alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
 
<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM FORM 10-Q
FOR PERIOD ENDED JUNE 30, 1998 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO
SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          SEP-30-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             OCT-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1998
<CASH>                                             141
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   12,590
<ALLOWANCES>                                     1,166
<INVENTORY>                                      9,438
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                25,145
<PP&E>                                          76,820
<DEPRECIATION>                                  25,962
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 103,488
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            9,616
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                         7,143
<OTHER-SE>                                       3,221
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   103,488
<SALES>                                         20,064
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                43,512
<CGS>                                           13,678
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   27,627
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                   354
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               4,128
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                (2,727)
<INCOME-TAX>                                     (946)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            (1,781)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   (1,781)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   (0.16)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (0.16)
        

</TABLE>
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

No. DA 23-0748

STATE OF MONTANA,

Petitioner,

v.

JONATHAN PARTAIN,

Respondent.

ORDER GRANTING EXTENSION

UPON consideration of Respondent’s motion for extension of time,

as well as agreement, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Respondent is 

granted an extension of time up to and including August 28, 2024,

within which to prepare, file, and serve Respondent’s brief on appeal.

Electronically signed by:

Mike McGrath

Chief Justice, Montana Supreme Court

July 17 2024

07/17/2024

Case Number: DA 23-0748
**UN PUBLISHED** 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

**No. 09**  **- 8224** 

PRINCIBE LAGUERRE , Plaintiff

- Appellant ,
v. MELISA WHITE GAY, Esquire , Defendant

- Appellee
.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina , at Columbia
. Patrick Michael Duffy, Senior District Judge. ( 3:09

- cv - 01864

- PMD )

Submitted : March 16, 2010 Decided: March 24, 2010

Before NIEMEYER, MOTZ, and DAVIS , Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by un published per curiam opinion
.
Princ ib e Laguerre, Appellant Pro Se.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM: Princibe Laguerre appeals the district court ’ s order accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and denying relief without pre judice on his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (200 6 ) complaint. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district court. Laguerre v. Gay , No. 3:09

- cv - 01864

- PMD (D.S.C. f iled Nov. 19, 2009 ; entered N ov. 20, 2009 ) . We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent *

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision **

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

LARRY LUCHETTI,

 Plaintiff - Appellant,

 v.

HERSHEY COMPANY, a Delaware

corporation,

 Defendant - Appellee.

No. 09-17193

D.C. No. 3:08-cv-01629-SI

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of California

Susan Illston, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted January 14, 2011** 

San Francisco, California

Before: WALLACE, NOONAN, and SILVERMAN, Circuit Judges.

Luchetti appeals from the district court’s summary judgment in favor of The

Hershey Company (Hershey). The district court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28

FILED

JAN 27 2011

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) and we have jurisdiction over this timely appeal pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm.

Both California Labor Code § 1102.5 (West 2010) and § 6310 (West 2003)

require that Luchetti prove he expressed his opposition to Hershey’s safety

practices or lack thereof. Daly v. Exxon Corp., 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d 727, 729 (Cal. Ct.

App. 1997); Taylor v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 873, 881–82 (Cal.

Ct. App. 2000); Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc., 116 P.3d 1123, 1133 (Cal. 2005). 

Luchetti argues that his oral complaints to Soles, his supervisor, together with his

email with a copy to Soles, create a triable issue of fact as to whether Luchetti was

expressing opposition to participation in the status quo, which included ongoing

violations of Cal-OSHA. The district court disagreed and so do we. Neither

Luchetti’s email, nor his conversation with Soles, is evidence of any opposition to

Hershey’s safety practices. The evidence shows only that Luchetti discussed how

to best address safety practices at the plant with his supervisors and co-worker. In

addition, none of Luchetti’s evidence shows that he complained about the legality

of Hershey’s practices or procedures. See Holmes v. General Dynamics Corp., 22

Cal. Rptr. 2d 172, 181 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993). Finally, Luchetti failed to rebut

Hershey’s evidence that his termination was for a legitimate reason that was not a

pretext for retaliation. 

AFFIRMED.
December 23, 2014

JUDGMENT

The Fourteenth Court of Appeals

JOSE VASQUEZ, Appellant

NO. 14-12-00096-CR V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

________________________________

This cause was heard on the transcript of the record of the court below. The 

record reveals error in the judgment. The Court orders the judgment REVERSED 

and REMANDED for further proceedings in accordance with its opinion.

We order THE STATE OF TEXAS to pay all costs incurred in this appeal. 

We further order this decision certified below for observance.
#### HOWE *v.*DOYLE.

Appeal and Error — “Blue-Sky Law” — Moot Questions — Dismissal.

Where Act No. 143, Pub. Acts 1913, known as the “Blue-Sky Law,” was repealed pending an appeal by complainants of injunction proceedings attacking the validity of the law, and there are no proceedings pending before the Michigan Securities Commission in which complainants are interested which are continued by the repealing act, but the questions raised on appeal are mere moot questions, this court will, on its own motion, dismiss the appeal.

Appeal from Ingham; Collingwood, J.

Submitted February 3, 1914.

(Docket No. 174.)

Decided September 28, 1915.

Bill by Burton Howe and another against Edward *656H. Doyle, John W. Haarer, and Grant Fellows, constituting the Michigan Securities Commission, for injunction restraining defendants from .enforcing the provisions of Act No. 148, Pub. Acts.1913. From a decree for defendants, complainants appeal.

Appeal dismissed.

*Beaumont, Smith & Harris,*and *Caldwell, Masslieh & Reed (Robert R. Reed, Thomas C. P. Martin,*and *Hal H. Smith,*of counsel), for appellants.

*Grant Fellows,*Attorney General, for appellees.

Per Curiam.

This case is an appeal from the decree of the circuit court in chancery, which dismisses the bill of complaint of the complainants, filed again”st the defendants herein, members of the Michigan Securities Commission created by Act- No. 143, Pub. Acts 1913, the so-called “Blue Sky Law.” The bill attacks the constitutionality of this law on several grounds, and prays for an injunction restraining the defendants from enforcing its terms.

While this case has been pending in this court on this appeal, the legislature at its session of 1915 enacted a new law, creating a similar commission, and by its terms repealed Act No. 143, Pub. Acts 1913, and all acts or parts of acts in conflict with the new legislation. The new act also provided:

> “All proceedings pending before said Michigan Securities Commission created by said Act one hundred forty-three of the Public Acts of nineteen hundred and thirteen shall be continued by the commission created by this act; all actions, civil and criminal, pending under said Act one hundred forty-three of the Public Acts of nineteen hundred thirteen shall be continued and completed thereunder.” (Act No. 46, Pub. Acts 1915).

It does not appear from this record that there are any proceedings pending before the commission; nor *657are there any actions, civil or criminal, pending in which complainants are interested. The act whose constitutionality is assailed by these proceedings having been repealed, if we should consider the questions here raised, we would be giving our consideration to mere moot questions, and this we must decline to do.

We will therefore dismiss the case on our own motion, without costs to either party.

The late Justice McAlvay took no part in this decision.
§ 1.306-2 Exception. ( a ) If a shareholder terminates his entire stock interest in a corporation— ( 1 ) By a sale or other disposition within the requirements of section 306(b)(1)(A), or
( 2 ) By redemption under section 302(b)(3) (through the application of section 306(b)(1)(B)), the amount received from such disposition shall be treated as an amount received in part or full payment for the stock sold or redeemed. In the case of a sale, only the stock interest need be terminated. In determining whether an entire stock interest has been terminated under section 306(b)(1)(A), all of the provisions of section 318(a) (relating to constructive ownership of stock) shall be applicable. In determining whether a shareholder has terminated his entire interest in a corporation by a redemption of his stock under section 302(b)(3), all of the provisions of section 318(a) shall be applicable unless the shareholder meets the requirements of section 302(c)(2) (relating to termination of all interest in the corporation). If the requirements of section 302(c)(2) are met, section 318(a)(1) (relating to members of a family) shall be inapplicable. Under all circumstances paragraphs (2), (3), (4), and (5) of section 318(a) shall be applicable.
( b ) Section 306(a) does not apply to— ( 1 ) Redemptions of section 306 stock pursuant to a partial or complete liquidation of a corporation to which part II (section 331 and following), subchapter C, chapter 1 of the Code applies,
( 2 ) Exchanges of section 306 stock solely for stock in connection with a reorganization or in an exchange under section 351, 355, or section 1036 (relating to exchanges of stock for stock in the same corporation) to the extent that gain or loss is not recognized to the shareholder as the result of the exchange of the stock (see paragraph (d) of § 1.306-3 relative to the receipt of other property), and
( 3 ) A disposition or redemption, if it is established to the satisfaction of the Commissioner that the distribution, and the disposition or redemption, was not in pursuance of a plan having as one of its principal purposes the avoidance of Federal income tax. However, in the case of a prior or simultaneous disposition (or redemption) of the stock with respect to which the section 306 stock disposed of (or redeemed) was issued, it is not necessary to establish that the distribution was not in pursuance of such a plan. For example, in the absence of such a plan and of any other facts the first sentence of this subparagraph would be applicable to the case of dividends and isolated dispositions of section 306 stock by minority shareholders. Similarly, in the absence of such a plan and of any other facts, if a shareholder received a distribution of 100 shares of section 306 stock on his holdings of 100 shares of voting common stock in a corporation and sells his voting common stock before he disposes of his section 306 stock, the subsequent disposition of his section 306 stock would not ordinarily be considered a disposition one of the principal purposes of which is the avoidance of Federal income tax.
[T.D. 6500, 25 FR 11607, Nov. 26, 1960, as amended by T.D. 6969, 33 FR 11998, Aug. 23, 1968]
TSCA Statutory Definitions Document, February 11, 2014

Terms Defined

The terms “Manufacture,” “processor,” “process” and “distribute in commerce” are defined in 

TSCA section 3. Entities engaged in hydraulic fracturing activities may be considered a 

manufacturer, processor, distributor in commerce or any combination of these, which would be 

relevant to those entities for the purposes of reporting.

TSCA §3 (7) “The term ‘‘manufacture’’ means to import into the customs territory of the United 

States (as defined in general note 2 of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States), 

produce, or manufacture.”

TSCA §3 (10) “The term “processor” means any person who processes a chemical substance or 

mixture. “Process” means the preparation of a chemical substance or mixture, after its 

manufacture, for distribution in commerce-

(A) in the same form or physical state as, or in a different form or physical state from, 

that in which it was received by the person so preparing such substance or mixture, or 

(B) as part of an article containing the chemical substance or mixture.”

TSCA §3 (4) “The term ‘‘distribute in commerce’’ mean to sell, or the sale of, the substance, 

mixture, or article in commerce; to introduce or deliver for introduction into commerce, or the 

introduction or delivery for introduction into commerce of, the substance, mixture, or article; 

or to hold, or the holding of, the substance, mixture, or article after its introduction into 

commerce.”
- USGS Home
- Contact						   USGS
- Search 
USGS

- mobile menu barsUSGS Publications Warehouse
    Contact
    Explore recent 
    publications by USGS Authors
    Browse all of Pubs 
    Warehouse by Publication type and year
    FAQS
    Web 
    Service Documentation
    Other 
    Resources
    Descriptions of US Geological Survey Report Series
- USGS Publications Warehouse
- Contact
- Explore recent 
    publications by USGS Authors
- Browse all of Pubs 
    Warehouse by Publication type and year
- FAQS
- Web 
    Service Documentation
- Other 
    Resources
- Descriptions of US Geological Survey Report Series

- USGS Publications 
  Warehouse
- Explore					    
  Explore recent 
    publications by USGS Authors
    Browse all of Pubs 
    Warehouse by Publication type and year
- Explore recent 
    publications by USGS Authors
- Browse all of Pubs 
    Warehouse by Publication type and year
- Documentation					    
  FAQS
    Web 
    Service Documentation
    Other 
    Resources
    Descriptions of US Geological Survey Report Series
- FAQS
- Web 
    Service Documentation
- Other 
    Resources
- Descriptions of US Geological Survey Report Series
- Contact

### Interpretation of Cumberland Escarpment and Highland Rim, 
south-central Tennessee and northeast Alabama

#### Professional Paper 524-C

Tweet


#### Links

- Document: **Document**                                
  (pdf)
- Plate: **Plate 1**                                
  (pdf)
- Paper 
  version: **USGS Store**
- Download citation as:  RIS

#### Abstract

#### Additional publication details

Part or all of this report is presented in Portable 
Document Format (PDF). For best results viewing and printing PDF documents, it 
is recommended that you download the documents to your computer and open them 
with Adobe Reader. PDF documents opened from your browser may not display or 
print as intended. Download the latest version of Adobe 
Reader, free of charge. More information about viewing, downloading, and 
printing report files can be found here.

Accessibility
				    FOIA				    Privacy				    Policies and 
Notices

U.S. Department of the Interior				    | 				    
U.S. Geological 
Survey				    				   URL: http://pubs.er.usgs.gov/publication/pp524C 
                   				    				   Page Contact Information: Pubs 
Warehouse Contact Page				    				   Page Last Modified: February 02, 
2012 00:10:16
### EPA 300-B-95-010

October 1995 

## Regulatory Timeline & Checklist for Retrofit & Retirement Activities

Leak Discovered Fill in your dates below

Beginning of initial 12-month

period (date)

Deadline to develop a retrofit or retirement plan 30 Days after leak discovery or after a failedfollow-up verif. test (date)

Deadline to notify EPA if additional time will be needed to complete the retrofit or retirement due to delays occasioned by specific events 6 Months after 30 day period following leak discovery (date)

Last day for EPA to notify owners/operators of its final determination regarding the request for additional time where an EPA response is required 60 days from submittal of request for additional time (date)

Deadline to complete the retrofit or retirement (unless the refrigeration system is an industrial process refrigeration system or a federally owned chillerAND additional time has been permited). 12 Months from the date of the retrofit or retirement plan (date)

End of first 12-month period
Last day to submit requests for additional time beyond what has been permited. 9 Months into the first additional year extension (date)

Last day for EPA to reject request for additional time beyond that which has already been granted 30 Days from receipt of request for further additional time (date)

End of second 12-month End of additional one-year period & beginning of further additional time period to complete the retrofit or retirement extension (24 months from leak detection) 24 Months from the date of the retrofit or retirement plan (date)



### Further additional time period (beyond 2 years) to complete the retrofit or retirement for industrial process refrigeration systems.

F - 5
SCPW-22-0000327

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI#I

 

STEFANIE B. HILDRETH, Petitioner

vs.

THE HONORABLE FREDERICK MATSON KELLEY,

Judge of the Family Court of the Second Circuit,

State of Hawai#i, Respondent Judge.

 

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING

(FC-M NO. 22-1-0058)

ORDER DENYING AMENDED PETITION FOR

WRITS OF PROHIBITION AND MANDAMUS

(By: Recktenwald, C.J., Nakayama, McKenna, Wilson, and Eddins, JJ.)

Upon consideration of petitioner Stefanie B. Hildreth’s

amended petition for writs of prohibition and mandamus, filed on

May 17, 2022, the documents attached and submitted in support,

and the record, petitioner fails to demonstrate she has a clear

and indisputable right to relief or that she lacks alternative

means to seek relief. It also cannot be said that the respondent

judge exceeded his jurisdiction, committed a flagrant and

manifest abuse of discretion, or refused to act on a matter

properly before the court under circumstances in which the judge

Electronically Filed

Supreme Court

SCPW-22-0000327

25-MAY-2022

02:36 PM

Dkt. 30 ODDP
has a legal duty to act. Petitioner is thus not entitled to the

requested extraordinary writs. See Kema v. Gaddis, 91 Hawai#i

200, 204, 982 P.2d 334, 338 (1999) (explaining that a writ of

mandamus is an extraordinary remedy that will not issue unless

the petitioner demonstrates a clear and indisputable right to

relief and a lack of alternative means to redress adequately the

alleged wrong or obtain the requested action; such a writ is

meant to restrain a judge who has exceeded the judge’s

jurisdiction, has committed a flagrant and manifest abuse of

discretion, or has refused to act on a subject properly before

the court under circumstances in which the judge has a legal duty

to act); Honolulu Advertiser, Inc. v. Takao, 59 Haw. 237, 241,

580 P.2d 58, 62 (1978) (a writ of prohibition “is an

extraordinary remedy . . . to restrain a judge of an inferior

court from acting beyond or in excess of his jurisdiction”). 

Accordingly, 

It is ordered that the amended petition for writs of

prohibition and mandamus is denied.

DATED: Honolulu, Hawai#i, May 25, 2022.

/s/ Mark E. Recktenwald

/s/ Paula A. Nakayama

/s/ Sabrina S. McKenna

/s/ Michael D. Wilson

/s/ Todd W. Eddins

2
#### F. T. CHAFFIN, RECEIVER OF THE SHERMAN OIL MILL, v. THE UNITED STATES

[No. 17606,

Congressional.

Decided April 3, 1939]

*Mr. George R. Shields*and Benet, *Shcrnd da McGowam,*for the plaintiff.

*Messrs. Frank J. Keating*and *~WUMam W.*Scott, with whom was *Mr. Assistant Attorney General Sam E. Whitaker,*for the defendant.

*620Green, *Judge,*

delivered the opinion of the court:

The claim involved in this case originally accrued to Sherman Oil Mill. The receiver of The Sherman Oil Mill now claims to be entitled to recover on the claim under a contract of sale made by Sherman Oil Mill with The Sherman Oil Mill, but the evidence does not sustain this claim. The findings show that this sale did not include any choses in action or the cotton linter claim which is the subject matter of this suit. Sherman Oil Mill and The Sherman Oil Mill are two different corporations. It appears that F. T. Chaf-fin has been appointed receiver of The Sherman Oil Mill, and the order of the court appointing him receiver referred to the property involved in the receivership as a claim which originally arose in favor of Sherman Oil Mill purchased by The Sherman Oil Mill. The order is not definite with reference to the nature of the claim but, assuming that it refers to the one involved in the case now before this court, it is evident under the facts recited above that the receiver of The Sherman Oil Mill has no title thereto. The Texas court could appoint a receiver of the property of The Sherman Oil Mill but the recitals in its order in any event would not be binding upon the defendant which was not a party to the receivership proceeding.

Our conclusion is that the plaintiff Chaffin, as receiver of The Sherman Oil Mill, has failed to show any right of recovery against the defendant and it is therefore ordered that his petition be dismissed.

Whaley, *Judge;*Williams, *Judge;*Littleton, *Judge;*and Booth, *Chief*Justice, concur.
ARMED SERVICES BOARD OF CONTRACT APPEALS 

Appeal of -- ) 

) 

Sygnetics, Inc. ) 

) 

Under Contract No. W911YN-12-F-0040 ) 

APPEARANCE FOR THE APPELLANT: 

APPEARANCES FOR THE GOVERNMENT: 

ASBCA No. 59366 

Mr. Tony Tarkowski 

CEO 

Raymond M. Saunders, Esq. 

Army Chief Trial Attorney 

MAJ Nancy J. Lewis, JA 

Trial Attorney 

ORDER OF DISMISSAL 

The dispute has been settled. The appeal is dismissed with prejudice. 

Dated: 5 September 2014 

TERRENCES.HARTMAN 

Administrative Judge 

Armed Services Board 

of Contract Appeals 

I certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the Order of Dismissal of the Armed 

Services Board of Contract Appeals in ASBCA No. 59366, Appeal of Sygnetics, Inc., 

rendered in conformance with the Board's Charter. 

Dated: 

JEFFREY D. GARDIN 

Recorder, Armed Services 

Board of Contract Appeals