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S. HRG. 113–635 

ASSESSING VENEZUELA’S POLITICAL CRISIS: 

HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AND BEYOND 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

MAY 8, 2014 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/ 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey, Chairman

BARBARA BOXER, California 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware 

RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois 

TOM UDALL, New Mexico 

CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut 

TIM KAINE, Virginia 

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts 

BOB CORKER, Tennessee 

JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho 

MARCO RUBIO, Florida 

RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

JOHN McCAIN, Arizona 

JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming 

RAND PAUL, Kentucky 

DANIEL E. O’BRIEN, Staff Director

LESTER E. MUNSON III, Republican Staff Director

(II)

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Corker, Hon. Bob, U.S. Senator from Tennessee .................................................. 2 

Duddy, Hon. Patrick D., visiting faculty, The Fuqua School of Business, 

Duke University, Durham, NC ........................................................................... 31 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 34 

Jacobson, Hon. Roberta S., Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC ............................ 3 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 5 

Malinowski, Hon. Tomasz P., Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State, Washington, 

DC .......................................................................................................................... 7 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 8 

Menendez, Hon. Robert, U.S. Senator from New Jersey ...................................... 1 

Naim, Moises, Ph.D., senior associate, International Economics Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, DC ........................... 37 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 39 

Vivanco, Jose Miguel, executive director, Americas Division, Human Rights 

Watch, Washington, DC ...................................................................................... 43 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 44 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

Letters Sent to Senators Robert Menendez and Bob Corker from Roberta 

Jacobson re: The Role of Sanctions in Venezuela’s Policy ................................ 65 

(III)

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

(1) 

ASSESSING VENEZUELA’S POLITICAL CRISIS: 

HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AND BEYOND 

THURSDAY, MAY 8, 2014 

U.S. SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in room SD– 

419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Robert Menendez (chairman of the committee) presiding. 

Present: Senators Menendez, Durbin, Kaine, Markey, Corker, 

Rubio, Johnson, and McCain. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY 

The CHAIRMAN. This hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations 

Committee will come to order. 

Before I welcome our panelists, let me welcome Senator Nelson 

of Florida who has expressed to the Chair a very deep interest in 

what is happening in Venezuela, and we welcome him here today 

to be with us. 

Let me welcome today’s panelists from the Department of State, 

Duke University, the Carnegie Endowment, and Human Rights 

Watch, which this week released a deeply troubling report on the 

scale of human rights violations in Venezuela, a report documenting human rights abuses far worse than I had anticipated. 

The report documents how Venezuelan security forces, often in 

collaboration with colectivos, armed pro-government gangs, have 

systematically violated the rights of students, women, men, members of the political opposition, and journalists. They have severely 

beaten unarmed Venezuelans, and fired live ammunition, rubber 

bullets, and tear gas canisters indiscriminately into crowds. 

The report documents Venezuelan security forces subjecting detained protestors to severe physical abuse. I will not go into great 

detail, but I urge those who are interested to read the report. In 

one case, members of the National Guard detained a young 

protestor and, quoting from the report, kicked him, beat him and 

fired a rubber pellet from point-blank range into his right thigh. He 

was driven to a military installation where a guardsman who saw 

his bleeding leg inserted his finger into the open wound, removed 

it, and then inserted it again. 

The report goes on to say that the guards handcuffed him to a 

metal pole, gave him electric shock treatments, kicked him, and 

called him a fascist. 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

2 

Apparently, in some cases, prosecutors and judicial officials have 

been complicit in these reported human rights violations, and when 

governments degrade and politicize a justice system long enough, 

as the Chavez and Maduro administrations have done, the rule of 

law is abandoned and the judiciary becomes yet another tool of oppression. 

In fact, not a single member of the security forces have been sentenced for their role in these widespread human rights violations, 

but the courts have been used to remove and jail opposition mayors 

and imprison opposition leader Leopoldo Lopez. 

We should not overlook the fact that there has been violence on 

both sides, but we should be perfectly clear that the primary responsibility for the excessive, unjustified use of force rests with the 

Maduro administration. 

We must also be perfectly clear that a foreign power is acting 

openly in Venezuela, fueling the country’s instability and economic 

and political crisis. The Cuban Government, its advisors, and its 

intelligence officers have penetrated and are influencing senior levels of the Venezuelan Government. This cannot be overlooked. 

Today’s hearing is an opportunity for us to understand what role 

the United States has played and should play, given the current 

crisis in Venezuela. 

In the face of widespread human rights abuses in Venezuela and 

the lack of accountability for those crimes, I have introduced legislation, along with Senator Rubio and Senator Nelson, which calls 

for targeted sanctions on individuals responsible for rights violations. 

We also need to analyze what, in my view, has been a very weak 

response from the Organization of American States, look at what 

other South American governments are doing to mediate dialogue 

between the Venezuelan Government and members of the opposition, and explore other options, including action at the United Nations. 

We must also look at the future implications of the deteriorating 

political and economic conditions in Venezuela, and its potential 

impact on Caribbean and Central American nations that have benefited from Venezuelan subsidized oil shipments. 

Finally, we must assess the destabilizing role that Cuba is playing in Venezuela and the very real security challenges from 

transnational criminal enterprises operating in the country, as well 

as the signs of their collusion with members of the Venezuelan 

Government. 

With that, let me recognize the distinguished ranking member, 

Senator Corker, for his remarks. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BOB CORKER, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM TENNESSEE 

Senator CORKER. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you 

for your leadership on this issue and for having this hearing. 

I want to thank Senator Nelson for his interest and being here. 

I know he used to be on the committee. I think that is correct. Anyway, we appreciate having him here. 

And I want to thank the witnesses for being here today. 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

3 

All of us, I think, have had briefings on the human rights violations that are taking place under the Maduro government, and 

they are quite startling, no doubt, especially with this most recent 

report. So thank you for shedding light on that today. 

We have had a number of foreign policy meetings, as we always 

do, and it has been difficult at times to understand exactly what 

the administration’s policies are toward the areas where we are 

having issues. And so I do look forward today to the testimony to 

help understand us what the administration’s core policy goals are 

as it relates to Venezuela. 

And again, I thank the witnesses for being here. 

Venezuela is a deeply troubled country. Forty-one people are 

dead. The stories of torture and other abuses that our chairman so 

eloquently laid out certainly cause all of us to be concerned and 

want to be involved in helping shape a better future there. 

The economy is in shambles. The country is very divided right 

now, which makes it even more difficult, I know, to move ahead in 

a way that makes a lot of sense. 

So I do look forward to the testimony today, and hopefully it will 

shed light on us here in America putting forth a coherent policy 

that helps the country move ahead, although we understand they 

are going to have to do that themselves but with our help. So 

thank you very much for being here. I look forward to your testimony. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Corker. 

Well, let me introduce our first panel today. We have Assistant 

Secretary of State for the Western Hemisphere Roberta Jacobson; 

and Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of Democracy, 

Human Rights, and Labor Tom Malinowski. I believe this is your 

first appearance before the committee. So, we welcome you to your 

relatively new post. 

And with that, let me say that both of your statements will be 

fully included in the record, without objection. We ask that you 

summarize your statements in about 5 minutes or so, so that we 

can have in a dialogue with you. Madam Secretary, we will start 

off with you. 

STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERTA S. JACOBSON, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WESTERN HEMISPHERE AFFAIRS, 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Ms. JACOBSON. Thank you very much, Chairman Menendez, 

Ranking Member Corker, members of the committee. Thank you 

for this opportunity to speak with you about Venezuela. 

As you know, we continue to be very concerned about the situation in Venezuela where legitimate political, economic, and social 

grievances and a lack of adequate democratic space and respect for 

human rights have brought protests and, unfortunately, violence. 

The United States has called on the Venezuelan Government to respect human rights, uphold the rule of law, and engage in peaceful, 

inclusive dialogue with Venezuelans across the political spectrum 

to alleviate the tension. We have consistently called on the Venezuelan Government to release those it has unjustly jailed, lift restrictions on freedom of the press, and respect freedom of assembly. 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

4 

Assistant Secretary Malinowski will discuss the human rights 

situation in greater depth, while I will discuss what we are doing 

diplomatically to bring an end to the violence and encourage respect for democratic processes and human rights. I know this committee shares our concern, and we welcome your strong support for 

democracy in Venezuela. 

This is not a United States-Venezuela issue. It is an internal 

Venezuelan issue. We have been clear all along that the future of 

Venezuela is for the Venezuelan people to decide, and we have 

strongly resisted attempts to be used as a distraction from Venezuela’s real problems. Our focus has been to encourage an end to 

the violence and an authentically inclusive dialogue to address the 

Venezuelan people’s legitimate grievances. We have been actively 

engaging international partners to find a peaceful solution. We are 

encouraged by the Union of South American Nations-led initiative 

with Vatican participation involving meetings between the government and many parties of the political opposition. 

While we are encouraged by the UNASUR (Union of South 

American Nations) and Vatican efforts, we must have realistic expectations. The Venezuelan Government has so far resisted obvious 

demonstrations of good will: the release of political prisoners or disarming of the government-sponsored vigilante groups. Nevertheless, those opposition elements engaged in the dialogue are, for the 

first time in a long time, able to speak truth to power in a setting 

where the government must listen. That is not a panacea, but it 

could be a beginning. 

We also need to recognize that the Venezuelan opposition is not 

monolithic. Important elements of that opposition and student leaders remain outside the dialogue and are deeply skeptical of it. 

Protestors remain on the streets. They too need to be heard. We 

should respect the diversity of opinion within the Venezuelan opposition, meaning both those who have declined to enter the dialogue 

and those who believe that by doing so they can achieve some 

progress regarding human rights, democracy, and Venezuela’s economic and social problems. This may be a slow process, and it may 

fail. But for now, significant elements of the opposition consider the 

effort worthwhile. 

Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, and the Vatican are expending significant effort to facilitate this dialogue, and we believe it behooves 

us to respect the effort. If this dialogue does not begin to solve Venezuela’s chronic problems, then the country’s long-term outlook for 

stability is extremely poor. Leaving aside the ongoing political turmoil, Venezuela’s economy is stalling, the government is struggling 

to meet its financial obligations, and massive fiscal adjustments 

are urgently needed. The failure of the current dialogue process 

would result in an even more troubled Venezuela and would redouble its need for honest brokers from the international community 

to help Venezuela find its way. 

We share the concern of many in the region that the current dynamics, especially economic, raise doubts about Venezuela’s longterm stability. However, I want to emphasize the following: While 

we regard the current dialogue underway with cautious optimism, 

one thing we will not do is remain silent in the face of Venezuelan 

Government assaults on fundamental freedoms. Freedom of expresFOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

5 

sion and peaceful assembly are universal human rights. They are 

essential to a functioning democracy. 

Venezuela’s problems cannot be solved by criminalizing dissent. 

There must be space in Venezuelan society for those who do not 

agree with the government to express their views. 

We have strong historic and cultural ties with the Venezuelan 

people, and we remain committed to our relationship with them. 

But the future of Venezuela is for the Venezuelan people to decide. 

And they have real concerns that must be addressed. Venezuela’s 

serious and worsening and economic and social problems require 

democratic solutions. 

We remain committed to working with member states to utilize 

the OAS in conjunction with other regional and subregional, as 

well as international efforts to advance real dialogue in Venezuela. 

The OAS, as the region’s premier multilateral institution, can and 

should assume a greater role to find a peaceful resolution to the 

crisis in Venezuela, consistent with its mandate to promote peace, 

democracy, and respect for human rights in member states, as expressed in its charter and in the Inter-American Democratic Charter. 

Mr. Chairman, I would like to end by saying that I sincerely appreciate the support that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 

has provided to our core foreign policy interests in Venezuela and 

in the hemisphere. We all seek to advance democracy, human 

rights, social development, security, and economic prosperity in the 

region. 

Thank you very much, and I look forward to answering your 

questions. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Jacobson follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERTA S. JACOBSON

Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Corker, members of the committee, thank 

you for this opportunity to speak with you about Venezuela. I appreciate your interest in Venezuela and your support for U.S. assistance and our policies and engagement there. 

We continue to be preoccupied by the situation in Venezuela, where legitimate 

political, economic, and social grievances and a lack of adequate democratic space 

and respect for human rights have brought protests and, unfortunately, violence. 

The United States has called on the Venezuelan Government to respect human 

rights, uphold the rule of law, and engage in a peaceful, inclusive dialogue with 

Venezuelans across the political spectrum to alleviate the current tension. We have 

consistently called on the Venezuelan Government to release those it unjustly jailed, 

lift restrictions on freedom of the press, and respect freedoms of assembly and association. Assistant Secretary Malinowski will discuss the human rights situation in 

greater depth, while I will focus on what we are doing diplomatically to bring an 

end to the violence and respect for democratic processes and human rights. I know 

this committee shares our concerns, and we welcome your strong support for democracy in Venezuela. 

This is not a U.S.-Venezuela issue, it is an internal Venezuelan issue. We’ve been 

clear all along that the future of Venezuela is for the Venezuelan people to decide. 

We have strongly resisted attempts to be used as a distraction from Venezuela’s real 

problems. Our focus has been to encourage an end to the violence and authentically 

inclusive dialogue to address the Venezuelan people’s legitimate grievances. We 

have been actively engaging international partners to find a peaceful solution. We 

are encouraged by the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR)-led initiative 

with Vatican participation involving meetings between the government and many 

parties within the political opposition. 

While we are encouraged by the efforts of UNASUR and the Vatican, we must 

have realistic expectations. The Venezuelan Government has so far resisted two 

obvious demonstrations of good will: the release of political prisoners and disarming 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

6 

the government-supported vigilante groups. Nevertheless, those opposition elements 

engaged in the dialogue are, for the first time in a long time, able to speak truth 

to power in a setting where the government must listen. That of course is not a panacea, but it could be a beginning. We also need to recognize the Venezuelan opposition is not monolithic. Important elements of the opposition, and student leaders, 

remain outside the dialogue, and are deeply skeptical of it. Protestors remain on the 

streets. They, too, all need to be heard. We should respect the diversity of opinion 

within the Venezuelan opposition—meaning both those who have declined to enter 

the dialogue and those who believe that by doing so they can achieve some progress 

regarding human rights, democracy, and Venezuela’s economic and social problems. 

This may be a slow process; it may fail, but for now significant elements of the opposition consider the effort worthwhile. 

Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, and the Vatican are expending significant time and 

effort to facilitate this dialogue. It behooves us to respect and to support, as we have 

been doing, this effort. If this dialogue does not begin to solve Venezuela’s chronic 

problems, both democratic and economic, then the country’s long-term outlook for 

stability is extremely poor. Leaving aside the ongoing political turmoil, Venezuela’s 

economy is stalling, the government is struggling to meet its financial obligations, 

and massive fiscal adjustments are urgently needed. The failure of the current dialogue process will result in an even more troubled Venezuela, and will redouble its 

need for honest brokers from the international community to help Venezuela find 

its way. 

We share the concern of many in the region that current dynamics, especially economic, raise doubts about Venezuela’s long-term stability. However, I want to 

emphasize the following: While we regard the dialogue currently underway with 

cautious optimism, one thing we will not do is remain silent in the face of Venezuelan Government assaults on fundamental freedoms. 

Freedoms of expression and peaceful assembly are universal human rights. They 

are essential to a functioning democracy, and the Venezuelan Government has an 

obligation to protect fundamental freedoms and the safety of its citizens, including 

those who engage in peaceful protest. 

Venezuela’s problems cannot be solved by criminalizing dissent; there must be 

space in Venezuelan society for those who do not agree with the government to 

express their views. 

We are not alone—the U.N. Secretary General, the U.N. High Commissioner for 

Human Rights and six U.N. special rapporteurs, the EU High Representative for 

Foreign Affairs, and others—have called on the Venezuelan Government to respect 

the universal human rights and fundamental freedoms of its citizens. 

We have strong historic and cultural ties with the Venezuelan people, and we 

remain committed to our relationship with them. But the future of Venezuela is for 

the Venezuelan people to decide. They have real concerns that deserve to be 

addressed. Venezuela’s serious and worsening economic and social problems require 

democratic solutions. 

We defend human rights activists and fundamental freedoms around the world, 

including in Venezuela. Our commitment to democracy and human rights is unwavering and remains the center of gravity for our strategy in the region. 

We remain committed to working with member states to utilize the OAS, in conjunction with other regional and subregional efforts, to advance real dialogue in 

Venezuela. The OAS, as the region’s premier multilateral institution, can and 

should assume a greater role to find a peaceful resolution to the crisis in Venezuela, 

consistent with its mandate to promote peace, democracy, and respect for human 

rights in member states, as expressed in its Charter and in the Inter-American 

Democratic Charter. 

Mr. Chairman, I would like to end by saying that I sincerely appreciate the support that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has provided to our core foreign 

policy interests in Venezuela and the hemisphere. We are united in our core strategic goals. We all seek to advance democracy, human rights, social development, 

security, and economic prosperity in the region. There is strong, bipartisan cooperation where it matters most between the State Department and this committee, as 

well as among this committee’s members and staff, to the great benefit of our 

country. 

The CHAIRMAN. Secretary Malinowski. 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

7 

STATEMENT OF HON. TOMASZ P. MALINOWSKI, ASSISTANT 

SECRETARY OF STATE, BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN 

RIGHTS, AND LABOR, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member 

Corker, Senator Rubio. Thank you for having us here today and for 

all of your efforts to make sure that the spotlight continues to 

shine on Venezuela, even as we face so many other crises around 

the world. 

I want to start by putting this in a broader context and remarking that in the last several decades, democracy and respect for 

human rights have spread dramatically in Latin America. This has 

been one of the most extraordinarily positive transformations that 

we have seen anywhere in the world. As a result of it, we have 

been able to resolve armed conflicts. Prosperity has grown and is 

benefiting more people throughout the region. There are more opportunities for countries in the Americas to cooperate than ever before. 

And the United States has worked extremely hard to support 

this progress over the years and to push back when it is challenged. We have done so with countries that are our friends like 

Mexico and Colombia. We have done so with countries with which 

we have more strained relationships. We have done so by providing 

direct support to empower local communities and give citizens a 

voice in government. We have done so by championing the InterAmerican institutions that are supposed to protect this progress 

and to hold every country in the region to the same high standards. 

But democracy is still under threat in Latin America. This 

progress is still under threat. And what is happening in Venezuela 

illustrates the threat perfectly. Venezuela reminds us that democracy is nothing without checks on government power. It requires a 

strong, independent judiciary, a free press, separation of powers, 

and respect for individual rights. The idea that winning an election 

gives the winner the power to impose his will without any institutional limits is as dangerous to democracy as a military coup, a 

point that we have occasion to make in many parts of the world 

these days. If that idea is legitimized in Venezuela, the region 

could go back to a time when states and societies were in conflict, 

as we are seeing on the streets of Venezuela today. 

So those are the stakes for us. That is why this is important. 

Well before the current crisis, as you know, successive rulers in 

Venezuela eroded respect for democratic principles in several stark 

ways, engineering the takeover of television stations, blocking 

Internet sites, stripping opposition parliamentarians of their immunity, politicizing the judicial system and using it to intimidate and 

punish selectively critics of the government. When judges have resisted government pressure, they have been punished, for example, 

the case of Judge Maria Afiuni who was imprisoned, abused, spent 

4 years under house arrest, and remains on trial as we sit here 

today because she tried to do her job and enforce the law in Venezuela. 

The protests in February began as a reaction to increased crime, 

but they quickly evolved into a movement to restore the democratic 

freedoms that Venezuelans have lost. The government has reFOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

8 

sponded, as you mentioned, with tear gas, with plastic bullets, 

leaving more than 40 people dead and hundreds injured. It has empowered armed civilian thugs to intimidate and kill those Venezuelans who continue to march, harassed and intimidated television and radio stations, newspaper staffs and independent journalists, prosecuted political opponents like Leopoldo Lopez, shut 

down the Colombian television station NTN24 to stop its widely 

viewed live broadcasts of opposition protests. 

The administration has consistently condemned these human 

rights abuses and called for the restoration of democratic rights 

and freedoms in Venezuela. Just yesterday, Secretary Kerry did so 

again saying that the people in the streets have legitimate grievances that deserve to be addressed. 

We have encouraged constructive pressure and involvement by 

other countries in the region, and to that end, Mr. Chairman, I 

want to thank you for your help in raising Venezuela with Mexico’s 

President during your visit there in February. We have pressed the 

case at the OAS, at the U.N. We have continued to support targeted programs in Venezuela that promote democratic participation 

and help people overcome restrictions on freedom of expression, 

and we will not be deterred from continuing those programs. 

As Assistant Secretary Jacobson described in detail, the United 

States has also supported the mediated talks led by UNASUR with 

Vatican engagement. But we do not view dialogue as endless or as 

an end in itself. It is a means to an end, the restoration of the 

rights and freedoms Venezuelans have been denied for a generation. As Secretary Kerry said yesterday we will not stop defending 

those rights. 

So, Mr. Chairman, let me close by thanking you and others on 

this committee for raising awareness of the crisis. We are grateful 

for your longstanding commitment to advancing human rights and 

democracy in this hemisphere, and I would be happy to join Assistant Secretary Jacobson in answering any questions you have. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Malinowski follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. TOM MALINOWSKI

Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Corker, members of the committee, I am 

glad for this opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the deteriorating 

human rights situation in Venezuela. I join my friend Roberta Jacobson in welcoming your strong support for human rights, democracy, and rule of law in Venezuela. 

In the last several decades, democracy and respect for human rights have spread 

dramatically in Latin America. Dictatorships have fallen, and civil society has risen. 

As a result, a number of armed conflicts have been resolved. Prosperity has grown 

and is benefiting more people. There are more opportunities for countries in the 

Americas to cooperate to grow our economies and increase the security of our people 

than ever before. 

The United States has worked hard to support this extraordinary democratic 

progress, and push back when it is challenged. We’ve done so with friends such as 

Colombia and Mexico as well as with countries where our diplomatic relationships 

have been more strained. We have done so by providing direct support to people and 

nongovernmental organizations working across the hemisphere, from the bottom up, 

to empower local communities and give citizens a voice in government. Under 

Roberta’s leadership, we have done so by championing the Inter-American institutions, including the OAS and its Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and 

Inter-American Court, which protect this progress and hold every country in the 

region to the same set of standards. 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

9 

But democracy is still under threat in Latin America, and what is happening in 

Venezuela illustrates the threat perfectly. Venezuela reminds us that democracy is 

nothing without checks on government power; it requires a strong, independent judiciary, a free press, separation of powers, and respect for individual rights. The idea 

that winning an election gives the winner the power to impose his will on society 

without institutional limits is as dangerous to democracy as a military coup. This 

idea is at war with the basic principles that champions of human rights in Latin 

America have fought to enshrine in their national constitutions, and in Inter-American institutions. We have a stake in standing up for the principle, as President 

Obama put it speaking in Santiago, Chile, ‘‘that simply holding power does not give 

a leader the right to suppress the rights of others, and that leaders must maintain 

power through consent, and not coercion.’’ If that principle is undermined, the 

region could go back to a time when states and societies were in conflict, as we are 

seeing in Venezuela today. 

• The government has shut off all avenues of recourse, politicizing the judicial 

system, and using the judiciary to intimidate and selectively prosecute political, 

organized labor, and civil society leaders who were critical of government policies or actions. One judge who tried to rule according to law, Judge Maria 

Afiuni, was imprisoned, abused, spent 4 years under house arrest and remains 

on trial as we sit here today. Her crime? Ordering the release of a prisoner who 

had already served the maximum sentence without ever having been tried. • Last May the government engineered a takeover of the opposition-oriented 

Globovision television station by a company with government ties. Globovision 

has now, of course, lost its editorial independence. • In November, President Maduro announced that the government blocked seven 

Internet sites that post dollar- and euro-currency exchange rates other than the 

government’s official rate. Maduro accused these Web sites of creating economic 

instability and stated his intent to crack down on businesses that inflate prices 

to equal the unofficial rate. • Also in November, the National Assembly revoked the parliamentary immunity 

of opposition National Assembly Deputy Maria Aranguren and charged her with 

corruption, money laundering, and embezzlement. That action paved the way 

for President Maduro to pass a bill authorizing him to rule by decree for 1 year. 

The Department has for the last several years consistently highlighted the steady 

erosion of democracy and human rights in Venezuela, first under the Chavez and 

now Maduro administrations. The annual Country Reports on Human Rights submitted to Congress each year documents this trajectory publicly. 

In the current crisis, the government has intensified its assault on the rights of 

citizens to organize and express themselves freely. This time around President 

Maduro has made the media a particular focus of suppression, recognizing that an 

informed Venezuelan populace would present a threat to the government’s power 

and control. 

Though protests in February were launched primarily as a reaction to increased 

crime, they have since spurred a full-fledged movement aiming for the restoration 

of democratic institutions, and for some, the resignation of President Maduro. 

The government has in turn responded with tear gas and plastic bullets, leaving 

more than 40 people dead and hundreds injured. The government has harassed and 

intimidated television and radio stations, newspaper staff, and independent journalists, along with political activists and opposition leaders. 

• The Maduro administration continues to persecute political opponents, such as 

Leopoldo Lopez, who last week spent his 43rd birthday in a military prison 

after surrendering himself to authorities nearly 3 months ago. He still awaits 

a hearing, and is all but guaranteed to be found guilty for spurious charges fabricated by the government. 

• In February, the government shut down the Colombian television station 

NTN24, to stop its widely viewed live broadcasts of opposition protests. The station is now only available via the Internet. 

• The Maduro government stripped National Assembly Deputy Maria Corina 

Machado of her seat in retaliation for her presence at the OAS in March. 

• The government has jailed two opposition mayors, Daniel Ceballos and Enzo 

Scarano, the first sentenced to a year in prison on charges of ‘‘civil rebellion’’ 

and ‘‘conspiracy’’; the second sentenced to 10 months in prison for failing to dismantle barricades. 

While dismantling the independent media and jailing local officials who dare to 

dissent, the Maduro government is simultaneously empowering armed civilian 

thugs, or ‘‘colectivos’’ to intimidate and kill those Venezuelans who continue to 

march. 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

10 

In turning to what we can do in response to the worsening situation in Venezuela, 

I remind this committee of Secretary Kerry’s speech before the OAS in November 

2013, where he stated that ‘‘Successful democracies depend on all citizens having 

a voice and on respecting those voices, and all governments having the courage and 

the capacity to listen to those voices.’’ The United States as Assistant Secretary 

Jacobson has described in detail continues to call for a dialogue with all Venezuelans in a climate of mutual respect. In that vein, we are encouraged by the mediated 

talks led by UNASUR, with Vatican engagement. 

Constructive involvement by Venezuela’s neighbors will be essential to helping 

this highly polarized society reconcile. Regional civil society and media can also play 

a valuable role in supporting Venezuelan efforts for democracy and reporting on 

government abuses. One encouraging example was when several news outlets in 

Colombia shipped newsprint to Venezuela, after local newspapers were unable to 

restock their supplies due to government currency controls. We encourage Latin 

American civil society to continue supporting the Venezuelan people and to advocate 

their own governments to speak out as the situation deteriorates. To that end, Mr. 

Chairman, I want to thank you for your help in raising the situation in Venezuela 

with Mexican President Enrique Pena Nieto during your visit in February. 

We also press Venezuela diplomatically in the multinational arena. During the 

March session of the U.N. Human Rights Council, we raised Venezuela several 

times. We are hopeful that the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights can 

bring regional pressure to bear. Last month, the Commission released its 2013 

report, which included special reports on the situations of some member states, including Venezuela. The Commission declared that the Venezuelan Government is in 

serious breach of the core requirements and institutions of representative democracy 

outlined in the Inter-American Democratic Charter, and detailed the abuses and 

deterioration of democracy I have mentioned already. In March, the Commission 

held hearings on the situation in Venezuela, at which human rights defenders and 

other members of civil society were able to formally report the violations they have 

witnessed. 

In close coordination with our other State Department colleagues, my Bureau, 

DRL, focuses on generating and providing support for human rights and democratic 

governance in Venezuela. We continue to run targeted programs that promote public 

participation in democratic processes and highlights restrictions on the freedom of 

expression. Our programs are available to all individuals regardless of political 

affiliation, and their fundamental purpose has been and will continue to be to promote the universal freedoms and rights Venezuelans have been denied for almost 

a generation. 

Mr. Chairman, let me close by thanking you and others on this committee for 

raising awareness of the crisis in Venezuela, which is often overshadowed by other 

world crises. 

We are grateful for your longstanding commitment to advancing human rights 

and democracy in this hemisphere. I am happy to answer any questions you may 

have. 

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Well, thank you both for your testimony. 

Madam Secretary, I know that the Obama administration, as is 

evidenced again today by your testimony, has supported the 

UNASUR-mediated negotiations between the Venezuelan Government and the opposition. And while expectations may have been 

very high during the public initial meetings, very few results have 

been produced. 

Meanwhile, members of the opposition, including Leopoldo Lopez, 

remain in prison. We now have documented evidence of systemic 

human rights abuses and cases of torture, and just this morning— 

this morning—250 students were arrested in Caracas. 

So can you tell me the specific diplomatic efforts beyond that 

which you testified? I hear that we have things going on behind the 

scenes. Well, what is going on that we have faith in? 

I heard you say—and I understand when you say we do not want 

to be a distraction, meaning we, the United States. We do not want 

the Maduro government to use the United States as a distraction. 

At the same time, we will not remain silent as it relates to human 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

11 

rights. It seems to me that we run the risk of doing what many 

of our South American neighbors do, which is that we do not want 

to, ‘‘intervene in the internal affairs of another country.’’ In the interim, people get arrested, tortured, and jailed. I do not know how 

long I am personally willing to wait for those set of circumstances 

to continue without pursuing a more vigorous action such as the 

sanctions that several of us have called for. 

So talk to me in the context of that set of circumstances. 

Ms. JACOBSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I think all of us are frustrated in the sense that—you are right— 

there were very high expectations as the two sides sat down to 

talk, really the first time in at least a decade that the opposition 

and the government had the opportunity—certainly that the opposition had the opportunity to sit down and talk about some of the 

grievances that they had on democracy, on human rights and, indeed, in the first meeting that they had to do so on live broadcast 

TV and have those grievances heard by the majority of Venezuelans. And so that raised a lot of expectations. 

Those expectations have clearly not been met with results quickly. And I think that there is impatience from the international community and from Venezuelans themselves that some results need 

to be seen. And you are absolutely right. So far, we have not seen 

results. We have seen the arrests this morning of students who 

were protesting in four different locations in Caracas, and I think 

we have got to condemn those arrests in the strongest possible 

terms. Those were peaceful protests. 

But we also have to recognize that the Brazilian and Colombian 

and Ecuadorian Foreign Ministers who are helping to support this 

process and mediate this process, as well as the Vatican Nuncio, 

are actively engaged in working on all four parts of the agenda that 

the two sides have agreed to, that they believe there continue to 

be reasons for optimism, that movement is possible, as do the opposition members taking part in the technical working groups on the 

different agenda items. Again, I do not think—and I want to emphasize that the process is important because it is the first time 

they have had such a process, but it cannot be endless. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, that is my point. That is what I want to 

know. 

How many more people have to be tortured? How many more 

have to be arrested? How many more have to be fired upon before 

we say, well, guess what, the process is not working? Because when 

you are in the midst of supposedly a dialogue and you arrest 250 

peaceful protestors, you are not sending a message that such dialogue is moving in a direction in which you intend to ultimately ensure that a possibility for a negotiated settlement will be achieved. 

And when President Maduro puts op-eds here in the United States 

that say, please, do not intervene, while he systematically abuses 

the rights of his own citizens, I just think that we are at a point 

in time where the actions belie the words. 

And so I appreciate what those countries are doing, even though 

I must say in the case of some of those countries, you know, it is 

difficult for Colombia when there are several million Colombians in 

Venezuela and when they are hosting the discussions with the 

FARC under the auspices, even though they are not hosting it—the 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

12 

Cubans are hosting it, the discussions with the FARC—for them to 

pressure the Venezuelan Government very much. 

Ms. JACOBSON. You know, I think one of the things that is most 

important, as these talks move forward, is whether or not significant elements of the opposition remain committed to those talks. 

What we do not want to do is something that would abandon their 

effort in those talks. You are absolutely right. The actions taken by 

the Venezuelan Government today do not support the efforts at the 

dialogue table. They are not the kinds of efforts that members in 

a dialogue, in a negotiation take to give confidence to that process. 

And I want to be clear about that. And you are right. We need to 

be clear about that regardless of whether that is viewed as interference. So we are not going to—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Where is the administration’s calibration? Where 

is the point or sense—I am not asking for a redline because that 

creates all types of trouble. But I am asking for some sense of when 

is it that we say, well, you continue to arrest students, you continue to torture people, you use the judiciary system as a system 

of oppression, not a system of justice, you can have dialogues endlessly while you go ahead and do all those things—when is it that 

we think that it is time to take a more affirmative stance such as 

targeted sanctions? 

Ms. JACOBSON. I think that point comes—and I do not know that 

I want to lay out the exact criteria that would be the equivalent 

of a redline. But I do think it does not come 1 month after they 

started, which is what we are at. I also do not think it comes while 

there are significant members of the opposition believing that there 

still is a possibility for positive movement. So I think it comes in 

consultation with people who are engaged in the talks themselves. 

The CHAIRMAN. Is time the question? Let us give it 2 months, 3 

months, 4 months? Is it the number of people who get arrested? Is 

it when those who are participating say, you know what, this is not 

going anywhere? 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. I think there are many factors, Mr. Chairman, 

but the most important factor for me, as I approach these problems, whether it is in Venezuela, whether it is in Russia, whether 

it is in Burma, whether it is in any country that is undergoing this 

kind of internal conflict over fundamental issues of democracy and 

human rights—for me, the most important question is the judgment of the people who are trying to help on the ground. And that 

is also not a black and white question because, as we all know, 

there are differences within the opposition. 

But I can say that the judgments that we have made and that 

we are making on literally a day-by-day basis are informed by consultation with very, very brave and dedicated people in Venezuela 

who have chosen for now to give this dialogue a chance and who 

may not choose to give it a chance next week or the week after if 

these arrests continue. So I think it is fundamentally their judgment to make, first and foremost, at what point do we as an opposition give this dialogue another day, another week, given what is 

happening, and in consultation with them, informed by their judgment, we will make our judgment. 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

13 

The CHAIRMAN. Do you believe that Venezuela’s student movement and other sectors of civil society should be included in the 

dialogues between the government and the opposition? 

Ms. JACOBSON. We have been very clear, and I think I mentioned 

this in the testimony. We absolutely believe that they have to be 

heard. They are a very important voice. They are not at the table. 

Including those who are at the table, the MUD (Democratic Unity 

Roundtable), the members of the opposition who are participating 

in the dialogue have said they believe the voices of the students 

have got to be heard in this discussion. So absolutely, their voice 

is critical. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, let me just say, as I turn to Senator 

Corker, my personal patience is waning. I do not want to sit by and 

see hundreds arrested, people tortured. I think the human rights 

report, unless you want to dispute it here, is pretty exacting. We 

will hear from them in the second panel. 

I would really urge members to read the report because if you 

can read the report and believe that nothing should be done, then 

there is something wrong. 

Senator Corker. 

Senator CORKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, again for having 

this hearing, and I appreciate the leadership you and Senator 

Rubio have shown on this issue and causing this to happen. And 

I especially appreciate having a hearing in that I know there is 

some legislation that is proposed right now. I know the administration officials always come in here and thank us for our help, but 

they really do not want it at the end of the day and do what they 

can to keep that from occurring. 

So what I would like to ask today, because I know at some point 

we will need to be dealing with some legislation that has been put 

forth, is to, first, understand where we are today, where it is that 

if you had the ability to affect—I know we have this dialogue underway. I know the country is deeply divided. I know they have got 

all kinds of economic issues. And it is really at a critical juncture. 

What are the steps that you would like to see the country move 

through over the course of the next 6 months? What is it you are 

trying to make happen over this next 6 months? 

And then I want to move to some of the tools that Menendez and 

Rubio have put forth and understand how they would or would not 

be effective from your standpoint. 

Ms. JACOBSON. Thank you, Senator Corker. 

Let me start out by saying that the central goal that we have is 

to help Venezuelans move their country toward democracy, toward 

respect for human rights. Ultimately the steps that are taken to 

get there are for Venezuelans to decide, but you can see in the 

agenda item of this dialogue some of the issues that we would like 

to see move forward. They are things like a real discussion and 

movement on the political prisoners, the many people who have 

been detained and should be released, a real discussion on the incidents of violence that took place during these protests. That is the 

reason a truth commission has been set up as part of—or will be 

set up as part of the dialogue. 

There is also the issue—and I think this was a crucial one as 

part of the dialogue. It has been called the ‘‘rebalancing’’ of public 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

14 

institutions, the notion that positions on the Supreme Court, the 

electoral tribunal, indeed, the management of the national assembly are vacant because the government has not allowed elections to 

be held for those jobs and they have packed those entities with government officials such that the opposition has no voice in those institutions who run the branches of government in the elections that 

are held in Venezuela. So a level playing field is critical for future 

elections and legislation. 

Those are some of the kinds of steps. Obviously, commitments to 

respect human rights, to reduce the violence are critical as we 

move forward. Easing and ending the restrictions on freedom of expression, freedom of association and assembly, the crackdown on 

civil society I will leave to Tom who is a greater expert on some 

of those aspects. But those are the kinds of steps that have to be 

taken, it seems to us, for us to achieve the goal. Again, that is for 

the Venezuelans to have a discussion on moving towards greater 

democracy. 

Senator CORKER. So, for instance, we, as you well know, have 

had discussions about Ukraine and sanctions. We actually passed 

some out of this committee and may be looking at more. I hope we 

are. But the discussions have been around really sort of tangible 

things that you can see and touch and feel and you understand 

whether they are happening or not. 

The things you just laid out, obviously, are very, very important. 

There is no fine line in each of those. In some cases, maybe the release of prisoners and that kind of thing. That is a fine line. 

So as you look at two members of our committee that care deeply 

about this and others who want to make sure we understand the 

issue more fully and want to look seriously at what it is they propose, sanctions are one of the tools that have been put forth. And 

could you talk to me a little bit about how from your perspective 

targeted sanctions—first of all, what kind of targeted sanctions 

would you believe, if any, would work in this case? And again, 

what would be those things that you would measure relative to 

whether they were being effective or needed to be applied? A little 

bit of a twist on the question that Chairman Menendez asked. 

Ms. JACOBSON. You know, I would like to ask Tom to address 

this as well because he has a great deal of experience. 

One of the specific issues, obviously, that has been raised in the 

draft legislation is the use of sanctions in the specific area of 

human rights abuses and those who have either directed or been 

part of human rights abuses. We have certainly looked at and have 

been very forthright about the fact that we are obviously considering and consider part of the tools of our foreign policy and diplomacy sanctions, if you will, such as revocation of visas and other 

economic sanctions, whether it is asset blocking or other things, 

under the authorities that we have, that we already have. 

Senator CORKER. I think sometimes, you know, Congress feels 

like that even though you have those authorities, which we are witnessing in other countries right now, they are not utilized, and 

sometimes Congress wants to push you along. So if we were going 

to nudge you along, how would you like to be nudged in that regard? 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

15 

Ms. JACOBSON. Well, I think you will not necessarily be surprised 

to hear me say that we actually think we do not necessarily need 

the nudge. We are considering these things. We do think that right 

now they would be counterproductive, that they would enable the 

Venezuelan Government to go back to that sort of victim mentality 

using us, but there may well come a time at some point in the future when they would be useful if there has not been movement at 

the table. I may leave to my colleague to express when he believes 

they would be useful. Targeted sanctions have been useful around 

the issue of human rights in other cases. But I think they would 

have to be very specific, and we would have to be looking at a 

sticking point in an area of negotiation where things were not moving forward. 

Senator CORKER. So you would be concerned that they today 

might be a unifying thing within the government versus something 

that would be helpful towards moving them along, before we move 

to Tom. 

Ms. JACOBSON. Absolutely. Unfortunately, I do think they would 

be a unifying factor in the government, and I think they would 

serve to reinforce the narrative of this being about the Venezuelan 

Government standing up to the United States, unfortunately, 

which is not a narrative we want to see. This is about the Venezuelans standing up for their own rights. 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. I am a big believer in targeted sanctions, as 

many of you know. We have employed them in a number of contexts that are not entirely different from this one. I would point to 

Burma over the years as a place where targeted sanctions were 

particularly effective in not just highlighting human rights abuses, 

because that is symbolic, but in empowering an opposition to pursue success in dialogue with an authoritarian regime. We are employing them in Russia and Ukraine in a somewhat different context but one that is rooted in a human rights crisis. They work in 

some places. They do not work everywhere. Timing is extremely 

important. 

And as I mentioned before, I think one of the most important factors that we have to consider, again on a day-by-day, week-by-week 

basis, is what are the people on the ground telling us. What is 

going to be helpful to them? What is going to empower them? What 

do they think is going to be effective as a way of dividing the government in question from its support base? What is going to give 

them leverage? 

So for me, this is really a day-by-day, week-by-week question in 

Venezuela. I have absolutely no objection in principle to the use of 

targeted sanction, and I have got no objection to being nudged because that is Congress’ role. But I do want to make sure that if we 

do this, we do it at a time—— 

The CHAIRMAN. This is refreshing. 

Mr. MALINOWSKI [continuing]. That is going to give us the best 

chance of achieving our objectives. 

Let me suggest one other factor, and that is that wherever we 

have used targeted sanctions, it has been extremely important to 

try to make the pressure that we apply as multilateral as possible, 

whether that is getting other countries to apply sanctions of their 

own or just diplomatic pressure. And that is another element of the 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

16 

timing here. I want to make sure that if and when we take this 

step, if we feel that we need to, we do it at a moment where it will 

be best timed to generate multilateral pressure. And I think a 

question that some of our partners will ask is have we given this 

dialogue enough of a chance. Now, one may feel that that time has 

come. One may feel that that time has not yet come yet, but that 

is an extremely important consideration I think we have to take 

into consideration. 

Senator CORKER. Mr. Chairman, thank you. 

I want to thank you, Tom, for the tremendous efforts you have 

put forth in other arenas relative to human rights. It seems to me 

there may be a little daylight between the two of you in your presentations today, and my guess is other members of the committee 

may exploit that. But we thank you both for being here and we 

look forward to—— 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. We both agree that this is not the time to use 

the tool, and I think we both agree that it is a potentially effective 

tool. It is a question of picking the right time to make sure that 

we achieve the effect that we want. 

The CHAIRMAN. Before I call on Senator Durbin, let me just make 

two observations—I cannot resist—especially for the ranking member, who I think will appreciate one of these observations. 

I have never had the administration—this or other ones, not just 

this administration, to be very fair—ever look at me on the question of sanctions and suggest to me that it is not a unifying factor 

for the government that is targeted. I heard that about Iran. We 

have heard it to some degree about Russia. So that question of a 

unifying factor for the government that is targeted is always going 

to be a reality. They will always feel like this is the United States 

and others trying to impact us. So I am not greatly moved by that. 

And to the extent they will consider themselves victims, well, the 

only victims are the members of civil society who are suffering in 

jails. The only victims being tortured are members of civil society. 

The only people who are victims are political leaders who are in jail 

simply because they have a different view than the government. 

They are the ultimate victims here. So I am not too worried about 

Maduro feeling like a victim, although I do appreciate the issue of 

timing, but we may have a difference at some point in time as to 

when that is the appropriate time. 

Senator Durbin. 

Senator DURBIN. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you for your testimony. 

Senator McCain and I and others on the panel visited Ukraine 

6 or so weeks ago, and I came back to Chicago to report to the 

Ukrainian Americans—and we have a lot of them, maybe the most 

in the country—in Ukrainian Village, a section of Chicago. And I 

have noted that there were many, many Ukrainians, 500 or more, 

Poles, Lithuanians, Latvians, Estonians, Georgians, and Venezuelans. And we talked for a few minutes afterward, and I could 

not help but be struck by some parallels and similarities when we 

look at realpolitik in the 21st century between Nicolas Maduro and 

Vladimir Putin. Both of them have the military and the police force 

behind them, but their club, their political club, their source of extortion is energy. 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

17 

And then I take a look at the vote in the United Nations when 

it comes to condemning Vladimir Putin’s aggression in Ukraine. 

And the list of the nations that voted against us on the side of 

Putin include Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Cuba, Dominica, Ecuador, 

El Salvador, Guyana, Jamaica, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Saint Kitts 

and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, 

Suriname, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Many of these nations have 

suffered under military regimes, but they were prepared to look the 

other way when it came to Vladimir Putin in the Ukraine. And I 

think it has a lot to do with the fact that they are under the same 

pressure when it comes to energy and when it comes to Venezuelan 

oil. 

We saw the same thing in the closing of the OAS meeting which 

I think was an indication that they feel the pressure that comes 

on them from the oil exports from Venezuela. 

I would like to ask you, either or both, to comment on that, but 

I would like you to also comment on something else. One of the 

major customers when it comes to Venezuelan oil and the purchase 

of that commodity is the United States of America. How do we reconcile this notion that we are trying to at least indirectly pressure 

Venezuela into positive political change while we subscribe to—or 

at least while we are part of the support of his economy through 

the purchase of oil? Would that not be very obvious for us to lessen 

our dependence on Venezuelan oil as an indication of our feelings 

about their political regime? 

Ms. JACOBSON. Thank you, Senator Durbin. 

Let me start out by saying that, not being an expert on oil or the 

administration’s point person on energy policy, I have long ago recognized that I dare not venture too far into making comments 

about our energy policy or who we purchase oil from to mess up 

the energy market. So I am going to be a little tentative there. 

But I will say that one of the things I think is important over 

the last couple of years is you have seen a steady downward trend 

in imports from Venezuela, United States imports of Venezuelan 

oil, a steady downward trend. I believe the percentage over the last 

decade or so is 10 percent or more reduction in Venezuelan oil coming into the United States. And I think that is likely to continue 

as U.S. production increases. 

So I do think that our dependence and our purchase of Venezuelan oil is likely to continue to decrease. It is one of the reasons 

the Venezuelans have been seeking other markets, including the 

Chinese. 

On the question of the vote in the United Nations, in particular, 

and also in the OAS, let me say that in the U.N., the countries that 

you mentioned—I would split them a little bit because the ones 

that I think we are really talking about are the Caribbean countries and some of the Central American countries who are highly 

dependent on imported oil, which has been a serious problem for 

those countries for a long time. It has been a problem because of 

cost, which is why they are so attracted to subsidized heavy oil, but 

it has also been a problem because of simple dependence on one 

source of energy. And it has been something that we have been 

working with those countries on for a long time, but I think it has 

become a more acute problem as we have all realized over the last 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

18 

few years that it is not just an economic problem and an environmental problem. It is also a political problem. 

And so we have been talking to those countries about how they 

diversify their sources of energy, about how we can help them with 

that process. And we have also begun to talk with neighbors who 

can play a role in that process. When the President was in Toluca 

in Mexico in March for the North American Leaders Summit, he 

talked extensively with the leaders of Canada and Mexico about 

how we could work together to help the countries of Central America and the Caribbean because all of us are increasing our energy 

production. And the countries in those two subregions can only 

really increase their own attractiveness to investors, whether it is 

in other forms of fossil fuel like natural gas or it is in renewables, 

as a regional market. 

Senator DURBIN. You are taking this off in an area which is very 

interesting and should be the subject of a hearing. What I am asking you is when it comes to our importing Venezuelan oil—you 

have said we have lessened our imports because we are producing 

more. We now have an intervening situation, post-Chavez. We have 

a situation in Venezuela that we are trying to show some leadership in suggesting they democratize their own nation. I do not 

think the natural diminishing of our imports, as we have more 

fracking in the United States, is what I am talking about. I am 

talking about whether or not we make a statement or prepare to 

make a statement that if Venezuela is not going to be more forthcoming in negotiations or in democratization, we are going to start 

not gradually but eliminating our import of Venezuelan oil. Why 

would we not say that? 

Ms. JACOBSON. Senator, I do not know what the cutoff in our 

purchase of Venezuelan oil would do to oil and gas prices in the 

United States, and I do not know what our policy—the impact on 

our economy would be of no longer purchasing Venezuelan oil. We 

have a long, and our oil companies have long, commercial relationships with Venezuela. So I just cannot tell you that that would be 

something that economically from one day to the next would be 

something we would do. 

Senator DURBIN. You have just made such an argument against 

sanctions by saying this could hurt our country if we impose sanctions on Venezuela. How are we ever going to rally countries 

around the world to join us in any sanctions regime related to 

Ukraine or related to Venezuela if the first line of defense is, 

please, I do not want to inconvenience us? Now you have just said 

sanctions are really not going to be worth the conversation. We 

cannot have it both ways. I do not want to see our military engaged 

around the world. I want to see effective sanctions regimes, but if 

you start saying, you know, we may feel this if we impose some 

sanctions, for goodness sakes, is that not what it is all about, that 

we feel it, at least temporarily to solve a problem so we avoid sending in military force? 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. In the conversation about sanctions, energy 

sanctions are the nuclear option in all of these contexts, and it is 

true in the Russia-Ukraine situation as well, as you know, Senator, 

where we have started with targeted individualized sanctions on 

individuals, then on entities, then on companies, and have made 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

19 

clear that we are prepared to go to much deeper sanctions against 

sectors, one of which, in the case of Russia, is the energy sector, 

if the situation demands it, but recognizing that of all the sanctions 

that one can consider in a situation like that, that would be the one 

with the greatest economic costs, not just for us but for the global 

economy. All sanctions have costs, and absolutely you cannot have 

an effective sanction that does not hurt anybody. But one does have 

to take into account the costs, and I think in any of these situations, if we go down the sanctions route, I think we would probably 

begin with carefully targeted and calibrated sanctions which I 

think generally tend to be effective on their own. 

Senator DURBIN. Thank you. 

Ms. JACOBSON. Can I have one more point? I am sorry, Senator. 

That is exactly right. But part of the reason that we have not 

looked at that is really not just about us. It is about the Venezuelan people that would be hurt by such a cutoff as well. 

Senator DURBIN. I think you continue to make arguments 

against sanctions. And I have to ask you, What is your alternative? 

I mean, as Senator Menendez has said, every time we start to impose sanctions, they say, well, you are just going to unify the country that we are targeting for sanctions. And if we start with the 

premise that we cannot do anything that might affect the Venezuelan economy because it will hurt innocent people, we find ourselves, at the end of the day, saying, well, there just are not many 

sanctions. You know, prohibiting John McCain from visiting Russia 

I am sure was a great blow, but he has somehow weathered that 

storm. But we have to think in terms of if we are not going to use 

military force, what are sanctions that might result in a positive 

outcome. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Rubio. 

Senator RUBIO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and the ranking member, for holding this hearing. 

I want to bring some clarity to this hearing. I appreciate very 

much Senator Durbin’s voice on this issue, and I agree with just 

about everything he has said. But I want to refocus us back on 

what this hearing is about. 

The purpose of this hearing is that there has been a bill filed in 

the Congress to sanction individuals related to and in the Government of Venezuela for human rights violations committed against 

their own people. People have been murdered in Venezuela. People 

are detained indefinitely in Venezuela. Even as we speak, Leopoldo 

Lopez—his hearing has, once again, been indefinitely postponed. 

There was a young man sodomized in Venezuela by government 

forces. Women have been threatened, threatened with rape in Venezuela by government forces and those aligned with the government. 

What we are talking about here are sanctions against individuals 

responsible for human rights violations. It is typical in this process 

to set up these straw men, oh, we are not going to send boots on 

the ground, we are not going to sanction the oil industry. The bill 

we have filed does not do any of that. We have filed a piece of legislation, and the purpose of this hearing is to call attention to human 

rights violations in Venezuela. And what we are saying is we 

should sanction human rights violators who, by the way, happen to 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

20 

be people that travel to the United States with impunity, buy properties in the United States, laugh at us along the way, invest in 

our banks, send their kids to our schools. They have zero respect 

for this Government. 

What I have heard here today in responses, we do not want to 

sanction these people because it might unite them against us. Let 

me give you a brief bulletin: They are already united against us, 

other than when they come here to benefit from our free society on 

weekends in Miami and then go back and live off their newfound 

millions and billions that they have stolen from the people of Venezuela. 

This is not a hearing on oil sanctions. There is no bill before us 

to sanction oil in Venezuela. This is a bill that we are hopefully 

going to get to to sanction human rights violators in Venezuela. 

What I heard today is we should not sanction human rights violators because it might disrupt the process that is going on in Venezuela. Well, we sanctioned human rights violators in Russia. Why 

is what is happening in Russia more important than what is happening in Venezuela? We sanction human rights violators all the 

time, personally, individually, and we have their names. These are 

not even hard to find. These people brag about what they are doing 

in Venezuela. The only difference between those sanctions, those 

people and others, is they spend their weekends in Miami. They 

spend their weekends in Florida. 

Mr. Malinowski, you have in your statement—you talk about 

Globovision, which was once an independent television operation in 

Venezuela that actually covered news. What happened to 

Globovision? It was given over to allies of the Maduro regime and 

the Chavez regime. It is now a propaganda arm of Venezuela. Do 

you know where they live? Do you know where they live? They live 

in Miami. They own a multimillion dollar mansion in Cocoplum, in 

a very exclusive neighborhood in Miami. They drive up and down 

the streets in their fancy cars. They laugh at you and they laugh 

at us because they know they can get away with these things. 

So, let me ask you this. Who in the opposition in Venezuela has 

asked you not to impose sanctions against human rights violators 

because it might disrupt the dialogue? Who has asked you not to 

do that? Either one of you. Who has asked you not to impose sanctions against human rights violators among the opposition in Venezuela? 

Ms. JACOBSON. Senator, I am just not comfortable sitting here 

and giving you individual names. Members of the MUD who are 

participating in the dialogue have discussed this with us. 

Senator RUBIO. Listen to what you just told me: You are not comfortable telling me their names because you fear for their safety. 

What kind of dialogue is that? What kind of dialogue is that where 

the people that are involved in the dialogue cannot tell you what 

they really believe? That is a fake dialogue. 

So is it the policy now of the United States that as long as this 

dialogue is somewhat successful, we are going to forget the human 

rights violations? So we will just send a statement to condemn 

them, but we will not do anything about it. 

Ms. JACOBSON. Absolutely not, and I think we have both said 

that we will speak out, we will make statements, but we will also 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

21 

consider those sanctions. As Assistant Secretary Malinowski said, 

we will keep considering that and we will use those when we think 

the time is right. 

Senator RUBIO. So there is a timing element when it comes to 

human rights violations? In essence, there is a time when human 

rights violations are ripe? 

Ms. JACOBSON. There is a timing element when it comes to the 

response of a particular tactic on human rights violations, not our 

condemnation. 

Senator RUBIO. Give me an example where we have held back on 

human rights violations sanctions because of timing anywhere else 

in the world. Give me an example of when the United States has 

said, we know you have committed human rights violations, but we 

are not going to sanction you because we are waiting for something 

else to happen. Give me an example of when we have done that 

successfully. Mr. Malinowski, you have been involved in this. 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. I mentioned Burma as a case where we have 

applied sanctions very effectively over time. There are still human 

rights violations going on in Burma, but we have a process. We 

have a democratic process, a process of dialogue. And in consultation with the opposition, we have not continued to impose additional targeted sanctions over the last couple of years but remain 

ready—— 

Senator RUBIO. Why did the dialogue happen in Burma? 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. In Burma? 

Senator RUBIO. Yes. What was one of the things that led to the 

dialogue being successful? 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. As I acknowledged a few moments ago, sanctions in that case did. We had an opposition in Burma that made 

very, very clear that at that point it was important and useful and 

effective for the United States—— 

Senator RUBIO. I agree with what you said. This is not a United 

States-Venezuela issue. This is for the Venezuelan people to decide 

what they want to do with the future of their politics. The purpose 

of our policy here is not the change the government of Venezuela, 

despite Maduro’s claims. That is not for us to decide. That is for 

the people of Venezuela to decide. What we are saying is we have 

individuals that benefit greatly from the economy of the United 

States, particularly in my State. They benefit greatly from what 

they do in this country with our banks, our schools, our businesses. 

They invest with impunity throughout Florida and the country. 

These people also happen to be human rights violators or the associates of human rights violators. And all I am saying is we should 

sanction them for what they did. This is not about changing the 

government in Venezuela. That is up to the people of Venezuela to 

decide. This is about punishing and shaming individuals responsible for human rights violations. 

And I guess, to your point, Mr. Malinowski—I mean, I know your 

reputation. The first time we met was in a prison in Libya. We 

were not living there, either one of us. I mean, we met there, as 

we were touring it. [Laughter.] 

This is what you have dedicated your life to. I know you are not 

here today to argue that we should somehow look the other way 

on human rights sanctions—— 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

22 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. I am not. 

Senator RUBIO [continuing]. Until the appropriate time. 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. Sanctions serve two purposes in a situation 

like this. 

One is accountability, and there are times when we impose sanctions on people who have done horrible things because they have 

done horrible things and because it is the only thing we can do to 

make sure that they pay a price. 

There are other times when we impose sanctions and we determine the timing of the imposition of sanctions because we think 

there is a chance to make the kind of political progress that will 

end those human rights violations. 

Now, in a country like North Korea, for example, there is not a 

scintilla of a chance that I see of political progress that is going to 

free people from concentration camps. In a situation like that, the 

role of sanctions is to highlight the problem and to impose accountability. 

On Russia, there is no dialogue. 

Senator RUBIO. I know, but I cannot believe that your position, 

given your history, is that the United States must now—so now our 

message to the people of Venezuela and to those who have suffered 

at the hands of these brutal oppressors is I am so sorry that you 

were sodomized by a pipe or by the butt of a rifle, but we think, 

for the sake of your country, that we are going to hold off shaming 

the people and sanctioning the people responsible for ordering that 

because we think there might be some sort of dialogue that may 

one day allow you to own one newspaper that is free in Venezuela, 

or we think there might be a day where you might technically 

allow them to let you protest somewhere at a time of their choosing 

and of their way. 

How can that be our policy? How can the United States not firmly be on the side of people who are being violated in this systemic 

way? I just do not understand how our foreign policy can be about 

that. 

We are not asking for sanctions. We are not calling for an oil embargo or anything of that nature. We are calling on identifying 

human rights violators in Venezuela, naming them by name, and 

sanctioning them for what they have done. And I just do not understand how we can sit here and say that the time is not right to do 

that. I do not understand how we can say we should wait for some 

point in the future when the timing might be right to do that because by admission, what you are saying is that if the Venezuelan 

Government does certain things over the next few months, that day 

may never come. And I just do not understand how that could be 

our foreign policy. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Kaine. 

Senator KAINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And to the witnesses, I hope I do not trod ground that was on 

before I walked in. But I am a little interested in your take on the 

Venezuelan economy right now. I view much of the unrest as being 

driven by kind of an autocratic, oil-dominated economy where corrupt people at the top skim off a lot, but it is probably an 

unsustainable economic model. And I would view that as driving 

increasing political unrest and creating a demand for and opporFOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

23 

tunity for political change in Venezuela. But if you could begin 

there. Talk a little bit about the state of the economy in the early 

months of this new Maduro government. 

Ms. JACOBSON. I think that the economic situation, Senator, is 

indeed increasingly unsustainable. You have a situation in which 

I think the latest inflation figures are 57.3 percent, and continuing 

to go up, among the highest in the world. 

Senator KAINE. In a world where inflation is generally very, very 

low right now. 

Ms. JACOBSON. Correct. And you have recent wage increases that 

have been granted, which cannot possibly keep up with inflation 

like that and, therefore, will not really satisfy the needs of Venezuelans. But moreover, you have a situation in which Venezuelans 

cannot find basic foodstuffs. A country with among the largest, if 

not the largest oil reserves in the world where people cannot find 

basic goods on the shelves, even if they had the money to buy 

them. 

So you also have a situation in which foreign businesses cannot 

get the exchange to take their—— 

Senator KAINE. Holdings out of the country. 

Ms. JACOBSON. Foreign exchange out of the country. They cannot 

operate productively in the country. 

Senator KAINE. So foreign direct investment must have slowed. 

Ms. JACOBSON. It is drying up significantly. There is really a serious problem that foreign businesses are having, but Venezuelan 

businesses are having difficulty. That is why there is an economic 

dialogue that is taking place at the same time to try and come up 

with solutions, but so far the government’s exhortations in that 

conversation have largely been to increase national production. 

There is no incentive at this point to do so. Major economic changes 

have to be made, and I am sure you will hear from Moises Naim 

a bit more about that. It is not sustainable. 

Senator KAINE. And the changes generally do not get made if the 

autocrats feel like they can use their natural resource revenues to 

just kind of keep things limping along. You have all kinds of structural changes that need to be made. 

Ms. JACOBSON. Right, and I think high oil prices, obviously, have 

enabled this to continue, and most of the analysts suggest that this 

is not a situation that can change overnight. This is going to take 

serious structural changes in Venezuela and some time. And I am 

concerned that without a democratic space in which people feel 

they have an opportunity to express their opinion, to speak freely, 

hard economic changes are not going to be accepted by people if 

you cannot have a debate and a dialogue about them. 

Senator KAINE. What is the current government saying about 

making economic reforms or doing fundamental economic change? 

Is it just not even on the radar screen? 

Ms. JACOBSON. I have to tell you so far we are seeing very little 

acceptance that real change is necessary. There is a willingness for 

the first time to acknowledge discussion has to be had. What we 

are not seeing yet is a willingness to discuss real economic policy 

change. As I say, so far there has been an exhortation to greater 

national production by manufacturers and industry, not yet really 

changes in economic policy, which we have understood to have been 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

24 

urged by many of their neighbors as well because this is impacting 

the region too. 

Senator KAINE. What is the current practice of the government 

with respect to oil subsidies to other nations? They seemed like 

they were purchasing foreign policy alliances through subsidized 

oil. But with a challenged economy and inflation being high and 

people not having basic foodstuffs, devoting resources to adventurism in foreign policy would seem to be less and less tenable economically. Is the Maduro government changing the Chavez practice 

with respect to trying to buy friends through subsidized exports? 

Ms. JACOBSON. My understanding is that that is a fundamental 

part of Venezuelan policy that continues, Petro Caribe continues, 

although it is difficult to sustain economically. It has been cut 

back. There have been reductions in the amount of oil that some 

countries are receiving under Petro Caribe. There has been a reduction in the generosity of terms that new agreements have provided, and some countries have chosen not to go into the agreement 

because of that, but it continues in many cases. And it clearly puts 

a strain on the government in some cases to continue these kinds 

of deals. 

Senator KAINE. Here is a question that is probably impossible to 

answer, but to kind of get me just oriented, I would like each of 

your opinions. 

The civil unrest in Venezuela is driven primarily by resistance 

to an autocratic government that abuses human rights or driven 

primarily by popular understanding that the economy is in real 

trouble and people do not have the economic opportunities that 

they want? 

Ms. JACOBSON. My answer would be absolutely both, and I think 

the two, unfortunately, are now in a very bad reinforcing cycle. 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. It is the interplay between the two I think. 

People protest when they feel that the economic conditions that 

they are suffering are, in part, the result of not having representation, not having accountability, not having transparency when they 

sense there is a political cause for economic suffering. 

Senator KAINE. So there is a political cause for economic suffering and the leaders are not taking the steps needed and not 

tackling the fundamental changes necessary to change the economic situation. That will continue to embolden opposition, deepen 

the roots—— 

Ms. JACOBSON. And there is no political space. None of the institutions give the opposition political space to represent those views. 

Senator KAINE. When the elections were held and Maduro won 

over the opposition, I think I was in a tiny camp that was not sure 

it would be a good for the opposition to win these elections because 

the accumulated economic challenges were so massive that there 

was going to be some kind of a collapse and then a blame game, 

and it would be better for the people to get blamed who actually 

put in place all the economic policies that are fomenting the collapse rather than have somebody get in and then be blamed for a 

collapse that they frankly did not create. I am not 100 percent sure 

of my confidence level of my own opinion about that because, obviously, you see all the things that the Maduro government is doing 

that are so horrible. 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

25 

But I think the economic situation we are seeing is going to continue to get worse and worse and worse. There is going to be a resistance to change and an attempt to use kind of strong words and 

carisma as a substitute for policy change. It is going to continue to 

make the economy worse and worse, and that is going to create 

even more momentum on the opposition side. And we have to find 

the policies where we can—again, it is for the Venezuelan people 

to decide. But this opposition is going to just assume more and 

more momentum because of these economic factors, and if there is 

a targeted set of strategies that we can embrace to paint a different 

vision for the Venezuelan economy, I think that would be a good 

thing for us to do. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Senator Johnson. 

Senator JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator Kaine just used the words ‘‘it is for the Venezuelan people to decide,’’ but what prospect do they really have of actually 

making an informed decision? 

Senator Durbin made the connection, and I was with him in 

Ukraine and also with Senator McCain in Moldova. And one of the 

takeaways from those trips is that the propaganda of Vladimir 

Putin is incredibly effective and that America, the West, has pretty 

well unilaterally withdrawn from efforts of trying to inform those 

populations that are subjected to that propaganda. So let me really 

start there. 

To what extent is there any free press still existing in Venezuela? 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. Well, I think as we both outlined in our testimony, one of the central strategies of the Venezuelan Government 

under both Chavez and Maduro has been to steadily dismantle the 

free press, particularly on television, which is what, as in many 

countries, most people get their news from, by shutting down stations, by forcing them to take new ownership, through threats, intimidation, by beating up people on the streets who are taking 

video which eventually is then evidence that the TV stations use 

of abuses that are being committed. And that creates a climate in 

which the government is able to act with greater impunity and 

fewer checks. 

Senator JOHNSON. Correct. My question is, Is there an existence 

of any counter to that within Venezuela or from without? 

Ms. JACOBSON. The only thing that I would say is there are—I 

mean, one of the reasons you saw Colombia’s NTN24 expelled and 

then reinvited into Colombia—I am not sure if they are operating 

at this point—is that foreign stations were, of course, still operating. And so for those who had cable or had packages that had 

foreign stations, they were still able to see Venezuelan news being 

broadcast by foreign stations. This is not the way Venezuelans 

should be getting their news, obviously. So there are ways still or 

via the Internet or other things. But in terms of the mass of Venezuelans to have complete access to media within Venezuela, it is 

very difficult. There are still ways, but it is not massive and broadcast. 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

26 

Senator JOHNSON. Again, so I agree with Senator Rubio that I 

think targeted sanctions to highlight these gross abuses of human 

rights is a good thing. We should implement them immediately. 

But the point I am trying to make is I think a statement by— 

one of the witnesses said we have to speak out, we have to make 

statements. Well, that is good for speaking out and making statements here in America, but how does it get to the people in Venezuela? What is the United States doing not only just in Venezuela 

but also in the rest of South America and Central America where 

certainly over my lifetime my impression is we are not moving in 

a direction of democracy? We are moving away from democracy. We 

are moving toward greater socialism. What is America doing in 

terms of a robust effort to provide information to the population of 

those countries so they are not subject to the propaganda? 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. There are some things that we can do and we 

do actually have programs inside Venezuela—I do not want to go 

into detail here, but we can come and talk to you about them—that 

do help civil society groups, NGO’s, activists get access to information, particularly online. They do get information through social 

media. That is not shut down. My Twitter feed today is full of messages from Venezuelans who know about this hearing, and they are 

going to know every word that was spoken here. So it is not a 

closed information space. This is a contested space in which the 

Venezuelan opposition and civil society with support from their 

friends outside of Venezuela are still holding their own. 

Senator JOHNSON. What is the percentage of the population of 

Venezuela that has access to social media? 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. I do not have a number for that, but I think 

among activists, it is extremely high. This is how they organize. 

Senator JOHNSON. But, I mean, the general population that are 

going to be voting—how many of those individuals actually have 

access to that type of information? I mean, is it high? Is it 90 percent? Is it 10 percent? And I guess my point was should we not 

know? 

Is there any attempt to broadcast over the airwaves, either TV 

or radio, more information in a far more robust fashion? And do 

you think that would be a good idea and not only in Venezuela, 

into other areas of South and Central America? Should America 

start broadcasting its values of freedom and democracy to the rest 

of the world? Have we withdrawn from the world from that standpoint? That is the impression I get. 

Ms. JACOBSON. Senator, there is still a great of information that 

we get out, whether it is through Voice of America, Spanish language throughout the hemisphere, whether it is statements and 

other things that we get picked up on commercial stations throughout the hemisphere. I think our message is being picked up 

throughout the hemisphere both on commercial and other media. 

And I think it is absolutely true, as Tom says, that there are still 

media that people have access to in Venezuela. I do think also that 

the word gets around throughout Venezuelan society when we say 

things and when we make statements beyond activists in the population. 

Senator JOHNSON. Is it your impression that our efforts are winning that information war? 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

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Ms. JACOBSON. No, I would not say that we are winning that information war yet because it is one of the reasons why, obviously, 

we continue to be disturbed about the restrictions on press freedom. It is not as open, obviously, a society as it should be. 

Senator JOHNSON. So that is my point. I think we are losing the 

information war whether it is in Eastern Europe, whether it is 

eastern Ukraine, whether it is in South and Central America, or 

whether it is in Venezuela. We are losing the war. I think we have 

to recognize that reality, and I think we have to beef up our efforts 

to a far greater extent. Would you agree or disagree with that? 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. I would agree that we need to do more in Eastern Europe, for example, where we have a new threat that 5, 10, 

15 years ago, following the fall of the Berlin Wall, many people in 

the United States hoped we would not face again. I was just in the 

Baltic States. I know it is not the subject of this hearing, but people were talking about this, the propaganda coming from Russia 

and the need for all of us to come together with a plan to counter 

it. We are doing a great deal, but as the threat rises, we need to 

do more. There is no question. 

Senator JOHNSON. Anyway, my point to the authors of the bill 

would be I think that would be a good component of this bill. Add 

a section there for more robust activity in terms of information into 

Venezuela. 

Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Johnson. 

Senator McCain. 

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I thank the witnesses. 

I would note I just noticed that this morning there were four 

camps of protestors that were broken up and 283 students arrested. The repression of the government continues. 

I thank you, the witnesses, for being here. 

I would point out that on the issue of sanctions, the Burma sanctions originated in the Congress. The Iran sanctions initiated with 

the Congress over the objections of the administration. The North 

Korea sanctions were relaxed during the Bush administration in a 

vane hope that there would be an agreement on North Korea. We 

have now relaxed sanctions on Iran in what I believe will be the 

failed mission to achieve an enforceable and viable agreement with 

Iran on nuclear issues. 

So it sometimes is a bit entertaining when administration witnesses come forward and talk about how tough various administrations have been on sanctions when, by and large, they have initiated with the Congress. I particularly point to the Iran sanctions 

were vigorously opposed by the administration. 

I am curious. The witnesses, either one, would like to say—Cuba 

is heavily involved in Venezuela and in their activities. Maybe you 

could give the committee a quick readout on what the Cubans are 

doing in Venezuela. 

Ms. JACOBSON. Well, what I can tell you, Senator, is that obviously what we know from media reporting, including Venezuelaninfluenced government reporting—— 

Senator MCCAIN. I hope you have information besides what is in 

the media. 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

28 

Ms. JACOBSON. The information that I have besides what is in 

the media I probably cannot discuss in this setting. 

But what we do know is that there are about—— 

Senator MCCAIN. Let me get this straight. You cannot discuss 

what Cuba is doing in Venezuela in an open hearing? 

Ms. JACOBSON. To the extent that there was information that we 

have from intelligence sources, no, I would not. But the extent that 

we have information from other sources, that is what I am going 

to tell you. 

Information that we have is that there are about 40,000 Cuban 

advisors in Venezuela. Those advisors are doctors, teachers. They 

are in military and other areas. The Maduro government has made 

clear that they will continue what they consider a strategic alliance 

with the Cuban Government. So, we know there are a lot of Cuban 

officials and Cuban citizens in Venezuela. We do not know exactly 

what other fields they may be active in, but we do know there are 

a lot of Cuban officials in Venezuela and they are very, very active, 

including within the government. 

Senator MCCAIN. And that is an issue of significant concern? 

Ms. JACOBSON. Yes, certainly. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator McCain, would you yield for a moment? 

Senator MCCAIN. Please. 

The CHAIRMAN. Let me tell you what the State Department 

seems unwilling to tell you. If you travel to Venezuela, at the airport you will probably go through Cuban security agents to get into 

the country. Rapid response brigades, which are perfected in Cuba, 

where state security dressed as civilians to make it look like the 

civilian population is responding to protests, are actively engaged 

on behalf of the Venezuelan Government in these activities. And 

that is just the beginning of the list. So, to your question, it is a 

very prominent role and it is not just about advisors either. 

Senator MCCAIN. Well, I thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to 

thank you and Senator Rubio for your active involvement and commitment to trying to see that Venezuelan people are given a better 

government. Our witnesses have testified that the economy continues to deteriorate. That is not because of anything the United 

States has done. It is because of the corrupt government and the 

Chavezista, I think was what it was called. Tom, I have forgotten 

the exact name. 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. Your Spanish is better than mine, I am afraid. 

Senator MCCAIN. You gave a book to President Obama at one of 

the gatherings early in the administration. I am sure that the 

President got a lot out of it. 

Here is the situation I think as my two colleagues stated in a far 

more articulate fashion than I can. We see a deteriorating situation. We see further arrests. We see further repression. We see 

penetration of Cuba throughout Venezuela, including in their, 

quote, ‘‘law enforcement and military activities.’’ And yes, it has 

been overshadowed by Ukraine and Syria and other issues. But in 

our own hemisphere, it seems to me that we should be paying a 

lot more attention. We should be considering a lot more actions 

without asking you to draw red lines. 

But is it not really unusual for us to basically sit and watch the 

situation in Venezuela continue to deteriorate to the great suffering 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

29 

of the people of Venezuela, not to mention suppression of all those 

freedoms? 

So I would argue that maybe the message that we are trying to 

send is that if you do not act in some fashion, then again this committee will probably feel that we are forced to act. And I do not 

count votes very well, but under the leadership of our chairman 

and Senator Corker and Senator Rubio’s active involvement, I 

think a strong case has been made for us to at least consider sanctions. And I think it would be far better for us to work together 

in that effort rather than to just say, well, we are going to wait and 

see. 

So I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank the witnesses. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

I have just one final question. There is a vote going on, so I 

would like to finish with this panel, bring up the next, start the 

testimony, and then recess for a little bit. 

Madam Secretary, President Obama has determined that Venezuela has failed to meet its obligation under international narcotics agreements. The Treasury Department has designated members of the Venezuelan Government and military as kingpins, and 

the drugs flowing out of Venezuela have debilitating effects on levels of violence, governance, and the rule of law in Central America 

and the Caribbean. Given widespread signs of collusion between 

drug trafficking and the Venezuelan Government, does the situation in Venezuela constitute a national security threat to the 

United States? 

Ms. JACOBSON. Thank you, Senator, for that question because it 

is a great concern. 

I think the answer to that question is that it is a very serious 

concern to us, a national security threat. I think the answer is we 

are extremely concerned about the amount of drugs coming out of 

Venezuela. We are particularly concerned about the impact on 

countries in Central America, Honduras in particular, but frankly 

Hispaniola, both the Dominican Republic and Haiti. There is a lot 

more that needs to be done. 

The CHAIRMAN. So does it constitute a national security threat? 

Ms. JACOBSON. To the United States? 

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. If you have drugs flowing out of Venezuela 

into the hemisphere and I would say ultimately, from the routes 

of trafficking that I have seen, ultimately make it to the United 

States, either through ports or through boundary crossings or 

whatnot, is it a national security threat to the United States when 

elements of the government itself are involved, not because I say 

it, but because the administration says it? 

Ms. JACOBSON. I think we have said often that the amount of 

drugs coming from the region, the effect of those drugs on governments and societies in terms of the corruption, the violence that 

they bring with them overall in the hemisphere is certainly a 

threat to the United States, a national security threat. 

The CHAIRMAN. Is the money that we are spending in Central 

America not—why? Because we are concerned about the violence, 

about the narcotics trafficking, about the gangs that all flow from 

this. Do we not view that as a threat to the national security of 

the United States? 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

30 

Ms. JACOBSON. Yes. That is what I just said at the end of my 

statement, that I think if you look at the impact of the drug issue 

writ large and the impact it has, whether it is Central America, 

Mexico, the Caribbean, it is in fact a national security threat. That 

is why we spend the funds we do because it hollows out governments, institutions because it provokes the violence on the streets, 

because of the impact it has on our own society on the streets of 

the United States. 

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think that it affects the security of other 

countries in the region? 

Ms. JACOBSON. Certainly. 

The CHAIRMAN. And do you think those countries understand 

that threat? 

Ms. JACOBSON. Yes, I do. 

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask you one final question. Without naming names, because I know in response to Senator Rubio, you said 

you were reticent to name names, can you tell the committee under 

the testimony that you have given that you have been specifically 

asked by members of the civil society that are in negotiations or 

not in negotiations not to pursue human rights sanctions? 

Ms. JACOBSON. We have been specifically asked not to pursue 

sanctions at this time. 

The CHAIRMAN. No, I did not say that. 

Ms. JACOBSON. I am sorry. Not to pursue them—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Let me repeat it because maybe my English is 

a little difficult. Have you been asked by members of civil society, 

whether those who are at the negotiating or those who are not, not 

to pursue human rights violations sanctions? Yes or no? 

Ms. JACOBSON. I am not sure exactly what you mean, if you 

mean as the bill now stands, economic sanctions against human 

rights—for human rights violators? Is that what you mean? 

The CHAIRMAN. Sanctions against human rights violators. 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. The qualification is ‘‘at this time.’’ 

Ms. JACOBSON. The answer is yes, if you mean, yes, they have 

asked us not to pursue them at this time. 

The CHAIRMAN. Human rights violations sanctions. 

Ms. JACOBSON. Yes. 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. Those are the sanctions that are on the table. 

Ms. JACOBSON. That are on the table, yes. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, in a different setting then, we are going to 

find out who are the people who asked you. And I would love to 

hear from the civil society inside of Venezuela that they do not 

want to see sanctions against human rights violators. I would find 

that incredible, but if that is what the leadership of Venezuela of 

civil society wants, then I would be happy to hear it. 

Ms. JACOBSON. I would never characterize it as civil society in 

Venezuela because I am well aware that there are many who do, 

and I respect that view as well. 

The CHAIRMAN. Okay. So now I am confused. Is it that there are 

some members of civil society who say do not violate civil rights 

and there are others who do say violate? 

Ms. JACOBSON. Yes. There is a diversity of opinion on that subject. 

The CHAIRMAN. That is a little different. 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

31 

Ms. JACOBSON. Yes. I would certainly acknowledge that. 

The CHAIRMAN. With the appreciation of the committee, this 

panel is excused. 

Let me call up a very important panel that we have, and I would 

like to get them set up. I welcome Patrick Duddy, who is the 

former U.S. Ambassador to Venezuela and visiting faculty at the 

Fuqua School of Business at Duke University, Mr. Ambassador, 

thank you for joining us; Moises Naim, who is a senior International Economics Associate of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; and Jose Miguel Vivanco, who is the executive director of the Americas Division at Human Rights Watch. Thank 

you all for being here. 

Let me remind all of you that your full statements will be included in the record, without objection. 

We have got what I hope will be about 10 minutes or so before 

our deadline to catch the first vote. So I think we can get the first 

of the testimony here, and then we will have to have a brief recess 

and come back for the rest. 

And with that, Ambassador Duddy, we will start with you. 

STATEMENT OF HON. PATRICK D. DUDDY, VISITING FACULTY, 

THE FUQUA SCHOOL OF BUSINESS, DUKE UNIVERSITY, DURHAM, NC 

Ambassador DUDDY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the 

committee, Senator Rubio. I appreciate having the opportunity to 

share my observations today on the current situation. 

As we have heard, since President Chavez’s death last March, 

circumstances in Venezuela have markedly deteriorated. The economy, in particular, was in terrible shape when Maduro took over. 

It is worse now. The murder rate in 2012, for instance, was startlingly high. By the end of 2013, it was even higher. In February 

of this year, the popular discontent with the deteriorating conditions boiled over into the most widespread antigovernment demonstrations the country has seen in more than a decade. The government of President Nicolas Maduro was clearly alarmed by the 

scope and intensity of the mass rallies and reacted brutally to the 

demonstrators. 

Now, in response to rising levels of international concern and the 

determination of the antigovernment protestors to continue to demonstrate, the Maduro administration agreed to participate in the 

talks we have heard referenced today, mediated by the Union of 

South American Nations, UNASUR, and the Vatican. Like most observers, I hope that this effort is successful in ending the violence 

and that it facilitates the development of a genuine dialogue. I do 

believe it is going to be difficult and the arrests, which again were 

mentioned this morning, underscore just how very difficult that 

may well be. 

Not all of the leadership of the opposition is participating, and 

the government continues to demonize the opposition and to suggest that the country has been the target economic warfare. And 

even since the beginning of these UNASUR-sponsored talks, the 

Chavista-dominated Supreme Court announced a ruling asserting 

that the right to peacefully protest, quote/unquote, ‘‘without prior 

permission’’ is not absolute, notwithstanding the language of article 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

32 

68 of the Venezuelan constitution, a move which analysts have 

characterized as a clear effort to criminalize dissent. 

As we consider the current situation in Venezuela, I think it is 

important to recognize some of the factors that militate against an 

early solution. In this context, the dismal state of the economy is 

critical. Last year, Venezuela grew, according to some estimates, at 

an anemic 1.3 percent. I have seen estimates that were even lower. 

Most analysts expect the economy to be worse next year. The Central Bank’s own figures for inflation suggest it has now climbed to 

59 percent. And the scarcity of basic consumer goods has become 

so acute that standing in lines to buy foodstuffs has become a part 

of the daily routine for millions of Venezuelans. I might add to that 

as we consider the issue of the opposition, but also the larger public, staying in the street and continuing to put pressure on the government—this is one of the things that scarcity is doing. 

Now, recent polling suggests that the Venezuelan public is overwhelmingly unhappy with the current state of the country. According to a Datanalisis poll released just the other day, their unhappiness is at approximately 79.5 percent, and by a large majority, 

about 59.2 percent, they blame the Maduro administration for the 

mess. 

Increasingly, however, according to most of the polling I have 

seen, the public’s unhappiness has not yet evolved into unambiguous majority support for the opposition. While support for Maduro 

has fallen, Chavismo retains a strong base even if it does not now 

enjoy majority support. Support for the opposition is also solid but 

not monolithic. And emblematic of their situation is the fact that 

some groups are not participating in the UNASUR-mediated dialogue. 

The bottom line, however, I think for our purposes is that Venezuela remains both deeply polarized and also nearly equally divided. Supporters of the government are not just vested but dependent on the social programs of the government. Supporters of 

the opposition are united in their belief that the government is taking the country in the wrong direction, that the country’s political 

institutions have been compromised, and that the economy is in a 

freefall. 

They have yet, however, to articulate convincingly an economic 

alternative that would reassure both the business community and 

the Chavista base. And I want to stress that I think these economic 

considerations are fundamental as we look toward the possibility or 

the prospects for the future. I think the likelihood of further clashes is great and is alarming, and it is particularly alarming because 

of how the government has responded to the protests to date. 

So where does this leave the United States? What are our interests? What are our options? We have spent decades in the hemisphere trying to restore and consolidate democracy. We have made 

human rights a cornerstone of our political engagement. The 

hollowing out of Venezuela’s political institutions is cause for deep 

concern, as well as the reports of systematic human rights abuse. 

The government’s use of force with the demonstrators, the refusal 

to disarm the colectivos, the increasing hostility toward the independent media should, of course, be a concern not just for us but 

for all of the hemisphere. It is also true that we have tried to proFOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

33 

mote the notion of hemispheric cooperation, and it remains to be 

seen if the UNASUR can and will foster a genuine dialogue. Certainly the vote recently at the OAS, which closed the session in 

which the Venezuelan legislator Maria Carina Machado was scheduled to speak, was I think very disappointing to many of us. 

In the meantime, we need to be aware that the Maduro administration and indeed—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Ambassador, I am going to ask you to just hold 

there. I want you to finish your statement, but the time for the 

vote has expired. They are just holding it for Senator Rubio and 

I. So we will recess. There are three votes. This is the first. So it 

will be another 20 minutes. So we will recess for about 20 minutes. 

We will return and listen to the rest. To the extent that you need 

to make any calls, it might be a good time. The committee stands 

in recess subject to the call of the chair. 

[Recess.] 

The CHAIRMAN. This hearing will come back to order. With apologies to our witnesses, unfortunately, there were more votes than I 

thought. We regret the delay, but your testimony is very important 

to us. So, Ambassador Duddy, you were concluding, and I want to 

hear your conclusions. 

Ambassador DUDDY. Thank you, sir. 

I left off saying with the question where does the current situation leave us, what are our interests, what are our options. I noted 

that we have spent decades working on democracy and human 

rights in the region, but also on the concept or on mechanisms for 

collective action. And I noted my concern that the recent vote at— 

or my observation that the recent vote at the OAS was very disappointing. 

A couple of things that I would like to just revisit. We need to 

be aware that as the Maduro administration and, indeed, Chavez’s 

whole Bolivarian experiment have foundered, Maduro and company 

have looked to blame the United States. And, indeed, anti-Americanism has long been a central tenet of the Bolivarian revolution. 

In the current circumstance, the Maduro government would clearly 

love to turn their domestic crisis into a bilateral one, and we 

should not be sucked into that dynamic by taking steps unilaterally 

at this point that would validate Maduro’s wild accusations. After 

15 years in power the government owns this crisis. They made it 

and it is theirs. Unilateral action would risk rallying both the 

Chavista base and much of the region. 

So I know that there are some who have already dismissed the 

notion of economic sanctions, and that, sir, is not on your agenda. 

But I did want to touch on one or two things before ceding to my 

fellow panelists. 

It is true that the United States still has a robust trade relationship with Caracas. 2013 bilateral trade apparently totaled more 

than $45 billion, and Venezuela remains the fourth-largest foreign 

supplier of oil to the United States. But the total volume of oil 

sales to the United States fell to less than 800,000 barrels a day 

last year and with increased production, reduced domestic consumption and increased supplies from Canada and elsewhere, VenFOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

34 

ezuela’s oil imports to the United States are substantially less important to us than they used to be. 

They remain, however, immensely important to Venezuela’s economy, and the country’s very vulnerability on that score is one of the 

reasons I think why we probably do not want to use a doomsday 

tactic like economic sanctions against that sector to coerce the Venezuelan Government into changing its behavior. Economic sanctions could well collapse an already staggering, imploding economy 

and cause great suffering to the Venezuelan people, as well as 

harming many of the smaller nations of the Caribbean which, 

through the Petro Caribe program, depend on Venezuela’s concessionary financing for oil imports. And more importantly, such a 

course would not necessarily yield an improved human rights situation, greater respect for the Venezuelan opposition’s political rights, 

or restore the country’s debilitated political institutions. 

So does that mean we can do nothing? No. We can aggressively 

hold individual political and military figures responsible for promoting violence, condoning or committing human rights violations 

or, in extremis, attempting to subvert democracy. We can hold 

them responsible. We can identify key organizations complicit in 

abuse and hold all of their members responsible. This would put 

them on notice that even association with certain behaviors will 

make them into international pariahs. Beyond this, I think we 

could and should continue to work with the institutions of the 

inter-American system to bring pressure to bear on the Venezuelan 

state. 

I think how we do both parts of what I recommend will be critically important. Obviously, it is my view that unilateral action 

would not be successful. At the same time, it seems to me that 

after decades of engagement on human rights, making clear that 

certain activities are beyond the pale is consistent with our own 

foreign policy and our own interests, and I think that we can engage others in the hemisphere to work with us to try and change 

the reality on the ground. 

Thank you, sir. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Duddy follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. PATRICK DUDDY

Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Corker, members of the committee, thank 

you for giving me this opportunity to share my observations on the current situation 

in Venezuela. It is an honor to appear before you today. 

Since President Chavez’s death in March of last year, circumstances in Venezuela 

have markedly deteriorated. By the end of 2013, inflation had spiked to over 56 percent. The Central Bank’s own scarcity index confirmed that more than 25 percent 

of basic goods, including, importantly, many food items, were not available at any 

given time. The country with the world’s largest conventional oil reserves had proven itself demonstrably incapable of keeping the shelves in the local grocery stores 

stocked. Hard currency was in short supply and the dollar was trading on the black 

market at 10 times the official rate. Criminal violence was at alarming levels with 

one major survey ranking Venezuela the second most violent country in the world. 

Caracas was arguably the world’s most dangerous capital city. The economy was in 

bad shape when Maduro took over; it’s in worse shape now. The murder rate in 

2012 was startlingly high. By the end of 2013 it was even higher. 

In February of this year, popular discontent with the deteriorating conditions in 

the country boiled over into the most widespread antigovernment demonstrations 

the country has seen in more than a decade. The government of President Nicolas 

Maduro was clearly alarmed by the scope and intensity of the mass rallies. Maduro, 

who was sworn in after a disputed special election victory last April following 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

35 

Chavez’s death, characterized the demonstrators as ‘‘fascists’’ allied with right-wing 

elements in exile and encouraged by the United States. The government’s response 

to the demonstrators was not just vilification but bullyboy repression. Since February more than 40 people have been killed, hundreds injured and many more 

arrested. Several important opposition leaders have been jailed. Another has been 

expelled from the Chavista controlled legislature and stripped of her parliamentary 

immunity. Reports of human rights abuses and even torture of demonstrators who 

were detained by security forces have circulated widely. Video footage of uniformed 

security forces and armed gangs of government supporters on motorcycles generally 

called ‘‘motorizados’’ or ‘‘colectivos’’ violently repressing unarmed protestors have 

alarmed concerned observers in Venezuela and around the world. 

Although events in Venezuela have largely been overshadowed by crises elsewhere, calls for restraint have been issued by a number of legislative bodies as well 

as by a variety of NGOs. In response to the rising level international concern and 

the determination of the antigovernment protestors to continue to demonstrate, the 

Maduro administration agreed to participate in talks mediated by the Union of 

South American Nations (UNASUR) and the Vatican. Like most observers I hope 

that this effort is successful in ending the violence and that it facilitates the development of genuine dialogue. 

It is going to be difficult. Not all of the opposition leadership is participating. 

Leopoldo Lopez is still in jail. The government continues to demonize the opposition 

and to suggest that the country has been the target of economic warfare. Even since 

the beginning of the UNASUR sponsored talks, the Chavista-dominated Supreme 

Court announced a ruling asserting that the right to peacefully protest ‘‘without 

prior permission’’ is not absolute, notwithstanding the language of Article 68 of the 

Venezuelan Constitution, a move analysts have characterized as an effort to criminalize dissent. 

President Maduro has publically warned that the response of the Chavista base 

to the defeat or replacement of the Bolivarian Revolution would be a general uprising (‘‘pueblo en armas’’ El Universal, May 1). Maduro has also repeatedly cited evidence of conspiracy and accused the United States of interfering in Venezuela’s 

internal affairs and plotting the overthrow of the government and the jettisoning 

of the Chavez-era social programs. 

As we consider the current unsustainable situation in Venezuela I think it is 

important to recognize some of the factors that militate against an early solution. 

In this context, the dismal state of the economy is critical. Last year, Venezuela 

grew by an anemic 1.3 percent. Most analysts expect the economy to be worse this 

year and probably next. Scarcity of basic goods and the need to stand in long lines 

to buy consumables—when they can be found—has become daily routine for millions 

of Venezuelans. The latest Central Bank figures for inflation suggest it continues 

to climb and is likely already running at an annualized rate of 59 percent. In what 

will almost certainly prove to be another failed effort to get the unraveling retail 

sector under control and prevent hoarding, the government has eased some price 

controls and announced plans to introduce what they are calling a ‘‘Secure Food 

Supply’’ card, essentially a ration card intended to suppress and control consumption. 

One might assume that the problems with scarcity, inflation, and currency flight 

would compel the government to walk back from the economic policies that have 

eviscerated most of the nonpetroleum industries and resulted in stagnation even in 

the vitally important oil sector. While the government has, in fact, reached out to 

the private sector and tried to reassure business leaders and enlist them in efforts 

to reverse the trend lines, there has been no serious reconsideration of the direction 

in which Maduro and company are taking the country. Arguably this is in part 

because the direction was set by Chavez and Maduro ran as Chavez’s anointed successor. Even if one accepts the official government figures on the April vote count, 

Maduro barely squeaked out a win despite Chavez’s endorsement and the fact that 

he began the abbreviated campaign with a double digit lead in the polls. Maduro 

may believe he does not have the political capital within Chavismo to change course. 

Further to that point, Chavez and Maduro have vastly expanded the number of 

Venezuelans who depend directly or indirectly on the government. As a consequence, the base would be alarmed if substantial economic or political concessions 

are made to an opposition that Maduro himself has accused of plotting to dismantle 

Chavista-era social programs in order to restore their own economic fortunes. 

Recent polling suggests that the Venezuelan public is overwhelming unhappy with 

the current state of the country (79.5 percent according Datanalisis as cited by El 

Universal on May 5) and by a large majority (59.2 percent) blame the Maduro administration for the mess. Interestingly, however, according to most of the polling 

I’ve seen, the public’s unhappiness has not yet evolved into unambiguous majority 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

36 

support for the opposition. While support for Maduro has fallen, Chavismo retains 

a strong base, even if it does not now enjoy majority support. Support for the opposition is also solid but not monolithlic. Emblematic of their situation is the fact that 

some groups are participating in the UNASUR mediated dialogue and some are not. 

The bottom line, however, is that Venezuela remains both polarized and nearly 

equally divided. Supporters of the government are not just vested but dependent on 

the social programs of the government. Supporters of the opposition are united in 

their belief that the government is taking the country in the wrong direction, that 

the country’s political institutions have been compromised and that the economy is 

in free fall. They have yet, however, to articulate convincingly an economic alternative that would reassure both the business community and the Chavista base. 

The current situation in Venezuela is unsustainable. The opposition and government have settled into a sullen standoff. The economy is sinking and an economic 

collapse is not unthinkable. As circumstances get worse on the ground, as people 

become more and more frustrated with shortages, blackouts, and violent crime, further demonstrations demanding a more honest, competent, and democratic government are likely if the dialogue now under way fails to deliver results. The prospect 

of further clashes is alarming, as this government’s response to legitimate protest 

to date does not augur well for the future. 

Where does this leave the U.S.? What are our interests? What are our options? 

We have spent decades trying to restore and consolidate democracy in the region. 

We have made human rights a cornerstone of our political engagement. The hollowing out of Venezuela’s political institutions is cause for deep concern. The government’s use of force with the demonstrators, the refusal to disarm the colectivos, the 

increasing hostility toward the independent media should concern all of the democratic governments of the hemisphere, not just us. And, it is also true that the U.S. 

has promoted the notion of hemispheric cooperation. It remains to be seen if the 

UNASUR can and will foster a genuine dialogue but it seems to me that we should 

all hope that effort is successful. 

In the meantime, we need to be aware that as the Maduro administration and, 

indeed Chavez’s Bolivarian experiment have foundered, Maduro and company have 

looked to blame the U.S. Indeed, anti-Americanism has long been a central tenet 

of the Bolivarian Revolution. In the current circumstance, the Maduro government 

would clearly love to turn their domestic crisis into a bilateral one. We should not 

be sucked into that dynamic by taking steps unilaterally at this point that would 

validate Maduro’s wild accusations. After 15 years in power, the government owns 

this crisis: they made it; it’s theirs. Unilateral action would risk rallying both the 

Chavista base and much of the region to Maduro’s side. 

So, should the U.S. consider levying economic sanctions on Venezuela if the current situation doesn’t improve? At this point, I don’t think so. It is true, of course, 

the U.S. still has a robust trade relationship with Caracas. In 2013 bilateral trade 

totaled more than 45 billion dollars and Venezuela remains the fourth-largest foreign supplier of oil to the U.S. But total volume of oil sales to the U.S. fell to less 

than 800,00 barrels per day last year and with increased U.S., production, reduced 

domestic consumption and increased supplies from Canada and elsewhere, Venezuela’s oil exports to the U.S. are substantially less important to us than they used 

to be. They remain, however, immensely important to Venezuela’s economy and the 

country’s very vulnerability is one reason to refrain from what would certainly be 

seen as a doomsday tactic to coerce change in the Venezuelan government’s behavior. We could well collapse what is already an imploding economy and cause great 

suffering to the Venezuelan people as well as harming many of the small economies 

of the region which have become Venezuela’s Petro Caribe clients. And such a 

course would not necessarily yield an improved human rights situation, greater 

respect for the Venezuelan opposition’s political rights or restoration of the country’s 

debilitated political institutions. 

So, does that mean we can do nothing? No. We can aggressively hold individual 

political and military figures responsible for promoting violence, condoning or committing human rights violations or, in extremis, attempting to subvert democracy. 

We can identify key organizations complicit in abuse and hold all of their members 

responsible; this would put them on notice that even association with certain behaviors will make them into international pariahs. Beyond this we could and should 

work with the institutions of the Inter American system to bring pressure to bear 

on the Venezuelan State. At the end of the day, I think collective action has the 

best chance of success. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Naim. 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

37 

STATEMENT OF MOISES NAIM, PH.D., SENIOR ASSOCIATE, 

INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS PROGRAM, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Dr. NAIM. Thank you, Chairman Menendez, Senator Rubio. 

Thanks for inviting me here today. 

Let me please start with a personal note. What is going on in 

Venezuela today is very personal for me. I will be as dispassionate 

as possible in my analysis and recommendations on United States 

policy toward Venezuela, but I come to this task today with a 

heavy heart. To witness how widespread human suffering mounts 

on a daily basis is nothing less than a personal tragedy for me, for 

my family, and of course, and most importantly, for the Venezuelan 

people. 

Venezuela today has an authoritarian government that knows 

how to impersonate a democracy and tries to look democratic, and 

in many aspects, it has been successful at impersonating a democracy while rigging elections, stifling the media, repressing the opposition, and undermining checks and balances and concentrating as 

much power as possible. 

Just one example to illustrate this is that in the 14 years of 

Chavez’s rule and 1 year of Maduro’s government, there is not one 

instance when the legislative or the judiciary branches have 

stopped the Government or the President from doing exactly what 

he wants when he wants it as he wants it. 

More should be done to make it apparent to the rest of the world 

that Venezuela today just impersonates a democracy and is not a 

democracy. 

It is important, however, to stress that I deeply believe what others have said here and that the needed changes in Venezuela can 

and should only be brought about by Venezuelans. And I deeply believe that the United States cannot and should not be a main protagonist of what is going on there. 

I do have five concrete steps that I recommend, and they are 

aimed at clarifying a situation that the Venezuelan authorities are 

deliberately obscuring and also sanctioning those who are guilty of 

massive corruption and human rights violations. 

Unfortunately, as we speak here today, there is another improbable and surprising external power calling the shots in Venezuela 

and interfering with the will of the people there, Cuba. I hope that 

this committee and you, Chairman Menendez, Senator Rubio, will 

do more to try to clarify to the rest of the world what is the role 

of the Cuban Government in Venezuela. Havana now controls very 

important functions of the Venezuelan state, and we need to understand better the extent and the scope of that interference and that 

presence of the Cuban authorities in Venezuela. 

But the context for the concrete recommendations that I am 

going to offer is a severe and ill-understood human rights crisis. 

The most important clash in today’s Venezuela is not that of the 

left versus the right, the rich versus the poor, the United States 

against others, or even good ideas versus bad ideas on how to run 

a country. No. The defining issue of current-day Venezuela is the 

wholesale, state-sanctioned, and amply documented violation of 

human rights of those who oppose the government. 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

38 

We are very lucky to have today with us here Jose Miguel 

Vivanco. The organization, Human Rights Watch, as you know, just 

released yesterday a very significant and well-documented report to 

which he is going to refer, and therefore, I do not need to dwell on 

it. 

The five recommendations I will suggest in this testimony are 

aimed at clarifying the deliberately obfuscated situation, as I said. 

Let me briefly describe each one of them. 

First is fight lies with facts. The Venezuelan Government routinely manipulates and hides basic information about the situation 

of the country. Critical data about the economic, social, and political situation is either hidden or manipulated. After 15 years of the 

Chavez model of governing, it is still impossible to have an objective assessment of its impact. 

I urge you to encourage different branches of the U.S. Government and use a vote that the United States has in organizations 

like the United Nations and the IDB, the World Bank, the IMF, 

and others to collect and present serious, systematic, and objective 

evaluations of the situation in Venezuela. I am referring to the societal impact of the Chavez style of governing and the approach. 

After 15 years, the Venezuelan people and others deserve to have 

a better understanding of what happens when a nation adopts the 

kinds of policies that have been in place in Venezuela for so long. 

My second proposal is that the United States should help uncover and publicize the level of corruption and foreign interference 

in the current Government of Venezuela. Let us hear the names of 

individuals and groups most guilty of massive corruption in Venezuela and widespread violation of human rights there. These are 

the narcotraffickers and the government accomplices and the meddling Cuban authorities and their government associates and those 

that steal from the public funds. And of course, we want to know 

more and identify the perpetrators of the horrible human rights 

abuses that have become so common. 

My recommendation in this sense is that the United States consider the possibility of having an audit of all intelligence and law 

enforcement reports that it has and that can illuminate the Venezuelan situation and that it releases the information that can be 

made public without damaging the intelligence community’s need 

to protect sources and methods. I am sure that such audit will find 

that the U.S. Government holds secret information whose revelation can shed important light into the workings of the Venezuelan 

Government and its Cuban partners or the narcotraffickers in its 

midst without causing any lasting damage to the United States intelligence community. 

Third, United States should target the Bolivarian oligarchs and 

their partners. And in this sense, I fully support the initiative that 

you and Senator Rubio have taken on sanctioning individuals and 

their associates that are guilty of corruption and other misdeeds. 

The only additional thing that I will urge you is that when these 

individuals are sanctioned, it be very clear why. It is not enough 

to tell the world that a high-ranking government official has been 

denied a visa in the United States. It is very important that you 

explain and tell the world what is the evidence and what is the 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

39 

kind of information that has led the United States Government to 

do such a thing. 

Fourth, the United States must avoid the anti-imperialist trap. 

I strongly oppose and urge against any United States oil embargo 

of Venezuela. This action will be seen as a typical U.S. strong-arm 

tactic to harass poor Venezuela, a nation that, in quotes, is valiantly challenging this evil empire which longs to control its massive oil reserves. This is the narrative long nurtured by Chavez and 

his acolytes, and it is widely accepted and believed in Venezuela 

and firmly believed by millions of others around the world. If the 

United States imposes a unilateral total or partial oil embargo or 

generic economic sanctions, it will instantly incur the blame for all 

the ills that now befall Venezuela. United States sanctions will be 

a reward for the government of Caracas and the Government of 

Cuba. 

No sanction imposed by the United States, no generalized sanctions imposed by this Government can cause more damage or be as 

politically destabilizing for the Venezuelan Government as the 

sanctions that are currently being imposed by the Maduro administration on the Venezuelans or what the Cuban Government is already extracting from the nation. 

Fifth and to conclude, the United States should rally other Latin 

American leaders to condemn human rights violations in Venezuela 

and demand the freedom of political prisoners. A unified call from 

Latin American allies will be an important force in promoting liberty for those unjustly jailed and, in some cases, tortured. Those 

that are in jails include Leopoldo Lopez, obviously a prisoner of 

conscience, a well-known opposition leader of course, and Ivan 

Simonovis, a long-held political prisoner, and all of the young people who have been swept up by government forces. ‘‘Free the prisoners now’’ ought to become a rallying cry for all the freedom-loving governments in Latin America. 

Venezuela’s brutality should be a stain on the conscience of other 

Latin American nations that have looked the other way for too 

long. The United States should make indifference and inaction 

harder to sustain, and even if the United States must stand alone 

in denouncing these abuses, it can and should do so. Failure to do 

it will be an abdication of U.S. values and principles. 

For the sake of Venezuela and the Venezuelan people I hold so 

dear, I hope that these and other actions can help make progress 

towards a better future possible. 

Thank you for your leadership in holding this hearing. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Naim follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MOISES NAIM

Thank you, Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Corker, and members of the 

committee, for inviting me to appear before you today. It is an honor to be here. 

I would like to begin on a personal note. I spend most of my work days analyzing 

global economic and political trends and the capacity of nations to successfully 

accomplish their societal goals. The case of Venezuela is different for me. I grew up 

there, studied there, taught there and in the early nineties worked with an extraordinary team of government officials as Minister of Trade and Industry to bring prosperity to a country that had a defective but vibrant democracy. For over 40 years 

in Venezuela the results of elections were largely unpredictable, term limits were 

enforced and checks and balances helped contain the concentration of power. 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

40 

I will be as dispassionate as possible in my analysis and recommendation on U.S. 

policy toward Venezuela. But I come to this task with a heavy heart. I see a country 

I love, and which gave so much to me and my family, spiral downward into economic chaos, fighting in the streets, a deeply divided society, massive government 

abuses and unimaginable corruption. To have this fine country acquire many of the 

characteristics common to much poorer and failed states, and to witness how human 

suffering mounts is nothing less than a personal tragedy for me, my family and, of 

course, and most importantly, for the Venezuelan people. 

Venezuela today is not a democracy, and it clearly is an economic failure. Politically, it is a post-modern autocracy. What is this? It is an authoritarian government 

that knows how to look democratic while rigging elections, stifling the media, 

repressing the opposition and undermining checks and balances, thus concentrating 

power while keeping the appearance of a democracy. Just one example can illustrate 

this: in the 14 years of Chavez’ rule and 1 year of Maduro’s government, there is 

no single instance when the legislative or the judiciary branches have opposed a 

government initiative or stopped the president from doing exactly what he wants, 

when he wants. 

The government has stealthily and effectively annulled any checks and balances 

on the power of the executive. Governmental accountability and transparency have 

been systematically eroded and, for all practical purposes, ceased to exist years ago. 

That said, I will share with you five practical steps I believe could be taken by the 

U.S. Government that would make a positive contribution to understanding the 

Venezuelan reality, alleviating this suffering and assisting an important nation in 

our hemisphere to move beyond this horrendous situation. 

It is important, however, to stress that I deeply believe the conflicts in Venezuela 

can only be solved by Venezuelans, and that the United States cannot, and should 

not, be a protagonist in what is going on there. The steps I recommend are aimed 

at facilitating the resolution of the conflicts and at clarifying a situation that the 

Venezuelan authorities are deliberately obscuring. 

Unfortunately, as we speak there is another improbable and surprising external 

power calling the shots in Venezuela and interfering with the will of the people 

there: Cuba. I hope that this committee will discuss Cuba’s defining role in Venezuela in a future hearing. 

The context for the steps I recommend is a severe and ill-understood human 

rights crisis. I am fully aware of the extent of arbitrary arrests, lack of judicial oversight, kidnappings, beatings, threats, restrictions of the media and the jailing of 

young protesters in horrible prisons for hardened criminals. I know you will receive 

a comprehensive and reliable report on these and other human rights violations 

from Jose Miguel Vivanco of Human Rights Watch so I will not enumerate them 

here, except to comment that my fondest hope was that these practices were left 

behind with the end of the dark days of brutal military dictatorships in Latin America. Sadly, they have come back in Venezuela. The most important clash in today’s 

Venezuela is not that of the left versus right, rich versus poor, socialism versus capitalism, oligarchs versus the people or even good ideas versus bad ideas on how to 

run a country. No; the defining issue of current day Venezuela is the wholesale, 

state-sanctioned and amply documented violation of the human rights of those who 

oppose the government; violations carried out by the national guard and well 

trained and thuggish civilian militias, the infamous ‘‘colectivos.’’ 

Under these circumstances, it is a challenge for the U.S. to intervene in a constructive way. At best, the U.S. can take positive steps that will help support the 

central drivers of a change for the better: the Venezuelan people. 

The five steps I recommend are: 

(1) Help Venezuelans and the world understand the real impact of 15 years 

of the model of governing that Hugo Chavez put in place; 

(2) Help uncover and publicize the level of corruption and foreign influence 

in the present government; 

(3) Sanction those responsible for human rights abuses, as well as the 

oligarchs connected to the Chavez elite who have amassed unimaginable fortunes through corrupt deals and criminal undertakings; 

(4) Prevent measures which will fuel the ‘‘blame others’’ tactic of avoiding 

responsibility for a failed state and a collapsing economy that the Venezuelan 

Government and its apologists at home and abroad so often use; and 

(5) Encourage Latin American allies to abandon their silence about government abuses in Venezuela that they would not tolerate in their own country. 

I am not asking Venezuela’s neighbors or the Organization of American States 

(OAS) to intervene in Venezuela’s politics. But it is absolutely valid to expect 

decent governments—and decent leaders—not to remain indifferent as the Venezuelan Government brutally represses its opponents. 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

41 

Next, I will briefly elaborate on each of these five proposals. 

(1) FIGHT LIES WITH FACTS

One of the most potent tools the Venezuelan Government has used is the manipulation and the hiding of social, economic, political, and institutional information. 

To confront this reality, I recommend the U.S. Government exert the significant 

influence it has in international and national institutions which collect data and 

publish reports on the state of the country’s economy, society, political liberties, 

international relations, and national and international security. Use the vote of the 

U.S. representatives in international organizations such as the United Nations, the 

World Bank, the International Labor Organization, the Inter-American Development Bank and even the shamefully ineffectual OAS to push for quality research 

on the Venezuelan reality. U.S. national institutions such as the Congressional 

Research Service, private foundations and NGOs could also be engaged. 

The first casualty in a dictatorship is often truth. The Venezuelan reality is not 

being presented by the government as data is not reported, is manipulated or fabricated. There are legitimate doubts regarding the accuracy of the data concerning 

poverty and inequality, no objective assessment of the social programs has been carried out, the public ignores how much the massive foreign aid programs cost or the 

nature of the obligations the nation has acquired with countries like China, Russia, 

or Belarus. We don’t even have reliable information about homicides, kidnappings, 

and crime. The government ably exploits for propaganda purposes its doctored figures and benefits from the information vacuum. Recently, for example, the Governor 

of the Central Bank announced that the data about scarcity of consumer goods and 

medicines would no longer be published. 

Shining a light on the true conditions of poverty, inequality, labor practices, productivity, oil production, fiscal and monetary balances, censorship, and, of course, 

human rights will help reveal the failure of the Venezuelan leadership to pursue 

an economic and social path that serves its people. 

I am not asking that the U.S. explicitly ‘‘classify’’ the Venezuelan Government as 

a dictatorship, but that the U.S. use its power to fight an abusive regime with the 

force of information: to get the real facts out for everyone to see and debate. It is 

imperative to make it harder for the regime and its apologists to lie about what is 

going on in the country and to hide the devastating impact of their policies. 

(2) UNCOVER THE DIRTY SECRETS

Rumors, individual cases, whispered revelations, confessions by Venezuelan Government operatives, wild accusations and sporadic reports all tell of the Cuban 

influence on Venezuelan Government policies, of the enormous influence of narcotraffickers or their accomplices in the government and of the massive corruption in 

the use of government revenues and contracting. The U.S. security and financial 

agencies are well-informed on each of these realities. My recommendation is to conduct an information audit of all intelligence and law enforcement reports that illuminate the Venezuelan situation and to release the information that can be made 

public without threatening security assets or damaging the intelligence community’s 

need to protect sources and methods. I am sure that such audit will find that the 

U.S. Government holds secret information whose revelation can shed important 

light into the workings of the Venezuelan Government and its Cuban partners 

(or the narcotraffickers in its midst) without causing any lasting damage to U.S. 

intelligence. 

It is critically necessary to present information about the level of foreign influence, illegal money flows, government criminality and corrupt practices in Venezuela and to document how its government has become an important enabler of 

the illicit trade in drugs, people, and weapons. Under conditions of widespread 

media censorship and coercion, the potential for manipulating the public with false 

information is high. Again, the U.S. Government could take an important step in 

countering this misinformation by systematically revealing what it knows about 

these corrupt practices. 

(3) TARGET THE BOLIVARIAN OLIGARCHS AND THEIR PARTNERS

The U.S. has a number of tools to sanction individuals who enter U.S. territory. 

It is well known that the same corrupt individuals who steal from government coffers, take kick-backs on contracts and launder drug money while loudly condemning 

the United States, also come here to enjoy this country’s goods and services. These 

new billionaires, who have amassed unimaginable personal fortunes by criminally 

tapping into public funds, travel in private jets to the U.S., take advantage of topflight U.S. health services, send their children to U.S. colleges and spend their holiFOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

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days shopping in New York, skiing in Aspen or yachting in Florida. They are also 

heavy users of the U.S. banks and invest their misbegotten gains in real estate and 

other investment instruments under U.S. jurisdiction. 

My concrete proposal is to broaden the scope and reach of the microtargeted sanctions against specific individuals and their families and business partners. Since 

Hugo Chavez came to power, 15 years ago, it has become almost impossible to thrive 

in the private sector in Venezuela without entering into business deals with the government. Rarely are these deals conducted at arm’s length and without corruption. 

There is a long and growing list of obscenely and inexplicably affluent Venezuelans 

who pass for ‘‘business people’’ but are nothing more than criminals who enriched 

themselves on the backs of the Venezuelan poor that the Bolivarian Government so 

ardently claims to represent. These crooks and their associates should be targeted 

with individual sanctions. The U.S. government knows who they are. 

Denying a visa, freezing bank accounts, and limiting the access of the Chavez 

oligarchs and their families to the U.S. will obviously have a direct impact on these 

individuals. As important, it will make public the corrupt nature of the regime and 

will identify some of its wealthy beneficiaries. Demonstrating that the U.S. does not 

condone this kind of corrupt and illegal behavior will show these individuals, and 

the world, what it stands for and what it stands against. 

(4) AVOID THE ANTI-IMPERIALIST TRAP

There has been much discussion of using the oil trade with Venezuela as a tool 

to sanction the country. I strongly oppose this proposal for two reasons. First, as 

others have said, cutting off the most important source of revenue for the Venezuelan economy hurts all Venezuelans, most of whom have no influence in government decisions and certainly no ability to tap into public revenues for private gain. 

Second, and in this politically charged environment a key factor, a U.S. oil embargo on Venezuela or any kind of nationwide economic sanction would instantly be 

painted as Yankee imperialism, intervention and a typical U.S. strong-arm tactic to 

harass poor Venezuela—a nation that is valiantly challenging this evil empire which 

longs to control its massive oil reserves. This is the narrative that Chavez and his 

acolytes in and outside Venezuela have nurtured for a long time. The tenets of this 

narrative are firmly believed by Latin Americans and millions of others around the 

world—it is also widely accepted in Venezuela. If the U.S. imposes a total or partial 

oil embargo or otherwise uses heavy-handed, generalized economic sanctions, it 

would be committing a clumsy and self-inflicted wound. The U.S. would instantly 

become the cause of all Venezuelan ills, from the lack of basic goods at the grocery 

store to the deaths of children in hospitals without medicines. 

No sanction imposed by the U.S. can cause more damage or be as politically 

destabilizing for the Venezuelan government as the sanctions that the Maduro 

administration and its Cuban handlers are currently imposing on the Venezuelan 

people. 

Oil sanctions by the U.S. Government would be a reward for the Caracas Government and its Cuban partners, since they are desperately looking for someone to 

blame for the economic crisis they have created. 

So it is my strong recommendation NOT to do something that has been discussed 

by some Members of Congress. Don’t fall into the Anti-Imperialist trap. 

(5) RALLY LATIN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT VOICES TO CONDEMN OF HUMAN RIGHTS

VIOLATIONS IN VENEZUELA AND DEMAND THE FREEDOM OF POLITICAL PRISONERS

Finally, I would like to make a recommendation for action in the area of human 

rights. Even though the U.S. has lost influence in Latin America, it still does have 

supporters and allies in the region. I recommend rallying these allies to get political 

prisoners such as Leopoldo Lopez, the opposition leader, Ivan Simonovis, the longheld political prisoner, and all of the young people who have been swept up by the 

government forces out of prison. A unified call for living up to the most basic of 

human rights, the right to due process under the law, from friends of the U.S. 

across the continent would be an important force in gaining liberty for those 

unjustly jailed and in some cases tortured. 

U.S. leadership in mobilizing a group of countries to denounce the old but not forgotten tactic of governments to jail and harass their critics would be a loud voice 

in saying enough is enough. Release the prisoners! 

Venezuela’s brutality should be a stain on the conscience of other Latin American 

nations that have looked the other way for too long. The U.S. should make indifference and bystanding harder to sustain. 

Additionally, the U.S. should engage and encourage in the very innovative process 

spontaneously taking place in Latin America where opposition forces are taking a 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

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public stand against their governments’ complacency toward the Venezuelan situation. In Brazil, Argentina, Chile, and Peru, elected legislators have openly challenged their own governments for their passive stand toward Venezuela. This is a 

process that should be welcomed and encouraged by the U.S. It is very important 

to have elected officials who are members of nonruling parties throughout Latin 

America shaming their own governments out of their silence regarding the abuses 

taking place in Venezuela. 

To conclude, I would like to reiterate that these recommendations are based on 

the idea that real information and its broad dissemination are powerful tools in confronting deception and corruption. They embrace the idea that those culpable of 

wrongdoing should bear the brunt of punishment. They take into account the special 

role of the U.S. in the region and in the world, and they strive to bring nations 

together to defend modern practices of real democracies in protecting and defending 

all citizens. For the sake of Venezuela, and the Venezuelan people I hold dear, I 

hope these and other actions can help make progress toward a better future. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

Let me, before I turn to Mr. Vivanco, say there is nothing in the 

legislation that Senator Rubio and I are considering that has anything to do with oil embargos, and that is very clear. So let us 

eliminate that right off the bat. I know that Senator Durbin mentioned it as an item, but there is nothing in our legislation that 

speaks about that, so that we do not begin to obfuscate the differences. 

Mr. Vivanco. 

STATEMENT OF JOSE MIGUEL VIVANCO, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, AMERICAS DIVISION, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WASHINGTON, DC 

Mr. VIVANCO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Rubio. 

I will respectfully request that Human Rights Watch’s full report 

titled ‘‘Punished for Protesting’’ be included in the written record 

of this hearing. 

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection. 

Mr. VIVANCO. In late March, Human Rights Watch went to Venezuela to investigate reports of serious human rights violations 

committed in the context of massive public protests, which began 

on February 12. Our experts traveled to Caracas and three states, 

conducting more than 90 interviews with victims, the doctors who 

attended them, eyewitnesses, journalists, and human rights defenders. We also gathered extensive evidence, including photographs, videos, medical reports, and judicial documents. 

The scale of rights violations we found and the range of security 

forces and justice officials committing them shows, without question, that these are not isolated incidents or the excesses of a few 

rogue actors. Rather, they are part of an alarming pattern of abuse 

that is the worst we have seen in Venezuela in years. 

The most serious abuses we found are: first, the routine use of 

unlawful force against unarmed protestors and even bystanders, including severe beatings, firing live ammunition, rubber bullets, and 

tear gas indiscriminately into crowds, firing rubber bullets deliberately at pointblank range at unarmed individuals already in custody. The fact that these abuses were carried out repeatedly by 

multiple security forces, including the national guard, national police, and the state police, in multiple locations across the country 

and over the 6-week period we examined led us to conclude that 

these human rights violations were part of a systematic practice by 

Venezuelan security forces. 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

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Second, we found a range of serious abuses committed against 

detainees who were often held incommunicado on military bases for 

48 hours or more before being presented before a judge. This included beatings with helmets and firearms, electric shock and 

burns, being forced to squat or kneel without moving for hours at 

a time, being handcuffed to other detainees sometimes in human 

chains of over 30 people for hours at a time, and extended periods 

of extreme heat or cold. In at least 10 cases, we concluded the 

abuses we have documented constituted torture. 

Third, we found that rather than fulfill its role as a safeguard 

against abuse of power, justice officials were party to serious due 

process violations. Virtually every victim we interviewed was denied access to a lawyer until minutes before their hearings, which 

were often scheduled in the middle of the night. Prosecutors and 

judges routinely turned a blind eye to evidence suggesting the detainees had been physically abused or that evidence against them 

had been planted by security forces. 

Fourth, we found that security forces deliberately targeted journalists and others photographing and filming the repression 

against protestors. 

And fifth, we found that security forces tolerated and sometimes 

collaborated directly with armed pro-government gangs that attacked protestors with total impunity. 

Now, President Maduro and Attorney General Ortega have acknowledged that security forces have committed human rights violations, and they have pledged to investigate these cases. However, 

there are good reasons to doubt their credibility. Why? 

First, because justice officials are themselves directly implicated 

in serious due process violations. So any proper investigation will 

require these institutions to investigate themselves, a recipe for impunity. 

Second, because the Venezuelan judiciary has ceased to function 

as an independent branch of government. 

And third, because the President and Attorney General Ortega 

have repeatedly made public statements downplaying the abuses 

while, at the same time, celebrating the security forces that have 

carried out systematic violations. 

Given this reality, the international community should demand 

that people who have been unlawfully detained for exercising their 

fundamental rights should immediately and unconditionally be released; that President Maduro should cease all rhetoric that incites 

violence; that all human rights violations should be promptly and 

impartially investigated and those responsible brought to justice; 

and that Venezuela take steps to restore the independence of the 

judiciary beginning with the supreme court. 

Thank you very much. I look forward to your questions, Mr. 

Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Vivanco follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOSE MIGUEL VIVANCO

Mr. Chairman, committee members, thank you for the invitation to appear before 

the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on behalf of Human Rights Watch 

(HRW) to discuss the alarming human rights situation in Venezuela today. On May 

5, Human Rights Watch released a report titled ‘‘Punished for Protesting: Rights 

Violations in Venezuela’s Streets, Detention Centers, and Justice System.’’ Based on 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

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extensive research conducted on the ground in Caracas and three states, the report 

documents violations committed by Venezuelan security forces and justice officials 

in the context of protests since February 12, 2014. The findings of that report—the 

full version of which I have formally submitted to the committee, and which I would 

respectfully request be included in the record of this hearing—are the basis for my 

testimony today. 

FINDINGS OF HRW REPORT ‘‘PUNISHED FOR PROTESTING’’ 

On February 12, 2014, thousands of people across Venezuela participated in 

marches and public demonstrations to protest the policies of the government of 

President Nicolas Maduro. In Caracas and several other cities, violent clashes broke 

out between government security forces and protesters. Three people were killed, 

dozens seriously injured, and hundreds arrested. Since then, the protests have continued and the number of casualties and arrests has grown. 

In the days and weeks after February 12, Human Rights Watch received reports 

of serious human rights violations, including abuses committed during government 

operations aimed at containing protest activity, as well as in the treatment of people 

detained at or near protests. 

To investigate these allegations of abuse, Human Rights Watch carried out a factfinding investigation in Venezuela in March. We visited Caracas and three states— 

Carabobo, Lara, and Miranda—and conducted scores of interviews with abuse victims, their families, eyewitnesses, medical professionals, journalists, and human 

rights defenders. We also gathered extensive material evidence, including photographs, video footage, medical reports, judicial rulings, and case files. In addition, 

we collected and reviewed government reports and official statements regarding protest activity and the response of security forces. 

What we found during our in-country investigation and subsequent research is a 

pattern of serious abuse. In 45 cases, we found strong evidence of serious human 

rights violations committed by Venezuelan security forces, which included violations 

of the right to life; the prohibition on torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading 

treatment; the rights to bodily integrity, security, and liberty; and due process 

rights. These violations were compounded by members of the Attorney General’s 

Office and the judiciary who knew of, participated in, or otherwise tolerated abuses 

against protesters and detainees, including serious violations of their due process 

rights. 

The accounts of the victims in these 45 cases—together with corroborating evidence assembled from a diverse range of sources—provided credible evidence that 

more than 150 people were victims of serious abuses in related incidents. (For more 

on how we conducted our research and documented cases, see the ‘‘Methodology’’ 

section in this report.) 

In most of the cases we documented, security forces employed unlawful force, including shooting and severely beating unarmed individuals. Nearly all of the victims 

were also arrested and, while in detention, subjected to physical and psychological 

abuse. In at least 10 cases, the abuses clearly constituted torture. 

In all three states, as well as in Caracas, security forces allowed armed pro-government gangs to assault unarmed civilians, and in some cases openly collaborated 

with them in the attacks, our research found. 

The Venezuelan Government has characterized the protests taking place throughout the country as violent. There is no doubt that some protesters have used violence, including throwing rocks and Molotov cocktails at security forces. More than 

200 security force members and government officials have been injured in the context of the protests, and at least nine have died, according to the government. All 

crimes—including those committed against security forces, protesters, and bystanders—require rigorous investigation, and those responsible should be brought to justice. Moreover, security forces have a responsibility to detain people caught in the 

act of committing crimes. 

However, in the 45 cases of human rights violations we documented, the evidence 

indicated that the victims of unlawful force and other abuses were not engaging in 

acts of violence or other criminal activity at the time they were targeted by Venezuelan security forces. On the contrary, eyewitness testimony, video footage, photographs and other evidence suggest victims were unarmed and nonviolent. Indeed, 

some of the worst abuses we documented were committed against people who were 

not even participating in demonstrations, or were already in detention and fully 

under the control of security forces. 

The nature and timing of many of these abuses—as well as the frequent use of 

political epithets by the perpetrators—suggests that their aim was not to enforce the 

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law or disperse protests, but rather to punish people for their political views or perceived views. 

In many instances, the aim of the abuse appears to have been to prevent individuals from documenting the tactics being employed by security forces, or to punish 

those attempting to do so. In 13 of the cases we investigated, security forces 

targeted individuals who had been taking photographs or filming security force confrontations with protesters. Roughly half of these individuals were professional journalists, while the other half were protesters or bystanders using cell phones to document use of force by security forces. 

In addition to the unlawful use of force and arbitrary arrests, nearly all of the 

45 cases involved violations of due process guarantees. These included holding detainees incommunicado, denying them access to lawyers until minutes before they 

were presented to judges, and in several cases planting evidence on them before 

charging them with crimes. Judges often confirmed charges against detainees based 

on dubious evidence presented by prosecutors, without subjecting the evidence to 

rigorous review or inquiring into how suspects presented before them had sustained 

visible injuries. 

Prosecutors and judges routinely turned a blind eye to evidence suggesting that 

detainees had been subject to abuses while in detention, such as ignoring obvious 

signs of physical abuse, or interrogating detainees in military installations, where 

it was clear they did not have access to lawyers. 

High-ranking Venezuelan Government officials, including President Nicolas 

Maduro and the attorney general, have acknowledged that government security 

forces have committed human rights violations in responding to demonstrations 

since February 12. They have pledged that those responsible for abuses will be investigated and prosecuted, and the Attorney General’s Office recently reported that 

it is conducting 145 investigations into alleged human rights violations and that 17 

security officials had been detained for their alleged involvement in these cases. At 

the same time, President Maduro, the attorney general, and numerous others government officials have also repeatedly claimed that human rights abuses are isolated incidents, rather than evidence of a broader pattern of abuse. 

While it was not possible for Human Rights Watch’s investigation to determine 

the full scope of human rights violations committed in Venezuela in response to protests since February 12, our research leads us to conclude that the abuses were not 

isolated cases or excesses by rogue security force members, but rather part of a 

broader pattern, which senior officers and officials must or should have known 

about, and seem at a minimum to have tolerated. The fact that the abuses by members of security forces were carried out repeatedly, by multiple security forces, in 

multiple locations across three states and the capital (including in controlled environments such as military installations and other state institutions), and over the 

6-week period covered in this report, supports the conclusion that the abuses were 

part of a systematic practice by the Venezuelan authorities. 

Prosecutors and justice officials who should have operated independently from 

security forces—and whose role should have led them to identify and intervene to 

stop violations against detainees—instead turned a blind eye, and were in some 

cases actively complicit in the human rights violations being committed by security 

forces. Prosecutors contributed to various due process violations, such as participating in interrogations without a defense lawyer present, which is contrary to Venezuelan law. Both prosecutors and judges failed to scrutinize evidence that had been 

planted or fabricated by security forces, and held hearings to determine charges for 

multiple detainees who did not have prior adequate access to legal counsel. 

The scope of the due process violations that occurred in multiple jurisdictions 

across several states—and that persisted, at the very least, over the 6-week period 

examined by this report—highlights the failure of the judicial body to fulfill its role 

as a safeguard against abuse of state power. It also reinforces the conclusion that 

Venezuela’s judiciary has been transformed from an independent branch of government to a highly politicized body, as has been previously documented in multiple 

reports by Human Rights Watch. 

VIOLENCE BY PROTESTERS

Human Rights Watch reviewed government statements alleging that protesters 

engaged in acts of violence and other crimes in various parts of the country since 

February 12. We also collected and analyzed media reports, video footage, and photographs posted online purporting to shows acts of violence committed by protesters 

during demonstrations. As noted below, according to the Venezuelan Government 

there have been 41 fatalities connected to the protests, most of which the government attributes to protesters. 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

47 

The most common crime attributed to protesters was the obstruction of roadways 

and other transit, either by fixed barricades or the presence of demonstrators who 

did not seek official permits for their activities. In addition, on multiple occasions, 

people participating in protests have attacked security forces with rocks, Molotov 

cocktails, and slingshots. In a handful of incidents, there were reports of protesters 

shooting homemade mortars. 

For example, photographs taken by a Reuters photographer on April 6, 2014, 

show young men who appear to be protesters firing what looks like an improvised 

mortar device. The photograph’s caption reads: ‘‘Anti-government protesters fire a 

rudimentary mortar at police during riots in Caracas April 6, 2014.’’ Other photographs taken by the same photographer show different masked men holding and 

shooting what appear to be homemade mortar tubes on February 26 and 27, 2014. 

According to the photographs’ captions, the men holding the mortar tubes were 

antigovernment protesters participating in protests in San Cristobal, Tachira state. 

Human Rights Watch also found multiple photographs and videos that reportedly 

show antigovernment protesters throwing Molotov cocktails at security forces. Some 

images show the Molotov cocktails setting security force members or their vehicles 

on fire. For example, NTN24 posted online a cell phone video showing several people 

throwing Molotov cocktails at an armored government vehicle, setting it on fire. 

NTN24 reported that the vehicle had been shooting water and teargas as it aimed 

at demolishing street barricades in Caracas. 

Another video posted on YouTube shows around a dozen security force members 

retreating on a street as rocks are being thrown at them. A flaming object lands 

at their feet and explodes, temporarily setting at least a few of them on fire. The 

video was uploaded on YouTube on February 21 by a user who said it was taken 

on February 18, 2014, in Tachira state, and described the explosive as a Molotov 

cocktail. The video does not show who threw the rocks or explosive, but several 

news reports that covered the video alleged that they had been thrown by protesters. 

According to the Attorney General’s Office, there have been 41 fatalities in the 

context of the protests since February 12. Those 41 deaths were classified as follows: 

27 caused by firearms; 6 caused by motorcycle or car crashes attributed to the presence of barricades; 5 caused by ‘‘other circumstances’’ (which are not defined); 2 people killed by being run over by vehicles; and 1 person who died of stab wounds. Publicly available information indicates that of these 41 reported cases, 9 were members 

of the security forces or government officials, at least 10 were civilians who participated in or supported the protests, and roughly 4 were civilian government supporters. 

President Maduro has blamed the opposition for most of the protest-related 

deaths. However, to date, the government has not made public evidence to support 

this claim. In fact, based on official reports and credible media accounts, there are 

strong reasons to believe that security forces and armed pro-government gangs have 

been responsible for some of the killings. Indeed, several security force members 

have been arrested for their alleged role in some of these cases. 

In those cases where public officials have presented evidence purporting to demonstrate protesters’ responsibility for killings, that evidence has been far from conclusive. For example, in one case, a governor affiliated with President Maduro’s 

political party presented video footage showing two masked men on a rooftop who 

appear to be shooting a rifle or rifles in the direction of the street. The governor 

claimed the gunmen were antigovernment protesters and suggested they were 

responsible for the shooting death of a state worker, Juan Orlando Labrador 

Castiblanco. In a separate speech, President Maduro said Labrador had been killed 

by ‘‘right-wing snipers.’’ The video shown by the governor does not indicate whether 

the men on the roof were antigovernment protesters, nor is it possible to determine 

based on the footage whether the shots apparently fired from the rooftop hit anyone 

(Labrador is not shown in the video). No evidence was supplied regarding the trajectory of the bullet or bullets that killed Labrador. Several press reports confirming 

Labrador’s death during or around the time of a protest (which was taking place 

at the time on the Avenida Cardenal Quintero) included accounts—from neighbors 

and the mayor—claiming that armed pro-government gangs, allegedly acting in tandem with government security forces, had shot him dead. In the face of contradictory claims, the importance of a thorough, impartial, credible investigation that 

includes all available forensic and crime scene evidence and witness accounts is 

critical. 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

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UNLAWFUL USE OF FORCE

Security forces routinely used unlawful force against unarmed protesters and 

other people in the vicinity of demonstrations. The perpetrators included members 

of the National Guard, the National Police, the Guard of the People, and various 

state police agencies. The most common abuses included: 

• Severely beating unarmed individuals; • Firing live ammunition, rubber bullets, and teargas canisters indiscriminately 

into crowds; and • Firing rubber bullets deliberately, at point-blank range, at unarmed individuals, 

including, in some cases, individuals already in custody. 

When the restaurant where he worked in a shopping mall in El Carrizal closed 

on March 5 due to nearby protests, Moises Guanchez, 19, left to go home. But he 

found himself trapped in an enclosed parking lot behind the mall with around 40 

other people, as members of the National Guard fired teargas canisters and rubber 

bullets in their direction. When Guanchez attempted to flee the lot, a guardsman 

blocked his way and shot toward his head with rubber bullets. The shot hit 

Guanchez’s arm, which he had raised to protect his face, and he was knocked to the 

ground. Though Guanchez offered no resistance, two guardsmen picked him up and 

took turns punching him, until a third approached and shot him point blank with 

rubber bullets in his groin. He would need three blood transfusions and operations 

on his arm, leg, and one of his testicles. 

Willie David Arma, 29, was detained on March 7 in the street outside his home 

in Barquisimeto, a few blocks away from an antigovernment protest. He was shot repeatedly with rubber bullets, some at point-blank range, then subjected to a prolonged beating with rifle butts and helmets by three national guardsmen who asked 

him: ‘‘Who is your president?’’ 

Under international law, government security forces may use force in crowd control operations as a last resort and in proportion to the seriousness of the offense 

they are seeking to prevent. They may use lethal force only as self-defense or defense of others against the imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury. They 

may use teargas only when necessary and in a proportionate and nondiscriminatory 

manner—and should not use it in a confined area or against anyone in detention 

or already under the control of law enforcement. 

Human Rights Watch found that Venezuelan security forces repeatedly resorted 

to force—including lethal force—in situations in which it was wholly unjustified. In 

a majority of the cases documented by Human Rights Watch, the use of force 

occurred in the context of protests that were peaceful, according to victims, eyewitnesses, lawyers, and journalists, who in many instances shared video footage and 

photographs corroborating their accounts. 

In several of the cases we investigated, small groups of individuals committed acts 

of violence at the protests, such as throwing stones or bottles, or burning vehicles. 

In some instances, the evidence suggests these acts were committed without provocation; in others, they appear to have been committed in response to aggression by 

security forces. Regardless, eyewitnesses and journalists who observed the protests 

consistently told Human Rights Watch that the people who committed acts of violence at protests were a very small minority—usually less than a dozen people out 

of scores or hundreds of people present. 

Yet despite the fact that acts of violence were isolated to small groups, security 

forces responded by indiscriminately attacking entire demonstrations, and in some 

cases, bystanders. In at least six incidents we documented, the indiscriminate use 

of force endangered people in nearby hospitals, universities, apartment buildings, 

and shopping malls. These actions by security forces threatened the well-being of 

hundreds of bystanders—children among them. 

Rodrigo Perez, 21, felt several rubber pellets strike his back and head as he was 

running away from state police officials who had opened fire with rubber bullets at 

demonstrators. The demonstrators had been partially blocking traffic in Puerto La 

Cruz on March 7 to protest the government. Perez—who was hit as he ran into a 

nearby mall’s parking lot—hid in a store after being wounded, and saw several members of government security forces enter the mall’s food court and fire at unarmed, 

fleeing civilians, injuring two others. 

ARBITRARY ARRESTS

In the scores of cases of detentions documented by Human Rights Watch, the 

majority of the detainees were participating in protests at the time of their arrests. 

However, the government routinely failed to present credible evidence that these 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

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protesters were committing crimes at the time they were arrested, which is a 

requirement under Venezuelan law when detaining someone without an arrest warrant. On the contrary, victim and eyewitness accounts, videos, photographs, and 

other evidence indicate that victims were participating peacefully in demonstrations 

and not engaging in any criminal activity. 

Some of the people detained, moreover, were simply in the vicinity of protests but 

not participating in them. This group of detainees included people who were passing 

through areas where protests were taking place, or were in public places nearby. 

Others were detained on private property such as apartment buildings. In every 

case in which individuals were detained on private property, security forces entered 

buildings without search orders, often forcing their way in by breaking down doors. 

Luis Augusto Matheus Chirinos, 21, was detained on February 21 in Valencia by 

approximately 10 members of the National Guard at the entrance of a housing complex (urbanizacion), where he was standing, waiting for a friend he had gone to pick 

up. An antigovernment demonstration was taking place nearby. He was taken to a 

military complex of the Guard of the People, where he was beaten, threatened, and 

told to repeat that Nicolas Maduro was the President of Venezuela. Matheus was 

held incommunicado for 2 days and subsequently charged with several crimes, based 

on what our research strongly suggests was planted evidence and a police report that 

says he was arrested two blocks away from where he was actually detained. 

Pedro Gonzalez, 24, was visiting a friend on March 3 who lives in an apartment 

building near a public square in Caracas where a demonstration was taking place. 

When teargas began wafting into the apartment, Gonzalez went to the building’s 

enclosed courtyard to get some air. Minutes later, police burst into the building’s 

entrance, pursuing a protester. They grabbed Gonzalez, threw him to the ground, and 

dragged him out of the building, arresting him for no apparent reason. 

Jose Romero, 17, was stopped on March 18 by national guardsmen when he was 

coming out of a metro station in downtown Caracas. A guardsman asked to see his 

ID and, when Romero presented it, slapped him across the face. Romero was 

detained without explanation and taken to a nondescript building, where he was 

held incommunicado, threatened with death, beaten, and burned. 

TARGETING OF JOURNALISTS AND OTHERS DOCUMENTING THE VIOLENCE

In 13 of the cases of physical abuse documented by Human Rights Watch, security 

forces targeted individuals who had been taking photographs or filming protests. All 

but two were then arbitrarily arrested. Roughly half of these individuals were professional journalists, while the other half were protesters or bystanders using cell 

phones to document use of force by security forces. 

In these cases, when assaulting or arresting the victims, security force members 

reprimanded them for taking pictures or filming. In several instances, security force 

members told victims they were getting what they deserved for trying to undermine 

the reputation of security forces, or told them they did not want the images circulating online. 

Dayana Mendez Andrade, 24, a journalist, was covering a demonstration in Barquisimeto on March 20 wearing a vest with the word ‘‘Press’’ written in large letters 

across the front, when national guardsmen began firing teargas and rubber bullets 

at protesters. Mendez fled but was cornered together with a photographer—Luis 

Rodriguez Malpica, 26—by several guardsmen. When she and Rodriguez put up their 

hands and yelled that they were journalists, a guardsman responded, ‘‘You’re taking 

photos of me! You’re the ones that send the photos saying ‘SOS Venezuela.’ You cause 

problems for the National Guard.’’ Then, from a distance of a few meters, the guardsman fired at them with rubber bullets, striking Mendez in her left hip and leg. 

Angel de Jesus Gonzalez, 19, was taking photographs of a burnt out car after a 

march in Caracas on February 12 when he was approached by four armed men in 

plainclothes. One of the men told him to hand over his phone, which he did. Then 

the men (who Gonzalez later learned were government security agents) began to beat 

him for no apparent reason, and detained him. 

In these cases—as well as others involving the detention of protesters and bystanders—national guardsmen and police routinely confiscated the cell phones and 

cameras of the detainees. In the rare instances when detainees had these devices 

returned to them, they routinely found that their photographs or video had been 

deleted. 

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COLLUSION WITH ARMED PRO-GOVERNMENT GANGS

Security forces repeatedly allowed armed pro-government gangs to attack protesters, journalists, students, or people they believed to be opponents of the government with security forces just meters away. In some cases, the security forces 

openly collaborated with the pro-government attackers. 

(Armed pro-government gangs that carry out these attacks are often referred as 

‘‘colectivos,’’ a term also used in Venezuela to refer to a wide range of social organizations that support and, in some cases, help to implement the government’s policies. The vast majority of these groups have not engaged in violent behavior. For 

this reason, this report uses the term ‘‘armed pro-government gangs’’ to refer to 

groups that carry out violent attacks that appear to be motivated by loyalty to the 

government. Where the term ‘‘colectivo’’ has been used, it is with the aim of accurately reflecting the way it was used by a source.) 

The response of government security forces to armed pro-government gangs 

ranged from acquiescence and omission to direct collaboration. In some instances, 

security forces were present when armed gangs attacked protesters, but did nothing 

to disarm the gangs or protect their victims. Rather, security forces stood by idly, 

or left an area shortly before pro-government gangs attacked. 

In other incidents, we found compelling evidence of uniformed security forces and 

pro-government gangs attacking protesters side by side. 

National guardsmen and national police opened fire with teargas and rubber bullets on students who were demonstrating in and around the campus of the University 

Centro Occidental Lisandro Alvarado in Barquisimeto on March 11. Wladimir Diaz, 

20, who participated in the protest, said government security forces operated side by 

side with more than 50 civilians, many of whom were armed with pistols and fired 

live ammunition at the students. Diaz was shot in the abdomen when a mixed group 

of government security forces and armed, masked civilians opened fire on the university building where he was taking shelter. 

In some cases documented by Human Rights Watch, armed pro-government gangs 

detained people at or near protests, and then handed them over to security forces. 

Those security forces, in turn, falsely claimed to have caught the abducted individuals in the act of committing a crime, and prosecutors subsequently charged them 

before a judge. 

Jose Alfredo Martin Ostermann, 41, and Carlos Spinetti, 39, were detained on 

March 12 by armed civilians as they walked near a pro-government rally in Caracas. 

The victims were taken in plain sight of three national guardsmen, who did nothing 

to intervene. The armed men beat Ostermann and Spinetti, shouted insults at them 

that were political in tone (for example, accusing them of being ‘‘traitors to the fatherland’’), threatened to kill them, and photographed Spinetti holding a planted weapon, before handing them over to police. Rather than questioning the armed civilians, 

police detained the two victims. 

Sandro Rivas, 30, left a demonstration and was getting a ride home on the back 

of a motorcycle when he and the driver were stopped by four armed men driving a 

pickup truck. The plainclothes men forced Rivas and the driver into the back of the 

pickup, where they punched and kicked them repeatedly and threatened to kill them. 

Then they drove them to a National Guard checkpoint, where they told officers the 

detainees had been ‘‘guarimbeando’’—slang the government often uses to refer to protesters who block roads. The guardsmen arrested the two men without once questioning the armed men. 

All of the people we interviewed who were abducted, or taken captive, or attacked 

by pro-government gangs told us they were beaten severely, or subjected to threats 

or insults that were political in nature. 

Despite credible evidence of crimes carried out by these armed pro-government 

gangs, high-ranking officials called directly on groups to confront protesters through 

speeches, interviews, and tweets. President Maduro himself has on multiple occasions called on civilian groups loyal to the government to ‘‘extinguish the flame’’ of 

what he characterized as ‘‘fascist’’ protesters. For example, in a speech on March 

5 transmitted live as a mandatory broadcast (cadena nacional), Maduro said: ‘‘. . . 

These groups of guarimberos, fascists and violent [people], and today now other sectors of the country’s population as well have gone out on the streets, I call on the 

UBCh, on the communal councils, on communities, on colectivos: flame that is lit, 

flame that is extinguished.’’ 

Similarly, on February 16, the governor of the state of Carabobo, Francisco 

Ameliach, issued a tweet calling on the Unidades de Batalla Bolivar-Chavez 

(UBCh)—a civilian group formed, according to the government, as a ‘‘tool of the peoFOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

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ple to defend its conquests, to continue fighting for the expansion of the Venezuelan 

Revolution’’—to launch a rapid counterattack against protesters. Ameliach said the 

order would come from the president of the National Assembly, Diosdado Cabello, 

a close ally of President Maduro. The February 16 tweet, which was later deleted 

from his feed, said: UBCH get ready for the swift counterattack. Diosdado will give 

the order. #GringosAndFascistsShowRespect 

ABUSES IN DETENTION FACILITIES

In most of the cases documented by Human Rights Watch, detainees were held 

incommunicado for up to 48 hours, before being presented to a judge. In many instances they were held in military installations. 

During this period, security forces subjected detainees to severe physical abuse, 

including: 

• Beatings with fists, helmets, and firearms; 

• Electric shocks or burns; 

• Being forced to squat or kneel, without moving, for hours at a time; 

• Being handcuffed to other detainees, sometimes in pairs and others in human 

chains of dozens of people, for hours at a time; and 

• Extended periods of extreme cold or heat. 

Maurizio Ottaviani Rodriguez, 20, was detained on February 28 when he was leaving a demonstration in Plaza Altamira in Caracas. Despite having offered no resistance during the arrest, Ottaviani told Human Rights Watch, the guardsmen beat, 

kicked, and stepped on him. He was forced to board a school bus with more than 

40 other detainees, including several women and three minors. Each detainee was 

handcuffed to the person on his or her side, and they were held on the bus for 2 

hours, during which time they were not allowed to open the windows to alleviate the 

heat inside, which was stifling. The guardsmen hit people inside the bus with batons, 

threatened to throw a teargas canister inside the bus, and told detainees they would 

be sent to a violent prison. Detainees were then taken to the military base Fuerte 

Tiuna, where they were held for almost a day, and were not allowed to speak with 

their families or lawyers. As soon as they arrived, they were all taken to a chapel 

and separated into three groups: men, women, and the three minors. During this 

time, the men were handcuffed to each other in a human chain. 

Detainees also described being subjected to intrusive physical exams by guardsmen, ostensibly to search for weapons or drugs, which involved removing their 

clothes and being forced to perform squats while naked. At least one of the detainees subjected to these degrading exams was a boy. 

Detainees with serious injuries—such as wounds from rubber bullets and broken 

bones from severe beatings—were denied or delayed access to medical attention, exacerbating their suffering, despite their repeated requests to see a doctor. 

In the few instances in which detainees with serious injuries were taken to a hospital or clinic, security officials interfered with their medical care. Security officials 

refused to leave restricted medical areas when asked; denied doctors the right to 

speak privately with patients or carry out medical procedures without national 

guardsmen or police present; and in some instances tried to take detainees out of 

facilities before they had received adequate treatment or their condition had stabilized, against doctors’ advice. 

On February 19, a national guardsman fired at the face of Gengis Pinto, 36, from 

point blank range with rubber bullets, despite the fact that he had already been detained and was offering no resistance. Pinto had been participating in an 

antigovernment rally in San Antonio de los Altos, where hundreds of protesters had 

blocked off part of a highway. Pinto raised his arm to block the shot, which struck 

his hand, badly mangling several of his fingers, and embedded several pellets in his 

forearm. Despite serious pain, loss of blood, and several requests, guardsmen refused 

to take Pinto to a doctor. Instead, they beat him, threatened to kill him, and took 

him to a military base for questioning. Approximately 6 hours after being shot, 

guardsmen took Pinto to an emergency clinic, where they refused to let the doctor examine him privately. Though the doctor told guardsmen that Pinto needed immediate specialty care that the clinic could not provide, guardsmen ignored his advice 

and took Pinto back to the military base. There, he was handcuffed to another detainee and made to sit in the sun for roughly 10 more hours before being taken to 

a private clinic where he was operated on. 

In several cases, national guardsmen and police also subjected detainees to severe 

psychological abuse, threatening them with death and rape, and telling them they 

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would be transferred to the country’s extremely violent prisons, even though they 

had yet to be charged with a crime. 

In other cases, guardsmen and police warned victims not to denounce the abuses 

they had suffered, suggesting false stories that detainees should use to explain the 

physical injuries they had suffered at the hands of security forces. 

In at least 10 cases, Human Rights Watch believes that the combination of abusive tactics employed by security forces constitutes torture. 

Clipso Alberto Martinez Romero, 19, was participating in a demonstration in Valencia on March 20 when national guardsmen on motorcycles rode toward the crowd 

firing teargas and rubber bullets. He was knocked to the ground by guardsmen and 

kicked repeatedly, though he and several eyewitnesses said he offered no resistance. 

Then a guardsman stepped on Martinez’s head and fired rubber bullets at pointblank range in his thigh. The shot struck a set of keys in his pocket, dispersing metal 

shards as well as rubber pellets into his leg. Despite the serious pain it caused, 

guardsmen forced Martinez to jog, then took him to a military facility where he was 

made to strip naked for an invasive body search. Officers repeatedly forced Martinez 

to clean his blood off of the floor with his own t-shirt. He repeatedly asked to see 

a doctor, but was instead forced to kneel with other detainees for several hours. The 

room where they were held was kept at a very cold temperature by an air conditioner. 

When Martinez asked an officer to turn it down, the officer responded by turning it 

up full blast. Guardsmen came into the room where Martinez was being held to mock 

him, and several took photographs of his bullet wound on their cell phones. He was 

not taken to an emergency medical clinic until roughly 3 hours after he had been 

shot. There, the medical professional said he was suffering from hypothermia and 

heart arrhythmia likely caused by trauma, and that he had lost so much blood that 

he would die if he was not immediately treated at a hospital. 

Juan Sanchez, 22, was detained by national guardsmen when he was walking to 

the bank on the outskirts of Caracas on March 5. Earlier that day, Sanchez had participated in a protest in the neighborhood. Without warning, the guardsmen kicked 

him, beat him, and fired a rubber bullet from point-blank range into his right thigh. 

One of the guardsmen said, ‘‘Finally we got one. He’ll be our trophy so these brats 

stop fucking around.’’ Sanchez was driven to a military installation, where a dozen 

guardsmen forced him to take off his clothes. One guardsman, who saw his bleeding 

leg, asked: ‘‘Does this injury hurt?’’ and inserted his finger into the open wound, removed it, and then inserted it again. The second time he took something out of his 

leg, but Sanchez could not see if it was muscle tissue or a rubber bullet. Three 

guardsmen then handcuffed him to a metal pole, gave him electric shocks twice, and 

demanded that he tell them who his accomplices were. Afterward, the guardsmen 

took Sanchez to a patio where he was forced to fight with one of them, while the rest 

watched, laughing and cheering. Sanchez was taken to a hospital, where the guardsmen interfered with the doctor’s efforts to treat him, and then was driven back to 

the military installation, where guardsmen called him a ‘‘fascist’’ and continued to 

kick him, threatening to send him to one of Venezuela’s most violent prisons. 

DUE PROCESS VIOLATIONS

Under Venezuelan law, a detainee arrested while committing a crime should be 

brought before a prosecutor within 12 hours of his or her arrest. The prosecutor has 

up to 36 additional hours to investigate the case and bring the detainee before a 

judge at a hearing, in which the detainee may be charged with a crime or released. 

During this period, detainees have the right to communicate with their families, 

lawyer, or person of trust, and to be immediately informed of the charges against 

them. 

Human Rights Watch found that these fundamental due process guarantees were 

violated in the vast majority of cases documented in this report. 

The detainees were routinely held incommunicado for extended periods of time, 

usually up to 48 hours, and sometimes longer. While, in a few exceptional cases documented by Human Rights Watch, detainees were released before being brought 

before a judge, in the overwhelming majority of cases prosecutors charged them 

with several crimes, regardless of whether there was any evidence the accused had 

committed a crime. 

Six people, two of them children, were detained on February 18 for allegedly vandalizing the property of CANTV, the government telephone and Internet provider, in 

Barquisimeto. Yet while police reports claimed the accused were caught fleeing the 

CANTV offices, various witnesses and a video show at least four of the detainees were 

detained in a different location. Apart from the police report, the only evidence presented by the prosecutor against the detainees was an abandoned gas container 

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found near CANTV. In spite of the lack of evidence, a judge charged the detainees 

with eight crimes, including damages to public property, the use of an adolescent to 

commit a crime, and instigation to hate. 

In virtually all of the cases we investigated, detainees were not permitted to contact their families during the initial 48 hours of their detention despite repeated requests to do so. Meanwhile, relatives of detainees were routinely denied access to 

information regarding whether family members had been detained and, even when 

they knew detentions had taken place, where they were being held. Family members described traveling from one security force facility to another in search of their 

loved ones, only to be told they were not there. In several instances, authorities deliberately misled families and lawyers regarding the whereabouts of detainees. 

When families were able to determine the location of detainees—most often through 

the unrelenting searches of lawyers and local human rights defenders—they were 

consistently denied access to them, even when those detained were adolescents. 

Albany Ottaviani went to a military installation in Caracas on February 28 to inquire about the whereabouts of her brother, Maurizio Ottaviani Rodriguez, 20. He 

had been detained earlier that day at a protest by national guardsmen. At the installation, she said a colonel told her and 15 other family members waiting outside that 

they could be arrested for standing in a military zone. The family members promptly 

left for fear their presence might lead to retaliation against their relatives, who they 

believed were being detained on the base. The following morning, family members 

returned to the base, where guardsmen told them they would provide a bus to take 

the families to a courthouse, where the detainees were going to be tried. Families got 

on the bus, but guardsmen instead drove them around the city for several hours before dropping them off at a location that was not where hearings were to be held. 

Angelica Rodriguez went to look for her husband, Jesus Maria Toval, on a military 

installation in Barquisimeto on February 21—the day after he had been detained by 

an armed pro-government gang and handed over to national guardsmen. She said 

a guardsman told her that there was no list with names of detainees being held 

there, so they could not tell her where her husband was on the base. Two hours 

later—only after Rodriguez broke down crying—a different guardsman approached 

her and quietly told her that Toval was indeed being held at the base. Yet Rodriguez 

and her husband’s lawyer were not allowed to see Toval until 2 days later, when he 

was brought before a judge for his hearing. 

Lawyers told Human Rights Watch that detainees were routinely moved from one 

detention center to another during their incommunicado detention—a practice referred to as ‘‘taxi driving’’ (ruleteo)—without informing detainees, their families, or 

lawyers where they were being taken, or when they would be taken before a judge. 

Detainees were also denied access to legal counsel during their detention. Lawyers 

who were able to determine where detainees were being held—in many cases by deducing where they would be taken based on eyewitnesses’ accounts of where they 

had been detained, and by which security force—were not allowed to meet with 

them, despite repeated requests. 

Virtually all detainees were not allowed to meet with their defense lawyers until 

minutes before their initial hearing before a judge. Lawyers and detainees alike told 

Human Rights Watch that these meetings usually occurred in the hallways outside 

of courtrooms, in front of police and court officials as well as other detainees (to 

whom they were sometimes handcuffed), denying their right to a private audience. 

Lawyers, like detainees, usually learned of the charges against detainees at the 

hearings, or at the earliest, minutes before they began. They had virtually no time 

to review relevant court documents, such as police arrest reports or inventories of 

supposed evidence, which was critical to defend their clients. Lawyers told Human 

Rights Watch that this access was denied even in cases in which hearings were delayed for hours—time during which they could have met with detainees or reviewed 

case files. 

Hearings were routinely and inexplicably held in the middle of the night, a practice that lawyers interviewed by Human Rights Watch had not experienced in other 

types of cases. Lawyers told Human Rights Watch that, night after night, they were 

forced to wait for hours in courts, in military facilities, or in other where places 

hearings were held, without receiving any plausible justification for the delay. This 

routine was physically exhausting, wasted time they could have dedicated to defending other detainees, and made it even harder for them to provide an adequate 

defense. 

According to various lawyers and detainees—as well as judicial files to which 

Human Rights Watch had access—prosecutors’ accusations, and the eventual 

charges brought against detainees, were based almost exclusively on police reports 

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and, in several instances, on what detainees plausibly said was planted evidence. 

In addition, individuals who were detained separately, at different times or in different locations—and who in many cases did not even know each other—were sometimes charged by prosecutors in a single hearing with the same crimes, sometimes 

using the same piece of evidence for all of the accused, such as a piece of barbed 

wire. 

Instead of thoroughly reviewing the evidence provided by prosecutors and detainees—the latter’s physical appearance alone in many cases provided compelling evidence of abuse—judges routinely rubber-stamped the charges presented by prosecutors. 

While most of those charged were granted conditional liberty in the cases we investigated, judges repeatedly placed conditions (medidas cautelares) on detainees’ 

freedom that prevented them from exercising their fundamental rights to freedom 

of assembly and expression, such as prohibiting them from participating in demonstrations or talking to the media. 

Marco Aurellio Coello, 18; Luis Felipe Boada, 25; Cristian Holdack, 34; Nelson 

Gil, 22; Demian Martin, 19; and Angel de Jesus Gonzalez, 19; were arbitrarily detained on February 12 in six different places in or around Carabobo Park in Caracas, where a largely peaceful demonstration ended in violent incidents that led to at 

least three deaths, dozens of people injured, and the burning of several official vehicles. The six men—who did not know each other before that day—were subject to severe physical abuse during their arrest and at the headquarters of the investigative 

police in the area, where they were all held incommunicado for 48 hours. During 

their detention, they did not have access to their lawyers and were not permitted to 

see their families. At 11 p.m. on February 14, they were brought before a judge and 

charged with several crimes based on evidence presented by the prosecution that included clothes that security officials had stained with gasoline, and photographs of 

unidentifiable individuals engaged in confrontations with security forces placed 

alongside the men’s mug shots taken at the police station. At 5:30 a.m. on February 

15, the judge confirmed the prosecution of the six men and ordered their pretrial detention. Four of them were granted conditional liberty on April 1, and released while 

awaiting trial. 

Dozens of lawyers and human rights defenders told Human Rights Watch that, 

in a country where prosecutorial and judicial independence has been significantly 

undermined in recent years, they had grown accustomed to encountering obstacles 

to defending detainees. However, all said the situation had worsened dramatically 

after February 12. Never before, they said, had they encountered such a comprehensive battery of obstacles affecting so many cases. 

OFFICIALS AND SECURITY FORCES WHO INTERVENED TO HELP DETAINEES

It is important to note that not all of the security force members or justice officials 

encountered by the victims in these cases participated in the abusive practices. Indeed, in some of the cases, victims told Human Rights Watch that security officials 

and doctors in public hospitals had surreptitiously intervened to help them or to 

ease their suffering. 

In a few instances, national guardsmen quietly passed a cell phone to detainees 

being held incommunicado, so that they could call their families and tell them 

where they were, or snuck them food or water. Some security officials furtively told 

human rights lawyers the whereabouts of detainees, or tipped them off as to when 

the detainees would be brought before a judge. In several cases, doctors and nurses 

in public hospitals—and even those serving in military clinics—stood up to armed 

security forces, who wanted to deny medical care to seriously wounded detainees. 

They insisted detainees receive urgent medical care, in spite of direct threats—interventions that may have saved victims’ lives. 

FEAR OF REPORTING ABUSES

Many victims and family members we spoke with said they believed they might 

face reprisals if they reported abuses by police, guardsmen, or armed pro-government gangs. Victims also expressed fear that, were they to report abuses, the Attorney General’s Office would fabricate charges against them, or—in cases in which 

victims had already been accused of crimes—that judges would punish them by 

wrongfully convicting them, or revoking their conditional liberty if it already had 

been granted. 

A lawyer from the Catholic University Andres Bello, who coordinates the work of 

a team of criminal lawyers who have assisted hundreds of detainees in Caracas, told 

Human Rights Watch that ‘‘in almost no cases’’ do victims have the confidence to 

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file a complaint with the Attorney General’s Office. He added, ‘‘People don’t bring 

complaints because they don’t trust institutions. They fear who will protect them 

if they do.’’ 

Many victims traced these fears to threats they received from security forces during their detentions. Not only were detainees subject to repeated death threats, but 

several victims of severe physical abuse said that security forces had explicitly told 

them not to say how they had been hurt. In several cases we investigated, government security forces even went so far as to suggest false stories that victims of 

abuse should use to explain how their injuries had been sustained. Others were told 

they would not be released unless they signed documents saying they had not been 

abused during their detentions. Victims saw these exchanges as a clear threat not 

tell the truth about what had happened to them. 

Guardsmen told Gengis Pinto, 36, who had been beaten, given electric shocks, and 

shot at point-blank range by guardsmen after being detained at a protest, to say that 

he had run into a post and been hit in the face with a bottle by a fellow demonstrator. 

Nelson Gil, 22, who was beaten by plainclothes police, was told by investigative 

police who observed his injuries to say he fell and was punched by fellow protesters. 

Keyla Brito, 41, her 17-year old daughter, and six other women who were detained 

in a military installation where they were beaten and threatened by guardswomen, 

were forced to sign a document saying they had not been abused in exchange for authorities releasing them without charging them with a crime. 

Lisandro Barazarte, 40, a photographer for the newspaper ‘‘Notitarde’’ in Valencia, 

said he feared for his life after his photographs of armed pro-government supporters 

firing pistols on protesters were published. Barazarte received multiple death threats 

after the photos appeared in the newspaper. ‘‘I live in suspense, because I don’t know 

from where they are going to shoot at me,’’ he said. ‘‘At any moment something could 

happen to me.’’ At the time he spoke to Human Rights Watch, he had not placed a 

complaint about the threats with officials, out of fear he would be targeted for revenge attacks. 

Several victims expressed fear that reporting crimes could lead to the loss of employment for them or their family members who worked for the government. In several instances, these threats were made explicit. 

A victim who was beaten, shot, and threatened with death after being arbitrarily 

detained by national guardsmen told Human Rights Watch that, not long after he 

was released, members of the intelligence services (Servicio Bolivariano de 

Inteligencia Nacional, SEBIN) brought in his father for questioning. The victim said 

his father was a career officer in the Venezuelan military. SEBIN officers told the 

father that if his son continued to take part in demonstrations or filed a complaint, 

the father would be considered a ‘‘counterrevolutionary’’ and would lose his job. The 

victim said that he had stopped participating in demonstrations since his father’s 

conversation with SEBIN, and would not file a complaint with authorities for the 

abuses he had suffered, for fear it would cost his father’s job. 

Another victim who was arbitrarily detained and beaten by an armed pro-government gang said one of the reasons he had not filed a complaint was out of concern 

he could lose his job. An employee of a government ministry, he told Human Rights 

Watch, ‘‘I know that at any moment they could fire me.’’ He said he had intentionally 

steered clear of political activities since the incident. 

The reluctance to report abuses is compounded by a deep and widespread distrust 

of the justice system itself. Victims and their lawyers were extremely skeptical that 

prosecutors and judges who belong to the same institutions as those who had violated their rights would act with impartiality and professionalism when handling 

their abuse claims. 

Jose Alfredo Martin Ostermann, 41, who was abducted by members of an armed 

gang as he walked with a friend near a pro-government rally in Caracas, beaten in 

plain view of national guardsmen, and then handed over to police, said he did not 

plan to file a complaint with authorities because they were collaborating directly with 

his abusers. ‘‘I was beaten, threatened, and detained in front of the National 

Guard—which is supposed to be a state body—and they simply turned around and 

walked away.’’ He added, ‘‘They know [about this] at the prosecutors’ office and the 

police, and they are not doing anything.’’ Placing a complaint, he said, ‘‘may even 

be counterproductive. It could lead to vengeance.’’ 

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Victims’ lack of confidence in the justice system was underscored by cases in 

which government officials informed detainees and their families that the cases 

against them were being pursued on political grounds. 

OBSTACLES TO ACCOUNTABILITY

The Venezuelan state should ensure that any acts of violence or serious crimes 

are rigorously investigated and that those responsible for them are held accountable. These include crimes allegedly committed by protesters, as well as abuses committed by government security forces. 

Under international law, the Venezuelan Government also has an obligation to 

conduct prompt, thorough, and impartial investigations of human rights violations, 

including those documented in this report, as well as other abuses reported by victims and local human rights defenders and abuses reported in the press. 

President Maduro and Attorney General Luisa Ortega Diaz have acknowledged 

that security forces have committed human rights violations in the context of demonstrations since February 12. Both have pledged that those responsible for abuses 

will be investigated and prosecuted. According to the government, as of April 25, 

the Attorney General’s Office was conducting 145 investigations into alleged human 

rights violations, in which 17 security officials had been detained for their alleged 

involvement in these cases. 

While these investigations are a welcome start, there are good reasons to doubt 

the ability of Venezuelan authorities to ensure that the abuses are investigated in 

an impartial and thorough manner and that those responsible for them are brought 

to justice. 

One reason is that many abuses are likely to go unreported because of the widespread and well-founded fear and distrust that victims feel toward the Venezuelan 

justice system. 

Another reason is that, in many of these cases, the investigative police, the Attorney General’s Office, and the judiciary are themselves implicated in serious due 

process violations, as well as in failing to intervene to address abuses by security 

forces against detainees. Consequently, any thorough investigation will require 

these institutions to investigate their own misconduct—which is likely to give rise 

to serious conflicts of interest and severely compromise the credibility of their findings. 

A third reason is the fact that the Venezuelan judiciary has largely ceased to 

function as an independent branch of government. As Human Rights Watch has documented in past reports, the Supreme Court has effectively rejected its role as a 

guarantor of fundamental rights, with several justices publicly committing themselves to supporting the political agenda of the government. Lower-court judges are 

under intense pressure to avoid rulings that could upset government officials, as 

most have temporary or provisional appointments and risk being summarily fired 

by the Supreme Court if they rule in favor people perceived to be opponents of the 

government. 

Given the chronic underreporting of abuses and lack of independence of Venezuelan investigative and judicial institutions, it is troubling that the president, the 

attorney general, and other senior government officials—while acknowledging the 

need for accountability—have repeatedly said abuses against protesters have been 

rare and publicly defended the conduct of security forces. The attorney general, for 

example, claimed abuses by security forces were ‘‘isolated incidents’’ and that security forces generally ‘‘respect human rights.’’ Meanwhile, President Maduro said 

that only a ‘‘very small number of security forces personnel have also been accused 

of engaging in violence,’’ and that the government had ‘‘responded by arresting those 

suspected.’’ 

It is also troubling that the government has repeatedly sought to blame its political opponents, or simply the opposition as a whole, for the violence without providing credible evidence. For example, on March 14, President Maduro said that, 

‘‘[a]ll of the cases of people who have been killed are the responsibility of the violence from protests (la violencia guarimbera)—all of them—from the first to the 

last.’’ While, at that time, Maduro said the investigation into these and other crimes 

had made significant progress and provided numbers of alleged protesters detained, 

he did not indicate that anyone had been convicted for the crimes. On March 15, 

President Maduro said that, ‘‘practically all Venezuelans who have died, regretfully, 

are the responsibility of the violence of the right.’’ 

Similarly, despite compelling evidence of attacks by armed pro-government gangs 

on civilians, ranking government officials have denied their existence, or accused 

them of pertaining to the opposition. For example, on April 13, President Maduro 

said that, ‘‘the opposition had not provided any evidence that shows that the revoluFOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

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tionary colectivos are responsible for violent actions.’’ He added that, in contrast, the 

government had detained ‘‘supporters of the right [wing] for committing terrorist 

acts.’’ 

Cabello also said on April 10 that the only ‘‘armed colectivos’’ belonged to the 

opposition, and are the ones ‘‘who kill people at the guarimbas.’’ His statement implied not only that there were no armed pro-government gangs, but also that 

killings at barricades had been committed by antigovernment armed groups, an 

assertion for which he did not provide proof, such as cases in which people had been 

convicted for these crimes. 

In another example of blaming the opposition for the violence, the government 

accused Leopoldo Lopez, a prominent opposition leader, of being the ‘‘intellectual 

author’’ of the protest-related deaths on February 12. The Attorney General’s Office 

promptly sought his arrest for several alleged crimes—initially including homicide, 

a charge it was forced to drop when video footage appeared showing security force 

members shooting at unarmed protesters on the date in question. Lopez has been 

held in pretrial detention on a military base for more than 2 months despite the 

government’s failure to produce credible evidence that he committed any crime. The 

Attorney General’s Office has also obtained arrest warrants for Carlos Vecchio and 

other opposition figures, while the Supreme Court has summarily tried and sentenced two opposition mayors to prison terms, in judicial proceedings that violated 

basic due process guarantees. The Supreme Court’s rulings are not subject to 

appeal, which violates the right to appeal against a criminal conviction. 

Mr. Chairman and committee members, thank you for your attention to this critical issue, and for including this submission. 

[EDITOR’S NOTE.—To read the entire Human Rights Watch’s report, 

‘‘Punished for Protesting: Rights Violations in Venezuela’s Streets, 

Detention Centers, and Justice System: http://www.hrw.org/node/ 

125192. A copy of the report will also be maintained in the permanent record of the committee.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you all for your testimony. 

And, Mr. Vivanco, thank you and your organization for what is 

an incredible piece of work that I think is eye-opening, and hopefully will shape the conscience of leaders within the hemisphere 

and beyond. 

Let me ask you, given the broad pattern of behavior that you just 

described in your testimony, as well as in the report, how can the 

international community discern who is responsible for authorizing 

or encouraging the use of violence against protestors, specifically 

when not one member of the security forces has received a sentence 

for their role in human rights violations? 

Mr. VIVANCO. Mr. Chairman, I think it is doable. You need to 

start by looking at who was in command in the location where 

abuses took place. We do have that information. We were able to 

include that information in our report. There are several testimonies of individuals who were subject to arbitrary detention and 

abuses and then they were moved to a military facility where they 

suffered additional abuses. And those names and the location of 

those security forces are in the record, are available, and I think 

they are mostly responsible—the officials who are in charge of 

those forces are clearly directly responsible for these abuses. 

The CHAIRMAN. Now, let me ask you, given the fact that the report states that judicial officials did not provide a check on abuses 

committed by the Venezuelan security forces, and in some cases actually were complicit in human rights violations, can you provide 

some greater detail in the collusion between justice officials and 

the security forces? 

Mr. VIVANCO. Mr. Chairman, in our report, we refer to several 

fundamental violations of due process like, for instance, prosecutors 

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who, according to the evidence that we collected, interrogated detainees while being held incommunicado in a military installation 

without a defense attorney, and judges and also prosecutors that 

openly ignore allegations and complaints about physical abuse, including torture. There is a clear failure on the part of the judiciary 

to conduct a rigorous and independent investigation on cases so far 

of obvious and evident abuse. 

According to the report that we published, judges were holding 

hearings in the middle of the night and only 5 minutes before the 

hearing they gave access to the attorneys representing the victims 

their file and the evidence that was included in the file to support 

the charges against them. 

Unfortunately, the judicial system in Venezuela—and that includes the prosecutors, not only the prosecutors but also the justice 

system—and I am referring to the judiciary in general—has been 

captured since 2004, thanks to a reform promoted by the administration of President Chavez. What they did in 2004 was to change 

the structure of the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court at that 

point had only 20 justices, and overnight using a slim majority that 

the government had at Congress at that time, six or seven votes, 

they managed to change the structure from 20 to 32 justices, and 

they added 12 justices who are clearly on the side of the government. Since then, the Supreme Court for more than 10 years has 

been ruling systematically every decision on the side of the government. 

And on top of everything else, 80 percent of the judges in Venezuela are provisional judges. They do not have tenure in their position. They could be fired with basically no due process overnight, 

including the judge that is investing the case against Leopoldo 

Lopez is a provisional judge who could lose her job just by a decision of the Supreme Court which is completely on the side of the 

government. 

The CHAIRMAN. So now, with the report, which I have some good 

sense of, and with all of your testimony, I would say to any one 

of you, all three of you actually, do you oppose targeted sanctions 

against individuals who can be documented to have committed 

human rights abuses at this time? 

Mr. Vivanco. 

Mr. VIVANCO. The targeted sanctions is certainly a valid option 

against those involved in human rights abuses, and that should be 

a public policy option for this country as well as any other democratic country in the world. 

The key question is, How do you adopt a policy that could be effective on the ground and could change conditions there? My sense 

is that the ideal option is to strategize with democratic governments in the region and to try to develop a creative common 

ground, a unified vision with democracies in the region but also in 

other regions, in Europe specifically, that could exercise effective 

pressure on the government of Maduro to address these human 

rights abuses. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Naim. 

Dr. NAIM. Yes, Chairman. As I said in my testimony, I strongly 

support targeted sanctions against individuals that are violators of 

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human rights but also those incurred in massive economic crimes 

and corruption. 

The CHAIRMAN. Ambassador Duddy. 

Ambassador DUDDY. I do not oppose targeted sanctions against 

individuals. I note, as did Senator Rubio earlier, that Venezuelans 

of all political stripes continue to enjoy access to the United States, 

and that, indeed, being singled out, as has happened with a number of people designated as kingpins, will in some cases result in 

shrill defiance but will be understood by the individuals involved 

as something that they are going to need to deal with. It would be 

a formidable step. 

Once again, to return to an earlier point I made, how exactly we 

do and how we talk about it with our friends in the region will be 

critical. I think that we continue to enjoy very broad access with 

all of the democratic governments of the region, and as political officers, military attaches, and others engage with other governments 

in the region, I think we need to be clear that we are sanctioning 

behavior which should be objectionable, is indeed objectionable to 

all of us. 

The CHAIRMAN. I would just make an observation here that, 

based on the OAS performance, I know we want to engage in a 

hemispheric response, but if you cannot even get the appropriate 

resolutions passed at the OAS, which are far from sanctions, you 

wonder where that hemispheric response is going to be. In my experience, for 21 years now between the House and the Senate, 

where I have pursued sanctions at different times as one of the 

handful of peaceful diplomatic tools that exist for any given country, if you are going to pursue nonmilitary options in any given set 

of circumstances in the world, you have the use of international 

opinion, to the extent that a country and/or a dictator or authoritarian figure will be moved by that international opinion. You have 

the use of your aid and trade to induce a country to act a certain 

way, and, in the absence of that achieving something, then you 

have the denial of aid or trade, which is in essence sanctions. 

And the problem is that we consistently often have to lead to get 

other countries to then join us, such as with Iran. The European 

Union was not there first. It then joined us as we led an effort and 

showed that we were willing to engage. We are doing it in the 

question of the Ukraine, where we led with the first round of individual sanctions, and then the Europeans followed us. 

So I certainly would love to see a stronger hemispheric response. 

I just do not know how long one waits upon other countries to get 

to the point that they will acknowledge and do something about 

what is vividly before their eyes in their own neighborhood. 

Senator Rubio. 

Senator RUBIO. Thank you again, Mr. Chairman, for holding this 

hearing, for all of you for being a part of it. 

I would want to summarize what your testimony has been here 

today, and that is largely that in fact there are systemic human 

rights violations happening within Venezuela on behalf of the government as a part of a strategy. 

Number two, you have stated that you do not find an objection— 

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tions. We have heard testimony from the State Department saying 

that they do not think it is the right time to do it. I strongly disagree, as I think most of the members who were here today would 

as well. It is never the wrong time to condemn and sanction individuals responsible for grotesque human rights violations. 

And to that end, I wanted to use my time here today to share 

with you the name of 23 individuals in Venezuela who I think we 

should nominate for that sort of sanction based on many of the different things that you have all testified here today and others. 

I begin with Gabriela Ramirez, an ombudsman, a person who is 

in charge of defending people and in fact has been cooperating with 

the government; next are two people involved with the Department 

of Armaments and Explosives, Aref Eduardo Richany Jimenez y 

Julio Cesar Morales Prieto, individuals who in my opinion should 

be sanctioned. 

Third is one of the prosecutors there who has also acted unfairly 

and participated in these human rights violations, Luisa Ortega 

Diaz; the Chief of the Region number 8 of the National Armed 

Forces, Luis Alberto Arrayago Coronel; also the chief of a region of 

strategic defense, Miguel Vivas Landino. 

Then a number of governors for regions where there has been an 

unbelievable amount of human rights violations who have been cooperative in those activities, Francisco Rangel Gomez of the State 

of Bolivar; the Governor of the State of Tachira, Jose Gregorio 

Vielma Mora; and the Governor of the State of Trujillo, Henry Rangel Silva. 

Beyond that, there are a number of others, a commander of a 

regiment of what they call la Guardia del Pueblo, the commander 

of la Guardia del Pueblo regiment, Aquiles Rojas Patino. Another 

couple of individuals associated with the National Guard: Justo 

Jose Noguera Pietri; Sergio Rivero Marcano, the Director of Operations for that National Guard; also responsible for violations of 

human rights, Antonio Benavides Torres. 

The Chief of Region No. 1 of the Regional Command of the 

Bolivarian National Guard, Franklin Garcia Duque; the Chief of 

Region No. 2 of the National Guard, Arquimedes Herrera Ruso; the 

Chief of Region No. 3 for the National Guard, Manuel Jose 

Graterol Colmenarez; the Chief of Region No. 4 of the National 

Guard, Octavio Chacon; the Chief of Region No. 5 for the National 

Guard, Manuel Quevedo. 

One of the Ministers of Interior, Justice and Peace—there is anything but peace or justice in Venezuela today—who is directly responsible for many of these violations, not just encouraging them 

but looking the other way is Miguel Rodriquez Torres; another vice 

minister in the same Interior Ministry, Marcos Rojas Figueroa; the 

Director of the National Bolivarian Police, someone who has actively participated in controlling and directing human rights violations, Manuel Eduardo Perez Urdaneta. 

The Director General of their intelligence system, which has been 

deeply involved in these activities is Gustavo Enrique Gonzalez 

Lopez, and associated with him as well, Manuel Gregorio Bernal 

Martinez. 

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These are just 23 names. The list goes on and we will continue 

to collect those names of individuals who I believe should be nominated for sanctions by this Government at multiple levels. 

Beyond that, I would ask the comments of the panel. What about 

these individuals that have made themselves millionaires and billionaires because of the access they have to the government? What 

about individuals that have cooperated and enriched themselves as 

the process of that who now actively parade up and down the 

streets of the United States mocking us, quite frankly acting with 

impunity, in many instances openly laughing at this Nation’s inability to reach them or do anything about it? Do you have any 

opinion on what we should do with private individuals who have 

facilitated what the government and these 23 individuals have 

been able to carry out within Venezuela? 

Dr. NAIM. I support the sanctioning of individuals that have committed economic crimes, that are guilty of massive abuses and corruption. I, however, encourage that whatever sanctions are imposed on those individuals are well documented and let the world 

understand what have they done and why they are being sanctioned. 

Ambassador DUDDY. I would simply add to that what we are seeing still in Venezuela is the greatest waste of an incredible era of 

windfall profits. I would emphasize that it is astounding, the country with the largest proven oil reserves in the world sees every 

morning millions of Venezuelans streaming out to find basic 

consumables in the supermarkets. So there is a really extraordinary set of circumstances on the ground. 

I think that there is some real utility. Exactly how we do it, legally speaking, I am not sure, but there is some utility in underscoring the degree to which some people have pirated the resources 

of the state and, in doing so, frittered away an opportunity to Venezuela to make a real leap forward economically. 

Mr. VIVANCO. Senator Rubio, even targeted sanctions could be in 

some cases counterproductive. So I agree with Moises Naim that if 

any country in the world used that option, it is essential to be as 

transparent as you can in order to explain what you justify to the 

public and disclose as much information why who have been sanctioned and exactly what are the grounds. 

Senator RUBIO. And I hope we would as well because it makes 

them stronger. 

By the way, let me just clarify that list is by no means comprehensive. It is a list of 23 people. I would list 50 people, if I 

could, today but at least 23 people that today I wanted to share 

with you and everyone that I believe should be candidates for sanctions. And certainly any sort of sanctions would carry with them 

strong evidence of what these individuals have been responsible 

for. 

And I would just close by taking this moment, because I know 

that this will be listened to by government officials in Venezuela. 

I do believe there are people within the Government of Venezuela—in fact, I know there are people within the Government 

Venezuela that are quite uncomfortable with the direction that 

Nicolas Maduro and those around him have taken this country, not 

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tions. I know that there are professional military officers within 

the armed forces there that never signed up to be used as a way 

to repress their own people. 

And I would just say to them the intention and the policy of the 

United States is not to interfere in the internal affairs of any nation. The future of Venezuela belongs to the people of Venezuela. 

They must determine the direction of that country and what sort 

of system of government and economics they want. 

What we also want them to understand is that the United States 

will not stand by an idly watch as the rights of people, with whom 

we share this hemisphere, are systematically violated by an antiAmerican government, to top it all off, and ignore their plight. And 

we will endeavor to use and I think in a bipartisan way, I hope— 

and I know on this committee, that will be the case—to use the influence and the power of the United States of America to firmly 

line up on the side of those who aspire to liberty, to freedom, and 

to respect of human rights. And that is our intention here, and I 

pray and hope that that is the direction that we go in the weeks 

to come. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator. 

Two final questions, one to Mr. Naim and one to Mr. Vivanco. 

You mentioned and have written repeatedly about Cuba’s widespread detrimental influence in Venezuela. Can you provide a synopsis of the way that the Cuban regime and its advisors infiltrate 

the Venezuelan Government? 

Dr. NAIM. At this point, what we have is evidence of the presence 

of Cuban public servants in Venezuela’s Government. There is also 

ample evidence that the important functions of the Venezuelan 

state are being shaped or influenced or even decided by the Cuban 

Government. 

The CHAIRMAN. And does that include security forces? 

Dr. NAIM. Yes, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. Finally, Mr. Vivanco, maybe I am 

mischaracterizing this, so tell me if I am. In your answers, I hear 

a reticence to the question of even targeted sanctions against 

human rights abuses. So what is it that you think can happen that 

can be created both from these hearings, your organization’s reports, as well as others, to change the course of events in Venezuela. 

Mr. VIVANCO. Mr. Chairman, let me be as candid as I can. I hope 

that this type of hearing will encourage the administration to do 

more for democracy, for human rights, for the promotion of fundamental freedoms in this hemisphere. I think the administration has 

a chance and there is a space to develop a more robust policy toward the region and working closely with democratic governments, 

starting with the big ones, Mexico and Brazil—those governments 

have also responsibility to lead and to defend these freedoms and 

human rights. And I think the administration has not done enough 

so far to establish these goals as a clear priority in this region. 

The CHAIRMAN. When we talk about engaging in democracy and 

human rights, what specifically would you want to see, because, 

you know, when I visit the hemisphere and I talk to leaders, there 

is this Latin American sense of non-interference in their neighbor. 

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So when we talk about hemispheric responsibility so that countries 

within the hemisphere who are democratic like Mexico, like Colombia, like Chile, just to mention some, feel, well, I should not talk 

about my neighbor even though I think they are doing horrible 

things. What is the U.S. going to do with that? 

Mr. VIVANCO. Unfortunately, my sense is that you are right. The 

region is deeply fragmented. The basic consensus that was established in the 1990s in support of democracy and human rights to 

collectively defend those principles, unfortunately, is no longer 

present. 

And if there is one democracy in the region that could reinforce 

these principles, it is the U.S. Government and the Obama administration. I think it is in a unique position to work much more 

closely with Brazil. Brazil has tremendous influence in South 

America, and Brazil is very reluctant to publicly take a position on 

these issues. As a matter of fact, on the Venezuelan crisis, it has 

been pretty silent, and that silence needs to be, I think, changed 

for not only statements but also action like, for instance, to demand 

the release of all of those ones who have been under arbitrary detention or have an open file against them just because they exercised their fundamental rights. And I think the administration 

could be more aggressive in terms of engaging in the region with 

a strategy that defends these fundamental freedoms and rights. 

The CHAIRMAN. Last comments. I see you both have your hands 

raised. Mr. Naim. 

Dr. NAIM. Mr. Chairman, you are right that there is the propensity of Latin American countries not to want to interfere in the domestic affairs of their neighbors. 

But they have been very selective in doing that, and what we 

have seen, for example, in the case of Brazil that has maintained 

a very loud silence for all these years, there has not been one comment by the Brazilian authorities about what is going on in Venezuela even though Brazil is presided by a woman that, as a result 

of her opposition to a military government, was tortured and repressed. But we have not heard from her any comment about the 

same things that are happening to young women in Venezuela 

today. 

But in the case of Brazil, for example, they have been very active 

in the crisis in Honduras, and they were very active in the crisis 

in Paraguay. So we have seen a certain selectivity in the case of 

Brazil. 

But I want to point out a trend that I think is welcome and encouraging that is taking place in Latin America where opposition 

forces are taking a public stand against their government’s complacency toward the Venezuelan situation. In Brazil, Argentina, Chile, 

and Peru, elected legislators have openly challenged their own governments for their passive stance towards Venezuela. This is a 

process that ought to be welcomed and encouraged. It is very important to have elected officials who are members of non-ruling 

parties throughout Latin America shaming their own governments 

out of their silence regarding the abuse that is taking place in Venezuela. 

The CHAIRMAN. Ambassador Duddy. 

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Ambassador DUDDY. Yes, sir, just a final comment. First of all, 

I think that a hearing like this is useful, and as one of the earlier 

panelists said, I am sure that people in Venezuela will be following 

this. While we may be criticized collectively and individually for 

various things that have been said here this morning, the Venezuelan people will hear it. 

I would encourage you and other elected officials to continue to 

travel to the region and not only just talk to leaders, but to speak 

with foreign media, emphasizing our concern with human rights, as 

well as with the deteriorating economic situation. And I return to 

the deteriorating economic situation, which I hope will become an 

increasing part of our official dialogue in private with governments 

around the region, because what we need for others to understand 

is that as the situation on the ground spins out of control, all of 

the region stands to be affected, the Caribbean arguably most immediately, but Brazil has many, many businesses on the ground, 

as do others. They will all be affected, and we need to make sure 

that to the extent that we can—and we are in the best position to 

do so—that folks understand that this is not merely a matter of the 

United States interfering in a domestic political squabble, that it 

is bigger and much more serious than that. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I appreciate all of your insights. 

Two final observations. One is it was my hope that the democratic charter of the OAS, the effort that was combined collectively, 

was going to be a vehicle for hemispheric engagement in promoting 

democracy and human rights within the region. That has been, unfortunately, not the vehicle that I anticipated it being. And it is up 

to the leaders of the hemisphere to make that a vehicle, which they 

agreed to and ratified as a vehicle for collective action, which is not 

the interference of one country or another, but the standards that 

are held hemispherically and, I would say, globally. 

And the last point that I would make is that it is the intention 

of the committee that this not be the end of our engagement on the 

question of Venezuela. There are many, many different dimensions 

of that, and certainly the human rights issue, which has been the 

centerpiece of our focus today, is critical. I would suspect that the 

results of what we have heard here today will move some of us to 

action in a way that hopefully will be both constructive and, at the 

same time, give both the administration, as well as those in Venezuela who are committing human rights abuses, a clear knowledge 

of what is headed their way. 

And with that and the appreciation of the committee, this hearing will remain open until the close of business tomorrow. 

And this hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 1:15 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

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ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

LETTERS SENT TO SENATORS ROBERT MENENDEZ AND BOB CORKER FROM ROBERTA

JACOBSON RE: THE ROLE OF SANCTIONS IN VENEZUELA’S POLICY

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