Preserving 

Sovereignty in a 

Borderless World

by

Charles W. Ricks
On the cover: Refugees in Greece demand the European Union (EU) borders be opened, during 

a protest against EU policy regarding refugee matters. SOURCE: GIANNIS PAPANIKOS/

SHUTTERSTOCK.COM

JSOU Press Publications are available for download at:

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ISSN 2572-9020 (print)

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The views expressed in this publication are entirely those of the author and do not 

necessarily reflect the views, policy or position of the United States Government, 

Department of Defense, United States Special Operations Command, or the Joint 

Special Operations University.

Authors are granted academic freedom provided their work does not disclose 

classified information, jeopardize operations security, or misrepresent official U.S. 

policy. Such academic freedom empowers authors to offer new and sometimes 

controversial perspectives in the interest of furthering debate on key issues.

Charles W. Ricks

Mr Charles (Chuck) Ricks is a non-resident senior fellow at the Joint Special Operations 

University (JSOU), United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). He has worked in 

a variety of military and civil government positions during more than 45 years of public service in 

Europe, Asia, the Middle East, and the United States. He is an expert in political-military relations, 

security force assistance, governance, capacity building, strategic communications and public 

diplomacy, crisis and consequence management, the interagency process, economic development, 

and humanitarian assistance.

In 1992, while an active duty U.S. Army officer, Mr. Ricks traveled to Moscow as part of 

the first-ever NATO humanitarian assistance operation inside the former Soviet Union. After his 

retirement from active duty, He returned to Europe in 1999 to work in the NATO Information Cell 

during military operations (Operation Allied Force) in and around Kosovo. He also worked within 

the Defense Base Closure and Realignment process while serving as Deputy Mayor of Lawrence, 

Indiana, a community of some 45,000 people and the site of the former Fort Benjamin Harrison.

In recent years, Mr. Ricks has worked with representatives from more than 70 countries 

through Combating Terrorism and other programs conducted by JSOU, and has participated in the 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Partnership for Peace initiative. He has served in the 

Office of the Secretary of Defense and at the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, 

Belgium, and, in 2015, worked on crisis management programs in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 

He served two years in Afghanistan building governance capacity as a mentor, systems developer, 

and trainer for the Ministry of Defense (MOD) Social Relations, Parliamentary, and Public Affairs 

Office. He has been a mentor, in resource management and budget, for the Afghan General Staff 

and the MOD, as well as the Office of Disaster Response.

Mr. Ricks is a Distinguished Military Graduate of the University of Wisconsin-Madison, 

where he earned a bachelor’s degree in business administration, holds a master’s degree from the 

University of Kentucky, and conducted advanced communications studies at the University of 

South Carolina. He taught at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point; the Defense Information 

School, where he was also the director of the broadcasting department; the U.S. Army Armor 

School; the NATO Defense College in Rome, Italy; the Afghan War College in Kabul, 

Afghanistan; and the NATO School in Oberammergau, Germany. He has conducted training and 

education programs around the world and facilitated programs for the U.S. Army War College, 

U.S. Air Force Air War College, and the National Defense University.

He has published numerous articles and has appeared on television. Some of his work 

includes: “Telling the Afghan Military Story...THEIR WAY!” published in Military Review

(March–April 2006), and as a chapter in Ideas as Weapons: Influence and Perception in Modern 

War by G. J. David and T. R. McKeldin; The Military-News Media Relationship: Thinking 

Forward, published by the Strategic Studies Institute (1993); and his book Crisis Coverage and 
Newsroom Credibility (1996). Mr. Ricks’ JSOU publications include the first edition of the Special 

Operations Forces Interagency Counterterrorism Reference Manual (2009, revised in 2011 and 

2013) and numerous reports of proceedings to include three Sovereign Challenge conferences, the 

Irregular Warfare and the OSS Model Symposium, and the JSOU and Office of Strategic Services 

[OSS] Society Symposium.
1

In the wake of the failed Soviet coup d’état of August 1991, Army General John R. Galvin, NATO 

Supreme Allied Commander Europe and commander of the U.S. European Command at the time, 

shared his impressions of the events since the fall of the Berlin Wall on 9 November 1989, and the 

implications of those events.1In response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, NATO 

had conducted its first operational crisis management response, called Operation Southern Guard.

After decades of focusing on the singular threat of a massive Soviet and Warsaw Pact invasion 

across the European continent from the east, the Iraqi invasion introduced a fresh threat from a 

different direction.

In his memoir, Galvin captures the essence of those days: “Everything would be new and 

untried, and sixteen nations would have an extraordinary historical opportunity to improvise on 

the theme of crisis management.”2 But that experience was only part of what interested him the 

most during that time of lesson learning.

General Galvin spoke primarily of the uncertainties that had been unleashed by the 

upheavals leading to the demise of the Warsaw Pact and the ongoing disintegration of the Soviet 

Union. He drew a distinction between the concepts of nations and countries. Nations, he reminded 

his listeners, are distinguished by their unique cultures, language(s), religious beliefs, value 

systems, ways of interacting, political structures, traditions, and disputes, but not necessarily 

territory. In fact, a single country may hold within its borders representatives of multiple nations, 

and a nation or tribe may be spread over various neighboring countries or into distant states through 

a diaspora of its people. He presented a vision of upheaval and movement, of forgotten history 

returned to public view.

Galvin pointed out that the Cold War generated strong nationalist sentiments within 

countries, many of which were being redefined or collapsing completely at the time of his 

comments. He predicted that nations, no longer constrained by political boundaries, would likely 

spread across multiple borders and political frameworks. Countries would become increasingly 

diverse and potentially more unstable because of competing internal national interests. Instead of 

embassies, diaspora nations with no strong local political power would establish identity-based 

enclaves within which and from which they could assert influence and exercise their agendas.

Consequently, conflicts were likely to arise over both a reluctance to accept the ‘other’ or 

to assimilate into the ‘existing.’ The decades since have certainly fulfilled those predictions, 

especially during the ongoing migrations of peoples into Europe and the U.S. Galvin also spoke 

about issues of identity and long-ignored grievances that would begin to reemerge, and they have. 

 

1 Author’s personal experience attending one of these sessions as a member of the crisis management group, although the author

does not recall the specific date.

2

John R. Galvin, Fighting the Cold War: A Soldier’s Memoir (Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky, 2015), 404.
2

The rest of the world may have forgotten about those long-suppressed concerns, if they ever knew 

about them at all, but those most directly affected remember them very clearly and have sought

restitution for grievances, revenge for mistreatment, and justice as they understand its meaning.

For instance, to understand the upheaval in the Balkans that began in the 1990s, it is 

necessary to develop a sense of the importance of the battle between the Serbs and the Ottoman 

Empire that was fought near Kosovo in the Valley of the Blackbirds in 1389. This is because many 

of the parties to the contemporary violence in the region define their identities within the narratives 

that grew out of that battle 600 years earlier. Nationalist memories can be long and determined in 

their quest for restitution.

The full consequences of this dynamic were certainly not clear in the autumn of 1991, but 

the fragmentation within what 

rapidly became the ‘former 

Yugoslavia’ provided an early 

glimpse of what was to come. 

As independence movements, 

secession, and declarations of 

sovereignty spread from 

Slovenia to Croatia to BosniaHerzegovina, and the rest, the 

crescendo of resistance and 

violence grew in intensity. 

Internal conflicts, based on 

ethnic distinctions, erupted 

both between and within the 

former Yugoslav republics. 

A common thread to those 

conflicts often involved 

scattered Serbian minorities 

with their own national claims and grievances. Consequently, war and genocide returned 

to Europe.

During a February 1992 visit to Baku, Azerbaijan, NATO representatives asked what their 

hosts planned to do now that the Soviet Union was dissolved, the Red Army was withdrawing 

from their territory, and Azerbaijan had achieved a degree of independence. The response was 

predictive: “We shall now form our own army and go kill Armenians.” Here was a clear example 

of the conditions General Galvin anticipated when discussing the consequences of the end to Cold

War political and security structures. The ongoing changes would reveal long-simmering disputes 

and motivations for revenge. More than a quarter of a century later, the prediction in Baku remains 

an operational reality.

Pashtuns in Afghanistan often discuss their tribal homeland of ‘Pashtunistan’ as a 

geographic reality, not an abstract concept, that informs their world view. They acknowledge 

Serbian residents of a shelter for displaced persons located in Benkovac, 

Croatia, in March 1993. Thousands of people were displaced from their 

homes following the breakup of the former Yugoslavia. SOURCE: UN 

PHOTO/M GRAFMAN
3

foreign countries’ concerns about the 

movement of Taliban and other insurgents 

back and forth across the Durand Line 

separating Pakistan from Afghanistan, but 

Pashtuns regularly reject the importance of 

that ‘border.’ At such times, Pashtuns often 

pose the question, “Am I a terrorist because 

I live in Kandahar and visit my uncle 

in Peshawar?”3

More than an artificial—even 

illegitimate—border in their eyes, many 

Afghans also view the Durand Line as a 

barrier to what they regard as Pashtun 

territories in Pakistan. “This disputed land 

[the North West Frontier Province (NWFP)] 

was legally to be returned to Afghanistan in 

1993 after the 100-year-old Durand Treaty 

expired, similar to how Hong Kong was 

returned to China. Kabul has refused to 

renew the Durand Line Treaty since 1993 

when it expired ... Kabul never accepted that 

line or the fact that the NWFP is part of 

Pakistan.”4 Similar sentiments are expressed in places like Syria, Iraq, West Africa, and elsewhere 

as consequences of post-colonial influences center on the drawing of borders.

Candid discussions with Afghans are very clear about the point that the country of 

‘Afghanistan’ doesn’t exist except when the tribes collectively feel threatened from the outside. 

Then, alliances of mutual interest and convenience come together, for as long as necessary, to 

address the problem. The best recent example is the jihad against the Soviet Union from 1979 to 

1989. The Soviet intervention provided the impetus for unifying the various tribes of the country, 

providing them with the venerated cultural identity of ‘mujahedeen,’ which remains frequently 

more honored than that of ‘Afghan.’

In recent years, USSOCOM has put together a visually compelling strategic planning 

process5that captures the interaction of various factors, to include four major trends animating the 

geopolitical landscape. These trends are migration, violent extremism, transnational crime, and 

‘open-source’ networks. The threat natures of violent extremism and transnational crime are 

 

3 One located in Afghanistan; one located in Pakistan, but both located in ‘Pashtunistan,’ the Pashtun nation’s primary point of 

geographic reference and identity.

4

“Durand Line,” Afghanistan’s Web Site, accessed 5 April 2016, www.afghanistans.com/information/History/Durandline.htm. 

This information and news aggregation site expresses concisely the Afghan view of the border as the author experienced regularly 

in candid conversations with Afghan leaders. It offers important insight into their view of the distinctions between countries and 

nations.

5 USSOCOM, Directive 10-10: United States Special Operations Command Strategic Planning Process, 23 April 2013.

Map depicts, in red, the Durand Line border between 

Afghanistan and Pakistan. SOURCE: UNIVERSITY OF 

TEXAS PERRY-CASTAÑEDA LIBRARY MAP COLLECTION
4

obvious. Migration and open-source networks, operating throughout the global community, can 

either reinforce sovereignty or undermine it.

Migration is perhaps the most visible dynamic because of intense media coverage of 

crowds of people fleeing danger and seeking new opportunities in countries far from their points 

of origin. Population flows also provide very public tests of local governing competence as 

officials, from border guards to national leaders, function under the constant scrutiny of the news 

media, intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and other groups with a 

vested interest in the situation.

While migration is not, by itself, a threat to sovereignty, the mass movement of large 

numbers of people in multiple directions can and does mask a variety of challenges and threats. 

Migrants and refugees bring with them baggage that is both visible and invisible. These include 

stress on limited government services, disease, assimilation challenges, foreign fighters, criminals, 

and other disruptive influences. Effectively addressing the challenges of migration and related 

flows and trends, both at their sources and final destinations, can mitigate those concerns. Failure 

to do so can present a challenge to credible governance and, in the worst cases, the sovereignty of 

a country.

The vision suggested by General Galvin has been on full display on the world’s television 

screens in recent years: desperate groups of people fleeing from events beyond their control with 

no place to go and little to eat. Their 

plights have provided the international 

news media with a potpourri of 

emotionally charged images. One of 

the practices of the media has been to 

define roles and assign blame for 

such situations.

Essentially, there are three 

groups captured within the media 

narrative of such events: the victims, 

those who are the cause of the problems 

generating the victims, and those who 

seek to help alleviate the suffering of the 

victims. Governance initiatives at all 

levels should always find themselves portrayed in the role of helpers. After initial media praise in 

2015 for the actions of European leaders who welcomed migrants with few limits, the coverage 

tone shifted to the negative as tighter screening standards were eventually put into place.

Responsibility for such crisis situations can be murky. In testimony before the House 

Armed Services Committee on 25 February 2015, Air Force General Philip Breedlove, 

Commander of U.S. Forces Europe, said, “Nations [sic] on Europe’s Southern flank are concerned 

the focus on Eastern Europe may draw attention and resources away from their region, allowing 

for an unmonitored flow of foreign fighters, economic and political refugees, and unchecked illicit 

One of many emotionally charged images of refugees’ plight: a 

young boy is pulled out of a newly arrived boat from Turkey on

the shore of the Greek island of Lesbos. November 2015.

SOURCE: ALEKSANDR LUTCENKO/SHUTTERSTOCK.COM
5

trafficking of goods and humans from an arc of instability stretching across large parts of northern 

Africa through the Middle East.”6

There is also the concern that the mass flows of people are not entirely spontaneous. 

General Breedlove has characterized the movement of migrants and refugees out of the Middle 

East as the “weaponization of immigration ... Barrel bombs are designed to terrorize, get people 

out of their homes and get them on the road and make them someone else’s problem. These 

indiscriminate weapons used by both Bashar al-Assad, and the non-precision use of weapons by 

the Russian forces, I can’t find any other reason for them other than to cause refugees to be on the 

move and make them someone else’s problem.”7

Coping with the movement of huge numbers of people is, in itself, a significant challenge. 

The malicious scenario described by General Breedlove introduces a level of additional 

complexity that persistently tests government officials at all levels who are faced with the 

responsibility to respond. Both General Galvin’s observations and the USSOCOM strategic 

planning process focus on the dynamic action that takes the form of movement across borders, no 

matter the inspiration for such movement. The sense of continuous motion and change, inherent 

in these world views, demands persistent interagency, whole-of-government attention in which the 

military, especially Special Operations Forces (SOF), can play precisely defined roles.

Domestic political debate clumsily tries to carve out an American role in an increasingly 

uncertain and confusing world. Political sloganeering, such as, “That’s not our problem,” rings 

increasingly hollow as ‘their’ problems have an increasing tendency to become ours. The good 

news is that collective problem solving has increasingly been practiced internationally by the 

United Nations, NATO, various coalitions and other structures, NGOs and multinational 

corporations, who can play influential roles in specific situations. Though skill sets, resources, and 

experience vary significantly among countries, the fact is that it is no longer necessary (if it ever 

was) for the U.S. to ‘do it all.’ But, it is almost always helpful for the U.S. to play some sort of a 

useful role. Whenever a situation or issue arises anywhere in the world, responsible governance 

demands that the interagency process identify and assess the potential consequences for the U.S.

Thus, it would seem that the preservation of sovereignty is a task that recognizes that 

challenges to U.S. sovereignty are no longer discouraged by either geography or political 

boundaries. Distance no longer provides assurance of 

non-involvement. It has been demonstrated that it is not 

possible to keep threatening conditions or ‘bad guys’ at 

a safe distance merely because of their physical location. 

Focusing issues of sovereignty on a grid of static 

political borders is insufficient. Measures of effectiveness, based on securing fixed geographical 

lines, are difficult to form and explain, and are almost impossible to achieve.

At the same time, it is surely an exaggeration to characterize traditional borders as merely 

speed bumps to globalization and the movement of populations. But it is necessary for countries 

 

6 General Philip Breedlove, Commander, U.S. Forces Europe, Testimony to House Armed Services Committee, 25 February 2015, 3.

7 General Philip Breedlove, Commander, U.S. Forces Europe, Senate Armed Services Committee Transcript, 1 March 2016, 8.

Focusing issues of sovereignty 

on a grid of static political 

borders is insufficient.
6

and coalitions of countries to decide what roles borders will play moving into the future. Since 

1989, there has been a general relaxation of the strict restrictions over movement within Europe 

that were, in large part, previously sustained by the Cold War. The establishment of the Schengen 

Area8in 1995, which essentially enabled free movement of almost anyone inside the area to almost 

anywhere inside the area, institutionalized freedom of movement throughout the European Union

(EU). The challenge has now become to strike a balance between those extremes. It’s the struggle 

to seek that balance that has been playing out in recent years throughout the EU, the Western 

Hemisphere, and other regions of the world.

Technology and the omnipresence of social media have extended the traditional reach of 

national groups, commerce, and, of course, nefarious characters 

far beyond established borders. Dispersed national populations 

with shared identities, cultures, languages, and religions now 

remain connected through instantaneous communications. Anyone 

with a mobile phone—very few don’t have them—can be in 

almost continuous contact with families, friends, and networks, no matter where they are. A person 

no longer has to be at home to actually be home.

It has become useful to view the world as systems of shared governance challenges 

resembling geographic information system (GIS) maps that layer, rather than array, relevant data. 

GIS layers typically contain street grids, utility matrixes, and other relevant governance 

information, but they can also contain information about ethnic enclaves, school dropout rates, 

income levels, job distribution, and other data that presents a far more comprehensive governance

picture about the makeup of communities. Such depictions also provide shared visions of wholeof-government response requirements that call for both lateral and vertical integration of domestic 

government services.

Because of globalization in all its forms, governance challenges are rarely limited to 

specific areas of the globe. Thus, it would appear reasonable to view areas of instability not as 

isolated pockets of crisis, but as points of origin from which common problems gather momentum 

and spread. Population flows transport the elements of culture that were part of their lives at their 

points of origin, scatter some along their ways, and, finally, settle down with the remainder in their 

new homes. The unfamiliarity with which hosting government officials view these new challenges 

rivals the discomfort new arrivals experience in their new surroundings.

The most severe consequences can take the form of significant movements of populations 

with embedded terrorists, transnational criminals, diseases, corruption, and communication 

networks (social media, for instance) that knit together these forces and increase their impacts as 

they spread. Containment of such problems, once assumed during the Cold War, has reemerged as 

a policy objective in the contemporary governance environment. But policy and practice should 

not be based solely on the security threats of population flows. Such realities make for catchy 

 

8

“The Schengen Area and Cooperation,” EUR-Lex: Access to European Union Law, accessed on 14 April 2016, http://eurlex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:l33020.

A person no longer 

has to be at home to 

actually be home.
7

political slogans that generate public uncertainty and fear, but do little to enlighten decision makers 

on an effective way ahead.

In many cases, and certainly in those facing the greatest instability, countries have been 

artificially layered upon nations (who often live in tribal 

societies). The regeneration of national identities has 

rekindled internal tensions, grievances, rivalries, and, often, 

conflicts. Yoking together nations with others within or 

across political boundaries has resulted in significant 

instability. The former Yugoslavia, the former Soviet 

Union, and areas of the Middle East and Africa are useful, 

but not unique, examples.

What are the consequences of becoming a borderless world, at least in traditionally 

understood terms? How can governments preserve sovereignty as globalization moves people, 

goods, influence, and issues with few or no limits? The transplantation of national cultures, guided 

by identity rather than assimilation, introduces a powerful sense of ‘different’ or ‘other’ into the 

domestic practices of governance. Urban neighborhoods especially become linked with the selfcontained ethnic groups who live and work there, placing stress upon the social fabric of the wider 

community and country. The isolation of groups from each other creates friction and places a drag 

on political, social, and economic interaction. Perhaps most importantly, these conditions and their 

consequences are no longer confined to places far away.

The 2017 dispute between the Turkish president and the Netherlands provides a glimpse at 

the consequences of borderless sovereignty and the projection of influence. The Turkish decision 

to send government ministers to the Netherlands to rally voter support among the diaspora for 

government elections at home—and the Dutch resistance to that move—generated anger and 

unrest inside the Netherlands, Turkey, and elsewhere in Europe.

The very public disagreement reflected the importance of the Turkish diaspora to their 

country of origin. It would seem that immigrant communities within other countries are now seen 

as just another voting bloc to be visited and energized by office holders from their country of 

origin. Are there then expectations of shared sovereignty by which the host country owns the 

terrain and the country of origin owns the people who occupy that terrain?

Borders, Governance, and Sovereignty

Of course, it is not entirely accurate to speak of a borderless world. But it is necessary to 

acknowledge and understand that borders function differently than in the past. The difficulties 

associated with the assimilation of unfamiliar cultures, not exactly a new challenge, have taken on 

a different form because of the penetration of social media and cyber communications. There can 

be less motivation to adapt to new surroundings because of the ability to stay connected to familiar 

ways of living elsewhere that can now be transplanted to new surroundings.

Good governance is about the exercise and preservation of sovereignty. It is more than a 

political clash about the managing, securing, opening, and closing of borders. Challenges to 

The regeneration of 

national identities has 

rekindled internal tensions, 

grievances, rivalries, and, 

often, conflicts.
8

governance, and ultimately to sovereignty, presented by the trends and flows of the contemporary 

geopolitical environment, arise primarily from both unfamiliarity and scale. The arrival of large 

numbers of migrants from unfamiliar cultures or the discovery of a sophisticated international 

criminal cartel (or elements of a domestic gang from another part of the country) operating in a 

community can be disquieting at best. It’s simply not practical to assume that local government 

units can competently and consistently deal with such demands without outside assistance and 

resources. But that doesn’t mean that the default position is to have the federal and state 

governments take up the cause at each level.

To think domestically only in terms of state and federal governments is woefully 

inadequate. The number of governmental units in the U.S. is staggering. The last complete 

accounting by the U.S. Census Bureau (2007) identified 19,492 municipal governments, 16,519 

township governments, and 3,033 county governments. There are also another 50,432 ‘special 

purpose’ local government units. Some of the most important of these are 13,726 independent and 

1,452 dependent public school systems.9It is, after all, the schools that are educating the children 

representing cultures, speaking languages, and following religious traditions that are often 

unfamiliar to the teachers and administrators. In fact, most of these local government units,

properly engaged, can play important roles in the process of assimilation.

Among other things, citizens expect their elected and appointed government officials to 

provide security, government services, education for their children, strong economic activity, fair 

taxation, and responsible enforcement of the rules. 

Part of the process of assimilating immigrants is 

harmonizing their expectations with the established 

processes of governance they discover when they 

arrive. As population movements intensify, the 

unfamiliar nature of the new arrivals serves as a source 

of both uncertainty and opportunity. It’s instructive to 

watch local government officials as they struggle to 

address unfamiliar expectations from new arrivals. 

Merely having someone on staff who speaks the immigrants’ language is insufficient. Wider 

cultural literacy is essential.

In the immediate post-9/11 world, it became obvious that potential vulnerabilities spanned 

the country and that it was unreasonable to assume that the local public safety officials in the 

thousands of government units were trained, equipped, and experienced enough to address security 

issues. Subsequent initiatives by the Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency 

Management Agency, Department of Defense (DOD), and others recognized that homeland 

 

9

“Number of Municipal Governments & Population Distribution,” National League of Cities, accessed 19 April 2016, 

http://www.nlc.org/build-skills-and-networks/resources/cities-101/city-structures/number-of-municipal-governments-and-populationdistribution. A 2012 update by the U.S. Census Bureau documented only slight modifications, including 19,519 municipal 

governments and 3,031 counties. See “Local Governments by Type and State: 2012 - United States - States, 2012 Census of 

Governments,” United States Census Bureau: American Fact Finder, accessed 19 April 2016, 

https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?pid=COG_2012_ORG02.US01&prodType=table.

Part of the process of 

assimilating immigrants is 

harmonizing their expectations 

with the established processes 

of governance they discover 

when they arrive.
9

defense begins with hometown 

security. The development and 

implementation of the interagency 

National Preparedness System10 and 

the National Incident Management 

System11 have served to provide a 

shared structure for preparedness 

and response that yoked together all 

the government units and many in 

the private sector. The process of 

national preparedness and these 

documents will always constitute a 

work in progress, but they have 

provided the tools for a shared 

national effort to secure and protect 

the homeland from attack.

No such strategic guidance 

for cooperation, coordination, resource generation, training, and interdependence exists for 

meeting the governance challenges of a borderless world. The primary goal of governance in such 

times should be to tear down domestic walls of separation and isolation and encourage assimilation 

by ensuring access to housing, jobs, healthcare, education, equal protection under the law, and all 

the other rights legally afforded those living within the U.S. It’s a safe bet that the thousands of 

local government officials tasked with meeting these responsibilities are in need of similar kinds 

of the whole-of-government/whole-of-nation support that police and fire chiefs and first 

responders have benefitted from since the 9/11 attacks. An interagency, whole-of-government 

approach should take the form of expertise and resources made available to elected and other 

government officials without the compulsion to comply with the kinds of standards in place in the 

homeland security structure.

Effective governance at all levels is a serious business that requires the ability to multitask 

through the simultaneous management of a wide variety of issues in a prioritized manner. For state 

and local government leaders, national security and public safety typically lead the list, with other 

concerns following based on available expertise and resources. In military terms, effective 

governance requires simultaneous attention to multiple lines of operation or lines of effort (LOE). 

Failure, or even weakness, in one or two of those tends to discredit governance efforts in other 

areas. For instance, a perceived failure in providing swift justice can lead to others acting 

 

10 Department of Homeland Security, National Preparedness System (November 2011), accessed 24 April 2016, 

http://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/20130726-1855-25045-8110/national_preparedness_system_final.pdf. This document 

and the National Incident Management System take their direction from Presidential Policy Directive 8. For more, see “Presidential 

Policy Directive/PPD-8: National Preparedness,” Department of Homeland Security, accessed 24 April 2016,

https://www.dhs.gov/presidential-policy-directive-8-national-preparedness.

11 Department of Homeland Security, National Incident Management System (Washington, D.C.: Department of Homeland 

Security, December 2008), accessed 24 April 2016, http://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nims/NIMS_core.pdf.

Airmen from the New Jersey Air National Guard undergo hazardous 

materials and operations training so they can be integrated into the 

National Incident Management System. SOURCE: MASTER SGT. 

MARK OLSEN
10

unilaterally to ensure the achievement of their definition of ‘fairness.’ The current national debate 

about immigration, migrants, and refugees reflects an example of just one of those LOE.

The movements of populations during recent years into Europe, North America, and 

elsewhere have challenged traditional notions of border management. To what extent can or should 

a government establish controls over who enters their country? What sorts of screening standards 

should be enacted to assess new arrivals? 

What are the implications for 

sovereignty as the movement of 

populations from multiple nations flows

across borders and they establish 

themselves in new places? Though laws 

and procedures are often already in place 

to address many of these questions, there 

is no longer a consensus about the 

relevancy and usefulness of those laws or 

even whether they should be enforced. 

Today’s heated political debates in 

Europe, the U.S., and other affected 

countries frequently churn over legal 

structures and enforcement. Arguments 

rage about the distinction between legal and illegal immigration. During a USSOCOM conference, 

French Judge Jean-Louis Bruguière reminded attendees that “there is no crime without a law” that 

is in place and enforced.12

By necessity, governments are refining the meanings of borders and how they are managed. 

Another USSOCOM gathering, involving nearly 70 countries, concluded that, “the concept of a 

‘border’ has evolved from a linear geographic or political limit to a border ‘ecosystem’ 

characterized by interdependency and interaction among all those with an interest in the border.”13

Thus, those seeking to cross a country’s border for any reason affect the country’s governing 

authorities, those who live and do business within the border region, and those who live and do 

business farther into the interior. To the extent that borders pose vulnerabilities to sovereignty, 

what can and should be done to secure them responsibly?

The presence of political borders on a carefully crafted and agreed-to map is no guarantee 

of stability or, for that matter, sovereignty. Effective governance, carried out within those borders, 

is the key component to the sustainment of the absolute, unchallenged authority that ensures 

sovereignty. Ineffective governance in any form creates both domestic and international doubt, 

instability, and loss of credibility.

 

12 Report of Proceedings, 5th Annual Sovereign Challenge Conference: Regional Issues, Global Implications, 8–11 March 2010, 

Key West, Florida (MacDill Air Force Base, FL: Joint Special Operations University Press, 2010), 31.

13 Report of Proceedings, 6th Annual Sovereign Challenge Conference: Borders & Security: Similarities, Differences, and Shared 

Affinities, 7–10 November 2010, El Paso, Texas (MacDill Air Force Base, FL: Joint Special Operations University Press, 2011), 4.

Refugee children at a reception center in Rome, Italy, await a 

visit from UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon in 2015. 

SOURCE: UN PHOTO/RICK BAJORNAS
11

In the world described by General Galvin and the USSOCOM strategic planning process 

directive, poor governance and mismanagement can pose major threats to sovereignty. With 

globalization, there are now other political, social, economic, and communication ‘options’

available, even within a recognized border. Newly arrived populations who perceive that their 

needs are not being met or that they are not being fairly treated tend to seek acceptance and 

certainty within their own cultural or ethnic groups. 

There is often talk about ungoverned or undergoverned 

spaces. In cases of cultural isolation, the issue is often one 

of ‘differently governed.’ Innovations in thinking and 

action, derived and executed through a whole-of-nation 

approach similar to that of homeland security, are 

essential and must be communicated to elected and appointed officials throughout the U.S. system 

of government. Local efforts to sustain effective governance at the community or municipal levels 

are the building blocks that ensure broader responsiveness, credibility, and resilience. National and 

international security initiatives provide the context, and local, regional, and state officials provide 

the content for effective governance and unchallenged sovereignty. If local government fails, 

strong borders lose much of their relevance.

At a USSOCOM conference on borders and security, Alan Bersin, commissioner of U.S. 

Customs and Border Protection, acknowledged the dynamic nature of the contemporary border 

environment and spoke in terms of dynamic “flows” of “goods, people, capital, ideas, and 

information” as a more useful way of thinking about security. More specifically, he noted the 

requirement for a “sustained effort to ‘move the borders out ... not in an imperialistic sense ... not 

in a physical sense’ but rather by creating protocols for the exchange of information and the 

coordination of activities.”14 For instance, the exchanges of airline passenger lists provide hours 

of time to scan for undesirable characters during the hours the aircraft are en route to their 

destinations. A similar tool allows for the prescreening of cargo containers prior to their departure 

from foreign ports.

The result of such efforts is a blending of overlapping areas of influence and cooperation 

that places yet another layer of activity onto the international political system. When obvious selfinterest is engaged, varying levels of shared actions are possible. But the largely unregulated global 

commons environment (natural resources not controlled by any one country) continues to provide 

venues for competition and the potential for conflict. There are issues, such as access to resources, 

about which ownership and sovereignty are not clear.

In such cases, agreed-to protocols either do not exist or are ineffective. The United Nations 

Division of Environmental Law and Conventions refers to the “resource domains or areas that lie 

outside of the political reach of any one nation State” as being “the High Seas, the Atmosphere, 

Antarctica, and Outer Space.”15 The same report goes on to note that “access to some of the 

 

14 Report of Proceedings, 6th Annual Sovereign Challenge Conference, 39.

15

“IEG of the Global Commons,” United Nations Environment Programme Law Division, accessed on 7 April 2016, 

http://staging.unep.org/delc/GlobalCommons/tabid/54404/Default.aspx.

In cases of cultural isolation, 

the issue is often one of 

‘differently governed.’
12

resources found within the global 

commons, except for a few like fisheries, 

has been difficult and these resources have 

historically not been scarce to justify the 

attempt for exclusive control and access.” 

However, these things are changing.

The competition for increasingly 

scarce resources and access opportunities 

offered by melting ice caused by climate 

change has encouraged countries to move 

into previously inaccessible places to 

establish both presence and influence, with 

an eye on eventual control. By doing so, 

potential ‘gray zones’ for low-intensity 

confrontation and conflict have developed.

16

Thus, while countries seek to suppress 

threats to sovereignty domestically, they 

must simultaneously conduct expeditionary 

competition for resources in remote areas of the globe. Logically, at least for the foreseeable future, 

international cooperation within these areas will inevitably be uneven and unpredictable.

The Preservation of Sovereignty

The preservation of sovereignty relies on a mosaic of innovative, effective, and credible 

governance steps at all levels, from the smallest municipality to the federal government. It requires 

a whole-of-government effort that is not necessarily focused on specific issues or incidents. 

Anticipation has become a critical task. Governance today has become so complex that it requires 

a level of persistent attention that was not always the case in the past. It also requires international 

relationships to develop, employ, and enforce shared solutions.

Geoff Demarest has written about Winning Insurgent War.

17 His unique approach offers a 

variety of perspectives and suggestions for restoring order and stability, but his thoughts can also 

be read as a prophylactic approach to preventing instability in the first place. The rhetoric of 

modern political campaigning has taken on levels of grievance, discontent, and anger not familiar 

in recent American memory. In an interconnected world, there are other ‘options’ than the existing 

mayor, county executive, governor, or president. The street demonstrations—and the motivations

behind them—of the Arab Spring were echoed in those of the Occupy Wall Street, Tea Party, 

Black Lives Matter, and other activist movements.

 

16 Joseph L. Votel, Charles T. Cleveland, Charles T. Connett, and Will Irwin, “Unconventional Warfare in the Gray Zone,” Joint 

Forces Quarterly 80 (2016): 101–105. This article lays out the concept of the Gray Zone and its role in unconventional warfare 

and other contexts. The consequences of Gray Zone activities frequently create the conditions that generate the movement of 

populations and other activities that generated challenges to governance at the points of origin and elsewhere.

17 Geoff Demarest, Winning Insurgent War: Back to Basics (Fort Leavenworth, KS: The Foreign Military Studies Office, 2011).

Four nations participate in ICEX 2016 in the Arctic Ocean—

an exercise designed to research, test, and evaluate 

operational capabilities in the region as melting ice has led 

to easier access and competition for control. SOURCE: U.S. 

NAVY MASS COMMUNICATION SPECIALIST 2ND 

CLASS TYLER THOMPSON
13

Demarest argues: “If an entity besides the State can grant impunity to people who defy its 

rules, the State fails to that extent.”18 The self-serving granting of immunity by gangs, criminal 

organizations, or unassimilated populations poses direct 

threats of varying intensity to sovereignty. If groups, and 

individuals within them, can arbitrarily choose which 

rules to follow and which to ignore, then the exercise of 

power through the other aspects of sovereignty are also 

called into question. As an example, if a traveler on a 

road comes upon a checkpoint where armed individuals of uncertain affiliation are collecting 

money to allow them to pass, then the ‘legitimate’ ruling authorities are not truly in charge of what 

is going on.

Someone placed those gunmen on the road to extort money from travelers without any 

concern that the state could or would interfere. Protection rackets in urban neighborhoods, operated 

by criminal gangs or various ethnic-based groups with little or no interference by authorities, can

similarly cause a significant loss of trust in the state. Citizens find themselves confronted with 

choices or options. Whose rules should be followed: the government authorities who are remote 

or the threatening individuals on the road? If individuals and families don’t feel protected by the 

authorities, then power transfers to those who would do harm, whether on a remote country road 

or in a drug-infested urban neighborhood.

A familiar domestic law enforcement problem involves the deaths of undocumented 

individuals. In a typical case involving two men attempting to sprint across a street, one was struck 

and killed instantly. The other man raced to his side, knelt down, and removed his wallet and any 

other form of identification. When police and paramedics arrived a few minutes later, they had no 

way to identify the fatality. The undocumented man had been rendered completely anonymous. It 

took several days of police work to find someone who was willing to identify him.

By all indications, the man in the street was an honest laborer, a migrant simply seeking a 

better life. In fact, he posed no apparent threat to anyone. But he and his fellow migrants felt 

compelled to live in the shadows of anonymity, which also provides a haven of safety for criminals 

and other, less innocent, characters. Simply put, bad guys, whatever their ‘specialties,’ don’t want 

to be known, thus giving them the freedom to act with impunity and without consequence. 

Anonymity and impunity can breed parallel political, social, and economic systems that function 

within established political boundaries. The Panama Papers scandal19 that emerged in 2016, 

which involved leaked documents from a Panamanian law firm that revealed large-scale 

corruption and tax evasion linked to a number of world leaders and criminal organizations,

documented the consequences of anonymity when applied to the manipulation of wealth to 

 

18 Geoff Demarest, Winning Insurgent War, 2.

19 At this time, the investigation is ongoing, and the founders of the law firm were arrested in February 2017. I’ve included links 

to the BBC reporting on the scandal (http://www.bbc.com/news/world-35954224, accessed on 21 April 2016) and STRATFOR 

analysis of the scandal (accessed 21 April 2016, https://www.stratfor.com/search/site/Panama%20Papers%20Scandal), as well as 

CNN reporting on the recent arrest (accessed 21 March 2017, http://www.cnn.com/2017/02/15/americas/panama-papers-mossackfonseca-arrested-trnd/), as examples of credible sourcing.

“If an entity besides the State 

can grant impunity to people 

who defy its rules, the State 

fails to that extent.”
14

circumvent tax laws (tax collection being a characteristic of sovereignty), launder money, and 

leverage other corrupt practices.

Demarest advocates detailed record keeping as one practical governance approach to 

addressing anonymity. He argues that “records systems that tie specific physical locations to 

individual identities are especially relevant” and “careful record keeping helps make personal 

anonymity hard to maintain.”20 He explores the long history of record keeping as a tool for 

governance and stability by recalling the census and inventory of property completed under 

William the Conqueror in 1086. That extensive collection of information was organized into the 

so-called Domesday Book that can be reviewed on the Internet.21

The tradition of the Domesday Book and record keeping continues in the offices of 

municipal clerks, tax and property assessors, auditors, and other public servants at all levels of 

government. The International Institute of Municipal Clerks describes its role as “serving the needs 

of municipal clerks, secretaries, treasurers, recorders and other allied associations from cities and 

towns worldwide.”22 Such organizations have a practical role to play in improving the quality of 

governance. Demarest points out that stability can be achieved in a governed space if authorities 

“count everything in it ... Everything belongs to someone and everyone has some kind of 

connection with someplace, something or someone else.”23

The “If You See Something, Say SomethingTM” 

campaign by the Department of Homeland Security relies on 

the need to combat anonymity.24 The hope, of course, is that, 

when confronted by unfamiliar persons or suspicious behavior 

in their neighborhoods, citizens will not be intimidated and will 

feel comfortable enough to contact authorities.

This measure of confidence and trust is not confined to 

faraway places and situations most Americans experience only 

on evening news programs. Even domestic systems of record 

keeping and accountability can become frayed. Land uses, 

codified in zoning ordinances, attempt to organize how property 

is to be used to provide a balance between desirable residential 

areas with other land designated for profitable commercial and 

industrial purposes. Zoning variances are a legitimate way to 

adapt those rules to accommodate specific uses or non-standard 

situations. Authorities must ensure both that the original zoning 

standards are enforced and that zoning variances are not manipulated to the benefit of a few. 

Failure to do so undermines the authority of the governing unit and sends the message that proper 

 

20 Demarest, Winning Insurgent War, 3.

21 Open Domesday, accessed on 15 April 2016, http://opendomesday.org/.

22 “About Us,” The International Institute of Municipal Clerks, accessed 21 April 2016, http://www.iimc.com/index.aspx?nid=268.

23 Demarest, Winning Insurgent War, 4.

24 “If You See Something, Say SomethingTM,” U.S. Department of Homeland Security, accessed on 15 April 2016,

https://www.dhs.gov/see-something-say-something.

A Department of Homeland 

Security campaign reminds people 

to contact authorities if they see 

something suspicious. SOURCE: 

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND 

SECURITY
15

land use is not an important concern. Loss of confidence in the process of land use, zoning rules, 

and zoning enforcement is sure to generate grievances that are difficult to address.

Governance responsibilities below the federal level are not necessarily restricted to 

domestic issues, although they are the most immediate. As noted, challenges to governance can 

originate in places far away and then spread through the movement of people, ideology, goods, 

and other forms of influence. Thus, any effort at a whole-of-government/whole-of-nation 

governance approach has to account for the international geopolitical environment. It is there that 

SOF and its interagency partners have major roles to play.

Interagency Approaches

There exists the oft-stated general agreement that whole-of-government/whole-of-nation 

approaches mark the most effective path to effective governance. This standard relies on a wellled mosaic of agencies, skill sets, resources, and effort to achieve consistent and effective 

governance in all areas of responsibility. It must be as animated, aggressive, and sustained as the 

challenges it is designed to address. Good governance demands high-quality problem solving.

Contemporary grievances, provided visibility by the media and various other forms of agitation, 

can generate a loss of trust in government, business, and other social institutions, and result in 

instability. A quick scan of almost any morning’s news headlines provides timely examples.

John Rendon regularly speaks about how governments must turn their attention to public 

engagement and dialogue by practicing “Streetcraft” rather than “Statecraft”25 to maintain 

effective governance, credibility, and sovereignty. When the disenchanted take to the streets and 

voice their grievances and anger, they create venues for debate and, perhaps, negotiation, powered 

by social media. Social media serves as a force multiplier for such street populism because to ‘go 

viral’ on social media gains instant visibility that spreads far and wide through both new and 

traditional media.

Substantive programs to provide services, build interactive communities, and address 

grievances should be the goals of governance at all levels. Interagency efforts to assist in 

governance should assist in providing expertise, perspective, 

and necessary resources. They cannot and should not try to 

match the comprehensive structure of the National 

Preparedness and National Incident Management Systems.

However, a whole-of-government/whole-of-nation structure 

can be built to which local government officials can turn to 

improve their own skills and the quality of life within their 

communities. The consequences of good governance are stability and confidence in the decision 

makers. Ideally, effective governance will build a level of public satisfaction so that, when 

extremist ideologies appear (as they surely will), their audiences will be smaller and less willing 

to listen than they might have been.

 

25 John Rendon, “From the CEO: Personalized and Personal Democracy,” The Rendon Group, accessed on 14 April 2016, 

http://www.rendon.com/from-the-ceo-personalized-and-personal-democracy/.

The consequences of good 

governance are stability 

and confidence in the 

decision makers.
16

Dr. Boaz Ganor, a counterterrorism expert at the Interdisciplinary Center in Herzliya, 

Israel, said: “Combating terrorism is the most multi-disciplinary field of study that there is.”26

Disciplines and activities involved include military actions, law enforcement, rule of law and 

judicial systems, medicine and healthcare, forensics, 

finance, economics, intelligence, diplomacy, opensource information, anthropology, social sciences, and 

strategic communication. His view is important because 

the comprehensive menu of activities he identifies is 

helpful in shaping a whole-of-government approach for effective, multi-level governance. His list 

is not exhaustive, but he provides a broad outline for the kinds of expertise and resources that 

would be required both domestically and internationally to address instability.

A practical example comes from an unexpected source. Major James Love, in his JSOU 

monograph on Hezbollah, has written that “Hezbollah’s overwhelming success ... and subsequent 

political power in the Lebanese political system is attributed to its use of social services.”27 The 

Social Service Section of the organization “attempts to support every deficiency and grievance 

within the three Shi’a areas.”28 Obviously, the inclusion of Hezbollah here is because of the ‘what’

and ‘how’ of their activities, not the ‘why.’

More specifically, its reconstruction group is focused on improving the living conditions 

of those living in poverty and repairing war damage in the region. As another way of asserting 

influence, Hezbollah “openly assists populations from other sects and religions.”29 This 

comprehensive approach to governance by Hezbollah serves to build strong support and loyalty 

by meeting the needs of the populations who are permanent residents or who find themselves, 

however temporarily, in the area. Love predicts that, because of the efforts of the Social Service 

Section, “Hezbollah will continue to gain influence through the political process and eventually 

dominate Lebanese politics.”30 There are surely lessons for effective governance in other places 

within the Hezbollah model.

Another case study that considers the role of comprehensive, population-centric 

governance in bringing about stability concerns the long-standing ‘Troubles’ in Northern Ireland. 

After long years spent searching for solutions, Dr. Thomas H. Henriksen argues that, in Northern 

Ireland, “Britain’s nonmilitary responses to the paramilitary violence played the major role in the 

eventual pacification, far outweighing the counterinsurgency measures of small-unit foot patrols, 

intelligence gathering, and minimal use of force.”31 He notes that leadership of civic action 

 

26 Dr. Boaz Ganor is the Dean and Robert Lauder Chair for Counter-Terrorism at the Lauder School of Government, Diplomacy & 

Strategy and the Founder and Executive Director of the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism at the IDC in Herzliya, Israel 

(http://portal.idc.ac.il/faculty/en/pages/profile.aspx?username=ganor). Over the years, he has spoken frequently to international 

classes on combating terrorism for JSOU, and regularly includes this observation.

27 James B. Love, Hezbollah: Social Services as a Source of Power (MacDill Air Force Base, FL: Joint Special Operations 

University Press, June 2010), 37.

28 Ibid., 22.

29 Ibid.

30 Ibid., 37.

31 Thomas H. Henriksen, What Really Happened in Northern Ireland’s Counterinsurgency: Revision and Revelation (MacDill Air 

Force Base, FL: Joint Special Operations University Press, October 2008), 30.

“Combating terrorism is the 

most multi-disciplinary field 

of study that there is.”
17

programs gradually shifted from military commanders to civil authorities and that “The Arsenal 

of Victory: Local Government, Jobs, Houses, and Education” was central to final success.32

He points out that the long-established hatred of the governing authorities was tamped down, 

if not totally eliminated, by a systematic effort that engaged different levels of the government. 

“By addressing the roots of Catholic discontent and discrimination, British governments siphoned 

off enough anger, enticed enough collaborators, and neutralized enough opposition that it 

undermined much of the minority’s support for Irish Republican Army violence and led to a 

peaceful political resolution. The Sinn Fein leadership realized it could not win if its blood-loyal 

rank-and-file began drifting away to new homes, educational opportunities, and steady jobs.”33

Specific situations will inevitably vary. The cases of Hezbollah and Northern Ireland 

illustrate how the various tools of governance can be applied to both established and newly arrived 

populations. Dr. Ganor’s menu of disciplines and activities offers a glimpse of what is available to 

assist with assimilation, demonstrate effective domestic 

governance, and strengthen sovereignty by addressing 

needs and grievances. A related approach relies on the 

reverse engineering of current events to understand what 

is going on and provide a sense of the expertise and skill 

sets required. The consequences of such thinking—

facilitated by a comprehensive, whole-of-government effort to build public trust, loyalty, and 

investment in the process—can provide consistent, effective governance and ensure sovereignty. 

The importance of assimilation efforts that accommodate identity cannot be overstated here.

The persistent invocation of ‘complex’ is certainly an apt description of the contemporary 

geopolitical environment, but should not be tolerated as an excuse for inattention, inaction, or 

mismanagement. Clear thinking and appropriate tools exist for mitigating complexity. Clearly 

defined, whole-of-government/whole-of-nation approaches can provide the strategic direction and 

structure for those efforts. General Galvin and the USSOCOM strategic planning process provide 

us with ways of thinking about what is going on around us and helping us to understand the critical 

roles played by the constant flux within those environments. Bersin and Demarest present 

complementary and practical approaches for governance measures that simultaneously address 

security, stability, and sovereignty. There are more approaches out there to develop and employ.

What is required is an interagency, whole-of-government response that addresses both the 

domestic and international consequences of the dynamic geopolitical environment. They should 

be focused on three areas of activity, each presenting a different problem set in need of solutions. 

Each task must be addressed simultaneously:

1. Mitigate the conditions at the points of origin for the movement of populations to 

reduce the motivation of migrants and refugees to leave their homes and set out on an 

uncertain path;

 

32 Ibid.

33 Henriksen, What Really Happened in Northern Ireland’s Counterinsurgency, 47–48.

The importance of 

assimilation efforts that 

accommodate identity cannot 

be overstated in this effort.
18

2. Manage the transit points to care for people and process them for onward movement 

or return to their original homes based on harmonized screening standards; and

3. Assimilate refugees and migrants who are accepted from the transit points into their 

destinations. Domestically, there are programs, which are too often viewed as pots of 

money that must be expended by the end of each fiscal year (30 September). What is 

too often lacking is a vision for the use of those funds and the plans to animate those 

funds toward a productive outcome.

Transitioning from task #2 to task #3 is perhaps the most challenging, as decisions have to 

be made about who will be allowed to continue onward and who will be returned to their point of 

origin. Essentially, the strategic goals should be to limit the motivation to leave, care for the people 

on their journey, and encourage assimilation upon arrival. The process must be efficient and 

effective. Those caught up in population flows have both needs and expectations about their 

opportunities to move on and establish lives in new places. Delays in meeting basic human needs 

or failing to fulfill those expectations can be very destabilizing.

Once again, the distinctions between what is happening internationally and domestically 

are increasingly blurred. Events elsewhere in the world are generating consequences for 

government officials in American villages, towns, cities, counties, and states. Mass movements of 

populations under stress offer compelling evidence that the quality of governance in places like 

Syria, Iraq, Southwest Asia, Africa, and Central and South America can affect governance 

practices and decision making in the U.S., Europe, and elsewhere. Thus, improving the quality of 

governance at home includes paying attention to events going on elsewhere in the world. Often it 

may be that the mitigation of conditions internationally becomes the best we can hope for.

The Role of Special Operations Forces

Having outlined the domestic and international challenges faced by government officials at all 

levels of responsibility, it’s important to understand the various overseas capabilities to mitigate 

the trends and flows that find their way to the United States. SOF play important roles in wideranging interagency efforts to provide effective governance while addressing international 

challenges to U.S. sovereignty. When points of instability arise that could pose challenges to the 

U.S. domestic governance network, it becomes necessary to muster the necessary political will, 

skill sets, and resources to act in these areas of uncertainty and instability.

As with all interagency partners, SOF bring with them specialized skill and mission sets 

that can be applied at points of greatest need to create stabilizing effects. Among the most relevant 

to this discussion are foreign internal defense, security force assistance, foreign humanitarian 

assistance, military information support operations, and civil affairs operations.

34 Through these 

and related efforts, SOF can assist in shaping the conditions in areas of instability so that 

populations are less motivated to flee their homes and set off for new destinations. An important 

 

34 Special Operations Forces Reference Manual, Fourth Edition (MacDill Air Force Base, FL: Joint Special Operations University 

Press, June 2015), 1-6.
19

goal of a governance interagency 

apparatus should be to reduce stress 

on domestic government units by 

making long, dangerous journeys 

for migrants unattractive and 

unnecessary. One way is by 

assisting local authorities at points 

of origin to stabilize their areas and 

mitigate grievances, tasks regularly 

performed by SOF.

Beyond doctrinal roles and 

missions, SOF also provide 

important value-added expertise, 

skills, and experience to the 

interagency governance process. 

First of all, SOF function as a tool 

for addressing uncertainty. They 

provide the interagency process with a knowledgeable, experienced, and trusted presence on the 

ground, where such traits are most needed. With a broad range of SOF capabilities functioning at 

any given time in scores of countries, it is reasonable to assume that SOF teams are in or very near 

to places of greatest immediate concern. That persistent presence on the ground greatly reduces 

the response time between the interagency development of policy and strategy and the 

commencement of intended activities in the field. Obviously, not all of the tasks will be performed 

by SOF assets, but SOF can provide an anchor for the activities of other interagency partners.

Given a SOF presence and SOF cultural knowledge and insights, language aptitude, 

relevant skill sets, diverse expertise, and varied experience, the evolution from interagency 

discussion and planning to desired effects can move quickly. SOF also have established indigenous 

relationships and built levels of trust that can allow for both access to the host nation and, along 

with the country team, approval to act in a mutually agreed manner. An established, functioning, 

and effective SOF presence can add clarity by developing the situation, assessing immediate 

causes, and framing a common operating picture that enhances interagency understanding of the 

scope of the situation. SOF insights can also suggest specific steps to be taken to shape or create 

favorable conditions for success.

SOF can provide the interagency structure with an expanded strategic reach through the 

various relationships and networks that have developed over the last 15 or more years of intense 

interaction with similar forces from other countries. The ability to create effects is expanded by 

harmonizing and synchronizing efforts with those other SOF entities who share 

similar responsibilities.

The commander of Special Operations Task Force - South shakes the 

hand of the 8th Special Operations Kandak commander after opening 

a clinic to provide medical care to local villagers in Afghanistan. 

SOURCE: U.S. ARMY STAFF SGT. KAILY BROWN/RELEASED
20

While promoting the notion of civilian power, The First Quadrennial Diplomacy and

Development Review (QDDR)35 anticipated the whole-of-government efforts that are required in 

the international environment to address both uncertainty and instability and to shape the 

environments for success. The QDDR acknowledges the roles of the State Department, U.S.

Agency for International Development, and the DOD in serving as the ‘three pillars’ of national 

security, and the critical roles played by other agencies from throughout the federal government 

and other government units engaged with the process.

Conclusion

As a rule, governance at any level is not simply a matter of choosing between a couple of options; 

it involves a menu of possibilities. The decisions and actions of thousands of elected and appointed 

officials combine to affect the quality of life, security, stability, and sovereignty of their citizens 

and others. Though strict consistency among countries is neither possible nor reasonable to expect, 

a coordinated international response to a shared concern is essential. Domestically, a government 

unit at any level that, for instance, offers unusually generous benefits and government services is 

likely to attract large numbers of individuals and families to its offices. A single grievance that 

receives public compensation in one township governance unit quickly generates a surge of 

identical complaints and demands for restitution throughout a region. That is rarely helpful.

From an international perspective, Afghan interpreters who came to the U.S. always had 

two specific destinations on their ‘possible’ lists: California, mostly because of established Afghan 

enclaves, and northern Virginia, because of what they perceived to be generous social services 

benefits. Piecemeal, uncoordinated management of need, wherever it exists, is a pursuit 

without end.

Recognizable results are essential. Because of its frequently amorphous nature, clear 

notions of interagency leadership and measures of effectiveness are basic requirements for 

achieving success. The perpetuation of process at the expense of a clearly defined governance 

outcome—the so-called ‘self-licking ice cream cone’—is not a productive application of 

resources, no matter the worthiness of the cause. Randomness is not a virtue.

Neither is being overly sensitive to outside criticism. Politicians, celebrities, and even Pope 

Francis have travelled to places such as the Greek islands of Chios, Kos, Lesbos, and Kastellorizo 

to demonstrate their solidarity with the migrant victims. Frequently, they also find time to express 

criticism of the government authorities responsible for addressing the crisis.

Crises of the magnitude of the ongoing flows of people and materials across traditional 

borders require more than staking out political or ideological positions. They demand 

comprehensive domestic and international efforts that are coordinated among those most affected. 

Distance, geography, and national identity are not necessarily factors in deciding who can and 

should contribute. 

 

35 U.S. Department of State, Leading Through Civilian Power: The First Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review

(Washington, D.C.: Department of State, 2010).
21

Within a variety of scenarios, SOF can and have played important roles in managing the 

movements of peoples, from their displacement from home villages to final assimilation. SOF 

expertise and experience can assist 

the wider U.S. government 

interagency by serving as 

facilitators on the ground. 

Working with their various 

international partners, SOF 

provide an important presence at 

every stage of an unfolding 

migratory crisis.

It may be counterintuitive, 

but the body of knowledge derived 

from SOF retail-level expertise 

and experiences with individuals 

from different cultures can also 

provide value in educating mayors,

county executives, and governors. 

These individuals have no such 

background, but it is their responsibility to build programs that facilitate assimilation of unfamiliar 

cultures into their own communities. 

Events and experiences over the past decades have established that what happens in places 

like Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, Africa, and Central and South America almost inevitably will have 

impact in other places, such as Europe, North America, and Australia. For government officials at 

all levels, events unfolding on the evening news now find expression in their own jurisdictions.

That reality should no longer surprise anyone in a world where anticipation and visioning have 

become true imperatives.

A U.S. Army chaplain participates in a humanitarian aid mission meant

to provide for families in need while deepening the cultural 

understanding between U.S. service members, the Afghan National 

Army, and the local populace. SOURCE: U.S. ARMY SPC. SARA 

WAKAI/RELEASED