NASA HUMAN 

SPACE 

EXPLORATION

Delay Likely for First 

Exploration Mission

Report to Congressional Committees

April 2017

GAO-17-414

United States Government Accountability Office
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-17-414, a report to 

congressional committees

April 2017

NASA HUMAN SPACE EXPLORATION

Delay Likely for First Exploration Mission

What GAO Found

With less than 2 years until the planned November 2018 launch date for its first 

exploration mission (EM-1), the National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s

(NASA) three human exploration programs—Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle 

(Orion), Space Launch System (SLS), and Exploration Ground Systems (EGS)—

are making progress on their respective systems, but the EM-1 launch date is 

likely unachievable as technical challenges continue to cause schedule delays. 

All three programs face unique challenges in completing development, and each 

has little to no schedule reserve remaining between now and the EM-1 date, 

meaning they will have to complete all remaining work with little margin for error 

for unexpected challenges that may arise. The table below lists the remaining 

schedule reserve for each of the programs.

Schedule Reserve to Exploration Mission 1 for Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle, Space 

Launch System, and Exploration Ground Systems Programs

Program

Schedule reserve to Exploration Mission-1 

(in days)

Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle 0

Space Launch System 80

Exploration Ground Systems 28

Source: GAO Analysis of NASA data | GAO-17-414

The programs all face challenges that may impact their remaining schedule 

reserve. For instance 

• the Orion program’s European Service Module is late and is currently driving 

the program schedule; 

• the SLS program had to stop welding on the core stage—which functions as 

the SLS’s fuel tank and structural backbone—for months after identifying low 

weld strengths. Program officials stated that welding resumed in April 2017 

following the establishment of a corrective action plan;

• the EGS program is considering performing concurrent hardware installation 

and testing, which officials acknowledge would increase complexity; and

• each program must integrate its own hardware and software individually, 

after which EGS is responsible for integrating all three programs’ 

components into one effort at Kennedy Space Center.

Low cost reserves further intensify the schedule pressure. Senior NASA officials 

said they are analyzing the launch schedule and expect that the EM-1 date will 

have to slip, but they have yet to make a decision on the feasibility of the current 

date or report on their findings. With budget discussions currently ongoing for 

fiscal year 2018, the last year prior to launch, Congress does not yet have insight 

into the feasibility of the EM-1 launch date, or the repercussions that any cost 

increase or delays could have in terms of cost and schedule impacts for NASA’s 

entire portfolio. Unless NASA provides Congress with up-to-date information on 

whether the current EM-1 date is still achievable, as of the time the agency 

submits its 2018 budget request, both NASA and Congress will continue to be at 

risk of making decisions based on less than the entire picture and on likely 

unachievable schedules.

View GAO-17-414. For more information, 

contact Cristina Chaplain at (202) 512-4841 or 

chaplainc@gao.gov.

Why GAO Did This Study

NASA is undertaking a trio of closely 

related programs to continue human 

space exploration beyond low-Earth 

orbit: the SLS vehicle; the Orion 

capsule, which will launch atop the 

SLS and carry astronauts; and EGS, 

the supporting ground systems. 

NASA’s current exploration efforts are 

estimated to cost almost $24 billion—to 

include two Orion flights and one each 

for SLS and EGS—and constitute 

more than half of NASA’s current 

portfolio development cost baseline. All 

three programs are necessary for EM1 and are working toward a launch 

readiness date of November 2018. In a

large body of work on this issue, 

including two separate July 2016 

reports, GAO has found that these 

programs have a history of working to 

aggressive schedules. 

The House Committee on 

Appropriations report accompanying 

H.R. 2578 included a provision for 

GAO to assess the acquisition 

progress of the Orion, SLS, and EGS, 

programs. This report assesses the 

extent to which these programs have 

risks that affect their progress toward 

meeting their commitments for EM-1. 

To do this work, GAO assessed 

documentation on schedule and 

program risks and interviewed program 

and NASA officials. 

What GAO Recommends

NASA should confirm whether the 

current EM-1 date is still achievable no 

later than as part of its fiscal year 2018 

budget submission, and propose a 

new, realistic EM-1 launch readiness 

date, if warranted, and report its 

findings to Congress. NASA concurred 

with both recommendations and 

agreed that EM-1 will be delayed.
Page i GAO-17-414 Exploration Programs’ Progress

Letter 1

Background 3

Ongoing Delays Foreshadow a Likely Schedule Slip as NASA 

Reassesses the Launch Readiness Date 7

Conclusions 14

Recommendations for Executive Action 15

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 15

Appendix I Objective, Scope, and Methodology 17

Appendix II Comments from the National Aeronautics and Space Administration 18

Appendix III GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 20

Table

Table 1: Cost and Schedule Baselines for National Aeronautics 

and Space Administration Human Exploration Programs 6

Figures

Figure 1: Space Launch System and Orion Multi-Purpose Crew 

Vehicle Hardware 4

Figure 2: Select Components of Exploration Ground Systems 

Program 5

Contents
Page ii GAO-17-414 Exploration Programs’ Progress

Abbreviations

EGS Exploration Ground Systems

EM-1 Exploration Mission 1 

EM-2 Exploration Mission 2 

ESA European Space Agency

ESM European service module 

NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration 

Orion Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle 

SLS Space Launch System

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety 

without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain 

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necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately.
Page 1 GAO-17-414 Exploration Programs’ Progress

441 G St. N.W.

Washington, DC 20548

April 27, 2017

The Honorable Richard Shelby

Chairman

The Honorable Jeanne Shaheen

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies

Committee on Appropriations

United States Senate

The Honorable John Culberson

Chairman

The Honorable José Serrano

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies

Committee on Appropriations

House of Representatives

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is developing 

the Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle (Orion) and its first explorationclass heavy-lift launch vehicle—the Space Launch System (SLS)—in over 

40 years, along with the Exploration Ground Systems (EGS) program that 

provides the necessary ground support equipment. While NASA intends 

for the Orion, SLS, and EGS programs to provide an important capability 

for human exploration missions, the agency’s more recent attempts to 

develop vehicles to transport humans beyond low-Earth orbit have 

ultimately been unsuccessful. Prior programs have been canceled after 

facing acquisition problems and funding-related issues. NASA’s current 

exploration efforts are estimated to cost almost $24 billion—to include two 

Orion flights and one each for SLS and EGS—and constitute more than 

half of NASA’s current portfolio development cost baseline. All three 

programs are necessary for the first integrated test flight, Exploration 

Mission 1 (EM-1), and are working toward a launch readiness date of 

November 2018.

GAO has designated NASA’s management of acquisitions as a high-risk 

area for more than two decades. In February 2017, we found that the 

agency has maintained progress in reducing risk on major projects after 

previously struggling with poor cost estimation, weak oversight, and risk 

Letter
Page 2 GAO-17-414 Exploration Programs’ Progress

underestimation.1 However, we also found that while the Orion, SLS, and 

EGS programs are generally better positioned for success than past 

crewed vehicle efforts, management weaknesses—including overly 

ambitious schedules, unreliable cost estimating, limited reserves, and 

operating for extended periods of time without definitized contracts—have 

increased the likelihood that the programs will incur schedule delays and 

cost overruns, particularly when coupled with the technical risks that are 

inherent in any human spaceflight development.

As we have found in our prior work, the Orion, SLS, and EGS programs 

have encountered cost and schedule challenges.2 The House Committee 

on Appropriations included a provision in its 2015 report for GAO to 

review the acquisition progress of NASA’s human exploration programs, 

including Orion, SLS, and ground systems.3 This report assesses the 

extent to which the Orion, SLS, and EGS programs have risks that affect 

progress toward meeting their schedule and cost commitments for EM-1.

To assess the programs’ progress against their EM -1 cost and schedule 

commitments, we compared current program status data against the 

programs’ cost and schedule baselines. To assess the risks for the Orion, 

SLS, and EGS programs, we obtained and reviewed quarterly reports and 

the programs’ risk registers and met with relevant program and contractor 

officials regarding program risks and impacts in order to understand the 

programs’ risks, the potential impacts, and program mitigation plans. To 

evaluate the programs’ performance in preparing for EM-1, we reviewed 

program plans and schedules and compared that data and information to 

quarterly program status reviews and program update briefings to assess 

whether program components and software were progressing as 

expected. We also compared current program data against program 

 1

GAO, High Risk Series: Progress on Many High-Risk Areas, While Substantial Efforts 

Needed on Others, GAO-17-317 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 15, 2017).

2

GAO, Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle: Action Needed to Improve Visibility into Cost, 

Schedule, and Capacity to Resolve Technical Challenges, GAO-16-620 (Washington, 

D.C.: July 27, 2016) and NASA Human Space Exploration: Opportunity Nears to 

Reassess Launch Vehicle and Ground Systems Cost and Schedule, GAO-16-612 

(Washington, D.C.: July 27, 2016).

3

H.R. Rep. No. 114-130, at 60-61 (2015), accompanying H.R. 2578. The Ground Systems 

Development and Operations program includes both the 21st Century Space Launch 

Complex Initiative and the EGS appropriation. For the purposes of this report, we refer to 

EGS as a program because NASA approved cost and schedule baselines specific to the 

EGS effort and NASA’s budget request refers to it as a program.
Page 3 GAO-17-414 Exploration Programs’ Progress

budget information to assess funding needs and cost growth. To assess 

the availability of the programs’ cost and schedule reserves, we analyzed 

its budget documentation and interviewed program management from all 

three programs to discuss the programs’ budget and reserve postures. 

For more information on our scope and methodology, see appendix I.

We conducted this performance audit from July 2016 to April 2017 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives.

The NASA Authorization Act of 2010 directed NASA to develop a Space 

Launch System, to continue development of a crew vehicle, and prepare 

infrastructure at Kennedy Space Center to enable processing and launch 

of the launch system.4 To fulfill this direction, NASA formally established 

the SLS program in 2011. Then, in 2012, the Orion project transitioned 

from its development under the Constellation program—a program that 

was intended to be the successor to the Space Shuttle but was canceled 

in 2010 due to factors that included cost and schedule growth—to a new 

development program aligned with SLS. To transition Orion from 

Constellation, NASA adapted the requirements from the former Orion 

plan with those of the newly created SLS and the associated ground 

systems programs. In addition, NASA and the European Space Agency 

(ESA) agreed that ESA would provide a portion of the service module for 

Orion. Figure 1 provides details about the heritage of each SLS hardware 

element and its source as well as identifies the major portions of the 

Orion crew vehicle.

 4

Pub. L. No. 111-267, §§ 302, 303, 305.

Background
Page 4 GAO-17-414 Exploration Programs’ Progress

Figure 1: Space Launch System and Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle Hardware

The EGS program was established to renovate portions of the Kennedy 

Space Center to prepare for integrating hardware from the three 

programs as well as launching SLS and Orion. EGS is made up of nine 

major components, including: the Vehicle Assembly Building, Mobile 

Launcher, software, Launch Pad 39B, Crawler-Transporter, Launch 

Equipment Test Facility, Spacecraft Offline Processing, Launch Vehicle 
Page 5 GAO-17-414 Exploration Programs’ Progress

Offline Processing, and Landing and Recovery. See figure 2 for pictures 

of the Mobile Launcher, Vehicle Assembly Building, Launch Pad 39B, and 

Crawler-Transporter.

Figure 2: Select Components of Exploration Ground Systems Program
Page 6 GAO-17-414 Exploration Programs’ Progress

NASA established an agency baseline commitment—the cost and 

schedule baselines against which the program may be measured—for 

each program. NASA has committed to be ready to conduct one test 

flight, EM-1, no later than November 2018. During EM-1, the SLS vehicle 

is scheduled to launch an uncrewed Orion to a distant orbit some 70,000 

kilometers beyond the moon. All three programs—SLS, Orion, and 

EGS—must be ready on or before this launch readiness date to support 

this integrated test flight. While the SLS and EGS program cost and 

schedule baselines are tied to the uncrewed EM-1 mission, the Orion 

program’s cost and schedule baselines are tied to a second, crewed 

mission—EM-2. See table 1 for program baseline information.

Table 1: Cost and Schedule Baselines for National Aeronautics and Space Administration Human Exploration Programs

NASA human exploration programs Agency baseline commitment

Exploration Mission (EM) 1 

Launch Readiness Date

Exploration Mission (EM) 2 

Launch Readiness Date

Cost (in billions 

of dollars)

Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle —a April 2023 11.3 

Space Launch System November 2018 — 9.7 

Exploration Ground Systems November 2018 — 2.8 

Source: GAO presentation of NASA data | GAO-17-414

a

The Orion program will participate in EM-1 and is working toward a November 2018 launch 

readiness date, but is baselined to EM-2.

All three programs are entering the integration and test phase of the 

development life cycle—which our prior work has shown to be when 

problems are commonly found and schedules tend to slip. In general, 

programs have schedule and cost reserves in order to address 

challenges that arise during development. Funded schedule reserve is 

extra time, with the money to pay for it, in the program’s overall schedule 

in the event that there are delays or unforeseen problems. Cost reserves 

are additional funds that can be used to mitigate problems during the 

development of a program. For example, cost reserves can be used to 

buy additional materials to replace a component or, if a program needs to 

preserve schedule, cost reserves can be used to accelerate work by 

adding extra shifts to expedite manufacturing and save time.
Page 7 GAO-17-414 Exploration Programs’ Progress

With less than two years until the committed November 2018 launch 

readiness date for EM-1, the three human exploration programs—Orion, 

SLS, and EGS—are making progress, but schedule pressure is 

escalating as technical challenges continue to cause schedule delays. All 

three programs face development challenges in completing work, and 

each has little to no schedule reserve remaining to the EM-1 date—

meaning they will have to complete all remaining work with minimal delay 

during the most challenging stage of development. This includes 

completing design, production, and integration work at each program as 

well as integrating the hardware and software from the three programs in 

preparation for launch. Integration and testing is the phase where 

problems are most likely to be found, and the amount of potential 

problems is increased due to the two levels of integration—each 

inherently complex program must be integrated individually and then as 

an interdependent, combined enterprise. Because all three programs 

must be ready for launch to occur, a redesign of a single program’s 

component, a test failure, or a significant hardware or software integration 

issue in any one area could delay the launch readiness date for all three 

programs.

The schedule pressure is intensified by the low levels of cost reserves 

held by all three programs to mitigate problems during development. In 

some cases, however, even if the programs held higher levels of cost 

reserves, using them to gain back schedule would be difficult because—

at this late stage of development—work has become more sequential and 

there are fewer opportunities for workarounds, which the programs have 

relied on until now to preserve schedule. With little to no schedule or cost 

reserves remaining as the programs finalize production and enter 

integration and testing activities, the EM-1 launch readiness date is in a 

precarious position. While NASA officials told us they are assessing 

factors that could contribute to an EM-1 schedule slip, they have not 

committed to a timeline for completing that assessment or proposing an 

amended launch schedule, if needed. Therefore, it is unclear when 

Congress will be informed of NASA’s findings and any impact those 

findings might have on NASA’s fiscal year 2018 budget request.

Ongoing Delays 

Foreshadow a Likely 

Schedule Slip as 

NASA Reassesses 

the Launch 

Readiness Date
Page 8 GAO-17-414 Exploration Programs’ Progress

Since we last reported on the human exploration programs in July 2016, 

the programs have made progress toward completing development, 

including the following:5

• Orion: After changing the heatshield design following a December 

2014 test flight in which NASA determined that not all aspects of the 

original monolithic design would meet the more stringent requirements 

for EM-1 and EM-2 when the capsule will be exposed to greater 

temperature variance and longer durations, the Orion program and 

contractor reported that production of heatshield blocks is underway 

and production quality is very high.6 Orion officials also stated that the 

risks associated with the ESM main engine—a heritage in-space 

maneuvering engine from the Space Shuttle program—have been 

largely addressed. The program was concerned with the state of 

internal components given their age; however, the engines have 

completed rounds of acceptance and vibration testing following 

replacement of valves and other components. In addition, the program

and contractor stated that they have addressed all probable causes of 

crew module airbag anomalies from the December 2014 test flight. 

These bags are designed to inflate upon touchdown in the ocean to 

properly orient the crew module; however, some did not properly 

inflate or leaked due in part to the bags inflating before they were 

outside of the vehicle, which placed the bags under stress. While the 

root cause for the failures remains unknown, given the mitigation 

steps being taken, program officials now have high confidence in the 

system’s performance going forward.

• SLS: Program officials stated that the solid rocket boosters have 

completed the second of two planned qualification tests and that the 

program has also implemented a design change to address an issue 

where the solid rocket propellant might loosen from the insulation on 

the inside of the booster casing, which may increase the risk of 

booster failure. The program office is performing analysis to ensure 

the mitigation meets expected safety margins. The program is 

producing test and flight unit core stage hardware and, according to 

program officials, has made progress manufacturing panels which will 

be bolted together to create the intertank section of the core stage. 

They also stated that early attempts to bend some of the thick 

 5

GAO-16-620 and GAO-16-612.

6

The heatshield will be capable of withstanding temperatures of up to 5,000 degrees 

Fahrenheit and will protect the Orion crew module during re-entry into Earth’s atmosphere.
Page 9 GAO-17-414 Exploration Programs’ Progress

materials necessary for the core stage led to unrepairable cracks, but 

the contractor has updated its processes, which has allowed recently 

produced panels to pass inspections. The program has also begun 

integrated structural testing of its EM-1 in-space propulsion stage, 

Launch Vehicle Stage Adapter, and Orion Stage Adapter.

• EGS: Program officials stated that work for the Crawler Transporter 

and Launch Vehicle Offline Processing facility is complete. In addition, 

all 10 of the platforms that will allow access to the integrated SLS and 

Orion vehicles during final assembly in the Vehicle Assembly Building 

have been installed, according to EGS officials. Additionally, they 

have started verification and validation, the process by which the 

program assesses whether systems are capable of meeting their 

intended purpose and are being developed according to agency 

requirements, at the Multi-Payload Processing Facility—where 

spacecraft fueling will be performed. Program officials stated that 8 of 

the 20 pieces of launch equipment and accessories—for example, 

umbilical connections from the launch tower to the vehicle—have 

been built, finished testing, and are ready for installation onto the 

Mobile Launcher.

The magnitude of the schedule delays that the programs have 

experienced amid this progress, however, foreshadows a likely schedule 

slip for the November 2018 EM-1 launch readiness date. In addition, each 

program is facing risks that will likely consume what little schedule 

reserve exists, and low cost reserves limit mitigation options to achieve 

the planned launch readiness date. These ongoing challenges include the 

following:

Orion: The Orion program has no schedule reserve to EM-1 and the 

delivery of the European Service Module (ESM) and completion of flight 

software are the primary and secondary critical paths—or the path of 

longest duration through the sequence of activities that determines the 

earliest completion date—for both Orion and EM-1 as a whole. In 

December 2015, Orion officials stated that the program had zero 

schedule reserve to EM-1 and we reported in July 2016 that the program 

had already experienced several ESM development delays that impacted 

the ESM delivery, and that further delays could cause the EM-1 launch to 

slip.7 As of the ESM’s critical design review in summer 2016, ESA has 

delayed ESM delivery to the Orion program from January 2017 to April 

2017, and senior NASA officials stated the delivery will likely slip to 

 7

GAO-16-620.
Page 10 GAO-17-414 Exploration Programs’ Progress

August 2017 or later. Program officials stated that the delays are largely 

due to NASA, ESA, and the ESA contractor underestimating the time and 

effort necessary to address design issues for the first production ESM 

and the availability of parts from suppliers and subcontractors. For 

example, the contractor found welding failures in the ESM’s propulsion 

tanks, and a number of parts deliveries have been late.

Orion program officials told us that following delivery from ESA, they will 

need the service module for 12 months for integration with the crew 

module and testing prior to providing the completed Orion spacecraft to 

the ground systems at Kennedy Space Center. This means if ESA’s 

delivery date of the service module slips to August 2017, the Orion 

program will not be ready to deliver Orion to Kennedy Space Center until 

August 2018. NASA officials stated that they would not be able to 

maintain a launch readiness date of November 2018 if Kennedy Space 

Center receives the Orion spacecraft after July 2018. As a result, the 

November 2018 launch readiness date is likely unachievable unless 

NASA identifies further mitigation steps to accommodate delays.

In addition, the Orion program faces a number of other technical 

challenges including software delays and hardware design, but has 

limited cost reserves to address them until fiscal year 2018 when more 

cost reserves will be available. As we found in July 2016, the Orion 

program continues to employ most of its available budget to fund current 

work and holds most of its cost reserves in fiscal years 2019 and 2020.8

Program officials told us that the Orion program is schedule-constrained 

at this point, meaning that even if additional funding were available, it 

could not alleviate all schedule pressure to EM-1.

SLS: The SLS program currently reports having the most program-level 

schedule reserve of the three programs—approximately 80 days—

however, schedule pressure is mounting as the program completes 

production and integration and test events grow near. Development of the 

core stage—which functions as the SLS’s fuel tank and structural 

backbone—is the program’s critical path, meaning any delay in its 

development reduces schedule reserves for the whole program. A 

number of important events must successfully take place before the core 

stage, or the vehicle at large, are ready for EM-1. First, the contractor is 

scheduled to complete production of the core stage flight unit and deliver 

 8

GAO-16-620.
Page 11 GAO-17-414 Exploration Programs’ Progress

it to Stennis Space Center for testing by September 2017. However, 

officials stated that they have exhausted schedule reserve for this delivery

date to address “expected unknowns” with hardware processing due to 

this being the first time they have built the core stage. Further, according 

to officials, welding on the core stage was stopped for months due to low 

weld strength in the liquid oxygen and liquid hydrogen tanks caused by a 

program and contractor decision to change the weld tool configuration 

during fabrication. The altered configuration produced different welds that 

the program has had to confirm are within specification. While officials 

indicate that they now have a corrective action plan in place, and welding 

resumed in April 2017, they did not provide detail on the impact to 

program schedule reserve.

Once production of the core stage flight unit is complete, the program 

plans to deliver it to Stennis Space Center for testing. At Stennis Space 

Center, the core stage will be filled with cryogenic hydrogen and oxygen 

for the first time—a considerable process on its own, as officials stated 

they were finding and mitigating hydrogen leaks for the entire life of the 

Shuttle program—and will undergo a “green run” test. During the green 

run, the core stage flight model—integrated with four RS-25 engines—will 

be fired for about 500 seconds to test a flight-like engine-use profile. 

Following this, the program has 20 days of reserves—less any delivery 

delays and delays from issues that arise during testing—from the 

completion of the green run test until it must be shipped to Kennedy 

Space Center to begin integration with the boosters, upper stage, and 

Orion as well as all EGS equipment. Should further challenges arise 

during final production and testing, the program’s 80 days of reserve will 

likely be reduced.

As we found in July 2016, NASA baselined the SLS program with cost 

reserves of less than 2 percent, even though guidance for Marshall Space 

Flight Center—the NASA center with responsibility for the SLS program—

establishes standard cost reserves for launch vehicle programs of 20 

percent when the baseline is approved.9 NASA has not changed its cost

reserve posture for this program since that time, meaning the program 

still has limited cost reserves to address risks and challenges.

 9

GAO-16-612 and Marshall Space Flight Center, Marshall Procedural Requirements, 

7120.1, Chapter 17 (Aug. 26, 2014). 
Page 12 GAO-17-414 Exploration Programs’ Progress

EGS: EGS program officials stated they used the majority of the 6 months 

of schedule reserve the program had when we reported in July 2016 to 

address, among other issues, complications at the Launch Equipment 

Test Facility and with the Mobile Launcher’s ground support equipment 

installation.10 The program now has 28 days of schedule reserve, which 

program officials stated is being held for integrated operations before EM1, and zero days remaining for any further delays for EGS-specific 

projects. Without any schedule margin remaining for the EGS-specific 

projects, the program will be challenged to complete its remaining work 

that includes umbilical testing, ground support equipment and umbilical 

installation, and verification and validation testing. These efforts all carry 

schedule risks with expected delays that, if not mitigated, total 14 months. 

Program officials stated that they are actively trying to mitigate these 

schedule risks; however, they acknowledged that some mitigation tactics 

they are considering—such as performing some portion of these efforts 

concurrently—increase the complexity of these efforts. In addition, EGS 

officials indicated they are planning to consolidate some verification and 

validation testing to streamline the test flow, which they said would 

increase schedule risk but not technical risk. The program is also 

considering implementing additional work shifts to create additional 

schedule margin. The internal EGS delays and the cascading delays from 

Orion and SLS that EGS may have to absorb—as the program 

responsible for final integration of the three programs—contribute to 

NASA likely not achieving the November 2018 launch readiness date.

Similar to Orion and SLS, we previously found in July 2016 that the EGS 

program is operating with limited cost reserves to address future 

construction and software risks.11 For example, we found that when 

NASA approved the program’s baseline, the program had cost reserves 

of only 4 percent. While Kennedy Space Center—which is responsible for 

the EGS program—does not have cost reserve guidance in place, 

guidance from other NASA centers establishes higher levels of cost 

 10GAO-16-612.

11GAO-16-612.
Page 13 GAO-17-414 Exploration Programs’ Progress

reserves at this stage of development.12 Further, according to EGS 

officials, the program used all of its fiscal year 2017 reserves in recent 

years, and has limited reserves in fiscal year 2018, hindering EGS’s 

ability to address any remaining challenges.

GAO’s work on acquisition best practices has shown that success in 

development efforts such as these programs depends on establishing an 

executable business case based on matching requirements and 

resources before committing to a new product development effort.

13 In our 

prior reviews of NASA’s human exploration programs, we have found that 

all three programs have been using aggressive schedules and that SLS 

and EGS have low reserve levels compared to NASA standards.14 We 

have also previously found that both SLS and Orion cost and schedule 

estimates—which inform their cost and schedule baselines—were 

unreliable when compared to best practices.15

In July 2016, we recommended that the NASA administrator direct the 

Human Exploration and Operations Mission Directorate to re-evaluate 

SLS and EGS cost reserves as it finalized its schedule and plans for EM1 during a planned build-to-synchronization review—in summer 2016—in 

order to take advantage of all available time and resources and maximize 

the benefit of available cost reserves, and to verify that the November 

2018 launch readiness date remained feasible.16 This review was 

intended to demonstrate that the integrated launch vehicle, crew vehicle, 

and ground systems will perform as expected to meet EM-1 objectives. 

NASA concurred with our recommendation and as of January 2017, 

senior NASA officials told us that they have reordered integration 

 12Marshall Space Flight Center—the NASA center with responsibility for SLS—guidance 

establishes cost reserves at this stage of development of 20 percent, and Goddard Space 

Flight Center—the NASA center with responsibility for managing other complex NASA 

programs such as the James Webb Space Telescope—requires 25 percent cost reserves 

at this stage. Marshall Space Flight Center Procedural Requirements, 7120.1, Chapter 17 

(Aug. 26, 2014) and Goddard Space Flight Center, Goddard Procedural Requirements 

7120.7 (May 4, 2008).

13GAO, Best Practices: Better Acquisition Outcomes Are Possible If DOD Can Apply 

Lessons from F/A-22 Program, GAO-03-645T (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 11, 2003).

14GAO-16-620 and GAO-16-612.

15GAO, Space Launch System: Management Tools Should Better Track to Cost and 

Schedule Commitments to Adequately Monitor Increasing Risk, GAO-15-596 

(Washington, D.C.: July 16, 2015) and GAO-16-620.

16GAO-16-612.
Page 14 GAO-17-414 Exploration Programs’ Progress

activities to try to meet the EM-1 launch schedule, but further analysis 

indicates that they will have to delay the launch readiness date. These 

officials stated that no decision has been made and NASA has not 

committed to a timeline in which to report its findings. Fiscal year 2018 is 

the last year before the November 2018 EM-1 launch readiness date. 

With fiscal year 2018 budget discussions ongoing, until it receives 

updated EM-1 schedule information, the Congress will be in the position 

of determining NASA’s appropriations based on a launch readiness date 

that is likely not achievable.

Should NASA determine it is likely to exceed its cost estimate baseline by 

15 percent or miss a milestone by 6 months or more, NASA is required to 

report those increases and delays—along with their impacts—to the 

Congress.17 Given that these three human space exploration programs 

represent more than half of NASA’s current portfolio development cost 

baseline, a cost increase or delay could have substantial repercussions 

for not only these programs but NASA’s entire portfolio. A principle of 

federal internal controls is that managers should externally communicate 

the necessary quality information to achieve an entity’s objective and 

address related risks.18 If NASA’s ongoing assessment of the November 

2018 EM-1 launch readiness date reveals that a new, more realistic, date 

is warranted, prolonging any decisions regarding the extent of delays and 

cost overruns—no matter the magnitude—until after deliberations on 

NASA’s fiscal year 2018 budget request would increase the risk that both 

NASA and the Congress continue making decisions potentially involving 

hundreds of millions of taxpayer dollars based on schedules that may no 

longer be feasible.

Human spaceflight and exploration programs are complex and require 

significant time and effort to design and develop hardware and software. 

While the Orion, SLS, and EGS programs are working toward a target 

EM-1 launch readiness date of November 2018, the threats to each 

program’s schedule continue to mount, and the schedule reserve of each 

program is either very limited or nonexistent. In addition, as the target 

EM-1 launch readiness date nears—now less than two years away—the 

flexibility of the schedule to allow for replanning is likewise reduced. To 

 1751 U.S.C. § 30104(e).

18GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, GAO-14-704G 

(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 10, 2014).

Conclusions
Page 15 GAO-17-414 Exploration Programs’ Progress

this point, the programs have replanned program-level efforts and 

scheduled concurrent work despite the risks involved, and NASA is 

replanning integration efforts at the enterprise-level in an attempt to find 

additional schedule margin. However, beyond that, the programs have 

little to no cost reserves remaining to deal with challenges that may arise. 

By continuing to work toward this deadline, these programs are 

positioned to make potentially risky decisions in attempting to meet a 

schedule that is likely unachievable. Until NASA completes an analysis of 

factors that could contribute to an EM-1 schedule slip and reports on the 

feasibility of either its current or revised schedule, program managers will 

remain under pressure to achieve a goal that may be untenable, and the 

Congress will continue to base important budget decisions on an unclear 

picture of the time and money needed to support future human space 

exploration efforts.

In order to ensure that the Congress is able to make informed resource 

decisions regarding a viable EM-1 launch readiness date, we recommend 

that the NASA Administrator or Acting Administrator direct the Human 

Exploration and Operations Mission Directorate to take the following two 

actions:

• Confirm whether the EM-1 launch readiness date of November 2018 

is achievable, as soon as practicable but no later than as part of its 

fiscal year 2018 budget submission process; and

• Propose a new, more realistic EM-1 date if warranted and report to 

Congress on the results of its EM-1 schedule analysis.

NASA provided written comments on a draft of this report. In the written 

comments, NASA concurred with both recommendations and stated that 

maintaining the November 2018 launch readiness date is no longer in the 

best interest of the programs. Further, NASA stated that it is reassessing

the launch readiness schedule and anticipates proposing a new date by 

September 2017. These comments are reprinted in Appendix II. NASA 

also provided technical comments, which were incorporated as 

appropriate.

In its response, NASA stated that “many of the specific concerns 

referenced in the report are no longer concerns, and new ones have 

appeared and caution should be used in referencing the report on the 

specific technical issues, but the overall conclusions are valid.” We agree 

with NASA that the situation with these programs is dynamic and that 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action

Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation
Page 16 GAO-17-414 Exploration Programs’ Progress

risks and challenges change over time. However, in commenting on the 

report, NASA did not provide us with evidence that they have overcome 

specific technical issues that we highlight. Further, in at least the instance 

of the European Service Module, the situation has deteriorated for the 

program since we sent the draft copy of the report to NASA for comment. 

At the time we sent the report for comment, the delivery date for the 

service module was April 2017, and officials anticipated it could slip to 

August 2017 or later. The delivery date is now September 2017 with a 

risk of an additional 2-month delay. We continue to believe that NASA is 

facing several technical issues across all three programs that will 

contribute to a delay for Exploration Mission-1.

We are sending copies of this report to NASA’s Acting Administrator and 

to appropriate congressional committees. In addition, the report is 

available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact 

me at (202) 512-4841 or chaplainc@gao.gov. Contact points for our 

Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on 

the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this 

report are listed in appendix II.

Cristina T. Chaplain

Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management
Appendix I: Objective, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 17 GAO-17-414 Exploration Programs’ Progress

To assess the extent to which the National Aeronautics and Space 

Administration’s (NASA) Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle (Orion), 

Space Launch System (SLS), and Exploration Ground Systems (EGS) 

programs have risks that affect their progress towards meeting their 

Exploration Mission 1 (EM-1) cost and schedule commitments, we 

compared current program status information against program cost and 

schedule baselines. To assess the risks for the Orion, SLS, and EGS 

programs and the extent to which those risks may impact cost and 

schedule commitments, we obtained and reviewed quarterly reports and 

the programs’ risk registers, which list the top program risks and their 

potential cost and schedule impacts, including mitigation efforts to-date. 

We interviewed program and contractor officials on technical risks, 

potential impacts, and risk mitigation efforts underway and planned. To 

evaluate the program’s performance in preparing for EM-1, we reviewed 

program plans and schedules and compared them to actual program 

performance data found in quarterly program status reviews and program 

update briefings to assess whether program components and software 

were progressing as expected. We also compared current program data 

against program budget information to assess funding needs and cost 

growth. To determine the programs’ cost and schedule posture and to 

assess the availability of the programs’ cost and schedule reserves 

approaching EM-1, we analyzed its budget documentation, interviewed 

program officials from all three programs with insight into the programs’

budget and schedule and discussed how reserves were being used to 

mitigate known risks. Our work was performed at Johnson Space Center 

in Houston, Texas; Marshall Space Flight Center in Huntsville, Alabama; 

Kennedy Space Center in Titusville, Florida; Lockheed Martin Space 

Systems Company in Houston, Texas; and NASA headquarters in 

Washington, DC.

We conducted this performance audit from July 2016 to April 2017 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives.

Appendix I: Objective, Scope, and 

Methodology
Appendix II: Comments from the National 

Aeronautics and Space Administration

Page 18 GAO-17-414 Exploration Programs’ Progress

Appendix II: Comments from the National 

Aeronautics and Space Administration
Appendix II: Comments from the National 

Aeronautics and Space Administration

Page 19 GAO-17-414 Exploration Programs’ Progress
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

Page 20 GAO-17-414 Exploration Programs’ Progress

Cristina T. Chaplain (202) 512-4841 or chaplainc@gao.gov.

In addition to the contact named above, LaTonya Miller (Assistant 

Director), Molly Traci (Assistant Director), Juli Digate, Susan Ditto, Laura 

Greifner, Carrie Rogers, Ryan Stott, Roxanna T. Sun, and Marie Ahearn

made key contributions to this report.

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

GAO Contact

Staff 

Acknowledgments

(100996)
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