alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
# C_2017293EN.01002901.xml

| 4.9.2017 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 293/29 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

4.9.2017

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 293/29

---

Judgment of the General Court of 20 July 2017 — ADR Center v Commission

(Case T-644/14) (1)

1

((Financial aid - General Programme ‘Fundamental Rights and Justice’ for the period 2007-2013 - Specific Programme ‘Civil Justice’ - Action for annulment - Enforceable decision - Article 299 TFEU - Powers of the author of the act - Principle of sound administration - Application for an order directing the Commission to pay the balance due under the grant agreements - Partial reclassification of the action - Arbitration clause - Jurisdiction of the General Court - Eligible costs))

(2017/C 293/32)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Parties

Applicant: ADR Center SpA (Rome, Italy) (represented: initially by L. Tantalo, and subsequently by A. Guillerme, lawyers)

Applicant:

Defendant: European Commission (represented: initially by J. Estrada de Solà and L. Cappelletti, and subsequently by J. Estrada de Solà and S. Delaude, acting as Agents)

Defendant:

Re:

Re:

Application, first, based on Article 263 TFEU seeking annulment of Decision C(2014) 4485 final of the Commission of 27 June 2014 concerning the recovery of part of the financial contribution paid to the applicant under three grant agreements concluded in the context of the ‘Civil Justice’ specific programme and, second, based on Article 272 TFEU seeking an order directing the Commission to pay it the balance due to it under the three grant agreements in an amount of EUR 49 172,52 together with damages.

Operative part of the judgment

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | Dismisses the action; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Dismisses the action;

| 2. | Orders ADR Center SpA to pay the costs incurred by the European Commission, including the costs of that institution pertaining to the proceedings for interim measures, and to bear half of its own costs, including in relation to its costs pertaining to the proceedings for interim measures; |
| --- | --- |

2.

Orders ADR Center SpA to pay the costs incurred by the European Commission, including the costs of that institution pertaining to the proceedings for interim measures, and to bear half of its own costs, including in relation to its costs pertaining to the proceedings for interim measures;

| 3. | Orders the Commission to pay half of the costs incurred by ADR Center, including half of the costs of the latter pertaining to the proceedings for interim measures. |
| --- | --- |

3.

Orders the Commission to pay half of the costs incurred by ADR Center, including half of the costs of the latter pertaining to the proceedings for interim measures.

---

(1)  OJ C 388, 3.11.2014.

1

---
# C_2014388EN.01001701.xml

| 3.11.2014 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 388/17 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

3.11.2014

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 388/17

---

Action brought on 2 July 2014 — Novartis Europharm v Commission

(Case T-511/14)

2014/C 388/21

Language of the case: English

Parties

Parties

Applicant: Novartis Europharm Ltd (Horsham, United Kingdom) (represented by: C. Schoonderbeek, lawyer)

Applicant:

Defendant: European Commission

Defendant:

Form of order sought

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | annul the contested decision; and |
| --- | --- |

—

annul the contested decision; and

| — | order the European Commission to pay its own costs and those of Novartis. |
| --- | --- |

—

order the European Commission to pay its own costs and those of Novartis.

Pleas in law and main arguments

Pleas in law and main arguments

By its present action, the applicant seeks the annulment of Commission Decision C (2014) 2155 final of 27 March 2014 granting a marketing authorisation to Teva Generics for the medicinal product for human use ‘Zoledronic acid Teva Generics — Zoledronic Acid’.

In support of the action, the applicant relies on a single plea in law, essentially identical or similar to the plea in law relied on in Cases T-472/12 Novartis Europharm v Commission
   (1) and T-67/13 Novartis Europharm v Commission
   (2).

Novartis Europharm

Commission

1

Novartis Europharm

Commission

2

---

(1)  OJ 2012 C 389, p. 8.

1

(2)  OJ 2013 C 101, p. 24.

2

---
### IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

_____________________

No. 14

- 11317

_____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff − Appellee

versus

MICHAEL HERROLD,

Defendant − Appellant

__________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, Dallas

__________________________

ON PETITION FOR REHEARING EN BANC

(Opinion February 12, 2016 , 5 Cir., 201 6, 813 F.3d 595 ) (Opinion on Remand from U.S. Sup. Ct. April 11, 2017, 5 Cir., 2017, ___ Fed. Appx. ___)

Be fore STEWART, Chief Judge, JOLLY, JONES, SMITH, DENNIS, CLEMENT, PRADO, OWEN, ELROD , SOUTHWICK, HAYNES, GRAVES,
HIGGINSON and COSTA , Circuit Judges.

BY THE COURT:

A member of the court having requested a poll on the petition for

rehearing en banc, and a majority of the circuit judges in regular active

service and not disqualified having voted in favor, United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

### FILED July 7, 2017

Lyle W. Cayce ClerkIT IS ORDERED that this cause shall be reheard by the court en banc

with oral argument on a date hereafter to be fixed. The Clerk will specify a

briefing schedule for the filing of supplemen tal briefs.
**Exhibit 15.1**

**Consent of Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm**

The Supervisory Board and Management Board of Merus N.V.: 

Weconsent to the incorporated by reference in the registration statement on Form S-8 (No. 333-211497) of Merus N.V. of our report dated April 28, 2017 with respect to theconsolidated statement of financial position of Merus N.V. and subsidiary as of December 31, 2016 and 2015 and the related consolidated statements of profit or loss and comprehensive loss, changes in equity, and cash flows for each of the yearsin the three-year period ended December 31, 2016 which report appears in the December 31, 2016 Annual Report on Form 20-F of Merus N.V. 

/s/ KPMG Accountants N.V. 

Amstelveen, The Netherlands 

April 28, 2017
§ 1.1071-4 Manner of election. ( a ) An election under the provisions of section 1071 shall be in the form of a written statement and shall be executed and filed in duplicate. Such statement shall be signed by the taxpayer or his authorized representative. In the case of a corporation, the statement shall be signed with the corporate name, followed by the signature and title of an officer of the corporation empowered to sign for the corporation, and the corporate seal must be affixed. An election under section 1071 to reduce the basis of property and an election under such section to treat the sale or exchange as an involuntary conversion under section 1033 may be exercised independently of each other. An election under section 1071 must be filed with the return for the taxable year in which the sale or exchange occurs. Where practicable, the certificate of the Federal Communications Commission required by § 1.1071-1 should be filed with the election.
( b ) If, in pursuance of an election to have the basis of its property adjusted under section 1071, the taxpayer desires to have such basis adjusted in any manner different from the general rule set forth in paragraph (a) of § 1.1071-3, the precise method (including allocation of amounts) should be set forth in detail on separate sheets accompanying the election. Consent by the Commissioner to any departure from such general rule shall be effected only by a closing agreement entered into under the provisions of section 7121.
Honeywell International 

Buffalo Research Laboratory 

20 Peabody Street 

Buffalo, New York 14210 

USA 

Compliance with Good Laboratory Practice

Refrigerant concentration sensor calibration and Under Hood Engine Compartment 

Measurements 

I declare that the attached report constitutes a true and faithful account of the procedures 

adopted and the results obtained in the performance of this study. 

Approved by: 

Dr. Christopher J. Seeton 

Principal Engineer – 1234yf MAC Technology Leader 

Honeywell International 

February 3rd, 2012
**UN PUBLISHED** 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

**No. 13**  **- 7**  **658**

JACOB DOUGLAS PEYTON, IV , P etitioner

- Appellant ,

v. HAROLD CLARK, Director , Respondent

- Appellee
.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia , at Roanoke
. Glen E. Conrad , Chief District Judge. ( 7 :1 2

- cv - 0 0 574

- GEC )

Submitted : February 20, 2014 Decided: February 26, 2014
Before DUNCAN, DIAZ, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges

.
Dismiss ed by un published per curiam opinion

.
Jacob Douglas Peyton, IV , Appellant Pro Se. Robert H. Anderson, III, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF VIRGINIA, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM: Jacob Douglas Pe yton, IV , seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2012) petition and a subsequent order denying reconsideration . The order s are not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2253(c)(1) (A) (2012) . A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2012)
. When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. Slack v. McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); see Miller

- El v. Cockrell , 537 U.S. 322, 336

- 38 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that th e petition states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. Slack , 529 U.S. at 484

- 85. We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Peyton has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny Peyton’s motion for a ce rtificate of appealability, deny leave to proceed in forma pauperis, and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal3 contentions are adequately presented in the materials before th is court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
# C_2016078EN.01001701.xml

| 29.2.2016 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 78/17 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

29.2.2016

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 78/17

---

Judgment of the General Court of 14 January 2016 — The Cookware Company v OHIM — Fissler (VITA+VERDE)

(Case T-535/14) (1)

1

((Community trade mark - Opposition proceedings - Application for the Community figurative mark VITA+VERDE - Earlier word mark VITAVIT - Relative ground for refusal - Likelihood of confusion - Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009))

(2016/C 078/26)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Parties

Applicant: The Cookware Company Ltd (Hong Kong, China) (represented by: K. Manhaeve, lawyer)

Applicant:

Defendant: Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) (represented by: V. Melgar, acting as Agent)

Defendant:

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of OHIM, intervener before the General Court: Fissler GmbH (Idar-Oberstein, Germany) (represented by: A. Späth and V. Töbelmann, lawyers)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of OHIM, intervener before the General Court:

Re:

Re:

Action brought against the decision of the Second Board of Appeal of OHIM of 15 April 2014 (Case R 1082/2013-2), relating to opposition proceedings between Fissler GmbH and The Cookware Company Ltd.

Operative part of the judgment

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | Dismisses the action; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Dismisses the action;

| 2. | Orders The Cookware Company Ltd to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Orders The Cookware Company Ltd to pay the costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 351, 6.10.2014.

1

---
§ 1.101-7 Mortality table used to determine exclusion for deferred payments of life insurance proceeds. ( a ) *Mortality table.* Notwithstanding any provision of § 1.101-4 that otherwise would permit the use of a mortality table not described in this section, the mortality table set forth in § 1.72-7(c)(1) must be used to determine— ( 1 ) The amount held by an insurer with respect to a beneficiary for purposes of section 101(d)(2) and § 1.101-4; and
( 2 ) The period or periods with respect to which payments are to be made for purposes of section 101(d)(1) and § 1.101-4.
( b ) *Examples.* The principles of this section may be illustrated by the following examples: Example 1. A life insurance policy provides only for the payment of $5,000 per year for the life of the beneficiary, A, beginning with the insured's death. If A is 59 years of age at the time of the insured's death, the period with respect to which the payments are to be made is 25 years. This period is determined by using the mortality table set forth in § 1.72-7(c)(1), and is shown in Table V of § 1.72-9 (which contains life expectancy tables determined using this mortality table). If the present value of the proceeds, determined by reference to the interest rate used by the insurance company and the mortality table set forth in § 1.72-7(c)(1), is $75,000, $3,000 of each $5,000 payment ($75,000 divided by 25) is excluded from the gross income of A.
Example 2. A life insurance policy provides for the payment of $82,500 in a lump sum to the beneficiary, A, at the death of the insured. Upon the insured's death, however, A selects an option for the payment of $2,000 per year for life and for the same amount to be paid after A's death to B for B's life. If A is 51 years of age and B is 28 years of age at the death of the insured, the period with respect to which the payments are to be made is 55 years. This period is determined by using the mortality table set forth in § 1.72-7(c)(1), and is shown in Table VI of § 1.72-9 (which contains life expectancy tables determined using this mortality table). Accordingly $1,500 of each $2,000 payment ($82,500 divided by 55) is excluded from the gross income of the recipient.
( c ) *Effective date.* This section applies to amounts received with respect to deaths occurring after October 22, 1986, in taxable years ending after October 22, 1986.
[T.D. 8161, 52 FR 35415, Sept. 21, 1987. Redesignated and amended by T.D. 8272, 54 FR 47980, Nov. 20, 1989]
§ 876.1620 Urodynamics measurement system. ( a ) *Identification.* A urodynamics measurement system is a device used to measure volume and pressure in the urinary bladder when it is filled through a catheter with carbon dioxide or water. The device controls the supply of carbon dioxide or water and may also record the electrical activity of the muscles associated with urination. The device system may include transducers, electronic signal conditioning and display equipment, a catheter withdrawal device to enable a urethral pressure profile to be obtained, and special catheters for urethral profilometry and electrodes for electromyography. This generic type of device includes the cystometric gas (carbon dioxide) device, the cystometric hydrualic device, and the electrical recording cystometer, but excludes any device that uses air to fill the bladder.
( b ) *Classification.* Class II (special controls). The device is exempt from the premarket notification procedures in subpart E of part 807 of this chapter subject to § 876.9.
[48 FR 53023, Nov. 23, 1983, as amended at 63 FR 59228, Nov. 3, 1998]
§ 1.105-5 Accident and health plans. ( a ) *In general.* Sections 104(a)(3) and 105 (b), (c), and (d) exclude from gross income certain amounts received through accident or health insurance. Section 105(e) provides that for purposes of sections 104 and 105 amounts received through an accident or health plan for employees, and amounts received from a sickness and disability fund for employees maintained under the law of a State, a Territory, or the District of Columbia, shall be treated as amounts received through accident or health insurance. In general, an accident or health plan is an arrangement for the payment of amounts to employees in the event of personal injuries or sickness. A plan may cover one or more employees, and there may be different plans for different employees or classes of employees. An accident or health plan may be either insured or noninsured, and it is not necessary that the plan be in writing or that the employee's rights to benefits under the plan be enforceable. However, if the employee's rights are not enforceable, an amount will be deemed to be received under a plan only if, on the date the employee became sick or injured, the employee was covered by a plan (or a program, policy, or custom having the effect of a plan) providing for the payment of amounts to the employee in the event of personal injuries or sickness, and notice or knowledge of such plan was reasonably available to the employee. It is immaterial who makes payment of the benefits provided by the plan. For example, payment may be made by the employer, a welfare fund, a State sickness or disability benefits fund, an association of employers or employees, or by an insurance company.
( b ) *Self-employed individuals.* Under section 105(g), a self-employed individual is not treated as an employee for purposes of section 105. Therefore, for example, benefits paid under an accident or health plan as referred to in section 105(e) to or on behalf of an individual who is self-employed in the business with respect to which the plan is established will not be treated as received through accident and health insurance for purposes of sections 104(a)(3) and 105.
[T.D. 6722, 29 FR 5071, Apr. 14, 1964]
#### Vincent A. Jablon et al. *v.*Town Planning and Zoning Commission of the Town of Newtown et al.

Submitted March 6

decided April 2, 1968

*Bussell L. Post, Jr.,*in support of the motion.

*Herbert B. Wanderer,*in opposition.

The motion by the defendants to strike certain assignments of error in the appeal from the Court of Common Pleas in Fairfield County is denied.
Opinion filed January 6 , 201 1



## In The 

# Eleventh Court of Appeals

__________



### No. 11

- 10

- 00 252

- C R

__________

DONNIE RAY CARRION , Appellant

V.

STATE OF TEXAS , Appellee

On Appeal from the 350 th District Court

Taylor County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 9435

- D

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

The trial court convicted Donnie Ray Carrion, upon his plea of guilty, of possession of

cocaine and found both enhancement allegations to be true. Pursuant to the plea bargain

agreement, the trial court imposed a sentence of confinement for eigh t years. We affirm.

On appeal, appellant contends in two issues that the trial court erred by failing to provide

him with counsel at the hearing on his pro se motion for new trial. The State argues that this

court lacks authority to consider appellant’s issues challenging the ruling on his postconviction

motion under Woods v. State , 108 S.W.3d 314 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). We agree.2

T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 25.2(2) provides that, in plea bargain agreement situations where the

punishment assessed does not exceed that in the agreement, appellant may only challenge those

matters raised in written motions ruled upon prior to trial or those matters that the trial court

gives permission to challenge. In Woods , the Court of Criminal Appeals stated that the “plain

import of [former T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 25.2(b)(3) now Rule 25.2(2)] is that appeals from plea bargain

case are limited to the situations set forth in the rul e

. Consequently, a court of appeals is not

authorized to address points of error that do not fall within

. . . Rule [ 25.2(2) ] .” Woods , 108

S.W.3d at 316.

In its certificate of right to appeal, the trial court gave appellant permission to appeal “as

to t he issue of whether or not the plea was voluntary.” This is not the issue that appellant has

briefed. Therefore, we lack the authority to address the issues that appellant did brief. Rule

25.2(2); Woods , 108 S.W.3d at 315

- 16. Appellant’s issues are dis missed.

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

PER CURIAM

January 6, 2011

Do not publish. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 47.2(b).

Panel consists of: Wright, C.J.,
McCall, J., and Strange, J.
Exhibit 35.1

Servicer Compliance Statement of AmeriCredit Financial Services, Inc.

This Annual Statement as to Compliance is delivered to you pursuant to Section 4.10 (a) of the Sale and Servicing Agreement dated as of August 5,
2015 (the Agreement) and Item 1123 of Regulation AB, executed in connection with the formation of AmeriCredit Automobile Receivables Trust 2015-3 (the Trust), the issuance of the Notes
by the Trust and the closing of the transactions and the execution and delivery of the various documents by AmeriCredit Financial Services, Inc. (the Servicer) and AFS SenSub Corp. in connection therewith. The capitalized terms used
herein shall have the same meanings as in the Agreement.

The undersigned certifies that I am the Executive Vice President, Corporate
Controller and Chief Accounting Officer of the Servicer. I further certify as follows:



| | 1. | I have conducted, or caused to be conducted under my supervision, a review of the Servicer during the preceding period from January 1, 2017 through December 31, 2017, and its performance under the Agreement.
| | -- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | 2. | To the best of my knowledge, following such review, the Servicer has fulfilled all its obligations under the Agreement throughout such period, and, to the best of my knowledge, there has been no default in the
fulfillment of any such obligation.
| | -- | -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

AmeriCredit Financial Services, Inc.



|    |  |                                         |  |  |  |                      
|--- |  | --------------------------------------- |  |  |  | ---------------------
|By: |  | /s/ Connie Coffey                       |  |  |  | Dated: March 15, 2018
|    |  | Connie Coffey                           |  |  |  |                      
|    |  | Executive Vice President, Corporate     |  |  |  |                      
|    |  | Controller and Chief Accounting Officer |  |  |  |