1

Department of Defense

 

Annual Report on Civilian Casualties in Connection With United 

States Military Operations

Submitted pursuant to Section 1057 of the National Defense Authorization Act for 

Fiscal Year 2018

The estimated cost of this report or study for the Department of Defense is approximately $29,000 for the 2018 

Fiscal Year. This includes $20 in expenses and $29,000 in DoD labor. 

Generated on 2018May22 RefID: 9-C74FBC5
2

Section 1057 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 states the 

following: 

Annual Report on Civilian Casualties in Connection With 

United States Military Operations

(a) Annual Report Required.—Not later than May 1 each year, the Secretary 

of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report on civilian 

casualties caused as a result of United States military operations during the 

preceding year.

(b) Elements.—Each report under subsection (a) shall set forth the following:

(1) A list of all the United States military operations during the year covered by 

such report that were confirmed, or reasonably suspected, to have resulted in 

civilian casualties.

(2) For each military operation listed pursuant to paragraph (1), each of the 

following:

(A) The date.

(B) The location.

(C) An identification of whether the operation occurred inside or outside of a 

declared theater of active armed conflict.

(D) The type of operation.

(E) An assessment of the number of civilian and enemy combatant casualties.

(3) A description of the process by which the Department of Defense 

investigates allegations of civilian casualties resulting from United States military 

operations.

(4) A description of steps taken by the Department to mitigate harm to civilians 

in conducting such operations.

(5) Any other matters the Secretary of Defense determines are relevant.

(c) Use of Sources.—In preparing a report under this section, the Secretary of 

Defense shall take into account relevant and credible all-source reporting, including 

information from public reports and nongovernmental sources.

(d) Form.—Each report under subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified 

form, but may include a classified annex.

(e) Sunset.—The requirement to submit a report under subsection (a) shall 

expire on the date that is five years after the date of the enactment of this Act.
3

Department of Defense Report on Civilian Casualties in 

Connection With United States Military Operations in 2017

The Department of Defense (DoD) welcomes the opportunity to provide Congress with this 

annual report on civilian casualties in connection with U.S. military operations, as required by 

Section 1057 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year (FY) 2018.

As noted in Executive Order 13732, United States Policy on Pre- and Post-Strike Measures To 

Address Civilian Casualties in U.S. Operations Involving the Use of Force, of July 1, 2016, the 

protection of civilians is fundamentally consistent with the effective, efficient, and decisive use 

of force in pursuit of U.S. national interests. Minimizing civilian casualties can further mission 

objectives; help maintain the support of partner governments and vulnerable populations, 

especially in the conduct of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations; and enhance the 

legitimacy and sustainability of U.S. operations critical to U.S. national security. As a matter of 

policy, U.S. forces therefore routinely conduct operations under policy standards that are more 

protective than the requirements of the law of war that relate to the protection of civilians. 

U.S. forces also protect civilians because it is the moral and ethical thing to do. Although 

civilian casualties are a tragic and unavoidable part of war, no force in history has been more 

committed to limiting harm to civilians than the U.S. military. This commitment is reflected in 

DoD’s consistent efforts to maintain and promote best practices that reduce the likelihood of 

civilian casualties, take appropriate steps when such casualties occur, and draw lessons from 

DoD operations to further enhance the protection of civilians. Executive Order 13732 catalogues 

the best practices DoD has implemented to protect civilians during armed conflict, and it directs 

that those measures be sustained in present and future operations. 

I. MILITARY OPERATIONS DURING 2017 THAT WERE CONFIRMED, OR 

REASONABLY SUSPECTED, TO HAVE RESULTED IN CIVILIAN 

CASUALTIES

During 2017, U.S. forces engaged in a number of military operations, some of which were 

assessed to have resulted in civilian casualties. This section provides information regarding: a) 

Operation INHERENT RESOLVE and other military actions related to Iraq and Syria; b) 

Operation FREEDOM’S SENTINEL, including support to the North Atlantic Treaty 

Organization (NATO)-led RESOLUTE SUPPORT Mission; c) U.S. military actions in Yemen 

against al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria 

(ISIS); d) U.S. military actions in Somalia against ISIS and al-Shabaab; and e) U.S. military 

actions in Libya against ISIS.
4

DoD’s practice for many years has been not to tally systematically the number of enemy 

combatants killed or wounded during operations. Although the number of enemy combatants 

killed in action is often assessed after combat, a running “body count” would not necessarily 

provide a meaningful measure of the military success of an operation and could even be 

misleading. For example, the use of such metrics in the Vietnam War has been heavily 

criticized. We have therefore provided other information that is intended to help give context, 

such as information regarding the objectives, scale, and effects of these operation.

It is longstanding DoD policy to comply with the law of war in all military operations, however 

characterized. All DoD operations in 2017 were conducted in accordance with law of war 

requirements, including law of war protections for civilians, such as the fundamental principles 

of distinction and proportionality and the requirement to take feasible precautions in planning 

and conducting attacks to reduce the risk of harm to civilians and other persons and objects

protected from being made the object of attack.

DoD assesses that there are credible reports of approximately 499 civilians killed and 

approximately 169 civilians injured during 2017 as a result of Operation INHERENT RESOLVE

in Iraq and Syria, Operation FREEDOM’S SENTINEL in Afghanistan, and U.S. military actions 

in Yemen against AQAP and ISIS. For the purposes of this report, these are incidents in which 

U.S. aircraft conducted the strike or strikes or where U.S. personnel engaged in ground combat. 

DoD has no credible reports of civilian casualties from U.S. military operations in Somalia or 

Libya in 2017. Sub-sections A through E below and the accompanying classified annex provide 

additional information about these operations.

The assessments of civilian casualties are based on reports that DoD has been able to assess as 

“credible”; i.e., based on the available information, it is assessed that it is more likely than not 

that the report regarding civilian casualties is correct. Section II of this report describes in more 

detail the processes for conducting these assessments.

A. Operation INHERENT RESOLVE and other military actions related to Iraq and 

Syria

Operation INHERENT RESOLVE. During 2017, as part of the United States’ comprehensive 

strategy to defeat ISIS, U.S. forces conducted a systematic campaign of airstrikes and other vital 

actions against ISIS forces in Iraq and Syria and carried out airstrikes and other necessary actions

against al-Qa’ida in Syria in the context of the ongoing armed conflict against those groups. 

U.S. forces were also deployed to Syria to conduct actions against ISIS with indigenous ground 

forces. In Iraq, U.S. forces advised and coordinated with Iraqi forces and provided training, 

equipment, communications support, intelligence support, and other support to select elements of 

the Iraqi security forces, including Iraqi Kurdish Peshmerga forces. 
5

During 2017, the U.S.-led Coalition to defeat ISIS conducted more than 10,000 strikes, which 

killed hundreds of ISIS leadership figures and facilitators in Iraq and Syria; disrupted ISIS’s 

command control network; degraded its use of unmanned aerial systems; reduced its ability to 

conduct research and development, procurement, and administration; and denied sources of 

funding for terrorist activities. These losses have undermined ISIS’s ability to conduct attacks 

throughout the region and the world. With the loss of terrain and the liberation of the local 

population, ISIS can no longer generate funding through extortion and taxation. Additionally, 

airstrikes and ground operations crippled ISIS’s use of hydrocarbon generating facilities and 

facilitation routes that moved and supplied ISIS fighters and supported illicit oil sales. U.S. 

forces have also degraded ISIS media operations. 

These actions helped support partners, in particular the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and Syrian 

Democratic Forces (SDF), to make extraordinary progress over the past year, liberating Mosul 

and Raqqah – the former capitals of ISIS’s self-proclaimed “caliphate” – during 2017. The 

liberation of Mosul provided the ISF with the momentum that led to the quick liberation of Tal 

Afar and Hawijah. During 2017, more than 61,500 square kilometers were liberated from ISIS 

control across Iraq and Syria, equating to the liberation of more than 98 percent of the land once 

claimed by ISIS and of more than 4.5 million people from ISIS oppression. Actions in Iraq were 

undertaken in coordination with the Government of Iraq, and in conjunction with Coalition 

partners. 

In 2017, U.S. forces participating in the Defeat-ISIS campaign in Syria also took a limited 

number of strikes against Syrian government and pro-Syrian government forces in order to 

counter immediate threats to U.S. and partner forces while engaged in that campaign. 

DoD assesses that there were credible reports of civilian casualties caused by Operation 

INHERENT RESOLVE in Iraq and Syria during 2017, as indicated earlier in the report. 

For Operation INHERENT RESOLVE, U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) publishes a 

monthly report that: (1) catalogues reports of civilian casualties that have been received, 

including the date and location in which the civilian casualties reportedly occurred and the 

source of the report (e.g., a military unit’s own after-action reporting, media report, nongovernmental organization report, posting on social media); and (2) whether reports of civilian 

casualties have been assessed to be credible or not, and if not, the general reasons why such 

reports were assessed not to be credible. The monthly report also identifies the reports of 

civilian casualties that still remain to be assessed.

It should be noted that the U.S.-led Coalition to defeat ISIS, as a matter of strategy and policy, 

considers all civilian casualties to be the combined result of “Coalition” action and jointly 
6

attributed to Coalition members. It is rarely the case that a single civilian casualty occurs solely

from the actions of one nation’s military activities. Coalition personnel from multiple countries 

take part in every strike in some manner, from the initial collection and analysis of intelligence, 

to the Coalition’s deliberate targeting process, and finally, in conducting the strikes themselves. 

In our view, this is the most appropriate way to view civilian casualty incidents related to 

Coalition action in Iraq and Syria. Public reports released by USCENTCOM about civilian 

casualties reflect this approach. 

Due to the number of reports of civilian casualties in Iraq and Syria received during 2017 and the 

resources required to review each report, as of February 26, 2018, more than 450 reports of 

civilian casualties from 2017 remained to be assessed. As described below, DoD continues to 

assess reports and updates assessments if DoD receives additional information on any report of 

civilian casualties. 

Additional Military Action in Syria. Additionally, on April 6, 2017, U.S. forces in the

Mediterranean Sea operating beyond the territorial sea of any State struck the Shayrat military 

airfield in Syria in response to the chemical weapons attack on Syrian civilians in southern Idlib 

Province, Syria, on April 4, 2017. The strike, which involved 59 Tomahawk Land Attack 

missiles, was assessed to have resulted in the damage or destruction of fuel and ammunition 

sites, air defense capabilities, and 20 percent of Syria’s operational aircraft. DoD has no credible 

reports of civilian casualties resulting from this strike. 

B. Operation FREEDOM’S SENTINEL, including support to the North Atlantic 

Treaty Organization (NATO)-led RESOLUTE SUPPORT Mission

During 2017, U.S. forces operated in Afghanistan to eliminate the reemergence of safe-havens 

that enable terrorists to threaten the United States or its interests, support the Afghan government 

and the Afghan military as they confront terrorist organizations in the field, and help create

conditions to support a political process to achieve a lasting peace. In the context of the ongoing 

armed conflict in Afghanistan, U.S. forces in Afghanistan trained, advised, and assisted Afghan 

forces; conducted and supported counterterrorism actions against al-Qa’ida and against ISIS; and 

took appropriate measures against those who provide direct support to al-Qa’ida, threaten U.S. 

and Coalition forces, or threaten the viability of the Afghan government or the ability of the 

Afghan National Defense and Security Forces to achieve campaign success. 

These actions included strikes, such as (1) the strike on February 26, 2017, that killed Taliban 

commander Mullah Abdul Salam, along with four other enemy combatants in Kunduz; (2) the 

strike on an ISIS tunnel complex in Achin district, Nangarhar Province, on April 13, 2017, that 

was designed to minimize the risk to Afghan and U.S. forces conducting clearing operations in 

the area while maximizing the destruction of ISIS fighters and facilities; (3) the strike on April 
7

19, 2017, that killed Quari Tayib, once known as the Taliban shadow governor of Takhar 

Province, along with eight additional Taliban fighters in Kunduz Province; (4) the strike on an 

ISIS headquarters in Kunar Province on July 11, 2017, that killed an emir of ISIS, Abu Sayed;

and (5) the strike on December 1, 2017, that killed the Taliban’s “Red Unit” commander Mullah 

Shah Wali, along with one of Wali’s deputy commanders and three other insurgents in Helmand 

Province. These actions also included strikes on seven Taliban drug labs and one Taliban 

command-and-control node in northern Helmand Province during November 2017. 

DoD assesses that there were credible reports of civilian casualties caused by U.S. military 

actions in Afghanistan during 2017, as indicated earlier in the report.

C. U.S. military actions in Yemen against al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) 

and ISIS

During 2017, a small number of U.S. military personnel were deployed to Yemen to conduct 

actions in the context of the armed conflict against AQAP and ISIS. U.S. forces continued to 

work closely with the Government of Yemen and regional partner forces to dismantle and 

ultimately eliminate the terrorist threat posed by these groups. U.S. forces conducted a number 

of airstrikes against AQAP operatives and facilities in Yemen, and supported United Arab 

Emirates- and Yemen-led efforts to clear AQAP from Shabwah Governorate. 

For example, on January 20, 21, and 22, 2017, the U.S. military conducted strikes in al-Baydah 

Governorate, which killed five AQAP operatives. On January 28, 2017, U.S. forces conducted a 

raid on an AQAP compound in al-Bayda, Yemen, to gather information to help prevent future 

terrorist attacks, killing 14 AQAP operatives. U.S. forces also conducted a counter-terrorism 

operation against a compound associated with AQAP in Ma’rib Governate, Yemen, on May 23, 

2017, which killed seven AQAP militants through a combination of small arms fires and 

airstrikes. On November 20, 2017, U.S. airstrikes in al-Bayda Governorate, Yemen, killed five 

AQAP militants, including an AQAP leader responsible for planning and conducting terrorist 

attacks against Yemeni and Coalition forces and an al-Bayda-based facilitator. U.S. forces also 

conducted eight airstrikes in Yemen in December 2017 that targeted both AQAP and ISIS, 

resulting in the death of an AQAP external operations facilitator and the AQAP deputy arms 

facilitator with ties to senior AQAP leadership and who was responsible for facilitating the 

movement of weapons, explosives, and finances in Yemen. 

DoD assesses that there were credible reports of civilian casualties caused by U.S. military 

actions in Yemen against AQAP and ISIS during 2017, as indicated earlier in the report. 
8

D. U.S. military actions in Somalia against ISIS and al-Shabaab

During 2017, U.S. forces in Somalia were countering the terrorist threat posed by ISIS and alShabaab, an associated force of al-Qa’ida. In the context of the armed conflict against those 

groups, U.S. forces conducted a number of airstrikes against ISIS and al-Shabaab. For example, 

on January 7, 2017, Somali partner forces, African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) 

forces, and U.S. advisors conducted a self-defense strike against al-Shabaab in Gaduud, Somalia. 

On June 11, 2017, U.S. forces also conducted an airstrike in southern Somalia on an al-Shabaab 

command and logistics node, killing a number of militants. Periodic strikes continued 

throughout the summer and fall of 2017, killing numerous al-Shabaab militants. On November 

21, 2017, U.S. forces conducted an airstrike against an al-Shabaab camp 125 miles northwest of 

Mogadishu, killing more than 100 militants. Strikes continued into December 2017, with U.S. 

forces conducting more airstrikes against al-Shabaab vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices 

and al-Shabaab militants. U.S. forces also advised, assisted, and accompanied regional forces, 

including Somali and African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) forces, during 

counterterrorism actions in Somalia in 2017. 

As indicated earlier in the report, DoD has no credible reports of civilian casualties resulting 

from U.S. strikes in Somalia in 2017. One 2017 report of civilian casualties in Somalia remains

under investigation. 

E. U.S. military actions in Libya against ISIS 

During 2017, U.S. forces conducted a number of airstrikes in Libya as part of the ongoing armed 

conflict against ISIS. For example, on January 19, 2017, U.S. forces conducted airstrikes 

destroying two ISIS camps 45 kilometers southwest of Sirte. On September 26, 2017, U.S. 

forces also conducted two airstrikes in Libya, killing several ISIS militants. These airstrikes 

were conducted in coordination with Libya’s Government of National Accord.

As indicated earlier in the report, DoD has no credible reports of civilian casualties resulting 

from U.S. strikes in Libya in 2017. 

II. DOD PROCESSES FOR ASSESSING REPORTS OF CIVILIAN 

CASUALTIES FROM U.S. MILITARY OPERATIONS

As reflected in Executive Order 13732, United States Policy on Pre- and Post-Strike Measures 

To Address Civilian Casualties in U.S. Operations Involving the Use of Force, of July 1, 2016, 

the U.S. military, as appropriate and consistent with mission objectives and applicable law, 

including the law of war, has a practice of reviewing or investigating incidents involving civilian 

casualties, including by considering relevant information from all available sources, such as 
9

other agencies, partner governments, and nongovernmental organizations and taking measures to 

mitigate the likelihood of future incidents of civilian casualties. 

Specific processes for reviewing or investigating incidents have varied over the years and have

varied by geographic combatant command and by operation. Department of Defense has 

different processes due to host nation requests, different mission objectives, different operational 

designs, different available resources, and different organizational designs and command 

relationships within the Area of Responsibilities. As but one example, some commands do not 

have access on the ground to areas where civilian casualties are suspected to have occurred. 

Commands also work to improve their processes over time and adapt to the ever-changing fog 

and friction of war. The following is a general description of processes U.S. military units used 

during 2017. 

After a report of civilian casualties resulting from a command’s operations becomes known, the 

command or another entity (such as a specialized board or team) will seek to assess the 

credibility of the report. The command or entity would consider reports from any source, 

including its own after-action reporting or reports from external sources, such as a 

nongovernmental organization, the news media, or social media. In assessing the report, the 

command or entity would seek to review all readily available information from a variety of 

sources. This may include, but is not limited to, operational planning data, video surveillance 

and other data from Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) assets, witness

observations (including those of partnered forces) where available, news reports, and information 

provided by nongovernmental organizations and other sources such as local officials or social 

media. 

After reviewing the available information, a competent official determines whether it is more 

likely than not that civilians were injured or killed. If warranted, a more extensive administrative 

investigation would be conducted to find facts about the incident, and to make relevant 

recommendations, such as identifying process improvements to reduce the risk of further civilian 

casualty incidents. 

DoD acknowledges that there are differences between DoD assessments and reports from other 

organizations. These differences result from a variety of factors. For example, nongovernmental 

organizations and media outlets often use different types of information and different 

methodologies to assess whether civilian casualties have occurred. Some organizations conduct 

on-the-ground assessments and interviews, while others rely heavily on media reporting. DoD 

assessments seek to incorporate all available information, including tools and information that 

are not available to other organizations – such as operational planning data and intelligence 

sources. As the RESOLUTE SUPPORT (RS) Mission explained in an April 2018 report that 
10

sought to explain discrepancies between its assessments and those of the United Nations 

Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA): 

The RS investigation team assess that in several of the cases where casualties 

were alleged to be from air strikes, no aerial platforms were nearby at the time, 

and reported explosions may have resulted from concealed IEDs or insurgents 

firing rockets and mortars. In other cases, RS investigators have access to 

surveillance information that gives them confidence that civilians were not 

present at the scene of a strike. 

For example, on November 19, 2017, in the air campaign under new US authorities

striking Taliban revenue streams, a suspected drug lab was struck in northern 

Helmand. UNAMA relayed information to RS alleging that nine civilians from 

the same family were killed in the strike. They shared detailed information about 

three women, two boys and four girls – including a one-year-old. This claim of 

nine dead was included in the UNAMA report, but not counted by RS. RS 

investigations disproved the allegation as surveillance of the house over a 

significant period of time showed no sign of the presence of a family. Local 

government officials said that no civilians were killed.

It also bears noting that DoD’s assessments reflect DoD’s efforts to review reports of civilian 

casualties. In some cases, DoD has not been able to assess a report as credible because 

insufficient information has been provided or because investigators have not yet been able to 

review the report due to a large volume of reports. However, DoD assessments continue to be 

conducted, and existing assessments are updated if new information becomes available. 

III. STEPS DOD TAKES TO MITIGATE HARM TO CIVILIANS

As mentioned earlier in the report, Executive Order 13732, United States Policy on Pre- and 

Post-Strike Measures To Address Civilian Casualties in U.S. Operations Involving the Use of 

Force, of July 1, 2016, catalogues the best practices DoD implements to protect civilians during 

armed conflict, and it directs that those measures be sustained in present and future operations. 

For ease of reference, the relevant portion of Executive Order 13732 is reproduced as follows.

“Sec. 2. Policy. In furtherance of U.S. Government efforts to protect civilians in U.S. operations

involving the use of force in armed conflict or in the exercise of the Nation’s inherent right 

of self-defense, and with a view toward enhancing such efforts, relevant departments and 

agencies shall continue to take certain measures in present and future operations.
11

(a) In particular, relevant agencies shall, consistent with mission objectives and applicable 

law, including the law of armed conflict:

(i) train personnel, commensurate with their responsibilities, on compliance with legal 

obligations and policy guidance that address the protection of civilians and on 

implementation of best practices that reduce the likelihood of civilian casualties, 

including through exercises, pre-deployment training, and simulations of complex 

operational environments that include civilians;

(ii) develop, acquire, and field intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems 

that, by enabling more accurate battlespace awareness, contribute to the protection of 

civilians;

(iii) develop, acquire, and field weapon systems and other technological capabilities

that further enable the discriminate use of force in different operational contexts;

(iv) take feasible precautions in conducting attacks to reduce the likelihood of civilian 

casualties, such as providing warnings to the civilian population (unless the 

circumstances do not permit), adjusting the timing of attacks, taking steps to ensure 

military objectives and civilians are clearly distinguished, and taking other measures 

appropriate to the circumstances; and

(v) conduct assessments that assist in the reduction of civilian casualties by identifying 

risks to civilians and evaluating efforts to reduce risks to civilians.

(b) In addition to the responsibilities above, relevant agencies shall also, as appropriate and 

consistent with mission objectives and applicable law, including the law of armed conflict:

(i) review or investigate incidents involving civilian casualties, including by considering 

relevant and credible information from all available sources, such as other agencies, 

partner governments, and nongovernmental organizations, and take measures to mitigate 

the likelihood of future incidents of civilian casualties;

(ii) acknowledge U.S. Government responsibility for civilian casualties and offer 

condolences, including ex gratia payments, to civilians who are injured or to the families 

of civilians who are killed;

(iii) engage with foreign partners to share and learn best practices for reducing the 

likelihood of and responding to civilian casualties, including through appropriate training 

and assistance; and

(iv) maintain channels for engagement with the International Committee of the Red Cross 

and other nongovernmental organizations that operate in conflict zones and encourage 
12

such organizations to assist in efforts to distinguish between military objectives and 

civilians, including by appropriately marking protected facilities, vehicles, and personnel, 

and by providing updated information on the locations of such facilities and personnel.”

During 2017, all operations previously listed were conducted consistent with the best practices 

identified in Executive Order 13732. For example, pre-deployment training for U.S. military 

units during 2017 included instruction on the law of war, rules of engagement, and other policies 

related to protecting civilian populations. Also, during U.S. military operations in 2017, 

practices related to protecting civilians during operations included: (1) characterizing the 

operating environment in an effort to identify the locations of civilians in advance of operations;

(2) carefully crafting the operational design to avoid civilians during planned ground maneuver;

(3) conducting shaping actions to reduce the need later to conduct fires in self-defense; (4) 

optimizing targeting processes; and (5) taking active measures to mitigate weapons’ effects in 

order to protect civilians and structures.

Characterizing the operating environment -- Available sensors (e.g., visual sensors, human 

intelligence, signals intelligence) were used to characterize the battlespace to determine where 

the enemy was located, where civilians were located, and where the enemy kept equipment, 

arms, and other objects required to fight. For large operations, this process can start a year or 

more in advance. For smaller operations, the process can start weeks ahead of ground force 

maneuver. Characterizing the battlespace is a continual process used during target selection, 

target engagement, and post-strike assessments.

Crafting the operational design -- U.S. military planners also worked with partner forces during 

2017 to design battle plans so ground forces were able to maneuver around areas of the enemy 

and civilians in such a way as to reduce harm to civilians.

Conducting shaping actions -- U.S. forces also relied heavily on precision-guided munitions

(PGMs) during 2017 to conduct shaping actions designed to degrade enemy capabilities and 

defenses well ahead of the arrival of ground forces. Although the law of war does not require the 

use of PGMs when non-precision-guided weapons may be used in compliance with the law of 

war, commanders understood that shaping actions could use a relatively few, well-placed PGMs 

to concentrate force for greater effects in degrading enemy defensive capabilities. This helped 

speed up the successful liberation of enemy-held areas and maximized the protection of civilians

and structures. When supporting partner forces, most munitions were employed dynamically as 

the partner force maneuvered and was in contact with the enemy. By using shaping actions to 

shorten the period when ground forces would be in contact with enemy forces, the number of 

munitions employed by liberating forces in the conflict can often be decreased, resulting in more

protection of civilians from the dangers of combat.
13

Optimizing targeting processes -- During U.S. military operations in 2017, measures were also 

taken during targeting processes to protect civilians more fully. For example, strike processes 

worked with commanders to define the required effects of different strikes, intelligence sources 

and analysis were used to identify enemy forces as accurately as possible, and determinations 

were made whether the required effects could be achieved through non-kinetic options. For 

example, in some instances, simply bringing aircraft overhead was enough to get the enemy to 

react and to slow or stop a counterattack and thus enable friendly forces to regain the initiative. 

Additionally, some lawful targets were not attacked due to concerns about collateral effects on 

objects and/or certain persons, even though such collateral harm would not have been excessive. 

Before strikes, U.S. forces often leveraged multiple ISR assets to do collateral scans to help 

protect transient civilians. This included employment of multiple strike aircraft and ISR 

platforms to clear for and to protect transient civilians during attacks. In situations where 

commanders determined a strike was required, they were often able to choose weapons that 

would achieve the desired effects but that would also cause the least amount of collateral 

damage. 

Mitigating weapons’ effects -- During U.S. military operations in 2017, techniques were used to 

mitigate weapons’ effects on civilians and structures. One example was to delay the fuse on airto-ground munitions. Delaying the fuse buries the munition, allowing the ground to absorb

fragmentation from the munition and to channel the blast, which can more effectively protect 

nearby civilians and structures. Low-yield and direct fire munitions were also used to reduce the 

likelihood of causing collateral damage. Another technique used during U.S. military operations 

in 2017 was to use specific angles of entry for munitions sent into target areas, which allowed for 

the munitions to strike more precisely (e.g., a particular floor of a building or other specific 

location of hostile forces), thereby further minimizing civilian casualties and effects on 

structures. 

As mentioned earlier, we believe that the U.S. military operations listed above were conducted 

consistent with the best practices identified in Executive Order 13732. Unfortunately, despite 

the best efforts of U.S. forces, civilian casualties are a tragic but at times unavoidable 

consequence of combat operations. This is especially true when fighting in urban areas and 

against adversaries like ISIS and al-Qa’ida who use civilians as shields and whose tactics include 

intentionally endangering the lives of innocents.