Air University

Steven L. Kwast, Lieutenant General, Commander and President

Air Force Research Institute

Dale L. Hayden, PhD, Director
AIR UNIVERSITY

Air Force Research Institute

Shaping Air Mobility Forces 

for Future Relevance

Robert C. Owen

AFRI Paper 2017-1

Air University Press

Air Force Research Institute

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama
Project Editor

Donna Budjenska

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: Owen, Robert C., 1951- author. | Air University (U.S.). Air Force 

Research Institute, issuing body. | Air University (U.S.). Press, 

publisher.

Title: Shaping air mobility forces for future relevance / Robert C. Owen.

Other titles: Research paper (Air University (U.S.). Air Force Research 

Institute) ; 2017-1. 1537-3371

Description: Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama : Air University Press, Air 

Force Research Institute, [2017] | Series: AFRI paper, ISSN 1537-3371 ; 

2017-1 | Includes bibliographical references.

Identifiers: LCCN 2016057446| ISBN 9781585662746 | ISBN 1585662747

Subjects: LCSH: National Air Mobility System (U.S.) | Airmobile operations 

 (Military science) | Airlift, Military--United States. | Unified 

 operations (Military science)

Classification: LCC UD493 .O94 2017 | DDC 358.4/460973—dc23 | SUDOC 

D 301.26/7-5:2017-1

LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2016057446

Published by Air University Press in January 2017

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A DIVISION OF THE AIR FORCE RESEARCH INSTITUTE
iii

Contents

List of Illustrations v

About the Author vii

Introduction 1

  Context: The National Air Mobility System 1

 Emerging Challenges 10

 Air Mobility Program of Record: 

 Capabilities and Shortfalls 16

   Opportunities 28

 Next Steps 31

Notes 32

Abbreviations 37

Appendix 39

v

List of Illustrations

Figure

1 Chinook and Osprey aircraft 4

2 Tier 2 and Tier 3 airfields 6

3 Planforms of C-17, A400M, and C-130J 8

4 XC-142A and C-7 9

5 C-130 parked next to C-5 11

6 Two approaches to disaggregating combat air basing 13

7 Operation Serval map 22

8 YC-14 and YC-15 24

9 A400M on grass and dragging F-18s 25

10 KC-130 with two F-35B Lightning II Joint Strike Fighters 28

Table

1 The national air mobility system 2

vii

About the Author

Robert C. Owen is a professor in the Department of Aeronautical Science 

at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University, Daytona Beach Campus. In this 

position, he teaches courses in manned and unmanned aviation operations, 

law, and history and conducts research in national defense policy issues. 

Owen joined the Embry-Riddle faculty in 2002, following a 28-year career 

with the United States Air Force. His military career included a mix of operational, staff, and advanced education assignments. He is both an Air Force 

command pilot and a commercial pilot and has logged over 4,500 hours of 

flight time in around 25 different aircraft. Professor Owen also served on the 

Headquarters Air Force staff and the Headquarters Air Mobility Command 

staff as a doctrinalist and strategic planner. His academic assignments included tours as an assistant professor of history at the US Air Force Academy, 

dean of the USAF’s School of Advanced Airpower Studies (now the School of 

Advanced Air and Space Studies), the service’s graduate school for strategic 

planners, and as chair of the Aeronautical Science Department at EmbryRiddle. In addition to numerous articles and monographs, his book publications include the Chronology volume of the Gulf War Air Power Survey (1995), 

Deliberate Force: A Case Study in Effective Air Campaigning (2000), and Air 

Mobility: A Brief History of the American Experience (2013). 

1

Introduction

This report asks whether the national air mobility system (NAMS) of the 

United States will or will not be able to accomplish its full spread of mission 

responsibilities in an uncertain future fraught with emerging challenges and 

threats. More specifically, this report will examine operational, institutional, 

doctrinal, and technological trends shaping a useful answer to that question. 

That answer will recognize the unequalled readiness of the NAMS for future 

wars and conflicts while also identifying some of its more troubling shortfalls 

in specific task areas. In the end, this study will identify opportunities to mitigate those shortfalls in the near term and without breaking the defense budget, and it will propose some initial steps along a path to further reducing or 

even eliminating them over the longer term. Accordingly, this report proceeds in four sections. It begins with a brief discussion of some of the more 

influential and enduring contextual elements of air mobility policy—namely 

structure, mission, and technology. It describes some emerging challenges to 

the nation’s ability to conduct global air mobility operations effectively. It then 

discusses shortfalls in the current program of record fleet’s ability to address 

those challenges and ends by identifying near- and longer-term opportunities 

to make things better in a “challenging fiscal environment.”1

Context: The National Air Mobility System

Enduring contextual elements of the NAMS will influence the success of 

any future decisions regarding its organization, fleet structure, doctrines, and 

so on. Its roots go back almost exactly a century, when the US Army used 

aircraft to fly dispatches and mail in support of the 1916 Punitive Expedition 

into Mexico. The modern system—an interconnected complex of airlift and 

air refueling operating forces and a global infrastructure of command and 

support elements—has been in existence since the late 1940s. Though the 

NAMS has undergone refinements in the details of its institutional composition and specific mission requirements, its foundational structure, mission 

responsibilities, and technological constraints have remained (and likely will 

remain) stable. Any efforts to understand and shape the future of the air mobility system, therefore, must begin with an appreciation of those enduring 

elements of the NAMS and their relevance to planning and operations.

Structure

The NAMS consists of four components. The Civil Reserve Air Fleet 

(CRAF) is the largest component in terms of airlift capacity, currently provid-
2

ing about half of the 54 million ton-miles per day (MTMD) lift capacity of 

the NAMS.2

 As of January 2016, 20 airlines were contributing 453 modern 

passenger and cargo aircraft to the CRAF, 415 of which were large and mostly 

wide-body aircraft suited to international operations.3

 The military components of the NAMS are twofold and contain the active duty component and 

the air reserve component (ARC, which consists of the Air National Guard 

and the Air Force Reserve). Most ARC and active forces are assigned to units 

aligned with only one component, but some associate units share common 

pools of aircraft and equipment. In 2016 the combined aircraft strengths of 

the active and ARC components included 52 C-5 and 223 C-17 long-range 

transports, about 330 (decreasing toward 300) C-130 theater transports, and 

about 400 KC-135 and 59 KC-10 air refueling aircraft with secondary air 

transport capabilities. The so-called air mobility enterprise comprises the 

fourth component of the NAMS. It consists of the whole global network of 

permanent and temporary bases, mobile support units, command-andcontrol centers, coordination and liaison elements, planning staffs, education 

and training institutions, communications systems, maintenance depots, and 

a host of other institutions needed to keep the NAMS running effectively and 

able to conduct planned and unexpected global operations.4

Table 1. The national air mobility system 

Component Content of component Example of component 

content

Civil Reserve Air Fleet 450+ passenger and cargo 

aircraft

Military:

Active component

Air reserve component 

(Air National Guard 

and Air Reserve)

575+ transports

450+ tankers

Air mobility 

enterprise

People

Bases

Command and control, etc.

The command relationships applied to these forces are consistent with US 

joint doctrines. The Air Force, Air National Guard, and Air Force components of the geographic combatant commands—such as Air Forces Europe, 

Air Forces Africa, and Pacific Air Forces—perform the service functions of 
3

training, organizing, equipping, and sustaining mobility forces. Through 

standing documents and amending orders in times of crisis, the secretary of 

defense assigns all operational air mobility units to combatant commands. Of 

these commands, the US Transportation Command controls most long-range 

or global air mobility forces and provides general, or common user, air mobility and sustainment support to the entire defense community. US geographic 

commands, such as the European, Africa, and Pacific Command, receive theater forces for support of their own operations. Despite their theater appellation, these geographically assigned air mobility forces can consist of any aircraft type, though they tend to be C-130s, C-17s, and KC-135s. Combatant 

commanders normally assign operational command of their air mobility 

forces to their joint force air component commanders, who control them 

through the air operations centers of numbered air forces, most importantly 

Ninth Air Force for Central Command, Eleventh Air Force for Pacific Command, Seventeenth Air Force for European and Africa Commands, and Eighteenth Air Force for Transportation Command. Put succinctly, the services 

prepare forces for assignment to combatant commands, which control their 

operations in peace and war.

For anyone concerned with the future of air mobility, these command relationships are important because they lay out the geography of how studies are 

done and force structure plans are made. In short, organizations in the combatant chain of command study operations and set general capacity and capability requirements for air mobility forces. Service elements, mainly headquarters USAF and Air Mobility Command (AMC), develop management 

plans for air mobility forces, including those regarding personnel preparation 

and support, capabilities and composition of the fleet, aircraft acquisition 

programs, and doctrines. The combatant and service communities do collaborate formally and informally on all studies, but their general responsibilities remain distinct. So discussions of current and future requirements, such 

as the Mobility Capabilities and Requirements Study–2016, impinge on the 

realm of the office of the secretary of defense and combatant responsibilities, 

while capabilities studies and specific force-structure plans generally are service products. When a service element such as AMC discusses requirements, 

it usually does so in the context of tactical operations, as in the need for specific radios or missile decoy systems, in reflection of existing combatant requirements, or in close coordination with the combatant chain if considering 

operational and strategic issues.

Also important to shaping air mobility policy is that all of the military services operate “organic” air mobility forces that are not part of the NAMS but, 

nevertheless, complement and extend its capabilities. The Army has hundreds 
4

of UH-60 and CH-47 helicopters assigned to battalions within its aviation 

brigade combat teams (BCT). The Marine Corps also operates squadrons of 

CH-46, CH-53E, CH-53K, and MV-22 lift helicopters as well as five tankertransport squadrons equipped with a total of about 60 KC-130J aircraft. The 

Air Force Special Operations Command fields a modest fleet of MC-130 

transport and tanker aircraft equipped to support special land and air operations deep inside enemy threat areas. The Navy also operates transport aircraft to link shore bases and to deliver supplies and passengers to ships at sea. 

Importantly, the rotary-wing aircraft in the Army and Marine fleets have very 

limited payload-over-distance capabilities, or range/payload curves, as compared to Air Force aircraft. When operated in large numbers, consequently, 

they can move a lot but typically only out to distances of 100 miles or less 

from their main bases. Still, from a general perspective, these organic assets 

provide specialized capabilities that extend the tactical reach and maneuver 

of American air mobility forces from the aerial ports of debarkation utilized 

by NAMS components to forward landing and airdrop zones and shipborne 

landing decks. (See the appendix for an illustration of payload and range performance of mobility aircraft.)

Figure 1. Chinook and Osprey aircraft. Left: A CH-47F Chinook conducts a 

mission in northern Afghanistan; right: An MV-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft lands 

on a Japanese navy helicopter destroyer. 

Mission

The air mobility spread of missions is more complicated than it might at 

first appear. Air mobility sloganeers have encapsulated its mission as moving 

“anything, anytime, anywhere” or as a “fort-to-foxhole” continuity of service. 

In less exuberant language the Air Mobility Command today seeks to “provide global air mobility . . . right effects, right place, right time.”5

 The caveat to 
5

all this enthusiasm is the multiplicity of meanings that anything, anytime, and 

anywhere can have in air mobility planning and operations. The things that air 

mobility forces and complementing aviation arms must move range from 

battle tanks, special operations assault craft, and deep submergence submarine rescue vehicles at the high end of size and weight to endless lists of lighter 

items, ranging down to boxes of bandages and candy bars. Time has an infinitely flexible meaning in this realm; some administrative cargos can move 

more or less routinely through the airlift system, while air and ground combat 

units might need to move over global distances in matters of a few days or 

even hours. Finally, where includes the widely varying distances over which 

tanker and transport aircraft must fly, the nature of the bases from which they 

must operate, the terminal points into which they must deliver their payloads, 

and the atmospheric conditions under which they must operate. 

Equally important to understanding the air mobility challenge are the 

widely variable natures of the terminal points—airfields, airstrips, landing 

zones, and so on—from which transports and tankers can operate and into 

which airlift aircraft must deliver their loads. The landing terminal points 

useable by airlift aircraft also are critically important to the challenge of delivering ground units to their destinations with their full complements of protected maneuver, firepower, and support vehicles ready for immediate combat operations. Delivering core vehicles and their expanded armor kits 

separately at forward fields, for example, imposes delay and risk as Soldiers 

and Marines scramble to put them together. The summary implications of 

these variations are that the present and future air mobility missions will 

manifest endless combinations of payload, time constraints, and locations of 

operations and delivery.

Terminal Points: An Examination

A slight digression will be useful here to clarify a number of terms regarding air mobility terminal points. In the absence of any universal taxonomy of 

airfields or terminal points, this paper organizes them into operationally significant tiers. Tier 1 terminals are “global-class” airports and air bases—capable of supporting sustained operations by large and fully loaded civil and 

combat aircraft under nearly all reasonable density altitude conditions.6 They 

generally are characterized by wide runways of around 8,000–10,000+ feet in 

length and pavement and subgrade combinations several feet thick. If they 

have substantial parking areas (it takes about an acre of surface to park a large 

transport or tanker aircraft), these are the terminals that air mobility planners 

prefer to use as aerial ports of embarkation and debarkation and as air refuel-
6

ing operating bases in forward areas. Tier 2 terminals are smaller air bases, 

civilian regional airfields, and perhaps national airports in less-developed 

countries. Generally, Tier 2 runways can accommodate medium-sized transport category and fighter-type aircraft. Typically they are 5,000–8,000 feet 

long, usually long enough to allow takeoff and landing operations of appropriate aircraft at likely density altitudes. Some Tier 2 terminals may have large 

parking areas, but civilian regional airfields in the less developed parts of the 

world are likely to have parking for only a few medium-size aircraft, if any. 

Tier 3 terminal points are unpaved air strips or even open fields suitable for 

sustained operations by medium-weight air transports, such as C-130Js and 

A400Ms, and perhaps episodic use by heavier aircraft, such as the C-17. For 

this paper, Tier 4 terminals are points or restricted areas of hard-surfaced or 

unsurfaced terrain suitable for operations by vertical takeoff and landing 

(VTOL) aircraft only. Forward arming and refueling points (FARP) comprise 

a subgroup overlapping the Tier 3 and 4 terminal categories. FARPs are temporary facilities organized to provide fuel and ammunition necessary for the 

employment of air units in combat.7

 Depending on the types of aircraft supported and the sources of their sustainment supplies, FARPs may be Tier 3 

airfields, including highway strips, or Tier 4 terminal points supporting 

VTOL aircraft. Any airfield may be austere if it is not equipped with support 

infrastructure, such as refueling systems, service buildings, billeting facilities, 

and so on. 

Figure 2. Tier 2 and Tier 3 airfields. Left: This characteristic Tier 2 airfield consists of a mile-long runway of medium strength with limited taxi and parking 

facilities. (Photograph courtesy of Ashland Regional Airport, 27 March 2016, 

http://www.ashlandregionalairport.com/default.htm); right: This characteristic 

Tier 3 airfield with a surface of compressed laterite and clay would have a 

California bearing ratio of 50 to 80 and could handle hundreds of passes by 

C-130s and A400Ms before requiring repairs. 
7

Understanding airfields in tiers helps in evaluating actual and conceptual 

mission requirements for air mobility planning. For example, as repurposed 

civil airliners, fully loaded Air Force KC-10, KC-135, and future KC-46 aircraft generally operate from Tier 1 runways. These aircraft can operate from 

longer Tier 2 runways but usually with reduced fuel loads and, consequently, 

limitations on their abilities to support combat operations. Such operations 

may also be restricted by the scarcity of suitable parking pads for tanker aircraft at many Tier 2 regional airports and military bases. Thus, air combat 

plans and concepts predicated on receiving robust air refueling support may 

be challenged by the impossibility of stationing tankers near the combat zone 

or in the numbers required. Similarly, the Air Force’s largest air transports, 

C-5s and C-17s, can carry their maximum payloads into Tier 1 airports and 

air bases. But if those bases are damaged or under threat of damage by enemy 

attacks, commanders may wish to push air transport operations onto nearby 

Tier 2 or even Tier 3 airstrips. 

As with tanker operations, pushing transports out to less-developed airfields or even to the unpaved areas of main bases can sharply crimp their utility. Indeed, one recent Africa Command analysis indicated that all of subSaharan Africa had only about 16 airfields able to accommodate a handful of 

C-17s; consequently, these airfields were serving as hubs for C-130 operations 

to destinations as much as 1,000 miles away.8

 Finally, when Army planners 

ponder the value of “surprise through maneuver across strategic distances . . . 

[with] the mobility, protection, and firepower necessary to strike the enemy 

from unexpected directions,” they are wanting something the Air Force cannot do—transport of mechanized ground units across long distances and delivery precisely into less-developed Tier 2 or even Tier 3 terminal points at or 

within tactically useful distances from their points of need/employment 

(PON/E).9

Technology

Terminal considerations continue to shape the design of civilian and military transport aircraft. In their manipulations of the aircraft design calculus of 

capacity, speed, range, maneuverability, and airfield requirements, transport 

aircraft designers have handled airfield requirements differently for commercial and military transports. Focused on profitability, the designers of airliners 

tend to emphasize seat-mile productivity on the presumption that airport infrastructures can be modified to handle whatever aircraft they produce. Historically this has been a safe presumption since airport operators generally 

have found ways to expand the facilities of existing fields or to create alto-
8

gether new airports to handle the demands of succeeding generations of airliners. So all successful commercial jet airliners since the 1960s have been of 

a type featuring wings swept back about 35–37o

 almost always mounted at the 

bottoms of long, tubular fuselages optimized for passenger carriage and landing gear assemblies designed for operation on hard-surfaced runways. 

In contrast, the designers of military transports have emphasized throughput of military-type cargos at whatever airfields might be available during 

contingencies. Range and payload remain important considerations, of 

course, so military transports designs tend to reflect careful balances of airfield flexibility (the number of fields into which an aircraft can operate) and 

range/payload performance. Consequently, military transports usually feature high-mounted wings and strong landing gear assemblies permitting at 

least some ability to operate on unpaved surfaces. Aircraft intended to cross 

intercontinental distances usually have wings swept back about 25o to optimize their range/payload and airfield flexibility characteristics. Aircraft intended for operations into Tier 3 airfields generally are equipped with less 

swept or even straight wings to minimize their landing and takeoff rolls while 

retaining acceptable range/payload performance. 

Figure 3. Left to right: Planforms of C-17, A400M, and C-130J. Each aircraft 

balances speed, range, payload, and runway requirements through different 

combinations of aerodynamic features and power. (Reproduced by permission 

from Airbus.)

Probably the most important implication for mobility planners is that the 

air mobility fleet consists of several broad aircraft types. CRAF air carriers 

overwhelmingly bring airliners to the fleet. The military components generally bring a bifurcated fleet composed of aircraft designs that trade off airfield 

flexibility for range and payload and designs emphasizing airfield flexibility at 

the expense of range and payload. This has been the model of the airlift fleet 

since the 1960s, a model dominated by C-141s, C-5s, and C-17s in the inter-
9

continental fleet segment and C-123s and C-130s in the theater fleet. At times, 

the Air Force fleet has included a class of smaller assault transports capable of 

conducting short takeoff and landing operations (STOL) onto unpaved and 

rougher-than-typical runways shorter than 1,000 feet. These STOL/roughfield (STOL/RF) aircraft have included Chase/Fairchild C-122s and C-125s 

appearing in the late 1940s and De Havilland of Canada C-7 aircraft appearing in the late 1950s. The Air Force considered larger STOL/RF designs—such 

as the Breguet 941, Ling-Temco-Vought XC-142, and De Havilland of Canada 

C-8—but largely abandoned this class of aircraft after the Vietnam War. Finally, the Air Force developed two replacements for the C-130 in the mid1970s, the Boeing YC-14 and McDonnell-Douglas YC-15. These successful 

designs promised to give the Air Force an ability to deliver medium and 

heavyweight armored units into airfields equivalent to those required by the 

significantly smaller C-130. But the Defense Department abandoned these 

advanced medium STOL transports in 1979 in favor of developing the C-17. 

This multifaceted story of air transport aircraft design reflects the complexity 

of the mission and suggests the likelihood that tailoring the fleet to cover it all 

will not get easier or simpler in the future.

Figure 4. XC-142A and C-7. left: XC-142A being tested by NASA in 1969. This 

aircraft could take off and land vertically or on airstrips just a few hundred feet 

long with heavier loads. (Photograph courtesy of NASA, https://crgis.ndc.nasa.

gov/historic/LTV_XC-142A); right: C-7 Caribou operating from a Tier 3 airstrip 

during the Vietnam War. 

The Air Force’s episodic quests for larger aircraft capable of operating into 

Tier 3 and even Tier 4 airfields reflect another enduring operational conundrum for force-structure planners—the disconnect in cargo capacity and 

takeoff and landing performance between global and theater transports. At 

the moment, combinations of CRAF and intercontinental military aircraft 

can deliver robust flows of forces and supplies into Tier 1 airports. As outsize 

transports, C-5s and C-17s can carry virtually any item of combat or support 
10

equipment required by Army BCTs or air combat units. Large military transports also can utilize Tier 2 airfields, though their throughputs will be limited 

by the lengths and strengths of their runways and number of parking spots 

available. Otherwise, C-130s are the only aircraft available to move forces and 

supplies forward from Tier 1 to smaller Tier 2 and Tier 3 terminal points. As 

oversize transports, C-130s have the lifting capacity and internal cargo dimensions to carry light vehicles and some smaller or less-protected versions 

of medium-weight combat vehicles, such as Strykers, but nothing larger or 

heavier.10

This global-theater cargo capacity disconnect presents ground commanders with difficult tactical choices and sometimes dangerous operational risks. 

When deploying by air, for example, ground combat and support units 

equipped with or supported by outsize equipment (as most are) either must 

debark at Tier 1 airports and make potentially long road marches to their objectives or move what they can forward on C-130s and then wait for their 

heavier elements to catch up. Airdrop deliveries of some heavy equipment can 

speed up the advances of such units. However, key items such as self-propelled 

howitzers, counter-artillery radar systems, and multiple launch rocket systems cannot be airdropped. If consequently forced to make long road marches 

or divide their forces, ground units can lose their maneuver velocity and element of surprise, thereby being exposed to piecemeal attrition and seeing 

their lines of communications interdicted by the attacks of alerted enemies.

The global-theater capacity disconnect also can undermine the hitting 

power and sustainability of forward-deployed air combat forces. Forward airfields often will not have runways suitable for C-5 and C-17 operations, or if 

they do, their runways may be damaged or under imminent threat of damage 

from enemy strikes. In such cases, C-130s will be the primary sources of aerial 

resupply. C-130s are capable aircraft, but their inability to transport oversize 

cargo could restrict the kinds of support equipment available to forward combat units and the rate of resupply they can receive. In other words, the globaltheater disconnect is an airpower as well as a land-power issue.

Emerging Challenges

The future promises a perfect storm of declining American air mobility 

capabilities in the face of growing demands. The mobility fleet is aging, with 

large portions of it qualifying as antiques. Its rate of recapitalization, particularly in the air refueling fleet, is not likely to keep up with the age out of its 

oldest aircraft. Meanwhile, the demands placed on it are increasing as a consequence of numerous and well-developed trends in American security af-
11

fairs. These trends include declining absolute and relative American military 

power, withdrawing of the bulk of US land forces into the homeland, evolving Army and Air Force operational concepts, multiplying and intensifying 

global cultural conflicts, and the proliferating of enemies able to strike 

throughout the depth of American military capabilities. Given their relevance to understanding the risks facing air mobility forces and the combatant commands they support, the most significant trends are expanded on in 

this section.

Figure 5. C-130 (foreground) parked next to C-5. A single photo illustrates the 

global-theater air cargo compatibility gap.

Declining Strength

The elephant in the room of American defense affairs is the decline of its 

military forces in absolute terms relative to the challenges they face. In the 

words of the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, this is happening “at a time when we face a complex array of challenges not seen since 

the end of World War II.”11 Sen. John McCain’s comments were prompted by 

release of a Heritage Foundation report, Index of U.S. Military Strength, which 

rated the aggregate ability of US military forces as “marginal and trending 

toward weak” in their ability to defend the country in the face of “aggressive” 

threats of “gathering strength” in every populated region of the world.12 By the 

time the Heritage Foundation made its report, the secretary of defense had 

already warned that “our loss of depth across the force could reduce our ability to intimidate opponents . . . [who having] become accustomed to our presence could begin to act differently, often in harmful ways . . . [and] the situation . . . will worsen over the next 3 to 4 years.”13 The chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff expressed the same concerns in The National Military Strategy 

of the United States, stating that “today’s global security environment is the 

most unpredictable I have seen. . . . [G]lobal disorder has significantly increased while some of our comparative military advantage has begun to 
12

erode. We now face multiple, simultaneous security challenges . . . [and] future conflicts will come more rapidly, last longer, and take place on a much 

more technically challenging battlefield.”14 Finally, in early 2016, the Air Force 

chief of staff considered the demands of a major war in Europe or in the Pacific and said simply, “We’re not very ready for that.”15 The consistency of these 

authoritative evaluations makes clear that, from the perspective of general air 

mobility planning, the future security environment will be characterized by a 

smaller American defense establishment concentrated in the homeland, attempting to confront a widening and strengthening array of simultaneous 

threats spread across the globe.

Disaggregation

Of similar import to mobility planners is the trend toward operational 

concepts that emphasize “adaptive basing” or other forms of agile disaggregation (or dispersal). Disaggregation in this case refers to the division of operational units into geographically dispersed subunits conducting operations 

coordinated in time and space. These subunits are agile if they are able to shift 

their operating bases or locations quickly and unpredictably. The Defense Department is committed to agile disaggregation to improve the “resilience of 

air, naval, ground, space, and missile-defense capabilities, even in the face of 

large-scale, coordinated attacks . . . and allow them to sustain high-tempo 

operations.”16

Accordingly, all US military services are developing doctrines and improving their capabilities in this style of operations. The Air Force has been experimenting for several years with deployments of small teams of fighters and 

C-17 transports to austere airfields to conduct operations for a few hours and 

then move on before enemies detect and launch effective strikes against 

them.17 A recent study examined the agile disaggregation of air refueling 

forces at austere airfields within enemy long-range weapon engagement 

zones.18 Similarly, having highlighted “the need to conduct dispersed operations with smaller, task-organized forces,” the Marines are refining their ability to operate fixed-wing fighter aircraft from dispersed expeditionary bases 

and forward arming and refueling points (FARPs) located at small airfields, 

highway strips, and other suitable locations.19 On its part, the Army sees dispersed operations as essential in high-threat environments to “evade enemy 

attacks, deceive the enemy, and achieve surprise . . . and seize upon fleeting 

opportunities.”20
13

Figure 6. Two approaches to disaggregating combat air basing. Left: IAF Mirage 

2000 landing on an improvised highway strip in India (Indian Air Force photo);

right: A prepared autobahn strip with parking areas in Germany, circa 1978. 

The autobahn strip has the advantage of being able to accommodate air transport aircraft as well.

For mobility planners, of course, the salient implications of disaggregated 

combat operations are disaggregated air mobility operations. Air mobility 

forces in the future likely will employ agile and disaggregated basing themselves, while attempting to satisfy the increased aerial and ground refueling 

requirements of air forces and the expanded dependence of disaggregated 

ground forces on airlift for maneuver and sustainment support. In many foreseeable situations, military logisticians never will be able to establish surface 

lines of communication to these disaggregated air and ground units. Rising to 

such demands will be challenging but necessary to air mobility forces, given 

recognition by national leaders that “the ability to quickly aggregate and disaggregate forces anywhere in the world is the essence of global agility.”21

Among the services, the Army’s specific demands for air transportation are 

likely to increase the most in coming years. Importantly, this increase will not 

be driven by growth in the weights of Army combat units or its support echelons and logistical demands. While Army leaders are moving to equip infantry BCTs with more capable and inescapably heavier mobile, protected firepower vehicles and to develop newer and potentially heavier classes of 

armored combat vehicles, they also are pushing numerous initiatives that will 

lighten field units.22 These initiatives include reducing vehicle fuel demands, 

improving the efficiency of power generation and use, making supply chains 

more efficient, and so on.23 Rather, the most important driver of increasing 

Army airlift needs will be more frequent and global air movements of its light, 

medium, and heavy BCTs and their support elements. Historically, light airborne and light infantry forces only deployed independently in low-intensity 
14

conflicts involving relatively weak enemies. They usually deployed into highintensity combat situations only in conjunction with heavy forces in place 

already or due to arrive in support within a few days. But in fast-breaking 

conflicts and crises in the future, joint commanders may project light forces 

by air over thousands of miles and well ahead of the possible arrivals of heavier 

units via ships or overland marches. Nevertheless, if strong enemy threats are 

present, such movements of light forces will need to be accompanied by air 

transport of some medium or heavy units, either as integrated elements of 

task-organized light units or as independent battalions and brigades. 

At the high end of its emerging requirements, the Army wants the support 

of air mobility forces able to lift at least medium-weight armored equipment, 

such as fully armored Strykers and self-propelled artillery, over strategic distances and to deliver them very near or precisely at their PON/Es. The most 

ambitious variation of this concept is mounted vertical maneuver (MVM), 

“the maneuver and vertical insertion of medium weight armored forces into 

areas in close proximity to their battlefield objectives without the need for 

fixed airports, airfields, or prepared airheads.”24 In pursuit of MVM, Army 

leaders have long expressed a hope that the Defense Department will authorize development of a vertical takeoff and landing aircraft capable of carrying 

medium-armored vehicles at least as heavy as 30–32 ton M-3 Bradleys.25 Over 

the last several decades, the Army and the Air Force have collaborated in several assessments of the operational value and mobility of aircraft required to 

support such precision-delivery-over-strategic-distances operations. But as 

yet, the services have not settled upon a definitive design concept, nor has the 

Defense Department authorized funding for developing the concept or necessary aircraft.

Strong Enemies

America will need global air mobility to preserve its security in a world 

characterized by multiplying conflicts and threats. Aggressive states, extremist organizations with regional and international influence, international 

criminals, natural disasters, restive populations, and other sources of interstate and intrastate violence are going to keep American military forces busy 

and moving into the foreseeable future. The 2014 National Defense Strategy 

summarized the future security environment as one characterized by “powerful global forces . . . [and] shifting centers of gravity . . . empowering smaller 

countries and non-state actors on the international stage . . . [and] a fundamentally globalized world . . . [in which] economic growth in Asia, aging 

populations, . . . instability in the Middle East and Africa, and many other 
15

trends interact dynamically.”26 Moreover, the availability of low-cost information technologies throughout the world increases the suddenness and scale at 

which regional conflicts can break out, particularly among urban populations 

that now comprise over half of the world’s humanity.27 Little wonder that the 

chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff declares that “the military does not have 

the luxury of focusing on one challenge to the exclusion of others. It must 

provide a full range of military options for addressing both revisionist states 

and VEOs [violent extremist organizations]. Failure to do so will result in 

greater risk to our country and the international order.”28 The American military of the future, in short, will be a military on the move—often, of necessity, 

by air.

America’s efforts to deal with such a multiplicity of threats will confront 

many state and nonstate opponents able to strike the full depth of its military 

capabilities. Depending on the enemy, US forces deploying into a conflict 

situation could face many threats, including: 

•	 space surveillance and warfare systems, 

•	 robust cyber intrusions and attacks, 

•	 long-range ballistic and cruise missiles, 

•	 aircraft launching close-in and stand-off weapons of precision accuracy, 

•	 wide arrays of land- and sea-based tube and tactical missile artillery 

with ranges extending from 10–300 nautical miles (nm) and equipped 

with precision warheads, 

•	 naval combatant ships firing long-range cruise missiles out to 1,000 

miles, 

•	 special operations forces, 

•	 terrorist cells, and 

•	 fifth columnists drawing from the large immigrant populations of the 

United States and many allied nations. Indeed, one of the surveillance 

systems plaguing air mobility forces could be the eyes of thousands of 

unfriendly individuals wielding encrypted cell phones. 

The threats to American military capabilities go much further than commonly recognized. For example, much of the current discussion of the proliferation of enemies possessing antiaccess/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities 

tends to focus on their abilities to block or hinder American access to and 

operations within contested regions. But a fuller appreciation of the A2/AD 

challenge would reveal enemies able to observe and strike air mobility forces 
16

from the homes of their personnel all the way to their forward-most bases, 

engagement zones, and fighting positions. Consequently, while American 

military forces have always faced daunting challenges, this is the first time 

they have confronted a situation offering no reliable operational or logistical 

sanctuaries anywhere.

No one seriously engaged in American defense affairs can doubt the vital 

importance of developing air mobility forces able to counter these daunting 

combinations of threats and difficulties. The National Military Strategy of the 

United States declares that “the execution of integrated operations requires a 

Joint Force capable of swift and decisive force projection around the world . . . 

rely[ing] upon a global logistics and transportation network.” The document 

subsequently reaffirms the criticality of maintaining capable and relevant mobility forces, saying simply that “as the Department rebalances toward greater 

emphasis on full spectrum operations, maintaining superior power projection capabilities will continue to be central to the credibility of our Nation’s 

overall security strategy.”29 In short, if the nation does not make the investments and policy adjustments needed to keep air mobility forces relevant in a 

more demanding and dangerous world, most US strategic, operational, tactical, and logistical concepts will lose some or even all of their relevance. 

Air Mobility Program of Record: 

Capabilities and Shortfalls

The cancers of future failures originate in the complacencies of current 

successes: If this premise is accepted, then air mobility planners should examine their future prospects with skeptical objectivity and in magnified detail. 

The recent history of the national air mobility system suggests that it is highly 

capable and in the hands of a community of unprecedented expertise. This 

community’s ability to balance the demands of numerous wars and an endless 

variety of other contingencies demonstrates its ability to get the most out of 

the complex network of air mobility operating and support forces. Still, the 

NAMS is aging and routinely engaged near or at its maximum capacity in a 

rapidly evolving and very tough world. For those reasons, this section examines features of the present air mobility modernization program that limit 

American military options today and that could lead to strategic and operational disasters in the future. These features include the persistent inadequacy 

of global airlift capacity; the lack of a capability to deliver medium-weight 

forces, outsize equipment, and robust cargo flows into Tier 2 and 3 airfields; 

and the vulnerability of the air refueling fleet. 
17

Modernization

Given the importance of operational flexibility in the face of an uncertain 

future, the ongoing recapitalization of the mobility fleet should raise long-term 

concerns. The two major recapitalization efforts—replacement of KC-135s 

with KC-46As and of older C-130s with C-130Js—are imminently necessary 

given the geriatric conditions of the outgoing aircraft. The KC-46 carries a little 

more fuel than the KC-135 under optimal conditions (212,000 pounds versus 

200,000 pounds). But from shorter runways and at higher density altitudes, 

the newer plane can take off with as much as 30–40 percent more fuel than its 

predecessor.30 Still, as another increment of repurposed airliners, KC-46s require basically the same Tier 1 and high-end Tier 2 runways and expansive 

paved parking areas required by the aircraft they are replacing. Thus KC-46s 

will enhance the operational flexibility of the air mobility fleet marginally, but 

they do not address the core problems of finding enough bases for them in 

many conflict situations and of protecting them from enemy detection and 

attack, particularly on the ground. Likewise, C-130Js enhance the overall flexibility and capacity of the existing airlift fleet marginally, but they do not address the ability of the fleet to accomplish key missions. The aircraft is 30–40 

knots faster and climbs more quickly than its immediate predecessors in the 

60-year-long heritage of the C-130 design, and it is easier to maintain. But its 

basic payload capacity and cargo deck dimensions are unchanged from earlier models. The aircraft remains limited in its ability to support the maneuver 

and logistics of modern ground forces and air forces operating at forward 

locations.31 In short, as the only two major recapitalization air mobility programs currently under way, these programs bring incremental improvements 

in basing flexibility and capacity, but they do not represent needed upgrades 

in the ability of American air mobility forces to support future land and air 

operations.

Beyond the ongoing KC-46 and C-130J programs, AMC’s plans for major 

recapitalization in the future are inchoate. The continued technical health of 

the C-17 fleet reduces the command’s sense of urgency for acquiring a new 

C-X strategic transport. In 2013 the Headquarters Air Force Life Cycle Management Center increased the projected service life of the C-17 from 30,000 

flight hours to 42,750 hours, and unofficial Boeing estimates suggest that the 

aircraft could safely fly past 45,000 hours. Similarly, AMC plans to rely on a 

modernized C-130 fleet to cover the theater airlift mission indefinitely and, 

accordingly, is not engaged in specific planning for a successor aircraft. Notionally, AMC anticipates acquisition of a second batch of tankers after the 

current program of 179 KC-46s is complete but has yet to state the specific 
18

requirements or general design characteristics of those aircraft.32 In net, then, 

AMC’s planning for the future seems limited to conjectural examinations of 

technology opportunities and examinations of near-future operational requirements and capabilities.

Insufficient Global Airlift Capacity

Despite the unequaled sophistication, capacity, and professionalism of 

American airlift forces, the impression that they are and will continue to be 

inadequate to some of their tasks is as inescapable as it is difficult to quantify 

in an unclassified document. From a qualitative perspective, the high day-today operating pace of airlift forces and the growing demands and threats they 

face provide some evidence that the country now needs more airlift capacity 

than it has and airlift aircraft better able to meet emerging challenges. Since 

the most recent air mobility requirements and capabilities studies remain 

classified, it is impossible to present here an authoritative, quantitative case 

that capabilities remain short of needs. The record of earlier planning efforts, 

however, suggests qualitatively that such must be the case. 

The 1981 Congressionally Mandated Mobility Study (CMMS) is the logical 

place to begin an assessment of the record of air mobility planning shortfalls. 

The CMMS ushered in an era of increasingly sophisticated and detailed examinations of air mobility requirements. It was the first major study that examined air mobility from a global perspective and as an element within the 

whole tapestry of American air, sea, and land transportation capabilities and 

alternatives. In a manner that became typical of subsequent studies, the ultimate force structure recommendations of the CMMS were as much about 

fiscal constraints as actual requirements. After assessing complex mobility 

scenarios involving large force deployments into the Arabian Gulf region, Europe, and Korea, defense planners suggested a “fiscally responsible” strategic 

airlift capacity target of 66 million ton-miles per day, even though the scenarios assessed called for as much as 124 MTMD. The study implied that the 

potential offsets for these shortfalls would be the blood of American Soldiers 

and higher risk of failure, asserting at one point that “failure to meet the 

schedule for the approximate four divisions required in the first 25 days to 

face [a Soviet invasion of Iraq] could require a 15-division force to drive these 

enemy forces out at a later time.”33

Events during the First Gulf War (1990–91) proved the point. Although the 

commercial, active, and ARC components had reached a notional combined 

capacity of 49 MTMD, they only achieved an average productivity of 13.6 

MTMD.34 This fractional performance was a consequence of unforeseeable 
19

breakdowns in shipper coordination, delayed arrivals of cargo shipments at 

aerial ports of debarkations, inefficient loading of individual aircraft, and so 

on.35 Ultimately, global air mobility forces delivered about 600,000 troops and 

540,000 tons of cargo into the Southwest Asia area of operations over a period 

of six months.36 This did not compare well to the 200,000 tons in 15 days

called for in the congressional study’s Persian Gulf scenario.37

Later Defense Department air mobility plans continued the CMMS pattern of paring down air mobility force structure goals to fit contemporary 

notions of what senior leaders believed was affordable. The next major Defense Department study of airlift reduced the capacity target to 54.5 MTMD, 

which closely matched the capabilities of the fleet then in existence.38 Similarly, the current mobility planning guide, the Mobility Capabilities and Requirements Study 2016, aims at 56.4 MTMD.39 Of significance to the adequacy 

and flexibility of these planning bogies, the Civil Reserve Air Fleet’s planned 

contribution increased 149 percent between 1991 and 2016, from 18 to 26.8 

MTMD, while the military component share dropped from 31.7 to 29.7 

MTMD. In a future marked by continually high demands and intensifying 

threats, these plans are increasing reliance on the most risk averse and legally 

restricted—albeit also least expensive—component. Perhaps the wisdom to 

be gained from this is an understanding that official air mobility force structure bogies reflect budgetary realities as much as or more than they do military requirements.

No Outsize STOL/RF Theater Airlift Capabilities

Another troubling shortfall in the air mobility system is its limited ability 

to sustain high capacity force and sustainment flows into short and undeveloped airfields and landing zones in the face of significant enemy A2/AD 

threats. The absence of outsize-cargo-capable aircraft possessing short takeoff 

and landing rough field capability is a characteristic of the current mobility 

fleet and is not obviously being addressed in any concrete plans.40 As a consequence, the present and likely future air mobility fleet does not have the flexibility and capacity to support established ground force maneuver concepts, 

and its ability to support combat air units based at Tier 2 and 3 airfields and 

even at damaged Tier 1 airfields will be limited.

The current combination of C-17s and C-130s in the airlift fleet epitomizes 

the outsized cargo and STOL/RF gaps. C-130s can operate into short and 

rough airfields and FARPs, but their payload and cargo-dimension limitations 

restrict their ability to provide maneuver and sustainment support. C-17s can 

carry outsize loads and more tonnage, but they can’t operate repetitively into 
20

the austere locations most likely to be available in forward combat zones. In a 

South China Sea conflict scenario, for example, C-130s flying unrefueled, 

2,800 nm, round-trip missions from Anderson AFB on Guam to the Philippine island of Luzon would deliver a maximum of six tons of cargo per mission, compared to C-17s delivering 60 tons.41 But the C-17s are less likely to 

find a place to land than the C-130s. Under standard sea-level atmospheric 

conditions of temperature and atmospheric pressure, C-130s can take off in 

1,700–3,200 feet depending on how much fuel and cargo they were carrying.42

A C-17 would require 2,500–7,000 feet under those conditions.43 Also important to the flexibility of the existing fleet, C-130s can make as many as 1,500 

landings and takeoffs from unpaved runways and open fields with California 

bearing ratios of 10 before rendering those fields unusable.44 With their 

much greater weights and higher landing speeds, C-17s will rut, gouge, and 

otherwise render the same airstrips unusable in just 30 landings and takeoffs.45 C-130s or aircraft of similar airfield requirements also could utilize 

multilane highway strips and dry farm fields, while C-17s could not. 

The range, payload, and cargo dimension limitations embedded in the 

C-17/C-130 fleet present the Army with several challenges to its future effectiveness. They moot the mounted vertical maneuver concept. In more traditional maneuvers, land force commanders will face a Hobson’s choice: (1) not 

making air movements at all, or (2) accepting tactically dangerous divisions 

of their forces between light elements debarking from C-130s at their PON/

Es—without vital mobile protected firepower assets—and heavy elements arriving at more distant airfields and making long and hazardous road marches 

to catch up. That compromise might be difficult in light of the scarcity of 

C-17- and C-130-capable airfields in many regions of the world. As discussed 

earlier, there may be only about 16 airports in sub-Saharan African capable of 

acting as C-17 hubs. Plus, the C-130s operating out of those hubs may not 

find C-130 capable airfields near ground-force PON/Es and, if they can, may 

not be able to deliver critical mobility and firepower assets. One recent study 

of airlift operations in Africa found that about half of the 158 airfields surveyed in the region are “impractical for operating a C-130 or larger aircraft” 

and that the percentage of the 3,300 airfields identified in the region able to 

handle heavy aircraft was unknown. In one specific case, the study found that 

a portion of a Tier 2 runway selected for an exercise was too weak for safe 

C-130 operations.46 Little wonder, then, that the Army believes that fixedwing air transports generally would deliver ground units in Africa no closer 

than 50 kilometers from their PON/Es.47 Even when considering movements 

in developed regions of the world, Army planners wonder if the existing fleet 

has the capacity to sustain conventional operations in A2/AD environments.48
21

The 2013 French military intervention against Islamic insurgents in Mali 

demonstrated the reality of these concerns. During Operation Serval, the 

French had support from US C-17s and leased Antonov 124 airlift aircraft 

capable of delivering outsize, medium-weight armored vehicles, most importantly 25-ton VBCI infantry carriers. But with only the airport in Bamako 

capable of receiving those aircraft, French motorized units made road marches 

up to 3,000 km long to reach their objectives.49 French airborne units did 

conduct some operations to seize key bridges and C-130-capable airfields 

during the advance from Bamako into the far eastern areas of Mali. However, 

these units did not arrive with medium armor support, and they went in only 

a day or so before the main force arrived to back them up. Thus the French 

advance was conducted as a serial roll up of Islamist resistance and proceeded 

at an average of 60–80 kilometers per day. As a result of this slow advance, the 

French never were able to cut off retreating Islamists; consequently, most of 

them had escaped death or capture and retained their weapons by the end of 

the campaign.50

Given the pedestrian pace of the campaign advance and its limited results, 

it is seductive to consider what French commanders would have done with 

the capabilities offered by the fleet of A400M transports now coming into the 

French air force. Capable of operating from virtually any unpaved airstrips or 

open-terrain landing fields available to C-130s, A400Ms can carry payloads of 

up to 37 tons, which would accommodate virtually any armored combat vehicle except main battle tanks and the heaviest self-propelled artillery, along 

with associated support vehicles and equipment. Had they been available during Operation Serval, A400Ms could have lifted any vehicle actually used in 

the campaign in nonstop sorties from France to anywhere in the operational 

zone and then flown as much as 1,000 nm further before stopping for fuel. 

With a fleet of such aircraft on hand, French commanders in Mali could have 

conducted a parallel instead of a serial land campaign. A parallel campaign 

would have involved the insertions of mobile, hard-hitting forces throughout 

the depth of the line of advance whenever tactical opportunities presented 

themselves. Because they included medium-weight mobile protected firepower, the depth and frequency of such insertions would not have been restrained by the location of the main advance, at least not to the extent that 

they actually were. Such wide-ranging and unpredictable “heavy cavalry” operations likely would have shortened the campaign and enhanced its impact. 

Deep-operating mobile forces could have hit Islamist units as they scattered 

and chased them in hot pursuit while they were in the open. The long-term 

effect almost certainly would have been residual enemy units and personnel 

less able materially or psychologically to renew guerilla operations.
22

MALI

ALGERIA

MAURITANIA

Bamako

Dyabali

Nampala

Lere

Timbuktu

GourmaRharous

Goundam

Dire

Niafunke

Kona

Hombori Douentza

Gao

Bourem

Anefis

Aguelhok

Tessalit

Kidal

Ansongo

Tessit

Anderamboukane

Menaka

GUINEA

SENEGAL

NIGER

NIGERIA

BURKINA FASO

GHANA BENIN

Operation Serval

2013

Capital of Mali

Sole airport in Mali

capable of receiving

C-17 and Antonov 124

aircraft

Held by various

Islamist insurgent groups

Overall extent

of insurgent territory

0 100 km 500 km

Figure 7. Operation Serval map. This map of the French military’s operating 

area illustrates the distances involved. 

Combat air force commanders also should see the value of large, STOL/RF 

aircraft. Combat squadrons deploying into established air bases usually require only a few C-17 sorties to bring in their ground support echelons. But if 

these forces move into bases not already equipped with fuel storage and distribution systems, appropriately stocked munitions bunkers, billeting facilities, fire trucks, and so on, the airlift bill increases drastically and must be paid 

by steady streams of air transports until surface lines of communication can 

be established. Normally such movements would be supported by C-5s, C-17s, 

and perhaps CRAF aircraft. If the runways of these airfields are short, weak, 

or damaged by enemy attacks, however, bringing in these big jets can be impossible or unacceptably risky. Even if airfield infrastructures are intact but 

threatened by enemy attacks, air commanders likely will cringe at the sight of 
23

transports loaded with many tons of munitions or fuels taxiing in proximity 

to their parked combat aircraft and then parking themselves at spots long before identified and pretargeted by enemy weaponeers. In such circumstances, 

air commanders likely would welcome the availability of high-capacity transport aircraft able to operate on the unpaved margins of their airfields or perhaps at airstrips or open-field landing zones separated from the primary runways, parking ramps, and other vital facilities of their main bases.

Air commanders anticipating disaggregated operations from networks of 

austere airfields or FARPS should also be concerned about the present composition of the air mobility fleet. In regions such as the western Pacific, the Middle East, Africa, and eastern Europe, airfields that can accommodate conventional fighters and large transport aircraft are scarce. In a South China Sea 

conflict, for example, the entire island of Luzon has only five airfields with 

runways at least 7,000 feet long and parking ramps to handle a dozen fighters 

and one or two C-17s.51 Even Marines employing short takeoff and verticallanding (STOVL) AV-8B or F-35B aircraft at highway or smaller airfield-based 

FARPs will face challenges in obtaining supplies and support from the existing 

Air Force transport fleet. In many such cases, reliance on C-17s to deliver support to these FARPs will oblige Marines to debark substantial rotary-wing 

aircraft or truck complements to move supplies from main airports to the 

FARPs. C-130s could potentially deliver supplies and most required support 

vehicles to STOVL FARPs, but their small payloads over strategic distances 

would limit the scale of combat operations they could support.52

For decades, the US defense community has recognized the need for an 

aircraft able to bridge the operational gap between large airfield-restricted 

aircraft and smaller, more airfield-agile aircraft. The YC-14 and YC-15 aircraft 

developed in the mid-1970s were efforts to bridge this gap. Both of these aircraft were capable of delivering nearly twice the payloads of C-130s into 

shorter and softer airfields. The Air Force expected the aircraft selected for 

production to carry 30-ton loads into 3,500-foot and 20 tons into 2,000-foot 

airstrips. The Army endorsed the advanced medium STOL (AMST) transport 

for its ability to “bridge the gap of thirty years of troop maldeployment . . . 

[and] forced centralization of depots . . . by flying supplies and equipment to 

sites within the forward combat zone” and as a way to move heavy combat 

units within theaters of operation “when the tide of battle . . . may demand.”53

The Defense Department, however, cancelled the AMST program in 1979 to 

free funds to develop a C-X aircraft, which became the C-17, better able to 

transport reinforcements from the United States into Europe should the Warsaw Pact launch a surprise attack.54
24

Figure 8. YC-14 (left) and YC-15. Though jet powered, both of these outsize 

transports had straight wings and lift augmentation devices to give them STOL 

capabilities. 

After cancellation of the AMST program, over three decades of theater airlift modernization studies consistently called for development of an outsized 

theater airlifter. One milestone study was the Army-Air Force 1984 Qualitative Intratheater Airlift Requirements Study, which called for acquisition of an 

aircraft “capable of delivering outsized cargo to small, austere airfields . . . 

3,000 feet long.”55 Most recently, the AMC’s 2013 Joint Future Theater Lift 

Study examined options to satisfy requirements for an aircraft “capable of (1) 

moving medium-weight armored vehicles and personnel to strategic, operationally, and tactically significant depths and (2) supporting maneuver in 

close proximity to objectives and sustainment of distributed forces in complex, austere, unimproved/unprepared landing areas to point of need/point of 

effect. The platform must be able to carry and/or airdrop required cargo loads 

into and out of complex, austere, unimproved/unprepared landing areas.”56

Based on the requirement for outsized precision deliveries as close to PON/Es 

as possible, the study assessed the program risk of a $128 billion program to 

develop, acquire, and sustain for 30 years a fleet of 96 VTOL tilt-rotor aircraft 

as low and a $36 billion program involving 49 conventional takeoff and landing (CTOL) aircraft as high.57 Thus the real issue in the study was not the need 

for an outsize capability but the trade-off between cost and the degree to 

which the Air Force could attain the precision delivery goal.

Inescapably, then, the challenge to acquire a new outsize-capable theater 

airlifter is about money and, therefore, politics. For the foreseeable future, 

virtually any US defense leader would hesitate to start an effort to find funding within already overstressed defense budgets for a $128 billion VTOL airlifter or even for a $36 billion CTOL aircraft. Any such effort would entail 

difficult trade-off decisions with other programs and would run headlong 

into the powerful military, industrial, and political constituencies of those 
25

other programs. The challenge would be exacerbated by the fact that the only 

outsized STOL/RF airlifter likely to be available for the next 30 years or so will 

be a foreign design.

There is no glossing over the fact that the outsized STOL transport choice 

before US defense planners is between the A400M and nothing for a long 

time to come. The only other outsize theater airlifters available or in development either come from countries that would be unacceptable as American 

military aircraft suppliers (the Russian Antonov AN-70 or Chinese Xian 

Y-20), do not possess the necessary STOL and rough field capabilities (the 

Kawasaki C-2), or are too small (the Embraer C-390 and Lockheed C-130). 

Moreover, experience with the C-17 program suggests that an effort to build 

a new theater airlifter would not put even the small force of 49 aircraft called 

for in the Joint Future Theater Lift Study on the ramp until well after the professional careers of everyone reading this paper have ended. The C-17 program took 20 years from authorization to get 49 aircraft into squadron service 

(1979–99) and took another 14 years to complete production for the Air Force 

in 2013. Given that the Air Force likely will not begin production of a new 

theater airlifter until after it completes production of a new C-X aircraft to 

replace the C-5 and C-17, the earliest that an operationally useful force of 

next-generation theater airlifters could be available would be around the latter 2040s. So the choice before the Defense Department regarding theater 

airlift modernization is to either buy a niche force of A400Ms now or live 

without an outsize theater airlift capability for decades to come.

Figure 9. A400M on grass and dragging F-18s. Theater tanker/transports, such 

as these A400s, offer the flexibility of Tier 3 airstrip operations and air refueling. 

(Photographs courtesy of Airbus)

Increasing Vulnerability of the Air Refueling Fleet

Air commanders confronting opponents in possession of strong air forces 

and long-range weaponry have several reasons to worry about the vulnerabil-
26

ities of their air refueling fleets. Most important, tanker aircraft hold central 

importance to virtually all American air warfare concepts and capabilities. 

Our potential opponents know that and undoubtedly will seek ways to destroy tanker forces in any major conflict. Also of importance, air refueling 

aircraft are large aircraft, easier than other air elements to detect in the air and 

on the ground, and vulnerable to a host of long-range weaponry. In the air, 

they could face radar-guided missiles fired from as far as 200 nm away and 

flying at Mach 3 or faster and large, all-capabilities “gorilla packs” of enemy 

aircraft with ranges of 400 nm or more that are capable of chasing fleeing 

tankers at supersonic speeds. On the ground, tanker parking areas at most 

airfields likely will be pretargeted by sophisticated enemies. They’ll likely be 

subject to both direct and shot-in-the-blind attacks by air-to-ground missiles, 

bombs also released from a few to hundreds of miles away, and ground-toground cruise or ballistic missiles ranging out to 1,000 nm or more. All of 

these weapons are capable of precision, terminal guidance to within a few 

meters of their aim points.

In any robust combination, these vulnerabilities will force air commanders 

to choose between basing their tankers forward to maximize their effectiveness or rearward to ensure their survival, not a happy choice to make in highintensity air wars. In a conflict centered on the South China Sea, rearward 

would mean basing tankers at least out to the so-called second island chain, 

which would include the Marianas, Guam, Micronesia, and Palau. These islands presently are beyond the capabilities of potential enemies on the Asian 

mainland to launch sustained and concentrated air and missile strikes. Safe 

basing of tankers supporting operations over eastern Europe would involve 

locations in Britain, southern France, and Spain. Even then, all of these locations would be at risk from standoff air attacks and cruise missiles fired from 

warships and submarines. As an example of the operational impact of such 

rearward basing, KC-46s operating from Anderson AFB, Guam, would burn 

65,000 pounds of their 212,000-pound fuel capacity just getting to and from a 

refueling orbit over the west coast of central Luzon.

Tanker vulnerabilities also will force embattled air commanders to make 

hard choices about how many of them to bring into their theaters. Along the 

second island chain, for example, only a handful of air bases and civil air fields 

can support operations by fully loaded tankers, and most of them have limited parking areas. Even in a developed region such as western Europe, tanker 

basing options can be limited. As exemplified by the experience of Odyssey 

Dawn, the NATO air campaign over Libya in 2011, tanker basing options 

were sharply restricted by the refusal of civil authorities to open commercial 

airports to air refueling operations and by the competing claims of air combat 
27

units for scarce parking space at available military fields.58 Even if parking is 

available at major airfields, air commanders will have to think twice about 

jamming a lot of tankers into them and making them vulnerable, lucrative 

targets for enemy attack. In net, then, the vulnerabilities of the existing Air 

Force tanker fleet present air commanders with a difficult choice calculus, the 

outcome of which would shape the combat power, resiliency, and operational 

flexibility of their air campaigns.

The obvious hazards presented by the vulnerabilities of the tanker fleet 

have engendered numerous official and unofficial studies and proposals for 

mitigating them. Much of the official literature, understandably, is classified. 

But a blog contribution by two knowledgeable insiders articulates the key 

concerns of the potentially devastating impact that even a low tanker attrition 

rate could have on combat air operations. Greg Knepper and Peter W. Singer 

suggest mitigation strategies that include installing better defense capabilities 

in new KC-46As and developing fighter escort and barrier defense tactics to 

protect them.59 Other studies have explored the use of agile basing strategies 

to improve the resilience and efficiency of air refueling forces based inside 

enemy weapons engagement zones. One study suggested integrating sea bases 

into the support of disaggregated air refueling forces, shifting rapidly between 

austere bases and parking locations on those bases.60 A later study concluded 

that while hardening or dispersing their bases offered air refueling forces limited advantages in their resilience, agile basing was the only methodology 

likely to make them survivable in sustained operations against strong enemies. When conducted by “theater” tankers able to operate from marginal 

airfields and highway strips, this latter study concluded that agile basing also 

would greatly improve the efficiency and scale of air refueling operations. Perhaps most importantly, the freedom to base tankers well forward would enhance their ability to support surges in offensive and defensive combat operations and to respond to the unpredictable ebb and flow of military events.61

The study on tanker basing strategies also suggested that the practical 

choice for theater tankers able to operate from austere airfields presently was 

the same as for theater airlift, one between the KC-130J and the A400M. All 

other available tanker aircraft fall out of reasonable consideration either because they are airliner-derived designs with limited airfield agility or because 

they offer only marginal or virtually no advantages over aircraft already in or 

coming into the core air refueling fleet.62 The KC-130J and the A400M are 

classic theater airlifters designed for operations into a wide range of airfields. 

Their ability to operate on unpaved surfaces can also facilitate their dispersal 

around forward airfields. Equipped with rear cargo doors, which to date have 

prevented the installation of refueling booms, both aircraft are only capable of 
28

probe-and-drogue type air refueling operations. Consequently, they would be 

limited to refueling probe-equipped Marine Corps, Navy, and most allied 

combat aircraft. This is hardly the handicap it might at first seem, since US air 

component commanders are obliged to provide common-user support to 

Marine Corps and Navy aircraft and frequently are called upon to render 

similar help to allied aircraft engaged in combined operations. Further, having an airfield-agile force of drogue-equipped tankers available to meet the 

bulk of their common-user obligations would allow joint force air component 

commanders to concentrate their longer-range (and possibly limited numbers of) refueling boom-equipped tankers to service Air Force aircraft. Additionally, as Marine Corps airmen have known for decades, a force of KC130, A400M, or similar aircraft would offer useful airlift options for supporting 

ground maneuvers or forward air bases and airfields. 

Figure 10. KC-130 with two F-35B Lightning II Joint Strike Fighters. This 

Marine Corps KC-130 also is capable of operating from Tier 3 airstrips and conducting air refueling operations. 

Opportunities

This paper has articulated some of the salient contextual elements of airlift 

policy making and identified troubling shortfalls in the capabilities of the US 

national air mobility system to meet future demands. Important contextual 

elements identified include the emergence of an increasingly complex and 

dangerous world for air mobility operations and enduring considerations of 

structure, mission, technology, money, and politics. Shortfalls identified are 

inadequate long-range lift, the absence of outsize theater lift, and tanker vulnerabilities. These shortfalls have existed in the fleet for decades, but the 
29

emerging context of air mobility increases their importance and potentially 

negative consequences for national security. Accordingly, this paper now 

turns to considering some options for mitigating these shortfalls without ignoring the policy constraints of structure, mission, technology, money, and 

politics—at least not excessively.

The first order of business for the airlift community is to begin setting the 

stage for the next air mobility requirements study (MRS). Based on discussions with active and recently retired air mobility leaders and analysts, this 

paper concludes that the Department of Defense is not likely to initiate the 

next such study until mid to late 2017 or even into 2018. That date will allow 

the next administration to articulate the strategic priorities and military guidance needed to provide a foundation and justification for a requirements 

study. Meanwhile, the DOD and its combatant and service chains of command should begin settling a number of background issues that will shape the 

next MRS, regardless of when it is initiated or its strategic foundations. A 

short list of these outstanding issues includes:

•	 articulating the low-risk airlift and air refueling requirements of each 

combatant command for its most likely worst-case contingency,

•	 articulating lesser-case requirements that might call for specialized airlift and air refueling support or aircraft not included in the baseline 

worst-case contingency,

•	 settling the mounted vertical maneuver issue, at least for the midterm. 

Potentially, MVM is the long-pole requirement for theater airlift investment. Consequently, the Defense Department needs to issue a yes, no, 

defer indefinitely, or pursue a less aggressive variation decision as soon as 

possible to clear the air for theater airlift planners,63 and

•	 developing realistic planning factors for operations in the face of robust 

A2/AD threats. These planning factors likely will include disaggregation 

tactics, unit reorganizations, logistical requirements, fleet capabilities 

requirements and gaps, and minimal expected rates of attrition. 

This stage-setting effort also should consider the methodology of the next 

requirements study. The legacy pattern of such studies since the 1981 Congressionally Mandated Mobility Study has been focused on major force movements between undegraded Tier 1 and 2 airfield networks. Essentially, air mobility requirements studies to this point have been incrementally refined 

variations of the Reinforcement of Germany exercises of the latter half of the 

Cold War, meaning that they focused on the flow of massive forces out to 

conflict areas and gave little or no attention to return flows, let alone onward 
30

deployments to engage in other crises. But now, given the shrinkage of US 

forces and the proliferation of threats they face, large-scale theater-to-theater 

movements have become an unavoidable planning consideration. The airlift 

and general mobility communities, therefore, should think deeply about how 

to integrate such movements into the next MRS.

In addition to enhancing the conceptual foundations and methodology of 

the next MRS, air mobility planners should begin developing an integrated 

roadmap for recapitalizing the airlift and tanker fleets. Against a budgetdriven constraint of spending as little and late as possible, this roadmap 

should begin by considering near-term modernization needs and opportunities that also offer offsets from other programs. Based on this present reading, 

the most pressing air mobility issues are the absence of an outsize theater 

airlift aircraft in the fleet and the vulnerability of the tanker fleet in A2/AD 

environments. These concerns represent immediate risks to the Army’s ability 

to conduct parallel operations in depth and the Air Force’s capacity to fight 

major wars in many global regions. The realistic aircraft options for addressing these issues—C/KC-130Js, A400Ms, or nothing—should be assessed for 

their ability to mitigate these challenges and the offsets they could enable, 

such as reductions in other acquisition or service-life extension programs and 

early retirements of other types of aircraft.

In contrast, the far-term issues identified in this paper (modernizing and 

expanding global and theater airlift capabilities) require only thought now 

and little investment. Current acquisition programs for systems like the F-35, 

KC-46, and B-21 will dominate the Air Force acquisition budget until the 

early 2030s. Consequently, the authoritative air mobility planners interviewed 

for this paper agreed that a new global airlifter likely will not enter production 

until the mid-2030s or later and a new theater airlifter not until as much as a 

decade after that. These distant dates and the normal pattern of aircraft development programs imply that the air mobility community has perhaps a decade to ponder the configuration of the global airlift aircraft, and maybe 15 

years to think about the next-generation theater airlifter, before the Air Force 

must issue requests for proposals and start spending real money on them.

Before closing, the data in this paper support some broad suggestions for 

addressing these challenges and shortfalls. Given the operational risks involved and the possibility that offset opportunities might be lost to delay, the 

air mobility community should pursue the outsize theater airlift and tanker 

vulnerability issues as matters of high priority. This pursuit should begin with 

open and objective analysis of the options, unfettered by political considerations. Hopefully, the bottom line of this analysis would boil down to the net 

costs (essentially, outlays minus offsets) of satisfying requirements and, in the 
31

case of tanker aircraft, perhaps their cost per pound of fuel delivered in relevant combat scenarios.

As a final thought, it is reasonable to suggest that the global and theater 

airlift missions ultimately will be filled by two different aircraft. Barring miracles, future advances in propulsion and airframe designs may make for more 

elegant solutions to these missions, but the necessity of trading off airfield 

flexibility and aerodynamic performance likely will remain and thus compel 

designers to optimize designs for each mission. Engineers will design the 

next-generation global airlifter to be as capacious as possible and still fit into 

a useful array of Tier 1 and 2 airfields. They will, in turn, design the next theater airlifter to interface with the cargo capacities and dimensions of the global 

fleet, fly some definition of strategic distance, and then land at Tier 3 airstrips 

or, hopefully, even Tier 4 landing spots. The decades-long process of conceptualizing, advocating, designing, acquiring, and learning how to operate such 

a fleet will be grist for thousands of military careers in the future.

Next Steps

This paper closes by suggesting the next two steps in the long journey to 

the future air mobility fleet. First, it emphasizes the need to take action on the 

outsize theater airlift and tanker vulnerability issues. The justifications and 

required specifications are not obscured in the mists of the distant future; 

they are already known. Second, AMC or higher should take steps to broaden 

and deepen the national discussion of air mobility theory, strategy, and requirements. Broaden and deepen imply participation in this discussion by a 

community of interested military, civil government, industry, academic, and 

other experts. Accordingly, this report suggests that the AMC individually or, 

preferably, in partnership with other organizations sponsor an annual or biannual air mobility conference. Besides bringing together useful combinations of practitioners and policy shapers, this conference should produce a 

report, and its outcomes should become action items for appropriate committees drawn from inside and outside the command. The goal should be to facilitate, discipline, formalize, and promulgate the nation’s growing understanding of and investment in its air mobility enterprise, which is a true and 

unique American national treasure. Partnership candidates for this conference would include the Airlift/Tanker Association and its very useful annual 

convention, the Air Force Association and its conventions and outreach programs, the National Defense Transportation Association, and others. Finding 

these partners and taking this step will make many of the coming challenges 
32

in the quest for relevant air mobility much easier to overcome and do so at 

minimum cost and operational risk.

Notes

1. Department of Defense (DOD), Quadrennial Defense Review 2014 (Washington, DC: 

Government Printing Office, 4 March 2014), 27, http://archive.defense.gov/pubs/2014_Quadrennial_Defense_Review.pdf.

2. Figure based on data provide in spreadsheet, “AMC Fleet Capacity (Organic and Commercial),” provided by Air Mobility Command (AMC) Directorate of Analysis, Assessments, 

and Lessons Learned, 30 November 2015.

3. Department of Transportation to Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) program participants, 

letter, subject: CRAF Allocation Changes—2016, 20 January 2016, 1 and Enclosure 1. For a 

comprehensive discussion of the workings of the CRAF, see US Transportation Command and 

AMC, Civil Reserve Air Fleet Study, Phase 2 Report, 29 April 2014, Appendix A and throughout.

4. See Air Force Doctrine Annex 3-17, Air Mobility Operations, 5 April 2015, for detailed 

discussion of the national air mobility system, https://doctrine.af.mil/DTM/dtmairmobilityops.htm.

5. AMC, Air Mobility Command Factsheet, AMC, 9 October 2014, https://web.archive.org/

web/20160303174803/http://www.amc.af.mil/library/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=229. 

6. Density altitude is the standard pressure altitude of an airport above sea level as corrected for nonstandard temperature. It is the primary consideration in the calculation of takeoff and landing distances for aircraft. Wind conditions, runway surfacing, and runway sloping 

can also influence these distances but usually not nearly to the degree that density altitude 

does. US Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration, Pilot’s Handbook of 

Aeronautical Knowledge (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2016), 11-3, https://

www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/handbooks_manuals/aviation/phak.

7. DOD Dictionary of Military Terms, s.v. “FARP,” Joint Education and Doctrine Division, 

Joint Staff, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/dod_dictionary/. 

8. Capt Christopher M. Jones to the author, e-mail, 29 December 2015. At the time, Jones 

was an operations research scientist at the combined headquarters of United States Air Forces 

Europe–Air Forces Africa.

9. The US Army Operating Concept: Win in a Complex World, 2020–2040 (Washington, DC: 

US Army Training and Doctrine Command, 31 October 2014), 18, http://www.tradoc.army.

mil/tpubs/pams/tp525-3-1.pdf.

10. The DOD defines oversize air cargo as “exceeding the usable dimension of a 463L [air 

cargo] pallet loaded to the design height of 96 inches, but equal to or less than 1,000 inches in 

length, 117 inches in width, and 105 inches in height.” Outsize cargo “exceeds the dimensions 

of oversized cargo.” In practice, the “stretched” KC-130J-30 has the cross section for oversized 

cargo, but its cargo deck is only 660 inches long. Outsize cargo “requires the use of a C-5 or 

C-17 aircraft or surface transportation.” DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.

11. Sen. John McCain, “Statement by SASC Chairman John McCain on Heritage Foundation’s 2016 Index of US Military Strength,” press release, 28 October 2015, http://www.mccain.

senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2015/10/statement-by-sasc-chairman-john-mccain-on-the-heritage-foundation-s-2016-index-of-u-s-military-strength.
33

12. Dakota L. Wood, ed., 2016 Index of US Military Strength: Assessing America’s Ability to 

Provide for the Common Defense (Washington, DC: Heritage Foundation, Davis Institute for 

National Security and Foreign Policy, 2015), 10–14 and throughout, http://index.heritage.org/

military/2016/.

13. DOD, Quadrennial Defense Review 2014, 64. 

14. US Joint Chiefs of Staff, chairman, The National Military Strategy of the United States, 

2015 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, June 2015), i, http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Publications/2015_National_Military_Strategy.pdf.

15. John A. Tirpak, “An Air Force for the Future,” Air Force Magazine (April 2016): 22, 

http://www.airforcemag.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/2016/April%202016/An-Air-ForceFor-the-Future.aspx.

16. DOD, Quadrennial Defense Review 2014, 38.

17. Blake Mize, “Rapid Raptor: Getting Fighters to the Fight,” Pacific Air Forces Public Affairs, 20 February 2014, http://www.pacaf.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123400928; and Robert D. 

Davis, “Forward Arming and Refueling Points for Fighter Aircraft: Power Projection in an 

Antiaccess Environment,” Air and Space Power Journal (September–October 2014): 5–28, 

http://www.au.af.mil/au/afri/aspj/article.asp?id=224.

18. Robert C. Owen, “Sea-Land Basing of Air Refueling Forces: A Concept for Resiliency 

and Efficiency,” Air and Space Power Journal (March–April 2014): 5–28, http://www.au.af.mil/

au/afri/aspj/article.asp?id=267.

19. US Marine Corps, Expeditionary Force 21, Forward and Ready: Now and in the Future

(Washington, DC: Headquarters, US Marine Corps, 4 March 2014), 10, 12, 14, 16, and 43, 

http://www.mccdc.marines.mil/Portals/172/Docs/MCCDC/EF21/EF21_USMC_Capstone_

Concept.pdf. 

20. United States Army, Army Operating Concept, 31 October 2014, 18.

21. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Chairman, The National Military Strategy of the United States, 

2015, 15.

22. For discussion of the Army’s strategy for mechanizing its light units and modernizing 

its Stryker and armored brigades, see US Army, Capabilities Integration Center, The US Army 

Combat Vehicle Modernization Strategy, 2015, 8–9 and throughout.

23. For a summary of the Army logistics roadmap and its weight-reduction initiatives, see 

LTG Gustave F. Perna, US Army Deputy Chief of Staff, G4 (Logistics), “Expeditionary Logistics 

for Army 2025,” Army.mil (website), 2 October 2015, http://www.army.mil/article/156604/.

24. US Army and US Marine Corps, Gaining and Maintaining Access: An Army–Marine 

Corps Concept, Army Capabilities Integrations Center and Marine Corps Combat Development Command, March 2012, 10, http://www.defenseinnovationmarketplace.mil/resources/

Army%20Marine%20Corp%20Gaining%20and%20Maintaining%20Access.pdf. 

25. BG Robin P. Swan and LTC Scott R. McMichael, “Mounted Vertical Maneuver: A Giant 

Leap Forward in Maneuver and Sustainment,” Military Review 87, no. 1 (January–February 

2007): 52–62, https://www.questia.com/library/journal/1G1-158735254/mounted-verticalmaneuver-a-giant-leap-forward-in.

26. Secretary of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review 2014, 3.

27. United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, World Urbanization Prospects [Highlights] (New York: UN Press, 2014), 1, https://esa.un.org/unpd/wup/.

28. Joint Chiefs of Staff, The National Military Strategy of the United States, 2015 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, June 2015), 3, http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Publications/2015_National_Military_Strategy.pdf.
34

29. Ibid., 10, 19.

30. Air Mobility Command, Directorate of Studies and Analysis (AMC A9A), “Tanker 

Versatility and Capability” (briefing, 20 March 2013), slides 1 and 2. 

31. C-130 absolute and relative performance characteristics are discussed in Lockheed 

Martin Corporation brochure, “C-130J Super Hercules: Whatever the Situation, We’ll Be There,” 

http://www.lockheedmartin.com/content/dam/lockheed/data/aero/documents/c130brochure/

C130JPocketGuide.pdf.

32. Life cycle and general planning information drawn from Col David R. Steele to Robert 

Owen, e-mail, subject: Air Mobility Future’s Study, 31 March 2016. At the time he wrote the 

e-mail, Steel was chief of the AMC Strategic Planning Division. However, the e-mail was the 

product of an informal discussion between Steele and the author, and his comments regarding 

policy reflected his professional opinion and not necessarily the official positions of the command or the US Air Force.

33. DOD, Congressionally Mandated Mobility Study Executive Summary (CMMS), 7 April 

1981, 3. Document is now declassified; Duncan McNabb, “Congressionally Mandated Mobility 

Study,” (point paper, HQ MAC/XPPB, Air Mobility Command History Office, 12 February 

1986); and John Shea, interview by the author, 8 August 1990, tape 3A, index 409.

34. Military Airlift Command, History of Military Airlift Command, Calendar Year 1991, 

Volume I, Narrative and Appendices (Scott AFB, IL: Air Mobility Command History Office, 

1991), 175. 

35. Jean R. Gebman, Louis J. Batchelder, and Katherine M. Poehlmann, Finding the Right 

Mix of Military and Civil Airlift, Issues and Implications, Vol. 1, Executive Summary (Santa 

Monica, CA: RAND, 1994), 13-4, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_

reports/2006/MR406.1.pdf; and John Lund, Ruth Berg, and Corinne Replogle, Project Air Force 

Analysis of the Air War in the Gulf: An Assessment of Strategic Airlift Operational Efficiency

(Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1993), 33, 91, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/reports/2006/R4269.4.pdf; Military Airlift Command, History, 1991, 181–83.

36. James K. Matthews and Cora J. Holt, So Many, So Much, So Far, So Fast: United States 

Transportation Command and Strategic Deployment for Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm

(Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint History Office, 1995), 13, http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/History/Monographs/Transcom.pdf.

37. DOD, CMMS Executive Summary, 4; and McNabb, point paper.

38. Secretary of Defense, Mobility Requirements Study Executive Summary, December 

2000, 4. 

39. DOD, Executive Summary: Mobility Capabilities and Requirements Study 2016, 17 September 2013, 1–8; and John A. Tirpak, “The Double Life of Air Mobility,” Air Force Magazine

(July 2010): 31, http://www.airforcemag.com/MagazineArchive/pages/2010/july%20

2010/0710mobility.aspx.

40. The DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms defines STOL as “the ability of an 

aircraft to clear a 50-foot (15 meters) obstacle within 1,500 feet (450 meters) of commencing 

takeoff or in landing, to stop within 1,500 feet (450 meters) after passing over a 50-foot (15 

meters) obstacle.” Light STOL transport aircraft such as the De Havilland C-7 and Ryan XC142 have been capable of takeoff runs of only a few hundred feet. But the 2,500–3,000 foot 

takeoff rolls of aircraft like the C-130 and A400M are about as short as available at this time. 

Thus by “STOL/RF” this study means unpaved airstrips and open fields or weakly paved runways around 3,000 feet in length or less.

41. Lockheed Martin, “C-130J Super Hercules,” 29.
35

42. Ibid., 27–28.

43. Boeing Corporation, “Backgrounder: C-17 Globemaster III,” April 2015, http://www.

boeing.com/assets/pdf/defense-space/military/c17/docs/c17_overview.pdf.

44. California bearing ratio (CBR) measures the resistance of unpaved surfaces to compression and rutting. A CBR of 100 equates to a surface of crushed California limestone, almost 

equivalent to pavement in its strength. A CBR of 10 equates to one of wet sand and soil, while 

lower CBRs delineate wet tilled soil or plain mud. 

45. For discussions of C-17 and C-130 effects on soft fields, see Air Force Civil Engineer 

Support Agency, “Engineering Technical Letter 97-9; Criteria and Guidance for C-17 Contingency and Training Operations on Semi-Prepared Airfields,” 25 November 1997, 10, https://

www.wbdg.org/ccb/AF/AFETL/etl_97_9.pdf; and Lockheed Martin, “C-130J Super Hercules,” 18.

46. Maj Joseph D. Gaddis, “Rethinking the Last Tactical Mile: Adaptive Air Logistics in 

Africa,” Army Sustainment 44, no. 4 (July–August 2012): 34–41, http://www.alu.army.mil/alog/

issues/JulAug12/Rethinking_Last_Tactical_Mile.html.

47. US Army Concepts Integration Command, “Global Deployment Assessment: Examining Deployment Considerations within the Arc of Instability” (briefing, 7 July 2008), slides 

15–24.

48. The author heard this concern expressed several times during Army Warfighting Challenges Seminar, hosted by the US Army Maneuver Center of Excellence at Fort Benning, GA, 

9–10 February 2016. This particular seminar of about 100 senior-level planners and field leaders was considering the challenges of conducting a multidivision operation in the European 

theater.

49. Olivier Tramond and Philippe Seigneur, “Operation Serval: Another Beau Geste of 

France in Sub-Saharan Africa?,” Military Review (November–December 2014): 76–86, https://

www.joomag.com/magazine/military-review-english-edition-november-december2014/0915712001414005115?page=78.

50. Michael Shurkin, France’s War in Mali: Lessons for an Expeditionary Army (Washington, DC: RAND Corporation, 2014), 9, 11–19, and 24, http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR770.html.

51. These airfields would be Ninoy-Aquino, Subic, Clark, San Fernando, and Laoang airports.

52. The author discusses this issue at length in “Distributed STOVL Operations and Mobility Support,” Naval War College Review 69, no. 4 (Autumn 2016): 30–48, https://www.usnwc.

edu/getattachment/10f62895-b4c2-4fa7-b853-73753a139f08/Distributed-STOVL-Operations-and-Air-Mobility-Supp.aspx.

53. US Army Training and Doctrine Command, “An Army Concept for Intratheater Tactical Airlift,” July 1978, attachment to Military Airlift Command, Directorate of Plans, letter, 

“TRADOC/ALPO paper “An Army Concept for Intratheater Tactical Airlift,” 3 August 1978.

54. See Military Airlift Command, History Office, History of Military Airlift Command 1 

January–31 December 1979 (Scott AFB, IL: MAC History Office, 1980), 68–70 for summary of 

DOD decision to cancel AMST program; and Betty R. Kennedy, Globemaster III: Acquiring the 

C-17 (Scott AFB, IL: Air Mobility Command Office of History, 2004), 17–20. The decision 

documents were Secretary of Defense Program Management Directives R-Q6131(3) and R-C0020(1). 

55. MAC and US Army Training and Doctrine Command, Airlift Concepts and Requirements Agency, Qualitative Intratheater Airlift Requirements Study, 1985, xviii. Also see the 
36

“Phase II” iteration of the report, which was released in 1986 and which reinforced the salient 

conclusions and recommendations of the initial study.

56. US Air Force Aeronautical Systems Center, Joint Future Theater Lift Technology Study

(Wright Patterson AFB, OH: Aeronautical Systems Center, 20 October 2010), 3, http://www.

airforcemag.com/SiteCollectionDocuments/Reports/2010/October%202010/Day25/JFTL_

CRFI__102210.pdf.

57. For an authoritative discussion of mounted vertical maneuver (MVM), see Swan and 

McMichael, “Mounted Vertical Maneuver: A Giant Leap Forward,” 52–62. Also see AMC, Joint 

Future Theater Lift: Technology Study Final Report, 20 February 2013, 17–18, 31, and 125–6.

58. Karl P. Mueller, Karl P., Gregory Alegi, Christian F. Anrig, Christopher S. Chivvis, Robert Egnell, Christina Goulter, Camille Grand, Deborah C. Kidwell, Richard O. Mayne, Bruce R. 

Nardulli, Robert C. Owen, Frederic Wehrey, Leila Mahnad, and Stephen M. Worman, Precision 

and Purpose: Airpower in the Libyan Civil War (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, RR676-AF, 2015), accessed 25 February 2016, http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/

RR676.html, 88–90.

59. Greg Knepper and Peter W. Singer, “Short Legs Can’t Win Arms Races: Range Issues 

and New Threats to Aerial Refueling Put US Strategy at Risk,” War on the Rocks (website), 20 

May 2015, http://warontherocks.com/2015/05/short-legs-cant-win-arms-races-range-issues-new-threats-aerial-refueling/.

60. Owen, “Sea-Land Basing of Air Refueling Forces,” 5–28.

61. Robert C. Owen, Basing Strategies for Air Refueling Forces in Antiaccess/Area-Denial 

Environments (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air Force Research Institute, 2015), 4–14, http://www.au.af.

mil/au/aupress/bookinfo.asp?bid=572.

62. Ibid., 11.

63. For a deeper discussion of this issue, see Robert C. Owen, “Theater Airlift Modernization: Options for Closing the Gap,” Joint Force Quarterly 75 (4th Quarter 2014): 13–18, http://

ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/jfq/jfq-75/jfq-75_13-18_Owen.pdf.
37

Abbreviations

A2/AD antiaccess/area denial

AMC Air Mobility Command

AMST advanced medium STOL (short takeoff and landing) transport

ARC air reserve component

BCT brigade combat team

CMMS Congressionally Mandated Mobility Study

CRAF Civil Reserve Air Fleet

CTOL conventional takeoff and landing

FARP forward arming and refueling point

MRS mobility requirement study

MTMD million ton-miles per day

MVM mounted vertical maneuver

NAMS national air mobility system

nm nautical mile

PON/E point of need/employment

STOL short takeoff and landing

STOL/RF short takeoff and landing/rough-field

STOVL short takeoff and vertical landing

VEO violent extremist organizations

VTOL vertical takeoff and landing

Appendix

0

50000

100000150000200000250000300000

0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000 8000

s)bl(daoly Pa

Range - nm

Payload-Range Comparison of Mobility Aircraft

C17C17ERC5BC5MC130JC130H3CH-47FMV-22A400M

Assumptions Fixed-Wing a/c:No WindStandard DayStep Climb1 hr holding fuel at destination

Assumptions Rotary-Wing a/c:

No Wind

Standard Day

≤ 250' mean sea level flight level

Internal load

Payload and range performances of global, theater, and battlefield (rotary-wing) transport aircraft. The author sourced these data from numerous official, manufacturer, and other sources as available in open, nonproprietary sources. (Chart by Robert C. Owen, 2016.)