NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

____________

No. 12-4076

____________ MARK JACKSON, Appellant,

v. THE DOW CHEMICAL COM PANY; ROHM AND HAAS COMPANY; ROHM & HAAS COMPANY BENEFITS ADMINISTRATIVE COMMITTEE; LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMP ANY; RAJ L. GUPTA; PIERRE R. BRONDEAU; JACQUES M. CROISETTIERE; ROBERT A. LONERGAN , ESQUIRE; ELLEN FRIEDELL, ESQUIRE; ROYCE WARRICK, ESQUIRE; JANE GREENETZ; DEAN NA MAY; CYNTHIA MAZER; RICHARD QUINLAN, ESQUIRE; SEAN B. MCSWEENEY, ESQUIRE; MI CHAEL MILLER, ESQUIRE;

NANCY MAYO; LORI HAMLIN; JOHN DOE NOS. 1-15

_______________ ___________________ On Appeal from the Un ited States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Civ. No. 11-cv-06194) District Judge: Honorable James Knoll Gardner

________________ __________________ Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) May 20, 2013 Before: AMBRO, FUENTES and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges (Opinion filed: May 22, 2013)

____________ OPINION

____________2 PER CURIAM Appellant Mark Jackson appeals pro se an order of the District Court dismissing his pro se complaint. For the reas ons that follow, we will affirm. Jackson initiated his pro se action against his former employer, Rohm & Haas, Liberty Mutual Insurance Comp any, and others by filing h is complaint in the United States District Court for the Distr ict of Delaware, D.C. Civ. No. 10-cv-00938, after a virtually identical complaint, f iled by his former counsel on his behalf, was dismissed with prejudice in the Eastern District of Pennsylva nia, D.C. Civ. No. 05-cv-04988, under Poulis v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. , 747 F.2d 863, 868 (3d Cir. 1984). See Jackson v. Rohm & Haas Co. , 2009 WL 773936 (E .D. Pa. March 19, 2009 ). Tellingly, in connection with the prior E astern District proceedings, the District Judge previously assigned to the case not only d ismissed the case under Poulis , he also fined Jackson’s counsel in excess of $80,000 fo r prosecuting it. See id. , 2009 WL 773936, at * 1 (“Viewed in the light of the history of this litigation and the decisions of this court, the [Consolidated Amended Comp laint] seems a model of obstr uctive and contumacious posturing.”). The complaint filed by counsel on behalf of Jackson in the Eastern District, known as the Consolidated Amended Complaint (“CA C”), asserted violations of RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1962, ERISA, 29 U. S.C. § 1132(a)(3), and related common law claims based on the defendants’ alleged misconduct in earlier state court proceedings and the handling of certain benefits. The claims were lacking in merit. It also asserted claims under the3 Americans with Disab ilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. , which were not obviously wholly withou t merit and which were not dismissed, Jackson , 2009 WL 773936, at *2, but Jackson vo luntarily withdrew them so that he could immediately appeal. We affirmed the Poulis dismissal on appeal, Jackson v. Rohm & Haas Co. , 366 Fed. Appx. 342, 348 (3d Cir. 2010), noting among other things, that the CAC was duplicative of earlier l itigation and meritless: Jackson contends that [the Magistrate Judge] and the District Court erred in the Poulis analysis. . . . We do not find that the District Court abused its discreti on in its dismissal of the 21 CAC claims: (1) Jackson bore personal responsibility for the CAC after the May 20, 2008 hearing; (2)-(3) Jackson’s repeated filing of improper comp laints with fri volous claims prejudiced the defendants and illustrates a history of dilatoriness; (4) Jackson’ s refusal to abide by [the Magistrate Judge’s] last instructions regarding the CAC indicates that his counsel’s conduct was willful or in bad faith; (5) the continuation of improper condu ct after the imposition of the $80,000 fine demonstrates that any sanction other than dismissal would have likely been ineff ective; and (6) Jackson’s ERISA and RICO claim s were without merit. Jacksons litany of arguments to the contrary are simply not convincing. Id. at 348. 1

1 In this decision we discussed in some d etail the case’s lengthy histor y and it is thus not necessary that we repeat it here. Suffice it to say that Jackson sued his former employer Rohm & Haas in state court for invasion of privacy and eventu ally lost because his claims were barred by the state Work ers’ Compensation Act. He became disabled due to depression and received disability benefits for a time before those benefits were suspended. Jackson’s lawsuits in federal court alleged that the defendants perpetrated a fraud on the state courts and impr operly terminated his benefits. Jackson’s petition for writ of certior ari was denied by the United States Supreme Court on October 4, 2010 , Jackson v. Rohm & Haas Co. , 131 S. Ct. 206 (2010) (mem).4 The fine imposed on counsel, our a ffirmance, and the den ial of discretionary review by the United States Supreme Court sh ould have brought an end to Jackson’s decades-long pursuit of litigatio n against these defendants, but, surprisingly, it did not. Jackson soon thereafter filed th e instant action – a mirror imag e of the CAC – pro se in the District of Delaware. The action was transferred to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and reassigned to a new United States District Judge. 2

Jackson appeals pro se. We have jurisd iction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary review over res judicata, or claim preclusion, dismissals. See Elkadrawy v. Vanguard Group, Inc. , 584 F.3d 169, 172 (3d Cir. 2009). The defendants then moved in two groups to dismiss the complaint on the basis of res judicata, and, in an order entered on October 1, 2012, the Distr ict Court granted the motions and dismissed Jackson’s pro se complaint.

We will affirm. Jackson’s pro se co mplaint was properly dismissed as barred by the doctrine of res judicata, or claim preclusi on. Claim preclusion applies when “there has been (1) a final judgment on the merits in a prior suit involving (2) the same parties or their privies and (3) a subsequent suit b ased on the same cause of action.” Lubrizol Corp. v. Exxon Corp. , 929 F.2d 960, 963 (3d Cir. 1991) . The doctrine “is not a mere matter of technical practice or procedure but a rule of fundamental and substantial justice.” See Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. U.S. Steel Corp. , 921 F.2d 489, 492 (3d Cir. 1990) (internal quotation mark s and citation omitted). It is “central to the purpose for which civil cour ts have been establish ed, the conclusiv e resolution of

2 The judge previously assigned to the case had sin ce passed away.5 disputes,” and seeks to avoid “the expense and vexation” of multiple lawsuits, while conserving judicial resources and fostering reliance on judicial action “by minimizing the possibility of inconsisten t decisions.” Id. (internal quotation ma rks omitted) (quoting Montana v. United States , 440 U.S. 147, 153-54 (1979)). “The doctrine of res judicata bars not only claims that were brought in a previous action, but also claims that could have been brought.” In re Mullarkey , 536 F.3d 215, 225 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing Post v. Hartford Ins. Co. , 501 F.3d 154, 169 (3d Cir. 2007)). Jackson’s pro se filing in a different forum of the sam e complaint that was dismissed under Poulis in the Eastern District of Pen nsylvania presents a clear case for the application of res judicata. As a threshol d matter, dismissal of an action under Poulis is a serious sanction; it is meant to deter future abuses. See Hicks v. Feeney , 850 F.2d 152, 156 (3d Cir. 1988) (citing National Ho ckey League v. Metro politan Hockey Club,
Inc. , 427 U.S. 639, 643 (1976). If counsel for Jackson was sanctioned, and prohibited from filing the CAC or something similar to it in any feder al court, this same prohibition extended to Jackson acting pro se. The District Court properly dismissed Jackson’s pro se complaint as barred by the doctrine of res judicata. With out a doubt, the prior final judgment – the dismissal of Jackson’s CAC in D.C. Civ. No. 05-cv-04988 purs uant to Poulis – operated as an adjudication on the merits for cl aim preclusion purposes. See , e.g. , Dillard v. Security Pacific Brokers, Inc. , 835 F.2d 607, 608 (5th Cir. 1 988) (claim preclu sion accorded to earlier federal judgment entered as sanction for f ailure to comply with court order). Jackson’s voluntary dismissal with prejudice of his remaining ADA claims also operated6 as a final judgment on the merits fo r purposes of claim preclusion. See Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. v. Celotex Corp. , 56 F.3d 343, 345 (2d Cir. 1995). Jackson’s assertion on appeal that his CAC claim s were so frivolous that the prior dismissal was for lack of sub ject matter jurisdiction, Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 12(b)(1), rather than “on the merits” for claim preclusion purposes, see Appellant’s Brief, at 17-19, is specious. Moreover, Semtek Intern. Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp. , 531 U.S. 497 (2001), on which Jackson relies, see Appellant’s Brief, at 33-34, was a diversity case and the issue was “whether the claim-preclusive e ffect of a federal judgment dismissing a diversity action on statute of limitation ground s is determined by the law of the State in which the federal court sits.” 531 U.S. at 499. Finding that federal common law governed, the Supreme Court concluded th at while the statute of limitation dismissal in California had res judicata effect in the district court in California, the dismissal did not necessarily bar an action in Maryland state c ourt under Maryland’s longer statute of limitation. See id. at 508-09. Jackson’s repetitive r acketeering lawsuits in the federal courts do not involve the claim-preclusive effect of a fe deral judgment dismissing a diversity action on state law statute of limitation grounds, and thus Semtek does not apply. The other requirements for application of r es judicata also were met. Although Jackson named new defendants in his pro se complaint, res judicat a applies “against a plaintiff who has previously asserted essen tially the same claim against different defendants where there is close or si gnificant relationship between successive defendants.” Gambocz v. Yelencsics , 468 F.2d 837, 841 (3d Cir. 1972). We agree with7 the District Court that, for pu rposes of claim preclusion in this case, there is a sufficiently close relationship between th e defendants named in the CAC and those named in Jackson’s pro se complaint. See Lubrizol Corp. , 929 F.2d at 966 (c laim preclusion bars relitigation of claims against both the parties to the prior su it and those in privity with them). In addition, Jackson’s pro se lawsuit was based on th e same cause of action as the prior lawsuit. Jackson frankly admits that he “updated and re-filed the fraud and racketeering case previously filed in the Easter n District of Pennsy lvania.” Appellant’s Brief, at 4. Claim preclusion turns not on the specific legal theory asserted but on the essential similarity of the underlying events that gi ve rise to the various legal claims. See United States v. Athlone Industries, Inc. , 746 F.2d 977, 983 (3d Cir. 1984); Davis v. United States Steel Supply , 688 F.2d 166, 17 1 (3d Cir. 1982) (en banc). Federal courts look to whether the claims arise out of the same transaction or occurrence, see Lubrizol Corp. , 929 F.2d at 963, and the focus is on “wh ether the acts complained of were the same, whether the material facts allege d in each suit were the sam e, and whether the witnesses and documentation required to prove such alleg ations were the same,” id. (citation and quotation marks omitted). The appellees’ side-by-side comp arison chart persuasively reveals that Jackson’s pr o se complaint mirrors the CAC almost completely. See Appellee Liberty Mutual’s Brief, at 22-23. The vast majority of Jackson’s pro se claims are identical or essentially identical to the claim s raised in the CAC. Jackson’s addition of some new, nonmaterial facts concerning, for example, Liberty Mutual’s merger with Safeco, does not obscure the essential similarity of the two lawsuits.8 Jackson argues that the District Judge prev iously assigned to his case held, albeit in the context of a mandamu s petition, that the claims in his pro se action were not identical to the CAC claims. See Appellant’s Brief, at 35-40. We note that certain of the defendants requested under the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 16 51, that Jackson be enjoined from filing the pro se action in the District of Delaware, and that the District Judge previously assigned to the case did indeed decline to invok e an extraordinary remedy under the All Writs Act. Importantly, howeve r, in allowing Jackson’s pro se complaint to run its course, the District Judge made no assessment of whether the claims were the same or similar for purposes of res judicata . Accordingly, the prior District Judge’s analysis under the All Writs Act did not pr event the District Court from concluding that Jackson’s pro se complaint was based on the same cause of action as the prior lawsuit. We have considered all of the other argum ents in Jackson’s brief and find them to be lacking in merit. For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the dismissal of Jack son’s complaint on the basis of res judicata and all other orders of the District Court. Jackson’s motion to supplement the appe ndix is denied.