United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit 

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No. 19-3780

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United States of America

 Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Daniel Evans

 Defendant - Appellant

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Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Missouri - St. Louis

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Submitted: January 15, 2021

Filed: July 12, 2021 

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Before LOKEN, GRASZ, and KOBES, Circuit Judges. 

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GRASZ, Circuit Judge.

Daniel Evans challenges the district court’s1 denial of his motion to suppress, 

which argued that the affidavit used to secure a search warrant for his house omitted 

critical facts about an anonymous source. We affirm. 

1

The Honorable E. Richard Webber, United States District Judge for the 

Eastern District of Missouri, adopting the report and recommendations of the 
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I. Background 

 In June 2018, Saint Louis Metropolitan Police Department (“SLMPD”) 

Detective Michael Joyner applied for a search warrant based on information from an 

anonymous source that was corroborated by SLMPD officers. The source reported 

to Joyner that Evans was selling drugs out of his house, and that Evans had a silver 

revolver in the house. The source also described how these transactions happened: 

customers waited in the living room area while Evans retrieved drugs from the 

bedroom. And, according to the source, Evans also conducted drug transactions 

from his car. 

Because the police had not worked with this source before, Joyner took steps 

to corroborate what the source said. Joyner (1) had the source identify Evans from 

a photograph; (2) confirmed Evans’s address; (3) confirmed Evans’s previous 

criminal convictions; and (4) surveilled Evans’s house, which showed heavy foot 

traffic. 

The source accompanied Joyner to apply for a search warrant and signed the 

affidavit as “John Doe.” A state court judge concluded the affidavit contained 

sufficient information to establish probable cause and signed the search warrant. 

The warrant authorized the SLMPD to search Evans’s house and seize any illegal 

narcotics, controlled substances, and firearms. 

 

Six days later, Joyner and other officers for the SLMPD observed Evans 

leaving his house in his car. When he was outside of view of the house, they pulled 

him over. The officers searched Evans and his car but did not find any drugs or 

weapons. The officers detained and handcuffed Evans and took him to a staging 

area. There, Joyner read Evans his Miranda rights, and Evans was informed there 

Honorable John M. Bodenhausen, United States Magistrate Judge for the Eastern 

District of Missouri. 
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was a search warrant for his house. Evans told the officers that there was a firearm 

in the house. 

During the authorized search, the officers found methamphetamine, heroin, 

fentanyl, cocaine base, marijuana, three firearms, and other items consistent with 

drug distribution. Joyner advised Evans of his Miranda rights a second time

following the search of Evans’s house. Evans admitted that he knew about the drugs 

and a pistol in his bedroom, but he denied knowing about a shotgun and revolver 

found in the basement. Later, Evans asked another officer what the officers would 

do with the money found during the search and how the officers would determine if

it was connected to the drugs.

Evans was indicted for possession with intent to distribute cocaine base, 

possession with intent to distribute a mixture or substance containing 

methamphetamine, possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime 

and being a felon in possession of one or more firearms. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), 

(b)(1)(C), (b)(1)(D); 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2), (c); 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Evans moved 

to suppress the statements he made following his arrest. He argued that the 

government violated his Fourth Amendment rights by questioning him while 

executing a warrant that lacked probable cause. The district court denied Evans’s 

motion and the case proceeded to trial. A jury convicted Evans and the district court 

sentenced him to 93 months of imprisonment. Evans appeals the district court’s 

denial of his motion to suppress. 

II. Discussion

On appeal of the denial of a motion to suppress, we review the district court’s 

“legal conclusions de novo and factual findings for clear error.” United States v. 

Morris, 915 F.3d 552, 555 (8th Cir. 2019) (quoting United States v. Woods, 747 F.3d 

552, 555 (8th Cir. 2014)). We “will affirm the district court’s denial of a motion to 

suppress evidence unless it is unsupported by substantial evidence, based on an 

erroneous interpretation of applicable law, or, based on the entire record, it is clear 
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a mistake was made.” United States v. Perez-Trevino, 891 F.3d 359, 365 (8th Cir. 

2018) (quoting United States v. Collins, 883 F.3d 1029, 1031 (8th Cir. 2018)). “We 

may affirm on any ground supported by the record.” Id. (citing United States v. 

Murillo-Salgado, 854 F.3d 407, 414 (8th Cir. 2017)). 

Evans raises two issues on appeal. First, he argues the affidavit used to obtain 

the search warrant failed to establish probable cause due to omissions about the 

reliability of the source and lack of corroboration. Second, Evans argues his

statements made during his arrest and detention should be suppressed for lack of 

probable cause supporting his arrest. Neither argument is persuasive.

A. Search Warrant

Evans argues that information about the anonymous source, including the 

source’s reliability, was omitted from the affidavit, making it misleading. A “search 

warrant may be invalid if the issuing judge’s probable cause determination was 

based on an affidavit containing false or omitted statements made knowingly and 

intentionally or with reckless disregard for the truth.” United States v. Reinholz, 245 

F.3d 765, 774 (8th Cir. 2001) (citing Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171 (1978)). 

In order to prevail, a defendant “must show (1) that a false statement knowingly and 

intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, was included in the affidavit; 

and (2) that the affidavit’s remaining content is insufficient to establish probable 

cause.” Id. 

“Probable cause is a fair probability that . . . evidence of a crime will be found 

in the location to be searched.” United States v. LaMorie, 100 F.3d 547, 552 (8th 

Cir. 1996). We give the issuing judge substantial deference to decide whether 

probable cause exists. Id. When an “issuing court relies solely on an affidavit to 

determine whether probable cause exi[s]ts,” this court only looks to “the information 

‘found within the four corners of the affidavit[.]’” United States v. Wells, 347 F.3d 

280, 286 (8th Cir. 2003) (quoting United States v. Gladney, 48 F.3d 309, 312 (8th 

Cir. 1995)). 
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Evans does not argue the information provided within the affidavit is false, 

but rather that the source, as a previously unused and untested informant for the 

SLMPD, could not be taken at “face value.” However, when probable cause depends 

on information provided by a source, the determinative factor is not the source’s 

history alone, “[t]he core question . . . is whether the information is reliable.” United 

States v. Keys, 721 F.3d 512, 518 (8th Cir. 2013) (alterations in original) (quoting 

United States v. Williams, 10 F.3d 590, 593 (8th Cir. 1993)). 

“Information may be sufficiently reliable to support a probable cause finding 

if . . . it is corroborated by independent evidence.” Id. Where some information is 

independently corroborated, it is permissible for the issuing judge to conclude the 

informant and the remaining information provided are reliable, even if 

uncorroborated. Id. “[C]orroboration of minor, innocent details can suffice to 

establish probable cause.” Id. (quotations omitted) (concluding probable cause 

existed when officers corroborated the named defendant’s residence through two 

sources). 

Like the district court, we conclude the affidavit contained sufficient 

corroborated information to support a fair probability that evidence of a crime would 

be found at Evans’s house. See LaMorie, 100 F.3d at 552. This is true for three 

reasons. First, Joyner corroborated the affidavit’s information in multiple ways: (1) 

by independently verifying Evans’s address and criminal record; (2) by conducting

multiple types of surveillance at Evans’s house; and (3) by verifying Evans’s identity 

by asking the source to look at a picture. 

Second, the presence of the source before both the officer and the issuing 

judge—and the source’s willingness to swear to the facts he provided under oath—

further support reliability. The physical presence of the source is significant, 

because it allowed Joyner and the issuing judge to further assess the source’s

credibility and allowed the source to be held accountable if the allegations were 

false. United States v. Braden, 844 F.3d 794, 799 (8th Cir. 2016). 
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Third, the “richness and detail” of the source’s firsthand observations also

support a finding of probable cause here. Id. Unlike in Reinholz, where the officer 

recklessly misrepresented a pharmacist’s information as personal knowledge of drug 

use and distribution, 245 F.3d at 774, the source here directly provided the issuing

judge with a specific, personal account of Evans selling drugs. The source’s 

firsthand observation of the drug sales combined with specific and detailed 

descriptions provided a fair probability that evidence of a crime would be found.

In sum, we affirm the district court’s conclusions because Joyner’s 

corroboration, combined with the specificity of the source’s information and 

physical presence before the officer and issuing judge, sufficiently established 

probable cause for the search warrant.

B. Post-Arrest Statements

Evans argues the exclusionary rule applies, which bars the use of verbal 

statements made as a result of an unlawful, unauthorized arrest. Wong Sun v. United 

States, 371 U.S. 471, 485 (1963). Evans maintains his statements were made as the

result of an arrest that was not supported by probable cause, which requires that the 

statements be suppressed. 

However, the probable cause determination resulting in issuance of the search 

warrant was predicated on information concerning the activities of Evans, rather than 

merely information about criminal activity at his house in general. “Probable cause 

for an arrest exists when the totality of circumstances demonstrates that the arresting 

officer personally knows or has been reliably informed of sufficient facts to warrant 

a belief that a crime has been committed and that the person to be arrested committed 

it.” Reinholz, 245 F.3d at 778 (citing Kuehl v. Burtis, 173 F.3d 646, 650 (8th Cir. 

1999)). 
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The source stated that Evans sold drugs, and Joyner corroborated Evans’s

identity, address, and prior criminal record. Evans was also known to sell drugs 

from his car. These facts provided “reasonably trustworthy information sufficient 

to warrant a belief by a prudent person that an offense has been or is being 

committed.” United States v. Council, 860 F.3d 604, 609 (8th Cir. 2017). Because 

the affidavit underlying the search warrant for Evans’s house also supported

probable cause to detain and arrest Evans, the officers did not need separate indicia 

of criminal activity occurring at the time of the arrest. “[T]he warrantless arrest of 

an individual in a public place upon probable cause d[oes] not violate the Fourth 

Amendment.” Id. at 608 (alterations in original) (quoting United States v. Santana, 

427 U.S. 38, 42 (1976)). Here, the information in the affidavit—which covered 

Evans’s conduct, not just his house—gave the officers probable cause to detain and 

arrest him. 

Thus, we affirm the district court’s denial of Evans’s motion to suppress 

because probable cause existed for his arrest. 

III. Conclusion

We affirm the judgment of the district court. 

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