theory because they 

have made a fundamentally flawed connection between special operations 

and SOF. This manuscript parses out special operations from tangential and 

convoluting distractions to provide the first comprehensive theory of special 

operations, yet it also accommodates the above theorists in many ways as it 

provides the umbrella framework under which the aforementioned theoretical contributions fall. 

A cautionary point is called for at this stage. The reader may be inclined 

to be limited in thought to existing statutes and codified restrictions and 

definitions of special operations under Title 10 U.S. Code (USC) 167. This is 

theory, not a legal review or a work limited to legal considerations. Restricting thought on theory to existing legal codification represents a lack of depth 

in thinking and conception of the subject at hand and the role of theory in 

general. Theory should predate codification in all cases; thought should come 

before action. Revision of theory provides a foundation for a paradigmatic 

shift, and recodification may follow. To be restricted in thought to 10 USC 

167 on the subject is literally to be stuck insisting the sun revolves around the 

earth. Before Copernicus, the geocentric (Earth-centric) model was canonical (statutory in essence and context) and his assertions were heretical to 

the conventional wisdom. To insist that no theory can contradict statute is 

nonsense at best and dangerous at worst. Another clearer example can be 
7

Rubright: A Unified Theory for Special Operations

illustrated with the Laws of Armed Conflict (LOAC). Just war theory is not 

the offspring of LOAC. Just war theory evolved from thinkers like Aquinas, 

Grotius, and paradigm shifts of liberalism and the Enlightenment; one can 

argue that LOAC, although codified, needs revision. Theory explains phenomena; statutes codify the existing understanding of phenomena as an 

extension of politics. Confusing theory, or the role of theory, and the purpose 

of 10 USC 167 is to lack thought on the subject beyond a shallow level. 

Good theories should be simple. The thinking, research, and analysis 

behind the theory should be deep and thoughtful. Yet, for comprehension, 

the theory should be elegantly simple to convey—parsimonious. Darwin’s 

Theory of Evolution in its simplest form is not complex. Species change over 

time to adapt to their environment.8 Yet, the intellectual process and research 

to achieve that conclusion was hardly simple. This brevity can also be misconstrued as the theory was hijacked to explain social phenomena through 

bastardizations such as Social Darwinism, an unfortunate possibility for any 

theory.9 Regardless, the simplicity and elegance of Darwin’s theory stands on 

its own merit. Einstein’s Theory of Special Relativity demonstrates the same 

simple elegance with the expression E=mc2, but the actual proof of the equation and profound genius it required to develop is staggering.10 The intent 

of these examples is to provide context to the value of simple and concise 

expression. A good theory should also be universally applicable through 

time. Darwin and Einstein may not be perfect explanations of phenomena, 

but they certainly have a good historical track record. The unified theory of 

special operations presented below is applicable to all cultures and all special 

operations communities, and is timeless. While the author is primarily concerned with the U.S. military special operations community, each reader, in 

other U.S. organizations and around the world, should be able to contextualize the theory appropriately to their own milieu with acceptable applicability. 

This unified theory of special operations can be simply expressed as: special 

operations are extraordinary operations to achieve a specific effect. 

The reader will likely feel underwhelmed at this point, and understandably so given the anticlimactic nature of the statement above. What follows 

is a defense, justification, and context of the unified theory. Just because 

Darwin’s theory can be boiled down to a single sentence does not mean his 

work did not have merit or answer questions tangential and related to the 

theory. The reader may notice there is no reference to special operations 

communities or SOF in the statement above; this is intentional. The human 
8

JSOU Report 17-1

factor of the human domain is not represented; this, too, is intentional. There 

is no reference to special operations–specific missions, or missions such 

as counterinsurgency or counterterrorism. There are no references to the 

military for a reason. The statement above is the simplest and most concise 

representation of the theory for brevity, clarity, and applicability. By the end 

of the work, the reader should have an understanding of why the theory is 

written as it is. The reader should also have a foundational context in which 

to think about special operations that makes sense to their community. If 

the work is correct, then at the end they will not be able to refute the work 

on grounds of conception and accuracy; of course style is always open to 

interpretation. 

As mentioned, this work comprises two distinct parts: The first part deals 

with the theory by examining special operations through current thinking 

on the subject, to include the human domain, special operations power, SOF 

not being the same thing as special operations, and the concepts of surgical 

strike coupled with special warfare. The work then moves on to the lexically 

semantic implications of the theory’s words ‘extraordinary operations’ and 

‘specific effect.’ The second part of the work deals with the implications of 

the unified theory. This section examines the U.S. strategic paradox, which 

forces adversaries to respond asymmetrically, irregular warfare as the new 

norm, how authorities should be impacted by the theory, and finally a reality check for the unified theory with real world bureaucratic considerations. 

The Foundation of Politics 

Special operations are normally conducted by consummate professionals. 

To achieve the required levels of proficiency at their given jobs within their 

chosen career fields, they typically spend untold hours learning, practicing, 

and honing their respective skill sets to reach the profoundly high levels of 

ability and knowledge which are directly related to the tasks they must perform. These individuals are recognized in the military, the civilian sector, 

and around the world as being at the pinnacle of their trade. This high level 

of tradecraft, unfortunately, often comes with a deficiency in other areas. 

This is not a slight against the men and women of the U.S. military special 

operations community; the fact of the matter is that there are just so many 

hours in a day. The end result is the described level of proficiency at the tactical level. As these operators’ careers progress, they become exposed to and 
9

Rubright: A Unified Theory for Special Operations

proficient at the operational level of war, and their skill sets and knowledge 

increase while their tactical acumen starts to diminish. As they get near the 

end of their careers, they become more focused on the strategic level of war 

and the end of their tactical longevity. This natural progression provides 

invaluable experience in leaders who must increasingly see a larger picture 

and take on different responsibilities as they mature.11

By the time the operators have matured to retirement they understand all 

three levels of war, but they have also spent a career being apolitical, given 

historical examples like Douglas MacArthur as cautionary tales.12 This is not 

to say they are without affiliations and do not vote; rather, they have spent 

a career with the assumption that the political, by design, is not a purview 

of the armed forces. Politicians and civilian leaders engage in politics; the 

military is not supposed to tread in that realm to ensure a continuity of 

civilian leadership and oversight of the military. Unfortunately, this can lead 

to a detriment in political thinking, the level of war above the strategic.13

There are, in fact, five levels of war (theory, political, strategic, operational, and tactical), even though we often recognize only three within the 

military (this is further explained on page 45). All war starts with and is 

governed by theory at the uppermost level of war (you can call it the first level 

or the fifth level, depending wholly on one’s perspective). It is the theory that 

drives the political level of war, at which point policy is formulated. In turn, 

the policy drives the strategic level where the political object is bridged to the 

available military capability. The operational level is driven by the strategic, 

and then the tactical. However, it is important not to confuse the theoretical 

level of war with the theory that is being written here. The theoretical level 

of war is purely contextual to the entity being examined. For the U.S., the 

theoretical level is driven by international relations theory like Liberalism 

and Realism.14 For the Islamic State, the theoretical level is being driven by 

fundamental Islam with attendant cascading effects down to the tactical 

level.15 This author will delve much deeper into this in a later chapter on 

the U.S. strategic paradox and the implications for special operations. The 

concept is brought up only to properly contextualize that politics is a level 

of war and it is rarely thought about by military professionals. 

Politics is the pursuit and practice of power. It is directly defined in the 

Oxford English Dictionary as: “The activities associated with the governance 

of a country or other area, especially the debate or conflict among individuals 

or parties having or hoping to achieve power.”16 Politics is, therefore, first and 
10

JSOU Report 17-1

foremost a human endeavor. Some other species trade food or sex in social 

situations as part of a social hierarchical process. However, humans have 

taken the process and purpose of politics to a level not seen in the animal 

world. In fact, Aristotle described humans as “political animals,” which 

implies that to be human one engages in some political process because all 

humans associate in some way in power relationships.17 This may be employer 

to employee, parent to child, student to teacher, general to colonel, police 

officer to criminal, criminal to law abiding citizen, or any other relationship. 

In all of these circumstances, there is an element of power, and therefore an 

element of politics. The police officer may be exercising power over a citizen 

to control a situation which is then followed by the citizen agitating and 

eventually voting for the restriction of the power of the police. The parent 

exercises their power over the child, yet in time the child demands a degree 

of freedom and tries to gain power from the parent. All of these processes 

are political and they all have an element of power. 

The special operations community should appreciate this dynamic 

because their chosen profession is rooted in power. While not every special 

operations mission or concern has to do with the exercise of a lethal form of 

power, even those that merely seek to influence other populations are pursuing political goals, and therefore, are in some way utilizing power. Seeking 

to insulate the perception of politics from the special operations profession 

does not help the conception of power or help understand its ubiquitous 

and ever-present nature. To try to ignore the political and only focus on the 

power aspect is to limit the understanding of the role of power in whichever 

endeavor the special operator is engaged at the time. It also makes it very 

difficult to connect the activities with which the special operator is concerned 

to a theory of special operations. 

So far, the author has referenced the special operations community and 

sometimes the U.S. military special operations community, or SOF. These 

are not the same thing. Contrary to many peoples’ perceptions, the special 

operations community goes beyond the very narrow special operations community found in the U.S. military. It just happens that the U.S. military has 

the largest and best-funded special operations community in the world. The 

U.S. military’s special operations community also benefits from the cache of 

usually good publicity and known heroic deeds even in foreign countries.18 

However, this theory is about special operations, not about SOF, or solely 

about SOF in the U.S. military, because the theory must be unified and 
11

Rubright: A Unified Theory for Special Operations

universal to have validity. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Hostage 

Rescue Teams (HRT), Department of Energy Nuclear Emergency Support 

Teams, Bureau of Land Management and Department of Agriculture Smokejumper Teams, and others all represent special operations communities. 

This theory, to meet the criteria of rigor, must be as applicable to special 

operations in their realms as much as in the U.S. military’s realm. And as 

will be shown, they are not separate at all. Yes, the specific missions which 

these communities perform are different, but again, this theory is not about 

SOF, it is about special operations, and in that distinction, the similarities 

exist. For the reader with operational experience in the U.S. military who 

has the qualifications of either a SEAL trident or Special Forces tab, this may 

be hard to accept. 

In returning to the issue of politics and power, every special operation 

has some element of politics, and therefore power. It is inescapable because 

every mission in some way incorporates people. Navy SEALs killing Osama 

bin Laden were performing a special operation, very unusual or remarkable, which resulted in some controversy as it violated the sovereignty of 

a partner nation.19 It is equally clear the special operation was politically 

motivated and as equally clear it had political ramifications, but it is no different from other special operations. An FBI HRT is comprised of and deals 

with people. A successful rescue involves people and power, and hence has 

a political dimension. Even Smokejumper teams, who battle forest fires in a 

man (or woman) vs. nature scenario, are still composed of people performing 

a special operation;20 whether they fail to contain the blaze or not, missions 

have political outcomes because people are affected. Homes may burn, lives 

can be lost, Smokejumpers may die, reviews of performance will happen, 

new funding and requirements emerge, which involve money, and again it 

is back to the political. No special operation happens in a vacuum isolated 

from people, power, or politics. 

What is described above is a trinity—an inseparable connection between 

three entities: politics, power, and people. You cannot affect one of the three 

without affecting the other two. Without the involvement of people, there is 

no meaning, context, or existence of power and politics. With the involvement of people, there will always be the involvement of power and politics. 

Ergo, a special operation is not a special operation if it involves no people 

and it must therefore have a political and power connection. Some special 

operations communities will be less interested in this aspect of the theory 
12

JSOU Report 17-1

than others, especially the U.S. military’s special operations community. 

The focus of the U.S. military’s interest in people, power, and politics stems 

from the concept of the human domain, which will be discussed in depth 

later. At this point, the trinity serves a foundational principle with which to 

contextualize special operations. 

Special operations, as stated, have a political component to them. But not 

all politics are created equal. The political sensitivity of a special operation is 

contextual in nature. A wildfire that threatens the homes of 1,500 residents 

is different from a wildfire in an uninhabited part of a national forest. The 

political sensitivity of the situation will create an impetus to act if people’s 

homes, property, and, potentially, family members are at risk. Smokejumpers will more likely be called into action in such a scenario. They may offer 

no more capability than a hotshot crew—a wildland firefighting crew that 

has special training and is considered better than most regular crews—but 

the political need to act, or more aptly put, the need to convey a perception 

of action (perception is reality in politics)21 may call upon them to perform 

a special operation. Likewise in a military example, a direct action special 

operation to kill or capture a high value target that is not well known to the 

American people or policymakers will not have the same political context 

as a special operation to kill or capture Osama bin Laden.22 These examples 

are fairly extreme, but illustrate the point that no two situations can ever 

have the same political calculus involved. 

As Yarger has pointed out, the evolving doctrinal definition of SOF is: 

forces that conduct special operations in politically sensitive environments.23

At this point, it is important to again delineate between special operations 

and special operations communities. The theory is not about SOF or communities, yet examples concerning them must be used to make points. While 

the author will refute the notion that special operations are operations performed by SOF, that particular aspect must come later. More importantly, 

special operations often have a higher level of political importance than usual 

operations. After all, something must make them special. This is not to define 

special operations as having a higher political sensitivity or importance than 

conventional operations. It simply is recognizing that some operations have 

a higher political sensitivity and level of importance. As such, the logical 

choice of the forces to assign to the mission would be the most capable force 

available to execute the mission. This observation is directly taken from 

Spulak’s theory, which is here described as a theory of SOF rather than a 
13

Rubright: A Unified Theory for Special Operations

theory of special operations (this is exactly the trap most thinkers fall into, 

an inability to separate special operations from SOF).24 In essence, the better 

trained the force, or the more elite the force, the greater the likelihood that 

it will be able to adapt to uncertainty (Clausewitz’s notion of “friction”).25 

Yet, the 82nd Airborne could have killed Bin Laden, even though the unit 

would probably have adjusted and adapted less fluidly. 

Finally, concerning politics—this aspect is focused upon the U.S military 

special operations—is that Clausewitz’s timeless and overly quoted maxim 

that war is an extension of politics by other means remains true within the 

theory.26 Normally the delineation between the normal means of politics, 

namely discourse, implies an element of force (sanctions, embargoes, and 

influence should not be confused with war or the notion of force). Force can 

be most succinctly defined as the threat or application of violence and fear. 

Some will disagree with this definition and may be hesitant to accept or 

ascribe the use of fear as a tool, and it is tolerably objectionable within the 

universality of the theory. For example, the use of fear by a Smokejumper 

to intimidate a fire is nonsensical. This, however, does not detract from the 

theory. The theory of special operations still applies to the Smokejumper 

community because it engages in special operations which are extraordinary operations to achieve a specific 

effect. The fact that the U.S. military 

must take into account force as an 

aspect of power and warfare in order 

to impact people to achieve a desired 

specific effect is simply an attribute 

of that specific community, much 

like the FBI, Special Weapons and 

Tactics Team, or other law enforcement entities. The unified theory of special operations being extraordinary operations to achieve specific effects still 

applies in all cases and should also further illustrate why the concise form 

of the theory is required. 

As Clausewitz’s writings still, and always will, apply to the U.S. military 

special operations community, the people dimension of the trinity (politics, 

power, and people, not the traditional Clausewitz Trinity of reason, passion, 

and genius) is of paramount importance. For clarity, other special operations communities must account for people as well; however, their degree 

of involvement will be relative, and the U.S. military special operations 

The theory of special operations 

still applies to the Smokejumper 

community because it engages in 

special operations which are extraordinary operations to achieve 

a specific effect.
14

JSOU Report 17-1

community will be at the far end of such a spectrum. Therefore, as growing 

awareness of the importance of people has recently increased in the U.S. 

military special operations community, the unified theory needs to address 

this issue, especially if it can claim to represent a unified theory. The term 

for this human consideration in the special operations community is the 

human domain.27

The Human Domain 

The human domain (used hereafter for continuity and ease, even though this 

author has reservations about its authenticity) has had several definitions. It 

is currently advocated as the sixth domain in warfighting.28 The other five 

domains are: land, sea, air, space, and cyber.29 In essence, these domains are 

environments in which entities conduct warfare. They are helpful for differentiating the ways power is used to best take advantage of the environment 

with each environment’s idiosyncrasy taken into account. Obviously four of 

the five domains are geographical physical environments, with cyber existing 

virtually, yet capable of reaching into the physical environments of each of 

the other four. As the proposed sixth domain, Celeski gives this definition: 

“The human domain is comprised of humans, including humans as physical 

beings, human thought, emotions, human action, human collectives (such 

as groups), and what they create.”30 It is the sum total of human activity both 

external to the human and internally within the human mind. 

In the previous section, the trinity of people, power, and politics is covered and needs to be understood, not only as a trinity, but also how that trinity relates to special operations. The human domain is obviously connected 

to people, but also to politics and power, as well. The above definition of the 

human domain refers to human collectives, which is inevitable as Aristotle’s 

political animal requires a political aspect. In fact, Aristotle was specifically 

referring to the human nature to form collective groups, from the family to 

the Polis.

31 Human thought, also in the definition, requires perception, which 

is the reality of the human political process. Human action is not a random 

event of chaos but is ordered for effect, which requires a degree of leadership 

and, therefore, power. In short, there is nothing within the above definition 

of the human domain or any other definition of the human domain that 

violates the trinity of people, power, and politics, nor is there anything new 
15

Rubright: A Unified Theory for Special Operations

at its core. It is simply a rediscovery of what has been long written about, 

covered by numerous classics. 

The real issue, however, is how does the human domain fit within the 

unified theory of special operations? If it does not fit, then the theory is 

by definition not a unified theory. In restating the theory—“Special operations are extraordinary operations to achieve a specific effect”—there is no 

contradiction with the concept of the human domain. As the theory has 

already been linked to the trinity of people, power, and politics, and the 

above definition of the human domain has been linked with the trinity, it 

leaves compatibility of the human domain with the trinity, and more importantly, with the unified theory. But, then it begs the question, why is there 

no reference to people in the theory? There is no reason why the idea of the 

human domain is excluded from the unified theory, and there is support for 

the human domain in the supporting trinity of the theory, so why not add it? 

The human domain is not included because the theory does not require its 

inclusion, and because the human domain is a redundant concept. Further, 

inclusion in the theory, being unneeded, simply adds length at the cost of 

brevity while contributing nothing. The human domain will be revisited 

later in a section on the U.S. strategic paradox. 

The author would agree that the human domain has validity for the 

propagation of education about war for those unlikely to study the subject 

in depth. The fact that anyone needs to be told of the central importance 

of people in war may be a bit damning about the recent depth of thought 

on the subject. However, as with other concepts, such as hybrid war,32 the 

concept of the human domain does not bring anything new to the field and 

has been well covered in the past. Yet, does the educational value of a new 

catchy name justify the writing, time, and focus on the human aspect of 

war? Probably is the best answer. The subject is certainly important, and if 

a new name will provide focus and a context for practitioners and theorists 

alike, then it is unlikely to cause much harm. The only real danger lies in 

the self-delusion that may accompany the concept. If USSOCOM views the 

human domain as a panacea, it could well set itself up for failure as cultures/

ideologies and their associated grievances (millennia in the making) may 

be beyond USSOCOM’s ability to affect, regardless of how much human 

domain is studied and touted. 

The author is troubled by the redundancy of the concept. In essence, 

as was covered above, the trinity of people, power, and politics is the very 
16

JSOU Report 17-1

foundation of war, whether it is Thucydides’ classification of the cause of 

war as fear, honor, and interest33 or whether it is Clausewitz’s definition of 

war being politics by other means. Even Clausewitz’s trinity of government 

(politics and political goals), people (passions and will), and the military (the 

ultimate manifestation of power)34 only has relevance when it is contextualized by people and pertaining to people. So, why would it now be new, after 

thousands of years of recorded conflicts, to discover that people matter in 

war? Unfortunately, the likely answer is that the obvious has been generally 

unstated by past writers, mainly because it was and is obvious, unless the 

writers of ‘new’ ideas have not adequately versed themselves in past writings. 

And, of course, there are the ever-present parochial considerations. 

The fact is the past 14 years of conflict have developed the cachet of the 

special operations community to a degree not possible before 9/11. There is 

today a much more robust appreciation for special operations and a heightened awareness and support for those who conduct such missions. Yet, 

the available defense funding will remain the same and/or decrease.35 As 

USSOCOM is a service-like entity, it does compete for funds under Major 

Force Program 11 (MFP-11). Big Army, Navy, and Air Force have seen, and 

often still do see, the special operations community as comprising arrogant, 

overfunded people who have a self-conception of being special.36 Ultimately, 

there is a fear amongst the SOF community that the services will cause a 

sharp drop in funding to the special operations community. This fear is 

not just paranoia; it is the historical norm and has potentially devastating 

consequences for the special operations community and the skill sets they 

provide.37 One of the SOF Truths is that SOF cannot be mass produced. If the 

community is again gutted post-conflict (as after WWII, Korea, Vietnam, 

and to a lesser extent, the Cold War), it will take tremendous effort and time 

to reconstitute the skills and abilities once they are again needed. 

The best way to remove the threat of appropriation reduction is to establish in both theory and doctrine the rationale and requirements for the 

special operations community. One way to accomplish this is to take ownership of a domain. The Navy is important because the nation needs them to 

project sea power in the sea domain. Whether the reader is inclined to be 

a fan of Corbet or Mahan, it is safe to say there is no coherent debate about 

the existence of a sea domain (maritime) or the need for a strong Navy.38 The 

Army is important because the nation needs them to project land power in 

the land domain.39 Likewise, the Air Force is needed in the air and space 
17

Rubright: A Unified Theory for Special Operations

domains (Note: the Air Force wisely grabbed two domains). Cyber Command is more neutral ground, as the commander is subordinate to the U.S. 

Strategic Command and therefore not the purview of a service.40 So, where 

do USSOCOM and the special operations community fit into this domain 

and power structure? Here is the crux of the problem with past efforts to 

define a special operations theory: it depends on whether one is talking about 

special operations or if one is talking about the U.S military special operations community. To further the interests of the special operations community, it would be bureaucratically helpful to have a domain and power like 

the services; the argument may be that SOF are needed because the nation 

needs USSOCOM to project special operations power in the human domain. 

This makes SOF bureaucratically indispensable, but, in fact, has nothing to 

do with special operations. 

Not only do the existing domain and power structures already provide 

the nation with domains that make sense, they all include the human domain 

because they have no context without humans involved and affected (back 

to the nature of war and politics). United States Army Special Operations 

Command specifically recognizes that the human domain crosses other 

domains.41 More importantly, special operations do not need a domain to 

be defined, and are, in fact, involved in all domains. By going back to the 

unified theory, special operations are 

extraordinary operations to achieve a 

specific effect; you will find no need 

to limit special operations within any 

domain. Extraordinary operations can 

take place in every domain on an asneeded basis. One may be wondering, 

at this point, if the author is so negative 

about the human domain, and if the concept is redundant and well covered 

by other works, why even attempt to address it and ensure it fits within the 

unified theory. 

While the human domain has been covered and is redundant, it does, 

in the author’s opinion, have value beyond the bureaucratic. The level of 

knowledge of the human domain is not as developed as it could be. Technology, network analysis, behavioral science, psychology, cultural anthropology, linguistics, and many other fields impacting or developing greater 

understanding of humans and their influences in war should be studied 

By going back to the unified 

theory, special operations are 

extraordinary operations to 

achieve a specific effect; you 

will find no need to limit special 

operations within any domain.
18

JSOU Report 17-1

further. The human domain advocates are tolerably correct by focusing on 

the concept. And, arguably, some special operations are more dependent on 

the human element in warfare than are their conventional counterparts.42

In essence, it is worthwhile, and there are certainly positive aspects of the 

human domain that are deeper than a bureaucratic ploy for funding. However, as stated above, the human domain is included here out of a desire for 

rigor in the unified theory, which it does not contradict, rather than because 

the notion of the human domain has merit above and beyond past writings 

and concepts. 

Special Operations Power 

A contention that Army SOF operate in and between the human domain 

and the diplomatic, intelligence, military, economic, financial, information, and law enforcement (DIMEFIL) aspect of the interagency, utilizing 

instruments of national power, has been made.43 In essence, DIMEFIL offers 

strategic options to policymakers beyond simple military means. As the 

human domain crosses and is a part of every other domain, it also, theoretically, provides individuals in the special operations community the ability 

to impact the full spectrum of DIMEFIL, again making the special operations community of high value in both times of peace, as well as in times of 

actual conflict. This has been attempted to be defined as “Special Operations 

Forces Power.”44 This is perhaps the second most nonsensical term next to 

‘political warfare.’ 

Before moving on to deal with special operations (or SOF) power more 

deeply, the issue of political warfare should be addressed. It is a completely 

nonsensical term. It actually is a redundancy akin to describing a round 

wheel. The term came into vogue to delineate the difference between kinetic 

operations and operations of subtle means meant to exert political pressure 

to achieve political ends. This is simply an amalgamation of Sun Tzu, Aristotle, and Clausewitz. Consider the following definition: 

Political war is the use of political means to compel an opponent 

to do one’s will, political being understood to describe purposeful 

intercourse between peoples and government affecting national 

survival and relative advantage. Political war may be combined with 

violence, economic pressure, subversion, and diplomacy, but its chief 
19

Rubright: A Unified Theory for Special Operations

aspect is the use of words, images, and ideas, commonly known, 

according to context, as propaganda and psychological warfare.45

Within Sun Tzu’s concept of war, there is a never-ending process by which 

a political entity attempts to defeat their opponent’s (there will always be 

opponents) strategy for victory. Often, this entails attacking the alliance base 

of the adversary.46 As previously covered, Aristotle recognized the inherent nature of the political condition of all human existence. Clausewitz has 

more than made the case that all war is political in nature; it is simply the 

means that differ between a condition of war and a condition of peace. When 

combined, these authors explain, without exception, any notion of political 

warfare. It is certainly easier to invent a new concept that a person has, in 

essence, been exposed to throughout their professional life than it is to read, 

digest, and synthesize the classical works on the subject of war and politics. 

Yet that is exactly what professional soldiers and politicians should be doing, 

not reinventing what is already apparent, as is the case for ‘political warfare.’ 

This brings the subject back to special operations power. With political 

warfare removed, and the human domain equally redundant, one must ask: 

What could special operations power actually mean? According to retired 

Army Colonel Joseph Celeski, “Power is the ability to do something; a special 

operation, as a form of military power, has the ability to do the following 

operational functions in the Human Domain.”47 This again demonstrates 

foundational flaws in the concept of special operations/SOF power and 

links the flaw to the unneeded, represented by the human domain. If one is 

talking about physics and engineering, then yes, power is the ‘ability to do 

something,’ much as the measurement of horsepower is a quantification of 

work. However, in war, as an extension of politics, power is about getting 

other people to conform to one’s will, not a positive motive action. In this 

context, the self-proclaimed ability of SOF-designated units to ‘influence’ a 

population is not power; it is a plan, perhaps not even a strategy, and quite 

optimistic. 

If special operations/SOF power is indeed the ability to affect the full 

DIMEFIL spectrum through the other five domains listed, through people, 

then it almost makes itself directly irrelevant. Put another way, there are 

individual agencies that specifically conduct activities within each of the 

DIMEFIL areas. For example, the State Department conducts diplomacy, the 

Drug Enforcement Agency conducts law enforcement, and the intelligence 
20

JSOU Report 17-1

community conducts intelligence. If special operations power is the ability 

to affect each of the DIMEFIL spectrum, then in essence, it defines every 

agency engaged in the DIMEFIL spectrum as utilizing special operations 

power. But, this is clearly not what is meant by special operations power. 

What special operations power really means is forces designated as SOF 

conducting operations within the DIMEFIL spectrum. This then brings us 

back to the original problem people have had in developing a special operations theory: the inability to separate the concept of special operations from 

the concept and unit designation of SOF. It should also highlight why the 

unified theory of special operations, as stated upfront, is worded carefully 

to be as concise as possible without any mention of SOF. 

SOF ≠ Special Operations 

One of the problems with developing a theory of special operations is the 

intrinsic perceived value and designation of SOF. Often it is easier to contextualize SOF than it is special operations. The SOF community of the U.S. 

military is finite, and like all military units it is delineated in several logical 

ways. Each of the services, and the Coast Guard under the Department of 

Homeland Security, has or had a SOF element that is responsible for carrying out special operations.48 There is funding for SOF formations, MFP-11 

dollars for USSOCOM and SOF-unique gear offering photogenic reminders 

of these distinct organizations.49 The men (and likely in the future, women)50

who kill or capture targets like Osama bin Laden are the modern heroes 

performing dangerous, daring missions. The aura that has developed around 

the Army Green Beret and the Navy SEAL makes the heroes synonymous 

with special operations, at least in the eyes of the public. Anyone interested 

in these organizations can browse Netflix to vicariously experience the grueling selection processes which these warriors must pass—all of which brings 

more attention to the members of the SOF community rather than on special 

operations themselves, a further confusing and unhelpful factor. 

The confusion, and perhaps intrinsic assumptions of commonality, 

between special operations and designated SOF can actually be witnessed 

in conversations within the community. It is not unusual for the two terms 

to be used interchangeably. It would be hard to count the number of times 

people (including this author) have referred to their work as a “SOF theory” 

when they meant a “special operations theory.” The tautology is accepted 
21

Rubright: A Unified Theory for Special Operations

without much thought at all. “What are special operations?” “Oh, those are 

what SOF do.” “What are SOF?” “Oh, they conduct special operations.” In 

the common interchange and vernacular of the community that is not a 

particular problem. When constructing a theory of special operations, the 

tautology makes the job impossible while the semantic designation remains. 

The real crux of the issue with elevating SOF to such lofty heights is that, 

in terms of a unified theory of special operations, they have absolutely nothing to do with special operations. This statement may seem a bit counterintuitive, and for the special operator a bit blasphemous. Yet, defining SOF as 

a part of a unified theory of special operations makes the theory untenable, 

and this has been the general downfall of previous attempts to formulate a 

theory of special operations. Normally, most people could not be bothered 

by whether or not there existed a special operations theory, which is why 

this work started with a justification of why and what a theory of special 

operations offers to the readers. However, most people who have been concerned with a theory of special operations have been the practitioners and 

those who must oversee the practitioners. Without buy-in from practitioners, 

until recently, there probably has not been enough need to step outside the 

practitioners’ comfort zone. Defining special operations to be wholly independent of and unconcerned with SOF has likely not been the best manner 

for obtaining buy-in from the SOF community. 

A running joke is that SOF are special, and if this is in doubt, then all you 

have to do is ask and they will make it clear they are special. While this joke 

is meant to be a dig against the perceived narcissism and myopic tendencies 

of the special operations community, the special operations community is 

actually quite correct when it says it is elite—it is—but special is a step too far 

because semantics have profound effects; words really do matter. The professionalism of the special operations community is without question and the 

recognition they receive for their high levels of skill, tradecraft, and toughness is quite well deserved. The selection and qualification of select communities, such as the Air Force pararescuemen, Navy SEALs, Army Special 

Forces, and Marine Raiders, are all testaments to the incredible mental and 

physical toughness of the airmen, sailors, soldiers, and Marines who make 

up these formations. They are not only tougher mentally and physically than 

the average airman, sailor, soldier, and Marine, but they are also generally 

smarter and more educated (education defined by knowledge acquisition and 

experience rather than who has checked the college degree box) than the 
22

JSOU Report 17-1

vast majority of the U.S. military (which on average is more educated than 

the general public).51 However, this does not make them integral to special 

operations, it makes them elite. 

In restating the theory, you will notice that there is no mention of people 

or SOF communities; special operations are extraordinary operations to 

achieve a specific effect. The lack of reference to SOF will undoubtedly strike 

many readers as wrong. Beyond the need to make the theory unifying and 

rigorous enough to be defended, the inclusion of SOF is not only unneeded, 

it would, in fact, be quite wrong. This work is not a call for action or a justification of funding. The parochial interests of the services and various special 

operations tribes, in this case, cannot be served while remaining intellectually honest. And, at the risk of incurring the wrath of the community, the ego 

and identity of the special operations community does not interest the author 

as it fails to inform the work at hand. Pride of achievement in being part of 

the special operations community is understandable and admirable—but 

only as long as it does not become myopic narcissism, which anyone involved 

with the special operations community knows it can, even though it is by 

far the exception not the rule. Most importantly, parochial service interests 

and myopic ego are all transient in nature. Definitions and conceptions will 

inevitably change over the course of time. A unified theory of special operations must transcend this contextual and time-specific aspect if it is to be 

truly applicable. It must be timeless, and therefore, must be and is defined 

with only the trinity of people, politics, and power to constrain it; it certainly 

cannot be based upon current definitions of SOF, or bureaucratic definitions 

of specific activities, or even U.S. statutes. Just because USSOCOM defines 

a USSOCOM core activity does not, in fact, make it ‘special’ nor solely conducted by officially designated SOF.52

Historical examples of SOF will be explored later as the unified theory is 

tested to ensure it is historically sound. However, at this point, a historical 

contextualization is called for to properly place the theory relative to SOF. 

Just as one man’s freedom fighter is another man’s terrorist, the relativity of 

perspective applies equally to SOF through time. One era’s SOF is another 

era’s conventional forces. Simply being an airborne infantryman today is not 

considered to be a great achievement in the special operations community. In 

fact, while recently attending a conference, the author was asked by another 

attendee why he would wear something as mundane as miniature jump 

wings as a tie tack. The comment was both wryly amusing and somewhat 
23

Rubright: A Unified Theory for Special Operations

disappointing. The implication was that the author should surely wear a 

tie tack with more prestige than a simple airborne insignia. Yet, there was 

a deeper, and perhaps unintended, aspect of the comment. The individual 

who made the comment had to, at least to some degree, have the opinion that 

airborne troops and the achievement of being an airborne soldier was not to 

be celebrated. Such an insignia and distinction was below an accepted level 

of professionalism. At the time, the author ignored the comment, laughed 

and moved on, but the incident has remained a reminder of the perceptual 

limits of some, hopefully few, in the SOF community. During World War 

II, being an airborne infantryman was to be elite; as was being in the Office 

of Strategic Services and the Rangers. The reader may notice that the author 

chose to use the word elite rather than to call that era’s elite SOF; the point 

being to illustrate the difference in terms as well as historic relativity of how 

elite forces are defined. As the reader will see later, there is a vast difference 

in the elite forces through time within a military context, and the definition 

is always relative. 

The Oxford English Dictionary defines elite as: “A select part of a group 

that is superior to the rest in terms of ability or qualities.”53 Special is defined 

as: “better, greater or different from the usual.”54 Many readers will prefer 

and argue that special is a better designation for SOF units for a myriad of 

reasons. However, throwing ego aside, SOF are a part of the U.S. military, 

and every USSOCOM core activity is also conducted by non-SOF designated 

units. Like it or not, elite is the more accurate of the two terms. Using this 

definition is helpful when examining SOF, but is only tangentially related to 

special operations. Special operations communities are composed of highly 

motivated and skilled individuals that generally have advanced through 

lower tier levels of their organizations. Take, for example, the Smokejumper 

community within the United States Forest Service55 and the Bureau of Land 

Management.56 These are two different organizations, as the United States 

Forest Service is controlled by the Department of Agriculture and the Bureau 

of Land Management is controlled by the Department of the Interior; both 

are cabinet level organizations. Yet, the Smokejumpers of both organizations 

are considered elite members of the wildland firefighting community. Their 

standards differ to a degree, but not so significantly that they are substantially different. Smokejumpers in both organizations will typically start their 

firefighting careers in a district firefighting crew. These crews have the least 

experience of all wildland firefighters. As they gain experience and expand 
24

JSOU Report 17-1

their skill sets they may move on to become a member of a Hotshot crew. 

At the Hotshot level, the skill level is higher and the physical demands are 

increased given their extremely high operational tempo throughout the fire 

season. Rather than fighting fires in one specific district, a Hotshot crew 

will likely move around whole regions to continuously engage fires. After 

more time and experience, a wildland firefighter can attempt to become one 

of the approximately 400 Smokejumpers operating in the United States.57 

Competition for these spots is fierce, and physical and mental standards and 

skill sets are unforgiving.58

The above example of the Smokejumpers relative to the rest of the wildland firefighting community fits well into the Oxford definition as being a 

select group of superior ability and quality. They are undoubtedly the elite 

formation of wildland firefighters. This, however, does not give them any 

relation to special operations within wildland firefighting; it only means 

they are the elite professionals within the wildland firefighting community. 

Yet Smokejumpers have their name because they parachute into rugged terrain to fight forest fires. Smokejumpers also perform many other missions 

including surveillance and reconnaissance of fires, medical augmentation 

during disaster response, advising other less experienced fire crews, and even 

establishing logistic bases. It is the parachuting into burning forests that 

captures the attention of most given the seriousness of any such endeavor. 

The parachuting aspect makes the Smokejumpers unique in their profession and it could be argued, therefore, that only Smokejumpers can perform 

this task, which means by definition there can be no wildland special operations without Smokejumpers. This is the equivalent of saying there can be no 

U.S. military special operations without high altitude-low opening (HALO) 

qualified teams to bypass anti-access/area denial 

challenges and therefore, by definition, there can 

be no U.S. military special operations without 

HALO-qualified special operators. This is inaccurate in both cases and again leads to the mistake of attempting to define special operations 

as something that only SOF do, again the tautology trap discussed earlier. 

In both cases, the HALO teams and the Smokejumpers are performing roles 

within their respective mission sets (wildland firefighting and U.S. military 

special operations) as elite members of their respective communities, not 

because they are SOF. It is the mission that is special because, as stated in 

It is not the people 

conducting the mission 

that are special; they 

are elite. 
25

Rubright: A Unified Theory for Special Operations

the unified theory, the special operation is an extraordinary operation. It is 

not the people conducting the mission that are special; they are elite. 

The above distinction may seem pedantic and will likely leave most operators wondering why the distinction is needed. After all, if a career is spent 

doing almost nothing other than special operations, than why is it important 

to make such a distinction? The point here is that special operations, because 

they are extraordinary operations, may be more difficult to accomplish, have 

a greater political risk attached to them, require specialized skills which are 

rarer in the conventional forces, or a myriad of other reasons, and prefer, 

not require, elites. Take the example of the Smokejumpers above; they are 

not the only people capable of jumping into fires to combat blazes. In fact, 

the U.S. Army has a historical connection to the Smokejumpers. The 555th 

Parachute Infantry Battalion was activated as a result of a recommendation 

made in December 1942 by the Advisory Committee on Negro Troop Policies, chaired by Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy. In approving the 

committee’s recommendation for a black parachute battalion, Chief of Staff 

General George C. Marshall decided to start with a company, and on 25 

February 1943 the 555th Parachute Infantry Company was constituted.59 The 

battalion did not serve overseas during World War II. However, in May 1945, 

it was sent to the West Coast to combat forest fires ignited by Japanese balloons carrying incendiary bombs.60 Although this potentially serious threat 

did not materialize to any significant degree, the 555th fought numerous 

other forest fires. Stationed at Pendleton Field, Oregon, with a detachment 

in Chico, California, unit members courageously participated in dangerous 

firefighting missions throughout the Pacific Northwest during the summer 

and fall of 1945, earning the nickname “Smoke Jumpers” in addition to 

“Triple Nickles.”61 So, in essence, while the special operation to jump into a 

fire and the Smokejumper community itself would prefer that an elite unit 

accomplish the mission, it does not mean only an elite Smokejumper unit 

is capable of doing such. 

As this is a unified theory of special operations, it is worth pointing out 

that when a special operation, like the need to jump into a fire, is presented, 

calling upon an elite unit like the Missoula Smokejumpers is the preferred 

choice of force. A non-elite unit (within this relative context) like a Navy 

SEAL platoon would likely be worse than letting the fire burn itself out or 

having a Hotshot crew come in by helicopter. In this case, the Navy SEALs 

are not elite, in fact they would be so substandard it could be detrimental to 
26

JSOU Report 17-1

employ them in such a role. In truth, no Navy SEAL platoon, Special Forces 

Operational Detachment - Alpha (ODA), or any other airborne military unit 

should be employed in such a fashion when Smokejumpers are available. 

Likewise, it would be equally ridiculous to employ a Smokejumper team to 

jump and secure an airfield in a kinetic environment; it is simply not what 

they do best. But again, the point is that the operation is special, and while 

elites are preferred, in no way does the definition or context of the mission 

rest upon a linkage to units designated as SOF. More mundane but perhaps 

more illustrative examples of elites and non-elites that can do the same thing 

at different levels of competency yet still accomplish the special operations 

mission include: a special operations navigator vs. an artificial intelligenceenhanced global positioning system, pilots vs. a drone operator or artificial 

intelligence unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) control system, national mission 

force vs. airborne or air assault infantry, SEAL and Marine Corps Forces 

Special Operations Command operators vs. regular Marines, etc. This is not 

to say units designated as SOF have no value; the author is at pains to ensure 

their credit as elite members of their respective communities is acknowledged. But to move forward, SOF cannot have any meaningful relation as 

part of a definition of a unified theory of special operations. It is the semantic 

equivalent of insisting that only supercomputers can solve math problems, 

even extraordinary ones. As it will be made clear later, the U.S. military, 

as the largest special operations community and the primary focus of this 

work, has a very specific role within a unified theory of special operations. 

Surgical Strike and Special Warfare 

There is no foundational contradiction between the concepts of surgical 

strike and special warfare with the unified theory of special operations. 

As long as the activities of surgical strike and special warfare are unusual/

extraordinary, and seek a specific effect, they are not at odds. Yet, that does 

not mean there is harmony as the surgical strike and special warfare are currently conceived. Marsh, Kenney, and Joslyn argue persuasively that special 

operations can be broken down into these two categories.62 Unfortunately, 

they conclude, “The category of special operations, therefore, from a social 

science perspective, is too broad perhaps to develop a single theory, certainly for the construction of a parsimonious theory.”63 The unified theory 
27

Rubright: A Unified Theory for Special Operations

of special operations is exactly that parsimonious theory that provides a 

framework. 

The problem with the theoretical designation of special operations theory 

being categorized as surgical strike and special warfare is that it once again 

falls into the SOF equals special operations tautological trap. Special warfare 

is defined to include, “activities that involve a combination of ... actions 

taken by specially trained and educated force that has a deep understanding of cultures, foreign language, proficiency in small unit tactics and the 

ability to fight alongside indigenous combat formations.”64 While this could 

describe an infantry soldier who is a first generation immigrant from the 

conflict area in question, the authors above come to the conclusion that, 

“There is also an undeniable parsimony in this definition, as it firmly anchors 

the ‘specialness’ of special warfare to the selected, trained, educated, and 

culturally and linguistically astute men and women that comprise SOF.”65 

This tautological connection is not required for a theory of special operations; it is another example of SOF defining the parameters of a theory of 

special operations. In essence, the above authors are correct; no parsimonious overarching theory can be achieved, but only because, like previous 

writers, the tautological trap is so firmly entrenched in the paradigms of 

theorists on the topic. 

Surgical strike suffers the same fate as special warfare in its inability to 

divide and address special operations and SOF as distinct entities. Army 

Doctrine Reference Publication 3-05 defines surgical strike as: “the execution of activities in a precise manner that employ special operations in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments to seize, destroy, capture, 

exploit, recover or damage designated targets, or influence adversaries and 

threats.”66 This definition is incredibly broad while providing almost no 

clarity and many facets could be conducted by a whole range of non-SOF elements. The following example will demonstrate that conventional forces have 

done this on a regular basis over the last decade. Yet, again the tautological 

connection is made when the authors conclude “This ability [U.S. surgical 

strike capability], we believe, significantly alters the nature of power in the 

international system, as other states seek to gain the status and capabilities 

that come from possession of such elite units and their ability to conduct 

missions such as surgical strike. This has led to the proliferation of SOF 

across the globe over the past 20 years and is a trend likely to continue.”67 

The reader should notice the authors almost broke out of the tautological 
28

JSOU Report 17-1

trap by recognizing that the ‘elite units,’ as argued earlier, have the ability 

to conduct surgical strike. This would be in line with the historical record 

that special operations predate SOF. Yet the authors then slip back into the 

trap as they connect the ‘proliferation of SOF across the globe’ in pursuit of 

surgical strike capabilities. 

Ultimately, while theories of surgical strike and special warfare are not at 

odds with the unified theory of special operations, they do limit their utility 

by continuing to insist that special operations theories must somehow be 

grounded or connected with current force structure designations at the minimum, and allow the force structure to define the theory at the maximum. 

Extraordinary Operations 

A lexically semantic problem arises when trying to define special operations. With the definition above of special being different from something 

else while elite is of the same group but of higher quality, one needs to ask 

whether special operations should actually be defined as ‘elite operations.’ 

After all, they are operations like other operations within a community. 

In other words, if the national mission force assaults an objective to kill 

or capture a high value target (HVT) or a line infantry platoon assaults an 

objective to kill or capture a HVT, is the operation really different? This 

leads back into the tautology trap of linking special operations with SOF. 

It could lead the reader to conclude it is the force that makes the mission 

special, but they would be inaccurate in the appraisal. Foremost, ‘special 

operations’ is the subject of the theory. To try to redefine the subject would 

be to redefine the entire scope of the work as well as the validity of the logic. 

In essence, we have to start somewhere with an accepted topic, and there 

is no way to get around the semantic designation of the subject. While the 

designation may be awkward or semantically cumbersome, the subject’s 

definition cannot be altered to fit a proposed theory while intellectual honesty and rigor remain. This would be akin to developing a theory of gravity 

based upon an understanding of magnetism and then redefining gravity as 

a magnetic force. It may explain how magnets work, but it certainly would 

not be a theory of gravity. 

Thus, special operations need some contextualization for coherence in 

the theory as an explanatory tool without a redefinition. In strategy terms, 

special operations, while unusual, are a bridge (the ways) between a desired 
29

Rubright: A Unified Theory for Special Operations

effect (the ends) and the capabilities at hand to achieve the desired effect 

(the means). This contextualization should make clear the absurdity of the 

special operations/SOF tautology, but to make it clearer, a metaphor can be 

helpful. If an architect (policymaker) designs a house, it is the house that 

is the ends or object. The builder—a geographic combatant commander 

(GCC)—will figure out the best way to build the house. He will choose 

which tools to use (force of choice) and when to accomplish the construction. He may use a hammer (conventional forces), or a nail gun (SOF), or a 

subcontractor (local militias). The builder will use the best tool for the job 

at hand, but the hammer or the nail gun does not determine the design of 

the house, nor does it determine how the builder builds the house. It is only 

a tool to be used when the builder decides it is the most useful tool. So, too, 

with a special operation; it determines the tool to be used, and prefers (like 

the builder) to use the best tool available for the job, especially because the 

missions are unusual, but it does not have to be the case. Conventional forces 

have been doing unusual missions throughout history just as houses were 

built well before the nail gun was invented. 

Within the theory, ‘special operations’ is identified as extraordinary 

operations. The definition of extraordinary is “very unusual or remarkable,” 

with unusual being the most apt for the purposes of this monograph.68 For 

anything to be unusual, it must, in any context, exist in relation to another 

category representing the usual. Extraordinary has been chosen for a specific 

reason; special operations are simply unusual when compared to conventional operations. Underwhelming, perhaps, but as this theory is universal 

for special operations, unusual provides the leeway for all communities with 

unusual operations to benefit from the theory, not just in a military context. 

Rescuing hostages and jumping into and fighting wildland forest fires are 

unusual acts within the law enforcement and firefighting communities, but 

the theory is equally applicable. Importantly, in both examples, the mission 

to rescue the hostages and put out small remote fires before either situation 

escalates to a worse condition; the missions prefer the use of the best tools 

around (FBI, HRT, and Smokejumpers), but none of the groups define the 

mission and, if required, other less elite groups can be used to accomplish 

the mission albeit likely with more friction.69 You will notice the author has 

personified the word mission and allowed it to be possessive. This distinction 

may seem awkward, but it facilitates the thinking of the mission as special 

and distinct. 
30

JSOU Report 17-1

So if the mission is separate in definition from the force used to accomplish the mission, and the designation of special operations are extraordinary 

(unusual) operations, what limits the boundaries of the theory? Where does 

the definition of unusual start and stop in practical terms? The answer to 

both questions is that there exists no limits other than those policymakers and the community choose to place upon the community in question. 

The theory rests upon the fundamental basic principle that the unusual, 

the extraordinary operation, is defined by the usual or the ordinary. This 

relationship is relative in context and therefore constantly in flux. The limiting factor, or the bounds which govern the unusual, is not defined by the 

unusual, it is fundamentally defined by the usual with the unusual as the 

outlying exception. Therefore the unusual is contextual in nature. At face 

value this creates a logical paradox. Within a single community an operation 

could be defined as both unusual and usual. An example would be the use 

of a B-2 Spirit bomber to fly a resupply mission to an elite unit in an area 

with limited access by air due to air defense capabilities. While the Air Force 

would probably balk at such a mission for such a platform at the inception 

phase, the penetration of enemy air space by such an aircraft is exactly what 

it was designed for and therefore it could be argued that it does not represent 

a departure from the usual. However, using such a platform for resupply of 

troops on the ground, far behind enemy lines would be unusual. This paradox, however, is only skin deep. It again leads the reader back toward the 

tautology trap. The B-2 is the tool, while the mission of deep resupply is the 

extraordinary mission. This is much like the absurdity of the SOF tool defining what a special operation is; the same absurdity applies to any attempt to 

define the mission based upon the widgets employed. 

Extraordinary operations are not only contextual relative to what is usual, 

for the theory to be a relevant explanatory tool, they must also be contextual 

through time. This again leads back to the tautological trap when misinterpreted. When looking at the historical record of special operations, it is 

tempting to start in World War II. In fact, the first record of military usage 

of “special” is with the creation of the Special Operations Executive directed 

by Churchill to “set Europe ablaze.”70 In this context, small teams were to 

infiltrate into continental Europe to wage a campaign of the most ungentlemanly style of war to include assassination and sabotage.71 This historical 

event is seen as the genesis, quite incorrectly, of special operations. It links 

specific units with specific types of action leading to the tautological trap 
31

Rubright: A Unified Theory for Special Operations

that exists to the present day. The events and history of SOF since World War 

II fit neatly within a comforting paradigm which sees the linkage between 

SOF and special operations. In essence, the tautology has created a self-reinforcing conception of special operations and the role of SOF in conducting 

such missions. Unfortunately, the rest of the military has gone along with 

the delineation of such roles and mission sets as it allows the conventional 

forces to focus on what it perceives to be its proper role—fighting World 

War II conventional style conflicts even while gutting SOF designated units 

post conflict.72

Ironically, the U.S. Army and Marine Corps for much of their history 

have been engaged in unconventional combat missions. The norm through 

time has been to fight small wars or conflicts that do not resemble large-scale 

conventional fights.73 Whether it is fighting the American Indians, Confederate rebels, Filipino insurgents (three times), pirates, the Viet Cong or other 

irregular forces, it has and is continuing to do itself a disservice by longing 

for the good old days of conventional fights; those good old days never really 

existed except in spurts of relatively short, intense interstate conflicts. Much 

more time has been spent dealing with far more complex conflicts. 

The question then arises: If the theory is to be credible and timeless, 

when did special operations start? When did the unusual become the other 

in military operations or nonmilitary operations? If we trace the semantic designation of ‘special,’ it is a very difficult subject. For example, as far 

back as 1408 there is reference to “Our generals and specials attournes and 

deputes,”74 and in 1733 in law enforcement, “There was a Necessity for the 

Number of Special Constables that were appointed.”75 The designation of 

special certainly did not start with World War II. Yet, the precursors to 

modern military special operation units can be traced back to World War 

II.76 If we follow Spulak’s assertion that there can be no special operations 

theory without and linked to a theory of SOF, then there should be neither 

identifiable special operations, nor applicable theory prior to World War II.77

Clearly the etymology of the word special, as demonstrated above, shows its 

usage prior to the 1940s. And, history has recorded special operations prior 

to World War II, long before Special Forces tabs and SEAL tridents adorned 

the uniforms of units. This, again, is another example of the faulty tautology 

of SOF equals special operations. 

With the theory in mind and restated, special operations are extraordinary operations to achieve a specific effect, and extraordinary defined 
32

JSOU Report 17-1

as the unusual which prefers elites, the theory requires specific historical 

examples to prove its relevance. A comprehensive listing of such operations 

is far beyond the scope of this work. However, two instances, one ancient in 

origin and the other more modern but predating World War II, are helpful 

examples of special operations conducted within the bounds of the theory 

but free of the post–World War II historical tautological trap. 

The first example is also one of the oldest recorded histories of war. After 

10 years of siege, the Greek armies of Agamemnon were unable to bring the 

city-state of Troy under his control due to the impregnable defensive walls. 

To overcome this obstacle, an unusual operation was undertaken with the 

well-known ruse of the Trojan horse. Elite soldiers hid inside the wooden 

horse until it was moved into the city and the Trojans relaxed their guard.78

The soldiers then slipped out of the horse, opened the city gates allowing 

Agamemnon’s army to enter the city and bypass the walls. This unusual 

operation fits every criteria of the unified theory of special operations. It was 

extraordinary (unusual) and conducted for a specific effect: the opening of 

the gates. The next section will go into the implications of specific effect, but 

it can also be classified in military terms as a strategic effect; the difference 

addressed later. In this example, the soldiers who took part in the operation 

were the elite among the Greeks.79 They were not designated as a special 

operations force, nor in any way did they define what the nature of the operation would be. It was the mission, unusual in nature, designed to achieve a 

specific effect that had a preference for the most capable soldiers to increase 

the likelihood of success. The soldiers themselves did not define the mission; 

that would lead back to Clausewitz’s absurdity and the tautological trap. 

There is, of course, some question about the truth of the Trojan horse 

story. Archeological evidence does suggest that Troy was destroyed in a fire 

around the time indicated.80 Whether or not we will ever know the truth 

behind the story is, however, irrelevant. No historical event is captured with 

100 percent accuracy, especially one so far back in antiquity. The importance 

here is that the historical account, ancient in origin, fits within the parameter 

of the theory, and is a tolerably compatible analogy to our current conception 

of a special operation. A remarkable continuity given the number of years 

since it took place and the intervening advances in the conduct of warfare. 

It, however, is not remarkable in that it lends credence to the theory and 

provides historical evidence that the theory rests upon a sound foundation. 

It further demonstrates that there need be no linkage between the unified 
33

Rubright: A Unified Theory for Special Operations

theory of special operations and a theory of SOF, only supporting evidence 

that extraordinary operations prefer elites to reduce uncertainty.81

The second example is arguably the most successful special operation 

ever conducted by the U.S military and a relatively forgotten figure in the 

annals of Army special operations. Fred Funston was a Brigadier General 

of Volunteers when he learned the whereabouts of Emilio Aguinaldo, the 

Filipino rebel leader of the insurgents in the Philippine-American War (following the Spanish-American War).82 He was made aware of not only Aguinaldo’s location, but that he was expecting reinforcements to arrive to help 

the insurgency. Armed with this knowledge, Funston chose four of his most 

trusted officers along with 85 indigenous forces (Macabebe Filipinos) who 

posed as the reinforcements (with Funston and his officers acting the parts 

of prisoners of war) who then ingressed by boat and moved to Aguinaldo’s 

location. The force was able to successfully infiltrate Aguinaldo’s headquarters, capture the insurgent leader, and then egress to Manila with Aguinaldo 

in tow. This single operation successfully captured the head of an insurgent 

organization that led to the insurgency’s collapse and the effective end of 

three years of counterinsurgency warfare in the Philippines (a few other leaders held out for a time, but the insurgency was effectively over). Importantly, 

Aguinaldo was not executed or even imprisoned but used for political ends, 

which will be discussed in the next section of the theory on specific results.83

This operation was conducted prior to the advent of designated SOF units 

and again should illustrate that special operations have been around for 

much longer than such units. While the majority of Funston’s force was 

made up of indigenous personnel, he chose four of his best men, people he 

considered elite by his standards and able to accomplish the mission. The 

context of the mission dictated the forces used—Americans could not pose 

as the relief force. Even a Spanish 

mercenary, Lazaro Segovia, was in 

on the operation, from the interrogation of the prisoner who gave up 

Aguinaldo’s location (through torture) to the actual apprehension of 

the leader.84 This was very much an 

unusual operation, both in terms of 

audacity, force structure, and in the end result. It was undertaken by a Volunteer Brigadier General (Funston was commissioned a Brigadier General 

While the majority of Funston’s 

force was made up of indigenous 

personnel, he chose four of his 

best men, people he considered 

elite by his standards and able to 

accomplish the mission.
34

JSOU Report 17-1

in the regular Army as a reward), four guys he trusted, a mercenary and a 

bunch of loyal locals, and effectively ended the formalized period of the war.85

Consider how far removed we have become as a community (USSOCOM) 

from this level of risk taking and reward. Could anyone today envision a 

National Guard brigadier general and four of his staff he trusted teaming 

up with a mercenary to torture an enemy courier, and then going off, few 

and unafraid, with 85 local tribal fighters to bring down an insurgent leader 

and end a war? Today this kind of unusual operation would lead to a jail 

sentence rather than a promotion, but even in its day it was quite unusual. 

As revealing as this is about the nature of USSOCOM, we will explore it 

further in the second half of this work. More importantly, Funston’s mission 

fits the criteria of the theory. It was a special operation defined as unusual 

and to achieve a specific effect. The mission chose the make-up of the force 

through preference of the tools that could best accomplish the mission. None 

of the participants were designated operators, and in no way did the conception of special operations even exist at the time. It was simply the act of courage and creativity by a figure who would later be surrounded by controversy, 

given his actions in the Philippines as part of our counterinsurgency effort 

(what would today be considered war crimes), as well as later remarks out 

of step with the political correctness of his time.86

The above examples show clearly that unusual operations have a long 

history predating the designation of units within the military as SOF. Other 

special operations communities within law enforcement have similar lineages and histories, and the theory applies equally. Further, while the scope 

of extraordinary operation may feel terribly broad, with unusual being the 

only benchmark, it is purposely done and offers benefits, as will be seen later. 

Lastly, extraordinary operations need to be given another contextualization through time. While the examples above provide a historical relevance 

to the unusual, the term, as previously stated, is defined by the usual and is 

always in flux. The same mission can be both unusual and usual depending on perspective, as the B-2 example showed. But the same operation can 

go back and forth between usual and unusual through time. An example 

of this phenomenon is a direct action mission to kill or capture a HVT. By 

the late 1990s, the ability to gather intelligence in real time to conduct a 

direct action mission to get a HVT was probably restricted to the national 

mission force level of operators. By 2004–2005, the ability to conduct these 

missions was routinely used by SOF as the technical tools had become more 
35

Rubright: A Unified Theory for Special Operations

widespread.87 While both of these groups are within the U.S. military special 

operations community, it was the mission, or more accurately the number 

of missions combined with the dissemination of technical capability, that 

drove this participatory shift. In 2008, the author was in Iraq doing research 

and experienced the following:88

An illustration of the technical capabilities of an unmanned aerial 

vehicle and the opportunities it can provide within a counterinsurgency effort was very clearly revealed on a night air assault mission 

in early April 2008. Twenty-two U.S. soldiers were standing by at the 

heliport in Forward Operating Base Warhorse outside Baquba for a 

mission of opportunity that night. At the same time a UAV flying 

just east of the town of Khalis spotted three insurgents placing an 

improvised explosive device in a culvert by a road. The controllers of 

the UAV, a Shadow, relayed the coordinates of the three individuals 

to an air weapons team standing by; in this case, an Apache attack 

helicopter. While the helicopter was in route, two of the insurgents 

left the third behind as they drove towards Khalis on a motorcycle. 

The air weapons team eliminated the third insurgent,89 who was left 

behind walking down the road, while the Shadow UAV continued to 

follow the motorcycle and watched it as it weaved through the streets 

of Khalis. At the same time, the position of the IED was relayed 

back to the battalion tactical operations center for subsequent disarming or destruction by combat engineers the next day.90 The two 

insurgents on the motorcycle eventually parked it and mingled with 

the crowds in the town of Khalis. It was decided that the destruction of the motorcycle or the attempted targeting of the insurgents 

would be counterproductive as all three were now situated within 

a densely populated residential area. The Shadow UAV maintained 

surveillance for over two hours until the insurgents returned to the 

motorcycle and drove out of Khalis to the east. It then followed the 

insurgents to a chicken coop roughly 10 miles east of Khalis and 

relayed the coordinates to the battalion tactical operations center. 

Within minutes the 22 U.S. soldiers and one civilian observer loaded 

up on two Black Hawk helicopters and proceeded with a 10 minute 

flight to the chicken coop at which the insurgents had stopped. While 

in flight the Shadow UAV continued to keep constant surveillance of 
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JSOU Report 17-1

the chicken coop and was prepared to follow any individuals leaving. Within 10 minutes of the helicopter landing, the chicken coop 

was under U.S. control and four insurgents captured.91 One of the 

insurgents captured was a corrupt police officer wanted in another 

province of Iraq;92 two of the insurgents captured admitted to being 

two of the three individuals placing IEDs that night as had been 

observed by the unmanned aerial vehicle and were subsequently 

turned over to the Iraqi authorities for prosecution and imprisonment; the fourth insurgent was the most wanted target in Diyala 

Province; he commanded extremist Shia militias who were involved 

in sectarian violence against Sunnis and attacks on U.S. forces.93

By 2008, what had traditionally been a mission set conducted by units 

designated as special operations units was then being conducted by line 

mechanized forces. The missions were no longer unusual and were routinely 

being conducted by all of the battalions in the 4th Brigade, 2nd Infantry 

Division (4/2) on a rotating basis. Would the commander of 4/2 have preferred to have the National Mission Force dedicated to his brigade for HVT 

missions? Of course. No commander is going to turn down more forces when 

confronted with real world challenges. However, the point is that the mission had become a usual mission rotating between the battalions to spread 

casualties. It was no longer in the realm of unusual and therefore no longer 

a special operation, regardless of who conducted the mission. Of course, 

when it first started to be conducted by the 4/2, it was unusual. It was a 

special operation being conducted by the line units. As the mission became 

routine, and the capacity for the intelligence collection became imbedded 

at the brigade level, it transitioned into the usual. 

Is that trend likely to continue? Probably not. Even the 2/12 Field Artillery was among the rotation for the missions. Are they likely to keep their 

artillery in storage as they transition back to a barracks force? Not likely. 

They will once again establish the skill sets that have traditionally been the 

bread and butter of line units; they will return to their comfort zone, and the 

type of mission above will once again revert back to the category of unusual. 

The mission will again become extraordinary, at least until the next conflict 

requires it to again transition to the usual. 
37

Rubright: A Unified Theory for Special Operations

Specific Effect 

There are two overarching reasons to use the term ‘specific effect’ in the 

unified theory of special operations. Foremost, it is a theory of broad scale 

intended for all special operations communities. As such, the term ‘strategic 

effect’ may not have adequate meaning for all communities. The term strategic (and strategy) has been widely abused. Technically, strategy, while defined 

as a plan, comes from the Greek strategos, which is the title of general. It is 

an inherently military term in which the way (strategy) military capability 

(means) is used to achieve a political objective (ends). While strategy as a 

word has been usurped by other communities, such as one may now have a 

business strategy or marketing strategy, within the context of this theory, 

strategy, and the military nature of this publication, strategic effect, while 

possibly accurate, obfuscates the matter. Specific effect allows the theory to 

make sense on a broader scale to special operations communities that may 

not have inherent military ties. 

The second reason, and most pertinent to this monograph, is that many 

special operations have no strategic effect. The conventional wisdom is that 

special operations provide an option to conduct tactical operations using 

direct or indirect methods to achieve strategic and operational level objectives.94 This type of vagueness is unfortunate and leads to no better understanding of special operations. In effect, all military actions take place at the 

tactical level, which is guided by and supports the operational objectives, 

which in turn is guided by and supports the strategic objectives, which in 

turn is guided by and supports the political objectives. The figure later in 

the section on the U.S. strategic paradox demonstrates this cascading and 

supporting effect of all military operations without any regard to whether 

they are special operations or not. Every military effort by every military 

unit should have some strategic effect, even if cumulative in nature, and 

the notion that special operations are somehow unique in this attribute is 

nonsense. 

However, the unusual operation, the extraordinary, has a specific effect. 

If it was general and usual tactical engagements and efforts in support of the 

operational objectives, it by definition is not unusual. The unusual operation 

is differentiated because it is not usual; again the usual defines the unusual 

in context. Therefore, there must be a specific reason the unusual operation 

is being undertaken; otherwise, by definition, it would be usual. In truth 
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JSOU Report 17-1

there are very few special operations that have remarkable strategic effect. 

Rather, their cumulative effect creates strategic effect, just like every other 

tactical military effort. Few have ever risen to the level of Funston’s raid discussed above. That was a special operation that had not only a strategic effect 

but a political effect (even a theoretical effect on the Filipino conception of 

self-determination), which helped bring the war to a close. No other special 

operation in the last century can claim to have had that level of impact. 

To a certain degree, when the special operations community asserts that 

it conducts tactical operations for operational or strategic effect, it is in effect 

saying they are different from the conventional forces. In the sense they are 

special by having this effect, they are wrong for the reason stated above. 

However, they are correct in that they are called upon to do the unusual 

operation due to the elite status of some of their units. To illustrate this 

point, the bin Laden raid did not actually accomplish a strategic objective 

at or even remotely close to that of Funston’s raid. It did not spell the end of 

al-Qaeda, nor did it end the threat posed by al-Qaeda. The Islamic State of 

Iraq and Syria’s (ISIS) savvy marketing has done more damage to al-Qaeda’s 

recruiting base than a military operation could have hoped to accomplish. 

And conventional forces could have performed the same mission, albeit at a 

higher risk with regards to Clausewitzian friction and likelihood of friendly 

casualties. The mission should not be classified as having a strategic effect. 

The mission, however, had a very specific effect. It demonstrated American 

resolve to find our enemies, anywhere in the world, and exact retribution 

when we are so inclined to put forth the effort. Does that translate into 

strategic deterrence? Are there ancillary political benefits? Maybe on both 

counts, but time will be the determining factor in the end. It still remains 

ironic that arguably the most strategically successful special operation ever 

conducted by the U.S. military (Funston’s raid) was successfully undertaken 

before the first SOF designation happened. 

While ‘specific effect’ may, like unusual operation, feel too broad and 

nebulous, it serves to rectify the misconception of special operations and 

strategic effect. It also allows inclusion under the theory of a whole range of 

options for operations. Remember, this theory is meant to be an umbrella, 

not an exacting definition to cover precise facets of special operation in 

minute detail. Ultimately, it allows the conception of special operations 

beyond the bounds of the operational and strategic. 
39

Rubright: A Unified Theory for Special Operations

Part II: Implications of a Unified Theory 

of Special Operations 

States maintain military forces and adopt policies to use them for 

many reasons. For those forces to have value, they must be capable 

of being used effectively. Obsolescent or obsolete forces have low 

credibility and low operational serviceability.95

While the first part of this monograph has presented a unified theory 

of special operations, a pertinent question then becomes ‘so what?’ 

From here this author diverges from the umbrella which covers all special 

operations communities to focus solely on the implication for USSOCOM 

as that is the community for which this work is intended. It is up to professionals in the other special operations communities to best figure how the 

overarching unified theory is applicable and helpful within their specific contexts. This theory is not a call to action for parochial interests within the U.S. 

military special operations community. As such, the discussion will remain 

broad and not delve into the actions or roles of the specific components of 

USSOCOM. The cascading effect of this theory at that level can be left for 

follow-on research and reflection to better tune a complimentary theory to 

explain the roles of each component’s constituent forces. 

Foremost, it becomes important to contextualize current conflicts and the 

likely trajectory of future conflicts. This contextualization lays the foundation 

for exploring how USSOCOM and the civilian oversight of the organization 

can benefit from the theory. Fundamentally, there is a shift in the complexity of conflict in comparison to the historical norm of the 20th century.96 

This shift is more in line with the historical norm of continuous low-level 

conflict.97 Yet this return to the overall historic norm creates a paradox for 

U.S. strategic engagement. It will challenge our paradigms and the popular 

conception of how and to what ends wars are fought. This shift is extremely 

important for the theory in that the usual, which defines the unusual, is 

in flux, and therefore what is extraordinary is going to be redefined in the 

coming decades. The implications for USSOCOM will be profound because, 

while the unusual will become the usual or norm in conflict, the perception 

of what is usual or unusual will define the reality. 
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JSOU Report 17-1

In short, USSOCOM will be overburdened by future commitments 

because the mission sets that have been deemed as special operations (often 

wrongly) will continue to increase in importance, and the perception of the 

appropriate tool will cause policymakers to look toward USSOCOM to solve 

the complex challenges of the present and future—SOF in Syria being just 

the most recent example. This could be a boon for USSOCOM if it uses the 

unified theory to start understanding and accepting the true nature of special 

operations as the unusual/extraordinary rather than a set of core missions 

defined by the tools in the toolbox. 

The U.S. Strategic Paradox 

While ostensibly the topic of this second section is about the future of special 

operations within the framework of the unified theory of special operations, 

it is in fact about the future of warfare—the actual conduct of war, not the 

nature of war. War, much like strategy, may be conducted differently, but the 

nature of both is unchanging and ubiquitous.98 Yet the unchanging nature 

of war provides only general terms of reference, usually historical and with 

misleading clarity. The conduct of war is quite the opposite. Pondering warfare is adequate for providing fleeting glimpses of the current juxtaposition of 

history and quite often profoundly inaccurate predictions of an unknowable 

future. Yet, there are trends, general in scope, certainly fuzzy in fidelity, and 

subject to change that may help guide our understanding of future challenges 

in the conduct of war—the certainty of crystal balls and tarot cards belong 

solely at the carnival. 

Future uncertainty is compounded by the tendency of military professionals, civil servants, and the outlying academics interested in martial subjects to focus upon the tactical and operational challenges du jour. Interesting 

technologies, photogenic weapon systems, and all manner of rediscovery of 

subjects previously examined (with obligatory new names attached) provide 

endless subject matter for debate and publishing opportunities. The general 

process of find, fix, finish, exploit, analyze, and disseminate (F3EAD) would 

be wholly new and exciting had it not been conducted by the French in the 

Battle of Algiers half a century ago.99 The discovery of the human domain 

could be revolutionary, unless of course you buy into Aristotle’s idea that 

humans are political animals,100 and Clausewitz’s notion that war is politics 

by other means.101 Apparently humans have always been the primary focus of 
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Rubright: A Unified Theory for Special Operations

war. The point here is not to ridicule or lessen the value of current thinking 

about the subject of warfare (or the profession of the author and readers), but 

to point out that questions of the day are often distracting from the strategic 

problems of a much longer period. This is to say that current operational 

and tactical problems are important, but in a strategic vacuum, or at least a 

strategic paradox, they may not matter in the long run. 

The United States faces a fundamental strategic paradox which will 

become more pronounced the longer it is ignored. The paradox is not static 

and has been slowly evolving; the roots are centuries in the making as Liberalism has continued to influence warfare. In the simplest terms, the paradox 

resides in the inability of U.S. strategic culture to permit the achievement of 

desired political outcomes because warfare has become ritualized through 

constraints which are diametrically opposed to the timeless nature of war. 

More importantly, the paradox is confronted by a world in which change will 

be the norm and populations will be less tolerant of U.S. military intervention that is overtly visible rather than lesser known special operations. The 

good news is that nothing in the future is assured and the United States has 

a history of adaptation when confronted by challenges. If the will emerges, 

the paradox can be broken, but the paradox is also likely to be the single 

greatest challenge the U.S. military, and USSOCOM in particular, will face 

in the conduct of war in the coming century. In essence, the U.S. strategic 

paradox then is that through our ritualization of war, based upon a theory 

of Liberalism, combined with our technical superiority driving adversaries 

to irregular means, the U.S. military is left unable to impose its will on the 

population-centric enemy. 

An Irregular Future 

The technologic advantage of the U.S. military is unrivaled and will likely 

remain so until China reaches parity within a few decades at most.102 While 

the technical advantages of the U.S. military are profound, they also represent a second order effect of self-neutralization. Particularly after Operation Desert Storm, it became apparent that attempts to meet U.S forces in a 

classic conventional confrontation were an unproductive activity for other 

states. China specifically recognized the extreme lethality of the technically oriented conventional forces which the United States developed in the 

later stages of the Cold War.103 Yet, while the U.S. Army may have relegated 
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JSOU Report 17-1

Vietnam and irregular warfare to a second-class military standing, other 

countries realized that an asymmetrical response had become the only viable 

counter to U.S. hard power. In many ways the investment in conventional 

capability had reached a culminating strategic point in which further investment will not provide the same return. This is not to imply that the culminating point has taken on a degree of finality. Rather, for a time, and for the 

foreseeable future, U.S. conventional forces are unlikely to meet opponents 

within a conventional context or framework, yet, special operations will 

remain. As noted previously, China is clearly trying to close the technical 

gap and may well once again make the U.S. conventional force as important 

as it has been historically. In the meantime, the future is far more likely 

to see irregular threats to U.S. national interests rather than state-backed 

conventional threats.104

Before delving further into the implications of irregular war in the U.S. 

strategic paradox, it is most helpful to contextualize war itself. Fundamentally, war is about achieving political objectives through the imposition of our 

will, as Clausewitz elegantly and perhaps obtusely (in his writing) observed; 

this means the use of violence and fear, as politically incorrect as some may 

find such a proposition. The other timeless strategic thinker, Sun Tzu, would 

agree in principle if not within the method or context. Importantly, war is 

not about winning. In fact, the idea of winning wars is a truly unfortunate 

semantic designation. To win falls somewhere between a sporting outcome 

and a lucky string of lottery numbers without any true meaning in modern 

or irregular conflict. While we may want to “Win the Current Fight” as a 

line of effort at USSOCOM, one must ask what that actually means.105 What 

does a ‘win’ look like? Does the phrase make any sense within a strategic 

framework, or does it simply supply a placeholder as a slogan, easily identifiable within a culture that prefers rather neat constructs with a certainty 

of some sort of finality? The future therefore will be, generally, unusual in 

outcomes vis-à-vis the traditional 20th century expectations of finality as 

the end state of conflicts. 

Tactically, you may ‘win’ an engagement with clear domination of the 

enemy force and the objective taken; to some degree this makes sense. However, the United States is not going to ‘win’ against ISIS because it is as 

much an ideology as it is an entity. The U.S. may be successful in achieving 

certain political objectives—perhaps degrading the organization—but the 

underlying ideology is not something the United States can ‘win’ against; 
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Rubright: A Unified Theory for Special Operations

the ultimate fate of the ideology is in the hands of Muslims in the Middle 

East. Politicians get it very wrong when making claims such as promises to 

‘destroy’ ISIS; after all, that would entail the destruction of the people who 

support the ideology behind the movement which is not something Western 

democratic leaders will support.106

The fact that our future conflicts are likely to be irregular in nature 

against opponents like ISIS, al-Qaeda, or other violent extremist organizations of the month, means we will be combating an underlying ideology 

that is supported by a segment of a given population. This population is 

sometimes recognized as up to 10–15 percent of a population, but the exact 

number is unknowable and will vary given the specific context.107 Mistakenly 

in the past, such populations and the insurgents they support have been 

underestimated. ISIS was classified as a “JV squad” in comparison to alQaeda,108 and Iraqi insurgents were referred to as dead-enders by individuals 

who preferred or perhaps could not grasp the significance of either emerging threat.109 The fact is that all war is 

political in nature, and by definition, 

insurgents seek political objectives. 

While some groups may start as terrorist organizations to rally support 

and awareness of a political cause, 

terrorism alone will almost never 

accomplish a political objective. At 

some point, the terrorist group must transform itself to leverage the political awareness it has garnered. Whether an insurgency starts as a terrorist 

organization or not, it must have political support of some percentage of a 

population in order to exist. 

The fact that there is popular support for an adversary certainly does not 

mean the adversary cannot be targeted. There should be no distinction here 

between a conventional and irregular adversary. In essence, the nature of 

war, not the peculiarities of warfare, provide for the application of violence 

and fear, which is equally applicable to both categories. Breaking networks 

through F3EAD and defeating maneuver battalions is at the theoretical level 

no different. However, as the ever sage Yogi Berra once may have said, “In 

theory there is no difference between theory and practice. In practice there 

is.”110 The method of dealing with either a conventional or an irregular threat 

will be quite different, but is highly dependent upon the strategic context of 

While some groups may start 

as terrorist organizations to rally 

support and awareness of a 

political cause, terrorism alone 

will almost never accomplish a 

political objective.
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JSOU Report 17-1

the adversary. If it is a conventional force representing a government resented 

by the people, and based upon questionable loyalty of the societal elites, 

popular support will not necessarily be an issue. Conversely, an irregular 

adversary must have popular support (more so with insurgencies than terrorist organizations), which should be central and a paramount concern in 

any theory of victory. In either case, most responses, due to the paradox, 

will require unusual solutions and lines of effort compared to the historical 

norm. These will be special operations by definition. 

The Context of War 

Naturally, the last 15 years of conflict have provided ample lessons in the 

importance of the human terrain, social networks, actors and agents of influence, tribal affiliations, and other human-to-human connections within the 

strategic contexts of the conflicts. As each context is unique, so too should 

be each effort. Counterinsurgency (COIN) in Afghanistan is not COIN in 

Iraq, just as COIN in Anbar Province, Iraq, is not COIN in Diyala Province, 

Iraq. The U.S. military’s recognition of the value and importance of the 

interagency community to obtain success in these varied conflicts speaks 

volumes on the adaptability of the military as a learning institution and the 

ability to move beyond a theory of victory defined by warheads on foreheads 

alone.111 In essence, the U.S. military has come to understand that all war 

is conducted in a strategic context in which people matter. People will have 

a vote on whether our political objective may be achieved. This may seem 

like an uninspiring and banal observation of evident facts, but it is in fact 

not a historical norm and is partially one of the foundational issues of the 

U.S. strategic paradox. 

Populations have been, are, and will continue to be targets in war. The 

examples are legion from the historical record of Mongols, Romans, and 

a plethora of other cultures and peoples. More modern examples can be 

found in the Russian efforts in Chechnya and Sri Lankan campaign to bring 

finality to the Tamil Tigers.112 Western democratic nations practiced similar 

warfare during the colonial period with U.S. treatment of American Indian 

and Filipino insurgents standing as poignant examples of U.S. military participation in campaigns that would now be classified as morally dubious at 

best and war crimes at worst.113 This is not an attempt to engage in moral 

judgment of past military practice through a modern lens. The historical 
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Rubright: A Unified Theory for Special Operations

period treated these activities and those who participated as normative and 

should be considered in that light. Such conduct of warfare will remain an 

option for the future and will be judged harshly by contemporary standards, 

while potentially ignoring the efficacy of such methods. The Western world 

is different, but only when viewed through the context of time and our ideological/theoretical paradigms of the present, which in turn help define the 

usual, and thereby the extraordinary. 

Figure 1 should be familiar to most military professionals with the three 

overlapping rings of levels of war at the bottom. This model is taught in many 

of the professional military education institutions of the U.S. military. The 

U.S. military performs brilliantly at the tactical level, excels at the operational level, and contemplates the strategic level later in individuals’ careers 

as it intersects with policy directives. In reality, there are five levels of war 

that all fall under the umbrella of theory. It is theory that drives politics and 

policy, which in turn drives strategy, operations, and tactics in descending 

order. By design, the U.S. military actively remains below the political level. 

Some generals operate well at the political level, such as Eisenhower’s ability 

to help reorganize the Department of Defense because he understood his 

role was to execute policy rather than attempt to make policy.114 Others like 

Douglas MacArthur (and his father Arthur MacArthur) fell to ignominy 

because they strayed into the political level and attempted to make policy.115 

Academics

Intelligence

Community

Grand

Strategy

U.S. Military

and Interagency

Theory

Political

Strategic

Operational

Tactical

The Five Levels of War and U.S. Strategic Context

Ike � MacArthur

Intentional Role Boundary

Patton

D

I

M

E

F

I

L

Figure 1: The Five Levels of War and U.S. Strategic Context. Source: Author116
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JSOU Report 17-1

Over time, our conception of appropriate use of forces has morphed 

because our overarching theory of Liberalism (the political theory) has 

impacted the political level within the figure. Behaviors that were once 

acceptable, such as attacking American Indian villages and killing Filipinos 

over the age of 10 who were capable of bearing arms as a definition of enemy 

combatants, have become much more restricted.117 This is a natural process 

of our political system to reflect the ever-evolving nature of the values of the 

population, or at least those elected to represent them. This is not meant to 

be a critique on Liberalism (the political theory) and its impact on American 

society—a debate beyond the scope of this work. The point is to recognize the 

historical trend of Liberalism acting as a constraint on U.S. military activities and should, again, highlight the ever-evolving definition of the usual.118

Limiting U.S. military activities and the conduct of forces in war has a 

long historical precedence. Most societies have held some degree of definition as to what constitutes appropriate military behavior. These constraints 

will be in proportion to the political objectives of the conflict. The closer a 

conflict comes to being an existential threat, the further it will move toward 

Clausewitz’s idea of total war. However, Liberalism defines the sanctity of 

noncombatants as absolute. One need only read the continuous droll of 

international watchdogs like Human Rights Watch who attempt to define 

war crimes and genocide through an almost absurd abuse of each actual 

definition. Importantly, the civilian populations that provide tacit or moral 

ideological support of an adversary cannot be targeted intentionally; after all, 

they have the freedom of expression, as well. This would be of slight concern 

if future war resembled conventional wars of Europe’s past. 

Put another way, we cannot force an adversary (population) to stop supporting organizations as outlandishly beyond any normative bounds as ISIS. 

It is the historical equivalent of refusing to fight Nazi Germany with every 

means available because a segment of the German population supported the 

Nazi Party, and hurting people not in uniform is almost never acceptable. 

Such a paradigm creates a strategic paradox, again, when at the political 

level, policy statements about destroying an organization like ISIS are then 

to guide strategy. 

The U.S. military is attempting to address the paradox—not out of awareness, but rather, out of a lack of alternatives, as USSOCOM and special operations are considered more important than ever before. Contrary to popular 

opinion and public statements made by defense experts of all stripes, there 
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Rubright: A Unified Theory for Special Operations

is, in fact, a military solution to irregular enemies—just ask the Tamils. 

Given our theoretical basis within our context, however, it is an issue of lack 

of will and a moral/legal self-restraint. To address the paradox, the wholeof-government or all-of-nation approach is seen as the model with which 

to move forward. Ironically, this is just a rediscovery of Grand Strategy, but 

catchy new names always sound better than hard to grasp, ill-defined, and 

academically dusty terms.119 In theory, through the whole-of-government 

approach, all facets of national power are deployed throughout the DIMEFIL 

spectrum to achieve our political objective. The means of strategy becomes 

more diverse and the ways more complex. The interagency approach should 

address the shortfalls of purely military efforts in a modern irregular context. The problem, as Peter Drucker is credited for recognizing: culture eats 

strategy for breakfast.120

Figure 1 is applicable to any state or non-state actor with theory representing the meta-narrative of a group: ideology, culture, and ethos as examples. 

When we act against an adversary at the tactical level, it should support the 

operational and strategic objective in order to effect a political change in the 

adversary’s context. Too often, the military thinks in terms of tactical action 

for strategic effect as a win; think of killing Bin Laden and then ask, what 

has been won? How have we affected the theoretical and political levels of 

Salafist Jihadism? Can we change an adversary’s theoretical underpinnings 

or foundations upon which its entire political paradigm rests? The answer is 

both yes and no; we have in the past, but the paradox will not allow us to in 

the future. The historical norm is no longer the current or near-term usual. 

The reorganization of Japan and Germany (the American Indians can be 

used as an irregular example) was a foundational change of our adversary’s 

contexts at the theory level, which in turn cascaded down to the political 

level, effecting change. However, this was accomplished with a tremendous 

amount of force, bloodshed, and suffering of the people, as well as the social 

and political elites. The Allies imposed their political will upon their adversaries in every sense, and it was clear to the populations of Germany and 

Japan that continued irregular conflict was not in their best interests—in 

essence, get with the program or get dead. This level of reorganization may 

work without the attendant violence and wholesale destruction of a country and a large number of its people. However, our success stories, such as 

Operation Enduring Freedom–Philippines, are limited while the continued 

problems of Iraq and Afghanistan remain very real. Solutions will now be 
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JSOU Report 17-1

sought through unusual means, but what exactly will be effective within the 

realm of the unusual is still very much in question. 

This second section returns full circle to the original question regarding 

the future of special operations in warfare under the umbrella of the unified theory of special operations; what are the implications given the U.S. 

strategic paradox? Challenges will arise, such as mega cities, force structure optimization, emerging disruptive technologies, the role of cyber warfare, and other unforeseen issues. The history of the U.S. military is one in 

which adaptation and innovation are the norm and these challenges will be 

addressed with a general level of tolerable success. Confronting challenges 

by including interagency organizations 

will provide strategic flexibility in some 

places, leading to success at the tactical, 

operational, and often strategic levels. 

However, USSOCOM will have to be 

flexible, ready to adapt to the unusual, 

challenge its paradigms and assumptions, and most importantly, accept 

the unusual as perceived by the public and policymakers as a challenge to 

overcome, not a duty to be avoided. 

The good news for USSOCOM is that there will be plenty of business. 

The big Army and big Air Force attempts over the last 15 years have not 

yielded effective return on investment when comparing financial and political capital expended for very little in political objectives achieved. It has been 

recognized, or perceived to have been recognized, that given the constraints 

the U.S. military faces today, a conventional military force may not provide 

the solutions to our international challenges.121 Within the context of the 

challenges we face, there could and should be an open debate whether these 

are regular (usual) challenges the nation faces or are still unusual within 

the context of the last century. The answer to that will depend upon whom 

you ask. What USSOCOM may be walking into, unbeknownst to them, is a 

classic problem of overpromising and under-delivering. If USSOCOM and 

the components make clear that the human domain is where the challenges 

reside, and they are uniquely prepared to operate effectively in that space, 

it may be prudent to be careful what they wish for. In truth, there may very 

well be populations which USSOCOM has zero chance of affecting within the 

The history of the U.S. military 

is one in which adaptation and 

innovation are the norm and 

these challenges will be addressed with a general level of 

tolerable success.
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Rubright: A Unified Theory for Special Operations

human domain. To build a perception that USSOCOM can accomplish the 

impossible strongly suggests an unavoidable future encounter with failure. 

Authority 

If the unified theory of special operations is accurate, which the author 

would strongly argue the evidence supports, then the extraordinary operation (special operation) has been wrongly classified as having an impact 

at the operational and strategic levels of war. In reality, the term ‘specific 

effect’ is far more accurate. It may have effects at the operational and strategic levels, but what is truly valuable is to have an effect at the political level 

within figure 1 on page 45. In essence, this is what makes Funston’s special 

operation in 1901 so utterly brilliant. It effectively ended the insurgency, the 

most sought after political goal of the conflict, the true ends of the conflict 

at the political level. This was not just an operational or strategic effect, but 

a specific effect to cause a specific result. Every special operation should be 

thought of that way, not only to broaden the possibilities of what can be 

accomplished, but to also cause USSOCOM and the operators themselves to 

move beyond a campaign plan when considering what is possible, no matter 

how unusual it may be. The bounding of the scope of a special operation 

need not fit any one or two categories. If the mission is unusual, it does not 

matter if the specific effect is at the tactical, operational, strategic or political level. All are valid, even though a recognition that the higher the level 

of effect, the likely more valuable the operation is as the ends of any conflict 

are inexorably linked to the political. 

But then what does this mean for USSOCOM? The world is becoming 

more complex. The force of choice will be the most flexible, professional, 

and agile. This is not to say that it equates to SOF; they may not fit the bill. 

The strategic paradox takes big Army, Air Force, and Navy out of the role 

as primary actor unless large-scale intervention is again required—an ever 

present possibility, but one that is currently tenuous given the public sentiment of the last 15 years. It means USSOCOM must be prepared to conduct 

operations through the GCCs and in support of the GCCs, or on its own, 

which brings the issue to the question of authorities and oversight.122

Since special operations are extraordinary missions to achieve a specific 

effect, then there is no way to predict the future requirements. The unusual 

mission is often the byproduct of the unforeseen. Sure, some unusual 
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JSOU Report 17-1

missions may be expected: the odd kill capture mention here, or the collaboration with an exotic people of different culture, language and custom there. 

But the unusual has a habit of popping up in unexpected ways and places. 

Ten years ago, no one thought Syria would be in its present state. No one 

foresaw the difficulty of choosing our proxies among the Syrians and how the 

vetting, training, and equipping would take place, or if they did, there has 

been a breakdown of sound advice to policymakers and/or willing dismissal 

of said advice by policymakers. The result has been strategic paralysis.123 No 

one anticipated an enemy with an outlandishly fundamentalist outlook like 

IS with such a savvy ability to control the narrative, or an effective response 

to challenge which we continue to fail at countering.124 The unusual has a 

nasty habit of causing surprise; we could ask Custer if he were still around. 

So how do we plan for the unusual and the attendant surprise it may entail? 

The answer to dealing with the unusual is not to restrict action. The 

application of tools to conduct the unusual operation is not furthered by a 

reduction in flexibility. This is especially true when in the modern complex 

world state and non-state actors have made it blatantly clear they will not play 

by our rules. The solution is the opposite of clinging to bygone paradigms of 

the role of special operations. The Leahy Law is just one case in point. The 

restriction on collaboration with outside entities, from wholly different cultures, with different norms and customs, may be far too restrictive if the goal 

is to accomplish a political end.125 The counter-argument to such a blatant 

disregard for our normative values is that it lessens our standing in the world 

and helps promote “democratic development around the world.”126 It may be 

surprising to the domestically focused political leader in America, but we 

have already lost the moral high ground in the eyes of many peoples around 

the world; it is also quite condescending to demand other cultures conform 

to our norms.127 Freedom of action and flexibility is what the theory calls for. 

You will notice in the theory there is no reference to morality, societal norms, 

laws of armed conflict, or other restrictive measures. This makes the theory 

applicable universally, but it has also been kept out because such restrictions 

constitute a detrimental effect on any special operations community trying 

to recognize and coherently cope with the unusual when it does happen. 

Questions then arise as to which specific authorities should USSOCOM 

have: Title 50, Title 10, Title 22 and 23, or others? The answer, guided by the 

unified theory of special operations, is that USSOCOM should have full 

authority across the entire spectrum. It is not a question of which authorities 
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Rubright: A Unified Theory for Special Operations

it should have, because of the nature of the unforeseeable of the unusual, it is 

an issue that there should be no applicable limitations to the scope of interest, activity, or execution of extraordinary operations. In essence, authority 

for anything should be carte blanche with minimal limitations, otherwise 

the ability of a special operations community, USSOCOM in particular, will 

be limited, and therefore, the strategic utility of special operations will be 

curtailed—the opposite of what should be intended. Such a wide-ranging 

discretion by a single entity within the U.S. government should be taken into 

consideration given past abuse by government agencies from Hoover, to the 

CIA,128 to the Internal Revenue Service.129 Such extraordinary authority will 

de facto come with extraordinary opportunity for abuse, mismanagement, 

and potential misuse or ethical missteps. To be clear, unlimited authority 

does not mean the absence of oversight. Whether an ambassador in a certain country is the appropriate oversight is certainly questionable, but just 

as the CIA must brief Congress on all operations, the same oversight can, 

and arguably should, be applied to USSOCOM to prevent historical abuses 

of authority. It can be argued that the GCC structure is no longer as needed 

as it once was. This author leaves that open to the interpretations of others. 

However, the GCCs, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff, the Office of the President, and Congressional oversight are adequate 

mechanisms in place to ensure USSOCOM does not behave unacceptably, 

not by limitations through statutes in U.S. Code that limit flexibility, but 

rather, through common sense and vigilance. 

In such circumstances, USSOCOM and the component commands may 

find such unlimited authorities to be welcome, and perhaps the theory a 

little bit more palatable. But they should be careful in that the theory does 

not call for any specific action to be taken; again, it is broad in nature as are 

the implications. The theory also implies change within the paradigm of the 

U.S. special operations community. It does not imply unlimited authority 

for the purpose of the status quo—just the opposite, in fact. The logic of 

the theory implies any unusual operation, the extraordinary, is within the 

realm of special operations, not just the extraordinary which fits current 

paradigms, comfort zones, and prized military occupational specialties. 

The fundamental conceptions of what it means to be an operator would be 

in flux. The missions would no longer be comfortable lists of core activities 

which can be translated for the force all the way down to a mission essential 

task list. While there will always be a place for the elite warriors with tridents 
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JSOU Report 17-1

and tabs, the implications for USSOCOM are far larger if the unified theory 

of special operations is to not just explain the phenomenon of special operations, but to also provide more effective use. 

Regarding cyber operations, Admiral McRaven stated:

What we do is we provide our demands. So if we’re looking for a 

particular individual, then we will make sure that we are linked 

with the NSA. They will through their technical means figure out 

how to identify that person. So instead of us in USSOCOM building an additional capability to conduct cyber operations, we use the 

experts at Cyber Command and at NSA to do that.130

From an organizational and bureaucratic perspective this makes sense. 

Cyber Command was established in 2009; the intelligence community 

has likely been involved in cyber operations.131 The message is fairly clear: 

USSOCOM is not trying to take or play in other Executive Branch department’s rice bowls. USSOCOM will do what USSOCOM does best and leave 

the emerging, confusing, and quickly changing world of cyber operations 

to organizations that are designed and specifically designated to handle this 

aspect of conflict. This is unfortunate and brings the work back to the SOF 

equals special operations tautology that is so damaging. Again, it is the nail 

gun designing the house. If SOF do not have the capability to do a particular 

mission, it will not be considered a special operation and within the purview 

of USSOCOM. This is exactly the opposite of the implications of the unified 

theory of special operations. SOF should not be the determining factor of 

whether a mission is extraordinary; the mission should be determined as 

extraordinary by its juxtaposition to the ordinary, and it then prefers the 

elite force to accomplish the mission. Consider a group of very creative and 

savvy computer and coding specialists who put together a string of ones 

and zeroes, which they manage to get into the computer control system of 

the centrifuges, which then cause the centrifuges to spin out of control and 

tear themselves apart? Is the end result not the same? Is the mission on both 

accounts extraordinary and designed to cause a specific effect? Of course, 

there really is no difference between the two ends; the only difference lies 

in the means and ways. Sure, the computer guys have not passed rigorous 

physical selection processes like Basic Underwater Demolition School and 

Special Forces Assessment and Selection to weed out the physically and mentally weak. But does that matter? Does it make the computer guys any less 
53

Rubright: A Unified Theory for Special Operations

‘operators’ conducting a special operation? It does not. The only thing that 

is different is that within the U.S. military special operations community, it 

is a foreign concept and paradigm. It challenges the conventional notions of 

people who, by their nature and through the selection process, are supposed 

to think in unconventional ways—a touch of irony on many levels. 

With the implications of unlimited authorities comes the implication of 

unlimited potential and a responsibility to realize and act on that unlimited 

potential. USSOCOM is not bureaucratically nor paradigmatically designed 

to think that far out of the box, regardless of their designation as creative, 

flexible thinkers and doers. It would be akin to the builder of the house, in 

the example earlier, figuring a way to 3D print a home even though there 

will always be uses for his tools in his toolbox. It fundamentally challenges 

an implied hierarchy within the U.S. military special operations community that values the qualified special operator above all others. That is fine, 

for the niche which they fill, and again kudos should be given to those who 

have risen to meet such high standards of performance within their selected 

niches. It is detrimental only so far as it has supported the tautology trap that 

has and will prevent USSOCOM from using a sound unified theory of special 

operations in the future. The number, and specifics of possible missions, are 

far too lengthy to list, and are literally only limited by the creativity of the 

reader. For example, during World War II, art experts were brought into military service in an attempt to salvage art plundered by the Nazis throughout 

Europe, recently highlighted in the movie The Monuments Men.

132 This was a 

very unusual mission conducted for a specific effect, in no way connected to 

tactical, operational, strategic, or even political ends at the time, but rather, 

a cultural end. Juxtapose that to the looting of Iraqi antiquities and artifacts 

in 2003.133 Where was the creativity in thinking? Who would be responsible 

for such an unusual mission? Surely not the Third Infantry Division. This 

is the complex world of the future, and USSOCOM should be looking for 

the unusual, not for exclusive missions fit for a SEAL platoon, or ODA. How 

hard would it be to draft/buy/convince experts in Iraqi antiquities to conduct 

a similar mission as the World War II model? Not hard if recognized and 

chosen as an unusual operation, but almost impossible for the tools in the 

box lacking the expertise. The future is unknowable; only general trends 

may be inferred until the challenges present themselves. The question is 

whether USSOCOM can adapt to effectively use a better explanation of the 
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JSOU Report 17-1

phenomenon of special operations offered by the unified theory of special 

operations. More importantly, can anyone else? 

The Reality Check 

While changing the paradigm of USSOCOM could be an extreme challenge, 

to change the perspectives of other interagency players and the legislative 

branch, to put it lightly, would be herculean. Bureaucracies are specifically 

designed to resist change. It is human nature to be comfortable and protect 

what you have. The State Department would blanch at the suggestion of 

an unfettered USSOCOM actively conducting any operation they deemed 

unusual on a global scale, and would likely become apoplectic at the notion 

that a country ambassador was not able to provide the final word on operations within ‘their’ country. But the world is changing. Challenges of nonstate actors are not confined to a single country, a single GCC, or even a 

single continent.134 Regardless, the prospects of the State Department giving 

any ground to USSOCOM are highly problematic. The same would go for 

many interagency partners who may deem an unbound and unfettered 

USSOCOM a threat to their self-interests. Like it or not, we created the 

system we have, as a nation, and changing a system, much less a culture, 

requires monumental shifts in thinking and attitudes. 

The reader may notice in the figure presented in the U.S. Strategic Paradox section, the top rung in the graph is labeled “Theory.” While Liberalism’s effect on politics has been discussed, the first step in changing policy 

is to have a solid theoretical basis in order to argue, cogently, that change is 

needed. Such drastic changes do not happen overnight, if at all. The unified 

theory of special operations may be best utilized through broad interpretation, but in politics, perception is reality. 

If the perception is that USSOCOM is 

making a power play for more funding, 

influence, billets, etc., then the outcome 

is likely to be negative. This is understandable, because while the unified 

theory of special operations does not 

call for specific action, it also does not favor a service or logically lead to the 

diminishment of other agencies authority and utility; from the bureaucratic 

The unified theory of special 

operations may be best utilized 

through broad interpretation, 

but in politics, perception is 

reality. 
55

Rubright: A Unified Theory for Special Operations

standpoint, other organizations will have the opposite perception. It is the 

nature of culture and bureaucracies that have been built. 

Congress, in particular, will be leery of expanding the scope and authority of USSOCOM to operate. The very nature of USSOCOM is seen to be 

shadowy, secretive, and clandestine.135 These attributes have historically given 

the American people reason to pause and be distrustful of government, 

certainly since the 1960s, but also traceable all the way back to some of the 

Founding Fathers’ hesitancy to build a standing Navy.136 Following closely 

behind Congress and the interagency, the services themselves are likely to be 

less than enthusiastic with an unfettered USSOCOM. In the world of shrinking budgets, money matters. Money is finite, with each service jealously 

guarding their appropriations, deserved or not. As such, MFP-11 funding 

could require a dramatic increase if USSOCOM were to take on the mantle 

of any extraordinary operation. The money to expand the scope and role of 

USSOCOM would likely have to come out of the services’ slice of the defense 

spending pie—another uphill battle regardless how sensible it may be.137

Does this mean the unified theory is advocating for a greater share of 

resources from defense spending? No. It explains the phenomenon of special operations, and is now addressing the challenges of effectively using 

USSOCOM to fill a role within the unified theory. If USSOCOM does not 

embrace the unified theory and challenge itself to approach special operations in a more rigorously sound manner, then unusual operations should 

continue to be conducted by whomever is able, with the required funds 

going to that entity. It would likely be far easier for USSOCOM to retain the 

mantle of ‘special’ while comfortably remaining in the niche where the nail 

gun designs the house. But, the United States would be far better served if 

USSOCOM, the services, the Legislative Branch, and the other interagency 

organizations accepted that the unified theory is not an institutional threat. 

And while ephemeral and hard to pin down, special operations are extraordinary operations to achieve a specific result. 

Conclusion 

As stated previously, this is not the last word, nor is it an attempt to be the 

last word. The theory is a framework, a way to think about special operations 

that breaks the tautology of special operations and SOF being existentially 

linked in some unbreakable bond. It is precisely that bond that has prevented 
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JSOU Report 17-1

the development of a holistic special operations theory for the last 75 years. 

Other writers, theorists, and academics have attempted to create a holistic 

theory, but the consensus is that one has not been developed to date. There is 

even debate as to whether there should be an independent theory of special 

operations. The author believes there is not only a need, but if the thinking 

of the community is to move forward on a sound theoretical basis, there 

needs to be an umbrella framework, a primer, that provides a context for the 

future work. This manuscript is that attempt. Other theories, like Admiral 

McRaven’s theory of direct action and non-contradictory aspects of Spulak’s 

theory of SOF, are accommodated by this meta-narrative. Hopefully, other 

theories will emerge that further the thinking and context of special operations and activities that USSOCOM engages in. Possible areas of exploration are a theory of U.S. special operations, foreign internal defense, special 

operations in the cyber domain, and many others, limited only by the creativity of the community and the need for explanatory tools. Other special 

operations communities beyond the U.S. military could also benefit under 

this umbrella framework and even inform the U.S. military special operations community as they develop theoretical foundations and implications 

that may transcend their own communities. 

In summation, the world is changing rapidly and in unforeseen ways. New 

challenges will emerge which require dynamic and innovative responses. 

The unusual will always remain in warfare; special operations are in no 

danger of extinction. Even with the expanded scope which the unified theory 

advocates, SOF will remain eminently employable. The question is whether 

USSOCOM and the U.S. government have the willingness to reexamine what 

special operations are and how best USSOCOM can and will be allowed to 

meet the future challenges. 
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Rubright: A Unified Theory for Special Operations

Acronym List 

COIN counterinsurgency 

DIMEFIL diplomatic, information, military, economic, financial, 

 intelligence, and law enforcement 

F3EAD find, fix, finish, exploit, analyze, and disseminate 

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation 

GCC geographic combatant commander 

HALO high-altitude low-opening 

HRT Hostage Rescue Team 

HVT high value target 

ISIS Islamic State of Iraq and Syria 

LOAC Law of Armed Conflict 

MFP Major Force Program 

ODA Operational Detachment - Alpha 

SOF Special Operations Forces 

UAV unmanned aerial vehicle 

USC United States Code 

USSOCOM United States Special Operations Command 

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Rubright: A Unified Theory for Special Operations

Endnotes

1. Brian Greene, The Elegant Universe (New York: Vintage Books, 1999), 23. 

2. William McRaven, Spec Ops Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare: Theory 

and Practice (New York: Ballentine Books, 1996), 2–5. 

3. Robert Spulak, A Theory of Special Operations: The Origin, Qualities and Use of 

SOF (Hurlburt Field, FL: JSOU Press, 2007), 4. 

4. Christopher Marsh, Mike Kenny, and Nathanael Joslyn, “So What? The Value 

of Scientific Inquiry and Theory Building in Special Operations Research” in 

Special Operations Journal, Vol. 1, 2015. 

5. Carl Von Clausewitz, translated by Col. J.J. Graham, On War (New York: Barnes 

and Noble, 2004), 86. 

6. Ibid., 134. 

7. Bernd Horn and Emily Spencer, “Force of Choice: SOF as a Foreign Policy Enabler” 

in Special Operations Forces: Building Global Partners (Kingston, Ontario: Canadian Defense Academy Press, 2012), 16–17. 

8. Charles Darwin, On the Origin of Species, 201, accessed 12 September 2015 at: 

http://darwin-online.org.uk/content/frameset?itemID=F373&viewtype=side&

pageseq=1. 

9. Adrian Desmond and James Moore, Darwin: The Life of a Tormented Evolutionist 

(New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1991), 264–265. 

10. Isaac Asimov, Understanding Physics (USA: Dorset Press, 1966), 107–116. 

11. U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight & Investigations, Another Crossroads? Professional Military 

Education Two Decades After the Goldwater-Nichols Act and the Skelton Panel, 

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house.gov/index.cfm/files/serve?File_id=d4748d4a-b358-49d7-8c9a-aa0ba6f581a6. 

12. David Halberstam, The Coldest Winter: America and the Korean War (New York: 

Hyperion, 2007), 614–615. 

13. Colin Gray, Modern Strategy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 120. 

14. Barack Obama, National Security Strategy, 2010, 3–5. 

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16. Oxford Dictionaries-English, definition of politics, accessed 3 September at: http://

www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/politics. 

17. Aristotle, Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), xi. 
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18. Adrian Brown, “Osama Bin Laden’s death: How it happened,” BBC, 10 September 2012, accessed 2 September 2015 at: http://www.bbc.com/news/

world-south-asia-13257330. 

19. Bryan Bender and Philip Ewing, “U.S. officials fuming over Hersh account of bin 

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21. Richard Devetak, “Postmodernism,” in Theories of International Relations, 2nd 

ed. (New York: Palgrave, 2001) 184–185. 

22. Stanley McChrystal, My Share of the Task (New York: Portfolio/Penguin, 2013), 160. 

23. Harry Yarger, 21st Century SOF: Toward an American Theory of Special Operations (Tampa: JSOU Press, 2013) 20–21. 

24. Spulak, A Theory of Special Operations, 21. 

25. Ibid., 41. 

26. Clausewitz, On War, 10. 

27. Joseph Votel, Operating in the Human Domain, Version 1, USSOCOM, 3 August 

2015, 3. 

28. Mathew Balint, Heather Gregg, Donnie Reed, David Scherr, Erich Schneider, Jeffery Sharpe, Mathew Upperman and John Wilcox, The Human Domain: Military 

Objectives in the Sixth Domain of Warfighting (Monterey: Naval Postgraduate 

School, Defense Analysis Department, 2013), 16. 

29. Ibid., 6–12. 

30. Joseph Celeski, “SOF, the Human Domain and the Conduct of Campaigns,” in 

Special Warfare, 27, no. 3 (July–Sept 2014), 5–7. 

31. Aristotle, Politics, xi. 

32. Timothy McCulloh and Richard Johnson, Hybrid Warfare (Tampa: JSOU Press, 

2013), ix. 

33. Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War (Chicago: William Benton, 1952), 358. 

34. Clausewitz, On War, 20. 

35. Dinah Walker, “Trends in U.S. Military Spending,” Council on Foreign Relations, 

15 July 2014, accessed 1 September 2015 at: http://www.cfr.org/defense-budget/

trends-us-military-spending/p28855. 

36. McChrystal, My Share of the Task, 97. 

37. David Bohrer, “Chapter 6: The Future of Special Operations,” in America’s Special 

Forces: SEALS, Green Berets, Rangers, USAF Special Ops, Marine Force Recon 

(St. Paul, MN: MBI Publishing, 2002), accessed 15 August 2015 at: https://books.

google.com/books?id=tM6VzlwsVzgC&pg=PT126&lpg=PT126&dq=defundi

ng+of+special+operations+forces+after+wars&SOurce=bl&ots=eJtTs6VtGD&

sig=M8X7kRqrkKCbif0RIXuUwzuawqQ&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0CCgQ6AEwA
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Rubright: A Unified Theory for Special Operations

WoVChMIlsu_joD5xwIVRJiACh2P5wgi#v=onepage&q=defunding%20of%20

special%20operations%20forces%20after%20wars&f=false. 

38. Ian Speller, “Naval Warfare,” in Understanding Modern Warfare (Cambridge: 

Cambridge University Press, 2008), 173. 

39. Michael Handel, Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought (London: Frank 

Cass, 1992), 203. 

40. Functional Components, U.S. Strategic Command, accessed 13 September 2015 

at: https://www.stratcom.mil/functional_components/. 

41. “ARSOF 2022 Part II: Changing the Institution” in Special Warfare, 27, No. 3 

(July–Sept 2014), 5. 

42. Ibid., 5. 

43. Ibid., 16. 

44. Joseph Celeski, “Joint Special Operations University SOF-Power Workshop: A 

Way Forward for Special Operations Theory and Strategic Art” (August 2011), 

22–23, accessed 15 September 2015 at: https://jsou.socom.mil/JSOU%20Publications/SOF-Power%20Workshop%20Final.pdf. 

45. Paul A. Smith, Jr., On Political War (Washington D.C.: NDU Press, 1989), 3. 

46. Sun Tzu, translated by Lionel Giles, The Art of War (New York: Barnes and Noble, 

2003), 15–17. 

47. Celeski, “SOF, the Human Domain and the Conduct of Campaigns,” 7. 

48. Antonieta Rico, “Deployable Operations Group disbanded,” Navy Times, 31 May 

2013, accessed 10 August 2015 at: http://archive.navytimes.com/article/20130531/

NEWS03/305310003/Deployable-Operations-Group-disbanded. 

49. Steve Vogel, “Army demotes its black berets,” The Washington Post, 15 June 2011, 

accessed 16 September 2015 at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/armydemotes-its-black-berets/2011/06/15/AG9nfRWH_story.html. 

50. Laura Smith-Spark and Ray Sanchez, “Meet the Women Making Army Ranger 

History,” CNN, 20 August 2015, accessed 15 September 2015 at: http://www.cnn.

com/2015/08/20/us/women-graduate-army-ranger-course/. 

51. “Fact of the Day #44: U.S. Military Better Educated Than Populace It Protects 

(INFOGRAPHIC),” The Huffington Post, 11 September 2012, accessed 15 September 2015 at: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/09/11/military-educationinfographic_n_1873842.html. 

52. Romas Zimlicki, Maximizing the Potential of the Special Operations Forces and 

the General Purpose Forces (Ft. Leavenworth: School of Advanced Military Studies, 2014), 1–4. 

53. Oxford Dictionaries-English, definition of elite, accessed 10 August 2015 at: http://

www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/elite. 

54. Oxford Dictionaries-English, definition of special, accessed 10 August 2015 at: 

http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/special. 
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55. United States Forest Service, “Smokejumpers: National User Guide” (2011), 

accessed 10 August 2015 at: http://www.fs.fed.us/fire/people/smokejumpers/

national-sj-users-guide.pdf. 

56. U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Land Management, Smokejumper 

Requirements, accessed 10 August 2015 at: http://www.blm.gov/nifc/st/en/prog/

fire/fireops/people_in_fire/smokejumpers/requirements.html. 

57. Hillary Mayell, “Women Smokejumpers: Fighting Fires, Stereotypes,” National 

Geographic News, 8 August 2003, accessed 23 August 2015 at: http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2003/08/0808_030808_smokejumpers.html. 

58. U.S. Department of the Interior, Smokejumper Requirements. 

59. U.S. Forest Service, “Chapter 1: History of Smokejumping, National Smokejumper 

Training Guide,” accessed 13 August 2015 at: http://www.fs.fed.us/fire/aviation/

av_library/sj_guide/02_history_of_smokejumping.pdf. 

60. Ibid., 5. 

61. Ibid., 5. 

62. Marsh, Kenney, and Joslyn, “So What?” 

63. Ibid., 95. 

64. Department of the Army, ARDP 3-05: Special Operations (Washington, D.C.: 

Headquarters, Department of the Army, August 2012), 1–5. 

65. Marsh, Kenney, and Joslyn, “So What?” 96. 

66. Department of the Army, ARDP 3-05, 1–5. 

67. Marsh, Kenney, and Joslyn, “So What?” 100. 

68. Oxford Dictionaries-English, definition of extraordinary, accessed at: 12 July 

2015 at: http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/

extraordinary. 

69. Jim Cummins, “Homecoming for troops who caught Saddam,” NBC News, 22 

April 2004, accessed 23 August 2015 at: http://www.nbcnews.com/id/4806269/

ns/world_news-mideast_n_africa/t/homecoming-troops-who-caught-saddam/#.

VfhqQqEpC70. 

70. William Breuer, Top Secret Tales of World War II (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 

2000), 134. 

71. Ibid., 135. 

72. Russell Weigley, The American Way of War: A History of United States Military 

Strategy and Policy (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973), 369. Granted, 

much of the focus in the coming decades was focused upon nuclear capabilities 

and conventional responses, yet still, this fit very comfortably within the Big 

Army paradigm. 

73. Max Boot, Invisible Armies (New York: Liveright Publishing Corp., 2013), 9. 

74. The Oxford English Dictionary. 

75. Ibid. 
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76. Ibid. Within the etymology of the word “special,” the first reference in military 

terms of special operations is with the creation of the SO Executive (SOE) in 

1942, although according to Breuer other parts of the British government knew 

it by different names to ensure secrecy (Breuer, 135). 

77. Spulak, A Theory of Special Operations, 21. This is Spulak’s greatest flaw in 

theoretical foundation, and a surprising one as it is quite obviously at odds with 

centuries if not millennia of historical evidence. 

78. Virgil, The Aeneid (Chicago: William Benton, 1952), 124–130. 

79. Ibid., 124. There has been some misinterpretation of issue of how the soldiers 

were picked. “Picked warriors stealthily by lot they stow” [inside the horse] does 

not mean the soldiers were picked by lot. Rather they were [hand] picked for 

their elite status as any other way would have robbed the best soldiers of glory 

(Kleos). 

80. UNESCO, Archaeological Site of Troy, accessed 13 September 2015 at: http://

whc.unesco.org/en/list/849. 

81. Virgil, 124. 

82. Gregg Jones, Honor in the Dust: Theodore Roosevelt, War in the Philippines, and 

the Rise and Fall of America’s Imperial Dream (New York: Penguin, 2012), 216. 

83. Ibid., 217. 

84. Ibid. 

85. Ernest Dupuy and Trevor Dupuy, The Encyclopedia of Military History: from 

3500 B.C. to the present (New York: Harper and Row, 1986), 1011. 

86. Paul Kramer “The Water Cure: Debating torture and counterinsurgency—a 

century ago” The New Yorker, 25 February 2008, accessed 16 September 2015 at: 

http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2008/02/25/the-water-cure. 

87. McChrystal, My Share of the Task, 188–192. 

88. Richard Rubright, The Role and Limitations of Technology in U.S. Counterinsurgency Warfare (USA: University of Nebraska Press, 2015), 84–85. 

89. Interview with Petty Officer First Class Sean Mulligan, United States Navy, 

(Attached) HHC 4/2ID, FOB Warhorse Iraq, 1 March 2008. 

90. Interview with Major Mike Garcia, United States Army, HHC 4/2ID, FOB Warhorse Iraq, 3 April 2008. 

91. Personal Experience, Air Reaction Force Mission with A Troop 2/1 CAV 4/2 ID, 

Diyala Province Iraq, 2 April 2008. 

92. Interview with Major Garcia. 

93. Interview with Major Thomas Rider, United States Army, Provost Marshall HHC 

4/2ID, FOB Warhorse Iraq, 4 April 2008. 

94. “Introduction to Special Operations,” accessed 16 September 2015 at: https://jSOu.

blackboard.com/bbcswebdav/library/Library%20Content/JSOU%20References/

JSOU-ISOF/LesSOn%20Presentations/LesSOn%201.1%20%2827Sept12%29/

LesSOn%201%20PowerPoint/L1%20SO%20Final%20PPT%20with%20notes.pdf. 
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95. Roger Barnett, Asymmetrical Warfare: Today’s Challenges to U.S. Military Power 

(Washington D.C.: Brasseys, 2003), 95. 

96. Colin Gray, Another Bloody Century (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 2005), 

217. 

97. Ian Morris, War! What Is It Good For? (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 

2014), 150. 

98. Colin Gray, Modern Strategy (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1999), 354. 

99. Alez von Tunzelmann, “The Battle of Algiers: a masterpiece of historical accuracy,” 

The Guardian, 26 March 2009, accessed 1 July 2015 at: http://www.theguardian.

com/film/2009/mar/26/the-battle-of-algiers-film-historical-accuracy. The French 

methods were brutal, yet effective, and broke the cellular insurgent structure 

with a continuous process much like 3FEAD. While the methods used are obviously out of bounds today, in both cases it was recognized that extremely high 

operational tempo, based upon intelligence, is paramount in a CT effort. Roger 

Trinquier’s account remains the best textual record and lessons learned even 

though his politically incorrect writings have fallen from favor in comparison 

to David Galula. 

100. Aristotle, Politics, xi. This observation is widely quoted, but the totalities of its 

implications are seldom recognized. In essence, all human activity is political in 

nature even though Aristotle’s observation was meant to explain the construction 

of the cooperative unit from family to Polis. 

101. Carl Von Clausewitz, “Book One: On the Nature of War,” in The Book of War: 

Sun-Tzu’s ‘The Art of War’ and ‘On War’ series, Editor Caleb Carr; Introduction 

by Ralph Peters; Roger T. Ames and O. J. Matthijs Jolles, Translators (New York: 

The Modern Library, 2000), 271. 

102. Gray, Another Bloody Century, 172. 

103. U.S. Embassy Beijing, “The Gulf War—Lessons for Chinese Military S&T” (Nov 

1996), accessed 26 June 2015 at: http://fas.org/nuke/guide/china/doctrine/stmil14.

htm. 

104. James Kiras, Understanding Modern Warfare (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 

University Press, 2008), 227. We should be careful not to dismiss regular warfare 

between other state belligerents. Such conflict may be closer to technical parity 

and take on conventional characteristics which the United States will be wellsuited to provide a technical upper-hand to a chosen side. 

105. United States Special Operations Command, SOCOM 2020, USSOCOM Public 

Affairs Office. 

106. Julian Borger and Patrick Wintour, “Obama vows to destroy ISIS’s ‘brand of evil’ 

as Iraq requests help from Britain,” The Guardian, 24 September 2014, accessed 

29 June 2015 at: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/sep/24/obama-isisbrand-of-evil-uk-air-strikes-iraq. A serious question should arise of the degree 

of strategic understanding of political leaders when such statements are made. 
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Rubright: A Unified Theory for Special Operations

107. Department of the Army, FM 3-24 Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies 

(Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2006), 32. 

108. Steve Contorno, “What Obama Said about Islamic State as a ‘JV’ team,” Politifact, 7 September 2014, accessed 28 June 2015 at: http://www.politifact.com/

truth-o-meter/statements/2014/sep/07/barack-obama/what-obama-said-aboutislamic-state-jv-team/. This reference has been spun back and forth. At the end of 

the day, the reference is still there and it shows that there is often a tendency to 

underestimate irregular threats until they exponentially become more dangerous, ISIS being a prime example. 

109. Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Imperial Life in the Emerald City: Inside Iraq’s Green Zone

(New York: Random House 2006), 86–89. The disconnect to reality was at the 

political level in both Washington, D.C., as well Iraq. 

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brainyquote.com/quotes/quotes/y/yogiberra141506.html. 

111. Department of the Army, FM 3-24 Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies. This 

was the first edition of FM 3-24 and really is mostly a rework of David Gaulua’s 

writings on COIN. The recognition of irregular warfare as an important military 

activity is currently and widely accepted; however, whether the Army will remain 

focused on IW in the future remains to be seen. 

112. United Nations, “Report of the Secretary-General’s Panel of Experts on Accountability in Sri Lanka,” 31 March 2011, accessed 27 June 2015 at: http://www.un.org/

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Yale University Press 1990), 118. Ike also showed his political acumen as Supreme 

Allied Commander in dealing with the different allied personalities and strategic 

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115. David Halberstam, The Coldest Winter: America and the Korean War (New York: 

Hyperion 2007), 592–594. Halberstam’s account of the Korean War is unparalleled in scope and complexity. 

116. The author created this chart to specifically demonstrate U.S. strategic context 

to students. While other countries see a different role of the military within the 

political realm, the central five levels of war are applicable to any state or nonstate actor. When we describe an actor as “irrational” (ISIS), it simply means that 

we do not understand the theoretical drive of the political decisions cascading 

down to the tactical actions. 

117. Jones, 312. 

118. Barnett, 130–131. 

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JSOU Report 17-1

pwc.com/media/file/Katzenbach-Center_Webinar_Culture-Eats-Strategy-forBreakfast.pdf. Peter Ducker is given rightful credit for the phrase. In essence, 

no matter how good your strategy may be, cultures which are not susceptible to 

the strategy, or by identity cannot cooperate with it, may relegate your strategy 

to meaninglessness. 

121. Barnett, 130. 

122. Special Operations Reference Manual, 4th ed. (Tampa, FL: JSOU Press, 2015), 

2–13. 

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accessed 19 September 2015 at: http://www.leahy.senate.gov/issues/human-rights. 

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everything-you-need-to-know-about-the-irs-scandal-in-one-faq/. 

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132. Jim Morrison, “The True Story of the Monuments Men,” Smithsonian, 7 February 

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136. George Daughan, 1812: The Navies War (New York: Basic Books, 2013), 6–8. 

137. Robert M. Gates, Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War (New York: Alfred Knopf, 

2014), 457–459. Even if the services agreed to a reallocation, congressional pet 

programs could well take precedence.