alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
* Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule

47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 96-60627

USDC No. 4:95-CV-67-S-A

 

ROGER ERIC THORSON,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

HARRISON COUNTY ET AL.,

Defendants,

KIRK FORDICE; EDDIE LUCAS;

EDWARD HARGETT; MISSISSIPPI

DEP'T OF CORRECTIONS; ROGER 

COOK; J.J. STREETER,

Defendants-Appellees.

- - - - - - - - - -

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Mississippi

- - - - - - - - - -

April 7, 1997

Before SMITH, DUHE’ and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Roger Eric Thorson (Mississippi prisoner # 08836C), moves

this court for leave to appeal in forma pauperis (IFP) under the

Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA) in his appeal from
No. 96-60627

-2-

the district court's denial of his motion pursuant to FED. R. CIV.

P. 60(b)(6). The motion for leave to proceed IFP is GRANTED. 

The PLRA requires a prisoner appealing IFP in a civil action to

pay the full amount of the filing fee, $105. As Thorson does not

have funds for immediate payment of this fee, he is assessed a

partial filing fee of 40¢ in accordance with 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(b)(1). Following payment of the partial filing fee, funds

shall be deducted from Thorson’ prisoner account until the full

filing fee is paid. Id. 

IT IS ORDERED that Thorson pay the appropriate filing fee to

the Clerk of the District Court for the Northern District of

Mississippi. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the agency having

custody of Thorson’s inmate account shall collect the remainder

of the $105 filing fee and forward for payment to the Clerk of

the District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi in

accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). 

Thorson argues that the district court abused its discretion

by denying his Rule 60(b)(6) motion. As Thorson's Rule 60(b)(6)

motion did not present the district court with "extraordinary

circumstances" justifying relief, the denial of Thorson's motion

did not rise to the level of an abuse of discretion. Government

Fin. Servs. One Ltd. Partnership v. Peyton Place, Inc., 62 F.3d

767, 774 (5th Cir. 1995). The decision is AFFIRMED.
§ 1.162-7 Compensation for personal services. ( a ) There may be included among the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred in carrying on any trade or business a reasonable allowance for salaries or other compensation for personal services actually rendered. The test of deductibility in the case of compensation payments is whether they are reasonable and are in fact payments purely for services.
( b ) The test set forth in paragraph (a) of this section and its practical application may be further stated and illustrated as follows: ( 1 ) Any amount paid in the form of compensation, but not in fact as the purchase price of services, is not deductible. An ostensible salary paid by a corporation may be a distribution of a dividend on stock. This is likely to occur in the case of a corporation having few shareholders, practically all of whom draw salaries. If in such a case the salaries are in excess of those ordinarily paid for similar services and the excessive payments correspond or bear a close relationship to the stockholdings of the officers or employees, it would seem likely that the salaries are not paid wholly for services rendered, but that the excessive payments are a distribution of earnings upon the stock. An ostensible salary may be in part payment for property. This may occur, for example, where a partnership sells out to a corporation, the former partners agreeing to continue in the service of the corporation. In such a case it may be found that the salaries of the former partners are not merely for services, but in part constitute payment for the transfer of their business.
( 2 ) The form or method of fixing compensation is not decisive as to deductibility. While any form of contingent compensation invites scrutiny as a possible distribution of earnings of the enterprise, it does not follow that payments on a contingent basis are to be treated fundamentally on any basis different from that applying to compensation at a flat rate. Generally speaking, if contingent compensation is paid pursuant to a free bargain between the employer and the individual made before the services are rendered, not influenced by any consideration on the part of the employer other than that of securing on fair and advantageous terms the services of the individual, it should be allowed as a deduction even though in the actual working out of the contract it may prove to be greater than the amount which would ordinarily be paid.
( 3 ) In any event the allowance for the compensation paid may not exceed what is reasonable under all the circumstances. It is, in general, just to assume that reasonable and true compensation is only such amount as would ordinarily be paid for like services by like enterprises under like circumstances. The circumstances to be taken into consideration are those existing at the date when the contract for services was made, not those existing at the date when the contract is questioned.
( 4 ) For disallowance of deduction in the case of certain transfers of stock pursuant to employees stock options, see section 421 and the regulations thereunder.
# Fourth Court of Appeals San Antonio, Texas November 21, 2016
No. 04

- 16

- 00566

- CR Ex Parte George RODRIGUEZ, JR.,

Appellant
Fr om the 38th Judicial District Court, Medina County, Texas

Trial Court No. 14

- 03

- 11476

- CR The Honorable Camile G. Dubose, Judge Presiding



### O R D E R
The Stat e’s brief was due to be filed with this court on November 14, 2016. To date, the State has not filed its brief or a motion for extension of time to file its brief. If the State wish es to file a brief in th is appeal, we ORDER the State’s attorney to file within TEN DAYS of the date of this order (1) the State ’s brief , and (2) a reasonable explanation for failing to timely file the brief. See T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 38.6(d). I f the State wishes its response to serve as a mot ion for extension of time, it must comply with Rule 10.5 (b)(1) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure and the Fourth Court of Appeals’ local rules. See id. R. 10.5(b)(1); 4 TH T EX
. A PP
. (S AN A NTONIO ) L OC
. R S
. , http://www.txcourts

. gov /4thcoa/practice

- before

- the

- court/local

- rules/

. If this court does n ot receive an adequate response from the State within ten days, this appeal will be set for submission without a Stat e’s brief.

_________________________________ Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said court on this 21st day of November, 2016

.

___________________________________ Keith E. Hottle Clerk of Court
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#### Winters v. Sheporwich

*Fred Winters,*for plaintiff.

*Michael H. Sheridan,*for defendant.

*485May 20, 1952.

Pinola, J.,

Defendant has filed seven preliminary objections but we need consider only the sixth, which reads as follows:

“The bill as filed violates the rules of both the court of this county and the Supreme Court, in. that it is filed on behalf of the plaintiff by Fred Winters, who is not a member of the bar of a court of record of either this county or State.”

Plaintiff avers that in 1918 a savings account was opened in the Markle Banking and Trust Company of Hazleton in the name of “John Daffner or sister Anne (Anne Daffner),” in which account there remains the sum of $1,883.62.

She also avers that on December 21, 1950, her husband, on her behalf, engaged defendant to perform certain services which are not set forth and paid him a retainer of $250.

In paragraphs 3 to 12, inclusive, plaintiff avers the receipt from defendant and answers sent to him on her behalf, of numerous letters between December 26,1950, and July 13,1951.

In paragraph 12 she avers that she revoked the power of attorney in favor of defendant.

In paragraphs 14 and 15 she asserts that although defendant accepted compensation for professional services to be rendered for her according to her husband’s instructions, defendant disobeyed those instructions. Therefore she sues “in breach of contract for the joint bank account and . . . additional expenditures.” While she does not say so, it is apparent that she claims the bank account because John Daffner died and she is “sister Anne, (Anne Daffner) ”.

On what theory she claims to be entitled to recover that amount from defendant does not appear nor can we imagine.

She seeks to recover for stenographic service, trans*486portation and expense of some unknown persons from Newark to Stroudsburg and from Newark to Wilkes-Barre, and the sum of $125 for services performed by Fred Winters, her husband, as her attorney-in-fact.

The action, if any, should be at law and not in equity. The bill, if the action were properly in equity, fails to comply with several equity rules. This case clearly points to the futility of permitting pleadings to be prepared by persons inexpert and unlearned in the law and its practice.

While plaintiff may appear in person, if she does not do so, she must engage an attorney-at-law; she may not appear by an agent who is not duly admitted to practice: Cobb v. Judge of Superior Court, 43 Mich. 289, 5 N. W. 309. And, since proceedings initiated by a person unauthorized to practice are a nullity (Goldstein v. Marriott, 14 D. & C. 635), we must sustain preliminary objection 6.

Accordingly, we enter the following

*Decree*

Now, May 20, 1952, it is ordered, adjudged and decreed as follows:

1. Plaintiff’s bill is dismissed.

2. Plaintiff shall pay the costs.
<PAGE>
                                                                    EXHIBIT 32.1

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

            In connection with the quarterly report on Form 10-Q of Biopure
Corporation for the period ended July 31, 2003, I, Thomas A. Moore, Chief
Executive Officer, hereby certify, to the best of my knowledge, pursuant to 18
U.S.C. 1350, as adopted pursuant to 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

      1.    the Form 10-Q for the period ended July 31, 2003, fully complies
            with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities
            Exchange Act of 1934; and

      2.    the information contained in the Form 10-Q for the period ended July
            31, 2003 fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial
            condition and results of operations of Biopure Corporation.


/s/ Thomas A. Moore
-------------------
Thomas A. Moore
Chief Executive Officer

September 15, 2003


                                       33
Order entered January 16 , 2015

In The 

## Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

No. 05
- 15
- 00053
- CR THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellant

V. ANTHONY HILL, Appellee On Appeal from the 292nd Judicial District Court

Dallas County, Texas Trial Court C ause No. WX14
- 90030
- V



### O RDER The Court has received the State’s notice of appeal from the trial court’s order granting appelle e ’s pretrial application for writ of habeas corpus. This is an accelerated criminal appeal under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedur e 31.
We ORDER the Dallas County District Clerk to file, within FIFTEEN DAYS of the date of this order, the clerk’s record containing all the documents related to the pretrial application for writ of habeas corpus, including the trial court’s written order ruling on the application for writ of habeas corpus.
We ORDER Peri Wood, official court reporter of the 292nd Judicial District Court, to file or coordinate the filing, within FIFTEEN DAYS of the date of this order, of the reporter’s
record from the heari ng on the pretrial application for writ of habeas corpus.The State’ s brief is due by FEBRUARY 18, 2015

. Appellee ’s brief is due by MARCH

6, 2015 . If any party does not file its brief by the date specified, the appeal will be submitted without that party ’s brief. See T EX
. R. A PP
. P . 31.1. The appeal will be submitted, without argument, on April 10, 2015 to a panel consisting of Justices Francis, Lang

- Miers, and Whitehill See T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 31.2, 39.1.
We DIRECT the Clerk to send copies of this order, b y electronic transmission, to the Honorable Brandon Birmingham, Presiding Judge, 292nd Judicial District Court; Peri Wood, official court reporter, 292nd Judicial District Court; Felicia Pitre, Dallas County District Clerk; and to counsel for all parties.
/s/ ADA BROWN JUSTICE
Editorial Note on Part 890
Editorial Note: Nomenclature changes to part 890 appear at 73 FR 35341, June 23, 2008.

§ 890.3150 Crutch. ( a ) *Identification.* A crutch is a device intended for medical purposes for use by disabled persons to provide minimal to moderate weight support while walking.
( b ) *Classification.* Class I (general controls). The device is exempt from the premarket notification procedures in subpart E of part 807 of this chapter, subject to the limitations in § 890.9. The device is also exempt from the current good manufacturing practice requirements of the quality system regulation in part 820 of this chapter, with the exception of § 820.180, regarding general requirements concerning records and § 820.198, regarding complaint files.
[48 FR 53047, Nov. 23, 1983, as amended at 66 FR 38816, July 25, 2001]
Editorial Note on Part 890
Editorial Note: Nomenclature changes to part 890 appear at 73 FR 35341, June 23, 2008.

§ 890.5050 Daily activity assist device. ( a ) *Identification.* A daily activity assist device is a modified adaptor or utensil (e.g., a dressing, grooming, recreational activity, transfer, eating, or homemaking aid) that is intended for medical purposes to assist a patient to perform a specific function.
( b ) *Classification.* Class I (general controls). The device is exempt from the premarket notification procedures in subpart E of part 807 of this chapter, subject to the limitations in § 890.9. If the device is not labeled or otherwise represented as sterile, the device is also exempt from the current good manufacturing practice requirements of the quality system regulation in part 820 of this chapter, with the exception of § 820.180, regarding general requirements concerning records and § 820.198, regarding complaint files.
[48 FR 53047, Nov. 23, 1983, as amended at 66 FR 38817, July 25, 2001]
Editorial Note on Part 866
Editorial Note: Nomenclature changes to part 866 appear at 73 FR 35341, June 23, 2008.

§ 866.3035 *Arizona* spp. serological reagents. ( a ) *Identification. Arizona* spp. serological reagents are devices that consist of antisera and antigens used to identify *Arizona* spp. in cultured isolates derived from clinical specimens. The identification aids in the diagnosis of disease caused by bacteria belonging to the genus *Arizona* and provides epidemiological information on diseases caused by these microorganisms. *Arizona* spp. can cause gastroenteritis (food poisoning) and sepsis (blood poisoning).
( b ) *Classification.* Class I (general controls). The device is exempt from the premarket notification procedures in subpart E of part 807 of this chapter subject to the limitations in § 866.9.
[47 FR 50823, Nov. 9, 1982, as amended at 54 FR 25046, June 12, 1989; 66 FR 38791, July 25, 2001]
#### ATLANTA LAUNDRIES INC. *v.*HARRISON, comptroller-general, *et al.*

No. 8516.

February 18, 1932.

Rehearing denied February 25, 1932.

*451
      *Herbert J. Haas*and *Bertram 8. Boley,*for plaintiff.

*George M. Napier, attorney-general,*and *T. B. Gress, assistant attorney-general,*for defendants.

Beck, P. J.

(After stating the foregoing facts.)

Under the evidence the court was authorized to find that the petitioner operates eight laundries. In the petition it is alleged that “ Petitioner is engaged in the operation of a laundry in this State and county, at which various and sundry kinds of wearing apparel are washed, ironed, and laundered; that petitioner has nine (9) stations established throughout the City of Atlanta, County of Fulton, for the purpose of collecting said wearing apparel.” It is to be observed the petitioner does not deny that at these nine stations the apparel collected is washed, ironed, and laundered. Besides this vague and indefinite statement, which will be most strongly construed against the petitioner, there is an affidavit in the record from the statements in which the court was authorized to find that the petitioner operates eight laundries. If the plaintiff operates laundries, that is, places of business where wearing apparel is collected, washed, ironed and laundered, then the court was authorized to find that there were eight laundries.

The fact that one corporation owned and operated these eight laundries did not prevent the levying of the tax prescribed in the tax act for each laundry. Paragraph 62 of the general tax act of 1927 (Georgia Laws 1927, p. 76) is as follows: “Laundries. Upon each person, firm, or corporation operating a laundry or dyeing establishment, $100.00 if employing ten or more persons; $50.00 if employing five and not more than ten persons; $25.00 if not employing more than five persons.” And section 16 of the *452amendment to that tax act (Georgia Laws 1929, p. 66) is in the following language: “Be it further enacted by the authority aforesaid, that paragraph 62 of section 2 of said general tax act of 1927, approved August 25, 1927, is hereby amended by adding at the end of said paragraph the following proviso, to wit: ‘Provided, that where any person, firm, or corporation owns or operates more than one laundry, this tax shall be paid for each such laundry, according to the scale of tax herein provided, that is to say, the tax shall be paid for the operation of each such laundry or dyeing establishment/” Under the provisions of this last section quoted, the plaintiff corporation, as it operates more than one laundry, is rendered liable for the .payment of the tax for each laundry owned and operated, according to the scale of taxes in the tax act provided.

The rulings in the last three headnotes require no elaboration.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*All Hie Justices*concur, *except*Russell, *G. J., who dissents.*
BLD

- 096 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________ No. 24

- 1337

___________ IN RE: RAJ K. PATEL ,

Petitioner

____________________________________ On a Petition for Writ of Mandamus from the United States District Court for the District of Delaware (Related to D.C. Civil Action No. 1:24

- cv - 00021 )

____________________________________ Submitted Pursuant to Rule 21, Fed. R. App. P.

April 4, 2024 Before: BIBAS, MATEY, and CHUNG , Circui t Judges

(Opinion filed : April 17, 2024 )

_________ OPINION *

_________
PER CURIAM Pro se litigant Raj Patel petitions for a writ of mandamus directing the Clerk of the
United States District Court for the District of Delaware to enter a default and a default

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent.2

ju dgment in Patel’s favor in a lawsuit that he has brought against United Parcel Service , Inc. (“UPS”). For the reasons that follow, we will deny Patel’s petition, as amended

. 1
I.
Patel commenced his lawsuit against UPS in January 2024

. In February 2024,
Patel asked t he District Court Clerk to enter a default and a default judgment against
UPS. A few days later , Patel filed this mandamus actio n. He then filed additional requests for a default and a default judgment in the District Court

. On March 2 2 , 2024,
the District Court denied Patel’s requests for a default and a default judgment , explaining that “service [of UPS] has yet to be effected,” and that UPS “is under no obligation to respond to [ Patel’s ] Complaint until formally served o r until it has waived service.” (Dist. Ct. Order entered Mar. 22, 2024.)
II. A writ of mandamus is a drastic remedy that is available in extraordinary circumstances only. See In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig. , 418 F.3d 372, 378 (3d Cir. 2005). To obtain the writ, a petitioner must show, inter alia, that “no other adequate

mean s [exist] to attain the relief he desires.” Hollingsworth v. Perry , 558 U.S. 183, 190 (2010) (per curiam) (alteration in original) ( citation to quoted case omitted). Patel has not made that showing here, for he may challenge the District Court’s denial o f his requests for a default and a default judgment in an appeal from the District Court ’s entry

1 Although Patel has amended his petition several times, the mandamus relief that he is seeking

— an order directing the District Court Clerk to enter a default and a default judgment against UPS

— has remained unchanged.3

of a final decision in his case. 2 See Chamberlain v. Giampapa , 210 F.3d 154, 164 (3d Cir. 2000); Adult Film Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. Thetford , 776 F.2d 113, 115 (5th Cir. 1985) (per curiam); see also Madden v. Myers , 102 F.3d 74, 77 (3d Cir. 1996) (explaining that “a writ of mandamus may not issue if a petitioner can obtain relief by appeal”). In view of the above, we will deny Patel’s mandamus petition, as amended. 3

2 We take no position on the merits of such an appeal. 3 Patel’s motion to expedite our resolution of this mandamus acti on is denied.