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i 

20–818 2017

[H.A.S.C. No. 114–131] 

SOUTH CHINA SEA MARITIME DISPUTES 

JOINT HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND 

PROJECTION FORCES 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

MEETING JOINTLY WITH

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

[Serial No. 114–242] 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

JULY 7, 2016 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia, Chairman 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama 

ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California, Vice Chair 

VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri 

PAUL COOK, California 

JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma 

JACKIE WALORSKI, Indiana 

RYAN K. ZINKE, Montana 

STEPHEN KNIGHT, California 

STEVE RUSSELL, Oklahoma 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam 

HENRY C. ‘‘HANK’’ JOHNSON, JR., Georgia 

SCOTT H. PETERS, California 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

GWEN GRAHAM, Florida 

SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts 

DAVE SIENICKI, Professional Staff Member 

PHIL MACNAUGHTON, Professional Staff Member 

JODI BRIGNOLA, Clerk 
(III) 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

MATT SALMON, Arizona 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

PAUL COOK, California 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

CURT CLAWSON, Florida 

SCOTT DESJARLAIS, Tennessee 

REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin 

DAVID A. TROTT, Michigan 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

DANIEL DONOVAN, New York 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

AMI BERA, California 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania 

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director 

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

MATT SALMON, Arizona Chairman 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

SCOTT DESJARLAIS, Tennessee 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

AMI BERA, California 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

GRACE MENG, New York 

(V) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Courtney, Hon. Joe, a Representative from Connecticut, Ranking Member, 

Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces, Committee on Armed 

Services ................................................................................................................. 2 

Forbes, Hon. J. Randy, a Representative from Virginia, Chairman, Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces, Committee on Armed Services ......................................................................................................................... 1

Salmon, Hon. Matt, a Representative from Arizona, Chairman, Subcommittee 

on Asia and the Pacific, Committee on Foreign Affairs .................................... 3 

Sherman, Hon. Brad, a Representative from California, Ranking Member, 

Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, Committee on Foreign Affairs ........... 5 

WITNESSES 

Denmark, Abraham M., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asia, 

U.S. Department of Defense ................................................................................ 8 

Willett, Colin, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau for East Asia 

and Pacific Affairs, U.S. Department of State ................................................... 6 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Courtney, Hon. Joe ........................................................................................... 35 

Denmark, Abraham M. .................................................................................... 44 

Forbes, Hon. J. Randy ...................................................................................... 33 

Willett, Colin ..................................................................................................... 37 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

Mr. Sherman ..................................................................................................... 57 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Forbes ......................................................................................................... 61 

Mr. Larsen ........................................................................................................ 62 

Mr. Lowenthal .................................................................................................. 65 

Mr. Salmon ........................................................................................................ 63 

(1) 

SOUTH CHINA SEA MARITIME DISPUTES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED

SERVICES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJEC- TION FORCES, MEETING JOINTLY WITH THE COMMITTEE

ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND

THE PACIFIC, Washington, DC, Thursday, July 7, 2016. 

The subcommittees met, pursuant to call, at 3:30 p.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. J. Randy Forbes (chairman of the Seapower and Projection Forces Subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. J. RANDY FORBES, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM VIRGINIA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE 

ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES, COMMITTEE ON 

ARMED SERVICES 

Mr. FORBES. I want to welcome the members of the House Armed 

Services Seapower and Projection Forces Subcommittee and the 

House Foreign Affairs Asia-Pacific Subcommittee to a special joint 

hearing on the topic of maritime disputes in the South China Sea. 

I also want to extend a warm welcome to our two witnesses, Ms. 

Colin Willett, Deputy Assistant Secretary [DAS] for Strategy and 

Multilateral Affairs in the State Department’s Bureau of East 

Asian and Pacific Affairs, and Mr. Abraham Denmark, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asia. I thank you both for 

being here to testify at this special joint hearing. 

Our topic today is a timely and critically important one. Early 

next week, the Permanent Court of Arbitration is expected to rule 

on the legitimacy of China’s expansive territorial claims in the 

South China Sea. 

In the aftermath of that ruling, the world will be watching two 

things. First, to see whether China behaves like a responsible 

stakeholder in the international system, and if not, to see how 

America responds. For decades, the United States has sought to facilitate China’s integration into the global economy and the rulesbased international order that has benefitted Asia so well. China’s 

reaction to next week’s ruling will provide a clear indicator of how 

that is going and whether Beijing’s quest for regional dominance 

can be curbed by international law and world opinion. 

America’s response will also send a powerful signal. While the 

United States does not take sides in territorial disputes, we can 

and should stand up for those parties that pursue their peaceful 

resolution. The Philippines is one such party but not the only one. 

And what we do or don’t do to support our allies in the rules-based 

international system in the weeks ahead will have echoes across 

the region and in other corners of the globe. 
2 

With so much at stake in the South China Sea, it is critically important that the United States has a clear policy toward the region 

and a strategy to sustain peace, prosperity, and the rule of law in 

Asia. Diplomacy will play a crucial role in avoiding and resolving 

conflict, and I am pleased to have Ms. Willett and members of the 

House Foreign Affairs Committee [HFAC] with us here today to 

discuss that critical aspect of any interagency approach to the region. 

If China continues to flaunt international law and world opinion, 

however, I firmly believe that the surest way of averting another 

devastating conflict in the Asia-Pacific region will be for the United 

States to remain present, engaged, and capable of projecting decisive military power in the region. Might does not make right, but 

it can be used to deter threats to peace, prosperity, and the rule 

of law. 

That is why I have been pleased to see an increase in U.S. naval 

and military presence in the region and an increase in the frequency of our freedom of navigation operations. I look forward to 

hearing from Mr. Denmark about what the Department of Defense 

is doing to deter Chinese aggression, reassure our allies and partners, and maintain a favorable military balance in the Asia-Pacific 

region going forward. 

I now turn to my good friend and colleague, Mr. Courtney, the 

ranking member of the Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection 

Forces, for any comments that he may have. 

Mr. Courtney. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Forbes can be found in the Appendix on page 33.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. JOE COURTNEY, A REPRESENTATIVE 

FROM CONNECTICUT, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE 

ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES, COMMITTEE ON 

ARMED SERVICES 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to 

yourself and to Mr. Salmon for organizing today’s hearing, which 

again, as you stated, could not be more timely, given the fact that 

a proceeding that the eyes of the world have been watching for over 

a year or so is about to come to a climax with the decision by the 

U.N. [United Nations] Hague Convention in terms of resolving this 

question about maritime claims in the South China Sea. 

Again, the stakes are huge. Trillions of dollars of commercial sea 

traffic and products pass through the South China Sea every single 

year. There are numerous stakeholders in terms of different nations, maritime nations that are adjacent to it, and obviously, the 

U.S. Navy and the U.S. as a nation has huge interests at stake in 

terms of making sure that international norms are followed that 

have been followed for the last 70 years in the wake of World War 

II and that hopefully we are going to continue to see that rule of 

law continue after The Hague’s decision. 

I think a nice—I have a written statement, which I am going to 

ask to be submitted, and I am just going to briefly end by saying 

that one way to sort of frame this question is that in September 

of 2015, five Chinese naval ships entered U.S. territorial waters off 

the coast of Alaska. In acknowledging the transit of these vessels, 
3 

the United States made clear we viewed this action as well within 

the rights of China and any other nation to conduct innocent passage through legitimately established territorial seas and nonthreatening military activities within exclusive economic zone of 

another country. 

The question is whether or not that same standard, which we 

scrupulously followed, is going to be adhered to in the South China 

Sea. And again, the Navy, as we have heard on the Armed Services 

Committee, has been conducting these freedom of navigation operations over the last 6 months, 12 months or so, again, well within 

our rights under UNCLOS [United Nations Convention on the Law 

of the Sea], and really, that is what I think our policy should be, 

which is to just basically have a single standard across the board, 

whether it is up in the Alaskan waters or in the South China Sea. 

And you know, obviously, you know, we have a huge amount at 

stake, as I said earlier, but we are also, I think, the nation that 

really a lot of our allies in the region are looking towards in terms 

of leadership, and really, again, following through on what I think 

is really the only path forward in terms of assuring that international maritime activity is going to continue peacefully and productively for all the stakeholders that are affected. 

So again, I have a written statement which I would ask to be entered into the record, and with that, I would yield back. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Courtney can be found in the Appendix on page 35.] 

Mr. FORBES. Without objection, all the written statements will be 

entered as part of the record. And now it is my privilege to recognize another good friend and colleague, the chairman of the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, Mr. Matt Salmon of Arizona, for 

any remarks he may have. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MATT SALMON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM ARIZONA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA 

AND THE PACIFIC, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

Mr. SALMON. Thank you very much, Chairman Forbes. I appreciate you giving me the opportunity to join you in convening this 

important and timely joint hearing. 

The territorial disputes in the South China Sea may represent 

the most significant long-term security challenge in our shared 

jurisdiction. Our conversations about this topic are often complicated by the minutia of territorial sea’s baselines and high tide 

elevations, but it is important for us to remember today what the 

South China Sea dispute boils down to. One nation turning away 

from the peaceful mechanisms of international law and peaceful coexistence and instead embracing belligerence. 

Congress, the administration, and other counterparts across the 

world, recognize the severity of the threat posed by China’s aggressive coercive actions in the South China Sea that undermine international norms. Our Secretary of Defense and the President himself regularly list the South China Sea among the world’s most concerning international friction points and raise it at the highest levels with their Chinese interlocutors, including Chinese President Xi 

Jinping. 
4 

Analysts around the world pour over the disputes, and the 

United States has undertaken a series of highly publicized freedom 

of navigation operations to contest China’s outrageous claims. 

Alarmingly, all of this attention seems to have had little effect. 

Tensions in the sea continue to mount, and China has established 

effective control of many areas by building capable military facilities on top of disputed features. 

In light of these trends, today’s hearing could not come at a better time. In the coming days, weeks, and months, the South China 

Sea territorial disputes will present a series of especially important 

challenges. Our response to these challenges has the potential to 

reverse the trend of escalating tensions or to cause further injury 

to the peaceful rules-based international order. I would like to 

touch briefly on a few of these challenges. 

First, the arbitral tribunal deciding the Philippines’ legal case 

against China recently announced it will conclude its decision on 

July 12. Although China is legally bound, and I repeat, they are 

legally bound to its result, it has refused to participate and has 

clearly said it will not comply. I am concerned that many seem to 

have written off China’s noncompliance as a foregone conclusion. 

You must remember that this case is the most significant substantial approach to settling disputes in the South China Sea 

through a peaceful, equitable process. China should be held accountable to the tribunal’s ruling. The Scarborough Shoal represents another critical test. China and the Philippines have come 

to the physical confrontation over this site before, and recent rumors hint that China may soon extend its island building campaign 

to the Shoal. 

Despite how near Scarborough is to Philippine shores, its disputed status makes it unclear whether it is covered by the U.S.- 

Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty. This uncertainty means that if 

aggression around Scarborough Shoal is not handled properly, the 

very credibility of such treaties could be damaged. These treaties 

are anchors of hub-and-spoke alliance system in the Pacific and 

damage to them could have dire consequences on American influence and security in the region. 

Finally, I want to mention the continuing threat posed by China’s ability to declare an Air Defense Identification Zone [ADIZ] 

over the South China Sea. I am concerned we have few direct options to counter this type of escalation if China chooses to pursue 

it. China’s network of airstrips, radars, missile batteries constructed across the South China Sea while the rest of the world 

watched, may prove a capacity—excuse me—may provide a capacity to enforce such an ADIZ. 

While the United States military would never recognize such a 

zone, commercial carriers will likely comply with China’s notification requirement as they have under China’s ADIZ in the East 

China Sea. China will once again unilaterally have changed the 

status quo. These countless other challenges posed by the South 

China Sea territorial disputes will continue to test the United 

States and our allies. 

Though the answers are sometimes not easy to find, I am really 

glad we came together today to hold this joint hearing and working 

towards solutions, and keeping the issue at the forefront of foreign 
5 

policy and national security agendas is critical, and I appreciate 

the opportunity. I yield back. 

Mr. FORBES. Mr. Chairman, thank you. And with that, I would 

like to yield to the ranking member of the Subcommittee on Asia 

and the Pacific, Mr. Sherman, for any comments he might have. 

STATEMENT OF HON. BRAD SHERMAN, A REPRESENTATIVE 

FROM CALIFORNIA, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

ASIA AND THE PACIFIC, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I will be a little bit of 

a contrarian, but if I just agreed with everybody who had just spoken, it would be so boring. 

It is my view that the power in making decisions in any important area of our policy is often under the control of the domestic 

organization that has power and cares about that policy. 

So when it comes to the Trans-Pacific Partnership [TPP], Wall 

Street wants it, Wall Street will probably get it. When you look at 

the Pentagon and its needs, we see that for 150 years every time 

our military forces have confronted a worthy symmetrical uniformed adversary, it has ended with glory for our Armed Forces, 

from the Spanish-American War through the victory over the Soviet Union without a major conflagration. And every time we have 

faced a non-uniformed asymmetrical opponent, it has been a terrible experience for our military from the Philippine insurrection 

right up until the operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, not that we 

are always unsuccessful, but it has never been gloriously easy. 

And so it is not surprising that the Pentagon is looking for a worthy adversary, and there is only one available in the world, and 

that is China. And so we are told that we should spend hundreds 

of billions of dollars focused on developing new technologies and 

procuring new weapons systems for the purpose of confronting 

China in the South China and East China Sea. 

Not only are we subject to this, but China is subject to it as well. 

In China, there is one institution at the center of making decisions, 

that is the Communist Party, and that Communist Party suffers a 

great crisis of legitimacy. People all over China are asking, ‘‘Why 

are these guys running things?’’ Their old answer was they are 

running things because they are the vanguard of the proletarian. 

Not so much. Then they said: ‘‘Shut up. We are giving you 10 percent economic growth.’’ I would be inclined to switch political parties if I could achieve 10 percent annual economic growth, but the 

Communist Party can no longer do that. So the Communist Party 

of China is retreating into the last refuge of scoundrels and illegitimate governments, and that is exaggerated nationalism, and the 

best way for them to do that is to focus on these islands. 

The amount of cost that we are incurring as we build toward this 

confrontation, again, is hundreds of billions of dollars. We don’t 

have a good cost accounting system for our military to tell us what 

weapons systems relate to what international threats and what foreign policy objectives, but every time I talk to the Pentagon about 

research and procurement, they say: ‘‘Sherman, we are not interested in doing research on anything unless it shoots down Chinese 

planes over the South China Sea.’’ There are other things that we 
6 

confront, particularly a war on terrorism where research is called 

for. 

Now, we are told that these islands are of such great importance. 

They have remained uninhabited, even though they are off the 

shore of the most teeming and populated continent, they have been 

uninhabited for millennia. We are told that trillions of dollars of 

trade goes through these islands. That is all trade going in and out 

of Chinese ports, which means if China were able to militarize 

these islands, they would be able to blockade their own ports. 

We are told that there is economic value in minerals, and none 

of which have happened, but we are sure of one thing, and that is, 

if there is any oil, it doesn’t belong to us. It belongs to Japan, the 

Philippines, China, whoever owns these islands. And keep in mind, 

all of our allies want us to spend hundreds of billions of dollars defending their islands which may or may not have any economic 

value at all, but they are never willing to spend more than 1, 

maybe 2 percent of their GDP [gross domestic product] to defend 

their islands or their countries. 

So I am not saying we should surrender to China, but we should 

not surrender to the urge to exaggerate. We should be careful, and 

we should relax. I am not pro-China. I am pro-Ambien, America’s 

leading sleep product. 

There are many situations in the world where countries make 

outlandish claims that can be quietly resisted without turning the 

Pentagon on its head, spending hundreds of billions of dollars developing new lethal technologies and reorienting our foreign policy 

and our military policy toward dealing with one particular outlandish claim. 

So we need to resist calmly China’s claims in the South China 

Sea. I yield back. 

Mr. FORBES. The gentleman yields back. 

Ms. Willett, we are glad to have you with us today, and Mr. Denmark. And before I turn to your testimony, I want to make one procedural motion. 

I ask unanimous consent that non-subcommittee members be allowed to participate in today’s hearing after all subcommittee members have had an opportunity to ask questions. Is there an objection? 

Hearing none, non-subcommittee members will be recognized at 

the appropriate time for 5 minutes. 

And with that, Ms. Willett, we want you to take all the time you 

want as long as you can get it within that 5-minute allotment that 

we have given there to give us your thoughts and your comments, 

and again, your written testimony will be made part of the record, 

so thank you for being with us, and we turn the floor over to you. 

STATEMENT OF COLIN WILLETT, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE, BUREAU FOR EAST ASIA AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Ms. WILLETT. Well, thank you very much, Chairman Forbes and 

Chairman Salmon. It is a great opportunity to appear before 

this—— 
7 

Mr. FORBES. Ms. Willett, I am going ask you to do what they 

asked me to do. Can you get a little closer to that mic. Sometimes 

they just aren’t very sensitive and don’t pick up. Thank you. 

Ms. WILLETT. Sure. So thank you, Chairman Forbes and Chairman Salmon for the opportunity to appear before this joint subcommittee hearing today. It is a very timely issue. It is a very important issue. The importance of the South China Sea to global 

commerce and to regional stability, I think is well known. Its economic and strategic significance means the United States has a 

vested interest in ensuring that territorial and maritime issues are 

managed peacefully. 

Next week will present an important milestone in the South 

China Sea dispute. On July 12, the arbitral tribunal convened 

under the Law of the Sea Convention is set to issue a decision on 

the Philippine submissions relating to the application of the convention to the South China Sea. 

The Philippines has asked the tribunal to rule on a number of 

issues, particularly on the validity of China’s nine-dash line and on 

the maritime entitlements generated by various land features in 

the South China Sea. Such a ruling has the potential to narrow the 

areas which can legitimately be considered subject to dispute based 

on maritime zones generated from contested land features as well 

as the undisputed mainland coast of Southeast Asian claimants. 

While the tribunal will not address the underlying sovereignty 

claims to land features, the decision does have the potential to 

crack the door open to a new modus vivendi among the parties that 

would help manage tensions in those disputed spaces. 

It is possible to envision a diplomatic process among the claimants that would explore different ideas for managing marine resources in areas that all relevant parties agree are subject to competing claims. 

Such a path towards cooperation is achievable if claimants have 

the political will, flexibility, and creativity to find reasonable and 

practical arrangements that could serve as starting points for addressing these longstanding tensions. Conversely, an adverse reaction to the tribunal ruling could become a source of increased tension. 

The Law of the Sea Convention makes clear that the absence of 

a party or failure of a party to defend its case shall not constitute 

a bar to the proceedings, and that a decision by the tribunal shall 

be complied with by the parties to the dispute; in this case, China 

and the Philippines. 

The world will be watching to see whether China chooses a path 

of diplomacy and cooperation or continues to walk along one of confrontation with its neighbors. The U.S. approach to the dispute 

aims to reduce the risk of conflict and preserve space for diplomatic 

solutions, including by pressing all claimants to exercise restraint, 

maintain open channels of dialogue, lower their rhetoric, and behave responsibly in the sea and in the air, and acknowledge that 

the same rules and standards must apply to all. 

The international community has an interest in maintaining a 

peaceful and stable South China Sea and preserving a rules-based 

regional system. As such, we will keep the South China Sea and 

maritime cooperation at the top of the agenda in the region’s multi-
8 

lateral forum while also working bilaterally with the relevant countries. We will continue to ensure that problematic behavior is exposed and censured. We are engaging closely with all of the claimants at all levels of government, as President Obama did in his recent trip to Vietnam, and Secretary Kerry did at the strategic and 

economic dialogue in Beijing last month. 

We are working with Southeast Asian coastal states to improve 

their maritime domain awareness, maintain effective presence in 

their claimed waters, and enable them to increase communication 

and collaboration amongst themselves. A common operating picture 

can help prevent unintended escalations and improve levels of cooperation. For these countries, having a steady and consistent presence is an important demonstration that they have no intention of 

relinquishing their legitimate maritime rights. 

These diplomatic and capacity building efforts rest on top of our 

robust and durable U.S. military presence in the region, which my 

colleague will discuss in greater detail. But let me underscore that 

the United States will not hesitate to defend our national security 

interest and to honor our security commitments to our allies and 

partners. 

The United States has been an important partner in protecting 

the security and stability of the Asia-Pacific region for decades, and 

we will continue to protect our rights and the rights of all nations 

to fly, sail, and operate wherever international law allows. 

I thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today and 

look forward to discussing. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Willett can be found in the Appendix on page 37.] 

Mr. FORBES. Ms. Willett, thank you. 

Mr. Denmark, we look forward to your comments. 

STATEMENT OF ABRAHAM M. DENMARK, DEPUTY ASSISTANT 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR EAST ASIA, U.S. DEPARTMENT 

OF DEFENSE 

Mr. DENMARK. Thank you, Chairman Forbes, Chairman Salmon, 

ranking members, distinguished members of the committee. Thank 

you for—— 

Mr. FORBES. Mr. Denmark, could you do the same thing, could 

you get a little closer? 

Mr. DENMARK. Thank you for inviting me and Deputy Assistant 

Secretary Willett to testify before you today on this important 

issue. 

I would like to thank both of the committees for your leadership 

in supporting our Nation’s robust engagement across the AsiaPacific. South China Sea is an area of immense economic and strategic importance. For decades, it has been a critical operational 

area for our military and is central to our strategy of strengthening 

a principled rules-based order that enables regional stability and 

prosperity. 

This afternoon I will describe a region at a crossroads with the 

upcoming U.N. arbitral tribunal and what actions the Department 

of Defense is taking to preserve regional stability for decades to 

come. 
9 

At the center of the South China Sea disputes are a series of 

competing claims among Brunei, China, Malaysia, the Philippines, 

Taiwan, and Vietnam. While the U.S. takes no position on competing territorial sovereignty claims, we do take a strong position 

on protecting and in upholding the rights, freedoms, and lawful 

uses of the sea and airspace guaranteed to all, and we seek to uphold key principles at the heart of a rules-based international 

order, including customary international law, unimpeded lawful 

commerce, freedom of navigation and overflight, and the peaceful 

resolution of disputes. 

We do have concerns about the actions by any claimant that may 

have an effect of eroding these principles. China in particular has 

undertaken a series of initiatives that set it apart from other claimants, reclaiming 3,200 acres in the Spratly Islands, building harbors, logistical facilities, and military-grade airfields as it deploys 

military assets to these features, and using low-intensity coercion 

to enhance its presence and ability to control the South China Sea. 

At the same time as China has been building outposts, another 

process has also been playing out. In just 5 days, on July 12, a 

United Nations Permanent Court of Arbitration tribunal will issue 

a ruling on these disputed features. The ruling will mark an important crossroads for the region. It will present an opportunity for 

those in the region to determine whether the Asia-Pacific’s future 

will be defined by adherence to international laws and norms that 

have enabled it to prosper, or whether the region’s future will be 

determined by raw calculations of power. 

In light of this key inflection point, I would like to briefly describe what we are doing in the region to preserve regional stability. The United States has undertaken a whole-of-government 

approach in the South China Sea with the Department of Defense 

[DOD] working in lockstep with the State Department and others 

to support our diplomacy with a robust military capability. 

I would like to outline the four broad DOD efforts that have supported the broader USG [U.S. Government] strategy. First, the Department of Defense has been providing a credible capability in the 

South China Sea and the region to deter conflict and to create 

space for our diplomatic efforts to succeed. We have increased our 

military presence, and we are ensuring our presence is geographically distributed, operationally resilient, and politically sustainable. 

Second, we have enhanced our tempo of military operations. 

From exercises, to freedom of navigation operations and presence 

operations, DOD continues to fly, sail, and operate wherever international law allows so that others can do the same. 

Third, we are enhancing our regional security network through 

building partner capacity, training, and exercises, particularly 

through our engagement with ASEAN [Association of Southeast 

Asian Nations]. 

And finally, we are engaging China directly to reduce risk. We 

consistently encourage China to take actions that uphold the 

shared principles that serve so many in the Asia-Pacific so well. We 

seek to keep lines of communication with Beijing open to improve 

our cooperation in areas of mutual interest and to speak candidly 

and constructively, manage differences when we disagree. 
10 

These efforts have set the stage for engagements following the 

upcoming decision from the U.N. arbitral tribunal. DOD will provide critical support to our diplomacy by providing a credible deterrent against the use of force and in favor of the peaceful resolution 

of these disputes. We will continue to defend ourselves, our allies 

and partners, our interests, and our principles. 

Mr. Chairman, ranking members, distinguished members of the 

committees, the upcoming U.N. arbitral tribunal ruling provides an 

opportunity for the region to stand firm in our enduring commitments to a principled order in the Asia-Pacific and the rest of the 

world. And it is an opportunity for us to reconfirm our commitment 

to work with the region to ensure a principled future, one in which 

all people have the opportunity to live in peace and prosperity. 

I thank you very much, and I look forward to our questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Denmark can be found in the 

Appendix on page 44.] 

Mr. FORBES. Ms. Willett, Mr. Denmark, thank you both for being 

here. 

Let me ask you this, Mr. Denmark. Is there any military significance to Scarborough Shoal to the United States? 

Mr. DENMARK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The military value of 

Scarborough is not intrinsic to the feature itself. It is highly variable, dependent on if a country—if a claimant were to place military capabilities on Scarborough, it will be highly valuable, depending on the specific capabilities that have been in place. 

So to my mind, the value of Scarborough is one of strategic importance in that it would increase a claimant’s ability, de facto ability to control the South China Sea and would, I think, marginalize 

a principled international order in which countries refrain from occupying, and constructing, and deploying military assets to previously unoccupied features. 

Mr. FORBES. Ms. Willett said that we will do everything necessary to defend the national security interest of the United States 

and allied defense rights. If you did have a militarization of the 

Scarborough Shoal, would that have any impact on our national interest or our allied defense rights? 

Mr. DENMARK. Well, Mr. Chairman, it is very difficult for me to 

comment to any degree of specificity on potential future hypotheticals. 

Mr. FORBES. Well, we need to—don’t we need to know? I mean, 

don’t we need a strategy to be able to answer those kinds of questions, or—I mean, are we saying we don’t have a position based on 

the Department of Defense right now as to whether or not there 

is any military significance there and if it does have military significance as to whether or not it would impact our national security 

interests? 

Mr. DENMARK. Well, Mr. Chairman, as I said, the military significance of Scarborough is not intrinsic to the feature itself but 

rather what would be in place upon it. So it is difficult for me to 

react, to guess as how I would react because there is such a wide 

degree of variability. 

Mr. FORBES. Is there anything you could tell us as to what would 

constitute the militarization of Scarborough Shoal? 
11 

Mr. DENMARK. Militarization is not a term that we have used. 

The term was introduced, as you know, sir, during diplomatic exchanges with the Chinese. We look to resolve these issues through 

diplomacy. 

Mr. FORBES. I understand. We want everybody to take a breath 

and be calm, but at some point in time, they don’t always do that. 

And so if we were to have a situation, they say they are not going 

to militarize those islands. If they were to militarize those islands, 

would that be contrary to the national security interest of the 

United States? 

Mr. DENMARK. Again, sir, I think it is too—the variability in 

what could be placed on various—— 

Mr. FORBES. So the Department of Defense or you can’t give us 

an opinion as to whether or not you think the militarization of the 

Scarborough Shoal would be against the national security interest 

of the United States? 

Mr. DENMARK. Well, in terms of—you asked me, sir, what I can 

comment upon is the military implications of this. 

Mr. FORBES. Okay. 

Mr. DENMARK. And in terms of military implications, as I said, 

the variability, based on what could be in place on any of these features, is extremely broad, and so therefore it is difficult for me to 

hypothesize about how we may react or respond to what may be 

put on any one of these features. 

Mr. FORBES. Okay. Let me ask you this then. The 1951 Mutual 

Defense Treaty finds the United States and the Philippines were 

bound to respond to attacks on the armed forces, public vessels, or 

aircraft of the other party as well as island territories under its jurisdiction. 

Has the United States or—either through the Department of Defense or the State Department even made an analysis of whether 

or not it thinks the Scarborough Shoal is an island territory under 

the jurisdiction of the Philippines? 

Mr. DENMARK. Sir, treaties tend to be—the specific meaning of 

treaties tend to be handled by the State Department, so let me— 

before I turn things over—— 

Mr. FORBES. Okay. 

Mr. DENMARK [continuing]. To my colleague, let me just say, as 

I have said in my written testimony, as DAS Willett mentioned in 

her statement, that we are—we retain an ironclad commitment to 

the defense of our allies, and that is something that we will not 

hesitate to follow through with. 

Mr. FORBES. Ms. Willett. 

Ms. WILLETT. Absolutely. Mr. Chairman, the United States does 

not take a position on disputes over land features, and the Scarborough Shoal is disputed. 

Mr. FORBES. How would you interpret your treaty responsibilities 

if it says ‘‘island territories under the Philippine jurisdiction,’’ how 

would you make the determination as to whether that was or was 

not under the jurisdiction of the Philippines? 

Ms. WILLETT. Scarborough Reef is a disputed feature, and we 

don’t take a position on whose claim is more legitimate. 
12 

Mr. FORBES. So if there was a dispute with China over whether 

or not one of their vessels belonged to them or to the Philippines, 

the United States wouldn’t make a decision over that? 

Ms. WILLETT. I think the language in the Mutual Defense Treaty 

is clear in terms of its applicability to persons and vessels from 

the—— 

Mr. FORBES. Is it not clear about island territories under its jurisdiction? 

Ms. WILLETT. Scarborough Reef is a disputed feature that we 

don’t recognize any country’s sovereignty over. That said, our treaty commitment to the Philippines is absolutely ironclad. This is 

something that we would take very seriously, and any move to occupy a currently unoccupied feature, or further militarize a currently occupied feature, is very dangerous and it is very destabilizing and I think something that would concern not just us but 

the other countries in the region. 

Mr. FORBES. And I am going to try one more bite at this, and 

then I am going to give it to Mr. Courtney. I understand it would 

be very destabilizing. Military actions always are. What my concern is, we have a treaty, and at some point in time, we have to 

make an analysis or determination what is in that treaty and what 

is not in that treaty. We specifically state in here armed forces, 

public vessels, aircraft, and we talk about island territories under 

its jurisdiction. 

At some point in time, the United States has to make its own 

legal determination as to whether or not they think those vessels 

belong to the Philippines or the aircraft belong to the Philippines. 

Are you saying that anytime somebody just puts that in dispute 

that the United States is going to step back and not defend that? 

Ms. WILLETT. No. I mean, I think the language in the treaty is 

clear. In the specific case of Scarborough Reef, the land feature 

itself is disputed. 

Mr. FORBES. Okay. 

Mr. Courtney. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Ms. Willett, I would just like to drill down with you a little bit 

about UNCLOS and its history and just sort of the structure of 

how that treaty operates. 

Again, in terms of how past cases have played out, I think your 

testimony mentioned India and Bangladesh had a dispute which 

went through the arbitration process, and it ended up with a peaceful resolution. Is that correct? 

Ms. WILLETT. Yes, that is correct. 

Mr. COURTNEY. And it had been a longstanding claim over many 

years that led up to that decision. But again, the sort of moral and 

global force of the UNCLOS kind of prevailed at the end of the day 

to have a positive outcome? 

Ms. WILLETT. Yes. I think that is correct. I mean, I think there 

are actually numerous examples within the region where countries 

have effectively used legal dispute resolution mechanisms to settle 

territorial, including maritime territory, disputes amongst themselves. And so it can be a very effective tool for upholding that 

rules-based system. 
13 

Mr. COURTNEY. But there is no sort of, you know, UNCLOS 

SWAT [special weapons and tactics] team that is out there, so that, 

again, in terms of enforcing a ruling. I mean, it is really something 

that sort of uses, as I said, sort of the international, you know, 

standing as a way of trying to get people to work within the rulebased system that it created. Is that correct? 

Ms. WILLETT. Yes, it is. UNCLOS protects the rights of all nations, whether they have maritime entitlements themselves or not, 

to a specific standard for use of the seas. So it protects globally everyone’s right to legally use international waters around the world. 

And so I think the pressure comes from an understanding that we 

all benefit from having an international system for regulating how 

seas can be used that benefits all of us. 

Mr. COURTNEY. All right. So over, you know, the last year or so, 

though, I mean, it appears that China has been trying to sort of 

step outside that structure and sort of negotiate sort of on a bilateral basis with countries in the region there to sort of, again, establish their own agreements regarding, you know, the issues that are 

really under the jurisdiction of UNCLOS. 

Is that sort of the pattern that you have seen, the salami slicing, 

as they call it? 

Ms. WILLETT. Yes, Congressman. I think you hit on it exactly 

that the fundamental issue at stake in the South China Sea is it 

is not about the rocks. It is about the rules. Is China, as it becomes 

a global sort of player and as its interests expand, is it going to 

play by the same rules as the rest of the globe does, whether that 

is in terms of the Law of the Sea or trade law or what have you? 

The question that is posed right now, is China going to play inside 

that rules-based system that has benefitted all of us so much over 

the last 70 years? 

Mr. COURTNEY. All right. So and during the course of this proceeding—I mean, it is my understanding that the U.S. actually 

tried to obtain observer status in the, you know, the litigation that 

took place there, and we actually were denied that opportunity because the U.S. Senate has never ratified UNCLOS. Is that your understanding, or is that your testimony? 

Ms. WILLETT. Yes. The Obama administration, like all previous 

administrations, believes very firmly that our interests would be 

served by ratifying the Convention on the Law of the Sea. We did 

request observer status at the hearings under—held by the arbitral 

tribunal, but because we are not a party to the Convention, we are 

not able to participate, and it does harm us that we have not yet 

ratified the Convention. It is a common criticism when we speak 

out about the importance of these rules when we, ourselves, have 

not—— 

Mr. COURTNEY. Right. 

Ms. WILLETT [continuing]. Signed up. 

Mr. COURTNEY. And that is, frankly, an observation that has 

been made by our military leadership as well. I mean, Admiral 

Richardson, you know, has testified to that effect. General Dunford 

has testified to that effect, and Admiral Harris, who is out there 

in the middle of all this with the 7th Fleet in PACOM [U.S. Pacific 

Command] has said that, really, it is time for this country to move 

forward and ratify UNCLOS. 
14 

And again, as we get closer to the decision, frankly, I think hopefully our friends in the upper chamber will understand that, you 

know, this is not just some sort of parlor game in Washington. I 

mean, it has real life effects in terms of trying to, again, maintain, 

you know, what I think has been a rules-based system of maritime 

law and that we benefit from it in many respects even more so 

than other countries. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Would my friend yield? 

Mr. COURTNEY. Sure. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. My understanding is that by not being a member, and the Chinese being a member, they actually can influence 

all the committees and subcommittees and we can’t. And so in 

terms of doing the actual work of the law of the seas, we are day 

to day at a disadvantage and they are day to day at an advantage. 

I don’t know if Ms. Willett wants to confirm that, but I thank my 

friend for yielding. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Well, all I would just point out is there is a 

House Resolution 631 urging the Senate to ratify, and hopefully 

today some Members will take a look at that and maybe have them 

sign onto it because, as I said, next week, the eyes of the world are 

going to be on this treaty and its benefits. 

And certainly, I mean, I think what we have heard without specifics this morning or this afternoon is really that, you know, we 

are going to be part of whatever that sort of international, you 

know, force to make sure that the decision is really adhered to. 

And again, we have that single standard that really, I think, is so 

important and that UNCLOS, you know, is really focused on creating. We all benefit from that. With that, I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. FORBES. Chairman Salmon. 

Mr. SALMON. Thank you. 

When I first started serving on the Foreign Affairs Committee, 

it was 1995, Warren Christopher was the Secretary of State, and 

I remember asking the question in a hearing like this, what was 

our State Department policy toward China, and the answer kind of 

astounded me, yet it has been a policy of many administrations. He 

called it strategic ambiguity. I thought that was the oddest policy 

I had ever heard. 

And having been to China myself probably close to 50 times and 

speaking the language, living in Taiwan for a couple of years, being 

around them a lot of time, I think this is a country we need to have 

some real strategic clarity with, and I think one of reasons that 

things are getting so out of control in the South China Sea is that 

everybody is kind of dancing around, you know, the 800-pound gorilla in the room. China has stated pretty openly that with this arbitral tribunal decision that is expected in a couple of weeks that 

they don’t intend to adhere to it. 

So then what? I guess that is my question. What are our options 

then? A lot of our allies in the region are extremely concerned 

about China’s land grabbing. And as the chairman of the HAS 

[House Armed Services] Committee said that, you know, not only 

island grabbing but putting military installations on those islands, 

and so virtually all of our allies in the region have expressed grave 
15 

concerns about what China is doing, and they are waiting on us to 

do something. 

What is that something? If they flout the decision by the tribunal, what is our next move? Because I think all eyes are going 

to be watching us, and though we don’t specifically have any land 

disputes ourselves but our allies do, the other concern I have is 

that I think that the South China Sea is a real tinderbox. Whenever President Obama or Secretary Kerry talks about, or Ash 

Carter talks about the South China Sea, it is always one of the top 

national security concerns that we have. It is always delineated as 

such. 

And so what I am wondering, you know, with a lot of the close 

encounters with the ships and the planes, you know, just one 

wrong move at any given time could escalate into a major conflict, 

a major problem. What is our recourse if they just flout that decision? 

Ms. WILLETT. So to your point about China, Mr. Chairman, it is 

a big and obviously very strategically important relationship to the 

United States. It is one that has grown dramatically over the last 

several years, but one that contains disagreements but also contains a great deal of areas where we have common interests and 

can cooperate fairly effectively. 

And I would say that that dialogue, that cooperation has grown 

quite a bit over the last several years. It is true that we still have 

areas of disagreement, but part of that is our continued dialogue 

and our continued cooperation has allowed us to be able to deal 

with those areas pretty frankly. 

Now, there are areas, and the South China Sea is a clear example, where we continue to have a very significant difference of opinion and a great deal of friction. Our strategy overall, from day one, 

has been multifaceted. It includes diplomatic, military, capacity 

building, and economic tools aimed at shaping the strategic environment such that flouting the rules-based order and not playing 

by the same rules as others, the incentives aren’t there, and ensuring that the effects of coercion, or you know, lawbreaking aren’t 

positive. 

The net effect of what we are seeing is a situation where, you 

know, no claimant can expect to flout the law, flout the ruling in 

a way that doesn’t draw international approbation and interest and 

a great deal of scrutiny, and in fact, has resulted in a situation 

where we are seeing a much greater demand for U.S. security presence, U.S. security cooperation, U.S. engagement, and we have 

seen much greater interest in economic diversification, including 

interest in TPP, expanded security ties to other regional players 

such as India and Japan, such that flouting international law, 

pushing back, behaving in a way that is not consistent with the 

rules-based order isn’t paying the dividends that it might otherwise. And I believe that our intensive diplomatic, economic, and 

military engagement has played an important role in creating an 

environment where the payoff just isn’t worth it. 

I think it is clear that Southeast Asian claimants continue to 

stand up for their rights and push back against efforts to coerce 

and bully them. We have seen a great deal of growth in multilat-
16 

eral cooperation on these big strategic issues, and I would expect 

that to continue. 

Mr. SALMON. What can we do to encourage ASEAN to step up 

to the plate in a bigger way, because heretofore—I know that most 

of the ASEAN members, because I have met with them, they are 

all very concerned about what is going on in the South China Sea 

and Chinese belligerence, but ASEAN as a group has yet to be incredibly effective as one strong voice to deal maybe some reputational harm to China. What can we do to help maybe make that 

stronger, that response from them? 

Ms. WILLETT. Well, thank you. ASEAN has actually been a consistent voice for international law and an international rules-based 

system for the nearly 50 years that they have existed. But you are 

correct, Mr. Chairman, that their institution has some limitations. 

There have been some instances and some limitations to their ability to speak out, but on this issue, they have actually spoken out 

fairly clearly fairly recently both in their joint statement with the 

President at the Sunnylands Summit in February where they made 

a clear statement in support of the Convention on the Law of the 

Sea and the right of countries to pursue dispute resolution through 

all peaceful processes, including legal and diplomatic processes. 

They have made their own standalone statements through their 

foreign ministers at their foreign ministerial in April, and we expect them to continue to take that principled line on the importance of the rule of law and international conventions such as the 

Law of the Sea. 

Mr. SALMON. Finally, is imposing reputational harm the absolute 

best that we can do? Other than upgrading the maritime security 

capabilities of our partners in the region, do we have any other 

tools for inducing behavioral change in the South China Sea? 

Ms. WILLETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As I said, our strategy 

is multifaceted. It is diplomatic, it is military, it is about capacity 

building with the other claimants, it is about economic tools, but 

it is a cumulative long-term strategy aimed at making clear that 

the strategic environment is such that it is not in any claimant’s 

or any nation’s interest to violate international law. 

Mr. SALMON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. FORBES. Mr. Sherman. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you. There is only one significantly inhabited island in dispute in the South and East China Sea called Taiwan, a lot more people than all the—and one way to defend Taiwan 

would be to spend a few hundred billion dollars on more naval assets; but there is something else that would be just as effective, 

probably more effective, and that is with a clear law that would immediately eliminate China’s ‘‘most favored nation’’ [MFN] status if 

they blockade or invade Taiwan. 

Under those circumstances, the missiles that China could use on 

any day to just threaten Taiwan and close its ports would, I think, 

become inoperative. Ms. Willett, would you oppose or would the 

State Department oppose an effort by Congress to just say if you 

invade or blockade Taiwan, at that moment you automatically lose 

MFN? 
17 

Ms. WILLETT. Thank you, Congressman. I am happy to take your 

question and consult with my colleagues who cover Taiwan policy 

and come back to you with an answer. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Can I count on a clear unambiguous answer for 

the record? 

Ms. WILLETT. I have to take your question back to my colleagues 

who cover Taiwan. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 57.] 

Mr. SHERMAN. I think it was my—the chairman of our subcommittee that talked about ambiguity. It might be good to be ambiguous toward China but maybe not ambiguous toward Congress 

on this issue. I hope to get a clear answer. 

Mr. Denmark, there has been a massive increase in the world’s 

attention to disputes between Japan and China over islands. Has 

Japan massively increased its defense budget over the last 4 years? 

And don’t they spend well less than a quarter of what we spend 

as a percentage of GDP? 

Mr. DENMARK. Thank you, sir. I don’t have the specific numbers 

in front of me. I do believe it is a percentage of how much—— 

Mr. SHERMAN. It is about 1 percent of their GDP. 

Mr. DENMARK. In terms—— 

Mr. SHERMAN. They keep claiming they are going to increase it, 

they never actually increase it, and they want us to spend hundreds of billions of dollars to develop and deploy naval assets to defend islands that don’t have any oil, but if they do have oil, it is 

Japan oil or Chinese oil, it is not American oil. 

Mr. DENMARK. To answer your question, sir, in terms of absolute 

numbers, I do believe that Japan’s defense budget has increased in 

recent years, although not dramatically, as you said, sir. But we 

have seen, I think, very important developments in our alliance 

with Japan in the last few years with our agreement on new defense guidelines, the passage of new legislation that enables 

their—— 

Mr. SHERMAN. They are not willing to put their money where 

they want us to put our money. They are not willing to put their 

lives where they want us to put our lives, and it is nice that they 

will issue joint communiques, but joint communiques don’t cost 

anything. 

Ms. Willett, I want to return to the UNCLOS. I agree with you. 

It is not about the rocks. It is about the rules. China seems to have 

it the best of both worlds. They join UNCLOS, serve on the subcommittees, as the gentleman from Virginia pointed out, and yet 

they are not going to follow the outcome of this arbitration provision. Should we join—I mean, there are various arguments about 

us not joining UNCLOS, but it seems like China has demonstrated 

that you can join, participate, and if you disagree with anything 

they do, well, you just say they don’t have jurisdiction. 

Is there any mineral rights or fishing rights or anything of value 

that the United States claims that someone is objecting to in a way 

that we could lose in UNCLOS, and if so, would we have to recognize the binding power of its decision? 
18 

Ms. WILLETT. On the China question, Congressman, it is true 

that China has indicated that it does not accept the jurisdiction of 

the tribunal. 

Mr. SHERMAN. You can be sure they will accept it if they happen 

to win. 

Ms. WILLETT. Our focus is on their behavior following the tribunal decision. Actions matter in this case. 

Mr. SHERMAN. This question more is about why shouldn’t we join 

UNCLOS? It seems China is demonstrating that you can participate, you can influence, and you don’t really have to follow their 

rulings, so what is—can you think of any disadvantage to joining 

UNCLOS? Is there anything we could lose? 

Ms. WILLETT. Disadvantage to joining UNCLOS? 

Mr. SHERMAN. Yes. 

Ms. WILLETT. No. Our position is that it materially benefits us 

to be a part of the Convention of the Law of the Sea. 

Mr. SHERMAN. So we get the benefits, you can’t think of anything 

we could lose, but even if we lost in an arbitration on UNCLOS 

about some arctic resource, China is demonstrating that you don’t 

have to follow the ruling. It sounds like a great organization to 

join. 

Ms. WILLETT. China has not yet demonstrated that you don’t 

have to follow the ruling. There hasn’t been a ruling. 

Mr. SHERMAN. They have demonstrated that if the ruling goes 

against them, they will not feel it binding on them. 

Ms. WILLETT. I am concerned with their actions after we have an 

actual decision from the tribunal. 

Mr. SHERMAN. I mean, they may scale back what they do voluntarily for a host of reasons, but it is clear that they have laid the 

legal foundation to win if they win at UNCLOS and not to feel 

bound by it if they lose. 

Ms. WILLETT. They have presented an argument asserting that 

they are not bound by the tribunal if—when it rules. That is 

not—— 

Mr. SHERMAN. And it is an incredibly weak argument. 

Ms. WILLETT. That is correct. 

Mr. SHERMAN. If we ever needed to present an argument, we 

could certainly present one that strong. Their argument is that 

some other government that they don’t recognize once drew a line 

claiming something. That is like a Confederate general claiming 

Cuba, and so we claim all of Cuba. It is—so again, there are the 

advantages that the gentleman from Virginia pointed out. 

What could we possibly lose by joining UNCLOS? I don’t know 

if Mr. Denmark has a comment. I will see if you have a comment, 

and then I believe my time has more than expired. 

Ms. WILLETT. The Convention on the Law of the Sea protects our 

maritime interests around the world. It is an important legal 

framework that ensures all countries are able to make use of the 

seas based on a rules-based system. We firmly believe that it is in 

the United States’ interests to ratify, and we expect all parties to 

the Convention to fulfill their obligations under it. 

Mr. SHERMAN. I will just yield to the gentleman from Connecticut to remind us of the H.R. resolution that allows us to reg-
19 

ister our belief. That would be 631, and you are allowed to cosponsor that, right? Good to find out. Thank you. 

Mr. FORBES. The gentleman yields back his time. 

The distinguished gentleman from Alabama, Mr. Byrne, is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. BYRNE. Thank you. Several of us on these two panels were 

in China together a couple months ago, and we had the opportunity 

to have a number of briefings and actually got to hear the Chinese 

position. And the Chinese position is that we are a weakening 

power in the Pacific. Now, I don’t know that we necessarily have 

to agree with their assessment, but I think it is important we understand that is their assessment. They got me to thinking about 

what Teddy Roosevelt always said, which is, ‘‘Walk softly but carry 

a big stick.’’ A lot of what we have heard today has been about 

using discretion and the use of power, which is certainly appropriate in any environment, particularly in a sensitive environment 

like the South China Sea. But I guess the question I have is, do 

we have a big enough stick over there? Do we have the right military assets in place in the right place to do what we need to do 

to fulfill the objectives of the United States, both militarily and 

otherwise? We keep having these incidents. The Chinese are clearly 

pushing very hard. You are from the Department of Defense. Do 

you have the assets that you need to carry out your mission? 

Mr. DENMARK. Yes, Congressman, I believe we do. It is interesting, you mentioned, you referenced President Roosevelt in that, 

several months ago, I had the opportunity to accompany Secretary 

of Defense Carter to the USS Teddy Roosevelt operating in the region, which the ship calls itself ‘‘America’s Big Stick,’’ which I think 

is a nice example—— 

Mr. BYRNE. I have also been on that vessel. It has a motto stenciled all throughout it saying ‘‘putting warheads on foreheads.’’ I 

love that. It is a good motto. 

Mr. DENMARK. As I mentioned in my testimony, Congressman, 

we have increased our presence in the region over the last several 

years, and this is responding to a fairly ubiquitous and loud demand signal that we have been hearing from across the region 

from our allies and our partners stating that they are concerned 

about activities and actions happening in the South China Sea and 

asking us to work with them. And we have answered that call. We 

are working with them to enhance their capabilities. We are conducting exercises. We are conducting training. We are building our 

own capabilities in the region. Our operations tempo has increased, 

and we see that all these actions are providing for the common 

good. They are increasing maritime domain awareness and maritime security in the region, supporting our allies and our partners 

as well as our own national interests. And all of our missions are 

done meticulously to ensure that everything that we do is done in 

a way that is compatible and supports international law and maintains safety. 

Mr. BYRNE. Well, a number of us are going with Mr. Courtney 

to the RIMPAC [Rim of the Pacific] exercise in a couple weeks. 

I want to go back to that Chinese perception. If we believe we 

have the appropriate number of assets, how do we cure that problem? Because a misperception is as dangerous to us as anything 
20 

else. How do we cure that misperception with the Chinese? Do exercises like RIMPAC help with that, or does there need to be more 

direct communication between us and them? What is the source of 

their misunderstanding, and what can we do about it? 

Mr. DENMARK. Well, Congressman, I do think that RIMPAC is a 

very good demonstration of American leadership and American 

power in that no other country is able to bring together so many 

countries to work together in pursuit of a common objective. So I 

think RIMPAC is a terrific example of that. In terms of our interactions with China, we have pursued for several years very consistently a robust military-to-military relationship with them, which 

includes military diplomacy in which our senior leaders, their senior leaders from our two militaries, interact with each other, both 

in person and over communications. We visit each other’s countries. 

We visit each other’s militaries. And from the U.S. perspective, we 

try to enhance that sort of transparency as a way to ensure, to reduce the potential for misunderstanding and miscalculation. 

We have also recently agreed to several confidence-building 

measures on rules of behavior in airspace and on the high seas, 

which we see as a very important aspect of our efforts to reduce 

risk. As our militaries operate in closer proximity to one another 

to a greater degree of regularity, we see that efforts of risk reduction are very important. 

In terms of managing Chinese perceptions, as somebody who has 

studied China for a long time, I find that task to be very complicated and very difficult. What we can be responsible for is to make 

sure that we are doing the right things, to make sure that we have 

the capabilities in the places that we need to make sure that we 

are building the capabilities of our allies and partners and make 

sure that we are able to defend ourselves, defend our allies, and 

defend our interests. And I believe we are. 

Mr. BYRNE. Thank you. 

I yield back. 

Mr. FORBES. The gentleman yields back. 

The gentleman from California, Mr. Bera, is recognized for 5 

minutes. 

Mr. BERA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Throughout the opening statements and certainly throughout the 

witnesses’ opening statements, there is a theme of the importance 

of recognizing global rules and norms and understanding the mechanisms by which to resolve disputes. So I think many of us in Congress have been concerned when we look at China’s unilateral 

moves, whether in the East China Sea or in the South China Sea, 

which really go against international norms, unilateral moves, 

whether it is Scarborough Shoals, or, you know, declaring an ADIZ 

over the East China Sea, which really go outside the norms—so if 

we just think about the next steps and what is in our toolbox as 

the United States to help deescalate tensions, I think it is reasonable to go ahead and—we should certainly—I do wish we were a 

part of UNCLOS. We are not. But we are going through the process of recognizing international norms and international mechanisms by which to resolve disputes, so a ruling will come out shortly. 
21 

I think it behooves us to make sure, as an international community, when we see that ruling, we do everything we can to enforce 

that ruling. Now, what I would say is, you know, let’s say that ruling is not the one China is looking for, and they choose to ignore 

that ruling. We look at, I think Ms. Willett, you talked about the 

tools that we have. We are already engaged diplomatically in the 

sense that we have gone to UNCLOS. I would consider that a diplomatic tool by which to resolve this dispute. We can continue to 

engage them diplomatically, but we have already used that tool. 

None of us is interested in a military or kinetic engagement. We 

certainly are posturing by having some of our assets in the region. 

And the importance of the South China Sea, the reason why these 

small reclaimed islands are so important is that is one of the most 

important trade routes in the world right now. It is of incredible 

economic importance to not only the United States but to our allies 

in the region. And the number of goods that move through that region are very important, so they are very strategic. 

We can try to use economic tools to get China back to the table, 

but the worry here is, you know, China increasingly is moving assets to that island, and the more assets they have, the harder it 

will be to move them off of those islands. And it is much easier for 

us to deal with this today than it will be a decade from now. 

So, Mr. Denmark, outside of that, what are our options? 

Mr. DENMARK. Well, thank you, Congressman. 

I think you can understand why I would be reluctant to discuss 

military options to any degree of specificity in an open hearing. 

What I do feel comfortable saying in an open setting is that we remain very committed to continue to defend our allies, to defend 

critical principles that we see as necessary to the continued peace 

and stability of the region, and to continue to defend our national 

interests. In terms of what happens after a decision, I would refer 

you to the statement that I submitted in that we see the military 

role in this as being essential to deter conflict and ensure that diplomacy has space to succeed, and we are going to continue to play 

that role. 

Mr. BERA. And certainly there is no desire for a military option 

here. I mean, we want diplomacy, and we certainly want China to 

understand that it is in China’s economic benefit to have open seaways and the free movement of goods and services. They obviously 

see that as well. So, from our perspective, let’s hope adhering to 

international norms and international mechanisms by which to resolve dispute, that China will take that mechanism as a member 

of UNCLOS and adhere to whatever ruling we do see next week. 

Otherwise, I think we ought to come back into a joint committee 

here and really, you know, send a strong message that we have got 

to adhere to these international norms. 

With that, I yield back. 

Mr. FORBES. The gentleman yields back. 

The gentleman from Alabama, Mr. Brooks, is recognized for 5 

minutes. 

Mr. BROOKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Looking at the South China Sea, there appear to be a number 

of nations that have significant economic and, perhaps, security interests. How would you rank those in terms of importance? Let’s 
22 

talk about it in terms of economics. Which countries use the South 

China Sea the most perhaps for fishing, food, commerce, oil, things 

of that nature? 

Ms. WILLETT. Thank you, Congressman. 

It is a big, complicated question. There are a number of claimants. They all have different, or not all, but they have varying 

claims. They have varying ways that they assess the values of 

those claims. I think—— 

Mr. BROOKS. I am not asking about claims. I am talking about 

who uses them. 

Ms. WILLETT. No, I understand. But the geographic scope of individual claims impacts how they assess the value of the resources 

and the importance of those spaces, which is all to say it is a complicated answer. 

Mr. BROOKS. What is your judgment? 

Ms. WILLETT. From a U.S. perspective, what is most important 

and what is driving these disputes vary much from country to 

country; from our perspective, what is most important is whether 

or not they are going to pursue those claims in a way—— 

Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Denmark, I am not getting an answer. Perhaps 

you can share with me your insight on which countries have the 

greatest amount of economic interest in the South China Sea. It 

might be oil being shipped through the South China Sea that they 

are dependent on. It might be unfinished or finished products. It 

might be food in the form of fishing. Do you have a judgment as 

to which countries have the greatest economic interest in the South 

China Sea? 

Mr. DENMARK. Well, Congressman, it is a very interesting question. I don’t believe I have seen an academic analysis that tries to 

rank these. What I have seen, though, is that the complexities of 

international trade in this region means that it is not just the 

claimants that are affected, although obviously they have a critical 

interest in it, but countries outside of even the immediate area of 

the South China Sea, like Japan, like South Korea, like the United 

States, also have a critical interest—— 

Mr. BROOKS. Let’s talk about it for a moment. South Korea, what 

is their interest in the South China Sea? 

Mr. DENMARK. Well, obviously, I can’t speak for them. 

Mr. BROOKS. I understand you cannot speak for them. Do you 

have no judgment? 

Mr. DENMARK. What I would say is my sense is that all countries 

in the region—I wouldn’t want to identify one specifically. I would 

say all countries in the region—— 

Mr. BROOKS. I thought this was an easy question. South Korea, 

do they rely on their oil shipments from the Persian Gulf and from 

other areas to go through the South China Sea? 

Mr. DENMARK. So what I was going to say is that South Korea, 

Japan, most of the countries of the region rely tremendously on 

international trade, much of which flows through the South China 

Sea. 

Mr. BROOKS. Okay. Let’s try to get to some specifics, and I have 

already lost about 70 percent of my time. South Korea, oil shipments through the South China Sea, do they have other commerce 
23 

that is shipped to or from South Korea through the South China 

Sea? 

Mr. DENMARK. Congressman, I am not trying to not answer your 

questions. As a representative of—— 

Mr. BROOKS. The answer is yes or no or you don’t know. 

Mr. DENMARK. What I will say, as a representative of the Department of Defense, I don’t have those figures with me here. 

Mr. BROOKS. Well, I am not asking for specific figures. 

Ms. Willett, are you familiar with whether or not South Korea 

ships or receives products through the South China Sea, other than 

oil? We have already established oil. 

Ms. WILLETT. All countries in East Asia receive and ship goods 

and services—oil, liquid and natural gas—through the South China 

Sea. 

Mr. BROOKS. Is it fair to say that South Korea has a significant 

interest, then, in the South China Sea? 

Ms. WILLETT. Yes. I believe about 30 percent of the liquid natural gas that gets shipped to South Korea and Japan goes through 

the South China Sea. About 25 percent of the world’s goods—— 

Mr. BROOKS. And Japan also has a significant economic interest? 

Ms. WILLETT. Yes, Congressman. 

Mr. BROOKS. And the Philippines has a significant economic interest? 

Ms. WILLETT. Yes, sir. 

Mr. BROOKS. Vietnam has a significant economic interest? 

Ms. WILLETT. Yes. 

Mr. BROOKS. Taiwan has a significant economic interest? 

Ms. WILLETT. Yes, all countries in East Asia have a significant 

economic interest. 

Mr. BROOKS. And would it be fair to say that their economic interest on a percentage of GDP is greater than that of the United 

States of America, economic interest? 

Ms. WILLETT. I would have to go back and look at the specifics 

because a great deal of this trade is also bound for the United 

States. 

Mr. BROOKS. What can the United States of America do to encourage these other countries that have a greater reliance on shipping through the South China Sea to step up to the plate and absorb more of the defense costs associated with those shipping 

lanes? 

Ms. WILLETT. We work very closely with all of these countries on 

diplomatic, military, economic approaches to ensuring that the 

rules are followed in the South China Sea. 

Mr. BROOKS. But they aren’t stepping up to the plate like the 

United States of America is. My question is, what can we get them 

to do to step up to the plate to measures that are commensurate 

with their economic interests? 

Ms. WILLETT. We continue to engage with all of our partners in 

the region to ensure that we are all playing a part in ensuring that 

a rules-based order is protected in the South China Sea. 

Mr. BROOKS. If the United States of America were to withdraw 

its military assets in the South China Sea, would that encourage 

these other countries to step up to the plate? 
24 

Ms. WILLETT. I think that is a question for those other countries. 

I am sorry, sir. 

Mr. BROOKS. All right. Thank you. 

Mr. FORBES. The gentleman’s time is expired. 

The gentlelady from Guam is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Chairmen 

Forbes and Salmon, for holding this important and timely hearing. 

Two weeks ago, I had the pleasure of meeting with the Prime 

Minister of Timor-Leste to discuss a variety of bilateral issues. In 

particular, Secretary Willett, I would like to briefly note my concern regarding the outstanding maritime dispute between Australia and Timor-Leste. I believe the United States should use our 

diplomatic power and influence to bring about a swift resolution to 

this matter, and the lack of an agreement on this maritime dispute 

undermines our credibility when discussing the issue of the ChinaSouth China Sea maritime issues with the Chinese. I do know the 

Chinese raise this very often, so I hope that we can use some of 

our influence to encourage a swift resolution to the matter, and I 

think the political will exists in the region if we just need—of if we 

can just nudge this along. So I know Mr. Courtney has introduced 

a resolution to this matter, and I will also add my name to the chorus of people who believe the Senate should ratify UNCLOS. 

Now my first question is for, I guess, Secretary Denmark. I believe that an asymmetric advantage we have in countering Chinese 

influence in the South China Sea is the partnerships that we have 

in the region, and we should continue to cultivate them. Are programs such as the Maritime Security Initiative [MSI] a helpful tool 

for building partner capacity, and what areas can be improved? I 

am particularly concerned that we can find over $3 billion for the 

European Reassurance Initiative program, but we struggle to find 

$100 million for the Maritime Security Initiative. Now, you briefly 

touched on MSI in your testimony, Secretary Denmark, but I think 

this disparity sends the wrong message about our rebalance strategy, especially given your commentary on the need for building 

partner capacity. Do you agree? If you could just give it a brief answer. I have very little time. 

Mr. DENMARK. We believe that MSI is very important. It is something that we have been working very actively to help train and 

equip our allies and partners. I agree with you that our allies and 

partners are a critical advantage to us in the region. And we are 

just in the beginning of this effort, and we are looking to continue 

to advance it. 

Ms. BORDALLO. So you do agree then. Secretary Denmark, my 

final question is for you. On Guam, we are particularly concerned 

with the PLA [People’s Liberation Army] Navy’s increased presence 

in the South China Sea and the high number of unsafe aerial and 

maritime intercepts they are conducting. Could you elaborate on 

the steps that the Department is taking to, one, A, reduce Chinese 

intercepts and, B, create a roadmap for deescalating potential conflicts resulting from a botched Chinese reaction? 

Mr. DENMARK. Sure. Yes, of course. As I have mentioned before, 

we have recently concluded several confidence-building measures 

with the Chinese, which are designed to reduce risk in terms of setting rules of behavior for interactions between our aircraft and our 
25 

surface vessels based on existing international laws and norms. 

And we have seen an increase in the number of interactions between our forces in recent years, primarily because both sides are 

more active in the region militarily, but at the same time, we have 

seen a decrease in unsafe intercepts between our two sides, which 

I think demonstrates the effectiveness of these efforts. 

So we are going to continue to work with China to continue to 

advance these efforts to reduce risk, to enhance our ability to communicate with one another. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much. 

And I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. FORBES. The gentlelady from Missouri, Ms. Hartzler, is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you. 

I was just wondering, has China adopted the U.N. Convention on 

the Law of the Sea? 

Ms. WILLETT. Yes, Congresswoman. They were integral in the 

drafting of the Convention on the Law of the Sea and have ratified 

it. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Ratified it. Okay. So they should abide by that, 

no question, obviously. Has the International Tribunal for the Law 

of the Sea ever ruled for a shared claim between countries? Could 

that be something potentially they would do next week? 

Ms. WILLETT. The tribunal in this instance won’t rule on the 

underlying question of sovereignty over the individual land features. What it will do is potentially clarify what maritime entitlement those features are entitled to, among other issues. I would 

have to go back and look at the history of previous tribunals and 

get back to you on your question. But at the moment, the issue at 

question isn’t who owns the land feature, but what maritime space 

is generated from a land feature. Is it a territorial sea or an exclusive economic zone? 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Okay. Very good. How avoidable have recent 

near misses between U.S. and Chinese air- and seacraft been, and 

do you believe these incidents indicate that we are likely to see additional tense military encounters? 

Mr. DENMARK. Congresswoman, as I mentioned, we have actually 

seen, the number of interactions between our aircraft and vessels 

in international places have increased in recent months and years. 

We have seen a decrease in the number of unsafe interactions between our two sides, as a result, I believe, of the risk reduction efforts that we have conducted. But as our forces continue to operate 

in relatively close proximity to one another, it is an issue that we 

are going to continue to be focused on, and these efforts at risk reduction are something that we are going to continue to pursue with 

the PLA. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. So, back to the claim, a lot of my colleagues have 

advocated that the Senate adopt UNCLOS, and how would you respond to the concerns that I have heard that it would jeopardize 

American sovereignty by subjugating some of our rights to the U.N. 

and also perhaps jeopardize our fishing industry and the ability to 

fish certain areas? How would you respond to those concerns? 

Ms. WILLETT. It is our view, the Obama administration and the 

previous administrations, that the legal framework offered by the 
26 

Convention on the Law of the Sea protects U.S. maritime interests 

and protects our rights around the world. On the specifics of what 

our accession and a ratification of the treaty might look like, I 

wouldn’t want to speculate. That is something, I think, that would 

be part of the Senate deliberations. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Would you like to add anything? 

Mr. DENMARK. If I could just add, from a DOD perspective, our 

military forces, even though we have not ratified UNCLOS, our 

military forces do operate in accordance with its guidelines, and we 

are very meticulous to make sure that all of our operations are conducted within the bounds of international law. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Thank you very much. 

I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. FORBES. The gentlelady from Florida, Ms. Graham, is recognized for a little less than 5 minutes. 

Ms. GRAHAM. I won’t even take that long, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate it. Both of the chairmen, thank you for this opportunity. 

Ms. Willett, you mentioned that the United States will be looking 

at China’s actions following conclusion of arbitration. Aside from 

the obvious—and I will say it has surprised me somewhat this 

hearing—and I have been here from the beginning—because it 

seems like the witnesses, that you all are somewhat hesitant, and 

I am assuming because of the sensitivity of the subject we are discussing, so I don’t know if this would be maybe better addressed 

in a classified, Mr. Chairman. But aside from the obvious, what actions will you all be looking at from China’s perspective that would 

signal noncompliance? 

Ms. WILLETT. Thank you, Congresswoman. 

I think the hesitance comes in part from the fact that it is a complicated legal question that has been put before the tribunal, and 

we do not have a ruling yet from the body that we could evaluate 

or even assess, you know, what noncompliance might look like. 

Thus far, our efforts have been focused on engaging intensively 

with China, with the other claimants, with the other parties in the 

region, to ensure that, following the ruling, everyone behaves with 

restraint, everyone is looking for ways to use the tribunal decision 

as a jumping-off point to restart diplomatic discussions about a 

common way forward that avoids conflict but looks for commonalities that can be built on so that in these disputed spaces, we can 

reduce the risk of misunderstanding and find a way for all of the 

parties involved to benefit and to behave in a manner that is consistent with international law and that isn’t in violation of whatever the ruling is. But until we see the ruling, it is difficult to speculate on just what its implications are. 

Ms. GRAHAM. And I think that is a fair comment. However, I will 

segue to something Mr. Denmark said. I certainly hope—and I will 

end with this—that if, in fact, there is a failure to live up to what 

our expectations are following the decision, unknowing what the 

decision is at this point, but I think we can all extrapolate out 

what would be a violation, that we do have—and you said, Mr. 

Denmark, that we are making sure we have the capabilities where 

we need them, and I wrote that down, make sure we have the capabilities where we need them. I think that is a key statement because, clearly, this is an area in the world where there are a lot 
27 

of potential international implications if, in fact, they do not fulfill 

their obligations, being China. 

I will end with that. I don’t really think there is a need to have 

a follow-up response, and I appreciate you all being here. Thank 

you very much. 

Mr. FORBES. We want to thank you both for being here. I told 

you at the beginning that we would allow you time to have any 

final comments. Unfortunately, these votes are called, so what I am 

going to allow you to do if you would like is to submit anything for 

the record to clarify any statement you have made or to put anything else in there that you feel we didn’t cover that you thought 

was important. Is that okay with both the ranking members and 

with the chairman? 

With that, the other members have said that they do not need 

to return to ask their questions, so we are going to let you guys 

go. Thank you so much for being here. 

With that, we are adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:59 p.m., the subcommittees were adjourned.] 

A P P E N D I X 

JULY 7, 2016 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

JULY 7, 2016 

(33) 
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41 
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44 
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46 
47 
48 
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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING 

THE HEARING 

JULY 7, 2016 

(57) 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. SHERMAN 

Ms. WILLETT. We remain committed to preserving Taiwan’s democracy and ensuring the freedom of the people on Taiwan from coercion, threats, and intimidation. 

In accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act, the United States would consider any 

effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including 

by boycotts and embargoes, a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific 

area and of grave concern to the United States. [See page 17.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

JULY 7, 2016 

(61) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FORBES 

Mr. FORBES. Under the terms of the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty between the 

United States and the Philippines, each party is bound to respond to attacks on the 

‘‘armed forces, public vessels or aircraft’’ of the other party, as well as ‘‘island territories under its jurisdiction.’’ Do the terms of this alliance cover Philippine forces 

in the disputed areas of the South China Sea? Do they cover the Scarborough Shoal? 

Ms. WILLETT. President Obama has been clear that we will stand by our commitments to the Philippines, as we do any mutual defense treaty ally. The long-standing, ironclad alliance between the Philippines and the United States has contributed 

to peace, stability, and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region for more than 70 years. 

We do not comment on specific hypotheticals. We believe the language in the Mutual Defense Treaty is clear. 

Mr. FORBES. China has claimed that the outposts it is constructing in the Spratlys 

are for civilian purposes only, and that China will not ‘‘militarize’’ the islands. In 

the view of the United States government, what would count as ‘‘militarization?’’ 

Ms. WILLETT. The United States opposes efforts by any claimant to use force or 

threat of force to advance its territorial or maritime claims. We have consistently 

voiced support for the peaceful resolution of disputes in accordance with international norms. We consistently call on claimants to cease further land reclamation, 

construction of new facilities, and militarization of their outposts in the South China 

Sea. We would consider the introduction and rotation of military assets, including 

but not necessarily limited to offensive weapons systems and combat aircraft, on occupied outposts as militarization. 

Mr. FORBES. As to China’s maritime claims in the South China Seas, has the 

State Department or the Department of Defense performed an analysis, either officially or unofficially, as to the validity of China’s territorial claims and reclamation 

activities? If so, can the administration provide such analysis to our committees? 

Ms. WILLETT. The Department conducted an analysis of China’s maritime claims 

in the South China Sea in volume no. 143 of its longstanding publication Limits in 

the Seas, which was released December 2014. It is currently available on the Department of State website. The United States does not take a position on competing 

sovereignty claims over land territory in the South China Sea. 

Mr. FORBES. According to press reports, China has declared that it will be holding 

a week of naval exercises on the eve of the court’s ruling, and has designated approximately 40,000 square miles of the South China Sea—an area roughly the size 

of Kentucky—as a no-go zone for foreign shipping. Are these reports accurate? How 

do you interpret China’s actions? 

Mr. DENMARK. The People’s Liberation Army continues to conduct routine military operations—including military exercises—in the South China Sea. We were 

aware of China’s naval exercise in the South China Sea that occurred during the 

timeframe that the arbitral tribunal announced its ruling. We recognize the right 

of any State to conduct exercises in accordance with the established international 

laws and norms. We understand this particular exercise was part of China’s annual 

naval training plan and would refer you to the Chinese government for further information. 

U.S. forces operate in the Asia-Pacific on a regular basis, including in the South 

China Sea, and have done so for decades. All operations are conducted in accordance 

with international law. The establishment of a Warning Area in international waters for the conduct of an exercise does not give any country the right to prohibit 

the entry of ships or aircraft into that area. The United States and China agreed 

to these international standards as part of the Confidence Building Measures signed 

in 2014 and will discuss lessons learned from this event during our relevant diplomatic dialogues. 

Mr. FORBES. In 2013, China declared an Air Defense Identification Zone or ADIZ 

over the East China Sea. Some observers have suggested that China may intend 

to declare a similar zone over the South China Sea, and enforce it from its artificial 

island bases. How would the United States respond to the declaration of such an 

ADIZ? 
62 

Mr. DENMARK. When China announced its 2013 East China Sea (ECS) Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ), the United States made it clear that a unilateral 

and uncoordinated ADIZ over politically sensitive areas was provocative and raised 

tensions. This declaration has not affected U.S. military operations in any way. 

A Chinese declaration of an ADIZ over disputed territories and water space in the 

SCS would not grant it any new authority or strengthen its claims over the area. 

In fact, such a declaration would only serve to increase tensions with China’s neighbors. Just as in the East China Sea, an ADIZ in the South China Sea would not 

change how the United States conducts military operations in the region. The 

United States will continue to fly, sail, and operate in accordance with international 

law, as U.S. forces do all around the world. U.S. forces will continue to be present 

and active in and around the SCS on a regular basis. 

Mr. FORBES. Some observers have suggested that rather than trying to achieve 

legal jurisdiction over the South China Sea, Beijing may simply strive for de facto 

control, and use its paramilitary forces, fishing boats, and ‘‘maritime militia’’ to 

achieve dominance in the region without crossing the threshold into outright conflict. How should the United States respond to and counter that kind of ‘‘gray zone’’ 

aggression against our partners? Do we have a strategy to do so, or the forces, tactics, and capabilities required? 

Mr. DENMARK. To address security concerns in the region, including those referred 

to as ‘‘gray zone’’ aggression, the Department of Defense has executed a four-part 

strategy to achieve our broader national objectives: 

• First, we have strengthened our own military capacity and presence in the region through efforts such as the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement 

(EDCA) with the Philippines. 

• Second, we have enhanced the tempo of our military operations in the region 

increasing our visible presence in the region. U.S. military forces are present 

and active in and around the Western Pacific on a daily basis. U.S. ships and 

aircraft operate routinely throughout the Western Pacific—including the South 

China Sea, East China Sea and Philippine Sea—and have for the last 70 years. 

In the past year, U.S. aircraft carriers, Ronald Reagan and John C. Stennis 

Strike groups, conducted routine operations in the international waters of the 

South China Sea and the Philippine Sea. The Stennis operated in the South 

China Sea for three months before joining the Reagan in the Philippine Sea for 

combined training and exercises. These routine operations were conducted in accordance with international law and demonstrated continued U.S. freedom of 

navigation in international waters in accordance with international norms, 

standards, rules and laws. 

• Third, we continue to network our security relationships by enhancing our engagements and cooperation with and among our allies and partners, and thorough building partner capacity efforts such as the Southeast Asia Maritime Security Initiative. 

• Finally, we have sought to leverage our military diplomacy with partners, including China, to reduce the possibility of misunderstanding and miscalculation 

between our forces. 

These efforts, combined with the strategic investments we are making at home, 

will ensure that we are ready to address all contingencies in the region. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LARSEN 

Mr. LARSEN. China has stated that it neither accepts nor recognizes the Permanent Court of Arbitration’s ruling against its claims in the South China Sea. This 

has led to media speculation as to potential Chinese provocations and U.S. military 

responses. However, given the mutual goals of resource extraction and fishing 

among claimants to the contested waters, resolving these conflicting claims is primarily a diplomatic question. How can the State Department play a constructive 

role in this process? 

Ms. WILLETT. The Administration employs a comprehensive and multifaceted approach to the South China Sea that includes intense bilateral and multilateral diplomacy, a consistent military presence and operations, defense engagement and 

partner capacity building, and sustained economic engagement. As a non-claimant, 

one of our primary interests is in helping shape a rules-based strategic environment 

so that disputes are settled peacefully and in accordance with international law. 

Our consistent and steady presence in the South China Sea plays an important role 

in deterring any claimant from employing the use or threat of force to assert their 

claims, leaving open the door for constructive diplomatic or other peaceful processes 

among claimants. We are strengthening our defensive presence in the South China 
63 

Sea. As part of a long term strategy, we are moving 60 percent of our naval fleet 

to the Pacific and rotating more of our forces through friendly countries in the region. We are also strengthening maritime domain awareness and law enforcement 

capabilities in the region. This includes new security cooperation agreements with 

allies and partners in Southeast Asia and providing equipment and training to help 

partners better patrol offshore and ensure their ability to maintain an effective presence. On the diplomatic front, we are advocating for peaceful dispute resolution and 

compliance with international law. We continue to engage in intense, high-level diplomacy with all claimants, including advocating for them to take advantage of the 

July 12 Arbitral Tribunal’s ruling to find a workable modus-vivendi in areas subject 

to dispute. President Obama, Secretary Kerry, and Secretary Carter continue to 

make our interests and concerns clear to all claimants in an open and frank manner. In addition, we have consistently called on all parties to negotiate a Code of 

Conduct in the South China Sea, which would build on the Declaration on the Conduct they negotiated in 2002. 

Mr. LARSEN. What is the U.S. military’s assessment of China’s long-term goals as 

a naval power in Asia and beyond? Are there any ways a more powerful Chinese 

navy is in the U.S. national interest? 

Mr. DENMARK. China’s Navy is shifting its mission from ‘‘near sea’’ defense to ‘‘far 

seas’’ protection, which was espoused as the Navy’s objective in China’s most recent 

Defense White Paper. China’s maritime emphasis and attention to missions guarding its overseas interests has increasingly drawn the PLA beyond China’s borders 

and its immediate periphery. The PLAN is increasingly conducting operational tasks 

outside the so-called ‘‘first island chain’’ with multi-mission, long-range, sustainable 

naval platforms that have robust self-defense capabilities. Over the past 15 years, 

China’s ambitious naval modernization program has produced a more technologically advanced and flexible force. The PLAN now possesses more than 300 surface ships, submarines, amphibious ships, and patrol craft. China is rapidly retiring 

legacy combatants in favor of larger, multi-mission ships equipped with advanced 

anti-ship, anti-air, and anti-submarine weapons and sensors. 

As China’s capabilities improve, we consistently encourage China to be a constructive partner in the region and to contribute positively to regional stability. China’s 

contributions to global and regional public goods—such as humanitarian assistance 

and disaster relief—would be in the interests of the entire Asia-Pacific, including 

the United States. 

Mr. LARSEN. Does the U.S. military believe that China’s building up of ‘‘islands’’ 

and installation of military facilities in the South China Sea are the result of PLAN 

pressure and influence on China’s civilian leadership, or are these the result of a 

centrally-directed strategy from China’s top civilian leadership? 

Mr. DENMARK. I would refer you to Chinese authorities to address questions about 

China’s internal policy coordination process. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SALMON 

Mr. SALMON. Since the hearing, the tribunal deciding the Philippines v. China arbitration has issued its ruling, largely invalidating China’s claims in the South 

China Sea. China, predictably, has made clear that it refuses to recognize or abide 

by this ruling. As the tribunal lacks an enforcement mechanism, what will be the 

ramifications of China’s noncompliance? Does this noncompliance stand to damage 

the credibility of international law? How can we hold them accountable? 

Mr. DENMARK. As provided in the Law of the Sea Convention, the Arbitral Tribunal’s decision in this case is legally binding on both the Philippines and China. China’s stated non-compliance with the ruling does not negate the legitimacy of the ruling. 

Although the United Nations Permanent Court of Arbitration does not have a 

mechanism to enforce the ruling, this is common to all international maritime law. 

The expectation in this and other cases relating to international maritime law is 

that both parties will comply with their obligations and exercise restraint. We have 

encouraged China and all claimants to clarify their claims in accordance with international law as reflected in the Law of the Sea Convention, and to work together 

to creatively and peacefully manage and resolve their differences. The United States 

will continue to provide a credible presence in the region to create the diplomatic 

space for China and the Philippines to resolve their differences. Our military operations, though not intended to enforce the ruling, will continue to uphold freedom 

of navigation and overflight in the South China Sea, as we do around the world. 

Mr. SALMON. Our strategy towards the South China Sea has been limited to imposing reputational harm on China, rather than actually attempting to elicit a 
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change in its behavior. Our freedom of navigation operations have shown that we 

will not recognize China’s excessive claims, and our statements in support of international law show that China’s noncompliance with the arbitral ruling is wrong; but 

this strategy hasn’t stopped Chinese militarization of the area. Is imposing 

reputational harm really the best we can do? Other than upgrading the maritime 

security capabilities of our partners in the region, do we have any tools for inducing 

behavioral change in the South China Sea? 

Mr. DENMARK. We are committed to defending our allies and protecting the rights, 

freedoms, and lawful uses of the sea and airspace guaranteed to all countries. The 

United States will continue to conduct routine and lawful operations in the South 

China Sea in order to protect the rights, freedoms, and lawful uses of the sea and 

airspace guaranteed to all countries. 

We have a multi-pronged strategy to defend and uphold these interests and principles and set the stage for change. First, the United States has strengthened our 

own military capacity and presence in Southeast Asia though such efforts as 

rotationally basing ships, aircraft and Marines in Singapore and the Philippines. 

Second we have enhanced the tempo of our military operations in the region which 

included a persistent and scalable Command and Control Detachment in the Philippines, dual carrier operations in the Philippine Sea and a deployed rotational air 

component to the Philippines. Third, we have enhanced our regional security network by building partner capacity through the Southeast Asia Maritime Security 

Initiative, training regional forces, and conducting multilateral exercises such as 

BALIKATAN and RIMPAC. Finally we have leveraged military diplomacy to reduce 

risk with China utilizing Confidence Building Measures, high level dialogues, and 

existing structures such as Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS) and ASEAN 

Defense Ministers Meeting (ADMM) Plus. 

In combination with the broader United States Government diplomatic engagement strategy these lines of effort have provided an increased set of tools for creating more favorable conditions for claimants to lower tensions and take steps to 

peacefully resolve disputes, including through peaceful dispute mechanisms such as 

arbitration. 

Mr. SALMON. ASEAN is the multilateral body most directly involved in the South 

China Sea disputes, but has had trouble making forward progress due to its consensus-based procedures. Some members of ASEAN continue to ask for U.S. assistance to secure the region. The Maritime Security Initiative was recently implemented to assist coastal states’ abilities to address challenges in the area, including 

China’s belligerence. What more can we do to work with our friends in ASEAN to 

move toward a secure region? How can we facilitate progress within the framework 

of ASEAN? Will the disputes cause fractures in the ASEAN community and what 

can we do to prevent it? 

Mr. DENMARK. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is critical to 

the regional security architecture. The United States supports ASEAN centrality, 

and has focused on enhancing ASEAN through engagement, building partner capacity, training and exercises. This is why DOD has invested in ASEAN thorough multiple high-level dialogues such as the East Asia Summit and ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus). In addition to the dialogue, DOD has taken action to back up the principles we espouse. We are deepening multilateral regional 

security architecture through the ADMM-Plus and its Experts Working Groups, 

through which we are pursuing practical defense cooperation, initiatives, and exercises to address challenges that affect us all more effectively. 

Additionally, we have begun implementing the Southeast Asia Maritime Security 

Initiative, which Congress authorized in Section 1263 of the FY16 NDAA. This is 

a comprehensive, multi-year effort that will reinforce our partners’ and allies’ maritime security efforts and address shared challenges. In the Initiative’s first year, 

we’re helping the Philippines enhance its National Coast Watch Center and outfitting a previously provided excess high endurance cutter with reconnaissance and 

maritime sensors, advising Vietnam on maritime patrol capabilities, providing Indonesia and Malaysia with communications equipment and training, and advising 

Thailand on fusion center operations. 

In addition to building partner capacity, we also conduct several bilateral and 

multilateral exercises. Examples include BALIKATAN with the Philippines, and the 

Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) Exercise includes 27 nations focused on building maritime cooperation, security, and disaster response capacity. Additionally, PACIFIC 

PATHWAYS builds partner capability and interoperability with Thailand, South 

Korea, the Philippines, Indonesia, and Malaysia. 

In recent years, we have also seen Asia-Pacific countries come together to 

strengthen bilateral and trilateral ties. For example, Malaysia, the Philippines, and 

Indonesia, members of ASEAN, are coming together to counter maritime threats in 
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coastal waters. And Indonesia has proposed trilateral joint maritime patrols with 

Malaysia and the Philippines, including counter-piracy patrols in the Sulu Sea. The 

United States welcomes and encourages these burgeoning partnerships among likeminded partners who share our vision of a principled regional order. By networking 

security together, we believe we strengthen the ability of ASEAN and all countries 

to enjoy stability and prosperity in a dynamic region. 

Mr. SALMON. Secretary Kerry recently warned that the United States would treat 

a Chinese ADIZ over the South China Sea as a ‘‘provocative and destabilizing act.’’ 

Tensions were high when China declared an ADIZ in the East China Sea in 2013, 

and much of that strain has shifted south. Given China’s militarization of the South 

China Sea, does China now have the infrastructure in place to declare an ADIZ? 

Would the United States and the international community comply with a Chinese 

South China Sea ADIZ? How would it differ with the Chinese ADIZ in the East 

China Sea? 

Mr. DENMARK. When China announced its 2013 ECS ADIZ, we made it clear that 

declaring a unilateral and uncoordinated ADIZ in a politically sensitive area was 

provocative and raised regional tensions. 

A unilateral and uncoordinated declaration of an ADIZ over disputed territories 

and water space in the SCS would not grant China any new authority over the region and only serves to increase tensions with China’s neighbors. Just as in the East 

China Sea, an SCS ADIZ would not change how the United States conducts military 

operations in the region. The United States will continue to fly, sail, and operate 

in accordance with international law, as U.S. forces do all around the world. U.S. 

forces will continue to be present and active in and around the SCS on a regular 

basis. 

Mr. SALMON. The Philippines v. China arbitral tribunal’s award has defined the 

Scarborough Shoal as a rock under the Law of the Sea treaty. What implications 

does this definition have for the U.S.-Philippines alliance? What does this settling 

of the Shoal’s status mean for the U.S.-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty? 

Mr. DENMARK. As President Obama and Secretary Carter have stated, our commitment to the Philippines is ironclad. This alliance has been nurtured over decades; tested in crisis; and is built on shared interest, values, and sacrifice. Our alliance relationships form the bedrock of our role in the Asia-Pacific, and accordingly, 

the stability and security that have helped so many in the Asia-Pacific to rise and 

prosper. 

The United States takes no position on competing sovereignty claims to features 

in the South China Sea and encourages all parties to seek a peaceful diplomatic resolution to their disputes. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LOWENTHAL 

Mr. LOWENTHAL. Ms. Willett, last month the Foreign Ministers of ASEAN released a strong statement of concern on Chinese activities in the South China Sea. 

In what I think is a pretty extraordinary move, however, the ministers retracted 

the statement after coming under heavy pressure from China. 

What can the United States do to build greater consensus among the nations of 

Southeast Asia? Will ASEAN ever be able to speak with one voice on the Sea? 

Ms. WILLETT. The United States values ASEAN’s role at the center of the region’s 

multilateral security architecture, and believes that ASEAN centrality plays an important role in maintaining regional stability. We continue to invest in ASEAN institutions, including a commitment toward helping ASEAN further implement its 

own goals to become a more integrated and effective economic, political, and sociocultural community. We also continue to diplomatically engage all ten members at 

all levels, using these opportunities to impress upon them the importance of ASEAN 

speaking out in favor of international law, rules, and standards. 

Our relationships throughout Southeast Asia are strengthening, support for a 

common vision of a rules-based regional order is deepening, and demand for us to 

play a more active role in upholding regional stability is increasing. 

If thwarting ASEAN consensus to prevent a specific mention on the July 12 Arbitral Tribunal ruling was meant as a means to draw attention away from the decision and its legally binding effect on the Philippines and China, those actions 

achieved the opposite result. In fact, the region and international community are 

increasingly vocal about calling for compliance with international law and against 

activities that raise tensions and complicate the situation. Last month, ASEAN foreign ministers jointly called for disputes to be resolved peacefully, with full respect 

for diplomatic and legal processes. The United States and ASEAN Member States 
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also stressed the importance of international law, including freedom of navigation 

and overflight. 

Mr. LOWENTHAL. In the case that the UNCLOS tribunal rules in favor of the Philippines and China completely ignores the ruling, as signs have indicated, what 

would this mean for China’s general commitment to international law? 

Ms. WILLETT. The tribunal’s ruling will be final and binding on both China and 

the Philippines under the Law of the Sea Convention, an international treaty that 

both countries helped negotiate and willingly joined. China’s public rejection of the 

tribunal’s decision would certainly raise questions about China’s commitment to 

honoring its international obligations and commitments. But we’re especially watching China’s actions, and whether it acts in a manner consistent with the arbitral 

decision or acts in violation of its treaty obligations. Actions by China that violate 

the tribunal’s decision or otherwise escalate tensions would send a worrying signal 

to the international community about China’s attitude to international rules and 

norms. As a result, we are working, together with allies, to convince China to act in accordance with international law—not just in the South China Sea, but on other 

issues as well. To this end, we engage directly with the Chinese government to underscore the importance of respecting and upholding the rules-based international 

order and to highlight the risks and costs of undermining it. We also engage with 

other countries in the region, as well as the broader international community, to 

build support for common principles and set shared expectations for Beijing. 

Mr. LOWENTHAL. Should we be worried about China’s potential rejection of an unfavorable tribunal ruling as setting a precedent to ignore international legal commitments in the future? 

Ms. WILLETT. The tribunal’s ruling will be final and binding on both China and 

the Philippines under the Law of the Sea Convention, an international treaty that 

both countries helped negotiate and willingly joined. China’s public rejection of the 

tribunal’s decision would certainly raise questions about China’s commitment to 

honoring its international obligations and commitments. But we’re especially watching China’s actions, and whether it acts in a manner consistent with the arbitral 

decision or acts in violation of its treaty obligations. Actions by China that violate 

the tribunal’s decision or otherwise escalate tensions would send a worrying signal 

to the international community about China’s attitude to international rules and 

norms. As a result, we are working, together with allies, to convince China to act in accordance with international law—not just in the South China Sea, but on other 

issues as well. To this end, we engage directly with the Chinese government to underscore the importance of respecting and upholding the rules-based international 

order and to highlight the risks and costs of undermining it. We also engage with 

other countries in the region, as well as the broader international community, to 

build support for common principles and set shared expectations for Beijing. 

We have made real progress. We have demonstrably strengthened our relationships throughout the Asia Pacific region, deepened regional support for a common 

vision of a rules-based regional order, and seen an increase in regional demand for 

us to play an active role in upholding regional stability. The region and international community are increasingly vocal against activities that raise tensions. Instead, they are in favor of respect for international law and restraint among all 

claimants, including China. 

Mr. LOWENTHAL. What other avenues are available to the United States or the 

international community to pressure China to respect the tribunal’s decision? 

Ms. WILLETT. As a non-claimant, our vital interest lies in helping shape a regional 

environment in which disputes can be settled peacefully and in accordance with 

international law. To this end, the Administration is pursuing a comprehensive and 

multifaceted approach to the South China Sea. 

Our consistent and steady presence in the South China Sea plays an important 

role in deterring claimants from employing the use of force to assert their claims, 

leaving open the door for constructive diplomatic or other peaceful processes among 

claimants. We are strengthening our security posture in the South China Sea. As 

part of a long term strategy, we are moving 60 percent of our naval fleet to the Pacific and rotating more of our forces through friendly countries in the region. 

We are also strengthening maritime domain awareness and law enforcement capabilities in the region. This includes new security cooperation arrangements with 

allies and partners in Southeast Asia and providing equipment and training to help 

partners better patrol the maritime domain and ensure their ability to maintain an 

effective presence. 

On the diplomatic front, we are advocating for peaceful dispute resolution and 

compliance with international law. We are engaging in intense, high-level diplomacy 
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with all claimants, including advocating for them to take advantage of the July 12 

Arbitral Tribunal’s ruling to advance a modus vivendi in disputed areas. President 

Obama, Secretary Kerry, and Secretary Carter make our interests and concerns 

clear to all claimants in an open and frank manner. 

Mr. LOWENTHAL. Mr. Denmark, the United States has conducted several ‘‘freedom 

of navigation’’ operations in the South China Sea to ensure that these essential waterways continue to remain open for all. Australia has also conducted freedom of 

navigation flights in the sea, can we expect our other allies in the region, like the 

Philippines or Singapore, to also contribute to these efforts? 

Mr. DENMARK. Our Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) demonstrate the 

commitment of the United States to operate wherever permitted under international 

law, and to uphold the rights, freedoms, and lawful uses of the sea that are enjoyed 

by all nations in accordance with international law. They are designed to support 

and sustain the principled rules-based order in the Asia-Pacific. The United States 

will continue to conduct FONOPs around the world, including in the South China 

Sea. 

Questions on the specific response by individual countries must be answered by 

their respective governments. 

Mr. LOWENTHAL. Should we be encouraging our allies to conduct these exercises? 

Mr. DENMARK. The United States welcomes all states to exercise their rights, freedoms, and lawful uses of the sea and airspace. 

Mr. LOWENTHAL. With so many different actors and militaries operating in the region, how can we be sure that there are open lines of communication and misunderstandings do not lead to violent confrontations? 

Mr. DENMARK. We actively seek to reduce the risk of miscommunication and miscalculation at sea through a variety of mechanisms. These include our bilateral and 

multilateral defense dialogues, such as ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting (ADMM) 

Plus, combined exercises such as Rim of the Pacific 2016, and participation in multilateral organizations such as the Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS). 

In 2014, the member states of WPNS agreed to the Code of Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES), which standardizes basic communications between naval ships 

and aircraft in an effort to minimize the risk of miscommunication and miscalculation. This, and other efforts such as our bilateral Confidence Building Measures 

with China, provide the practical mechanisms to mitigate risk of unintended incidents. 

We also maintain a robust military-to-military relationship with China that seeks 

to reduce risk and enhance mutual understanding. As part of this effort, U.S. military leaders regularly engage their Chinese counterparts and maintain regular 

channels of communications with them through the use of the Defense Telephone 

Link. 

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