alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
##### Table of Contents

 

 

**United States**

**SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION**

**Washington, D.C. 20549**

 

**
 
**

**Form 10-Q**

 

**
 
**

 

For the quarter ended June 30, 2009 

or 

 

For the transition period from             to             

Commission File Number 1-9583 

 

**
 
**

**MBIA INC.**

**(Exact name of registrant as specified in its charter)**

 

**
 
**

 

 

**Registrant’s telephone number, including area code: (914) 273-4545**

 

**
 
**

Indicate by check mark whether the registrant (1) has filed all reports required to be filed by Section 13 or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 during the preceding 12 months (or for such shorterperiod that the registrant was required to file such reports), and (2) has been subject to such filing requirements for the past 90 days.    Yes  x    No   ̈

Indicate by check mark whether the registrant hassubmitted electronically and posted on its corporate Web site, if any, every Interactive Data File required to be submitted and posted pursuant to Rule 405 of Regulation S-T (§232.405 of this chapter) during the preceding 12 months (or for suchshorter period that the registrant was required to submit and post such files).    Yes   ̈    No   ̈

Indicate by check mark whether the Registrant is a large accelerated filer, an accelerated filer, a non-accelerated filer, or a smaller reporting company. Seedefinitions of “large accelerated filer,” “accelerated filer” and “smaller reporting company” in Rule 12b-2 of the Exchange Act. (Check one): 

Large accelerated filer  x            Accelerated filer   ̈            Non-accelerated filer   ̈            Smaller reporting company   ̈

Indicate by check mark whether the Registrant is shell company (as defined in Rule 12b-2 of the Act).    Yes   ̈    No  x

As of July 31, 2009, 207,994,886 shares ofCommon Stock, par value $1 per share, were outstanding. 

 

 

 

Table of Contents
**INDEX**

 
      **PAGE****PART I FINANCIAL INFORMATION**  
**Item 1.**
  Financial Statements (Unaudited) MBIA Inc. and Subsidiaries    Consolidated Balance Sheets—June 30, 2009 and December 31, 2008  1  Consolidated Statements of Operations—Three and six months ended June 30, 2009 and 2008  2  Consolidated Statement of Changes in Shareholders’ Equity—Six months ended June 30, 2009  3  Consolidated Statements of Cash Flows—Six months ended June 30, 2009 and 2008  4  Notes to Consolidated Financial Statements  5-76
**Item 2.**
  Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations  77-150
**Item 3.**
  Quantitative and Qualitative Disclosures About Market Risk  151
**Item 4.**
  Controls and Procedures  151**PART II OTHER INFORMATION**  
**Item 1.**
  Legal Proceedings  152-154
**Item 1A.**
  Risk Factors  155
**Item 1B.**
  Unresolved Staff Comments  155
**Item 2.**
  Unregistered Sales of Equity Securities and Use of Proceeds  155 
**Item 3.**
  Defaults Upon Senior Securities  155 
**Item 4.**
  Submission of Matters to a Vote of Security Holders  155
38983.

#### STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY v. MOORE.

Decided July 14, 1961.

*195
      *Joe R. Young, Jr., Hitch, Miller & Beckmann,*for plaintiff in error.

*B. Daniel Dubberly, Jr., L. P. Strickland,*contra.

Townsend, Presiding Judge.

Whether reinstatement of a lapsed insurance policy is prospective or retrospective is ordinarily determined by the policy terms. It was held in *Winder Nat. Bank v. Aetna Life Ins. Co.,*36 Ga. App. 703 (2) (137 SE 848) that where the intention of the parties is that the reinstatement shall relate back to the date of default the insured is covered during the interim period. In *Plumer v. Continental Cas. Co.,*12 Ga. App. 594 (77 SE 917), where there was a policy provision that reinstatement, if accepted, should be effective at noon of the day following the receipt of premium, it was held that since punctual payment of insurance premiums is of the essence of the contract, failure to make payment in strict compliance with contract terms results, in the absence of waiver by the insurer, in forfeiture. In *Forrester v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co.,*97 Ga. App. 618 (103 SE2d 619), citing the *Plumer*case, this court held that where a policy of automobile insurance expires, and, after an injury has occurred during the default period, *196the insured mails a renewal premium which is cashed by the insurer but the insurer returns a rebate for the time the policy was out of force, which included the day on which the injury occurred, this did not constitute a waiver of the late payment of premium so as to relate the insurance coverage back to the time of expiration of the original policy.

In the present case the insurance company, with notice that the policy had expired and that the plaintiff had suffered a loss between the expiration date and the date he mailed a renewal premium check, granted the insurance prospectively from the date of receipt of the check. Nothing in the policy required the company to grant coverage at all, or, if it wished to do so, to relate the coverage back to the expiration of the original policy so as to cover the period during which the loss occurred. By its notice it specifically refused to do so. Nothing in the policy or in the conduct of the parties indicates an intention that the reinstatement of the policy should be retroactive. Since the general allegation that the policy was in full force and effect on the date of loss must yield to the specific facts pleaded which show that such was not the case, the petition did not set forth a cause of action and the trial court erred in overruling the general demurrer.

*Judgment reversed.*

*Frankum and Jordan, JJ., concur.*
**EXHIBIT 32**

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C.        SECTION 1350,

AS        ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION        906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In        connection with the Quarterly Report of GVC Venture Corp. (the "Company") on Form 10-QSB        for the quarter ended December 31, 2007, as filed with the Securities and Exchange        Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Bernard Zimmerman, Principal Executive        Officer and Principal Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.        Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 that, to        the best of my knowledge:

|   | (1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section                        13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and |
|--------|-----|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|   | (2) | The information contained in the report fairly presents, in                        all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of                        the Company. |
|--------|-----|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

         

February 4,        2008   

 

                                                              

|    | /s/ Bernard Zimmerman                                                                                                                                               |
|--------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|    | Bernard Zimmerman, President                        (Principal Executive Officer) and Treasurer                        (Principal Financial and Accounting Officer) |
N O T FO R PUB L ICAT IO N UNITED STATES C OUR T OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH C IR C UIT JINPING ZHAO, Pe titione r, v. ER IC H. HOLDER , Jr., Attorne y Ge ne ra l, R

e sponde n t . No. 09-73374 Age n c y No. A099-422-235 M EM O R ANDUM *

On Pe tition for Re vie w of a n Orde r of the B oa rd of Im m igration Appe a ls Subm itte d De c e m

be r 17, 2013 ** B e fore : GOODW IN, WALLAC E, a nd GR AB ER , C irc uit Judge s. Jinping Zhao, a

native and c i tiz e n

of C h ina , pe titions pro se for re vie w of the B oa rd of Im m igration Appe a l s’ (“ B IA” ) orde r dism issing his a ppe a l from an im m igration judge ’ s de c i sion de ny i ng his a pplic at ion for a s y lum , withholding of re m ova l, a

nd re lie f unde r the C onve ntion Aga i nst Torture . W e have jurisdic tion 

# FIL ED JAN 03 2014 M OLLY C. DW Y ER, CLERK U . S . CO URT O F APPEALS

* This disposition is not a ppropria te for public at ion a

nd is not pre c e de nt e xc e pt a s provide d

by 9th C ir. R . 36-3. ** The pa

ne l una nim ously c onc lude s this c a se is suita ble for de c ision without oral a

rgum e nt. Se e Fe d. R . App. P. 34(a)(2).unde r 8 U.S.C . § 1252. W e re v ie w for substa ntia l e vide nc e the a ge n c y ’ s fa c tua l findings, a

pply ing the sta

nda rds gove rning a dve rse c re dibility de te rm inations c re ate d by

the RE AL ID Ac t. S

hre stha v . Holde r , 590 F.3d 1034, 1039 (9th C ir. 2010). W e grant the pe tition for re vie w a nd we re m and. The a ge n c y

ba se d its a dve rse c re dibility de te rm ination in pa

rt on a finding that Zha o a ppe are d in pe rson to m a

ke a c ha nge to his household re gistra tion on June 15, 2005, a

dat e whe n he c la im e d

to be in de te ntion. Howe ve r, this da te a ppe ars unde r Zha o’ s son’ s re gistra tion c a rd a nd Zha o did not te stify

tha t this e ve nt, wha

te v e r it wa s, involve d a

c ha nge tha t would re quire Zha o to a ppe ar in pe rson. Se e Re n v . Holde r , 648 F.3d 1079, 1087 (9th C ir. 2011) (re je c ting a n a dve rse c re dibility

finding tha

t wa s ba se d on a

m i sc ha ra c te riz ation of the e vide nc e ). The a ge nc y

a lso ba se d its a dve rse c re dibility de t e rm inat ion on a

finding that Zha o’ s te stim o ny

tha t his son alwa

y s live d with him

wa s inc onsiste nt with his house h old re gistra

tion. Substa

n tia l e vide nc e doe s not support this finding bec a use the a ge nc y ’ s re

je c tion of Zha o’ s e xpla

nation a s im

p la usible is ba s e d on spe c ulation. Se e id. at 1087-88.

0 9 - 7 3 3 7 4 2Ac c ordingly , we grant the pe tition for re vie w, a nd we re m and Zha o’ s c la im s for re c onside ration of Zha o’ s c re dibility and suc h othe r issue s a s the B IA m ay de e m a ppropria te . PE T IT IO N FO R RE V IE WG RANT E D; RE M A NDE D.

0 9 - 7 3 3 7 4 3
§ 1.1402(a)-6 Gain or loss from disposition of property. ( a ) There is excluded any gain or loss: ( 1 ) Which is considered as gain or loss from the sale or exchange of a capital asset;
( 2 ) from the cutting of timber or the disposal of timber, coal, or iron ore, even though held primarily for sale to customers, if section 631 is applicable to such gain or loss; and
( 3 ) from the sale, exchange, involuntary conversion, or other disposition of property if such property is neither ( i ) stock in trade or other property of a kind which would properly be includible in inventory if on hand at the close of the taxable year, nor
( ii ) property held primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of a trade or business. For the purpose of the special rule in subparagraph (3) of this paragraph, it is immaterial whether a gain or loss is treated as a capital gain or loss or as an ordinary gain or loss for purposes other than determining net earnings from self-employment. For instance, where the character of a loss is governed by the provisions of section 1231, such loss is excluded in determining net earnings from self-employment even though such loss is treated under section 1231 as an ordinary loss. For the purposes of this special rule, the term “involuntary conversion” means a compulsory or involuntary conversion of property into other property or money as a result of its destruction in whole or in part, theft or seizure, or an exercise of the power of requisition or condemnation or the threat or imminence thereof; and the term “other dispostion” includes the destruction or loss, in whole or in part, of property by fire, storm, shipwreck, or other casualty, or by theft, even though there is no conversion of such property into other property or money.
( b ) The application of this section may be illustrated by the following example:
Example. During the taxable year 1954, A, who owns a grocery store, realized a net profit of $1,500 from the sale of groceries and a gain of $350 from the sale of a refrigerator case. During the same year, he sustained a loss of $2,000 as a result of damage by fire to the store building. In computing taxable income, all of these items are taken into account. In determining net earnings from self-employment, however, only the $1,500 of profit derived from the sale of groceries is included. The $350 gain and the $2,000 loss are excluded.
[T.D. 6691, 28 FR 12796, Dec. 3, 1963, as amended by T.D. 6841, 30 FR 9309, July 27, 1965]
427 A.2d 1208

#### Commonwealth v. Burrell, Appellant.

Submitted June 29, 1979.

John Alden, for appellant;

David E. Fritchey, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.

Before CERCONE, P. J., and WIEAND and LOUIK, JJ.*

*

Judge Donald E. Wieand is sitting by special designation. Judge Maurice Louik of the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, is sitting by designation. ■

Judgment of sentence affirmed.
# C_2014282EN.01003901.xml

| 25.8.2014 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 282/39 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

25.8.2014

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 282/39

---

Action brought on 19 May 2014 — Rintisch v OHIM — Compagnie laitière européenne (PROTICURD)

(Case T-382/14)

2014/C 282/51

Language in which the application was lodged: English

Parties

Parties

Applicant: Bernhard Rintisch (Bottrop, Germany) (represented by: A. Dreyer, lawyer)

Applicant:

Defendant: Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs)

Defendant:

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal: Compagnie laitière européenne SA (Conde Sur Vire, France)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal:

Form of order sought

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | Annul the decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of the Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) of 14 March 2014 given in Case R 609/2011-4; |
| --- | --- |

—

Annul the decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of the Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) of 14 March 2014 given in Case R 609/2011-4;

| — | Order the defendant to pay the costs of proceedings. |
| --- | --- |

—

Order the defendant to pay the costs of proceedings.

Pleas in law and main arguments

Pleas in law and main arguments

Applicant for a Community trade mark: The other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal

Applicant for a Community trade mark:

Community trade mark concerned: The word mark ‘PROTICURD’ for goods in Classes 5 and 29 — International Registration No 9 81  041 designating the European Union

Community trade mark concerned:

Proprietor of the mark or sign cited in the opposition proceedings: The applicant

Proprietor of the mark or sign cited in the opposition proceedings:

Mark or sign cited in opposition: German trademarks Nos 3 9 7 02  429, 3 9 5 49  559 and 3 9 6 08  644

Mark or sign cited in opposition:

Decision of the Opposition Division: Upheld the opposition in part

Decision of the Opposition Division:

Decision of the Board of Appeal: Granted the appeal in part

Decision of the Board of Appeal:

Pleas in law: Infringement of Article 8 (1)(b) CTMR.

Pleas in law:

---
Exhibit 99.4



CERTIFICATIONPURSUANT TO SECTION 302 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



I, Peter Aceto, certify that:



1. I have reviewed this annual report on Form
40-F of CannTrust Holdings Inc.;



2. Based on my knowledge, this report does
not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in
light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;



3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements,
and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results
of operations and cash flows of the issuer as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;



4. The issuer’s other certifying officer(s)
and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e)
and 15d-15(e)) for the issuer and have:



a. Designed such disclosure
controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that
material information relating to the issuer, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those
entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;



c. Evaluated the
effectiveness of the issuer’s disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness
of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and



d. Disclosed in this report
any change in the issuer’s internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the period covered by the annual
report that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the issuer’s internal control over financial
reporting; and



5. The issuer’s other certifying officer(s)
and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the issuer’s auditors
and the audit committee of the issuer’s board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):



a. All significant deficiencies
and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to
adversely affect the issuer’s ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and



b. Any fraud, whether
or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the issuer’s internal control
over financial reporting.



Date: March 28, 2019



|/s/ Peter Aceto               | 
|----------------------------- | 
|Peter Aceto                   | 
|Chief Executive Officer       | 
|(principal executive officer) |
<page> EXHIBIT 32.01

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In connection with the Quarterly Report of Dean Witter Principal
Plus Fund L.P. (the "Partnership") on Form 10-Q for the period
ended September 30, 2003 as filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Jeffrey A.
Rothman, President, Demeter Management Corporation, the general
partner of the Partnership, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section
1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
of 2002, that, to the best of my knowledge:
(1)	The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section
13 or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
(2)	The information contained in the Report fairly presents,
in all material respects, the financial condition and
results of operations of the Partnership.









By:  	/s/Jeffrey A. Rothman

Name:		   Jeffrey A. Rothman
Title:	   President

Date:		   November 14, 2003
# Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

September 19, 2016

No. 04

- 16

- 0038 7

- CR

Veronica ALEGRIA

, Appellant

v.

The STATE of Texas, Appellee

From the 399th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2015CR5021A Honorable Ray Olivarri, Judge Presiding



### O R D E R

Appellant’s court

- appointed attorney has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California

, 368 U.S. 738 (1967), in which he asserts there are no meritorious issues to raise on appeal. Counsel has informed the appellant of her right to file her own brief and provided appellant with a form motion for requesting the appellate record. See Kelly v. State , 436 S.W.3d 313, 319

- 20 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014); Nichols v. State , 954 S.W.2d 83, 85 (Tex. App.

— San Antonio 1997, no pet.); B runs v. State , 924 S.W.2d 176, 177 n.1 (Tex. App.

— San Antonio 1996, no pet.). The State has filed a letter waiving its right to file an appellee’s brief unless the appellant files a pro

se brief.

If the appellant desires to request the appellate record, she must file the motion requesting the record within ten days from the date of this order. If the appellant desires to file a pro se brief, she must do so within thirty days from the date of this order. See Bruns , 924 S.W.2d at 177 n.1. If the appella nt files a pro se brief, the State may file a responsive brief no later than thirty days after the date the appellant’s pro se brief is filed in this court. It is further ORDERED that the motion to withdraw, filed by appellant’s counsel, is HELD IN ABEYAN CE pending

further order of the court.

_________________________________ Sandee Bryan Marion, Chief JusticeIN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said

court on this 19th day of September , 2016

.

___________________________________ Keith E. Hottle

Clerk of Court
39334.

#### SOUTHEASTERN EQUIPMENT COMPANY, INC. v. PEOPLES INSURANCE & FINANCE COMPANY, INC.

Hall, Judge.

1. The effect of failure to record a bill of sale to secure debt is the same as the failure to record a deed of bargain and sale. *Code*§ 67-1305.

2. Where a bill of sale to secure debt, executed Outside the State, is not recorded in Georgia within the time provided by *Code*§ 67-108, the purported conveyance of title is invalid in Georgia as to parties other than the grantor and grantee. *Lewis v. Jackson,*102 Ga. App. 573, 575 (117 SE2d 209).

3. A bill of sale executed out of this State, probated before a notary public, is not entitled to record in Georgia where the seal of the notary is not attached and where the official character of the notary is not certified by a clerk of the court of record in the county or city of the residence of the notary. *Code*§§ 29-409, 67-106.

4. Where such a bill of sale has not been attested or probated as the law requires, it is inadmissible in evidence even *540when placed on the record by the clerk of the court. *Livingston v. Hudson,*85 Ga. 835, 838 (12 SE 17); *Allgood v. State,*87 Ga. 668, 672 (13 SE 569); *Gray Lumber Co. v. Harris,*127 Ga. 693 (56 SE 252); *Jones Motor Co. v. Finch Motor Co.,*34 Ga. App. 399, 402 (129 SE 915).

Decided March 12,1962.

*Louis Saul, B. H. Barton,*for plaintiff in error.

*B. H. Jones,*contra.

5. It was therefore error for the court, trying without a jury, the issue between the plaintiff in execution under a mechanic’s lien foreclosure- and the claimant asserting title under a bill of sale to secure debt, which was executed outside this State, and was not probated by the grantor before a notary public whose seal was attached or whose official character was certified by a clerk of a court of record in the county or city of the notary’s residence, to admit a copy of the bill of sale to secure debt in evidence.

The court erred in denying the motion for a new trial.

*Judgment reversed.*

*Felton, C. J., and Bell, J., concur.*