### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT KNOXVI LLE A ssi gne d onBr ie fs Apr il 25, 200 7
CON NIE L EE A RN OLD v. S TAT E OF TEN NES SEE
Direc t Appeal from the Cr im inal Cou rt for Car terCounty

No. S15534 Robert E. Cupp, Ju dge

No . E 2 0 0 6 -0 0 4 4 0 -C CA -R 3 -PC F iled Augu st 3, 2007

The petiti oner, Connie L ee A rnold, appe als the Carte r County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-c onviction relief f rom his convictions for c hild rape a n d es p ecia lly

ag g ravated sexual exploi tation of a minor and resulting eff ective thirty -seve n-y ear sentenc e. On appea l, he contends that (1) he rec eived the ine ffe ctive assistanc e of tria l counsel bec aus e h is attorney failed to file a motion for chang e of venue based on pretria l publicity and (2) the pos t-conviction court judge err ed by ref using to re cuse himself f

rom this case
. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, w e c on c lud e tha

t th e pe tit ion e r d id n ot r e c e ive the ine ffe c tiv e a ssi sta nc e of c ouns e l and

that th e po stconviction cour

t did not err by

denying the petitioner’s motion to recuse . Neve rtheless, we hold that the judg e who pr esided ove r this pos t -c o n v iction proce edingis disqualified from any subsequent proce eding s in this case.
Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 App e al a s o f Rig ht ; J udgm e nt s o f the Cr im ina l C our t a r e Affir m e d.
N OR MA M C G EE O G LE , J ., delivere d the opinion of the cour t, in which J ER R Y L. S MI TH and D. KELLY T HOMAS , J R ., J J ., joined.
C. Bra d Sproles, King sport, Tenne ssee, f or the a ppellant, Connie L ee A rnold. Robert E. Cooper, Jr., Attorney Genera l an d Reporter ; J ennife r L . Ble dsoe, Assistant Attorney Gene ral; Anthony Wade C lark, District Attorney Gene ral; and K enneth B aldwin, Assistant District Attorney Gene ral, for

the appe llee, State of Te nnessee
.

OP IN ION
I. F ac tu al B ac kgr ound
This case has an e x tensive proc edura l history

. The recor d ref lects t hat i n November

1994, the petitioner wa s indicted i n J o h n s o n County for se x ual cr imes ag ainst his minor daug hter. Subsequently , the ca se wa s transf er re d t o Carter

County for tria l. I n November

1995, a Carte r County Criminal Court jury

convic t ed the petitioner of r ape of a child, a Class A f

elony , and-2-

espec ially ag g ravated sexual ex ploitation of a minor, a Class B f elony

. On di rec t appea l, this court g ave the fo llo wi ngfa c tua l a c c ount o f t he c ri me s: Earne st Hendrix, a cab dr iver, testified that on October 23, 1994, he was driving the defe ndant from Knoxville to Kingsport. He said that the de fe ndant showed him a photog raph de picting or al sex. Mr. H e n dr ix s a id

th a t t h e d e f e n d an t t o ld

h im th a t t h e p e n is in

the ph oto g ra phwa s h is a

nd the g ir l w a s h is d a

ug hte r. Th e state i n troduce d a Polaroid photog raph into evide nce a s exhi bit two, and Mr. Hendr ix identified it as t he one display ed by the def endant. He testified that the def

endant of fer ed to have his daug hter pe rfor m oral se x on h im i n li e u of t

he c a b f are . M r. He nd

ri x sai d th a t up on

the ir arr ival in Kingspor

t, he ca lled the police.
The victim testified t hat s he was eleve n y ear s old in October 1994. She said that befor e Ha lloween, she was attending to he r sick g randmot h er when her

fathe r, the de fenda

nt, came to the door

and m o t i o ned her

out of the room. She said the de fenda nt gr abbed he r arm a nd took her to his bedroom. She said he put his came ra on the dr e sse r, pu sh e d he r he a d dow n, stu c k his pe nis in h e r m outh, and tol d her to g o up and down on it. She s ai d t h at he reac hed over and pushed the button o n the camera . She identified exhibit two as the photograph the de fenda

nt made that day . The jury found the de fe nd ant guil ty

of bo th c ounts

. State v. Connie L

. Arnold, No. 03C01-9902-CR-00081, 2000 Tenn. Crim. App. L EXI S 20, at **2-3 (Kno xv il le , Jan
. 1 1 , 2 0 0 0 ) , p e r m. to a p p e a l d e n ie d , ( T e n n
. 2 0 0 0 )

. O n d ir e c t a p p e a l, th is court aff irmed the pe titioner’s convictions. I d. at *13. Subsequently , the petitioner filed a pro se pe tition for post-conviction relief . Howeve r, the post-conviction cour

t dismi ssed the petition without appointing counse l or aff ording the petitioner an evide ntiary

hear ing, c oncluding that the petition failed to state a colora ble claim for r elief. See Connie L e e A r

n o ld v
. St a te , N o
. E 2 0 0 1

- 0 2 5 2 6

- CC A

- R3

- PC , 2 0 0 2 T e n n
. Cr im

. Ap p
. L E X I S 970 (Knoxvil le, Nov. 13, 2002). A lthough a majority p anel of this court aff irmed the post-c onviction c ourt , o ur su pr e me c ourt

remand ed th e c a se fo r r e c on sid e ratio n in lig ht o f t hat c ourt ’s re c e ntl y rele ased opinion of Bur

nett v. State, 92 S.W .3d 403 (Tenn. 2002) . See Connie L ee Arnold v. State, No. E2001-02526- SC-R11-PC , 2003 Tenn. L EXI S 211 (Knox ville, Mar. 10, 2003). Howeve r, on rema nd, a majority

of this court ag ain aff

irmed the lower court’s ruling , stating that “the pe titioner pr e se nte d o nly

a ba re and c on c lus or

y all egati on as to a

c on sti tut ion a l vi olatio n, and , a s su c h, his claim was not c olorable so a s to avoid summary dismiss al.” Connie L ee Arn o l d v
. S t at e, No. E2003-00691-CCA-RM-PC, 2003 Tenn. Crim. App. L EXI S 353, at *16 (Knoxvi lle, Apr. 15, 2003). Our supre me cour

t gr anted the pe titi o n er ’s Ru l e 11 application for per mission t o appea l and conclude d that the petit ion stated a colora ble claim for

ineffe ctive assistanc e of c ounsel based uponT h e p o st-co n v ic tio n c o u rt n o te d o n the re c o rd tha t t h e a rtic le s w e re p u b lishe d p o st-t ria l an d a p p e a re d to 1

co m e f rom t he Jo hnson C i t y P res s newsp ap er. -3- trial counsel’ s failur e to see k a cha ng e of ve nue due to pr etrial publicity . Arnold v. State, 143 S.W .3d 784 (Tenn. 2004)

. The supreme court rema nded the case to the post-conviction cour t for the appointment of counse l and an e videntiary hear ing. I d. at 787.
On Se pte mbe r 2 0, 2005, a pp ointe d c ouns e l f

ile d a mot ion tit le d “ MO TI ONF OR

A CH AN GE OF VENU E. ” I n th e mot ion , th e pe tit ion e r a lle g e d a s f oll ow s: De fe nd ant/ Pe tit ion e r fe e ls that it wo uld be imp os sib le to o bta in a

fa ir a n d j u s t h e a r i n g b e f o r e t h i s h on or a ble Cou rt be c a us e De fe nd ant/ Pe tit ion e r h a s, in the pa st, a pp e a le d s e ve ra l r

uli ng s o f t his Court which have resulted in r ever sal, and De fenda nt/Petit ioner ha s filed a f ormal complaint ag ainst the Honora ble J udg e Robert E. Cupp with the Boa

rd of Profe ssional Responsibil ity and/or the Judi ci al Boa rd.
On Octobe r 12, 2005, counse l also filed an amended pe tition for post-conviction relief , alleg ing that the petitioner re ceive d the ineff ective assistance of counsel because his trial attorney , amongother things, fa iled to “take a dequate measure s to protec t Petitioner from the damag es ca used by pretria l publicity of

th e c a s e
. ” O nN o v e mb e r 2 , 2 0 0 5 , th e p o s t- c o n v ic ti o nc o urt c o n c lu d e d th a t t he petitioner’s motion for chang e of venue was actua lly a motion to recuse , and in a wr itten order, the c ourt de nie d th e pe tit ion e r’ s motio n, statin g that “[t]hi s Cour t has no bia s o r p re

jud ic e a g a ins t th is Petitioner, and assure s the Petitioner that he will g et a f air he aring .”
An evidentiar

y hear ing on the petitioner’s post-conviction petition was held on November 9, 20 05

. At the he ari ng , the po st- c on vic tio n c ourt he ard the fo llo wi ngte sti mony , p e rt ine nt t o th is a pp e a l: T he the n f

if ty -s ix-y e ar- old

pe tit ion e r t e sti fi e d th a t in Oc tob e r 199 4, he wa s a rr e ste d in Sulli van County

and cha rg ed with cr imes aga i n st the victim. However , those cha rg es we re later dismiss ed, and the petitioner wa s indicted in J ohnson County for c ri m es aga i n st the victim. The petitioner stated that dur ing jur y selec tion for the petitioner’ s J o h n s o n C ounty trial, the trial cour

t had to dec lare a mistrial and tra nsfer red the case to Carter County . The pe titioner stated that information about his case was on the radio and in the ne wspape rs “f rom Mountain City

to Carter County .” The petitioner di d not know how many article s about his case appea red in ne wspape rs, but the def ense introduc ed into e vidence two newspa per a rticles. The undated a

rticles we re titled “Ma

n convicted in rape of 11-y ear -old daug hter” and “Convict acc uses lawy er, de lay s sentencing .” The 1 petitioner stated that he did not have acc ess to a radio while he was in ja il a nd was awa iting trial but that his wife told him about the pu b l i ci t y h i s ca s e wa s rec eiving . He state d that he believe d the publicity influence d the public’s i m p ression of his case. On c ross-examination, the petitioner a c kn ow le dg e d th a t po te nti a l jur or s sta te d dur ingvo ir dir e tha t th e y did no t kn owany

thi nga bo ut t his case
.-4-

The pe titioner’s trial attorney testified t hat he beca me license d to prac tice law in Te nnessee in 1978 and that a major ity of his prac tice involved cr iminal defense . Counsel tal k ed with the pe tit ion e r a

bo ut t he c ha rg e s a g a ins t hi m ma

ny tim e s, and

the pet ition e r w a s v e ry

int e re ste d in

his c a se . Co un se l st a te d that publ ic ity “ wa s not a pr ob le m in thi s ca se .” He sa id t hat du ri ngjur y vo ir dire in Johns on County , a potential juror g ave a response to a question that resulted in the tria l court de c lari nga

mis tr ia l. Couns e l state d that the c a se wa s tr ans fe rr e d to Cart e r County and that he did not remember havinga proble m selectinga jury due to publicity . On cr oss-examination, counsel te sti fi e d th a t th e pe tit ion e r a sk e d him ab out med ia c ov e ra g e in t his c a se but di d n ot s e e m pa rt ic ula rl y conce rned a

bout it.
Ju d g e L y nn Br own testified that he pr esided ove r the pe titioner’s trial. Initially , the petitioner was to be tried in Johnson County

. Howeve r, during jury selec tion in J ohnson County , a potential juror’s a nswer to a

question reve aled to the other potential jurors that the pe titioner had a pr ior criminal history . After

the potential juror’ s outburst, J udg e Br own g rante d a motion for chang e of ve nu e and

mov e d th e c a se to C art e r C ounty . H e state d th a t he tr ans fe rr e d th e pe tit ion e r’ s c a se to Carter County beca use the p et i t i o n er co u ld not ge t a fa ir jury in J ohnson County . He sa id that pr e tr ia l pu

bli c ity wa s n ot the re a so n fo r the tr ans fe r and that he de c ide d to t ra ns fe r t he c a se be c a

us e too many potential jurors in J ohnson County kn ew t h e petitioner. Judge Br own stated that the pe tit ion e r h a d p ri or c on vic tio ns fo r se xua l c ri me s a g a ins t c hil dr e n and that “ John so n Co un ty is j us t such a small community

that [t he petitioner] was rather notorious as a criminal.”
On c ro ss- e xami natio n, Judg e B ro wn te sti fi e d th a t T he To maha wk wa s th e on ly

g e ne ra lc ir c ulatio n n e ws pa

pe r i n Joh ns on County , that he ha d sub sc ri be d to the ne ws pa pe r fo r a bo ut t we nty y ear s, and that the ne wspape r did not print arr ests or cr iminal court proce eding s. J udg e B rown stated that there also was no pr etrial publicity about the petitioner’ s case in the Eliz abethto n Star or the J ohnson City

Press but that he believed the re w as some new spaper cover ag e about the pe titioner’s trial. Howe ver, he said the Carte r County newspa pers did not know any

thing a bout the petitioner and we re not intere sted in his ca s e. J udg e B rown a cknowledg ed that he did not watch much television and could not comment on the a mount of case publicity

that appea

red on te levision. He stated that a “ number” of potential jurors in J ohnson County knew the petitioner and ha d a neg ative opinion of him. During jury voir dire in Johnson C ounty , J udg e B rown a sked the potential juror s i f t h ey h adh ea rdab o u tt h e c as e f ro mt h e m ed i a, an d

th e j uro rs s ai d n o
. Ho we v er , th ey t o l d J u d ge B ro wn that th e y

“ ha d h e ard

a bo ut [the pe tit ion e r] f

ro m ta lk i n th e
. . . ti g htk nit mou nta in community .”
For mer assistant dis trict attorney g ener al L isa Rice testified that she prosec uted the pe tit ion e r’ s c a se . Sh e state d th a t sh e did no t r e c a ll a

ny pr e tr ia l pu

bli c ity in the c a se and

that sh e did not remembe r the media

beingprese nt during the trial. S h e al s o d i d n ot remembe r any potential j u r o r s m ak i n g an y c o m m e n t s a b o u tp r e tr i a l p u

b l i c i ty.
I n a wr itten order, the post-conviction cour t ruled that the petit ioner had failed to show that he re ceive d the ineff

ective a ssistance of counse l beca use his trial attorney

failed to file a

motion for chang e of ve nue due to pretrial publi city

. The court noted t hat J udg e B rown testified he moved theW e no te tha t t h e p e tit io n e r’s b rie f d o e s n o t co m p ly with T e n n e sse e R u le o f A p p e llate P ro c e d u re 2 7 (a )( 6 ). 2 Pur s u an t t o t h e r u l e, i t i s t h e pet i t i on er ’ s du t y t o i n cl u de i n h i s br i ef a s t at eme n t of

t h e f ac t s r el ev an t t o t h e i s s u es on appeal wi t h a pp r op r i at e r ecor d re f er enc es
. T he s t at ement of f act s i n t he pet i t i oner ’ s bri ef cont ai ns no ev i dence p res ent ed at t he evi d ent i ary heari ng. -5- petitioner’s trial f

rom J ohnson County

to Carter County due to the petitioner’ s reputation in J ohnson County , not due to pr etrial publicity

. The c ourt noted that Judge B rown, trial c ounsel, and L isa Rice all testified that pretrial publicity was not a problem in this case. The post-conviction cour t denied the petition for post-convic tion relief.
II. Ana lys is
A. Ineff ective A ssistance of Counsel
T h e p e t i t i o n e r

c o n t e n d s t h a th e r e c e i v e d th e i n e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t an c e o f

c o un s e l

. S p e c i f

i c a l l y, 2 he c on te nd s th a t be c a

us e so many

po te nti a l juro rs in Johns on County ha d a ne g a tiv e op ini on of him , his re putatio n in that c omm un ity mus t have be e n a ff

e c te d b y pu bli c ity . H e a lso argue s th a t be c a us e J ohnson County an d Carter County “ar e close ly

related and inter

mingled,” the jurors in Carte r County a lso mus t ha

ve be e n a ff

e c te d b y pret ri al publi c ity . T he State c on te nd s th a t th e po stconviction cour

t property denied the pe tition for post-conviction relief . We ag ree with the State. When a petition er s eeks post-c onviction relief on the basis of ineff ective a ssistance of counsel, “ the petitioner be ars the burden of proving both that counsel’s perfor mance was de ficient and that the de ficienc y

prejudice d the def

ense.” Goad v. State, 938 S.W.2d 363, 369 (Tenn. 1996) (c iti ng Str ic kla

nd v. Was hin g ton , 466 U. S. 668 , 687 , 1 04 S. Ct . 2 05 2, 20 64 (1 98 4) ). To e sta bli sh d ef i ci en tp er fo rm an ce , t h e p et i t i o n er mu s ts h o w t h at co un s el ’s p er fo rm an ce wa s b el o w “ th e r an ge o f competenc e dema

nded of attorney s in criminal case s.” B axter v. Rose, 523 S.W .2d 930, 936 (T e nn . 197 5)

. To e sta

bli sh pr e jud ic e , th e pe tit ion e r m

us t sh owthat “ the re is a

re a so na ble pr ob a bil ity that, b ut f or c ouns e l’ s unp ro fe ssi on a l e rr or s, the re su lt of the pr oc e e din g wo uld have be e n d if

fe re nt. A re asonable probability is a probab i l i t y

sufficie nt to undermine conf idence in the outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068. Moreover,

[b] eca use a petitioner m ust establish both prongs of the test, a fa ilure to p ro ve e ith e r d e fi c ie nc y or pr e jud ic e pr ov ide s a su ff

ic ie nt b a sis to deny relief on the ineffe ctive assistanc e cla im. I ndeed, a court ne ed no t a dd re ss t he c omp on ent s in a

ny pa rt ic ula r o rd e r o r e ve n a dd

re ss bo t h i f t he [petitioner] m akes a n insufficient showingof one component. Goad, 938 S.W.2d at 370 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697, 104 S. Ct. at 2069).
I nitially , we note that the trial transc ript has not be en included in the appellate rec ord. During the evidentiar

y hear ing, the State and the petitioner requested that the t rial transc ript be made part-6-

of the re cord on a

ppeal. The post-conviction cour t refuse d, stating
A g a i n , an d [ t h e C o u rt o f C r i m i n a l Ap p e a l s ] m ay s e n d i tb a c k an d s ay, Cup p, y ou’re wro ng , b ut i t w ou ld a ssume to m e that . . . th a t is something that they Court of [ Criminal] Appea ls could t ake judicia l notice of, a

nd that’s the fa cts of t his case that’s in their computers down there

. Once agai n, we must reiter ate that this court may take judicial notice of the re cord f rom the petitio n er ’s d i re ct appea l. See State ex rel. Wil kerson v. B omar, 376 S.W.2d 451, 453 (1964). Be cause such judicial notice is not re quired, the post-c onviction court should have order ed that the trial transc ript be made a part of t he appellate re cord a s the parties r equeste d. Howeve r, g iven that the post-conviction cour t appar ently

did not consid er t h e trial transcript when r uling that the petitioner wa s not entitled to post-conviction relief, w e choose not to take judicial notice of the trial transcr ipt from the petitioner’s dire ct appe al.
Th a t sa id, we ho ld t

hat th e po st- c on vic tio n c ourt pr op e rl y c on c lud e d th a t the pe tit ion e r d id not rec eive the ineffe ctive assist ance of counsel. As the pos t-conviction cour t noted, J udg e B rown, t ri al co u n s el , an d L i s a R i ce t es t i fi ed t h at p re tri al p u b l i ci ty wa s n o t a pr o b l em i n th i s ca s e. Al th o u gh the p et i t i o n er argue d that there was media cover ag e of his ca se “f

rom Mountain City

to Carter County ,” he stated that he lea rned a bout pretr i al p ublicity

from his wife a

nd acknow ledg ed that po te nti a l juro rs state d th e y did no t kn owany

thi nga bo ut h is c a se . T he pe tit ion e r i ntr od uc e d into e vid e nc e on ly

tw o n e ws pa

pe r a rt ic le s a bo ut h is c a se , a

nd bo th o f t

ho se art ic le s a

pp e are d in newspa pers a fter the j u ry convicted the petitioner. Given that the petitioner has pr esente d no evidenc e of pretria l publicity in this case, trial c ounsel did not render defic ient perf

ormanc e by failing to file a motion for c hang e of ve nue.
B . M oti on

to R e c us e Next, the petitioner contends that the post-c onviction court judg e committed reve rsible er ror by re fu sin g to r e c us e him se lf fr om t his c a se
. He c onte nd s th a t th e jud g e sh ou ld h ave re c us e d h ims e lf

“ du e to A pp e lla nt’ s c omp la int

to the B oa

rd of Judic iary a g a ins t sai d ju dg e ” and be c a us e c omm e nts t h ro u gh o u tt h e c o u rt ’s t h i rt y -p age o p i n i o nd en yi n g p o s t -c o n v i ct i o n re l i ef d em o n s tra t e th at th e j u d ge “held a predisposition to rule ag ainst the Appellant.” The State contends that the petitioner ha s failed to s ho w that th e po st- c on vic tio n c ourt e rr e d b y re fu sin g to grant the pe tit ion e r’ s mo tio n to re c us e beca use no unjust disposit ion of the ca se has oc curr ed. We ag ree wi t h t h e State. Howe ver, w e conclude that the judg e is disqualified fr om any subsequent proc eeding s involving this petitioner. Duringthe petitioner’s e videntiary hear ing, the post-conviction cour t was fa ir, patient, and courte ous to the p et i tioner and a ll of the attorney s involved with the hear ing. H oweve r, upon our revie w of the post-c onviction court’s orde r deny ing post-conviction relief , we must agree with the pe tit ion e r t

hat muc h of the langua g e in the or de r is, to say the le a st, tr ou bli ng . In th e or de r, the po stc on vic tio n c ourt

ma ke s th e fo llo wi ngstate me nts :P res um ab l y , t he si x ap p el l at e judges t o whi ch t he p o st

- co nvi ct i o n co urt ref ers are t he f

i ve jus t i ces of

our 3 suprem e co urt , who ul t i m at el y remand ed t hi s case t o t he p o st

- co nvi ct i o n co urt f o r t he ap p o i nt m ent of co unsel , and Judge Jos eph M

. T i pt on, wh o t wi ce di s s ent ed whe n a pane l of t hi s cour t af

f i r med t he po s t

- convi ct i on cour t ’ s i ni t i al d e n ia l o f p o st-co n v ic tio n re lief. H o w e v e r, the p o st-co n v ic tio n c o u rt’s sta te m e n t i s inc o rr e c t. T h e six j u d g e s sim p ly
co ncl ud ed t hat t he p et i t i o ner’ s p et i t i o n s t at ed a co l o rable cl ai m f o r po st

- co nvi ct i o n rel i ef t hat warrant ed t he ap p o i nt m ent of co unsel and an evi d ent i ary heari ng. N o judge o n t hi s co urt or t he suprem e co urt has rul ed t hat t here
w a s a d v e rs e p u b licity in this c a se
. -7-

This matter is now bef

ore this cour

t on Post -Conviction as a re sult of the petitioner c onvincing six of eig ht Appellate Judge s that there w as adver se publicity

in this case and ne ither the attorney nor t h e trial jud g e did

any thi ngto p ro te c t hi m fr om t his e xploi tiv e me dia cover ag e. 3

. . . . T h is Pe ti ti o nf

o r Po s t C o n v ic ti o nr e li e f

is n in e le g a l s iz e pag es. I t can be st be summarized by quoting f

rom J udg e Glenn’ s opinion, where a majority of the [C ourt of Criminal Appe als] agr eed wi th t his jud g e that the pe tit ion e r fa ile d to pr e se nt a c olo ra ble c la im.

. . . . I nc r e d i b l y , [i t ] w i l l h e r e a f t e r b e s h o w nth e r e w a s n o m e dia cove ra ge. Be that as it may , the Supreme Court re verse d and re mand e d f

or thi s c ourt to pr oc e e d co ns ist e nt w iththe ir op ini on . T his Court has now followed that directive.

. . . . Appar ently , the petit ioner doe s not remember the ca b driver te stifying that it was a picture of his daug hter that pe titioner offe red up f or ora l se x, i nl i e uo f

c a b f ar e
. M o r e o v e r , an d

r e a l l y an d tr uly unbelievable [,] his eleve n y ear old daug hter g ets on the witness stand and l o o k s a t t

h is p ic tu r e th a t a ju r y h a s s e e no r

w il l b e s e e in g and testifies that its her father’s pe nis in her mouth. Only , and I mean on ly Mr . A rn old

wo uld be c a pa ble of sa yingso me thi nglik e thi s.

. . . . This court is conce rned that over the last eleve n (11) y ear s that t ax p ay er af t er t ax p ay er d o l l ar h as b ee ns p en to nfrivolou s p ro ce ed i n gs by this petiti oner. This c ourt is amused and hope ful [that] the following will amuse the Appe llate J udg es[.] [I] t is from theT h e ca r d i s n ot i n t h e appe l l at e r ec or d. 4
-8- petitioner’s c omplaint ag ainst this judge:

There is no li m i t to how low[] J udg e Cupp will go, just to g et b ac kat the Supreme Court J udg e[s] , in this case, eve n causingpoor old hard working , taxpay ing pe ople, to pay out money , on and for lawy ers, to sit around a nd do nothing, in a court case , [namely ] m ine. . . . This petitioner by

his corre spondence to this j u d ge and ever y one else thinks that he controls the Supreme Court of this state. We all know that this is not true, but it d o es n ’t keep him fr om thinking it . . . .

. . . . Iknow this opinion wil l result in two things, if nothing else. An a pp e a l and a com pl ain t to the B oa

rd of Judic iary . B e that a s it may , th is p e tit ion e r’ s Po st- Convic tio n is wi tho ut m e ri t, a nd it i s AC CO RD IN G LY DI SM ISSED

. This court has r efle cted ba ck on thi s matt e r

an d c anr e a c hn o o th e r

c o n c lu s io na s to h o w much attorney , court re porter, c lerks, prose cutor s a n d judge s resourc es have been e x pended on this ca se. The tax pay er bill to this c ase would be simply incre dible.
Th is c ourt wo uld be re mis s in its duty if a t so me po int

it d id no t sen d th is o rd e r, a lon g wi th e ve ry thi nge lse that ha s h a

pp e ne d in this case to the or igina l trial jurors so that they ca n s ee wh at has ha pp e ne d w iththi s c a se ov e r t he la st e le ve n ( 11 ) ye ars . It is no t my intent to do that until such time as this matter runs its course , if eve r. Finally , this court has attache d a copy of a Christmas ca

rd sent to this judge by

the petitioner. This makes me ill, not at g etting the

4 c ard , b ut at it s c on te nt a

nd the ob vio us purp os e it w a s se nt. “A judg e shall disqualify

himself . . . in a proc eedingin which the judg e’s impar tiality might re a so na bly be qu e sti on e d. ” Te nn . Su p. Ct. R. 1 0, Cano n 3 E( 1) . “ [A] tr ia l ju dg e sh ou ld gra nt a rec usal whene ver the judge has any doubts a bout his or her ability to preside impar tially .” Alley

v. State, 882 S.W .2d 810, 820 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994). Howeve r, re cusal a lso is necessar y “whe n a person of ordinary prudenc e in the judg e’s position, knowing all of the fa cts k n own to the judg e, would find a re asonable basis for que stioning the judg e’s impar tiality .” I d. This objective standa rd-9-

“‘takes into acc ount that disqualification is require d if there is an appe ara nce of p ar t i ality

to the rea sonable obser

ver, a nd it preclude s a judg e fr om avoiding r ecusa l m er ely by avowinghis or her impartiality .’” State v. Co n wa y , 77 S.W .3d 213, 225 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2001) (quoting State v. Connors, 995 S.W .2d 146, 149 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998) ); see a lso St ate v. Ma rk A. Schief

elbein, N o s
. M 2 0 0 5

- 0 0 1 6 6

- C C A

- R 3

- C D , M 2 0 0 5

- 0 2 3 7 0

- C C A

- R 1 0

- C O , 2 0 0 7 T e n n
. C r i m
. Ap p
. LE X IS 2 1 3 , at * * 1 2 2 -2 3 (N as h v i l l e, Fe b

. 1 4 , 2 0 0 7 ), p erm
. t o ap p ea l d en i ed , (T en n
. 2 0 0 7 ). “A dv er s e r u l i n gs by a trial court are not usually sufficie nt gr ounds to establish bias.” Alley , 882 S.W .2d at 821. The “issue to be de termined is not the proprie ty of the judicial c onduct of the trial judge , but whether he committed an er

ror which resulted in an unjus t dispositi on of t he case.” State v. Hurley , 876 S.W .2d 57, 64 (Tenn. 1993) ; State v. Bog g s, 932 S.W .2d 467, 472 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996). A trial judg e’s ref usal to g rant a

motion to recuse will be revie wed under an abuse of discre tion standard. State v. Raspberr y , 875 S.W .2d 678, 681 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993)

. We note that a trial judg e is not r equire d to r ecuse himself mere ly beca use a pa rty has filed a f o rm al compl aint ag ainst the judg e. See State v. Par ton, 817 S.W .2d 28, 30 (Tenn. Crim. App. 19 91 ). Mo re ov e r, we c an und e rs tand the po st- c on vic tio n ju dg e ’s fr us tr a tio ns wi th t

he pe tit ion e r i n this case. B y

the petitioner’s own admission in his appellate brief, he has “consistently attacke d the trial court, his attorney s, the prosec uting attorney , the police investiga tors, and the post-c onviction court.” Neve rtheless, we cannot c ondone the inappr opriate c omments made about the petitioner or the disrespe ctful t one used toward any judge on this court or our supre me cour t. That said, we ha

ve car efully revie wed the r ecor d and have considered the pe titioner’s ineff ective a ssistance of c ounsel claim. The pe titioner has fa iled to present absolutely any evidenc e that he r ece ived the inef fec tive a ssi sta nc e of c ouns e l in

thi s c a se . T he re fo re , w hil e many of the po st- c on vic tio n c ourt ’s c omm e nts in the order

wer e egreg ious, we ar e unable to conclude that the petitioner suffe red a ny prejudice or that the comments led to an unjust disposition of the case. T hus, we hold that the post-c onviction court did not abuse its discre tion by denying the petitioner’s motion to recuse

. Howeve r , th e p o s t- c o n v ic ti o nc o urt’ s r e ma r k s c e rta in ly

e s ta b li s h , f r o m a no b je c ti ve s t an d p o i n t , a r ea s o n ab l e b as i s fo r q u es t i o n i n g th e j u d ge’ s i mp art i al i ty i nan y fu ture p ro ce ed i n gs involving this petitioner. Ther efor e, the post-c onviction cour t j u d ge i s disqualified from a ny subsequent proc eeding s in this case.
III. Conclusi on
B a se d u po n th e re c or d a

nd the pa rt ie s’ s b ri e fs , w e a ff

ir m th e jud g me nts of

the po stconv ic ti o nc o u rt. Ju d g e Cu p p is d is qu a li f

ie d f r o m a n y s u b s e qu e n t p r o c e e d in g s in

th is c a se.

___________________________________ NORMA McGEE OGL E, J UDGE