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24–917PDF 2017

TURKEY’S DEMOCRACY UNDER CHALLENGE

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE, EURASIA, AND 

EMERGING THREATS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

APRIL 5, 2017

Serial No. 115–15

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

PAUL COOK, California 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

DANIEL M. DONOVAN, JR., New York 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., 

Wisconsin 

ANN WAGNER, Missouri 

BRIAN J. MAST, Florida 

FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida 

BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania 

THOMAS A. GARRETT, JR., Virginia 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID N. CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

AMI BERA, California 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania 

DINA TITUS, Nevada 

NORMA J. TORRES, California 

BRADLEY SCOTT SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

THOMAS R. SUOZZI, New York 

ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York 

TED LIEU, California

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE, EURASIA, AND EMERGING THREATS

DANA ROHRABACHER, California, Chairman 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

TED POE, Texas 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., 

Wisconsin 

FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida 

BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID N. CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Mr. David L. Phillips, director, Program on Peace-Building and Rights, Institute for the Study of Human Rights, Columbia University .............................. 6

Mr. Mehmet Yuksel, Representative to the United States, People’s Democratic 

Party in Turkey .................................................................................................... 19

Mr. Ali Cinar, president, Turkish Heritage Organization ................................... 27

Ms. Naz Durakoglu, strategist and senior fellow, Digital Forensic Research 

Lab, Atlantic Council ........................................................................................... 45

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

Mr. David L. Phillips: Prepared statement ........................................................... 8

Mr. Mehmet Yuksel: Prepared statement ............................................................. 21

Mr. Ali Cinar: Prepared statement ........................................................................ 29

Ms. Naz Durakoglu: Prepared statement .............................................................. 48

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 64

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 65

Ms. Naz Durakoglu: Revised prepared statement submitted after the hearing 66

Mr. David L. Phillips: Material submitted for the record .................................... 71

The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress from the 

Commonwealth of Virginia: Prepared statement .............................................. 77

Internet link for material submitted for the record by the Honorable Dana 

Rohrabacher, a Representative in Congress from the State of California, 

and chairman, Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, and Emerging Threats .... 79

(1)

TURKEY’S DEMOCRACY UNDER CHALLENGE 

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 5, 2017

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE, EURASIA, AND EMERGING THREATS,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:18 p.m., in room 

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Dana Rohrabacher 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Good afternoon. I call this hearing to order. 

Today, we return our attention to the political situation in Turkey. 

I could have waited 1 more minute. There you go. Okay. 

Today, we return our attention to the political situation in Turkey. Those of you who have followed the work of this subcommittee 

will note that this is a topic we have dedicated significant time toward in the past. This has not been motivated by malice, but a sincere desire to keep the United States-Turkish relationship rooted 

firmly in shared interests and shared values. 

As we meet now, voting is already under way in a referendum 

to rewrite the Turkish Constitution. Voting is expected to be completed later this month on April 16. If adopted, the new amendments to the Turkish Constitution will cement in law much of the 

power President Erdogan has already seized for himself. The new 

Constitution would see Turkey convert into a Presidential system, 

combining the head of state, head of government, and head of the 

ruling party all into a single powerful office. 

Once all that is done, the Prime Minister’s leading position will 

be eliminated. The President will be able to select his own Vice 

Presidents and his own Cabinet. The power of the legislature to 

check the executive branch would be drastically reduced. 

After reviewing the proposed changes and the Council of Europe’s Venice Commission, an advisory body of constitutional experts, concluded that these amendments that are being voted on by 

the Turkish people, ‘‘represent a dangerous step backwards,’’ and 

that these changes put Turkey on a path towards, and I quote, ‘‘an 

authoritarian’’ regime. 

This referendum is the latest in a long list of actions taken by 

the Turkish Government under Erdogan, and under Erdogan, we 

have seen, basically, the civil society, closed space for them; silencing the media; you have seen sidelining of the judiciary; and a 

neutering of the military, of course. 

I recognize the traumatic and unsettling nature of the failed July 

coup, but Erdogan started down this path toward authoritarianism 

2

long, long before that coup. President Erdogan’s desire to maintain 

power at any cost is not good for the people of Turkey. It is not 

healthy for Turkey’s democracy, obviously. It is not in the interest 

of Turkey. And Erdogan, if nothing else, is spoiling Turkey’s relationship with Europe and the United States and, alarmingly, has 

opened up Turkey to a greater risk of attack by radical violent 

Islamists. 

Lastly, while thousands of Turks have been unjustly fired and 

arrested, forced abroad, I need to highlight one particular case. 

And that is Reverend Andrew Brunson, an American citizen who 

has been needlessly detained in Turkey since last year. In February, I, along with 75 other Members of Congress, signed a letter 

to President Erdogan requesting his release. Sadly, Mr. Brunson 

remains in jail, and this case continues to be an impediment to our 

relationship. 

I want to thank all of our members for coming today. I don’t have 

many on my side of the aisle. I thank my Democratic colleagues for 

joining us today. I am going to yield to Mr. Meeks for his opening 

statement. Then each member will be granted 1 minute for an 

opening statement. And then we will hear from the witnesses. 

Mr. Meeks. 

Mr. MEEKS. Thank you, Chairman Rohrabacher, and for the opportunity to talk about the U.S.-Turkish relationship. I see we have 

got a full audience today, and the timing is interesting, as it is less 

than 2 weeks before the important constitutional referendum. 

The timing is also unfortunate because I know how congressional 

hearings resonate in Turkey and are sometimes used to misrepresent the feelings of Congress. I do hope that this hearing helps foster better relations between our two countries and does not fuel 

anti-American sentiment in Turkey with either side. 

Nevertheless, as someone who has visited Turkey several times 

and loved Turkey and particularly the Turkish people, it pains me 

to watch what is transpiring in that beautiful country. The attempted coup that we discussed in our last hearing in Turkey was 

a traumatic shock to the system. In the aftermath, President 

Erdogan sought to rid the government agencies of coup plotters, 

Gulenists and more, and what he has actually done is overreached, 

and he is not respecting due process or the basic tenets of democracy in what appears and is a power grab. 

And I have already heard from several members of my community, in my constituency and folks from Queens, who are very concerned about the democracy and how it will continue in Turkey and 

whether or not those individuals who have been jailed and were 

not given due process, what will happen to them, and how long will 

this continue. This is of tremendous concern to me. 

Now comes another test: The upcoming referendum that attempts to turn the Turkish Government into what is being called 

a Presidential system. The question is, why now? Is there a special 

need to formalize President Erdogan’s power in light of threats that 

are real or imagined? Regardless of the outcome of the referendum, 

which seems to be hardly fair and free, I do not see how Turkish 

democracy wins. 

In either scenario, the economy will continue to suffer; the 

brightest will continue to leave Turkey; and the space for a liberal 

3

Turkey will become even smaller. And during this difficult time, 

our Secretary of State paid a visit without mentioning anything of 

the troubles I and our chairman have outlined. 

It is difficult to speak honestly with allies in trouble. It is easier 

to skip that conversation and hide behind the rhetoric of the war 

against ISIS. 

I hope that Mr. Flynn, Mr. Michael Flynn’s role, who was a paid 

foreign agent in the Trump administration, has nothing to do with 

the egregious silence on the state of democracy in Turkey. 

As I follow my former mayor’s recent interest in Turkey, I hope 

that Mr. Giuliani’s work to protect Turkish bankers does not seep 

into the Trump administration’s position, for far too much is at 

stake. 

We are discussing a NATO ally, and it is best for the United 

States that Turkey remain in NATO because a Turkey without 

that anchor is left in a difficult region and—it is an understatement—without support, without someone to work with them in the 

difficult nature of democracy. Both NATO and the U.S. have a tremendous opportunity and responsibility with our ally Turkey in 

this regard. 

And despite the crackdown on freedom of speech in the Turkish 

press, despite the firing and jailing of tens, if not hundreds of thousands, of public servants, and despite the fact that this election will 

likely not be free and fair, people still in Turkey are in the streets 

demonstrating. The Turkish people are resisting and persisting in 

the face of great odds. 

This is the hope that I want to keep alive. The Turkish people 

care about their democracy. All you have to do is ask them, and 

that is why they are in NATO, and that is why I am here today 

to listen and to learn from our witnesses. And I would like to thank 

Ms. Durakoglu for being here with us again. I know she was up 

on the Hill and the State Department for a while, and I just wanted to say I am happy to see you back here on the Hill. 

I yield back. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. All right. Mr. Sherman. 

Mr. SHERMAN. A couple of notes. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. 1 minute. 

Mr. SHERMAN. A couple of notes on history. 

Early in the 20th century, the Armenian people were subject to 

a genocide that will be recognized here in this building today. And 

Turkey would be a better ally of the United States if we had a government that came to terms with its history rather than one that 

tried to engage in genocide denial. 

Early in the 21st century, Erdogan welcomed, or at least turned 

a blind eye, to ISIS fighters going across Turkey, using Turkey as 

a place for R&R and recuperation and medical training, in part because they were fighting against Assad. Now, he faces a blowback 

from the same ISIS fighters that he once welcomed or at least gave 

safe passage to. 

Erdogan is not a democratic leader. He is, as others have pointed 

out, moving Turkey toward authoritarianism. That being said, 

there is an effort to designate the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization. I for one would want to make sure that any 

such action did not include the AKP, which may have some philoVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:24 May 03, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 Z:\WORK\_EEET\040517\24917 SHIRL
4

sophical roots with the Brotherhood but is not, at least at this 

stage, a terrorist organization. 

I yield back. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Sires. 

Mr. SIRES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding today’s hearing 

to evaluate the challenges facing democracy in Turkey, and thank 

you to our panelists for being here today. 

While Turkey has been a strategic partner of the U.S. and a key 

NATO ally in a volatile region, I am deeply troubled by the actions 

of President Erdogan and his government following last year’s coup 

and the implications these actions have on the future of democracy 

in Turkey. 

Amid the atmosphere of distrust, Turkey’s government has detained or dismissed thousands—tens of thousands—of personnel 

within its military, judiciary, and civil service, and the education 

system, as well as taken over or closed various businesses, schools, 

and media outlets. It is unclear how long this type of purge will 

last, but it is imperative that the U.S. and our European partners 

continue to press Turkey to follow the rule of law. 

The emerging relationship between Erdogan and Putin also contributes to not only the uncertain future of U.S.-Turkey relations 

but to the future of democracy in Turkey as well. In less than 2 

weeks, we will have a clearer picture of the trajectory of democracy 

in Turkey when Erdogan’s proposed constitutional changes to increasingly consolidate his power will be put to a vote. 

Hopefully, the referendum will be held freely and fairly without 

undue influence. The Turkish Government should take the opportunity to, in these unstable times, to unite Turkey and not to intensify division and mistrust. I look forward to hearing from our esteemed panel of witnesses on their views of the current events and 

the impact on the U.S.-Turkey relationship, and thank you. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. All right. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Cicilline. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you, Chairman Rohrabacher, and Ranking 

Member Meeks for calling this important and timely hearing. 

Turkey remains a key ally in the fight against ISIS yet has had 

considerable challenges of its own in recent years. President 

Erdogan has consolidated power in recent years, culminating with 

the planned referendum this month that would give him sweeping 

authority and jeopardize the Turkish democratic system moving 

forward. 

I am greatly concerned by Erdogan’s government’s use of mass 

arrests of civil servants, critics, journalists, academics, and anyone 

he perceives as an opponent. The government’s use of a state of 

emergency to carry out a sweeping crackdown against anyone who 

dissents with his views is counter to democratic values. 

The Trump administration has thus far shown no willingness to 

criticize the undemocratic and repressive tendencies of the Erdogan 

government, a position which I fear will only lead to further bad 

and destabilizing behavior. Moreover, 100 years after the fact, the 

Turkish Government continues to deny its well-established role in 

the Armenian genocide and continues to target Armenian, Kurdish, 

and other minorities within its borders. 

5

As we approach the commemoration of the 102nd anniversary of 

the Armenian genocide, it is my hope that this is the year in which 

the American President will fully recognize the atrocities perpetuated against the Armenian people by the Ottoman Empire beginning in 1915. 

The Armenian people deserve full recognition and acceptance of 

their suffering. I look forward to today’s testimony and to having 

an opportunity to discuss these issues in more detail. 

And I thank you and yield back. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you. 

And Ms. Kelly. 

Ms. KELLY. I pass. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. All right. 

Well, I would like to welcome our witnesses today, and I would 

ask if the witnesses could keep it down to 5 minutes and please 

submit anything more than that for the record, and that will be 

part of the record of this hearing. 

I will introduce the witnesses, and then we will proceed down the 

line. First is David Phillips as director of the program on PeaceBuilding and Rights at Columbia University’s Institute for the 

Study of Human Rights. He is also the author of a recently released book. There it is. I am a writer, and I always wanted to 

have a book, but I haven’t got one yet. But thank you for sharing 

that with us today and the knowledge that you gained. Your book 

is entitled, ‘‘An Uncertain Ally,’’ and it is specifically about Turkey. 

So we appreciate you sharing this expertise with us today as you 

did, sharing your talents, as a foreign affairs expert and senior advisor at the State Department. 

We have with us also Mehmet Yuksel. I hope I am pronouncing 

this correctly. 

Mr. YUKSEL. Mehmet Yuksel. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Yuksel, okay, why don’t you pronounce it for 

us? 

Mr. YUKSEL. Yuksel. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Yuksel. Okay. He is a representative of the 

People’s Democratic Party, or the HDP, in the United States. He 

has spent his career working in the United States and in Europe 

to promote conflict resolution between Turks and the Kurdish minority. We appreciate you being with us today and sharing your insights. 

And Ali Cinar is President of the Turkish Heritage Organization 

and has a long track record in terms of working on U.S.-Turkey bilateral relations. He has been both a journalist and a businessman 

and is well versed on the issues that we are going to be discussing 

today. 

And I am going to ask Naz to pronounce her last name for us 

again. 

Ms. DURAKOGLU. Durakoglu. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay.I am going to get it. All right. You got 

it. If anybody can pronounce Rohrabacher correctly, I am going to 

give them an award as well. She is a senior fellow at the Atlantic 

Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab. She comes to us having 

recently left the State Department. I remember her having here on 

several occasions. She was a senior advisor on Europe and Eurasia 

6

topics, and before that, she worked on Capitol Hill, including as a 

minority staff director for this subcommittee. 

So welcome back, and we appreciate all of our witnesses. 

We would start off with Mr. Phillips and then just say 5 minutes, 

and we will just go right down the line, and at that point, we will 

up for dialogue between the members and the witnesses. 

So Mr. Phillips. 

STATEMENT OF MR. DAVID L. PHILLIPS, DIRECTOR, PROGRAM 

ON PEACE-BUILDING AND RIGHTS, INSTITUTE FOR THE 

STUDY OF HUMAN RIGHTS, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY 

Mr. PHILLIPS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to address 

two falsehoods that define the U.S.-Turkey relationship. The first 

is that Turkey is a secular democracy. It is neither secular nor is 

it a democracy. 

In 1998, Mr. Erdogan read a poem, ‘‘The mosques are our barracks, the domes are helmets, the minarets our bayonets, and the 

faithful are soldiers.’’ He was convicted to a 10-month prison term 

for inciting hatred based on religious differences. 

The other myth is that Turkey is an important member of 

NATO. That may have been the case, but given the close collusion 

between Turkey and jihadists, including the Islamic State, beginning in 2013, there is serious cause for concern. NATO is more 

than a security partnership. It is a coalition of countries with 

shared values. Because Turkey today, under Erdogan, is Islamist, 

antidemocratic, and hostile to human rights, if NATO were being 

established, Turkey simply wouldn’t qualify as a member. 

On the subject of Islamism, when the AKP won a resounding 

electoral victory in July 2007, instead of addressing human rights 

concerns or the Kurdish question, Erdogan introduced legislation to 

permit the wearing of a hijab in public institutions. Just 2 weeks 

ago, women were allowed to wear the hijab in the military. 

There is widespread corruption in Turkey. On December 17 of 

2013, Mr. Erdogan was recorded speaking to his son about how to 

dispose of tens of millions of dollars of assets, including plans to 

buy luxury apartments on the Bosporus. There have been 50,000 

WikiLeaks recordings of his son-in-law, Berat, colluding with ISIS 

to sell oil from Syria, the proceeds of which, at its peak, was generating $3 million a day and was used to support the Islamic State. 

Serious concerns exist about freedom of expression and assembly. 

The 1991 law on the fight against terrorism is used to silence critics. Article 8 of the Anti-Terror Act applies selectively to restrict 

freedom of expression. Article 301 of the penal code makes it a 

crime to denigrate Turkishness. 

When Turks gathered in Gezi Park in May 2013 to protest plans 

to build a shopping mall in a green space, they were violently dispersed by riot police. Protests spread to 60 cities as a result of police brutality. There was scant media coverage of the events while 

they were going on. Turkish national television broadcast a documentary about the migration of penguins. 

Provocateurs were tracked after Gezi, and they were rounded up. 

The national intelligence agency is allowed to gather personal data 

without court order. By November 2016, Turkey has more journalists in jail than any country in the world. In fact, a third of all 

7

journalists that are jailed come from Turkey. There are about 150 

imprisoned. About 160 media outlets have been closed. 

On the transparency report of Twitter censorship, Turkey ranks 

high for crackdown on social media. It was reported in the Turkish 

media that President Erdogan called imprisoned journalists terrorists, child molesters, and murderers. 

Gag orders have been issued for specific activities, including reporting on the transfer of weapons from Turkey to Islamic State 

fighters. The editor in chief of Cumhuriyet was sentenced to 5 

years for reporting weapons transfers to Syria. There is some contestation about Turkey’s collusion with ISIS. We have conducted an 

extensive research report, which I have submitted to the committee 

for the record. 

Let’s remember that Fethullah Gulen and Tayyip Erdogan were 

fast friends and partners. Their relationship soured and Gulen was 

accused of running a parallel state, of orchestrating the corruption 

crackdown in 2013. After the coup of July 15, 2016, there was a 

systematic crackdown that you have referenced. About 140,000 

Turks have either been imprisoned or removed from their positions. 

These include members of the security as well as educators. 

Turkey has become an outlier in Europe. The European Parliament voted to suspend Turkey’s EU membership negotiations on 

November 24 of this year. When the Justice and Development 

Party wanted to send ministers to campaign for the referendum in 

Germany and in the Netherlands, they were not allowed to do so 

because of security concerns. Erdogan responded to that by calling 

Chancellor Merkel subject to Nazi measures. He described the 

Dutch action and Dutch Government as Nazi remnants and fascists. Recently a minister said that they would launch jihad in Europe if they were not allowed to campaign there, and they threatened to release 15,000 refugees a week into Europe if Europe and 

Turkey continued to head south in their relationship. 

On minority rights, we will hear from Mr. Yuksel. Let me just 

say that there are serious concerns about Greek issues and Armenian issues. I chaired the Turkish Armenian Reconciliation Commission for 4 years. There was a legal opinion issued indicating 

that the events could be characterized as genocide. Recently, Turkey has intensified its repression against Armenians. It refused to 

submit the protocols on normalization for ratification. On Greek 

issues, the Ecumenical Patriarch still suffers great repression. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much. 

Mr. PHILLIPS. In our discussion, I will discuss some recommendations with you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Phillips follows:]

8


24917a-1.eps

Testimony by: 

DAVID L. PHILLIPS 

Director of the Program on Peace-building and Rights 

Columbia University's institute for the Study of Hmnan Rights 

TURKEY'S DEMOCRACY UNDER 

CHALLENGE 

U.S. House of Representatives 

Committee on Foreign Affairs 

Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, and Emerging Threats 

Rayburn 2172 

April 5, 2017 
9


24917a-2.eps

Introduction 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am pleased to participate in this Committee's hearing on challenges 

to democracy in Turkey. 

There were early warning signs. In 1998, Tayyip Edogan made a public speech: 

The mosques are our barracks, the domes our helmets, the minarets our bayonets, and the 

jaithjill our soldiers. 

A court sentenced Erdogan to a ten-month prison term for "inciting hatred based on religious 

differences." 

After the 2002 elections, Erdogan said "Democracy is like a street car. You get off when you 

reach your destination." 

When this committee held similar hearings last May, it was apparent that democracy was 

backsliding in Turkey. As I will report today, this trend has intensified. My analysis will address: 

Islamism; 

Corruption; 

Freedom of Expression and Assembly; 

Freed om of the Press; 

Terror Ties; 

Relations with the EU and NATO; and, 

Minority rights (Kurds, Armenians, and Greeks) 

Turkey is called as a secular democracy. Turkey is neither secular nor a democracy. If the 

referendum passes on April 16, formalizing anti-democratic governance, the date will mark the 

death of Turkey's nascent democracy. 

Turkey is heralded for its NATO membership. But NATO is more than a security alliance. It is a 

coalition of countries with shared values. Turkey under Tayyip Erdogan is an uncertain ally. 

Turkey is lslamist, anti-democratic, and a serial abuser of human rights. Turkey would not 

qualify as a member if NATO was established today. 

lslamism 

Mustafa Kemal Ataturk established the Republic of Turkey in I 923. He redefined the role of 

religion, strictly separating religion and government. Ataturk defined Turkey's republican 

identity through cultural values shared with Europe. Secularism gave primacy to reason over 

faith It placed individualism over the divine. 

After Ataturk, pious politicians increasingly challenged the country's secular elite. In response, 

the Constitutional Court banned Islamist parties. The military intervened in 1960, 1971, 1980, 
10


24917a-3.eps

and 1997 to restore Kemalist order against leftist, conservative, and Islamist parties. In 1994, 

Erdogan was elected mayor of Istanbul. The Refah Party, with Erdogan in its leadership, was 

banned in 1997. Erdogan became prime minister when the AKP won national elections in 2002. 

For Erdogan, human rights are Islamic rights. After emerging from prison in 1998, Erdogan 

found it expedient to espouse human rights in Western terms. Not because he believed in them, 

but because it advanced his political agenda to subordinate the security establishment under the 

guide of advancing Turkey's EU candidacy. Erdogan disassociated himself from political Islam, 

while embracing Islamic identity politics. For Erdogan, democracy and human rights were 

vehicles to advance Islamic expression. 

Tensions between the AKP and the military escalated when Erdogan nominated Abdullah Gul to 

become president in 2007. Security oftlcials were appalled that Gul, a devout Muslim, would 

occupy the office once held by Ataturk. To counter threats of a coup, Erdogan called early 

elections. On July 22, 2007, the AKP won 46.6 percent of the vote, which equated to 341 of the 

550 seats in parliament. Erdogan used his political capital to push legislation allowing women to 

wear the hijab at universities and public institutions. 

When the Turkish Supreme Court deemed the law unconstitutional, Erdogan threatened: "We are 

going to shut down the Constitutional Court." In 2008, the AKP sponsored a referendum on 

constitutional reform, giving the AKP-controlled parliament greater influence over the 

appointment of senior judges and prosecutors. Erdogan also intensified pressure on the military. 

Hundreds of retired military otlicers were arrested. Arrests were justified, citing a fantastic plot 

that included bombing mosques in Istanbul, staging the assault of a military museum by people 

disguised as religious extremists, and raising tensions with Greece by downing a Turkish plane 

over Greek air space. Turkey's anny, navy and air force heads resigned to protest the arrests. 

Last month, a measure was adopted allowing females in the armed forces to wear the hijab while 

on duty. 

Corruption 

Single-party rule fostered a culture of corruption that touched the highest levels of government, 

as well as the Erdogan family. On December 17, 2013, police officers raided several homes, 

seized $17.5 million in cash, and detained fifty-two people with ties to the AK.P. Prosecutors 

charged fourteen people with bribery, corruption, fraud, and money laundering. Four ministers 

resigned. 

As the crackdown unfolded, Erdogan called Bilal, his son, instructing him to dispose of cash at 

several family homes. Wiretaps recorded the calls. At eight in the morning on December 17, 

2013, Erdogan called Bilal ''Now I'm telling you, whatever you have in the house, get rid of it, 

OK?" Father and son spoke four times during the day. In their last conversation, Bilal indicated: 

[I still have] "30 million euros ($39 million) that we could not yet get rid of" Erdogan assured 

Bilal, "Whatever, we will deal with it." Bilal indicated "Berat Albayrak, (Erdogan's son-in-law 

and current minister of enert\Y), "has an idea to buy villas from Sehrizar Apartments. What did 

you think0 " The case was white washed. Prosecutors and police were fired and incriminating 

tapes destroyed to get rid of the evidence. 
11


24917a-4.eps

The case of Reza Zarrab warrants special mention. Zarrab, a dual Iranian-Turkish national was 

arrested by Turkish police in December 2013. Zarrab was charged with gold smuggling and 

bribing cabinet ministers. Erdogan made special etl'orts to shield Zarrab. He vouched for 

Zarrab's character, calling him a ''philanthropist" whose work had ·'contributed to the country." 

Charges against Zarrab were dismissed, as a result ofErdogan's intervention. 

When Iran was denied access to the SWIFT international money transfer system as a result of US 

sanctions, the Iranian government developed a strategy for by-passing SWIFT using Turkey's 

Halkbank. Zarrab sent money to front companies in China, identifying the transfers as export 

reimbursements. Funds were moved from the Chinese companies to companies in Turkey. The 

money was used to buy gold, which was transported to Iran via middlemen in Dubai. Selling 

Iranian gold and laundering the proceeds through Turkish banks violated US sanctions. On 

March 19, 2016, Zarrab was arrested at Miami International Airport. 

Zarrab' s indictment was unsealed in the Southern District of New York. Charges included 

defrauding the United States, money laundering, and violating the International Emergency 

Economic Powers Act, which regulates Iran sanctions. Kemal Kilicdaroglu, head of the People's 

Republican Party (CHP), predicted: "All the dirty laundry will come out. Many people won't 

sleep a wink tonight." 

The probe is ongoing Mehmet Hakan Atilla, Halkbank's vice president for international 

banking, was arrested in New York on March 27, accused of "a years-long scheme to violate 

American sanctions laws by helping Zarrab to use U.S. financial institutions to engage in 

prohibited financial transactions that illegally funneled millions of dollars to Iran." 

The 2013 EU progress report highlighted corruption, expressing "concern" 39 times. According 

to the report, "The government's response to allegations of corruption targeting high-level 

personalities, including members of the government and their families, raised serious concerns 

over the independence of judiciary and the rule of law.'' 

Freedom of Expression and Assembly 

Turkey systematically denies freedom of expression and treedom of assembly. It uses the 1991 

Law on the Fight against Terrorism to silence critics, alleging breaches of national security. 

Article 8 of the Anti-Terror Act is applied selectively to restrict freedom of expression. Article 

301 of the Penal Code makes it a crime to denigrate "the Turkish Nation, the State of the Turkish 

Republic or the organs and institutions of the State." Article 216 of the Penal Code, which carries 

a mandatory prison tenn of up to three years, bans "incitement of hatred or violence based on 

ethnicity, class, or religion," targeting Kurds. 

Turks resent Erdogan's authoritarianism and intrusion into their private lives. For example, 

Erdogan publicly called on women to bear at least three children. He made comments about their 

make-up, lipstick color, and what clothes women should wear. He recently called on Turks living 

in Europe to have five children in order to affect Europe's demography. 
12


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In May 2013, Turks protested plans for a shopping center in Gezi Park, camping in Gezi for 17 

days. Though Article 34 of the constitution permits freedom of assembly, riot police attacked 

with tear gas and water cannons on May 30, 2013. While Gezi was the epicenter of protests, 

antigovernment demonstrations occurred in sixty cities across Turkey. Police brutality fueled 

civic unrest. There was scant media coverage of the Gezi protests. As the crackdown was 

unfolding, state media aired a documentary about penguins. 

Gezi initiated a new phase in Turkey's crackdown on social media. Though Article 26 of 

Turkey's constitution guarantees freedom of expression and dissemination of thought, the 

government launched an investigation to track down tweets during the protest and expose 

"provocateurs." After Gezi, the government exercised increased powers to shut down websites. 

The Internet Law No. 5651 of February 2015 empowered Turkey's Telecommunication 

Directorate to block web sites without court approval. 

Adopted in April 2015, the Law Amending the Law on State Intelligence Services and the 

National Intelligence Organization allowed the National Intelligence Agency (MIT) to access 

personal data without a court order. It provided immunity to MIT personnel from legal violations 

committed in the course of their work. lt also criminalized reporting on MIT's activities. A new 

law allowed sentences of up to nine years for publishing information trom leaked intelligence 

material. Article 299 of the Penal Code established criminal liability for insulting the President. 

Between August 2014 and March 2016, the prosecutor opened 1,845 cases based on Article 299. 

Press Freedom 

By November 2016, Turkey had more journalists in jail than any country in the world. As many 

as 150 journalists, one-third of the total jailed worldwide, were imprisoned. More than 160 

media outlets were closed by the end of2016. The European Parliament (EP) issued its bi-yearly 

progress report on April 14, 2016. "Turkey still has one of the highest number of imprisoned 

journalists in the world." According to Freedom House, "Turkey does not have a free press.'' 

"Turkey remains top of Tvvitter's global censorship list,'' according to the latest Twitter 

Transparency report published on March 21." Erdogan called imprisoned journalists "terrorists, 

child molesters, and murderers (Cumhurriyet, 22 March 2017) '' 

Turkey uses a variety of techniques to suppress criticism. Journalists are prosecuted for 

terrorism, insulting public officials, or crimes against the state. Threats and physical attacks 

occur. Ofticials interfere with editorial independence and pressure media organizations to fire 

critical journalists. The government also exerts financial pressure. For example, the Dogan 

Group, which owns Hurriyet and CNN liuk, was penalized $3.2 billion in tax arrears. 

Turkish courts and regulators issue gag orders on specitic topics. A ban on allegations of MIT 

involvement in weapons shipments to Syria was imposed in February 2014. Another was issued 

in March 2014, restricting dissemination of leaked audio recordings of national security 

meetings. Can Dundar, editor in chief of Cumhurriyet was sentenced to five years for reporting 

on MIT's weapons transfers to ISIS in Syria. 
13


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Terror Ties 

Turkey stepped up its supply of weapons to lslamist insurgents in Syria when the US failed to 

intervene after Syria used chemical weapons in Aut,>ust 2013. MIT established an infrastructure 

for supporting jihadists, ranging from weapons transfers to logistical support, financial assistance 

and medical services. Vice President Joe Eiden confirmed Turkey's involvement (Harvard 

University, 2 October 2014). "Our allies in the region were our largest problem in Syria. The 

Turks .. poured hundreds of millions of dollars and ten thousand tons of weapons into anyone 

who would fight against Assad." Biden continued, "President Erdogan told me, he's an old 

friend, 'You were right. We let too many people through" 

Erdogan refuted Eiden's claim. "My request from our friends in the United States is to make 

your assessment about Turkey by basing your information on objective sources." In response, 

Columbia University created an international research team based in the US. Europe, and 

Turkey. Columbia documented scores of credible reports on Turkey's cooperation with jihadi 

groups, including ISIS. (Copy attached) 

Fethullah Gulen 

Gulen and Erdogan were friends and partners. Hizmet ("Service"), a moderate Muslim network 

founded by Gulen, propelled the AKP's rise. Gulen provided resources and infrastructure to 

support the AKP and erode the secular bureaucracy. Gulen instructed his followers to infiltrate 

mainstream structures: "You must move within the arteries of the system, without noticing your 

existence, until you reach all the power centers." In 1999, Gulen was charged with undermining 

secularism and fled to Pennsylvania. 

Erdogan blamed Gulen of running a "parallel state," with Gulenists permeating the judiciary, 

police, and the media. Erdogan accused Gulen of orchestrating the corruption crackdown in 

December 2013. Turkey is seeking his extradition for allegedly masterminding the failed coup of 

July 15,2016. 

Post-Coup Conditions 

Erdogan warned his opponents, "They will pay a heavy price for this." He launched purges 

against oppositionists. lhe New York 1/mes described the purges as a "counter-coup." Erdogan 

would "become more vengeful and obsessed with control than ever, exploiting the crisis not just 

to punish mutinous soldiers but to further quash whatever dissent is left in Turkey." A threemonth state of emergency was declared, giving the government extraordinary powers, bypassing 

parliament and ruling by decree. The state of emergency was extended for a second three-month 

period, as the crackdown intensified. As of November 2016, more than 40,000 people had been 

arrested since the coup. More than 100,000 people were dismissed from state institutions 

including the judiciary, military, and security forces 

Roughly one-third of the 220 brigadier generals and 10 major generals were detained. One third 

of all admirals were arrested. Many majors and lieutenant colonels were taken into custody. 

About six thousand soldiers of various ranks, mostly conscript privates, were imprisoned and 
14


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about nine thousand police otlicers dismissed. 262 Turkish diplomatic, military personnel have 

requested asylum in Germany 

The education sector was decimated. About 21,000 teachers were suspended or fired. An 

additional 11,000 Kurdish educators were suspended for suspected links to the PKK Every 

university dean in the country was forced to resign. Erdogan was given authority to appoint 

university heads. 

The rule of law was undermined. 2,754 judges were dismissed, including members of the High 

Council of Judges and Prosecutors. A member of the Constitutional Court was arrested and 

charged with collusion. Ten members of Turkey's highest administrative court were detained. 

Under new state of emergency provisions, prosecutors were given permission to record lawyerclient conversations, and judges were empowered to deny the accused access to a lawyer for up 

to 3 months. 

At least thirty governors were fired. The Ministry of Interior revoked the passports of 49,2II 

Turkish citizens. Private property was confiscated and retirement benetits canceled. The World 

Justice Index placed Turkey 99th out of Il3 countries in its rule of law ranking, behind Iran and 

Myanmar. 

Outlier in Europe 

Turkey became a European Union (EU) candidate country at the EU Helsinki Summit in 

December 1999. EU candidate countries must meet economic and institutional requirements. 

They must also have "stable institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights 

and respect for and protection of minorities" Actual negotiations would start when Turkey met 

the "Copenhagen criteria," which enshrine human rights. 

The EP voted to suspend talks with Turkey on EU membership (24 November 2016), citing 

Erdogan's crackdown on political opponents after the failed coup. The resolution warned, "The 

government's actions are further diverting Turkey from its European path.'' The resolution 

passed overwhelmingly with 479 votes in favor, 37 against and 107 abstentions. 

Erdogan doubled down by threatening to cancel the EU-Turkey deal on migrants. Tensions 

between Ankara and the EU worsened. When Germany refused to allow a campaign rally with 

Turkish ministers, citing security concerns, Erdogan accused the Gennan government of "Nazi 

measures." When the Dutch government refused landing rights to Turkey's foreign minister for 

similar reasons, Erdogan described it as "Nazi remnants and fascists." On March 15, Turkey's 

Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu warned: "Holy wars will soon begin in Europe." That same 

day the interior minister threatened: "We could open the way for 15,000 refugees that we don't 

send each month." 

Efforts to undermine democracy extend to countries in Europe as well as the United States. 

Revelations in Wikilinks document a systematic effort to camouflage Turkey's illicit lobbying 

efforts in the US Payments to General William T. Flynn also represent influence peddling, 

including representation that violated the Foreign Agents Registration Act. 
15


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Minority Rights 

EU Membership requires the protection and promotion of minority rights in accordance with 

international standards. Turkey is not in compliance when it comes to Kurdish, Armenian and 

Greek issues. 

Kurdish Issues 

The AKP's sweeping victory in 2007 resulted from inroads with Kurdish voters. The AKP 

appealed to Kurds through its conservatism and by expanding social services, building roads, 

schools and hospitals in predominantly Kurdish areas of the Southeast Erdogan publicly 

acknowledged the Kurdish issue, promising an end to civil war. Kurds were tired of conflict 

They hoped that the AKP would pursue a peace process with the PKK, resulting in disarmament 

and demobilization. Kurds also hoped that the AKP would amend the constitution, recognizing 

Kurdish identity. These hopes were misplaced. 

In January 2016, more than 1,400 Turkish academics signed a "peace petition" calling for an end 

to Turkey's "deliberate massacre and deportation of Kurdish people." The petition, entitled "We 

will not be party to this crime", also called for peace talks with the PKK .. The government 

responded with a broadside on academic freedom and freedom of expression. Erdogan said, "We 

are not in the position to seek permission from the so-called academics. These [people] should 

know their place.'' Erdogan referred to the peace petition as a ''betrayal.'' He called its signatories 

"darkest of the dark'' and "a fifth column'' for terrorists. According to Erdogan. "They commit 

the same crime as those who carry out massacres.'' 

The 2016 EP report deplored "the increasingly authoritarian tendencies of the Turkish 

leadership" It expressed concern about "rapidly deteriorating" security situation in the country, 

especially in the Southeast The report insisted that, "All operations by security forces must be 

proportional and not take the form of collective punishment" According to the EP, "The Turkish 

government has a responsibility to protect all people living on its territory, irrespective of their 

cultural or religious origins." 

The AKP received 40.9 percent of the vote on June 7, 2016. The tally was less than Erdogan 

expected. The vote was the first time in four general elections that support for Erdogan 

decreased. The progressive and pro-Kurdish Democratic People's Party (HDP) crossed the 10 

percent barrier with 13.1 percent, which equated to 80 seats in the parliament Erdogan blocked 

the formation of a coalition government, resulting in early elections. In July, Erdogan cynically 

re-started Turkey's civil war with the PKK in a play for nationalist voters. He promised stability 

and the return of economic growth. Fear mongering worked. On November 1, Erdogan tightened 

his grip on power, establishing single party government with nearly 50 percent of the vote. The 

tally was a big step towards realizing Erdogan's goal of constitutional reform and an executive 

presidency, pending parliamentary approval and a popular referendum, which is scheduled for 

April16, 2017. 

Eliminating the HDP as an effective opposition, the Turkish government jailed 13 HDP members 

of parliament on terrorism charges and took direct control of 82 municipalities in the Southeast, 

incarcerating elected mayors. Thousands of other members of the Kurdistan Communities Union 
16


24917a-9.eps

(KCK) were arrested. According to the HDP, 5,471 HDP party otlicials, including heads of 

provincial and district branches, were detained since the coup. The arrests undermined the 

HDP's ability to conduct a campaign over the upcoming referendum. 

A report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (March 

2017) documented security operations in a number of Southeast provinces a±Iecting civilians. 

Between July 2015 and December 2016, about 2,000 people were killed. The report documented 

numerous cases of excessive use of force; killings; enforced disappearances; torture; destruction 

of housing and cultural heritage; incitement to hatred; prevention of access to emergency 

medical care, food, water and livelihoods; violence against women; and severe curtailment of the 

right to freedom of opinion and expression as well as political participation. The most serious 

human rights violations reportedly occurred during periods of curfew, when entire residential 

areas were cut off Movement was restricted around-the-clock for several days at a time. Half a 

dozen cities were attacked. Cizre's destruction rivals the destruction of Aleppo in Syria. 

Armenian Issues 

From 2001 to 2004, I chaired the Turkish Armenian Reconciliation Commission (TARC), whose 

work represented enormous progress addressing the Armenian Genocide. TARC facilitated 

participation of both sides in a legal opinion recognizing that the lJN definition of genocide fit 

the Armenian experience. TARC also facilitated the agreement of joint recommendations to 

concerned governments on how to establish and improve relations. Contact between Turkish and 

Armenian civil society developed rapidly and continues to show progress. As President Reagan 

recognized in 1981, Armenians suffered the first genocide of the 201

h Century with over 1.5 

million victims; Armenian Genocide Remembrance Day is April 24. 

In 2009, the Armenian and Turkish governments signed protocols on how to advance their 

relationship by establishing diplomatic relations, lifting the Turkish blockade of Armenia, and 

dealing openly with unresolved problems. Armenian President Serge Sarkisian stood by those 

agreements. However, Erdogan reneged refusing to submit the protocols to parliament for 

ratification His anti-Christian and anti-Armenian rhetoric appeals to the Turkish nationalist base 

and exacerbates racism. 

The Erdogan government is currently seeking to control the election of a new Armenian Church 

Patriarch in Istanbul. It has reversed prior trends toward objective education on the millennia old 

Annenian history in Turkey. Where the Annenian Church used to own over 5,000 churches and 

religious institutions, today it is allowed less than fifty. During more positive times and with 

assistance from the courageous mayor of Diyarbikir, Armenians were allowed to renovate and 

reopen the historic Saint Giragos Church. Under the pretext of the war on terror, however, the 

Turkish government expropriated the Church falsely claiming it wanted to repair damage. Local 

residents believe the government plans to replace destroyed minority neighborhoods with highend condominiums. Better-off Syrian refugees could be resettled there. Turkey has also played 

an unhelpful role in US and international efforts to resolve peacefully the Nagorno-Karabakh 

conflict 
17


24917a-10.eps

Greek issues 

Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew, the spiritual leader of the second largest Christian Church in 

the world with 300 million followers, resides in IstanbuL The Ecumenical Patriarch's religious 

freedom is severely curtailed in Turkey. By refusing to recognize his "legal identity" as the 

Ecumenical Patriarch, the government of Turkey justifies the confiscation of thousands of 

Ecumenical Patriarchal properties including monasteries, church buildings, an orphanage, private 

homes, apartment buildings, schools and land. Turkey began returning some of those properties a 

few years ago, but then stopped. 

The Ecumenical Patriarch's seminary at Halki, which had operated since 1844, was forced to 

close in 1971. The Government of Turkey has inserted itself into the Church's selection of future 

Ecumenical Patriarchs, suggesting it may again insist on the right to veto Ecumenical Patriarchs 

elected by the Church's Holy Synod. 

Turkey's recent treatment of Hagia Sophia in Istanbul is cause for concern. Hagia Sophia is a 

UNESCO World Heritage Site, built in 537 and maintained as the world's largest Christian 

cathedral for nearly 1,000 years. Muslims then utilized the structure as a mosque for almost 500 

years. In 193 5, it was opened as a museum for all faiths Just last year, for the first time in 85 

years the Qur'an was recited at Hagia Sophia. Other steps are anticipated, converting Hagia 

Sophia into a mosque. 

The Constitutional Referendum 

Parliament authorized constitutional amendments on January 20, 2017. A referendum to approve 

18 amendments to the constitution will be held on April 16, 2017. If approved, the referendum 

will establish an executive presidency. 1t will eliminate checks and balances. The current 

parliamentary system will be canceled, and the Office of the Prime Minister abolished. The 

president would appoint and dismiss ministers. The number of seats in parliament will be 

increased to 600 from 550. Changes brought about by adoption of the referendum will limit the 

power of parliament to impeach the president Changes will also be made to the Supreme Board 

of Judges and Prosecutors, undermining judicial independence. The referendum will destroy 

Turkey's prospect of gaining membership in the EU. By abandoning its Western orientation, the 

referendum will change the way Turkey is governed, establishing one-man rule and transfonning 

Turkey into a dictatorship. 

Free and Fair? 

Erdogan has tried for years to consolidate his power by establishing an executive presidency. He 

has used his current executive powers to enhance the "yes" vote. The AKP's control of media 

has hampered the "no" campaign. The state of emergency declared after the coup created an 

environment hindering efforts of the "no" campaign. Erdogan intimidated opponents by accusing 

them of supporting the coup plotters. Opponents of the referendum have suffered coercion, 

harassment, and arrest The American pastor Andrew Brunson was jailed. Incarcerating HOP 

deputies and lifting their parliamentary immunity undermined the coalition of opponents. The 

HDP has filed an application at the European Court of Human Rights regarding continued arrest 

of its co-leaders, Selahattin Demirtas and Figen Yuksekdag. The police limited the activities of 
18


24917a-11.eps

"no'' campaigners. Local government officials denied "no" campaigners permission to hold 

rallies and limited their access to public facilities. The CHP released a report identifying 78 

measures Erdogan used to suppress support for the "no" campaign ( 1 March 20 17). The CHP 

intends to challenge the parliamentary vote at the Constitutional Court, citing irregularities and 

intimidation of deputies. For example, a CHP member with an artificial arm and leg was attacked 

on the floor of the parliament and her prosthetics ripped trom her body. 

Turkey's descent to dictatorship is occurring in plain sight. US officials must not turn a blind 

eye. They should see Turkey as it is, not how it used to be, or how they wish it were. 

Recommendations 

Review Turkey's NATO membership. There are extensive political criteria for joining 

NATO. But no one ever thought a NATO member would go rogue, requiring expulsion. 

The North Atlantic Council could establish a "Compliance Review Committee," using a 

scorecard to grade the democracy and human rights performance of Member States. If a 

country, such as Turkey or Hungary, receives a failing score for consecutive years, its 

NATO membership would be temporarily suspended. 

Diversify air combat operations, mitigating threats by Turkey to block US access to 

lncirlik Air Force. Alternatives include British bases in Cyprus- Akrotiri and Dhekelia, 

as well as bases in Jordan, Kuwait, and Traqi Kurdistan. 

Develop a dossier of war crimes committed by Turkish security against the Kurds, and 

support a commission of inquiry. The risk of Interpol red bulletins freezing the assets and 

restricting travel of Erdogan, members of his inner circle, and family members could 

have a positive influence on Turkey's behavior. 

Have additional hearings of the House Committee on Foreign Atiairs. Consider the 

referendum, including whether votes were accurately counted, as well as the conditions in 

which the referendum was conducted. Members of Congress should support initiatives to 

directly assist democratic forces and civil society in Turkey. 

Continue to prosecute with appropriate zeal the case of Reza Zarrab. In 2016, federal 

prosecutors successfully defeated Zan·ab motions for bail and dismissal. Trial is now set 

for August. It should proceed apace. 

Resist politicization of Gulen's extradition review. The US Justice Department must 

decide if Turkish evidence is strong enough to merit extradition, and if Gulen could 

receive a fair trial in Turkey in the context of post-coup conditions. The State 

Department has an important role to play in extraditions. But extradition is fundamentally 

a legal, rather than a political, determination, as established in the US-Turkey Extradition 

Treaty. 
19

Mr. ROHRABACHER. All right. Thank you. 

Mr. Yuksel. 

STATEMENT OF MR. MEHMET YUKSEL, REPRESENTATIVE TO 

THE UNITED STATES, PEOPLE’S DEMOCRATIC PARTY IN 

TURKEY 

Mr. YUKSEL. Dear Honorable Chairman Dana Rohrabacher and 

distinguished members of the House subcommittee. It is an honor 

for me to testify today on crucial development in Turkey. 

I would like to discuss a few major threats to democracy in Turkey and the rule of law. 

The constitutional amendments that are proposed by President 

Erdogan and AK Party project an authoritarian system of governance whereby absolute power is held by a single person. Even 

though the proposed constitutional amendments have not been legally accepted, the amendments have been implemented and practiced under the state’s rule of emergency. 

Let me list the several indication for extralegal and single-person 

rule in the Kurdish area especially and against the Kurdish political parties. 

Since the failed coup attempt, July 2016, 11 HDP deputies have 

been arrested and jailed, including co-chair Selahattin Demirtas 

and Figen Yuksekdag. The freedom of speech that democracy supports and Turkey’s Constitution guarantees is the basic allegation 

that co-chair Demirtas for what he is subjected to over 500 years 

of detention. 

Between July 2015 and March 2017, 8,930 HDP members were 

detained and 2,782 party members have been imprisoned; 494 HDP 

offices have been attacked, burned down, and vandalized, including 

HDP headquarters. Rallies were attacked and law enforcement 

support for these attacks has been widely documented. 

Around 10,000 municipality and humanitarian employees of 

Kurdish origin have been suspended from their positions. The government has also confiscated the monetary assets of the people 

they remove from their positions. Almost all of the media outlets 

protesting in Kurdish, both local and national levels, were closed. 

Kurdish journalists are arrested and sent to the prison. Even 

daycares where Kurdish is spoken have been shut down by the government. 

In the prisons, especially, the torture and ill-treatment methods 

have mainly been widely practiced, and there is ongoing hunger 

strike in the prisons for 50 days in some of the prisons. 

The number of internally displaced in southeastern Turkey is estimated between—estimated about half a million people, mainly 

the citizens of origin Kurdish. The humanitarian aid to the IDP is 

very limited. All of the local humanitarian NGOs have been shut 

down. 

The governmental aid to IDPs is also conditioned upon leaving 

their properties and lands, which will bring a demographical 

change in the Kurdish-populated areas. Many people have already 

left the areas. 

The authorities have also imposed extended around-the-clock 

curfews on 30 towns and neighborhoods, prohibiting any movement 

without permission for extended periods of time, lasting up to sevVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:24 May 03, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00023 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 Z:\WORK\_EEET\040517\24917 SHIRL
20

eral months. These months-long around-the-clock curfews have prevented civilians to evacuate the towns where the Turkish military 

conducted the operation. 

The lack of emergency services to the sick and wounded ultimately contribute to a high toll of deaths in these operations. In 

total, 2,000 people were killed during these operations and under 

the curfew. 

The public prosecutors have consistently refused to open an investigation on the reported killings. Failure to conduct the investigation of the killings is clear violation of constitutional and international human rights laws. 

In Cizre, 189 me, women, children were trapped in the basements of the buildings that were heavily shelled by Turkish security forces. These people did not have any access to water, food, 

and medical attention. Even though the trapped were calling for attention and help from the international community via phone conversations and videos, they were burned alive by the Turkish security forces. 

The Kurdish cities, which has been attacked by the security 

forces is Silvan—Sur, Silvan, Lice, Nusaybin, Dargecit, Cizre, 

Silopi, Sirnak, Idil, and Yuksekova. Those towns have been destroyed by the Turkish security forces. The images of the destroyed 

Kurdish cities resemble Syria’s civil war images, which you have 

also a copy of the photo of some destructions. 

On March 10, 2017, the United Nations Human Rights office 

published a report detailing massive destruction, killings, and numerous of other serious human rights violation committed by Turkish forces between July 2015 and December 2016 in Turkey. 

Honorable chairman and distinguished members of the House 

subcommittee, my people in Turkey are going through a full-scale 

assault, which could be viewed as a form of genocide. The Turkish 

authorities have seen the Kurdish identity as the main enemy. 

Fighting this enemy, they have been conducting a slow-motion 

genocide. 

I urge the United States House of Representatives to authorize 

this concern, to launch an investigation on crimes against humanity committed in southeastern Turkey and the Kurdistan of Turkey; to take action to put further pressure on Turkish authorities 

to respect democracy, rule of law, and human rights; ensure the 

freedom of speech with releasing thousands of political prisoners 

and journalists. 

I also urge the House of Representatives committee to act upon 

mediating peace talks and negotiation in Turkey to achieve a 

peaceful political solution to the Kurdish issue in Turkey and to encourage Turkish authorities to resume peace talks and mediate the 

peace process and achieve a political solution. 

With the approaching referendum on the constitutional amendments, Turkish society has become further polarized across different social and ethnic and sectarian groups. What has been quite 

worrisome is the fact that the ruling AK Party has been arming its 

supporters, and state authorities have been encouraging attacks on 

dissident groups within the country. 

If the situation in Turkey is not taken seriously and the democracy and the rule of law——

21

[The prepared statement of Mr. Yuksel follows:]


24917b-1.eps

MEHMET YUKSEL 

THE REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED STATES 

OFFICE 

PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC PARTY (HOP) IN TURKEY. 

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE, EURASIA, AND 

EMERGING THREATS 

HEARING: "TURKEY'S DEMOCRACY UNDER 

CHALLENGE" 

APRIL 5, 2017 
22


24917b-2.eps

Dear Honorable Chairman Dana Rohrabacher and distinguished members 

of the House Subcommittee, 

It is an honor for me to testify today on a crucial development in Turkey. I 

would like to discuss a few major threats to democracy and rule of law in 

Turkey. 

The constitutional amendments that are proposed by President Recep 

Tayyip Erdogan and the ruling AK Party projects an authoritarian system of 

governance, whereby absolute power is held by a single person. 

Even though the proposed constitutional amendments have not been 

legally accepted, the amendments have been implemented and practiced 

under the State of Emergency Rule. 

Let me enlist several indications of this extralegal, single-person rule: 

Since the failed coup attempt in July 2016, the immunity of 55 out of 59 

HOP law makers has been removed. Following this, 11 HOP deputies have 

been arrested, including the Co-Chair Selahattin Demirtas and Co-Chair 

Figen Yuksekdag. The freedom of speech that democracy supports and 

Turkey's Constitution guarantees is the basic allegation against Co-Chair 

Demirtas for what he is subjected to over 500 years of detention. 

Between July 22, 2015, and March, 27 2017, 8, 930 HOP members were 

detained; and 

2782 party members have been imprisoned. 494 HOP offices have been 

attacked; burned or vandalized, including the party headquarters. HOP 

rallies were attacked and law enforcement's support for these attacks have 

been widely documented, even on social media. 

At the 84 municipalities run by the pro-Kurdish Democratic Regions Party 

(DBP), 88 co-mayors and 6 deputy co-mayors were dismissed and 

replaced by state appointed trustees. The mayors and co-mayors are 

currently under arrest. These mayors and co-mayors were all 

democratically elected by the people with overwhelming majority. 
23


24917b-3.eps

Around 10,000 municipality and humanitarian employees of Kurdish origin 

have been suspended from their positions. The government has also been 

confiscating the monetary assets of people they remove from their 

positions. 

Almost all of the media outlets broadcasting in Kurdish at both local and 

national levels were closed. Kurdish journalists are arrested and sent to 

prisons. Even daycares where Kurdish is spoken have been shut down by 

the government. 

Speaking of prisons, the torture and ill-treatment methods, namely beating 

and punching of detainees; sexual violence including rape and threat of 

rape; deprivation of basic needs, such as water, food and sleep; 

deprivation of medication and treatment; forcing detainees to kneel 

handcuffed from behind for hours; verbal abuse, psychological violence, 

and intimidation have been prevailing in Turkish prisons. 

These methods of torture and ill-treatment recently led to a large-scale 

hunger strike among prisoners. The HOP Co-Chair Selahattin Oemirtas 

has also joined the hunger strike to raise the awareness for torture. 

The number of internally displaced persons (lOPs) in South-East Turkey is 

estimated between 355,000 to half a million people, mainly citizens of 

Kurdish origin. The humanitarian aid to the lOPs is very limited. All of the 

local humanitarian NGOs have been shut down. The government aid to 

lOPs is also conditioned upon leaving their properties and land, which 

would bring a demographical change in the Kurdish-populated areas. 

Many people have already left their homes. 

Since the failed coup attempt in July 2015, the Turkish government forces 

have been conducting security operations in a number of South-Eastern 

provinces, involving thousands of troops serving with combat-ready 

infantry, artillery and armoured army divisions, as well as the Turkish Air 

Force. The authorities also imposed extended around-the-clock curfews on 

over 30 towns and neighborhoods prohibiting any movement without 

permission for extended period of time, lasting up to several months. 

These months-long around-the-clock curfews have prevented civilians to 

evacuate the towns where the Turkish military conducted operations. The 

lack of emergency services to the sick and wounded ultimately contributed 
24


24917b-4.eps

to the high death toll of operations. In total of 2,000 people were killed 

during those operations and curfews. The public prosecutors have 

consistently refused opening investigations on the reported killings. Failure 

to conduct investigations on the killings is a clear violation of constitutional 

and international human rights law obligations. 

In the coldest months of the year, the late January and early February of 

2016, for weeks, in the town of Cizre, 189 men, women and children were 

trapped in basements of the buildings that were heavily shelled by the 

Turkish security forces. These people did not have access to water, food 

and medical attention. Even though the trapped were calling for attention 

and help from the international community via phone conversations and 

videos, they were burned alive by the Turkish security forces. 

The Kurdish provinces and cities that Turkish security forces targeted 

includes Sur, Silvan, and Lice in the province of Diyarbakir, Nusaybin, and 

Dargecit in the province of Mardin, Cizre, Silopi, ldil, Sirnak city center in 

the province of Sirnak, and Yuksekova in the province of Hakkari. These 

towns have been destroyed by the Turkish security forces. 

The images of the destroyed Kurdish cities resemble the Syrian civil war 

images. 

The scale of the unnecessary destructions, including damages to 

properties and businesses, in Kurdish cities and towns is estimated around 

21 billion US dollars. 

On March 10, 2017 the UN human rights office published a report detailing 

massive destruction, killings and numerous other serious human rights 

violations committed by Turkish forces between July 2015 and December 

2016 in southeast Turkey 1

. 

According to Human Rights Association, the Turkish government has 

conditioned financial compensation for destroyed housing upon the 

signature of declaration by owners that their property was destroyed by 

"terrorist activities". Families who have been forced to sign such 

declaration have reported this practice as an effort to falsify the historical 

1 http: I fwww. u n .org/ a pps/news/sto ry. asp ?News I 0=56330 
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record of the 2015-16 events and an effort to bring impunity to the state 

officers committed to human rights violations. It has also been reported 

that a number of families, who had been compelled to abandon their 

destroyed homes during the period of the security operations, were also 

forced to sign away the ownership of their properties. 

Honorable Chairman Dana Rohrabacher and the Distinguished members 

of the House Subcommittee, 

My people in Turkey are going through a full-scaled assault, which could 

be viewed as a form of genocide. The Turkish authorities have seen the 

Kurdish identity as the main enemy. Fighting this enemy, they have been 

conducting a slow-motion genocide. In fact, when we look at the eight 

stages of genocide published by Genocide Watch, we see that the Turkish 

government is indeed committing genocide against a minority. 

On November 18 2016, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the 

promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, 

expressed grave concerns about the "draconian" measures being used to 

erode independent opinion and expression in Turkey. 

I urge the United States House of Representatives to address these 

concerns; to launch investigations on the crimes against humanity 

committed in South-East Turkey. I urge the United States House of 

Representatives to take action to put further pressure on the Turkish 

authorities to respect democracy, rule of law and human rights, and ensure 

the freedom of speech with releasing thousands of political prisoners and 

journalists. I also urge the House of Representatives to act upon mediating 

peace talks and negotiations in Turkey and achieve a peaceful and political 

solution in Turkey to the Kurdish issue with encouraging the Turkish 

authorities to resume the peace talks and mediate the peace process to 

achieve a political solution. 

With the approaching referendum on the constitutional amendments, 

Turkish society has become further polarized, across different social, 

ethnic, and sectarian groups. What has been quite worrisome is the fact 

that the ruling AK Party has been arming its supporters and state 

authorities have been encouraging attacks on the dissident groups within 
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the country. If the situation in Turkey is not taken seriously and democracy 

and the rule of law in Turkey are not restored and rescued immediately, 

the country would face a large-scale civil war. Unfortunately, Turkey slowly 

but steadily is moving into chaos that leads to destabilizing the region 

further, in which we, the Kurds and other minorities would pay the heaviest 

price. 
27

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Cinar. 

STATEMENT OF MR. ALI CINAR, PRESIDENT, TURKISH 

HERITAGE ORGANIZATION 

Mr. CINAR. Good afternoon, Chairman, Ranking Member, and 

members of the subcommittee. It is an honor for me to testify 

today. 

I am sure everyone would agree that 2016 was a particularly 

challenging year for Turkey and U.S. relations. There are disagreements and tensions over two major security issues, U.S. support of 

the PYD in Syria and Turkey’s request for the extradition of 

Fethullah Gulen. 

Understanding Turkey’s democracy that is under challenge requires a comprehensive review of its domestic and regional risks. 

Terrorism continues to be the Turkey’s number one security concern. 

Overall, more than 270 people lost their lives in at least 12 major 

terror attacks by ISIS and PKK in Turkey, making 2016 a year of 

terror. 

July 15 coup attempt, which was carried out by a faction with 

the Turkish armed forces, took a considerable toll on the Turkish 

nation. According to the Turkish Government, the coup attempt 

was organized by Fethullah Gulen and his followers. The Majority 

of Turkish people, including opponents of President Erdogan, believe that Gulen was the organizer of the coup attempt. 

Gulen’s network’s influence of state institutions in Turkey was a 

well-known fact. For the first time in its history, Turkey, a country 

that is all too familiar with the periodic military disruptions, was 

able to stop a military coup, but it claimed 249 lives and injured 

over 2,000 people. 

Turkey had survived an enormous threat and had to make difficult choices in the aftermath of the coup attempt. The emergency 

rule, which is still in effect, was aimed at taking the necessary 

measures and eliminating the complex national security risks that 

it created. 

Turkey is gearing up for a historical referendum on April 16 

when voters will decide whether or not to approve constitutional 

amendments that will shift Turkey’s current parliamentary system 

to an executive Presidency. Upcoming referendum is an attempt by 

the Turks to start a new chapter, a chapter that doesn’t involve 

any military imposed constitution. 

Under the proposed changes to the Constitution, the President 

will be elected directly by the people with more than 50 percent of 

the votes, which means that there will be a better representation 

of the national will. The Turkish Parliament will remain involved 

in the political process and able to investigate the President, if 

needed. 

Considering the challenges Turkey faces, my understanding is 

that the proposed changes will set the foundation for a more stable 

and secure Turkey. Don’t we, the United States, need a much 

stronger ally in the region? 

The Kurdish issue. Since 1980, Turkey has been experiencing a 

violent conflict with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party. PKK is classiVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:24 May 03, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00031 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 Z:\WORK\_EEET\040517\24917 SHIRL
28

fied as a terrorist organization by United States, NATO, and European Union. The fight between the PKK and the Turkish state cost 

more than 40,000 lives. 

When looking at the Kurdish issue in Turkey today, it is important to separate Turkey’s Kurdish population from the PKK terrorist group. There are concerns about certain HDP members maintaining links to PKK or otherwise supporting the terrorist group, 

such as in case of some HDP members attending the funerals of 

PKK terrorists, meeting at their base camp in Kandil, and posing 

photos. It must also be remembered that, despite a base that is 

broadly Kurdish, the HDP is not de facto representative of all 

Kurds in Turkey. 

Freedom of expression and the media constitute an important 

pillar of human rights in Turkey. It is a fundamental freedom 

guaranteed under the Constitution and other relevant legislation. 

It is important to note that the post-coup-attempt state of emergency has required extraordinary actions in order to ensure the 

stability and security of Turkey. Those journalists who have been 

detained or arrested under the state of emergency have been 

charged with serious crimes, which include spreading propaganda 

for terrorist organizations such as PKK and FETO. 

Domestic remedies exist for those who believe they have been 

wrongfully suspected in antiterrorism investigations. The Inquiry 

Commission on the State of Emergency Measures addresses the applications from citizens who feel they have been wrongfully persecuted. This provides an effective domestic legal remedy to any 

false accusations. 

U.S.-Turkey relations are more important now than ever. Turkey 

and Turkish democracy is experiencing an exceptional period of 

stress due to the security concerns. A weaker destabilized Turkey 

will be a disaster not just for citizens of Turkey but for Europe, 

NATO, and U.S. As Joint Chiefs Chairman General Dunford said 

during an Ankara visit, an express willingness to work through 

these issues and share perspectives will mean stability in the region. 

The U.S. remains the ideal example of such democracy, and it is 

important now more than ever that Washington and Ankara maintain and improve their strategic and historic relationship in order 

to ensure the security of both their countries. 

I would like to thank you again, Mr. Chairman and the committee members, for giving me the opportunity to be a part of this 

hearing today. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Cinar follows:]

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TESTIMONY OF All CINAR, PRESIDENT OF TURKISH HERITAGE 

ORGANIZATION 

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

EUROPE, EURASIA, AND EMERGING THREATS HEARING: TURKEY'S 

DEMOCRACY UNDER CHALLENGE APRIL 5, 2017 

Chairman Rohrabacher, Ranking Member Meeks, Members of the 

Subcommittee: 

It is an honor for me to testify before you today. As a first generation 

American, I have had the privilage to take important leadership roles 

with two of the oldest Turkish-American umbrella organizationAssembly ofTurkish American Associations (ATAA) in Washington, 

DC and Federation of Turkish-American Associations (FTAA) in New 

York City. As the President of Turkish Heritage Organization, I 

continue to dedicate myself to advance U.S.- Turkey relations. I am 

very much aware about the importance of these hearings and I feel 

particularly privilaged to be invited to this hearing room again for a 

witness. 

I think "Turkey's Democracy Under Challenge" is a suitable title for 

this hearing. Regardless of where one stands on his/her views on 

Turkey, I am sure everyone would agree that 2016 was a particularly 

challenging year for Turkey and U.S.- Turkey relations. Exceptional 

security challenges, including an attempted coup on July 15 and an 

increase in deadly terror attacks carried out by groups like Daesh, the 

PKK, and TAK have compounded U.S.-Turkey relations, which have 

suffered a series of setbacks regarding disagreements and tensions 

over two major security issues: U.S. support of the YPG in Syria and 

Turkey's request for the extradition of Fethullah Gulen. 
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Understanding Turkey's democracy that is under challenge requires a 

thorough review of its domestic and regional risks. Terrorism 

continues to be Turkey's number one security concern. Escalation of 

the conflict between the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) and the 

Turkish state in 2016, ignited a wave of deadly terror attacks carried 

out by the Kurdistan Freedom Hawks (TAK) in cities like Istanbul, 

Ankara, and Kayseri. The renewal of this conflict is compounded by 

the increasing threat posed by Daesh, which successfully carried 

out a series of large-scale attacks in Turkey. These attacks made it 

clear that Turkey was facing an unprecedented security threat 

emanating from Syria that needed to be addressed. Overall, more 

than 270 people lost their lives in at least 12 major terror attacks in 

Turkey, making 2016 a year of terror. 

The July 15 Coup Attempt, which was carried out by a faction within 

the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK), took a considerable toll on the 

Turkish nation. According to the Turkish government, the 

coup attempt was organized by U.S.-based Turkish exile Fethullah 

Gulen and a group of his followers that the Turkish government has 

labeled the Fethullah Gulen Terror Organization (FETO). Turkey's 

26th Chief of the General Staff, Gen. (Ret.) M llker Basbug, who was 

jailed following the Ergenekon Trials, delivered a special address in 

Washington, D.C. as Turkish Heritage Organization's guest. Gen. 

Basbug told the audience he had no doubt that the coup attempt 

was organized by followers of Fethullah Gulen. 

Similarly, Lt. Gen. Ismail Hakki Pekin, the former head of Turkey's 

military intelligence; Colonel Judge Ahmet Zeki Ucok, former military 

judge who has conducted investigations into the infiltration into the 

Turkish Armed Forces of followers of Pennsylvania-based Turkish 

cleric Fethullah Gulen; and Nedim Sener, who has investigated the 

role of Gulen-affiliated security forces in the assassination of TurkishArmenian journalist Hrant Dink, spoke about the dangerous nature 

of the Gulen network when they visited Washington, D.C. as Turkish 

Heritage Organization's guests. 

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Following the coup attempt, the Turkish government formally 

requested Gulen's extradition to Turkey and presented the U.S. 

government with evidence showing Gulen's involvement in multiple 

crimes in Turkey. The extradition is one of the major areas of concern 

for Turkey with regard to its relations with the U.S. 

It may be difficult to grasp the dangerous nature and capabilities of 

the Gulen movement for those who are not familiar with it but Turks 

and Americans from Turkish heritage are well aware of this 

organization's history and extensive world-wide network. Gulen 

network's infiltration of state institutions in Turkey was a well known 

fact. However, at the time both the Turkish and U.S. governments 

turned a blind eye to the organization "when it suited them." 

Colonel Judge Ucok, who helped conduct military investigations into 

the Gulen network's infiltration during his tenure at the Air Force 

Attorney General's office, claimed that investigations had shown 

evidence that during the period between 1986 and 2006, 30,000 

officers could have been connected to the Gulen movement. He 

estimated that during the following decade, an additional 40,000 

could have entered into the armed services, thus making the number 

of affiliated officers approximately 100,000 by the present day. He 

said that of the 358 generals in the Turkish Armed Forces, 160 had 

been connected to this organization. 

For the first time in its history, the Republic of Turkey, a country that 

is all too familiar with periodic military interferences, was able to stop 

a military coup but it claimed 248 lives and injured over 2000 people. 

Regardless of what we think about Turkey's democracy, the truth is 

that this coup attempt was going to undermine Turkey's democratic 

institutions, political parties and many other rights and libertiesexacerbating the existing domestic and regional risks and possibliy 

initiating a civil war. 

3 
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Republic of Turkey had survived an enourmous threat and had to 

make difficult choices in the aftermath of the coup attempt. The 

emergency rule, which is still in effect, was aimed at taking the 

necessary precautions and eliminating the complex national security 

risks that it posed. According to Turkish newspapers, more than 113 

thousand people were arrasted for charges related to FETO. Close to 

42 thousand people were released following the appropriate 

investigations. 

As it entered its sixth year, the civil war in Syria became Turkey's 

biggest regional security risk in 2016. Turkey has continued to be a 

reliable and effective partner in the fight against Daesh. After 

opening up lncirlik Air Base in July 2015 for use by the Global 

Coalition to Counter ISIL as part of Operation Inherent Resolve, 

Turkey launched its own operation in August 2016 in northern Syria 

to counter Daesh as well as the People's Protection Units (VPGL 

which Ankara views as a terrorist organization due to its links to the 

PKK. 

With Operation Euphrates Shield in northern Syria, Turkey declared 

that it was exercising its right to self-defense (codified under Article 

51 of the UN Charter) and officially became the first anti-Daesh 

coalition country to use ground forces in Syria.6 However, continued 

U.S. support of the YPG- which Washington considers an effective 

partner in the fight against Daesh- has aggravated and severely 

antagonized Turkey's threat perceptions during a period in which 

Turkey is suffering from attacks by both Daesh and Kurdish nationalist 

terror groups. 

Operation Euphrates Shield holds considerable significance for 

Turkey. Following the coup attempt in July, there were both domestic 

and international concerns about the state of the TSK and about 

Turkey's institutional strength as a critical NATO member. In addition 

to addressing border security concerns and confronting terror groups, 

4 
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Operation Euphrates Shield provided Turkey the opportunity to 

re-affirm its military strength and capability not only to its allies but 

also to its adversaries. 

The ongoing civil war in Syria and the fight against Daesh continue 

to pose significant risks not only for Turkey but also for its allies. The 

Syrian conflict has exposed Turkey's domestic and regional 

vulnerabilities and undermined its security. It has strained U.S.-

Turkey relations, which worsened even further after the coup 

attempt. Various disagreements between Turkey and the U.S.-

especially over Syria drove Turkey closer to Russia. As a result, near 

the end of 2016, Moscow and Ankara worked closely together to 

negotiate a humanitarian ceasefire in Aleppo that would pave the 

way to a 2017 international meeting on a Syrian settlement in Astana, 

Kazakhstan. Although the rapprochement between Russia and Turkey 

has distanced the U.S. from this process, Ankara has expressed its 

willingness to improve its relations with Washington under the new 

presidential administration in the U.S. 

In additon to significant security risks, the ongoing civil war in Syria 

also poses a significant humanitarian aid concerns for Turkey. While 

EU was seeking ways to stem the flow of refugees, both the Turkish 

government and NGOs have expended ample time and resources to 

support the 3 million refugees in Turkey with little assistance from 

the international community. Turkey remains at the forefront of 

global humanitarian aid efforts, ranking second on the 2016 Global 

Humanitarian Assistance report's list of top global donors. Even 

though Turkey is the largest refugee hosting country in the world, it is 

only the 10th highest recipient of aid. There is a major need for more 

aid to support large refugee populations in host countries such as 

Turkey. 

The observations that I make in Turkey as well as in Washington 

clearly indicate that continuation of complications between 

Washington and Ankara- will not only severely damage bilateral 

defense cooperation between the two largest militaries in NATO but 

5 
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will also contribute to the destabilization of both Turkey and its 

region. 

All of these challenges and enormous risks should be taken into 

consideration when evaluating Turkey's domestic and foreign policy 

motives. Turkey's domestic security will continue to be vulnerable to 

the conflict in Syria, and for that reason, Ankara cannot adequately 

address the threats it faces from myriad terror groups without 

strong cooperation with the U.S. on Syria. 

Turkey is gearing up for a historical referendum on April16, when 

voters will decide whether or not to approve constitutional 

amendments that will shift Turkey's current parliamentary system to 

an executive presidency. The idea of executive presidency is not new 

in Turkey. Former Presidents Turgut Ozal, Suleyman Demirel have 

introduced it but they were unable to pursue it due to the political 

conditions at the time. As someone who lived through the 1980's 

military coup d'etat and the constitution that was established 

afterwards in 1982, it is important to emphasize that Turkey is not a 

"classical" parliamentary system. In fact the existing constitution was 

set up to address the expectatios of military for a president that 

would come from a military background. In other words, the existing 

constituion is geared more toward protecting the Turkish state from 

the people than guaranteeing political and civil rights. From this 

perspective, the proposed changes to Turkey's constitution should be 

seen as a natural urge. 

Turkey may not be a perfect democracy but one has to recognize that 

despite numerous challenges and setbacks, politial and civil rights has 

significantly improved since the 1980's. The upcoming referandum is 

an attempt by the Turks to start a new chapter- a chapter that does 

not involve any military imposed constitution. Political stability, 

something that is difficult to grasp for under the military imposed 

constitution will be the ultimate goal of this referandum. 

6 
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I am not an expert on constitutinallaw and government. However, it 

is important to analyze the root causues and needs behind the 

proposed changes. Turkey traditionally had been governed by a 

bureaucratic-military secular elite. Up until recently, Turkish military 

remained as the invisible hand that monitored and threatened the 

political establishment. In 2007, military blocked then AK Party 

Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul's run for the presidency- a complete 

disregard to politial process. This is just one example at the highest 

level. Turkey and Turks have been living under this invisible hand for 

over 35 years now! 

Turkey and Turks hope that the proposed changes will finaly change 

this three decades-long influence and interference that has 

negatively impacted the natural course of democratic progress. 

Under the proposed changes to the constitution, the President will 

be elected directly by the people with more than 50% of the votes, 

which means that there will be a better representation of the 

national will. Additionally, current issues with jurisdiction of the 

President is extraordinarily large. The new system proposes greater 

responsibility and accountability as well as faster and more efficient 

decision making process. Administrative obstacles and red-tape, 

which have severe consequences on Turkey's overall governance, 

will be eliminated. Not to mention that the proposed system will 

create a strong barrier against coups. 

The Current Version: Judicial power shall be exercised by 

independent courts on behalf of the Turkish Nation. The Proposed 

Version: The Current Version: Judicial power shall be exercised by 

independent and impartial courts on behalf of the Turkish Nation. 

Why: This would increase confidence into the Judiciary. FETO like 

illegal structures will not be able to infiltrate to the Judiciary. 

Who has the Power? The Grand National Assembly can take the 

decision to send the president to the Supreme Court with two-thirds 

of its members secret votes. 

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Judicary in the new Proposed Presidential System: The Council of 

Judges and Prosecutors shall be composed of 13 regular members; 

and shall comprise two chambers. The Council's four members are 

appointed from among judges and prosecutors by the president. 

Seven members are appointed by the Grand National Assembly. The 

minister of justice is the head of the council and the undersecretary 

is its natural member. Democratic legitimacy would be consolidated. 

Factionalism would come to an end. Example: The Netherlands: All 

members appointed by the King upon the proposal of the Justice 

Minister. Spain: All members appointed by the King upon the 

proposal of the Parliament. Norway: 9 members. 2 appointed by 

the Parliament. The King appoints 7 upon the proposal of the 

Government. 

I wanted to give some examples of the proposed Presendential 

system. The Turkish Parliament will remain to ve active and involve 

with the execution and able to investigate the President if needed. 

The most important part is to have a A stronger system will increase 

the country's influence in the region and across the world. 

Don't we-U.S- need a much stronger NATO Ally in the Region? 

I would like to make some highlights on Turkey's Current Issues 

and Future of Partnership w U.S especially after April 16th: 

We will learn the results on Aprill61

h but no matter what happens 

US-Turkey partnership will remain stronger despite some 

disagreements. 

Security: 

-Especially PYD&PKK and FETO are the two top major issues for the 

relationship. Many members of congress don't believe that FETO was 

behind the coup attempt but many evidences show that FETO was 

8 
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24917c-9.eps

behind of the coup. PYD and FETO are the big terror threats for 

Turkey along w ISIS. 

While Turkey considers the PKK/PYD to be a terrorist group affiliated 

to the PKK, which has waged war against Turkey since 1984, the U.S. 

sees the PKK/PYD as its ground ally against Daesh in Syria. Turkey 

launched Operation Euphrates Shield on Aug. 24 and completed 

mission last week. As a result: the operation was ensure the security 

of turkey, purge isis terrorities from turkish borders, to eliminate 

operational force of the terror PKK-PYD and ISIS to ensure stability 

securyithof region. More than 2500 ISIS terrorist were neutrailized 

more than 600 terrorist captured- more than 71 Turkis Military staff 

martred . life in the purges areas went back to normal and 

thousands of syrians went back their homelands 

Turkey is ready to support for fighting against ISIS in the region but 

concern remains on the US support to PYD. Several NGPs including 

Amnesty lntHuman Rights Watch and Syrian Network forhuman 

Rights report continuous human right violoations and ethnic leasing 

campaign conducted bt PYD-YPG. 

Turkey has all the capabilities and ready to cooperate w US on 

ground fight against DAESH 

-FETO: Turkey would like Fettullah Gulen to be extradited ASAP. If 

U.S believes Turkey as a strong ally on this case, U.S should take a 

look evidences more seriously and Turkey needs to be more patient 

on the U.S justice system. 

Since we talk about the respect of the countries justice system, The 

extradition signed by in 1979 treaty's lOth article 

or the U.S. 

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The "Kurdish Issue" 

The "Kurdish issue" in Turkey is so-named because previous 

governments in Turkey restricted the rights and representation of 

ethnic Kurds, and this situation was exacerbated by violence against 

citizens of Turkey in the name of Kurdish separatism. 

Since 1980, Turkey has been experiencing a violent conflict with the 

Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). The PKK is classified as a terrorist 

organization by Turkey, the U.S., and the EU. The fight between the 

PKK and the Turkish state has cost more than 40,000 lives. 

In the 2000s, the AKP-Ied Turkish government initiated a "Kurdish 

opening" in an effort to find a political solution to this decades-long 

conflict. This opening included pursuing reforms that would allow for 

greater cultural rights. As one example of progress, in recent years, 

several Kurdish-language television and radio stations have been 

established in Turkey and courses teaching the Kurdish language and 

dialects have been created. This is a far cry from the days when 

Kurdish was banned in various forms under previous governments. 

As part of this "Kurdish opening," the Turkish government pursued a 

peace process with the PKK aimed at ending the violence of the 

previous decades. This process collapsed in 2015. 

When looking at the "Kurdish issue" in Turkey today, it is important 

to disassociate Turkey's Kurdish population from the PI<K terrorist 

group. 

The only "issue" the government of Turkey has is with PKK terrorists 

and their affiliates, who attack and kill citizens of Turkey of all 

backgrounds. It is important to note that the resurgence of the PKK 

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24917c-11.eps

conflict in Turkey is directly tied to the ongoing conflicts in Syria and 

Iraq. The chaos on Turkey's borders has strengthened the PKK by 

allowing it to continue operating from northern Iraq while 

strengthening its affiliates in Syria. 

There are significant links between the PKK and the Democratic 

Union Party (PYD) and its armed wing, the People's Protection Units 

(YPG), in northern Syria. In addition to sharing an ideology and a 

devotion to Abdullah Ocalan, both the PKK and the PYD/YPG also 

share fighters, who may be fighting with the PKK one week and with 

the YPG the next. 

The PYD-Ied cantons in northern Syria have also served as a training 

ground for terrorists who go on to conduct attacks in Turkey, as was 

the case of Seher Cagla Demir, who killed 37 people in a bombing in 

the heart of Ankara in March 2016. 

In the West, there is a narrative that YPG and PKK advances against 

ISIS are victories for human rights. Juxtaposed against ISIS, many 

militant and terrorist groups look tame. But the need to defeat ISIS 

does not erase the fact that both the YPG and the PKK are terrorist 

organizations. The latter in particular has the blood of thousands of 

Kurds and Turks on its hands in Turkey alone. 

Turkey has also been a victim of ISIS. In 2016, ISIS killed more than 

100 people in Turkey- including foreigners. For Turkey, both ISIS and 

the PKK pose significant, deadly threats. A whitewashing of groups 

like the YPG and the PKK only serves to elongate conflicts in Syria, 

Iraq, and Turkey. 

It is paramount for Turkey and the PKK to return to a peace process 

that will enable this conflict to be resolved once and for all. For this 

to happen, the U.S. needs to stand behind its NATO ally and help 

create the conditions for peace. This includes heeding Turkish 

concerns about U.S. support for the YPG while also working with 

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Turkey and other regional actors to negotiate an end to the Syria 

conflict. As long as there is a war on Turkey's borders, there will be 

the threat of spillover into Turkey's domestic issues. 

The recent detentions and arrests of a number of MPs from the 

People's Democratic Party (HDP) must be understood in the context 

of the PKK conflict. last May, immunity from criminal prosecution 

was lifted from over 100 members ofthe Turkish parliament, 

including MPs from every political party represented in parliament. 

Following this move, all affected members except some HOP MPs 

gave depositions regarding ongoing investigations into potential 

criminal activities. Turkish courts issued warrants for the HDP MPs in 

order to secure depositions. Since then, some have been remanded 

into custody while others have been released. 

The HDP is a political party that passed the election threshold to 

enter the Turkish parliament, and it should continue to be included 

in the Turkish parliament as such. As a party with a broad Kurdish 

base, it will likely play an essential role in any new peace process 

between the Turkish state and the PKK, as it did in the past. 

Nevertheless, there are concerns about certain HDP members 

maintaining links to the PKK or otherwise supporting the terrorist 

group, such as in the case of some HOP members attending the 

funerals of PKK terrorists. These concerns need to be addressed. It 

must also be remembered that despite a base that is broadly 

Kurdish, the HOP is not the de facto representative of all Kurds in 

Turkey. 

Freedom of Expression and the Media 

Freedom of expression and the media constitute an important pillar 

of human rights in Turkey. It is a fundamental freedom guaranteed 

under the Constitution and other relevant legislation. 

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24917c-13.eps

This does not mean, however, that mistakes have not been made in 

the past regarding ensuring this fundamental right. The abuses and 

fabrications of the Ergenekon and Sledgehammer trials, which were 

carried out by corrupt officials tied to FETO, are just one example. 

Today, media in Turkey includes a diverse and wide variety of 

domestic and foreign print, television, radio, and online news 

outlets. In Turkey, there are over 7,000 newspapers and journals as 

well as more than 200 TV stations and more than 1,000 radio 

stations that reach national and local audiences. Each regularly 

exercises free speech without intervention from the government. 

There are 110,000 Associations and 50,000 foundations currently 

operating in Turkey. In recent years, Turkey has undertaken a series 

of comprehensive judicial reforms in line with both international and 

EU standards and principles for the protection and promotion of 

freedom of expression and the media. 

There is no Turkish legislation that includes any provision that would 

lead to imprisonment of journalists on account of their journalistic 

work. Everyone is equal before the law without any distinction as to 

his or her profession. 

It is important to note that the post-coup-attempt state of 

emergency has necessitated extraordinary actions in order to ensure 

the stability and security of Turkey. Those journalists who have been 

detained or arrested under the state of emergency have been 

charged with serious crimes, which include spreading propaganda for 

terrorist organizations such as FETO and the PKK. Turkey has suffered 

repeated attacks and loss of life from both of these groups, and it is 

necessary to take actions that prevent further violence, including by 

pursuing criminal investigations against those who support these 

organizations. 

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Domestic remedies exist for those who believe they have been 

wrongfully suspected in the anti-terrorism probes. The Inquiry 

Commission on the State of Emergency Measures addresses 

applications from citizens who feel they have been wrongly 

persecuted. This provides an effective domestic legal remedy to any 

false accusations. 

U.S.-Turkey Relations More Important Now Than Ever 

Today, Turkey is beset by three major terrorist groups- the PKK, ISIS, 

and FETO. Violent conflicts in Syria and Iraq have direct ramifications 

for Turkey's own security. Turkey- and Turkish democracy- is 

experiencing an exceptional period of stress due to these security 

concerns. 

Many of the actions taken under the current state of emergency 

have been pursued in order to return Turkey to a state of security 

and stability. 

However, the Turkish government must also be cognizant of how 

these actions are carried out. 

There are concerns that many innocents have been caught up in the 

Turkish government's efforts to extract members of FETO and other 

terrorist groups from the ranks of the military, police, judiciary, and 

academia. 

It is imperative that the government continue to pursue programs 

like the Inquiry Commission on the State of Emergency Measures to 

give legal recourse to citizens who have been negatively affected. 

Already, 31,000 individuals have been reinstated in their jobs after 

having been removed under the state of emergency measures, and 

300 institutions that were previously closed under the state of 

emergency have been reopened. 

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While trials and detentions continue, it is essential that the Turkish 

government works to ensure fair and speedy trials and to prevent 

undue suffering while individuals remain in custody. Allegations of 

abuse of prisoners must be addressed when and where they are 

made. 

A strong and stable Turkey will be a more beneficial partner for the 

U.S. It is important, then, for the U.S. to understand the exceptional 

situation Turkey is now in and to support its partner in its pursuit of 

stability. 

As Turkey reconciles with the events of July 15 and their aftermath 

while also defending itself against spillover from the conflicts in Syria 

and Iraq, it is more important than ever for the U.S. and Turkey to 

maintain an open dialogue. Officials in both Washington and Ankara, 

need to return to a tenor of solidarity, respect, and shared 

commitment toward the realization of each country's interests. 

As a NATO ally with the second largest military in the alliance, Turkey 

is a crucial security partner for the U.S. A weaker, destabilized Turkey 

will be a catastrophe not just for citizens of Turkey but for Europe, 

NATO, and the U.S. It is important for both Washington and Ankara 

to be able to engage in honest but respectful discussions with each 

other even in the face of disagreements or concerns. As General 

Joseph Dunford said on a November 2016 visit to Turkey, "an express 

willingness to work through these issues and share perspectives will 

mean stability in the region." 

The July 15 coup attempt shook Turkey to its core and called into 

question its democratic resilience. However, the incredibly 

courageous response shown by the Turkish public as the coup 

attempt was unfolding made one thing clear: the Turkish people 

want a strong, free, and fair democracy. 

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The U.S. remains the preeminent example of such a democracy, and 

it is more important now than ever that Washington and Ankara 

maintain their strategic and historic relationship in order to ensure 

the security of both of their countries. 

I would like to thank you again Mr. Chairman and Committee 

Members for giving me the opportunity to be a part of this hearing 

today. 

16 
45

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much. 

And we wanted to make sure that we had somewhat of a balance 

to this hearing, and that is always important to have at least one 

point of view that differs. 

And we thank you for coming today. And knowing that that is 

a challenge in today’s society, to step forward with your testimony, 

we appreciate it very much. 

You may proceed. 

STATEMENT OF MS. NAZ DURAKOGLU, STRATEGIST AND SENIOR FELLOW, DIGITAL FORENSIC RESEARCH LAB, ATLANTIC 

COUNCIL 

Ms. DURAKOGLU. Thank you, Chairman Rohrabacher, Ranking 

Member Meeks, and members of the committee. It is an honor to 

testify before you both as a witness and a former staffer on this 

committee under Congressman Bill Keating. 

Congressman Bill Keating’s commitment to public service and 

my work with all of you continues to be an inspiration to me. 

The Turkish referendum on April 16 should not be viewed as a 

standalone domestic event; rather, a critical moment in Turkey’s 

history with wider implications for the transatlantic community 

and NATO alliance. 

The vote comes at a time of heightened fear, polarization, and 

trauma for Turks, who have endured one of the deadliest years in 

their recent history, a failed coup on July 15, and a subsequent 

purge of institutions across Turkey. 

This environment colors the constitutional package at the center 

of the referendum. If passed, Turkey’s parliamentary structure 

would change into a Presidential system with few checks and balances. I detail these changes in my written testimony but would 

like to emphasize that under the proposed constitution, the new 

President would exercise almost complete executive control with 

the ability to appoint and dismiss all ministers with no legislative 

buy-in. 

Further, the proposed amendments weaken instead of strengthen 

the Turkish judiciary and give the President the power to appoint 

two-thirds of the country’s senior judges. No matter the outcome, 

Turkey’s partners must prepare to engage with the Turkish state 

that is in battle for its future. 

The four key areas to watch are transatlantic security, energy cooperation, economic prosperity, and democratic values. Having the 

second largest military in the NATO alliance, Turkey has a profound influence on international security matters. The use of Turkey’s Incirlik Air Base allows for 25 percent more strikes against 

ISIS in Syria, and much of the United States’ humanitarian aid 

work there is based out of Turkey. 

Last week, Secretary Tillerson visited Turkey to discuss the campaign against ISIS in Raqqa. The final assault on Raqqa has 

stalled over a disagreement on which forces to use. The U.S. would 

prefer to see Raqqa taken by a coalition of Arab and Kurdish YPG 

units, collectively known as the Syrian Democratic Forces. Because 

Turkey considers the YPG an extension of the banned PKK, the 

Turkish Government is proposing to use its own military and a mix 

of local Arab partners to take back Raqqa. 

46

Since the SDF has proven to be a reliable force on the ground 

in Syria and given no viable alternative, the United States will 

most likely back the SDF option. However, it appears to be waiting 

for the outcome of Turkey’s referendum before making any announcement. 

While President Erdogan would have additional control over the 

Turkish military if the referendum passes, it is unclear how he will 

react to this decision. The buildup to the referendum has also instigated worrying diplomatic roads between Europe and Turkey. The 

tension between these two critical partners of the U.S. may result 

in long-term damage to Turkey’s EU prospects and to NATO’s common defense community. 

If emboldened by a victory, President Erdogan may seek to test 

Europe’s limits further and bring Turkey’s EU candidacy to a halt. 

A loss in the referendum fueled by conspiracies about European 

intervention may be just as detrimental. Regardless, NATO allies 

will need to work to steady relations between all partners. 

The outcome of the Turkish referendum can also impact regional 

energy cooperation. The dynamic of Turkey’s influence on the Cyprus reunification process and the negotiations’ implications on the 

eastern Mediterranean’s gas reserves is of note. A successful referendum could empower some Turkish nationalists in the MHP 

who helped usher the package through Parliament in January. 

Their views on Cyprus and the Turkish military presence there 

may spoil a potential agreement. 

It is not clear if President Erdogan will follow MHP’s lead after 

the referendum. What is clear, however, is that once the referendum is over, Turkey will have more time and attention to focus 

on Cyprus. If a deal is reached, reconciliation between Turkish and 

Greek Cypriots can occur, and Mediterranean gas can flow into the 

European market. 

The last two international considerations surrounding Turkey’s 

referendum are economic prosperity and democratic ideals, which 

go hand in hand. Turkey experienced growth and economic stability 

early on under President Erdogan. Recently, the AK Party government’s indifference toward democratic institutions, rule of law, and 

freedom of expression has undercut Turkey’s lasting prosperity. 

It is difficult to foresee how a consolidation of power away from 

the judiciary and into the executive would enhance the democratic 

principles needed for an open trade-based economy. The only way 

to bring about more certainty in the Turkish economy is if checks 

and balances are restored and maintained. 

Turkey has always been strongest when it comes close to the 

ideal of a liberal democratic society where all voices are tolerated. 

For this reason, Turkey’s partners must address challenges to 

democratic norms head on. Only direct U.S. engagement, a true 

partnership, and conversation about Turkey’s commitment to 

democratic ideals can deter worse behavior, enhance global security, and bring Turkey to the table on critical issues. 

In order to be taken seriously, the West must also hold true to 

its own democratic values and principles. If attacks against the 

press, unethical behavior, or disregard for democratic institutions 

becomes commonplace, it will be difficult to make the case of their 

importance in Turkey and other countries. 

47

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Meeks, members of this committee, thank you again for your careful attention to U.S.-Turkey 

relations. I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Durakoglu follows:]

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I 

Turkey's Democracy Under Challenge 

~pril 5. 2017 

Prepared staternent by 

N az Durakoglu 

Se11ior I'e!!ow a!ld Stratq!/rt, D{r:,ita! T'mr:!l.f!C Rt.rearch Lab, The Athntic Council 

Before the 

The United States House Committee on Foreign Affairs 

United States llousc of RcprcscntatiYcs 

11 Slh Congress 

'l'lw Atlantic Council takt>s no 
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Thank you Chairman Rohrabacher, Ranking ·Member i\'feeks, and members of the Committee for the 

opportunity to join you and discuss Turkey's upcoming constitutional referendum. It is an honor to 

testify before you both AS a \\'itness, M1d a former staffer on this Committee under Congressm;m 

\\'illiam R. r..:eatmg. 

_L\s th1s Con~m1ttee kno\YS, the United States dlld Turkey share one of d1e most complex, yet s1gnifiecmt 

partnerships "~thin the North .'\tlmltic '1reaty Organization (N"'\'1'0). This criticruk important 

relationship has \vithstood hoth positiYc turning points and challenging decisions taken hy hoth 

countries. In this 1:v·ay. the Turkish rcfcrcndutn on April 1() should not he vio,vcd as a stand-Jllonc, 

dotncstic event - rather. a critical tnotncnt 111 Turkey's history \Yith \Yidcr implicJltions for the 

transatlantic community and the K ATO Alliance. 

The referendum vote comes at a time of heightened fear, polari:.-:ation, and trauma for Turks, \:vho 

have endured one of the deadliest years in their recent history with a string of high-casualty terrorist 

attacks dtld a failed coup on .July 15. As the country reels from the deYastJtion of these repedted blows, 

Turkish citizens are mcrectsingly ctffected by a forceful, post-coup cc::tckdm,'n against thousands in 

Turkey, including foreigners, Y>.rell-respected journalists, businessn~en, publlC servants, and academics. 

This environment colors the 18-article const1tut10nal package at the center of the referendum, \vhich 

if passed. \Yould tn.nsfonn Turkey's parli;;unentary political structure into a presidential \Yith 

fC\Y checks and hJllances. ~\mid allegatiOns of improper voting procedures and physic;li ~lt.orcati•Jns 

Turkey's parliament passed this package of ;;unendtnents on January 21 once Turkish President Recep 

Tayyip Frdogan's ruling AK-Party teamed up \vith members from Turkey's nationalist opposition 

party, the \HTP. 

The package includes fundamental changes to the Turkish political system that would: 1) eliminate the 

pos1tion of the prime minister and render the president the head of state, head of go\rernment, dlld 

head of mling party; 2) presKiential authonty to appoint cabmet nlinisters ~md nv-o-thirds of the 

country's senwr judges: permit the executive to pass la\vs by decree, d1smiss parhan~ent, and decLtre 

a state of emergency; 4) empmver the current president to call early presidential and parh~unent~HT 

elections, ~nd possibly open the door to an Erdogan presidency until2029. 

Grven the uncertainty over Turkey's future, the populatlon remains split on the referendutn and on 

President Erdogan's policies and response to the instability gripping the nation. \Vhilc many nlling 

AK-Party supporters continue to see President Erdogan as a strong, calming force in a Yobtile region, 

others in the vie\v his policies as a \'ehicle for chaos and blame him for Turkey's declining 

prosperity and 

Internationally, Turkey's partners and allies have been largely silent, despite accusaTions from Turkish 

officials charging Europeans with ·attempting to influence the refercndurn. ~o matter the outcome, 

Turkey's partners- particularly the C111ted States- n~ust prepare to engage with a Turkish state tlut 

is in a battle tOr its future. It is not only the referendum's outcotne that matters, but President 

Erdogan's governance style and how the Turklsh leadership chooses to tnoYe Turkey beyond the postcoup phase. The four key areas in which U.S.-Turkey rclatlons \viii be affected by decisions made after 

the referendum are: transatlantic security, energy cooperation, economic prospenty, and last but not 

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24917d-3.eps

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least, democratic values. 

HAving the second largest military in the K-''\TO alli,mce, Turkey alre~1dy has a profound mtluence on 

internrtt.ionrtl security matters. The use of Turkey's Incirlik _.:\ir B~1se, according to U.S. Secretary of 

StAte Rex Tillers on, Allo\.vs for 25 percent more strikes ,tgainst ISIS in Syria, and much of the United 

States' humtwitarian aid \Vork m Syria 1s based out of southeastern Turkey. _i\Ioreover, Turkey's 

loc:1tion hctwccnlran. Iraq. Syria, Europe, and the CJ1uc1sus puts 'l'urkcy :1t the center of sotnc of the 

tnost unstable, yet critic:1l hotspots 111 the \vorld. Indeed, tnodcn1 Turkey still maint:1ins the age-old 

characterization of Turkey as a strategic friend in :1 troubled neighborhood. 

J .ast week, Secretary Tillerson Yisited Turkey to "build on three tnutual long-tertn goals: working 

together to defeat Daesh/TSTS~ building stability in the region: and bolstering econotnic ties bet\veen 

[the] t\vo nations." Tlis Yisit came on the heels of advanced planning stages in the campaign against 

TSTS in Raqqa. The final assault on Raqqa has stalled OYer a disagreement on \vhich forces the United 

States should use to liberate dtld hold the ISIS stronghold. The United States would prefer to see 

Raqqa taken by a co,tlition of •\rab and Kurd1sh Popular Protection Units (YPG), collectiYely knmm 

as the SyncU1 Defense Porces (SDP). Ho"\vever, because Turkey considers the l"'PG an extension of 

the banned Kurchstan \\"orkers' Party or PKK-the latter designated as a terrorist entity by the U.S. 

govcn11ncnt -they arc proposing to usc their mvn military and a tnix of local, Arah partners to take 

hack ltl.qqa. lt iS not clear, ho\vevcr, \\Thcther Turkey can adequately muster these forces beyond its 

recently-stalled Euphrates Shield operation. 

Smce the SDP has proven to be a reliable force on the ground in Syri~1, ~md given no virtble alternAtive 

absent a major int1ux of L.:.S. troops, the United States has little choice hut to hack the SD~ option. 

Jlmvcver. it appears to he \vAiting for the outcotne of 'l'urkey1

s rcferendutn before making any 

announcement. \Vhile President Erdogan \vould have additional control over the ·rurkish military if 

the referendum passes, it is unclear \Vhat options Turk e) has to prevent the SDfl from taking Raqqa. 

President Erdogan's tlexibility toward a U.S. decision to use SDP forces may change after the 

referendum, but it is diftlcult to predict his response. Regardless, it may be a tuming point for relations 

and an area to closely watch. 

The grovvmg rift bet\veen Turkey and Europe is also a worrymg trend Hl trcwsatLwtic security as it 

threatens to unrcwel a delicate balance bet\veen these t\vo crucial partners. President Erdog:m has 

already threatened to undo the deal that the FU and Turkey struck at the height of the refugee crisis 

in 2016. The agreement -\vhile imperfect- stipulates that irregular migr;mts entering Greece em 

be retun1ed to Turkey in exchange for expedited visa liberalization for Turks, a €3 billion assistance 

package, and speedy processmg of refugees \\~tilting to enter Europe from Turkey. Unfortunately, the 

EU has reluctantly cotnphed \Yith its part of the bargam, and Turkey, \.\Thich already generously hosts 

3 million refugees, finds its patience \\"J\'Cring. 

'l'he build-up to the referendum has already instigated intense diplomatic rmvs as some European 

nations blocked 'l'urkish officials from campaigning on their territory, and Ankara reacted \vith 

accusations ofKa/.ism and threats to reevaluate its relationship with Furope. The undoing of decorum 

hct\veen Europe And Turkey may result in long-term datnage to 'l'urkey's Ell prospects And to 

NATO's conunon defense cotntnunity, \.vhich demands consensus on decisions. lf emboldened hy A 

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victory, President Erdogan may seek to test Furope's limits even further and bring Turkey's EU 

candidacy to a halt, tnaking for a very uncotnfortable ~A. TO Alliance. :-\loss in the referendum, fueled 

by conspir<-tc1es about Europe~m intervention, n~~1y be just as detrin~ent<-tl to the fe.-tymg Turkey-EU 

reL-ttionship. Regardless, ~-''\TO Alhes ·will need to \.\'ork to steady relations bet\Yeen these partners. 

The outcon~e of the Turkish referendun~ cdll also 1m pact energy cooperation \Vith Europe for the 

same reasons th:1t threaten transatb.ntic security. Yet~ there is the :1ddcd dynamic of'l'urkcy's intlucncc 

on the Cyprus rcunitlcation process and the negotiations' itnplications on the E:1stcm .. \lcditcrrancan's 

gas res crvcs. 

\\/hile Turkey has pledged to be a constructiYe force in this dift1cult process, a successful referendum 

could empO\ver Turkish nationalists in the i\HTP \vlw supported the ruling AK party and ushered the 

constitutional package through parliament in January. The nationalists h:we not staked out a position 

on negotiations, but their traditional vie\VS on Cyprus and the Turkish military's presence there may 

sp01l a potentul agreement cwd enchwger this unique opportunity. It is not clear, ho"\Yever, if President 

Erdogan would follow '\!HP's lead after the referendum takes place. \\'hat 1s clear is thJt once the 

referendum is over, Turkey \Vlll have n~ore t1me and attention to focus on Cypn1s. If d. deal is reached, 

reconClllation bet\Ji.~een Turkish and Greek Cypriots can finally come to fruition after decades of 

attetnpts. and 1\lediterranean gas can flo\Y into the European tnarket, helping to reduce Jiurope 1s 

dependence on Russian gas. 

Smlllarly, referendutn politics may affect ongoing plans het\veen Turkey and Russ1a to huild a second 

natural gas pipeline in the TurkStrearn project. This pipeline \\.'Ould bring Ga/.prom gas to Europe by 

bypassing Ukraine. A. \vin in the referendum may help President Frdogan push the proJect along, 

despite environmental concerns at home and foreign policy implications for Ukraine. 

The last t\vo international considerations surrounding Turkey's referendum ctre economic prosperity 

and den~ocrabc ideals - \Vhich as Turkey's example shows go hand in lund. Turkey experienced 

gro\\'th and econon~ic stability throughout President Erdogcw's tin~e in office, but n~ore recently, the 

AK Party government's indifference toward democratic institutions, rule of law, freedom of 

expression, and tnedia has undercut Turkey's lasting prosperity . ..c'\lready, the Turkish Lira has 

experienced a sharp decline, tnaking it the \Vorst emerging tnarket currency in 2017. This rdlects 

tnarket fears o\-er Turkey's slo\Ying economy and rismg inflation. The busmess climate is greatly 

affected hy uncertainty in Turkey, \vhich is already experiencing capital fl1ght and a reluctance by 

foreigners to inyest. Turkey has the \vorld's 1 T11 largest economy, and any instability will haye ma1or 

implications for neighbors throughout the region. Post-referendum, no matter the outcorne, the 

'l'urkish govenunent must work to maintain checks and balances and help steady the climate to 

encourage investment and grO\vth, once again. 

i\nother issue that the' 1 'urkish go\-ernment must attention to is ·any instance of foreign tr·avelcrs 

or residents being caught up in the post-coup These examples ~tre growmg cwd hurting 

econon1ic prospects for Turkey. Por exan1ple, the arrest of long-titne resident of Turkey and U.S. 

cihzen, Pastor .;\.ndre\Y Dnmson, reYerherates throughout the Ll11ted States and has led to Secretary 

Tillerson, and previously Secretary John l'-_erry, to raise this case repeatedly \vith Turkish oftlnals. 

Cases hke Pastor Brunson's do not encourage a strong investment climate and do even less to help 

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24917d-5.eps

I 

generate tourism in Turkey. 

It is difficult to foresee ho\v a consolidation of po"\ver m'l\~ay fron~ the jud1c1ary and into the executive 

"\vould 1mprove investn~ent potenti~1l in Turkey or enhance the den~ocrrtt.ic principles needed for ;m 

open, trrtde-h--tsed econon~y. The only \\'ay for the referendum to bnng about more certainty in the 

Turkish econon~y is if checks ctnd balances are restored and maintamed under the 11e\V Turkish 

presidency or any political sys tern. 

Regardless of the outcotnc of the rcfcrcndutn, Turkey has ahvays he en strongest "\vhcn it comes close 

to the ideal of a lihcral democratic society such as during the earlier years of the Erdogan 

administration. Turkey's partners must address challenges to democratic norms head-on. Speaking 

out on these matters directly should not be done in a \vay that embarrasses Turkish oft1cials or through 

one-off press statements or criticisms. Instead, the most effectiYe means of communicating concerns 

is to rnaintain close high-ln,el contacts between Turkey and the Cnited States. Only direct U.S. 

engagement, a tn1e pdrtnership, and conyerscttions about Turkey's commitment to democratic ideals 

cctn deter \\'Orse behavwr, protect our O\Yl1 security, and bring Turkey to the table on cntical 

interncttionctl issues. 

To ;qchicve these goals. the L·mtcd States and the \Vest tnust also hold true to their mvn dctnocratic 

~,-alucs ;qnd principles ;qt hotnc. lf attacks against the press. unethic;q} heha\-10f. or disreg-;qrd for 

detnocratic institutions hecome comtnonplace ;qmong \Vesten1leaders, it will he difficult to m:lli:_e the 

case for thc1r unportance to Turkey ;qnd other countries. 

i\Tr. Chainnan, Ranking i\fernber i\feeks, rnembers of this Comrnittee, thank you for your careful 

attention to the future of Turkey and U.S.-Turkish relations. T look fonvard to your questions. 

Thank you. 

'l'lw Atlantic Council takt>s no 
53

Mr. ROHRABACHER. And thank all of you for your testimony 

today. 

The Chairman will start the questions, and then we will proceed 

with the rest of the members. 

Let me start. The contrast between our two central witnesses 

here was dramatic in terms of the picture that was being painted. 

Let me just ask: Mr. Cinar, you mentioned that freedom of expression and the press in Turkey is something that Turkish people 

cherish and over the years have expected to live with, and there 

are certain guarantees of that freedom. But yet you did recognize 

that, today, there has been a wave of suppression, freedom of 

speech. There has been a wave of destruction, freedom of the press, 

but you mentioned you really put that fault on the state of emergency, which is a result of the coup attempt. 

My question for you, Mr. Cinar, is, what about the newspapers 

that were closed up and the journalists that were arrested and 

kicked out of their job long before the coup? We have been hearing 

reports. This committee has had a number of hearings on Turkey. 

I have always tried to be fair, make sure both sides are represented, but we had testimony in our very first hearing on Turkey 

long before the coup attempt. 

So how can you excuse the suppression of freedom of the press 

and expression, excuse it by saying ‘‘the coup’’ and blaming that on 

the military then when it was happening long before there was a 

coup? Go right ahead. 

Mr. CINAR. Chairman, that is a great question. 

I mean, the freedom of press, yes, Turkey has some problems on 

freedom of press, but investigations aren’t due to their journalistic 

work but due to their support and link to terrorist organizations. 

So, when you look at, overall, some journalists and reporters are 

making propaganda of Fethullah Gulen before the coup and as well 

as PKK terrorist organization, and also some of the journalists also 

were sharing intelligence information to the public, which is illegal 

through the Constitution. 

And, also, I would like to highlight as an example journalist 

newspapers like Zaman. In 2010, there were some cases to the secular groups, and some of the secular journalists were in prison and 

set up with FETO. Most of them are jailed for many years. At that 

time, right now, the Gulenists are complaining about freedom of 

press, but in 2010 and before, the Gulenists newspapers be quiet, 

and they were supportive of the freedom of press. 

So it seems like there is a double standard on what kind of freedom of press we are understanding. As I said, and I would like to 

give an example. Several thousand newspapers and journalists——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Cinar, we will submit that for the record. 

Mr. CINAR. Sure. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. And let me just note that someone else’s double standard doesn’t excuse the current government’s suppression 

before and after the coup of freedom of the press. Because someone 

else had a double standard doesn’t mean that is an excuse. 

Mr. CINAR. I totally agree, Chairman. I mean, as I said from 

my—at the beginning, there are some problems on freedom of 

speech, but when you look at, overall, 7,000 newspapers and journalists, 200 TV stations, 1,000 radio stations, I mean, still there is 

54

freedom at some point that Turkey is operating and journalists are 

able to criticize President Erdogan and his party. But the reporters 

or journalists are linked to terrorist organizations; they are face, 

you know, to crime. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Some may well be linked because someone 

has made that report and claimed a link. We have had four hearings on this now, and in the original hearings, what became clear 

is that certain journalists had lost their jobs shortly after they had 

reported on corruption of President Erdogan’s family and appointees, which does not just jive with an excuse that there is not 

an overall attempt to suppress speech. 

To your knowledge, were there people who were reporting corruption in the Erdogan government? Were they arrested in the beginning and kicked out of their job? 

Mr. CINAR. I mean, my understanding is—I am not well knowledge on this, that I can’t say there was a corruption or not. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. You can’t answer that. All right. Well, 

let’s go back. Just to be fair, Mr. Phillips, you mentioned that 

women were now being allowed to wear the hijab in a government 

office, and before they haven’t been permitted. I don’t think that 

is an indication of radical Islam: Letting women make a choice. 

Now, if they were forced to wear the hijab and they were forced 

to do that, that would be a sign that the people had gone overboard 

and that that was radical Islam. 

But, Mr. Phillips, do you have data that suggests that President 

Erdogan and his regime have actually sold oil from Syria. Are you 

trying to suggest to us today—and please say it outright if you 

can—that under Erdogan, the Turkish Government has been providing the resources to terrorist organizations that have been murdering people throughout the Middle East? 

Mr. PHILLIPS. Yes, that is precisely what I am saying. There 

were 57,000 emails that had been released linking the Erdogan 

family directly to the sale of ISIS-controlled oil. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. And that money went to do what? 

Mr. PHILLIPS. That money, which totaled, at its peak, $3 million 

a day, went to ISIS to support its caliphate operations, which is 

used to kill people and to target Westerners. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. And do you think that, Mr. Cinar’s observations—his right to his opinion—but do you think that the fact that 

you just stated, meaning money that is being syphoned off by the 

very top of the government and going to terrorists, do you think 

that had anything to with Erdogan’s decision to suppress certain 

news outlets and to make sure that the press was notified that 

there would be a price to pay if certain criticism was heard? 

Mr. PHILLIPS. Any journalist in Turkey who reports on corruption 

linking the family to ISIS activities is assured of losing their job 

and going to jail. We saw that in the case of the Cumhuriyet editor 

in chief and their foreign affairs editor, both of whom received 

more than 5-year sentences for reporting on the national intelligence agency’s transfer of weapons to Islamic State fighters across 

the jihadi highway from Sanliurfa to Raqqa, which was a wellknown fact, extensively documented. 

55

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I will move on to Mr. Meeks, but let me just 

thank the witnesses. I think I may have a second round, but better 

get my colleagues their first round. 

Mr. MEEKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me start with Ms. Durakoglu. Now, foreign policy is very difficult, and Turkey is in a very difficult part of the world, and I am 

trying to figure out with interrelationships with other governments, 

and et cetera, how we can make sure that the best interest of the 

United States and actually the best interest of others, whether it 

is the—those in NATO and EU, how we figure this thing out. 

I am really concerned about—because I think your testimony was 

absolutely correct, that if I am to stand true to myself, I can’t ignore human rights violations and individuals being penalized and 

put in prison without due process or anything of that nature. But 

I can’t advocate for Turkey to be removed from NATO or anything 

of that nature because they are a vital ally, especially in that region. 

So, in your opinion, is there any low-hanging fruit in a U.S.-Turkey cooperation and the political security or economic fronts, something that we can do? You know, because Syria is right there, and 

we will talk about Syria and talk about—that is my second question. Let me just ask that first. 

Ms. DURAKOGLU. Thank you for your question. I think your question actually hits the complexity of the relationship. You are absolutely right. There are definitely serious domestic concerns within 

Turkey. However, there is reason for the United States and for 

NATO, in particular, which Turkey is an ally, to be cooperating at 

all times. Part of it is the geographic location of Turkey itself. 

In terms of your question about low-hanging fruit, before I mention that, I would just say President Erdogan has demonstrated 

that he appreciates continual contact with other leaders. And sometimes I think in the structure that Turkey represents at this point, 

the message that we might be sending as the United States over 

to Turkey may not be making its way up. So direct communication 

is key, even though it might be uncomfortable at times. 

In terms of low-hanging fruit, I alluded to this in my testimony, 

but what seems to be at the forefront of our relationship with Turkey at the moment is what is going to happen with the Raqqa campaign in Syria, and the United States is moving in a direction to 

work with the Syrian Democratic Forces, which does include YPG 

elements, which Turkey is highly uncomfortable with. 

I think some communication there, more regular contact. Secretary Tillerson was just in Turkey to be able to discuss this. However, without an end game or an end point in Syria on our side, 

it is difficult to imagine what is going to end up happening with 

Raqqa, with the forces the United States may choose to use there. 

So it is difficult to explain to a NATO ally like Turkey that we are 

going to go ahead with this option; however, we don’t necessarily 

know what is going to come of it, and you obviously have serious 

concerns. 

So I think closer communication is definitely key, and then, of 

course, economic cooperation. This is something that the Turks 

raise often, I know, here in Congress as well. That could also be 

helpful. 

56

But continually raising the issues of Turkey’s domestic politics 

and the people that are being persecuted unnecessarily, that is key, 

too. That can’t be ignored. 

Mr. MEEKS. So we have got have those face-to-face honest dialogues with our allies. 

Ms. DURAKOGLU. Absolutely. 

Mr. MEEKS. When we think they are wrong and when we think 

they are right. 

You mentioned Syria. You know, as the chemical weapons were 

released yesterday, that is concerning to me. This is complicated 

stuff, and I don’t think that the United States can do—I didn’t 

think that, under President Obama—and I know you worked during the Obama administration—I don’t think that he could have 

done anything by himself or in this country, nor do I think that 

Donald Trump can. 

So the question then becomes the relationships that—in the region. So I believe it was Turkey that shot down a Russian jet some 

time ago. And so what is the relationship now between Turkey and 

Russia and Iran and the whole Syria thing? All of that is intertwined. How does that work? 

Ms. DURAKOGLU. That is a really interesting question and one 

that I know Turkey watchers are continually examining, particularly the relationship between Turkey and Russia. The incident you 

mention happened in November 2015 where the Russian warplane 

was shot down when it impeded Turkish airspace. And it led to a 

break in relations between Turkey and Russia and very heated 

talk. Sanctions actually came into play as well. 

Since then, I know that President Erdogan around June 2016 extended an olive branch. They tried to make things better. To be 

quite frank, the situation—the energy situation in Turkey demands 

that they do have a sort of cooperation as well as the tourism industry. There are a lot of Russian tourists that go to Turkey. 

So I know that Russia and Turkey are working on that relationship. They have had four high-level meetings, most recently earlier 

in March as well. And that is what we were talking about earlier. 

Russians are offering them more economic cooperation. There are 

discussions about Syria. However, when you look on the ground in 

Syria, suddenly there is a very different picture where Russians 

are obviously not cooperating with the Turks. So I don’t know how 

long that relationship between Turkey and Russia will last. 

Mr. PHILLIPS. Mr. Meeks, could I add to that answer, please? 

Mr. MEEKS. All right. 

Mr. PHILLIPS. I would like to recognize that the North Atlantic 

Council established something called a Membership Compliance 

Review. There are very strict criteria for getting into NATO. There 

is no process for kicking anybody out. Annually, each member of 

NATO should be subject to review of their democracy and human 

rights practices, and if they receive a failing score for 2 years in 

a row, then their membership should be suspended. This wouldn’t 

only affect countries likes Turkey, but also Hungary would also be 

under review. 

And on the subject of Incirlik that we have heard so much about, 

yes, Incirlik is an important forward air base, but there are other 

options. Turkey always holds Incirlik use over our heads. There are 

57

bases in Jordan, in Kuwait, in Iraqi Kurdistan. There are British 

bases in Cyprus. So we can diversify our combat air operations 

without losing our capacity in the fight against ISIS. 

Mr. MEEKS. Thank you. 

I am out of time. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Sires. 

Mr. SIRES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

You know, I always think that Turkey has this attitude. If we 

support an Armenian resolution—and I remember when we had 

the resolution here in Congress, the pressure that was borne, some 

of the people that supported it, you would think you were going to 

go to jail. 

If you support arming the Kurdish fighters that are fighting 

ISIS, there is going to be dire consequences. And if you don’t return 

Gulen, they are going to make the U.S. disappear. 

I really think that, Mr. Cinar, when you talk about jailing or 

purging one-third of the journalists in the country, it is a little 

strong. 

I mean, this reminds me of my country when I was a boy. When 

the Communists took over, this is how they started. So, to me, I 

mean, this is somebody grabbing for power, and you have this effort where they took over 600 businesses. I mean, what did the 

businesses have with these generals? To me, it looks like somebody 

went out there and tried to get some of the better businesses for 

some of the family members or themselves. So there is just a couple of things here that do not jive in my point of view. 

And as far as NATO is concerned, I would hate to depend on 

Turkey in a crunch the way they have been moving the last few 

years. 

And, Mr. Phillips, my question to you is, if this resolution, if this 

amendment to the Constitution does not pass, where do you—you 

know, which I doubt it is not going the pass, from what I am hearing, where do you see Turkey going? 

Mr. PHILLIPS. There are 12 credible public opinion polls that 

have been taken about the referendum. Eight of them say that the 

‘‘no’’ campaign is going to win. If, in fact, the votes are stolen or 

there is an international opinion that the conditions for the referendum were not free and fair, this is going to fuel divisions in 

Turkey, and we could see social cohesion fall apart and violence become widespread. 

That is why it is important for international monitors to be on 

the ground to verify the voting conditions. We also have to recognize that if this referendum is approved one way or another, Turkey’s aspirations of joining the EU are over. It will not be a European country. It will be increasingly inward looking. And as Turkey 

becomes inward looking, it will be less reliable to the United 

States. We always talk about Turkey’s role fighting the Islamic 

State. I think that this is a misnomer. We need to recognize that 

Turkey hasn’t fought the Islamic State; it has abetted the Islamic 

State with money, with weapons, with health care, all of which is 

well documented. We need to see things as they are, not as we 

wish them to be or how they used to be. 

58

Mr. SIRES. Mr. Cinar, where do you see Turkey going if this 

fails? 

Mr. CINAR. Congressman, first of all, for the human rights, I 

would like to give you some examples before I jump to where Turkey is going. And also we need to respect the Turkish people. There 

is a government that is democratically elected, and the referendum 

is coming up, including all opposition parties right now. The election is going to be crystal clear, and everybody needs to respect the 

election. 

Regarding the human rights——

Mr. SIRES. So you are comfortable that this is going to be an honest election? 

Mr. CINAR. Yes. 

Mr. SIRES. There is not going to be any interference by the 

Erdogan government? 

Mr. CINAR. Correct. In the last election, the November election, 

Congressman, all opposition parties agreed it was a noncorrupted 

election. 

Regarding the human rights, as I submitted——

Mr. SIRES. No Russian interference in the election? 

Mr. CINAR. Hopefully not. 

Let me talk about human rights and freedom of press. As an example, before the coup, July 13, one of the Gulen journalists, said, 

‘‘Busted in bed, hung by dawn.’’ Or another one: ‘‘You just wait and 

see what is to come.’’ Another one: ‘‘Good times are just around the 

corner. How I wish I were a colonel today and not professor. Then 

I would have much more to contribute to this process.’’

Mr. SIRES. What am I looking at here? 

Mr. CINAR. So these are the journalists of Gulen. So they were 

promoting the coup. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Unfortunately, votes have just been called. 

Could you please put those in for the record of this hearing? 

Mr. CINAR. Sure. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. We will submit that. 

We have about 15 minutes at the most. So we have 10 minutes. 

I would ask my colleagues to have about 3 minutes each for their 

questions. We will try to get you in. 

Mr. KEATING. Actually, Mr. Cicilline was here first. 

Mr. CICILLINE. No, Mr. Keating was. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Keating, go right ahead. You have the 

time. Quit being too gentlemanly. 

Mr. KEATING. I think that Ms. Durakoglu made four pillars, if 

you will, that we should be focused on. My discussions with representatives of Turkey since I have been in Congress have really 

come back to economic cooperation. There was a great deal of interest when there was interest in the TTIP agreement. Every discussion I had virtually centered on that. 

Now, with the failure of our trade agreements, I do hope there 

is a chance for even a bilateral EU and U.S. agreement. How important would that be, really, to find some inducement for Turkey 

to have more open discussions with the West and with the U.S.? 

Ms. DURAKOGLU. Thank you, Congressman. 

That is hugely important. You are 100 percent right. And I know 

you were very active on that issue at the time. I think, at the time, 

59

Turkey was nervous about the TTIP agreement and being left out 

of the economic prosperity that might take place. But there was a 

parallel conversation with Turkey about how they can potentially 

benefit. And they were engaged, and the United States was engaged in that conversation as well. So, as long as that carrot is 

there, that is very important to bring Turkey to the table, because 

I am of the opinion, with all due respect to all the viewpoints represented here, that are very important, but they need to continually be more exposed to our ideals as well as our thinking and to 

be able to understand that we do want what is in the best interest 

of Turkey, including more freedoms for their people there. 

Mr. KEATING. Is there any way to ascertain what the feeling of 

the Turkish people, what it really was about the coup itself? We 

heard so much about the coup. But what about people, the general 

population? Is there any way to get a sense of how they perceived 

that? 

Ms. DURAKOGLU. Yes. There have been several polls. And, unfortunately, there is not a very positive picture to paint there. A lot 

of the polls—they do overwhelmingly believe that this was a Gulenorchestrated coup. And many—and, unfortunately, I don’t have the 

exact figure with me—but many also believe that either the Central Intelligence Agency or the United States was behind this, 

which is wrong across the board. But that is a prevailing view, unfortunately, in Turkey. 

Mr. KEATING. I will yield because of the rollcall. Thank you. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Cicilline? 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you. Ms. Durakoglu, I appreciated your 

testimony, other than that reference to how Mr. Keating inspired 

you. 

Thank you to the witnesses. 

What I am interested to know is, with respect to the treatment 

of journalists and academics and opposition leaders, Mr. Phillips, 

would you just tell us what your assessment is with respect to the 

imprisonment of journalists and the conditions in which they are 

being imprisoned and whether in fact they are primarily people 

who have disclosed classified documents and the like? What is the 

real situation in Turkey right now with respect to opposition leaders and journalists? 

Mr. PHILLIPS. Freedom House says there is no press freedom. According to Freedom House, Turkey does not have press freedom. 

Turkey uses legislation as the basis for arresting journalists. The 

idea that almost 2,000 journalists would have been arrested because they insulted the President to me represents a crackdown on 

freedom of expression. Using items in the penal code and the AntiTerror Act to suppress debate is also a violation of freedom of expression. 

So we should just deal with the facts. Right now, more journalists are in jail in Turkey than in any other country in the world, 

more than China, more than Iran. A third of the journalists in the 

world who are in jail are in jail in Turkey. What conditions they 

are experiencing there, I can’t say. But I do know that the rule of 

law in Turkey is an instrument to suppress oppositionists. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you. 

60

The other question I have is you did a significant amount of research about the role of Turkey both in assisting with logistics and 

transportation, support and training of ISIS fighters. Could you 

speak a little bit to that? 

And then my last question to other members of the panel is, 

what is the likelihood that in the context of the continued state of 

emergency that a referendum can be held which is free and fair 

and something upon which the international community and the 

Turkish people can rely? 

Mr. PHILLIPS. So we were not able to use primary sources for our 

research because we weren’t on the ground in Syria. We used credible secondary sources. We referred to Vice President Joe Biden’s 

remark at Harvard, where he said that Turkey was the primary 

sponsor of ISIS. And then, through our research teams in Turkey, 

looking at Turkish language reporting in Europe and in North 

America, we came up with scores of credible reports that Turkey 

was involved in providing weapons, financing, logistics, serving 

wounded warriors in hospitals in Turkey. So there is ample evidence. 

Meanwhile, we hear constant protests from President Erdogan 

that Turkey is being misrepresented. I think the protests should be 

coming from the United States that Turkey, a NATO ally, is aiding 

and abetting a terrorist organization. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you. 

Ms. Kelly. 

Ms. KELLY. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Ms.—I hope it pronounce it right—Durakoglu? 

Ms. DURAKOGLU. That is right. 

Ms. KELLY. I am concerned with, after the constitutional referendum, I am concerned with the weakening of the independent 

branches of government because there are few checks and balances 

in place now. And, also, how will the minority populations be affected, as well as will there be any effect on military independence? 

Ms. DURAKOGLU. Thank you, Congresswoman. 

Yes, that is a concern. It is also a concern expressed by the Venice Commission that looked at the package of amendments. In 

terms of the judiciary, I think that some of the greatest changes 

in the constitutional package take place there. As I alluded to in 

my testimony, about two-thirds of Turkey’s senior judges can now 

be appointed by the President. And, further, there is a body that 

actually deals with both prosecutors and judges in Turkey. And 

they end up dealing with judiciary issues, as well as appointing 

judges, and the President can appoint a significant amount of those 

members as well. 

That all being said, there have been some studies on the referendum and the package of amendments, and some of them in 

English actually. And there is the potential to still abide by checks 

and balances. It really does come down to the President under this 

new Presidency to be able to maintain that balance. So I know that 

there are some with the hope that President Erdogan, who will 

most likely be the President under this new system, be able do 

that. But when you look at it on paper and all those who have analyzed it, they have a rather bleak view of the separation. 

61

And for minority issues, I would defer to my colleague from the 

HDP. 

Mr. YUKSEL. The situation is very hard because, especially with 

this situation, they shut down the television, which was transmitting only cartoons for the children in Kurdish. And after a lot of 

pressure, they allowed. So, even with a lot of translation in Turkish, or should be more than 60 percent in Turkish, that is how the 

minorities live right now, on the front of an assimilation. And other 

minorities numerically are less, and they are under huge pressure. 

And, plus, the Alawites in Turkey are under huge pressure because 

they see the regime changing more and more as an Islamic regime 

and without any law, like Iran, and they are afraid that they will 

be the next target. 

Mr. CINAR. Congresswoman? 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Excuse me. You got your minute because you 

are here, and we appreciate you giving the other side. But we are 

going to have to be out of here in a couple minutes. So 1 minute. 

What do you got? 

Mr. CINAR. Sure. Congresswoman, Chairman, I wish at least we 

can see a little bit appreciation of Turkey’s fight against ISIS. And 

I will be submitting some documents that U.S. Pentagon also said 

there is no evidence between ISIS and Turkey. And Turkey lost 72 

security personnel on the ground and 1,000 ISIS terrorists neutralized by Turkish army in Syria’s operation. 

And also, regarding the human rights, and I would like to ask 

you a question, you have a look at some HDP members here that 

are promoting PKK at their meetings. Can you imagine a Congressman speaking——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. You want to put that in the record? 

Mr. CINAR. Sure. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. 

Mr. CINAR. Can you imagine a Congressman attending an ISIS 

leader’s event and promoting the terrorist organization? So this is 

a big problem for Turkey. It is a national security risk. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. All right. Thank you very much. 

I am sorry. We only have got 2 minutes or 3 minutes to go because we have to go vote. 

Do you have a 1-minute closing statement, Mr. Meeks? 

Mr. MEEKS. I want to say real quickly, number one, I want to 

thank the witnesses for your testimony. I want to thank the chairman for the diversity of the witnesses that you presented. I think 

you got thoughts from all sides. 

For me, this is a very difficult, difficult period, a difficult decision. A lot to look at. And as I said in my opening statement, the 

key to me is, the bottom line, the one that I have ultimate belief 

in is the Turkish people. So I should hope that the Turkish people—that is where I keep my hope—that I will stand with them. 

I will try to make sure, where I see atrocities, I will speak up and 

speak out. But I believe that the Turkish people will stand up. And 

as I have seen the brave ones still on the streets now protesting 

and doing what they think is necessary and others who may be on 

the other side, because ultimately that is what makes the difference, the Turkish people. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you, Mr. Meeks. 

62

And I would echo that sentiment. The Turkish people are voting 

on whether they want to have a tough, strong, centralized power 

controlling their government or whether they want to have more of 

a loose freedom and exchange. Obviously, we don’t think they 

should overlook this incredible suppression of the press and of disagreements and dissidents that now is in place in Turkey as compared to the last 15 or 20 years in Turkey’s history. Let me note 

that one of my colleagues said we don’t know if we can rely on 

Turkish people to back us up. The bottom line: The whole Cold 

War, the Turkish people were the friends of the United States. We 

could count on them. They fought in Korea. They were part of the 

deterrent that prevented the Soviet Union from thinking they could 

come down and attack all of Europe. 

The Turkish people are going to the polls right now to decide, 

will they be friends of the West and the United States? Will they 

be a friend of the United States? And will they have a radical-oriented government, an Islamic-oriented government, a terrorist-oriented government in power in Turkey, or will they be friends of the 

United States and have more of a democratic future? That will be 

determined. 

I agree with Mr. Meeks; we are on the side of the people of Turkey. Please, I would hope that they hear our plea, remain our 

friend. Don’t go to the polls and then basically join in this negation 

of a friendship that has lasted so long and done so much well for 

the people of the United States and the people of Turkey. 

With that, I say thank you very much. We have to go vote. 

[Whereupon, at 3:34 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

(63)

A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

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SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING NOTICE 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

WASHINGTON, DC 20515-6128 

Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, and Emerging Threats 

Dana Rohrabacher (R-CA), Chairman 

March 30, 2017 

TO: MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

You are respectfully requested to attend an OPEN hearing of the Committee on Foreign Affairs_ to 

be held by the Subco111111ittee on Europe, Eurasia, and Emerging Threats in Room 2172 of the Rayburn 

House Office Building (and available live on the Committee website at 

bnJL.i!www.Foreigp/\ffairs.hoq.§J<£QY): 

DATE: 

TIME: 

SUBJECT: 

WITNESSES: 

Wednesday, April 5_ 2017 

2:00p.m. 

Turkey's Democracy Under Challenge 

Mr. Oa,id L. Phillips 

Director 

Program on Peace-Building and Rights 

h1stitute for the Study of Human Rights 

Columbia University 

Mr. Mehmet Y ukscl 

Representative to the United States 

People's Democmtic Party in Turkey 

Mr. Ali Cinar 

President 

Turkish Heritage Organization 

Ms. Naz Durakoglu 

Senior Fellow 

Digital Forensic Research Lab 

Atlantic Council 

By Direction of the Chairman 
65

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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

MINUTES OF SUBCOMMITTEE ON _____ E_u_ro.:_p_e,_E_u_,·a_s_ia_, _m_ui_E_m_e--'r~'-4--'ug'----11-"·_en_ts _____ HEARING 

Day Wednesday Datc. __ _cA"'P:..:'_c'ifc:5"-,""2"'0-'-1-'-7 __ .Room _ ____,2:.::1c:7.:::'2_:RB=..::Oc::B:____ 

Starling Time 2:18p.m. Ending Time .1:34 p.m. 

Recesses i_o_l ( __ to __ ) ( __ to __ ) ( __ to __ ) L_to __ ) ( __ to___) L_to __ ) 

Presiding Membcr(s) 

Rep. Rollrubacller 

Check all ofthefollmving that app(l': 

Open Session IZl 

Executive {<ioscd) Session D Televised D 

TITLE OF HEARING: 

Turkey's Democracy Under Challenge 

SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT: 

Rlcctronically Recordm.ftapcd) IZJ 

Stenographic Record l.:LJ 

Rep. Meeks, Rep. Sherman, Rep. Keating, Rep. Sires, Rep. Cicilline, Rep. Kelly 

NON-SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT: (Mark with an* ifthey are not members of fill/ committee.) 

N/A 

HEARING WITNESSES: Same as meeting notice attached? Yes m NoD 

(lf "nn '',please list below and include title, agency, department, or organization.) 

STATEMENTS FOR THE RECORD: (Lis/ any statements submit!edjilr !he record.) 

Attached 

TIME SCHEDULED TO RECONVENE ___ _ 

or 

TIME ADJOURNED 3:34p.m. 
66

REVISED STATEMENT SUBMITTED AFTER THE HEARING BY MS. NAZ DURAKOGLU, 

STRATEGIST AND SENIOR FELLOW, DIGITAL FORENSIC RESEARCH LAB, ATLANTIC

COUNCIL


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Thank you Chairman Rohrabacher, Ranking ·Member i\'feeks, and members of the Committee for the 

opportunity to join you and discuss Turkey's upcoming constitutional referendum. It is an honor to 

testify before you both AS a \\'itness, M1d a former staffer on this Committee under Congressm;m 

\\'illiam R. r..:eatmg . 

.L\s th1s Con~m1ttee kno\YS, the United States d.lld Turkey share one of d1e most complex, yet s1gnifiecmt 

partnerships "~thin the North .'\tlmltic '1reaty Organization (N"'\'1'0). This criticruk important 

relationship has \vithstood hoth positiYe turning points and challenging decisions taken hy hoth 

countries. In this \V:1y, the Turkish referendutn on April 1() should not he vie\ved as a stand-Jllone, 

dotnestic event - r:1ther. :1 critical tnotnent 111 Turkey's history ·with ·wider implic:1tions for the 

transatlantic community and the K ATO Alliance. 

The referendum vote comes at a time of heightened fear, polari:.-:ation, and trauma for Turks, \:vho 

have endured one of the deadliest years in their recent history with a string of high-casualty terrorist 

attacks dtld a failed coup on .July 15. As the country reels from the deYastation of these repeated blows, 

Turkish citizens are mcrectsingly ctffected by a forceful, post-coup crackdown against thousands in 

Turkey, including foreigners, Y>.rell-respected journalists, businessn~en, publ1c servants, and academics. 

This environment colors the 18-article conshtutiotul pack:1ge at the center of the referendum, \vhich 

if passed. \Yould trJlnsfonn Turkey's parli;11nentary political structure into a presidential \Yith 

few checks and hJllanccs. ~\mid allcgJltions of improper voting procedures and physicJll ,w•c>cawH" 

Turkey's parliament passed this package of ;11nendtncnts on January 21 once Turkish President Recep 

Tayyip Frdogan's ruling \K Party tearned up with members from Turkey's nationalist opposition 

party, the \HTP. 

The package includes fundamental changes to the Turkish political system that would: 1) eliminate the 

pos1tion of the prime minister and render the president the head of state, head of go>.'ernment, d.lld 

head of mling party; 2) presKiential authonty to appoint cabmet nlinisters ~md nv-o-thirds of the 

country's senwr judges: permit the executiYe to pass la\vs by decree, d1smiss parhan~ent, and decLtre 

a state of emergency; 4) empmver the current president to call early presidential and parh~unent~try 

elections, ~nd possibly open the door to an Erdogan presidency until2029. 

Grven the uncertainty over Turkey's future, the population remains split on the referendutn and on 

President Erdogan's policies and response to the instability gripping the nation. \Vhilc many nlling 

AK-Party supporters continue to see President Erdogan as a strong, calming force in a Yobtile region, 

others in the vie\v his policies as a \'ehicle for chaos and blame him for Turkey's declining 

prosperity and 

Internationally, Turkey's partners and allies have been largely silent, despite accusaTions from Turkish 

officials charging Europeans with ·attempting to influence the referendurn. ~o matter the outcome, 

Turkey's partners- particularly the Cmted States- n~ust prepare to engage with a Turkish state dut 

is in a battle tOr its future. It is not only the referendum's outcotne that matters, but President 

Erdogan's goYernance style and ho"\Y the Turkish leadership chooses to tnoYe Turkey beyond the postcoup phase. The four key areas in which U.S.-Turkey relations \vill be affected by decisions made after 

the referendum are: transatlantic security, energy cooperation, economic prospenty, and last but not 

'l'lw Atlantic Council takt>s no with the CS gowrnrnmt. All 

author. 
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24917e-3.eps

least, democratic values. 

HAving the second largest military in the K-''\TO alli,mce, Turkey alre~1dy has a profound mtluence on 

internrtt.ionrtl security matters. The use of Turkey's Incirlik _.:\ir B~1se, according to U.S. Secretary of 

StAte Rex Tillers on, Allo\.vs for 25 percent more strikes ,tgainst ISIS in Syria, and much of the United 

States' humtwitarian aid \Vork 111 Syria iS based out of southeastern Turkey. _i\Ioreover, Turkey's 

loc:1tion between Iran. Ir:1q. Syria, Europe, and the CJ1uc1sus puts 'l'urkey :1t the center of sotnc of the 

tnost unstable, yet critic:1l hotspots 111 the \vorld. Indeed, tnoden1 Turkey still maint:1ins the age-old 

characterization of Turkey as a strategic friend in :1 troubled neighborhood. 

J .ast week, Secretary Tillerson Yisited Turkey to "build on three tnutual long-tertn goals: working 

together to defeat Daesh/TSTS~ building stability in the region: and bolstering econotnic ties bet\veen 

[the] t\vo nations." Tlis Yisit came on the heels of advanced planning stages in the campaign against 

TSTS in Raqqa. The final assault on Raqqa has stalled OYer a disagreement on \vhich forces the United 

States should use to liberate dtld hold the ISIS stronghold. The United States would prefer to see 

Raqqa taken by a co,tlition of •\rab and Kurd1sh Popular Protection Units (ll>G), collectiYely knmm 

as the Syrian Democratic Porces (SDP). Ho\v-ever, because Turkey considers the \""PG an extens10n 

of the bm1ned Kurdistan \\'orkers' Party or PKK- the latter designated as a terrorist entity by the 

U.S. gm.-cnuncnt -they arc proposing to usc their 0\\'11tn1litary and a mi.-x of locaL -~ab partners to 

tJlkc hack R:1qqa. It 1s not clear, hmvcver. \.Yhcthcr Turkey can adequately muster these forces beyond 

its recently-st~lled Euphrates Sh1cld oper~tion. 

Smce the SDP has proven to be a reliable force on the ground in Syri~1, ~md given no virtble alternAtive 

absent a major int1ux of L.:.S. troops, the United St~tes has little choice hut to h~ck the SD~ option. 

Jlmvcvcr. it appears to he \vJliting for the outcotne of 'l'urkey1

s referendutn before making :1ny 

announcement. \Vhile President Erdogan \vould have additional control over the 'furkish military if 

the referendum passes, it is unclear \Vhat options Turk e) has to prevent the SDfl from taking Raqqa. 

President Erdogan's tlexibility toward a U.S. decision to use SDP forces may change after the 

referendum, but it is diftlcult to predict his response. Regardless, it may be a turning point for relations 

and an area to closely watch. 

The grovvmg rift bet\veen Turkey and Europe is also a worrymg trend Hl trcwsatLwtic security as it 

threatens to unrcwel a delicate balance bet\veen these t\vo crucial partners. President Erdog:m has 

already threatened to undo the deal that the FU and Turkey struck at the height of the refugee crisis 

in 2016. The agreement -while imperfect- stipulates that irregular migr;mts entering Greece em 

be retun1ed to Turkey in exchange for expedited visa liberalization for Turks, a €3 billion assistance 

package, and speedy processmg of refugees \\~tilting to enter Europe from Turkey. Unfortunately, the 

EU has reluctantly cotnphed \Yith its part of the bargam, and Turkey, \.\Thich already generously hosts 

3 million refugees, ftnds its patience \\"J\'Cring. 

'l'he build-up to the referendum has already instigated intense diplomatic rmvs as some European 

nations blocked 'l'urkish officials from campaigning on their territory, and Ankara reacted \vith 

accusations ofKa/.ism and threats to reevaluate its relationship with Europe. The undoing of decorum 

between Europe :1.nd Turkey may result in long-term datn:1ge to 'l'urkey's Ell prospects at1d to 

NATO's conunon defense cotntnunity. \vhich demands consensus on decisions. If emboldened hy Jl 

'l'lw Atlantic Council takt>s no with the CS gowrnrnmt. All 

author. 
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I 

victory, President Erdogan may seek to test Furope's limits even further and bring Turkey's EU 

candidacy to a halt, tnaking for a very uncotnfortable ~A. TO Alliance. :-\loss in the referendum, fueled 

by conspir<-tc1es about Europe~111 intervention, n~~1y be just as detrin~ent<-tl to the fe.-tymg Turkey-EU 

reL-ttionship. Regardless, ~-''\TO Alhes ·will need to \.\'ork to steady relations bet\Yeen these partners. 

The outcon~e of the Turkish referendun~ cdll also 1m pact energy cooperation \Vith Europe for the 

same reasons th:1t threaten transatb.ntic security. Yet~ there is the :1ddcd dynamic of'l'urkcy's intlucncc 

on the Cyprus rcunitlcation process and the negotiations' itnplications on the E:1stcm .. \lcditcrrancan's 

gas res crvcs. 

\\/hile Turkey has pledged to be a constructiYe force in this dift1cult process, a successful referendum 

could empO\ver Turkish nationalists in the i\HTP \vlw supported the ruling AK party and ushered the 

constitutional package through parliament in January. The nationalists h:we not staked out a position 

on negotiations, but their traditional vie\VS on Cyprus and the Turkish military's presence there may 

sp01l a potentul agreement cwd enchwger this unique opportunity. It is not clear, ho"\Yever, if President 

Erdogan would follow '\!HP's lead after the referendum takes place. \\'hat 1s clear is thJt once the 

referendum is over, Turkey \Vlll have n~ore t1me and attention to focus on Cypn1s. If d. deal is reached, 

reconClllation bet\Ji.~een Turkish and Greek Cypriots can finally come to fruition after decades of 

attetnpts. and 1\lediterranean gas can flo\Y into the European tnarket, helping to reduce Jiurope 1s 

dependence on Russian gas. 

Smlllarly, referendutn politics may affect ongoing plans het\veen Turkey and Russ1a to huild a second 

natural gas pipeline in the TurkStrearn project. This pipeline \\.'Ould bring Ga/.prom gas to Europe by 

bypassing Ukraine. A. \vin in the referendum may help President Frdogan push the proJect along, 

despite environmental concerns at home and foreign policy implications for Ukraine. 

The last t\vo international considerations surrounding Turkey's referendum ctre economic prosperity 

and den~ocrabc ideals - \Vhich as Turkey's example shows go hand in lund. Turkey experienced 

gro\\'th and econon~ic stability throughout President Erdogcw's tin~e in office, but n~ore recently, the 

AK Party government's indifference toward democratic institutions, rule of law, freedom of 

expression, and tnedia has undercut Turkey's lasting prosperity . ..c'\lready, the Turkish Lira has 

experienced a sharp decline, tnaking it the \Vorst emerging tnarket currency in 2017. This rdlects 

tnarket fears o\-er Turkey's slo\Ying economy and rismg inflation. The busmess climate is greatly 

affected hy uncertainty in Turkey, \vhich is already experiencing capital fl1ght and a reluctance by 

foreigners to inyest. Turkey has the \vorld's 1 T11 largest economy, and any instability will haye ma1or 

implications for neighbors throughout the region. Post-referendum, no matter the outcorne, the 

'l'urkish govenunent must work to maintain checks and balances and help steady the climate to 

encourage investment and grO\vth, once again. 

i\nother issue that the' 1 'urkish go\-ernment must attention to is ·any instance of foreign tr·avelcrs 

or residents being caught up in the post-coup These examples ~tre growmg cwd hurting 

econon1ic prospects for Turkey. Por exan1ple, the arrest of long-titne resident of Turkey and U.S. 

cihzen, Pastor .;\.ndre\Y Dnmson, reYerherates throughout the Ll11ted States and has led to Secretary 

Tillerson, and previously Secretary John l'-_erry, to raise this case repeatedly \vith Turkish oftlnals. 

Cases hke Pastor Brunson's do not encourage a strong investment climate and do even less to help 

'l'lw Atlantic Council takt>s no with the CS gowrnrnmt. All 

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generate tourism in Turkey. 

It is difficult to foresee ho\v a consolidation of po"\ver m'l\~ay fron~ the jud1c1ary and into the executive 

"\Yould 1mprove investn~ent potenti~1l in Turkey or enhance the den~ocrrtt.ic principles needed for ;m 

open, trrtde-brtsed econon~y. The only \\'ay for the referendum to bnng about more certainty in the 

Turkish econon~y .is .if checks ctnd balances are restored and maintamed under the nt'\v Turkish 

presidency or any political sys tern. 

Regardless of the outcotne of the rcferendutn, Turkey has ahvays he en strongest "\vhen it comes close 

to the ideal of a liberal democratiC society "\vhcre all voices arc represented. Turkey's pmtners must 

address challenges to democratic norms head-on. Speaking out on these matters directly should not 

be done in a \:vay that ernbarrasses Turkish officials or through one-off press statements or criticisms. 

Instead, the most etlecti\'e means of comrnunicating concen1s is to maintain close high-leYel contacts 

bet\veen Turkey and the United States. Only direct C.S. engagement, a true partnership, and 

conversations about Turkey's comm.itn~ent to democratic ideals can deter \'l\~orse behctVlor, protect our 

mvn security, and bring Turkey to the table on crit1eal international issues. 

To achieve these goals, the C111ted States cmd the \\,Test must also hold true to their mvn democratic 

~,-alues and principles at hotne. lf attacks against the press, unethical hcha\-10C or disregjll'd for 

dctnocratic institutions become comtnonplace among \Vestcn1leadcrs, it\vill he difficult to mAke the 

case for the1r unportance to Turkey :1.nd other countries. 

i\Tr. Chainnan, Ranking i\fernber i\feeks, rnembers of this Comrnittee, thank you for your careful 

attention to the future of Turkey and U.S.-Turkish relations. T look fonvard to your questions. 

Thank you. 

'l'lw Atlantic Council takt>s no with the CS gowrnrnmt. All 

author. 
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MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY MR. DAVID L. PHILLIPS, DIRECTOR, PROGRAM ON PEACE-BUILDING AND RIGHTS, INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF HUMAN

RIGHTS, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY


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many times. When the trucks were stopped, MIT agents tried to keep the inspectors trom looking 

inside the crates. The inspectors found rockets, anns, and ammunitions. 

• Cumhuriyet reports that Fuat Avni, a preeminent Twitter user who reported on the December 

17th corruption probe, that audio tapes confirm that Turkey provided financial and military aid to 

terrorist groups associated withAl Qaeda on October 12, 2014. On the tapes, Erdogan pressured 

the Turkish Armed Forces to go to war with Syria. Erdogan demanded that Hakan Fidan, the 

head of Turkey's National Intelligence Agency (MIT), come up with a justification for attacking 

Syria. 

• Hakan Fidan told Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu, Yasar Guier, a senior defense official, and 

Feridun Sinirlioglu, a senior foreign affairs official: "If need be, I'll send 4 men into Syria. I'll 

formulate a reason to go to war by shooting 8 rockets into Turkey; I'll have them attack the 

Tomb of Suleiman Shah." 

• Documents surtitced on September 19th, 2014 showing that the Saudi Emir Bender Bin Sultan 

t!nanced the transportation of arms to ISIS through Turkey. A tlight leaving Germany dropped 

oti arms in the Etimesgut airport in Turkey, which was then split into three containers, two of 

which were given to ISIS and one to Gaza. 

Turkey Provided Transport and Logistical Assistance to ISIS Fighters 

• According to Rmlib! on June 13, 2014, Interior Minister Muammar Guier signed a directive: 

"According to our regional gains, we will help al-Nusra militants against the branch ofPKK 

terrorist organization, the PYD, within our borders ... Hatay is a strategic location for the 

muj ahideen crossing from within our borders to Syria. Logistical support for Islamist groups will 

be increased, and their training, hospital care, and safe passage will mostly take place in 

Hatay ... MIT and the Religious Atiairs Directorate will coordinate the placement oft!ghters in 

public accommodations." 

• The Daily Mail L"lliQ!:lS:d on August 25, 2014 that many foreign militants joined ISIS in Syria 

and Iraq after traveling through Turkey, but Turkey did not try to stop them. This article 

describes how foreign militants, especially from the UK, go to Syria and Iraq through the 

Turkish border. They call the border the "Gateway to Jihad." Turkish army soldiers either tum a 

blind eye and let them pass, or the jihadists pay the border guards as little as $10 to facilitate 

their crossing 

• Britain's Sky News obtained documents showing that the Turkish government has stamped 

passports offoreign militants seeking to cross the Turkey border into Syria to join ISIS. 

• The BBC interviewed villagers, who claim that buses travel at night, carryingjihadists to fight 

Kurdish forces in Syria and Iraq, not the Syrian Armed Forces. 
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• A senior Egyptian o±1icial in_Qig~Jcl on October 9, 2014 that Turkish intelligence is passing 

satellite imagery and other data to ISIS. 

Turkey Provided Training to TSTS Fighters 

• CNN Turk reported on July 29, 2014 that in the heart of Istanbul, places like Duzce and 

Adapazari, have become gathering spots for terrorists. There are religious orders where ISIS 

militants are trained. Some of these training videos are posted on the Turkish ISIS propaganda 

website takvahaber.net. According to C~N Turk, Turkish security forces could have stopped 

these developments if they had wanted to. 

• Turks who joined an a±1iliate ofiSIS were recorded at a public gathering in Istanbul, which 

took place on July 28, 2014. 

• A video shows an ISIS a±1iliate holding a prayer/gathering in Omerli, a district of Istanbul. In 

response to the video, CHP Vice President, MP Tanrikulu submitted parliamentary questions to 

the Minister of the Interior, Efkan Ala, asking questions such as, "Is it true that a camp or camps 

have been allocated to an affiliate of ISIS in Istanbul? What is this affiliate? Who is it made up 

of? Is the rumor true that the same area allocated for the camp is also used for military 

exercises~" 

• Kemal Kili<;daroglu warned the AKP government not to provide money and training to terror 

groups on October 14, 2014. He said, "It isn't right for armed groups to be trained on Turkish 

soil. You bring foreign fighters to Turkey, put money in their pockets, guns in their hands, and 

you ask them to kill Muslims in Syria. We told them to stop helping ISIS. Ahmet Davutoglu 

asked us to show proof Everyone knows that they're helping ISIS." (See W::N and IliJS.E_.) 

• According to Jordanian intelligence, Turkey trained ISIS militants for special operations. 

Turkey Offers Medical Care to ISIS Fighters 

• An ISIS commander told the Washington Post on August 12, 2014, "We used to have some 

fighters- even high-level members of the Islamic State- getting treated in Turkish hospitals." 

• Tarai'reportecl on October 12, 2014 that Dengir Mir Mehmet Frrat, a founder of the AKP, said 

that Turkey supported terrorist groups and still supports them and treats them in hospitals. "In 

order to weaken the developments in Rojova (Syrian Kurdistan), the government gave 

concessions and arms to extreme religious groups ... the government was helping the wounded. 

The Minister of Health said something such as, it's a human obligation to care for the ISIS 

wounded." 

• According to Taraf, Ahmet El H, one of the top commanders at ISIS and Al Baghdadi's right 

hand man, was treated at a hospital in Sanliurfa, Turkey, along with other ISIS militants. The 

Turkish state paid for their treatment According to Tarars sources, ISIS militants are being 
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treated in hospitals all across southeastern Turkey. More and more militants have been corning in 

to be treated since the start of airstrikes in August To be more specific, eight ISIS militants were 

transported through the Sanliurfa border crossing; these are their names "Mustafa A., YusufEl 

R., Mustafa H., Halil ElM., Muhammet El H., Ahmet El S., Hasan H., [and] Salim El D." 

Turkey Supports ISIS Financially Through Purchase of Oil 

• On September 13,2014, The New York limes reported on the Obama administration's etl'orts to 

pressure Turkey to crack down on ISIS extensive sales network for oil. James Phillips, a senior 

fellow at the Heritage Foundation, argues that Turkey has not fully cracked down on ISIS's sales 

network because it benefits from a lower price for oil, and that there might even be Turks and 

government officials who benefit from the trade. 

• Fehirn Ta~tekin wrote in Radikal on September 13, 2014 about illegal pipelines transporting oil 

from Syria to nearby border towns in Turkey. The oil is sold for as little as 1.25 liras per liter. 

Ta~tek:in indicated that many of these illegal pipelines were dismantled after operating for 3 

years, once his article was published. 

• According to Diken and OdaTV, David Cohen, a Justice Department official, sav~ that there 

are Turkish individuals acting as middlemen to help sell ISIS's oil through Turkey. 

• On October 14, 2014, a German Parliamentarian ±rom the Green Party accuseil Turkey of 

allowing the transportation of arms to ISIS over its territory, as well as the sale of oil. 

Turkey Assists ISIS Recruitment 

• Kernal Kili<;daroglu claimed on October 14, 2014 that ISIS oftices in Istanbul and Gaziantep 

are used to recruit fighters. On October 10, 2014, the mufti ofKonya said that 100 people from 

Konyajoined ISIS 4 days ago. (See HERE and HERE) 

• OdaTV I~PQt:!!l. that Takva Haber serves as a propaganda outlet for ISIS to recruit Turkishspeaking individuals in Turkey and Germany. The address where this propaganda website is 

registered corresponds to the address of a school called Trfan Koleji, which was established by 

llirn Yayma Vakfi, a foundation that was created by Erdogan and Davutoglu, among others. lt is 

thus claimed that the propaganda site is operated from the school of the foundation started by 

AKP members. 

• Minister of Sports, Suat Kilic, an AKP member, visited Salafi jihadists who are ISIS supporters 

in Germany. The group is known for reaching out to supporters via free Quran distributions and 

raising ±i.mds to sponsor suicide attacks in Syria and Iraq by raising money. 

• OdaTV released a video allegedly showing ISIS militants riding a bus in Istanbul. 

Turkish Forces Are Fighting Alongside ISIS 
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• On October 7, 2014, IBDA-C, a militant Islamic organization in Turkey, pledged support to 

ISIS. A Turkish friend who is a commander in ISIS suggests that Turkey is "involved in all of 

this" and that" 10,000 ISIS members will come to Turkey." A Huda-Par member at the meeting 

claims that officials criticize lSlS but in fact sympathize with the group (Huda-Par, the "Free 

Cause Party", is a Kurdish Sunni fundamentalist political party). BBP member claims that 

National Action Party (MHP) officials are close to embracing ISIS. In the meeting, it is asserted 

that ISIS militants come to Turkey frequently to rest, as though they are taking a break from 

military service. They claim that Turkey will experience an Islamic revolution, and Turks should 

be ready for jihad. (See HERE and HERE.) 

• Seymour Hersh maintains in the London Review of Books that ISIS conducted sarin attacks in 

Syria, and that Turkey was informed. "For months there had been acute concern among senior 

military leaders and the intelligence community about the role in the war of Syria's neighbors, 

especially Turkey. Prime Minister Recep Erdogan was known to be supporting the al-Nusra 

Front, a jihadist faction among the rebel opposition, as well as other Islamist rebel groups. 'We 

knew there were some in the Turkish government,' a former senior US intelligence official, who 

has access to current intelligence, told me, 'who believed they could get Assad's nuts in a vice 

by dabbling with a sarin attack inside Syria- and forcing Obama to make good on his red line 

threat." 

• On September 20, 20I4, Demir Celik, a Member of Parliament with the people's democratic 

party (HDP) claimed that Turkish Special Forces fight with TSTS. 

Turkey Helped ISIS in Battle for Kobani 

• Anwar Moslem, Mayor of Kobani, said on September 19, 2014: "Based on the intelligence we 

got two days before the brealwut of the current war, trains full offorces and ammunition, which 

were passing by north of Kobane, had an-hour-and-ten-to-twenty-minute-long stops in these 

villages: Salib Qaran, Gire Sor, Moshrefat Ezzo. There are evidences, witnesses, and videos 

about this. Why is lSlS strong only in Kobane's east" Why is it not strong either in its south or 

west" Since these trains stopped in villages located in the east of Kobane, we guess they had 

brought ammunition and additional force for the ISIS." In the second article on September 30, 

2014, a CHP delegation visited Kobani, where locals claimed that everything from the clothes 

ISIS militants wear to their guns comes from Turkey. (See HERE and 1-Ir;RE.) 

• Released by Nuhaber, a video shovYs Turkish military convoys carrying tanks and ammunition 

moving freely under ISIS flags in the Cerablus region and Karkamis border crossing (September 

25, 2014). There are writings in Turkish on the trucks. 

• Salih Muslim, PYD head, claims that 120 militants crossed into Syria from Turkey between 

October 20th and 24th, 2014. 
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• According to an op-ed _yyritten by a YPG commander in The New York 1/mes on October 29, 

2014, Turkey allows ISIS militants and their equipment to pass freely over the border. 

• Diken reported, "TSTS fighters crossed the border from Turkey into Syria, over the Turkish train 

tracks that delineate the border, in full view of Turkish soldiers. They were met there by PYD 

fighters and stopped." 

• A Kurdish commander in Kobani claims that ISIS militants have Turkish entry stamps on their 

passports. 

• Kurds trying to join the battle in Kobani are h1med away by Turkish police at the TurkeySyrian border. 

• OdaTV released a photograph of a Turkish soldier befriending lSlS militants. 

Turkey and ISIS Share a Worldview 

• RT .t:.@2D2 on Vice President Joe Biden's remarks detailing Turkish support to lSlS. 

• According to the Hurriyet Daily News on September 26, 2014, ''The feelings of the AKP's 

heavyweights are not limited to Ankara. I was shocked to hear words of admiration for ISIL 

from some high-level civil servants even in Sanliurfa 'They are like us, fighting against seven 

great powers in the War oflndependence,' one said." "Rather than the [Kurdistan Workers' 

Party] PKK on the other side, I would rather have ISIL as a neighbor," said another." 

• Cengiz Can dar, a well-respected Turkish journalist, maintained that MIT helped "midwife" the 

Islamic state in Iraq and Syria, as well as other Jihadi groups. 

• An AKP council member posted on his Facebook page "Thankfully ISIS exists .. May you 

never run out of ammunition ... " 

• A Turkish Social Security Institution supervisor uses the ISIS logo in internal correspondences. 

• Bilal Erdogan and Turkish oft'icials meet alleged ISIS fighters 
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Statement for the Record 

Submitted by Mr. Connolly of Virginitt 

On April 16, 2017, the Turkish people will decide whether to expand President Erdogan's 

powers by rendering the Turkish president the head of state and head of government or to 

maintain the current parliamentary system with its existing checks and balances. The refonn 

would enable the president to issue decrees, declare emergency rule, appoint cabinet ministers 

and two-thirds of the country's senior judges without parliamentary approval, and even to 

dissolve parliament. 

This constitutional referendum represents a critical moment for Turkish democracy. Erdogan 

claims that the proposed presidential system would strengthen Turkey's government in the face 

of internal and external threats. However, there are widespread concerns about Erdogan's 

attempts to consolidate power and suppress political dissent, and any discussion of this 

referendum must consider this context. Formal entrenchment of these administrative powers 

could accelerate Turkey's slide toward authoritarianism and sound the death knell for its 

accession to the European Union. 

The plebiscite takes place against a backdrop of violence and fear. Last July, disaffected factions 

of the Turkish military carried out a failed coup attempt that claimed more than 270 lives. 

Despite a long history of successful and unsuccessful coup attempts in Turkey, there is no doubt 

that the bombing of the Grand National Assembly building, attempts on the lives of Turkey's 

civilian and military leadership, and other disturbing images from the night of July 15 inflicted a 

level of trauma on the Turkish public. A series of terrorist attacks by the Islamic State and the 

Levant (ISIL) and Kurdish militants have also rattled the Turkish people over the last year and a 

half. 

In the wake of the coup attempt, President Erdogan declared a state of emergency and has 

subsequently embarked on a sweeping crackdown of dissent. The government has formally 

arrested more than 40,000 individuals, including 10,000 soldiers. One-third of the general corps 

for the Turkish military has been dismissed and more than 170 media outlets shut down. The 

government has suspended or terminated 125,000 private and public sector workers, half of 

which come from the field of education. 

Ostensibly, the target of much of this activity by law enforcement has been the followers of the 

U.S.-based cleric Fetullah Gulen. More than a dozen universities and 1,000 secondary schools 

connected to Mr. Gulen have been shuttered, and the government has filed a forrnal extradition 

request with the United States. However, many accuse Erdogan of using the coup attempt as an 

opportunity to quash any and all political opposition or threats to his power. The government has 

also jailed 13 members of the pro-Kurdish democratic opposition in parliament on terrorism 
78

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charges, and suspended or incarcerated elected mayors of 82 municipalities in the Kurdish 

southeast region. 

The United States should care about the health of Turkish democracy. As a close ally and one of 

28 democracies that comprise NATO, Turkey has been a strategic partner in our capability to 

respond to regional crises. The United States has a national security interest in ensuring the 

stability of our ally during this difficult time. That includes reinforcing democratic institutions 

and helping Turkey hold accountable those responsible for the coup attempt and continued 

threats to security. However, we must lend this assistance on our tenns. The United States will 

not play handmaiden to a crackdown on dissent that violates our support for democratic 

principles and engages in human rights abuses. 

Turkey's future has to be with the European Union, and the European Union's future must 

include Turkey. The timing of this constitutional referendum, amidst a sweeping crackdown of 

free expression and political space for opposition, could magnify concerns about the health of 

Turkish democracy. llook forward to hearing from our witnesses on how the United States 

should engage our ally Turkey during this critical test for its democratic future. 

2 
79

Note: Material submitted for the record by the Honorable Dana Rohrabacher, a 

Representative in Congress from the State of California, and chairman, Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, and Emerging Threats, entitled ‘‘Islamic State Networks in Turkey,’’ by Merve Tahiroglu and Jonathan Schanzer, Foundation for Defense of Democracies, is not reprinted here but may be found on the Internet at: 

http://docs.house.gov/Committee/Calendar/ByEvent.aspx?EventID=105842

Æ