alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 34.17



LOGO

Report of Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm

To the Board of Directors, PNC Financial Services Group, Inc.:

We have examined managements assertion, included in the accompanying Report on Assessment of Compliance with Regulation AB Servicing Criteria, that
Midland Loan Services, a division of PNC Bank, National Association (Midland or the Company) complied with the servicing criteria set forth in Item 1122(d) of the Securities and Exchange Commissions Regulation AB for
all transactions serviced on the Enterprise!Loan Management System (the Platform), as of December 31, 2015 and for the year then ended, excluding criteria 1122(d)(1)(iii), 1122(d)(3)(i)(B), 1122(d)(3)(i)(C), 1122(d)(3)(i)(D),
1122(d)(3)(ii), 1122(d)(3)(iii), 1122(d)(3)(iv), and 1122(d)(4)(xv), which the Company has determined are not applicable to the servicing activities performed by it with respect to the Platform. Management is responsible for the Companys
compliance with the servicing criteria. Our responsibility is to express an opinion on managements assertion based on our examination.

Our
examination was conducted in accordance with attestation standards of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (United States) and, accordingly, included examining, on a test basis, evidence about the Companys compliance with the
applicable servicing criteria and performing such other procedures as we considered necessary in the circumstances. Our examination included testing of selected asset-backed transactions and securities that comprise the Platform, testing of selected
servicing activities related to the Platform, and determining whether the Company processed those selected transactions and performed those selected activities in compliance with the applicable servicing criteria. Our procedures were limited to the
selected transactions and servicing activities performed by the Company during the period covered by this report. Our procedures were not designed to detect noncompliance arising from errors that may have occurred prior to or subsequent to our tests
that may have affected the balances or amounts calculated or reported by the Company during the period covered by this report. We believe that our examination provides a reasonable basis for our opinion. Our examination does not provide a legal
determination on the Companys compliance with the servicing criteria.

In our opinion, managements assertion that Midland complied with the
aforementioned applicable servicing criteria as of and for the year ended December 31, 2015 for the Platform is fairly stated, in all material respects.



LOGO

February 25, 2016



|                                                                                                                    
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|                                                                                                                    
|PricewaterhouseCooper
sLLP,1100WalnutStreet,Suite1300,KansasCity,MO64106
T:(816)4727921,F:(816)2181890www.pwc.com/us
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>
Financial Data Sheet for Healthcare Properties, L.P.
</LEGEND>
<CIK>                         0000814458
<NAME>                        Healthcare Properties, L.P.
<MULTIPLIER>                  1
<CURRENCY>                    U.S. Dollars
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                 3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>             DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                JAN-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                  MAR-31-1998
<EXCHANGE-RATE>               1
<CASH>                        11,130,809
<SECURITIES>                  0
<RECEIVABLES>                 1,044,639
<ALLOWANCES>                  (316,042)
<INVENTORY>                   0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>              0
<PP&E>                        34,070,008
<DEPRECIATION>                (13,543,456)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                32,799,290
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>         0
<BONDS>                       0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>         0
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<COMMON>                      0
<OTHER-SE>                    25,264,702
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>  32,799,290
<SALES>                       0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>              2,165,865
<CGS>                         0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                 1,778,644
<OTHER-EXPENSES>              25,982
<LOSS-PROVISION>              0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>            162,967
<INCOME-PRETAX>               198,272
<INCOME-TAX>                  0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>           0
<DISCONTINUED>                0
<EXTRAORDINARY>               0
<CHANGES>                     0
<NET-INCOME>                  198,272
<EPS-PRIMARY>                 0
<EPS-DILUTED>                 0
        



</TABLE>
In the

Court of Appeals

Second Appellate District of Texas

at Fort Worth ___________________________

No. 02-20-00336-CV

___________________________

On Appeal from the 393rd District Court

Denton County, Texas

Trial Court No. 18-4863-393

Before Birdwell, Bassel, and Womack, JJ.

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Birdwell

VAN LE AND DUNG TRAN, Appellants

V.

QUYEN NGUYEN, Appellee
2

MEMORANDUM OPINION

In two appeals, Appellants Van Le and Dung Tran have attempted to challenge 

two final judgments. We dismiss one of those appeals for lack of jurisdiction.1

In appellate cause number 02-20-00336-CV, Appellants have attempted to appeal 

the “Final Default Judgment” that was entered on October 26, 2018, in trial court cause 

number 18-4863-393. But we did not receive Appellants’ notice of appeal until June 12, 

2020, more than a year after it was due. See Tex. R. App. P. 26.1.

We notified Appellants of our concern that we lack jurisdiction because of the untimely 

notice of appeal. We warned Appellants that this case could be dismissed unless they or 

another party filed a response showing that we have jurisdiction. Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(a). 

Appellants filed a response, but it does not demonstrate that this court has jurisdiction.

A timely notice of appeal confers jurisdiction on this court, and absent a timely 

notice of appeal, we must dismiss the appeal. Howlett v. Tarrant Cty., 301 S.W.3d 840, 843 

(Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2009, pet. denied) (op. on reh’g); see Tex. R. App. P. 25.1(b). 

Because the notice of appeal was filed too late, we dismiss the appeal in cause number 

02-20-00336-CV for lack of jurisdiction. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(a), 43.2(f).

/s/ Wade Birdwell

Wade Birdwell

Justice

Delivered: December 23, 2020

1

In appellate cause number 02-20-00219-CV, Appellants have appealed the “Final 

Judgment” that was entered on August 13, 2020, in trial court cause number 19-7206-

393. That case is unaffected by this opinion and remains ongoing.
EXHIBIT
32





CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO


18 U.S.C.
SECTION 1350,


AS
ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION
906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In
connection with the Quarterly Report of Fonix Corporation on Form 10-Q for the
period ending June 30, 2009, as filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Roger D. Dudley, Chief
Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:





(1)           The
Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2)           The
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.











/s/
      Roger D. DudleyRoger
      D. DudleyPresident,
      Chief Executive Officer, andChief
      Financial Officer(Principal
      Executive Officer, Principal Accounting Officer)Dated:
      August 14, 2009
# C_2016038EN.01004902.xml

| 1.2.2016 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 38/49 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

1.2.2016

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 38/49

---

Judgment of the General Court of 9 December 2015 — Comercializadora Eloro v OHIM — Zumex Group (zumex)

(Case T-354/14) (1)

1

((Community trade mark - Opposition proceedings - Application for Community figurative mark ZUMEX - Earlier national figurative mark JUMEX - Lack of genuine use of the earlier mark - Article 42(2) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009))

(2016/C 038/64)

Language of the case: Spanish

Parties

Parties

Applicant: Comercializadora Eloro, SA (Ecatepec, Mexico) (represented by: J. de Castro Hermida, lawyer)

Applicant:

Defendant: Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) (represented by: S. Palmero Cabezas, acting as Agent)

Defendant:

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of OHIM, intervener before the General Court: Zumex Group, SA (Moncada, Spain) (represented by: M.C. March Cabrelles, lawyer)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of OHIM, intervener before the General Court:

Re:

Re:

Action brought against the decision of the First Board of Appeal of OHIM of 13 February 2014 (Case R 391/2012-1), relating to opposition proceedings between Comercializadora Eloro, SA and Zumex Group, SA.

Operative part of the judgment

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | Dismisses the action; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Dismisses the action;

| 2. | Orders Comercializadora Eloro, SA to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Orders Comercializadora Eloro, SA to pay the costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 253, 4.8.2014.

1

---
* P ursuant to 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the lim ited circumstances set forth in 5 T H C IR

. R.

47.5.4. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FIFTH CIRCUIT

_________________

No. 97-41336

Summary Calendar

_________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

TAURUS KARTIK,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Texas

(6:96-CR-59-3)

September 3, 1998

Before EMILIO M. GARZA, DeMOSS, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Taurus Kartik appeals his conviction following a jury trial

for armed robbery of a bus, possession of a firearm during a crime

of violence, and possession of a short-barreled shotgun during a

crime of violence. Kartik argues that the district court’s jury

instruction on duress improperly placed the burden of proof on him

and that, in any event, he demonstrated by a preponderance of the1 To the extent that Kartik argues that we should overrule our prior

case law on duress, we note our firmly established rule that one panel lacks the

power to overrule a binding decision of a prior panel. S ee, e.g., Harris v.

Sentry Title Co., Inc.

, 806 F.2d 1272, 1282 (5th Cir. 1987). Kartik should press

this argument, if he so desires, to this court en banc or to the Supreme Court.

-2- evidence that he acted under duress.

We reject Kartik’s argument that the trial court incorrectly

instructed the jury on duress. In the Fifth Circuit, “justification

defenses are affirmative defenses,” and the burden to establish

each element of the duress defense rests with the defendant. See

United States v. Gant , 691 F.2d 1159, 1165 (5th Cir. 1982). The

trial court drew its instruction fro m the Fifth Circuit pattern

jury instructions and correctly stated our law on duress. 1 See

United States v. Willis , 38 F.3d 170, 179 (5th Cir. 1994).

We also reject Kartik’s argument that he established by a

preponderance of the evidence that he acted under duress. As the

district court noted, the evidence tended to show that Kartik was

under “serious coercion” from the other participants in the bus

robbery. The district court, however, gave Kartik full latitude to

present this argument to the jury; the jury simply rejected it.

Because we review a jury verdict only to determine whether a

rational trier of fact could not have “found the essential elements

of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt,” United States v. Gallo

,

927 F.2d 815, 820 (5th Cir. 1991), we conclude that Kartik’s

challenge to the jury verdict must fail. Moreover, as a legal

matter, in order to succeed on a duress defense, a defendant must

show, inter alia

, that n o opportunity to escape or to avoid the

threatened harm existed. See United States v. Liu

, 960 F.2d 449,-3-

454 (5th Cir. 1992). Kartik had ample opportunity to call the

police in the two days prior to the robbery. See Gant

, 691 F.2d at

1164 (rejecting duress defense because defendant had the

opportunity to call police, but did not do so).

AFFIRMED.
§ 1.1464-1 Refunds or credits. ( a ) *In general.* The refund or credit under chapter 65 of the Code of an overpayment of tax which has actually been withheld at the source under chapter 3 of the Code shall be made to the taxpayer from whose income the amount of such tax was in fact withheld. To the extent that the overpayment under chapter 3 was not in fact withheld at the source, but was paid, by the withholding agent the refund or credit under chapter 65 of the overpayment shall be made to the withholding agent. Thus, where a debtor corporation assumes liability pursuant to its tax-free covenant for the tax required to be withheld under chapter 3 upon interest and pays the tax in behalf of its bondholder, and it can be shown that the bondholder is not in fact liable for any tax, the overpayment of tax shall be credited or refunded to the withholding agent in accordance with chapter 65 since the tax was not actually deducted and withheld from the interest paid to the bondholder. In further illustration, where a withholding agent who is required by chapter 3 to withhold $300 tax from rents paid to a nonresident alien individual mistakenly withholds $320 and mistakenly pays $350 as internal revenue tax, the amount of $30 shall be credited or refunded to the withholding agent in accordance with chapter 65 and the amount of $20 shall be credited or refunded in accordance with such chapter to the person from whose income such amount has been withheld. With respect to section 1446(a), this section applies only to a publicly traded partnership or nominee described in § 1.1446-4 and, with respect to section 1446(f), only to a publicly traded partnership or broker described in § 1.1446(f)-4.
( b ) *Tax repaid to payee.* For purposes of this section and § 1.6414-1, any amount of tax withheld under chapter 3 of the Code, which, pursuant to paragraph (a)(1) of § 1.1461-2, is repaid by the withholding agent to the person from whose income such amount was erroneously withheld shall be considered as tax which, within the meaning of sections 1464 and 6414, was not actually withheld by the withholding agent.
( c ) *Applicability date.* The last sentence of paragraph (a) of this section applies to nominees and publicly traded partnerships described in § 1.1446-4 for partnership taxable years beginning after April 29, 2008, and to brokers required to withhold and publicly traded partnerships liable for underwithholding under § 1.1446(f)-4 on transfers that occur on or after January 1, 2022.
[T.D. 6922, 32 FR 8713, June 17, 1967, as amended by T.D. 8804, 63 FR 72188, Dec. 31, 1998; T.D. 9394, 73 FR 23085, Apr. 29, 2008; 74 FR 14932, Apr. 2, 2009; T.D. 9926, 85 FR 76946, Nov. 30, 2020]
VERDICT CONTRARY TO ALL THE EVIDENCE.

Circuit Court of Cuyahoga County.

#### W. W. McGill v. John A. Weber.

Decided, January 16, 1905.

*Trials*— Compromise *Verdict Set Aside.*

Where the jury returns a verdict which is contrary to the evidence introduced by both plaintiff and defendant it will be set aside.

*Walter C. Ong,*for plaintiff in error.

*Higley & Maurer,*contra.

Winch, J.; Hale, J., and Marvin, J., concur.

The plaintiff in error brought an action in the common pleas court against defendant in error to recover under the statute money claimed to have been lost at gambling; he recovered a verdict upon which judgment was entered for $5(1, which he asks us to set aside as against the weight of the evidence. *We*have *451read all the evidence in the case, and if we are to believe plaintiff’s witnesses, he should have recovered several hundred dollars; if we are to believe defendant’s witnesses, there should have been a verdict for defendant, as he claims plaintiff was indebted to him in the sum of $50; there is no middle ground. Such being the case, it is apparent that the jury absolutely disregarded the evidence in arriving at its conclusion. Whether there was a “guessing match” in the jury-room, as claimed by counsel for plaintiff in error, we do not know; but it is apparent that the verdict is not sustained by the evidence and for that reason it is set aside.

Judgment reversed.
<page> EXHIBIT 32.02



CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In connection with the Quarterly Report of Morgan Stanley
Principal Plus Fund L.P. (the "Partnership") on Form 10-Q for the
quarter ended September 30, 2008, as filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I,
Christian Angstadt, Chief Financial Officer of Demeter Management
Corporation, the general partner of the Partnership, certify,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section
906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of my
knowledge:
(1)	The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section
13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
(2)	The information contained in the Report fairly presents,
in all material respects, the financial condition and
results of operations of the Partnership.









By:  /s/Christian Angstadt

Name:	   Christian Angstadt
Title:  Chief Financial Officer of Demeter Management Corporation,
	   the general partner of the Partnership

Date:   November 13, 2008
#### J. W. RUMSEY, AN INDIVIDUAL TRADING AS RUMSEY AND COMPANY, v. THE UNITED STATES

[No. 43174.

Decided January 9, 1939]

*Mr. John W. Gross*for the plaintiff. *Messrs. Wm. I. Den-ning*and *Olark*Nichols, /r., were on the brief.

*Mr. James J.*Sweeney, with whom was *Mr. Assistant Attorney General Sam E. Whitalcer,*for the defendant.

*263MEMORANDUM

Under the provisions of the contract involved, the plaintiff’s claim was considered by a Board of Changes made up of two representatives of the Navy Department and one representative of the plaintiff. This Board on January 19,1934, found that the plaintiff was entitled to $13,493.36 extra compensation due to the increased cost of cofferdam construction and the “cost of sinking the intake excavation” over and above the originally estimated cost. The site of the work was changed and this change in location brought about the conditions which resulted in extra cost to the plaintiff. Every official of the Navy Department charged with considering and recommending with respect to the claim approved it, and after allowance by the Board a voucher in plaintiff’s favor was issued by the Bureau of Yards and Docks. The General Accounting Office later refused pay*264ment of the same and denied the claim. The General Accounting Office was without jurisdiction to consider it. The contract itself under the facts of this case determined the rights of the parties. *McShain Co.*v. *United*States, 83 C. Cls. 406, and authorities therein cited. The plaintiff is. clearly entitled to the judgment awarded.
Dolan Chemical Laboratory

4001 Bixby Road

Groveport, OH 43125

T: 614-836-4221, Audinet 210-4221

F: 614-836-4168, Audinet 210-4168

http://aepenv/labs

Water Analysis

Form REP-703

Rev. 1, 11/2013

Location: Amos Plant Report Date: 3/11/2014

Sample Number: 140763-001 Date Collected: 03/05/2014 09:38 Date Received: 3/5/2014

Recirculation Pond Outlet at Weir 

Parameter Result Units RL MDL Analysis By Analysis Date/Time Method

Data 

Qual

Mercury, Hg 4.39 ng/L 2 0.8 TLT 03/10/2014 EPA 1631E-2002

Sample Number: 140763-002 Date Collected: 03/05/2014 09:38 Date Received: 3/5/2014

FGD Landfill Discharge to Pond 

Parameter Result Units RL MDL Analysis By Analysis Date/Time Method

Data 

Qual

Mercury, Hg 135 ng/L 50 20 TLT 03/10/2014 EPA 1631E-2002

Sample Number: 140763-003 Date Collected: 03/05/2014 09:55 Date Received: 3/5/2014

WWTP Outlet 

Parameter Result Units RL MDL Analysis By Analysis Date/Time Method

Data 

Qual

Mercury, Hg 144 ng/L 50 20 TLT 03/10/2014 EPA 1631E-2002

Sample Number: 140763-004 Date Collected: 03/05/2014 09:52 Date Received: 3/5/2014

Secondary Clarifier Outlet B 

Parameter Result Units RL MDL Analysis By Analysis Date/Time Method

Data 

Qual

Mercury, Hg 145 ng/L 20 8 TLT 03/10/2014 EPA 1631E-2002

Sample Number: 140763-005 Date Collected: 03/05/2014 09:50 Date Received: 3/5/2014

Secondary Clarifier Outlet A 

Parameter Result Units RL MDL Analysis By Analysis Date/Time Method

Data 

Qual

Mercury, Hg 142 ng/L 20 8 TLT 03/10/2014 EPA 1631E-2002

Sample Number: 140763-006 Date Collected: 03/05/2014 09:58 Date Received: 3/5/2014

Primary Clarifier Outlet B 

Parameter Result Units RL MDL Analysis By Analysis Date/Time Method

Data 

Qual

Mercury, Hg 1350 ng/L 50 20 TLT 03/10/2014 EPA 1631E-2002

Sample Number: 140763-007 Date Collected: 03/05/2014 10:00 Date Received: 3/5/2014

Primary Clarifier Outlet A 

Parameter Result Units RL MDL Analysis By Analysis Date/Time Method

Data 

Qual

Mercury, Hg 1460 ng/L 50 20 TLT 03/10/2014 EPA 1631E-2002

Amos Plant, 140763 Page 1 of 2
Location: Amos Plant Report Date: 3/11/2014

Sample Number: 140763-008 Date Collected: 03/05/2014 10:03 Date Received: 3/5/2014

WWTP Inlet 

Parameter Result Units RL MDL Analysis By Analysis Date/Time Method

Data 

Qual

Mercury, Hg 251000 ng/L 10000 4000 TLT 03/10/2014 EPA 1631E-2002

THIS TEST REPORT RELATES ONLY TO THE ITEMS TESTED AND SHALL NOT BE REPRODUCED EXCEPT IN FULL WITHOUT WRITTEN 

APPROVAL OF THE LABORATORY. ALL TEST RESULTS MEET ALL OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ACCREDITING AUTHORITY, 

UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED.

U: Analyte was analyzed and not detected at or above adjusted Method Detection Limit

J: Analyte was positively identified, though the quantitation was below Reporting Limit.

Brian Snyder, Chemist II

Email bssnyder@aep.com Tel. 614-836-4224

Fax 614-836-4168 Audinet 210-4224

Amos Plant, 140763 Page 2 of 2
#### § 1.263(c)-1 Intangible drilling and development costs in the case of oil and gas wells.

For rules relating to the option to deduct as expenses intangible drilling and development costs in the case of oil and gas wells, see § 1.612-4.