1

The Honorable David S. Doty, United States District Judge for the District of

Minnesota, adopting the Report and Recommendation of the Honorable E.S.

Swearingen, United States Magistrate Judge for the District of Minnesota.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 01-3694

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, * Appeal from the United States

* District Court for the

v. * District of Minnesota.

*

Juan Mederos Gomez, *

*

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: June 14, 2002

Filed: December 11, 2002 

___________

Before HANSEN, Chief Judge, BOWMAN and BYE, Circuit Judges.

___________

BOWMAN, Circuit Judge.

Juan Mederos Gomez appeals from the order of the District Court1

 denying his

motion to suppress. We affirm.

The only witness to testify at the hearing on Gomez's motion was Daniel

Medrano, at the time a ten-year veteran of the United States Postal Inspection Service
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and a prohibited mailings narcotics specialist in Indianapolis, Indiana. Early in the

morning on Saturday, April 28, 2001, a drug interdiction operation involving forty

postal inspectors and ten national guardsmen, all trained in spotting suspicious

packages, was ongoing at the United States Postal Service (USPS) Express Mail hub

in Indianapolis. The package in question arrived between 2:00 and 2:30 a.m. An

unidentified inspector removed the package from the conveyor belt in the area where

the packages were sorted for transfer to their final destinations and brought it, along

with others, to Medrano at the "command center," approximately twenty yards from

the belt, for further inspection.

Medrano observed that the package was sent by Express Mail for delivery by

noon the next day to a "Juan Mederos" at a Minneapolis address. Medrano testified

that Express Mail next-day noon delivery is favored for the transport of contraband,

notwithstanding the greater expense compared with regular mail (or even Express

Mail two-day delivery or next-day 3:00 p.m. delivery), because it is reliable and

trackable, and obviously faster. Medrano found the package's size—approximately

fourteen inches square and nearly twelve pounds—to be unusually large for personto-person mail, as the hand-written label indicated it was. He testified that only five

percent of Express Mail is not business-related and personal Express Mail packages

are typically much smaller than those for which the sender or recipient is a business.

The size of the package was further significant because, in Medrano's experience,

illegal drugs are often sent through the mail enclosed in larger items. The cost for

mailing the package was $37.55, relatively expensive, especially for mail not sent by

a business, and the sender paid the postage in cash. 

The package was mailed on Friday for delivery on Saturday. Medrano testified

that he had been seeing more illegal drugs in parcels mailed Friday for Saturday

delivery and believed that this was because drug dealers speculated that fewer drug

interdiction efforts were being conducted on weekends. The package was mailed

from LaBrea, California, near Los Angeles, a known source city and state for illegal
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drugs. Medrano noticed that the package was heavily taped, possibly an attempt to

thwart a drug-detection dog. His attention also was drawn to a "FRAGILE" stamp

on the package and to the fact that the sender and the addressee had the same surname

(presumptively relatives). In Medrano's experience, both of these factors reflected

an attempt to "legitimize" the package. The sender's first name was spelled "Antony,"

which Medrano suspected was a misspelling of "Anthony" and so perhaps not the

sender's true name. Medrano decided to detain the package for further investigation.

Medrano's intention was to verify the addresses of the sender and the addressee

at the earliest opportunity. He spoke with the mail carriers assigned to the routes in

Minneapolis and LaBrea when they arrived for work, after 7:00 a.m. local times.

Although the addresses were valid, the carriers were unable to associate the names

of the sender and the intended recipient with the addresses written on the label. The

package was then subjected to a canine sniff by Wendy, a certified drug-detection

dog, who alerted to the package. The "Juan Mederos" package was one of thirty (out

of thirty-five that had been detained) to which drug-sniffing dogs alerted that

morning. Medrano prepared a search warrant application and delivered it to the home

of a United States magistrate judge, who authorized the warrant at 5:17 p.m. 

The package was opened and found to contain nine pounds, three ounces of

methamphetamine. Gomez accepted the package in Minneapolis in a controlled

delivery on Monday, April 30, 2001. He was charged in two counts with federal drug

violations. After the District Court denied his motion to suppress the

methamphetamine, Gomez entered a conditional guilty plea, was sentenced, and filed

this appeal.

We review de novo the District Court's conclusions regarding reasonable

suspicion and probable cause. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996).

On the other hand, we "review findings of historical fact only for clear error
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and . . . give due weight to inferences drawn from those facts by resident judges and

local law enforcement officers." Id.

Gomez first argues that the package was seized without reasonable suspicion

to believe it contained contraband, and therefore in violation of the Fourth

Amendment, when it was lifted from the conveyor belt by an inspector. Assuming

the inspector who picked up the package did not have the necessary reasonable

suspicion, the question is whether there was a seizure—"meaningful interference"

with Gomez's "possessory interests" in the package. United States v. Jacobsen, 466

U.S. 109, 113 (1984). We have recently held in a very similar case that the lifting of

a package from a FedEx conveyor belt by a drug interdiction officer was not a seizure

in the constitutional sense, and so reasonable suspicion was not required. United

States v. Demoss, 279 F.3d 632 (8th Cir. 2002). Such is the case here. The large,

heavily-taped Express Mail package, voluntarily deposited in the mail in California

for delivery by the USPS hundreds of miles away in Minnesota, virtually begged for

the attention of a postal inspector. It is not reasonable for Gomez to have expected

this particular package—or any package, for that matter—to make its way through the

USPS system with its exterior characteristics unnoticed. See id. at 635 ("[T]here

could be no expectation that [a FedEx] package would not be handled or that its

physical attributes would not or could not be observed."); see also Walter v. United

States, 447 U.S. 649, 655 n.5 (1980) (quoting a passage from a seminal case where

the Court noted that the "outward form and weight" of sealed, first-class mail was not

protected under the Fourth Amendment from examination by authorities) (Stevens, J.,

announcing the judgment of the Court) (citation to quoted case omitted).

We further conclude that moving the package twenty yards away from the

conveyor belt for some moments (as contrasted with the package at issue in Demoss,

which was not moved any appreciable distance from the belt before reasonable

suspicion was established) was minimal interference with Gomez's possessory interest
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As we noted above, this Court held that the FedEx package in question in

Demoss was not seized when it was lifted from the conveyor belt in the sorting area

of the FedEx facility. United States v. Demoss, 279 F.3d 632, 635-36 (8th Cir. 2002).

The Court further held that because of the package's particular and readily observable

external characteristics, reasonable suspicion was established almost immediately

when the package was picked up. Id. at 636. The exact moment at which the package

was seized therefore became immaterial to the holding. The Demoss Court's

statement that the package was seized when the officer took it away from the belt was

dictum—not a holding of the case—because it was not essential to the resolution of

the legal issues raised by the appellant. That statement did not establish a rule that,

for Fourth Amendment purposes, a package examined at a sorting facility is seized

when it is taken away from a sorting area for further inspection. Indeed, a

comparison of the facts relating to the seizure in Demoss and to the seizure in this

case demonstrates the wisdom of the Supreme Court's teachings that the factintensive nature of Fourth Amendment inquiries makes the promulgation of brightline rules ill-advised. See United States v. Drayton, 122 S. Ct. 2105, 2111 (2002)

("[F]or the most part per se rules are inappropriate in the Fourth Amendment

context."); see also infra p. 8. The fact that the FedEx package was taken away from

the conveyor belt was no more determinative of the question of seizure in Demoss

than the Express Mail package's twenty yards' distance from the sorting area for

further visual inspection by Medrano is determinative of a seizure in this case. In

each case, there was no seizure until the respective officers exerted dominion and

control over the packages by deciding to go beyond a superficial inspection of the

exterior of the packages and to detain the packages for further inquiry into

characteristics that could not be observed by merely holding the package. See United

States v. Jacobson, 466 U.S. 109, 121 n.18 (1984).

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 in the package.2

 When the package was taken to the command post, away from the

normal activity near the conveyor belt but still within the confines of the processing

center, it was merely "stopped," and reasonable suspicion was not required for that

stop. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). It was not seized until Medrano opted

not to return it to the conveyor belt for transfer to its intended destination, that is,
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As a result of Medrano's inspection of the package, or perhaps because of the

subsequent detention of it, the package missed the flight, which departed Indianapolis

at approximately 2:30 a.m. on Saturday morning, that would have arrived in

Minneapolis in time for the package to be delivered to "Juan Mederos" before noon.

It is unclear at precisely what point in the inspectors' review of the package the

connecting flight left for Minneapolis. Medrano answered in the affirmative when

asked if the "package was missing the plane" when the decision was made "to check

further on the package." Hearing Transcript at 38. In other words, it may have

missed the connection before Medrano even had a chance to look at it. 

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until he "exert[ed] dominion and control over the package for [his] own purposes."3

Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 121 n.18.

We also reject Gomez's alternate argument that even if we hold (as we have)

that the package was seized only after Medrano had a look at it and not when it was

removed from the conveyor belt, the seizure was not supported by reasonable

suspicion. We do not know why the first inspector to handle the package lifted it

from the belt, so we cannot say that he immediately formed a reasonable suspicion

that the package contained contraband. But as we explain below, we do know why

it attracted Medrano's attention, and we conclude that by the time the package was

seized, Medrano had reasonable, articulable suspicion to do so. 

The characteristics of the package described by Medrano in his testimony at the

suppression hearing, which we have detailed supra, when combined with his

undisputed knowledge and experience in the interdiction of packages containing

illegal drugs, clearly demonstrate that Medrano had formed the reasonable suspicion

necessary to detain the package. See United States v. Arvizu, 122 S. Ct. 744, 750

(2002) ("When discussing how reviewing courts should make reasonable-suspicion

determinations, we have said repeatedly that they must look at the 'totality of the

circumstances' of each case to see whether the detaining officer has a 'particularized
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and objective basis' for suspecting legal wrongdoing.") (quoting United States v.

Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981)). Gomez contends that the factors cited by

Medrano might just as easily have been noted on an altogether innocent package. "A

determination that reasonable suspicion exists, however, need not rule out the

possibility of innocent conduct. Undoubtedly, each of these factors alone is

susceptible to innocent explanation, and some factors are more probative than others."

Id. at 753 (citation omitted). But the historical facts of this case considered in light

of the background facts—that is, viewed "through the lens of [Medrano's] experience

and expertise" as a postal inspector—clearly add up to reasonable suspicion. Ornelas,

517 U.S. at 699; cf. United States v. Johnson, 171 F.3d 601, 604 (8th Cir. 1999)

(reversing the denial of a suppression motion where "there was no articulation of how

the officer's experience bore upon his appraisal of the package in light of the

profile"). The features observed by Medrano have been considered relevant and

probative by this and other courts of appeals when evaluating reasonable suspicion.

See, e.g., Demoss, 279 F.3d at 635-36; United States v. Scarborough, 128 F.3d 1373,

1378 (10th Cir. 1997); United States v. Dennis, 115 F.3d 524, 532 (7th Cir. 1997).

In some cases such reasonable suspicion has been found where far fewer of the

"profile" characteristics were noted. Given Medrano's interdiction experience, the

factors present here "sufficed to form a particularized and objective basis for" the

package to be detained for further investigation. Arvizu, 122 S. Ct. at 753. The

seizure of the package was constitutionally reasonable.

A seizure properly supported by reasonable suspicion nevertheless may by its

"nature and extent" cross over to become an unreasonable intrusion upon Fourth

Amendment rights, in which case the detention would be unconstitutional in the

absence of probable cause. Demoss, 279 F.3d at 636 (quoting United States v. Place,

462 U.S. 696, 705 (1983)). Although Gomez does not specifically challenge the

reasonableness of the detention after the package was seized, out of an abundance of

caution and in order to round out our discussion, we will address the issue.
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It may have been as long as twelve to fourteen hours between the time

reasonable suspicion was established (Medrano's cumulative observations, taking into

account his professional training and experience) and the time probable cause was

clearly demonstrated (Wendy's alert to the package, see United States v. Sundby, 186

F.3d 873, 876 (8th Cir. 1999)). We know it was approximately fifteen hours after the

package arrived in Minneapolis that the search warrant was approved by the

magistrate judge. But to our knowledge, no court has set a limit on the amount of

time that a package deposited into the USPS Express Mail system may be held where

reasonable suspicion that is less than probable cause has been established. And it is

our opinion that setting an outside limit, a bright-line rule, would be a mistake. See

United States v. Drayton, 122 S. Ct. 2105, 2111 (2002) ("[F]or the most part per se

rules are inappropriate in the Fourth Amendment context."). We take that position

in part because the length of the detention must be considered in light of the amount

of time reasonably required for a diligent inspector to complete an investigation into

the package being held, see Place, 462 U.S. at 709, and that will vary with each case.

It is undisputed in this case that Medrano attempted to verify the addresses as

soon as possible. Because the seizure occurred in the wee hours of the morning in

Indianapolis, soon after the package arrived at the Express Mail hub, and because the

sender's address was in California, there was no practical way to check that address

until approximately eight hours after the package arrived. Once that step was taken,

Wendy, whose reliability as a drug-detection dog is unchallenged, was called in.

When she alerted to the package, there was probable cause to support the issuance of

a search warrant. See Sundby, 186 F.3d at 876 ("A dog's positive indication alone is

enough to establish probable cause for the presence of a controlled substance if the

dog is reliable."). The record demonstrates that Medrano acted as expeditiously as

the circumstances would allow to establish and document the facts necessary to

support a lawful search and to apply for a warrant. We cannot say that the intrusion

upon the legitimate expectations of Gomez in the interim between reasonable

suspicion and probable cause was unreasonable.
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The District Court's denial of Gomez's suppression motion is affirmed.

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.