The Role of the Global SOF Network in a Resource Constrained Environment

The Role of the Global SOF 

Network in a Resource 

Constrained Environment

Edited by Chuck Ricks

JSOU Report

November 2013

Joint Special Operations University

7701 Tampa Point Boulevard

MacDill AFB FL 33621

https://jsou.socom.mil
Joint Special Operations University

and the Strategic Studies Department

The Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) provides its publications 

to contribute toward expanding the body of knowledge about joint special 

operations. JSOU publications advance the insights and recommendations 

of national security professionals and the Special Operations Forces (SOF) 

students and leaders for consideration by the SOF community and defense 

leadership. 

JSOU is the educational component of the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), MacDill Air Force Base, Florida. The JSOU 

mission is to educate SOF executive, senior, and intermediate leaders and 

selected other national and international security decision makers, both 

military and civilian, through teaching, outreach, and research in the 

science and art of joint special operations. JSOU provides education to the 

men and women of SOF and to those who enable the SOF mission in a joint 

and interagency environment. 

JSOU conducts research through its Strategic Studies Department where 

effort centers upon the USSOCOM and United States SOF missions: 

USSOCOM mission. Provide fully capable Special Operations Forces to 

defend the United States and its interests. Synchronize planning of global 

operations against terrorist networks.

USSOF mission. USSOF conduct special operations to prepare the operational environment, prevent crisis, and respond with speed, precision, and 

lethality to achieve tactical through strategic effect. 

The Strategic Studies Department also organizes and conducts strategic symposia, interagency curricula, international curricula, regional and 

cultural education senior level courses, and senior level professional military education.

This publication is available on the JSOU public web page located at

https://jsou.socom.mil.

Joint Special Operations University

Brian A. Maher, Ed.D., SES, President

Kenneth H. Poole, Ed.D., Strategic Studies Department Director

Robert Nalepa, Lt. Col., U.S. Air Force, Ret., Director of Research

Mark Moyar, Ph.D., History; William Knarr, Ed.D., Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret.; Richard Rubright, 

Ph.D., Strategic Studies; Jason Quirin, Ph.D., Chemical Engineering; Joanna Gutierrez Winters, 

M.A., International Relations and Diplomacy, M.A., Economics, Resident Senior Fellows

Anna-Marie Wyant, M.A., English, JSOU Press Editor

Editorial Advisory Board

Roby C. Barrett

Ph.D., Middle Eastern & South Asian History 

Public Policy Center Middle East Institute 

and JSOU Senior Fellow

Joseph D. Celeski

Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret.

JSOU Senior Fellow

Chuck Cunningham

Lieutenant General, U.S. Air Force, Ret. 

Professor of Strategy, Joint Advanced 

Warfighting School and JSOU Distinguished 

Senior Fellow

James J.F. Forest 

Ph.D., Higher Education Administration

Associate Professor, School of Criminology and 

Justice Studies, University of Massachusetts 

Lowell and JSOU Senior Fellow

Thomas H. Henriksen

Ph.D., History, Hoover Institution 

Stanford University and JSOU Senior Fellow

Bernd Horn

Colonel, Canadian Dept. of National Defence 

Ph.D., War Studies

Director, CANSOFCOM Professional 

Development Centre

Russell D. Howard

Brigadier General, U.S. Army, Ret.

JSOU Senior Fellow

John D. Jogerst

Colonel, U.S. Air Force, Ret.

James Kiras

Ph.D., History, School of Advanced Air and 

Space Studies, Air University and 

JSOU Associate Fellow 

William W. Mendel

Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret. 

JSOU Senior Fellow

Alvaro de Souza Pinheiro

Major General, Brazilian Army, Ret.

JSOU Associate Fellow

James F. Powers, Jr.

Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret.

JSOU Senior Fellow 

Thomas Sass

Ph.D., International Relations

Richard H. Shultz, Jr.

Ph.D., Political Science

Director, International Security 

Studies Program, The Fletcher School, 

Tufts University and JSOU Senior Fellow

Robert G. Spulak, Jr.

Ph.D., Physics/Nuclear Engineering

Sandia National Laboratories 

and JSOU Associate Fellow 

Jessica Glicken Turnley

Ph.D., Cultural Anthropology

Galisteo Consulting Group 

and JSOU Senior Fellow 

Francisco R. Wong-Diaz

J.D., Ph.D., Political Science

Professor of international affairs and law and 

JSOU Senior Fellow

Rich Yarger

Ph.D., History 

JSOU Senior Fellow
On the cover. 

A Joint Terminal Attack Controller with U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Special 

Operations Command (MARSOC) communicates with a Navy MH-60S 

helicopter during takeoff as part of Carrier Airwing Training conducted by 

the Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center aboard Naval Air Station Fallon, 

Nevada. MARSOC photo by Lance Cpl. Kyle McNally. 

The JSOU Press

MacDill Air Force Base, Florida

2013

The Role of the Global 

SOF Network in a 

Resource Constrained 

Environment

Richard Rubright

Kevin Morton

Emily Spencer

Bill Knarr

Bernd Horn

Alan Bell

Chuck Ricks
This monograph and other JSOU publications can be found at https://jsou.

socom.mil. Click on Publications. Comments about this publication are 

invited and should be forwarded to Director, Strategic Studies Department, 

Joint Special Operations University, 7701 Tampa Point Blvd., MacDill AFB, 

FL 33621.

*******

The JSOU Strategic Studies Department is currently accepting written works relevant to special operations for potential publication. For more information please 

contact the JSOU Research Director at jsou_research@socom.mil. Thank you for 

your interest in the JSOU Press. 

*******

This work was cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.

ISBN: 978-1-933749-83-9
The views expressed in this publication are entirely those of the 

author and do not necessarily reflect the views, policy, or position of the United States Government, United States Department of Defense, United States Special Operations Command, 

Joint Special Operations University, Canadian Government, 

Canadian Department of National Defence, Canadian Special 

Operations Forces Command, or the Professional Development Centre.
Recent Publications of the JSOU Press

Piracy: The Best Business Model Available, November 2013, John Alexander

The Terrorist Trafficking Nexus: Scourge of the World or so Much Hype?, 

October 2013, Russell D. Howard and Colleen Traughber

Interagency Counterterrorism Reference Manual, September 2013

Security Force Assistance and Security Sector Reform, August 2013, Richard Shultz

Special Operations Research Topics 2014

Hybrid Warfare, August 2013, Timothy McCulloh and Richard Johnson

Smart Power and U.S. National Strategy, August 2013, Francisco Wong-Diaz

Retooling for the Future, May 2013, Francisco Wong-Diaz

21st Century SOF: Toward an American Theory of Special Operations, April 2013, 

Harry R. Yarger

Irregular Warfare: The Maoist Threat to India’s Internal Security, December 2012, 

Prakash Singh

Iran: Illusion, Reality, and Interests, September 2012, Roby Barrett

Knowing Your Partner: The Evolution of Brazilian Special Operations Forces,

August 2012, Alvaro de Souza Pinheiro

Confronting the Terrorism of Boko Haram in Nigeria, May 2012, James J.F. Forest

“We Will Find a Way”: Understanding the Legacy of Canadian Special Operations 

Forces, February 2012, Bernd Horn
vii

Contents

Foreword ................................................................................ix

Introduction............................................................................ 1

1. A Strategic Perspective on the Global SOF Network: Little 

Money, Unclear Ends, and Big Ideas....................................... 5

2. Interoperability: Benefits and Challenges .......................... 19

3. Solving the People Puzzle: Educating and Training SOF 

Operators for Enhanced Cultural Intelligence........................ 23

4. Matching the Footprint of Governance to the Footprint 

of Sovereignty....................................................................... 31

5. Private Military Corporations as Members of the Global 

SOF Network: Worth Another Look? ..................................... 41

6. Private Military Corporations: A View from Inside ............. 57

7. General Themes and Thoughts .......................................... 67

Endnotes............................................................................... 81

ix

Foreword

It was an honor for the Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) to host 

the February 2013 Special Operations Forces (SOF) Symposium, The Role 

of the Global SOF Network in a Resource Constrained Environment. This 

symposium represented the second year in which JSOU and the Canadian 

Special Operations Forces Command (CANSOFCOM) have co-sponsored 

this event.

We built upon the prior symposium hosted by the CANSOFCOM Professional Development Centre held in December 2011 at the Royal Military 

College of Canada in Kingston, Ontario. In that symposium, we explored 

the issues and challenges of SOF personnel training, mentoring, and collaborating with SOF from our partner nations around the world.

This symposium moved us forward and focused on the future integration 

and interoperability necessary to sustain the emerging Global SOF Network 

with the realization that we will have to do this more efficiently and effectively. With anticipated resource constraints in the future, it will require a 

synchronized and interoperable Global SOF Network to combat our current 

and emerging threats.

A network is inherently human in the SOF realm. Although our operators 

have a distinct advantage of access to some of the best equipment and systems 

in the world, it is the understanding and leverage of the human domain that 

serve to strengthen the bonds of trust among our partners while providing 

us an advantage in operations against our adversaries. Those bonds among 

our partners represent commitments that must be nurtured and sustained 

so we develop, together, both commonality of experience and trust.

Shared experiences and trust will then support furthering a compelling 

narrative of the value of SOF within the context of our complex security 

environment. It’s about knowing what we can and can’t do, and having an 

appreciation for the contributions of partners within our community. As 

Lieutenant General John Mulholland, Deputy Commander of United States 

Special Operations Command stated, “I’m more concerned with capabilities than caveats. There’s always something to be done; we just have to vet 

the capabilities to see what is possible.” Our resources must be carefully 

allocated, yet SOF are still expected to, as Lieutenant-General Stu Beare, 
x

Commander of Canadian Joint Operations Command noted, “deliver operational success.” The Global SOF Network supports increased capability for 

that success.

I would like to thank Brigadier-General Thompson for the great commitment he and our CANSOFCOM partners made to this symposium. I also 

offer a special thank you to our distinguished speakers and panelists who 

took time from their busy schedules to contribute to this forum. Without 

their participation and support to SOF, this symposium would not have been 

possible. It is through their unique experiences and wisdom that each of us 

will refine our search for innovative solutions to the complex issues facing 

the global SOF community.

I am proud to introduce this collection of essays that capture the essence 

of the symposium. It is my hope that the ideas presented will act as a catalyst 

for members of the SOF community to discuss and critically evaluate these 

issues—issues that will shape and influence the future of our SOF network.

Brian A. Maher, SES

President, Joint Special Operations University
1

Introduction

Introduction

More than 125 Special Operations Forces (SOF) personnel from Canada, 

the United States, and eight other countries gathered at MacDill Air 

Force Base in Tampa, Florida, for a two-day symposium on the Role of the 

Global SOF Network in a Resource Constrained Environment from 27-28 

February 2013. In addition to U.S. and Canadian SOF, participants included 

representatives from Australia, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, 

Poland, Spain, and the United Kingdom. 

This was the third symposium in the series and the second co-sponsored 

by the Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) and the Canadian Special 

Operations Forces Command (CANSOFCOM) Professional Development 

Centre (PDC). The event featured a mix of individual presentations, panel 

discussions, and social interaction to introduce issues, engage in productive 

discussions, and strengthen SOF network relationships. The focus ranged 

from the tactical (The Acid Test of Reality—Experiences of the Operators) to 

the strategic with senior civilian and military leadership from both Canada 

and the U.S. assuming active, contributing roles. 

In his opening remarks, JSOU President Dr. Brian Maher outlined the 

symposium concept as one of “knowledge proliferation ... free of policy 

constraints and leadership prerogatives” in which participants could address 

issues and concerns in an open environment. He pointed out two important 

linkages to guide the discussions:

1. The continuity of effort achieved through the CANSOFCOM PDC’s 

publication of Special Operations Forces: Building Global Partnerships. 

This work documented and expanded upon the content from the 5-7 

December 2011 SOF Symposium held at the Royal Military College of 

Canada. Each attendee at the 2013 symposium received a copy of this 

comprehensive collection of articles.

2. The particular importance of this symposium to the second (The 

Global SOF Network) and fourth (Responsive Resourcing) Lines of 

Operation (LOOs) established by Admiral William H. McRaven, Commander, USSOCOM. Though not the central focus of the gathering, 

the other LOOs (Win the Current Fight and Preserve the Force and 

Families) were acknowledged several times and entered the discussions 
2

The Role of the Global SOF Network in a Resource Constrained Environment

periodically. Each of the four LOOs focuses on fulfilling the overall 

SOCOM 2020 Vision: “A globally networked force of SOF, Interagency, 

Allies, and Partners able to rapidly and persistently address regional 

contingencies and threats to stability.”

One of the themes that emerged early in the symposium and persisted 

throughout was the need to sustain and adapt existing mission-essential 

networks while continuing to develop new ones during times of austerity. 

Central to these imperatives was the recognition that resource constrained 

environments offer opportunities as well as pose challenges to SOF and 

their networks. 

Lieutenant-General Stu Beare, Commander of the Canadian Joint Operations Command, reminded the attendees that regardless of the mission sets 

assigned or the resources available, SOF have the overriding obligation to 

“deliver operational success.” Thus, it is essential to develop and apply creative and innovative thinking to develop new and efficient ways of doing 

things and solving problems. The ways SOF operate offer opportunities compelled by the persistent need to be successful and shaped by an environment 

far different from that of recent experience.

Typically, discussions of military operations amid austerity define the 

challenge as having to “do more with less.” This characterization is superficial, frequently reverting to merely agonizing over the hardships of reduced 

resources rather than on what must be done to succeed. Within the traditional strategic model of “ends, ways, and means,” the ends (that which must 

be accomplished) are increasing and shifting while the means to accomplish 

them (resources) are declining. That’s the reality. What remains constant is 

the expectation that SOF will continue to be successful. 

By emphasizing declining resources, one tends to focus on what can be 

done based only on available resources rather than on what must be done 

(deliver operational success) and how with the available resources. The first 

perspective is one that limits options; the latter seeks to exploit opportunity. 

In other words, how do SOF continue to deliver operational success with 

whatever resources provided to them?

One of the features of the symposium was that the majority of the presentations and discussions acknowledged both the realities of new and changing 

mission sets and declining resources while emphasizing the need for critical thinking and innovation to deliver operational success and sustain the 
3

Introduction

advances achieved over the past decade-plus of war. Handwringing was not 

a feature of the gathering, but creative energy was.

Several of the presenters have contributed chapters to this collection. The 

last chapter, General Themes and Thoughts, provides an overview of the 

issues raised and a survey of the views expressed across the various presentations. Seven shared themes emerged from the symposium:

1. Networks require persistent attention and sustained nurture to maintain and expand their documented effectiveness of recent years.

2. Cultural intelligence/cross-cultural competence programs contribute 

significantly to SOF network effectiveness and should be viewed as 

force multipliers, especially in times of diminishing resources.

3. The traditional values of trust and confidence among SOF network partners become even more important in times of constrained resources as 

the mission sets expand while the margin for error diminishes. Each 

network partner, whatever their role, must contribute effectively.

4. The ongoing shift in emphasis from direct to indirect action is increasing SOF engagement in Phase Zero shaping activities, thus placing 

increased demand on network partners who bring with them 3-D 

(defense, diplomacy, and development), security assistance, and governance skill sets.

5. Persistent attention to interoperability and integration protocols is 

essential to leverage the contributions of others and to maximize SOF 

network effectiveness in a resource-constrained environment.

6. Especially in a time of constrained resources, it is imperative to develop 

and communicate a “compelling narrative” to educate various stakeholders about the value SOF provide.

7. Measures of effectiveness must be clear, understood, shared, and 

practiced by all members of the SOF Network.

The pages that follow offer insights and suggestions on how to deliver 

operational success while accommodating both changing mission sets and 

resource constrained environments.

5

Rubright: A Strategic Perspective on the Global SOF Network

1. A Strategic Perspective on the Global 

SOF Network: Little Money, Unclear 

Ends, and Big Ideas 

Dr. Richard Rubright

The cohesion of the Allies was always shifting, subject to the whims 

of political and military personalities, and constantly tested.1 

—Rod Paschall

This chapter provides a strategic view of the emerging Global SOF Network 

(GSN) within a resource constrained environment, fostered by views of panel 

members of our recent CANSOFCOM symposium. The purpose is to examine the proposed GSN within a strategic framework to provide a degree of 

contextualization. In doing so, the chapter is intended to highlight strategic 

disconnects between thought and the political reality within which the GSN 

must exist. This step is imperative if the GSN will become an effective means 

of pursuing U.S. national interests, without as much strategic surprise or 

potential irrelevancy. 

Every strategy is a plan, but not every plan constitutes strategy. Often 

the word “strategy” is applied in imprecise and nebulous ways to convey 

the notion of sequential steps or improvement to achieve some stated goal. 

This is a very different, and often quite unhelpful, connotation than the 

definition used within strategic studies to denote a plan to specifically use 

force, or the threat of force, for the imposition of political will to achieve 

a specific political objective. This can be more generalized by stating that 

strategy bridges military power with political purpose.2 The precision of 

the appropriate use of the word strategy, albeit in a strategic studies context 

rather than a straight dictionary listing, narrows assumptions and demands 

a degree of rigor that is often sorely lacking in discourse and the written 

Dr. Richard Rubright is a Resident Senior Fellow with the Joint Special Operations University Strategic Studies Department. Dr. Rubright holds a Ph.D. 

in Strategic Studies from the University of Reading. His book, The Role and 

Limitations of Technology in US Counterinsurgency Warfare, is in publishing 

at Potomac Press for 2014 release.
6

The Role of the Global SOF Network in a Resource Constrained Environment

word. A pertinent example of this distinction is the plethora of examples 

used over the past decade to describe, judge, critique, and otherwise explain 

counterinsurgency (COIN). Colin Gray illustrates the definitional problem 

well by stating: “COIN is neither a concept nor can it be a strategy. Instead, it 

is simply an acronymic description of a basket of diverse activities intended 

to counter an insurgency.”3 In short, utilitarian need will make use of the 

“basket of diverse activities” to develop a strategy, specifically tailored to 

the conflict, to achieve specific political goals—bridging the military power 

involved in the activities with the political goal of countering the insurgency.

Quite understandably, the reader may be inclined to dismiss the above 

observation as being an overly pedantic and trivial distinction. However, as 

a perspective on the GSN, the context of the network (a profoundly complex 

political milieu with constrained resources), with a lack of grand strategic 

vision by U.S. leadership, and the distinction becomes important. Much like 

the “basket of diverse activities,” the GSN represents military possibilities. 

The GSN will link capability across national boundaries, cultures, languages, 

and social norms. To be clear, this is a positive endeavor. It will provide strategic flexibility, increase options to policymakers, and allow a more tailored 

response to global challenges—but it should not be confused with a strategy. 

The GSN is an organizational plan and as such it should not be expected to 

be a strategy, but it may enable future strategies within a challenging and 

complex environment.

Means

No matter how brilliant my strategy might be, the implementation 

depended on the availability of a vast reservoir of cash with which to 

arm, train and move my forces.4 —Mohammad Yousaf

The symposium, like all timely endeavors, attempted to focus on the resource 

constrained environment found in most countries at the moment. While the 

political messaging is obvious, and wise, the GSN will always, in fat times 

and lean, be working in a resource constrained environment. Such restrictions are an inevitable consequence of any allied military endeavor. As far 

back as the Delian Confederacy of Greece, not all members were willing or 

capable of contributing like amounts of resources.5 Ironically, this resulted 

in Athens providing the ships and their allies providing money, which in 
7

Rubright: A Strategic Perspective on the Global SOF Network

time left the allies in a vulnerable position—a lesson not likely unknown to 

our would-be partners in the GSN.6 However, as the GSN is a network rather 

than a hierarchical structure, it follows that no capability-based parity needs 

to exist between members. One cannot help but to wonder if there will exist 

a paradigm of each according to their ability to each according to their need, 

another ironic twist.

Whatever the contributions made by each member of the GSN, and 

regardless of the accompanying rhetoric, means do, in fact, matter a great 

deal. Means may be the contribution of military assets, monetary contributions, and some variant or composite of both. Inevitably, the importance 

of the contributions will impact the relative leverage and importance of 

contributing members. Whether this idea is couched in Realist political 

theory, historical examinations of allied efforts or just plain common sense, 

there will be a functional impact upon the GSN. However, the constraining 

nature of means will never be uniform; rather, the importance of means will 

be relative to the unique needs of each member.

As a panel member providing his knowledge and first hand insights into 

the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Special Operations Headquarters (NSHQ), Mr. Scott Morrison articulated that the value of the NSHQ 

model is the ability to link like-minded nations into a cooperative SOF structure providing value in excess of the sum of its parts.7 This is undoubtedly 

an asset in military endeavors which NATO feels are appropriate for the 

employment of SOF. In fact, the NSHQ model is considered so successful 

that other Regional SOF Coordination Centers (RSCCs) will be patterned 

after the NSHQ success, albeit with their own unique regional objectives.8

However, an organizational structure does not equate de facto into strategic 

success when force must actually be employed.

Will the burden sharing to alleviate the United States Special Operations 

Forces (USSOF) budgetary strain be realized through a GSN? This has yet to 

be seen and can obviously be viewed from a variety of angles. One obvious 

comparison with another similar alliance is the financial dynamics within 

NATO. By every measure of effectiveness, NATO has served its original 

intention of collective security, although without ever actually being challenged by a state actor. Yet, NATO should serve as a cautionary example of 

burden sharing. The entire notion of burden sharing is utterly relative to the 

unique positions of the members involved. While the Athenians were more 

than pleased to provide military assets while their notional allies contributed 
8

The Role of the Global SOF Network in a Resource Constrained Environment

financial support, one should seriously doubt whether Athens would have 

been as equally enamored with providing both the military and financial 

assets. A modern parallel may be aptly described by former Secretary of 

Defense Robert Gates’ attack on European decline in defense capabilities 

likely leading to NATO’s military irrelevance and Europe’s complacency over 

international security.9 This does not indicate either a concurrent American 

and European vision of military utility or a concurrent prioritization of 

funding efforts.

The schism between Europe and U.S. funding priorities is not a simple 

issue. There are deep-seated differences in political realities which have to 

be dealt with. Foremost, there is a different world view driving European 

and U.S. actions internationally in general and militarily specifically. This 

dichotomy must, inevitably, manifest a differing prioritization of funding 

allocation. In the view of Robert Kagan: “When it comes to setting national 

priorities, determining threats, defining challenges, and fashioning and 

implementing foreign and defense policies, the United States and Europe 

have parted ways.”10 This is troubling for the future of means available to a 

GSN if the intention is to alleviate the likelihood of the United States becoming the sole funding source. This should not be taken to imply that the nations 

of Europe will find the smaller footprint, less manpower intensive, and force 

multiplying aspects of SOF to be unattractive military options; likely they 

will profit from it. However, it will be toward their ends in response to their 

own particular political perspectives and not as carte blanche acquiescence 

to U.S. political objectives; again, as Kagan notes: “European intellectuals 

are nearly unanimous in the conviction that Americans and Europeans no 

longer share a common ‘strategic culture.’”11

If the strategic cultures of NATO members are becoming schizophrenic, 

then the ends (which we will delve into later) will be affected by the means 

available. Yet, NATO through the NSHQ represents only a single node within 

the GSN. It cannot be indicative of other actors within the network with 

any degree of certainty, albeit there will always be some parallel aspect. The 

NATO partnership does comprise a core of highly capable and superbly 

trained forces that have worked well with USSOCOM elements. The interoperability of forces or the quality of the forces is not so much a question, 

but rather, the utility of the forces within the political paradigms of the 

nodal actors (states) and the commensurate means available for the work of 

the entire network. NATO has far more financial and qualitative assets to 
9

Rubright: A Strategic Perspective on the Global SOF Network

contribute than many other countries of the world, but without a common 

political end, any amount of means may become irrelevant. Consider for 

a moment a more Liberal view of warfare that has much more traction in 

Europe than in the United States. Mary Kaldor’s view: “A cosmopolitan 

global community cannot stand aside when genocide is committed, as in 

Rwanda, for example. But military tasks should be confined to the protection of civilians and the arrest of war criminals and should be authorized 

through the ‘appropriate multilateral procedures.’”12 This of course may ring 

of naiveté and banality, yet this attitude is far from a fringe view. Consider 

the ramifications for NATO contributions (means) to the employment of 

force within a GSN and how they may actually hamper U.S. action if Kaldor’s 

view becomes even more of the norm than it is now. 

So far the focus has been on NATO within a GSN and some of the political challenges that will be associated with the contributions of means to 

affect political outcomes. Undoubtedly, the fact the USSOCOM pays for the 

NSHQ makes it an attractive entity for NATO participation. Equally likely, 

RSCCs around the world will be attractive forums for interaction between 

other nations. But, is it reasonable to expect more than token contributions 

from partner nations within the GSN? Declarations of burden sharing have 

obvious appeal when the U.S. Congress is eyeing defense spending for deficit 

reduction. It plays equally well within the Department of Defense as services 

jockey for funding as the overall budget shrinks. However, in reality a GSN 

likely serves the interests of the United States more than it serves the interests 

of potential partner nations. After all there is no guarantee that potential 

GSN participants could not benefit more from direct bilateral relationships 

with SOF communities without necessarily signing on for burden sharing 

within a GSN.

Ends

The World had been cleft in two, with good on one side and evil on 

the other, and victory would come, George W. Bush promised, only 

when we ‘rid the world of evil-doers.’ 13 —Reza Aslan

At this point, addressing the ends to be achieved by the GSN is the next logical step. As the means to support and facilitate the GSN are in question in 

these austere times, there has to be an assumption that some means will be 
10

The Role of the Global SOF Network in a Resource Constrained Environment

available, or that there will never be an ideal amount of means as is typical in 

any organization. This is not an indictment of the GSN, but given the potential scope of employment and varied objectives of the likely participants, 

more means will always be welcome. The GSN, being an organizational plan, 

must facilitate the accomplishment of political objectives. The network in 

and of itself should not be a political objective. Yet, in fact, the network may 

be the objective dependent on the particular view of the nodal participants. 

According to USSOCOM, the purpose of the GSN, which obviously must 

be in some harmony with U.S. national interests, is to build “a network ... 

over time through persistent engagement because you can’t surge trust.”14 

However, USSOCOM’s 2020 vision is based upon national strategy, one of 

which calls for avoiding operations that “constitute an irreversible policy 

commitment.”15 The avoidance of such policy commitments implies flexibility for U.S. forces but may not be very reassuring to partner nations or 

propagate the building of trust. However, be that as it may, the United States 

is still positioning itself to build a GSN that furthers its political objectives. 

Of course, this is not to imply that the political objectives of the United States 

must be at odds with partner nations in the GSN—just the opposite in fact. 

It is quite likely that the policy objectives of most states will align and be 

fertile ground for collaboration on a whole range of issues. Yet, as often as 

not the friction of war also applies to politics; not all nations will share the 

same concerns, or rank similar concerns with like degrees of urgency or 

trepidation, and each will have personalities which military commanders 

will have to heed.16

Europe may, as a political imperative, see a very different foundational 

reason for a GSN vis-à-vis the United States. This is postulated upon the 

differing roles of the United States and Europe within the international 

community and the political outlook of each. Generalities in this regard 

become perilous as they inevitably fail to take nuance into account; however, 

an attempt is justified. Europe often views process and intention as more 

important than tangible result. In essence, through a process of coalition 

building, dialogue, and interaction, Europe seeks to influence the world with 

the genuine intention of making it a better place while, at times, limiting 

U.S. military power.17 As an end goal of peace, both Europe and the United 

States remain committed as they share fundamental liberal ideas. This is well 

articulated by Michael Howard: “The original view of the eighteenth-century 

philosophies, that international disputes could be settled without violence, by 
11

Rubright: A Strategic Perspective on the Global SOF Network

reasoned discussion and agreement between men of goodwill, has remained 

the basis of most liberal Western thinking about international relations.”18 

Likewise, the United States shares similar goals but approaches challenges 

in the international arena much more directly. The willingness to use hard 

power by the United States could be simply, and wrongly, attributed to the 

overwhelming disparity between the U.S. military and other forces around 

the world. Rather, it is part and parcel of U.S. strategic culture.

The importance of the differing view of Europe and the United States 

resides at the crossroads of where the post-modernist view of Europe intersects with the realist view of the United States with regard to the utility of 

the GSN. Europe’s view is as valid as any, but the utility of the GSN within 

their political context may be less about meeting challenges around the globe 

through direct and indirect means and more about demonstrating the reasonableness of European diplomacy and a desire to foster dialogue. Again, 

generalities lack precision and always have exceptions, but the United States 

should head into a GSN while asking itself what utility it foresees in terms 

of support to U.S. national interests, and does it really expect a high degree 

of burden sharing and cooperation from other partners? Consider Colin 

Gray’s view of the U.S. role in the international arena in the next century: “I 

prefer to think of the United States as the sheriff of the current world order, 

for reasons both of cultural fit of concept and of tolerable accuracy.”19 If this 

is accurate, and the author would argue that it is, then what role does the 

GSN fulfill for the United States, and more importantly, to what degree? 

Again consider Gray: “The United States is not, and should not and cannot 

be, the world’s policeman vis-a-vis any and every disturbance. The actions 

of this American sheriff of order are guided frankly by a national interest 

discriminator.”20 While the United States may see it as their duty, and in its 

national interest, to foster world order, the same end may not be shared by 

other countries or partner nations in the GSN. Of equal importance, they 

may not agree on the ways in which such a goal may be reached through the 

utility of the GSN, but this will be addressed in the next section.

While the above is a fairly nebulous characterization of possible ends to 

be achieved by different polities as the GSN grows, a slightly less obscure 

end can be found in USSOCOM’s 2020 vision. Specifically, USSOF are operating in 75 countries to “defeat threat networks and to build partnership 

capacity.”21 This represents a dramatic effort far exceeding the capabilities 

of many potential GSN participants. It also lends some weight to Gray’s 
12

The Role of the Global SOF Network in a Resource Constrained Environment

characterization of the Untied States behaving as sheriff of world order. However, it represents some troubling language. “Defeating threat networks” as a 

strategic goal has all of the clarity and exactness of a Global War on Terror. 

It fails to identify specific ends. Yet, that is likely an intentional aspect; openended enemies offer open-ended funding needs and open-ended commitments. This is not an attempt to be critical of the writers, nor is it intended 

to delineate the goal as unachievable. Rather, it presents a potentially unrealistic expectation of ends beyond the grasp of strategic reality. Certainly 

the United States is incapable of defeating all of the “threat networks” in 

the world, and just as certainly the wording reflects a desired flexibility to 

engage networks determined to be a threat to U.S. national interests. It may 

even be reassuring to potential partners in the GSN that their concerns will 

be the concerns of the United States. But, importantly it may also signal to 

potential partners that the United States is engaged in a global strategy far 

beyond the national interests of the partner nations, just as Iraq in 2003 was 

not universally approved.

The obvious need to identify specific threats leads to even murkier facets. 

As Maria Stephens noted, unregulated and technically enabled money transfer schemes are challenging to track and understand.22 In essence, money is 

being transferred around the globe by criminal and terrorist elements using 

technology as an enabler. These methods and actors are evolving faster than 

authorities are able to respond. At least some of the monies involved are 

funding threat networks which represent a direct challenge to international 

stability and order. So, how is the GSN prepared to confront such challenges? 

Is it reasonable to expect countries that rely on emerging payment systems 

that require little infrastructure to suddenly engage these networks on 

behalf of U.S. national interests? Does this type of activity even warrant the 

required resources to tackle knowing new and novel techniques will emerge 

to replace eliminated transfer capabilities? These are the type of questions 

that will have to be addressed by the various partners of the GSN; each one 

an independent and sovereign political entity. This may at first glance seem 

like a trivial specific, yet millions of people rely on the Hawala network of 

money lenders to move money; can this simply be done away with?23

It is important to manage expectations whenever strategy is involved. 

Given U.S. strategic culture, this is not always the most expedient way 

to garner resources or support for an endeavor. The result can be a very 

confused and often seemingly disconnected political narrative from the 
13

Rubright: A Strategic Perspective on the Global SOF Network

strategic reality. When the United States declares “war” on an emotional 

response (terror), chemical compounds (drugs), or economic descriptions 

(poverty), the marketing is clear, but the strategy and ends to be achieved 

are not. Much like the destruction of “threat networks” as a strategic end, 

the lack of clarity becomes problematic. Such clouded rhetoric may serve 

some interests, but it will also work against others. After all, where on the 

spectrum of threat networks would we define a terrorist? Somewhere, one 

would hope, near al-Qaeda but short of teenagers sharing MP3 files. How 

will different expectations of strategic ends within a GSN be managed? The 

ends remain unclear. If this is intentional, then so be it. Yet, intentional or 

not, inevitable problems are likely to emerge as no two nations share exactly 

the same national interests.

Ways

Forward presence forces demonstrate our national resolve and 

commitment to maintain peace and stability in a region. These 

recourses serve to deter aggression and they help prevent major crises 

though aggressive engagement programs and coalition building.24

—Robert H. Scales, Jr.

If it has been determined there will be limited resources, and determined 

that there are nebulous, if not grand, ideas of what the GSN will accomplish, 

it is logical to examine how some ends will be attained. Again, at the risk 

of redundancy, how things are accomplished must be examined in light 

of restrictions placed upon conduct. In short, the capability of the GSN to 

execute whatever mission is proposed will be directly impacted by the political realities, which is to say perceptions, of the participants within the GSN. 

As Lieutenant-Colonel Earl Vandahl noted, it is often trying and challenging 

to work within a nation’s own governmental structure in support of SOF, 

much less coordinate with multiple partners.25

Attempts to understand foreign cultures will always be limited. Understanding not only a culture, but more importantly the perception within the 

culture, which in turn determines the political reality, is even a step further 

into the realm of difficulty. Yet, as history is our guide, allied efforts have 

a successful track record—both in peace and in war. But, the GSN represents something new, an endeavor of global proportions, in the end state, 
14

The Role of the Global SOF Network in a Resource Constrained Environment

with almost limitless possible missions and an equally varied set of national 

interests and political personalities. What should remain foremost, as stated 

above, building an organization is different from strategically employing 

the organization.

Consider the political perceptions required for the United Kingdom to 

proclaim its support of the League of Nations in the following:

The Foreign Policy of Great Britain shall not be aimed at creating 

Alliances for the purpose of maintaining the Balance of Power, but 

shall be directed to concerted action between the Powers, and the 

setting up of an International Council, whose deliberation and decisions shall be public, with such machinery for securing international 

agreement as shall be the guarantee of an abiding peace.26

While this statement was the foundation for UK participation in the 

league, it represents the same sentiment for the inclusion of the UK in the 

United Nations (UN) as well as the public sentiment that the UK operate 

militarily under UN mandate. It also recognizes that the historical role of 

Balance of Power politics and secret alliances in the run up to World War I is 

to be avoided. As the UK is arguably our closest ally, one must wonder about 

the role of the GSN if, for example, China is determined to be an adversary. 

Not only would the partnership in East Asia be affected, even a partner as 

far away from the theater as the North Atlantic would have questionable 

commitment. Would a strategically adversarial position of China and the 

United States be classified as Balance of Power? Would the UK want to be in 

an Alliance of such profound scope with the ideological battle of the Cold 

War no longer a threat? How and to what degree would the UK be willing 

to participate in a GSN on the other side of the globe? The above quote is 

historical, and therefore dated, yet, to a degree the sentiment it represents 

is still very much alive.

The questions posed above are not intended to imply a shortcoming of 

the GSN; it is, after all, a network which implies flexibility and adaptation. 

The point is to illustrate the complex and varied ways in which local political consideration will have an inevitable impact on how the GSN is utilized 

strategically, not necessarily upon its formative construction. While other 

partners will have an impact, there should also be questions about the impact 

that U.S. strategic culture will have upon the employment of the GSN. 
15

Rubright: A Strategic Perspective on the Global SOF Network

In looking back over the past 10 years, several trends have become apparent. The level of constraints the U.S. political system has placed upon U.S. 

military capabilities has become a strategic handicap. U.S. Naval War College professor emeritus and author, Dr. Roger Barnett, identifies the impact 

by stating: “Cumulatively, the constraints extinguish U.S. choices. By doing 

so, they accomplish the same effect as coercion by the enemy. Coercion is 

for the purpose of confining options, of requiring the target to do one’s bidding. But, their effect is unidirectional.”27 In short, military capabilities are 

being eroded through legalistic constraints and lawfare just at a time when 

the United States is seeking to engage enemies around the world through a 

global network. How far these restrictions will go is unknown, but the quote 

previously mentioned from Mary Kaldor indicates that there is an effort, or 

at least a school of thought, that will, in effect, reduce military utility to the 

level of meaninglessness. This is a troubling trend that will likely continue. 

If the most able SOF in the world will be limited in how they can be 

employed through arms control, legalistic interpretations, or even a judicial 

process for targeting known enemies, how effective will the GSN be as a 

whole when other partner nations look for a degree of leadership and capability from the United States? Again, beyond the formation of the network, the 

question directly is concerned with the actual utility of the network. When 

faced by adversaries who play by no rules at all, be they non-state actors or 

states practicing unrestricted warfare, is it reasonable to expect a network 

to be value added? Perhaps if proxies are able to operate in the grey areas in 

which we decline to get our hands dirty. Yet, how long before congressionally mandated vetting or political pressure from allies responsible to their 

constituents have a negative impact upon capability? 

Another troubling trend is one of precedence. While the NSHQ represents 

the general template for the RSCCs envisioned as part of a GSN, a serious 

question of utility must be asked. How effective has the NSHQ and the allied 

International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) effort contributed to success 

in Afghanistan? Undoubtedly, this is a question that will raise hackles and is 

a tough one to put forward. The more than 2,000 SOF contributed through 

the NSHQ are valued and contributing members of the ISAF mission and 

bring capabilities that enhance the effort. In no way should that contribution, nor any contribution by any allied nations, be underestimated or 

underappreciated, nor can their sacrifice be ignored. However, we are in the 

realm of strategy and not in the realm political correctness, albeit political 
16

The Role of the Global SOF Network in a Resource Constrained Environment

correctness drives much of our strategy. The simple fact is that time will tell 

whether the SOF network working in Afghanistan has made a difference. 

The effort will be in the hands of history decades from now. Unfortunately, 

while NSHQ can be used as a validation of a template on how to organize a 

SOF network, it cannot yet serve as a template for how to effectively employ 

a GSN to achieve strategic aims. 

The final trend is one of political will to sustain a U.S. military effort. 

While the U.S. military will carry out the directives of its civilian leaders, ultimately those civilian leaders must be cognizant of their constituents’ political desires. It would have been hard to imagine on 12 September 

2001 that the citizenry of the United States would become tired of a war in 

Afghanistan after fewer deaths than just the single day Union deaths during 

the battle of Antietam.28,29 As every U.S. casualty, as well as every allied 

casualty, represents a shattered family, the last decade indicates that the tolerance of the American public for military adventurism, must less casualties 

in causes they do not directly relate to, is questionable. Whether or not this 

fatigue of 24-hour news bombardment will extend to a persistent low-level 

engagement is yet to be seen. If SOF efforts in Afghanistan after 2014 do not 

elicit popular disapproval, it may bode well for the ability of the U.S. military 

to operate as part of a large GSN. On the other hand, if political actors in the 

United States use persistent engagement as an opportunity to score political 

victories, then popular U.S. support for persistent engagement through the 

GSN may indeed be short lived. 

Considerations

Time is on the side of the counter-terrorists ... but Al Qaeda 

cannot be permitted to fade at a speed set by what may be 

a glacial pace of societal evolution in the Dar ul Islam.30

—Colin Gray

The quote by Colin Gray is accurate, and the tool to ensure that an organization like al-Qaeda is harried at every possible turn is through a GSN. The 

recognition of the need to engage in a wide-ranging effort is not new and was 

recognized outside of the SOF community years ago.31 While the thoughts 

above may have seemed critical of the idea of a GSN, they were, rather, 

intended to highlight the strategic context and a few of the difficulties the 
17

Rubright: A Strategic Perspective on the Global SOF Network

GSN will encounter. It was never intended as a critique of the actual intention 

to build such a network. If nothing else, the GSN is a relatively inexpensive 

way to engage partners, learn from other perspectives and cultures, extend 

some influence and help to troubled nations, and engage enemies that have 

already been well defined within the current fight. The GSN is a logical step, 

if not for burden sharing, then at a minimum, for the collaboration with 

other forces that have local knowledge and capabilities which is not possessed within USSOCOM. 

The GSN will be a useful tool for future commanders and policymakers 

for use in pursuit of U.S. political objectives. However, if the complexity of 

the mission is not grasped, or the political objective reasonable, then policymakers may make assumption about the utility of the GSN that are not 

well grounded. In order to manage such expectations, USSOCOM may want 

to bring clarity to the GSN in a manner that explicitly outlines the realistic 

rather than the vague. In short, it would position the GSN to bridge military 

power and political objectives in a realistic way to ensure that proper strategy 

is developed to appropriately use the GSN.

19

Morton: Interoperability

2.Interoperability: Benefits and 

Challenges

Lieutenant-Colonel Kevin Morton

Canadian Special Operations Forces Command’s challenge, based on 

its domestic CT mandate and its out-of-area responsibilities, is to 

maintain relationships and ensure an appropriate level of interoperability 

and/or integration across a broad front. This is no small feat. Interoperability is without a doubt not only a benefit in the contemporary operating 

environment, but truly a necessity. Yet, organizational culture, technology, 

and security concerns often impede the necessary process of working more 

effectively together. 

Nonetheless, the value and necessity for interoperability are generally 

quite clear. In fact, interoperability within certain ‘communities of practice’ 

is extremely important, even critical for mission success. This connection 

is underscored with regard to CT where a rapid response can mean the difference between success and failure. Nevertheless, due to limited resources 

and capacities, as well as time constraints, it is not always possible to maintain interoperability with all the potential players. One must then decide 

where and how to focus their effort. One must ask who you truly need to be 

interoperable with, and to take it to the next level, who you need to be able 

to integrate with in the various situations you are likely to encounter. 

To put this in context, within CANSOFCOM, we have historically focused 

on being interoperable with our Canadian Forces Services—the Army, the 

Navy, and the Air Force—while we have driven to integrate with our SOF 

‘Five Eyes’ partners. The reasoning and value of this differentiation and its 

focus has borne itself out over the years in multiple theatres as a solid start 

point. Yes, in some cases, integration with our services is the key to success, 

but for the most part we simply need to be able to operate in the same space, 

capable of communicating with and supporting one another. Our efforts in 

Lieutenant-Colonel Kevin Morton is the Commanding Officer of the Canadian 

Special Operations Training Centre. Lieutenant-Colonel Morton has more 

than 18 years of experience within the counterterrorism and SOF environment 

and was the first Special Operations Liaison Officer to USSOCOM.
20

The Role of the Global SOF Network in a Resource Constrained Environment

this regard are more often than not focused on the harmonization of effects 

vice the synchronization of activities. 

Notably, where an appreciation for the need to be interoperable, or even 

have an ability to integrate based on the need, does not exist, the situation 

can become not only professionally frustrating but, more worrisome, it can 

inhibit mission success. For example, as is always the case when responding to a crisis, time will be in short supply. Akin to producing quality SOF, 

interoperability must be established pre-crisis, such that when the need 

arises, you are not establishing baseline connectivity, muddling through a 

seldom practiced approval process, or, worse yet, operating in a manner that 

risks mission success because you have no other recourses.

At the political and strategic levels, mitigating these challenges equates 

to ensuring that the chain of command and approval processes are clear; 

that each of the invested stakeholders knows their roles, responsibilities, 

and capabilities; importantly, all can communicate appropriately through 

voice and data mediums in a secure domain. In a perfect world, the chain 

of command and approval processes are as flat as possible, with no noncontributing layers of staff or decision makers. At the operational and tactical 

levels, mitigating these challenges equates to a similar ability to communicate over distance in the classified realm across the tactical option space. It 

also means having a well-oiled process in place for the various elements to 

operate within the same space, and potentially, where required, the ability 

to integrate assets to achieve an end. 

For instance, in the Canadian domestic maritime environment, being 

interoperable means that CANSOFCOM can operate in the same space, 

communicate with, support, or be supported by, the Royal Canadian Navy, 

the Royal Canadian Air Force, the Canadian Coast Guard, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, the Canadian Border Services Agency, and/or the 

Canadian Security Intelligence Service, most likely all at the same time on 

the same task. 

For Canada, striving to achieve fulsome pre-crisis interoperability in 

response to domestic situations or crises abroad is critical. To achieve this 

proficiency one must first and foremost understand the threat environment 

including the threat posed, the stakeholders and their roles, the chain of 

command, the decision makers, and the processes in place to take action. 

Then a rigorous analysis must be completed to confirm the level of interoperability and/or integration necessary to achieve a desired effect. Prioritization 
21

Morton: Interoperability

of effort must then occur. Whenever possible, interoperability should ideally 

begin at the highest combined joint interagency levels, thereby defining the 

perimeters and setting the conditions for the elements below. When appropriate levels of interoperability and integration have been achieved, they are 

appropriately practiced and realistically rehearsed. By doing so, one’s ability 

to efficiently, and in a timely manner, ‘wade’ through the systems at play will 

be considerably enhanced. 

While interoperability is without a doubt a necessity in the contemporary operating environment, it is nonetheless often inhibited. Specifically, 

organizational cultures tend to resist interoperability even with other similar 

organizations. Nations, and departments or agencies within nations, all have 

distinct cultures, mission-sets, and by extension priorities. For example, the 

operational mindset necessary for CANSOFCOM to be successful in the 

prosecution of military actions, domestically or abroad, is not necessarily 

shared by all departments or agencies within Canada. Culturally the varying 

groups may have different perspectives which may militate against a common 

appreciation of a given situation. Indeed, where CANSOFCOM is involved, 

it is often a lack of knowledge of our viewpoint or our specific requirements 

that deny an aligned perspective. This communication challenge rests with 

us. Even with that completed, however, that does not necessarily drive others 

to a common understanding of what defines interoperability or the need 

for it. 

Working within an international context is also fraught with similar 

challenges to interoperability. The military operational culture is, however, 

generally pervasive and typically paves the way for aligned thought, purpose, and action, at least when national agendas are similar. CANSOFCOM’s 

experience in Afghanistan provides a good example. With relatively aligned 

national agendas, Canada was able to operate easily within a Combined Joint 

SOF environment and was interoperable and fully and seamlessly integrated 

with a series of Allied entities. In the early days of the war, this ability was 

predicated on pre-crisis efforts within the international SOF community. 

Since 2001, with continual interaction, these relationships have done nothing 

but improve. This experience has truly set the conditions for the Western 

SOF community going forward, with operational and tactical integration 

relatively easily accomplished. 

Another significant challenge to interoperability is technology, which is 

underscored by the rapid pace of technological advancement. Governments, 
22

The Role of the Global SOF Network in a Resource Constrained Environment

departments, and agencies optimize technology first and foremost to meet 

the demands of their respective mandates. Regrettably, this myopic focusing 

is often done in a bit of a vacuum, thus creating a technological barrier to 

being seamlessly interoperable. Arguably, these technological barriers are 

most acute in the communications sphere, be it as a result of the device, its 

software, its deployability, or its classification. 

Security is a third significant challenge to interoperability. Where 

national agendas do not necessarily align, or a certain nation’s operational 

efforts are compartmentalized, the will or want to share information has historically been a significant contributor to a lack of interoperability. National 

missions and security classifications (for example ‘Four Eyes,’ ‘Five Eyes,’ 

NATO caveats and/or constrained disclosure policies) have been serious 

impediments. Notably, things have started to change. More open policies 

and approaches within the Western SOF community have increased sharing and forced change in the underlying mindset. Certainly, this progress 

is no more apparent than with Admiral William McRaven’s inclusive SOF 

network approach to doing business going forward. 

For CANSOFCOM, defining and efficiently navigating both the domestic 

and out-of-area ‘systems’ at play is a constant challenge. Applying a ruthless 

task and mission focus allows us to prioritize the levels of interoperability 

and/or integration necessary across our response continuum. Domestically, 

much work has been and continues to be done in the public safety domain to 

ensure that those who need to be able to talk and operate together can do just 

that. Moreover, as the international SOF community is becoming more and 

more networked, one clear derivative is an increased level of interoperability. 

While my view is framed from an operator’s perspective, my experiences within the combined, joint, interagency environments and across the 

strategic, operational, and tactical levels of conflict hopefully contribute to 

a balanced perspective.
23

Spencer: Solving the People Puzzle

3. Solving the People Puzzle: 

Educating and Training SOF Operators 

for Enhanced Cultural Intelligence

Dr. Emily Spencer

Following nearly a decade of war in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Canadian 

and American people, as well as our allies, are weary of war. Arguably, 

there is a growing lack of national will within Western nations to commit 

troops to battle, a state of affairs simply underscored by a lack of resources, 

both human and financial. In fact, there is a common belief that military 

engagements are costly in terms of human and financial capital, are often 

of long duration and incite division amongst constituents. With regard 

to the large footprint that the conventional force leaves in its wake, these 

perceptions generally reflect reality. Nonetheless, avoiding the increase in 

transnational acts of aggression, including terrorism, criminal activity, and 

cyber attacks, to which no nation is immune, is not an option. Therefore, in 

order to combat transnational insecurity and violence, a collective, global 

solution is required.1

By nature of their agile, unobtrusive, and cost-effective profile, SOF represent an ideal option to deal with such violence.2

 More specifically, by empowering partners to develop local solutions to global problems, SOF networks 

provide a rapid, efficient, and effective manner of dealing with transnational 

threats while at the same time minimizing the cost to each nation. 

Importantly, the concept of SOF networks is neither new, nor is it 

laden with risk.3 Moreover, continued global threats, combined with fiscal 

restraint, highlight the need to expand SOF networks.4

Essentially, a confederation of SOF organizations—a SOF network—is 

about helping partners who possess the will but not necessarily the capacity 

or expertise to conduct counterterrorism or other types of operations and 

Dr. Emily Spencer is the Director of Research and Education at the CANSOFCOM Professional Development Centre. She holds a Ph.D. in War Studies 

from the Royal Military College of Canada and has authored, coauthored, and 

edited numerous books, chapters, and articles on the contemporary operating 

environment.
24

The Role of the Global SOF Network in a Resource Constrained Environment

to build that capacity. Its strength resides on the ability to provide common 

professional military education, and combined training and information 

sharing opportunities. Through this type of resource sharing and mentoring, SOF networks provide an opportunity for the SOF of various nations 

to work together and grow from each other’s strengths.5

Within the scope of Global SOF Networks, (and importantly not limited 

to this domain), the future operating environment (FOE) will no doubt represent a mosaic of cultures from SOF to conventional forces to civilians, all 

from various regions of the world and each embedded with its own cultural 

perspectives. As Admiral McRaven notes, “although SOF usually only garner 

attention for high-stakes raids and rescues, direct action missions are only 

a small part of what we do.” He continues, “on any given day USSOF are 

working with our allies around the world, helping build indigenous special 

operations capacity so that our partners can effectively deal with the threat 

of violent extremist groups, insurgents, and narco-terrorists—themselves.”6 

McRaven astutely comments, “neither we nor our partners can kill our way to 

victory in this fight.”7 Indeed, it is starting to be recognized that the indirect 

approach, often reflected by the statement “by, with, and through” will be 

the most influential for SOF in the FOE.

As such, to be successful in the FOE and for Global SOF Networks to be 

effective, the issue of “culture” needs to be addressed.8 While common tactics, techniques, and procedures, as well as military camaraderie, may help 

bridge some cultural divides, there must be increased cultural education 

and training for SOF members.9 Ultimately, SOF operators need to solve 

the “people puzzle,” and they should be empowered to do so through professional military education and professional development. In short, in order 

for SOF to be highly effective in the FOE, they will need to communicate 

and behave in a way that transcends cultural boundaries and influences a 

group of people toward a desired end. Demonstrating enhanced cultural 

intelligence is germane to achieving this objective.

Essentially, cultural intelligence is about understanding the beliefs, values, 

and attitudes that drive behaviors and acting in a way so as to further your 

interests, which, in the case of Western militaries, are national interests.10

It is about understanding the message that is being sent, making sure that 

the intent of your message is being properly understood and, ultimately, 

influencing a group of people to achieve your goal.
25

Spencer: Solving the People Puzzle

While demonstrating enhanced levels of cultural intelligence may seem 

simple enough in theory, there are many innate obstacles to fruitful intercultural encounters. For instance, a big problem to solving the people puzzle is 

that we often assume that our interpretations are not only correct, but that 

they are also shared. This bias is generally underscored when speaking the 

same language. Any military member who has worked with other governmental departments can likely appreciate that even though you are coming 

from the same national culture and you are speaking the same language, the 

meaning behind the words might actually be quite different depending on 

which government agency or organization you are working for. For example, 

a problem that is “urgent” might mean to SOF that it needs to be solved 

immediately and no time can be wasted in initiating action. Conversely, an 

“urgent” problem for foreign affairs practitioners might mean that it will 

be addressed at the next regularly scheduled daily brief, even if that is in 

23 hours. Moreover, it may also mean not deciding on any action for days 

using the philosophy that perhaps something will change to improve the 

circumstances and reduce risk, even though not making a timely decision 

is actually a decision. 

Additionally, one should not assume that simply because a behavior can 

be copied, that the underlying motives and effect will be as easy to replicate. 

Instead, breaking down and explaining core beliefs and values are key in 

making sure that your intent is understood. For example, one SOF operator 

mentioned that when he was training a group of Afghan SOF, he stressed the 

importance of establishing check-points. In fact, the Afghans saw how often 

the Canadians and Americans performed these checks, so it was not hard to 

get their buy-in. The Afghans began to stop many cars but, surprisingly to 

the Canadian operator, they never actually looked into any of them. While 

they understood the “action,” they had no idea why it was being done. They 

simply mimicked the superficial behaviors that they had witnessed. It was not 

until the reasons for why road-checks were performed and their importance 

were fully explained to the Afghans that they began to perform effectively.11

The reason behaviors that are simply copied without an understanding of 

the core beliefs and values that drive them often lack effect is because, in its 

simplest form, culture provides meaning. Our culture or, more appropriately 

our cultures, are the lenses through which we understand the world and our 

place in it. In essence, culture is the way we make sense of things. Everything 

has cultural meaning and, more importantly, to some extent all meaning 
26

The Role of the Global SOF Network in a Resource Constrained Environment

is culturally derived. When that meaning is not clearly explained to people 

with different cultural backgrounds it can often be misinterpreted.12

While the need for SOF operators to act in a culturally intelligent manner 

is rarely debated, the issue of how to achieve this objective is one that has not 

yet been fully resolved.13 In essence, the issue is how to enable SOF, through 

education and training, to be better at applying cultural intelligence. Particularly in a period of fiscal restraint, and when global, multi-cultural SOF 

networks are increasingly seen as valuable tools, this is a pertinent issue that 

needs to be addressed.

Before proposing a solution, however, it is first important to address some 

of the challenges that often come up in discussions about how to best educate 

and train military members to have and use cultural knowledge effectively. 

It is vital to acknowledge these challenges at the start so that the negative 

effects of these biases can be minimized.

To begin, a major area of contention that continuously surfaces is that 

between “academics” and the “military.” The distance that sometimes gets 

created between academics and the military needs to be bridged as each side 

has something valuable to offer the other. To dismiss a good idea simply 

because it did not come from someone in the military, or as sometimes is the 

case for SOF, an “operator,” is short sighted; it is equally as myopic to ignore 

ground truth and insight because it is not expressed in academic jargon.

The next roadblock to progress that is often brought up is the disconnect 

or, often more appropriately, the lag between theory and practice, which 

notably adds fuel to the academic/military debate by often placing theorists 

on one side and practitioners on another. Sometimes things are easier said 

than done, and reality is so complex that theories are rendered almost useless. Nonetheless, at the end of the day, there is value to recognizing that each 

has their merits and, importantly, for the purposes of this discussion, both 

the theorists and the practitioners—the academics and the military—are 

trying to achieve the same goal.

A final challenge that needs to be addressed is the idea that if there is no 

100 percent solution, then there is no point to going down that path. Making 

such a statement is akin to saying if there is no silver bullet—if there is no 

perfect solution—then no ammunition will be used at all. Put this way, the 

ridiculousness of the situations should be apparent to all.

Notably, what follows is not a “silver bullet” for any and all potential 

culturally based challenges that SOF will encounter in the FOE. Rather, the 
27

Spencer: Solving the People Puzzle

following is a practical way to help educate and train SOF so they exhibit 

high levels of cultural intelligence in order to become even better at what 

they already do well. As such, below is a five step method that provides a 

potential solution to solving the people puzzle in the FOE.

Step One: Recognize the Importance of Cultural Intelligence 

to SOF in the FOE

At a grassroots level, the operators know how important cultural intelligence is. At the leadership level, this recognition needs to be transferred 

into dedicating scarce resources, particularly time, into developing this skill 

set. Also, success should be rewarded. It is one thing to be “quiet professionals,” but rewarding success through recognition, pay and/or promotion is 

also a way to show how serious you are about this ability. It also means that 

people with these necessary skills sets will eventually be in positions to help 

foster them within others. Simply put, words are not enough; they need to 

be backed by actions.

Step Two: Matching Skill Sets with Individuals: Who Needs to 

Know What?

This step sounds simple enough in theory. You need to determine what 

skill-sets are required for which individuals. Do certain ranks need more or 

less knowledge than other ranks? Do certain trades demand better affinity 

than others? 

SOF is about equipping the man, not manning the equipment. Cultural 

intelligence enables individuals to problem solve in cross-cultural situations. Everyone can benefit from having enhanced cultural intelligence, but 

it should also be seen as a work in progress. You can always learn more and 

be better, so what needs to be determined is what threshold of knowledge 

is required for which positions. In particular, what needs to be avoided is 

placing people in positions where a lack of cultural intelligence may have a 

negative strategic impact.

Step Three: Cultural General Versus Cultural Specific 

Education and Training

The next phase should be to distinguish between cultural general education 

and training and cultural specific education. Cultural general education 
28

The Role of the Global SOF Network in a Resource Constrained Environment

and training looks at the broad mechanisms that help you understand what 

culture is, how it has shaped your own perspectives, and how it shapes those 

of others, which will also help you appreciate how others see you. It is not so 

much about what to think, but rather how to think. Cultural specific items 

that are representative of a specific group of people represent the fine detail. 

Like putting a puzzle together, the cultural general part helps you see the 

big picture, but the culture specific part provides you with the pieces to fill 

in the picture. Although there has been debate about which is better to have, 

it is clear that they do work together and neither should be seen as simply 

good to have. Rather, both should be seen as must haves.

That being said, however, the framework for cultural general knowledge—

the how to think piece—is the part that should be continuously addressed for 

SOF. The regions where SOF may deploy can change on a moment’s notice, 

so investing a lot of time studying a specific culture may not be fruitful. Yet, 

teaching individuals how to use cultural information—how to appreciate 

what information is important and why—will help individuals be faster and 

more efficient at using cultural specific information and transforming this 

knowledge into a strategic advantage. 

Teaching people to not just understand the words that are being spoken 

but, more importantly, how to determine the meaning behind the words, is 

what is crucial for SOF. The cultural specific information can then be added 

to this framework.

Step Four: Integrating Cultural Intelligence into SOF 

Education and Training

Step four becomes the real challenge where you integrate these skill-sets into 

training and education. The key, as has been alluded to, is teaching people 

how to think more effectively. 

As such, strategic thinking, which teaches individuals to think both critically and creatively, while also acknowledging that emotions will always be 

at play, is a really good skill set to develop. What you want is for people to 

understand the true meaning of the problem and to be able to come up with 

a variety of potential solutions or courses of action. Importantly, first you 

have to understand what the problem is actually about before being able to 

find a solution. 
29

Spencer: Solving the People Puzzle

Additionally, operators are going to need to be able to apply this knowledge to real life scenarios. Since cultural intelligence is not just about improving communication by understanding the true meaning and intent behind 

words but also about achieving a desired impact, it is important to look at the 

psychological and leadership dimensions of being able to influence others.

At the end of the day, in the SOF context, cultural intelligence should be 

an applied art, not a theoretical model. Notably though, when we think of 

fields like anthropology, psychology, philosophy and history, for example, we 

tend to think of a classroom learning environment. A lot of military members 

may reject this type of learning environment as useless to their “real jobs” 

and, in fact, developing these skill-sets in a classroom may provide somewhat of a false sense of accomplishment because ultimately operators need 

to apply these skill sets in potentially volatile and dangerous environments. 

Thus, like operational training, cultural intelligence should be incorporated into scenarios that are supposed to be reflective of potential future 

operating environments. In essence, what you should be teaching people to 

do is to make better decisions with limited knowledge, minimal time, and 

under physical duress. In the end, this course of action makes sense since 

this performance is what you are actually asking operators to do in theater.

Step Five: Recognize that Maintaining Enhanced Cultural 

Intelligence Needs Continuous Education and Training

Finally, step five is the recognition that, like physical training and conditioning, cognitive skills need to be continuously refreshed. These skills can also 

fade without practice or use. If you trained for a marathon 10 years ago but 

have been sitting on the couch eating potato chips ever since, the odds are 

that you are not going to simply be able to get up and run 26.2 miles—or at 

least not without much pain. The brain also needs continuous exercise to stay 

in peak condition. As such, education and training need to be continuous 

endeavors at all stages of peoples’ careers.

Concluding Remarks

While there may never be a “silver bullet” for solving the people puzzle, that 

does not mean that SOF should not go in with as much ammunition as they 

can carry. Ultimately, to encourage high levels of cultural intelligence, you 

need buy-in, you need to determine who needs to know what, and you need 
30

The Role of the Global SOF Network in a Resource Constrained Environment

to be able to teach cultural intelligence in an engaging and realistic fashion. It 

is also important to remember that cultural intelligence is a skill set that can 

always be improved upon and can get rusty if it is not being applied regularly. 

The FOE is certainly going to be rife with cultural challenges. Given its 

global nature, coupled with fiscal restraints, enhanced cultural intelligence 

will not just be a luxury, but rather should be seen as a necessity for SOF in 

the FOE. As such, it would be unconscionable not to provide the proper cultural education and training to enable SOF to excel in these circumstances.
31

Knarr: Matching the Footprint of Governance to the Footprint of Sovereignty 

4. Matching the Footprint of Governance 

to the Footprint of Sovereignty

Dr. Bill Knarr

If the expansion of governance matches the footprint of sovereignty 

then there would be no place where an illegal clandestine non-state 

actor network could hide except with the support, or at least the 

benign neglect, of the host nation government.1 —J.Q. Roberts 

The epigraph by J.Q. Roberts, keynote at the JSOU/CANSOFCOM PDC Symposium in February 2013, shows when governance matches the footprint of 

sovereignty, there is no room for belligerence. Nonetheless, as the contemporary operating environment makes clear, this is not the case.2 Indeed, gaps in 

governance present potential sanctuary for violent extremist organizations. 

The United States 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance further characterizes 

those gaps as “ungoverned territories.” It proposes that working with allies 

and partners to establish control is not only strategically and operationally 

smart, but also economically imperative as we also work “to put our fiscal 

house in order.”3 The document suggests that “developing innovative, lowcost, and small footprint approaches [and] relying on exercises, rotational 

presence and advisory capabilities” are the ways forward. Additionally, it lists 

counterterrorism and irregular warfare as primary missions in “achieving 

our core goal of disrupting, dismantling, and defeating al-Qaeda” specifically, and violent extremists in general. 

Not surprisingly, many have recognized that SOF are uniquely positioned to address those missions and fiscal realities because of their small 

footprint, unique skill sets, and core activities. These skill sets emphasize 

the non-kinetic as well as the kinetic and include training others, engaging host nation populations, and operating in ambiguous and unorthodox 

Dr. Bill Knarr is a Resident Senior Fellow with the JSOU Strategic Studies 

Department. Dr. Knarr’s recent studies and publications deal with the “Al 

Anbar Awakening,” in Iraq, “Battle for Fallujah,” also in Iraq, and “Mazar-e 

Sharif: First Victory of the 21st Century,” from Afghanistan. Dr. Knarr served 

34 years in the U.S. Army and retired as a colonel in 2002.
32

The Role of the Global SOF Network in a Resource Constrained Environment

environments.4 Core activities include or address the five operations or 

activities of irregular warfare to include counterterrorism.5

The theme of the symposium, The Role of the Global SOF Network in a 

Resource Constrained Environment, leveraged two of Admiral McRaven’s 

Lines of Operation: The Global SOF Network and Responsive Resourcing.6

Those two LOOs provided the basis for speaker and panel presentations, as 

well as discussions that addressed the issues of ungoverned spaces through 

expansion of the Global SOF Network and the fiscal advantages of using SOF. 

The purpose of this chapter is to provide the views of operators who have 

experience “working with others.” The question is, “How are those strategic 

level goals being executed at the tactical level?” This chapter is based on a 

panel discussion, The Acid Test of Reality, held at the symposium. The panel 

consisted of four SOF operators with recent field experience: two Americans 

and two Canadians. 

The Canadian contribution comprised a captain (Eric) from the Canadian 

Special Operations Regiment (CSOR). He was badged in 2009 and has been 

deployed to Afghanistan, Mali, and Jamaica. Eric spoke mostly of his time 

in Mali. The second Canadian was a sergeant (Dave), who is also a CSOR 

badged operator. He has deployed to Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Jamaica. 

Currently, he is a Special Forces Detachment Commander. He spoke of his 

time in Jamaica.

The two U.S. participants were Sergeant Major (SGM) Michael Miller and 

Command Sergeant Major (CSM) David Betz. SGM Miller is Special Forces 

qualified and currently an instructor with the Joint Special Operations University Senior Enlisted Academy. He has been deployed to Panama, Iraq, 

Afghanistan, and Central and South America. He spoke of his time with 

the NATO SOF Headquarters in Belgium and Afghanistan, and his work 

in Colombia. Anchoring this panel was CSM David Betz, the Joint Special 

Operations University Senior Enlisted Leader. He has been deployed as a 

Special Forces operator to Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia, Haiti, and the Horn 

of Africa. He spoke of his time in Haiti and the Horn of Africa.

During the panel, the operators discussed the background, experiences, 

significance, and lessons, both positive and negative, of their deployments, 

particularly with regard to training missions. Those missions are primarily under the authorities of foreign internal defense (FID) and security 

force assistance (SFA) in the United States, and defense, diplomacy, and 

military assistance in Canada. Each of the four operators’ experiences and 
33

Knarr: Matching the Footprint of Governance to the Footprint of Sovereignty 

perspectives are unique. However, there is common ground when they 

speak of training others, persistent engagement, trust, early engagement, 

and linking their tactical actions to strategic goals.7 As such, the scheduling of this panel, which was near the end of the symposium, capitalized on 

presentations and perspectives by policymakers, senior military leaders, 

nongovernmental organizations, contractors, and academia. The focus was 

at the tactical level—where the “rubber meets the road.” This level is where 

policies and strategies are implemented, on the ground—it is where tactical 

applications have operational and strategic implications. 

Filling the Gaps

As J.Q. Roberts discussed ungoverned spaces, he indicated that there were 

“huge portions of the world where the footprint of governance is tiny and the 

footprint of sovereignty is huge.” He provided Mali as an example which provided a great segue to Captain Ross’s discussion of his experiences in Mali.8

During the fall of 2011, Eric deployed with a 13-man team to Mali for 

three months—this would be the third of four iterations of sending a CSOR 

team to Mali. His mission was to build counterterrorism capacity within 

the Malian security 

forces. He explained, 

“We partnered with 

the 33rd Regiment 

Comando Parachutiste in Bamako, Mali 

and we were there to 

build that initial relationship with them as 

well as determine their 

suitability as a longterm partner. We did 

that by providing tactical level training, basic 

light infantry skills to 

a company of 120 that 

Figure 1. Map of Mali. Courtesy Central Intelligence 

Agency.
34

The Role of the Global SOF Network in a Resource Constrained Environment

were destined to rotate up to Kidal to perform border security in Northern 

Mali.” 

The team’s expertise was sorely needed to train the Malian forces as 

northern Mali had become a “gap,” a source of instability. Tensions in the 

northern region, exacerbated by a disenfranchised people, Malian armed 

fighters returning from Libya, and subsequently al-Qaeda in the Islamic 

Maghreb (AQIM) seeking safe haven, placed the entire region at risk.

The team also provided a crash course in operational planning to the 

regimental staff and trained the Malian forces on air-ground integration, 

specifically, on how to integrate “ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] platforms and attack helicopters in support of ground forces.” 

Eric also elaborated on the importance of Mali to Canada:

There is a significant diplomatic connection between Canada and 

Mali. At the time, it was the third largest recipient of Canadian aid 

just after Afghanistan and Haiti. There was kidnapping for ransom 

in 2008 that saw two Canadian diplomats captured in Niger and subsequently held in northern Mali. Lastly, there are significant mineral 

interests, and it was a democratically elected nation in West Africa.

Notably, there are a number of risks associated with training other 

nations’ forces. A common question is, “How do you know you are not training the members of the next military coup?” The question became a reality 

in March of 2012 when the democratic government of Mali was ousted by 

a military coup. Elements of the Malian military, led by Captain Amadou 

Sanogo, once trained by U.S. Forces, frustrated with what they perceived as 

the mishandling of the instability in the north, deposed Amadou Toumani 

Touré, suspended the constitution, and imposed a curfew.9 The coup, however, was short-lived with the negotiated appointment of Dioncounda Traoré 

as acting president and a civilian administration in April.10 It was later found 

that the CSOR’s partner force, the 33rd Regiment Comando Parachutiste, 

defended the democratically elected president, escorted him safely out of the 

country, and staged a counter-coup. 

Although this was Eric’s unique experience in “training others” to fill the 

gaps in Mali’s national security, others had similar stories. Dave cited similar 

experiences as a team leader in Jamaica, his duties as a “Warrior Diplomat,” 

and the challenges of handing off the mission to the host nation force. Again, 

as in Mali, Canadian national interests were at stake. Jamaica, a member of 
35

Knarr: Matching the Footprint of Governance to the Footprint of Sovereignty 

the British Commonwealth, has strong economic ties with Canada, and the 

illegal drug nexus between the two countries provides a common threat. 

Dave also mentioned partnering with the “force of choice” as the host 

nation military transitions from the lead agency to a supporting role with the 

law enforcement agencies taking the lead. This change reflects a maturity in 

the security situation as the civil law and police organizations become more 

responsible for security in the local areas. This transference also reflects the 

type of partnering commitment that is necessary in “matching the footprint 

of governance to the footprint of democracy” by maintaining those commitments long enough to see positive trends. As such, all panel members 

spoke of the need for persistent engagement and long term commitments.

Persistent Engagement/Long-term Commitments

Canada’s commitment to Jamaica started as a five-year commitment and is 

ongoing today. The length of time of the mission provided time for CSOR 

teams to rotate back into Jamaica and assess progress as they trained partner forces. Dave deployed to Jamaica twice and, from his first to second 

deployment, saw progress in the capabilities of the Jamaican Defense Forces 

(JDF) in particular and their security system in general. During his first 

deployment his team assisted with the JDF basic course and formalized the 

courseware. During the second deployment, he found the JDF more than 

capable of teaching their basic course and had a “firm grasp on formalizing 

and instituting their courseware.” During his second deployment he also 

sensed that the emphasis for security transitioned from the military to law 

enforcement. This change was a clear indication that the security system had 

matured to a point that local security matters were the responsibility of the 

police and not the military. 

That ability to assess the partner’s growth, capitalizing on repeated 

deployments, was very similar to CSM Betz’s experiences in Haiti and SGM 

Miller’s experiences in Colombia. Notably, that commitment toward progress 

is a two-way street, and it applies to the host nation as well as the supporting nation.

As an example, SGM Miller expressed frustration that every time he went 

to Colombia to train partner forces, he felt that he was starting over and 

that there was no observable progress from the previous deployment. That 

is until Colombia’s military leadership understood that they had to be part 
36

The Role of the Global SOF Network in a Resource Constrained Environment

of the solution by supporting the development of the Colombian noncommissioned officer (NCO) corps, both in terms of training and education, as 

well as giving the NCOs responsibility and holding them accountable. A 

contributing factor was the development of the Command Sergeant Major 

Academy. According to SGM Miller, the system did not progress until the 

leadership pushed from the top down and told the “lieutenants and young 

officers to utilize the NCOs like they are supposed to be used ...” Then they 

started to succeed. Looking back over the last ten years, he was able to see 

the progress as well as the success of the program. 

Nonetheless, some endeavors are much more difficult than others. From 

the policymakers’ perspective, Mr. Roberts stressed the “absorptive capacity” 

of the society as a critical factor in determining the trainability of the host 

nation soldier. Do they have the basic skills of reading and writing to understand and apply the training? The absorptive capacity is directly related to 

the time and funding required developing the force. This connection became 

quite apparent in Iraq and more so in Afghanistan as the literacy rate, and 

the capacity of the society to improve the literacy level, became a factor for 

those locals aspiring to be soldiers and policemen.

Indeed, there are examples of what worked and what did not work in all 

theaters. Admiral McRaven, in a January 2013 speech, mentioned SOF international engagement efforts and attributed persistent presence as a key to 

successes in the Philippines and Colombia. On the other hand, he indicated 

that “episodic deployments or chance contacts,” were not conducive to building relationships and trust, and cited U.S. experience in Mali as an example.11

Additionally, persistent engagement develops a trust that is so necessary to 

a cohesive network. Those networks include the requisite enabling systems 

and technologies to link allies and partners as well as exploit virtual spaces.

Sharing is Based on Trust

Mr. Roberts commented that 10 years ago “We [only] talked about sharing, 

but today we share.” That became most evident when SGM Miller discussed 

his duties at NSHQ in 2011 and 2012. SGM Miller’s previous training missions were under the authorities of FID or SFA and primarily involved host 

nation infantry or SOF—training missions that most people visualize when 

they think of Special Forces training indigenous forces. Additionally, most 

of the NSHQ training takes place at Chievres Air Base near Mons, Belgium. 
37

Knarr: Matching the Footprint of Governance to the Footprint of Sovereignty 

However, Miller’s experience was different. As a team leader for a technical 

exploitation operations team, he was responsible for training the 28 NATO 

countries and Partnership for Peace (PFP) members on a number of systems 

that were critical to irregular warfare, in particular counterterrorism and 

counterinsurgency. That training took place as part of a forward deployed 

contingent in Afghanistan. Those systems included the Battlefield Information, Collection and Exploitation Systems (BICES), the Secure Electronic 

Enrollment Kit (SEEK), and CelleBrite. 

The importance of BICES as a communications and collection system 

among the various nations is evident, but SEEK has some far-reaching implications. Its basic function is to collect biometric data such as fingerprints, 

iris scans, photographs, and personal information on individuals and their 

families. That is valuable in and of itself, but its networking capability into 

a shared database is its real value. For example, when 475 Taliban escaped 

from the Sarposa prison in Southern Afghanistan in April 2011, 35 were 

picked up within a couple of days during random biometric spot checks 

of the population.12 Another example occurred in 2009, when Afghanistan 

started enrolling people in their program. During that process the Federal 

Bureau of Investigations (FBI) crosschecked a number of prints, and one of 

them linked a criminal to a latent print the FBI had recorded in 2007 from 

a different crime scene. They passed the information to the Afghan government and helped them prosecute the individual.13

As one can imagine, there are a number of benefits to SOF. They include 

supporting population control in COIN, targeting of high-value individuals in CT, and protecting the force through access and entry control.14 The 

concept of identifying individuals and population control is not new, as 

reflected in Figure 2 that provides an example of census operations in the 

Republic of Vietnam in 1968. The approach was to identify the residents of 

the village by a photograph corresponding to the number on the black board 

and recorded personal and family information. That information was placed 

in a book and maintained at the district. In conjunction with identity papers 

or cards, anyone that showed up in the village that was not in the book and 

could not be immediately vouched for, would be suspect until they could 

legitimize their presence.15 Conversely, if people, in particular military-aged 

males, were not present for the census, the question, “Where are they?” was 

immediately asked. 
38

The Role of the Global SOF Network in a Resource Constrained Environment

Figure 2. Identification and Census in 

Vietnam. Photo by Bill Knarr.

Forty-five years ago, this process was extremely time-consuming. 

Although the approach is not new, capabilities since Vietnam have improved 

immensely. In particular, they are now able to develop and expand the network to track people, even across international boundaries, and communicate 

information more quickly. Imagine the implications for CT. Direct action 

for CT targeting is now much more defined, accurate and timely. The team 

can verify identities on-site in several minutes (again, as long as information 

on the high-value individual is in the database). Certainly, contributions to 

the protection of the force were readily demonstrated by SGM Miller’s team 

when, after a two-week training session at a British camp, they biometrically 

enrolled and screened potential employees for a position at the camp.

Although biometrics enhances sharing, there are a number of drawbacks 

at the local as well as the national and international levels. In order to be 

effective, the database needs to be extensive—locally, nationally, and internationally. Additionally, the database needs to be available to all members. 

As you can imagine, human rights groups are concerned over the potential 

misuse of the system. As the database is developed in Afghanistan, there are 

Figure 3. Biometrics in Afghanistan. 

Photos courtesy Department of 

Defense. 
39

Knarr: Matching the Footprint of Governance to the Footprint of Sovereignty 

concerns over abuse and the potential for targeting groups that are opposed, 

even if in a legitimate way, to the current government.16

The use of cell phones in today’s society makes them a lucrative target 

for exploitation.17 CelleBrite Universal Forensic Extraction Device is used to 

extract information from cell phones, personal digital assistants and smart 

phones. Through link analysis and other techniques, this process allows 

the operator to look at enemy networks, such as al-Qaeda and Haqqani. In 

combination with BICES and SEEK, these become powerful network and 

counter network tools. 

But the interoperability and sharing of those systems is based on trust. 

Per Admiral McRaven in USSOCOM 2020 Vision, “you can surge forces; you 

can surge capabilities; but you can’t surge trust.”18 Building trust requires 

time and commitment. It also requires a recognition that developing those 

relationships and building trust is important before a crisis. Phase Zero 

operations, left of the line of operations, are defined as: 

Joint and multinational operations—inclusive of normal and routine 

military activities—and various interagency activities are performed 

to dissuade or deter potential adversaries and to assure or solidify 

relationships with friends and allies.19

Everyone acknowledged that persistent presence was important, but just 

as important, and maybe more important, was timing—the ability to arrive 

well before the crisis in order to “deter and dissuade.” Brigadier-General 

Denis Thompson, CANSOFCOM Commander, emphasized the need to be 

involved in Phase Zero and cited Mali, from a Canadian perspective, as a 

great example. “We need to be present in advance of any major conventional 

operation or in advance of SOF being the major show.”20 SGM Betz described 

it as “left of the line of operations,” and cited experiences in the Horn of 

Africa and Haiti. He used the phrase, “thickening relationships” to convey 

the concept of persistent presence, and advocated living with the indigenous 

force to help thicken the relationship. He also indicated that FID was not 

glamorous: “there will be no movies,” and patience is a prerequisite. 

Conclusion

Each operator offered his own unique experiences, reinforcing the reality 

that every country and location is different and that missions need to be 
40

The Role of the Global SOF Network in a Resource Constrained Environment

approached with that awareness in mind. However, there were a number of 

themes that linked those experiences and approaches. Those themes not only 

horizontally linked applications at the tactical level, but, just as importantly, 

vertically connected strategic and policy goals to tactical actions. 

First of all is the realization that “military capabilities, once monopolized 

by nations, are proliferating rapidly to non-state actors. This has created a 

more unpredictable and dangerous security environment,”21 particularly 

when those non-state actors find sanctuary and breed in under or ungoverned spaces. An example would be AQIM efforts in the northern regions 

of Mali, as they attempt to create instability throughout the region. Because 

of their small footprint, unique skill sets, mission capabilities, and today’s 

fiscal realities, SOF are uniquely positioned to partner with and train others 

to address those challenges. 

Although it is typically referred to as “training others,” it does not do 

justice to the commitment and complexity of the effort. In addition to mentorship, coaching and living with those forces, it takes early and persistent 

engagement, trust, and the ability to link tactical actions to strategic goals 

and to understand the implications of those actions. Additionally, timing is 

just as important as persistence and, just as Admiral McRaven cautioned, 

you cannot surge trust. Brigadier-General Denis Thompson stressed that it 

requires early engagement during Phase Zero to do it right. 
41

Horn: Private Military Corporations as Members of the Global SOF Network

5. Private Military Corporations as 

Members of the Global SOF Network: 

Worth Another Look? 

Colonel Bernd Horn

Few would disagree that generally, the public, and military for that 

matter, have a negative perception of private military corporations 

(PMCs). Their motives, allegiances, and conduct are often questioned and 

held under a great deal of suspicion. This view is not totally surprising since 

PMCs are normally linked to the concept of mercenaries. Moreover, the 

explosion of PMCs after 2003, as a result of Operation Iraqi Freedom, led to 

the rapid, unregulated rise of a large number of firms, many becoming the 

root cause of a number of allegations of unethical behavior and human rights 

abuses. But as is the case with most stereotypes and popularized myths, there 

is another side to the story of PMCs. In fact, their widespread involvement in 

the contemporary operating environment warrants perhaps a closer look at 

who and what they are. Furthermore, PMCs potentially represent a valuable 

contributor to, if not member of, the Global SOF Network. 

What Exactly Are PMCs?

There is continued confusion and/or debate on the concept, if not the terms 

mercenaries, PMCs, and private security companies (PSCs). To many there 

is no difference and many governmental, scholarly, and public discourse and 

narratives use the terms almost interchangeably. However, for the sake of 

clarity in this chapter, the terms will be defined as follows:

1. Mercenaries – Individuals or organizations who sell their military skills 

outside their country of origin and as an entrepreneur rather than as a 

member of a recognized national military force.1 The international definition 

Colonel Bernd Horn is the Director of the CANSOFCOM Professional Development Centre. Colonel Horn has a Ph.D. from the Royal Military College of 

Canada where he is also an Adjunct Professor of History. He has authored, 

coauthored, edited, and co-edited in 36 books and over 100 chapters and 

articles on military history and military affairs.
42

The Role of the Global SOF Network in a Resource Constrained Environment

of mercenary, captured in the Geneva Conventions, under Article 47 of Additional Protocol 1, is based on an individual meeting six conditions:

a. Is specially recruited locally or abroad in order to fight in an armed 

conflict;

b. does, in fact, take a direct part in the hostilities;

c. is motivated to take part in the hostilities essentially by the desire for 

private gain and, in fact, is promised, by or on behalf of a Party to 

the conflict, material compensations substantially in excess of that 

promised or paid to combatants of similar ranks and functions in the 

armed forces of that Party;

d. is neither a national of a Party to the conflict nor a resident of territory 

controlled by a Party to the conflict; 

e. is not a member of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict; and 

f. has not been sent by a State which is not a Party to the conflict on 

official duty as a member of its armed forces.2

2. Private Military Corporation – A legally chartered company or corporation organized along business lines and engaged in military operations across 

the spectrum of conflict.3 The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of 

Armed Forces states:

Private military companies (PMCs) are businesses that offer specialized services related to war and conflict, including combat operations, strategic planning, intelligence collection, operational and 

logistical support, training, procurement and maintenance. They 

are distinguished by the following features:

a. Organizational structure: PMCs are registered businesses with corporate structures. 

b. Motivation: PMCs provide their services, primarily for profit rather 

than for political reasons.4

3. Private Security Company – A registered civilian company that specializes 

in providing contract commercial services to domestic and foreign entities 

with the intent to protect personnel and humanitarian and industrial assets 

within the rule of applicable domestic law.5
43

Horn: Private Military Corporations as Members of the Global SOF Network

Historical Context

As noted earlier, PMCs to this day are still lumped together by many with 

the concept and practice of mercenaries. At the core is the issue of payment 

for military/police/security type services. At the end of the day, the use of 

mercenaries is an age-old practice. Almost every ancient empire, including 

Persia, China, Greece, and Rome employed foreign soldiers under pay. The 

Renaissance period in Italy in the 1400s witnessed one of the best known 

periods of mercenary armies. The condottieri (i.e. military contractors) were 

formed in Free Companies and offered their services to the highest bidder. 

The use of mercenaries was also practiced at sea by privateers who were used 

widely by nations in the 1800s to enlarge their maritime forces. 

The use of mercenaries only began to wane with the rise of nationalism 

and the nation-state, when national service, particularly in times of crisis, 

was considered a duty of all fighting-age males.6 In addition, the growth of 

bureaucratically organized sovereign states, capable of effectively recruiting, 

maintaining, and training large armed forces began to render mercenary 

forces somewhat redundant and uncompetitive. More importantly, states 

began to see the independent/private armies, which they could not totally 

rely on, or control, as a potential threat to their authority and sovereignty.

Although mercenaries continued to exist and could be contracted individually to be formed into larger groups as required, no formal “corporate” 

entity existed well into the Cold War. The first embryonic beginnings of 

a PMC could be traced back to the late 1960s when Sir David Stirling, the 

legendary founder of the Special Air Service (SAS), created Watchguard 

International (1967), a firm that offered such services as security analysis, 

military training, and personal protection services to government clients, 

primarily in the Middle East, Africa, and former British colonies. During 

the next decade, Special Advisory Services, a British PSC, operated under 

the SAS acronym offering the same type of services. 

Arguably, the first large scale PMC was established in 1975 when the 

Vinnell Corporation of California received a multimillion dollar long-term 

contract to create and operate an entire training establishment for the Saudi 

Arabian National Guard. Significantly, Vinnell advisors reportedly provided 

tactical support and advice to the Saudi military conducting operations to 

retake the Grand Mosque in Mecca after anti-government forces seized the 

religious site in 1979.7
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The Role of the Global SOF Network in a Resource Constrained Environment

In the 1980s, another former SAS member, David Walker, established 

Saladin Securities Limited and Keeny Meeny Services. Notably, keeni meeni 

is Swahili for “deadly snake in long grass,” which was also a term often used 

by the SAS to describe covert, stealthy, and dangerous operations.8

The rise of PMCs, however, began in earnest in the post-Cold War era. 

With the disintegration of the spheres of influence and economic/political support to many impoverished and politically fragile states artificially 

propped up by the two opposing global superpowers, the world spiraled into 

chaos in many regions of the globe creating failed and failing states. These 

countries were often of marginal strategic value and the political appetite 

to spend blood or treasure to stabilize them was very low. As a result, there 

was a vacuum to be filled. 

The first of the “new breed” of PMCs was the South African firm Executive Outcomes (EO). It was established in 1989. EO marketed its services as a 

provider of military training and peacekeeping services to “create a climate 

for peace and stability for foreign investment.”9 It set a new standard for 

PMC capability. It advertised the ability to provide:

1. a highly professional and confidential military advisory service to 

legitimate governments;

2. sound military and strategic advice;

3. the most professional military training packages currently available 

to armed forces, covering aspects related to sea, air, and land warfare;

4. advice to armed forces on weapon and weapon platform selection; and 

5. a total apolitical service base on confidentiality, professionalism, and 

dedication.10

EO came to international prominence in March 1993, when National 

Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) rebels captured the 

Soyo oilfields. When the Angolan Army was unable to remove them, the 

Angolan government, specifically the Angolan state oil company Sonangol, 

hired EO, who in turn assigned a group of 50 former officers and noncommissioned officers to work with 600 Angolan Army troops, who quickly 

recaptured the oilfields. Casualties amounted to only three wounded South 

Africans, and there was minimal damage to the drilling equipment. The 

Angolan government deflected criticism of using white mercenaries by stating they were a mixed-race force of security guards.11 Not surprisingly, EO 

has been described as “the world’s first fully equipped corporate army.” 12
45

Horn: Private Military Corporations as Members of the Global SOF Network

Their actions continued to create controversy. In September 1993, EO 

accepted a further contract to guard a diamond mine in Canfunfo in Lunda 

Norte, Angola. The “contractors” were ostensibly hired as military trainers, 

but were allowed to prosecute preemptive strikes against UNITA if they felt 

the mine was threatened.13 The firm gained further notoriety in March 1995 

when an EO team assisted the beleaguered Kono diamond mines in Sierra 

Leone. After a short period of training and preparation, the EO-led force took 

the offensive in April, and in 11 days they drove the insurgent Revolutionary United Front rebels out of the diamond fields. The disturbing aspect to 

many was the fact that the impoverished Sierra Leone government paid for 

the EO services by giving a firm entitled Branch Energy (owned by Strategic 

Resources Group, a British company, which in turn was owned by EO) the 

concession to operate the Koidu diamond field.14

EO’s success was not lost on others. South African intelligence reports 

asserted, “so successful has EO proved itself to be, the OAU [Organization 

of African Unity] may be forced to ... perhaps offer EO a contract for the 

management of peace-keeping continent-wide.”15 In 1998, EO began training soldiers of the Angolan Army. However, EO closed down in 1999, when 

South Africa introduced new legislation under the Nelson Mandela regime, 

the Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Act, which prohibited South 

Africans from participating in mercenary activities.

Beginning shortly after the rise of Executive Outcomes was another 

famous PMC, Military Professional Resources Incorporated (MPRI). Started 

by a number of retired U.S. Army generals, the company boasted as being the 

“greatest corporate assemblage of military expertise in the world.” In 1994, 

MPRI won a contract with the U.S. State Department to provide 45 border 

monitors for 18 months to report on Serbian compliance with international 

sanctions. That same year, it also signed a contract with the Croatian government to transform the unskilled Croatian Army into an effective fighting force that was able to conduct Operation Storm, which resulted in the 

seizure of the Krajina region that had been held by Serbs since the beginning 

of the conflict. In the end, French and British officials accused MPRI of not 

only training the Croatian forces but also of assisting with the planning of 

the operation. MPRI’s success, or at least their perceived success, led to a 

13-month renewable contract with Bosnia to cover everything from planning 

long-term strategy to conducting war games and demonstrating how to operate the newly received equipment under the U.S. “equip and train program.”16
46

The Role of the Global SOF Network in a Resource Constrained Environment

In 1995, MPRI also became influential in U.S. Army conceptual and doctrinal development as well. For example, it was involved in the development 

of the Force/Army XXI combat service support force (CSS), the U.S. Army 

Combined Arms Support Command on the Battlefield Distribution project, 

the Theater Force Opening Package, and the CSS Rock Drill. It was also 

contracted to write a number of Field Manuals (e.g. Theatre Distribution and 

Theater Support Command). In 1997, MPRI was further awarded a contract 

to assist in the administration and training of students enrolled in the U.S. 

Army Reserve Officer Training (ROTC) program. In fact, under the contract 

up to 50 percent of the ROTC cadre, depending on the respective university, 

was filled by MPRI contractors.17

MPRI was purchased in June 2000 by L-3 Communications Corporation, 

which specializes in command, control, and communications; intelligence, 

surveillance, and reconnaissance; government services; training and simulation; and aircraft modernization and maintenance. MPRI is now called 

Engility. 

Also in 1994, the President of Congo-Brazzaville hired the Israeli PMC 

Levdan to create a new force to replace military units loyal to the former 

president. The United Nations itself used “hired guns,” namely armed clansmen, as guards to protect its operations in Somalia in the 1990s and in 1997 

hired a “mercenary firm” to guard its offices in Kinshasa during a period of 

unrest.18 Similarly, in mid-1990s, when the UN was trying to find forces to 

separate armed factions in the refugee camps along the Rwandan-Zairian 

border and no governments were willing to provide troops, the use of PMCs 

was proposed. 

In 1997, another of the more infamous PMCs was created. Blackwater 

USA began that year as the creation of two former U.S. Navy SEALs. Blackwater USA claims to have trained tens of thousands of security personnel to 

work across the globe. Its state-of-the-art training facilities are regularly used 

by law enforcement and military personnel, including SOF. Its information 

brochures clearly articulated its aim:

Our mission is to provide the most in-depth risk assessment and 

forward-thinking analysis of our customers’ operational and security needs, and on demand, provide a force of the best trained 

men and women for global deployment. We employ only the most 

highly motivated and professional operators, all drawn from various 
47

Horn: Private Military Corporations as Members of the Global SOF Network

U.S. and International Special Operations Forces, Intelligence and 

Law Enforcement organizations. Our chosen focus is our greatest 

strength—physical and personal security, personal security/risk 

assessments, and training.19

Its conduct in Iraq in 2005-2007 created a hailstorm of criticism, which 

eventually led to a number of internal changes, including two corporate 

name changes.

The end of the 1990s continued to witness the expansion of PMC involvement in conflict. In 1998, the U.S. government decided to contract DynCorp, 

a company based in Virginia, to deploy verification monitors to Kosovo, 

rather than send military officers as other participating nations were doing. 

However, that same year, the “Arms to Africa” or “Sandline Affair” 

prompted a serious look at the regulation of PMCs. In March 1997, military 

officers of the Sierra Leone Army ousted President Kabbah. In March 1998, 

after a year of brutal repression and the killing of political opposition, with 

no effective international response on the horizon, the British High Commissioner in Sierra Leone reached out to Sandline International to train 

and equip a local force capable of removing the generals who had initiated 

the coup and who were now ruling with an iron fist.20 Both the British and 

U.S. governments were seemingly aware of the request and lent their tacit 

approval. However, the assistance was in contravention to UN sanctions 

in place. As a result, a scandal erupted, eventually costing the British High 

Commissioner his job. It also prompted a number of actions by the UN 

Security Council pledging support to the Economic Committee of West 

African States and its Military Observation Group and banning the supply 

of arms and supplies to the junta. Additionally, it cast a negative pall over 

Sandline and PMCs in general. 

But, as the undercurrents of the Sandline Affair indicated, PMCs, despite 

the distrust that existed, represented a viable solution for governments. For 

beleaguered states unable to raise and train a competent force to exercise 

national security, or an advanced country that sought to “stretch their military budget” or find a solution to an ugly political situation that required 

some form of action, but the risks of embroilment were too high and the 

domestic appetite for such action were too low, PMCs became a possible 

way out. In fact, by 2002, many governments considered PMCs a viable 

option in the resource constrained security environment. In February, the 
48

The Role of the Global SOF Network in a Resource Constrained Environment

British Foreign Office published a Green Paper, “Private Military Companies: 

Options for Regulation,” which asserted that UN peacekeeping operations 

could be contracted out to PMCs. The argument made was that PMCs were 

more cost-effective than UN operations and they were much more rapid, 

considering how long it normally took to mount and deploy a UN peacekeeping force.21

Then British Foreign Secretary, Jack Straw, announced, “states and international organizations are turning to the private sector as a cost effective way 

of procuring services which would once have been the exclusive preserve of 

the military.” He added, “the demand for private military services is likely 

to increase ... The cost of employing private military companies for certain 

functions in UN operations could be much lower than that of national armed 

forces.”22

By 2004, the use of military contractors was not abnormal. In fact, many 

questioned the ability of the U.S. to prosecute operations without the services 

of Kellogg Brown and Root, one of its primary contractors. The Center for 

Public Integrity reported that since 1994, the Defense Department entered 

into 3,601 contracts worth $300 billion with 12 U.S.-based PMCs within the 

United States. Not surprisingly, as the U.S. Army has decreased almost a 

third in size since 1990 and the end of the Cold War, PMCs have increased 

from a handful at best in 1989 to almost 90 by 2004.23

The rapid and unprecedented explosion of PMCs onto the international 

scene, however, occurred as a result of the second invasion of Iraq in 2003. 

PMCs became an integral component of how the war was fought. By 2004, 

there were approximately 10,000-20,000 private contractors serving in theater—one contractor for every 10 soldiers.24 By 2008, there were approximately 60 PMCs operating in Afghanistan employing some 18,000-28,000 

personnel in a global industry valued at $100-120 billion annually.25

A Question of Trust

Prior to the global expansion, if not explosion of PMCs, the whole issue of 

mercenaries has always been cloaked in distrust and suspicion. Many characterize them as disconnected from society and representative of “instruments of oppression,” used to impede political process, self-determination, 

and violate human rights. A British Intelligence report captured the mood. 

It assessed Executive Outcomes’ “widespread activities” as a “cause for 
49

Horn: Private Military Corporations as Members of the Global SOF Network

concern.”26 It also noted, “it appears that the company and its associates 

are able to barter their services for a large share of an employing nation’s 

natural resources and commodities ... EO will become ever richer and more 

potent, capable of exercising real power even to the extent of keeping military regimes in being ... Its influence in sub-Saharan Africa could become 

crucial.” 27

The reason for suspicion was consistently fueled by exotic allegations 

and actual plots of mercenaries and/or PMCs to overthrow regimes around 

the world. This just reinforced the belief of PMCs as sketchy characters. For 

example, as recently as 2004, 64 individuals linked to the former firm, EO, 

were captured as they embarked on a mission to remove the president of 

Equatorial Guinea and replace him with an opposition leader in exile. This 

prompted many to believe that EO was back in business.28 In another case, in 

mid-May 2006, police in the Democratic Republic of the Congo arrested 32 

alleged mercenaries of different nationalities: 19 South Africans, 10 Nigerians, 

and 3 Americans. Half of them worked for a South African company named 

Omega Security Solutions and the Americans for AQMI Strategy Corp. The 

men were accused of plotting to overthrow the government but charges were 

not pressed. The men were subsequently deported to their home countries.

Despite this nefarious press, the key undercurrent that continues to exist 

and feed the existence of PMCs is the fact that they provide a needed, and 

wanted, service. Due to often less than transparent governmental connections, some of the PMCs were seen as virtually untouchable and a law unto 

themselves. For example, American, Iraqi, and even industry representatives felt the PMC formerly named Blackwater, which was responsible for 

protecting the U.S. ambassador and other diplomats in Iraq, was “untouchable” because of U.S. State Department officials who defended it, seemingly 

without question.29

Apparently, the U.S. State Department allowed heavily armed teams 

from Blackwater to operate without the necessary Iraqi Interior Ministry 

licenses, even though the requirement was embedded in Department of 

Defense security contracts. Furthermore, Blackwater was not subject to 

military restrictions on offensive weapons or their procedures for reporting 

shooting incidents. In addition, it was exempt from the military’s central 

tracking system. One senior American official revealed, “The Iraqis despised 

them because they were untouchable.” 30 A senior Iraqi Interior Ministry 

official agreed. He insisted, “they [Blackwater] are part of the reason for all 
50

The Role of the Global SOF Network in a Resource Constrained Environment

the hatred that is directed at Americans, because people don’t know them 

as Blackwater, they know them only as Americans.” 31

The animosity is not hard to understand. Between 2005-2007, Blackwater 

guards were involved in nearly 200 shootings in Iraq.32 The most notorious 

shooting by Blackwater personnel occurred in Al-Nisour Square in Baghdad 

when 17 people were killed and 20 others severely injured on 16 September 

2007, when Blackwater personnel allegedly responded to an attack while 

protecting a U.S. State Department convoy. 33

Adding fuel to the fire was the 2003 Abu Ghraib prison human rights 

scandal. A number of the accused were contract employees working for a 

PMC. They were never subject to investigation or legal sanction despite assurances by the U.S. Government. 34 Not surprisingly, this seeming unchecked 

authority and power, coupled with a lack of accountability, framed within 

the historical context and legacy of mercenary activity, breeds suspicion and 

a lack of trust.

Cause for Concern?

Although many agree that PMCs have a vital role to play in the contemporary 

security environment, there is a large degree of concern. The first issue is a 

question of regulation. The explosion of PMCs as a result of Operation Iraqi 

Freedom due to instant need fueled the growth of the industry without the 

necessary safeguards to ensure personnel were qualified or properly trained. 

The race for governmental contracts and the need to insert personnel into 

a theatre that was complex, chaotic, and extremely violent, led to an infusion of many poorly trained operators who quickly became stressed, acted 

without necessary authority, and began shooting with little provocation. 

They quickly added to the problem of countering the insurgency rather than 

helping stop it.

Their rapid infusion into and throughout the theater of conflict also 

fueled legal and practical operating concerns. What exactly is the legal 

status of PMC personnel operating in a theatre in support of a government 

but employed outside of the military chain of command? From a practical 

viewpoint, how do you ensure an integrated response to dangerous situations 

when information sharing, tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), as 

well as reporting chains are not common? 
51

Horn: Private Military Corporations as Members of the Global SOF Network

Another concern for many is the motive of PMCs—it’s all about the 

money.

At the height of the crisis in Iraq, operators were receiving a “basic salary 

of $5,000 or $6,000 a week, topped up with danger pay and other allowances.”35 A four-man ex-SAS team in Baghdad cost up to $5,000 a day.36 But 

in matters of national interest, the question always becomes, how can you 

trust those who are in it only for the money? How reliable are they?

The money issue is the catalyst for yet another concern—poaching talent. 

Not surprisingly, with the lure of big money, many highly trained SOF members or other military or law enforcement individuals choose to leave for 

more lucrative waters. This represents a drain on scarce and valuable expertise for the government that has invested huge sums in training these individuals. For example, between May 2003 and December 2004, approximately 

40-60 men from the SAS and Special Boat Service sought their premature 

voluntary release.37

Yet another concern about PMCs involves accountability—that of the 

actual government. Many see PMCs as a means for a government to avoid 

political oversight—the ability to conduct foreign policy by proxy. It allows 

governments to avoid opposition and public accountability and scrutiny by 

using contract money to pay PMCs to execute de facto foreign policy through 

contracted services. 

This is not lost on PMCs. Timothy Spicer, the founder of Sandline International clearly acknowledged:

It’s not so much that we can do things better than sovereign governments—though sometimes in Africa a heavy machinegun can 

be as effective as 10 tanks elsewhere—it’s that we can do it without 

any of the spin-offs that make military intervention unpalatable to 

governments; casualties [among PMCs] do not have the same emotive impact as those from national forces.38

The greatest issue, however, for those who have concerns with PMCs is 

the matter of the role of a sovereign state as the sole entity responsible for 

national security and the protection of its citizens. In essence, the specter 

of private armies worries many. They are seen as a challenge to the state 

as the sole legitimate entity to wage war, and they are viewed as generating military power that does not reside in the nation state itself, which can 

undermine the state’s monopoly on the use of force and actually threaten the 
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The Role of the Global SOF Network in a Resource Constrained Environment

democratic nation state, particularly in cases of weak or fragmented states. 

As such, some argue that PMCs actually worsen the situation for long term 

stability because they can prop up rogue regimes and they contribute to the 

proliferation of weapons.

The issue of the potency of private armies is not a mere theoretical 

matter. For example, Erinys, a British firm, also founded by an ex-SAS officer, Alastair Morrison, won a contract with Jordanian and Iraqi partners 

to protect Iraq’s oil installations. The contract was worth over $100 million, 

and the firm now controls a 14,000-strong force in Iraq.39

A Question of Oversight and Regulation

The concerns mentioned are valid. However, they are not insurmountable. 

In fact, many of the issues that arose particularly during Operation Iraqi 

Freedom have already led to corrective action. Specifically, initiatives have 

been taken to augment the archaic legislation that is in place. The main pieces 

of legislation in international law that consider the use of “mercenaries” 

harkens back to the 1977 Organization of African Unity Convention for the 

Elimination of Mercenarism in Africa and the 1989 UN Convention against 

the Recruitment, Use Financing and Training of Mercenaries. 

The U.S. also possesses legislation that impacts mercenaries and PMCs. 

Amended in the 1980s, the 1968 Arms Export Control Act regulates the sale 

of arms and the selling of military expertise in any form. 40 This requires any 

U.S. company that provides security or military services abroad to register 

and apply for a license from the State Department under the International 

Transfer of Arms Regulations, and any contracts over $50 million must 

be approved by the government. There is also the Federal Criminal Statue 

that proscribes the enlisting or recruiting of American citizens for service 

against a state that the U.S. is at peace with. The British legislation is the 

1870 Foreign Enlistment Act which prohibits the enlistment or recruitment 

of British citizens for foreign military service. 

More recently, in 2008, the UK, U.S., and China, as well as 27 other states 

endorsed the Montreux Document on Pertinent International Legal Obligations and Good Practices for States Related to Operations of Private Military 

and Security Companies During Armed Conflict, which provides guidance 

to states on regulating PMCs. In addition, individual states (e.g. Afghanistan, 

Colombia, Iraq) have also begun to exercise greater regulatory authority. 
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Horn: Private Military Corporations as Members of the Global SOF Network

In some cases PMC employees actually became members of the employer’s 

armed forces, such as Sandline International’s “Special Constables” in Papua 

New Guinea.41

Moreover, PMCs themselves have developed more robust internal management systems, ethic programs, and controls.42 For example, Academi, 

the former Blackwater, due to its problems in Iraq has invested in ensuring 

that its reputation would not suffer further. It invested in a new governance 

framework to oversee ethical and legal compliance, as well as create a new 

chief regulatory and compliance officer. At the end of the day, as commercial 

entities relying on the global market economy for their livelihood, it is their 

reputation that will guarantee PMCs continued solubility. 

Tom Rothrauff, the president of Trident International, offers some key 

advice to those engaging PMCs. Firstly, ensure they have a legitimate office 

and appropriate licensing and that they are compliant with existing regulations. Second, invest the time in researching and hiring the proper PMC that 

has the appropriate backgrounds for contractors; especially ensure that that 

they employ the right people with the right job skills and experience for the 

situation/task at hand. Thirdly, ensure that the respective PMC possesses 

the appropriate equipment and standard operating procedures, as well as 

solid TTPs. Finally, he insists that it is important to work with PMCs that 

provide full contractor support (e.g. provide the necessary infrastructure 

and administrative support to their personnel).43

Rothrauff asserts that respectable PMCs take regulations and the respective laws to heart. A PMC, he believes, “needs to be able to stand up in front 

of its employer and the public and explain what you did and why.” Most in 

the industry acknowledge and practice transparency and accountability. 

“What your troops do,” proclaims Rothrauff, “is a direct reflection of the 

leadership that sent them out.” He also reminds all that a “good reputation 

is important for future contracts.”44

A SOF Nexus?

So what is the nexus between SOF and PMCs? The reality is that most 

credible PMCs share a lineage with many international SOF organizations 

based on membership. As noted earlier, many SOF personnel either create 

or join PMCs. They take with them their ethic, skills, and TTPs. It is not by 

chance that Academi specifically stated in its promotional literature that the 
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The Role of the Global SOF Network in a Resource Constrained Environment

organization “has its roots in the Special Operations community. Born of 

a culture that emphasizes expertise and execution, we continue to develop 

and perfect the skills required to support both national security and commercial objectives.” 45

As well, during the turmoil created by the explosion of PMCs during 

Operation Iraqi Freedom, the industry itself implemented a grading system 

for PMCs to attempt to ensure clients understood what they were getting. As 

a result, the industry set the following benchmarks: Tier 1, ex-SOF; Tier 2, 

ex-marines/airborne; Tier 3, ex-law enforcement/private security personnel; 

and Tier 4, everybody else.

Once again, the Tier 1 PMCs field former SOF personnel who bring with 

them the SOF culture, and all the skills and attributes that accompany that. 

In the end, the professional competence, personal networks, and operating 

ethic and ethos are similar. This provides an important SOF nexus that can 

be exploited.

What can PMCs Contribute to the Global SOF Network?

The question then becomes, what can PMCs contribute to the Global SOF 

Network? The answer is: potentially a lot. PMCs offer a wide variety of services, but equally if not more important, they can provide insight, information, knowledge, and expertise. In the contemporary operating environment, 

as already shown, they are widely employed by a number of players from corporations, nongovernmental organizations, international organizations, and 

governments. As a result, they have a persistent presence in many regions. 

Therefore, they develop relationships and networks. They understand the 

power brokers, decision makers, customs, and “lay of the land.” Moreover, 

they have probably built strong personal relationships and identified sources 

that can, for the lack of a better word, be exploited. As such, they can be an 

incredibly important information provider. 

With the choice of the correct PMC, one that has qualified personnel, the 

information they provide should be of substantial value as the SOF nexus 

discussed earlier, means that the operators are experienced, tested, critical 

thinkers who are also accustomed to the TTPs and needs of SOF personnel. 

An added advantage is the fact that PMC personnel, unlike newly arrived, 

exceptionally fit and focused—yet unknown—Western personnel who arrive 

in a region/alien culture, are known and have a “legitimate” reason to be 
55

Horn: Private Military Corporations as Members of the Global SOF Network

there. For example, in 1997, Sandline International provided the American 

government with political-military information on events in Sierra Leone 

after the U.S. sources dried up following the coup.46

Another benefit to the global network is the relative PMC speed of movement, specifically their ability to get people and equipment on the ground 

faster than military or government because they have arguably less bureaucratic and/or political “barriers” to surmount. As such, with their ability to 

provide specialized forces, recruit internationally and surge rapidly, they 

could establish a presence in “sensitive” areas and assist in influencing and 

shaping regions to help in preventing local problems becoming international issues. After all, as already discussed, PMCs are arguably politically 

less costly. Since they deploy by choice, arranging for the contracting of a 

PMC abroad is seldom held to the same standard as sending national troops 

working for their country.47 And, often, it is not seen as contentious by host 

countries or their neighbors as are foreign troops. As such, PMCs, in some 

circumstances, provide a low-cost, low-risk, low-visibility manner to exert 

military influence.48

Conclusion

In the end, PMCs offer the potential to be a valuable contributor to the Global 

SOF Network. Their specialty skill sets, unique characteristics, persistent 

presence, low-visibility, and “legitimate” footprint access to local information 

(that may be of tactical/operational/strategic value) all make them a valued 

partner in the contemporary operating environment. 

However, it must always be recognized that like military or other government department partners, not all PMCs are equal; it is always necessary to 

investigate and choose carefully. In addition, it must always be remembered 

that a network by definition requires a degree of reciprocity; it cannot be a 

one-way valve. As such, expectations must always be defined up front. It may 

be strictly a monetary arrangement, or it could entail a sharing of information and/or assistance in time of peril. 

Nonetheless, in an ever-increasingly complex, chaotic, violent, and 

resource-constrained international security environment, SOF must maintain their agility, responsiveness, and effectiveness. Therefore, SOF must 

always strive to look for innovative solutions and maximize their ability to 
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The Role of the Global SOF Network in a Resource Constrained Environment

leverage the Global SOF Network. As such, it may be worth taking a closer 

look at PMCs as another potential contributor and partner to the network. 
57

Bell: Private Military Corporations

6. Private Military Corporations: A View 

from Inside 

Mr. Alan Bell

One can argue that it is counterproductive to resurrect the history of 

private military corporation involvement during the early days of the 

invasion of Iraq, but suffice it to say that PMCs have come a long way from 

Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003. Moreover, during the last decade, PMCs 

have become an integral part of both governmental and military security 

infrastructures in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other parts of the globe, and they 

continue to provide a cross-section of security support services throughout 

the world. As such, they represent a potential high-value contribution to any 

Global SOF Network.

The term PMC was initially coined in reference to private security companies operating in Iraq, primarily because they were managed and staffed 

by ex-military personnel. Important to note is the fact that approximately 85 

percent of today’s PMCs did not even exist prior to the invasion of Iraq and 

those that did were operating globally under a “Gray Man” persona utilizing 

virtual offices, no marketing materials, and relying mainly on a website and 

word-of-mouth methodology to garner business contracts. There was no 

media involvement in operations and very little interaction with so-called 

government agencies. 

PMC Governance

Clearly, mistakes were made during the early days as there initially existed 

no governmental oversight, laws, regulations or rules of engagement (ROEs) 

Mr. Alan Bell is the President of Globe Risk Holdings Inc., a Private Military 

Corporation that specializes in integrating crisis management and security 

programs designed to prevent, minimize, and proactively prepare individuals and companies for crisis/security related risks. Editor’s note: Mr. Bell 

gave a presentation on PMCs at the JSOU and CANSOFCOM co-sponsored 

symposium “The Role of the Global SOF Network in a Resource Constrained 

Environment” in February 2013 to provide a unique perspective and share 

his experiences working in the PMC industry. Mr. Bell was invited to provide 

follow-up comments as part of this publication. 
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The Role of the Global SOF Network in a Resource Constrained Environment

governing the activities of PMCs. As a result, for several years, there were 

significant numbers of international PMCs operating in Iraq as a law unto 

themselves, with some PMCs actually conducting their operations outside of 

the law. During this period, for the sake of expediency, PMCs were allowed 

to operate unchecked, unregulated, and not managed by any governmental 

body. From the governmental perspective, they had little choice, as multimillion dollar contracts were being awarded daily as the American and 

embryonic Iraqi governments struggled to bring order to chaos. For example, 

in Iraq, all convoy protection was initially carried out by coalition forces. 

However, after too many attacks and resultant casualties, the coalition privatized convoy protection by passing the responsibility and risk to PMCs.

For PMCs, the risks are enormous. They are often required to operate 

in extremely hostile environments, usually without the benefit of air and 

ground support. They effectively operate “on their own.” If attacked, or if 

they sustain casualties, they normally have to rely on their own resources 

to get themselves out of their predicament. It is for this reason that many 

ex-military personnel who attempt a career in PMC work often have problems, since they are accustomed to operating under an umbrella of high-level 

support during operations. Not having the level of support they experienced 

during their military service deters a large number of potential PMC operators from joining or staying in the business.

Nevertheless, to address the sudden increase in manpower requirements 

during the Iraq war, a significant number of PMCs were quickly incorporated. Some were not, and to enable a client to be aware of what they were 

paying for, PMCs developed the tier system described in the previous chapter. This tier system was both good and bad. Initially many bogus biographies/resumes were submitted, and nobody was checking the backgrounds 

of potential operators. This resulted in some ex-law enforcement and other 

inexperienced personnel passing themselves off as Tier 1 operators. Unfortunately, as a result, this tiered system was ultimately responsible for lowering 

the standards and professionalism of some PMC personnel operating in Iraq 

and Afghanistan.

This, however, has changed. PMCs are now being managed by ex-military 

personnel with extensive experience in both military and business operations. As such, the industry has advanced significantly from the initial dark 

days of Iraq. For example, in 2004, Global Risk International (GRI) was 

invited to Kabul by the Afghanistan government to discuss and subsequently 
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establish an organization to regulate PMC operations throughout the country. The government of Afghanistan was determined that it was not going to 

make the same mistakes that were made in Iraq.

As a result, we had just begun the process of establishing the mechanisms 

and creating new rules, regulations, policies and laws, when the UN decided 

that they would take on that responsibility. Not surprisingly, the Afghan government concurred. Then, 12 months later, the Afghan Ministry of Interior 

took over the process as they saw it as an easy money grab.

Why PMCs are Necessary in the Contemporary Military 

Operating Environment

Generally, military commanders do not want their soldiers performing basic, 

security related duties, particularly when conducting offensive military 

operations in a war zone. Their manpower requirements are such that any 

soldier freed from garrison type general and security duties creates additional bayonets capable of performing operations in the field. PMCs fill this 

gap. They can provide protective security details, convoy protection, static 

forward operating base security, and protection for capacity and rebuilding 

operations.

Friction Points 

Although PMCs can fill these essential functions and free up valuable 

combat power, there are frictions. With regard to governmental decisions 

on whether to use PMCs or not, there is always a foreign and defense policy 

nexus. Simply put, PMCs provide a gray space, some “political” latitude that 

military forces do not. Utilizing PMCs, particularly foreign PMCs, provides 

governments with minimal legal liability, and more importantly, plausible 

deniability.

In the end, PMCs do provide a great service. However, if international 

governments choose to work with PMCs, they must ensure that they are 

engaging reputable companies. History has shown that this cannot be said 

of all PMCs. As such, there must be more emphasis placed on developing 

relationships between PMCs, government agencies, and the military in a 

more formalized manner.

The failure and reluctance to develop these relationships is a severe handicap for all concerned. Specifically, the military continues to be reluctant to 
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provide PMCs with the necessary information and intelligence required to 

enable them to fully support military operations. Some international governments have built close links with the PMC industry, but these are still the 

exceptions. More common is the case where governments lack an understanding of military and security operations, which on occasion has had a 

an unproductive impact on both military and PMC operations.

Unfortunately, in Canada, where GRI is located, there still remains a 

relatively high degree of suspicion and distrust about PMCs. In the past, if 

Canada has had a requirement to utilize PMCs, they have normally used 

foreign, not Canadian PMCs. This is mainly because they have not been educated in the nuances of PMC operations, as well as the significant legal issues. 

An example from my personal experience highlights this issue. In 2009, 

GRI was retained to assist with the Dahla Dam, a major government project 

in Kandahar, Afghanistan. When I arrived in Kandahar on my reconnaissance, I had a meeting with a senior military commander. I asked some 

simple questions:

•	 Where do I get my intelligence information from?

•	 Who are the main power brokers?

•	 What type of “in extremis” support can I expect from ISAF forces?

The reply was succinct, as well as abrupt. The brigadier-general blurted, 

“we are looking for you to assist with providing this type of information 

and intelligence.”

There were additional frictions as well such as the problems with end-user 

certificates for PMC security team firearms; meetings with local tribal leaders and the Taliban to discuss expectations of the project(s); and working for 

government managers and nongovernmental organizations that have little 

or no understanding or perception of security.

Yet another problem in the ongoing relationship between the military and 

PMCs has been the military chain of command and their lack of understanding of PMC capabilities, particularly how PMCs can assist conventional and 

SOF military operations. Three years ago, I was asked to speak at a senior 

officer course at the Canadian staff college regarding how PMCs can support 

military operations. This generated a significant amount of dialogue between 

myself and the attending officers who all agreed that this was a useful exercise. But this was the first time most, if not all, had even been introduced to 

the concept or had given it any thought.
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This is not totally surprising since there are a number of myths and 

incorrect stereotypes that plague the industry. The fact of the matter is if one 

PMC company makes a poor judgment call and innocent people are killed or 

injured as a result, it reflects badly on all PMCs. The result is normally that 

all PMCs are painted with the same brush, irrespective of their particular 

training and operational abilities, or their track record.

As the withdrawal of ISAF forces continues in Afghanistan, PMCs will 

continue to protect international capacity and infrastructure construction 

interests throughout Afghanistan. Unfortunately, the Afghan president is 

slowly replacing PMCs with the Afghan Public Protection Force, which is 

under the control of the Ministry of Interior, which is a state-owned organization with an Afghan National Police-centric force that is slowly going 

to assume the responsibilities of current PMCs.

International PMCs could be told to leave Afghanistan with only 30 days 

notice. This means PMCs will be leaving behind the security infrastructures that they had built up over a number of years including buildings, 

vehicles, weapons, and equipment. Unfortunately, historical experience has 

shown that most indigenous PMCs cannot effectively operate without “expat” 

oversight. One need only look at numerous friendly fire incidents that have 

occurred between friendly forces and local PMCs; all involved indigenous 

PMCs that did not have “expat” oversight. 

What can PMCs Contribute to the Global SOF Network?

So the question becomes, what does this all mean to SOF? More specifically, 

what can PMCs contribute to the Global SOF Network? The fact is, some 

PMCs have been providing this type of support globally for many years. 

While some PMCs have only operated in Iraq and Afghanistan and lack 

experience of operating in other theaters, there are other PMCs that have 

a vast amount of global experience and networks rooted in a large number 

of countries. 

This experience and “infrastructure” allows PMCs to offer a wide range of 

“conventional” services to support government, military, and international 

agencies to include:

•	 Logistics support

•	 Site and personnel security

•	 Kidnap and ransom support
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The Role of the Global SOF Network in a Resource Constrained Environment

•	 Training and response

•	 Emergency quick reaction forces response support

•	 Counter surveillance operations

•	 Defensive protection operations (secure housing compounds, military 

bases, logistic areas)

•	 Psychological operations support

•	 Mine clearing operations

•	 K9 support operations

•	 Convoy protection operations

•	 Protective security operations 

•	 Anti-piracy operations

•	 Intelligence support

There are also a number of “non-conventional” services that PMCs can 

offer, including:

•	 Threat, risk, vulnerability assessments of the security environment 

(political, local, and military) and emerging country risks

•	 Integration of threat assessments and response mechanisms

•	 Technology-enabled strengthening of security around critical infrastructure facilities including access control and security systems, oil/

gas pipelines, power grids, air and sea ports, and telecommunications 

•	 Counter surveillance operations

•	 Intelligence and human intelligence operations

•	 Introduction of potential local resources

•	 Cultural overview

There are many advantages to including PMCs in the Global SOF Network. For instance, PMCs:

•	 are able to work freely outside the wire;

•	 can develop local relationships/sources;

•	 are able to generate ongoing and up-to-date information; and 

•	 can provide a significant amount of information to “other agencies.”

However, there is a danger that the information that is gathered and 

shared, if misused or shared with the wrong parties, can compromise the 

respective PMC(s) and their human sources. 
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Why Should PMCs be Considered a Value Added Partner in 

the Global SOF Network?

In short, with the international threats facing the collective of nations today, 

the fact is that there are only a limited number of SOF resources available. 

As such, there could be an opportunity for selected PMCs to act as a force 

multiplier on selected SOF operations or tasks. 

Obviously, not all PMCs can be considered capable to provide this type 

of support, but it could be an additional consideration when planning future 

operations. A significant number of PMCs already have extensive experience 

working in hostile environments and war zones, on top of their previous 

military experiences.

Importantly, working consistently outside the wire gives PMCs many 

opportunities, as well as the latitude to regularly interact with the local population to a degree that military personnel could never hope to achieve. Once 

again, it is important to note that some PMCs may be uncomfortable in this 

role. However, for those that are not, they often represent “eyes and ears on 

the ground” before any military force arrives. For example, one Christmas 

Eve I received a call from a Somali asking for “contacts” on the ground.

Governments will continue to face complex and growing challenges and 

will be looking at SOF assets to provide innovative and novel solutions. 

They will also attempt to bring together a wide range of diverse capabilities. 

Regional problems in such areas as Mali, Algeria, Niger, Sudan, Chad, Libya, 

as well as other countries around the world, will create the next potential 

crisis area and the need to conduct counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, stabilization, or security operations. As always, resources and “willing nations” 

will be scarce. PMCs could provide some relief. 

Those PMCs that focus their own resources and create compelling partnerships with organizations to address this ever-growing demand will 

become an excellent resource for the future. Why? Because they are already 

on the ground, are a known entity in the area, and are not averse to risk 

taking or innovation. Quite frankly, American “boots on the ground” are 

not wanted in some countries. Countries prefer Commonwealth countries 

such as the UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. PMCs provide another 

viable option.

The bottom line is that, in general, PMC contractors are well-led, effective, and reliable subordinates to work alongside the military. Some military 
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personnel who can get things done are given some slack while operating in 

a combat situation, but otherwise it’s all about avoiding bad publicity. It is 

better to appear competent than to actually be competent. 

PMCs have the advantage of hiring former well-trained and motivated 

military officers and NCOs on the basis of their ability to get things done. A 

PMC contractor of whatever rank who does not perform can be terminated 

immediately. All PMC contractors understand that they either perform or 

they are terminated. Additionally, PMC contractors can also leave at any 

time (with some financial loss for breaking a contract). Why do PMC contractors put up with all these demands and challenges? The reason is the pay 

is better than they would get in the military (or civilian jobs) for the same 

kind of work. Moreover, the people they work with and for are usually of a 

higher quality. 

Conclusion

PMCs will never fully replace military forces. However, under certain circumstances, PMCs could be used to complement military forces as an effective force multiplier. There will always be a demand for PMC services. All 

countries could benefit, as long as the PMCs they retain do not compromise standards in their hiring, training, and operational practices. As such, 

PMCs will continue to perform a valuable service, thereby freeing up military 

resources to conduct military operations. Additionally, PMCs provide a commercial service to commercial interests that the military is not mandated to 

provide. Love them or hate them, PMCs are a commercial necessity.

In the end, PMCs will remain, as long as there is a requirement for them 

to operate in support roles in hostile environments around the world, either 

with or without military support. A significant amount of military training 

and support of indigenous security forces is already being commercialized. 

It is important to note that the majority of international PMCs take their 

responsibilities seriously and take great care and pride in selecting their 

employees. The military is not always so fortunate. 

Therefore, if PMCs are well trained and operate under strict guidelines 

with effective ROE, they could support future conventional and SOF global 

military operations. As such, well trained and equipped PMCs will continue to have an important role to play in supporting governments and the 

military; protecting commercial activities; responding to humanitarian 
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emergencies; and strengthening accountable national security capabilities 

around the globe, particularly in support of SOF operations. Undeniably, 

they should be considered a value-added partner in the Global SOF Network.

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Ricks: General Themes and Thoughts

7. General Themes and Thoughts

Mr. Chuck Ricks

The preceding chapters provide in-depth looks at many of the most compelling issues that emerged from the two-day symposium. However, 

they are not exhaustive in their treatment of the discussions that ranged 

across a wide collection of topics.

Drawing on Lieutenant-General Stu Beare’s reminder that “we are a culture of doing,” a variety of themes and thoughts emerged that sought to 

address the challenge of seeking greater efficiency and becoming more effective in delivering operational success with the resources provided—whatever 

they may be. This chapter is dedicated to an overview of those various themes 

and thoughts. Some of the latter are narrowly defined and contained within 

a single theme. However, most reflect the complexity of the challenge by 

crossing presentation boundaries and resulting in inevitable overlap and 

occasional contradiction.

Given the evolving quantitative restrictions on what has been a largely 

unconstrained resource environment for the past decade-plus of war, SOF 

face more missions that are qualitatively altered from recent experience with 

the gradual shift in emphasis from direct to indirect action. The way ahead 

for Global SOF Networks relies on the collective embrace of critical thinking, innovation, and change management to be effective. 

1. Networks require persistent attention and sustained 

nurture.

There was a consensus, expressed in a variety of ways, that the concept of 

SOF is “riding high” and has experienced a bit of a “Renaissance” over the 

Mr. Chuck Ricks is a Senior Fellow with the JSOU Strategic Studies Department. He serves JSOU Press as an initial reviewer of assigned submissions 

and compiler/technical writer, most recently completing the Interagency 

Counterterrorism Reference Manual, 3rd Edition. Ricks has also mentored 

JSOU’s Basic and Advanced Combating Terrorism Courses involving more 

than 70 countries and has participated in various JSOU overseas programs. 

Mr. Ricks served in the Army as an armor officer and later a public affairs 

officer and retired as a lieutenant colonel. 
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The Role of the Global SOF Network in a Resource Constrained Environment

past 11 years. Consequently, the next major goal is to take the necessary steps 

to retain what has been established over that time by strengthening and 

expanding existing networks. Recalling that it took a decade to “get all the 

SOF guys into one tribe,” Rear Admiral Kerry Metz, Deputy Commander, 

Special Operations Command Central, suggested, “let’s not repeat the 10 

year-lesson.”

He went on to stress the importance of a unified effort by suggesting that 

“when we go, we go together.” While not embracing entirely the terminology 

to “thicken the Global SOF Network,” he did say that “strengthening such 

networks is ok.” When faced with complicated and diverse environments—

populated with multiple cultures, languages, and problem sets—relationship 

building and sustainment are central to success in strengthening/thickening. 

Rear Admiral Metz reminded the attendees that networks can be very 

dissimilar, with uneven interaction among members featuring a mosaic of 

bilateral and multilateral partnerships. The attitudes of network partners 

toward SOF can also vary. He noted that “some countries will take as much 

as we can give them; others are not as welcoming of SOF.”

In discussing the nature of these relationships, Rear Admiral Metz 

emphasized that they are neither position-based (commanders don’t automatically “match up”) nor, certainly, rank based, a point made by various 

speakers. For instance, General (retired) Charles Holland, former Commander USSOCOM, noted that once, as a major general, one of his counterparts was a major. Rear Admiral Metz asserted that “if you don’t have a 

personal relationship, they’re not picking up the phone to talk with you.”

Perhaps more than ever, the establishment and sustainment of such relationships remains the center of gravity for SOF success. Mr. J.Q. Roberts, 

Principal Director, Special Operations and Combating Terrorism, Office 

of the Secretary of Defense, spoke of “shared values, shared skills, shared 

burdens, and shared costs,” all of which “result in expertise that the United 

States and Canada might not have themselves.” 

Mr. Roberts established as an achievable goal an “international, interagency, SOF-centric, networked collection of like-minded security officials 

who ideally will collaborate and cooperate in the future to address the threats 

that I think we’ll see over the next 20 to 30 years.” 

One venue for such cooperation lies in the energizing of diverse domestic 

and international partners to shift the focus of the effort from direct action 

(“where we act and our partner gains deniability”) to indirect action (“where 
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Ricks: General Themes and Thoughts

our partner takes the action on his own behalf”). This shift in missions 

generates fewer requirements for the direct approach while increasing the 

need for multiple skill sets from various sources to build partner capacity 

and effectiveness. Thus the focus on assisting a partner to “help himself will 

help us all.”

Mr. Roberts argued that the shift in American security focus will assist in 

the migration of mission focus from the direct to the indirect. As part of this 

process, the central question that needs to be asked is whether the “footprint 

of governance matches the footprint of sovereignty.” If so, then there is no 

area for instability to take root “without either the encouragement, tolerance, 

or at least the benign neglect of the government.” However, in situations 

where there are gaps in sovereignty, “we can’t close those ungoverned spaces 

... It’s up to the guy who owns the land to close the ungoverned space.” That 

effort demands a variety of partner organizations and skill sets.

Within that context, Rear Admiral Metz included a discussion of the 

diverse cultures encountered within domestic, whole-of-government networks as well as in partner nations. Echoing his comment above about a 

Global SOF Network unity of effort, he said that the inclusion of the State 

Department/Ministry of Foreign Affairs, government-wide intelligence agencies, law enforcement, diplomatic country teams, and other relevant organizations is essential because “if we’re going to get this done, we’re going to 

have to get it done together.”

Acknowledging the difficulty of building such relationships, Rear Admiral Metz noted that “we could say it’s too hard ... and we’d get nowhere ... 

or we could reach across the aisle and tell them, ‘here’s what we need.’” A 

predictable response from such potential partners to the high-energy, selfconfident SOF Warrior is, “don’t overwhelm us, don’t outrun us, and we’ll 

be your partner.”

Brigadier-General Denis Thompson, Commander, CANSOFCOM, 

spoke of the unique capabilities of the SOF “3-D Warriors” who animate 

the whole-of-government process by bringing with them defense, diplomacy, 

and development capabilities that result in positive effects within the area 

of operations.

Rear Admiral Metz reminded the audience that partners “do what they 

can do.” Patience and understanding are essential because, after all, “we 

need to take advantage of the skill sets, capabilities, and resources of other 

organizations.” 
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The Role of the Global SOF Network in a Resource Constrained Environment

Consistent with this point, General (retired) Holland discussed the virtue 

of patience as a critical aspect of SOF operation when dealing with various 

partners who field different capabilities. He reminded the group that “what 

we want to do is to make sure we have a framework to make sure everyone 

is successful.”

In speaking of the roles of networks, Lieutenant General John Mulholland, Deputy Commander, USSOCOM, identified some of the challenges 

of melding together diverse partners and the absolute need to “sustain the 

connecting tissue” that has grown and strengthened over the “nearly 12 years 

of battle together.”

“It seems easy, but when people come together, there’s friction, even 

among friends.” The process brings together partners with different capabilities, capacities, and limitations. It is necessary to “overcome the friction 

that coalition warfare and coalition efforts require.” 

Yet Lieutenant General Mulholland argued that “there is no better element to do that than the Special Operations community because we have so 

much in common and we share so much together.”

Mr. Roberts and General Holland addressed the important roles that 

conventional forces play in the effective functioning of a SOF network. In 

fact, the fifth SOF Truth has captured the essence of this relationship: “Most 

Special Operations require non-SOF support.”

Other organizations that have played major roles during the past decade 

of war are the private military companies who bring skill sets, experience, 

and responsiveness to the fight. Colonel Horn’s earlier chapter spoke to the 

dynamics and complexities of the roles of the PMCs. 

Linked to this discussion of networks is the need to identify responsibility for leadership. Both presenters and participants were among those who 

spoke to this issue. “Who takes the lead?” asked Rear Admiral Metz. “The 

U.S.? Allies? Regional Partners?” One of the attendees noted that, “we don’t 

always know or understand the results that flow from the SOF networks ... 

We don’t have to own or manipulate the network; we need merely to invest 

in people.”

In response, Mr. Roberts commented that “no single nation should try 

to control the SOF network ... all should use and leverage the bounce we get 

out of the network.”

Various speakers, panelists, and participants spoke to the continuing need 

to be adaptive to the specific environments in which SOF find themselves. 
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The evolution of regionally focused fusion centers, variously referred to as 

International Support Centers or Regional SOF Coordination Centers, was 

portrayed as a way to gain efficiencies in relationship building by focusing 

on the complexity and diversity of specific environments. 

Rear Admiral Metz was the first of several to speak about the value of 

building SOF network structures within environments where organizations 

such as the North American Air Defense Command and NATO have established structures and records of effectiveness.

Absent the stability and predictability of such legacy organizations, General Holland asserted that it is necessary to “take in the culture of those you 

are dealing with ... the strategic thinking and cultural roots of interagency 

organizations and others who don’t plan like us, don’t act like us, don’t think 

at the ‘speed of war.’” 

Adding complexity to the sustainment of networks built over the past 

decade of war and the establishment of new ones was the clear awareness 

that the resource environment is becoming increasingly constrained. One 

oft-repeated concern was for the need to pay attention to the uncertain consequences of budget cuts and austerity on SOF institutions and mission sets. 

In his opening comments, Dr. Brian Maher suggested that SOF are “good 

at economies of scale.” 

Consistent with that observation, one of the panelists argued that it is 

not possible to “do all things well in a time of declining resources.” Thus it 

is essential to establish priorities for skill set proficiency and network expansion to achieve maximum effects. 

As part of the discussions, an important question was posed that asked, 

“what does ‘value-added’ mean” when diverse partners are seeking to gain 

from a network relationship? With that question came the caution that “networks will fail if those invested don’t get out of them what they desire.” 

Especially in times of constrained resources, SOF need to prioritize their 

requirements and then develop innovative ways to meet them, to include 

leveraging the capabilities and capacities of network partners. This concern 

directly contributes to the uncertainty about the identification, assessment, 

and achievement of measures of effectiveness as addressed in the final theme 

discussed later.
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2. Cultural intelligence/cross-cultural competence programs 

contribute significantly to SOF network effectiveness and 

should be viewed as force multipliers, especially in times of 

diminishing resources.

Perhaps more than anyone else, SOF must be able to adapt to and navigate 

through the complex human and cultural terrain in which they operate. Dr. 

Emily Spencer’s chapter—Solving the People Puzzle: Educating and Training 

SOF Operators for Enhanced Cultural Intelligence—addresses this issue in 

great detail. 

During his comments about NATO SOF Headquarters, Mr. Scott Morrison, Director, Commander’s Action Group, NATO Special Operations 

Headquarters, spoke about the “human network” as the key center of gravity. 

Later a senior leader reminded the symposium attendees of the importance of 

“understanding the roles, perspectives, and cultural nuances of those you’re 

working with.” While it is true that conventional forces and other partners 

such as nongovernmental organizations must also do so, the former generally 

pursue different mission sets and the latter maintain a long-term presence 

that allows for a more measured immersion into a culture. That is usually 

not a luxury available to SOF. 

In addressing the guiding theme of the symposium, presenters spoke 

of the time investment required to gain proficiency in cultural issues. Dr. 

Spencer argued that “time is more often the issue than money—cultural 

intelligence involves a huge amount of time.” Complicating the matter is the 

fact that the cultural landscape is constantly in flux. As Dr. Kerry Fosher, 

Anthropologist, Director of Research, USMC Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning, pointed out, “cultures don’t hold still and wait for 

you to show up with your ‘smart card.’” 

Cultural effectiveness is a function of education, training, and experience. 

Typically budget fights debate issues such as whether resources should be 

devoted to cultural training or to language training. The correct answer, suggests Dr. Spencer, is “yes.” Both need to be addressed in a balanced manner. 

Focusing on the future operating environment, Dr. Spencer sought to distinguish between cultural general and cultural specific knowledge. Cultural 

general knowledge enables a person to “learn and understand in a different 

way.” What cultural cues should I be looking for? What are the cultural cues 

that I am seeing? How do I read them? By contrast, cultural specific efforts 
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require “frameworks to build and assess culturally specific information.” 

What are a (specific) culture’s core values? How can I identify them? How 

might they impact my mission?

3. The traditional values of trust and confidence among SOF 

network partners become even more important in times of 

constrained resources as the mission sets expand while the 

margin for error diminishes. Each network partner, whatever 

their role, must contribute effectively.

The effectiveness of SOF networks relies to a large degree on the trust and 

confidence shared by its human and institutional partners. These central 

features of any relationship require time and effort to mature. Several participants invoked Admiral McRaven’s admonition that “You can’t surge trust.” 

It is a condition that must be in place and credible when circumstances 

demand. It can never be an afterthought. 

In discussing the challenges of “sustaining the connecting tissue,” Lieutenant General Mulholland cited the familiar concerns over national agendas, different cultures, and national caveats. Several speakers spoke about the 

fact that it took a decade or more to get all the SOF “tribes” onto the same 

campaign plan and of the need to build on the linkages that have evolved 

over time. 

There was also discussion at different times about the capabilities of the 

partners. Lieutenant General Mulholland asserted that “I’m more concerned 

with capabilities than caveats. There’s always something to be done; we just 

have to vet the capabilities to see what is possible.” Another panelist spoke of 

capacity-building missions that involve assessments of a military organization’s current state of training and an evaluation of the country’s “suitability as a partner.” In building trust and confidence, “we’ve got to be honest 

with each other about what we can and cannot do.” It may be that certain 

partners will, by necessity, be limited to “important niche capabilities.” But 

each partner must be able to perform as promised and justify the trust and 

confidence that are central to the effectiveness of the SOF network.
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The Role of the Global SOF Network in a Resource Constrained Environment

4. The ongoing shift in emphasis from direct to indirect 

action is increasing SOF engagement in Phase Zero shaping 

activities, thus placing increased demand on network 

partners who bring with them 3-D (defense, diplomacy, and 

development), security assistance, and governance skill sets.

There was considerable interest expressed in the shift of mission sets resulting 

from the increased emphasis on shaping, capacity building, and governance. 

Several of the senior leaders endorsed the need to be involved with Phase 

Zero operations. This would include the placement of liaison elements in 

various domestic and international organizations, a practice carried out by 

Canada, the U.S., and other countries. Their role is to develop understandings of partner systems with an eye toward leveraging diverse capabilities 

in times of need. 

Lieutenant-General Beare was adamant that SOF “need to be there before 

the bang—in fact, to prevent the bang!” SOF need to “be out there before 

the crisis.” Several panelists discussed foreign internal defense missions as 

central platforms for shaping the environment. Working with host nation 

SOF, conventional forces, and other government institutions allows SOF 

to “get closer to the problems” and develop “recommendations for future 

engagements” in coordination with partner SOF. 

CSM Dave Betz reinforced the view that “FID is used for persistent 

engagement ... it’s not glamorous; it’s a hard, challenging job.” He went on to 

challenge the attendees to “develop imaginative ways to train,” especially in 

times of resource constraints. One of the challenges to FID and other Phase 

Zero activities posed by reductions in resources is that personal assessment 

visits will become less frequent, and deploying SOF units will have to become 

proficient in relying on written assessments rather than personal contacts to 

prepare themselves for the areas in which they will operate. 

5. Persistent attention to interoperability and integration 

protocols is essential to leverage the contributions of others 

and to maximize SOF network effectiveness in a resource 

constrained environment.

There was considerable interest in the need to seek efficiencies in the functioning of SOF networks. Discussions about interoperability and integration concerns began with the truism that “no nation can [act] alone.” Care 
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Ricks: General Themes and Thoughts

was taken to distinguish between interoperability and integration, with the 

former meaning “coexisting within the same space” and the latter the “synchronization of activities.” Awareness of partner capabilities and priorities 

assists in identifying those partners with whom we must maintain interoperability and those with whom we need to integrate. Such awareness comes 

from relationships built during “quiet times” so they are available when 

necessary. 

Yet uncertainty persists in the different approaches to building required 

trust and confidence. Recognizing that building upon existing structures 

such as NATO and the North American Aerospace Defense Command 

eases the challenge of forming and sustaining networks, speakers and panelists spoke of the need to identify and exploit existing protocols such as 

agreements among domestic interagency partners and international treaties 

among countries. Especially at the tactical level, experience teaches that the 

leveraging of common tactics, techniques, and procedures helps to ensure 

a common effort. 

There was also the recognition that circumstances can make it necessary 

for SOF to “be prepared to engage with people you never thought you would 

(“unnatural relationships”). One issue that arose several times was the need 

to integrate with conventional forces for various forms of support. General 

Holland stated that the “integration piece with conventional forces is the 

key to success.” 

Integration with interagency and international partners is advanced 

through the employment of SOF liaison officers and others who serve as 

functioning members of organizations, not just as points of contact for data 

exchanges. Through such arrangements we develop the common understanding that “if we’re going to get this done, we’re going to have to get it 

done together” (Rear Admiral Metz and others). Even so, as pointed out 

elsewhere, it took more than a decade to bring the various SOF communities 

together in Afghanistan to achieve a unity of effort. The challenges of integrating the efforts of interagency partners, intergovernmental organizations, 

and nongovernmental organizations are inevitably more difficult because of 

the different agendas and cultures they bring with them. 

Among others, the senior leaders spoke of the “interoperability gap” and 

noted that it is “tough for many countries to keep up.” Because technology 

often provides the leverage to close many of those gaps, it is not always 
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The Role of the Global SOF Network in a Resource Constrained Environment

possible that all SOF partners are equally equipped, either because of their 

own resource constraints or “national decisions.” 

6. Especially in a time of constrained resources, it is 

imperative to develop and communicate a “compelling 

narrative” to educate various stakeholders about the value 

SOF provide.

One of the shared realities is that SOF represent very small segments of any 

country’s defense establishment and, therefore, risk being overwhelmed or 

shoved aside as battles for resources are fought by the larger and bureaucratically more powerful members. Quite simply, many—if not most—of those 

not associated with SOF neither know nor understand what SOF is about. 

Lieutenant General Mulholland expressed amazement at the “amount of 

continuing adult education required to help people understand what we do 

... and that’s after 12 years!” He went on to assert that there is “always, always 

a requirement for an ongoing program to educate and inform.” 

Thus, SOF networks must rely on compelling narratives to inform and 

persuade various stakeholders. Their purpose is to strengthen ties and educate decision makers and enablers such as conventional forces who are critical members of any SOF network. Mr. J.Q. Roberts noted that while resource 

constraints are a harsh reality, the emerging security environment remains 

complex and dangerous and must be addressed. He presented what he saw as 

the specific elements of the contemporary security environment, portraying 

a mix of non-state actors, such as terrorist groups and various criminal elements, and state actors who seek to act either directly through cyber attacks 

and other forms of direct action or through surrogates who can be difficult 

to identify, trace, and neutralize. He briefly summarized the details of the 

January 2012 U.S. Strategic Guidance and concluded, “it sure sounds like 

SOF to me!”

7. Measures of effectiveness must be clear, understood, 

shared, and practiced by members of the SOF network. 

Of all the various themes and issues that emerged from the symposium, the 

discussion of measures of effectiveness was perhaps the most incomplete. 

The issue emerged during various sessions, sometimes in the form of a question, but it remained largely unresolved. For instance, the effort to create a 
77

Ricks: General Themes and Thoughts

“compelling narrative” is dependent on the ability to track, document, and 

communicate SOF effectiveness. Success narratives are essential to informing 

and persuading influential constituencies about the value-added provided by 

SOF. Thus the requirement for both an ongoing education program about the 

value of SOF and the creation of SOF success narratives depends on clearly 

defined measures of effectiveness. 

Recalling Lieutenant-General Beare’s comments about the necessity to 

“deliver operational success,” questions and concerns emerge that demand 

attention. What specific examples demonstrate when and how SOF achieved 

the measures of effectiveness set for a mission? These must not be superficial 

“good news stories,” but rather substantial cases where SOF’s unique capabilities achieved important strategic goals. 

Mr. Roberts’ vision of “an international, interagency, SOF-centric, networked collection of like-minded security enterprises” certainly provides 

a structure within which to pursue Lieutenant-General Beare’s imperative. 

Given both the current and future international security environments discussed during the gathering, such a structure can respond effectively to 

situations through direct (“we act”) or indirect action (“they act”). 

Some basic questions that must be addressed about measures of effectiveness include: What are the measures of effectiveness for the functioning of 

the SOF network? For instance, “how can you tell if all of this [cultural and 

language training] is having a positive effect?” What should the measures 

of effectiveness be? How do we gain common acceptance of the measures of 

effectiveness? How do we communicate them to all of the SOF network partners? How do we assess how well we’ve done in achieving those standards? 

Senior Leadership Perspectives

The symposium was fortunate to host several senior leaders who presented 

their perspectives on the roles of SOF networks and then participated in discussions of topics addressed by the symposium. As noted earlier, they spoke 

of the high regard that SOF presently enjoy, but warned that the current 

respect for SOF competence and success is fragile and in need of continuous 

attention. Thus it is necessary to be able to tell the story of SOF, to educate so 

that those stakeholders in the non-SOF communities know and understand 

what value SOF bring to the national security mosaic, especially in times of 

diminishing resources. 
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The Role of the Global SOF Network in a Resource Constrained Environment

One of their shared themes addressed a sense of purpose, of the need to 

answer the question “Why are we here?” Some addressed the utility of the 

national military establishment and its role and purpose in specific contingencies. Others more narrowly focused on the role and purpose of SOF, 

offering suggestions on how to build the educational narrative so frequently 

mentioned during the symposium. 

One issue that arose from this group addressed the challenge of balancing 

national political guidance—typically concerning indirect activities such as 

building justice and corrections systems; facilitating job creation; building an 

effective education system; ensuring safe water delivery; and other activities 

associated with good governance—with the operational requirements of the 

mission. The latter tend to address more frequently the “defense” component 

of the 3-Ds and require a more immediate and responsive posture. 

Figure 4. Brigadier-General Denis Thompson (left), Dr. Brian Maher (center), 

and Lieutenant General John Mulholland discuss key issues during The Role of 

the Global SOF Network in a Resource Constrained Environment symposium 

at MacDill Air Force Base on February 27, 2013. Photo by Marine Master Sergeant Fred Zimmerman. 
79

Ricks: General Themes and Thoughts

More generally, the strategic perspective provided by the senior leadership during the two days served as a source of context and a sense of what is 

possible in times of resource contraction. Not surprisingly, much of what is 

possible depends on a diverse and capable network of perspectives, expertise, 

and skill sets. What is possible is not always obvious, and requires leadership attention to take advantage of what various partners bring with them 

to the challenge. 

Conclusion

The symposium succeeded in remaining focused on the role of SOF networks in a time of resource constraints and uncertainty. Though many broad 

themes and issues arose during the panel discussions and questions from 

the attendees, these were typically talked about more narrowly in terms of 

their implications and consequences for SOF networks. 

By remaining on topic, the gathering was able to advance the agendas 

of last year’s symposium in Canada while raising fresh topics that suggest 

themselves for further discussion during next year’s and subsequent symposiums. Comments by attendees and feedback from presenters and panelists 

affirmed the symposium’s educational and relationship-building success. In 

his closing remarks, and with an eye toward subsequent gatherings, Brigadier-General Thompson spoke of the need to sustain the continuity of the 

SOF effort and noted the value of “deconfliction conferences like this” in 

achieving that goal.

81

Endnotes

Endnotes by Chapter

CHAPTER 1

1. Rod Paschall, The Defeat of Imperial Germany: 1917-1918 (New York: Da Capo 

Press, 1994), 32.

2. Colin Gray, Strategy and History: Essays on theory and practice (Abingdon, Oxon: 

Routledge, 2006), 1.

3. Colin Gray, PRISM, “Concept Failure? COIN, Counterinsurgency, and Strategic 

Theory,” Vol. 3 No. 3 06/2012 17.

4. Mohammad Yousaf and Mark Adkin, Afghanistan the Bear Trap: The Defeat of 

a Superpower (South Yorkshire: Leo Cooper, 2001), 77.

5. Thucydides, The History of the Peloponnesian War (Chicago: William Benton, 

1952), 374.

6. Will Durant, The Life of Greece (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1939), 245.

7. Scott Morrison, Director, Commander’s Action Group, NATO Special Operations Headquarters, 2013 CANSOFCOM Symposium presentation at MacDill 

AFB, FL, 27 February 3013.

8. USSOCOM, Special Operations Forces 2020: The Global SOF Network, Available 

at https://sof.socom.mil/sites/opt/global/Readingroom/default.aspx Accessed 

11 April 2013, 8.

9. Ian Traynor, The Guardian “US defence chief blasts Europe over Nato,” 10 June 

2011, Available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jun/10/nato-dismalfuture-pentagon-chief Accessed 17 April 2013.

10. Robert Kagan, American Power in the 21st Century, “Power and Weakness” (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004), 134.

11. Ibid., 135.

12. Mary Kaldor, American Power in the 21st Century, “American Power: From ‘Compellance’ to Cosmopolitanism?” (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004), 206.

13. Reza Aslan, How to Win a Cosmic War: God Globalization, and the End of the 

War on Terror (New York: Random House, 2009), 9.

14. USSOCOM, Special Operations Forces 2020: The Global SOF Network, Available 

at https://sof.socom.mil/sites/opt/global/Readingroom/default.aspx Accessed 

11 April 2013, 3.

15. Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Joint Force 2020, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 

Available at https://acc.dau.mil/adl/en-US/347752/file/48933/CCJO%20Joint%20

Force%202020%2010%20Sept%2012.pdf Accessed 17 April 2013, 7.

16. Colin Powell and Joseph E. Persico, My American Journey (New York: Random 

House, 1995), 475.
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The Role of the Global SOF Network in a Resource Constrained Environment

17. Warren Zimmermann, Origins of a Catastrophe (New York: Random House, 

1996), 224.

18. Michael Howard, War and the Liberal Conscience (New Jersey: Rutgers University 

Press, 19789, 32.

19. Colin Gray, The Sheriff: America’s Defense of the New World Order (Lexington: 

University Press of Kentucky, 2004), 7.

20. Ibid., 8.

21. USSOCOM, Special Operations Forces 2020: The Global SOF Network, Available 

at https://sof.socom.mil/sites/opt/global/Readingroom/default.aspx Accessed 

11 April 2013, 2.

22. Maria Stephens, Senior Technical Advisor U.S. Agency for International Development, 2013 CANSOFCOM Symposium presentation at MacDill AFB, FL, 27 

February 3013.

23. BBC, “Fears Over US Hawala Crackdown,” accessed 22 April 2013, http://news.

bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3463683.stm.

24. Robert H. Scales, Future Warfare (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1998), 111.

25. E.S. Vandahl, Lieutenant-Colonel, Senior Military Assistant for the Canadian 

Minister of National Defence, 2013 CANSOFCOM Symposium presentation at 

MacDill AFB, FL, 27 February 3013.

26. Michael Howard, War and the Liberal Conscience (New Jersey: Rutgers University 

Press, 1978), 76.

27. Roger Barnett, Asymmetrical Warfare: Today’s Challenge to U.S. Military Power

(Washington D.C.: Brassey’s Inc., 2003), 19.

28. Available at http://icasualties.org/oef/ Accessed 22 April 2013.

29. Available at http://www.nps.gov/anti/historyculture/casualties.htm Accessed 

22 April 2013.

30. Colin Gray, Another Bloody Century: Future Warfare (London: Weidenfeld and 

Nicholson, 2005), 244.

31. Michael Delong and Noah Lukeman, Inside CENTCOM: The Unvarnished Truth 

about the Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq (Washington D.C.: Regenry Publishing 

Inc., 2004), 30.

CHAPTER 3

1. Indeed, General Martin Dempsey, Chief of the Defense Staff noted in his capstone document that “military success in today’s environment is ‘about building a 

stronger network to defeat the networks that confront us.’” Cited in Admiral William H. McRaven, “Written Statement of Admiral William H. McRaven, USN, 

Commander, United States Operations Command Before the 113th Congress 
83

Endnotes

Senate Armed Services Committee Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee,” 9 April 2013, 2.

2. Linda Robinson, “The Future of U.S. Special Operations Forces,” Council Special Report No. 66, April 2013, 5. Specifically, Robinson notes, “One of the most 

cost-effective elements of the defense arsenal, special operators are mature and 

highly skilled.”

3. In fact, recent experience demonstrates the value of this course of action. For 

example, NATO SOF Headquarters was able to assure an increase in SOF partnering efforts and the expansion of overall SOF capabilities throughout the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. After only six years of 

operations, NATO SOF Headquarters standardized SOF practices throughout 

Europe resulting in an estimated fivefold increase in the number of operators 

deployed to Afghanistan. Shane McGalun, “SOCOM Commander Wants Global 

Special Operations Network” Daily Tech, 14 May 2012.

4. Robinson, “The Future of U.S. Special Operations Forces,” 6-7.

5. “U.S. Seeks Global Spec Ops Network,” Defence News, 12 May 2012.

6. McRaven, “Written Statement of Admiral William H. McRaven,” 6.

7. Ibid.

8. Notably, there is long standing debate about the nature and definition of culture. 

The 2006 American counterinsurgency manual, for example, contrasts cultural 

and social structures. It explains: “Social structure comprises the relationships 

among groups, institutions, and individuals within a society; in contrast, culture 

(ideas, norms, rituals, codes of behavior) provide meaning to individuals within 

the society.” It defines culture as a “‘web of meaning’ shared by members of a 

particular society or group within a society.” The manual explains this definition in terms of people’s identity, beliefs, values, attitudes, perceptions, and 

belief systems. It also emphasize that cultural knowledge about insurgents, as 

far as the military is concerned, should be exploited to be used to further U.S. 

national objectives. Counterinsurgency, 2006, 3-6, 3-8. Similarly, scholar Adam 

Bozeman, defines culture as “those norms, values, institutions and modes of 

thinking in a given society that survive change and remain meaningful to successive generations.” Adam Bozeman cited in Montgomery McFate, “The Military 

Utility of Understanding Adversary Culture,” Joint Force Quarterly, 38, 2005, 48, 

note 4. While all these definitions (as well as most of the plethora of available 

definitions of culture) are complementary, Alan English does an exceptional 

job of breaking culture down into its component parts and thereby, arguably, 

make the concept of culture more understandable at a structural level. English 

defines culture as a set of common beliefs and values with a group of people 

that combined, transform into attitudes that are expressed as behaviors. Allan 
84

The Role of the Global SOF Network in a Resource Constrained Environment

D. English, Understanding Military Culture: A Canadian Perspective (Montreal: 

McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2004), 12.

9. Notably, it is not just in the role of SOF networks that enhanced cultural intelligence is important. It is also important to the “shaping” piece before a conflict 

actually happens. Moreover, it is paramount when dealing with local populations, other governmental departments (OGDs) and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), just to mention a few. In fact, there is no SOF task, including 

direct action (DA), where enhanced cultural intelligence would not be a benefit 

to operators. For example, cultural intelligence can help with targeting, determining what type of resistance might be met during an attack and also what the 

retaliation might be. It can also help predict what the domestic reaction might be 

if information is leaked in the media and what type of collateral damage might 

occur as a result.

10. For a further elaboration on cultural intelligence see Emily Spencer, “Solving the People Puzzle”: Cultural Intelligence and Special Operations Forces (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 2010). 

Also, it should be noted that there are several different terminologies used to 

express the advantageous use of cultural knowledge. These terms include, but 

are not limited to, cultural savvy, cultural astuteness, cultural literacy, cultural 

appreciation, cultural expertise, human terrain, cultural awareness, cultural 

competency, and cross-cultural competence. There are also many different proposed acronyms for cultural intelligence, for example, CI, CULTINT, and CQ.

CQ draws parallels to the more commonly used term Intelligence Quotient 

(IQ). IQ is based on the early twentieth century findings of German psychologist 

William Stern that the mental age to chronological age remains relatively constant 

throughout one’s life. This suggests that an individual’s IQ does not change throughout his or her lifetime. “What Does IQ Stand for and What does it Mean?” http://

www.geocities.com/rnseitz/Definition_of_IQ.html; Accessed on 14 July 2007.

The way that CQ is used in this chapter, however, does directly argue that 

individuals can increase their CQ with knowledge and the motivation to apply 

that knowledge toward a specific goal. Indeed, Christopher Earley and Soon 

Ang, the originators of the term, are also clear on this point. They write, “We 

use the shorthand label of CQ as a convenience to remind the reader that this 

is a facet of intelligence. However, we do not use CQ in a strict fashion as is 

implied by ‘IQ’; that is, we do not mean to denote a mathematical relationship 

generated from normative data of capability. In this sense, our usage parallels that from the literature on emotional intelligence and their usage of ‘EQ’.” 

Christopher Earley and Soon Ang, Cultural Intelligence: Individual Interactions 

Across Cultures (Stanford: Stanford Business Books, 2003), 4. Notably, whatever 

the label one applies to the concept, in the end, the issue is to determine what 
85

Endnotes

enables people to function effectively in cultural settings. One should not lose 

sight of this objective.

11. Interview by author with a Canadian SOF operator, November 2012.

12. See for example, Michael T. Flynn, James Sisco and David C. Ellis “‘Left of Bang’: 

The Value of Sociocultural Analysis in Today’s Environment,” Prism 3(4) 2012, 

13-21.

13. Nonetheless, there is much valuable research that has been done and continues 

to be conducted. A good starting point to explore the topic is: Jessica A. Gallus, 

Melissa C. Gouge, Emily Antolic, Kerry Fosher, Victoria Jasparro, Stephanie 

Coleman, Brian Selmeski and Jennifer L. Klafehn, “Cross-Cultural Competence in the United States Department of Defense: An Annotated Bibliography,” 

Technical Report, United States Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and 

Social Sciences, February 2013.

CHAPTER 4

1. J.Q. Roberts, Principal Director Special Operations and Combating Terrorism, 

Office of the Secretary of Defense, presentation at the Joint Special Operations/

Canadian Special Operations Conference, held in Tampa, Florida on 27 and 28 

February 2013, entitled Global SOF Networks—A Policy Perspective. 

2. Ibid on the conference and Defense Strategic Guidance, 5 January 2012, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense. Like-minded 

nations, p. 1. 

3. President Obama’s 3 January 2012 Forward to the January 2012 Defense Strategic 

Guidance.

4. Rick “Ozzie” Nelson and Michael Stieg, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Implications of the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance for U.S. Special Operations 

Forces, 13 February 2012, accessed on 29 April 2013 at http://csis.org/publication/

implications-2012-defense-strategic-guidance-us-special-operations-forces. 

5. The Irregular Warfare: Countering Irregular Threats, Joint Operating Concept, 

17 May 2010, Version 2.0, lists counterterrorism, unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, counterinsurgency, and stability operations as the five IW 

operations and activities. Joint Publication 3-05, Special Operations, 18 April 2011, 

lists the first four (CT, UW, FID and COIN) as Special Operations core activities 

and then describes its support for stability operations. 

6. United States Special Operations Command, SOCOM 2020, accessed on 28 April 

2013 at https://sof.socom.mil/sites/opt/global/Readingroom/Shared%20Documents/current/2020StratDoc.pdf.

7. Dr. Emily Spencer, editor, Special Operations forces: Building Global Partnerships, 

dated 2012, was published after the December 2011 symposium. Chapter 6, “The 
86

The Role of the Global SOF Network in a Resource Constrained Environment

Acid Test of Reality: Accounts of Working with Others from the Front Lines in 

Iraq and Afghanistan,” provided the themes from that panel. Those included 

Operational Culture. Although that was also a dominant theme for this panel, 

the perspectives were very similar and the author chose to cite other themes for 

discussion. Please see that document to gain an understanding of their perspectives on operational culture. 

8. Mali, formerly a French colony, became independent in 1960 under a military 

dictatorship. By 1991 Mali was democratically ruled.

9. Simon Tisdale, Mali, Fragile Democracy and Clumsy U.S. Policy, The Guardian, 

18 January 2013, accessed on 20 January 2013 at http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2013/jan/18/mali-fragile-democracy-clumsy-us-policy. According to 

the article, Sanogo had trained in the United States at Fort Huachuca, Arizona, 

Quantico, Virginia, and Fort Benning, Georgia. 

10. Central Intelligence Agency, World FactBook, accessed on 29 April 2013 at 

https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ml.html.

11. Stew Magnuson, “Mali Crisis Officer Lessons for Special Operations Command,” 

National Defense, May 2013, 28.

12. Tom Shanker, “To Track Militants, U.S. Has System That Never Forgets a Face,” 

New York Times, 13 July 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/14/world/

asia/14identity.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 on 12 May 2012.

13. Mission Afghanistan, accessed http://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2011/april/

afghanistan_042911 on 12 May 2013.

14. Joint Publication 3-24, Counterinsurgency Operations, 5 October 2009, page X-8.

15. This was not a matter of “innocent until proven guilty.”

16. “The Eyes Have It,” The Economist, 7 July 2012, http://www.economist.com/

node/21558263.

17. Normally, you would also expect that of computers, but according to SGM Miller, 

“Not as much in Afghanistan.”

18. USSOCOM Vision 2020, and LTG John Mulholland, Deputy Commander 

USSOCOM, Panel Member.

19. Joint Publication 5, Joint Operational Planning, 11 August 2011. 

20. Brigadier-General Denis Thompson, Commander, CANSOFCOM, Canada, 

during a presentation at the Joint Special Operations/Canadian Special Operations Conference, held in Tampa, Florida 27-28 February 2013.

21. Chairman’s Strategic Direction to the Joint Force, 6 February 2012.
87

Endnotes

CHAPTER 5

1. Thomas Adams, “The New Mercenaries and the Privatization of Conflict,” 

Parameters, Summer 1999, 104.

2. Jose L. Gomez, “The Role of Private Military and Security Companies in Modern Warfare,” Global Research, 11 August 2012, 

accessed 4 November 2012, http://w w w.globalresearch.ca/the 

-role-of-private-military-and-security-companies-in-modern-warfare/32307. 

3. Quoted in Eugene B. Smith, “The New Condottieri and US Policy: The Privatization of Conflict and Its Implications,” Parameters, Winter 2002-03, 105. Another 

useful definition of PMC is: A registered civilian company that specializes in the 

provision of contract military training (instruction and simulation programs), 

military support operations (logistic support), operational capabilities (special 

forces advisors and command and control, communications and intelligence 

[C3I] functions) and or military equipment, to legitimate domestic and foreign 

entities. The emergence of the term is not entirely clear. Major S. Goddard, “The 

Private Military Company: A Legitimate International Entity Within Modern 

Conflict,” MA Thesis, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 2001. Researcher Owen Greene 

insists the term gradually entered the NGO vocabulary around 1997. He believes, 

“People came up with this as a brand new idea. It was trying to find a word that 

gave them some respectability - a cleaner term.” Quoted in The International 

Consortium of Investigative Journalists, “Marketing the New ‘Dogs of War’,” 

2002, 7. The US government defines the meaning and roles of battlefield contractors in such publications as Army Regulations 715-9, Contractors Accompanying 

the Force (1999); Field manual (FM) 100-21, Contractors on the Battlefield (1999);

FM 100-10-2, Contracting Support on the Battlefield (1999); and FM 63-11, and 

Department of the Army (DA) Pamphlet (PAM) 715-16, Contractor Deployment 

Guide (1998).

4. Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), “Private 

Military Companies,” DCAF Backgrounder, 04/2006. They also state that “Terms 

such as mercenaries and private security companies (PSCs) are often used interchangeably with PMCs.”

5. Goddard.

6. Adams, 105-106.

7. Ibid., 107. At least two Vinnell-trained Saudi armored brigades fought in the 

1991 Gulf War.

8. See Christopher Spearin, “Special Operations Forces a Strategic Resource: Public 

and Private Divides,” Parameters, Winter 2006-2007, 62.

9. Smith, 108.

10. Adams, 108.
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The Role of the Global SOF Network in a Resource Constrained Environment

11. Ibid.

12. Ibid., 104.

13. Ibid., 108. 

14. Ibid. The Sierra Leone government maintained 60 percent ownership. 

15. Quoted in, The International Consortium of Investigative Journalists, “Marketing the New ‘Dogs of War’,” 2002, 5.

16. Smith, 110 and Adams, 110. The contract was worth tens of millions of dollars 

and was funded by a number of Islamic countries. Tammy Arbuckle, “Building 

a Bosnian Army,” Janes International Defence Review, August 1997. 

17. John G. Roos, “Army Begins Four Year Experiment with Contracted Employees 

Filling Selected ROTC Positions,” Armed Forces Journal International, September 1997.

18. DCAF Backgrounder, 04/2006.

19. Blackwater USA promotional brochure, No Date, 8.

20. Adams, 114. The firm apparently received $10 million for its assistance, as well 

as the cost of weapons and ammunition. 

21. Felix Soh, “Mercenaries as tomorrow’s peacekeepers,” The Straits Times, 22 June 

2002. 

22. Quoted in, “Marketing the New ‘Dogs of War’,” 15.

23. David Simons, “Occupation for Hire. Private Military Companies and their Role 

in Iraq,” RUSI Journal, June 2004, 68.

24. Barry Yeoman, “The growing role of mercenaries,” International Herald Tribune, 3 April 2004, http:/www.iht.com/articles/513165.html; and David Simons, 

“Occupation for Hire. Private Military Companies and their Role in Iraq,” RUSI 

Journal, June 2004, 71.

25. Jose L. Gomez, “Impact on Human Rights of Private Military and Security Companies’ Activities,” Global Research, 11 October 2008. Http://www.globalresearch.

ca/impact -on-human-rights-of-private-military-and-security-companies-activities/10523, accessed 4 November 2012.

26. “Marketing the New ‘Dogs of War’,” 5.

27. Ibid.

28. “The men behind the ‘Guinean plot’,” BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/uk/2/

jo/africa/3504748.stm, accessed 3 December 2004; and Araminta Wordsworth, 

“Zimbabwe Says Plane of Spies Plotted Coup,” National Post, 11 March 2004, A3.

29. “Blackwater in Iraq given wide latitude,” Washingtonpost.com. Http://www.

msnbc.msn.com/id/20884905/from/ET, accessed 20 September 2007.

30. Ibid. 

31. Ibid. 

32. Gomez, “The Role of Private Military...” 
89

Endnotes

33. Ibid. Accountability of the Blackwater personnel became a huge dissatisfier. 

Under the existing Status of Forces Agreement contractors had immunity from 

prosecution. Only in January 2009, with the implementation of a new agreement 

and the cancellation of the Coalition Provisional Authority Order 17 (which 

granted immunity to contractors) was the Iraqi government able to deny Blackwater an operating license in the country. See also Gomez, “Impact on Human 

Rights...” A 2007 House of Representatives oversight committee determined that 

Blackwater was involved in 196 firefights in Iraq since 2005. They noted that in 84 

percent of those cases, Blackwater opened fire first, despite contract stipulations 

that they were to use force only in cases of self-defense.

34. Gomez, “Impact on Human Rights...”

35. Tom Blackwell, “Canadians killed in fiery Iraq Ambush,” National Post, 29 March 

2004, A3.

36. “The Baghdad Boom,” The Economist, 25 March 2004. A local/host nation 

national earns $150 a month; a third-country national 10-20 times as much and 

internationals 100 times as much. The relative cost savings fuel the continuing 

use of PMCs—why pay for a Western platoon when you can hire a similar sized 

force for a fraction of the cost? 

37. Christian Jennings, “Special forces quitting to cash in on Iraq,” The Scotsman, 

Scotsman.com website, accessed, 21 February 2004.

38. Adams, 114.

39. “The Baghdad Boom,” The Economist, 25 March 2004.

40. David Simons, “Occupation for Hire. Private Military Companies and their Role 

in Iraq,” RUSI Journal, June 2004, 69.

41. Ibid., 69.

42. See James Cockayne and Emily Speers Mears, “Private Military and Security 

Companies: A Framework for Regulation,” International Peace Institute, March 

2009.

43. Tom Rothrauff, speaker, “The Role of the Global SOF Network in a Resource 

Constrained Environment,” Tampa, 28 February 2013.

44. Ibid. 

45. Blackwater USA promotional brochure, No Date, 8.

46. Adams, 114.

47. See Deborah Avant, “Private Companies and the Future of War,” Foreign Policy 

Research Institute, April 2006.

48. Alan Bell, the president of Globe Risk International has catalogued a wide 

number of conventional and nonconventional services that PMCs can cover.