Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 179 / Wednesday, September 16, 2015 / Rules and Regulations 55521 

FIGURE 3 TO PARAGRAPH (g) OF THIS AD—AUXILIARY POWER UNIT (APU) FUEL SHUTOFF VALVE POSITION INDICATION

OPERATIONAL CHECK

AWL No. Task Interval Applicability Description 

28–AWL–APU ....... ALI 10 DAYS ............................

INTERVAL NOTE: The 

operational check is not 

required on days when 

the airplane is not used 

in revenue service. The 

operational check must 

be done before further 

flight with an operational 

APU if it has been 10 or 

more calendar days 

since last check. 

ALL ....................................

APPLICABILITY NOTE: 

Applies to airplanes with 

an actuator installed at 

the APU fuel shutoff 

valve position having 

part number (P/N) 

MA20A2027 

(S343T003–56) or 

MA30A1001 

(S343T003–66). 

APU Fuel Shutoff Valve Position Indication Operational Check 

Concern: The APU fuel shutoff valve actuator design 

can result in airplanes operating with a failed APU 

fuel shutoff valve actuator that is not reported. A latently failed APU fuel shutoff valve actuator could 

prevent fuel shutoff to the APU. In the event of certain APU fires, the potential exists for an APU fire to 

be uncontrollable. 

Perform the operational check of the APU fuel shutoff 

valve position indication (unless checked by the 

flightcrew in a manner approved by the principal operations inspector). 

A. Do an operational check of the APU fuel shutoff 

valve position indication. 

1. If the APU is running, unload and shut down the 

APU using standard practices. 

2. Supply electrical power to the airplane using standard practices. 

3. Make sure the APU FIRE switch on the Aft Aisle 

Stand is in the NORMAL (IN) position. 

4. Make sure there is at least 1,000 lbs (500 kgs) of 

fuel in the Left Main Tank. 

5. Move APU Selector switch on the Overhead Panel 

to the ON position and wait approximately 10 seconds once the FUEL CONTROL switch is in the 

RUN position or the APU selector switch on the 

overhead panel is in the ON position. 

6. Move the APU Selector switch on the Overhead 

Panel to the OFF position. 

7. Verify the APU FAULT light on the Overhead Panel 

illuminates and then goes off. 

8. If the test fails (light fails to illuminate), before further flight requiring APU availability, repair faults as 

required (refer to Boeing AMM 28–25–02). 

NOTE: Dispatch may be permitted per MMEL 28–25– 

02 if APU is not required for flight. 

(h) No Alternative Actions or Intervals 

After accomplishment of the maintenance 

or inspection program revision required by 

paragraph (g) of this AD, no alternative 

actions (e.g., inspections) or intervals may be 

used unless the actions or intervals are 

approved as an alternative method of 

compliance (AMOC) in accordance with the 

procedures specified in paragraph (i)(1) of 

this AD. 

(i) Alternative Methods of Compliance 

(AMOCs) 

(1) The Manager, Seattle Aircraft 

Certification Office (ACO) FAA, has the 

authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if 

requested using the procedures found in 14 

CFR 39.19. In accordance with 14 CFR 39.19, 

send your request to your principal inspector 

or local Flight Standards District Office, as 

appropriate. If sending information directly 

to the manager of the ACO, send it to the 

attention of the person identified in 

paragraph (j) of this AD. Information may be 

emailed to: 9-ANM-Seattle-ACO-AMOCRequests@faa.gov. 

(2) Before using any approved AMOC, 

notify your appropriate principal inspector, 

or lacking a principal inspector, the manager 

of the local flight standards district office/

certificate holding district office. 

(j) Related Information 

For more information about this AD, 

contact Rebel Nichols, Aerospace Engineer, 

Propulsion Branch, ANM–140S, FAA, Seattle 

Aircraft Certification Office, 1601 Lind 

Avenue SW., Renton, WA 98057–3356; 

phone: 425–917–6509; fax: 425–917–6590; 

email: rebel.nichols@faa.gov. 

(k) Material Incorporated by Reference 

None. 

Issued in Renton, Washington, on 

September 7, 2015. 

Jeffrey E. Duven, 

Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, 

Aircraft Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. 2015–23119 Filed 9–15–15; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 39 

[Docket No. FAA–2013–1071; Directorate 

Identifier 2013–NM–204–AD; Amendment 

39–18264; AD 2015–19–01] 

RIN 2120–AA64 

Airworthiness Directives; The Boeing 

Company Airplanes 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Final rule. 

SUMMARY: We are adopting a new 

airworthiness directive (AD) for certain 

The Boeing Company Model 777 

airplanes. This AD was prompted by 

reports of latently failed fuel shutoff 

valves discovered during fuel filter 

replacement. This AD requires revising 

the maintenance or inspection program 

to include a new airworthiness 

limitation. We are issuing this AD to 

detect and correct latent failures of the 


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fuel shutoff valve to the engine, which 

could result in the inability to shut off 

fuel to the engine and, in case of certain 

engine fires, an uncontrollable fire that 

could lead to wing failure. 

DATES: This AD is effective October 21, 

2015. 

Examining the AD Docket 

You may examine the AD docket on 

the Internet at http://

www.regulations.gov by searching for 

and locating Docket No. FAA–2013– 

1071; or in person at the Docket 

Management Facility between 9 a.m. 

and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, 

except Federal holidays. The AD docket 

contains this AD, the regulatory 

evaluation, any comments received, and 

other information. The address for the 

Docket Office (phone: 800–647–5527) is 

Docket Management Facility, U.S. 

Department of Transportation, Docket 

Operations, M–30, West Building 

Ground Floor, Room W12–140, 1200 

New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, 

DC 20590. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Rebel Nichols, Aerospace Engineer, 

Propulsion Branch, ANM–140S, FAA, 

Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, 

1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, WA 

98057–3356; phone: 425–917–6509; fax: 

425–917–6590; email: rebel.nichols@

faa.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Discussion 

We issued a notice of proposed 

rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR 

part 39 by adding an AD that would 

apply to all The Boeing Company Model 

777 airplanes. The NPRM published in 

the Federal Register on January 10, 

2014 (79 FR 1772). The NPRM was 

prompted by reports of latently failed 

fuel shutoff valves discovered during 

fuel filter replacement. The NPRM 

proposed to require revising the 

maintenance or inspection program to 

include a new airworthiness limitation. 

We are issuing this AD to detect and 

correct latent failures of the fuel shutoff 

valve to the engine, which could result 

in the inability to shut off fuel to the 

engine and, in case of certain engine 

fires, an uncontrollable fire that could 

lead to wing failure. 

Record of Ex Parte Communication 

In preparation of AD actions such as 

NPRMs and immediately adopted rules, 

it is the practice of the FAA to obtain 

technical information and information 

on operational and economic impacts 

from design approval holders and 

aircraft operators. We discussed certain 

comments addressed in this final rule in 

a teleconference with Airlines for 

America (A4A) and other members of 

the aviation industry. All of the 

comments discussed during this 

teleconference that are relevant to this 

final rule are addressed in this final rule 

in response to comments submitted by 

other commenters. A discussion of this 

contact can be found in the rulemaking 

docket at http://www.regulations.gov by 

searching for and locating Docket No. 

FAA–2013–1071. 

Clarification of Certain Terminology 

Throughout the preamble of this final 

rule, commenters may have used the 

terms ‘‘fuel shutoff valve’’ and ‘‘fuel 

spar valve’’ interchangeably. Both terms 

refer to the same part. In our responses 

to comments, we have used the term 

‘‘fuel shutoff valve.’’ The term ‘‘fuel spar 

valve’’ is more commonly used in 

airplane maintenance documentation 

and, therefore, we have used that term 

in figure 1 to paragraph (g) of this AD. 

Comments 

We gave the public the opportunity to 

participate in developing this AD. The 

following presents the comments 

received on the NPRM (79 FR 1772, 

January 10, 2014) and the FAA’s 

response to each comment. 

Request To Withdraw the NPRM (79 FR 

1772, January 10, 2014) 

American Airlines (AA) stated that 

Boeing’s internal review found that the 

issue addressed by the NPRM (79 FR 

1772, January 10, 2014) is not a safety 

concern, and that Boeing has not 

recommended any interim action on 

this issue. In addition, AA stated that 

Boeing is addressing the issue in the 

long term with a design change to the 

motor-operated valve (MOV) actuator. 

We infer AA is requesting that the 

NPRM be withdrawn. 

We disagree with the commenter’s 

request to withdraw the NPRM (79 FR 

1772, January 10, 2014). We have 

determined that an unsafe condition 

exists that warrants an interim action 

until the manufacturer finishes 

developing a modification that will 

address the identified unsafe condition. 

Boeing did not formally comment on 

whether it considers this issue to be an 

unsafe condition. We have determined 

that, without the required interim 

actions, a significant number of flights 

with a fuel shutoff valve actuator that is 

failed latently in the open valve position 

will occur during the affected fleet life. 

With a failed fuel shutoff valve, if 

certain engine fire conditions were to 

occur, or if extreme engine damage were 

to occur, or if an engine separation 

event were to occur during flight, the 

crew procedures for such an event 

would not stop the fuel flow to the 

engine strut and nacelle. The continued 

flow of fuel could cause an uncontrolled 

fire or lead to a fuel exhaustion event. 

The FAA regulations require all 

transport airplanes to be fail safe with 

respect to engine fire events, and the 

risk due to severe engine damage events 

be minimized. Therefore, we require, for 

each flight, sufficiently operative fire 

safety systems so that fires can be 

detected and contained, and fuel to the 

engine strut and nacelle can be shut off 

in the event of an engine fire or severe 

damage. 

The FAA airworthiness standards 

require remotely controlled powerplant 

valves to provide indications that the 

valves are in the commanded position. 

These indications allow the prompt 

detection and correction of valve 

failures. We do not allow dispatch with 

a known inoperative fuel shutoff valve. 

Therefore, we are proceeding with the 

final rule—not because of the higherthan-typical failure rate of the particular 

valve actuator involved, but instead 

because the fuel shutoff valve actuator 

can fail in a manner that also defeats the 

required valve position indication 

feature. That failure can lead to a large 

number of flights occurring on an 

airplane with a fuel shutoff valve 

actuator failed in the open position 

without the operator being aware of the 

failure. An airworthiness limitation 

containing required inspections is 

intended to limit the number of flights 

following latent failure of the fuel 

shutoff valve. Issuance of an AD is the 

appropriate method to correct the 

unsafe condition. We have not changed 

this AD in this regard. 

Request To Provide Further 

Clarification of the Purpose of the 

NPRM (79 FR 1772, January 10, 2014) 

The European Aviation Safety Agency 

(EASA), which is the Technical Agent 

for the Member States of the European 

Union, requested that we revise the 

NPRM (79 FR 1772, January 10, 2014) to 

add more details on the frequency of 

valve failure findings, and the 

associated root cause driving the 

proposed weekly inspection interval 

versus the existing maintenance 

planning data (MPD) document check 

interval of 18,000 flight hours. 

We agree with EASA’s request to 

provide further clarification. As we 

mentioned in a previous comment 

response, the reason for this final rule 

is not simply a high fuel shutoff valve 

failure rate, but is rather a design error 

that allows a single failure within a fuel 

shutoff valve to affect both the control 


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of the valve and the indication of the 

valve’s position. 

The 18,000-hour check in the MPD 

document was recommended based on 

the assumption that the indication of 

the fuel shutoff valve position would 

not be affected by failures that affect the 

control of the valve. With the intended 

design, there was not a potential for a 

significant number of flights to occur 

with a fuel shutoff valve failed open 

(even if the valve was never checked), 

because the indication system was to 

provide real-time indication of the 

valve’s response to commands. 

With the design error that exists in the 

affected fuel shutoff valve actuators, 

indication and control of the valve are 

not independent, and if no action is 

taken, we anticipate a significant 

number of flights to occur with a fuel 

shutoff valve failed open. Without the 

issuance of this final rule, our risk 

assessment and the manufacturer’s risk 

assessment predict that thousands of 

flights of Model 777 airplanes would be 

conducted with latent fuel shutoff valve 

failures. 

In addition to the design error 

described previously, the affected fuel 

shutoff valves have a higher-thantypical rate of failure in several failure 

modes. We have received several reports 

of valves failed open (discovered only 

when fuel filters were changed), of 

valves failed closed (preventing engine 

start), and of valves that spontaneously 

closed in flight (causing an engine 

shutdown). Boeing’s long-term solution 

to provide a redesigned MOV actuator is 

intended to address these issues in 

addition to restoring the independence 

of the actuator control and indication 

features. We have not changed this final 

rule in this regard. 

Request To Postpone the NPRM (79 FR 

1772, January 10, 2014) 

Singapore Airlines (SIA) requested 

that the FAA consider delaying the 

release of the final rule until after the 

Boeing service information is issued and 

sufficient model kits are made available. 

SIA also requested that Boeing provide 

warranty coverage for the post-modified 

part replacement and warranty coverage 

for the man-hours incurred. 

We disagree with the commenter’s 

request to postpone releasing the final 

rule. Because this unsafe condition 

could exist or develop on Model 777 

airplanes, an airworthiness limitation 

containing repetitive inspections as an 

interim action is necessary to ensure the 

safety of the fleet. Issuance of an AD is 

the appropriate method to correct the 

unsafe condition. 

In addition, the manufacturer does 

not expect a large number of latently 

failed valve actuators to be discovered. 

Existing parts stores are expected to be 

sufficient, and parts can be repositioned 

in time to support the initial 

inspections. A functioning fuel shutoff 

valve is required at dispatch. This 

position is consistent with the original 

determination in developing the master 

minimum equipment list (MMEL) that 

dispatch relief is not allowed for firesafety-related flammable fluid shutoff 

valves (other than in a locked, closed 

position for non-required equipment). 

However, under the provisions of 

paragraph (i)(1) of this AD, we might 

consider requests for an adjustment to 

the compliance time if data are 

submitted to substantiate that such an 

adjustment would provide an acceptable 

level of safety. In regard to providing 

warranty coverage, we cannot comment 

on Boeing’s behalf on this issue. We 

have not changed the final rule in this 

regard. 

Request for Clarification of Other 

Affected Airplane Models 

EASA requested clarification on 

whether similar designs on other 

airplanes could exist. EASA stated that 

this would be the basis for a design 

review of parts of similar design. 

We agree to provide clarification for 

the commenter. This AD is applicable to 

certain Model 777 series airplanes only. 

Similar AD action is planned for Model 

737NG, 757, 767, and 787 series 

airplanes. At this time, our 

understanding is that no other 

manufacturer’s airplanes are affected by 

this specific design problem. We have 

not changed the final rule in this regard. 

Request To Add Estimated Costs for the 

Proposed Repetitive Inspections 

AA requested that we revise the 

NPRM (79 FR 1772, January 10, 2014) to 

include the estimated costs for the 

repetitive inspections of the MOV 

actuator of the fuel shutoff valve. AA 

stated that the cost included in the 

NPRM does not account for the cost of 

the ongoing inspections. AA stated that 

the NPRM reflects only the first 

inspection. AA also stated that the 

annual cost of compliance will be 52 

times greater, or $839,800, if the 

inspection is accomplished weekly. AA 

stated that these costs should be 

included for operator planning 

purposes. 

We acknowledge the commenter’s 

concern. In this AD, the required action 

is to revise the maintenance or 

inspection program, as applicable, to 

include a new airworthiness limitation. 

The added airworthiness limitation 

requires an inspection of the position of 

the MOV actuator of the fuel shutoff 

valve every 10 days. However, these 

repetitive inspections, which are 

expected to take less than an hour to 

complete, are required by section 

91.403(c) of the Federal Aviation 

Regulations (14 CFR 91.403(c)) once 

incorporated into the maintenance or 

inspection program. 

The cost analysis in AD rulemaking 

actions typically includes only the costs 

associated with complying with an AD. 

In this AD, the required action is the 

maintenance or inspection program 

revision, as applicable, to include the 

new airworthiness limitation, and 

accomplishing repetitive actions that are 

specified in the airworthiness limitation 

are not directly required by this AD. The 

FAA, as a matter of practice, does not 

include a cost estimate for these 

repetitive actions in an AD because 

these actions are required as part of the 

operating rules. Therefore, we have 

made no change to this final rule in this 

regard. 

Requests To Limit the Applicability 

Air France, AA, Boeing, and KLM 

Royal Dutch Airlines (KLM) requested 

that the proposed applicability be 

changed to include only Model 777 

airplanes having line numbers 1 through 

1164 inclusive. 

Air France and KLM stated that 

Boeing Fleet Team Digest 777–FTD–28– 

12002, dated January 10, 2014, 

indicated that airplanes delivered 

December 2013 or later incorporate 

AIMS–2 BlockPoint (BP) v 17, which 

has a new function that avoids latently 

failed fuel shutoff valves. 

Boeing stated that, beginning with 

line number 1165, all new production 

airplanes will be delivered with AIMS– 

2 BP v 17 or later software. Boeing also 

stated that starting with AIMS–2 BP v 

17, all AIMS–2 software versions will 

include changes to ensure that the 

correct fuel shutoff valve position is 

displayed in the flight deck, and that the 

software will monitor both the valve 

transition and the end state to ensure 

the correct position indication. 

Boeing also requested that the 

proposed applicability be limited to 

Model 777 airplanes with part number 

(P/N) MA20A2027 (S343T003–56) or P/ 

N MA30A1001 (S343T003–66) actuators 

installed at the ‘‘engine fuel spar valve 

locations.’’ Boeing stated that the failure 

mode exists only in actuators having 

these part numbers. Boeing stated that 

actuators having P/N MA20A1001–1 

(S343T003–39) might be installed in the 

‘‘fuel spar valve location,’’ and that 

actuators having P/N MA20A1001–1 

(S343T003–39) are not susceptible to 

the latent failure addressed by the 

NPRM (79 FR 1772, January 10, 2014), 


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and would not benefit from an interval 

inspection. 

We agree that the applicability of this 

AD should be limited. We have changed 

paragraph (c) of this AD to include only 

Model 777 airplanes having line 

numbers 1 through 1164 inclusive. In 

addition, in figure 1 to paragraph (g) of 

this AD, we have changed the 

Applicability column for Airworthiness 

Limitation (AWL) 28–AWL–MOV to 

clarify that the limitation applies to 

airplanes with the AIMS–1 system 

having an actuator with P/N 

MA20A2027 (S343T003–56) or P/N 

MA30A1001 (S343T003–66) installed at 

the engine fuel spar valve position; and 

airplanes with AIMS–2 BP v 16 and 

earlier software having an actuator with 

P/N MA20A2027 (S343T003–56) or P/N 

MA30A1001 (S343T003–66) installed at 

the engine fuel spar valve position. 

Request for Clarification of the 

Proposed Terminating Action 

AA requested clarification of the 

proposed terminating action. AA stated 

the NPRM (79 FR 1772, January 10, 

2014) is an interim action, and no 

information is provided regarding the 

terminating action. AA stated that, if 

issued, the final rule should contain 

sufficient documentation to clearly 

establish the effectivity of Model 777 

airplanes subject to the rule, and to 

terminate the inspection program on the 

subject airplanes. AA stated that Boeing 

Fleet Team Digest 777–FTD–28–12002, 

dated January 10, 2014, among others, 

addresses the corrective action plan that 

is in progress. 

We agree to provide clarification 

regarding the modification referenced in 

the NPRM (79 FR 1772, January 10, 

2014). Since the issuance of the NPRM, 

the manufacturer has developed a 

modification that addresses the unsafe 

condition identified in this final rule. 

However, the service information is not 

available at this time. Since we have 

limited the applicability of this AD to 

exclude all new production airplanes 

that are delivered with AIMS–2 BP v 17 

or later software, as explained 

previously, we find that no further 

change to this AD is necessary in this 

regard. 

For the affected airplanes, there will 

likely be two possible terminating 

options—one to replace the fuel shutoff 

valve actuator, and another to upgrade 

airplanes with AIMS–2 systems to BP v 

17 to address the unsafe condition. 

Because service information for these 

modifications is still being developed, 

we have not changed this final rule in 

this regard. 

Request To Replace the AWL Revision 

Requirement With MOV Actuator 

Inspections Requirement 

Boeing requested that the proposed 

requirement to incorporate the MOV 

actuator inspection into the AWL 

Section of the Instructions for 

Continued Airworthiness of the 

operator’s maintenance or inspection 

program be replaced with an AD 

requirement to ‘‘perform the MOV 

inspection every 10 days.’’ Boeing stated 

that the MOV inspection is an interim 

mitigation and is required only until a 

redesigned MOV can be installed in the 

spar valve locations. Boeing stated that 

including the 10-day test requirement as 

the required AD action would allow 

installation of the redesigned MOV to be 

approved as an alternative method of 

compliance (AMOC) to the AD, and as 

a terminating action for the repetitive 

inspections, while avoiding the need for 

regulatory approval to remove the AWL 

from each operator’s maintenance or 

inspection program. In addition, Boeing 

stated the AWLs are permanent actions 

that affect operators’ planning and 

scheduling, and that incorporating a 

temporary AWL into the operators’ 

maintenance documents or a Boeing 

MPD document will cause confusion 

among operators. 

We disagree with the commenter’s 

request. During the development of the 

NPRM (79 FR 1772, January 10, 2014), 

we discussed the impact of an AWL 

revision versus a repetitive inspection 

requirement with Boeing, who, in turn, 

discussed it with a sample of operators. 

At that time, both Boeing and the 

operators indicated that the addition of 

an AWL revision was the preferred 

solution because it would reduce the 

record keeping required to document 

AD compliance. Affected operators who 

wish to use a repetitive inspection 

requirement in place of an AWL may 

apply for approval of an AMOC in 

accordance with the provisions 

specified in paragraph (i)(1) of this AD, 

by submitting data substantiating that 

the request would provide an acceptable 

level of safety. We have not changed 

this AD in this regard. 

Request To Extend the Proposed 

Compliance Time Grace Period 

AA requested that we extend the 

grace period for performing the initial 

inspection required by the new AWLs. 

AA stated that it is a complicated 

logistical matter to establish a new line 

maintenance task at stations throughout 

the world, and that there is a ‘‘learning 

curve to acclimate the line maintenance 

organizations to the new task.’’ In 

addition, AA stated that the existing 

inventory of actuators at maintenance 

stations may be insufficient to replace 

any failed valves discovered through the 

inspections, resulting in grounded 

airplanes, and that ordering new valves 

from the vendor generally takes at least 

30 days. 

We partially agree with the 

commenter’s request. We retained the 

30-day compliance time for revising the 

maintenance or inspection program, as 

applicable, to include the new AWL. In 

addition, we have changed the initial 

compliance time for accomplishing the 

actions specified in figure 1 to 

paragraph (g) of this AD to 10 days. The 

compliance time of 10 days is consistent 

with other regulatory actions on other 

affected airplane models. 

We have determined that the initial 

compliance time for the inspection 

represents an appropriate time in which 

the required actions can be performed in 

a timely manner within the affected 

fleet, while still maintaining an 

adequate level of safety. In developing 

an appropriate compliance time, we 

considered the safety implications, parts 

availability, and normal maintenance 

schedules for timely accomplishment of 

the checks. 

The check itself involves a visual 

inspection of an existing prominent 

design feature that is intended to 

indicate the position of the fuel shutoff 

valve actuator. This check is also 

described in existing maintenance 

documentation. The manufacturer does 

not expect a large number of latently 

failed valve actuators to be discovered. 

Existing parts stores are expected to be 

sufficient, and we expect that parts can 

be repositioned in time to support the 

initial inspections. However, under the 

provisions of paragraph (i) of this AD, 

we might consider requests for 

adjustments to the compliance time if 

data are submitted to substantiate that 

such an adjustment would provide an 

acceptable level of safety. 

Requests To Extend the Interval for the 

MOV Actuator Inspection 

Aerologic GmbH, Air France, All 

Nippon Airways (ANA), AA, Boeing, 

FedEx, Japan Airlines Company Ltd. 

(JAL), KLM Royal Dutch Airlines (KLM), 

Lufthansa Technik AG (LTK), and 

Lufthansa Cargo AG (LUB) requested 

that we change the interval for the MOV 

actuator inspection of the engine fuel 

shutoff valve. 

Aerologic GmbH, Air France, 

Lufthansa LTK, Lufthansa LUB, and 

KLM stated that the interval should be 

25 flight cycles based on a typical 

utilization in flight cycles that 

corresponds to a one-week interval. The 

operators stated that the actuator failure 


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mode is associated with the cycling of 

the valve, and the interval should, 

therefore, be based on flight cycles. 

AA stated that the ‘‘weekly’’ interval 

is not defined sufficiently, and that it is 

not clear whether this means once every 

seven days, one time each calendar 

week, or some other interpretation. AA 

stated that, for its airline and for many 

other international carriers, this 

presents a problem when the airplane 

continually crosses the International 

Date Line. AA also stated that the 

interval does not address occurrences 

where the airplane is out of service for 

an extended period of time, such as a 

week or longer. AA stated that it has 

strong concerns that the proposed 

interval may impede the airline’s ability 

to function on its current published 

schedule. AA stated that many 

established flight routings occur on a 

four-day cycle, and not all stations can 

be set up to perform the inspection for 

logistical, personnel, and contractual 

reasons; therefore, the weekly interval 

makes it very difficult to achieve the 

inspection at available stations. AA 

stated that the inspection, if mandated, 

should be on a flight-cycle interval 

rather than a calendar schedule, and 

suggested a 25-flight-cycle interval to 

alleviate the ‘‘weekly’’ term 

interpretation issue, and to address the 

adverse impact to airline operations. 

JAL and ANA requested that the 

inspection interval be ‘‘25 flight cycles 

or more, or weekly or more, whichever 

occurs later.’’ JAL stated that the FAAproposed inspection interval of 

‘‘weekly’’ is without detailed 

information such as the number of 

latently failed fuel shutoff valves, failure 

rates, and so forth. JAL stated that it 

understands that it is preferable to 

control inspection intervals in flight 

cycles for international flights. JAL and 

ANA also stated that an average flight 

cycle for a Model 777 airplane might be 

2.5 flight cycles per day, but that their 

domestic Model 777 flight cycle average 

is 6 flight cycles per day; therefore, it is 

a burden to inspect the MOV actuators 

at per-flight-cycle-related intervals. 

ANA stated that it prefers a compliance 

time of 18,000 flight cycles, which is 

stated in the MPD document. ANA 

stated that they currently perform the 

proposed inspection at 2,000-flight-hour 

intervals, and while it has experienced 

several fuel valve actuator failures, it 

has not detected any latently failed open 

fuel valve actuators. 

SIA requested that the proposed 

inspection interval be extended to 2,000 

flight hours. SIA stated that the 

inspections are disruptive, laborious, 

and costly to operations, and would 

require SIA to inspect at least three to 

four airplanes daily. SIA also stated that 

frequent opening and closing of panels 

to inspect the MOV actuator may 

inadvertently disrupt other airplane 

systems and result in unintended 

defects. SIA stated that, if operators are 

unable to inspect the airplane within 

the mandated intervals, or if the 

inspection findings require extensive 

rectification, Boeing or the FAA should 

consider granting operators a ‘‘no 

technical objection’’ or an AMOC to 

allow the airplane to be released to 

service for a restricted period of time. 

SIA also stated that it understands 

Boeing is working on a modified MOV 

actuator part number that would resolve 

the reliability issue associated with it. 

Boeing requested that the interval be 

changed to 10 days. Boeing stated that 

it understood the term ‘‘weekly’’ to 

mean 10 days. 

We partially agree with the 

commenters’ request. We agree with 

extending the inspection interval to 10 

days. Some operators’ route structures 

and maintenance intervals do not align 

with a 7-day interval. Also, several of 

the operators routinely cross the 

International Date Line, potentially 

creating confusion over the application 

of an interval when expressed as 

‘‘weekly.’’ The 10-day interval will 

provide more operational flexibility and 

will not significantly increase the 

number of at-risk flights. We have 

changed paragraph (g) of this AD and 

figure 1 to paragraph (g) of this AD 

accordingly. 

We also added a note to the Interval 

column of figure 1 to paragraph (g) of 

this AD to specify that the inspection is 

not required on days when the airplane 

is not used in revenue service, and that 

the inspection must be done before 

further flight if it has been 10 or more 

calendar days since the last inspection. 

However, we disagree with changing 

the interval basis to flight cycles. While 

the failure of the fuel shutoff valve is 

likely associated with the cycling of the 

valve, the purpose of the inspections is 

to minimize the exposure to flights that 

are initiated with a valve actuator that 

is latently failed in the open position. 

To determine the appropriate actions 

and intervals to minimize this exposure, 

we considered the actions necessary to 

detect the latent failure on each affected 

airplane model, and then, based on 

those identified actions, determined a 

minimum practical interval for 

performing the actions. 

On other Boeing airplane models with 

designs that allow a check to be 

performed using available indications, 

we determined that a daily check is 

appropriate. That interval is similar to 

the check interval required for fire 

detection systems. For the affected 

Model 777 airplanes identified in this 

final rule, the fuel shutoff valve position 

cannot be checked using available 

indications, and a physical inspection of 

the valve actuator itself is necessary to 

detect the latent failure. Because of the 

work necessary to perform this 

inspection, we determined that a daily 

interval would be overly burdensome 

and that the 10-day interval would be a 

more appropriate balance of the risk and 

the burden of performing the inspection. 

However, affected operators may apply 

for approval of an AMOC in accordance 

with the procedures specified in 

paragraph (i)(1) of this AD by submitting 

data substantiating that the request 

would provide an acceptable level of 

safety. 

We also disagree that the performance 

of these inspections is likely to cause 

defects in other systems. While 

additional defects due to unrelated 

causes might be discovered during the 

visual inspection, the opening of the 

access door and visual inspection of the 

fuel shutoff valve position is not 

expected to cause other system failures. 

Request To Allow Use of Parts From 

Less Critical Locations 

FedEx requested that a provision be 

added to the proposed AD (79 FR 1772, 

January 10, 2014) to allow the removal 

of a working MOV actuator from a less 

critical fuel system valve location and 

installation in the engine fuel shutoff 

valve. FedEx stated that this will reduce 

the immediate impact of any actuator 

failures discovered by the required 

inspection. 

We disagree with the request. This 

situation is not unique to the MOV 

actuator of the fuel shutoff valve. It is 

not our intent in this AD to change 

operational practices used in performing 

maintenance and alterations, or to 

change relief provided by the minimum 

equipment list (MEL). The removal of a 

fully functional part from a less critical 

location and its replacement with a nonfunctioning part is considered an 

alteration and, as such, must meet the 

airworthiness regulations, which is not 

possible in this case. However, if a 

failure occurs at a less critical location, 

operation in the same exact 

configuration may be allowed for a 

limited time under the MEL. The 

decision to allow this type of 

maintenance action remains with the 

local Flight Standards organization. 

Also, it should be noted that the 

installation of certain MOV actuators is 

prohibited by FAA AD 2013–05–03, 

Amendment 39–17375 (78 FR 17290, 

March 21, 2013). We have not changed 

this AD in this regard. 


Lhorne on DSK5TPTVN1PROD with RULES
55526 Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 179 / Wednesday, September 16, 2015 / Rules and Regulations 

Additional Change Made to This AD 

In the ‘‘Description’’ column of figure 

1 to paragraph (g) of this AD, we have 

removed the phrase ‘‘refer to Boeing 

AMM 28–22–00’’ for performing an 

inspection of the MOV actuator of the 

fuel spar valve (i.e., the fuel shutoff 

valve). 

Conclusion 

We reviewed the relevant data, 

considered the comments received, and 

determined that air safety and the 

public interest require adopting this AD 

with the changes described previously, 

and minor editorial changes. We have 

determined that these minor changes: 

• Are consistent with the intent that 

was proposed in the NPRM (79 FR 1772, 

January 10, 2014) for correcting the 

unsafe condition; and 

• Do not add any additional burden 

upon the public than was already 

proposed in the NPRM (79 FR 1772, 

January 10, 2014). 

We also determined that these 

changes will not increase the economic 

burden on any operator or increase the 

scope of this AD. 

Interim Action 

We consider this AD interim action. 

The manufacturer has developed a 

modification that addresses the unsafe 

condition for some of the airplanes 

identified in this AD. Once the service 

information for the modification is 

developed, approved, and available, we 

might consider additional rulemaking. 

Costs of Compliance 

We estimate that this AD affects 190 

airplanes of U.S. registry. 

We estimate the following costs to 

comply with this AD: 

ESTIMATED COSTS

Action Labor cost Parts cost Cost per 

product 

Cost on 

U.S. operators 

Incorporating Airworthiness Limitation ............ 1 work-hour × $85 per hour = $85 ................. $0 $85 $16,150 

Authority for This Rulemaking 

Title 49 of the United States Code 

specifies the FAA’s authority to issue 

rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, 

section 106, describes the authority of 

the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII: 

Aviation Programs, describes in more 

detail the scope of the Agency’s 

authority. 

We are issuing this rulemaking under 

the authority described in Subtitle VII, 

Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: 

‘‘General requirements.’’ Under that 

section, Congress charges the FAA with 

promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in 

air commerce by prescribing regulations 

for practices, methods, and procedures 

the Administrator finds necessary for 

safety in air commerce. This regulation 

is within the scope of that authority 

because it addresses an unsafe condition 

that is likely to exist or develop on 

products identified in this rulemaking 

action. 

Regulatory Findings 

This AD will not have federalism 

implications under Executive Order 

13132. This AD will not have a 

substantial direct effect on the States, on 

the relationship between the national 

government and the States, or on the 

distribution of power and 

responsibilities among the various 

levels of government. 

For the reasons discussed above, I 

certify that this AD: 

(1) Is not a ‘‘significant regulatory 

action’’ under Executive Order 12866, 

(2) Is not a ‘‘significant rule’’ under 

DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures 

(44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979), 

(3) Will not affect intrastate aviation 

in Alaska, and 

(4) Will not have a significant 

economic impact, positive or negative, 

on a substantial number of small entities 

under the criteria of the Regulatory 

Flexibility Act. 

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39 

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation 

safety, Incorporation by reference, 

Safety. 

Adoption of the Amendment 

Accordingly, under the authority 

delegated to me by the Administrator, 

the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as 

follows: 

PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS 

DIRECTIVES 

■ 1. The authority citation for part 39 

continues to read as follows: 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701. 

§ 39.13 [Amended] 

■ 2. The FAA amends § 39.13 by adding 

the following new airworthiness 

directive (AD): 

2015–19–01 The Boeing Company: 

Amendment 39–18264; Docket No. 

FAA–2013–1071; Directorate Identifier 

2013–NM–204–AD. 

(a) Effective Date 

This AD is effective October 21, 2015. 

(b) Affected ADs 

None. 

(c) Applicability 

This AD applies to The Boeing Company 

Model 777–200, –200LR, –300, –300ER, and 

777F series airplanes, certificated in any 

category, line numbers 1 through 1164 

inclusive. 

(d) Subject 

Air Transport Association (ATA) of 

America Code 28, Fuel. 

(e) Unsafe Condition 

This AD was prompted by reports of 

latently failed fuel shutoff valves discovered 

during fuel filter replacement. We are issuing 

this AD to detect and correct latent failures 

of the fuel shutoff valve to the engine, which 

could result in the inability to shut off fuel 

to the engine and, in case of certain engine 

fires, an uncontrollable fire that could lead to 

wing failure. 

(f) Compliance 

Comply with this AD within the 

compliance times specified, unless already 

done. 

(g) Revision of Maintenance or Inspection 

Program 

Within 30 days after the effective date of 

this AD, revise the maintenance or inspection 

program, as applicable, to add Airworthiness 

Limitation (AWL) 28–AWL–MOV by 

incorporating the information specified in 

figure 1 to paragraph (g) of this AD into the 

Airworthiness Limitations Section of the 

Instructions for Continued Airworthiness. 

The initial compliance time for 

accomplishing the actions specified in figure 

1 to paragraph (g) of this AD is within 10 

days after accomplishing the maintenance or 

inspection program revision required by this 

paragraph. 


Lhorne on DSK5TPTVN1PROD with RULES
Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 179 / Wednesday, September 16, 2015 / Rules and Regulations 55527 

FIGURE 1 TO PARAGRAPH (g) OF THIS AD—AWL FOR ENGINE FUEL SHUTOFF VALVE (FUEL SPAR VALVE) ACTUATOR

INSPECTION

AWL No. Task Interval Applicability Description 

28–AWL–MOV ...... ALI 10 days ..............................

INTERVAL NOTE: Not required on days when the 

airplane is not used in 

revenue service. 

Must be done before further flight if it has been 

10 or more calendar 

days since last inspection. 

Airplanes with AIMS–1 

system.

Airplanes with AIMS–2 

BlockPoint (BP) v 16 

and earlier software. 

APPLICABILITY NOTE: 

Only applies to airplanes 

with a fuel spar valve actuator having part number MA20A2027 

(S343T003–56) or 

MA30A1001 

(S343T003–66) installed 

at the engine fuel spar 

valve position. 

Engine Fuel Shutoff Valve (Fuel Spar Valve) MOV Actuator Inspection. 

Concern: The fuel spar valve actuator design can result in airplanes operating with a failed fuel spar 

valve actuator that is not reported. A latently failed 

fuel spar valve actuator would prevent fuel shutoff to 

an engine. In the event of certain engine fires, the 

potential exists for an engine fire to be uncontrollable. 

Perform an inspection of the fuel spar valve actuator. 

NOTE: The fuel spar valve actuator is located behind 

latch panel 551 DB (left engine) and latch panel 651 

DB (right engine). 

1. Make sure both Engine Control Switches are in the 

CUTOFF position. 

NOTE: It is not necessary to cycle the FUEL CONTROL switch to do this inspection. 

2. Inspect the left engine fuel spar valve actuator located in the left rear spar. 

a. Verify the manual override handle on the left engine 

fuel spar valve actuator is in the CLOSED position. 

b. Repair or replace any fuel spar valve actuator that 

is not in the CLOSED position (refer to Boeing Airplane Maintenance Manual, 28–22–02, for guidance). 

3. Inspect the right engine fuel spar valve actuator located in the right rear spar. 

a. Verify the manual override handle on the right engine fuel spar valve actuator is in the CLOSED position. 

b. Repair or replace any fuel spar valve actuator that 

is not in the CLOSED position (refer to Boeing Airplane Maintenance Manual, 28–22–02, for guidance). 

(h) No Alternative Actions or Intervals 

After accomplishing the maintenance or 

inspection program revision required by 

paragraph (g) of this AD, no alternative 

actions (e.g., inspections) or intervals may be 

used unless the actions or intervals are 

approved as an alternative method of 

compliance (AMOC) in accordance with the 

procedures specified in paragraph (i)(1) of 

this AD. 

(i) Alternative Methods of Compliance 

(AMOCs) 

(1) The Manager, Seattle Aircraft 

Certification Office (ACO) FAA, has the 

authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if 

requested using the procedures found in 14 

CFR 39.19. In accordance with 14 CFR 39.19, 

send your request to your principal inspector 

or local Flight Standards District Office, as 

appropriate. If sending information directly 

to the manager of the ACO, send it to the 

attention of the person identified in 

paragraph (j) of this AD. Information may be 

emailed to: 9-ANM-Seattle-ACO-AMOCRequests@faa.gov. 

(2) Before using any approved AMOC, 

notify your appropriate principal inspector, 

or lacking a principal inspector, the manager 

of the local flight standards district office/

certificate holding district office. 

(j) Related Information 

For more information about this AD, 

contact Rebel Nichols, Aerospace Engineer, 

Propulsion Branch, ANM–140S, FAA, Seattle 

Aircraft Certification Office, 1601 Lind 

Avenue SW., Renton, WA 98057–3356; 

phone: 425–917–6509; fax: 425–917–6590; 

email: rebel.nichols@faa.gov. 

(k) Material Incorporated by Reference 

None. 

Issued in Renton, Washington, on 

September 7, 2015. 

Jeffrey E. Duven, 

Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, 

Aircraft Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. 2015–23121 Filed 9–15–15; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 39 

[Docket No. FAA–2014–0194; Directorate 

Identifier 2014–NM–022–AD; Amendment 

39–18266; AD 2015–19–03] 

RIN 2120–AA64 

Airworthiness Directives; The Boeing 

Company Airplanes 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Final rule. 

SUMMARY: We are adopting a new 

airworthiness directive (AD) for all The 

Boeing Company Model 737–600, –700, 

–700C, –800, –900, and –900ER series 

airplanes. This AD was prompted by 

reports of latently failed fuel shutoff 

valves discovered during fuel filter 

replacement. This AD requires revising 

the maintenance or inspection program 

to include new airworthiness 

limitations. We are issuing this AD to 

detect and correct latent failures of the 

fuel shutoff valve to the engine, which 


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